

**British, Chinese, and Tibetan Representations of the Mission to
Tibet of 1904**



**Thesis Submitted for Degree of Doctor of Philosophy in
Tibetan and Himalayan Studies**

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Abstract

British, Chinese, and Tibetan Representations of the Mission to Tibet of 1904

This thesis presents and analyses Chinese, Tibetan, and British sources relating to the British Mission to Tibet of 1904. It balances accounts provided by the British officers and men with modern Chinese sources. It analyses both polarised sides of the history, whilst remaining critical of all sources.

British historical accounts analysed in chapter one are balanced with Chinese narratives that present the Mission as an invasion of the Motherland and its unity. Chapter two examines the role of propaganda in modern China, and how different media are used to guide the Tibetan and Chinese populations' understanding of their history and nation.

Chapters three and four provide an original translation of *Bod kyi rig gnas lo rgyus dpyad gzhi'i rgyu cha bdams bsgrigs*, a textbook written from a Chinese nationalistic perspective. The introductory chapter providing the Chinese narrative of the build-up to the Mission is studied in chapter three, and chapter four analyses the bloody advance into Tibet.

The translation and analysis in chapter five of the letters of the Dalai Lama to the King of Nepal, the Tongsa Pönlop, and the Chögyal of Sikkim place the Mission in pan-Himalayan context, and show how the Tibetan Government sought to counter the Mission. It is the first study to provide a historical Tibetan perspective of events.

Chapter six analyses the divisive issue of looting during the Mission. It examines the psychology of those who looted Tibet, and the role the items taken play in shaping the image of Tibet in the West. Modern Chinese propaganda sources from the new media are analysed in chapter seven, and demonstrate how they have been used to compliment and propagate the established narrative. The conclusions analyse the impact of the Mission, and the lessons that may be learnt for those that play the 'New Great Game.'

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"After all," said the Duchess vaguely, "there are certain things you can't get away from: Right and wrong, good conduct and moral rectitude, have certain well-defined limits."

"So, for the matter of that," replied Reginald, "has the Russian Empire. The trouble is that the limits are not always in the same place."

MUNRO, HECTOR HUGH. (SAKI). 1904. *Reginald*. London: The Bodley Head. p. 85.

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Becky, the pain now is part of the happiness then; thank you for your love and support.

And those that I hold dearest: Thank you for making it possible, but more importantly, worthwhile.

"Writers may be divided into two classes- those who have nothing to say and say it extraordinarily well, and those who have something to say and say it extraordinarily ill. There may be a third class - those who have nothing to say and say it very badly. And my readers may conclude that I belong to this class."

YOUNGHUSBAND, FRANCIS. 1927. *The Coming Country*. London: John Murray. p. 4.

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Abbreviations

ADC: *Aide De Camp*.
BBC: British Broadcasting Corporation.
BL: British Library.
Bod. Lib.: Bodleian Library, University of Oxford.
CA: California.
CCP: Chinese Communist Party, also Communist Party of China (CPC).
CCTV: Chinese Central Television.
CIE: Companion of the Order of the Indian Empire.
CITC: The China Tibet Information Center.
CNTV: China Network Television.
CPD: The Communist Party of China's Central Propaganda Department.
CPJ: Committee to Protect Journalists.
CSI: Companion of the Order of the Star of India.
CT: Connecticut.
CVO: Commander of the Royal Victorian Order.
DC: District of Columbia.
DSC: Distinguished Service Cross.
DSO: Distinguished Service Order.
GDP: Gross Domestic Product.
GMIE: Grand Master of the Order of the Indian Empire.
GMSI: Grand Master of the Order of the Star of India.
HMSO: His Majesty's Stationery Office.
ICS: Indian Civil Service.
IDP: International Dunhuang Project.
IFJ: International Federation of Journalists.
IL: Illinois.
IMS: Indian Medical Service.
IP: Internet Protocol.
KA: Kentucky.
KCIE: Knight Commander of the Order of the Indian Empire.
MA: Massachusetts.
MD: Maryland.
NAI: National Archives of India.
NAM: National Army Museum, London.
NATO: North Atlantic Treaty Organisation.
NC: North Carolina.
NGO: Non-Governmental Organisation.
NJ: New Jersey.
NWFP: North West Frontier Province.
NY: New York State.
OUP: Oxford University Press.

PC: Privy Council.
PRC: People's Republic of China. *Zhōnghuá Rénmín Gònghéguó*.
Retd.: Retired [from military service.]
RMB: Renminbi. Principle unit is Yuan.
RN: Royal Navy.
Rs: Rupee.
RSF: *Reporters Sans Frontières*. Reporters Without Borders.
TAR: Tibet Autonomous Region.
TCHRD: Tibetan Centre for Human Rights and Democracy.
UN: United Nations.
UNESCO: United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation.
UNHCHR: United Nations High Commission on Human Rights.
UNICEF: United Nations International Children Education Fund.
USSR: Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.
V&A: Victoria and Albert Museum, London.
WTO: World Trade Organization.

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Conventions

Officially termed 'The Sikkim Tibet Field Force,' the British presence in Tibet in 1904 has been variously known as the 'Younghusband Mission,' the 'British Mission to Tibet,' and the 'Second British Invasion of Tibet.' Younghusband himself refers to events as the 'British Mission,' rather than the 'mission.' For simplicity I adopt his convention, but attach no ulterior significance to this choice.

Spellings used here are those employed by the main agents in the relevant chapters. For example, in chapters one and six that deal mainly with British historical accounts, 'Peking' is used, and in chapters two and seven, where the main focus is modern Chinese sources, Beijing is used. Likewise I refer to the Gurkha Regiments that served with Younghusband in 1904; however modern conventional spellings include Gorkha, and Ghurka. The only exception being the term 'Panchen' Lama is used throughout rather than the term 'Tashi Lama' which was often preferred by the officers of the Mission.

In the case of Tibetan translations and terms, I have used the Wylie system of transliteration,¹ and all quoted translations are given in Wylie format in the endnotes. Historical transliterations found in some British accounts in chapters one and six are given in the original system devised by O'Connor in 1903 for the Government of India, but only if the original source used his system. All examples of this are indicated as such.

Likewise in the case of Chinese transliterations; for modern Chinese sources I follow the Pinyin system devised by a committee of the Chinese Government in 1958. However for historical Chinese sources, and especially those quoted in the original by British Officers accompanying the Mission, the contemporary Wade-Giles system is used. These are again indicated as such.

¹ WYLIE, TURRELL. 1959. A Standard System of Tibetan Transcription. *Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies*, p. 261-267.

The term 'Raj' is used to represent not only the British Indian Empire, and His Majesty's Government of India, but also its various supporting structures, administrative, social, and ideological. The use of the term 'Tibet' follows the convention laid by spellings; In chapters one and six it refers to the polity ruled by the Dalai Lama in 1904, and in all other chapters to the region now designated the Tibetan Autonomous Region of the People's Republic of China.

Officers ranks, both British and Tibetan, are given at the time of service, not their final rank. A full list of British players, with a short biography is given in Appendix one. Appendix two provides the full Tibetan transliteration, and Romanised format for personal names and ranks of the main Tibetan and Chinese players.

Proper names and terms such as 'Dalai Lama,' 'Dzong,' 'Dzongpön,' 'thanka,' and 'Kashag' which are commonly used in English, have not been italicised. Place names are given in the Romanised form and are not italicised. A full gazetteer of place names is provided in Appendix three. This also provides Tibetan transliteration in brackets and also the alternative spellings for familiar place names used in all sources. Tibetan place names are divided into equal units of two syllables, with the exception of Trashilhunpo.

Introduction

All academic writing on Tibet tends to be emphatically polarised; one either accepts the official position of the Chinese Government and their 'pro-China' supporters, or one accepts the Tibetan view, predominantly produced in exile, and vehemently anti-Chinese. Despite this dichotomy, both sides adhere to three general principles; firstly that their views are mutually incompatible, secondly that they have full conviction in their beliefs, and thirdly that history is not only central to their argument, but that it also validates their claims. Both sides are so thoroughly convinced of the absolute truthfulness of their paradigms that they cannot imagine that somebody might genuinely hold opposing views. Each therefore accuse their opponents of deliberately lying and covering up the 'facts' and the 'truth.'²

Chinese sources begin with the historical notion that China, as the 'Middle Kingdom,'³ is at the centre of the civilised world, and her Emperors were mandated by heaven to rule her vast Empire. Tibetan sources by contrast are pervaded by the supreme importance accorded to the Buddhist religion, and emphasise its diffusion and glorification. Both sides are guilty not only of bias and distortion of fact, but also of inventing events and history that accentuate their claims.

The ruling Chinese Communist Party has established its official positions on Tibet in several 'white papers' issued by the Information Office of the State Council.⁴ According to the official narrative China, the 'Motherland,' comprises the Han and

² POWERS, JOHN. 2004. *History as Propaganda. Tibetan Exiles versus the People's Republic of China*. Oxford: Oxford University Press. p. xi.

³ *Zhōngguó*: Motherland.

⁴ THE STATE COUNCIL OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA. 1992. *Tibet - Ownership and Human Rights Situation*.

THE STATE COUNCIL OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA. 2008. *Protection and Development of Tibetan Culture*. Beijing.

THE STATE COUNCIL OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA. 2001. *Tibet's March Toward Modernisation*.

THE STATE COUNCIL OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA. 2004. *Regional Ethnic Autonomy in Tibet*.

All documents are available on the website of the Embassy of the PRC to the UK. <http://www.chinese-embassy.org.uk/eng> and see also links to the 'About China' section, <http://english.gov.cn/about.htm> Accessed 3rd March 2009.

fifty-six minority peoples that have coexisted for time immemorial. Since the beginning of the seventh century China has maintained cultural hegemony over Tibet, and formal sovereignty was instituted in the thirteenth century, leading to direct rule from Peking under the Qing dynasty. By contrast, Tibetan history presents Tibet as culturally and ethnically separate from China, and prior to the Chinese takeover in the 1950s, as an independent and closed unity established under Buddhist doctrines and ruled by consecutive Dalai Lamas from their court in Lhasa. The XIVth Dalai Lama was forced into exile in India in 1959, and established his Government in Exile in Dharamsala, Himachal Pradesh.⁵ It is not the intention here to examine the accuracy or otherwise of these claims, nor to side with any one of the opposing positions, merely to analyse narratives and information presented by both regarding the British Mission to Tibet in 1904.

Western narratives are naturally also biased. Academics and authors from the West may present facts and analyse data, but all make assessments of the evidence and attempt to persuade their readership of the validity of their opinions. Many are openly straightforward about their inclinations, and their rhetoric is as fervent and dogmatic as any that comes from China or Tibet, but most present their works as impartial opinion, based on research. A further layer of complexity obscures Western historical accounts, often written in partisan language and carrying all the hallmarks of the Imperial agenda and beliefs, and finally all sources have to be examined through the prism of modern historical revisionist theory to give an accurate appraisal of their content.

This thesis is therefore an analysis of a triad of narratives and accounts regarding the British Mission to Tibet; historical Tibetan materials translated here for the first time, contemporary British accounts and modern Western interpretations, and diverse modern Chinese sources. Each has their own prejudice, style, and rationale; however when combined and examined fully they provide a unique insight into the

⁵ TIBETAN GOVERNMENT IN EXILE. 1993. *Tibet - Proving Truth From Facts*. This is The Tibetan Government in Exile's response to the Chinese official paper *Tibet - Ownership and Human Rights Situation*. <http://www.tibet.net/en/index.php> Accessed 3rd March 2009.

Tibetan response to the British Mission, and how the event has since been used as propaganda by the Chinese authorities.

Chapter one attempts to establish a balanced account of the Mission utilising historical British sources and modern interpretations from both the West and China. I examine the rationale behind the accounts produced by the officers and men who served with the Mission and set them within their historical background and conventions. These accounts are matched by modern Chinese interpretations that portray the Mission entirely differently, and discuss the construction of narratives in history. Chapter two shows how propaganda has been used to influence opinions in China and beyond with regard to history generally, and more specifically how events in 1904 have been used to construct perceptions of Tibet and its relations with China. Chapters three and four present translations from *Bod kyi rig gnas lo rgyus dpyad gzhi'i rgyu cha bdams bsgrigs* (Complied and Selected Materials for the Investigation and Research into the History and Culture of Tibet.) This commentary and compilation of letters and documents records Tibetan communications regarding the build up to and main events of the Mission. It is a source of much propaganda, but also the most reliable resource available in attempting to establish a Tibetan account of the Mission. Chapter five presents letters from this volume written by the XIIIth Dalai Lama to the rulers of Bhutan and Nepal, as well as communications between his government and military officials. Careful analysis of these letters sheds light on how the Tibetans sought to counter the British Mission, both diplomatically and militarily. Chapter six analyses the controversial topic of the looting that took place during the Mission, and uses new sources to establish what was taken, where the items are now, and what role they have to play in constructing narratives and histories today. The final chapter, seven, examines Chinese 'new media' presentations of the Mission from film, television, print, the Internet, and museums, before conclusions that observe the effects of the Mission, and the long term consequences in both Tibet, China, and the West on the construction of identity, narrative, history, and the self.

The introduction below provides a brief overview of the structure of the Governments in India and Tibet at the time of the Mission, the background and build-up to the Mission, and briefly introduces some of the key players involved.

The British Government in London and Calcutta

The Indian Mutiny⁶ of 1857 led the British Government to dissolve the East India Company and reorganise the army, the financial system, and the administration of India.⁷ India was thereafter directly governed as a Crown Colony with the Government in London appointing Viceroys to rule on behalf of the Monarch. The 1858 'Act for the Better Government of India' made changes in the governance of India at three levels: In the Imperial Government in London, in the Central Indian Government in Calcutta,⁸ and in the provincial governments in the presidencies. The Viceroys appointed their own Executive Council to assist with the monumental task of ruling the conglomeration of native and princely states, presidencies and provinces, protectorates and dependencies; however they remained answerable to the Secretary of State for India and his Council of India in London. The Act provided a system of 'double government' in which the Council served both as a check on unrestrained and ill-conceived imperial policy-making, and as a body of knowledge and expertise on India.⁹ However, this system of councils also created a slow and deliberate government that was laborious in its reaction to events, and required constant communication between the Viceroy and the Secretary of State. This situation suited the more pedestrian of Viceroys, but thwarted those of more ambition and individuality, and George Nathaniel Curzon abounded with ambition and individuality.

⁶ This controversial event is recorded in different narratives as India's First War of Independence, the Great Rebellion, the Indian Mutiny, the Revolt of 1857, the Uprising of 1857, the Sepoy Rebellion or the Sepoy Mutiny.

⁷ BAYLY, CHRISTOPHER. 1990. *Indian Society and the Making of the British Empire*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. pp. 194-7.

⁸ The Government of India was moved to New Delhi in 1911.

⁹ MOORE, ROBIN. 2001. 'Imperial India, 1858-1914.' PORTER, ANDREW. (Ed.) 2001. *Oxford History of the British Empire: The Nineteenth Century*. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 424-426.

Lord Curzon of Kedleston became Viceroy in 1898. His term in office became known as the 'high noon' of British Imperial rule in India;¹⁰ the zenith being the splendour of the Imperial Durbar he arranged to celebrate the coronation of King Edward VII and Queen Alexandra as Emperor and Empress of India. An Eton and Oxford educated high Tory, Curzon was appointed Secretary of State for India in 1891, but lost his office when the Earl of Rosebery formed a Liberal Government in 1894. After the election the following year the Conservative Party regained power and Curzon was rewarded with the post of Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs. Three years later the Prime Minister, The Marquis of Salisbury, granted him the title Baron Curzon of Kedleston, and appointed him Viceroy of India.

His style was formal and stiff. As a speaker he was brilliant and eloquent, but also presumptuous and rather self-assured. Throughout his life he maintained an interest in travel¹¹ despite a chronic spinal injury, incurred while riding as a teenager, that left him with insomnia and required him to wear a metal corset that only added to his aura of stiffness and arrogance. Nayana Goradia aptly described him as the "last of the British Moghuls."¹²

Curzon was a firm believer in a forward strategy, a 'hawk' of today's parlance, and while he viewed all European powers as potential threats, he believed Russia to be the most likely challenger to British supremacy in the Asiatic region. He was well aware of the geopolitical importance of Tibet, caught between the great empires of China, India, and Russia, and unlike his superiors in London, and his predecessors in Delhi, he also believed that it was pointless trying to negotiate with Tibet through China. His policy with regard to Tibet was emphatically not one of occupation, but to establish a 'Buffer Zone' friendly to British India. In the geopolitical thinking of the time, the Imperial frontier had to continually expand in order to remain stable. This theory was aptly summarised by General Sir John

¹⁰ EDUARDES, MICHAEL. 1965. *High Noon of Empire: India Under Curzon*. London: Eyre & Spottiswoode.

¹¹ He was awarded the gold medal of the Royal Geographical Society for his exploration of the source of the Amu Darya.

¹² GORADIA, NAYANA. 1997. *Curzon: The Last of the British Moghuls*. New Delhi: Oxford University Press.

Jacobs, who on the Sind frontier, stated that "to enable this thin red line to retain its present position ... it is absolutely necessary to occupy posts in advance of it."¹³ However if this 'thin red line' it were to abut a hostile power war would become inevitable, thus the idea of buffer states gained favour in order to hold enemies apart by remaining outside the direct control of the opposing powers. Curzon himself insisted in 1901 that "Tibet... must become a buffer between ourselves and Russia,"¹⁴ and Landon recorded that "We have no wish to interfere with Tibet so long as Tibet does not imperil our tranquillity in Bengal. While we ourselves seek no exclusive rights in that country, we have at the same time no intention of allowing any other power to secure them."¹⁵ Curzon therefore wanted to ensure that Tibet accepted British guidance in matters of defence and foreign policy, but realised that annexing Tibet would be militarily, financially, and politically difficult for British India. Some contemporary critics of the Mission did voice their concerns that diplomatic talk of buffer zones masked a more sinister desire to annex Tibet,¹⁶ however for his part the leader of the Mission evidently believed the British sought to establish influence rather than possession.¹⁷

¹³ Quoted in MCKAY, ALEX. 1997. *Tibet and The British Raj: The Frontier Carde 1904-1947*. London: Curzon Press. p. 13.

¹⁴ LAMB, ALASTAIR. 1959. Some notes on the Russian intrigue in Tibet. *Journal of the Royal Central Asian Society*. No. 46. p. 52. Indeed Curzon continued to wax lyrical on the subject of buffer zones and frontiers for decades to come. In the 1906 Romanes Lectures he gave as the Chancellor of the University of Oxford he spoke at length evaluating their uses and of his fascination with boundaries, the romance of frontiers, the literature they inspired, and the kind of 'manhood' fostered by them - even the effect on national character in being engaged in expansionist frontier struggles. See CURZON, GEORGE. 1908. *Frontiers. Romanes Lectures*. Oxford: Clarendon Press. pp. 55-7.

It has also been recently postulated that Tibet should become a demilitarized Buffer Zone between China and India, especially in the event of a nuclear standoff. See SINGH, GUNJAN. 2008. Can Tibet Play the Role of a Buffer State Again? *The Online Journal of Peace and Conflict Resolution*. No. 8. Vol. 1. pp. 25-31.

¹⁵ LANDON, PERCEVAL. 1905. *Lhasa: An account of the country and people of Central Tibet and the progress of the mission sent there by the English Government in the year 1903-4*. London: Hurst & Blackett. Vol. 1. p. 25.

¹⁶ SCOTT, ALEXANDER. 1905. *The Truth About Tibet*. London: Simpkin Ltd.

¹⁷ He wrote to his wife from the Dzalep La that with a British Agent in Lhasa "we could run the whole show." BL: MSS EUR. F 197 177.

When the opportunity (Curzon would have called it a need) arose to send a representative for negotiations with the Tibetans, the Viceroy turned instinctively to the young army Captain who had accompanied him on his tour of Chitral in 1894: Francis Younghusband.



Figure 1: Younghusband, left, and Curzon, right, both photographed in 1904.

Younghusband was a household name by the time Curzon selected him as his Tibet Commissioner. He was every boy's hero; a world record holder for the 100 yard dash, an explorer who found new passes to China, Gold Medal Holder and later President of the Royal Geographic Society, an Everest mountaineer, and later in life the founder of the World Congress of Faiths. Patrick French describes him "the last great imperial adventurer."¹⁸

Born in Murree in the Punjab in 1863, Younghusband was sent to England to receive his education at Clifton College in Bristol before attending the Royal Military Academy at Sandhurst, from where he graduated in 1882 to be

¹⁸ FRENCH, PATRICK. 1995. *Younghusband: The Last Great Imperial Adventurer*. London: Flamingo.

commissioned as a subaltern in the 1st King's Dragoon Guards. During leave from his regiment he travelled extensively in Asia, crossing the Gobi Desert and discovering a new pass from Kashgar to India, before being promoted and sent to Hunza to put pressure on the truculent local Mir.

Nearly all those who crossed his trailblazing path lauded Younghusband as a hero; however like his political mentor, he too could be arrogant, obsessive, and argumentative, especially with those that he believed undermined his authority. Among his dissenters was Brigadier-General Macdonald, the man tasked with directing the military and logistical arms of the 1904 Mission. However the view shared by nearly all the British officers that took part in the Tibet Mission is best presented by Captain Frederick O'Connor, his aide and interpreter. For him Younghusband was,

... one of the few specimens of the typical "strong silent man" whom I have ever met. Very quiet, very laconic . . . at once a philosopher and a man of action . . . I never once saw him for a moment even ruffled, far less discomposed or perturbed, by any circumstance or crisis which we had to encounter. An imperturbable exterior covered a strong and steadfast character and a most equable temperament.¹⁹

Younghusband's Mission of 1904 was also one of the first major overseas campaigns which British journalists, or 'following correspondents' as they were then known, were permitted to accompany. The installation of a telegraph line as far as Gyantse allowed them to keep their readers in Britain fully abreast of the latest developments in Tibet, and as a result the events that followed were discussed everywhere, from the back streets of London to Buckingham Palace. Perceval Landon of *The Times*, Henry Newman of the news agency *Reuters*, and Edmund Candler of *The Daily Mail* published gripping accounts of the Mission as it battled both the elements and the Tibetan Army, that fuelled the public imagination and appetite for both the real and an 'imagined' Tibet.²⁰

¹⁹ O'CONNOR, SIR FREDERICK. 1931. *On the Frontier and Beyond*. London: John Murray. p. 33.

²⁰ WILKINSON, GLENN. 1998. The Blessings of War: The Depiction of Military Force in Edwardian Newspapers. *Journal of Contemporary History*. Vol. 33. No. 1. pp. 97-115.

The Tibetan Government

Tibet's political governance at the time was a unique balance of secular and spiritual interests integrated into a complex bureaucracy.²¹ While the Dalai Lama was the secular and spiritual leader of Tibet and held final authority on all matters, he was advised by a combination of monks and lay officials drawn from a hierarchical pool of aristocratic families.

Goldstein notes five characteristics of Tibet's bureaucracy:

1. In the hierarchy of offices and positions each held a reasonably clear delimited sphere of activity.
2. Recruitment was based on qualifications, which were measured by a limited system of examinations of handwriting and appearance.
3. The system of internal promotions was theoretically based on ability.
4. Written records were used extensively.
5. Disciplinary action was taken if responsibilities were not fulfilled or rules disobeyed.²²

The process of reincarnation leads to long intervals between the majorities of one Dalai Lama and the next. These periods, when the Head of State is either being sought or is still in infancy, have traditionally been times of political instability and vulnerability when a Regent ruled Tibet. The exact nature of regency varied during those of the twentieth century when regents were reincarnate lamas selected to rule by the National Assembly. Their selected status, rather than divine appointment and inheritance, meant that regents on the whole were less able or willing to rule in the same way a Dalai Lama could. Many also had divided loyalties and patronage, maintaining strong and divisive links with their individual monasteries.

²¹ TRAVERS, ALICE. 2009. Risk and social mobility: A study of the demotion and dismissal cases in the careers of the *dGa' ldan pho brang* officials from 1885 to 1952. In, DOTSON, BRANDON, MYATT, TIM, NORBU GURUNG, KALSANG, HALKIAS, GEORGIOS. 2009. *Contemporary visions in Tibetan Studies: Proceedings of the First International Seminar of Young Tibetologists*. Chicago, IL: Serindia Publications.

²² GOLDSTEIN, MELVYN. 1989. *History of Modern Tibet: The Demise of the Lamaist State*. Berkeley, CA: The University of California Press. p. 10.

After the Dalai Lama or Regent the most senior position in the Ganden Phodrang was that of *Blon chen*, a post usually comparable with that of Prime Minister. The number of *Blon chen* varied at different times, for example while in exile in Mongolia the XIIIth Dalai Lama appointed three to rule jointly in his absence; however it was usual that one senior official be appointed to the role.

The structure of the various departments of the Ganden Phodrang, the official name for the Tibetan Government, depended on seniority and importance. There were usually a set number and ratio of monastic and lay officials, who held positions and offices that correlated across all departments in a graduated system of ranks and privilege.²³ The political, military, economic, judicial, foreign, financial, and educational departments all had two representatives, one temporal and one monastic, whereas the Ministry of Finance, the *rTsis khang*, had three secular appointments. Government ranks were either numerical or bore titles which denoted the holder's precedence in ceremonies, social order, and attire. While political power was naturally concentrated at the upper end of the ranking system it was not always the case that the higher ranked individual carried more political authority. Promotion was theoretically based on ability and examination; however the system was open to abuse, especially when most positions had no set terms of office and pay. Petech estimates that there were 175 ecclesiastical offices in Tibet during the period covered in this study.²⁴

The highest decision making body was the Kashag (*bKa' shag*),²⁵ or cabinet, comprising four Kalöns (*bKa' blon*),²⁶ usually three lay members and a monk official nominally respected as the senior member. All decisions were based on

²³ The ranking system was based on a Chinese model, but only five of the nine ranks were in normal use, those from the third to the seventh inclusive. Petech notes, "Only the Dalai Lama and Panchen Lama were outside and above official rank. Only the ministers and holders of Chinese titles (Kung, Taiji, Jasak) were entitled to the third rank. Most of the higher officials belonged to the fourth, and the title *rim-bzhi* (fourth rank) was a sort of general style for most of the upper bureaucracy." PETECH, LUCIANO. 1973. *Aristocracy and Government in Tibet. 1728-1959*. Rome: Istituto Italiano Per Il Medio Ed Estremo Oriente. p. 8.

²⁴ PETECH, LUCIANO. 1973. p. 7.

²⁵ The name derives from the 'disputes' offices, near the Jokhang in Lhasa.

²⁶ More fully, *bka'i gung blon*.

consensus of these Kalöns before their recommendations were passed on to the Dalai Lama for final approval. The Kashag had a considerable civil service at its disposal to assist with clerical work and who were also responsible for all government written records. The Kashag was the highest authority on all secular matters, and was seen as the link between the Dalai Lama and the rest of the government; it could only recommend advice to the Dalai Lama, but by deciding what or who to recommend carried much weight, especially as they held all government written records.

The highest religious authority below the Dalai Lama was the *sPyi khyab mkhan po*, (the closest translation of this office would be the Lord Chamberlain) and the *Yig tshang* who had control over all monastic officials, appointments, and religious affairs. Created at the time of the Gurkha Wars of 1788-92, the *sPyi khyab mkhan po* was in charge of the Dalai Lama's entire staff and acted as a liaison between the *Yig tshang* and the Kashag. Goldstein notes how "in issues of national importance, he was normally invited by the Kashag to meet jointly with them before a recommendation to the ruler was made."²⁷

The image originally located here has been removed from this electronic version of the thesis for copyright reasons. [Figure 2: BL 1083/14 Bailey Collection: Tibet 1903-4 F.M.B. [Volume] III Image 368. "The Ta [sic] Lama and the Tunyik Chempo [sic] 30.7.04. "The Image is identical to RSAA: BAI/2/23.]

²⁷ GOLDSTEIN, MELVYN. 1989. p. 16.

The *Yig tshang* functioned in the same way as the Kashag, but its remit covered religious affairs, monasteries, and finances for all monasteries excepting the Three Seats²⁸ who were directly responsible to the Dalai Lama. It comprised four monk officials known as *Drung yig chen mo*, the most senior of whom was its chairman. This chairman usually held the half-Chinese title of *Tā* (lit. 'great') *Lama*. The *Yig tshang* presented candidate lists for all of the Ganden Phodrang's religious appointments to the *sPyi khyab mkhan po*, who in turn passed them on to the Kashag, and thence to the Dalai Lama. The *Yig tshang* also chaired half of the meetings of the National Assembly.

The *rTsis khang*, or Finance Office, was in charge of accounting and tax revenue for the Ganden Phodrang, and being the reserve of the aristocracy was the most important secular authority under that of the Kashag. Similar to the *Yig tshang* in structure, it was led by four senior lay officials known as *rTsis dpon* who were the second half of the committee that chaired the National Assembly. The *rTsis dpon* were assisted by a battery of accountants who dealt with the affairs of the three treasuries, the national, emergency and personal treasury of the Dalai Lama. The office also dealt with the financial administration of the army through two paymasters, one lay and one ecclesiastical.

The National Assembly or *Tshogs 'du* was established in the 1860s. It included the heads of major government departments as well as representatives from the larger monasteries, the army, and the aristocracy. All decisions were made by consensus and thus it became a popular format for government with the general population; its decrees appointing Regents or declaring war. The National Assembly met in three different formats when called upon by either the Kashag, Regent, or Dalai Lama.

²⁸ Three Seats: The monasteries of Ganden (*dGa' ldan rnam rgyal gling*), Sera (*Se ra*), and Drepung (*'Bras spungs*).

The smallest format entailed a standing committee of the four *rTsis dpon* of the *rTsis khang* office and the four *Drung yig chen mo* of the *Yig tshang* office. It was used by the Kashag to garner extra opinion without the need of summoning the full *Tshogs 'du*. An Abbreviated National Assembly, or *Tshogs 'du hrag 'du* comprised about fifty members selected from various government departments, monasteries and the standing committee. It drafted resolution in the same way as the Full National Assembly, without the need for Lhasa's bureaucracy to be brought to a halt while important decisions were debated. When the Full National Assembly usually met for the first day of debate, the *Tshogs 'du hrag 'du* usually replaced it for subsequent days of deliberation.

Goldstein notes that the Full National Assembly or *Tshogs 'du rgyas rdzoms* comprised of:

- All the Abbots and ex-Abbots of the three major Gelugpa monasteries, Ganden, Sera, and Drepung.
- The *Trung tsigye* or standing committee of the *Tshogs 'du*.
- All the lay and monk officials present in Lhasa at the time.
- Representatives from a number of incarnations and monasteries such as Reting, Kundeling, Tshomöling, Tshechöling, Ditru, Tashilhunpo, the Ganden Tripa, and Sakya Rimpoche.
- The *Ru dpon* and *brGya dpon* of the Army stationed in Lhasa. (See below.)
- Approximately twelve minor officials, *Tsho pa*, responsible for collecting house taxes and arranging corvee labour in Lhasa.
- About thirty clerks or *Drung tog*.²⁹

The *Tshogs 'du gyen tsoms* was convened at the request of the Kashag and presided over by the standing committee, one of whom nominally chaired the meetings. No votes were cast, but policy was decided upon when one of the chairmen adequately summed up the feeling of the members present. Resolutions were drafted and sent to the Kashag who presented them to the Dalai Lama who could then submit alterations to the *Tshogs 'du* before four seals bound the resolution, those of the Ganden Phodrang officials, and one for each of the Three Seats. The *Tshogs 'du* in

²⁹ GOLDSTEIN, MELVYN. 1989. p. 20.

its various forms therefore was not an elected or legislative chamber; it was a consultative group designed to allow for debate and opinion to be sought on issues of national importance.

Outside the capital there was loose hegemonic control; During the time of the XIIIth Dalai Lama, Tibet was divided into 52 dzongs (*rdzong*), or districts, most of which were administrated by two officials known as Dzungpön (*rDzung dpon*), of whom, in most important districts, one was usually a layman and the other a monk.³⁰ These Dzungpöns exercised considerable power, as although they were nominally under the command of a Provincial Governor, they were directly responsible only to the Kashag. As a rule they were guided by general orders from Lhasa and left to interpret and action them as they saw fit; micromanagement was not in Lhasa's interests, perhaps advisedly so; as Richardson points out "the Tibetan people have never acquiesced with spineless timidity in everything that is done by their government."³¹

Beyond Lhasa there was moreover no graded judiciary. Dzungpöns acted as judges in all civil and criminal cases. In Lhasa there were two City magistrates or *Mi dpon*, who had jurisdiction from twenty-six miles up the Kyichu (*sKyid chu*) valley and nineteen down it.³² The Kashag was advised by two *Ser pan*, or legal advisors who sat in court of appeal for serious legal cases brought to Lhasa, and were also responsible for the care of the Jokhang (*Jo khang*).

In terms of military organisation, at the time of the 1904 Mission, Tibet had only a diminutive standing army. Kalön usually took command of various units of local militia in times of need, and it was not until 1913 and the reforms of the XIIIth Dalai lama that a permanent post of Commander-in-Chief was created. The highest officers of the army were the four provincial Generals, *mDa' dpon*, and twelve

³⁰ RICHARDSON, HUGH. 1962. *Tibet and its History*. Oxford: Oxford University Press. p. 22.

³¹ RICHARDSON, HUGH. 1962. p. 25.

³² PETECH, LUCIANO. 1973. p. 11.

Majors, *Ru dpon*.³³ There were an additional twenty-four centurions, *brGya dpon*, or captains, and 120 *IDing dpon*, or lieutenants. Shan notes that at the time the stipulated number of the Tibetan army was 3,320 men.

It consisted of six *mDa' dpon* (regiment; regimental commander was also called Dapon), each *mDa' dpon* in charge of 500 men. Each *mDa' dpon* also had two officers with the rank *Ru dpon* under him, and each *Ru dpon* had two officers of the each *brGya dpon* under him, each *brGya dpon* had five officers with the rank of *IDing dpon* under him, and each *IDing dpon* was in charge of twenty-five men.³⁴

He also claims that "the Dapons [*mDa' dpon*] were under the direct control of the Resident Minister," or Chinese Amban,³⁵ despite these Manchu officials being ordered back to China in 1913 by the Dalai Lama.

The unifying force in Tibet at the time was manifestly its religion. While the Ganden Phodrang in Lhasa held only loose hegemony over the country owing to its size and sparse population, Buddhism was a unifying force in Tibetan society. Despite the numerous sects and divisions within Tibetan Buddhism, the supremacy and authority of the Dalai Lama was paramount in this period. The XIIIth Dalai Lama, Thub bstan rgya mtsho, was recognised in 1878 and was the first Dalai Lama not only to reach his majority, but to rule effectively for any period of time since the Great Vth Dalai Lama died in 1682.³⁶ Despite becoming a pawn in the Great Game he exercised considerable power in Tibet, and has been regarded as a reformer and moderniser. He survived assassination attempts early in his life, and despite being only eleven at the time of the Anglo Tibetan war of 1888 he soon developed a

³³ Petech translates *Ru dpon* as 'Wing Commander.' Either way, a *Ru dpon* commanded about 250 troops.

³⁴ ZHENG, SHAN. 2001. *A History of Development of Tibet*. Beijing: Foreign Languages Press. p. 282.

³⁵ 'Amban' is Manchu translating literally as 'High Official,' 昂邦 (*Bāngbàn*). The Qing Emperor appointed the Amban in Lhasa, who represented Qing authority over Tibet, and commanded over the 2,000 troops stationed in Lhasa. The chief Amban was aided with assistant Amban (*Bāngbàn Dàchén*, 幫辦大臣) and both of them reported to the Qing Court of Colonial Affairs. See, KOLMAŠ, JOSEF. 1994. *The Ambans and Assistant Ambans of Tibet, Archiv Orientální. Supplementa 7*. Prague: The Oriental Institute.

³⁶ Previous Dalai Lamas had often either died in infancy or were murdered in coup attempts. There were attempts on his life in 1899 when Shaol Rimpoche from Nyarong in Eastern Tibet was convicted of attempting to poison him and cause his untimely death through black magic. See MULLIN, GLENN. 1988. *The Path of the Bodhisattva Warrior*. Ithaca, NY: Snow Lion Publications. p. 45.

certain distrust of the British. His time in exile in Mongolia, Amdo, and China from 1904-9, and in India between 1910-13, further instilled in him the importance of international relations and of the power of the Western nations in Asia. By working with Sir Charles Bell, British Political Officer in Sikkim, and with the Chögyal of Sikkim directly and personally he bypassed the authority of the Kashag and took personal responsibility for Tibet's foreign relations. He also attempted to wrestle power away from the monastic institutions and form a nascent lay civil service to assist the aristocracy, and even left his *nyen chen* retreat early when matters with the British required his personal attention. Bell describes him as a frank and open-minded individual, fond of animals and plants, and who sought the privacy of his secluded apartments at the Norbu Linka over the hustle of the Potala.³⁷

On returning from India in 1913 the Dalai Lama proclaimed formal independence from China, instituting a standardised postal service, mint, medical facilities, taxation system, system of laws, and national flag. He also facilitated the opening of the first Western style schools in Tibet and sent four promising Tibetan students to be educated at Rugby School in England. He developed the Tibetan Army, and set up a system of leadership along British lines, but ensured that they were protected by mantras and a special detachment of ritual assistants to conduct long life rituals. The role of *Sog po tsen zhabs Ngag dbang blo bzang*, also known as Dorjiejff, is examined in chapter two, but he was only one of a number of well travelled advisors the XIIIth Dalai Lama used for their information and knowledge.

³⁷ BELL, SIR CHARLES. 1947. *Portrait of a Dalai Lama. The Life and Times of the Great Thirteenth*. London: Collins. p. 37.

Chapter One: The Roots of the Mission

Youngusband claims that his 1904 Mission to Tibet was "merely the culmination of a long series of efforts to regularise and humanize [sic]"³⁸ relations between British India and Tibet. Almost every book that has been written on the subject in the intervening century has included a chapter examining the nascent relationship between Tibet and the West, from a diplomatic and military perspective.³⁹ A full analysis is beyond the scope of this thesis, but it is important to examine briefly why the Mission was dispatched across the Himalayas, and contextualise it in the historical sequence of events that culminated in the Treaty of Lhasa.

The roots of the Mission are deep and convoluted, and Anglo-Tibetan relations had followed a complex path by the time Mission was dispatched. Trade opportunities were the paramount concern during the period of the East India Company's hegemony over northern India. When Warren Hastings became Governor of Bengal he decided that Bhutanese raids could no longer be tolerated on the northern borders of his burgeoning dominion.

In 1773 Hastings responded to an appeal for help from the Raja of Cooch Behar, whose territory had been invaded by the Bhutanese, on the condition that Cooch Behar recognise British sovereignty. The Raja agreed, and with the help of British troops, pushed the Bhutanese out of the Duars and back over the border. At the time, Bhutan was under Tibetan suzerainty,⁴⁰ and the Panchen Lama interceded to stop the subjugation of Bhutanese forces by the troops of the East India Company. Tibet's debut into international diplomacy roused interest in Calcutta for the

³⁸ YOUNGHUSBAND, FRANCIS. 1910. *India and Tibet: A History of the Relations which have Subsisted between the two Countries from the time of Warren Hastings to 1910; With a particular account of the Mission to Lhasa of 1904*. London: John Murray. p. viii. Hereafter, *India and Tibet*.

³⁹ For example see: WOODMAN, DOROTHY. 1969. *Himalayan Frontiers*. London: The Cresset Press. MACGREGOR, JOHN. 1970. *Tibet: A Chronicle of Exploration*. London: Routledge & Kegan. WALLER, DEREK. 2004. *The Pundits: British Exploration of Tibet and Central Asia*. Louisville, KY: University Press of Kentucky.

⁴⁰ "Suzerain, *n.* A feudal overlord. In recent use, with reference to international relations, a sovereign or a state having supremacy over another state which possesses its own ruler or government but cannot act as an independent power. *b. attrib. or adj., as suzerain lord, power, state.* Hence suzerainship, suzerainty." OED.

opportunity of trade relations, and in 1774 Hastings sent George Bogle through Bhutan to Trashigang to meet the Panchen Lama for discussions.⁴¹ The first Englishman to reach Lhasa itself was the eccentric Thomas Manning who in 1811 was travelling in China and was allowed to accompany a Chinese army unit to Lhasa after curing some of the troops from illness. He remained in Lhasa for six months and was even able to secure an audience with the young IXth Dalai Lama.⁴²

In 1850, having annexed Sikkim, Britain was again drawn into Tibetan politics when it found itself in control of trade routes between India and Tibet. Both the Kashag and the Chinese Ambans in Lhasa believed it to be in their interests to encourage a policy of isolationism, and therefore ignored all diplomatic advances from India. There was also a belief in British circles that the Manchu Imperial Empire was on the verge of collapse.⁴³ Such an event would release a vast area of the globe into a kind of spatial anarchy, and this led the British to adopt clandestine methods of gathering information about their northern neighbour. Throughout the second half of the nineteenth century, Thomas Montgomerie, the architect of the Great Trigonometric Survey of India, trained Sikkimese and Nepalese merchants to work as undercover surveyors and spies. Known and celebrated as the 'Pundits,' these agents attracted less suspicion than Europeans, and were able to make observations disguised as traders or monks.

The Pundits played their part in the 'Great Game,' the battle of diplomacy, strength and strategy fought between the British and Russian Empires for supremacy in Central Asia during the nineteenth century. The British fought to protect their trade and interests in Central Asia, but especially for the defense of India, the 'jewel in the

⁴¹ Extensive research has been conducted by Kate Teltscher bringing to light the political and personal motives behind George Bogle's 1774 mission to the Court of the Panchen Lama, while Gordon Stuart has sought to compare Bogle's mission with that of Younghusband. TELTSCHER, KATE. 2006. *The High Road to China: George Bogle, the Panchen Lama and the First British Expedition to Tibet*. London: Bloomsbury. STUART, GORDON T. 2009. *Journeys to Empire: Enlightenment, Imperialism, and the British Encounter with Tibet, 1774–1904*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

⁴² MARKHAM, CLEMENTS R. 1876. *Narratives of the Mission of Georges Bogle to Tibet and of the Journey of Thomas Manning to Lhasa*. London: Trubner & Co.

⁴³ LAMB, ALASTAIR. 1960. *Britain and Chinese Central Asia: The Road to Lhasa, 1767 to 1905*. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. p. 207.

crown' of the British Empire. 'Thrusters' of the day feared that the Russians would use Afghanistan, or one of their Asian khanates, to launch an attack on India, and believed that strong 'buffer states' or suzerain states, loyal to the British were key to India's defense. Many believed that there was a Russian hand in the Mutiny of 1857, and in the Anglo-Afghan Wars of 1838 and 1878, and when the Russians began the construction of the Trans-Caspian Railroad in 1879 it was perceived by some as an overtly aggressive expansionist project, enabling the rapid mobilisation of troops and supplies throughout the Silk Road region.⁴⁴ The Crimean war had frustrated Russian aspirations in the Balkans and caused their efforts in Central Asia to be intensified.

Their empire in that region was consolidated in just thirty years: in 1869 Russian troops captured Tashkent and in 1868 a treaty was signed with Bokhara. General Kaufmann entered Khiva at the head of a substantial army in 1873, whilst Khokand was annexed in 1876. The Russian frontiers with Persia and Afghanistan were finally fixed in 1885 and 1895.⁴⁵

The Russian threat was also more subtle than the possibility of an immediate invasion of India. As Lamb explains in his introduction to the 1985 edition of Younghusband's *India and Tibet*,

It was not so much that Russian forces, squadrons of Cossacks, would rush down the passes through the mountain border of north-western India, though there were advocates of this particular scenario; but rather that a few Russian agents, supported by expanding Russian prestige in Asia, would cause trouble for the British on the frontier, in Afghanistan and elsewhere.⁴⁶

Tibet was essentially a backwater for much of this 'tournament of shadows', but intelligence reports that indicated Russian arms and influence in Lhasa began to concern successive Viceroys. The British were also frustrated by their inability to deal directly with Tibet owing to the Byzantine complexity of its status with regard

⁴⁴ CURZON, GEORGE. 1889. *Russia in Central Asia in 1889 & the Anglo-Russian Question*. London: Longmans, Green & Co.

⁴⁵ LAMB, ALASTAIR. 1960. p. 49.

⁴⁶ LAMB, ALASTAIR. 1985. 'Introduction.' YOUNGHUSBAND, FRANCIS. 1910. *India and Tibet*. Oxford: Oxford University Press. p. xii.

to the Manchu Empire; British acceptance of China's role in Anglo-Tibetan affairs began with the signing of the Chefoo Convention of 1876. Under the terms of the agreement, Sir Thomas Wade, the British Minister in Peking, extracted from the Imperial Court the right to send a mission to Tibet either through China or British India. For their part the Manchus would inform their Amban, and would dispatch officers to accompany the mission through Tibet to Lhasa. From this date forward therefore a degree of Manchu involvement in any expedition to Tibet was inevitable.

The Convention was however redundant by the time Colman Macaulay, the Financial Secretary to the Government of The Bengal, was chosen to lead a small commercial and diplomatic mission to Lhasa to promote Indian tea to the Tibetan authorities in 1885. The Kashag refused to sanction such a mission, and it was halted in Darjeeling amidst persistent Manchu claims that the Tibetans would oppose the mission with force. In an aggressive step following the advice of the Nechung Oracle, Chinese fears were confirmed when the Tibetan army occupied disputed areas of Sikkim and set up roadblocks. The argument changed from whether the mission could go to Tibet, to whether the Tibetans had any right to be in Sikkim.

It became clear that the Chinese were unable to offer any assistance in clearing the Tibetans from the British protectorate of Sikkim, and a status quo persisted whereby the British were unwilling to drive the Tibetans out for fear of how their actions would be perceived in Peking. The situation could not be allowed to persist, and the offer of negotiation having been rejected, General Graham turned the Tibetans out of Sikkim, and in 1888 occupied the Chumbi Valley. This situation forced the 1888 Sikkim Convention between China and Great Britain, recognising the British protectorate over Sikkim, and delineating a boundary with Tibet. The Convention also allowed the British to establish a trade mart at Yatung in the Chumbi Valley in 1893, but further entrenched the notion of Manchu authority in Tibet. Nonetheless the Ganden Phodrang had not signed the treaty, and, while not

actually disputing the legality of the trade mart, did all they could to hamper its development.

The Russian threat and the Kashag's policy of obstruction led the newly appointed Viceroy Lord Curzon to write to the Dalai Lama⁴⁷ to seek assurances regarding trade, and the activities of Dorjjeff. Several months later his letter was returned, Tibetan officials having declined to open it.

It had come to Curzon's attention that Dorjjeff, a Buryiat Mongol, had been sent by the Dalai Lama to the Court of the Tsar in 1898 to open diplomatic channels and inquire into a military alliance. As a Buryat born not far from the shores of Lake Baikal, Dorjjeff was closer religiously and culturally to the Dalai Lama's Buddhism than to the Tsar, his nominal sovereign. He had studied in Lhasa from about 1873, and became the young Dalai Lama's tutor and debating partner. After travelling widely in both India and Europe he became one of the XIIIth Dalai Lama's closest advisors, despite many in the Ganden Phodrang remaining sceptical of his modernising and international influence in the Potala. Reports suggested that Tsar Nicolas II initially greeted him with "restraint and distrust,"⁴⁸ but two years later he was welcomed back when he discussed 'pan-Buddhist unity' with the Tsar and his Court. Such discussions were widely reported in the foreign press, and fuelled Curzon's paranoia, especially when it became clear that the Russians were carrying out undercover missions of their own in Tibet. By August 1902 a frantic Sir Ernest Satow, Britain's envoy in Peking, was telegraphing home copies of 'The Secret Agreement between Russia and China over Tibet.' Russian assurances of ignorance were comprehensive and unequivocal, but not accepted in London or Simla. The seizure of Merv in 1884 had set a precedent for the Russians having done exactly

⁴⁷ Curzon attempted to reach the Dalai Lama through the offices of O rgyan rdo rje Ka zi, the Ha Thrunpa (chief of the Ha district, and Governor of Southern Bhutan) Dzungpön of Thimphu and a relative of the Tongsa Pönlop. SINHA, AWADHESH. 2004. *Himalayan Kingdom Bhutan: Tradition, Transition, and Transformation*. New Delhi: Indus Publishing Company. p. 28.

⁴⁸ FLEMING, PETER. 1961. *Bayonets to Lhasa*. London: Rupert Hart-Davis. p. 42. Quoting, NOVY VOSTOK. 1923. *Towards Tibet's Struggle for Independence*.

what they claimed they would never do, and a Russian alliance with, or military presence in, Tibet seemed the only credible intent of the meetings.

When subsequent letters to Lhasa were returned to Curzon in similar fashion, he wrote to Hamilton that, "it is the most extraordinary anachronism of the twentieth century that there should exist within less than three hundred miles of the borders of British India a State and a Government, with whom political relations do not so much as exist, and with whom it is impossible even to exchange a written communication."⁴⁹

Curzon's clamour for action, despite opposition from the Home Government, prompted orders to dispatch a force to Khamba Dzong, just inside the Tibetan border, to negotiate over a catalogue of issues that thinly disguised the real concerns of the Viceroy. Grazing rights violations, imprisoned Sikkimese nationals, destroyed boundary pillars, and stolen yaks formed the pretence for the diplomatic mission to Tibet, but few would have doubted that in going to Tibet, Curzon was playing 'the end game to the Great Game.'⁵⁰

Narratives and Accounts

Accounts of the 1904 Mission to Tibet fall into three main categories; historical accounts and subsequent analysis by British authors, Tibetan sources and narratives, and modern Chinese interpretations. All three have distinct styles, bias, and intentions. This chapter will introduce these conflicting accounts, examine the rationale behind the authors' motives, and highlight their differences. At the same time it will provide a balanced historical narrative of the build up to, and main events of the Mission, as portrayed in all categories of accounts. This is significant not only because it will form a reference for chapters three, four, and five where I examine Tibetan sources relating to the Mission and chapter seven in which new media narratives are presented, but also because for all that has been written

⁴⁹ LAMB, ALASTAIR. 1960. p. 263. Quoting Curzon's private papers.

⁵⁰ HOPKIRK, PETER. 1990. *The Great Game. On Secret Service in High Asia*. Oxford: Oxford University Press. p. 513.

regarding the Mission, no author has presented and analysed all narratives simultaneously.

The accounts analysed below may be termed 'cultural productions,' and along with other form such as novels, paintings, photographs, films, and museums are influential in constructing an image of Tibet not only in the West, but also in Tibet and China. The late nineteenth century witnessed an upsurge in interest in Tibet, and the formation of the entire discipline of Tibetology. Botany, geology, philology, ornithology, and surveying were joined by anthropology, archaeology, and folklore, as the grid of Western science threw itself over the Himalayas and Central Asia.⁵¹ In the West, the universities and noble-minded societies were involved in what Foucault has labelled the 'production' of knowledge,⁵² and in Europe, this growth of interest in Tibet led to a European Tibetophilia.⁵³

By the time the many competing images and accounts of Tibet presented here were written there had emerged what Said has described as "a complex Orient suitable for study in the academy, for display in a museum, for reconstruction in a colonial office, for theoretical illustration in anthropological, biological, linguistic, racial and historical theses about mankind and the universe."⁵⁴ Bishop aptly summarises some of the competing images as "Hedin's heroic landscapes; Younghusband's enthusiastic blend of politics and mysticism; Blavatsky's home of occult masters; Landor's adventure playground, and Rockhill's ethnographic paradise."⁵⁵ All these different images and accounts carry the hallmarks of cultural superiority and Said's Orientalist constructions, and the British and Chinese accounts below equally

⁵¹ TANNER, HENRY. 1891. Our present knowledge of the Himalayas. *Proceedings of the Royal Geographical Society*. Vol. 13. p. 411. Tanner was a Colonel in IMS.

⁵² FOUCAULT, MICHEL. 1980. *Power/Knowledge*. New York, NY: Pantheon Books. p. 4.

⁵³ Kaschewsky gives a useful and well-documented overview of Tibet's representation in the West from ancient Greece to the eighteenth century. See KASCHEWSKY, RUDOLF. The Image of Tibet in the West before the Nineteenth Century. DODIN, THIERRY AND HEINZ RÄTHER (Eds.) 2001. *Imagining Tibet*. Boston, MA: Wisdom Publications. pp. 3-20.

⁵⁴ SAID, EDWARD. 1979. *Orientalism*. New York, NY: Vintage Books. p. 7.

⁵⁵ BISHOP, PETER. 2000. *The Sacred Myth of Shangri-La. Tibet, Travel Writing and the Western Creation of Sacred Landscape*. London: Athlone Press. p. 145.

present Orientalist and essentialising perceptions of an imagined and idealised Tibet.

Studying these accounts and endeavouring to deconstruct their representations of Tibet is vital, since, as Foucault again demonstrates, modern representational practices produce knowledge, and representations establish control through knowledge formation.⁵⁶ This control, its forms and implications, are studied in chapter two.

In his seminal work, Said has insisted that "Orientalism depends for its strategy on flexible positional superiority, which puts the Westerner in a whole series of possible relationships with the Orient, without ever losing him the relative upper hand."⁵⁷ In the case of the accounts analysed here, Said's 'Westerner' could be said to include Chinese historians that present Hans, Manchus, and Tibetans in asymmetrical relationships of domination. Anand's analysis of Western colonial and neo-colonial discourses on Tibet and underlines this asymmetrical power.⁵⁸

However the image of Tibet is a special case that often epitomises the Orientalist construction, but at the same time eludes the total embrace of Orientalism. Bishop shows that Tibet has "always sustained an independent Otherness, a sense of superiority, albeit limited," and by never fully submitting to one definitive narrative of the Oriental, either historically or in more recent studies, Tibet has managed to remain a fluid concept, one that continually changes despite the best efforts of those that attempt to describe and depict her. This is as true for British accounts as for the Chinese sources discussed here.

Both narratives seek to establish the 'truth' about Tibet. The Orientalist British narrative that emerged from the Anglo-Tibetan Imperial encounter over the fifty years that immediately followed the Younghusband Mission was essentially a

⁵⁶ FOUCAULT, MICHEL. 1980. p. 17.

⁵⁷ SAID, EDWARD. 1979. p. 7.

⁵⁸ ANAND, DIBYESH. 2007b. Western Colonial Representations of the Other: The Case of Exotica Tibet. *New Political Science*. Vol. 29. No. 1. pp. 23-42.

positive one, based upon individual perception, international politics, and the search for the 'truth.'⁵⁹ Pushing the boundaries of understanding and knowledge were vital for any Imperial agent in Tibet, and the 'civilizing mission' of the Imperial nations included building up an archive of knowledge about their subjects. Curzon himself was a great proponent of this 'truth seeking,' asserting "it is equally our duty to dig and to discover, to classify, reproduce and describe, to copy and to decipher, and to cherish and conserve."⁶⁰ This 'truth' was obviously influenced by the nature of their activities in Tibet, in the case of the narratives presented here it seeks to emphasise the trade opportunities the Mission presented, justify their advance to Lhasa, and record details of an otherwise unknown part of the world.

The British historical narrative of deconstructing myths and presenting facts and knowledge regarding Tibet cannot be over emphasised; all the British accounts include long sections discussing everything from Tibetan dress, diet, physical appearance, religion, homesteads, government, superstitions, and landscape. Such descriptions of Tibet were keenly sought after, both by the Government of India and general readers. Tibet had captured the imagination of the British public, indeed "it was for the *fin de siècle* what Tahiti and China had been for the eighteenth century, what the Arctic was for the early to mid nineteenth century, and the source of the Nile was for the late nineteenth century... it was as if Tibet had touched some fundamental surface of the era's imagination."⁶¹

Such narratives however were caught in the paradoxical situation of seeking to destroy myths and provide information, without ever fully rendering Tibet as explained or ordinary. To do so would be to destroy the very rapture of the Edwardian readership, resulting in poor sales and profits. With published accounts of Tibet, especially in the era of expensive publications featuring sepia photographs and maps, one must acknowledge that these books were written to be sold and

⁵⁹ MCKAY, ALEX. 2001. 'Truth,' Perceptions, and Politics. DODIN, THIERRY AND HEINZ RÄTHER. (Eds.) 2001. *Imagining Tibet*. Boston, MA: Wisdom Publications. p. 71.

⁶⁰ ANDERSON, BENEDICT AND RICHARD O'GORMAN. 1992. *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*. London: Verso. p. 179.

⁶¹ BISHOP, PETER. 2000. p. 143.

therefore seek to glamourise and romanticise Tibet and the endeavours of their authors.

Modern Chinese accounts also seek to dispel myths and provide 'truths', and do so by providing an alternative perspective and construction of Tibet through narrative. Many of the concepts that 'Orientalise' the British accounts are true also for the Chinese accounts, but they additionally feature aspects of 'oriental/internal Orientalisation.' This is a two-part process where by firstly, subjects (generally the Han) perceive Orientalised images of themselves, and then they reproduce and reflect these Orientalised images on other subjects (the Tibetans).⁶² Under this development the initial subjects recognise the process of 'Otherisation' that the West has historically applied to their own society and culture, before either consciously or subconsciously using it to the same ends on secondary subjects.

British sources undoubtedly feminise Tibet through the process of Orientalisation. Simply by examining the language used by colonial officials when referring to Tibet we can establish that they saw Tibet in very feminine terms, and continued the nineteenth century portrayal of the Orient as female with all of the social and cultural implications this implied. The image of the eternal feminine has long been at the forefront of Western fantasies regarding the unknown and the fascinating, and Tibet is certainly no exception;⁶³ In his *Lhasa at Last* Millington described his arrival in the capital as "assisting in drawing aside a purdah,"⁶⁴ and Candler's book is tantalisingly entitled the *Unveiling of Lhasa*.⁶⁵ An article in *The Spectator* described Asia as "the women's apartment of the world,"⁶⁶ emphasising the secret aspect of Oriental life, and after the Mission returned home Curzon wrote to the explorer Sven Hedin that he was "almost ashamed of having destroyed the virginity

⁶² ANAND, DIBYESH. 2007b. pp. 23-42.

⁶³ BISHOP, PETER. 2000. p. 177.

⁶⁴ MILLINGTON, POWELL. 1905. *Lhasa at Last*. London: Smith Elder. p. 77.

⁶⁵ CANDLER, EDMUND. 1905. *The Unveiling of Lhasa*. London: Nelson.

⁶⁶ THE SPECTATOR. 1904. *The Capture of Lhasa*. 13th August 1904.

of the bride to whom you aspired, viz. Lhasa."⁶⁷ Chinese sources reverse the roles assigned by the British, depicting Younghusband as cowardly, feminine, and weak and often running from Tibetan attacks.

Another case in point is the Tibetan defensive action against the Mission; while British accounts emphasise how the Tibetan resistance was largely misdirected, poorly equipped, and easily overcome, Chinese accounts of the same incidents portray the Tibetans as fighting doggedly, bravely, and violently in hand-to-hand combat. They also depict the Tibetans being misled and tricked into defeat by the British, a concept that would ring home in China where the notion that Imperial China was hoodwinked into allowing Western powers to establish influence on the mainland is still widely accepted.

If the Western sources analysed are guilty of 'Otherising' and 'Orientalising' Tibet, Chinese sources are equally guilty of merging both cultural and communicative memories to present a definitive narrative.⁶⁸ Communicative memory is based on accounts of ordinary events. Memories are recalled by individuals within a society and transmitted by narratives between generations and within a community. These narratives often define the group in which they are communicated, excluding outsiders and influencing their relations with the group. Communicative memory changes over time as events are reinterpreted, information excluded or incorporated into the narrative; indeed groups can support different narratives of the same event at the same time, utilising them for different ends. Cultural memory by contrast is more authoritative, and refers to a structured narrative that gives the official record of events. Cultural memory allows only certain agents to decide upon the official account, and owing to the active selection of what is excluded and

⁶⁷ Indeed Hedin, in similarly masculine language, replied that this was reason enough to "lose the longing that had possessed [him] to penetrate the Holy City." ALLEN, CHARLES. 1982. *A Mountain in Tibet*. London: Andre Deutsch. pp. 201-2.

⁶⁸ ASSMANN, JAN. 2006. *Religion and Cultural Memory: Ten Studies*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.

included, is linked with Derrida's theory of the 'constructed archive.'⁶⁹ Although the two types of memory are covalent, when presenting an account as fact one cannot amalgamate the two sources of information and use the accumulated and tested authority of one (cultural) to support the biased account of the other (communicative). In the accounts that follow, Chinese historians often present recollections and communicative accounts as if they are cultural accounts and blur the boundaries between memory and history.

By 'inventing' memories such sources utilise the debated relationship between memory and history; Hobsbawm has noted, "history is the raw material for nationalist or ethnic or fundamentalist ideologies, as poppies are the raw material for heroin addiction. The past is an essential element, perhaps the essential element, in these ideologies. If there is no suitable past, it can always be invented."⁷⁰ The key here however is that communicative memories are presented as cultural memories, and therefore as history, resulting in a circle of narrative deceptions that each build on each other.⁷¹

British Accounts

The work of the Orientalist historian has been hampered by the laudatory glare that has developed around the figure of Sir Francis Younghusband and the 1904 British Mission to Tibet. History has been kind to those Westerners who took part in the Mission; not only did many of the young officers and men who took part in the campaign go on to notable achievements and remain beyond reproach, but also the leader of the Mission became a national hero.

⁶⁹ DERRIDA, JACQUES. 1998. *Archive Fever: A Freudian Impression*. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.

⁷⁰ HOBBSAWM, ERIC. 1997. *On History*. London: Abacus. p. 6.

⁷¹ For an examination of the use of historical arguments in narratives of the Chinese Government: SPERLING, ELLIOT. 2004. *The Tibet-China Conflict: History and Polemics*. Washington, DC: East-West Center Washington.

Younghusband's detailed account of the Mission, *India and Tibet, a history of the relations which have subsisted between the two countries from the time of Warren Hastings to 1910; With a particular account of the mission to Lhasa of 1904*, was immensely popular with his contemporary readership. It attempted to justify the actions of his superiors, himself, and his men, and gave prominence to their tangible achievements and service. His book was preceded by numerous tomes of congratulatory, celebratory accounts by his fellow officers, written to fill Edwardian society's yearning for the adventure and fascination with the Oriental and occult.⁷² Indeed by the 1880s a whole generation had been raised on the stories of Tibetan travel, and by 1885, one British journalist exclaimed, "Tibet may be said to be at present in a state of siege."⁷³

Examining the background in which Younghusband wrote his voluminous *India and Tibet* reveals why he wrote such an overweening treatise: In many ways, the Mission confirmed the flaws in Curzon's Central Asian policy, and demonstrated British India's inability to find a lasting solution to the Tibet question. When in 1910 the book was published, the Manchu army had just invaded Lhasa, a prelude to fundamental change in both the international status and the political administration of Tibet. The Chinese arrival indicated that the Mission was as much a failure for the Dalai Lama and his relations with China, as it was for British interests. Lamb notes in his introduction to the 1985 OUP edition that, "it was against this background of China rushing into a Tibetan breach originally blasted open by British bombardment that Younghusband produced his own account."⁷⁴

Younghusband also used his account to answer his critics, and present his case to those he felt had treated him unfairly and failed to appreciate all that he had achieved under difficult circumstances. These critics included not only his military and political superiors, but also those who, having read the accounts of bloodshed

⁷² See for example: OTTLEY, WILLIAM. 1906. WADDELL, AUSTINE. 1905. *Lhasa and its Mysteries, with a Record of the British Expedition of 1903-1904*. London: John Murray.

⁷³ WHITELEY, DAVID. 1895. The Attack on Tibet. *Little's Living Age*. Vol. 206. p. 218.

⁷⁴ LAMB, ALASTAIR. 1985. In YOUNGHUSBAND, FRANCIS. 1910. *India and Tibet*. p. vii.

in their daily papers, questioned the necessity and conduct of the Mission. The only published official papers relating to the Mission were the Tibet 'Blue Books' issued by an order of Parliament in 1904 and 1905.⁷⁵ Younghusband felt that these did not present the whole picture, and as Lamb points out, were "somewhat partisan in their selection and editing of material."⁷⁶

Younghusband also uses his account to counter those who depicted him as striving only to reach Lhasa, hell-bent on being the first to conquer that magical city. He argued in *India and Tibet* that, "I shall emphasise, there has always been intercourse of some kind between Tibet and India... Tibet has never really been isolated."⁷⁷ In his account the Tibetans are presented as intransigent, aggressive, and disruptive along the common frontier with India, and their policy of exclusion was made to appear more of a rejection of long established customs.⁷⁸ However, his efforts in this respect were thwarted by some of the books for which Younghusband wrote introductions. In many of these books Lhasa was presented as the ultimate goal of the expedition. For example, Landon wrote in his account how, "in the whole history of exploration, there is no more curious map than that which shows the tangled lines of travellers' routes towards this city, coming from all sides, north, south, east and west, interlocking, retracing, all with one goal, and all baffled."⁷⁹

By 1910 Younghusband was also writing in a different social and political climate from that which prevailed when he conducted his Mission. Chapter six scrutinises the 'mind of the mission' in greater detail, but it is important to note here that the mindset of Edwardian London was very different from the Victorian frontiersman mentality that existed among the officers and men when they served in Tibet. By

⁷⁵ HIS MAJESTY'S STATIONERY OFFICE. 1905. *Cd. 1920 Papers relating to Tibet. Cd. 2054 Further Papers relating to Tibet. Cd. 2370 Further Papers relating to Tibet.*

⁷⁶ LAMB, ALASTAIR. 1985. In YOUNGHUSBAND, FRANCIS. 1910. p. viii.

⁷⁷ YOUNGHUSBAND, FRANCIS. 1910. pp. 2-3.

⁷⁸ YOUNGHUSBAND, FRANCIS. 1905. In LANDON, PERCEVAL. 1905. *Lhasa: An Account of the Country and People of Central Tibet and of the Progress of the Mission sent there by the English Government in 1903-4.* London: Hurst and Blackett Ltd. Vol. 1. pp. ix-x.

⁷⁹ LANDON, PERCEVAL. 1905. Vol. 1. pp. 22-3.

1910 Britain ruled over one fifth of the globe, and while it was not alone in its rapid expansion⁸⁰ the actions of the likes of men such as Younghusband were not accompanied by unequivocal support and confidence at home, and 'New Imperialism' had many critics. From around 1880 to the outbreak of World War I a series of sweeping changes in technology and culture created distinctive new modes of thinking about the world and the 'natural' extent of man's ability and influence, and thereby also, his empires. Technological innovations including the "telephone, wireless telegraph, X-Ray, cinema, bicycle, automobile and airplane established the material foundations for this reorientation; independent cultural developments such as the stream-of-consciousness novel, psychoanalysis, Cubism, and the theory of relativity, shaped consciousness directly."⁸¹ In contemporary literature there was an increasing feeling of claustrophobia at home, yet also a sense of overpowering emptiness overseas. Reactions to these vast spaces, only recently discovered and claimed by imperialism, ranged from intoxication to depression, and from inspiration to horror.⁸² Younghusband and his officers would surely have been influenced by these seismic changes as they penned their accounts of the Mission, and of Tibet.

Later biographies and secondary materials have found it difficult to question the bold statements made in these early accounts, and failed to provide critical appraisal of the man, or his Mission.⁸³ In Western historiography, revision only started to gather pace with Charles Allen's analysis of the events of 1904, an account that acknowledged that greater use of non-European sources would be one route to capturing Tibetan perspectives.⁸⁴ Allen sought to redress the balance with a new investigation of Younghusband's bitter arguments with General Macdonald, failure to allow the Tibetans to negotiate fully at Gyantse, and disregard for orders

⁸⁰ EDUARDES, MICHAEL. 1967. *The West in Asia: 1850-1914*. London: BT Batsford Ltd. pp. 8, 25-6.

⁸¹ KERN, STEPHEN. 1983. *The Culture of Time and Place*. London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson. pp. 1-2.

⁸² FABER, RICHARD. 1966. *The Vision and the Need*. London: Faber & Faber. p. 166.

⁸³ See for example, SEAVER, GEORGE. 1952. *Francis Younghusband, Explorer and Mystic*. London: John Murray. FLEMING, PETER. 1961. *Bayonets to Lhasa*. London: Rupert Hart-Davis. FRENCH, PATRICK. 2004. *Younghusband: The Last Great Imperial Adventurer*. London: Flamingo.

⁸⁴ ALLEN, CHARLES. 2004a. *Duel in the Snows*. London: John Murray.

from Curzon, Dane, and Kitchener. It is important to remember therefore when reading the quotes and references that follow that Fleming and French, because of the popular nature of their works, seek to emphasise his achievements, whereas Allen seeks in fact to downplay his role because General Macdonald is the true hero of his book.⁸⁵ Lamb observes that several historians "emphasise the romantic impact of Younghusband's venture because it has served to create a general impression that the expedition was a success."⁸⁶

The role of Lieutenant-Colonel Waddell of the IMS is examined in detail in chapter six; however his account of the Mission, *Lhasa and its Mysteries*, published in 1905, is a central example of the 'celebratory account' and requires examination. The title of the book indicates Waddell's intended target audience and agenda; however he provides a valuable accompaniment to the frequently dry accounts of the military officers. In his account he describes the Tibetans variously as "in keeping with the squalor and filth amidst which they live," "sunk in almost the lowest depths of savagery," and "more like hideous gnomes than human beings."⁸⁷ He often derides their faith in their religion, and in language typical of his era describes the complexion of lower class Tibetans as "generally a light chocolate in colour" before adding "many of the better class, and a large proportion of the women, are almost as fair as a South Italian."⁸⁸

Waddell however made extensive use of photographs in his account, and many are reproduced in this thesis. Bishop notes how such images were vital to publications such as Waddell's, giving "Westerners a vicarious sense of power over Tibet. Even if they could not go to the country at will, nor occupy it, nor control it, at least they had the possession of its image."⁸⁹ In addition to this notion of possession Fredholm has show that Waddell did not restrict his construction of the image of

⁸⁵ MYATT, TIM, AND PETER D'SENA. 2008. Recounting the Past? The Contest between British Historical and New Chinese Interpretations of the Younghusband Mission to Tibet of 1904. *The International Journal of the Humanities*. Vol. 6. No. 9. pp. 107-116.

⁸⁶ LAMB, ALASTAIR. 1985. In, YOUNGHUSBAND, FRANCIS. 1910. p. vi.

⁸⁷ WADDELL, AUSTINE. 1905. p. 101.

⁸⁸ WADDELL, AUSTINE. 1905. p. 347.

⁸⁹ BISHOP, PETER. 2000. p. 189.

Tibetans as antediluvian and barbaric in only his written account, but also in his photographs:




Figure 3: 'Cavalry soldier in mail armour.' WADDELL, LAURENCE. 1905. p. 167.

Fredholm demonstrates however that this man is not soldier and has been dressed by Waddell in a collection of redundant military equipment in an inaccurate portrayal of the Tibetan military. Fredholm argues that,

First, his chain-mail coat and helmet had gone out of date already in the late eighteenth century. Second, the horse armour, which in any case remains incomplete, had fallen out of use even earlier, already in the mid-seventeenth century. Third, all the pieces of armour that the man wears would seem to form part of the old, abandoned pieces that the British found long since abandoned in old forts and monasteries.

Besides, unless the negative has been accidentally reversed, the man carries his sword on the wrong side.⁹⁰

By depicting Tibetans in this way Waddell was attempting to reveal for his audience their backwardness and weakness. He did not record how, in all likelihood, he found the armour that his subjects are dressed in at the hastily abandoned Dzong at Phagri, and that such items were kept for historic or ceremonial purposes. When he described Tibetan officers as wearing "iron helmets and cuirasses of the type familiar to us in medieval literature"⁹¹ Waddell chose not to remind his readers of the guards outside Buckingham Palace or at the Trooping of the Colour who sport equally obsolete badges of office, but of the exotic and eye-catching trappings of the medieval knight of literature. He equally fails to record how some historic armour found at Phagri was quarter-sized: it was in fact made for statues and protector deities, not for an army of undersized warriors.

Chinese Accounts

Modern Chinese accounts also carry strong bias and intention. In this sense they too can be said to be a 'self-satisfying narrative,' in the same way as the contemporary accounts published by the British officers and following correspondents of the Mission. The focus of these sources is not to justify the author's actions and enthrall the audience, but to emphasise the patriotism and heroics of the Tibetan troops, expose the brutality and greed of the British troops, and show how this was achieved through trickery and deception. They have been designed to have a broad appeal to both Han and Tibetans of all ages and levels of education, using texts, images, and monuments to inform. In this way Chinese historians are creating an alternative Foucault's "archive of material and information."⁹²

⁹⁰ FREDHOLM, MICHAEL. 2007. The Impact of Manchu Institutions on Tibetan Military Reform. *The Sixth Nordic Tibet Conference*. Stockholm. p. 3.

⁹¹ WADDELL, AUSTINE. 1905. p. 168.

⁹² FOUCAULT, MICHEL. 1980. p. 17.

These recorded versions of events are best described as propaganda, and a construct that attempts to insert Chinese influence into Tibetan affairs and to create a narrative of patriotic Tibetans fighting on behalf of the Motherland. They provide evidence for the way the Communist Party in China attempts to persuade both tourists and Tibetans of the historical validity of its 'One Nation' Policy. It is clear from the first words of most sources that historical accuracy must be forsaken in order to present the party line of unity and pride in China. For example, the first lines of Shan's *A History of Development of Tibet* inform us that, "Tibet has a long history, and since ancient times has been an inseparable part of China. The Tibetan people is one of the many ethnic groups that compose the big family of the Chinese nation."⁹³ As Powers points out however, "it is important to recognise that these writers apparently believe it to be true, despite the fact that it differs substantially from eyewitness accounts,"⁹⁴ and that each source must be taken as part of a "wider narrative of imperialism and the victimization of China by western powers."⁹⁵

The language used is indicative of the intent of the authors. The British presence in Tibet is never referred to as a 'Mission' as in British accounts, but always as an 'invasion,' 'occupation' or 'British scheming.' Likewise, the British are invariably afforded the epithet 'imperialists,' 'capitalists,' or 'aggressors,' and the government in Lhasa is continuously referred to as the 'Tibetan Local Government.' The rhetoric of such authors is identical to other sources of Chinese propaganda, as examined in chapter two, and passionately defends the unification and legitimacy of China's rule in Tibet, in contrast to "The British and Russian invasions of Tibet" that were "illegal because they infringed upon the territorial integrity of China and undermined China's unification."⁹⁶

⁹³ ZHENG, SHAN. 2001. *A History of Development of Tibet*. Beijing: Foreign Languages Press. p. 1.

⁹⁴ POWERS, JOHN. 2004. *History as Propaganda. Tibetan Exiles versus the People's Republic of China*. Oxford: Oxford University Press. p. 90.

⁹⁵ POWERS, JOHN. 2004. p. 94.

⁹⁶ WANG, JIAWAI AND NYIMA GYAINCAIN. 1997. *The Historical Status of China's Tibet*. Beijing: China Intercontinental Press. p. 81.

The proposition that the British sought to establish Tibet as a colony or protectorate is found in every Chinese history studied. Shan for example explains how Curzon "...repeatedly wrote to the XIIIth Dalai Lama, in the hope of separating Tibet from China,"⁹⁷ without suggesting exactly how the Viceroy sought to achieve such a separation. Chinese sources claim that Tibet, and therefore China, held suzerainty over Sikkim for all of the period in question. While Tibet certainly held cultural and religious hegemony in Sikkim, armed disputes with the East India Company resulted in a British Governor being appointed from 1853 to oversee the Chögyal who ruled in name only. Chinese historians therefore refer to the events of 1888 when General Graham forced Tibetan forces out of Sikkim as the 'first invasion of Tibet'⁹⁸ before Sikkim became a British protectorate in 1890. Thus Shan records that, "although the British imperialists' plot to turn Tibet into their exclusive colony had fallen through, their second invasion made Tibet even more sub-colonial and established the semi-colonial and semi-feudal social order."⁹⁹

In a similar vein Jaiwai claims "it is clear that Britain planned to deprive China of the power to rule Tibet and turn Tibet into an independent state just like Korea,"¹⁰⁰ presumably in reference to the Korean War of the mid 1950s when UN, South Korean, and Commonwealth powers fought North Korean and Chinese Communist troops in a bloody war for the Korean Peninsula.

Chinese authors argue that the British were only able to invade and dictate terms to Tibet on account of the Manchu Qing Government's corruption and the slowly ebbing power and authority of the Emperor. Shan records how, "the defeat of the second struggle by the Tibetan soldiers and people, monks and laymen was an outcome of the Qing Government's corruption and incompetence as well as the Tibetan local government's weakness and confusion." However, he adds that, "the great masses of the Tibetan people were determined to carry on the struggle

⁹⁷ ZHENG, SHAN. 2001. p. 279.

⁹⁸ The Mission of 1903/4 is therefore described as the 'second invasion.'

⁹⁹ ZHENG, SHAN. 2001. p. 294.

¹⁰⁰ WANG, JIAWAI AND NYIMA GYAINCAIN. 1997. p. 86.

against invaders. They smashed the plot of annexing Tibet by the British imperialists, their lofty patriotism and the heroic spirit of daring to struggle adds an illustrious page to the annals of Tibet."¹⁰¹

The notion that the British are responsible for fomenting Tibetan independence as a tactic resulting from their failure to take Tibet by force, is well established in Chinese propaganda literature. Jaiwai claims that the "myth of 'Tibetan independence' is actually the product of the imperialist invasion of China, with the British invaders in Tibet as the chief architects."¹⁰² He claims his impetus for writing 'The Historical Status of China's Tibet' was because "the British directed 'Tibetan independence' activities, and it is therefore of great importance to return black to white."¹⁰³ Such historians claim that British officers promoted the idea of Tibetan independence in their written accounts, and also in their negotiations with the Dalai Lama's representatives. By disregarding the Amban and failing to take diplomatic differences to Peking rather than Lhasa, Britain promoted the idea that Tibet could fight, negotiate peace, and sign treaties on her own;

By the late 19th century and early 20th century, Britain coupled its military means to bully China's Tibet with political efforts to win the hearts of certain people in the upper ruling class, trimming them into pro-British elements for its own use, and creating the theory of 'Tibetan independence geared to tear Tibet away from China.'¹⁰⁴

This presentation of history is examined further in chapter five.

A striking feature of these Chinese narratives is the vehemence with which those historians who present an alternative narrative are attacked. The Tibetan historian Wangchuk Deden Shakabpa, for example, is singled out for special criticism:¹⁰⁵ "While quoting historical records to make a 'purely objective' description of the war, he does not; however, use 'aggression' or 'invasion' to describe the British

¹⁰¹ ZHENG, SHAN. 2001. p. 294.

¹⁰² WANG, JIAWAI AND NYIMA GYAINCAIN. 1997. p. 80.

¹⁰³ WANG, JIAWAI AND NYIMA GYAINCAIN. 1997. p. 80.

¹⁰⁴ WANG, JIAWAI AND NYIMA GYAINCAIN. 1997. p. 110.

¹⁰⁵ I examine his claims and sources in chapter seven.

move." Shakabpa, a former *rTsis dpon* (Finance Minister) who escaped into exile in 1951 to work as the Dalai Lama's representative in New Delhi, is portrayed as having been influenced by his exile in America. Chinese sources attempt to discredit him and attack him for his nationalistic writings.

He refrains from lauding the heroic anti-aggression struggles waged by Tibetan soldiers and civilians. People who read the book see nothing wrong in Britain's invasion of Tibet, and nothing correct of Tibetans' struggle against this invasion. Xabagga [Shakabpa] manages to detach himself from the reality or take a "neutral" stand in dealing with the British invasion of Tibet. But in doing so, he becomes a loyal supporter of the British invaders.¹⁰⁶

The Mission in Conflicting Narratives

The following compiled account draws together the most reliable of the British narratives with Chinese historical sources to give a basic understanding of the main events and themes of the Mission. It is by no means definitive, and is written from a British perspective; however in order to analyse propaganda relating to the Mission, and attempt to arrive at a Tibetan 'subaltern' narrative a framework of facts must be first established.

Younghusband, with an escort of 200 men of the 32nd Pioneers and 300 porters arrived at Tangu, ten miles south of the Tibetan border on the 1st of July 1903. Younghusband, always a pedant for rank and status, recorded that he had "heard no news of either Chinese or Tibetan officials of rank and authority having arrived at Khamba Jong to meet me,"¹⁰⁷ and therefore dispatched White with the entirety of Colonel Brander's escort to advance and arrange a suitable reception. On arriving the next morning at the border, White was met by the Dzungpön of Khamba Dzong and invited to negotiations with Kalön Blo bzang 'phrin las, the *sPyi khyab mkhan po* and senior commander of the local militia. Equally high-minded, White

¹⁰⁶ WANG, JIAWAI AND NYIMA GYAINCAIN. 1997. p. 96

¹⁰⁷ YOUNGHUSBAND, FRANCIS. 1910. p. 110.

responded by refusing to dismount from his horse to greet the representatives formally, and informed them that he would only open negotiations at Khamba Dzong, almost a dozen miles inside Tibet. The Dzongpön pursued the Tibet Commissioner all the way to the Dzong, imploring him to meet the representatives of the Dalai Lama, warning him that, "you may flick a dog once or twice without his biting, but if you tread on his tail, even if he has no teeth, he will turn and try and bite you."¹⁰⁸

In his *Basic Information of Tibet of China; Tibetan History*, the Chinese historian Ying claims that by coming to Khamba Dzong White had "launched an armed provocation."¹⁰⁹ He records an immediate Tibetan military response to the incursion, the 'Tibetan Local Government' dispatching 700 troops to drive the invaders back. Furen reports that the British "pulled down the demarcation stones, forced the Tibetan frontier guards to retreat, and looted."¹¹⁰ No mention of this is made in any British account, and neither narrative has any definite military confrontation. Ying lists the negotiators as "Zongyi Qinbo, Daiboin Chairong and Prefecture Magistrate He Guangxie,"¹¹¹ and while he agrees that the negotiations stalled, he asserts the grounds for failure was the "unjustifiabe claim that He Guangshuo was not qualified to serve as a representative in the negotiations, and they insisted on negotiation with the Qing High Commissioners stationed in Tibet."¹¹²

On the 7th of August, Ernest Wilton¹¹³ arrived to assist Younghusband with his negotiations. Wilton informed Younghusband that a new Chinese Amban had been appointed in December, but that he was yet to leave Chengdu.¹¹⁴ Younghusband resorted to venting his frustration in letters to the Viceroy, one, typical of his

¹⁰⁸ YOUNGHUSBAND, FRANCIS. 1910. p. 111.

¹⁰⁹ YING, CHENQING. 2003. *Series of Basic Information of Tibet of China: Tibetan History*. Beijing: China Intercontinental Press. p. 88.

¹¹⁰ FUREN, WANG AND SUO WENQING. 1984. p. 122.

¹¹¹ YING, CHENQING. 2003. p. 88.

¹¹² YING, CHENQING. 2003. p. 88.

¹¹³ Like Parr, Wilton had been acting as Consul at Chengdu for the China Consular Service.

¹¹⁴ Indeed he would not arrive in Lhasa until February 1904, fourteen months after his appointment.

attitude towards the Tibetans fumed that "we have merely to burst that bloated bubble of monkish power."¹¹⁵ His frustrations were matched in New Delhi where Curzon was attempting to persuade the Government in London to sanction an advance into Tibet in order to force talks. Given the impasse Curzon recalled Younghusband to Simla so that he too could put his case before the Executive Council. Ya claims that White and Younghusband were forced to retreat to India "as a result of Russia's intervention... taking with them some five thousand sheep and six hundred head of cattle they looted from the local Tibetan herdsmen."¹¹⁶

Ya examines the role of the Amban, recording that the Qing Government ordered "Amban Yu Gang to present himself at Khamba Dzong for talks with the British with a view to preventing them from advancing any farther."¹¹⁷ He quotes at length from Gang's 'Memorial to the Throne' that describes how a group of Tibetans came to him informing him that "they knew what to do if the British troops entered Tibet, and that they would do all they could to prevent me from making the journey to the frontier because they considered my going there an act of yielding to the British and a disgrace to the Court."¹¹⁸ The Amban told the Imperial court that he had no option but to remain in Lhasa, afraid that, "if I rebuke them for their fallacies and insist on going, not only would I be incapacitated from shielding the Tibetans against foreign aggression, but something worse than that might happen: the Tibetans might have an excuse to stir up trouble which would eventually develop into internal disorder."¹¹⁹ In the light of Amban Yu Gang's admission that he could neither attend the negotiations, nor assuage Tibetan appetite for war, both Ambans tendered their resignations to the Court. The Qing Court appointed Yü Tai Amban in Lhasa.

Ya argues that not only did Yü Tai serve his own interests, but he desired that the British might win the war, and the Tibetans be soundly defeated. Ya shows that Yü

¹¹⁵ BL: MSS EUR F 197 80. FEY to Viceroy.

¹¹⁶ YA, HANZHANG. 1993. *The Biographies of the Dalai Lamas*. Beijing: Foreign Languages Press. p. 189.

¹¹⁷ YA, HANZHANG. 1993.191.

¹¹⁸ YA, HANZHANG. 1993. p. 191.

¹¹⁹ YA, HANZHANG. 1993. p. 191.

Tai believed that British aggression would have the effect of strengthening the Qing position in Lhasa because "If the Tibetans suffer another defeat, the situation will improve, for defeat will make them reserve their stand and obey our orders."¹²⁰ His claim is supported by the *Introduction to Tibetan History*, in which Ying writes "Qing High Commissioner Yü Tai, instead of sending troops to block the British troops, replied to Younghusband by saying that he was incompetent to teach the Tibetan populace and he was willing to negotiate with the British after the Tibetan troops were totally subdued."¹²¹

Once in Simla Younghusband briefed Curzon and the Executive Council on the situation in Tibet, and proposed an advance on the Chumbi Valley, even as far as Gyantse if necessary to force discussion. St John Brodrick had been appointed Secretary of State for India in October 1903. He attempted to reconcile Curzon and the Cabinet by sanctioning an advance as far as Gyantse predominantly on the grounds that the Tibetans would regard any lesser action as a retrograde movement. With purposefully nebulous orders the advance was authorised "for the sole purpose of obtaining satisfaction," however Brodrick was deliberately clear that "this step should not be allowed to lead to occupation or to permanent intervention in Tibetan affairs in any form."¹²² Younghusband himself admits, "It was a curious telegram, which I never quite understood."¹²³

Regardless of the political vacillations Lord Kitchener issued orders for the Mission to be supported by a Royal Artillery Mountain Battery with two ten-pounder screw guns, a half company of The 2nd Sappers and Miners, eight companies of The 23rd Sikh Pioneers, six companies of The 8th Gurkhas, and two Maxim guns from 1st Battalion, The Norfolk Regiment. The vast resources of the Coolie Corps were drawn upon, over 10,000 in all, along with 3,000 ponies, 5,000 yaks and buffaloes, 5,000 bullocks, 7,000 mules and six camels to carry the officers' cigars. The troops,

¹²⁰ YA, HANZHANG. 1993. p. 200.

¹²¹ YING, CHENQING. 2003. p. 90.

¹²² HIS MAJESTY'S STATIONERY OFFICE. 1905. *Cd. 1920 Papers Relating to Tibet*. p. 294.

¹²³ YOUNGHUSBAND, FRANCIS. 1910. p. 141.

and all military matters regarding the Mission, were placed under the command of Brigadier-General James Macdonald of the Royal Engineers. Whilst still termed the 'Escort to the Tibet Mission' the sheer size of the military contingent has enabled Chinese scholars to argue, with some plausibility, that, "the invaders began their march into Tibet under the pretext of 'escorting' a British mission for negotiations."¹²⁴

Chinese historians have interpreted the Qing Government's actions as having a "tendency towards compromise and capitulation."¹²⁵ By suggesting that Amban Yü Tai was willing to allow, or even facilitate the British advance, and the Imperial schema was to actively stop the Tibetans from resisting the British, such historians aim to pass any blame for the military failings on the corrupt Qing Court's attempts to bolster their own position in Lhasa. This interpretation of history portrays Tibetans as heroic, nationalistic pawns, fighting for the defence of China against imperialist invaders only to be undermined by the self-serving interests of corrupt Imperial agents.

Advance into Tibet

The British historical depiction of Tibet as a place of mystery and occult religion is exemplified by Waddell's opening chapter, which he prefaces with a prophecy from the 'Almanac for the Wood Dragon Year'. The translation is loose, and the language evocative, but by giving such a prophecy prominence in his book Waddell shows his readership that the political life of Tibet was influenced by oracles and divinations rather than reason and political process. "In the year of the Wood-Dragon the first part of the year protects the young king; [then] there is a great coming forward of robbers, quarrelling and fighting, full many enemies, troublous

¹²⁴ ZHENG, SHAN. 2001. p. 284.

¹²⁵ ZHENG, SHAN. 2001. p. 286.

grief by weapons and such like will arise, the king, father and son will be fighting. At the end of the year a conciliatory speaker will vanquish the war."¹²⁶




Figure 4: Tibetan Prophecy from the 'Almanac for the Wood Dragon Year.' WADDELL, AUSTINE. 1910. p. 2.¹²⁷

On the 12th of December the Mission crossed the 14,390 foot high Dzalep La. Captain Parr was the first Chinese official to greet the Mission, and introduced the Phagri Dzongpön. The Dzongpön patiently demanded that the British retire to the border, but Younghusband politely dismissed his demands, explaining that the British would advance until delegates of suitable authority arrived for negotiations.

The Mission advanced to Dromo Rinchen Gang (Gro mo rin chen sgang) where the town was defended by a stone wall extending across the valley floor and up both

¹²⁶ A more accurate translation might read; "In the year of the Wood Male Dragon year, Royal authority and prerogatives should be wisely exercised. The early part of the year will see the rule by the young King/Sovereign. Bandits and thieves will abound; draught severe, and arguments and fighting occur. Enemies, thieves, and such harmful occurrences will be many. Weapons will cause all sorts of suffering and privations. Rains will fall, ministers rise up against the King, and conflicts arise between father(s) and son(s.) And victory towards the end of the year will go to the one with powers of persuasion." I am grateful to Tsering D Gonkatsang for this translation.

¹²⁷ WADDELL, AUSTINE. 1905. p. 1.

sides of the ravine. The Tibetan and Chinese Officials who had made protest the day before attempted once again to halt the Mission at the wall. Younghusband noted how, "I let them repeat their protests, for it evidently pleased the Tibetan General to say it in public; but it did not strike me that he personally particularly minded our coming, and the meeting broke up in great good humour."¹²⁸ Shan explains for his audience that the British were only allowed to enter Tibet without opposition "owing to the fact that the Tibetan local government made a wrong judgement about the main direction of the attack by the invaders, the Tibetan main force was deployed in the Gamba region, while the region was poorly guarded."¹²⁹

Despite the courteous nature of the Dzongpön, General Macdonald believed that the Tibetans proposed to hold the strategically vital Dzong at Phagri. He immediately dispatched 800 fighting troops to capture the fort, and the Mounted Infantry scouted the barren plains for suitable camping grounds.¹³⁰ On arrival Ottley commented on the great commotion, but rather than a hail of bullets, he was greeted by a delegation of townsmen with open arms.




Figure 5: Phagri Dzong. LANDON, PERCEVAL. 1904. p. 126.

¹²⁸ YOUNGHUSBAND, FRANCIS. 1910. p. 156.

¹²⁹ ZHENG, SHAN. 2001. p. 284.

¹³⁰ There is an expression in Tibet, 'When rice grows on Phagri Dzong' much the same as the English 'when pigs fly,' as Ottley and his men soon discovered, there was neither suitable grazing nor sheltered ground.

To capture the Dzong unopposed was trumpeted as a great success in the British press, described by Candler as "A swift and secret swoop. He [Macdonald] was able to seize this great mobilisation centre of the Tibetan troops, with its tons of gunpowder and bullets, without a single shot being fired."¹³¹ The inside of the Dzong proved to be something of an anti-climax for the troops; The courtyards were strewn with old lumber, chain mail armour, helmets, spears and rubbish, but nothing of great value. Waddell however acquired for his collection his first item; a full illuminated set of the Kanjur. (See chapter six.) Chinese accounts highlight that "they seized about 10,000 pounds of ammunition and a great amount of weapons stored there by the Phagri Dzong Government."¹³²

The dirt and intense cold of Phagri roused the ire of the troops. In his account Waddell described Phagri as,

Appallingly foul and dirty, possibly the dirtiest and foulest town on earth. Its benumbed villages for generations have been throwing all their refuse immediately outside their doors into the streets, where this accumulated dirt of ages has raised the level of the streets so high that the dingy rooms now seem subterranean cellars, entry to which is got by digging steps down through the layers of this garbage.¹³³

The General considered that New Chumbi was the best place for the column to winter; however Younghusband disagreed, arguing "as our prestige at this time on the Sikkim frontier was quite astonishingly low... we had to do everything we could, short of fighting, to establish some prestige."¹³⁴ He proposed to establish the Mission at Düne well inside Tibet, with a good stock of ammunition and supplies. Younghusband's concerns for British prestige were validated when local Tibetans dared to cut the vital telegraph line to India.¹³⁵ By this stage the working

¹³¹ *The DAILY MAIL*. London. 13th January 1904.

¹³² ZHENG, SHAN. 2001. p. 284.

¹³³ WADDELL, AUSTINE. 1905. p. 100.

¹³⁴ YOUNGHUSBAND, FRANCIS. 1910. p. 159.

¹³⁵ Macdonald fined the inhabitants fifteen tonnes of fuel for their defiance. To his surprise the Tibetans asked to pay half their fine in Indian rupees rather than in the requested yak dung. Due to the severity of the fine no further attempts were made by the Tibetans to cut the line, and inquisitive Tibetans were told that the line's only use was to guide the British troops safely back to India.

relationship between the General and the Tibet Commissioner had drastically deteriorated as both sought to establish their control over the course of the Mission's advance. On this occasion Younghusband had his way and on the 4th of January a flying column of half the troops and the telegraph equipment pressed north for the squalor of Phagri.

When the advance column reached Phagri Dzong they were approached by a large delegation of monks and officials comprising senior monks from each of the Three Seats, and *mDa' dpon* lHa lding sras, known in British accounts as the 'Lhasa General.' The four delegates were deputised by the Kashag, and accordingly were of the highest rank; however Younghusband declined to meet the delegation, leaving the formalities to his translator, Frank O'Connor. He reported to Younghusband that "he found them exceedingly surly," that "they made no advance in civility,"¹³⁶ later recording in his 1931 autobiography that the monk officials "were always rude in their snarling and snappish refusal, and used disrespectful language."¹³⁷ Soon afterwards other spies arrived stating they had passed 2,500 Tibetan soldiers just over the Tang La preparing to halt the British advance, and scouting parties reported increased Tibetan activity in the vicinity.

Three days later Tibetan forces were seen massing near the British Camp. On the 12th of January the delegation of officials sent a message requesting that Younghusband meet them in the open plain for negotiations. Again he refused and sent O'Connor to negotiate on his behalf. Stalemate once more ensued with both sides reiterating their stated positions. It seemed that the Tibetans could not decide whether to attack or not, or at least lacked the leadership to carry the troops forward. With only 300 troops the British were poorly defended in their camp, and Allen is sure that if the Tibetans had advanced it is certain that "Younghusband would have found a place no doubt in the same pantheon of lost military heroes as

¹³⁶ YOUNGHUSBAND, FRANCIS. 1910. p. 159.

¹³⁷ O'CONNOR, WILLIAM. 1931. p. 44.

Generals Custer and Gordon."¹³⁸ O'Connor's spies reported that the Tibetan forces planned to attack that night, but the attack never came. It was later discovered that an abortive attack had been mounted, but had failed when the militia refused to advance despite their overwhelming numbers.

Chumi Shonko

Approximately ten miles from Düne the Mission camped at Chumi Shonko.¹³⁹ It was here that the Tibetans decided to make their stand.




Figure 6: View from the Tibetan side of the wall at Chumi Shonko. This plate was taken by Bailey a few minutes before the massacre occurred. LONDON, PERCEVAL. 1904. p. 149.

¹³⁸ ALLEN, CHARLES. 2004a. p. 82.

¹³⁹ British accounts either translate *Chu mig gshongs ko* as 'waters of the crystal eye' or the 'one hundred and eight hot springs.'

As the Mission advanced, *mDa' dpon lHa lding sras*, the Phagri Dzongpön, and *mDa' dpon dPal 'byor 'jigs med rNam sras* gling from Shigatse rode out to try and find a way to avoid bloodshed. The talks followed the same lines as all previous attempts at reconciliation, and failed to find resolution. Perhaps in exasperation, but certainly scornfully, Younghusband recalled how,

There was no possible reasoning with such people. They had such overweening confidence in their Lama's powers. How could anyone dare to resist the orders of the Great Lama? Surely lightning would descend from heaven or the earth open up and destroy anyone who had such temerity! I pointed to our troops, now deployed ready for action.¹⁴⁰

Jaiwai by contrast claims, "Ladingse and Namseling invited the British representatives to Qoimishango [sic] for negotiations."¹⁴¹ His account of Chumi Shonko portrays the Tibetans as gullible and foolish, but valiant and brave in the fighting that followed.

After debating for an hour the party broke up when Younghusband told *mDa' dpon lHa lding sras* his army would advance in fifteen minutes, with orders to avoid bloodshed if at all possible. Younghusband "wished still to give them just one last chance, in the hope that at the eleventh hour, and in the fifty-ninth minute of the eleventh hour, they might change their minds I asked General Macdonald to order his men not to fire upon the Tibetans until the Tibetans first fired on them."¹⁴² This request has been much quoted by both those involved in the events as they unfolded, and by subsequent historians. After analysing multiple British sources Allen concludes that, "Virtually every account of what followed, published and unpublished, refers to the General's order not to fire until fired upon,"¹⁴³ and while Hadow wrote to his father of "orders being issued that not a shot was to be fired until the Tibetans opened fire," Bailey similarly states that "we were told not to fire until fired upon."¹⁴⁴ The orders put the advancing troops into a perilous position,

¹⁴⁰ YOUNGHUSBAND, FRANCIS. 1910. p. 174.

¹⁴¹ WANG, JIAWAI AND NYIMA GYAINCAIN. 1997. p. 87.

¹⁴² YOUNGHUSBAND, FRANCIS. 1910. p. 175.

¹⁴³ ALLEN, CHARLES. 2004a. p. 107.

¹⁴⁴ ALLEN, CHARLES. 2004a. p. 108.

slowly moving up the valley in full view and range of the Tibetan defenders behind the wall. Ottley describes their nervous state writing, "On we went getting closer and closer and wondering when the Tibetans would fire the first shot and take advantage of the splendid opportunity we gave them."¹⁴⁵

However the Tibetans had also been ordered to hold their fire, and as the Pioneers and Gurkhas cautiously arrived at the foot of the wall not a single shot was heard. The troops were ordered to try to outflank the wall.

O'Connor was asked to inform *mDa' dpon lHa lding sras* to order the Tibetan troops to lay down their weapons. "Speaking as gently and as politely as I could, and of course, using all the honorific language, I gave them the General's Message."¹⁴⁶ Macdonald gave the order for the Sikhs to advance and disarm the Tibetans while Younghusband retired to his hastily erected tent to pen telegrams to London and Shimla telling of a bloodless victory. Candler leaned against his saddle only yards from *mDa' dpon lHa lding sras*, penning a similar dispatch to *The Daily Mail*. While attempting to disarm the Tibetans the bemused sepoy were later described by Fleming as having "something of the good humoured severity that London policemen display on Boat Race Night."¹⁴⁷ Fleming's image well demonstrates the way subsequent historians have not only failed to question the British narrative of events, but also continued to portray the Tibetans in Orientalised and patronising manner.

Perhaps inevitably and despite this 'good humour' scuffles soon broke out between the Tibetans and the Sikhs. Unlike the Native troops' Lee-Metfords, the Tibetans' weapons were not service issue, and were often family heirlooms or prized possessions. Then, as Landon of *The Times* recalls,

The Depon Lhadang [*mDa' dpon lHa lding sras*] shouted hysterically to his men to resist. They replied by stoning the Sikhs. Even then, the whole affair hung in a slippery balance, the latter held themselves on

¹⁴⁵ OTTLEY, WILLIAM. 1906. *With Mounted Infantry in Tibet*. London: Smith Elder & Co. p. 59.

¹⁴⁶ O'CONNOR, WILLIAM. 1931. p. 51.

¹⁴⁷ FLEMING, PETER. 1961. p. 148.

check. One of them advanced to the head of the Depon's pony as the Lhasa General tried to move up to the wall. In an evil moment for himself and his countrymen, the head of the great house of Lheling [Halding] drew his pistol and fired, smashing the Sikh's jaw. There was an awful pause that lasted for perhaps three seconds.¹⁴⁸

The minutes that followed are the most controversial of the whole campaign. While the Tibetans mounted what attack they could, the British poured fire down upon them from all sides. With no hope of pressing forward over the wall to attack their assailants, and the steep sided valley hemming them in on both sides, their only line of retreat was to run the gauntlet back up the valley in the cross-hairs of the Maxim guns. Fierce hand-to-hand fighting ensued before the British regrouped and,

Poured a withering fire into the enemy which, with the quick firing Maxims, mowed down the Tibetans in a few minutes with terrific slaughter... they perished almost to a man... while those who had been further off were pursued remorselessly by our mounted infantry, and their bodies strewed the roadside for several miles.¹⁴⁹

Many of the Tibetan troops had been issued special charms or pictures of the Dalai Lama and told they would protect them from the British bullets. Fleming is especially mocking of these: "the superstitious peasants in the ranks were sustained by a sort of half faith in the charms, spells, and other mumbo-jumbo which were supposed to render them invulnerable,"¹⁵⁰ but nothing could stop the Maxim guns' devastation.

¹⁴⁸ LANDON, PERCEVAL. 1905. p. 148.

¹⁴⁹ WADDELL, AUSTINE. 1905. p. 159.

¹⁵⁰ FLEMING, PETER. 1961. p. 150.




Figure 7: Charm/Talisman collected by Waddell after the battle at Chumi Shonko.¹⁵¹

Chinese accounts differ dramatically from the British version of events: nearly all report that the British offered to remove the bullets from their Lee-Metfords if the Tibetans were to extinguishing the fuses of their matchlock rifles in a display of peaceful intention. Jaiwai openly accuses the British of tricking the Tibetans: "When Younghusband and other British military representatives met with Lhadingsse [lHa lding sras] and Namseling [rNam sras gling], they noted: "Since we came for peace talks, our troops will remove the bullets from their rifles as a token of our sincerity. But you should put out the fuses of your firearms." At the order of Younghusband, the British troops present on the occasion each removed one bullet from their rifles but, immediately, loaded another without the Tibetans becoming aware."¹⁵² Whilst not appearing overly critical of the Tibetans, he points out their naïvety claiming, "the Tibetans were not aware of the danger, simply because they had no rifles and so had no idea how to use them. Thinking the British rifles were

¹⁵¹ WADDELL, AUSTINE. 1905. pp. 174-5.

¹⁵² WANG, JIAWAI AND NYIMA GYAINCAIN. 1997. p. 88.

empty, the Tibetan troops put out the fuses of their firearms."¹⁵³ He also makes it abundantly clear who fired the first shot. Rather than lHa lding sras firing his pistol in a blind moment of panic and frustration, Jaiwai reports that, "after the negotiation had gone on for only 15 minutes, one British officer drew his pistol and killed Lhadingsse, Namseling and other Tibetan representatives."¹⁵⁴ Ying also records deception by the British by only removing one bullet from their 'repeater rifles,' however he does blame the first shot on lHa lding sras when the British tried to forcibly remove his weapons.¹⁵⁵

Shan is more direct with his claims; "When Lhadingsse went to the front to talk with Younghusband, the British troops crept around the flanks of his army. Younghusband had machine guns secretly set up around the Tibetan troops and then ordered them to be disarmed. Lhadingsse refused his categorically. The British suddenly opened fire; taken unawares, the Tibetans were mowed down in cold blood by the heavy gunfire. This is not war but slaughter."¹⁵⁶ Furen's narrative is even more critical, claiming that "Younghusband proposed peace talks, simultaneously, he had machineguns set up on the sly around the Tibetan troops. Taken unawares, the Tibetans were mowed down in cold blood by heavy fire."¹⁵⁷

British casualties were minimal: Candler, who was close to lHa lding sras, was immediately cut down by a sword, losing his left hand and receiving more than a dozen wounds. Major Wallace-Dunlop was similarly injured in the first few seconds of the battle. Shan presents a conflicting casualty list, praising the "Tibetan soldiers, who although wounded severely, still fought bravely and killed and wounded fifteen British officers and men."¹⁵⁸ There are no British records of such casualties either in the official papers, or in the surviving journals of those who took part in the battle.

¹⁵³ WANG, JIAWAI AND NYIMA GYAINCAIN. 1997. p. 88.

¹⁵⁴ WANG, JIAWAI AND NYIMA GYAINCAIN. 1997. p. 89.

¹⁵⁵ YING, CHENQING. 2003. p. 89.

¹⁵⁶ ZHENG, SHAN. 2001. p. 285.

¹⁵⁷ FUREN, WANG AND SUO WENQING. 1984. p. 123.

¹⁵⁸ ZHENG, SHAN. 2001. p. 285.

Notable in the minutes following the massacre was the Tibetan refusal to run. As Hadow described from his view behind the Maxim guns, the Tibetans "moved at a fast walk along the foot of the hills straight across my front."¹⁵⁹

Surviving Tibetans were further bewildered by readiness of the IMS to attend to their wounds. Younghusband noted how "after the action, General Macdonald ordered the whole of the medical staff to attend to the wounded Tibetans," and a field hospital was hastily erected at Düne. Many British accounts record how for the Tibetans it seemed odd that, in one instant their enemy would seek to kill them, and in another try desperately to save them. Waddell, in a rare moment of compassion and in keeping with his training as a medical officer, wrote how "it was especially pathetic to see the wounded Tibetans expecting us to kill them outright, as they frankly said that they would have done to us, kowtowing with outthrust tongues, holding up their thumbs in mute appeal for mercy and grovelling in the dust to the humblest of our coolies."¹⁶⁰

Lieutenant Gurdon was ordered to count the Tibetan casualties and presented figures to Macdonald who penned a confidential telegram to the Viceroy attempting to explain the bloodshed. Gurdon counted 340 killed and 150 injured in the immediate vicinity. Macdonald's telegram estimates that over 2,000 Tibetans had been present, half regular soldiers and half militia, and of these 222 were wounded and 628 were killed.¹⁶¹ Ying by contrast claims that over "1,400 Tibetans were killed, including Daiboin Ladingse [*mDa' dpon lHa lding sras*] and Daiboin Namseling [*mDa' dpon rNam sras gling*], while only two British officers were wounded and 13 soldiers died."¹⁶²

The loss at Chumi Shonko was a disaster for the Tibetan military: having lost their three most senior officers, lHa lding sras, rNam sras gling and the Phagri Dzongpön, the main force was immediately pulled back to defend the approaches to Yamdok

¹⁵⁹ ALLEN, CHARLES. 2004a. p. 119.

¹⁶⁰ WADDELL, AUSTINE. 1905. p. 191.

¹⁶¹ BL: MSS EUR F 197 80. FEY to Viceroy F111/342.

¹⁶² YING, CHENQING. 2003. p. 90.

Tso. Macdonald believed that any survivors and reinforcements would now march to Gyantse, and decided to press home his advantage by immediately marching on the city.

It transpired that the Tibetans had not abandoned the valley totally, and had been ordered to stand once more a little further up the valley at a place known to the British as The Red Idol Gorge. Here a stronger wall had been constructed across the valley and up the sides of the gorge; however it was found abandoned. The Tibetans had skilfully chosen to defend the valley floor and steep sides further into the defile where nature had provided a perfect ambush site.

The Mission was halted on the morning of 10th of April when the vanguard came under heavy fire from unobserved sangas along the steep defile. The Gurkhas were employed to climb the valley sides under shrapnel cover. When the path (at some points only six feet wide) was considered safe the army advanced straight into an ambush. Ottley recalls how his Mounted Infantry were,

... ordered down in single file, about fifteen yards between the men, at a smart trot. No enemy was discovered and we began to think what fools the Tibetans were. Then we came to where the defile opened out to about 150 yards, with the fount blocked by precipitous boulders. On we gaily went, and the leading man was just at the corner there the road and valley turn sharp to the left, when the whole of the hitherto silent, unmanned hillsides burst forth into flashes of fire and puffs of smoke.¹⁶³

Remarkably there were no casualties; perhaps due more to the inaccuracy of the Tibetan matchlocks than British agility, but on seeing the flight of the Mounted Infantry the Tibetans gave chase, thereby revealing their defence positions. Ottley turned his men and returned fire from the saddle. Exposed in the open valley, and slow to load and fire, the Tibetans were soon on the defensive, fleeing back down the defile. Above them the Gurkhas harried their desperate flight. It was all over by the time Younghusband arrived to pen that the Tibetans were "bolting like

¹⁶³ OTTLEY, WILLIAM. 1906. p. 143.

rabbits,"¹⁶⁴ later reasoning that "the Tibetan generals were advised not to fight by the Chinese. The tears streamed down their faces as they said they had to fight for if they did not their families wd [would] be seized. So they pretended to fight and about a hundred of them were killed."¹⁶⁵

Waddell commented that the prisoners were put to work destroying the guns that were seized, a task they undertook with relish. Much is made of the encounter in Tibetan and Chinese sources, and Jaiwai records it as a great success, remarking that "some 30 mounted British troops entered the valley, they were ambushed and killed by the Tibetans armed with fire arms, clubs and stones."¹⁶⁶ However, in his account Younghusband merely notes that, "at the Tsamdang Gorge, the Tibetans again opposed our progress by building a wall across the narrow passage. But General Macdonald dislodged them and inflicted heavy loss."¹⁶⁷ Official figures of the battle list some 150 Tibetans killed or wounded.

Furen's narrative records how the Tibetans continually harassed the British advance effectively employing guerrilla tactics against the invaders. In one episode of his *Highlights from Tibetan History*, "the monks and lay people in Khang-dmar County informed of the imminent arrival of a British raiding party, donned sheepskins and hid themselves among their sheep. As the raiders dismounted from their horses to seize the livestock, the ambushers made their move. Twenty or thirty of the intruders were killed and the rest fled."¹⁶⁸ No British accounts mention any such imaginative Tibetan tactics, and after marching past Nenyng Monastery the Mission reached Gyantse on the 11th of April.

¹⁶⁴ BL: MSS EUR F 197 80. FEY to Viceroy. FY/78.

¹⁶⁵ HIS MAJESTY'S STATIONERY OFFICE. 1905. *Cd. 1920*. p. 219.

¹⁶⁶ WANG, JIAWAI AND NYIMA GYAINCAIN. 1997. p. 90.

¹⁶⁷ YOUNGHUSBAND, FRANCIS. 1910. p. 180.

¹⁶⁸ FUREN, WANG AND SUO WENQING. 1984. p. 124.

Gyantse

That evening the Gyantse Dzungpön arrived at the Mission camp. He was informed that Macdonald proposed to occupy the great Dzong that dominated the town and establish his headquarters there. The Dzungpön had been instructed by Lhasa not to abandon the fort at any cost, but had neither the strength nor will to defend it.

With the Union flag fluttering above the strongest fortress in Tibet, the Viceroy telegraphed to congratulate all of the officers and men of the Mission escort, expressing his "grateful recognition of the cheerfulness, self restraint, and endurance exhibited by all ranks."¹⁶⁹ Shan by contrast describes a looting frenzy once the Dzong fell, "Many provisions kept in the storehouses, including 600,000 jin¹⁷⁰ of grain, a great amount of beef and mutton, several thousand jin of gunpowder and fuses totalling several hundred kilometres in length¹⁷¹ were all captured by the invaders. The invaders looted, burned and killed in the adjoining

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The image originally located here has been removed from this electronic version of the thesis for copyright reasons. [Figure 8: The Dzungpön of Gyantse talking to Younghusband. ALLEN, CHARLES. 2004.]

¹⁶⁹ IGGULDEN, HERBERT. 1905. To Lhasa With the Tibet Expedition, 1903-04. *The Journal of the Royal United Services Institute*. Vol. 49. No. 328. pp. 659-79.

¹⁷⁰ Jin: A Chinese Imperial weight. Roughly equivalent to half a Kilogram.

¹⁷¹ This surely is an inflated figure. Several hundred Kilometres of fuse could extend all the way to Lhasa.

¹⁷² ZHENG, SHAN. 2001. p. 287.

The Dzong at Gyantse is built on the southern end of a crescent shaped steep-sided ridge about 400 feet high and running for about a mile and a half across the open plain of Gyantse. The crescent cradles the town of Gyantse, which despite being the third largest in Tibet, was relatively small, as well as the monastery of Pelkor Chöde with its famous Kumbum. When approached from the south the Dzong appears all but impenetrable and its steep walls and towers have defended the main trade route to Lhasa since it was built in the late thirteenth century. However it was not suitable as barracks for the Mission escort; owing to its sheer size it was not defensible with the small number of troops available to Macdonald. Once a more suitable home was found for the Mission at Changlo Manor, the majority of the escort troops were ordered to retire to Chumbi.¹⁷³

Matters progressed on May 1st when Captain Hodgson and the Mounted Infantry discovered almost 1,500 Tibetan troops behind a newly constructed wall only fifty miles east of Gyantse at the 16,000-foot Karo La. Contrary to Macdonald's orders to defend and attack only if attacked, Colonel Brander decided to attack the wall without delay. The Flying Column marched out of Changlo on May 3rd with three companies of the 32nd Sikh Pioneers, one company of the 8th Gurkhas, the Maxim Gun Detachment, and the newspapermen, leaving the Mission defended by only one company of each of the Gurkhas and Sikhs. On receiving word of this antagonistic move Macdonald immediately telegraphed to recall and reprimand Brander. His stern missive acknowledged Brander and Younghusband's ploy; such an action could be seen as an attempt to force the hand of the Government; however he did not anticipate Younghusband's Nelson touch of ordering the dispatch rider to proceed with utmost caution ensuring that Brander had every opportunity to engage the enemy. It was not long before Younghusband had reason to curse his opportunism and precaution.

¹⁷³ It was also an opportunity for Waddell to 'collect' the entire 450-volume library of the owner's private chapel when it was converted into the Mission's mess. The books are now in the British Museum. For more on Waddell's 'collecting' see chapter six.

On the morning of the 5th of May the garrison of Changlo was woken to the sound of Tibetan war cries. Tibetan militia had rushed past sleeping sentries, and in some places breached the curtain wall. Fierce hand-to-hand fighting broke out all along the perimeter of the garrison's enclosure and defences. Shan's narrative describes how the brave Tibetans,

Dashed into the enemy camp with swords, spears and homemade guns in their hands, shouting loudly. The heavy losses inflicted on the enemy by the Tibetan army left them stunned. Younghusband, breaking thorough the encirclement with an escort of several dozen infantrymen, fled in utter confusion.¹⁷⁴

Ying records that Younghusband "later admitted that if the Tibetan troops had not shouted before their assault, all the British troops would have been slaughtered. This Tibetan habit saved the British, winning them time to awaken and prepare to fight."¹⁷⁵

The Tibetan offensive had also captured the unguarded Dzong, which was now returning fire on Changlo. By the time the garrison had pushed the remaining Tibetans out of the compound there were 134 Tibetan and three British dead.

The image originally located here has been removed from this electronic version of the thesis for copyright reasons. [Figure 9: View from Changlo to Gyantse Dzong along Hadow's Maxim gun. ALLEN, CHARLES. 2004.]

¹⁷⁴ ZHENG, SHAN. 2001. p. 288.

¹⁷⁵ YING, CHENQING. 2003. p. 91.

Mission to Expedition

Waddell's description of the increased militarisation of the Mission resonated in London where the Cabinet were appalled by the attack on the Changlo, and sought a swift conclusion to what was rapidly becoming a diplomatic embarrassment. Kitchener gave orders for four companies of 1st Battalion, The Royal Fusiliers, six companies of Indian troops from 40th Pathans, an eight-man detachment from 1st Battalion, The Royal Irish Rifles with two extra Maxim guns, a British Army Mountain Battery with four ten-pounder guns, and The Murree Mountain Battery with two additional ten-pounders, and two field hospitals to assemble in Darjeeling and join the Mission with all speed. The name of the Mission was altered to reflect its military status, now being termed 'The Sikkim Tibet Field Force.' Joining them was the Tongsa Pönlop, O rgyan dbang phyug, the *de facto* ruler of Bhutan. Owing to his unique position he played a pivotal role in negotiations with the Tibetans; he acknowledged the religious supremacy of the Dalai Lama, but recognised that it was in both his own and his country's interest to assist the British in their activities in Tibet. His letters, influence, and the example of the way Bhutan was dealt with by the British is analysed further in chapter five.

The image originally located here has been removed from this electronic version of the thesis for copyright reasons. [Figure 10: Royal Fusiliers leave Lebung, Lt Col Cooper DSO is mounted on the white horse. Photograph courtesy of The Royal Regiment of Fusiliers Museum, The Tower of London.]

Urgent supplies and reinforcements were soon forthcoming, allowing Brander to attack the Tibetans in the plain below the Dzong. The newly arrived Sappers and Miners destroyed the defences at Phala Manor, a large aristocratic estate that had been fortified by the Tibetans. The Gurkhas fought a ferocious battle with Khampa warriors who had occupied the central courtyard resulting in stalemate. Reinforcements were called up with two Maxim guns, prompting dozens of Tibetan horsemen and militia to race from the Dzong to the Khampas' aid; however they rode straight towards the Maxim guns and within minutes all lay dead in the open ground before the Dzong. This demoralised the Tibetans inside Phala, and despite fighting to the last man, the estate was lost with the slaughter of over 400 Tibetans. Shan records that the battle for Phala cost the British twenty-three dead and countless wounded.¹⁷⁶

Further heavy fighting followed at Nenyng where the Tibetans had heavily fortified the monastery and surrounding village. The artillery pounded the village and large monastic complex for several hours before the Gurkhas and Pathans carried the attack home at bayonet point. The Mounted Infantry were engaged in house clearing operations suffering several casualties and fighting well into the night before the resistance was either shot down, or retreated to the hills. By this stage it was too late to count the casualties, but conservative estimates account for over 200 enemy killed.

Ying records in his narrative not only the bravery of the Tibetan defenders, but also the brutality of the British invaders. In one account he records how "the Tibetan troops and militia, as well as the monks, remained staunch in holding their ground fighting hand-to-hand against the invaders ... killing many with swords and spears." After relying heavily on their artillery to destroy the walls of the monastery, the British, "ransacked the monastery ... but also bound the Tibetan monks who refused to surrender to the post of Buddhist banners and shot them. The

¹⁷⁶ ZHENG, SHAN. 2001. p. 288.

dilapidated walls of Neinying [sic] Monastery remains until this day with many shell holes visible."¹⁷⁷

Furen records similar acts of heroism, describing the Tibetans as "battling like lions, and in some cases slashed their enemies in half." He also accuses the British of destroying the monastery before "ransacking and burning down its scripture reading hall,"¹⁷⁸ and estimates over 200 British casualties in the fierce hand-to-hand fighting. Jaiwai is the first to cite the celebrated case of the two brothers from Kongpo, A dar Nyi ma grags pa and *IDab ldob* A dar stating that they "are remembered to this day by the villages of Nenyning with horse racing, archery and other activities on the first day of the 10th month of each Tibetan year." He graphically describes how these noble patriots "killed a British officer and some 120 of the invaders. But they themselves died a heroic death during the battle, their blood dripping from the upper steps of the monastery."¹⁷⁹ He also describes the looting of "more than 1,000 gilded statues of Buddha, large amounts of satins embroidered with images of Buddha, Gangyur [sic] and other Buddhist classics, and gold, silver and bronze objects."¹⁸⁰

The reinforcements of the Sikkim Tibet Field Force arrived on the 26th of June, and preparations were made to storm the Dzong. O rgyan dbang phyug, the Tongsa Pönlop argued successfully for a five-day extension to the ultimatum so that officials soon to arrive from Lhasa could attempt to intervene. This gave the British time to clear Tsechen Monastery on the 28th, Waddell losing no time in collecting more precious artefacts and texts. Jaiwai estimates that at the storming of Tsechen "the fighting lasted one day, claiming a loss of 280 British soldiers and 150 Tibetans."¹⁸¹ The relaxed pose of the officers and men in the photo below adds to the British claims that not a man was lost in the bombardment that was effectively target practice for the forthcoming assault on the Dzong.

¹⁷⁷ YING, CHENQING. 2003. p. 92.

¹⁷⁸ FUREN, WANG AND SUO WENQING. 1984. p. 125

¹⁷⁹ WANG, JIAWAI AND NYIMA GYAINCAIN. 1997. p. 91.

¹⁸⁰ WANG, JIAWAI AND NYIMA GYAINCAIN. 1997. p. 92.

¹⁸¹ WANG, JIAWAI AND NYIMA GYAINCAIN. 1997. p. 93.

The image originally located here has been removed from this electronic version of the thesis for copyright reasons. [Figure 11: Macdonald, far right, watches the 7th Mountain Battery bombard Tsechen Monastery. 28th June 1904. ALLEN, CHARLES. 2004.]

On the last day of June a delegation of Tibetans approached carrying a large white flag, not of surrender, but a request for an extension of the deadline so that the Tā Lama, 'Bum thang Ye shes phul byung, could arrive from Lhasa. Younghusband gave the Tibetans until noon on the 1st of July. The Tā Lama, the representative of the Panchen Lama, eventually arrived for the durbar started at 16:00 with Younghusband in no mood to negotiate, nor listen to the Lama's insistence in negotiation. He ordered the Tibetans out of the Dzong within thirty-six hours, before military operations would begin by noon on 5th of July.

The image originally located here has been removed from this electronic version of the thesis for copyright reasons. [Figure 12: Macdonald, centre, watches the negotiations. ALLEN, CHARLES. 2004.]

Storming of Gyantse

When the deadline for surrender had passed Tsechen Monastery was set alight to prevent it being reoccupied, and a feint attack made on the western walls of the Dzong to draw Tibetans' attention away from the main attack from the south. Once the light was sufficient all available heavy guns were deployed, clearing the ramparts with shrapnel, before common shell was used to breach the walls and earthworks. Three columns of troops marched from the south, southeast and southwest with the 8th Gurkhas and Royal Fusiliers seizing a section of the perimeter walls. An outbuilding known as China House was occupied and a dressing station set up under the flag of the Red Cross. Under covering fire, the Gurkhas braved bullets and boulders hurled by the defenders to climb the steep cliffs beneath the Dzong. The Tibetan defenders returned inaccurate but intensive fire, and for a while it seemed that the attack had run out of steam. The artillery was repositioned to allow a greater concentration on the Dzong itself, and at 14:00

a huge explosion was heard, indicating the gunpowder magazine deep inside the Dzong had been hit.

This was the signal for the Gurkhas to begin to climb the rock face of the Dzong, despite the Maxim guns' covering fire hindering their difficult ascent. Lieutenant Grant, the officer commanding the Gurkhas, was felled by a large rock but got back on his feet to lead his men through the breach in the walls.¹⁸²

Suddenly like magic the defence fell to pieces like a house of cards and the defenders began to flee, their fire slackened, and in a few minutes the whole thing was over. The Tibetans were escaping in hundreds, climbing and jumping down the far side, and making off across the country and into the hills as fast as their legs or ponies could carry them.¹⁸³

Within minutes the troops were posing for photographs on the roof of the Dzong under the Union flag.

In Chinese accounts the siege of Gyantse is dealt with in detail. The common themes are again the bravery of the Tibetan soldiers, and their refusal to surrender, even in defeat. Jaiwai describes how the Tibetans suffered great hardships, having their water supply cut off, drinking from a pit and, "when the pit dried up, they drank their own urine. Even under the most difficult conditions, the Tibetans never wavered."¹⁸⁴ Shan claims that the battle for Gyantse Dzong lasted "ten days of bloody war," before the British had to confess that, "the resolution, means of defense and bravery expressed in the battle by the Tibetan people have destroyed the absurd idea that the Tibetans can not fight. They are of dauntless heroism... their individual bravery defies any comparison... The Tibetan's heroism is indisputable."¹⁸⁵

¹⁸² For this he was later awarded the Victoria Cross. Havildar Karbir Pun was at his side throughout the climb and final attack, earning him the highest award for bravery for native troops, The Indian Order of Merit, 1st Class.

¹⁸³ O'CONNOR, WILLIAM. 1931. p. 60.

¹⁸⁴ WANG, JIAWAI AND NYIMA GYAINCAIN. 1997. p. 92.

¹⁸⁵ ZHENG, SHAN. 2005. *A Selection of Tibetan Historical Materials*. Beijing: Sanlian Book Store. pp. 206-207.

The patriotism and courage of the Tibetans is included in Ying's narrative, claiming that, "although they were defeated, their valiant and tenacious spirit in the battle and resolute determination to resist the invasion of the imperialists wrote a glorious chapter in Tibetan history, winning the respect and the memory of later generations."¹⁸⁶ Furen adds to this narrative of heroism that "Those who failed to break through the enemy encirclement leaped over the cliff to avoid being taken prisoner." For an examination of this and subsequent claims regarding this final act of self-sacrifice see conclusions below.

The image originally located here has been removed from this electronic version of the thesis for copyright reasons. [Figure 13: 'F' Company of The Royal Fusiliers at the summit of Gyantse Dzong, 6th July 1904. Photograph courtesy of The Royal Regiment of Fusiliers Museum, The Tower of London.]

On to Lhasa

On the 18th of July the Mission advanced to the wall that spanned the Karo La. The General lost no time in sending The Royal Fusiliers against it. As in the previous encounter at this wall the Tibetans on the valley floor fled before the advancing troops, but those further up the slopes were engaged for some time in dogged resistance against the Gurkhas; their only route of escape being into the snow fields

¹⁸⁶ YING, CHENQING. 2003. p. 93.

above the pass.¹⁸⁷ Further on Nakartse Dzong had been abandoned, but the *sPyi khyab mkhan po* and Kalön gYu thog Phun tshogs dpal ldan, the senior most officer of the Kashag, received the officers and offered to negotiate. The Kalön informed Younghusband that the Ganden Phodrang would be willing to negotiate any settlement proposed by the Tongsa Pönlop, if negotiations took place at Gyantse. Younghusband arranged for a formal durbar the following day.

The image originally located here has been removed from this electronic version of the thesis for copyright reasons. [Figure 14: BL: 1083/11 Bailey Collection. Image 83. "M.I. with Tibetan prisoners. The man on the left thought the camera was a pistol, hence his face."The image also occurs in BL: 1083/13 Bailey Collection: Tobet 1903-4 F.M.B. [Volume] II. Image 285, with the caption "Two prisoners captured by Eric beyond the Karo La 16.6.04". The man on the extreme left of the photo is identified in pencil as Subdr. Sanghat Singh. 45th Sikhs.]

O'Connor described attempts to bribe him during the durbar with bags of gold dust that were left for him to discover on his table.¹⁸⁸ Despite this distraction negotiation was painfully slow, and the next day the durbar broke without agreement.

¹⁸⁷ This engagement stands as the highest battle in British military history.

¹⁸⁸ O'CONNOR, WILLIAM. 1931. p. 62.

Tibetan attempts to halt the Mission through mediation and diplomacy now intensified. As the troops crossed the river at Cagksam the Tibet Commissioner received a letter addressed to "The all-wise Sahib sent by the English Government to settle affairs, from the Tibetan National Assembly."¹⁸⁹

The National Assembly acknowledged the letter sent by the Tongsa Pönlop on behalf of the British Government, and announced that the suitable delegates, chaired by the Lord Chamberlain, had been dispatched to the banks of the river at Chushül to discuss matters. The letter urged Younghusband "not press forward hastily to Lhasa ... Even if the Sahibs should come to Lhasa and meet the Dalai Lama, this will not advantage the cause of friendship. Should a fresh cause of dispute arise, we greatly fear that a disturbance, contrary to the interests of friendship, may follow."¹⁹⁰ Furen blames this move towards negotiation on the "capitulationists who represented the interests of the big serf-owner class gaining the upper hand in the Tibetan local government."¹⁹¹

On the 2nd of August, a final deputation came to meet them. It comprised the highest authorities in Tibet; two of the four Kalöns, as well as the Abbots of the Three Seats at Ganden, Sera, and Drepung. With Lhasa so close it is little wonder they failed to make any impression or persuade Younghusband to return to India. The army continued and the following day, the long awaited golden roof of the Potala was sighted.

¹⁸⁹ FLEMING, PETER. 1961. p. 225.

¹⁹⁰ FLEMING, PETER. 1961. p. 226.

¹⁹¹ FUREN, WANG AND SUO WENQING. 1984. p. 126.

Lhasa at Last

The events of the next few weeks are not central to this thesis, and therefore will not be described in detail. Lhasa proved to be a dirty and disappointing town for many of the troops, but none could fail to be impressed by the sheer size and magnificence of the Potala Palace. After O rgyan dbang phyug, the Tongsa Pönlop led a triumphal entry through the great west gate of the city the troops were camped in fields below Shöl so as not to cause alarm to the curious residents. Nonetheless Ying misleadingly claims that Lhasa was forcibly occupied after a determined attack,¹⁹² and Furen goes so far as to claim "the British occupation army looted Lhasa. Even ordinary women's silver ornaments were not exempted from the pillage, let alone valuables. Cultural relics jealously kept in the monasteries and other places... including Buddhist scriptures and other books, Buddhist statues and porcelain were especially prized."¹⁹³ The contentious debate over looting during the mission is examined in chapter six.

Younghusband was installed in the home of the aristocratic Lhalu family near to the Norbu Linka,¹⁹⁴ and set about receiving visitors in an attempt to understand the minutiae of Lhasa politics. He faced many problems; it soon transpired that the Dalai Lama had fled to Mongolia leaving his Government in turmoil. To add to this, on the advice of the Amban, the Emperor in Peking had issued orders announcing a temporary end to the post of Dalai Lama and stripping the XIIIth incumbent of his temporal powers. The Government in India required the Mission to leave Tibet as soon as possible, and Macdonald sanctioned less than three weeks before the army had to return to India for winter.¹⁹⁵ Younghusband had to secure a legally binding, and internationally recognisable treaty, between two unwilling governments, in a space of less than three weeks.

¹⁹² YING, CHENQING. 2003. p. 93.

¹⁹³ FUREN, WANG AND SUO WENQING. 1984. p. 126.

¹⁹⁴ Norbu Linka. The Summer Palace of the Dalai Lama.

¹⁹⁵ British intention to retire from Lhasa once any treaty was signed is disputed by Ying who claims that "Curzon wanted Lhasa as a British 'buffer zone'" to "create a base from Britain's northward expansion." YING, CHENQING. 2003. p. 94.

The Tongsa Pönlop and the Nepalese Consul in Lhasa, Captain Jit Bahadur Khatri Chetry, assisted negotiations at the Lhalu Manor. Chetry introduced Younghusband to Blo bzang rgyal mtshan, the Ganden Tripa, in whose care the Dalai Lama had entrusted his seals of office. Despite his self-confessed poor knowledge of international affairs, the aged Regent impressed Younghusband with his humanity and humour. However the Kashag took umbrage against a proposed article demanding that an indemnity be paid to the Government of India to compensate the expense of the Mission. They were however willing to hand over the two Sikkimese prisoners captured in 1903. Despite a setback when a Sera monk attacked a group of British officers with a sword,¹⁹⁶ the troops impatiently entertained themselves with sightseeing trips, athletics competitions, football, and even a race meet.

The Amban proved to be of assistance to the British, offering advice and organising supplies for the officers and men, much to the disgust of later Chinese historians; "After the fall of Lhasa, Resident Minister Yü Tai once again acted shamelessly. He called on Younghusband and brought cattle, sheep, rice and flour to his troops and gifts to his staff to reward the invaders and express his greetings, as if he had forgotten he was a grand minister in charge of the security of the borderland."¹⁹⁷

The proposed indemnity proved a sticking point in negotiations. Younghusband proffered the figure of Rs50,000 for each day following the 5th May (when the Mission was attacked in Changlo) to the date of any treaty signed thus encouraging a swift resolution. However, by the end of August 1904 this amounted to nearly Rs6,000,000. Brodrick had also given Younghusband leverage by suggesting that the British occupy the Chumbi Valley as surety for a period of five years until the full indemnity was received. At Blo bzang rgyal mtshan's request Younghusband telegraphed the Government of India requesting that the Tibetans be allowed to

¹⁹⁶ A crime he was later tried and publicly hanged for.

¹⁹⁷ ZHENG, SHAN. 2001. p. 291.

pay any indemnity at a rate of Rs100,000 per year. What Younghusband did not tell his political masters in New Delhi was that he had increased the indemnity to over Rs7,500,000, meaning that Chumbi would remain in British hands until 1979.

On the 1st of September all parties met in durbar for final time. After much haggling over the sum and form of payment of the indemnity, the Ganden Tripa Rimpoche affixed his private seal to the daft treaty. Younghusband conceded in his account of the Mission that to agree to the seventy-five year surety was "a grave error of judgement, that was sure to bring upon me the censure of Government," however the Regent's seal indicated the Ganden Phodrang's willingness to sign. The final treaty was signed in The Potala to much pomp and ceremony. After Younghusband's long politically nuanced speech that must have been incomprehensible to the assembled Tibetan dignitaries, the seals of the Three Seats, The Ganden Tripa, the Kashag and the National Assembly were attached to the treaty.¹⁹⁸ The Lhasa Amban did not attach his seal, as authorisation to do so had not arrived from Peking. Shan describes the scene almost entirely differently, recording that the "Potala was besieged by British troops"¹⁹⁹ and that Blo bzang rgyal mtshan was forced to sign the treaty at gunpoint. The claim that the Ganden Phodrang were held at gunpoint and forced to sign the treaty is repeated in Furen's description of events, where he also calls the treaty the "British dictated unequal treaty of Lhasa."²⁰⁰ Despite his refusing to sign Shan claims that Yü Tai "helped Younghusband a great deal, and served as his accomplice."²⁰¹

The diplomatic fallout and effects of the treaty are analysed in the conclusions below; however the methods and propaganda that China uses to this day to present the treaty and the Mission as part of a wider narrative of Imperial aggression and Tibet's unity with the Motherland are examined in chapter two.

¹⁹⁸ The Regent refused to attach the seal to many small documents and so the final treaties were over nine feet long.

¹⁹⁹ ZHENG, SHAN. 2001. p. 292.

²⁰⁰ FUREN, WANG AND SUO WENQING. 1984. p. 127.

²⁰¹ ZHENG, SHAN. 2001. p. 291.

Chapter Two: Propaganda

The Introduction explored the varying accounts through which history is presented; From the Younghusband Mission we have the self-satisfying narrative of the British officers and men who took part in the Mission, modern Western academic interpretations, historical accounts from Chinese and Tibetan sources, and finally the modern interpretations from a Chinese perspective. These contemporary Chinese accounts explicitly seek to emphasise the imperialistic, violent, and dishonest nature of the Mission, when compared with the harmonious, valiant, loyal, and desperate struggle of the Tibetans. Later chapters will deal with specific instances, sources, and issues that arise from this genre, but here I examine why the Chinese authorities seek to present this image of the Mission, and their ultimate objectives in doing so. Having established their motives, I then examine the various methods that The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and government authorities in China use to disseminate and enforce their message. I examine the use of 'soft power,' propaganda, and persuasion techniques, and how the CCP has used these powers to convince the world of the viability of its economic model, the legitimacy of its founding principles, and its authority in Tibet.

Since gaining power in 1949 the CCP hierarchy have been acutely aware of the need to create a positive public image of both the Party, and of the Nation, and to associate the two in public perception both within the Motherland, and overseas. As early as 1936, Mao Zedong was urging propaganda workers to collect and promote stories of the 'Long March' in order to present it as a great triumph of the Party, rather than as a punishing rout.²⁰² In the years since the CCP came to power the message has been one of unity and progress, and as Brady points out, "in the Mao era, newspapers, radio and public bulletin boards were particularly important transmitters of government information. In the Deng, Jiang, and now Hu eras,

²⁰² MAO, ZEDONG. 1983. *Mao Zedong xinwen gongzuo wenjian*. [Mao Zedong's Articles on News Works.] Beijing: Xinhua Chubanshe. p. 37.

television and the Internet have become the most important propaganda tools."²⁰³ In this way China, unlike most of the other few remaining socialist countries, has thoroughly embraced modern communication technologies, and indeed now finds itself at the forefront of many fields of communication and information exchange. With these rapid developments in communication has come the need for ever increasing surveillance, control, and propaganda on the part of the controlling party. Lasswell has argued that in modern industrialised societies there is a need for more propaganda, not less, as one of the most fundamental means of social control, and China is a case exemplar.²⁰⁴

But as the mode of transmission has changed, so too has the message. In the early years of the CCP, propaganda sought to legitimise the rule of the Party through their founding principles of Marxist-Leninist rhetoric, interpreted and expanded by their 'Great Helmsman' and leader.²⁰⁵ The proletariat was educated through successive propaganda campaigns to root out enemies of the Party and State, and to unite in the fellowship, industry, and communism of the Motherland. The fifty-five officially recognised minorities of China were taught that they could enjoy maintain their ethnic identities, diverse religions, and several autonomous regions were established to preserve their cultures and status; *True Xinjiang* patriotically declares that, "Since its founding in 1921, the CCP successfully formulated and implemented policies concerning ethnic minorities, and united and led the people of all ethnic groups to win the final victory of the New Democratic Revolution."²⁰⁶ However the example of the breakup of the former Soviet Union has fueled Chinese fears that the minorities will somehow force the 'Balkanisation' of the Motherland,

²⁰³ BRADY, ANNE-MARIE. 2008. *Marketing Dictatorship: Propaganda and Thought Work in Contemporary China*. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield. p. 2.

²⁰⁴ LASSWELL, HAROLD. 1995. 'Propaganda.' JACKALL, ROBERT. (Ed.) *Propaganda*. New York, NY: New York University Press. p. 17.

²⁰⁵ McCarty has shown how the cult-like admiration of Mao Zedong is an important aspect of traditional Chinese propaganda, since it builds upon the historical notion of the emperor's role as mediator between heaven and earth, and, thus, as a quasi-divine figure. MCCARTY, MICHAEL. 2000. The Historical Roots of Chinese Communist Propaganda. *The Pulse*. Vol. 3. No. 1. pp. 1-7.

²⁰⁶ http://www.globaltimes.cn/www/english/truexinjiang/docs/200907/445453_2.html Accessed 24th June 2010.

and consequently although the official line has not changed, tolerance of separatist movements or dissent from minorities has become vehemently and often violently suppressed. The Chinese leadership is determined to crush what they describe as the three 'evils'; separatism, terrorism, and extremism. This is especially true in Tibet, which has a history of uprising against the rule of China, from the uprising in 1959 and the long running guerrilla war in the Kham regions, to nonviolent protests that marked the decade following the Dalai Lama's visit to the USA in 1987, and a return to violence in March 2008.

Propaganda in China

The focus of the modern propaganda message in China has changed to one that incorporates China's new economic model. Brady notes that, "economic propaganda aimed at creating market confidence is now a key theme, as is economic thought reform, aimed at getting Chinese people to come to terms with the new economic order. Nationalism and selective anti-foreignism are stressed, while Marxism-Leninism are somewhat downplayed."²⁰⁷ The CCP has rebranded China with a revised notion of national unity through the ideology of patriotic nationalism, Communism in the mould of Marxist-Leninist-Maoist theory, partial market force liberalism, an opening of the economy to foreign exchange and foreign direct investment, and a limited social democracy. In her book, *Marketing Dictatorships*, Brady shows how the State is "reinventing itself on more democratic lines, lower level elections, anti-corruption campaigns, improved transparency, e-government, and talk of social justice, while maintaining the political status quo of one party rule."²⁰⁸ What Kenez called the 'Propaganda State'²⁰⁹ is clearly alive and well in China, and propaganda has played a pivotal role in the repackaging of the CCP. It is through the careful and liberal use of propaganda that the CCP has held on to power in a post-communist China. Whereas once control over the economy and

²⁰⁷ BRADY, ANNE-MARIE. 2008. p. 3.

²⁰⁸ BRADY, ANNE-MARIE. 2008. p. 6.

²⁰⁹ KENEZ, PETER. 1992. *The Birth of the Propaganda State: Soviet Methods of Mass Mobilisation, 1917-1925*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

people followed staunchly communist lines, the China that has emerged from this transformation would barely be recognizable to Marx or Mao, but remains communist in name. China no longer fits the description of a Stalinist/Maoist dictatorship, but at the same time refuses to engage democracy at anything beyond a superficial level. The Party's stance on the unity of the Motherland, especially with regard to Tibet, has never altered, but by looking at the targets of its propaganda campaigns we get a glimpse into where the CCP perceives the fault lines of Chinese society to lie, and where its real or perceived threats to its stability, growth, and hold on power in the PRC may stem from.

In the past, the Party's legitimacy to rule the Motherland was defined in revolutionary terms; it was as a result of the leadership and zeal of the early revolutionaries that the CCP derived its status and unique position. The Party adopted policies of equality, unity, freedom, and regional autonomy. 'National Equality' prohibited discrimination and oppression, 'National Unity and Mutual Assistance,' was decreed by law, all parts of China were guaranteed the freedom of developing their own spoken and written languages, keeping or reforming their own customs and habits, and of religious belief, and regional autonomy ensured where minority nationalities lived in compact communities.²¹⁰ Revolutionary propaganda reflected these beliefs and focused on the unity of the Motherland.

The catchphrases of political thinking have now altered to include 'socialism' and 'the market,' while the revolutionary heritage of the Party is now drawn upon to invoke nostalgia and common history. China's 'economic miracle' of the last decade has been presented with terms such as 'socialism with Chinese characteristics,' and the 'socialist market economy,' and it is interesting to note how easily they have infiltrated the parlance of Western economists and commentators.²¹¹

²¹⁰ BLONDEAU, ANNE-MARIE. Ed. 2008. *Authenticating Tibet: Answers to China's 100 Questions*. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press. p. 191.

²¹¹ Indeed this has come perilously close to Orwell's 'Newspeak.' ORWELL, GEORGE. 1949. *Nineteen Eighty-Four*. London: Secker & Warburg. p. 372.

Methods Used in Propaganda, and the Tools of Information Control

History, and especially history that can be presented as a direct threat to the authority of the state, is a highly emotive issue in the PRC. The interpretation and presentation of an official and approved version of history is vital to the preservation of that authority. Historical interpretation is one way in which the CCP legitimises its position in China, and maintains its dominance. Through the use of propaganda and persuasion the CCP seeks to influence the opinions of its own citizens, and the international community, establishing its own authority and legitimising its control of the state. The presentation of history is only one of the many ways that the state influences opinions of these citizens; the use of financial aid, censorship of the radio, the Internet, and paper publications, and strict control over cultural programmes, films and television, and education policy all are used to add legitimacy to the current ruling system and party.

The Red Arts: Soft Power, Propaganda, and Persuasion

China has truly mastered the art of 'soft power.' Joseph Nye²¹² coined the term 'soft power' in the late 1980s, and describes how soft power can be used by an individual, organisation, or nation to shape the opinion others have of them.²¹³ Soft power lies in the ability to attract and persuade, it arises from the attractiveness of a country's culture, political ideals, and policies. Whereas hard power by comparison lies in the ability to coerce, or the ability to use the carrots and sticks of economic and military might to make others fall into line. The Chinese authorities uses mediums such as film, written word, radio broadcast, the Internet, educational programmes, financial aid packages and incentives, international diplomacy, and prestige events such as the Olympic Games to foster positive perceptions of the PRC. Anyone who doubts the validity or influence of 'soft power' need only muse on

²¹² A former United States Assistant Secretary of Defense.

²¹³ NYE, JOSEPH. 2005. *Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics*. New York, NY: Public Affairs.

how one of the world's last, and greatest, totalitarian and authoritarian regimes has resorted to using basketball teams and singing children to promote and legitimise itself.

In the application of these 'soft powers,' China has been emulating the past masters of the art: America. The Chinese have taken the American model of propaganda and information control, and applied it to the notion of the viability of the 'China Model;' that access to a limited market economy, communism and consumerism can all co-exist. As in the US the idea that the view the international media presents of the nation will form the opinion and perception of that country in the minds of the world's citizens is a matter of the topmost importance, and by extension therefore, 'national security.'

In the spring of 1989 and in the wake of the crackdown that followed the popular unrest in Tiananmen Square, the Chinese Communist Party established the Central Committee Propaganda Department to raise the image of the People's Republic in the aftermath of the damaging press attention it had received.²¹⁴ In terms of its two main objectives the use of international 'soft power' was successful for China; firstly to gain international recognition of the might of the People's Republic and to win UN recognition, and secondly to counter the Anglo-American policy of containment of communism in the Pacific Area.

Propaganda and Persuasion

The strict dictionary definition of propaganda provides a non-pejorative historical term; The Congregation of Propaganda, founded in 1622 by Pope Gregory XV was, and remains, a committee of Cardinals responsible for foreign missions and the word of the Gospel in the New Worlds.²¹⁵ Since that time however it has taken on connotations of negativity and corruption, and the definition most would

²¹⁴ BRADY, ANNE-MARIE. 2008. p. 54.

²¹⁵ OED.

understand highlights, "the systematic dissemination of information, especially in a biased or misleading way, in order to promote a political cause or point of view."²¹⁶

Terms that incorporate this negative interpretation of propaganda which are prevalent today include 'spin' and 'news and information management.'²¹⁷ Both are often used to indicate the manipulation of political information to lend a favourable light to the self-interest of the originator. Propaganda is also referred to as "organized persuasion;"²¹⁸ however the best working definition is Sproule's, who claims, "propaganda represents the work of large organisations or groups to win over the public for special interests through a massive orchestration of attractive conclusions packaged to conceal both their persuasive purpose and lack of sound supporting reasons."²¹⁹ When the term is associated with control it is regarded as a deliberate attempt to alter or maintain a balance of power that is advantageous to the propagandist. The ideological objective is therefore of utmost importance, and propaganda seeks to instill this in as many of the audience as possible. It should be noted however that as Leonard Dobb claims "a clear-cut definition of propaganda is neither possible nor desirable."²²⁰

An unfamiliar doctrine or set of ideas may need a long period of time to become accepted in the minds of the target audience. In such cases the propagandist can use various stimuli at the same time to bolster their message; these combined information sources are known as 'sub propaganda' sources, or 'facilitative communications'.

As Jowett and O'Donnell point out, "facilitative communication most frequently takes the form of financial aid, radio newscasts, press releases, books, pamphlets, periodicals, cultural programmes, exhibitions, films, seminars, language classes,

²¹⁶ OED.

²¹⁷ JOWETT, GARTH AND VICTORIA O'DONNELL. 2006. *Propaganda and Persuasion*. London: Sage Publications. p. 3.

²¹⁸ DEVITO, JOSEPH. 1986. *The Communication Handbook: A Dictionary*. New York, NY: Harper & Row. p. 239.

²¹⁹ SPROULE, MICHAEL. 1994. *Channels of Propaganda*. Bloomington, IN: Edinfo. p. 8.

²²⁰ DOBB, LEONARD. 1989. *International Encyclopaedia of Communications*. New York, NY: Oxford University Press. p. 375.

reference services, and personal social contacts."²²¹ Whilst such communication channels may not form examples of propaganda by themselves, the positive or bias information they present will have a stronger influence on the audience when the various channels are combined.

In this chapter I employ and add to Jowett and O'Donnell's list of facilitative communication channels and relate how the Chinese state has used them in their propaganda and persuasion efforts in Tibet. Propaganda in film sources is explored in chapter seven.

Financial Aid

Discussion concerning development issues in the less-developed world soon turns to Chinese economic prowess. In recent years market liberalisation has brought China's latent economy to the forefront of the global economic stage, and in the last thirty years the rate of Chinese economic growth has been dramatic, averaging over eight percent growth in GDP per annum.²²² This has nevertheless been achieved at some considerable social and political cost; the original Chinese Maoist state preached egalitarianism and relied on the loyalty of workers and peasants, and there was also a self-imposed isolation from the world economy. This did not however dovetail easily with open markets and Western-style economic development. In the last thirty years China has developed a "neo-Leninist solution that blends one-party rule and state control of key sectors of the economy with partial market reforms and an end to economic isolation."²²³ Whilst few would now argue with the fact that China has a large and globally powerful economy, there is much debate as to the extent that the Chinese Government is using this influence for political objectives, especially in Tibet.

²²¹ JOWETT, GARTH AND VICTORIA O'DONNELL. 2006. p. 26.

²²² http://www.economywatch.com/world_economy/china/ Accessed 7th May 2010.

²²³ *THE SAN FRANCISCO CHRONICLE*. 2006. The Dark Side of China's Dazzling Economic Boom. Hype Conceals Often Sordid Reality of Government Corruption and Cronyism. 9th April 2006.

Over the last twenty years China has poured billions of Yuan into 'development' in Tibet. In most cases this can take the form of funds to develop the infrastructure of Tibet, or else for restoration and preservation of Tibetan cultural heritage. The Chinese state media website proudly boasts that, "Since the peaceful liberation of Tibet, especially after the execution of the reform and opening-up policy, China has allocated 700 million Yuan to help Tibet renovate and open to the public over 1,400 monasteries, temples, cultural relics and religionary [sic] places."²²⁴ The economy in the TAR has maintained more than twelve percent growth for the seven consecutive years to 2008, reflecting "the strong support of the central government."²²⁵ Many however argue that this economic benevolence has not been without a political agenda.

Ten years ago the Chinese Government launched the 'Western Development Plan' to accelerate economic development across the plateau. The International Campaign for Tibet claims that, "the central element of the plan has been the separation of Tibetan nomads from their traditional livelihoods and their resettlement into urban centers concurrent with the movement of Chinese economic migrants up and onto the Tibetan plateau, facilitated by the construction of a new railroad, linking the Chinese interior to central Tibet. Many are calling this act of social reengineering the 'second invasion of Tibet'."²²⁶

Without doubt the most contentious and high profile engineering project that the Chinese Government has brought to Tibet has been the US \$4.1 billion rail link that connects Lhasa with Golmud, and thereby, the rest of China. The 1,142 kilometer long link was completed in July 2006, with 550 kilometers built on frozen earth. By September of 2006 the link had already carried over 380,000 passengers to Tibet.²²⁷ In 2007, the total number of tourists visiting Tibet reached 4,029,400: an

²²⁴ CHINA TIBET INFORMATION CENTER. 2008. *China Allocates Huge Investment to Protect Tibetan Culture*. 26th September 2008.

²²⁵ PERMANENT MISSION OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA TO THE UNITED NATIONS. 2008. *China's Central Government helps Tibet Develop Economy and Society*. 31st March 2008.

²²⁶ THE INTERNATIONAL CAMPAIGN FOR TIBET. 2008. *Chinese Rule In Tibet*.

²²⁷ Xinhua News Agency, quoted on www.tibetrailway.com Accessed 4th July 2009.

increase of 60.4% on the figures of the 1990s.²²⁸ This number is not divided into 'home' and 'foreign' tourists, but one would expect that this rapid rise to be of the homegrown variety. However, The International Campaign for Tibet claims that the, "aim of the construction is to expand the influence and consolidate the control of the Chinese Communist Party." Their report 'Tracking the Steel Dragon,' details the strategic significance to China of the extension of its national rail network into central Tibet, and claims that the Chinese Government has acknowledged the military applications for the railway. They point out the destabilising influence of large numbers migrant Chinese workers arriving in Tibet, as well as the environmental impact of such a large engineering project in the fragile Tibetan plateau.

The report highlights the "concern for the survival of Tibet's culture and religion" that is further pressurised by the arrival of large number of Han Chinese to the region, as well as the apprehension of India and Nepal at the "heightening military readiness on the Tibetan plateau through the expansion of Chinese influence and construction of civil and military transport links."²²⁹ To some extent this is acknowledged by the Permanent Mission of the People's Republic of China to the United Nations, who claim in their briefing paper that, "In 2006, the State Council formulated forty preferential measures to accelerate the development of Tibet, *and to maintain stability in the region* [emphasis my own.]"²³⁰ The briefing paper highlights how the 770 Billion Yuan allocated to development in Tibet will be spent on rural drinking water programmes, the construction of a power grid in areas without electricity, the construction of a telephone network, and the improvement in the infrastructure for farmers and herdsmen, but not how this will 'maintain the stability of the region.'

²²⁸ PERMANENT MISSION OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA TO THE UNITED NATIONS. 2008. *China's Central Government helps Tibet Develop Economy and Society*. 31st March 2008.

²²⁹ THE INTERNATIONAL CAMPAIGN FOR TIBET. 2008. *Tracking the Steel Dragon*.

²³⁰ PERMANENT MISSION OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA TO THE UNITED NATIONS. 2008. *China's Central Government helps Tibet Develop Economy and Society*. 31st March 2008.

Radio

Control of the information flow is also an important part of getting any propagandist message across to the target audience. Control of information may for example, involve the withholding of information, releasing information at predetermined times, releasing information in juxtaposition with other information that may influence the perception of the target, creating new and false information, releasing information only to selected audiences, and distorting and altering information.

The Centre for Independent Journalism has noted that the Chinese authorities have made it "nearly impossible for independent journalists to cover the recent protests in Tibet and in neighboring provinces²³¹ by imposing suffocating restrictions on the press." According to their press release of the 28th of March 2008, the number of people killed as a result of the protests, "cannot be verified because of official restrictions on reporting from Tibet. Tibet's Government-in-exile in Dharamsala, India says as many as 100 people have been killed and 1,000 arrested. China's state media reports that 16 civilians have been killed."²³² Reporters Without Borders (RSF), the International Federation of Journalists (IFJ) and the Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ) all unanimously agree that the Chinese state security forces have made reporting in Tibet impossible, and in March 2009, all journalists were ordered out of Tibet and the neighbouring regions for 'safety reasons.'

The airwaves have provided a source of relentless propaganda in the TAR, with both sides of the political, and geographic, divide of the Himalaya recognising the opportunity that radio broadcast offers for the dissemination of their political point of view.

This is all based on the assumption that those who control what reaches the listener are both 'reasoned' and 'popular.' In the case of propaganda radio neither

²³¹ By which I assume they mean the TAR.

²³² <http://www.cijmalaysia.org/content/view/307/25/> Accessed 6th June 2010.

can be said to be true. Although many changes have taken place in China during the past thirty years, the Chinese Government still creates and promotes systemic and deliberate propaganda messages aimed at "creating a cohesive communist society among a diverse population."²³³

Radio is a perfect means of communication in Tibet, not only because the vast expanse of the plateau can be comprehensively and cost effectively covered with long-wave radio waves, but because the apparatus needed to receive the broadcast remains within the everyday budget of the target audience, i.e. the working majority. It is also the case that the majority of the target audience is illiterate, and so printed propaganda would be of comparatively limited effectiveness. The Chinese Government in Lhasa launched 'Tibet People's Radio' on the first of January 1959, nine years after the peaceful liberation, and less than three months before the revolt of Lhasa that led to the Dalai Lama's flight into exile in India. The station has just celebrated fifty years of broadcasting with a "celebration ceremony on April 17 with the staff workers and audiences gathering together." One loyal listener, identified only as Siyong, commented, "Tibet People's Radio and its programmes have widened our eyesight as well as making our life more colorful."²³⁴

Tibet People's Radio has since become part of a wider satellite, radio and wired communications network that boasts nearly 300 ground satellite receiving stations, and more than 130 television relay stations and translator stations throughout the region. Tibet People's Radio has been joined by Shannan People's Radio, both broadcasting primarily in Tibetan for both the 'domestic' and 'international' Tibetan audiences. The Tibet People's Radio currently broadcasts twenty-four hours a day in ten frequency bands, six broadcasting in Tibetan. It has forty-two programmes broadcast in standard Tibetan, including twenty-one hours a day for news in Tibetan, and eighteen hours a day in the Khamba dialect. On the long wave

²³³ JOWETT, GARTH AND VICTORIA O'DONNELL. 2006. p. 50.

²³⁴ http://english.chinatibetnews.com/news/Society/200904/19/content_231679.htm Accessed 10th May 2010.

transmission there is also a forty-five minute "broadcast for Tibetan Compatriots Outside of China, presented twice daily, consists of three segments: news, features, and literature and arts."²³⁵ Whilst this programme, designed to reach the Tibetan populations in India and Nepal is not yet available on Internet listening services it is planned for the near future. Aside from this 'national' radio station, by 2007, the TAR had eight other broadcast and radio stations, thirty-nine medium wave transmitting stations, seventy-six FM radio transmitting and relay stations of 100 watts or above.²³⁶

The power of radio does however work in both directions. Not only can the state broadcast its message powerfully across the plateau, but also it has to accept that Tibetans will also be able to receive and listen to broadcasts from outside Tibet. Various international radio stations can be received in the TAR, the Voice of America, the BBC World Service and Radio Free Asia among them. More specifically there exist a number of what might be described as 'Free Tibet'²³⁷ radio stations that broadcast into Tibet, spreading the propaganda of the exiled Tibetan community and interested Western parties.

Internet

The Chinese "Internet police," officially known as the Ministry of Public Security's Internet and Security Supervision Bureau, has been reported to be more than 50,000 personnel strong.²³⁸ Its Beijing branch proudly claimed that, in 2002, it participated in a multiagency exercise to see whether the government could rid the Internet of "harmful content" within forty-eight hours of the onset of an emergency. During the exercise, all "harmful content" was removed in nineteen hours.²³⁹ The

²³⁵ <http://ru.chineseembassy.org/rus/ztd/xzjt/xzjj/t69872.htm> Accessed 12th May 2010.

²³⁶ http://www.npc.gov.cn/englishnpc/Special_NPC_Delegation/200903/16/content_1493485_5.htm Accessed 2nd April 2010.

²³⁷ <http://www.vot.org/aboutus.html> Accessed 6th April 2010.

²³⁸ *The Guardian*. "China's secret Internet police target critics with web of propaganda." WATTS, JONATHAN. 14th June 2005.

²³⁹ THE SAN FRANCISCO CHRONICLE. 2006. The Dark Side of China's Dazzling Economic Boom. Hype Conceals Often Sordid Reality of Government Corruption and Cronyism. 9th April 2006.

authorities have two main prongs of attack, 'selective repression' whereby they single out only those who openly challenge its authority while leaving the general public alone, and secondly restricting access to websites outside China that do not share the Party message or may criticise the Chinese state.

To enforce this policy, and by early as 1997, Public Security Minister Zhu Entao released new regulations that announced fines for 'defaming government agencies,' 'splitting the nation,' and leaking 'state secrets.' Violators would face a fine up to 15,000 Yuan.²⁴⁰ In recent years however the state has become much more high-tech in its approach to censorship. The Ministry of Public Security now has authority and control over Internet censorship inside China through the 'Golden Shield Project,' normally referred to outside the PRC as 'The Great Firewall.'

Using a variety of high-tech, and ever changing, methods such as IP Blocking, DNS Filtering and URL filtering, the shield effectively determines what comes into, and out of, China via the Internet. On top of that, the shield can effectively close down Internet sites within China that contain censored material. By either rerouting or simply blocking access to websites information is restricted to that which the censors see fit for general consumption. Banned sites include those with any reference to the Dalai Lama and his Government in Exile, the *Falun Gong* movement that is suppressed in China, Taiwanese Government sites, discussion boards or talk rooms that host discussions with reference to Tibetan independence, freedom of speech, or calls for democracy in China.

China does not however simply close down access to certain websites, but operates a rolling process of review. Websites that are not available one month may become operational again in a matter of weeks; recent examples of this include the online encyclopedia, Wikipedia, and the video sharing website YouTube. The BBC news website had been blocked for over a decade, along with the BBC Chinese news service when it came into operation in 1999; however in March last year the site

²⁴⁰ HARWIT, ERIC. 2008. *China's Telecommunications Revolution*. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.

became active. "Beijing never admitted to blocking access to BBC news stories - and there has been no official confirmation that the website has been unblocked,"²⁴¹ but the site now works in most provinces of China. The Chinese news service however continues to be blocked. During the protests in Tibet during March 2009, most British and American newspaper websites were also blocked, and all foreign reporters were told to leave Tibet.

Meanwhile pressure has mounted on companies that are seen to co-operate with the censorship programmes of the Chinese State and the Golden Shield Programme. In 2006 the Internet giant Google, which had defended its decision to comply with China's censorship, discovered that its main search engine has been blocked in most Chinese provinces. Due to the blocking, Chinese Internet users are limited to a censored version of Google, Google.cn. This policy goes against what many would argue as the ethic of free and open information on the Internet. However criticism of compliant American companies has come from as high as the US Senate's Sub-Committee on Human Rights that hauled the chief executives of Microsoft, Google, Yahoo and Cisco before their committee in February 2006 to accuse them of collaborating with Chinese censors. "American technology and know-how is substantially enabling repressive regimes in China and elsewhere in the world to cruelly exploit and abuse their own citizens," Sub-Committee Chairman Chris Smith said, while Republican Tom Lantos went further saying, "Instead of using their power and creativity to bring openness and free speech to China, they have caved in to Beijing's outrageous but predictable demands simply for the sake of profits. My message to these companies today is simple: Your abhorrent activities in China are a disgrace. I simply do not understand how your corporate leadership sleeps at night."²⁴²

²⁴¹ <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/asia-pacific/7312240.stm> Accessed 17th May 2010.

²⁴² <http://www.internetnews.com/ec-news/article.php/3585546> Accessed 12th May 2010.

Books, Pamphlets and Periodicals

The printed word has long been employed as a means of disseminating new ideas and beliefs. Censorship of the printed word can be traced to the earliest times, and was exemplified by the titanic struggle Martin Luther endured against the Catholic Church. The development of movable type and faster printing presses made Luther's protestant heresies more dangerous for the established church, and as the speed and volume of printing has increased exponentially over the centuries, censorship has struggled to keep pace.

In China censorship has more recently had to run hand in hand with government commitments to the World Trade Organization of a free and open press. Since 2002 China has begun to incorporate its publishing industry, and to date fifty-five publishing groups have been set up. These are often large publishing houses, of which the largest, China Publishing Group, was established in April 2003, and has under its umbrella twelve large enterprises and institutes including the Commercial Press, the Zhonghua Book Company, the DSX Book Company, the Xinhua Bookstore, China International Publishing Trade Corporation, and China Book Import and Export (Group) Corporation. As of December 2004, under WTO commitments, The State Press and Publication Administration Department has decreed that these publishing houses should have had to compete with international companies in the same sector.

According to government sources, the press and publishing industry in the TAR is flourishing; "Tibet has two publishing houses for books, and two for audio-visual products. Some 250 million volumes of over 11,300 titles, written in the Tibetan or Chinese language, have been published, including 3,000 Tibetan-language titles. There has been a 20-percent annual increase in the production of Tibetan-language books for five consecutive years."²⁴³

²⁴³ THE STATE COUNCIL OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA. 2008. *Protection and Development of Tibetan*

In terms of traditional printing houses, the TAR claims to have thirty-five houses of various types, featuring new technologies such as electronic typesetting, off-set lithography, electronic colour separation, and multi-colour printing. A book distribution network has been established to cover the entire region, and in 2002-2007 alone, 10.08 million Yuan had been invested in building or expanding thirty-five Xinhua Bookstores, bringing the total number of these shops to sixty-seven.²⁴⁴

The government also emphasises the need to preserve what it describes as 'Ancient Books.' The Tibetan Ancient Books Publishing House has been established with state funds to take charge of collecting, editing and reprinting collections of these historically important books;

A large number of ancient books in Tibetan, inscribed wooden slips, inscriptions on bronzes and stone tablets, Selected Tibetan Laws and Regulations of All Periods, Selected Books and Records on Tibetan Handicrafts, Selected Works on Medicine, and Selected Tibetan Historical Relics, as well as others, have been put under state protection.²⁴⁵

In the same light the 'Tibet Autonomous Region Library,' was opened in June 1996 at a cost of nearly 100 million Yuan. It has 590,000 books, including more than 100,000 of these 'Tibetan ancient books.'

Government sources now claim that the TAR has fifty-seven openly distributed newspapers and periodicals - twenty-three newspapers and thirty-four periodicals. Each of Tibet's seven prefectures and cities has a Tibetan newspaper and Han Chinese newspaper. In 2007, Tibet published 55.50 million newspapers and 2.67 million periodicals.²⁴⁶

Culture. Beijing.

²⁴⁴ http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2006-08/10/content_4946163.htm Accessed 12th July 2010.

²⁴⁵ CHINA TIBET INFORMATION CENTER. 2008. *China Allocates Huge Investment to Protect Tibetan Culture*. 26th September 2008.

²⁴⁶ <http://www.china.org.cn/english/features/China2004/107168.htm> Accessed 1st June 2010.

Such expansion of newspapers and books does not however go hand in hand with press freedom; the watchdog group Reporters Without Borders ranked China 163 out of 167 countries in its 2008 index of press freedom.²⁴⁷ China's constitution affords its citizens freedom of speech and press, but the document contains broad language that says Chinese citizens must defend "the security, honor, and interests of the motherland."²⁴⁸ Chinese law includes media regulations with vague language that authorities use to claim stories endanger the country by sharing state secrets. Journalists face harassment and prison terms for violating these rules and revealing classified matter. The government's monitoring structure promotes an atmosphere of self-censorship; if published materials are deemed dangerous to state security after they appear in the media, the information can then be considered classified and journalists can be prosecuted.²⁴⁹

The administration of printed censorship is dealt with by the 'General Administration of Press and Publication' that licenses publishers, screens written publications, and has the power to ban materials and shut down outlets. It is a subsection of the Communist Party's Central Propaganda Department. CPD guidelines are given to heads of media outlets, who then decide how best to view controversial subjects, and decide how delicate topics will be covered. "Publicizing the CPD guidelines invites punishment, too, as in the case of Shi Tao, a journalist detained in 2004 and serving a ten-year sentence for posting an online summary describing the CPD's instructions for how to report about the fifteen-year anniversary of events at Tiananmen Square."²⁵⁰

²⁴⁷ <http://www.rsf.org>

²⁴⁸ Article 54 of the Constitution of the People's Republic of China: "It is the duty of citizens of the People's Republic of China to safeguard the security, honor and interests of the motherland; they must not commit acts detrimental to the security, honor and interests of the motherland."

²⁴⁹ THE COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS. 2008. *Media Censorship in China*. 18th March 2008.

²⁵⁰ THE COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS. 2008. *Media Censorship in China*. 18th March 2008.

Television

The importance of television in China cannot be underrated. In a country that still has low levels of adult literacy, especially in rural areas, television provides a rich opportunity for information exchange and propaganda dissemination. It is estimated that in China there are over 700 conventional television stations, and more than 3,000 cable channels, with over a billion daily viewers; numbers that have been rapidly growing in the last decade. Since its introduction in China in the late 1940s, television has become the medium of choice for the transmission of educational, cultural, and propaganda material by those that control the content of broadcast. The Chinese population now has one television set for every four people, and is currently the world's largest producer of television sets. Even in remote nomadic areas satellite television keeps viewers up to date with news and entertainment after government authorities went as far as to offer free televisions to nomadic populations.²⁵¹

Despite being set back by the Great Leap Forward, television developed quickly in China, but its control was not centralised until the Ministry of Radio and Television was established in 1982 to oversee and upgrade the broadcasting networks, broadcasting the first domestic satellite channel in 1986. In 2001 the Chinese Government put forward a goal of promoting media amalgamation by establishing trans-regional multi-media news groups, a requisite for their joining the World Trade Organization (WTO). It also instituted detailed regulations on media industry fund raising, and foreign-funded cooperation. Foreign news and entertainment corporations now enjoy access to the Chinese market through links with many local and regional news organisations, and in the US, Fox News carries content from the state television provider China Central Television, or Chinese Central Television (CCTV).

²⁵¹HONG, JUNHAO. 1998. *The Internationalisation of Television in China: The Evolution of Ideology, Society, and Media Since the Reform*. Westport, CT: Praeger. p. 93.

CCTV is the main state funded television provider in China, providing eighteen open channels of entertainment, news, and cultural programmes. The content of the official channel was regulated by The Publicity Department of the Communist Party of China Central Committee until in 2001 The State Council established an executive branch, The State Administration of Radio, Film, and Television, to administer and supervise all the state owned television networks. Under the new branch decisions relating to content were relaxed, but the branch retained final decision over what was acceptable to be aired. At the same time, state funding was decreased, and a new dictat of 'affordability' ensured that the channels had to raise more income from advertising to ensure viability.²⁵² Since there has never been a 'television license' in China the majority of funding now comes from advertising and links with foreign providers; Since 2001 CCTV has established lucrative business cooperation with two hundred and thirty seven television networks in more than one hundred and forty countries.²⁵³ Since all local networks are required by law to reserve a channel to broadcast CCTV's flagship CCTV-1, and all local and national channels are required to carry CCTV's seven o'clock news, its coverage is almost total.

CCTV has long been considered the mouthpiece of government propaganda. Its Chairman has always been the Vice-Minister of the State Council, and all of its Directors are government appointed officials. Regulation of content is still strongly enforced, especially in live news presentations and investigative reporting. For example, one programme, *Jinaodian Fangtan* (Focal Report), tracks down and exposes problems within Chinese cities; however, the authorities require the programme to carry positive propaganda on occasions such as national holidays.²⁵⁴ During the Beijing Olympics live broadcast was delayed by ten seconds to give authorities time to react to any form of remonstrance against China from athletes

²⁵² KOPS, MANFRED, AND OLLIG, STEFAN. (Eds.) 2007. *Internationalization of the Chinese TV Sector*. Berlin: LIT Verlag.

²⁵³ http://www.chinaculture.org/gb/en_aboutchina/2003-09/24/content_23644.htm Accessed 1st July 2010.

²⁵⁴ ZHAO, BIN. 1999. Mouthpiece or money-spinner? The double life of Chinese television in the late 1990s. *International Journal of Cultural Studies*. Vol. 2. No. 3. pp. 291-305.

or protestors. Likewise the much anticipated inaugural address of President Obama in 2009 was cut when he spoke of how, "earlier generations faced down fascism and communism," and again later when he spoke of those, "who cling to power through corruption and deceit and the silencing of dissent, know that you are on the wrong side of history, but that we will extend a hand if you are willing to unclench your fist."²⁵⁵

In early 2009 a letter, signed by more than twenty of China's leading academics and intellectuals, calling for a boycott of state media was posted on several Western and Chinese news websites. It boldly describes CCTV's content as "propaganda aimed at brainwashing the audience,"²⁵⁶ especially in its history and news programmes. The letter's author, Ling Cangzhou, told the BBC that its signatories were fed up with the positive spin on domestic news from the central television station and the negative tone on international events, and hoped that the letter would act as a warning to the susceptible public.

International satellite television however remains banned in China after Rupert Murdoch, having invested \$525m for a majority stake in the failing Hong Kong based StarTV, made a speech in September 1993, unwisely announcing that, "new telecommunications have proved an unambiguous threat to totalitarian regimes everywhere ... satellite broadcasting makes it possible for information-hungry residents of many closed societies to bypass state-controlled television channels."²⁵⁷ His words prompted the then Prime Minister, Li Peng, and the State Council to issued a decree effectively banning international satellite dishes, excepting only hotels, media outlets, and apartment buildings housing foreigners. The ban remains in force despite much of the international news context being available over the Internet. Hu Zhanfan, deputy director of State Administration of Radio, Film and Television explained that the "object of the system is to ensure

²⁵⁵ <http://www.reuters.com/article/mediaNews/idUSPEK17739420090121> Accessed 3rd May 2010.

²⁵⁶ <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/7824255.stm> Accessed 10th May 2010.

²⁵⁷ <http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2008/apr/22/chinathemediarupertmurdoch> Accessed 4th May 2010.

stable social order and the right direction for cultural and ideological progress; it is also expected to help foster our own radio and TV industry."²⁵⁸ The ban is rarely enforced, and there are several websites offering information as to how to receive international content on a domestic satellite dish, it does however present a conflict of interest to the Chinese authorities who are eager to attract foreign investment and face strong market pressures.

Sinosat remains the only government approved satellite station for foreign broadcasters to transmit within China. This policy allows State authorities a greater degree of content control, and Brady records how, "the aim of concentrating the broadcasts on Sinosat is to control foreign broadcasts into China."²⁵⁹ The policy does however have drawbacks, despite the ability to totally switch off transmission; in 2002 the banned religious group *Falun Gong* broke into a Sinosat satellite transmission during the football world cup final and replaced the coverage with messages of their own. In the days that followed, State Media sources reported that the security breach had, unsurprisingly, originated in Taiwan.²⁶⁰

Education Policy

The spotlight of media attention and Western fascination with Tibet has led to a natural focus on the role of education in Tibet, its extent, quality, curriculum and the language of transmission. However this focus is not always well informed. As Bass points out, until the mid 1990s there had been no "detailed field research by foreign educationalists permitted in the TAR. Furthermore, research documents and government planning documents, particularly relating to culturally specific education – the kind of materials that is available to foreign educationalists studying in other parts of China – are classified documents in the TAR."²⁶¹ Even now, more than a decade after her seminal account of education policy and practice

²⁵⁸ <http://www.app1.chinadaily.com.cn/star/2002/0117/fo4-1.html> Accessed 26th July 2010.

²⁵⁹ BRADY, ANNE-MARIE. 2008. p. 142.

²⁶⁰ http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2002-09/24/content_573516.htm Accessed 12th May 2010.

²⁶¹ BASS, CATRIONA. 1998. *Education In Tibet: Policy and Practice since 1950*. London: Zed Books. p. VIII.

in Tibet was published, there is still little research carried out in this field, and the authorities in Tibet remain guarded over their education policy.²⁶²

Education however remains high on the agenda for those who press for development in Tibet, be they from inside the ruling elite, or outside Tibet itself in the form of activists and pressure groups. The importance of education in China is such that the Chinese authorities have acknowledged that education, in its broadest sense, is "one of the prerequisites to the achievement of technological and cultural changes."²⁶³ The sheer size of the population of minorities,²⁶⁴ the importance of the minority question for foreign policy and military strategy, and the natural resources and rich mineral deposits in the areas inhabited by minorities are all additional unacknowledged influences and additions to the importance of minority education in China. Dilger also notes a new further strategy that has shaped the development of education for minority populations in China, the "primary political goal of instilling a sense of commitment to the unity of China - the 'ancestral land' (*zuguo*) - and encouraging patriotism towards it."²⁶⁵

Education policy is a highly contentious issue in any state, and especially so in the TAR where traditionally low levels of education and literacy still prevail.²⁶⁶ State provision of education is especially controversial when individuals have no choice over the method and curriculum of education, as is the case in many socialist countries, including China. Central government policies with regard to the education of minorities has faced fierce criticism in recent years, and many accuse

²⁶² For excellent (but unfortunately restricted) analysis of this topic see, YESHE, KALSANG. 2008. *Chinese Codeswitching in Modern Lhasa Tibetan; A Motive-Driven Linguistic Behaviour of Lhasa Tibetans*. D.Phil Thesis. Oxford University.

²⁶³ DILGER, BERNHARD. 1984. The Education of Minorities. *Comparative Education*. Vol. 20. No. 1. p. 155.

²⁶⁴ As of 2005, the combined population of officially recognised minority groups numbered at 123.33 million, comprising 9.44% of mainland China and Taiwan's total population.

MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA. Accessed 17th March 2008.

<http://www.mfa.gov.cn/eng/premade/9052/autonomy.htm>

²⁶⁵ DILGER, BERNHARD. 1984. p. 158.

²⁶⁶ One recent estimation of literacy rates in China gives the Tibetan population of the TAR an average of 27%, and the combined Han and Tibetan population in the TAR 31%. BHALLA, AJIT AND SHUFANG QIU. 2006. *Poverty and Inequality Among Chinese Minorities*. Abingdon: Routledge. p. 75.

state education providers of impartiality and of using propaganda and persuasion techniques to change the perceptions and beliefs of those that they profess to educate. In Tibet there are concerns over access to education and government funding provision, the traditional role of nunneries and monasteries in providing education for poorer families, the quality of education provided, as well as the medium of instruction in school and in examinations. I have divided this section into these headings accordingly.

In each case opponents of the central government have provided evidence that policy and practice are being used for political ends, whilst the state has vigorously defended their provision. The Tibetan Centre for Human Rights and Democracy (TCHRD), an NGO based in Dharamsala, claimed in its 2003 briefing that,

Education has been the preferred conduit of inculcating loyalty to the state. The main objective of education in Tibet is to Sinicise the Tibetan population and indoctrinate them with political dogma. China uses every opportunity to saturate the masses with the rhetoric of love for the great motherland, and education is no exception.²⁶⁷

From a global perspective, China has clearly defined requirements as to the provision of education, and the values it teaches. The United Nation Convention on the Rights of the Child provides a legally binding framework of basic standards, or 'human rights,' which national education policy must comply with; Article twenty-nine directs that, "... the education of the child shall be directed to...the development of respect for the child's parents, his or her own cultural identity, language and values..."²⁶⁸

Within China policy is also clearly defined in the 'White Paper on Minorities' that states that education should be "of paramount importance to the improvement of the quality of the minority population and to the promotion of economic and

²⁶⁷ INTERNATIONAL CAMPAIGN FOR TIBET. 2003. *Education in Tibet: A Briefing Paper for the Special Rapporteur*. p. 16.

²⁶⁸ http://www.unicef.org/crc/index_understanding.html Accessed 28th June 2010.

cultural development in ethnic minority areas."²⁶⁹ However, despite these declarations and policies education provision in Tibet was describes as "horrendous"²⁷⁰ by The United Nations Special Rapporteur on Education, Ms. Katarina Tomasevski, at the United Nations High Commission on Human Rights (UNHCHR) in Geneva in 2004, and the United Nations 'Human Development Report for China' for 2002 placed education provision in the TAR last among China's provinces.

Specifically, the claims of propaganda in education curriculum focus on the teaching of a "love for communism and the "motherland" and demands the denunciation of the Dalai Lama and his "clique" in exile."²⁷¹ The approved school curriculum has historically been based on a Marxist analysis of history placing cultures at different stages of development. Naturally the Han population occupies a higher place in this 'league table' of development than those of the minority populations.²⁷² Students are taught an official version of history, which legitimises the CCP's rule in China, and justifies its policies and actions in minority areas. The '9th Five Year Plan for China's Educational Development and the Development Outline by 2010,' directs that education curricula, "always adhere to the socialistic direction so that the Party's educational policy will be implemented," and specifically that,

Schools of various types and at all levels should implement the Party's educational policies with socialistic direction, and educate the students with Maxism, Leninism, and Maoism and the theory of establishing socialism with Chinese characteristics.... patriotism, collectivism,

²⁶⁹ THE STATE COUNCIL OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA. 1999. *National Minorities Policy and its Practice in China*. Beijing.

²⁷⁰ TIBETAN CENTRE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS AND DEMOCRACY. 2004. *State of Education in Tibet: A Human Rights Perspective*. Dharamsala.

²⁷¹ INTERNATIONAL CAMPAIGN FOR TIBET. 2003. *Education in Tibet: A Briefing Paper for the Special Rapporteur*. p. 18.

²⁷² CHINA RIGHTS FORUM. 2001. *Human Rights in China: Education for Ethnic Minorities*. Beijing.

socialism, national unity and civilized behaviors needs to be strengthened.²⁷³

In April 2008 China launched an 'education' campaign in the TAR claiming it had the express purpose of "undermining support for the Dalai Lama and any separatist sentiment." The BBC quotes the *Tibet Daily* saying the campaign was to "unify the thinking... of officials and the masses."²⁷⁴ Announcements in this vein are common, and well reported on in the Western press, especially in the wake of the violence that erupted in the region during the build-up to the Beijing Olympics in the summer of 2008. Alternative histories such as those that celebrate diversity or religious expression are avoided, and there is no analysis of the different accounts that history presents us. In a staggering quotation in the TCHRD's report, Party Secretary Chen Kuiyuan is recorded as saying to a conference on education in the TAR:

The success of our education does not lie in the number of diplomas issued to graduates from universities, colleges... and secondary schools. It lies, in the final analysis, in whether our graduating students are opposed to or turn their hearts to the Dalai Clique and in whether they are loyal to or do not care about our great Motherland and the great socialist cause.²⁷⁵

The Traditional Role of Monastic Education

When the CCP came to power in 1949 Tibetan educational 'policy,' if such a word is appropriate, centered on monastic education. The only two secular schools run by the Ganden Phodrang were in Lhasa. These government schools trained monks and lay students to assume roles in the government, in both the monastic and secular records office, and the fiscal departments of the central government. The XIIIth Dalai Lama, Thub bstan rgya mtsho, in the early twentieth century made numerous

²⁷³ MINISTRY OF EDUCATION OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA. 1998. *The 9th Five Year Plan for China's Educational Development and the Development Outline by 2010*. Beijing.

²⁷⁴ <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/asia-pacific/7359190.stm> Accessed 12th June 2010.

²⁷⁵ INTERNATIONAL CAMPAIGN FOR TIBET. 2003. *Education in Tibet: A Briefing Paper for the Special Rapporteur*. p. 5.

attempts to develop a modern secular education system in Tibet; however his plans were from the outset opposed by the traditional conservative groups among the clergy, aristocrats and monasteries.²⁷⁶ Since the 'peaceful liberation' the Chinese Government has viewed monasteries and nunneries as obstacles to modernisation, as well as bastions of feudal power, and therefore has sought to lessen the educational role they have traditionally provided in Tibet. These days, although monasteries and nunneries are not widely perceived to be institutions of higher education, they are pillars of the Tibetan intellectual tradition, and today larger monasteries often have an affiliated public school under their auspices. Importantly they often provide a free education in rural environments where alternatives are limited; however their curriculum is obviously very different from that the state provides and condones; "One positive thing about studying in such institutions was because Tibetan remained the primary medium of instruction and they learned about their own Tibetan history, culture and religion."²⁷⁷

The popularity of these private and monastic schools, and the alternative political message they teach, has made them the target of government authorities that have led to subsequent closure or reconstruction to suit the needs of the Chinese authorities. In 1996 The Chinese Government introduced the 'Patriotic Education' campaign in Tibet, seeking, "to undermine loyalty to the Dalai Lama through the promotion of atheism. The campaign involves re-educating Tibetan monks and nuns in Chinese communist ideology and China's version of Tibetan history, denunciation of the Dalai Lama and dGe 'dun chos kyi nyi ma, the XIth Panchen Lama chosen by the Dalai Lama."²⁷⁸

Medium of Instruction

²⁷⁶ SHAKYA, TSERING. 1986. Making of Great Game Players: Tibetan Students in Britain between 1913-1917. *Tibetan Review*. Vol. 21. No. 1. pp. 9-14.

²⁷⁷ TIBETAN CENTRE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS AND DEMOCRACY. 2004. *State of Education in Tibet: A Human Rights Perspective*. Dharamsala. p. 68.

²⁷⁸ INTERNATIONAL CAMPAIGN FOR TIBET. 2003. *Education in Tibet: A Briefing Paper for the Special Rapporteur*. p. 5.

The most contentious issue in education policy in Tibet, as well as the most disturbing from a propaganda and persuasion viewpoint, is the seemingly systematic policy of eradicating the Tibetan language.

There has been strong official support for the Tibetan language, but at every level its use in education has been reduced. In 1987 at the instigation of Blo bzang 'phrin las lhun grub chos kyi rgyal mtshan, the Xth Panchen Lama,²⁷⁹ and the senior Tibetan official Nga phod Ngag dbang 'jigs med, the TAR People's Congress issued the 'Provisions on the Study, Use and Development of the Tibetan Language,' a detailed document which set out procedures for implementing Tibetan language policy in education and public life. The 'Provisions' proposed setting up Tibetan language medium and secondary schools throughout Tibet by 1993, and that by 1997 most subjects in senior middle schools and secondary schools were to be in Tibetan, and to have 'most' university courses available in Tibetan shortly after the year 2000.²⁸⁰ However, the TCHRD report points out that shows how, "in reality higher education in Tibet is entirely conducted in the Chinese language,"²⁸¹ despite Tibetan being the 'official language' of the TAR.

The reason for this seeming dichotomy is simply explained thus; "The Tibetans regard their language as the root of their ancient culture whereas the Chinese

²⁷⁹ In 1988, the Panchen Lama, while addressing the first meeting of the China's Institute of Tibetology in Beijing, commented: "The land, which managed itself well for 1,300 years, from the seventh century, lost its language after it was liberated. Whether we remained backward or made mistakes, we managed our life on the world highest plateau by using only Tibetan. We had everything written in our own language, be it Buddhism, crafts, astronomy, poems, logic. All administrative works were also done in Tibetan. When the Institute of Tibetology was founded, I spoke in the People's Palace and said that the Tibetan studies should be based on the foundation of Tibet's own religion and cultural. So far we have underestimated these subjects. ... It may not be the deliberate goal of the Party to let Tibetan culture die, but I wonder whether the Tibetan language will survive or be eradicated." TIBETAN DEPARTMENT OF INFORMATION AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS. 1999. *Kunsik Panchen Rinpoche'i katzom chedrik*. Dharamsala. p. 84.

²⁸⁰ TIBET INFORMATION NETWORK. 1996. *News Update*. 6th May 1996.

²⁸¹ TIBETAN CENTRE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS AND DEMOCRACY. 2004. p. 22.

authorities view it as the symbol of nationalist sentiment."²⁸² The government is accused of formulating a divisive policy deeming that by reducing tuition in Tibetan and promoting Mandarin Chinese, Tibetan nationalistic feeling will be lessened, and the TAR will become further assimilated into the Motherland. Tibetans regard their language as key to their culture and are rightly proud of their literary heritage and spoken traditions; however if schools do not teach in Tibetan, exams are taken in Mandarin, job prospects demand fluency in Mandarin, and Tibetan is relegated to a second tier language by government policies, then the language's survival in its homeland becomes threatened.

The law in China is entirely explicit over the rights of the nation's minorities to be educated in their own languages. Article twelve of the Education Law of 1995 directs that, "Schools and other educational institutions primarily for 'minority' nationalities may use the spoken or written language in common use among the ethnic group or in the locality as the language of instruction."²⁸³ However, as with policy concerning the direction of education, policy covering the language of tuition has oscillated between extremes.

In 1997 policy moved back in favor of Mandarin and it was declared that Chinese language instruction would be introduced from the first year of schooling for Tibetan children, and introduced a mandatory shift to Chinese only education after the age of thirteen. The 'TAR' Deputy Party Secretary Tenzin disclosed the decision in a meeting with James Sasser, US Ambassador to China, Tenzin declaring that the 1987 guidelines were considered "impractical" and "not in conformity with the reality of Tibet."²⁸⁴ By March 2000 Zhou Yongkang, Communist Party Secretary for Sichuan Province, said at a meeting of China's National People's Congress that the teaching of Tibetan in schools was, "a drain on government resources."²⁸⁵

²⁸² TIBETAN CENTRE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS AND DEMOCRACY. 2003. p. 10.

²⁸³ XINHUA. 1995. *Reporting on the Education Law*. 20th March 1995.

²⁸⁴ TIBET INFORMATION NETWORK. 1997. *Policy Shift in Teaching in Tibet*.

²⁸⁵ <http://www.tibet.net/en/pdf/diirpub/politics/2004white/7.pdf> Accessed 2nd April 2010.

The Han-centric curriculum, taught largely in standard Mandarin, and obligatory throughout China regardless of the ethnic composition of the region, marginalises those that have alternative histories, cultures, and languages. With no prospects or 'value' distilled in learning Tibetan, Tibetans sometimes find that they are no longer capable of communicating with older generations. The former United Nations Special Rapporteur on the Right to Education, Ms. Katarina Tomasevski, observed that, "An education that would affirm minority rights necessitates full recognition by the majority of the worth of minority languages and religions in all facets of life. Otherwise, education is seen as assimilationist and, hence, not compatible with China's human rights obligations."²⁸⁶

The Website of the Tibetan Government in Exile quotes a speech made in 1992 by Professor Dungkar Lobsang Trinle, in which he said,

In spite of Tibetan being declared the first language to be used in all government offices and meetings, and in official correspondence, Chinese has been used everywhere as the working language...All hope in our future, all other developments, cultural identity, and protection of our heritage depends on this (Tibetan language). Without educated people in all fields, able to express themselves in their own language, Tibetans are in danger of being assimilated. We have reached this point.²⁸⁷

This chapter has presented the means and methods that the Chinese Communist authorities use to persuade those that live in the PRC of their political message and chosen history. The following chapters will analyse specific examples of this propaganda in relation to the British Mission of 1904, and its subsequent repercussions in China, Tibet, and in the West. Chapters three and four present translated accounts of the Mission from this perspective, as presented in a modern Tibetan history book, the series *Bod kyi rig gnas lo rgyus dpyad gzhi'i rgyu cha*

²⁸⁶ <http://www.unpo.org/content/view/2253/84/> Accessed 18th May 2010.

²⁸⁷ <http://www.tibet.com/eco/chapter2.html> Accessed 12th May 2010.

bdams bsgrigs. Chapter five presents further historical documents, presented by the Chinese authorities to support the above narrative, but that lead us closer to a Tibetan account of the Mission.

Chapter Three: The Introductory Chapter of *Bod kyi rig gnas lo rgyus dpyad gzhi'i rgyu cha bdams bsgrigs* and the Chinese narrative of the build-up to the Mission

The seventh volume of the series *Bod kyi rig gnas lo rgyus dpyad gzhi'i rgyu cha bdams bsgrigs* [*Complied and Selected Materials for the Investigation and Research into the History and Culture of Tibet*]²⁸⁸ provides research materials focusing on the British Mission to Tibet of 1903/4. It was published in August 1985 in Lhasa by the 'Editorial Board of Selected Reference Material for Tibetan Culture and History' under the TAR's Political Consultative Committee.ⁱ It therefore offers a 'party line' account of the build-up to the Mission, and the Tibetan response to its advance. The volume falls into four sections; a short preface, a lengthier introduction and background, a commentary and account of the Mission, and a selection of contemporaneous letters and 'field reports' relating to events.

The contents and a detailed analysis of these letters form the basis of chapter five, but here I present translations from the introduction and commentary edited by Sle zur 'Jigs med dbang phyug, Se grong dBang rgyal, bDe zur Rin chen dbang phyug, 'Chi med rgyal po, and bCas khyis phyogs bsgrigs byas pa. The editors explain in the Preface how they were appointed to compile the volume by The Shigatse Area Political Consultative Committee in order to celebrate the twentieth anniversary of the foundation of the TAR.

The preface explains the three main sources of the information contained in the volume; firstly, much of the first-hand evidence relating to the Mission came from members of this Consultative Committee, the older members being described as, " a wealthy treasury of precious accounts and much factual material."ⁱⁱ Secondly, the members of the Writing Committee were dispatched to Shigatse, Gyantse,

²⁸⁸ *Bod kyi rig gnas lo rgyus dpyad gzhi'i rgyu cha bdams bsgrigs*. [*Complied and Selected Materials for the Investigation and Research into the History and Culture of Tibet*] 1985. Lhasa: *Bod rang skyong ljongs chab gros rig gnas lo rgyus dpyad gzhi'i rgyu cha zhib 'jug u yon lhan khang*. All quotes from this volume are my own translations. Standardised Wylie transliterations are provided as endnotes, with the page reference in square brackets.

Khangmar, Dromo Rinchen Gang, and the Khampa La areas to gather information and personal accounts, and finally, "many relevant documents, especially those official letters of the XIIIth Dalai Lama as well as a few original research documents, were gathered from the Tibet Autonomous Region's Cultural and Material Department's Archive."ⁱⁱⁱ

The poem of dedication sets the tone for the commentary, and offers the work for scrutiny and scholarship:

If on the banks of the ocean of the vast history of the Land of Snows, we take a small part of these waves of history, in the bubbles and froth, stirred by the cunning and despicable British, barbarous images appear naturally and clearly...The actions and dances of the imposing and awe-inspiring heroes fighting in defence of their country against the invaders, although known far and wide, in the mirror of writings remain unrecorded. Like a hundred thousand rivulets of water, anecdotes in the words of the elders are pooled together in this unprecedented treasury lake.^{iv}

The commentary opens by explaining how the British Imperialists, "stretched their ghostly hands towards more backwards eastern countries"^v from the end of the sixteenth century onwards. By 1849 they had occupied and consolidated the whole of India by force, and, "encouraged by their evil success they provoked the Opium War with our country. After this, they harboured the evil idea of occupying Tibet gradually and step by step."^{vi}

The British occupation of Sikkim in 1861²⁸⁹ is presented as a direct attack on Tibet, "Sikkim being located in the south of Tibet,"^{vii} and the treaty signed between the British and the Sikkimese Chögyal is described as 'unequal.'²⁹⁰ In the same way the

²⁸⁹ In the volume all dates are given in three formats, Chinese, Tibetan and Western. For example, the date for the occupation of Sikkim is given as "the 11th year of the reign of Manchu Qing Emperor Zhang Fun, the 14th of the Iron Bird cycle, A.D. 1861." [*man ching kong ma zhan hphun khri lo bcu gcig pa (rab byung bcu bzhi'i lcags bya) spyi lo 1861 lor*]

²⁹⁰ The phrase 'unequal treaty' is one that occurs in every Chinese narrative relating to Western intervention in China's history. The 1861 treaty, along with the 'Nine Point Unequal Treaty' signed in Lhasa in 1904 therefore form part of a catalogue of 'unequal' treaties imposed on China during the nineteenth century by Western Imperial powers. While the 'Treaty of Lhasa' obviously rankles in China, the Treaty of Nanjing is the subject of much greater vitriol and protest. Under the terms of the 1842 treaty, China was forced to open several ports to foreign trade, cede Hong Kong to the

annexation of Bhutan in 1865 is also an invasion of Tibetan territory, Bhutan being "in the Southern area of Tibet."^{viii} The blame for Tibet's lack of military or diplomatic response to the invasion of their lands is placed squarely on the shoulders of the Amban Sung Gui, who, "together with the Kashag was unable to take any immediate action, or make a decision, and procrastinated."^{ix}



Figure 15: The British Library catalogue for this image records, "The XIIIth Dalai Lama with the Chögyal of Sikkim. Circa 1900. Photographer unknown," however given that the Dalai Lama would have been twenty-five years old in 1900, I suspect the image to be later.

In 1876 the rulers of Sikkim and Bhutan sent a joint letter to the Amban, the Kashag, and the Regent of Tibet. The letter explains the ruler's fears for Tibet at the

British, allow Christians a right to reside in China, and under the much disputed 'extraterritoriality' clause foreign nationals in the port cities were afforded trials by their own consular authorities rather than under the Chinese legal system. The Chinese academic Hsü has commented that such treaties are considered unequal in China "because they were not negotiated by nations treating each other as equals but were imposed on China after a war, and because they encroached upon China's sovereign rights ... which reduced her to semi-colonial status." HSÜ, IMMANUEL. 1970. *The Rise of Modern China*. New York, NY: Oxford University Press. p. 239. In 1941 China announced that all treaties previously signed with Japan were abrogated; however China did not repudiate those signed with other Western powers that were allies in World War II. The situation with the British was only resolved to the satisfaction of China with the return of Hong Kong in 1997, see chapter seven below.

hands of "British manipulation"^x and warns the Tibetans to patrol and guard the border regions as "the Tibet region, and the realms of the Dharma, will be invaded."^{xi} A similar petition from the Phagri and Gampa District Commissioners is also quoted in full describing how the British were making roads, roughly mapping the area, and deploying soldiers in the direction of the border areas, and that "they [the British] are making preparations for war."^{xii} In reply to these petitions the Amban and the Government sent the Quartermaster to the Amban, Krang ching thung, together with the Tibet Military Commander, bKra shis dar rgyas (also known as rDo phra bKras gling pa) to the border areas to report on conditions there. It is recorded however that they disobeyed these orders and instead proceeded straight to Sikkim and met with the ruler and his ministers. They explained to the Sikkimese that any attack on Tibet would be blamed on Sikkim, owing to their lack of defence. The authors clearly believed Sikkim to be a vassal state to Tibet at the time.

The introduction claims that the British officer in Sikkim and the son of the Sikkimese Lord Chamberlain plotted to overthrow the Sikkimese Chögyal and use his kingdom as a launch pad to invade Tibet. The Macaulay Mission was prepared to negotiate trade alliances with Tibet; however the enterprise was abandoned as the Ganden Phodrang did not grant transit visas for the delegation.

Accounts follow of the Sikkimese Chögyal's visit to Lhasa where he was received by the Dalai Lama and extravagant gifts exchanged. The Chögyal describes how the British were restricting his movements and country, and were requesting "tourist and trade delegations with a hidden desire to own a sovereign part of the Motherland."^{291xiii}

The Kashag and the National Assembly were summoned to debate the advances of the British, and it is explained, "Tibetans are of great devotion to the Buddhist religion and faith, and the British are enemies of the faith. Our ideology and way of

²⁹¹ *Mes rgyal*. Literally, 'The kingdom of the ancestors,' or Motherland.

life are as different as fire and water, and not only that, we are the difference between hot and cold, we are incompatible, and as such there will never be a chance for friendship and reconciliation in either the short or long term."^{xiv} Accordingly the National Assembly signed the 'The Solemn Oath of Common Regulations,' that instructed the Tibetan populace and government to stop any 'enemy of the faith' from entering Tibet. The National Assembly and the Regent issued a statement of preparations to be made to counter any British aggression:

In order strictly to sustain the total ban on the British aggressors entering Tibet, for the civilian and military affairs of the border regions, we must appoint a group of effective and trustworthy leaders. Furthermore from the U-tsang region, Loka region, Kongpo region, and Dromo Rinchen Gang, Khams, and Changtang nomadic regions, we must raise and gather the people's militia, and on top of this if required we need to use the monks and soldiers from all the large and small monasteries. If the worst comes to the worst, we need to recruit and mobilise everyone from eighteen to sixty years old and for that we need to recruit leaders from amongst the monastic and lay populations. As for the weapons and ammunitions, the Tibetan made cannons and rifles, gunpowder and lead bullets, fuses, swords and spears, even slings and arrows need to be prepared, and similarly, the war provisions and logistics, primarily grain and other foodstuffs, whatever can be gathered and requisitioned should be stored, and the transport logistics should in every respect be properly and competently prepared for war. There should be no further procrastination. Likewise the monks should be asked to offer prayers to repulse the enemy, and in this issue the ex-Ganden Tripa should lead them together with other lamas, and Rimpoches, for example the Tashi Lama, should be asked to give advice and their prophecies and divinations, and whatever they suggest from the four great seats from the upper and lower colleges of the Great Tantric monasteries of all sects, should be appeased and given tea and funds, and along with this should give offerings and long prayers to the three gems for the support and victory in the war to drive out the enemies. Likewise the Official Government Oracle, the Nechung Oracle, the Lamo Tsangspa Oracle, the Gatong Choskyong Oracle and others lamas and deities should be asked for the most effective course of action through both peaceful and wrathful means, to stop the British, and they should be invoked to give predictions. Appropriate action should be taken in accordance with these predictions and advice.^{xv}

Orders were given for the Natu La and Lungtu La to be barricaded and defended strongly. These orders were also sent to the Manchu Qing Emperor in Peking;

however the Imperial Court replied that the Manchu policy was to try to appease the British, and that war should be avoided at all costs.

The introduction explains how the British exploited this weak policy by building a 'rest house' or Dak bungalow at Kalimpong. A long inspection period and various dispatches from the Kashag followed this, before it was ordered that a Tibetan fortress be built at the Lungtu La to counter this bungalow. The Nechung Oracle's *rten mdos* (magic charms) were incorporated in the new fortress to ward off the British. The Finance Minister, rDo rje rig 'dzin lCang can, was appointed principal military and civilian chief of the region, and border guards and soldiers were deployed. It is claimed that the Manchu army trained these troops.

The Manchu Qing Emperor is presented in the narrative as weak and eagerly bowing to the demands of the British; he sent a demand to the Amban that the fortress be dismantled and troops withdrawn. When the Amban informed the National Assembly of this demand they countered that such an action would allow the British free access to Tibet and further that while "whatever the orders of the Great Heaven-Mandated Emperor of Infinite Power might be, we will adhere to them, and that it is our duty to do this as his subjects ... Lungtu La is indisputably part of Tibetan territory, and not only Sikkim, but also Bhutan, having for a long time belonged to Tibet, being vassal principalities."^{xvi} The text justifies the Tibetan position, explaining that since time immemorial the Chögyal of Sikkim and the King of Bhutan had offered tribute and homage to the Dalai Lama, and furthermore, every New Year letters of 'good fortune' have been offered to the Manchu Qing Government's Tibet Resident Amban. Both states had also in the past asked Tibet to mediate in disputes between the people and the Ganden Phodrang.

The Amban is presented as being in an impossible situation; on the one hand he has to obey the commands of the Emperor and appease the British, whilst on the other he sympathises with the Tibetans and swears to help them defend the Motherland. He is quoted as giving his advice as to how to defend Tibet against invasion:

We must fight a guerrilla battle, an ambush war, rather than engaging the enemy openly and clearly. The army should be dispersed and scattered rather than remain in one place; we should never fight a face-to-face battle nor in full frontal attack. As for the timing it would be better if the ambushes were conducted at night. We must be flexible in our tactics, changing them as necessary. We should always be attacking forward, rather than moving back and our army should be deployed into two places and stay inside tents rather than all stay in one concentrated place. This the enemy will anticipate and will fire their heavy artillery at these barracks; further, they are not an easily defended position. Since the enemy's soldiers and horses all require food and grain, we need to find ways of cutting off the supply route of the enemy, whilst secretly hiding our own stores of weaponry and grain, and by doing this and letting them enter Tibet alone and without backup, they will starve to death.^{xvii}

With the support of the Amban, the Kashag and Regent sent a letter quoted in the introduction to the British explaining that they planned to rebuild the fortress at Lungtu La, and deploy more troops to the area. Any trade negotiations could only take place once the British had withdrawn all troops from Sikkim and Bhutan. However the British knew that the Manchu Qing Court was weak, and that China was encircled by foreign imperial powers keen to dismember the crumbling state. The editors cite the proverb that "once harmed by a striped snake, even a wound rope terrifies one"^{xviii} and in such a way the Emperor was bowing to the demands of the imperialists.

The Amban's difficult position was resolved once Peking learned of his support for the Tibetan cause. In 1888 he was immediately withdrawn from service and exiled, and a new Amban, Shing Tai, was installed as his replacement. The introduction claims that Shing Tai was "as much a traitor as the Emperor himself."^{xix}

The Sikkimese Chögyal, mThu stobs rnam rgyal, intervened on behalf of the British following the new Amban's appointment, and suggested negotiations between the parties. However his suggestion was rejected by the Tibetans. He then organised for information about the British activities to be secretly sent to the Kashag through an elaborate system of spies. The narrative tells how the Kashag used the

short period of inactivity to rearm the Tibetan army, and to assemble and train the militia.

The introduction also quotes a letter from the King of Nepal to the Dalai Lama, expressing his hope that, "mediation would lead to reconciliation between Tibet and the British."^{xx} He also wrote to the Manchu Qing Court in Peking, explaining, "If the Tibetan army do not cross Tibet's borders, we and the British army would never need to attack it."^{xxi} The editors make it clear to the reader that the loyalties of the King of Nepal lay firmly with the British, and the Prince of the Gurkhas, Gortsanyen (Gor tsa snyen),²⁹² was continually plotting with the British throughout the period of the build-up to the Mission of 1903/4.

Returning to 1888, the text then describes how the British attacked the upper meadow region of sTod spang, destroying the Tibetan ramparts and defensive structures and immediately building a huge barracks of their own. 2000 British and Indian troops are deployed over the Dzalep La to build and occupied the barracks. The editors claim that many of the troops were in fact members of the Gurkha Regiments, disguised as porters and labourers, but there to "reinforce military strength, and provide morale in numbers."^{xxii}

Having taken the high passes, the British pressed home their advantage, attacking the Natu La with heavy artillery on the night of the 18th of August. The Tibetans were forced to withdraw as far as Rinchen Gang, where they met the Gyantse Resident Amban, Shogranshan (sh'o gran shan) with a few of his officers and soldiers. The editors describe the urgent talks that took place between the Amban and the Kalön *Gung*²⁹³ lHa klu Ye shes nor bu dbang phyug who has just arrived from Lhasa. The Kalön is quoted as explaining that, "because it would be hard to match up to the powerful and fearsome artillery of the enemy, we are unable to give a matching response and have no choice but to accept temporary solutions."^{xxiii}

²⁹² The future king, Tribhuvan Bir Bikram Shah, was not born until 1906, so this must refer to a local ruler, or minor prince of the Gurkha region.

²⁹³ *Gung*: A Chinese Imperial title.

The Amban berated the Kalön for his lack of courage and skill, explaining that as he held rank as a Manchu Government Officer, the British would accept his authority and withdraw from their positions. He then unfurled a flag bearing the word 'China' from the top of his residence. Seeing the flag from a distance, the British army immediately halted its artillery bombardment, and accepted a messenger from the Amban. It is claimed that a British officer named "pa ya srab", also known as "min rto" (Minto?) Sahib, demanded that "If there is a Chinese officer we must at once lay down our weapons and establish a ceasefire."^{xxiv} The Amban and the British officers met to establish a ceasefire, and following a second meeting on the 22nd of August 1888, the "British army retreated from all of its former barracks."^{xxv}

The editors then explain that Tibetan Resident Amban's Representative in Gyantse was only a minor official with a small entourage, but despite his low status, he was "like the commander of a third and mediating country; however if one considers his actions (the shamelessness, greed, and the pretence of power), it is clear that he was a collaborator of the British."^{xxvi}

Meanwhile in Lhasa, the XIIIth Dalai Lama had not yet reached maturity, but the Regent ordered the Abbot of rDor brag and a group of fifteen senior monks to perform rituals in the Potala Palace to repulse the enemy from Tibetan territory; The editors explain that "in offering the Protector Deities incense and rituals, they hoped to expel the British from Lungtu La area."^{xxvii} In order to enforce these rituals more than 10,000 Tibetan troops were trained and deployed in Düne, Phagri, and Dromo Rinchen Gang, and orders were sent to all of Tibet's monasteries to prepare the monk soldiers to face the British.

In 1890 the Junior Tibet Resident Amban, Shing Tai, was appointed Senior Amban in Lhasa. It is claimed that he had the clear intention to "surrender to the British imperialists."^{xxviii} In his first speech to the National Assembly he ordered that "in order to keep the British away we should not be allowed to send the Tibetan army to Dromo Rinchen Gang, and the officers and soldiers sent to Phagri should never be allowed to advance from there."^{xxix} Such negative advice did not accord with the

agressions of the National Assembly, who rejected his advice claiming that, "whether or not your suggestions are those of the Heavenly Mandated Celestial Great Sovereign, we find it absolutely impossibly to accept them."^{xxx} The Amban was insulted and again explained that it was imperative not to fight the British. The National Assembly and the Kashag then published a joint open letter to the Amban showing how by not confronting the enemy, Tibet would fall to their evil plan of occupation.

The narrative explains how, realising that he had lost the favour of the Tibetan authorities, the Amban then left for Dromo Rinchen Gang on the pretext of visiting relatives. He headed straight for the British barracks and opened negotiations with the British Commander Powell (*Pa'o ar*)²⁹⁴ discussing the Tibetan, Bhutanese, and Sikkimese border issues with him. At the same time he ordered that the 10,000 Tibetan troops stationed in and around Dromo Rinchen Gang be dispersed and withdrawn. The editors explain how the Tibetan troops refused to withdraw fully, instead camping in the forests of the region, and carrying out night ambush attacks on the British positions. On discovering this the Amban announced that, "the Tibetan army needs to withdraw at once, and I, as the Tibet Resident Amban will deal with the British if they come again."^{xxxi}

With a certain amount of vitriol the editors persuade the reader that the Amban did all that he could to facilitate the imperialists' advance into Tibet. However the commanders of the Tibetan troops outwitted the Amban, only withdrawing their troops a short way. Not realising this, the Amban then 'politely and humbly' requested the British to withdraw. The British officer, Powell, 'distorted the truth' and refused to withdraw any of his troops. The editors then demonstrate over three pages that the British had aggressively occupied Sikkim and Darjeeling, and that these areas had been part of Tibet for centuries.

²⁹⁴ *Pa'o ar*: This could be transcribed as Powell, or Power.

For his service and duplicity Shing Tai was elevated to the rank of full Amban following these negotiations. It is claimed that he told the Kashag that, "I am the Full Amban with all the power of the Manchu Qing Government." However the editors explain that "he was an energetic and diligent running dog of the Manchu Emperor, ready to surrender, and stamp out the hopes and aspirations of the Tibetans who wanted to repulse the invasion."^{xxxii}

While the Amban was holding discussions with the British, Kalön Ram pa bKra shis dar rgyas and the envoy of the Kashag, the Tā Lama, 'Bum thang Ye shes phul byung, were sent to Dromo Rinchen Gang by the National Assembly to attempt to stall him. They were dispatched with a letter to the Amban, which the editors quote in full, explaining that as the British had, "invaded the border regions, so we the Tibetan monks and laypeople can not live in peace and harmony, we have no option but to attack in self defence... we must not yield even a handful of Tibetan land to the British, and concerning the markets and trade route between the two countries, we must never accept this as it was not there before."^{xxxiii}

The Amban refused to accept the letter from the Tā Lama and Kalön, and his arrogance only increased when he received a telegram from the Emperor granting him "the full powers to represent the Great Chinese Manchu Emperor; and in that capacity you must go to Calcutta to have discussions with the British regarding the Anglo-Tibetan situation."^{xxxiv} The Amban left Tibet in late February going via Darjeeling to Calcutta, to meet the British Representatives and the Indian Viceroy, Lad si ton.²⁹⁵ Much is made in the introduction of the reception that the Amban received; "At that time the Amban was given the reception of a fully empowered Manchu Emperor's representative cabinet minister and he was welcomed and received with all meticulous care and respect as the representative of the Emperor."^{xxxv} The British used this flattery and care to ensure that the Amban accepted all the articles of the 1817 Treaty of Titalia. Under the terms of the treaty the British officially annexed Sikkim, and decreed that no other nation could have

²⁹⁵ *Lad si ton*: possibly Lansdowne, Viceroy of India, 1888-1894.

any diplomatic or trade negotiations with the Sikkimese without their prior approval. Sikkim thus became a protectorate, with the British controlling its borders, trade and foreign relations.

The period described in the introduction is referred to as the 'British imperialists' first invasion of Tibet,' and came to an end with the death of the pro-imperialist Amban. The editors claim that over 14,000 troops were deployed during this time to defend the Motherland's sovereign territory and rights.

The period following Shing Tai's death promotes an assessment of Tibetan military strengths and weaknesses, and the editors examine the reasons for the 'defeat'; they note, "The soldiers' motivation, morale and training were not good, and as some were only militiamen their discipline was not strict enough. The behind-the-lines support (reserve troops), logistics, storehouses, and armouries, as well as the ammunition, provisions, and supplies were insufficient, and were unable to provide sufficient backup to the troops."^{xxxvi} The military generals and high-ranking commanders of the Tibetan Army are criticised as being unable to make decisions and to "meet hostilities on the basis of understanding and organisation, and they were unable to make plans in accordance with the situational developments of the war." The editors also refer to the wider picture of China and its experiences with Western powers at this time, explaining how, "the Manchu Qing Emperor's mighty territories boundaries were getting weaker, just as worms eat rotten meat, and therefore the aggressors, the bullies, and the robbers were encroaching like oil being used up in a butter lamp, gradually burning out."^{xxxvii}

The editors firmly place any blame for the loss of the war on the 'evil policies' of the Manchu Qing Government. The elders explain that, "wherever the path of the elephant (or the Buddha) goes, there all the cows follow without fear"^{xxxviii} (i.e. where the chief goes, then the people will follow) and in that way the Tibetans were led to placate the British imperialists by the defeatist policies of their failing suzerains.

The situation was unresolved at the time of the Amban's death in 1892, and so the Manchu Qing Government sent representatives directly to India to agree to a final settlement on the issue of trade. General Ha'o krang tung was dispatched to Calcutta, to meet with the British Special Political Officer, Paul Archer (Pa'o yar car)²⁹⁶ in 1893. Discussions ranged from the trade mart at Nadong, travel and transport arrangements, to enabling postage and telegraph installations. In March 1895 the Nine-Article Treaty was signed, decreeing the building of a trade route from Tibet to Yatung, and allowing the British to appoint a Trade Representative in Nadong. Moreover, there should be free access to Yatung from all from British India's borders, and the right to rent property was to be permitted in the region. Conflicts and trade disputes were to be dealt with by a committee comprising "China's border regions envoy, a British-appointed representative, and Sikkim's Conch holder."^{xxxix}

The editors present the treaty as damaging for the Tibetans, bringing nothing but "imperialistic pressure and control, the root cause of which lies with the Manchu Qing Government."^{xi} The Tibetan response was to procrastinate, and not to comply with the terms of the treaty, while at the same time mobilising their defences in the region. The British are accused of "gathering their strength on the one hand, whilst on the other talking about pasturage and trade relations."^{xi} Importantly; however, the text claims that the issue of border demarcation was intentionally left unresolved by the imperialists, so as to give them grounds for future attacks on Tibetan territories. The introduction concludes by showing how this ambiguity allowed the British to seek further concessions from China, and to maintain their desire to wrest Tibet from the Motherland.

²⁹⁶ *Pa'o yar car*: This could refer to many Western names. I have chosen to translate it as "Paul Archer," but can find no one of this name in British records.

Chapter Four: Commentary and Analysis from the *Bod kyi rig gnas lo rgyus dpyad gzhi'i rgyu cha bdams bsgrigs*

Following the preface and introduction of the *Bod kyi rig gnas lo rgyus dpyad gzhi'i rgyu cha bdams bsgrigs* the editors give an extensive commentary of the history of Anglo-Tibetan relations from the death of Amban Shing Tai to the Mission's arrival in Lhasa and the Dalai Lama's flight to Mongolia. The editors provide an unprecedented, and previously untranslated into English, account of the Mission, and record the brutality and duplicity of the British throughout their 'invasion.' The style of writing and language used is the same as that found in the preface and introduction, and the account is heavily biased towards the Chinese historical narrative. Accordingly, the Imperial Manchu Empire of the period is referred to as 'The People's Republic of China's Manchu Qing Government,' the administration of the Dalai Lama is referred to as the 'Tibetan Local Government,' and the British are variously referred to as 'imperialists,' 'invaders,' or 'enemies of the faith.'

The editors first remind readers that, "The Middle Kingdom of China's Manchu Qing Government was becoming more corrupt and falling further into decline."^{xlii} The name 'People's Republic of China' or 'Middle Kingdom' is a misleading use of terminology as the People's Republic was only proclaimed in 1949, and the events described in the narrative occur in the reign of the Guangxu Emperor (Man ching gong ma Kwang zhud).²⁹⁷ The editors use the term 'The People's Republic of China's Government' in order to link the historical Imperial Manchu Empire and the current PRC, whilst at the same time still enabling them to blame the invasion on the corruption and decline of the Emperor's court and his corrupt officials. This link additionally enables the PRC to claim sovereignty over all of the lands and territories of the former Imperial Manchu Empire even if the Imperial control over these regions was tenuous at best.

²⁹⁷ Reigned 1875-1908.

The opening pages of the commentary reiterate that the Amban was sent to Calcutta between 1890 and 1892, in order to sign 'The Eight Point Unequal Treaty of Calcutta.' However the editors note that the Tibetan Government, "doing the right thing, did not implement these treaties,"^{xliii} much to the irritation of the British, forcing them to devise other, more cunning, ways of gaining domination of Tibet. Their first plan was to initiate talks with the Ganden Phodrang concerning trade marts and border demarcation. In 1899 the British Resident in Darjeeling sent successive letters to the XIIIth Dalai Lama through the intermediary offices of O rgyan dbang phyug, The Tongsa Pönlop. Of these letters, "the first was returned by the Kashag, and the second was also not accepted by the Dalai Lama, and was therefore returned."^{xliv} The commentary insists that the British wrote directly to the Dalai Lama to sow discord between the Imperial Government and the Kashag, and by choosing to raise the question of border demarcation and trade marts with the Dalai Lama directly they hoped to gain an excuse to invade Tibet without need of informing the Emperor. They, "harboured the empty hope of deceiving us with this plan," however, it is described as resulting in an "embarrassing defeat for the British."^{xlv}

The editors describe how the British did not have sufficient authority to hold direct discussions with the Manchu Qing Government, and therefore decided to bully the Kashag into a settlement. In March 1903 they sent a letter to the Kashag; the commentary quotes an unreferenced British demand that, "As we are going to decide about these border regions, a competent envoy must be immediately dispatched to the border."^{xlvi} Accordingly the Kashag dispatched a newly appointed envoy of the Tibet Resident Amban Shuhon (Shu ho'n) along with their own representative, bLo bzang 'phrin las,²⁹⁸ also known as Tsa rong dBang phyug rgyal po, a monastic secretary, dGe 'dun chos dar, and *brGya dpon* 'Gyur med tshe bston with and a guard of troops for their protection. It was arranged that the delegates would hold discussions at the border between Tibet and Sikkim with

²⁹⁸ bLo bzang 'phrin las is given the title *mkhan drung*. This denotes that he is from the personal household of the Dalai Lama. Elsewhere he is given the title *trung che* or Chief Secretary.

Younghusband and White. However, as the delegation approached the border, the British, "deceptively and secretly"^{xlvi} sent a letter to the Kashag informing them that the discussions had been moved to Khamba Dzong, inside Tibet.

bTsag ser khang pa, the Gamba Dzongpön, sent news to the Labrang²⁹⁹ of Trashilhunpo, that the British had invaded with over two hundred troops, and taken his Dzong by force. This news was immediately passed on to the Kashag in Lhasa. The Kashag's reply was strongly worded, but devoid of any specific orders and direction. It reminded him that, "the enemy is politically cunning," and therefore, "we must all work co-operatively, and in short the invasion must not be allowed to progress. Please do whatever is suitable, through all appropriate and skilful methods, and through violent or peaceful means, to prevent this invasion."^{xlvi} The Labrang at Trashilhunpo was spurred into action and they, "immediately with great resourcefulness and enthusiasm came up with plans as to how to remove the British invading force."^{xlix}

In Lhasa, the Kashag maintained its policy of negotiation despite "realising that the British were only sweet talking about peace talks and the wind is chasing (i.e. accelerating) the chances of war," the Kalöns being "of the opinion that the flames of war are bound to burn."ⁱ The editors inform us that 'The Tibet Autonomous Region National Assembly' met to discuss the invasion. As with the use of the term 'People's Republic of China,' the TAR (*Bod rang skyong ljongs*) was not formed until 1965, and use of the term is misleading and historically inaccurate. The National Assembly issued a 'Memorandum of Common Regulations' to the effect that, "regardless of the outcome of the peace negotiations at the border, the enemies of the faith must be stopped at any cost."ⁱⁱ It was decided to use the defence strategy developed when the Mongolian nomadic areas rebelled in 1888, whereby each of the eighteen regions of Tibet were ordered to raise the militia according to their tribal makeup. The regions were responsible for their own stores and supplies,

²⁹⁹ Bla brang. Lit. "Lama's residence," i.e. his 'private estate,' 'palace,' or 'court.' Also, more usually the Abbot's office or committee that runs most monasteries. Not to be confused with Labrang Monastery in Amdo (Xiahe County, Gansu Province.)

each Dzongpön was placed in charge of logistics and stores, and each Dzong was to provide 48,000 *khal*³⁰⁰ of grain for the local militia.

The narrative describes the meeting between the Tibetan delegation and the British officers at Khamba Dzong at which they urged the British not to fight and called for peaceful conciliation, despite being sworn enemies since 1888. However the British showed no disposition for talking on an equal basis, and "blamed the Tibetans for building the fortress at Lungtu La,"^{lii} thereby contravening the border demarcation. The editors describe how the British were spoiling for a fight, and only the careful diplomacy of the Tibetan delegation denied their bloodlust.

The different approaches of, on the one hand, the Kashag's peaceful and diplomatic policy, and on the other the National Assembly and the Tibetan troops and monk's aggressive stance, is then illustrated by the words of the commander of the militia, sTeng pa tshé rabs. He was outraged by the British manoeuvres in the Kye ru region, raging that, "these sworn enemies have since the time of the Earth Mouse year been using the pretext of peaceful talks to invade." He claimed that he and his troops could not tolerate this, and that he therefore planned to, "expend my own life by leading my soldiers under the cover of darkness and attack the enemy."^{liii} The government delegates at Khamba Dzong were deeply troubled by this patriotic outburst, and ordered this 'reckless commander' not to go through with his plan owing to the small number of troops in the area.

The commentary then suggests that the British suddenly withdrew from Khamba Dzong so as to deceive the Tibetans, and further stretch their defences. The commissioners in the field continuously sent reports on British activity to Lhasa, and peaceful discussions carried on fruitlessly; however despite temporarily retreating the British soon announced that they planned to, "move our troops to Lhasa."^{liv}

³⁰⁰ *khal*. A standard Tibetan measure of volume for items such as grain and rice. It is measured using a small wooden box, and is equivalent to about 25-30 lbs.

On the 8th of September 1903, "Commanders Macdonald and Younghusband lead about a hundred civilian and military personnel, Sikhs and Gurkhas mercenaries, doctors, coolies, and transport carriers, altogether numbering over ten thousand people,"^{lv} over the Dzalep La to Dromo Rinchen Gang.³⁰¹ On the 14th they advanced up the valley, and marched on to Phagri. The Phagri Dzongpön, sKyid spug, and his officers had, "no power aside from his words to expel them, nor means to stop them."^{lvi} The commentary explains that the Dzongpön was bound by the orders of the Amban not to fire in aggression, an implication by the editors that the Amban had authority to dictate orders to Tibetan military commanders and officials. Such authority was beyond the responsibility of the Lhasa based Imperial Resident; however it gives us an indication of the powers the commentary's authors believe the Amban held.

Once he had withdrawn the border guards as ordered, Dzongpön sKyid spug sent a report to the Kashag. The Kashag had pre-empted this development and, "arranged the volunteers and militia so that they resembled the feathers of a bird"^{lvii} (i.e. one after another), and sent another eleven envoys to the region to negotiate with the British. However the editors again claim that the British were not interested in negotiation and, "no matter how hard they tried, the British were talking about peace, but in reality they were seeking to achieve their aggressive targets and aims."^{lviii}

The British divided into two attack groups; one remained in the vicinity of Phagri and set a camp at Horthang, and the other pushed further into Tibet, stopping at Düne. On their approach to Phagri Dzong the Ganden Phodrang's envoy called on the officers of the Mission to again request that they return to the border for talks. He stressed the limited number of Tibetan troops in the region, all of whom were stationed there to monitor the border, and hoped that the British would reciprocate their trust, adding that, "world order has been upset, and that they had

³⁰¹ Chumbi Valley, Dromo Rinchen Gang, and Tromo are used to describe the same place in the commentary.

violated an international code" by invading. He expressed concern for the, "innocent monks and laymen of this area who are suffering from the terrible fear of war."^{lix} The envoy told the British that, "Before long the suitable qualified representatives of the Ganden Phodrang and from both the monastic and lay populations will arrive here for peace talks."^{lx}

His words however did not concern the British, who replied that, "Although so far we have conducted a number of peaceful negotiations concerning the demarcation of the border, we have never been able to reach a conclusive agreement. If we were able to meet your main political functionaries face to face, we may be able to carry out our orders from London. Therefore, we do not have the option of retreating."^{lxi} The two sections of the Mission joined together at Düne on the 6th of November. In reply the Tibetans withdrew from Phagri to Chumi Shonko, and it was here that the militia commanders, "made up their minds to defend from there,"^{lxii} deciding to fight the British advance.

Their determination is another opportunity for the editors to demonstrate how the actions and policy of the Ganden Phodrang and their military and monastic counterparts differed. The Kashag in Lhasa maintained its policy of negotiation, and "invoked the Gods and offered extensive prayers. The Nechung Oracle³⁰² was invited into trance and asked for his opinion and prophecy."^{lxiii} His prophecy that peace talks alone would bring a positive solution to the crisis gave heart to the Kashag. News of the invasion and the loss of Phagri were sent to the Guangxu Emperor in Beijing. He sent word that, "under no circumstances were they [the Tibetans] to fight,"^{lxiv} and appointed Amban Yü Kang ('Us kang) to arrange the necessary dialogue. The authority of Beijing is demonstrated when, "as this command came from Beijing, the Tibetan Government followed the orders of the Manchu Qing Court and allowed the Amban to go and talk to the British."^{lxv} Despite

³⁰² Official State Oracle of the Government of Tibet. The Nechung Protector is related to the emanations of the Five Wisdom Buddha Families and their corresponding principles of Body, Speech, Mind, Qualities, and Activities. Pehar, the King of Activity is often considered to be the Chief of these five Nechung Protectors. The Nechung Oracle is considered the Emissary of the Five Kings, primarily an emanation of the King of Speech.

the Tibetans granting him access to the border regions it is claimed that the Amban, "dared not go" to meet the British, and, "under various pretexts he procrastinated."^{lxvi} His personal cowardice and weakness is much remarked on in the commentary, adding to the narrative of Imperial corruption and weakness that forms a common thread in the whole of the *Bod kyi rig gnas lo rgyus dpyad gzhi'i rgyu cha bdams bsgrigs*.

The commentary quotes from letters received by the Ganden Phodrang from expat Tibetans in India describing the large number of modern weapons, food provisions, horses, mules, camels, pack animals, and soldiers being amassed in Kalimpong.³⁰³ The letters warn of the difficulty the Ganden Phodrang would face meeting such a challenge. In a similar vein O rgyan dbang phyug wrote to the Ganden Phodrang, and in a letter quoted in full in the commentary informed the Kalöns that the British had made extensive preparations for war and,

If the Tibetan Government tries to do likewise, they should know that merely in terms of weapons alone there is no match with the British, and they must consider only peaceful talks. Concerning all this, we the Bhutanese are only insignificant, but it is our responsibility to mediate between the British and the Tibetans, and please therefore accept our mediation.^{lxvii}

The commentary admits that the Emperor's Government was being, "bullied and influenced by many foreign imperialists." The editors' comments must be seen in light of a continuing Chinese narrative of China's 'humiliation' with regard the international race for trade concessions with China, and the military campaigns that followed the Opium Wars and Boxer Rebellion. (See conclusions below for more analysis of this narrative.)

At successive meetings of the Kashag and the National Assembly, the Amban Yü Kang did all that he could to dampen the spirits and patriotic fervour of the Tibetans, and continued to promote his policy of procrastination and negotiation.

³⁰³ Kalimpong is a hill station in West Bengal, in Darjeeling District, often used in this period as a summer retreat and an alternative to Darjeeling.

All the evidence stacked against using force to defend Tibet; the letters from exiles, the Nechung Oracle's predictions, the orders from the Emperor, and the instinct of the Kashag; however, the National Assembly had vowed in its solemn oath not to allow a single enemy to enter Tibet. The National Assembly realised that it had no choice but to send soldiers to the border region, on the grounds that, "if you don't begin to defend yourself then it is an invitation for the enemy to walk into Tibet."^{lxviii} Accordingly the Kashag arranged for Commanders lHa lding sras³⁰⁴ and rNam sras gling dpal 'byor 'jigs med to lead a force of over one thousand Manchu trained soldiers to Chumi Shonko. They were to accompany the Ganden Phodrang's representatives, the envoy of the IXth Panchen Lama, the Lord Chamberlain, the former Abbot of Trashilhunpo, and envoys from The Three Seats. The editors give the misleading impression that this was a diplomatic mission that was guarded by a unit of well-trained troops.

On arrival at the battlefield the envoys and their armed escort pitched their tents near the hundred and eight hot water springs at Chumi Shonko. The troops were divided into three sections, one to defend the valley floor, and one for each side of the steep valley, across which a low wall was built. The troops were poorly armed and, "apart from a few of the commanders who had automatic weapons and some troops who had old style Tibetan rifles, there was nothing more than swords, spears, and slingshots."^{lxix} In a letter that is quoted at length, the Sikkimese royal family intervene to broker a peace deal. As Ye shes srol ma, Maharani of Sikkim, was related to Commander lHa lding sras, she wrote to the Kashag warning that there was, "no way you could match them [the British] militarily."^{lxx} The letter sparked another meeting of the National Assembly at which the members recognised the might of the British in terms of weaponry and numbers, listened to the advice of the Amban and the Maharani, and acknowledged that "there was no hope of victory,"^{lxxi} and that there would be a great loss of life, nevertheless their

³⁰⁴ In Western sources lHa lding sras is referred to as the 'Lhasa General.' YOUNGHUSBAND, FRANCIS. 1910. p. 177.

solemn oath compelled them to fight. A consequent resolution also demanded that all military expenditure be kept to a minimum.

The commentary quotes from a letter dated the 15th of January 1904 that the British sent to the Tibetans at Chumi Shonko demanding that they send suitable representatives to meet them at Düne for discussions. The letter speaks of a desire to settle their differences through discussion, but states that those delegates designated to attend must be of sufficient authority to speak for the whole government. The editors interpret this letter as phony, and the commentary describes how that very afternoon the British marched all of their troops, supplies, and porters straight up to Chumi Shonko, disregarding their offer of negotiation at Düne. The newly arrived Tibetan envoys met to consider the way forward, and resolved to meet the British for peace talks, but at the same time be ready for war. "The various battalions were deployed, the fuses on the rifles were ignited, their swords rested in their hands, and stones gathered to throw at the enemy."^{lxxii} The editors are keen to stress that the Tibetan officers ordered that every effort be made to ensure that no rifles were set off by accident causing alarm or give the wrong impression to the British while the discussions lasted.

The envoys met with the British officers to exchange their names and rank on the floor of Chumi Shonko valley at the stone defensive wall. The commander of the British force is quoted as requesting that, "in order to have the peaceful negotiation, we two sides must fulfil some preliminary conditions; firstly as we must only have peaceful discussions, all military equipment must be left to one side. Secondly, all British soldiers must remove all the bullets from their rifles, and from their rifle's chambers, and the Tibetan soldiers must extinguish their matchlock fuses."^{lxxiii} Despite knowing that the British were, "masters of trickery and cunning, these sweet and polite words of the British were trusted."^{lxxiv} Thereby Tibetan leaders were fooled by the reassuring words of the British officer, and the request was carried out. However, "the British were cunning aggressors, and their nature was barbaric, troublesome and as bad as the two tongued snake." With, "not a sniff of honesty," they immediately ordered their men to occupy the higher

ground, taking up an attacking position. The commentary then repeats the claim made elsewhere that the British officers had ordered their men to hide extra bullets in the hollows of their rifle stocks, where the oil and cleaning cloths were normally held. "As such the British soldiers' evil was in their hearts right from the beginning, and their hearts contained torture beyond the human imagination."^{lxxv}

There is no debate in the commentary as to who fired the first shot: "After about fifteen minutes of discussion at the wall between the officers, one British officer suddenly pulled out a small automatic weapon and shot the Tibetan military commanders and others present."^{lxxvi} Seeing this Commander lHa lding sras's personal attendant unsheathed the dead officer's long cavalry sword, and charged at the enemy officers. We are told that his heroic actions killed two officers, a sergeant, and about ten or eleven soldiers. General Macdonald records a different casualty list in his official 'After Action Report' dated 1st of April, "At this encounter at the wall Major Wallace-Dunlop, 23rd Pioneers, was severely wounded, and Mr Candler, Press Correspondent to the Daily Mail, dangerously wounded, besides two sepoy severely wounded and four men slightly wounded."³⁰⁵

According to the commentary an unnamed Tibetan commander rallied his troops with the cry, "instead of running away like a fox with its tail between its legs, it is better to die like a ferocious tiger fighting!"^{lxxvii} He then led them over the wall to attack the British. The British officers then gave a whistle signal to their troops to reload their weapons using the concealed bullets, and poured heavy fire down on the Tibetan positions. *mDa' dpon sKyid spug* attempted to mobilise the soldiers before he was shot in the leg. The Chinese narrative describes how the British did not stop firing, "until it was the evening, when some of the soldiers went about bayoneting the corpses to ensure they were dead. After that the British coolies searched through the pockets and pouches of the corpses for earrings, rings and whatever they could get hold of as loot."^{lxxviii}

³⁰⁵ BL: Mss 1060-A. Dated Camp Thuna [sic], 1st of April 1904. Brigadier-General JRL Macdonald to the Adjutant-General in India.

Where as British accounts analysed in chapter one record the medical assistance administered by the IMS to the Tibetan wounded, the editors tell us that many of the Tibetan soldiers were only feigning death, and once night had fallen they escaped out of the valley, carrying the wounded with them. *mDa' dpon sKyid spug* was carried to Changlo Manor, from where he dispatched a report of the battle to the Kashag. The Changlo estate was generous to the soldiers, feeding them and giving treatment to the wounded. The commentary estimates that at the battle of Chumi Shonko "about five hundred officers and men were killed, and about four hundred and thirty wounded,"^{lxxxix} and that all of their weapons, provisions, and horses were looted by the British. These numbers generally agree with British accounts.

The pages that follow are filled with furious vitriol about the "deception and butchery of the British," fuming that, "the anger and rage that we all have about this infamous bloodshed is like an engraving on stone; it will never be forgotten and will remain etched on the hearts of the Tibetan monastic and lay populations."^{lxxx} The editors point out the lessons to be learnt from the episode, and that, "we must firstly not forget our previous generation's heroic bravery and courage, and secondly ensure that the south-western gate of the Motherland be firmly guarded against invaders."^{lxxxix}

The editors believe that the trickery and deception of the British was the main cause of the appalling loss of life at Chumi Shonko, as well as their modern weapons, and greater military force. However, the British were, "impressed and shocked by the Tibetan national patriotic courage, bravery, and fighting skills."^{lxxxii} Indeed we are told that such was their shock that they relied more and more on their artillery and long range rifles to attack the Tibetans, attempting to avoid them in hand-to-hand combat.

There follows two accounts of valiant Tibetan victories over their invaders: Whilst on route to Gyantse, the British camped in Shölam Monastery, to the south west of Khangmar, where they were attacked under cover of darkness by *mDa' dpon bKras*

gling pa and Ram pa. It was reported to the Kashag that over sixty British officers and men were killed in the battle, and many pistols taken; however no further information is given in the commentary. There is no record of this attack in any other source, and there is no mention of it in any of the British officer's accounts analysed. Such a violent attack with so many British casualties would surely have been recorded in both versions of history, were it to have occurred.

The second incident is said to have occurred at the Dzatrang, about twenty kilometres from Khangmar. The roll call in the commentary of the Tibetan troops is impressive; over 1,500 monk militia from Tsang, 1,300 monks from Lhokha, and Kongkhul Monasteries, as well as monks from Ganden, Sera, Drepung, Labrang, and Trashilhunpo, and still more troops from various estates and monasteries. Senior monks from Trashilhunpo, Drepung, and Sera provided leadership for the attack, their strategy being to attack the British from above as they passed through the narrow gorge. Archers were placed along the east side of the top of the gorge, two cannons in the west, large stones and logs were accumulated at the top to roll down onto the invaders, and trenches were dug to hide the troops. An additional detachment of 1,200 troops commanded by sMon gling pa were sent to the north and south of the defile to cut off the escape routes of the fleeing British troops, and orders were given not to attack until the enemy were in the midpoint of the gorge.

The editors describe that on the morning of the 28th of February patrol units reported sighting the British cavalry advancing unsuspectingly towards the defile, and at approximately noon the main body of British troops had reached the target area. Something however alerted them to the ambush; the commentary has, "two accounts; either, one of our soldiers accidentally let off his rifle or, a rock suddenly rolled down the gorge."^{lxxxiii} Realising the ambush the British deployed their artillery and rifles along the tops of the gorge; however the Tibetans entrenched there were well defended. The Tibetans to the north attacked down the defile, scattering the British infantry, and, "aside from those that managed to escape, the rest lost their lives."^{lxxxiv} The British infantry regrouped with their cavalry and artillery and attacked the high ground and, "because their artillery had telescopic

sights, it could hit a target whether it was near or far."^{lxxxv306} The Tibetans only withdrew from the tops of the gorge once their ammunition ran out, holding out in the defile until the cavalry pushed them down the valley under a barrage of artillery fire. The fighting is reported to have lasted a full day, and, "about two hundred and thirty of the enemy soldiers were killed or wounded."^{lxxxvi} The Tibetans reportedly lost about eighty officers and men killed or wounded, and retreated to Gyantse.

mDa' dpon lCags sprag pa was appointed to oversee operations in Gyantse with the twofold aim of stopping the British and resupplying the troops pouring in from Khangmar and Dzatrang. He ordered that monks and troops be gathered from Gyantse Dzong, Pelkor Chöde Monastery, Nenyng Monastery, Tsechen Monastery, from the estates of Phala, Changlo, and Kabshi. Local militia and regular troops were also summoned to the Dzong to bolster its defence. The three aristocratic estates provided fifty soldiers each, the monks of Rinding, Khurpa, and Sekang Colleges of Pelkor Chöde Monastery each sent thirty fighting monks, and 460 men of the local militia formed a 'volunteer attack force.' Reports and requests for provisions were sent to Lhasa, with a full list of officers. In the aftermath of the battle at Dzatrang it was realised that *mDa' dpon* Ram pa was missing; it was realised that he had already arrived in Lhasa, having fled the scene of the fighting. The Kashag therefore removed him from his post, giving overall responsibility to *mDa' dpon* bKras gling pa. "When the news of this spread amongst the soldiers, it strengthened their resolve to fight the enemy."^{lxxxvii} His first action as commander was to establish an outpost at the estate of Sapü Gang.

The commentary describes how a small group of the enemy's cavalry was seen reconnoitring the area around Sapü Gang, and had established a barracks there. The British issued an ultimatum that the Dzong must be abandoned, and all the troops stationed inside surrender their weapons and disperse. British officers

³⁰⁶ This is misleading. Telescopic technology was only introduced effectively for artillery in the 1950s.

warned that failure to comply immediately would result in them showing no mercy at a later date. The next week fifty enemy cavalry approached the monastery at Pelkor Chöde to ensure that no Tibetan soldiers were hiding there. While the troops checked the monastery's many rooms, the Abbot, Nor rgyas byang chub, offered a *kha btags*³⁰⁷ to the enemy commander, expressing a desire for negotiation and adding that he hoped, "this monastery will not face destruction."^{lxxxviii} The British commander reportedly did not reply, and gave a hand signal, upon which his men returned to their barracks. News of this was sent to Commander bKras gling pa who commended the Abbot on his diplomacy, and advocated not stationing troops in the monastery, as this would invite the destruction of the monastery and its treasures. He did however offer to send troops to defend the monastery in the event of the British returning there, and ordered the resident monks back to their village and satellite monasteries. He sent word to the Abbot that, "all the arrows, swords and spears should be gathered along with those from the protector deities' temple and main prayer halls, for now is the time to use them to subdue the enemies of the faith."^{lxxxix} He ordered that doors to the monastery be firmly blocked with stones, and that fifty fit and able monks patrol the monastery at all times of day and night. Stalemate followed for some days.

The British were "unable to bear this defeat,"^{xc} and so began firing their long-range artillery and Maxim guns at the Dzong. They surrounded the nearby Tibetan camp, and it became, "a life and death battle"^{xcii} for the Tibetans inside the camp. The Tibetan commanders rallied their troops with a stirring speech before leading them out of the camp to attack the surrounding troops; "about thirty of the enemy soldiers were killed or wounded, and a great majority of them escaped to Changlo."^{xciii} This engagement, again not recorded in British accounts, signalled the start of the fighting proper in Gyantse.

Monastic Massacres: Nenying and Tsechen

³⁰⁷ *kha btags*. Tibetan silk offering scarves. Usually white with symbols of the eight auspicious symbols. Often presented to officials, Lama, or visitors on arrival and departure.

The commentary reports that the Tibetan troops were under the command of bKras gling pa, and he appointed *mDa' dpon* lCags sprag pa and *mDa' dpon* rNgon lung as his deputies. In March the units from Shigatse and Dingri were deployed to the monastery at Tsechen to defend it against attack from Changlo, and at the same time defend their base at Gabshi. However they were soon ordered back to the monastery at Pelkor Chöde, Latse, and Gyalkar owing to the increased artillery fire in these areas. The troops who were harassing the British in Changlo were pulled back to the Dzong, and the monasteries in the area were all reinforced.

In the stalemate that followed the British maintained their bombardment of the Dzong from Changlo, and the armies of both sides made preparations and tested their enemy's defences. The Chinese narrative gives prominence to a number of *Ru dpon* and *brGya dpon* who met with their senior commanders to make a bold suggestion: We are told they reasoned that to sit and wait in the Dzong for the British to attack was too defensive, and volunteered to lead an attack on the British base at Changlo.

mDa' dpon bKras gling pa commended them for their bravery and the ingenuity of their plan, adding a hundred fresh troops from Shigatse, Gyantse and Dingri to their units to reinforce the attack. Orders were given to prepare the attack, and bales of wool from the market place in Gyantse were brought up to the Dzong to form barricades and walls. The young commanders launched their attack in the dead of night. The British camp was unaware of their advance until they had reached the outer barbed wire perimeter fences. Here a sentry realised their advance and fired his rifle to wake the sleeping troops. There followed a savage engagement; however despite much of the fighting being hand-to-hand, the Tibetans were slowly beaten back to the Dzong by British Maxim Gun fire.

On their slow retreat they encountered the cavalry commanded by *lDab ldob* A dar supported by over one thousand militia from Markyang and Nyemo trying to join the forces in the Dzong. The Tibetans provided covering fire for their cavalry to approach, but the Maxim Gun fire from Changlo was too intense for them to cross

the open plain below the Dzong. The commanders in the Dzong sent orders to sMon gling pa at Nenyang Monastery that he should recruit soldiers and monks from the hillsides about the monastery and join forces with the cavalry to defend the southern approaches to Gyantse.

sMon gling pa summoned lDum ra ba, the head of the Tsang Militia, to the monastery at Nenyang. He brought with him 300 of his militia stationed at Markyang, Nyemo, and Rinpung to reinforce the monastery's defences. The remaining 700 militia remained in the mountains divided into two sections; 400 troops of the Nagtshang Militia were deputed to their Commander lHa dar can, and the remaining 300, were headed by the Secretary of Rinpung Monastery, Lodecen, with orders to be stationed at Ralung and Nartse.

Nenyang is about twenty kilometres south along the road from Gyantse. It was strategically important as it lay to the rear of the British camp at Changlo along any supply lines from India and Sikkim. The commentary records how during the rule of Khri srong lde'u btsan, 'Jam dpal gsang dbang realised the area to be of equal religious importance to Bodhi Gaya, and founded a large monastery there. After the battle at the gorge, the defeated militia made their way there to defend the famous monastery. They were joined by militia from Lhasa, Gongkar, and Chushül bringing their numbers to over 500 by the time lDum ra ba arrived with his Tsang Militia.

Owing to the large number of Tibetan troops in the area and their constant harrying of the supply lines, Younghusband decided to capture Nenyang Monastery and make it a forward supply depot for the troops at Changlo. We are told the attack failed owing to the excellent Tibetan defences, and so Younghusband ordered further reinforcements from Dode bringing more artillery and Maxim guns.

In April the British attacked again from the north and south with the reinforcements and troops from the garrison at Changlo. The attack came under the cover of artillery fire; however the perimeter walls were made of compressed earth and over two stories high, into which the Tibetan militia had installed numerous

defensive loopholes. On the hilltops surrounding Nenyang the Tibetans positioned *dal cang*³⁰⁸ and cannons pouring fire on the advancing British. The Tibetan troops fought "bravely and heroically"^{xciii} and, "a great number of enemy were killed or wounded."^{xciv} The commentary states that there was no way into the monastery, and with their casualty list rising, the British were forced to withdraw their attack.

During the lull in the fighting sMon gling pa and lDum ra ba then went to Gyantse for meetings with their superiors. Command in Nenyang was passed to rDor rje stobs rgyal, the command of the southern area was given to lHa dbang g.yul rgyal, and the militia were handed over to the command of A dar Nyi ma grags pa and his brother from Kongpo.

The account tells how the following day the British appreciated that in order to take Nenyang, they had to capture the western hills covering it. They deployed about eighty troops from the barracks at Changlo to take the high ground to the west of the monastery. They were guided through the upper part of the valley to the ridge behind the uppermost peak of Nenyang by one of their porters, a man reportedly called Phuntsog, from Dode. The editor's account pours scorn on this man, naming him as a traitor. The British attacked the small group of Horpa tribesmen who were stationed on the ridge, killing them all in a battle that lasted over seven hours, British casualties amounted to ten dead.

As soon as the ridge was taken the order was given for an all out assault on the monastery under covering fire from the western hills. The British reached the thick perimeter walls, and used explosives to create a breach in the walls. The British soldiers then rushed into the courtyard, pushing the Tibetan soldiers back the into the main prayer hall of the monastery. The British surrounded the Tibetans in the hall, and repeatedly attempted to secure their surrender, even to the extent of calling out, "now you have no hope of fighting on, if you surrender, we will let you leave with your lives."^{xcv}

³⁰⁸ *dal cang*: Chinese made automatic rifles; however these were not manufactured until the 1960s.

The commentary describes how their arrogance further enraged the Tibetans trapped in the prayer hall. They discussed their options and came to the united conclusion that, "it would be better to die in hand-to-hand fighting than to surrender to the evil British. In the defence of our native land and in order to avenge the memory of our brethren who have gone before us, we sacrifice our own lives, and we shall attack the enemy in hand-to-hand combat, and furthermore we will not take a single step in retreat."^{xcvi}

United in their defiance, the Tibetans burst out of the main doors of the prayer hall, led out by the courageous brothers, and attacked the British in the courtyard of the monastery. One of the brothers sliced off the shoulder of, "enemy commander rDza nya Sahib, and took his pistol."^{xcvii} After several hours of "vicious fighting, there were about one hundred and twenty enemy killed or wounded. Their blood spilled on the flagstones of the monastery courtyard, and flowed like a river."^{xcviii} Of the famous brothers, one was killed exiting the prayer hall, and the other was seriously injured in the fighting. In the pages that follow the editors portray a long and emotional death scene before the brother passes away, urging his comrades to fight on in his memory.

We are informed that, "This glorious chapter of the Tibetan soldiers at Nenying is remembered as a great victory."^{xcix} Much is made of the brothers' heroism, and we are told that, "in this battle of Nenying, the heroic actions of the Tibetan people in the defence of the Motherland and of their own country often gave up their own lives. Their heroic bravery, and the fame of their actions will not set like the sun, and the people of Tibet even today have not forgotten their actions."^c A circular letter was passed by the government to all regions of Tibet, describing the brothers' heroic deeds defending Tibet against the British, stirring people against, "the foreign enemy, whose ideology, religion, actions, behaviour, and way of life, are totally unlike our own."^{ci} The narrative tells how many young people, on hearing this call to arms, joined the militia and flocked to the battleground at Gyantse and Nenying.

The theme of remembrance is strong in the commentary, especially with regard to the Kongpo brothers. The editors quote a song sung by the people of the region in praise of the brothers and their bravery; "A dar Nyi ma grags pa has come with the Kongpo militia, and the British army has been crushed to the ground, the Nenying Monastery's stone courtyard, has been filled with red blood."^{cii} Details are also given of the rituals that take place in Kongpo on the first day of the tenth month to commemorate the day the brothers left the village to lead the fighting. Despite such attacks, and the death of Dza nya Sahib the commentary tells how the British eventually overran the monastery, looting its treasures, and burning the buildings.

Following the defeat at Nenying the battleground moved to Tsechen Monastery three miles northwest of Gyantse Dzong. The commentary describes this large monastery as being central to the Gelugpa sect, housing over 100 monks at the height of its power in the region. The 200 militia and thirty monk soldiers were lead by a high ranking official *rtse drung* Ngag dbang 'zam dpal but despite this large defence force he was unable to counter the heavy artillery and Maxim Gun fire of the British, especially when they positioned their heavy guns on the ridge overlooking the monastery. The commentary records that "fifty eight monks from the monastery, and approximately fifteen farmers from the local population were killed or wounded, and as for the tremendous loss, this debt was added to by the endless killing, looting, and destruction by the British."^{ciii}

The editors remind their Tibetan readers of the wholesale looting and destruction that followed the fall of the monastery in order to emphasise the cruelty and wanton nature of the imperialists, keen to plunder Tibet's riches and leave a trail of destruction in their wake. The well-fortified monastery and Dzong were founded in the fourteenth century and was an important seat of the Sakya sect, housing approximately 500 monks. Since the monastery resisted occupation it was considered 'fair game'³⁰⁹ by the British, and extensively looted. The commentary

³⁰⁹ Chapter six examines the items taken from its prayer halls in the context of other looted monasteries.

lists a catalogue of items pillaged and the buildings destroyed. The assembly hall, prayer hall, monastic colleges, monks dwellings, and kitchens were all torched to prevent them being reoccupied; however the editors' ire is evident when they list the items looted:

Images made from eastern bronze and western bronze, gold and copper, including big ones and small ones measuring between four meters and ten centimetre along with brocades, thanka, religious texts, and a golden Kanjur (*bka' 'gyur*) and Tengyur (*bstan 'gyur*), cymbals that were made in Mongolia, China, and Nepal, and small cymbals, gold silver and copper offering bowls, as well as water offering bowls, silver mandala, copper long horns, hanging banners made from old brocade, religious artefacts, of all possibly varieties, and of superior quality of a similar kind. Even the used monk's carpets were destroyed and looted.^{civ}

In the commentary the British are described as maliciously letting their horses loose in the fields surrounding Gyantse and Tsechen, thereby destroying the harvest, before the officers "raped the women, and the property, horses, and cattle were looted and they performed many different kinds of atrocities."^{cv} The words to a popular folk song concerning the looting from Tsechen are then quoted that "clearly shows the people's attitude of hostile resentment towards the enemy";

The turquoise valley of Gyantse,
has been filled with the foreign army,
oh alas, when one sees this,
what is the point of all the wealth we have accumulated?^{cvi}

Despite all the destruction and the grief of the Tibetan people becoming "as hot as a fire and as deep as an ocean, their backs were not broken, nor their courage daunted."^{cvi} The scattered troops all resolve to regroup at Gyantse to face the British and take "revenge for their martyred brothers."^{cvi} Almost two thousand troops from all areas of Tibet had rallied at Gyantse Dzong, including four hundred and fifty crack troops (*hrag mi grangs*) stationed in Shöl, just below the Dzong.

The commentary describes the leadership and role of Kalön Phun tshogs dpal ldan gYu thog, Commander of Tsang Military Affairs, and the cabinet level official deputised to stop the British advance. Much criticism is offered of his decision not

to travel to Gyantse and oversee operations directly, but to remain at Yakdekangsar and rely on mounted messengers bringing news from the battlefield. One such urgent dispatch warned the Kalön that his reinforcement troops stationed in Yakdekangsar were too far from the Dzong to provide support should they be needed. The Kalön referred the matter to the Kashag in Lhasa, who in turn asked the advice of Amban Yü Tai (Yu'u tha'e). The Amban's arrogance and self-importance is described by the editors, adding to the narrative of corruption of Manchu Qing officials and their "willingness to surrender to the Western Imperialist invaders."^{cix} Accordingly, the Amban replied that he had received orders from the Emperor sanctioning peaceful negotiations, and requesting that as his representative, he travel to Gyantse urgently to open talks with the British. The editors mock him for his decision to procrastinate and the 'illness' that prevented him from facing the enemy; however the Dalai Lama authorised Kalön gYu thog to conduct negotiations in his stead. This letter is translated and analysed in chapter five. The British however had tired of negotiation, and began their assault on Gyantse Dzong in earnest.

Assault on Gyantse

At dawn on the 7th of May the British began their final assault on the Dzong. The editors describe Younghusband standing on the rooftop of Changlo Manor, surveying the fortress with a telescope, checking his watch and recording the timing of the artillery bombardments. The Dzong sustained hours of bombardment, with the Tibetans returning fire with their Chinese made artillery. The Dzong is built on a steep rocky outcrop, and thus, "despite a couple of hundred artillery shells there was no damage to the fortress."^{cx} The minor impact their shelling was having on the Dzong, and the high moral of the Tibetans inside, left the British, "embarrassed and helpless."^{cxii}

On the 28th of May the British again bombarded the Dzong from Changlo, while at the same time sixty of their troops tried to climb up the rock face to the doors of the fortress. The Tibetans learnt of their plan, and sent 130 militia to engage them in

hand-to-hand combat, killing or wounding forty of the enemy before beating them back to the plains below the Dzong. It is recorded that only eight Tibetan militia were wounded in this attempt on the gates.

The British realised they could not take the Dzong with artillery alone, and that they would have to occupy the surrounding villages in order to attack with a body of troops. The Tibetan commanders too appreciated this, and sent troops to Pelkor Chöde Monastery so that they could be easily deployed to the outlying villages. On the morning of the 30th of May the British switched their attack to the villages of Latse and Shöl. A strong artillery barrage from Changlo again preceded the advance of the infantry. Despite doughty resistance from the defenders in the two villages, the Tibetan commanders were caught by surprise, and, "at that time some of the people had gone to collect and request ammunition from the Dzong." It was then that disaster hit the Tibetans fighting in the villages for, "either due to their lack of precautions, or due to the karma of the whole of Tibet, a lit fuse fell into the ammunition room; there was a fire, and at the height of the battle there was an explosion beyond the imagination. Flames and smoke rose up to the sky."^{cxii} It is notable that the editors claim that shelling from Changlo did not cause the explosion, nor a charge detonated by the enemy, but rather Tibet's bad karma.

After this explosion the Tibetan soldiers in front of the Dzong made an effective counter attack on the startled British aggressors. British commanders in Changlo sent reinforcements to attack the village of Latse. These reinforcements tipped the balance, and, "due to the heavy damage to both the lives and property of the villagers, many were unable to withstand more destruction. The need therefore arose for most of the villagers to leave the rampart defenses and make a sudden retreat to the ridge behind the monastery."^{cxiii} The commentary describes how the Tibetan troops refused to take one step in retreat, and continued to fight off the attack from within the village. Due to their bravery the reinforcements stationed in Pelkor Chöde Monastery came to their aid and, "succeeded in killing a fair number of the enemy."^{cxiv}

The British were however attacking the two fronts; the village, and the main objective of the fortress itself. Two detachments, each of fifty infantry were sent to climb the steep slopes of the fortress's base. The Tibetans defenders of the Dzong were running out of ammunition, and were, "throwing rocks and rolling timber logs down the hill, while firing their sling shots to try to stop the enemy."^{cxv} This successfully halted the British troops climbing up the sheer cliffs, and for a short time they withdrew to safety.

The commentary then concentrates the battle at the village of Latse, where the defenders realising the superior number of their attackers, "had a single mind to sacrifice their own lives and fight in hand-to-hand combat. They made their oath, and with indomitable courage, drew their swords and spears, and even using stones and sticks, they faced the British soldiers bearing modern weapons such as cannon, machineguns, and rifles."^{cxvi} Chinese claims that Tibetans sacrificed their own lives in the defence of the Dzong will be further analysed in the conclusion below.

The account records fierce fighting at the gates of the Dzong, with many British killed or wounded. After some time however the defenders grasped the gravity of their situation, and decided to withdraw, not in defeat, but, "so that they could die for the exclusive sake of the just cause of the long term interests of the Tibetan nationality."^{cxvii} These noble Tibetans forced open the gates of the Dzong and charged out, killing a "countless number of the British invaders."^{cxviii} The remaining British troops entered the abandoned fortress and ran up their flag on the ramparts. The Tibetans from the surrounding villages and monastery withdrew with their troops to the southern banks of the Myangchu.

The following pages of the commentary account for how the battle at Gyantse was lost. Blame is squarely placed on the shoulders of Kalön gYu thog; he and his entourage of officers had stayed in Yakde Manor near Nyemo, rather than fighting in the front line. Owing to the distance between the battlefield and this manor he

was not able to make decisions, nor deploy reinforcements in successive waves "like the feathers of bird."^{cxix}

After the defeat at Gyantse there was a lull in the fighting, while both sides consolidating their positions. The Kalön gYu thog gathered his scattered troops and appointed new commanders. He summoned one thousand four hundred troops from the militia of Rinpung, Lingkar, Markyang and Nyemo, and appointed bKras gshongs pa as their commander with orders to march to Nakartse.

Orders for new soldiers to be recruited and trained were sent to Shigatse, Namling, Lhabu, and Gyatso. Responsibility for this recruitment was given to *rtse drung*³¹⁰ Ngag dbang 'phrin las and the deputy secretary from Nyemo, mDo mkhar ba. This being done, Kalön gYu thog divided his officers, and moved his command headquarters to Gongkar Dzong, the Peldi estate, and the Dzong at Chushül, just to the south of Lhasa. The Dzongpöns of the Gongkar Dzong and Chushül Dzong were given orders to organise the defence of the Khampa La on the road towards Lhasa, as well as the defence of the river at the Cagksam ferry point. They were ordered to move all of the boats to the north of the river so as to hinder the anticipated British advance, and to build fortifications on the south bank. Kalön Youtok recognised the strategic importance of the Karo La on the road to Lhasa, and appointed bKras gshongs pa from Nyemo, to hold the pass with a body of 250 specially selected troops.

This flurry of organisational activity did, the editors remind us, not please the Lhasa Resident Amban. He is quoted as notifying the Kashag that, "all of the Kalöns must meet in Lhasa to discuss this important issue, and Kalön gYu thog must therefore be recalled as soon as possible."^{cxx} The remaining Kalöns had no choice but to recall Kalön gYu thog, a decision that was to have significant effect on the course of events. In this narrative the Amban's actions are again made to display his dominance of Kashag.

³¹⁰ *rtse drung*: An ecclesiastical functionary of the Ganden Phodrang headed by *yig tshang*.

The account then moves to the Karo La where the guards built defensive ramparts on either side of the pass, and a low slung wall across its saddle. The enemy cavalry that entered the gorge on the 2nd of June were reportedly taken by surprise, and all were, "either killed or wounded."^{cxxi}

The British withdrew and set up camp a short distance to the west of the pass. Reinforcements were ordered up, and reconnaissance troops sent to survey the mountains overlooking the pass. Under a barrage of artillery, "two flanks of infantry climbed up the mountain pass from the west and east, and fired continuously with their machine guns; like a fierce hail storm."^{cxxii} This combination again proved too much for the defenders behind the wall, and despite fighting valiantly, with the loss of great numbers they were forced to withdraw. The blame for this defeat is again placed on Kalön gYu thog; "Owing to the fact that the commander himself was not in the front line, the will to fight the enemy at various stages was relaxed. From then onwards the resistance against the enemy lessened."^{cxxiii}

The British did not stop at the Karo La, but pressed on towards Lhasa. This alarmed the Dalai Lama, and he informed the Kashag of his concerns should the British enter the capital itself; "if a large number of British soldiers were to come to Lhasa, then there would be commotion and turmoil among the Three Seats, the monks and all the people, and no one can tell what will happen."^{cxxiv} He ordered that the British should be approached peacefully, and letters bearing the official seal were sent to the Regent, the Lord Chamberlain, and Abbots of the Three Seats. The Dalai Lama also wrote directly to the Tongsa Pönlop requesting his assistance in any negotiations that were to take place. As this letter does not appear in the later sections of the book, along with others to O rgyan dbang phyug, it is quoted here in full. It is recorded that this letter was sent on both the 5th and then the 8th of June:

More recently in the letter that you have sent, that I have received, you say that according to the British, to date no one from the Tibetan side has been able to negotiate fully, and the situation remains as if in the

Bardo,³¹¹ and therefore they should come to Lhasa and meet the Dalai Lama to try to resolve our differences. They have also sent a nine-point proposal concerning the border issues for our consideration, and I have received this attached. Because these are very important issues I need to consult with the Kashag and the National Assembly, and, as soon as I have done this, I will reply. As I have explained, there is no benefit in the British to come to Lhasa, and therefore you need to temporarily hold them there. You must be of help in telling them all of this, and be of worthwhile service, and please be effective in conveying my wishes.^{cxxv}

At the same time, the Dalai Lama sent the *sPyi khyab mkhan po* to meet the British on the road to Lhasa and explain to them the folly of coming to the capital. However, no matter how smoothly or diplomatically the Lord Chamberlain made his case, the British commander is quoted as replying, "now, not only have we arrived very close to Lhasa, we are also carrying orders of the British Government, and we therefore have no choice but to go to Lhasa. So long as the Tibetan side does not attack our forces, then all of the Dzongs, villages etc will not be harmed, and will not be destroyed, and we will do no harm."^{cxxvi}

Again the record shows how the Amban worked to undermine the Ganden Phodrang's position, by telling the Kashag that, "since the British are nearing Lhasa, for the stability of this land, all of the Tibetan army must withdraw, and, on top of that, it is important that the British be welcomed and received in appropriate fashion, with a friendly and calm welcome."^{cxxvii} The Kashag duly reported the views of the Amban to the Dalai Lama, and so on the 13th of June the Dalai Lama summoned Blo bzang rgyal mtshan, The Ganden Tripa, to his personal apartments atop the Potala Palace. His speech to the Regent is not repeated in the letters section of *Bod kyi rig gnas lo rgyus dpyad gzhi'i rgyu cha bdams bsgrigs*, and therefore is translated here in full:

So far the Tibetan Government and the invading British army, have at all times tried to have peaceful negotiations; however, like rope snapping nine times, we fixed it nine times, but they do not listen, and therefore we have had no choice but to carry out our defensive measures to stop

³¹¹ The 'Bardo' refers literally 'intermediate state' between one life and the next. FREMANTLE, FRANCESCA. 2001. *Luminous Emptiness*. Boston, MA: Shambala Publications. p. 47.

them. All of the battles we have reported to the Emperor, yet the British have invaded and continue to invade, as big bugs eat little bugs, and although we have asked repeatedly no support has been provided. Not only that, the Tibet Resident Amban has found all our plans unacceptable. Presently those at Nakartse, and the commander of the fortress there, have been acting without waiting for orders from central command, and we have sent orders there requesting that they and their forces are withdrawn, and whatever defenses that have been made must be removed. At this time, because all of the British officers and men are about to come to Lhasa, further still, I cannot remain in this situation of inaction, and there is a risk to damage to both the long and short-term polity and the Buddha Dharma. It is impossible for me to shirk this responsibility, and therefore for the time being, I will go to Beijing through China and Mongolia to meet the Queen Mother and the Prince, and in short, for the long lasting safety for the religion and people of Tibet, we must face up to the challenges and I intend to do everything possible. Until then, as for the responsibilities of secular and religious government, I have looked among the high-ranking lamas and Rinpoches, and there is no one more suitable to take these responsibilities than you, and therefore for the sake of the Buddha Dharma, at this critical time, and wearing the armor of courage, you must take this responsibility.^{cxxviii}

At this interview, it is recorded that the Dalai Lama gave the official seals of office to The Ganden Tripa and gathered his elder brother *yab gzhis*³¹² Don grub rdo rje, the Kashag, the Secretariat comprising both monk and lay officials, the Abbots of the Three Seats, and representatives of the National Assembly. He gave a similar speech to the assembled patriarchs, telling them to each bear their responsibilities, and co-operate with each other, like "people lifting something in a sheet."^{cxxix} He told them that his departure and all strategy plans should be kept secret from the Lhasa Amban, pardoned his three former Kalöns, dPal 'byor rdo rje bShad sgra, Don grub phun tshogs Zhol khang, and mKha 'yen rab byang chub dpal bzan Chang khyim,³¹³ and restored them to their former estates. The Dalai Lama left Lhasa with a small entourage of monks and Buriat Mongolian soldiers on the 15th of June.

³¹² *yab gzhis*. An honorific title given to members of the Dalai Lama's family.

³¹³ Kalöns dPal 'byor rdo rje bShad sgra, Don grub phun tshogs Zhol khang, mKha 'yen rab byang chub dpal bzan Chang khyim and bSod names stobs rgyas Hor khang were the Kashag members dismissed in September 1903 for advocating peaceful discussion. On their dismissal Hor khang drowned himself, and an inquiry was held into the conduct of the remaining Kalöns. No decision

The editors note that; "at that time, Manchu Qing Guangxu Emperor and his mother sent from Beijing a specially appointed Amban according to the established custom, with an official greeting letter, brocades with nine yellow dragons upon them, ten bolts of cloth, and six thousand Chinese silver coins, and other gifts."^{cxxx}

The Dalai Lama sent word to the Panchen Lama, the Kashag, the National Assembly, and his elder brother, that he had arrived safely in Mongolia, and that they should send supplies and necessary belongings on after him. The Kashag arranged for these supplies to be sent, and at the same time met to discuss where to accommodate the British officers and men. A message was sent to the British commander offering that his officers be housed at the Lhalu Estate, and requesting that the troops pitch their tents a short distance from the city. The date of their arrival is given exactly; "in the Manchu Qing Guangxu Emperor's 30th year on the throne, the 15th cycle of years, the Tibetan year of the Wood Dragon, 22nd of June 1904, the British invading officers and men reached Lhasa."^{cxxxi}

The commentary describes how on their arrival Amban Yü Tai personally went to meet the British officers and took them many sacks of rice and flour as gifts. He also welcomed the troops by offering them fish, mutton, and various meats. For its part, the Ganden Phodrang supplied the cavalry with hay and grass for their horses, and food and water for the troops. Unlike the gifts of the Amban these were not given freely, but sold at a set market rate. The editors make much of the fact that as this rate was set at an open market price, rather than an inflated figure, and claim that both the Tibetans and British were impressed at the fair mind and insight of the Ganden Phodrang. Rather than rush into negotiations, or indeed welcome the invaders, there was then no further contact between the Government and the British. Each week the cavalry, infantry and the pack horses made a circuit up to Khangstod in the east of Lhasa on the pretext of practising drill. The real reason for this circuit, the editors insist, was to threaten the populace into submission;

was reached, and the Nechung Oracle asked to provide guidance; however he too failed to provide an answer. All three were sent into exile in Kongpo. In 1907 bShad sgra was re-appointed Lönchen, or Great Minister.

however the Tibetans knew that over 3,000 troops were still secretly stationed at Khangstod, Dechen, and Tshegungthang.

The Tibetan authorities soon quelled any popular unrest; we are told that the monks of the Three Seats, the two great tantric colleges, Meru Nyingpa Monastery, and Shide Monastery were unable to tolerate the British presence in the capital. They are quoted in the commentary, declaring that they were "unable to bear the actions of the enemy, and for the protection of the Buddha Dharma and the Tibetan Polity, we must either kill the enemy or they will kill us. Unless we do this, then we are not able to call ourselves Tibetans!"^{cxxxii} The Kashag responded by writing to all the Abbots of nearby monasteries in strict terms, telling them to ensure that no such inflammatory rumour be allowed to spread, further requesting that all the monks perform rituals for the repulsion of the enemy.³¹⁴ They provided three different types of tea, and payments for this to take place. They also made an announcement that the Tibetan army that was being held in reserve nearby and therefore the people not to be alarmed by the presence of so many foreign troops in the capital.

When the two sides met for the first time the meeting was much overshadowed by the actions of a monk from Sera Monastery who concealed a sword beneath the folds of his robe and entered the British camp. Brandishing the weapon and giving a war cry, he is reported to have killed one officer, and wounded many others. He fate was sealed when, "the British soldiers surrounded him, captured him, and brutally butchered him."^{cxxxiii} Following the incident Younghusband wrote to Amban Yü Tai and the Kashag warning them of the possible consequences of such actions and asking them to take responsibility for protecting the British troops in Lhasa. This incident raised the level of resentment among the Tibetan people; the editors record that numerous posters were put up on the streets of Lhasa warning that, "it is not allowed for anyone to go near the British army camp, nor to sell them

³¹⁴ For a depiction of such a ritual see Figure 16: "Tibetan officials cast spells in order to expel Anglo-Indian invaders." RICHARDUS, RICHARD. 1998. Plate 15. Drawn by Ts'an-chih Chen in 1928.

food or fodder etc."^{cxxxiv} The same poster forbade any Tibetan soldier, regardless of rank and importance, from meeting with the British. A second poster told how the Sera monk had sounded his war cry, and, "swooping like a hawk into the enemy camp, heroically like Gesar, killed the enemy, and after such a spectacle the remaining British troops immediately fled."^{cxxxv}

The British officers appreciated the changing attitude to their presence in Lhasa, and calculated that a swift resolution to the situation would enable them to return to India before the onset of winter. Consequently they again pressed the Regent and Kashag through the Amban for talks. The Regent replied that the National Assembly would have to be consulted, and that it would meet to discuss the proposed talks. The commentary tells how the Amban lost his patience with the Regent and told him to discuss his impediments and concerns directly with the British commanders. For their part the British represented the draft eight-point agreement to the Amban and told him to ensure the consent, and seal, of the Ganden Phodrang.

The Ganden Phodrang was however unable to consent to the proposed agreement, and specifically objected to the clause concerning indemnity. They reasoned that, "the British had invaded their land, used their resources, killed their livestock and people, and on top of this they demanded an indemnity, for which there is no justification."^{cxxxvi} They are also quoted as saying that, "this treaty goes against international justice."^{cxxxvii} When the Amban informed the British of the Tibetan reply, they resorted to other methods to secure their assent. The British persuaded the Nepalese *dpa' kil*³¹⁵ in Lhasa, Jit Bhahadur, and the Bhutanese Tongsa Pönlop to negotiate directly with the Ganden Phodrang and persuade them to sign the agreement. Bhahadur met with the Kashag and the Regent informing them that Younghusband had threatened to use force to guarantee their signing the eight-point agreement. O rgyan dbang phyug met the Regent and explained to him the power of the British and their threats of force. The editors note that,

³¹⁵ *dpa' kil*: Ambassador, or representative. Also written as Wakil, or Vakil.

"Younghusband, the Amban Yü Tai, and both the Nepalese and Bhutanese representatives used both 'soft and rough' methods, and tried to use cunning tricks to get their agreement."^{cxxxviii}

On the 1st of September Younghusband lead all of his officers, fully equipped and in uniform, to an arranged Durbar with Amban Yü Tai and the Kalöns. He presented them with three copies of the draft treaty, in English, Chinese, and Tibetan, and read them aloud to the assembly. He expressed the hope that it would be immediately accepted, "whereupon the Tibetans had no choice but to accept the treaty."^{cxxxix} At this point Younghusband is recorded to have waived as to who should sign the treaty, given that the Dalai Lama was in exile. He requested that in his absence the Regent and Kashag affix their signatures to the documents. Amban Yü Tai however proclaimed to the meeting, "prior to the departure of the Dalai Lama, the seal of government was given to The Ganden Tripa, and he was made the Dalai Lama's envoy. Since the Kashag and the National Assembly, and the Three Seats were all also consulted, then they too are entitled to sign the treaty."^{cxl} The editors do not account for why the Amban was not asked to sign the treaty.

The next concern was where to sign the treaty. The editors record that the Tibetan Government, "expressed the hope that because the Dalai Lama was not in residence, and as the residence of the Amban is the main centre of political negotiations and consultations, then the treaty should be signed there."^{cxli} Despite their 'persistent demands' the Amban told them that his residence was his private house and not an official office, and that therefore the meeting and signing should be held in the Potala Palace. The 'unequal treaty of ten articles' was signed on the 4th of September in the hall of the Potala as the Amban had demanded. The bitterness of the editors is evident in the statement, "the fact that this treaty was forced against the will of the people is clear to all, and the British relied on their military power to force the Tibetans to sign."^{cxlii} The British invaders marched out of Lhasa on the 23rd of September.

The editors then provide a financial audit of the costs the invasion, and estimate that over 18,600 fully armed and uniformed troops and porters came from India with Younghusband. The Ganden Phodrang's military expenses over the period are given as over 320,000 *khal* of grain, 28,010,000 Silver *srang*,³¹⁶ and 320,000 *rdo tshad*.³¹⁷ This money was used to buy grain at the market rate in Lhasa of *srang* 0.5 per *khal*, and therefore over 56,020,000 *khal* of grain were purchased as part of the defence campaign. The editors then turn their attention to the looting and destruction that took place while the British progressed north, especially during the storming of the Dzong at Gyantse, and the looting from Pelkor Chöde and Nenyang Monasteries. Since this is focused upon in chapter six I will not recount the lists of stolen items, suffice it to say that it extends over five pages.

Statistics are given for the loss of life and limb noting that, "while the British army was in Tibet, they mercilessly murdered Tibetans in cold blood, and they set fire to villages and monasteries."^{cxliii} The number of wounded soldiers is recorded as approximately 1,400, a low number given the casualties reported for both sides earlier in the commentary. A long list of commanders and officers is presented, honouring those, "who were willing to lay down their lives and become heroes."^{cxliv} 232 of these officers are reported killed, and 188 monastic and regular soldiers, made 'the great achievement.' Forty-eight are recorded as being killed in the battle at Nenyang Monastery, the two brothers from Kongpo among them. Only twenty-two men are recorded to have survived the massacre. There follows a list of promotions and awards for bravery as recommended by the Tibetan commanders. 442 men were, "awarded with promotion, gifts, and appropriate tax concessions."^{cxlv}

Finally, the editors attempt to consolidate blame for the invasion on the corrupt Manchu Qing Government. They claim that fact that the Dalai Lama and his inner entourage chose to depart for Inner Mongolia, and thence to Beijing to prove that,

³¹⁶ *srang*: A standard Tibetan measure of weight, usually equivalent to about an ounce. Silver coins were issued in one *srang* denominations.

³¹⁷ *rdo tshad*: A four-lb bar of silver, or about fifty silver *srang*.

"the golden eared [an honorific title of the Emperor] Guangxu Emperor of China was kept informed at all times of the wicked action of the British invasion of Tibet, from planning to the invasion, through the Tibet resident Amban."^{cxlvi} They claim that this was done in the hope that the Manchu Qing Government would offer the Tibetans assistance by way of either negotiation or by force. Rather than offering this assistance, the Manchu Qing Government, "signed the unequal treaty with the British invaders, and on top of that, they negotiated with the British invaders."^{cxlvii} They purposefully tied the hands of the Ganden Phodrang by informing them that, "you are not allowed exceed your limits and to make the mistake of confronting the British with violence and war," while at the same time they recalled the *Wun* Amban, who it is claimed, "was committed to standing up to the British aggressors by standing shoulder to shoulder with the monks and lay people of Tibet, and was committed to seeing through the patriotic strategy of attacking the enemy."^{cxlviii}

Owing to these reasons, the editors claim that the Dalai Lama chose not to go directly to Beijing, and it is here that the Russian influence on the Dalai Lama is explained. The fact that this comes so late in the commentary shows how the editors believe that the British invasion was concerned more with imperialist aggression and a strategy to acquire Tibet, than action to counter the Russian influence in the region. Accordingly, it is shown how even when the British were planning the invasion of Tibet, "the Tsar of Russia was sending successive envoys to make direct and indirect communications"^{cxlix} with the Ganden Phodrang. For the duration of his time in Mongolia the Russians kept a close eye on the activities of the Dalai Lama and his entourage, as well as the permanent envoy of the Manchu Government in Outer Mongolia, and on the special envoy Beijing had sent to supervise him. This is the first and only account of this 'special envoy' from Beijing; however the account does describe how "the Tsarist Russian Dorjjeff was also continuously and secretly attempting to influence and win over the Dalai Lama."^{cl}

The Dalai Lama was naturally eager to return to Lhasa once the British had departed. A secret letter, sent through Dorjjeff, to Tsar Nicholas II in St Petersburg is quoted in the commentary. It is dated in the 15th cycle of the Wood Snake year

(1905), and requests the Tsar's protection for the Dalai Lama's return to Tibet. The Russian Tsar is said to have had an interview with Dorjieff and, "sent greetings to the Dalai Lama by radio broadcast."^{cli} This level of contact between the Tsar and the Dalai Lama is not expressed elsewhere, and is plainly fictional given that two-way radio was not available until the 1930s at the earliest. We are told that the Dalai Lama passed several months pilgrimage at Wutaishan, 'The Five Peak Mountain Temple Complex,'³¹⁸ in Shansi. During his time there he received the British Ambassador to China³¹⁹ along with a Sikkimese Prince whose name is not recorded.

The Dalai Lama was then ordered to Beijing for an audience with the Emperor and the Empress Dowager Tzu Hsi. While in Beijing the commentary records that he met the Russian and British Ambassadors once again, and on the 20th of October the British representative organised a meeting and banquet in his honour. It was agreed at the meeting that friendly relations between the powers should be resumed, and the British promised not to block the Dalai Lama's return to Tibet. The Russian Ambassador also explained to the Dalai Lama that his country no longer intended on meddling in the "internal affairs of China,"^{clii} and advised friendly relations with Britain for the sake of the Buddha Dharma. At the meeting with the Dowager Empress and her ailing son the Emperor there were, "mutual expressions of respect and awards bestowed,"^{cliii} and on the 28th of October 1908 the Dalai Lama was granted permission to return to Tibet. On December 3rd he reached Shilling Monastery, and in the Earth Bird year of 1909, he finally reached Lhasa.

³¹⁸ The Dalai Lama appointed the Abbot of one of the monasteries in this complex, and he acted as his Agent or Ambassador to the Emperor in Beijing. The complex is home to 53 monasteries and temples, and is traditionally held to be the home of Manjusri, the Bodhisattva of wisdom. It has early Tang Dynasty wooden temples, and became a UNESCO world heritage site in 2009. TUTTLE, GRAY. 2006. Tibetan Buddhism at Ri bo rtse lnga/Wutai shan in Modern Times. *Journal of the International Association of Tibetan Studies*. No. 2. pp. 1-35.

³¹⁹ Sir Ernest Satow was British High Commissioner in China September 1900 to January 1902, and also Minister in Peking from 1900 to 1906. See, RUXTON, IAN. 2006. *The Diaries of Sir Ernest Satow, British Envoy in Peking (1900-06)*. Raleigh, NC: Lulu Press Inc.

The commentary makes no mention of the delicate diplomatic procedure requisite when the Dalai Lama was received by the Emperor; other records place much emphasis on the fact that the Dalai Lama was made to Kowtow to the throne,³²⁰ before the Emperor rose from his seat and invited the Dalai Lama to sit next to him on a cane chair. Both the Dalai Lama and the Emperor considered their dignity seriously injured by this compromise situation and their audience was postponed numerous times while the details were arranged to both sides satisfaction.³²¹

Following the Dalai Lama's return to Lhasa the commentary presents his letters to O rgyan dbang phyug, Prithvi Bir Bikram Shah, and the Kashag, as well as reports and military accounts of the fighting. *Bod kyi rig gnas lo rgyus dpyad gzhi'i rgyu cha bdams bsgrigs* also contains insights into the Amban's role in the diplomatic frenzy that followed in Lhasa, as well as his activities attempting to depose the Dalai Lama while he was in exile. These are all examined in chapter five, and the repercussions are further analysed in the conclusions below.

³²⁰ The importance of the Kowtow in Chinese Imperial culture cannot be overemphasised since it was required to come into the presence of the Emperor, but it meant submission before him. When the 'Great' Vth Dalai Lama established relations with the Chinese Imperial Court he was invited to meet the Emperor in Peking. He set out accompanied by 3,000 men and stayed at the Yellow Palace, which had been specially constructed by the Manchu Emperor to house him. The Emperor met the Dalai Lama in January 1653, sparking much contemporary and historical debate as to the etiquette of this visit, as it has implication as to the status of both of the Dalai Lama and Tibet; Some historians claim that the Emperor treated the Dalai Lama as an equal, (eg, LAIRD, THOMAS. 2006. *The Story of Tibet: Conversations with the Dalai Lama*. New York, NY: Grove Press. pp. 170-174.) while others dispute this claim. Grunfeld compromises between the extremes, claiming that, "Both (Tibetan and Chinese) accounts agree that the Dalai Lama was exempt from the traditional kowtow symbolizing total subservience; he was; however, required to kneel before the emperor." GRUNFELD, TOM. 1996. *The Making of Modern Tibet*. Armonk, NY: M E Sharpe. p. 42.

Kowtow was also very important in the diplomacy of China with European powers; The British embassies of George Macartney, 1st Earl Macartney (1793) and William Pitt Amherst, 1st Earl Amherst (1816) were foiled, since kowtowing would mean acknowledging their King as a subject of the Emperor.

³²¹ See, BLAND, JOHN AND EDMUND BACKHOUSE. 1911. *China Under the Empress Dowager*. London: William Heinemann.

Chapter Five: Translated Letters and Contemporary Communications

This chapter will primarily present translations of a selection of letters found in the *Bod kyi rig gnas lo rgyus dpyad gzhi'i rgyu cha bdams bsgrigs*. It will also draw together the published Tibetan and Chinese accounts of the Mission in order to provide the first accurate account of the Mission from a Tibetan perspective. Although the letters found in secondary materials are mainly quoted only in English translation, and not in their original languages, their provenance will be discussed, and I will also analyse their authenticity and accuracy. I present the accounts and letters in chronological order; however this can often be confused by the fact that many accounts are undated, and official letters and communications often repeat or contradict themselves owing to the long periods of time between their being written and delivered.

The seven letters presented in full translation from the *Bod kyi rig gnas lo rgyus dpyad gzhi'i rgyu cha bdams bsgrigs* have evidently been cherry picked from archives that survive from the Government of the XIIIth Dalai Lama. They are described in the commentary as sample letters from the Dalai Lama to the Kashag, from the Kashag back to the Dalai Lama, and battle reports from Tibetan field officers to Lhasa after the fall of Gyantse. Most importantly there are also letters from the Dalai Lama to leaders of Bhutan, Sikkim, and Nepal dated just prior to the Mission's arrival in Lhasa requesting their council, assistance, and prayers. The letters shed new light on Himalayan relations, and show how Tibet was not isolated in her plight. These letters highlight how the 'Spectators of the Great Game,' in the neighbouring states of Bhutan, Sikkim, and Nepal, viewed the developments in Anglo-Tibetan relations as a source of concern, but also as an opportunity. By playing 'the game' these states sought to challenge the hegemony of China and India and pursue their agendas for independence.

I also present three previously unstudied letters from the archives of the Bodleian Library. The letters, all written in a cursive *'khyug yig* script, date from the time of the Mission's presence in Lhasa and the negotiations that took place regarding the

proposed treaty. The letters contain blunt orders from the Amban to the Kashag, a reply from the National Assembly to the Amban, and an open letter from the Amban to the people of Lhasa warning the populace of British intention and aggression. These important letters have previously escaped the attention of scholars, despite being held in an open library. One possible explanation of this is found in their index and catalogue notes; the letters are catalogued as being examples of written Tibetan, and not as letters of the Amban.³²² A letter contained in the same file describes how the Amban's missives came into the possession of Vernon Magnic, Younghusband's brother in law and his personal secretary for the duration of the Mission. When Magnic died his wife passed the letters on to Sir William Herschel, who donated them to the Bodleian Library.

Although the translations and commentary below are presented chronologically there must, by necessity, be some backtracking and overlap between the sections. The letters are presented with an explanation of their context and intended recipient's role in the Himalayan politics of the period. Therefore when comparing the letters to the Bhutanese and Nepalese leaders and the Chinese Amban's missives the chronology becomes fractured. Specific instances and events in this chapter can be placed in the accepted chronology by reference to chapter one.

The Amban

During the initial stages of the Mission, the Chinese Amban was more willing to communicate with the British than the Ganden Phodrang. His letters were highly ornate in their style, but devoid of actual suggestions for implementing negotiations or mediation. They do not survive in the original correspondence, but are quoted in secondary Chinese materials, and briefly in British accounts from the period. By June 1903, Younghusband was receiving letters for his superior headed, "Yu, Chinese Imperial Resident at Lhasa, charged with the administration of Tibetan Affairs, Brevet Lieutenant-General of the Manchu Brigade, &c, to His

³²² Bod. Lib.: MS. Tibet c. 24.

Excellency the Right Honourable Baron Curzon of Kedleston, PC, GMSI, GMIE, &c, &c, Viceroy and Governor General of India, dated Lhasa, Kuang Hsir 29th Year, 5th Moon and 29th day."³²³ However despite the formality of the language, the letters contain little actual information. They simply assuring the Viceroy of the honourable and high status of all the representatives of the Amban, as well as offering apologies for their late arrival at Khamba Dzong. In these letters the Amban accuses the Tibetan of not providing his transport to the border, and later that he was "prepared to proceed to the frontier for the negotiations at his own expense, but he expressed that it would be a useless gesture without being accompanied by the Tibetan officials."³²⁴

In July 1903 information reached Lhasa that Younghusband and his troops were soon to reach Khamba Dzong. As described in chapter one, the Kashag dispatched Kalön Tsa rong dBang phyug rgyal po (also known as Blo bzang 'phrin las) to negotiate with the British, but insisted that talks only take place at the border. Records from Lhasa however indicate a more marshal and aggressive development. Ya in his *Biographies of the Dalai Lamas* quotes numerous dispatches and Chinese Imperial documents that, although he does not reference, appear genuine, especially in the context of the rift between the Kashag and the National Assembly as analysed in chapter one. An important document issued by the *Shölkhung* (Zhol khungs), the Government department in charge of inhabitants in the jurisdiction of the Potala, is essentially a mobilisation for war, and similar to other edicts, issued across Tibet, on the orders of the Kashag.

On the issue of the Tibetan frontier... China and Britain are now discussing it on the border, but neither side should be expected to listen to the other in a friendly manner. If the British insist on their unjustifiable demands, we shall not hesitate to lay down our lives in defence of the foundation of earthly happiness- Buddhism; inaction on

³²³ HIS MAJESTY'S STATIONERY OFFICE. 1905. Cd. 1920. *Papers Relating to Tibet*. p. 43. 24th June 1903.

³²⁴ MISHRA, TIRTHA. 1991. *The Taming of Tibet: A Historical Account of Compromise and Confrontation in Nepal-Tibet Relations: 1900-1930*. New Delhi: Nirala Publications. p. 79. O'Connor goes so far as to suggest "the Amban was prevented from leaving Lhasa by the Dalai Lama." O'CONNOR, FREDERICK. 1931. *On the Frontier and Beyond. A Record of Thirty Years Service*. London: John Murray. p. 53.

our part will be out of the questions. We should act in accordance with that we have said in our various petitions, and raise in arms to make the invaders pay for their follies. Therefore ..., each manorial and monastic estate and each pastoral area where corvee for the government is mandatory with land in excess of six gang, shall have one man conscripted into the army. Also, each region shall prepare, in accordance with the procedure or rules and regulations regarding military conscription, a new register of its inhabitants who are eligible for conscription; those on the new registers shall be brought here. Conscripts must be chosen on a household basis. Households whose members are too young or too old for military service may offer substitutes, and as the substitutes must be physically capable of the strenuous work in the army, they must not be chosen in a perfunctory manner.³²⁵

While there is still "considerable scholarly controversy over the nature of serfdom and feudalism in Tibet,"³²⁶ these edicts demonstrate the Ganden Phodrang's ability to summon militia and regular troops from their estates and into government military service. This mechanism had existed in Tibet since the Imperial period, and was used in times of great political upheaval and war, most especially in 1888 (see chapter one).

A second letter quoted in full by Ya is a joint petition signed by the Kashag and the Abbots of the Three Seats in winter 1903 denouncing the 'crimes' of the British whilst they were camped at Khamba Dzong. The open letter is addressed to the Amban Yü Tai, listing the grievances of the local population had to the highhanded treatment metered out by White and his fellow officers. The letter complains that:

Last year when the troops lead by Claude White crossed the ebo³²⁷ erected in the reign of Emperor Gaozong on the Khamba-Sikkim border, they pulled down the defence walls of the blockhouses there... Your Excellencies are requested to inform, as in previous cases, the Han troops stationed at Tachienlu [Kangding] to provide them with

³²⁵ YA, HANZHANG. 1993. *The Biographies of the Dalai Lamas*. Beijing: Foreign Languages Press. p. 193.

³²⁶ GOLDSTEIN, MELVYN. 1986. Re-examining Choice, Dependency and Command in the Tibetan Social System: "Tax Appendages" and Other Landless Serfs. *The Tibet Journal*. Vol. 11. No. 4. pp. 79–112. p. 79.

³²⁷ Ebo. Mongolian öbo, corresponding to the Tibetan la btsas. Rock piles marking boundaries.

reinforcements or logistic support. We shall humbly seek the approval of His Majesty for this undertaking.³²⁸

The letter is important in the regard that Ganden Phodrang officials are openly requesting military support from the Emperor, and specifically request Han troops come to Tibet's aid.³²⁹ This is counter to not only the muster of the militia ordered previously, but also to the Kashag's policy of negotiation and peaceful resolution of the developing crisis as outlined in chapter one. The notion that the Ganden Phodrang would request the Chinese Imperial powers to ask the Government of India to reprimand their own officers for their alleged actions in the Gamba area is remarkable, and indicated a certain naïvety on the Ganden Phodrang's behalf. In his account of the period Shakabpa also includes quotes from communications between the Ganden Phodrang and the Dzungpön of Gamba. These communications have not been extensively examined in later histories, but they are closer to the accepted narrative that the National Assembly was more militant in its response to the British incursion than the Kashag. Shakabpa records that the Dzungpön received a communication from the National Assembly, instructing that:

Not even a single British civil and military official is to be permitted to cross into Tibetan territory... Not only are the British the enemy of the Buddhist religion, but they have no other concern but to increase their territory... If they force their way into Tibet, ... then they should be obstructed by one soldier after another of the Tibetan Army.³³⁰

Shakabpa also comments on an episode that does not appear in British accounts, the arrest and imprisonment of the entire Kashag in the weeks leading up to the British Mission arriving in Tibet. The National Assembly, Shakabpa informs us, believed that the Kashag was too influenced by Kalön dPal 'byor rdo rje bShad sgra. bShad sgra was well travelled and educated by Tibetan standards; in 1890 he showed defiance against the outside world when he expelled Gabriel Bonvalot and

³²⁸ YA, HANZHANG. 1993. p. 196.

³²⁹ YA, HANZHANG. 1993. p. 197.

³³⁰ SHAKABPA, WANGCHUK DEDEN. TSEPON. 2010. *One Hundred Thousand Moons: An Advanced Political History of Tibet*. Leiden: Brill. p. 664.

Prince Henri d'Orleans from Tibet.³³¹ In 1892 he was appointed *bKa' blon las tshab* (Deputy Kalön) and sent to Darjeeling to conduct tripartite trade negotiations with Britain and Manchu China. The British were however under the impression that all matters concerning Tibet were dealt with by the Manchus, and did not invite him to sign the 1893 'Regulations Regarding Trade, Communication and Pasturage,' as a result of which the regulations were completely ignored in Tibet. After a year in Darjeeling, bShad sgra returned to the Kashag, sceptical of Imperial India, but in awe of the power the British wielded. The National Assembly however had no such figure to guide them. Dominated by monastic interests many members had no concept of the outside world, or experience when dealing with foreign powers and bShad sgra's policy of negotiation aroused allegations of treachery from the National Assembly. Chinese officials also mistrusted his "too close (although private) contact with British officials"³³² and also claimed he had undue authority with the Russian envoy Dorjjeff.

Rumours began to spread in Lhasa that the Government, and particularly the Kashag, were traitors, and the Nechung Oracle was ordered into trance to identify their names in the presence of the Dalai Lama and Kashag. The oracle was reluctant to do so, and did not remain in trance long enough to identify individuals. However, the four Kalöns were arrested and placed in detention at the Norbu Linka. A Tibetan account of their fate survives, according to which,

Not only was suspicion and discord aroused in the Tsondu, but also for a time Kalöns Shatra, Sholkhang, Changkhyim and Horkhang³³³ were held captive. While in a state of fear and depression, Horkhang drowned himself, and furthermore, because Shatra when previously in Darjeeling, had sent a message to the Government on the desirability of a peace

³³¹ Bonvalot and the Prince were travelling through Siberia to Siam when they strayed into Tibet to cross a mountain range. They published their exploits, and won the joint Gold Medal from The Geographical Society of Paris. BONVALOT, GABRIEL. 1891. *Across Thibet: Being a translation of "De Paris au Tonkin à travers le Tibet inconnu."* [Translated by C B Pitman.] London: Cassell.

³³² PETECH, LUCIANO. 1973. p. 182.

³³³ dPal 'byor rdo rje bshad sgra, Don grub phun tshogs zhol khang, mKha 'yen rab byang chub dpal bzan chang khyim and bSod names stobs rgyas hor kang.

treaty with the British, the Tsongdu wondered if he had taken the British side and an inquiry was initiated.³³⁴

At the investigation Kalöns Don grub phun tshogs zhol khang and mKha 'yen rab byang chub dpal bzan chang khyim stood by bShad sgra, who presented a full compendium of documents to support his policy of negotiation; however no clear decision was made by the inquisitors. As was usual in times of indecision, the State Oracle of Nechung was consulted to give guidance, but his trance neither convicted nor acquitted the accused. It was therefore decided to give the three Kalöns a public trial in the grounds of the Norbu Lingka. Although there is little recorded about this trial, French presents a short extract from a translation from *The Pure Unadulterated Copper of My History*, the autobiography of Shenhawa Gyurme Tobgyal.³³⁵ Shenhawa recalled how "after this Kalöns Shatra, Sholkhang, Changkhyim and Horkhang were examined by the Tsongdu on a tent set up at the centre of the Norbulinkha's [Norbu Linka] arena. After that father had to go away to Kongbo."³³⁶ A copy of Kalön dPal 'byor rdo rje bShad sgra's reply does survive. According to Shakabpa, who provides the reply in full, bShad sgra answered his critics by claiming that because of his loyalty he had submitted only truthful reports after having personally witnessed the power of the British in India. He claims that if he had collaborated with the British, they would not have written to the Dalai Lama asking that he be replaced, and that he possessed a letter from the Nechung Oracle praising his services to the country. bShad sgra shows his frustration in combating rumour and court intrigue, asking the National Assembly to make a final decision on his case, either proving him guilty or honouring him for his service to his country.³³⁷

³³⁴ WANGDU, NAMGYAL [of Gyantse]. 1976. *bod ljongs rgyal khab chen po'i srid lugs dang 'brel ba'i drag po'i dmag gi lo rgyus rags bsud*. [A short military History of Tibet.] Dharamsala: Private Publication. pp. 113-14. Cited in FRENCH, PATRICK. 1995.

³³⁵ Shenhawa was dPal 'byor rdo rje bShad sgra's adopted son who later became a high official in his own right, and accompanied the XIVth Dalai Lama when he fled Tibet in 1959.

³³⁶ SHENHAWA, GYURME SONAM TOBGYAL. 1990. *rang gi lo rgyus lhad med rang byung zang*. [The Pure Unadulterated Copper of My History]. Dharamsala: Private Publication. p. 5. Cited in FRENCH, PATRICK. 1995.

³³⁷ SHAKABPA, WANGCHUK DEDEN. TSEPON. 2010. pp. 668-70.

dPal 'byor rdo rje bShad sgra's reply was found wanting, and he, along with the other ministers who had supported his policy were exiled. Four new Kalöns were appointed; Kalön Lama Byams pa bstan 'dzin, an experienced and travelled monk-official, Kalön bsKal bzang dgra 'dul gSar byung, an inept aristocrat, Kalön gYu thog Phun tshogs dpal ldan, a descendant of the Xth Dalai Lama, and Kalön Tsa rong dBang phyug rgyal po, the Army General who had refused to negotiate with Younghusband at Khamba Dzong in the summer of 1903. The new Kalöns were to be ably assisted by Drung che Blo bzang 'phrin las.

The Amban's Son

The Dutchman, Mari Albert Johan van Manen (1877-1943) has recorded a valuable account of the Mission from a Manchu perspective, albeit one with self acknowledged bias. Van Manen joined the Netherlands Section of the Theosophical Society, before being appointed General Secretary of the Asiatic Society of Bengal in the 1923. His work at the famous society lead to his introduction to most of the leaned Tibetan and Himalayan scholars of the period, as well as to a great number of well travelled Tibetans themselves, some of whom he employed to teach him Tibetan. It was during these session that he chose to record the life stories of some of his tutors, Chen Ts'an-chih among them. Chen wrote his autobiography in a mixture of Chinese, Tibetan, and English with the assistance of Manen in 1928. Born in Lhasa in 1893 to a Chinese father and a Khampa mother, and he was educated at the Chinese school in Lhasa before being employed as a translator in the Sino Tibetan Translation Department of the Lhasa Amban. Crucially however his father had been Chief Secretary to the Amban at the time of the Younghusband Mission, and despite being only young at the time, Chen records detailed descriptions and accounts of the period. Therefore although Chen's account will undoubtedly be biased in favour of his parentage and employment, it does give us the interpretation of events from a Chinese perspective by one present at the time.

Chen records how mid July 1903, a series of bad omens were reported in Tibet, including "drops of water falling from a brass dragon head on the south west

corner of the roof of the Jo-khang. It had however not rained that day."³³⁸ The oracle was immediately summoned to interpret this, and explained that "an enemy was approaching from the green country in the southwest: The Kingdom of Sikkim."³³⁹ He explains how the Amban wanted to conclude a treaty with the British immediately; however the Dalai Lama "thought it better to consult an oracle possessed by the sprit of the War God. It advised Him to send Tibetan soldiers to force the British back to India,"³⁴⁰ especially in view of the events of 1888 and his own fragile position.

Chen also records that the Dalai Lama also "ordered spells to be cast in order to destroy the foreign invaders."³⁴¹ The Kashag interpreted the Nechung Oracle by "trailing their finger over a slate dusted with powdered lime, and from the patterns deduced that through a combination of spells and the force of Tibetan arms the devil masked invaders could be repelled."³⁴²

The image originally located here has been removed from this electronic version of the thesis for copyright reasons. [Figure 16: "Tibetan officials cast spells in order to expel Anglo-Indian invaders." RICHARDUS, RICHARD. 1998. Plate 15. Drawn by Ts'an-chih Chen in 1928.]

³³⁸ RICHARDUS, RICHARD. 1998. *Tibetan Lives: Three Himalayan Autobiographies*. London: Curzon.

Citing TS'AN-CHIH CHEN. 1928. p. 170.

³³⁹ RICHARDUS, RICHARD. 1998. p. 170.

³⁴⁰ RICHARDUS, RICHARD. 1998. p. 170.

³⁴¹ RICHARDUS, RICHARD. 1998. p. 170.

³⁴² ALLEN, CHARLES. 2004a. p. 53.

The monks of the Three Seats were employed to chant invocation prayers of protections from Chenrezig,³⁴³ Palden Lhamo,³⁴⁴ and the eight Tara,³⁴⁵ as well as the Guardian King of the south. Despite being a Western scholar, and researching primarily secondary sources, Allen paints a likely description of events;

Teams of masked dancers gyrated in the monastic courtyards to the sound of trumpets, conch shells, cymbals and drums. Crowned sorcerers moulded images on wheaten dough³⁴⁶ and cursed them in a series of rituals which involved the drawing of mystical symbols and the use of such powerful articles of magic as eagles' wings, snakes' tails, crows and owl's feathers and three headed axes. Spells of entrapment were cast by the weaving of intricate cat's-cradles of string. Arrows were fired and imprecations hurled at life size effigies of white-faced men in solar topees, which were then immersed in cauldrons of boiling oil.³⁴⁷

That Chen records the fact that the Dalai Lama sent two generals and their troops to oppose the British against the will of the Amban is important as he records what actually happened, not what he thinks ought to have happened.

Chumi Shonko

Chen's description of the battle at Chumi Shonko is less reliable, and at its conclusion he again acknowledges his bias adding, "as this story was told to me, I can not say if it is true."³⁴⁸ Chen records that both parties came together in a tent pitched between both camps, not as British accounts record, in the open near the wall across the valley. The next part of the account accords fairly well with those analysed in chapter one; "It was then that a group of Tibetan soldiers saw and

³⁴³ Chenrezig: (sPyan ras gzigs). Avalokiteśvara. The Bodhisattva who embodies the compassion of all Buddhas.

³⁴⁴ Palden Lhamo: (dPal lhan lha mo). A protecting Dharmapala, also known as Remati. The wrathful deity is considered the principal Protectress of Tibet. DOWMAN, KEITH. 1988. *The Power-Places of Central Tibet: The Pilgrim's Guide*. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd. pp. 255, 259.

³⁴⁵ Tara: (sGrol ma). A female Bodhisattva in Mahayana Buddhism. Appears as a female Buddha in Vajrayana Buddhism. She is known as the 'mother of liberation,' and represents the virtues of success in work and achievements. BEYER, STEPHAN. 1969. *The cult of Tārā: Magic and Ritual in Tibet*. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press. Also, STEVENS, RACHAEL. Forthcoming. D.Phil. thesis. University of Oxford.

³⁴⁶ Should read barley. Allen does not provide original sources for this quote.

³⁴⁷ ALLEN, CHARLES. 2004a. p. 55.

³⁴⁸ RICHARDUS, RICHARD. 1998. p. 170.

Englishman approach a horse owned by one of the generals. When the foreigner places his hand in admiration on the horse's saddle a superstitious Tibetan lost his temper." However Chen records only that "a Tibetan general and some of his men were killed by English guns," not the many hundreds that the majority of Tibetan and Western accounts claim were killed and injured. Chen does not mention the bloody engagements at Gyantse, only that the British could not be stopped before they reached Lhasa.

Having recorded the British arrival in Lhasa, Chen then provides an account of an event that is not mentioned in any other sources. Just before the British arrived in Lhasa he claims that the "Ta-la'i bLa-ma [Dalai Lama] saw to it that the King of Tibet residing at the monastery of bsTan-rgyas-gling was murdered," and that he then "fled to Peking in the company of His officers and servants."³⁴⁹ He gives no information as to how the Dalai Lama ordered such a murder, or the political motive behind his actions, or indeed who the King of Tibet was; I can only assume that he has mistaken the role of the Regent. To accuse the Dalai Lama of murder would be unthinkable in a Tibetan account, and such a claim demonstrates Chen's bias as a Sino-Tibetan, who later worked in the same capacity as his father as Personal Secretary for the Amban.

Shakabpa, in his account of the battle of Chumi Shonko, records the contents of the letter Commander lHa lding sras received from his brother-in-law, the Sikkim Chögyal, urging the Tibetans not to fight with the British and to negotiate as soon as possible. The letter pointed to the huge reserves of British troops in Sikkim, and that "if the Tibetans use force, it would not be any different from an egg fighting against a rock"³⁵⁰ Shakabpa records that Commander lHa lding sras went with a small group of officers to Düne to negotiate with Younghusband on the 29th day of the 11th month of the Water Hare Year,³⁵¹ however his offer of negotiation was rejected by the British. This date coincides with the date Younghusband claimed

³⁴⁹ RICHARDUS, RICHARD. 1998. p. 170.

³⁵⁰ SHAKABPA, WANGCHUK DEDEN. TSEPON. 2010. p. 671.

³⁵¹ 12th January 1904.

that he travelled into the Tibetan camp to foster negotiations, which likewise proved fruitless. For Shakapa to flip the roles of lHa lding sras and Younghusband is remarkable, especially given his pro-Western bias, and otherwise authoritative account.

Shakabpa is more akin to other Tibetan claims regarding the actual fighting; While Younghusband was still talking to the Tibetan commanders in front of the wall, "suddenly, in one moment, they fired their weapons, killing and wounding a huge number of the Tibetans."³⁵² Shakabpa's claim that it was the British who fired first is however not substantiated. In his own history book Shakabpa provides an account of the battle, given by a Tibetan survivor, that contradicts his claim. Shakabpa describes Tseten Wangchuk as an officer commanding about twenty-five soldiers on the day of the battle. Owing to the fact that this is the only published Tibetan account of the battle, by someone at the scene of the fighting, Wangchuk's account is reproduced here in full:

While we were waiting at the wall during the discussions, a hail of bullets came down on us from the surrounding hills. We had no time in which to draw our swords. I lay down besides a dead body and pretended that I had been killed. The sound of firing continued for the length of time it would take for six successive cups of hot tea to cool. When the firing ceased, the British troops came into the camp to examine the dead and wounded. They prodded me with a bayonet, but I remained quiet still and held my breath. Later, a sore developed where I was pricked by the bayonet. My relative Döndrup [*don grub*] was wounded in the leg and was taken away with the other wounded by the British troops. Beside me I recognised the dead bodies of Chang Gyapé Drakpala and Singma Khangchunggi Akhula. Though afraid, I remained in the company of the dead until it grew dark, and then, at night, I ran to [the town of] Guru. All the Tibetan officials had left, so I proceeded to Dochen, five miles distant, and informed our garrison of what had happened. My wounded relative, Döndrup, who had been treated by the British, then returned with fifty others. Döndrup informed us that they had been asked if the Tibetans were receiving assistance from China or any other country. He had been informed that the British army was such that if it lost one hundred soldiers today, it could replace them with a thousand tomorrow. Kuzhap Sahib [Younghusband] possessed glasses

³⁵² SHAKABPA, WANGCHUK DEDEN. TSEPON. 2010. p. 673.

through which he could see great distances. The poor peasants were told by the British they could return to their homes, as they were not to be blamed for what had happened; but, if they appeared again, they would be killed. They were photographed, and each of them was given five rupees and a package of cigarettes. Those who were seriously injured were given food and medical treatment. A number of Tibetan troops were kept by the British.³⁵³

Wangchuk's account of the actual fighting is limited, and does not mention who fired the first shot; only that he was taken by surprise when a hail of bullets came down upon the Tibetan positions. The account centres on the treatment received by the Tibetan injured, especially his relative Döndrup. This accords with the British accounts of Waddell and Candler who emphasise the IMS's work in treating the injured, and O'Connor's references to their bravery and indifference to physical pain as analysed in chapter one. The description that the British fired for the time it takes 'six successive cups of hot tea to cool' is most surely an exaggeration, especially when one examines the list of ammunition expended by the British troops, as presented in Macdonald's report on the battle given in chapter one.

The Amban, who wrote to Younghusband on the 14th of April, almost two weeks after the battle of Chumi Shonko, also comments on the medical assistance given to the Tibetan wounded. His letter does not survive in British accounts, and is offered in translation in Ya's *Biographies of the Dalai Lamas*. The Amban is highly critical of the role of lHa lding sras, and even goes as far as to describe the Tibetans as getting their just deserts:

It was the Dapon who in disregard of discipline who caused the hostilities at Guru. The defeat he and his men sustained was what they deserved, but it was also due to my failure to restrain them from challenging the might of a great power ... I appreciate your compassion in magnanimously releasing the foolish and ignorant prisoners, giving medical care to the wounded and showing all the Tibetans both your

³⁵³ SHAKABPA, WANGCHUK DEDEN. TSEPON. 2010. p. 674.

sternness and your mercy. All I can do to express my gratitude to you is to pray for you on behalf of all Tibetans.³⁵⁴

In his unctuous letter to Younghusband, Amban Yü Tai offers praise and eulogy for the British commander, and even his prayers, albeit on behalf of the 'foolish' Tibetans. Such words would have done little to ingratiate himself with the Lhasa elite, and his continued presence Lhasa would only have further angered the British. The Amban's plan to procrastinate and remain in the capital, thereby forcing the British advance, becomes clearer with the benefit of hindsight on reading the sequence of letters he sent to Younghusband. In his letter of the 14th of April he reassures Younghusband that he will attend negotiations on Gyantse, but at the same time acknowledges that he had failed to leave his residency, despite the assurances in his last three letters.

Despite the loss of many key commanders and a large number of troops, the Amban reports that the Dalai Lama had boldly "declared that the defence of Tibet was a matter that the Tibetans had to take into their own hands," but also that he had requested Imperial troops support the Tibetan army and militia. The Amban records that this audacious statement "left me thoroughly disgusted.... and the only thing that can be done to convince them of their follies is to let them fight on and be defeated in war. If their refusal to provide me with transport and listen to my advice is not an outrage, their disrespect for the instructions of His Majesty certainly is." Amban Yü Tai also reports that such expressions of disrespect are carefully kept out of Tibetan official documents, but that "examples of it abound in their talk." The key section of the report is however the concluding remarks, that place the entire Imperial policy with regard to the Mission in context:

The best thing to do now is to keep our composure and wait for the right occasion to arise. Fortunately, as the British fully understand what really caused the present situation, our relations with them will not be jeopardised except for the mere increase in difficulty in future bargaining with them. If the Tibetans suffer another defeat, the situation will improve, for defeat will make them reverse their stand and obey

³⁵⁴ YA, HANZHANG. 1993. p. 199.

orders. That is how the situation stands now and Your Excellency is requested to inform the Court of it.³⁵⁵

In this telling conclusion Amban Yü Tai suggests and sanctions allowing the Tibetans to continue in their valiant but costly attempts to stop the British, as once they had been resoundingly beaten, Imperial weight in Lhasa would be increased. Such duplicity on behalf of the Amban has not been analysed before, and sheds new light on the Manchu Qing claims of authority in Lhasa.

Letters from the Dalai Lama to *bKa' blon las tshab gYu thog Phun tshogs dpal ldan*

Having analysed the introduction and commentary of the *Bod kyi rig gnas lo rgyus dpyad gzhi'i rgyu cha bdams bsgriqs* in chapters three and four, I present here translations of the letters selected by the editors for inclusion in their volume. The editors claim that the letters have been chosen from the archives of the XIIIth Dalai Lama's administration, and accordingly they emphasise the comments and claims made in the book. They form the only published Tibetan account of the Mission, and the Ganden Phodrang's response, taken from original records. A total of six letters are included in the volume, five of which are presented here in full translation, and one that is edited for brevity.

The language used in the letters, and the style in which they are written indicates the Dalai Lama's personal opinion of the state of Tibet's relations with its Himalayan neighbours, and the high level of personal communication between the leaders of the region. As the Dalai Lama's letters to, O rgyan dbang phyug, the Bhutanese Tongsa Pönlop and the King of Nepal show, he clearly believed these states to be vassal to Tibet, owing allegiance to Lhasa on both spiritual and historical grounds. The letters to his ministers and military commanders point towards his total failure to grasp the rationale behind the British advance, and the lack of specific orders to counteract and defeat their progress. While often ambiguous and couched in diplomatic language, the letters do not provide their

³⁵⁵ YA, HANZHANG. 1993. p. 200.

recipients a clear indication for the Dalai Lama's intent and instructions. One can only assume that the Kashag or the National Assembly was instrumental in making the ministers and envoys aware of government policy, or that the letters were accompanied by an oral explanation and instructions. The ubiquitous use of abbreviations, and the elliptical language used in the letters could easily lead to misinterpretation of the letter by the recipient, and has only added to the complexity when translating them a hundred years after they were written.³⁵⁶

The first three letters are addressed to *bKa' tshab* gYu thog Phun tshogs dpal ldan. gYu thog Phun tshogs dpal ldan's title is an abbreviation for *bKa' blon las tshab* or Deputy Kalön, indicating that he was not yet appointed to the rank of a full Kalön at the time the letter was written. It dates from the time shortly after the British arrival in Gyantse, and the frenzied negotiations that took place before the Tibetans reoccupied the Dzong and the bloody period that followed.

For the attention of the military commander *bKa' tshab* gYu thog Phun tshogs dpal ldan.

When the diplomatic mission headed by the Kalön arrived in Gyantse, the Tongsa Pönlop said as follows. Even though [the Tongsa Pönlop] had requested that the *mkhan po* and *zhabs pad* should go from [i.e. as representatives of] the Tibetan State, it was not customary for the *sPyi khyab mkhan po* to go [anywhere as an envoy], but in actual fact because [the British] have actually been informed that two Kalön will be arriving, against the danger of [appearing to] mislead the Outsiders, you

³⁵⁶ Owing to the style of language and abbreviations the letters must also have been incredibly difficult for non-native speakers of Tibetan to interpret and read. Discourses between the British officers and their Tibetan, Nepalese, and Sikkimese counterparts also had to conform to dual systems of strict etiquette and social conventions according to tradition. This could often give rise to misunderstanding, especially given Younghusband's obsession with 'prestige' and 'status.' This is most evident in his communications with the Paro Pönlop [Dzongpön], who unwittingly offended Younghusband, raising suspicions about his loyalty: "Before he [The Trimpuk Jongpen] [sic] left I took the opportunity of sounding him in regard to the disposition of the Paro Pönlop who I have heard is more truculent than his fellow Chiefs. I asked the envoy whether the Paro Pönlop was well disposed towards [us]. He of course said yes: and I added that my reason for asking was that in writing a letter to me he had addressed me disrespectfully (He had addressed me as "three times excellent," while styling himself as "five times excellent") and I had had to return his letter and accompanying presents to him in consequence. The Envoy said it was a mistake of the Paro Pönlop clerk. I asked him to mention this matter to the Paro Pönlop, and ask him to have his clerk better instructed in future." BL: MSS EUR F197 85. Younghusband to Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department, Calcutta. Camp Tuna. 19th February 1904.

[the Tongsa Pönlop] said that gYu thog should come immediately, and that we should give an order that he should do so: this is the report I received from the Kalön and the diplomatic Mission together. On that matter, although there are two representatives of the *bKa' bshag* (*sPyi khyab mkhan po* and gYu thog) we cannot make decisions without consulting the nation on these issues; nor do I think that various kinds of complicated military preparations are of any help.

If it is of any use—because it is inappropriate for you to defer further action—you ought to depart immediately [for Gyantse], and thereupon you should extend your cooperation³⁵⁷ [to the Kalön] and in essence carry out without fail the written orders contained in the documents that have been sent at intervals to the *bka' bla* (*bka' blon* and *bla ma* i.e. the *sPyi khyab mkhan po*), as well as in the orders of the diplomatic Mission.

Sent with *rten*³⁵⁸ and a mantra knot, on the day of good virtue, 24th of the 5th month of the Wood Dragon Year.

Extracted from the Archives of the Government papers passed by the Dalai Lama.^{cliv}

This letter highlights the delicate situation the Ganden Phodrang found itself in regarding the status and authority of the *sPyi khyab mkhan po*. The office of *sPyi khyab mkhan po* was extremely senior in the Ganden Phodrang, being in charge of the Dalai Lama's entire staff, and acting as a liaison between the *Yigtsang* and the Kashag. However the British had demanded that two representatives of the Ganden Phodrang come to Gyantse for negotiations, and that they should both be of cabinet level seniority. Although the *sPyi khyab mkhan po* wielded as much, or perhaps even more, power than a Kalön, he was not a member of the Kashag, and therefore did not match the British requirements. Having failed to dispatch senior negotiators to Gamba Dzong, and further exasperated the British by his delay in dispatching his ministers to meet the enemy, the Dalai Lama was keenly aware that his actions should not be misinterpreted as attempting to fob the British off with another low level representative. His letter relies throughout on the advice and

³⁵⁷ *phyar ba gru 'degs*, lit. "Lift a tarpaulin from all the corners", i.e. engage in an inherently cooperative undertaking / support.

³⁵⁸ *rten*: object of devotion/ talisman.

recommendations of the Tongsa Pönlop, and is further evidence of the role O rgyan dbang phyug had in acting as a go between at this time (examined further in the letter below.) In the letter the Dalai Lama also gives the first indication that he believes that military opposition to the British advance is worthless. He does not explain to the Deputy Kalön if the basis of his decision was made on religious or empirical understanding and considerations. This stated opinion is important as it demonstrates that the Dalai Lama must not have sanctioned the attack on Changlo Manor that occurred later the same month, and that therefore he was not in direct control of his officers and army.

This theory is supported by the second letter found in the *Bod kyi rig gnas lo rgyus dpyad gzhi'i rgyu cha bdams bsgrigs*. Like the first letter it is addressed to the *bKa' tshab* bla ma gYu thog; however this letter is also addressed to the *mKhan drung*, or chief secretary, Blo bzang 'phrin las and the Tā Lama, 'Bum thang Ye shes phul byung, as well as to the representatives of the Three Seats. Such circular open letters were common in Tibet at the time (as they were in the Government of India), especially when issued by the Kashag or the Dalai Lama, and they served to keep all concerned abreast of the situation.

To the *bKa' tshab* Lama (Abbr. *bKa' blon las tshab*), [Deputy Kalön gYu thog], the one in overall charge of military affairs, the *mKhan drung* (chief secretary); the Tā Lama, Blo bzang 'phrin las, and to the representatives of the Three Seats:

In accordance with the instructions previously sent from here, concerning the peace treaty between Tibet and the foreigners, [you] the *bKa' [tshab]* Lama left Shigatse on the 15th day, and arrived in Gyantse on the 19th with the Tongsa Pönlop; you and the diplomatic Mission met the Bhutanese and the outsiders on several occasions and had a series of discussions and so forth. Until now you have been impeccable in conducting these and other affairs. From now on you should cultivate in your hearts courage, wisdom and skill without recklessness, and with as much tact as possible.

In essence, the Tibetan officers and men were previously in control [of certain positions], but later, owing to nothing but procrastination and carelessness, they were unable to defend their positions, and with the progressive advance of the [British] officers and men Tsechen

monastery lost to the enemy; and now the Dzong and monastery of Gyantse are also close to being lost to the enemy. Also, as a result of the failures and delays in carrying out the successive oral commands sent from here, it has now become fairly difficult to defend our positions.

It is time to have confidence in what you have already done; and in any case, according to your understanding of whether our forces have the strength and capability in the event of a confrontation with the enemy, if it is not the case that you do not make repeated attempts³⁵⁹ to find a means of postponing the situation, it is certain that successive losses will occur, and for that, you must make a strenuous effort to produce whatever mental acuity you possibly can. Furthermore, the *Se ra sprul sku* has already set out on the 19th day, with detailed instructions, and as for the Deputy Kalön gYu thog, I do not think there is any real need/urgency [to send him], but if it helps matters, should he have to leave, even if he comes, you should not compete with each other or blame your own faults on each other but act in unison. Generally, any important matters that might arise should be referred to the state, even though there are two *bKa' tshab* present. With regard to military affairs, I do not think there will be serious losses, but, bearing this in mind, you should do neither too much nor too little, and you should give me periodic updates about the situation.

Enclosed with rten and the knotted string on the auspicious 24th day of the 5th month, Wood Dragon Year.^{clv}

The letter acknowledges the dire situation the Tibetan army found themselves in while attempting to hold Gyantse Dzong against overwhelming numbers and the British heavy artillery. However the Dalai Lama does not blame the lack of numbers, nor courage of his troops, but places the blame for the defeat on the "failures and delays in carrying out the successive oral commands sent from here." As the letter above (sent on the 24th of the 5th month) shows the Dalai Lama's orders and advice were opaque if not incomprehensible. In his frustration the Dalai Lama accuses his officers and commanders of "nothing but procrastination and carelessness," thereby clearly demonstrating that he had no grasp on the situation and opposition that his army faced. While Candler and Landon may have been condescending in their assertion that Tibetan commanders faced greater difficulty from their own Government than the opposing army, it seems their statements

³⁵⁹ Lit. "If the rope snaps 9 times, link it again 9 times."

were not without basis,³⁶⁰ and sentences such as "with regard to military affairs I do not think there will be serious losses" must have discouraged the Tibetan military commanders.

The letter also requests that all decisions and information must be passed on to Lhasa, despite half the Kashag being present in Gyantse. This indicates that the Dalai Lama did not have confidence in his ministers sent to negotiate with the British, despite them holding the most senior of ranks. This inability to delegate responsibility, coupled with his own perceived infallibility illustrates the central flaw in Dalai Lama's Ganden Phodrang. While no minister was trusted, and none could act independently, the responsibility had to fall on the Dalai Lama himself, but as the manifestation of the bodhisattva of compassion, Avalokiteśvara, he was unable to bear any responsibility should his orders or governance prove ineffective or wrong. The delicate balance between the Dalai Lama's spiritual and secular guidance is highlighted in the final letter address to gYu thog, which was sent three days later:

As stated in your letter of the 23rd day of the 5th month, that we received this morning, the 24th, according to the statement of the Chos rgyal [of Sikkim] and his functionary Mig dmar, they are going to act sincerely to the best of their ability. However, the majority of leaders and soldiers are terrified³⁶¹ and will not risk doing anything. However, I am continuing to give instructions for military or peaceful actions as appropriate to the circumstances. Lively encouragement should be given to the *bKa' tshab bla ma* about the peace treaty, and in this regard the envoy of the Tongsa Pönlop has been sent to Gyantse Dzong with gifts (*zur gsos*) and tokens [to request] that they [the Tibetan side] accept reconciliation, [and as a result] there are no border violations.

³⁶⁰ See for example Candler's description of the actions of the 'Lhasa General' at Chumi Shonko: "My own impression is that the shot was the act of a desperate man, ignorant and regardless of what might ensue. To return to Lhasa with his army disarmed and disbanded, and without a shot having been fired, must have meant ruin to him, and probably death." CANDLER, EDMUND. 1905. p. 143.

³⁶¹ Lit. "Their souls have shrunk."

The officers and men from *Ri* [*Ri bo che*], *Chab* [*Chab mdo*], and *dPa'* [*dPa' schod*]³⁶² have already been dispatched to *sGo bzhi*,³⁶³ and all the actions that you have recently carried out, have been satisfactory.

And with regard to [the Sikkimese] suggested intention to go to Gyantse for discussions concerning the treaty. According to separate written orders I have sent, I have no fear that there would be any neglect of your duties in any circumstances of peace and war.

In accordance with the positive outcome of divinations, an emissary [of the Sikkimese Chögyal] should set out immediately [to meet with the British] with precise instructions. Furthermore, I acknowledge receipt [from the Sikkimese Chögyal] of spiritual gifts and kha btags, and five silver srang, for the sake of prosperity.

Keep in mind that I have offered continuous prayers and paid homage to the Triple Gem and the guardian deities, for the success and realisation of all things positive that are related to keeping uppermost the political interests of the nation, and to achieve all good things in matters big and small of public service. Bear all this in mind.^{clvi}

This letter aptly demonstrates the dual nature of the Dalai Lama's responsibilities in the Ganden Phodrang; first he describes how he has issued orders for the dispatch of troops to *sGo bzhi* and comments on their military roles, but it concludes with a reminder to gYu thog that he has "offered continuous prayers and paid homage to the Triple Gem and the guardian deities." This synthesis of spiritual and secular leadership has long been a hallmark of the Dalai Lamas, but at least with respect to letters relating to the British Mission of 1904 the two roles are not expressed elsewhere in a single letter. This letter is perhaps the only one owing to the status of the recipient, gYu thog, who also had responsibilities as both a lama and a Kalön. Along with the previous two letters, this third letter fails to provide specific instructions, but does focus on the mediation and support offered by the Sikkimese Chögyal. The Sikkimese Chögyal, the Bhutanese Tongsa Pönlop, and the King of Nepal all played important parts in the mediation between the British

³⁶² Three areas of Khams.

³⁶³ *sGo bzhi*: I am unable to ascertain if this is a place name.

officers and the Ganden Phodrang, and their roles and the communications between them is analysed below.

Letter from the Dalai Lama to the King of Nepal

As with the Sikkimese, both the Tibetans and the British used the offices of the King of Nepal³⁶⁴ to attempt mediation throughout the Mission. The King's representative in Lhasa, the *dpa' kil*, Jit Bahadur Khatri Chetry, was conscious that in offering mediation, Nepal was placed in a difficult position; the Treaty of Thapathali (1856) bound the King of Nepal to help Tibet should a foreign invasion threaten, and Nepal also used to send triennial missions of tribute to Peking. However the political tumult caused by the British Mission forced a reconsideration of this old alliance. Gulati has commented that "there is no doubt that Nepal was indulging in duplicity insofar as its relations with British and its Treaty obligations towards Tibet were concerned,"³⁶⁵ for as early as January 1903 the British Viceroy had tried to use Nepal as a channel of communication to, and influence over, Tibet. Curzon had even suggested to Bir Shamsher, the Prime Minister, that a joint Nepali-British expedition be mounted to conquer Everest. However the political implications of such a mountaineering expedition were too obvious, and Shamsher was not so naïve to accept Curzon's proposal at face value; he suggested a tiger shoot on the Terai instead.³⁶⁶ The Prime Minister did prove willing to act as a negotiator for the

³⁶⁴ Prithvi Bir Bikram Shah, King of Nepal (18th August, 1875 - 11th December, 1911) was king between 1881 and 1911. Confusingly the term Maharaja is used in diplomatic discourse for both the King and Prime Minister of Nepal. For clarity I reserve it specifically for the King.

³⁶⁵ GULATI, MAHINDER. Colonel (Retd.) 2003. *Tibetan Wars Through Sikkim, Bhutan and Nepal*. New Delhi: Manas Publications. p. 267.

³⁶⁶ GULATI, MAHINDER. Colonel (Retd.) 2003. p. 227

British; O'Connor records in his account of the Mission that he "from the first displayed the utmost good will in assisting us to bring the Tibetans to reason...and who throughout proved himself to be our most true and loyal friend."³⁶⁷

The image originally located here has been removed from this electronic version of the thesis for copyright reasons. [Figure 17: BL:430/53 Curzon Collection: Tibet by John Claude White. Image 86."The Nepalese representative in Lhasa." (Identical image to RSAA BAI/2/42.)]

Long before the Mission's arrival in Tibet, British representatives in the Kathmandu court pressured the Maharaja into ordering Chetry to communicate to the Kashag that "Nepal would not invade Tibet, until and unless Tibet enter into any sort of secret pact with a third power (Russia.)"³⁶⁸ This communication shows that the Nepalese had been sharing information with the British, a fact confirmed by Mishra; "The Nepalese envoy also gathered information that the Chinese emperor was receiving assistance from Russia."³⁶⁹ It was likely a Nepalese source was behind the British publication in 1903 of details of the 'secret agreement'

³⁶⁷ O'CONNOR, FREDERICK. 1931. p. 43, 66.

³⁶⁸ MISHRA, TIRTHA. 1991. p. 71. Prime Minister Chandra Shumshere Rana to Jit Bahadur, October 1903.

³⁶⁹ MISHRA, TIRTHA. 1991. p. 62.

between the Russians and the Chinese regarding Tibet.³⁷⁰ However, they were also trying to avoid bloodshed and destabilisation in the region. Accordingly, Chetry wrote to the Kashag in August 1903 that "it breaks my heart to see that you are going to war with the British who are immeasurably superior to you in arms, and the love I bear to you and your country and my long stay here, all these make it a duty on my part to clearly explain the matter to you."³⁷¹

The Nepalese Government also charged Chetry "to seek more accurate and authentic information from the Land of Lamas,"³⁷² and then passed this on to the British. Spies were paid from the Government's purse to gather information on Russian activities in Tibet, and the Government authorised up to Rs45,000 to procure original documents proving the Tibetan Russian alliance. The Japanese monk Kawaguchi, when passing thorough Kathmandu, was interviewed on the subject by the Maharaja personally, and led him to "believe in the dubious intentions of the Tibetans."³⁷³ It is an indication of the distain Chetry had for the Tibetan army that he informed the Prime Minister in Kathmandu that he had "taken the precaution to prevent the looting and plundering of Nepalese properties, and issued a timely warning to the Tibetan authorities that Nepal would lose no moment in retaliating if her interests were jeopardised."³⁷⁴

The Nepalese also offered the British practical assistance; the Maharaja sent letters to the eastern areas of Nepal ordering that yaks and transport animals could only be sold to the Government at a set price, and some 5,000 beasts were gathered and offered to the Mission in late 1903. The Prime Minister Chandra Shamsher, who had displaced his half-brother Bir Shamshr in a *coup d'etat*, offered ten regiments of Gurkha troops to the Mission; however these were politely declined. Large numbers of porters from Nepal were press ganged into joining the Mission with

³⁷⁰ *The Pioneer*. New Delhi. 21st September 1902.

³⁷¹ FOREIGN MINISTRY ARCHIVES OF NEPAL, KATHMANDU. No. 206. Chandra Shumshere to Four Kazis.

³⁷² MISHRA, TIRTHA. 1991. p. 65. Commiandair [sic] Kitab Khana, File No 11, B.S. 1957-1958 (1900-1901.)

³⁷³ MISHRA, TIRTHA. 1991. p. 67.

³⁷⁴ MISHRA, TIRTHA. 1991. p. 89.

low wages and six-month contracts. Having been forcibly recruited, these Nepalese porters proved difficult to retain, many seizing the first opportunity to flee. Some even petitioned the Maharaja himself to be allowed to break their contracts in order to return and work their fields. The Nepalese army was mobilised and militia forces gathered in Kathmandu. The Maharaja met with Lord Kitchener in early 1904, and was reported to have declared "I will be very much delighted to fight with the enemy of the British, if an opportunity is provided to me."³⁷⁵ Over 1,000 troops were stationed at Ilam for the duration of 1904, but were however never dispatched to assist the British. The *dpa' kil*, an opportunist at heart, suggested to the Maharaja that these troops could be put to use, as he was "inclined to occupy some portion of Tibet in this hour of crisis."³⁷⁶ The Nepalese representative in Lhasa proved such assistance to the British cause that upon arrival in Lhasa, Younghusband offered him quarters in the British officers' mess.

The Ganden Phodrang however regarded Nepal as one of its strongest allies in the region. Despite recent wars and border disputes Nepal remained a strong trading partner, and a source of many skilled artisans that produced intricate carvings and metalwork for Tibetan temples. Mishra records how, even if the British were the dominant influence on the Nepalese court, "the Tibetans gave the impression that the Nepalese were on their side. Accordingly, five hundred Tibetan soldiers were dressed in Nepalese uniform."³⁷⁷ News of this soon reached the British Mission, and set alarm bells ringing. Landon records how "strong representations were lodged in Kathmandu,"³⁷⁸ and assurances received from the Maharaja that he had not provided Nepalese troops to assist the Tibetan Army.

The letter presented below was sent by the Dalai Lama to the King of Nepal on the 25th day of the 5th month of 1904. This period relates to the immediate aftermath of the loss of Tsechen Monastery, but prior to the battle for Gyantse Dzong. The highly

³⁷⁵ FOREIGN MINISTRY ARCHIVES OF NEPAL, KATHMANDU. E 10. NO. KA, KHA, GA, 'Conversation between Chandra Shumshere and Lord Kitchener in Calcutta.' 1st February 1904.

³⁷⁶ MISHRA, TIRTHA. 1991. p. 87.

³⁷⁷ MISHRA, TIRTHA. 1991. p. 88.

³⁷⁸ LANDON, PERCEVAL. 1905. p. 112.

honorific language of the letter, and references to the Maharaja's 'wise council' demonstrates the high esteem the Dalai Lama held his Nepalese counterpart in, and the fact that he refers to recently received news shows that there was constant dialogue across the Himalayas.

Letter sent by the XIIIth Dalai Lama to the Gorkha King concerning the treaty between the British and Tibet.

To the Gorkha King, 'ko kan wang' (Chinese rendering of Gorkha King)³⁷⁹ who is highly exalted through his virtuous actions. I am pleased that you are presently in good health, and that affairs and friendship between Nepal and Tibetan are good, with good works shining out like rays of light. I am truly delighted by the excellent news that I have recently received via *gNya' sho* [an emissary]. Here too, I am in good health; the circumstances of such things as my diligent engagement in affairs of politics and religion are as good as always.

The great Emperor has sent to you a feather plumed crown (*tog*). In exchange you presented good-will gifts and auspicious tribute in the presence of *gNya' sho*, and it is my hope that you will receive a response from [The Guangxu Emperor] in the near future. Without abandoning loyalty between our royal houses, an investigation report concerning the situation of the war between Tibet and the outsiders, that your emissary had given to the ordinary Kalön, has been passed on to me.

Even though a report on the investigations needs to be sent quickly, [the fact that this has not been forthcoming] it is not out of careless disregard to the Maharaja, but to nothing more than the fact that all my ministers are absorbed with a variety of other tasks. My mind is very happy by merely having heard your wise council, the wisdom you have exercised in your measures to pacify the conflict between the two warring nations, and your efforts to establish many sentient beings living in peace.

As for the causes of the Tibet and the foreigners war, they have been pretending to be peaceful in talks, but have crossed borders and have brazen strength, and so our officers and men had to fight to preserve their lands and they fight for their own people in self-defence. The current suggestion that negotiation should take place in order to reach an agreement, and that we should now enter into negotiations for the

³⁷⁹ Gorkha: Owing to the original Chinese and Tibetan spellings I use the spelling 'Gorkha' for the King of Nepal, but retain the spelling 'Gurkha' for the troops that accompanied the Mission.

sake of good relations between the counties, is noble and well intentioned. Consequently, with regard to sending [to Nepal] the Kalön and the subjects, as they are both weary, there is a temporary delay in their being dispatched. In addition to this, the Kalön who is commissioned and who is already *in situ*, and the Bhutanese *Chos rje* [O rgyan dbang phyug, the Krong sa dpon slob], both have experience in acting as mediators for Lhasa.

Here, because state affairs here have become as abundant as the ripples on water [i.e. a never ending succession], it is hard to decide, as you kindly request, on our choice of representative. Not only this, if things were to go wrong between Nepal and Tibet as a consequence of our not having decided on a representative, but also by our not having our affairs in order, it is important that we should consider this matter as it would cause great harm to our fraternal unity and integrity.

Presently, there will be a treaty made with the [representatives of the] public, and so kindly send your Maharaja's competent emissary immediately.

Concerning establishing the treaty itself, in the spirit of one friend helping another, we request that your Majesty support our request, as far as the borders are concerned, since my competent Kalöns have a clear understanding of the situation and precisely such things as how the orders of the Qianlong Emperor should remain unchanged. You, Maharaja, are highly knowledgeable about the preservation of one's own territory, the characteristics of politics and, generally about medicine and about the establishment of sentient beings in a state of happiness.

Because there is an excellent fraternal relationship between Nepal and Tibet, I too am exceedingly hopeful in this matter. Regarding the treaty itself, it would be appropriate for you Maharaja and the representatives [of Tibet], to pass on any significant news and information regarding the situation. Via the Lhasa Resident Consul (*dpa' kil*) [Jit Bahahdur], kindly keep me informed of anything you ought to tell me as quickly as possible, and following consultation with the people on all important matters, I will keep your Majesty informed of all issues as they arise.

I enclose a good luck talismans and a large *kha btags*, on Friday, the 25th day of 5th month of the Wood Dragon Year from the Norbu Linka palace.
<From a collection of Government papers>^{clvii}

The letter does not request logistical nor military aid from Nepal, but emphasises the 'brotherly' relationship that exists between the countries. The Dalai Lama requests that Nepal send emissaries to Lhasa to witness the signing of an accord

with the British. This request is important as it shows that the Tibetan leader had accepted the need for a treaty with the British even before the loss of Gyantse and his Kalöns had had chance to negotiate directly with the enemy. In a similar vein the Dalai Lama does not request that a Nepalese representative attend the British Mission in order to open negotiations, explaining that the Bhutanese envoy was attempting this delicate manoeuvre. He reasoned that he did not want negotiations with the British to sour the special relationship between Tibet and Nepal, perhaps indicating that he did not foresee long-term British influence in Himalayan politics, nor grasp the extent of British authority in Kathmandu.

The language and register used in the letter indicates at the Dalai Lama's stance with regard to the relationship between Peking, Lhasa, and Kathmandu. He makes special mention of the gifts that the Manchu Qing Emperor had bestowed upon the King of Nepal, especially the feather plumed crown (*tog*). This plume was to form a central part of Nepal's royal insignia of state, and symbols of authority, and was one of a series of such gifts presented on the occasions of the 'quinquennial missions' to Peking.³⁸⁰

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³⁸⁰ MANANDHAR, VIJAYA. 2001. *A Documentary History of Nepalese Quinquennial Missions to China 1792-1906*. New Delhi: Adroit Publishers. p. 9.

Figure 18: Left, Prithvi Bir Bikram Shah, King of Nepal. Right, Chandra Shamsher Jang, Prime Minister of Nepal. Both are wearing a plumed crown or *Tog* referred to in the letter above. (Both images courtesy of <http://www.royalark.net/Nepal/nepal9.htm> Accessed 2nd May 2010.)

As with all Tibetan texts, the register of the language used also indicates the assumed relative social positions of the author and recipient. In the letter above, when the Dalai Lama describes the King of Nepal's gifts to the Manchu Qing Emperor he uses *phul bar*, literally to offer up to a superior, and likewise indicates that the Emperor will reply, *zhu lan*, to reply to an inferior. When the Dalai Lama requests the King of Nepal to send an emissary to facilitate the negotiations, he does so in the non-honorific register *gtong*, thereby indicating that this is an order to a subordinate.

Gyantse

Some letters and papers survive from the time immediately after the British arrival in Gyantse on the evening of the 11th of April 1904. While *mDa' dpon* bKras gling pa retreated to the Dzong to reassemble his troops and militia, Younghusband was informed that the Manchu Amban had arrived in Lhasa, and was attempting to come to Gyantse for discussions. Ya provides further evidence that in reality the Amban wanted to see the Tibetans defeated, and that he had no intention of going to Gyantse for the talks he so ardently professes to desire in his letters to Younghusband. In letters to the Board of Foreign Affairs, the Amban argues that to see the Tibetans defeated, and strong relations maintained with the British, "would help us to recover our [i.e. Chinese] authority" in Lhasa.³⁸¹ Xiu supports this position, and claims that the British gave Yü Tai two weeks to present himself in Gyantse for the negotiations. Xiu however claims that the Amban's static attitude was due not to the logistical difficulties placed in his way by the Tibetans, nor a misguided plan to boost Imperial authority, but that he believed that "having advanced this far, the British army would certainly not stop until they reached

³⁸¹ YA, HANZHANG. 1993. p. 201.

Lhasa and negotiations would therefore be useless."³⁸² Xiu supports his claim by recording that the National Assembly and the Kashag jointly petitioned the Amban, pleading for his assistance in negotiation. This account therefore differs to a great extent from the previously accepted narrative that the Tibetan refused to afford the Amban transport to Gyantse.

A final telegram quoted by Ya sheds interesting light on the problems all players of the 'great game' shared; namely the speed and availability of the rudimentary communication technology available. Ya records that when the Qing Government learnt of the British advance from Gyantse they sent a telegram to the Amban urging that he, "do your best to make the Dalai Lama understand that the important thing to do now is not to avoid the British and miss the opportunity but to open negotiations with them as soon as they reach Lhasa." However the telegram closes by explaining "In case that telegram does not reach you in time, we have asked Mr Satow³⁸³ of Britain to send this telegram to you through his Excellency Francis Younghusband."³⁸⁴ It is extraordinary that the Manchu Qing Government would send confidential telegrams to its Amban in Lhasa through the British cable network via India, and straight through the hands of Younghusband himself. McKay has noted that prior to 1904 the Manchu authorities used couriers to communicate, but found the British telegraph and postal service much quicker than their own arrangements.³⁸⁵ Although the content of this particular telegram is not controversial, one wonders how the Amban could reply if his message did not support and please the British who transmitted his telegrams.

Letter from the Dalai Lama to O rgyan dbang phyug the Tongsa Pönlop

³⁸² ZHU, XIU. 1996. *A Sixty-year Chronicle of Major Events in Tibet*. Xining: Qinghai Ethnic Publishing House.

³⁸³ Sir Ernest Satow. PC, GCMG: British High Commissioner (September 1900 - January 1902) and then Minister in Peking from 1900-1906.

³⁸⁴ YA, HANZHANG. 1993. p. 205.

³⁸⁵ The systematic interception of all Chinese telegrams passing though India was however not foolproof; Mail from the Japanese in Lhasa passed unread as there was no-one in available in India who could read that language. MCKAY, ALEX. 1997. p. 24.

Even before Curzon had ordered the dispatch of the Younghusband Mission he had been actively courting the Bhutanese Government by assigning them the role of chief mediators between his Government and the Tibetans. Aris has noted, "the importance of obtaining Bhutanese support in pursuit of their [the British] aims was quickly apparent to those planning the mission."³⁸⁶ While Curzon selected his agent from the "incomprehensible hierarchy who preside over the hills [of Bhutan]."³⁸⁷ The Bengal Government suggested the Bhutanese *dpa' kil* in Darjeeling, O rgyan rdo rje Ka zi. The *dpa' kil* had previously served British interests when he delivered the gift of a horse to the Dalai Lama while on an official Mission from the Tongsa Pönlop to Lhasa. His ability to combine British and Bhutanese interests allowed the *dpa' kil* to appear loyal and vassal the Tibetan cause; while at the same time carrying out British requests for information and answers. In 1898 the Dalai Lama had even suggested that O rgyan rdo rje Ka zi assume the role of unofficial mediator between the Tibetans and Calcutta; however the Kazi was forced to decline the role, explaining that he remained a Bhutanese subject.

O rgyan rdo rje Ka zi was requested to write to the Dalai Lama in 1899 warning of the dangers of ignoring the British concerns over the border demarcation, and Russian influence in Lhasa; however the Dalai Lama's reply was far from assuring. The British Government tried a third time in June of 1901, and persuaded the *dpa' kil* to carry a personal letter from the Viceroy to the Dalai Lama when he accompanied the unusual gifts of two elephants, two peacocks, and a leopard, north to Lhasa. However when O rgyan rdo rje returned in October of the same year he also returned with the letter, unopened, and its seals unbroken. The Kazi reported that he had handed the letter directly to the Dalai Lama, but that he had "refused to accept it on the grounds that tradition forbade him to have any dealings with

³⁸⁶ ARIS, MICHAEL. 2009. *The Raven Crown: The Origins of Buddhist Monarchy in Bhutan*. Bangkok: Serindia Publications Inc. p. 87.

³⁸⁷ ARIS, MICHAEL. 2009. p. 87.

foreigners."³⁸⁸ Doubt developed over whether the *dpa' kil* had ever presented the letter to the Dalai Lama, and in November Curzon wrote to Hamilton, "I do not believe that the man ever saw the Dalai Lama or handed the letter to him. On the contrary, I believe him to be a liar, and, in all probability, a paid Tibetan spy."³⁸⁹

While the Viceroy sought out alternative mediators in the building conflict, in Bhutan there was much debate over which side they should support in the eventuality of war; like Nepal, the Bhutanese were subject to treaty obligations to come to Tibet's assistance in times of crisis, and Tibet regarded Bhutan as a vassal state. The Bhutanese were also keen to recover lands lost to the British under the Treaty of Sinchula (1865) that followed the Bhutan War when they were forced to cede territories in the Assam Duars and Bengal Duars, as well as the land in Dewangiri in southeastern Bhutan, in return for an annual subsidy of Rs50,000. Thus while Bhutan was therefore naturally inclined towards Tibet, the annual subsidy influenced the ruling Pönlops towards assisting their British paymasters. The Tongsa Pönlop, O rgyan dbang phyug, had indeed offered help to the Tibetans, and had closed all the roads through Bhutan to Tibet. He had ordered every individual in Bhutan to make 200 arrows and donate them to the Tibetan cause; however the Ganden Phodrang declined his offer of assistance.³⁹⁰

The British responded by sending Commissioner Marindin to Bhutan to remind the Tongsa Pönlop of his commitments under the terms of the treaty, and to withhold the annual subsidy paid for the ceded territories. This had the desired effect, and the Tongsa Pönlop, O rgyan dbang phyug, was accordingly welcomed into the British camp, where O'Connor recalls that "he proved a friendly and sensible person, and after hearing our side of the case from Colonel Younghusband visited

³⁸⁸ SINGH, AMAR KAUR JASBIR. 1988. *Himalayan Triangle. A Historical Survey of British India's Relations with Tibet, Sikkim, and Bhutan 1765-1950*. London: The British Library. p. 337.

³⁸⁹ BL: MSS EUR. D 510/9. No. 49. Curzon to Hamilton. 5th November 1901. Indeed the *dpa' kil* was only cleared of these suspicions decades later when Charles Bell asked the Dalai Lama if he had indeed handed him a letter from Curzon. The Dalai Lama confirmed all aspects of the account of the *dpa' kil*, and added that it was Curzon who refused to believe him.

³⁹⁰ ARIS, MICHAEL. 2009. p. 45.

the Tibetan delegates [at Düne] and discussed matters with them, and did his best to persuade them to act more reasonably."³⁹¹ The slow arrival of the Tibetan delegates led the Tongsa Pönlop to withdraw, but he rejoined the Mission as at Gyantse, proving himself of such assistance that the Tibetans would refuse to negotiate without his presence.

The image originally located here has been removed from this electronic version of the thesis for copyright reasons. [Figure 19: O rgyan dbang phyug with his family in 1905. Photographed by John Claude White. Image courtesy of the British Library.]

O rgyan dbang phyug was well liked, if not fully understood by the British. As he arrived in Gyantse with his retinue of 200 troops, Corporal Coath describes him as "a jolly old fellow, riding on a richly caparisoned pony, with something on his head that I suppose did duty for a crown. He put me in mind of the picture I have seen of Bluff King Hal, of Glorious memory!"³⁹² Once the British had taken the Dzong at

³⁹¹ O'CONNOR, FREDERICK. 1931. p. 48.

³⁹² ALLEN, CHARLES. 2001a. p. 185.

Gyantse, Younghusband ordered the Tongsa Pönlop to bring the Tibetan leaders to a meeting, but they had all fled, and he received further letters from the Dalai Lama requesting talks by the river at Cagksam. The letter presented in translation below dates from this period (the 8th day of the 6th month of the Wood Dragon Year.)

The XIIIth Dalai Lama's letter to the King of Bhutan, The Tongsa Pönlop, regarding the treaty between the British and Tibet.

Issued to the faithful and devout Bhutanese Tongsa Pönlop Dza sag.³⁹³ Recently on the 4th day of the 6th month you sent to me via a messenger a letter, that I have received, the contents of which you report that according to the British, since the current state of affairs are very hard to settle the British therefore suggest that you [Tongsa Pönlop] immediately set off for Lhasa for an audience³⁹⁴ with the Dalai Lama in order to best settle the conflict.

Secondly, you say that it is exceptionally difficult, and if they [the British] were stopped on route there would be serious consequences. Furthermore, you have received and sent to me, a nine-article proposal paper. Concerning this, since it is paramount importance and concerns I will issue a written reply without delay after consulting and discussing with the expanded People's Assembly.³⁹⁵

Basically, since you have done your best in every respect to improve the situation, adopt actions that prevent harm and develop what is propitious in accordance with all kinds of circumstances, and, generally keeping at heart the interests of the Buddha Dharma, please continue to immediately dispatch me information and advice as you deem fit concerning what would be the most appropriate action for us to take.

Sent, accompanied by sacred objects and mantra protection knots, on the auspicious 5th day of the 6th month, Wood Dragon Year.^{clviii}

The letter is therefore devoid of any actual orders or requests from the Dalai Lama to his vassal, with the exception of the final request to be kept informed of developments. Perhaps however it is for this very reason that the editors in 1985 incorporated this letter into *Bod kyi rig gnas lo rgyus dpyad gzhi'i rgyu cha bdams*

³⁹³ Dza sag: A Manchu dynastic title, or a Mongolian title.

³⁹⁴ Lit. "to see his face and hear his voice."

³⁹⁵ Lit. "the public."

bsgrigs. The reader can construe no politically sensitive orders or sentiments, and additionally the Dalai Lama sets out clearly the vassal status of Bhutan. Modern China, through the Manchu link, has long regarded as Bhutan as falling into her sphere of influence owing to its historical and cultural links with Tibet. However, Bhutan has for centuries been an independent state, and tensions remain high in the region. The letter does demonstrate the high regard that the Tibetan leader had for the Tongsa Pönlop, and comments that he had "done your best in every respect to improve the situation," however it also reveals the extent to which the Bhutanese leader was playing his paymaster's tune; The three requests that the Dalai Lama acknowledges in the letter were all central components of the British Mission's ethos, namely, that they would press on to Lhasa, the futility of attempting to stop the advance militarily, and the proposed treaty. The Dalai Lama reflected on these proposals for three days, and then wrote again to O rgyan dbang phyug:

Sent three days later. Issued to the faithful and devout Dza sag, Tongsa Pönlop, of Bhutan. For the record, in response to the letter that I received previously through the messenger: Since, regarding your statement that is difficult to negotiate the treaty in a state of limbo.³⁹⁶ [the British request the possibility of the Tongsa Pönlop resolving the conflict through an audience here with the Dalai Lama.]

As you are aware, public concerns such as the issue of national borders, have to be discussed by the Head of State with his council of ministers, and expanded People's Assembly, rather, than it is not appropriate for than a single individual making a personal decisions on such matters. [Therefore the proposed meeting is not appropriate.] With regards to the nine-article proposal, I am sure the members of the expanded Tibetan People's Assembly, (*spyi tshogs*) are bound to send their letters [expressing their views and comments]. If, as before, the British forces, their officers and men, continue to cross the borders [invade], and we can not foretell what drastic consequences might arise from either party's actions.

³⁹⁶ *bar ma dor*: i.e. in the Bardo. See, EVANS-WENTZ, WALTER. (Ed.) 1927. *Tibetan Book of the Dead: or, The After-Death Experiences on the Bardo Plane*. (Translated by Lama Kazi Dawa Samdup.) Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Hence as per the detailed instructions dispatched through my personal attendant the *sPyi khyab mkhan po*, keep me informed concerning this matter according to the circumstances. And you, for your part, ensure that the time and occasion are fitting and proper for you to inform us of the causes and circumstances of the current predicament. On top of this, in keeping the interests of the Buddha Dharma at heart, ensure that your actions and services are of the highest order, rather than immediately setting off for Lhasa. Since it will not serve any purpose, postpone the journey.

Later, after [you have] rendered worthy service [to further the cause], I shall inform you the permission to come [for an audience]. Finally, in relation to the main issues that you are aware of, keep me updated in a timely manner as before.

Sacred objects and mantra protection knots are sent along with this letter, on the auspicious 8th day of the 6th month of the Wood Dragon Year.^{clix}

This postscript to the letter therefore clearly informs the Tongsa Pönlop that his proposed mission of mediation to Lhasa had been rejected. The Dalai Lama firmly rejects any notion that either a small British contingent, or O rgyan dbang phyug alone, might be permitted to come to the capital for direct talks. There is even the faintest hint of a slight paid to the Bhutanese leader when the Dalai Lama reminds him that the correct form of government is the "Head of State with his council of ministers, and expanded People's Assembly" and not the beliefs and actions of an individual acting alone, as appeared to be the situation developing in Bhutan. With regard to the other two requests, the Dalai Lama stalls for time over the proposed treaty, explaining that his ministers would reply once they had considered the matter, and secondly that he could not "foretell what drastic consequences might arise" if the British refused to halt their advance.

By this stage O rgyan dbang phyug had however decided that both his own and Bhutan's political future lay in dealing closely and in a friendly manner with the British. Despite his protestations of impartiality Landon was lead to comment, "in theory he came to act as mediator between ourselves and the Tibetans, but his unblushing and openly-admitted preference for the English was not entirely satisfactory even to us. It suggested a biased mind that was likely to interfere with

the discharge of his delicate and impartial duties."³⁹⁷ Younghusband continued to find his skills at bringing the Tibetans to reason useful, "despite the many embarrassments to which the predatory raid of his men exposed the mission."³⁹⁸

As promised in the letter, at Cagksam, O rgyan dbang phyug was met by the *sPyi khyab mkhan po*, and orders to delay: However the British were not to stay there long, and being only fifteen miles from Lhasa, set out as soon as they had crossed the river. It was the Tongsa Pönlop, wearing his raven crown, who led the British troops into Lhasa some months later. His 200 personal troops were to accompany him to the sound of drums and music, but he insisted on being alone, so as not to display too much ceremony to the Tibetans, the effect of this was in fact that "...the Bhutanese saw to it that they came in a poor second to the mounted infantry."³⁹⁹ He took joint chief negotiator status along with the Nepalese Consul in Lhasa, and sought on his own initiative to lessen the indemnity that the British demanded of Lhasa. Indeed Younghusband wrote of him that "[he has been] highly instrumental in effecting a settlement. A year ago the Bhutanese were strangers, today they are our enthusiastic allies."⁴⁰⁰

Field Report and the Morale of Tibetan Troops

While it is nearly impossible to measure the morale of Tibet's military forces during the period covered by the Mission's advance, the string of bloody defeats inflicted upon them by the Maxim guns and heavy artillery must have taken their toll. Following the battle at Chumi Shonko it became widely known that the British treated their prisoners well, and saw to their medical requirements before releasing them with money and food. What is more, the British paid well for grain, peas, hay, firewood, and labour. Shakabpa even goes as far as to claim, "people felt

³⁹⁷ LANDON, PERCIVAL. 1906. p. 202.

³⁹⁸ SINGH, AMAR KAUR JASBIR. 1988. p. 346.

³⁹⁹ ARIS, MICHAEL. 2009. p. 90.

⁴⁰⁰ ARIS, MICHAEL. 2009. p. 90.

that Younghusband had been very kind towards the Tibetan soldiers" despite killing hundreds of them, and "since they gained financially, people were positively inclined towards them [the British]."⁴⁰¹

The morale of the Tibetan troops was also affected by the notoriously draconian punishments that awaited those that had failed in their allotted tasks once they returned to Lhasa. While some examples of this trend are clearly constructs of the Edwardian imperialist mindset of the officers and men of the Mission, there is some evidence that their accounts are accurate. Landon and Candler both comment on the dilemma the 'Lhasa General' [lHa lding sras] faced at Chumi Shonko; to engage the enemy in certain defeat, or retreat to Lhasa and face the wrath of the Ganden Phodrang. O'Connor likewise describes the difficulties the Tibetan negotiators faced in Gyantse: "The Tibetan Government made no allowances for failure, especially in the sphere of foreign affairs, and was in the habit of meting out severe penalties to any of its public servants who were unsuccessful in their missions or remiss in their duties."⁴⁰²

The following letter, taken and translated from the *Bod kyi rig gnas lo rgyus dpyad gzhi'i rgyu cha bdams bsgrigs* gives a good indication of morale in the Tibetan troops, and the inefficiencies of their commanding officers. The letter is a field report sent from the battlefield by Kalön *Glang mthong*⁴⁰³ to what he describes as the 'war office,' sent on the 28th day of the 5th Tibetan month, the Year of the Wood Dragon.

Selections from the Field Report of Kalön *Glang mthong*

Powerful lords of the earth, leaders of the Dharma Kings, on your golden thrones, to you all of the Great Assembly, I submit the following: [after formalities] The main point is this: Lords, cabinet ministers, monk officials, as ordered, Kunrin (an attendant of the Kashag Lama), and myself, the two of us, were sent from Gyantse to summon the warrior monks at 'Brong, along with the cavalry from Namru, and we were

⁴⁰¹ SHAKABPA, WANGCHUK DEDEN. TSEPON. 2010. p. 677.

⁴⁰² O'CONNOR, FREDERICK. 1931. p. 51.

⁴⁰³ Kalön *Glang mthong*: This is not a name that appears anywhere else in the volume.

dispatched from there accordingly. On the 22nd day of the 5th month, when we were on the way, at Tsa ting gorge at Phagri: That morning, as we were passing on the other side of the mountain, through the valley known as Nang mdo, on our way from Gyantse, and behind the earth spirit mountain, there were very many soldiers escaping (running away). We called them to us, and eight soldiers came to us, one of them was carrying a *shung yang thang*.⁴⁰⁴ We questioned him. He said he was standing in for the commander and that they were sent to guard the mountaintop, as they were not able to defend the position, they had to escape. That is what he told us. So the two of us told them "Now you lot, you have to come with us to 'Brong rtse [were the monks are]. It is not allowed for you to escape in a helter-skelter way," we told them. Accordingly they said that they would follow us. Thinking that they would follow us, we dispersed, and they set off for the mountaintop. After the discussion we went up there, but nobody turned up!

We told the monk secretary and the soldiers that since it is vital to ensure and protect the interests of the Buddha dharma, we must cooperate, and therefore they must come with us to 'Brong rtse. We clearly explained the pros and cons; The reply that they gave was that the secretary and all the soldiers, had, up until now discharged their duties to the best of their abilities, and that their detachment from Ban po had once been 180 soldiers, and now after fighting with the enemy there were only about sixty in number, and in this way, the monk official was supporting the soldier's position not to come and fight. They gave us a good telling off. Suddenly after causing a commotion they made us go back, and fired upon us. Only by the grace of the Three Jewels did the bullets just miss us, otherwise the catastrophe of a government servant and secretary with a rank of Shiton, was disregarding the law and order and was firing on other secretaries.

This is a sad and dispiriting situation at present in all respects, and it is seems impossible to ensure survival. It enraged us.... Since they fired guns at me in this incident I was so shocked and my blood pressure has been high. I have been suffering and I did not recover; indeed I continue to suffer and on top of this, on the road to Gyantse, my horse threw me off, and my right leg was injured.

Therefore ideally, please grant me permission to cross north to return to the city and to serve you there, please grant me this I beg you, out of your compassionate consideration. If it is not convenient for you to do that then please temporarily grant me leave so that I may recover with medical treatment. For the sake of convenience please allow me permission to stay at 'Dri yul, and after I have recovered I will report

⁴⁰⁴ *shung yang thang*: Possibly a badge of Government regalia?

back to you for government service. Please have compassion and consideration and in your orders approve my request I beg of you.

I beg this with a prayer, and send as a token *kha btags* and objects of devotion, offering prostrations on the auspicious 28th day of the 5th month of the year of the Wood Dragon.^{clx}

Following receipt of this letter the Dalai Lama appointed the Kalön Lama Byams pa bstan 'dzin as Commander in Chief. The Kalön Lama proceeded to the front line to attempt to negotiate, but upon hearing of his army's crushing defeat at Karo La he rushed to return to Lhasa. However Byams pa bstan 'dzin became lost in the night, and found himself near Rong. It became clear to the Tibetan Government that events in Gyantse were beyond their control, and secret arrangements were prepared to protect the Dalai Lama and his flight into exile. Kalön gYu thog Phun tshogs dpal ldan held the next communication with the British at Nakartse. The Kalön was invited to the British camp and entertained with tea, but little was accomplished by way of negotiation.

Lhasa at Last

When the British arrived at Cagksam the Amban sent Major Liu Wentong, Chief of the Manchu Military Secretariat, and Assistant Secretary Wu Zu'nai to meet Younghusband, but himself remained in Lhasa. The letter that he sent with Liu adds to the evidence that the Amban was working to undermine the Tibetan position in Lhasa;

Please accept my sympathy for all the hardships Your Excellency suffered during the long journey. I am ashamed that the Tibetans acted so foolishly and were so obstinately averse to receiving advice... I have communicated with the Dalai Lama, warning him that the Tibetans on no account treat you unceremoniously again. But as the Tibetans are cunning and insincere, it is necessary to obtain guarantees from them before a settlement of anything can be made. I am looking forward to the day when I shall have the pleasure of meeting you.⁴⁰⁵

⁴⁰⁵ YA, HANZHANG. 1993. p. 207.

At the same time the Dalai Lama also sent a delegation to meet Younghusband at the river crossing. Blo bzang 'phrin las, the *sPyi khyab mkhan po* and *Drung che* of the Kashag, carried a letter in a last ditch attempt by the Dalai Lama to prevent the British arrival in the capital. It explained "I have sent two representatives on ahead to negotiate regarding friendship, ... It will be well if matters are discussed with my delegates there for the sake of peace. But it is not well for the establishment of an agreement between the two countries if you come to Lhasa contrary to my wishes."⁴⁰⁶ However such a repetition by the Dalai Lama was not going to sway the Mission's determination to reach Lhasa, especially as it was now so close, and Younghusband did not consider Cagksam a suitable place for negotiation.

Accordingly, the *sPyi khyab mkhan po* returned to Lhasa, and called the National Assembly and Kashag. It was decided that the Dalai Lama was at personal risk if he remained in Lhasa, and that it would be better for the long-term interests of the Dharma if he were to go into exile. The Ganden Tri Rimpoche, Blo bzang rgyal mtshan, was invested as Regent. The Regent was given the Dalai Lama's seals of office, and was instructed to free the imprisoned Kashag members. The Dalai Lama left for Mongolia and exile on the 15th day of the 6th month of the Wood Dragon year.⁴⁰⁷

The British arrived in Lhasa on 3rd of August 1904. On that same evening the Amban paid the officers' mess a visit, and on the following day the Nepalese *dpa' kil*, Jit Bahadur Khatri Chetry and the leader of the Kashmiri Muslims in Lhasa, all paid visits. The National Assembly and Kashag both met to discuss their arrival, but came to no conclusions regarding the British, and only sanctioned grain loans to the people of Gyantse to compensate their losses.^{408clxi} News of the Dalai Lama's

⁴⁰⁶ YA, HANZHANG. 1993. p. 208.

⁴⁰⁷ 30th July 1904.

⁴⁰⁸ The full list of the loans made forms an appendix to the *Bod kyi rig gnas lo rgyus dpyad gzhi'i rgyu cha bdams bsgrigs*. Its translation is as follows: To private individuals, the aristocracy and the monasteries, taking into consideration the difference between wet and dry weight, 3,850 sacks of grain and 300 bags of peas needs to be paid back over six years, as is clearly stated in this contract. For the people who come from Phala, in accordance with the signature of the Kashag, 5,000 bags were given. Presently people came and signed contracts. 230 bags were given to the Phun bde

exile soon spread in the city, and eventually came to the attention of both the British and the Amban. Following the initial meeting with Younghusband the Amban wrote to the Board of Foreign Affairs in Peking, venting his fury over not being informed of the Tibetan leader's exile. In this letter he blames the Dalai Lama for the whole situation, and outlines his proposal to remove the Dalai Lama from office, and replace him with the Panchen Lama:

The Dalai Lama escaped on the night of the fifteenth day last month. No one in the Shangshang could provide me with any information about his destination when I enquired. The Dalai Lama is believe to be chiefly responsible for the war this year. He began by acting contrary to Imperial instructions and giving no heed to advice, and when his army was defeated and a grave situation threatening, he did nothing to avert it but took flight to some remote region, deserting his homeland and giving the foreigners a handle against us.⁴⁰⁹

Letters that have survived untranslated in the Bodleian Library also record the Amban's public declaration that the Dalai Lama should be found and returned to Lhasa. In what is effectively an arrest warrant, Amban Yü Tai threatens the entirety of the Ganden Phodrang and monastic hierarchy with punishment and deportation should they fail to provide answers to his public demands. The threatening tone of the letter, and his self description as "the Great Amban" clearly show that Yü Tai considered himself superior to the Regent and Kashag:

family, the Ser kog religious estate, and the 'Brong family combined, and in accordance with the wet when compared to dry weight rules, 1/10 to be repaid each year once the grain in advance was made available.

In the contract 3,300 sacks of barley and 500 sacks of peas were made available to the common taxpayers whose houses were totally destroyed. To the Bon tantric practitioners and the religious groups whose residences were totally destroyed in the past, to them was granted, clearly in this contract, some 1,679 sacks of barley gain, and for the building of a new facility at Ralung some 1,345 barley bags were given. 140 bags were given to the sGo bzhi family whose home was destroyed and 1/8th for the renovation facility grant was made in barley.

⁴⁰⁹ YA, HANZHANG. 1993. p. 211.

From the Great Amban.

To all the Government officials both laymen and priests, headed by the three chief monasteries.

In consideration of the true facts of the reports, the following order is passed:- That all [of you] should enquire into and submit a report as to when the Great Jewel Protector Dalai Lama returns back [to his palace].

If anybody should attribute any blame [to the Dalai Lama], without sufficient reasons, he shall be liable to punishment, although he [the Dalai Lama] must have gone a long distance without informing me "the Great Minister."

It is necessary for you all monks and laymen &c. to kindly find him out wherever he might be and bring him back to his own residence the Potala. If it be henceforth reported that no action has been taken in the matter, [you all] will be dealt with by the punishment of deportation. Additionally, all you monks and laymen whose names are in the general list should bear that in mind, whether you are responsible or not on the subject.

Accordingly all monks and laymen headed by the three chief monasteries should bear this in mind.

Dated the 6th day of the 7th month of the 30th year of Manchu Emperor's Reign.^{clxii}

Two weeks later, on the 20th day of the 7th month⁴¹⁰ he also denounced the Dalai Lama in a 'memorial to the throne' or an official letter to the court in Peking. Ya provides the memorial in full:

Since he assumed secular office, the Dalai Lama has shown no respect for His Majesty, and paid no heed to advice, but has acted like a disgustingly conceited despot. He provoked neighbouring countries as he pleased, and when the situation got out of hand, he took flight. The outrages he committed are the source of seething discontent among the populace. Indeed, Tibet has never seen a worse ruler in all its history.⁴¹¹

However the actions of Amban Yü Tai did not find favour with the Lhasa officials, or the Tibetan population. The Amban remained deeply unpopular in Lhasa, and many

⁴¹⁰ Candler gives the date of this proclamation as 14th August 1904. CANDLER, EDMUND. 1905. p. 368.

⁴¹¹ YA, HANZHANG. 1993. p. 212.

British accounts of the Mission describe his decrees being torn down by angry mobs. In response to his denouncement the Abbots of the Three Seats, the Kashag and the lay officials all jointly replied to the Amban, claiming that,

Since His Holiness the Dalai Lama graciously condescended to take charge of the secular and ecclesiastical affairs at the request of the entire Tibetan population, he has been upholding the justice and has been impartial in his treatment of the monasteries and the people regardless of their status or position, thus bringing peace and happiness to Tibet. For that he commands the respect and enjoys the trust of all Tibetans, lay and monastic alike... it is important that the people be convinced of the necessity of removing his titles; until then it will be difficult for us not to feel dismayed at the decision.⁴¹²

The Amban's plan to replace the Dalai Lama with the Panchen Lama also began to unravel when Thub bstan Chos kyi nyi ma wrote to Yü Tai explaining that "I have received orders from His Majesty, and it is out of the question for me to disobey them."⁴¹³ As further evidence of the predisposition the Amban had for the British arrival, and his plans to create a power vacuum after their departure, Ts'an Chih Chen notes "when the British reached lHa-sa [Lhasa], they were welcomed by the Amban who soon signed a treaty."⁴¹⁴ While the Amban did not sign the convention, he did suggest that it was signed at his residence rather than in the Potala. His plan was however rejected by both the Regent, Blo bzang rgyal mtshan, and Younghusband.⁴¹⁵

The Lhasa Convention

Palace describes the Lhasa Convention, signed on the 7th of September 1904, as "posing as a commercial document,"⁴¹⁶ rather than a 'satisfaction' of Curzon's original disputes with the Lhasa Government and desire to counter Russian

⁴¹² YA, HANZHANG. 1993. p. 213.

⁴¹³ YA, HANZHANG. 1993. p. 213.

⁴¹⁴ RICHARDUS, RICHARD. 1998. p. 170.

⁴¹⁵ Indeed further evidence of his bias is found in his assertion that in 1906 the Dalai Lama told the Emperor of China personally that the British defeated the Tibetans due to a lack of ammunition. The Emperor then, graciously, sends troops to Lhasa, to "assist the Tibetans." RICHARDUS, RICHARD. 1998. p. 171.

⁴¹⁶ PALACE, WENDY. 2005. p. 7.

influence in the region. While elements of the treaty did concern commerce and the proposed trade marts, it was far from a commercial treaty. In the face of strong opposition from both Lhasa and London, Younghusband abandoned plans to establish a British Representative in Lhasa, and settled for Trade Agents in both Gartok in Western Tibet, and Gyantse, in addition to the mart at Yatung established in 1893. Article IX of the Convention prevented representatives of any other power from having commercial or diplomatic transactions with Tibet. This article proved the sticking point of the Convention; the Manchus believed the article was a threat to their status as Tibet's suzerain and therefore prevented Amban Yü Tai from signing the document. The indemnity clause, and who actually signed the Convention, are analysed in the conclusions below owing to their far-reaching implications and repercussions for the balance of power in the Himalayas.

The image originally located here has been removed from this electronic version of the thesis for copyright reasons. [Figure 20: 1st Bn. Royal Fusiliers march into Lhasa for the signing of the Lhasa Convention. Photograph courtesy of The Royal Regiment of Fusiliers Museum, The Tower of London.]

An exchange of prisoners followed the signing of the Convention, before the British packed their bags and toured the city's sights for a final time. Shakabpa notes, "According to the initial promises made by the British officers and soldiers, they did not involve themselves in any theft or destruction of monasteries or villages except for what happened in the course of the war."⁴¹⁷ The controversial issue of looting and destruction during the Mission is analysed in chapter six; however following the signing of the Convention Shakabpa comments that the enemy had

⁴¹⁷ SHAKABPA, WANGCHUK DEDEN. TSEPON. 2010. p. 683.

paid so handsomely for the transportation, hay, meat, vegetables etc it had purchased that a new folk song came about. It ran:

In the beginning, they were called enemies of Buddhism;

Then they were called foreigners.

Once they gave Indian rupees,

They were called Mr. Sahib.⁴¹⁸

⁴¹⁸ SHAKABPA, WANGCHUK DEDEN. TSEPON. 2010. p. 683.

Chapter Six: Treasures and Trinkets. Collecting, Looting, and Presenting Tibet

The possibility of looting during the 1904 mission was a controversial concern even before Younghusband had left India for Tibet, and has remained a contentious subject to this day. This chapter will attempt to answer pertinent questions that remain as to why items were taken, who stole the items, what were their reasons, what was taken, and how was it brought out of Tibet. Equally important is fresh research into what became of the items, and what they can teach us about the role of the museum and library collections in the West today.

Much has been written concerning the issue, but few sources examine the rationale behind the looting in an attempt to get into the mind of the officers and men that served in Tibet. Less still has been researched as to what was actually taken away, and I present here translated accounts of looting from the *Bod kyi rig gnas lo rgyus dpyad gzhi'i rgyu cha bdams bsgriqs* as well as translated documents showing the Government of Tibet's response to the destruction and pillage. Diaries and letters from officers to wives and families at home make many references to both curios and loot, and provide insight into their opinions regarding the 'legitimate' collection of objects. Contemporary newspaper reports, when augmented with up to date research, bring us closer to understanding the scale of the problem, and the authorities attempts to bring the matter under control.

It is beyond doubt in my mind that extensive looting did occur in Tibet during the Younghusband Mission; however its full extent, and a comprehensive catalogue of items taken, is impossible to discern. Certainly, the editors of the *'Bod kyi rig gnas lo rgyus dpyad gzhi'i rgyu cha bdams bsgriqs* give a poignant and heated account of destruction and pillage, but I can not concur with Carrington's suggested that, "a desire for books, manuscripts and curios, became an important element, even a central plank, of the philosophy of the Tibet mission."⁴¹⁹ Equally erroneous are comments found in various Western history texts that rebuke or ignore claims of

⁴¹⁹ CARRINGTON, MICHAEL. 2003. Officers, Gentlemen and Thieves: The Looting of Monasteries During the 1903/4 Younghusband Mission to Tibet. *Modern Asian Studies*. Vol. 37. pp. 1-27. p. 17.

looting, painting a harmonious picture of Anglo-Tibetan relations; Comments such as, "Colonel Younghusband, the leader, had been careful to avoid unnecessary bloodshed, and of course had not permitted atrocities, looting, or wanton destruction,"⁴²⁰ do not provide a full or accurate account of the Mission. Finally, libraries and museums are increasingly questioning the provenance of their collections, giving rise to important questions over the ownership and presentation of material culture.

The 'Mind' of the Mission

To attempt to reason why items were taken from Tibet it is important to look briefly at the seismic changes that were taking place in Edwardian society and attempt to rationalise the mindset of those dispatched north from India. An attempt to understand what morals and codes permitted officers and men to take items for profit or curiosity must be rooted in an understanding of who they were, and the social milieu by which they were governed.

Curzon and his Viceregal entourage believed strongly in the philosophy of Empire; that it was Britain's destiny to civilize and harmonise diverse peoples under the rule of law and banner of Empire. While missionaries and preachers brought the souls of 'barbarians' and 'heathens' into the folds of the 'true cloth,' Imperial armies pushed the boundaries of Empire, leaving behind them lawful, compliant, and tax paying, servants and subjects of the Emperor King. Under their role as natural leaders, military prowess and moral authority would spread an enlightening and benign influence across a world shaded with cartographer's pink.⁴²¹ However, the Younghusband Mission departed at a time when these self imposed high morals and notion of Victorian benevolence, civilisation, and culture, were slowly having to give way to a world that was forced to embrace industrialisation and militarisation,

⁴²⁰ HICKS, ROGER. 1988. *Hidden Tibet: The Land and its People*. Shaftesbury: Element Books. p. 55.

⁴²¹ GILMOUR, DAVID. 2003. *Curzon: Imperial Statesman*. New York, NY: Farrar, Straus & Giroux.

and had begun to question the validity of the Curzonian view of the world.⁴²² After becoming King in 1901 Edward VII declined to accede to the Triple Alliance of 1882, broke off the negotiations with Berlin, and revived the idea of a British-French alliance. The *Entente Cordiale* signed between Britain and France in 1904 was designed to bring an end to over a century of Anglo-French Imperial rivalries, and redraw the strategic alliances of Europe.⁴²³ In Germany it was interpreted as a direct threat to the rule of the Kaiser, and this along with a decade of German naval expansion policy and armament, began to sow the seeds of the First World War. Indeed, since the death of Queen Victoria in 1901 there had been a sea change in European courts, moving slowly away from the strong family ties that united nations,⁴²⁴ to a more aggressive and military policy, especially in France where the newly signed *Entente Cordial* allowed for a much more belligerent policy against the Germans, leading to the Morocco Crisis in 1905.

Edwardian Britain still held its martial spirit; the nation still had great pride and belief in armies and Empire. At the time of the Mission to Tibet, the Boer War⁴²⁵ in South Africa would have been fresh in the minds of the Edwardians. Some newspapers went as far as claiming that this war had a redemptive quality for both factions. In an article titled, *The Blessings of War*, *The Daily Mail* suggested that the war had a double blessing, "if it makes us re-examine the bases of our national life, ruthlessly dig away all that is decayed or doubtful, and place things on a sound footing... out of the present strife and conflict shall emerge an Empire stronger,

⁴²² It is a sad afterthought to realise that many of the men that served with the Tibet mission in 1904 would go on to lose their lives on the fields of Flanders, not defending Victorian values of Empire and Imperial munificence, but facing the very advanced, indiscriminate, weapons they carted over the Himalayas to level against the Tibetans.

⁴²³ MAYNE, RICHARD (ED.) 2004. *Cross Channel Currents: 100 Years of the Entente Cordiale*. London: Routledge.

⁴²⁴ King George V of Great Britain, Kaiser Wilhelm II of Germany and Tzar Nicholas II of Russia were all cousins. CLAY, CATRINE. 2007. *King, Kaiser, Tsar: Three Royal Cousins Who Led the World to War*. London: Walker & Co.

⁴²⁵ The Boer War, 1899-1902.

more fully prepared, amply equipped against the worst our foes can do against us."⁴²⁶

The Edwardians were also comfortable modifying theories and philosophies to suit their purposes and perception of themselves and their Empire. The notion of social Darwinism was gaining favor, justifying the use of force to ensure the progress of societies through competition, just as biological organisms in nature adapted and evolved through competition for resources and with each other.⁴²⁷ Likewise Clausewitz's theory of war as the legitimate means by which states conducted their policies⁴²⁸ were modified to the Edwardian needs; "his famous dictum that war was merely the continuation of politics by other means, was seen by at least some late Victorians and Edwardians to make war acceptable as a method of settling their differences."⁴²⁹

The Mission to Tibet took place at the very edge of this tumultuous mindscape and Imperial landscape; Tibet not only occupied one of the last blank spaces on the map, it also held Edwardian society in thrall of its mysticism, occult spirituality, legendary treasures, and very 'Otherness.'⁴³⁰ Regardless of the mindset at home, on the frontiers of the Empire Curzon's outlook remained the dominant guide for interaction and self-definition. Just as myth often needs liminal spaces, outside of the normal constraints of time and space to develop, Tibet provided, "the setting of a powerful mythology of Empire."⁴³¹

It was with this in the back of their minds that the officers and men of the Mission wrestled with the very real circumstances of both the armed resistance and Tibet's formidable landscape. The world may have been changing around them, but high in

⁴²⁶ *The Daily Mail*, London. 1st January 1900.

⁴²⁷ WILKINSON, GLENN. 1998. The Blessings of War: The Depiction of Military Force in Edwardian Newspapers Author(s). *Journal of Contemporary History*. Vol. 33. No. 1. pp. 97-115. p. 99.

⁴²⁸ CLAUSEWITZ, CARL VON. Reprint. 1976. *On War*. Edited and translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

⁴²⁹ WILKINSON, GLENN. 1998. p. 104.

⁴³⁰ BISHOP, PETER. 2000. *The Sacred Myth of Shangri-la. Tibet, Travel Writing, and the Western Creation of Sacred Landscape*. London: Althorne Press.

⁴³¹ MCKAY, ALEX. 1997. p. 190.

the Himalayas, soldiers were given ample room to be soldiers, regardless of their schooling, training, and the impossibly high ideals of the period. As frontiersman they occupied the higher echelons of the Imperial pantheon; "portrayed as strong, self-reliant, courageous and upright, he was a pioneer of European civilisation. By gaining the trust of the 'unruly' indigenous peoples and imposing the British concept of good order and civilisation he acted for the benefit of all."⁴³² However at the same time, the thinking, and voting,⁴³³ classes in London were becoming less confident of their dominance, legitimacy, and ability to press ever forward this Imperial agenda; those going over the Himalayas were probably out of step with public conscience and opinion at home, still harboring Victorian values and ideas. These old colonial attitudes were best surmised from the name of the little Pekingese dog given to Queen Victoria following the sack of the Peking Summer Palace in 1861; It was called 'Looty.'⁴³⁴

The rules of engagement changed with this shift in public conscience; The Hague Convention of 1899 became the forerunner of the Geneva Convention, and by Article forty-six decreed that, "private property cannot be confiscated," and Article forty-eight, "pillage is formally prohibited."⁴³⁵ Historically however, British readiness to plunder and loot following military victories is well documented. In *Officers, Gentlemen and Thieves*,⁴³⁶ Carrington gives examples ranging from the Napoleonic wars, to the relief of the residency at Lucknow during the Indian Mutiny. He also notes how even in the 1880s after the sacking and destruction of property in the border areas of Nagaland there developed a lively debate as to the

⁴³² MCKAY, ALEX. 1997. p. 191.

⁴³³ The 1884 Third Reform Act gave men in rural areas the same franchise as those in the urban boroughs, and the electorate now totaled over 5.5 million.

⁴³⁴ GREENFIELD, JEANETTE. 2007. *The Return of Cultural Treasures*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. p. 412.

⁴³⁵ HUDSON, MANLEY. 1931. Present Status of the Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907. *The American Journal of International Law*. Vol. 25. pp. 114-117.

⁴³⁶ CARRINGTON, MICHAEL. 2003. p. 108.

merits of village burning and displays of Imperial might to dissuade such extremities of the Empire from aggressive, or subordinate behavior in the future.⁴³⁷

The notion of 'gentleman collectors' had already established in the Himalayan region by such eminent figures as Sven Hedin and Aurel Stein. Hedin was by 1904 a renowned scholar, explorer, and cartographer, he served his native Sweden in Persia as Vice-Consul, travelled between 1893-7 in the Pamir Mountains visiting the abandoned cities of Dandan Oilik and Kara Dung in Khotan, and Central Asia between 1899 and 1902. On this last expedition he travelled through the Tarim Basin, Yarkand, Tibet (where he failed to reach Lhasa) and Kashmir. By the time of his death in 1952 he had donated over 8,000 individual items from his numerous expeditions to the Ethnographic Museum and National Archives in Stockholm.⁴³⁸

The image originally located here has been removed from this electronic version of the thesis for copyright reasons. [Figure 21. Sven Hedin in his study. Oil painting by Carl Emil Österman 1923. Image courtesy of Center for History of Sciences, The Royal Swedish Academy of Sciences.]

⁴³⁷ See also, ROBB, PETER. 1997. The Colonial State and Construction of Indian Identity: An Example on the Northeast Frontier in the 1880s. *Modern Asian Studies*. Vol. 31. No. 2. pp. 20-34.

⁴³⁸ KISH, GEORGE. 1984. *To the Heart of Asia: The Life of Sven Hedin*. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press.

Aurel Stein was a Hungarian explorer and scholar who later became a British citizen, receiving generous funding from the British Museum for his expeditions, and later from Curzon himself after the Viceroy visited the Lahore Museum where he worked. Although he was not to discover the famous caves at Dunhuang till his 1906-8 expedition, he had, by the time of the Younghusband Mission, already carved his name as a Central Asia explorer in his first expedition across the Taklamakan Desert. The British Libraries holdings in early Tibetan, Chinese, and Tangut manuscripts were the result of his many expeditions, the finest perhaps being the oldest known dated, printed, text; a copy of the Diamond Sutra. Stein famously purchased the majority of the priceless texts from the caves' guardian for a contemptible £220.⁴³⁹ A letter from Stein in Rawalpindi to Waddell dated 1902 gives some indication of his approach to collecting items for museum and libraries. The letter congratulates Waddell on his explorations and work, but laments he did not have, "opportunity to ransack the Chinese Buddhist monasteries before they were looted."⁴⁴⁰ It seems that, at least with regard to the monasteries of Central Asia, Stein regretted not that the monasteries were looted, but that they were looted by others first.

In 1904 the collections of Europe were weak in the field of Tibetan art and literature. Even at the heart of the Empire, the London museums had, "little more than a few leaves torn from some of the larger texts, and the libraries of Oxford, Cambridge, and the Royal Asiatic Society had still less."⁴⁴¹ The Government of India was well aware that the Mission to Tibet would provide an excellent opportunity to collect the texts and items that scholars and curators craved. It was therefore decided to appoint an official collector for the Government of India, grant him funds to purchase relevant material, and divide the results between major collections

⁴³⁹ HOPKIRK, PETER. 1984. *Foreign Devils on the Silk Road: The Search for the Lost Cities and Treasures of Chinese Central Asia*. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Also, BAUMER, CHRISTOPHER. 2000. *Southern Silk Road: In the Footsteps of Sir Aurel Stein and Sven Hedin*. Bangkok: White Orchid Books.

⁴⁴⁰ UNIVERSITY OF GLASGOW LIBRARY. Waddell Collection. GB 0247 MS Gen 1691/3/150. Stein to Waddell, 1902.

⁴⁴¹ WADDELL, AUSTINE. 1912. Tibetan manuscripts and books etc collected during the Younghusband mission to Lhasa. *Imperial and Asiatic Quarterly Review*. Vol. 3. No. 34. pp. 80-113.

held in India and Britain. Austine Waddell was chosen to fill this roll. There was an immediate clamor to become one of the fortunate museums to receive items from Tibet; many major collectors including The Cambridge University Ethnological Institute, and The Victoria Institute wrote directly to the India Office requesting that any items from Tibet should be passed on to their collections. The India Office replied to most that they had not received instructions as to the distribution of artifacts.⁴⁴² Waddell's papers in the University of Glasgow Library show similar requests directly to him. One dated 29th of July 1904 from Professor Cecil Bendall, Professor of Sanskrit at University College London until 1903, asks that the Mission be sure to collect Tibetan literature for Cambridge University Library, and adds a specific request for anything of a Sanskrit origin.⁴⁴³ Given this level of expectation and demand from the most august institutions in the land, it is unsurprising that items were removed to satisfy the clamor of the collectors, and there was an obvious choice of man to orchestrate this collecting.

'Archaeologist' to the Mission

L. Austine Waddell was a Lieutenant-Colonel in the Indian Medical Service, but was also the most renowned Tibetologist in the Empire. He had been posted to Darjeeling in the early part of his career developing a strong interest in all things Tibetan; wildlife, plants, and especially its religion. He befriended many of the 'Pundits' of the Great Game, including Sarat Chandra Das, the model for Hurree Chunder Mookerjee of Kipling's *Kim*.⁴⁴⁴ In 1892 he was joined by Kinthup, the Pundit who successfully trekked solo the length of the Tsangpo River in an attempt to discover the river's source, in an attempt to trek to Lhasa in disguise.⁴⁴⁵ Waddell's blue eyes soon meant that they were discovered; however his stock rose in both academic circles and local monasteries when rumour went about the

⁴⁴² NAI: Foreign (External) B, August 1904, No. 254-254A.

⁴⁴³ GLASGOW UNIVERSITY LIBRARY. Waddell Collection. GB 0247 Waddell q203.

⁴⁴⁴ KIPLING, RUDYARD. 1901. *Kim*. London: MacMillan & Co.

See also, HOPKIRK, PETER. 1996. *Quest for Kim: In Search of Kipling's Great Game*. London: John Murray.

⁴⁴⁵ WALLER, DEREK. 1990. *The Pundits, British Exploration of Tibet and Central Asia*. Lexington, KT: University Press of Kentucky.

bazaar of Darjeeling that he was an emanation of Amitabha, the Buddha of infinite light, an association he used to gather information for his major work, *The Buddhism of Tibet or Lamaism*.⁴⁴⁶ The book established him at the forefront of Tibetology; however his hypothesis that Tibetan Buddhism was a corrupt form of the teachings of the Lord Buddha, and the associations and comparisons he made with Western Catholicism, now appear misplaced.

In 1895 he was attached to the Chitral Relief Force, in the company of Francis Younghusband and his brother, George.⁴⁴⁷ This allowed him to indulge his penchant for collecting, amassing a large collection of, "several hundreds of beautiful Greco-Buddhist sculptures,"⁴⁴⁸ that he presented to the Calcutta and Peshawar Museums on his return. By 1900 he was attached to the 20,000 strong International Peking Relief Force sent to relieve the besieged delegations during the Boxer Rebellion.⁴⁴⁹ It was while serving in Malakand on the NWFP that Waddell first got wind of the proposed Mission to Tibet; he immediately sent a telegram to the Government of India emphasising, "the unique opportunity offered by the Mission for procuring from that closed land those manuscripts and books so greatly required by Western scholars."⁴⁵⁰ He secured the support of Younghusband, insisting that David Macdonald, his young Anglo-Sikkimese interpreter, and Kinthup join him in his dual role of Medical Officer and collector/Tibetologist. He was granted Rs10,000 from the Government of India to secure such artefact, texts and items he considered to be of best use scholars.⁴⁵¹ This government funding gave rise to claims in Indian and British newspapers that the looting from monasteries and estates was in some way sanctioned by the Government of India, a

⁴⁴⁶ WADDELL, AUSTINE. 1895. *Buddhism of Tibet or Lamaism, with its Mystic Cults, Symbolism and Mythology and in its Relation to Indian Buddhism*. London: W. H. Allen & Co.

⁴⁴⁷ YOUNGHUSBAND, GEORGE. 1910. *The Relief of Chitral*. London: MacMillan.

⁴⁴⁸ WADDELL, AUSTINE. 1912. p. 84.

⁴⁴⁹ FLEMING, PETER. 1959. *The Siege at Peking*. London: Rupert Hart-Davis.

⁴⁵⁰ ALLEN, CHARLES. 2004a. p. 40.

⁴⁵¹ The Home department refused to supply the Rs10,000, it was suggested that twenty-six scientific and Minor Departments be debited the amount. It was also indicated that there would perhaps be an additional grant of Rs10,000. However Carrington (*Ibid*) could find no evidence that this additional money was ever allocated. See also, NAI: Home (Books and Publications) A, July 1904. No. 90-6.

charge Waddell emphatically denied on his return. Lord Kitchener, the Commander in Chief, even asked him to secure items of Chinese porcelain from Tibet, being an avid collector of such items. However the majority of the fragile pieces Waddell did manage to accumulate were destroyed in transit.

On his return from Lhasa his collection of over 2,000 items was divided between the Calcutta Museum, the British Museum, the libraries of Oxford and Cambridge Universities, and the India Office Library. He noted with some pride in 1912 that the collection "forms by far the largest and richest collection of Tibetan literature which has ever reached Europe."⁴⁵² His magnum opus published in 1905, *Lhasa and its Mysteries, with a record of the British Expedition of 1903-1904*,⁴⁵³ (on the strength of which he was appointed Professor of Tibetan at London University in 1907) is perhaps the fullest and most readable account of the Mission. It is interesting not only for his extensive background and insight into Tibetan culture, but also for the exclusion of any mention of his Government funds, items collected by various means, or their eventual resting place.

Waddell's article in the Asiatic Quarterly describing the contents of the trove he brought back is interesting in that it was written over eight years after the return of the Mission, and deposit of the items in their respected museums and libraries. Why no earlier catalogue or description had not been published is unknown, and it is a sad fact that some of the items he amassed await, even to this day, translation and accurate description. (For example see chapter five, where I present original, previously untranslated correspondence between the Amban and the Kashag.) Waddell describes the collection as, "one of not the least solid results of the Mission of Sir Francis Younghusband,"⁴⁵⁴ but appears to get even the dates of the Mission confused, claiming that it was being formed in 1908, four years after its return. The article remains the only account of the distribution of the books and manuscripts

⁴⁵² WADDELL, AUSTINE. 1912. p. 80.

⁴⁵³ WADDELL, AUSTINE. 1905. *Lhasa and its Mysteries, with a Record of the British Expedition of 1903-1904*. London: John Murray.

⁴⁵⁴ WADDELL, AUSTINE. 1912. p. 83.

between the libraries; there being no modern full catalogue or index. Waddell lamented having to divide his collection between various institutions; however there appears to be little rhyme nor reasoning behind his methods in the division.⁴⁵⁵ Different volumes in the same book were given to diverse libraries, and the allocation appears more random than an attempt to play to the strengths of the institutions; having divided the collection into categories (A: Buddhist texts, B: Bon items, C: Histories, D: Science and Medicine and, E: Lexicons and Grammars,) he then further divided these collections between the libraries, rather than concentrating a field in each and thereby aiding scholars of each genre.

On his return to India, and in the face of strong criticism from the Indian press, Waddell claimed that the greater part of his collection had been assembled before the attack on Changlo Manor in May 1904, and that the majority was purchased with the funds provided by the Government of India. However simple maths shows that the Government of India gave Waddell Rs10,000 to spend on books, manuscripts, and items, and he amassed over 2,000 items,⁴⁵⁶ this would only leave an average of Rs5 per item,⁴⁵⁷ a pitifully small amount given the quality of his collection.

He later claimed that of his personal collection, "all except half a dozen volumes, was lost on the journey back from Tibet,"⁴⁵⁸ however Allen records that in 1905 The Berlin Museum purchased his collection of 'Indian antiquities' for a considerable sum.⁴⁵⁹ Waddell's claim that many of his items were lost in transit is corroborated by Captain Mainprize, who records in a letter how, "all the parcels were lost for weeks in an open shed, got thoroughly rotted in the rain and

⁴⁵⁵ The items that he allocated to the India Office were transferred to the British Library when it was disbanded in 1947.

⁴⁵⁶ This figure is Waddell's own: "I am pleased to be able to report that I have secure for the national libraries nearly two thousand volumes of books and manuscripts, comprising of several thousand distinct treatises." WADDELL, AUSTINE. 1912. p. 86.

⁴⁵⁷ CARRINGTON, MICHAEL. 2003. p. 206.

⁴⁵⁸ WADDELL, AUSTINE. 1912. p. 88.

⁴⁵⁹ Waddell was by no means the only officer to sell items directly to museums; Major Iggulden, Chief Staff Officer to the mission, sold one hundred and sixty nine separate pieces to the British Museum in May 1905.

practically destroyed, labels, addresses, everything, and now nothing can be deciphered. The P.O. [Post Office] says it was the General's fault because he would not provide transport."⁴⁶⁰ Waddell also records that, "one of these ponderous tomes, with their thick wooden covers, actually stopped a cannon ball from penetrating within my shelter whilst we were besieged and stormed at Gyantse."⁴⁶¹

While the opportunistic acquisition of loot never seems to have strayed far from the mind of some officers as recorded in their letters and diaries, some British accounts of looting hint at plain greed; Many of the British officers' personal journals and diaries are openly honest about the level of looting that took place. For example, Arthur Hadow of the Maxim Gun Detachment wrote in his diary how he found himself in the monastic complex at Pelkor Chöde just prior to the arrival of the main body of British troops. Hadow and a few of his fellow officers had been surveying the Dzong and on completion of their task the senior officers returned to Changlo. However, Hadow and another junior officer walked towards Gyantse and found themselves in the deserted Pelkor Chöde. Unbeknown to Hadow, General Macdonald was advancing towards the monastery, expecting stiff resistance from behind its thick walls. Hadow and his fellow officer found the complex all but deserted, and therefore "broke into three large buildings or temples on the hillside, loading ourselves with loot."⁴⁶²

The letters of Major Beynon give the most aggressive and alarming description of the behavior of British officers by one of their own number. His letters reveal not only open plundering of the monastery, but also the harsh methods used to gain access to hidden items:

Ross, 2nd Gurkhas, was in the big monastery here and was looking for grain with his coolie corps when one of his men was stoned by a Lama. They caught the beggar and tied him up and gave him twenty lashes on the spot and then told him if he didn't show where the grain was hid he would be shot. He showed them two places very cleverly hidden – but

⁴⁶⁰ ALLEN, CHARLES. 2004a. p. 306.

⁴⁶¹ WADDELL, AUSTINE. 1912. p. 86.

⁴⁶² ALLEN, CHARLES. 2004a. p. 224.

when Ross began to get the things out he found that instead of grain the man had shown him where the monastery's plate & robes were kept. Ross reported to the General who told him he might keep what he liked and to send the rest to the man who collects for the British Museum [Waddell].⁴⁶³

Beynon's letter is interesting as it mentions that the General, 'told him he might keep what he liked.' These may have been soothing words to calm the conscience of his wife at home, but it also provides an insight into the mind of a middle ranking British officer of the period, as well as that of his superiors.

At Gyantse Dzong Waddell's own account recalls how at the main building numerous discoveries were made in the labyrinth of rooms; one was a, "horrible chamber... full of decapitated human heads of men, women, and children. One of the men's heads appeared almost European in countenance. The gory necks of several showed that the heads had been struck off during life."⁴⁶⁴ In other rooms he found, "a huge stock of grain, about 100 tons, barley, flour, and peas... strings of mules and coolies were soon removing it to our camp." The porters helped themselves in the bonanza, "large stores of dried sheep and yak meat were found which our Nepalese and Tibetan coolies carried off with avidity, being gluttonous flesh eaters."⁴⁶⁵ Waddell does not however mention the statues nor texts that he collected from the rooms of the Dzong. It is Beynon's letters again that offer insight into how the officers allocated the loot; in one room a small production facility was discovered for making statues, these were declared legitimate loot and distributed among the officers. "A selection for the British, and other museums was first made, and then a dozen each for General Macdonald and Colonel Younghusband. After that the remainder were divided amongst the officers of the force, each getting two or three pieces."

⁴⁶³ ALLEN, CHARLES. 2004a. p. 226.

⁴⁶⁴ WADDELL, AUSTINE. 1905. p. 223.

⁴⁶⁵ WADDELL, AUSTINE. 1905. p. 222.

British accounts also record looting from Tsechen Monastery; it having offered resistance and therefore deemed fair game once it fell. Lance-Corporal Dunning of the Royal Fusiliers noted in his diary, "we also break open the monastery and kill two Tibetans found therein and secure some loot."⁴⁶⁶ Arthur Hadow of the Maxim Gun Detachment wrote home to his mother, "I at once made for the cellars, where we found some things hidden away. We only had time to visit a few of the buildings, so did not get very much, and we then had to divide the things between three of us. I got rather a nice gong which no doubt you will find useful when I am able to get it home."⁴⁶⁷ Captain Mainprise wrote to his wife that he had secured, "a few trifles, including a number of very curious painted scrolls." These he later sold at Christies.

Mainprise also recorded how news that curios were selling for high prices in the auction houses of London had filtered through to the officers and men. He told his wife that, "I have collected £10 worth of Lhasa curios, including, rings, necklaces, earrings, chatelaines and cup holders," also noting that the news had driven up prices in the bazaar, and, "some of the officers are spending hundreds of rupees on really worthless things, but as they come from Lhasa they are all considered to be of value." He also told his wife that officers were purchasing trinkets from the sepoys, "often at an absurd price, much more than they are worth."⁴⁶⁸ His comments add weight to the claim that many of the items were purchased in bazaars and from legitimate sources; however one wonders where the sepoys purchased or 'collected' the items from in the first place. In a similar vein Waddell prefers to claim that he "rescued" a number of books and manuscripts from the burning buildings at Nenyng, after they had been "set on fire by the retreating Tibetans."⁴⁶⁹

There is likewise no mention in any of the published accounts by British Officers of the Tibetan Government's petition against looting handed to Younghusband at

⁴⁶⁶ ALLEN, CHARLES. 2004a. p. 207.

⁴⁶⁷ ALLEN, CHARLES. 2004a. p. 208.

⁴⁶⁸ ALLEN, CHARLES. 2004a. p. 287.

⁴⁶⁹ WADDELL, AUSTINE. 1905. p. 85.

Nagartse. The document was over twenty-five feet long, and listed items taken from monasteries and private individuals. The only known record of its existence is found in Bailey's collection of photographs in the British Library.

The image originally located here has been removed from this electronic version of the thesis for copyright reasons. [Figure 22: BL: Bailey Collection: Tibet 1903-4: 1083/11. Image 137. "Petition against looting presented to L. Col. Younghusband at Nagartse. 25 feet long."]

In some accounts the British officers directly blame their Indian and Tibetan porters for the looting that occurred. In one such example Captain Mainprise, a doctor in the IMS, wrote in a disgusted letter home that after the battle at Chumi Shonko, "I found that my Tibetan Doolie bearers had run off and were looting the tents, houses and corpses. It took me about an hour before I could collect my Hospital and proceed along the blood stained road."⁴⁷⁰ Official British records for the battle at Chumi Shonko record no fatalities from the British troops; however three Gurkhas were killed in an explosion not mentioned in the official records. Their absence in the General's report to London also hints at his attitude to

⁴⁷⁰ Mainprise's letters are available online at <http://intotibet1903-04.blogspot.com/> In one such letter he describes how "I hear that Tibetans curios at Christie's are fetching large prices, The Tibetan scroll like the one I have sent to you fetched £20 so you had better see what you can get for any of them."

looting;⁴⁷¹ letters home from Lieutenant Bailey show that rather than being killed in combat these sepoys had found a large metal Tibetan box that they were forcing open in the search for loot, they were, "hitting it with a stone when it struck a spark and it turned out to be powder."⁴⁷²

It was not always the British officers who took part in this general looting; the press correspondents were also hot on the heels of the troops, eager to secure items for their own collections. Landon, *The Times* correspondent, recalls that, after the engagement at the Karo La, they found, "the tents still standing, the fires still alight, the water in the cooking vessels still boiling. Furs, blankets, horse furniture, spears, powder-flasks, quick-match, bags of tsampa, skins of butter, tightly stuffed cushions, everything was there as the Tibetans had left it in their haste."⁴⁷³ At the same camp Henry Newman, the Reuters Correspondent, spotted his "servant poking about inside a tent from which he suddenly emerged with a heavy scarlet gown in his arms. This garment must certainly have belonged to a very high Tibetan official."⁴⁷⁴ Newman appropriated the gown and despite his castigation of looting, wore it as a dressing gown for the duration of the Mission.

Carrington quotes letters from the Nepalese *dpa' kil* in Lhasa to Younghusband, confirming incidents of Tibetans looting and mistreating their own people. Although such accounts were second or third hand, it is unlikely that there is not a kernel of truth in them. The first records how the Tibetan militia had "killed three or four women who had mixed up with the British troops" at Gyantse.⁴⁷⁵ In the second the Nepalese representative writes to the Maharaja in Kathmandu that, "the

⁴⁷¹ See, Telegram No. 1060-A. Dated Camp Thuna, the 1st April 1904. From Brigadier-General Macdonald to Adjunct General of India. SOOD, SUBBHI. 2005. *Younghusband. Troubled Campaign*. New Delhi: India Research Press. p. 104.

⁴⁷² ALLEN, CHARLES. 2004a. p. 122.

⁴⁷³ LANDON, PERCEVAL. 1905. *Lhasa*. London: Hurst & Blackett. p. 140.

⁴⁷⁴ NEWMAN, HENRY. 1937. *A Roving Commission*. London: G. Bell & Sons Ltd. p. 133.

⁴⁷⁵ NAI: Foreign (Secret) E, October 1904. Letters from the Nepalese Representative at Lhasa Regarding Tibetan Affairs. No. 646-66.

Tibetans are plundering villages on their way back to Lhasa," and how the villagers were "hiding their respective wealth and property wherever they could."⁴⁷⁶

Not everyone approved, George Preston grumbled to his wife that he wished he could send her some loot, "but there are strict orders about it and it is only people who haven't any conscience at all who get it... It is awfully annoying to see fellows sending away loot, whilst you can't send any away at all."⁴⁷⁷ In a similar letter home Major Wimberly, an assistant in the field hospital to Waddell, told his wife how he had been left to collect the names and numbers of all the casualties after the storming of Gyantse Dzong, while Waddell, "went off on the loot."⁴⁷⁸ In the same letter however he did tell his wife how he had collected "two china vases, a china teapot, a pen-case, and a brass cup-stand and cover," which he intended to pack up and send down when he had the opportunity.

Trinkets and Treasures

The commentary of the *Bod kyi rig gnas lo rgyus dpyad gzhi'i rgyu cha bdams bsgrigs* deals extensively with the issue of looting by British officers and men during their 'invasion' of Tibet. The editors' observations fall in three general categories; indiscriminate looting during the British advance, items taken from Pelkor Chöde and other monasteries close to Gyantse during fighting at the Dzong, and items stolen from families and estates along the route of advance towards Lhasa. The tone of their argument is established early when they claim that, "while the British army was in Tibet, they merciless murdered Tibetans in cold blood, and they set fire to villages and monasteries, and stole priceless items, statues, and relics of the monasteries."^{clxiii} Allen concurs on the whole with this position, stating that, "the general view among officers seems to have been that, whatever General Orders and the Hague Convention of 1899 had to say on the matter, pillage was

⁴⁷⁶ NAI: Foreign (Secret) E, October 1904. Letter from the Honourable the Four Kasis of Tibet to His Highness the Maharaja of Nepal. Enclosure no. 3. p. 59.

⁴⁷⁷ ALLEN, CHARLES. 2004a. p. 225.

⁴⁷⁸ NARBETH, COLIN. 1996. The Storming of Gyantse Fort: An Unpublished Letter from the 1904 Younghusband Mission in Tibet. *Tibetan Review*. Vol. 2. pp. 16-18.

acceptable where an army had been opposed or where, in the case of monasteries, there had been incitement to oppose it. As far as Indian troops were concerned, loot was traditionally a soldier's perk."⁴⁷⁹

Concerning general indiscriminate looting the editors claim that the British stole, "turquoises, corals, gzi stones, amber, diamonds, gold and jewel encrusted artworks, golden crowns, earring, necklaces, gold and silver religious apparatus, satins and brocades, tiger skins, woven items, and religious artefacts."^{clxiv} Indeed pretty much whatever they could lay their hands on; however in this section no specific items are accounted for.

The editors' opinion that any looting was sanctioned and highly organised is presented in the claim that, "the evil foreign enemy sent all of these stolen items in stages from Gyantse via Phagri to India. In total over 460 packs of precious items were sent in this way."^{clxv} This is a claim supported by David Macdonald⁴⁸⁰ who writes, "in January 1905 I was sent to Calcutta to categorize books and treasures, which others and I gathered in Tibet and were brought back using more than 400 mules. They included Buddhist classics, statues of Buddha, religious works, helmets, weapons, books, and ceramics. The bulk of ceramics were sent to specialists for examination. All these treasures were formerly preserved in the India Museum, where I worked, and later in the British Museum, the Indian Museum, the Bodleian Library and the Indian Administrative Library."⁴⁸¹ He does however claim, "so far as I was personally able to observe, there was very little in the way of looting."⁴⁸² From this comment it is clear that Macdonald did not consider his and Waddell's 'collecting' as looting. Their appointment by the Government of India as official collectors allowed him to justify removing items and manuscripts under the label of scholarship and cultural education. Carrington

⁴⁷⁹ ALLEN, CHARLES. 2004a. p. 225.

⁴⁸⁰ Born of a Scottish father and Sikkimese mother and fluent in many Himalayan languages, Waddell took Macdonald to Tibet as his assistant collector. He was later the British Trade Agent in Gyantse between 1905 and 1925.

⁴⁸¹ MACDONALD, DAVID. 1932. *Twenty years in Tibet*. London: Seeley Service. p. 42.

⁴⁸² MACDONALD, DAVID. 1932. p. 26.

chooses not to describe the looting as 'sanctioned,' but as "institutionalized,"⁴⁸³ suggesting that it was considered customary behavior for the troops, but perhaps not condoned by their superiors.

The high value general items mentioned in the commentary would have been stored in the monasteries of Tibet, where as by contrast the British found the Dzongs they encountered to be rather damp dingy affairs. Waddell's description of Phagri emphasises the point; "an attempt was made to remove some of the accumulated garbage of ages, but it took many days before an army of several hundred villagers, carrying basketfuls of stuff all day long, made any impression on its dirt."⁴⁸⁴ Waddell however fails to mention that it was here that he made his first 'cultural acquisition;' a near complete hundred volume edition of the Kanjur.⁴⁸⁵ Many of the Dzongs did however contain military equipment of a historical and cultural value, but given their state of repair it unsurprising that the commentary focuses its claims on the topic of looting on Pelkor Chöde Monastery.

It is in the account of the storming of Gyantse Dzong that the editors make their first specific claim of stolen items. Although the famous stupa and monastery of Pelkor Chöde were not directly attacked, the commentary does recall British officers searching the monastery for Tibetan soldiers hiding there. According to Allen, Waddell searched all the buildings at Pelkor Chöde and, "found three thousand maunds⁴⁸⁶ of atta, or ground flour [sic], hidden in the main monastery."⁴⁸⁷ The commentary however claims that he found more than that; "the triptych of the principal Buddha and his disciples as well as the famous thangka were cut up and taken away."^{clxvi} Their claim that the enormous ceremonial thangka was removed is supported by a further account in which during the 1950s an Indian Army officer visited the monastery and informed the monks that a

⁴⁸³ CARRINGTON, MICHAEL. 2003. "The sheer scale of the looting of religious objects and the fact that it was institutionalized was unacceptable given the assurances that the monasteries were not to be pillaged." p. 105.

⁴⁸⁴ WADDELL, AUSTINE. 1905. p. 100.

⁴⁸⁵ ALLEN, CHARLES. 2004a. p. 71.

⁴⁸⁶ *Maund*: Unit of measurement. Roughly equivalent to 88 Lbs.

⁴⁸⁷ ALLEN, CHARLES. 2004b. 1904, Britain Invades Tibet. *Free Tibet*. No. 36. pp. 7-10.

"portion of the thangka has been discovered in India. We are gathering together all the pieces, and plan to make a new thangka, and I have therefore come to take measurements of the size of the original."^{clxvii} The commentary records how the officer revisited the monastery some months later with two boxes of the original brocades and cloth of the thangka. The editors claim that, "these were still there during the democratic reforms [the Cultural Revolution] however the remaking of the thangka never happened."^{clxviii}

A second specific item is recalled in the commentary that is worthy of close attention. The editors claim that the British looted the begging bowl of the central Jowo statue, along with the golden dharma wheel that stood in front of it. They observe that the statue was the main object of devotion in the great stupa at Pelkor Chöde. However, surprisingly the items were returned to the monastery; "the reason for this was that the items had caused the perpetrator to have a series of bad luck, and they suffered multiple misfortunes, so they gave it back."^{clxix} Such stories are common in folklore and often attached to objects of high value, for example the famous curse of the 'Hope Diamond,'⁴⁸⁸ and we can safely assume that the editors are being 'romantic with the truth' as no record of this bowl or wheel exists in British records.

The looting at Gyantse was not confined to the Dzong and Pelkor Chöde. The commentary has it that at "Tsechen the statues, religious artefacts, and the gold and silver accessories, texts, jewelled thangka, and carpets etc were all totally destroyed or taken."^{clxx} This catalogue fits the description of items taken from other camps and monasteries in British and Tibetan accounts. The editors are keen to point out that much of the destruction was soon repaired after the invasion. Teams comprising lay and monastic officials were set up to "carry out an investigation to determine the level of damage inflicted,"^{clxxi} take steps to repair the damage, and assess the level of compensation that was needed. The grain that was destroyed or

⁴⁸⁸ KEYS, DAVID. 2000. Curse of the mummy's tomb invented by Victorian writers. *The Independent*. 31st December 2000.

stolen was replaced at a set market rate however the artefacts and religious accessories were replaced, "at the lowest going market rate they were worth." At Tsechen the editors value the destruction totalling "11,623 silver srang, or if you use an exchange rate of 0.25 srang per Khal, about 46,492 Khal of grain."^{clxxii}

The editors of the commentary then focus on the looting from aristocratic estates and private individuals. They claim that, "since the British had occupied Yatung, the monasteries, the private estates and the tax paying families of all sizes, all of their possessions were robbed and stolen, and a countless number were pillaged."^{clxxiii} Needless to say, this goes against every British officer's account where orders were given expressly to stop any looting from estates and individuals. Younghusband emphasises that all grass and food was purchased, and that the local inhabitants long the route of the Mission were, "now selling us grass, buck-wheat, turnips and potatoes."⁴⁸⁹ At Gyantse he records that, "at each post we stopped at the officers in charge invariably reported that the people were well content with us on account of our liberal treatment. The villagers themselves were thoroughly friendly. They were making money by selling their produce at rates very favourable to themselves."⁴⁹⁰ Younghusband also accuses Tibetan troops of looting their own people when after a brief engagement along the Yandrok Tso, he blames Kham forces of, "retreating in a disorganised condition and looting the country en route."⁴⁹¹

By contrast the editors of the commentary claim that from private estates the looting was so widespread that, "to itemise them one by one would be impossible. Hence, here we will list only a few."^{clxxiv} The individuals are divided into tax paying brackets, in one such example, "of middle rank taxpayers to the government, for example, the family rGya khrong bSam kang's losses were about 9643.2 srang, or about 3712.18 Kral of grain."^{clxxv}

⁴⁸⁹ YOUNGHUSBAND, FRANCIS. 1910. p. 158.

⁴⁹⁰ YOUNGHUSBAND, FRANCIS. 1910. p. 208.

⁴⁹¹ YOUNGHUSBAND, FRANCIS. 1910. p. 232.

The *Bod kyi rig gnas lo rgyus dpyad gzhi'i rgyu cha bdams bsgrigs* includes one of the reports mentioned in the commentary, a compensation catalogue prepared by the Dzongpön of Grong ser, titled, "A list of the destruction of the local people's crops and the contents of their houses burnt and looted by the British Army in the region of Gyantse."^{clxxvi} The catalogue runs over ten pages, setting down the destruction of the British, the owners of the buildings burnt, livestock and produce looted, and their personal effects taken from them:

We the real inhabitants of Grong ser Dzong say as follows: On the 15th Day of the 5th month of the year of the Wood Dragon the British came in great strength and set up camp at Changra. On the 24th day they came to a place called Changratse. This is an area large enough to provide 100 bags of grain, and they harvested all the grain and carried it away. Furthermore they stole the horses, donkeys and cows and put to fire the local houses. All this destruction done by them is listed below.^{clxxvii}

The catalogue is too extensive to quote in full, but each item is given a cost of replacement in the form of a compensation claim from the government. One can safely assume that these figures have been inflated, never-the-less they provide a fascinating account of not only the possessions of average Tibetan families in 1904, but also the types of items that the British chose to pilfer.

By way of example of the destruction caused, "The property at rTse shol which is so large it needs six pillars and is three stories high, owned by the Trashi Ding family, was set alight and the wooden cross beams collapsed. Their servants were set to work as corvee labours, and the compensation for this is 180 srang."^{clxxviii} Below is a translation of the Dzongpön's compensation claim on their behalf:

In that house, the resident's personal effects and their material goods are valued roughly at 10 srang. They had five copper statues at 30 srang, twenty thangkhas with brocade surrounds at 160 srang. Approximately twenty-five sandalwood and clay statues valued at 75 srang. Various types of petcha in five volumes, valued at 7.5 srang. A large, good quality, treasure chest of family items, valued at 150 srang. A set of Chinese brass offering bowels, two sets of seven, worth 4.2 srang. A further set of offering bowels made of copper-white metal alloy, with only five in number, worth 7.5, and a further three sets of these bowls but smaller, valued at 3 srang, a variety of some thirty bronze offering

butter lamps of different sizes valued at 9 srang. A large roll of brocade at 2.5 srang. A silver tipped white metal alloy mandala set at 6 srang. A copper water-offering teapot for 1 srang. A variety of five rolls of good brocade at 30 srang. Five sets of new and old curtains and drapes at 4 srang. Several golden and rainbow coloured cloths valued at 4 srang. A good quality Chinese carpet at 12 srang, and a yard of under carpet at 2 srang. Two sets of three green and rainbow coloured cloths valued at 6 srang, and three sets of good quality partition screens each valued at 5 srang, giving a total of 15 srang. Two paired yards of material at 4 srang. Four dark blue lined cloth bolts from the gTshang region at 8 srang, two full sets of this at 2 srang. Two sets of three screens, for 6 srang. Four brocade pillows each at 1 srang, ten and good and medium carpets for 20 srang, a set Mongolian style hats of good quality for 10 srang, and three used hats for 4 srang. Partly used cloths for 2 srang, a brown set of cloth at 7 srang, another brown cloth with an inner fleece lining for 10 srang, three used fleece lined ones at 7.5 srang, three sets of amber for 6.75 srang, two round woollen helmet hat that pulls over, at 3.5 srang. A monks half sleeve waistcoat of good quality for 13 srang, and 10 inner ones at 20 srang, three pairs hand sewn felt boots at 3 srang, six pairs of good shirts at 15 srang, ten good quality shirts of rough silk at 15 srang, and two good quality Chinese muffler scarves at 4 srang, three multi coloured 'go thor for 3 srang, and two blue of these yards for 5.4 srang, and two more at 1.2 srang, ten yards of paper for 13.4 srang. Two 'bu di khe le for 9 srang, a pair of silver bowls at 25 srang, a set of silver monk's accessories for purification rituals for 11 srang, and statues for these rituals for 9 srang, a mandala at 2 srang, one earring of turquoise at 11 srang, turquoise and corral mixed triangular headpieces at 30 srang, and one gold earring for 5 srang. A roll good quality undergarment material at 6 srang, brass cymbals at 25 srang, five rolls of cloth for 27 srang, and a roll of blue undergarments cloth for 12 srang, one hundred rolls of locally woven white woollen cloth for the servant's annual clothes allowance for 12 srang, three sets of Chinese dyed bedding cloths for 9 srang, ten sets of mainly black bedding for 25 srang, twenty five sets of white of these for 30 srang. Fifteen white and black fleece sleeping rolls, for 40 srang, and three heavy winter meditation cloaks for monks of good quality for 12 srang, two bigger ones at 20 srang, three large copper cauldrons for 12 srang, and ten smaller ones for 15 srang, a large serving ladle for 2 srang, a copper banded tea churning device for 3 srang, and two guests bowls for 3 srang, a fat store bowel for 3 srang, two sets of brass ladles each set worth 1 srang, and a smaller set at 0.8, and an alloy metal set of smaller types at 3 srang, and four smaller still at 2.2.5 srang. A small alloy set at 0.9 srang, ten small iron ladles at 2.2.5, a bronze two handled pot at 3 srang, three big and small frying pans at 3 srang, six vegetable serving spoons at 1.5 srang, twenty tsampa bowel of golden inlay at 10 srang, 10 sets of blue Chinese china sets at 5 srang, five sets of different china tea

cups, at 2.5 srang, seven sets of different plates 2.5 srang, six alloy tea lids at 3 srang, four sets of Chinese ting khrang at 4 srang, three khro zhu lamps made of metal at 0.9 srang, ten different sized wood axes at about 3 srang, one whole set of horse bridlery dBang sKa for 5 srang. A good quality wooden bowel with Rag Shen decoration, a set of spurs and a bridle, all together worth 30 srang, three good quality rifles at 75 srang, one pistol for 2.5 srang. Two sets of armour and spears at 2 srang, three swords at 3 srang, about two hundred loads of grain and barley and peas, each load worth 0.45 srang, and in total 90 srang, from The Gyantse Quartermaster's store provisions for the troops, both before the war and after it had started, in total included the communal stock, about 800 loads, each load worth 0.35, giving 280 srang. One male horse at 25 srang, one mdzo at 13 srang, one cow at 5 srang, hay and pea meal for the animals about a full bag for 25 srang, twenty yak hair black and white sacks, each worth 0.75 worth in total 15 srang, twenty five smaller bags, totalling 18.75 srang. Household items including some carved wooden furniture and pottery items destroyed, many cooking utensils, and the prayer alter, totalling about 60 srang.

Total from this household: 2132:0:5 (Srang: Sho: sKar)^{clxxix}

The second catalogue provided by the Dzongpön, that of the 'Byor Khang family, chamberlains to the local lord, contains many similar items as to that given above and will not therefore be quoted here in full. Including large items of furniture, long bolts of cloth and brocades, livestock, and jewellery, the claim amounts to 2948:5:0 Srang: Sho: sKar.

Looting did occur on the march towards Lhasa, as British records confirm. While the monastery at Samding was found deserted, two sepoy of the Mounted Infantry were caught by Waddell red handed with their pockets bulging with looted statues. Waddell reported the two to General Macdonald, and ordered that the statues returned, the monastery having offered no resistance. As their activities had gone against the strict General Orders for the Mission, Macdonald ordered that the men be tried by courts marshal. Thomas Carey of the Royal Fusiliers records in his diary that one man received two years imprisonment, and the other one year, reduced on account of his bravery at the battle at the Karo La. However he also adds, "they were caught by Dr Waddell, IMS, who by the way is also noted for his looting propensities. Everybody rather sympathises although it was rather a flagrant case,

as all the staff have taken any amount of loot in their time. Before the sepoy generally got flogged, but General Macdonald wanted to make an example, especially as he had promised the envoys that nothing would be touched."⁴⁹² Carey also pens how he bitterly resents the Mounted Infantry who, "get the pick of the loot. Some of the MI officers have very valuable loot, we only get the dregs and the same of curios. Of course there are stringent orders against looting monasteries, unless they fire or make resistance."⁴⁹³

The next document that deals with the issue of looting in the *Bod kyi rig gnas lo rgyus dpyad gzhi'i rgyu cha bdams bsgrigs* is the, "The Government's official record list of the interest free loans and all kinds of grain that have been granted, together with the times by which they have to be repaid."^{clxxx} It is dated in the year of the Wood Snake, i.e. from February 1905 to January 1906, and is presented as the official record of, "The Government of Tibet's Commoner's Department, in the area of Gyantse Prefecture."^{clxxxi} It catalogues not only the destruction caused by the British, the grain and supplies needed to deploy the Tibetan troops and the militia, but also the measures the central Ganden Phodrang took to ensure the grains were replaced and the harvests secured for the coming years. It accuses the British of looting the autumn harvest of seeds and fodder, jeopardising the seeding for the summer harvest. The Government therefore established a system of seed and grain loans on an interest free basis to avert this catastrophe. Approximately a dozen examples of families in crisis are given in the text, all with similar situations and terms; generally ten years of no interest loans, with one tenth of the harvest each year being returned to the Government in repayments.

I have chosen the Phala Estate as my example for several reasons; It is the most clearly defined of the loans presented and gives the sub-divisions of the main loan to different families, monastic colleges and their estates. It also details the repairs needed after the British torched the estate once Latse village had fallen during the

⁴⁹² ALLEN, CHARLES. 2004a. p. 241.

⁴⁹³ ALLEN, CHARLES. 2004a. p. 241.

main assault on the Dzong. This contract is dated in the Fire Horse year, i.e. January 1906 to February 1907.

For the people who come from Phala, as per, and in accordance with the signature of the Kashag, 5000 bags were given. Presently people came and signed contracts. 230 bags were given to the Phundi family, the Serchog family and religious estate, and 'Drung family combined, and in accordance with the wet compared to dry weight rules, one tenth to be repaid each year, once the grain in advance was made available.

By contract 3300 sacks of barley and 500 pea sacks are made available to the common taxpayers whose houses were totally destroyed. To the Bonpo tantric practitioners and the religious groups whose residences were totally destroyed to them was granted, clearly in this contract, some 1679 sacks of barley grain, and for the building of a new facility at Ralung some 1345 barley bags were given. 140 bags were given to the sKoshi family whose home was destroyed and one eighth for the renovation facility grant was made in barley. A grant of 1710 bags were given to the secretaries for the various renovations and replacement of their furniture, the carpets, tables etc. 300 bags were given to the Lhantong family and to the taxpayers of Kong ksal. Altogether the total sacks of grain loaned by the Government is 23843/11/2 (bags and then other smaller units) of barley.^{clxxxii}

This evidence goes against Younghusband and others' assertion that all grains and fodder were paid for, and that little or no looting occurred.

Aftermath

English and Indian newspapers carried stories of sanctioned looting on a massive scale that were difficult for the authorities in New Delhi to ignore. *The Statesman* of Calcutta claimed that, "piles of loot, which it is not possible to transport, had accumulated at Gyantse, and the drawing rooms of Darjeeling begin to tell a tale, which it should be far from pleasant for English eyes to read."⁴⁹⁴ Even before the Mission had arrived in Lhasa, *The Englishman* conceded, "there was little glory to

⁴⁹⁴ *The Statesman*, Calcutta. 21st July 1904.

be had out of the campaign in Tibet," adding that there was, "no reason why the overwhelming weight of loot should not be thrown into the scale."⁴⁹⁵

The *Reuters* correspondent Henry Newman believed that the Mission's arrival in Lhasa was the last time that British troops were "allowed" to loot.⁴⁹⁶ Although he wrote this comment some twenty-five years after his return from Tibet, it does show his opinion of looting. Landon in his dispatches to *The Times* was more in line with the General's orders; however he does pour fuel on the fire of claims the looting was sanctioned when he wired that, "valuables or curios, found in the fort at Gyantse as were not immediately connected with religious worship, will be handed over to the Government of India for distribution among British and Indian museums." However he also told his readers, "nearly all the portable valuables have been removed from the monastery [Pelkor Chöde] by the lamas, in spite of the repeated proclamation by Brigadier-General Macdonald that there would be no looting."⁴⁹⁷ In spite of his claims, records at the British Museum show that he personally donated six items, some of considerable value. It is not recorded where he obtained them.

Younghusband wrote to the Government of India that after the capture of the Dzong at Gyantse he had asked Waddell, O'Connor, and Landon to select, "from among the mass of manuscripts and articles lying about such as were likely to be of value specifically." He also claimed that, "no articles were removed from the chapel in the Jong [Dzong]."⁴⁹⁸ The newspaper claims, bazaar scandal, and Younghusband's own admission that he had asked officers and correspondents to 'select' items soon came to the attention of the Viceroy, Amthill, who had taken over for a year after Curzon returned to Britain. He remained skeptical of the claims of excessive looting however Kitchener was asked to telegram his Tibet Commissioner and emphasise the strict orders against any such occurrence.

⁴⁹⁵ *The Englishman*, Calcutta. 28th July 1904.

⁴⁹⁶ NEWMAN, HENRY. 1937. p. 37.

⁴⁹⁷ *The Times*, London. 21st April 1904.

⁴⁹⁸ NAI: Foreign (External) B, August 1904, No. 254-254A. Younghusband to Russell, ICS, Under Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department. Gyantse, 12 July 1904.

At the same time there was some debate in the London newspapers regarding the appropriate degree of 'punishment' to be handed out to the Tibetan people for their willingness to challenge British authority. While this debate does not positively condone looting, it does hint at the public's attitude for revenge against the Tibetans, their acceptance of both the Imperial role of the army, and the methods it used. *The Times* believed that the British expedition to Tibet acted with, "determination and firmness"⁴⁹⁹ in its dealings with the Tibetans, and *The Glasgow Herald* reminded its readers that the aim of the operation was to inflict punishment and to inculcate a, "wholesome dread of the power of the invader,"⁵⁰⁰ and thus initiate a change in Tibetan behaviour.⁵⁰¹ *The Daily Mail* justified the British expedition by comparing the Tibetans to burglars who had been entering Indian territory without permission. The paper explained that, "we do not pardon the burglar or criminal because he is of puny stature or weak in health."⁵⁰² Their use of the term 'burglar' is inflammatory, given that the Mission was hardly invited into Tibet, and had filled its baggage train with loot during its short stay. The paper however "justified the invasion of Tibet and explained away the one-sided nature of the war there by showing that the natives were criminals with whom the British forces had to deal."⁵⁰³

Tibetan Treasures in British Collections

There is no better evidence to support the claims of looting than the museum and library collections of Britain that contain objects collected during the Mission. Although some of the items in the catalogues may have been mere curios purchased in bazaars and emporia of Lhasa and Gyantse, the larger, more valuable, and historically important items described could not have been purchased by of the officers and men during their advance. Museum catalogues also contain valuable snippets of history, often recording not only who collected the items, and from

⁴⁹⁹ *The Times*, London. 2nd April 1904.

⁵⁰⁰ *Glasgow Herald*. 8th August 1904.

⁵⁰¹ WILKINSON, GLENN. 1998. p. 105.

⁵⁰² *Daily Mail*, London. 7th April 1904.

⁵⁰³ WILKINSON, GLENN. 1998. p. 106.

where, but also how they acquired the items, and when they were donated to, or purchased by, the museum in question.

Many of the items described were donated or purchased in the years immediately after the Mission however a surprising number were donated in the 1940s and 50s often by the widow or family of a deceased member of the Mission. Some young subalterns who accompanied Younghusband to Tibet went on to lengthy and distinguished careers,⁵⁰⁴ serving in the far corners of the Empire and accumulating a vast hoard of collectibles and Imperial paraphernalia. Sorting Tibetan items originating from the Mission from others collected on later adventures can sometimes be difficult, and on each occasion I have erred on the side of caution assuming later collection dates if none is given. However some cases, such as the items donated by press correspondents (who only visited Tibet once), are clear cut, as are those whose provenance can be deduced from the nature of the item or secondary sources.

The British Museum in London was one of the major beneficiaries of Waddell's collecting, and remains one of the foremost collections of Tibetan art and artefacts in Europe.⁵⁰⁵ The museum's catalogue records one hundred and sixty seven items from Tibet donated in 1905, including thangka, statues, teapots, jewelry, incense burners, ceramics, prayer wheels, trumpets, horns, drinking vessels, gunpowder flasks, and amulet cases, and much more besides. In fact a list not dissimilar to those items claimed as looted in the commentary of the *Bod kyi rig gnas lo rgyus dpyad gzhi'i rgyu cha bdams bsgrigs*.

Highlights of the collection from other officers who served on the Mission include two early thirteenth century paintings on cloth collected by EHC Walsh of the CSI who was part of the Mission in 1904. The paintings both depict Kuvera, the god of

⁵⁰⁴ For example, the mission's translator O'Connor, went on to become the British Trade Agent in Gyantse, advised the trade talks in Shimla, became personal friends with the Panchen Lama, and eventually became Political Officer in Sikkim. He died Lieutenant-Colonel, Sir Frederic O'Connor, CSI CIE, CVO in 1943. O'CONNOR, WILLIAM FREDERICK. 1940. *Things Mortal*. London: Hodder & Staughton.

⁵⁰⁵ For an excellent introduction to the British Museum's Tibetan items see, ZWALF, WLADIMIR. 1981. *Heritage of Tibet*. London: British Museum Publications Ltd.

wealth (see below) and are exceptionally fine.⁵⁰⁶ A nineteenth century cloth mandala was taken from an unnamed monastery in Tibet, and was donated by the Indian Government from the Waddell collection.⁵⁰⁷ Captain Bethune's brother donated several items to the collection after his brother was killed in Tibet, including a fine wooden tomb figure. Such items are not Tibetan in origin, and it can be assumed that Bethune collected the item from a bazaar or temple not knowing that it originated from Afghanistan or Pakistan.⁵⁰⁸ A collection of alabaster buttons with skin fastenings are not of great monetary value, but the donations register notes that they were, "found on a dead woman during Sir Francis Younghusband's advance, where the road was walled up," giving credence to claims that the dead were looted after the battle at Chumi Shonko.⁵⁰⁹

The image originally located here has been removed from this electronic version of the thesis for copyright reasons. [Figure 23: Kuvera Thangka in the British Museum's collection, donated by Captain Walsh.]

⁵⁰⁶ Items 1950,0722,0.3. and 1950,0722,0.4. British Museum Catalogue.

⁵⁰⁷ Item 1906,1226.44. British Museum Catalogue.

⁵⁰⁸ Item As1944,06.1. British Museum Catalogue.

⁵⁰⁹ Item 1917,1109.2. British Museum Catalogue.

Landon donated four items to the British Museum including a pair of brass cymbals with silk and leather handles,⁵¹⁰ a bronze and tin ewer,⁵¹¹ and a cane shield he collected in Phagri Dzong.⁵¹² A seventeenth century silk hanging collected by Landon at Gobshi, on route between Gyantse and the Karo La is interesting in that the material was made in Assam and contains Hindu iconography illustrating Vaisnava, Garuda, and also Krishna related stories. Either Landon was unaware of its Indian origin, assuming it to be Tibetan, or it had for some time been used as a decorative hanging in Tibet and was therefore of interest to him.

Items purchased from Captain O'Connor, include over twenty-five Tibetan official and monastic hats, stone figures, boots and clothes, hangings, and horse riding equipment. Colonel Iggulden, the Chief Staff Officer of the Mission, sold nine items to the museum in 1905, including a bronze chalice, figures, a helmet, shield, and a full suit of Tibetan armour made of iron and leather over forty-seven inches long.⁵¹³ Items continued to be acquired by the museum in the years that followed, including a fabulous Vasudhara thangka dating from approximately 1500, donated in 1907.⁵¹⁴

Waddell sold the museum twenty-five items in 1906, including eighteen thangka, and a collection of poisoned arrowheads.⁵¹⁵ The arrows were collected in 1894 from the Lohit River basin, and therefore are unconnected with the Tibet Mission. The thangka are Tibetan in origin; however there is no mention in the catalogue that he was an official collector for the museum and Government of India, only that he was an academic and author. One has to wonder how some items were purchased with the official funds granted to him, yet he was at liberty to sell other items directly to museums on his return.

⁵¹⁰ Item 1905,0118.2. British Museum Catalogue.

⁵¹¹ Item 1905,0118.1. British Museum Catalogue.

⁵¹² Item As1905,0118.5. British Museum Catalogue.

⁵¹³ Item 1905,0519.168. British Museum Catalogue.

⁵¹⁴ Item 1906,1226,0.9. British Museum Catalogue.

⁵¹⁵ Item As1894,-.41. British Museum Catalogue.

The World Museum in Liverpool is host to the majority of the Bailey Collection, donated after many years of service in the Himalayas. In a letter to museum dated 1997, the Dalai Lama noted, "I understand that many of the objects in the collection were acquired by British Political Officers in the course of their duty in Tibet, many of whom showed great sympathy and friendship to my people," and it is difficult to sort which items originated with the Younghusband Mission, which were looted, and which were gifts owing to the friendship the Dalai Lama describes. The catalogue of the Younghusband collection further records that, "his collection includes objects taken during the military Mission as well as objects received in friendship." A particular highlight is a colorful helmet of the bodyguard of the Paro Penlop (Dzongpön), catalogued as being, "probably given to Younghusband."⁵¹⁶

The image originally located here has been removed from this electronic version of the thesis for copyright reasons. [Figure 24: Helmet of the bodyguard of the Paro Pönlop, circa 1900. Liverpool World Museum.]

⁵¹⁶ Accession Number 53.42.77. Liverpool World Museum.

The Bodleian Library, Oxford University's central library, was one of the fortunate libraries designated for items from Waddell's official collection. Aris reasons that, "his activities [Waddell] appear to have been sanctioned partly as a result of the recommendations of F. W. Thomas, then Librarian of the India Office Library, whose Tibetan interest always tended to outweigh his devotion to Sanskrit... Waddell procured a huge mass of original Tibetan material, by both gift and plunder."⁵¹⁷ In any event, in 1905 the library received one hundred and thirty-one volumes of Tibetan material, the core of which is a ninety-one volume edition of the Tibetan Buddhist canon, the Kanjur (bKa' 'gyur) representing an incomplete set of the Narthang edition prepared in 1732 during the reign of the VIIth Dalai Lama.

The collection also holds two collotype facsimile copies of letters from the Manchu Amban to the Tibetan public at the time of the expedition, and a letter in reply from the Kashag,⁵¹⁸ as well as two volumes of a manuscript prepared at the monastery of Shelkar (Shel dkar) in Southern Tibet, important because of the part it plays in the history of the transmission of the Tibetan canon.⁵¹⁹ Although not part of the official Waddell collection, the Bodleian does hold a beautifully illuminated first volume of the collection of Nyingma tantra known as the rNying ma rgyud 'bum.⁵²⁰ While the remaining volumes of this valuable manuscript are in the India Office Library, this first volume was offered for sale at Sotheby's in 1909, "belonging to one L. Austine Waddell."⁵²¹

⁵¹⁷ ARIS, MICHAEL. 1982. A Note on the Resources for Tibetan Studies at Oxford. *The Bodleian Library Record*. Vol. 10. No. 6. p. 373.

⁵¹⁸ Bod. Lib.:MSS. Tibet. c. 24.

⁵¹⁹ Bod. Lib.:MSS. Tibet a. 15 (R), 23 (R).

⁵²⁰ Bod. Lib.:MSS. Tibet. a. 24. (R).

⁵²¹ ALLEN, CHARLES. 2004a. p. 306.

The image originally located here has been removed from this electronic version of the thesis for copyright reasons. [Figure 25: Folio from the rNying ma'i rgyud 'bum held at the Bodleian Library. Image courtesy of the Bodleian Library, Oxford.]

The Pitt Rivers Museum in Oxford has become the beneficiary of several items from Tibet that were collected during the Younghusband Mission, although many were donated in the 1940s and 50s rather than immediately after the Mission. It also received items from the Cranmore Museum, a private ethnographical collection run by Harry Beasley in Chislehurst, when it closed in the 1950s.

The many items of interest include a *repoussé* brass, copper and white metal bowl decorated with dragons' heads and legs designed to look like curved serpents, donated by a Mrs. Weldon of Oxford. The bowl is interesting not only for its aesthetic qualities, but also for the catalogue's claim that the items was, "collected by Colonel Younghusband during his expedition to Tibet."⁵²² An elaborate frame containing four Tibetan paintings and an early photograph were donated to the Cranmore Museum by General Frank Conningham, late of the 12th Pathans, who served with Younghusband in Tibet,⁵²³ and were passed on to the Pitt Rivers.

The Pitt Rivers collection also contains elaborate pieces of arms and armour. William Beynon, Commander of the 2nd Gurkhas, donated several high quality items, particularly a fine example of plate lamellar armour used by horsemen in the Central Asian plateaus from the middle ages to the time of the Mission. The armour probably dates from the sixteenth or seventeenth century, and the coat is lined

⁵²² Item 1917.3.5. Pitt Rivers Collection Catalogue.

⁵²³ Item 1954.6.45. Pitt Rivers Collection Catalogue.

with leather and hangs in three sections, two to protect the legs, the back section lying over the horse's rump. It was probably collected from Phagri Dzong and was used for prayer festivals and ceremonies, it already being antique by the time of the Mission. The weight and size of the item is such that it cannot be considered neither curio nor trinket, and must have been a considerable burden on the advance towards Lhasa. This item was of such high quality that it was exhibited in New York as part of the Metropolitan Museum of Art's 'Warriors of the Himalayas' exhibition

The image originally located here has been removed from this electronic version of the thesis for copyright reasons. [Figure 26: Armour from Phagri Dzong in the Pitt Rivers Collection, donated by Major Beynon.]

Aris notes that the Pitt Rivers has four sets of Tibetan manuscripts, "a reflection of the magpie habits of many army officers and civil servants in India who left their acquisitions to this 'museum of a museum.'" As these are not catalogued in the same way as the main collection it is impossible to tell if the 'magpies' that donated them served with Younghusband in Tibet. Unfortunately most of the texts are in fragments, "but among them is a fine example of a Tibetan musical score, the dByangs yig tshangs pa'i rol mo (The musical notation [entitled] the Music of Brahma) (Beasley collection 357)."⁵²⁵

⁵²⁴ Item 1941.2.126.1. Pitt Rivers Collection Catalogue.

⁵²⁵ ARIS, MICHAEL. 1982. p. 368.

Beynon also donated five iron standard heads and poles for flags or spears with long silk standards attached to them. These are recorded as having been collected from "*Pedi-Jong Monastery, lake Tamdok*."⁵²⁶ The collection's Tibetan archer's bow taken from 'Brong rtse Monastery,⁵²⁷ and an ornate ivory lancehead and spike collected at Chumi Shonko⁵²⁸ add evidence to the claims of the editors of the *Bod kyi rig gnas lo rgyus dpyad gzhi'i rgyu cha bdams bsgrigs* that the Tibetans faced the British with the most rudimentary of weapons.

The British Museum catalogue also contains items purchased from a Lieutenant-Colonel Beyon [sic] in 1908. These include a papier mâché figure of a seated lama⁵²⁹ and a canvas and paste figure seated on a lion wearing monastic robes;⁵³⁰ fragile items that would have required some considerable trouble to transport to London.

The image originally located here has been removed from this electronic version of the thesis for copyright reasons.

Figure 27: *Papier mâché* seated lama in the British Museum, donated by Major Beynon.

⁵²⁶ Item 1941.2.127. Pitt Rivers Collection Catalogue. I assume the lake referred to is Yamdrok Tso.

⁵²⁷ Item 1905.81.5. Pitt Rivers Collection Catalogue.

⁵²⁸ Item 1941.2.132. Pitt Rivers Collection Catalogue.

⁵²⁹ Item 1908,0515.2. British Museum Catalogue.

⁵³⁰ Item 1908,0515.1. British Museum Catalogue.

The National Army Museum in Chelsea has become the home of many artifacts and items of importance dating from the Mission. The collection houses more than forty-five catalogue entries for items associated with the Tibet Mission, as well as dozens of silver Tibet medals awarded for the storming of Gyantse Dzong. The collection is divided between the fine and decorative arts, uniforms badges and medals, and weapons, equipment, and vehicles.

The Uniforms, Badges and Medals Department naturally contains many of the medals awarded during the Mission, as well as two entries for Tibetan flags acquired by Lieutenant-Colonel Frederick Bailey in Tibet. The first of these reportedly came from Chumi Shonko,⁵³¹ and the second description lists four other Tibetan flags taken at various stages of the Mission.⁵³² The fact that Bailey's rank is given as Lieutenant-Colonel indicates that he gave the items in later life, only being a Lieutenant at the time of the Mission.⁵³³

The Fine and Decorative Arts Department contains a valuable, but undated, collection of thangka, four of which were, "acquired by Capt F W Pirrie in Tibet 1903."⁵³⁴ Major M R E Ray⁵³⁵ collected four wooden Tibetan book covers, probably all for different volumes of the same book, each with a deep relief gilt carving depicting five figures seated in attitude of prayer. The catalogue notes these items were, "collected from the monastery at Gyantsi [sic] in 1903,"⁵³⁶ which most

⁵³¹ Item NAM 1966-09-124-1. National Army Museum Catalogue.

⁵³² Item NAM 1965-10-88-1. National Army Museum Catalogue.

⁵³³ Bailey was exceptionally generous with his donations to museums, especially his large collection of over two thousand bird specimens presented to The Natural History Museum, (WARR, FREDERICK. 1996. Manuscripts and Drawings in the Ornithology and Rothschild Libraries of The Natural History Museum at Tring. *British Ornithologists' Club Occasional Publications*. Vol. 19. No. 38. pp. 7-15), and his large collection of hunting trophies that now hang in the American Museum of Natural History in New York. (ANON. 1967. Obituary: Lt.-Col. F. M. Bailey, CIE. 1882-1967. *The Geographical Journal*. Vol. 133. pp. 427-428.)

⁵³⁴ Items NAM. 1953-05-27 - 1 / 2 / 3 / 4. National Army Museum Catalogue.

⁵³⁵ Major M R E Ray, DSO, of The 7th Duke of Connaught's Own Rajputs was Chief Intelligence Officer to the Mission in 1904.

⁵³⁶ Items NAM. 1953-06-31-1, 1953-06-34-1, 1953-06-33-1, 1953-06-32-1. National Army Museum Catalogue.

probably refers to Pelkor Chöde. Ray also donated three thangka, collected near Gyantse, showing scenes from the life of the Buddha.⁵³⁷

These items pale in comparison to the dozen items donated by Lieutenant Aubrey Vickers of the 48th Pioneers, each described as, "obtained from a Lama in a small monastery near Lada [Lhasa?] ... whilst serving on the Tibet Expedition 1903/4." The items 'obtained from a Lama' include a steel and copper box with a stepped onion dome top and repoussé design of scrolling fauna,⁵³⁸ a bead necklace of orange coral and turquoise beads with a gold filled human tooth,⁵³⁹ a thangka showing the Buddha and ten other deities in meditation,⁵⁴⁰ five clay plaques used for funerary offerings of various kinds,⁵⁴¹ and manuscripts that are described as 'prayer letters.' These have sets of holes at the end of each paper, indicating they were once tied around something, and perhaps are examples of the charms monks handed out to protect Tibetan soldiers from British bullets.⁵⁴² However, the finest piece from Vickers' collection is a beautiful thangka dating from the 1750s. The catalogue declares that the thangka depicts, "Dhyani-Buddha Amitabha in the Western Paradise of Sukhavati with his worshippers, edged with blue and red silks,"⁵⁴³ unfortunately the catalogue gives no indication of its monastery of origin.

Finally the Weapons, Equipment, and Vehicles Department lists sixteen items acquired during the Mission, including some of the most historically important, as well as those relating to Younghusband himself. The majority of the collection are marked as, "gathered by Lieutenant-Colonel George Allen Preston,⁵⁴⁴ while on the Tibet Expedition, 1904," and features a large collection of swords and knives, especially, an Afghan 'T-section' knife with bone grips,⁵⁴⁵ an elaborate single edged

⁵³⁷ Items NAM. 1953-07-3 - 1, 1953-07-4 - 1, 1953-07-5 - 1. National Army Museum Catalogue.

⁵³⁸ Item NAM. 1959-06-18 - 1. National Army Museum Catalogue.

⁵³⁹ Item NAM. 1959-06-18 - 11. National Army Museum Catalogue.

⁵⁴⁰ Item NAM. 1959-06-18 - 12. National Army Museum Catalogue.

⁵⁴¹ Items NAM. 1959-06-18 - 1 / 2 / 3 / 4 / 5. National Army Museum Catalogue.

⁵⁴² Items NAM. 1959-06-18 - 7 / 8 / 9. National Army Museum Catalogue.

⁵⁴³ Item NAM. 1967-07-2 - 1. National Army Museum Catalogue.

⁵⁴⁴ Preston was a Captain in the 40th Pathans at the time of the Mission.

⁵⁴⁵ Item NAM. 1967-07-1 - 2. National Army Museum Catalogue.

blade, with usual wavy lines of different colored metals complete with a fish skin covered grip pommel cap and scabbard with white metal and brass inlays,⁵⁴⁶ a *Talwar* sword similar to a Turkish kilij with a single heavy blade,⁵⁴⁷ and a lavish *Pesh kabz* knife with sheath and ivory grip and pommel.⁵⁴⁸ Such items are not curios or trinkets, and as a modest Captain, Preston was unlikely to have received these weapons as gifts from monks or officials keen to win his favor, one can only assume they were taken from protector deity temples and Dzongs.

As if to endorse the Mission's original rationale of countering Russian influence in the Himalaya, the catalogue also holds a collection of rifle cartridges, several of which have Russian markings.⁵⁴⁹ By far the prize items in the collection however are marked as, "given to Cdr J L Younghusband, DSC, RN, as a wedding present by his uncle, Sir Francis Younghusband." The two swords and scabbards listed are of the highest quality; the first of which is a straight blade with six narrow grooves along each side of the blade with a silvered copper ferrule, a gilt brass pommel, pieced with lattice patterns and embellished with dragon and cloud patterns.⁵⁵⁰ The second gift Younghusband gave his nephew is an ornamental wooden scabbard covered with brass and decorated with floral and dog motifs.⁵⁵¹ Exactly how the Tibet Commissioner came by these items is not recorded, nor is there mention of them in any of his published letters or books.⁵⁵²

The National Museums of Scotland Collection has a large assembly of thangka, one of which is described as, "depicting Buddha, seated on a lotus throne, surrounded by other divine beings including Yama, Lord of the Dead... Tibet, obtained by the

⁵⁴⁶ Item NAM. 1967-07-1 - 6. National Army Museum Catalogue.

⁵⁴⁷ Item NAM. 1967-07-1 - 4. National Army Museum Catalogue.

⁵⁴⁸ Item NAM. 1967-07-1 - 1. National Army Museum Catalogue.

⁵⁴⁹ Item NAM. 1966-09-125 - 1. National Army Museum Catalogue.

⁵⁵⁰ Item NAM. 1967-02-10 - 1. National Army Museum Catalogue.

⁵⁵¹ Item NAM. 1967-02-10 - 2. National Army Museum Catalogue.

⁵⁵² Younghusband was rather in the habit of making gifts of swords; when the founders of the Canadian Geographical Society invited him to give the inaugural lecture he presented to the Society an ornamental sword he had collected in Tibet. YOUNGHUSBAND, FRANCIS. 1930. A Summary of the Record of the Expedition to the Forbidden City of Lhasa. *Canadian Geographic*. Toronto. Vol. 1. pp. 30-35.

donor on the 1903 - 1904 Tibet Mission.⁵⁵³ The 2010 Autumn Newsletter of the Scottish 'Royal Museum Project' informs its readers of the forthcoming 'Treasured: Wonderful Things, Amazing Stories' exhibition starting in 2011 when the museum in Edinburgh reopens. Highlights of the forthcoming exhibition include, "a selection of the exquisite sixteenth century Tibetan armour acquired by Colonel Baillie, who participated in the Younghusband expedition, will be seen in its full glory, having been exhibited recently in The Metropolitan Museum of Art in New York."⁵⁵⁴ Colonel Baillie [sic] is in all likelihood a simple misspelling of Bailey (Frederick 'Hatter') of the Mounted Infantry.

The Victoria and Albert Museum (V&A) in London contains only three items that can positively be identified as having originated from Tibet during the Mission; however holds a large collections of thangka, jewelry, and statues, some of great antiquity and importance. It houses the Baille Collection which features nearly one hundred items from Tibet, including two full sets of horse armor, religious utensils, and ritual items. Percival Landon also donated ten fine silk thangkas in 1910. Of the items that are recorded as originating from the Mission, a late fourteenth or early fifteenth century gilt copper statue of Avalokitesvara, in his popular manifestation as Padmapani, the lotus-bearer, is perhaps the finest piece of Tibetan art in the collection. The statue is richly adorned with jeweled detailing inset with precious stones. He wears a five-pointed diadem surrounding his elaborate raised hair, which is surmounted by a small image of the Buddha Amitabha. Newar craftsmen probably made this image for Tibetan patrons, and the catalogue notes that,

This masterpiece of Newari metal-casting was acquired by Brigadier-General C G Rawlings⁵⁵⁵ at Shigatse in 1904, whilst en route to Lhasa as part of the British Younghusband expedition. Several members of the expedition acquired examples of 'Lamaist' art over the course of this journey.⁵⁵⁶

⁵⁵³ Item A.1954.334. National Museums Scotland.

⁵⁵⁴ NATIONAL MUSEUMS SCOTLAND. 2008. Royal Museum Project Newsletter. Autumn.

⁵⁵⁵ Captain C G Rawling of the Somerset Light Infantry, joined the Tibet Mission to lead a small survey party made up of Royal Engineers. Quite what he was doing, looting aside, in Shigatse is not clear, as the Mission never passed through the city.

⁵⁵⁶ Item IM.239-1922. V&A Catalogue.

The image originally located here has been removed from this electronic version of the thesis for copyright reasons.

Figure 28: Gilt statue of Avalokitesvara in the V&A Museum, acquired by Brigadier-General Rawlings.

The second item is not of particular value, but is interesting for its provenance; the multi-purpose ceremonial cloth, known as a *phyag bsil pang kheb* from Bhutan, was often used to dry the hands of important visitors and its name literally means 'hand wash lap cover'. The record for the cloth shows that, "the diplomat Sir Charles Bell was given this item by the first king of Bhutan, Urgyen Wangchuck [sic], with whom he became acquainted during the expedition to Tibet in 1904."⁵⁵⁷

⁵⁵⁷ Item IM.20-1933. V&A Catalogue.

The final item in the Victoria and Albert collection is a forty centimetre-high copper statue of the Buddha Sakyamuni, also of Newar origin, from the late 14th century.⁵⁵⁸ The catalogue merely states that it was, “bought by the Victoria and Albert Museum from a London gallery in 1905 at a sale of objects obtained during the 1904 Younghusband expedition to Tibet.”⁵⁵⁹ However when the item was inspected more closely it was found to contain both prayers and other holy objects hidden in the body cavity and sealed in with a base plate. The V&A website describes the statue as, “a medieval time capsule; the contents of this seated Buddha have revealed hidden details of its production and worship in Tibet.”⁵⁶⁰ A first set of 13 pen and watercolour drawings of deities dating from the time of consecration was initially found, before additional bundles proved to be a further set of nine drawings

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Figure 29: Left, Seated Buddha, Tibet, late 14th Century. The V&A Collection. Right, 'Dusum Khenpa.'((1110-70) Founder of the Karmapa order.) Ink and gouache on paper, Tibet, 14th century. Found inside the seated Buddha.

⁵⁵⁸ Item IM 121-1910. V&A Catalogue.

⁵⁵⁹ http://www.vam.ac.uk/collections/asia/object_stories/buddha/index.html Accessed 10th March 2009.

⁵⁶⁰ http://www.vam.ac.uk/collections/asia/object_stories/buddha/index.html Accessed 10th March 2009.

Captain Arthur Hadow of the Maxim Gun Detachment gave many of his Tibetan curios and loot to the Royal Norfolk Regiment Museum in Norfolk. Of the more than sixty items he presented almost half are of a military nature, including a cannonball fired at Changlo Manor from one of the larger guns in Gyantse Dzong, Tibetan matchlocks, "captured at the fight at Tuna," and various other typically Tibetan curio items such as bells, bowls, and prayer wheels. Of the more impressive, valuable, and almost certainly looted items, is an apron made from human bones looted from Gyantse Dzong, carved book covers, and the, "head of a statue, broken off as [sic] image was too large to carry away."⁵⁶¹

We can be sure that at least some of the items in British collections were gifts from monks, aristocrats, and officials to the higher-ranking British officers. Such items were often given to win favor, for example, the Mission's translator was often discovering small bags of gold dust had appeared on his desk.⁵⁶² The Ganden Tripa, Blo bzang rgyal mtshan, presented both Younghusband and Macdonald with bronze statues of the Buddha as they were leaving Lhasa. Younghusband was especially attached to his, keeping it with him at all times; it even rested atop of his coffin when he died in 1942.⁵⁶³

Museums, the Other, and the Self

The return of looted objects is a highly contentious issue, and one worthy of many books in of itself, indeed, Simpson declares, "one of the most difficult issues seeking resolution by museums in the post colonial era is that of repatriation."⁵⁶⁴ Aside from the claims of the editors that the cursed bowl and mandala that accompanied the Jowo statue in Gyantse were returned, no mention is made of the subject in the

⁵⁶¹ ALLEN, CHARLES. 2004a. p. 308.

⁵⁶² O'CONNOR, WILLIAM FREDERICK. 1931. *On the Frontier and Beyond*. London: John Murray. p. 165.

⁵⁶³ After his death the statue was donated first to the Liverpool Museum, and then into the hands of a private collector, R A Wheeler. Wheeler refused to part with the icon, and only with the threat of legal action did her restore it to Younghusband's daughter. She then gave it to the Royal Geographical Society in London, where it remains in the basement, "nestled in a Peak Frean's biscuit tin." FRENCH, PATRICK. 1995. p. 401.

⁵⁶⁴ SIMPSON, MOIRA. 1996. *Making Representations: Museums in the Post-Colonial Era*. London: Routledge. p. 171.

Bod kyi rig gnas lo rgyus dpyad gzhi'i rgyu cha bdams bsgrigs. Interestingly there are no calls from the editors for looted items to be returned, nor any obvious indication of what the authorities in Tibet would do with such items were they offered. They would certainly make a valuable addition to the 'Memorial Hall of the Anti British' in the Dzong (for more on this museum, see chapter seven.) Neither does any of the British museums⁵⁶⁵ I have visited, nor the websites for those that I was unable to get to, have any indication of willingness to consider the return of objects even on loan or temporary basis.

In the debate over ownership much hinges on where the objects in question came from and how they were obtained. Of the vast catalogues of museum collections none states that an object was 'looted,' preferring instead to record that items were, 'acquired,' 'collected,' or 'purchased.' As is recalled in letters and accounts of serving officers and men, bazaars spontaneously emerged selling curios and trinkets along the advance to Lhasa, and the Barkor area of Lhasa was then, as it is now, a source of many items of Tibetan memorabilia and touristic collectibles. Items that were purchased, often for overly inflated prices, cannot fall under question when considering the return of objects; however items of cultural importance, high monetary value, and historical significance, should be open to questioning by museums and collections.

Museums facing such difficult questions have a robust and vigorous defence, especially when the object has political and historical significance. For example the debate over the ownership of the Elgin Marbles,⁵⁶⁶ or the Kohinoor Diamond will rage for years to come, neither side willing to give up its claim for reasons that have

⁵⁶⁵ Here I include libraries as a form of a museum. While some libraries are places of great scholarship housing reference books that cannot fall under a definition of the collection, others hold items of such value that they can be considered 'collections' of books in a museum sense. "Books are, it is true, sometimes regarded as objects, collected for their beautiful bindings or illustrations... just as it is when a library acts as an archive or contains books intended solely for entertainment." POMIAN, KRZYSZTOF. 'The collection: Between the Visible and the Invisible.' In, PEARCE, SUSAN. (Ed.) 1994. *Interpreting Object and Collections*. London: Routledge.

⁵⁶⁶ FITZ GIBBON, KATE. (Ed.) 2005. *Who Owns the Past? Cultural Policy, Cultural Property and the Law*. New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press. p. 56.

more to do with politics than plunder. Museums often claim the 'universality' of such important objects; that they belong to no individual, organisation or state. This pan-national heritage sounds very grand, and museums point to the fact that their collections are open for all to see, often free of charge. However this claim can be refuted when one considers how many Tibetans have the opportunity to examine objects in a museum in, for example, Edinburgh or Oxford, as opposed to a collection in Gyantse or Lhasa.

Likewise the current argument from museums for the retention of major objects on the grounds of scholarship is no longer tenable. In many instances the tasks of scholars have been satisfied, as for example with the Rosetta Stone whose hieroglyphics have already been deciphered. Indeed, modern technology could surely offer solutions to scholars still working on items of importance, be that international co-operation, digital imaging or duplication, or sharing analysis from original samples.⁵⁶⁷ Greenfield rightly notes that, "scholasticism can be a high-sounding motive for a selfish and unrelated purpose."⁵⁶⁸

Such claims of a custodial role of museums can be interpreted both ways; either calling for the return of objects once they no longer are in need of custody, or their retention on grounds of the richness and source of identity they offer the museum going public.

Western museums may however have a strong argument from a custodial perspective with regard to Tibetan items in light of Tibet's tumultuous recent past. Quite how many of the items currently in foreign museums would have been lost in

⁵⁶⁷ Stein, frequently described as an 'imperialist looter' in Chinese accounts, is an unlikely source of support for the 'custodian role' argument; Whitfield, the Director of the International Dunhuang Project (IDP) at the British Library records, "at some sites the finds were too delicate or too large to be transported, and he reburied them in the sands for a time when, as he commented in his diary, the region would have its own museum. Unfortunately, treasure seekers reached many of them first, and Stein's photographs are often the only record left of these treasures." Indeed the IDP is a role model for international co-operational projects working with the Xinjiang Institute of Archaeology in China to retrace Stein's footsteps, and digitizing and freely distributing high-resolution images of the manuscripts collected from the caves at Dunhuang. WHITFIELD, SUSAN. 2009. Stein's Silk Road Legacy Revisited. *Asian Affairs*. Vol. XL. No. II. pp. 224-43.

⁵⁶⁸ GREENFIELD, JEANETTE. 2007. p. 412.

the destruction of the Cultural Revolution is of course conjecture, but it is safe to say that the majority would almost certainly have been lost to both scholarship and their original owners. Of the monasteries looted by the British only Pelkor Chöde was to escape the full fury of the red guards, and little of historical importance remains in Tsechen and Nenyng for example. It is important to note too that museums are becoming more aware and active with respect to dialogue and interaction with cultures from which their collections originated, and Kreps describes a new paradigm for cultural heritage preservation and a rethinking of cultural interaction and exchange.⁵⁶⁹

Greenfield draws attention to the fact that most major Western collections have such an abundance of objects in their catalogues that it is impossible for them all to be permanently and properly displayed for the public to view. In most cases the surpluses are simply stored, awaiting special exhibitions or the eyes of curious scholars and historians. She gives the example of the Victoria and Albert Museum in London, which holds the largest collection of Indian art treasures outside of the subcontinent, consisting of over 40,000 items, the vast majority not on display. In this instance however there is some prospect that the items will be seen and studied,⁵⁷⁰ and the V&A is one of a growing number of museums that has many of its treasures catalogued and photographed online. Their searchable databases, exhibitions, and galleries can be viewed online and images of particular items can be requested over the Internet making the collection accessible to a growing number of Internet users.⁵⁷¹

So why do we collect objects, even to the point of such excess? Answers to this hotly debated topic often resort to primitive psychology; however this route often provides tautology, "conjuring up any postulation it needs."⁵⁷² Undeniably however

⁵⁶⁹ KREPS, CRISTINA. 2003. *Liberating Culture: Cross-cultural Perspectives on Museums, Curation and Heritage Preservation*. London: Routledge. p. 67.

⁵⁷⁰ AMES, MICHAEL. 1985. De-schooling the Museum: A Proposal to Increase Public Access to Museums and their Resources. *Museum International*. Vol. 37. No. 1. pp. 25-31.

⁵⁷¹ www.collections.vam.ac.uk

⁵⁷² POMIAN, KRZYSZTOF. 1994. p. 162.

the tendency to hoard objects and a property instinct is found in probably most civilized cultures, if not in all. Items in collections sometimes give a certain aesthetic pleasure, others relate to and shed light on historical or scientific knowledge. Finally, Pomian shows how with some objects, "possession confers a certain prestige on their owners, since they serve as proof of their good taste, of their considerable intellectual curiosity, or even of their wealth and generosity, if not all these qualities at the same time."⁵⁷³

Any attempt to reason why there was such clarion call for Tibetan items must explore the process by which we construct identities, both of others, and of ourselves; By the later half of the nineteenth century, collection of plunder had also become the collection of curios, and artifacts for both personal and institutional reasons. This material had become increasingly important in the process of 'Othering' Oriental and African societies and was exemplified in the professionalism of exploration and the growth of ethnographic departments in museums, the new 'Temples of Empire.' The notion of an 'Imperial Archive' had developed in the mind of colonial administrators, their collecting agents in the field, and the museum staff of the London collections who sought to address the declining popular confidence in the very concept and need of Empire, a notion that had taken an exceptionally public mauling in the wake of the Boer War and Britain's disgraceful burning, looting and introduction of the concentration camp. Richards presents the 'Imperial archive' as neither, "a library nor a museum, but as a fantasy of knowledge collected and united in the service of state and Empire."⁵⁷⁴ These temples became the touchstones of Edwardian society, and continue to this day to assist us with our understanding of unfamiliar cultures and our own societies. Indeed it was the very stones themselves that would prove to be important in the Victorian era, as the British sought to raise their 'Temples of Empire' in the architectural and physical sense. The most dramatic and

⁵⁷³ POMIAN, KRZYSZTOF. 1994. p. 163.

⁵⁷⁴ RICHARDS, THOMAS. 1993. *The Imperial Archive: Knowledge and the Fantasy of Empire*. London: Verso.

symbolically important manifestation of this was the construction of New Delhi. Architectural historian David Johnson has commented,

New Delhi's precise location, its structures, its design, its rigorously controlled road grid, its monuments commemorating important imperial persons and events were artfully combined to make the Capital a new temple of Empire, the quintessential statement of what British Imperial rule had meant, and continued to mean, for Britain and India.⁵⁷⁵

India's new capital was to mirror and emulate the Capital of the Empire; London. Lund's painting of 1904, below, captures the authority of the Empire and of the dominance of the 'parish church of the Empire, St Paul's Cathedral. The fact that the painting was completed in the very year that the Mission advanced to Tibet also captures the mindset of those that accompanied Younghusband over the frontiers of the Empire.⁵⁷⁶

The image originally located here has been removed from this electronic version of the thesis for copyright reasons.

Figure 30: *Heart of Empire*. Niels Moeller Lund, The Heart of the Empire, 1904. Oil on canvas. London, Guildhall Art Gallery Photo: Guildhall Art Gallery.

⁵⁷⁵ JOHNSON, DAVID. 2008. A British Empire for the Twentieth Century: The Inauguration of New Delhi, 1931. *Urban History*. Vol. 35. No. 1. pp. 460- 72.

⁵⁷⁶ RAO, NIRMALA. 2010. Projections of Empire: India and the Imagined Metropolis. *Asian Affaris*. Vol. XLI. No. II. pp. 161-177.

Much of our urge to collect therefore has roots in the need of self-definition, a process that by definition has the need for a real or perceived 'Other.' This concept of the Other has a long tradition; the Greeks knew that they were unlike the barbarians, Christians from Muslims, Europeans from the 1400s onwards saw themselves apart from the Middle and Far Eastern civilisations they increasingly encountered, and even on an individual or social level earliest man knew that he, his family, tribe, or race was different from those that surrounded him; the 'Other.'

In terms of this 'Oriental Other,' Said has noted that, "from the end of the eighteenth century there emerged a complex Orient suitable for study in the academy, for display in the museum, for reconstruction in the colonial office, for theoretical illustration in anthropological, biological, linguistic, racial, and historical theses about mankind and the universe for instances of economic and sociological theories of development, revolution, cultural personality, national or religious character."⁵⁷⁷ By collecting objects from Tibet the Edwardian officers and men consciously and subconsciously sought to emphasise the differences between both their own, and the state they represented's, ordered, civilized, rational self, and Tibet's backward, religious, oppressed, and flawed, 'Other.' This could be achieved best by collecting and presenting items to museums that stereotypically encompassed Tibet; items made from human bone, monastic paraphernalia, medieval military equipment, and peasants' possessions.

Their magpie tendencies were enhanced when they collected Tibetan items as part trophy, and part referent; In Tibet, as in Europe until the Protestant revolutions, art and its productions and forms were inseparable from religious belief and ritual. Owing to this fact British officers could collect items from monasteries and temples for their 'artistic' merit, as opposed for their exclusively religious otherness. This dual reasoning was especially helpful when appropriating statues and depictions of tantric union. No Imperial officer could be seen to be accused of peddling pornography, but erotically themed *art* pieces (themselves surely the most

⁵⁷⁷ SAID, EDWARD. 1978. *Orientalism*. New York, NY: Random House. p. 8.

powerful and seductive depiction of the 'Other,') that held religious importance, were a quite different matter, and our museums are consequently crammed with such examples.

The British officers and collectors likewise assured their place in our common historical conscience; collections seek to anchor us in space and time. Collecting items from a far off location not only points towards the collector's presence there, but also demonstrates their influence over its history. The object becomes a continual reminder of that history, and the larger or more important the object, the more historical significance we can assume the actions of the collector had. As Crane explains, "being collected means being valued and remembered institutionally; being displayed means being incorporated into the extra-institutional memory of the museum visitors."⁵⁷⁸ This idea would most certainly be true Waddell who held a strong belief in the importance and derivable benefit of the collection he was amassing in Tibet.

These collections not only assist the unconscious boundaries we make as individuals, but also the broader academic explanations of cultural difference and division; "It has become obvious that the so called 'scientific' collections of Pitt Rivers in his generation, or Boas or Younghusband in theirs, have served to create a superstructure of Western intellectual ideas as a cultural explanation of perceived differences."⁵⁷⁹ By enabling those at home to consider the Tibetans as inferior, backward, or primitive, those that accompanied the Mission may have subconsciously sought to justify their presence and actions in Tibet. Furthermore, the multitude of religious and military items may have influenced popular opinion to the belief that the Tibetans were not to be reasoned with, owing to their devotion to a 'backward' religion, and their military strength was in such a deplorable state that any martial engagement would result in high numbers of casualties on their behalf.

⁵⁷⁸ CRANE, SUSAN. 2000. *Museums and Memory*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. p. 2.

⁵⁷⁹ PEARCE, SUSAN. 1995. *On Collecting*. London: Routledge. p. 330

Museums and collections therefore help us create an identity on both an individual and academic basis, but they also play a role in the construction of a 'national identity.'⁵⁸⁰ By looking at objects in museums we can find ourselves looking into an imaginary evolutionary mirror presenting a universal human heritage and development. In this way museums can unconsciously freeze the cultures displayed in their display cases, shaping the perspectives of the visitor to one that keep the place of origin in question in the past. This is certainly true of Tibet, where the items displayed being of some antiquity reinforce the commonly held view of Tibet as a theocratic, mystical, land transfixed by its Buddhist religious heritage. It is worth noting that none of the museums I have visited, with the exception of the Pitt Rivers, hold any displayed collections of contemporary Tibetan art, sculpture, or handicraft. Tibet remains in our minds sealed in history, just as the items in our museums remain preserved in their display cases.

It is accepted then that looting has a long history, from the grave robbers of the Egyptian kings⁵⁸¹ to the looting of the Iraq Museum in Bagdad in 2003. Indeed the tombs of the Tibetan kings themselves were also looted shortly after the fall of the Tibetan Empire; but what is being done to combat the problem? In 2006 Professor Sir Colin Renfrew drew attention to the "widespread looting of ancient sites to provide saleable objects for private collectors and museums, is rapidly destroying the available record of the past... This should concern us all."⁵⁸² This was followed by demands for international legislation to be tightened, and calls for museums and collectors to accept their responsibilities by declining to accept or acquire unprovenanced antiquities. Some museums provide a model of good practice, with The University of Pennsylvania's Museum of Archaeology and Anthropology

⁵⁸⁰ CRANE, SUSAN. 2000. p. 3.

⁵⁸¹ The Egyptian Museum in Cairo holds a 4,000 year old cenotaph recounting a short-lived rebellion against King Mentuhotep, in which the poor smashed open royal tombs and looted the gold and jewels buried with the mummies. Indeed, elaborate dummy graves, false passageways, and wrathful curses were often built into royal tombs to protect them from grave robbers.

⁵⁸² RENFEW, COLIN. In, ROBSON, ELEANOR. (Ed.) 2006. *Who Owns Objects? The Ethics and Politics of Collecting Cultural Artefacts*. Oxford: Oxbow Books. Renfrew was the Director of The MacDonald Institute for Archaeological Research at the University of Cambridge.

operating an ethical collecting policy since the 1970s, and most international museums publishing an code of practice for collections and acquisitions. The 1954 Hague Convention on the 'Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict' has been ratified by an ever increasing number of countries, and as recently as this year The Archaeological Institute of America, The German Archaeological Institute, and the Institute of Archaeology of the Russian Academy of Sciences, signed a 'Joint Statement of Principle on the Protection of Archaeological Sites, Monuments and Museums.'⁵⁸³ This statement bound the member organisations to, "reunite pillaged works with the monuments, sites, or historical contexts from which they were illegally removed." It is hoped that this declaration along with other programmes will address the, "indifferent political leadership, and international legal framework that has not caught up with the new threat of post-combat looting by civilians."⁵⁸⁴

This chapter has examined the claims and evidence for looting during the British Mission of 1904, and examined what has become of the items that were taken from Tibet. The issue of looting features prominently in modern Chinese accounts and narratives of the Mission, especially those presented in the 'New Media.' Modern Chinese presentations of this important issue, and other themes that emphasise the Chinese narrative of destruction and Imperial aggression are examined below in chapter seven.

⁵⁸³ <http://www.archaeological.org/webinfo.php?page=10397> Accessed: 23rd January 2008.

⁵⁸⁴ ROTHFIELD, LAWRENCE. 2009. *The Rape of Mesopotamia: Behind the Looting of the Iraq Museum*. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.

Chapter Seven: New Media: Highlights from a Chinese History of Tibet

This chapter examines Chinese propaganda sources specifically relating to the Mission of 1904 through the 'New Media.'⁵⁸⁵ After noting the political and historical reasons for the change in focus of propaganda emanating from official CCP sources in the 1980s and 1990s, I examine selected examples from the new media in turn. As discussed in chapter two, film has long played a central role in Chinese propaganda and I present research into two recent films, *Red River Valley* (1997), and *1904* (2007.) I then analyse propaganda sourced from the Internet that best represent the shift in style and content of propaganda of recent years. These sources are predominantly from official Chinese state news providers or government sites, mainly in the English language, and intended therefore for foreign readership. I then present new translation of an educational cartoon book regarding the events of 1904. As the book forms a supplement the local history curriculum it is examined in light of wider questions regarding Chinese education policy, and the role and political usage of history education in China. I finally examine propaganda tools located in Gyantse; namely the museum and memorial pillar that now occupy the famous Dzong. The political messages these structures carry is compared to other sites of social historical significance both within Mainland China and South Asia generally, and I then examine the national unity they attempt to create through the history presented to visitors.

Socialism to Patriotism: The New Message for the New Media

The message of government propaganda in China has altered dramatically in the last twenty years; the rise in nationalism in China has gone hand in hand with the transformation of the CCP from a revolutionary party, ruling China by strength of ideological and military force, to that of a ruling party, uniting harmoniously the minorities in the only justified and legitimate authority. Owing to the rapid decay in Communist ideology worldwide the CCP sought to "substitute performance

⁵⁸⁵ New Media: (noun) A new means of mass communication considered collectively; *specifically* electronic means such as the Internet, CD-ROMs, etc. OED.

legitimacy provided by surging economic development and nationalist legitimacy provided by invocation of the distinctive characteristics of Chinese culture in place of Marxist-Leninism and Mao Zedong Thought."⁵⁸⁶ Chinese leaders such as Deng Xiaoping and his successor, Jiang Zemin, realised in the 1980s and 1990s that despite the demise of communist ideology most Chinese people maintained a shared belief in nationalism, and therefore actively sought to embrace and foster this belief in order to give legitimacy to their ruling party. The party leadership began to place emphasis on the party's role as the "paramount patriotic force and guardian of national pride in order to find a new basis of legitimacy to bolster faith in a system in trouble and hold the country together during the period of rapid and turbulent transformation."⁵⁸⁷

This legitimacy and unity was expressed both within the Motherland, by demonstrating the harmony that exists between the minorities and Han majority, and outside China by the united resistance all patriotic citizens offered aggressors seeking to split China. Vickers has noted, "now socialist in name only, the Party bases its claim to legitimacy on its trusteeship of the glorious legacy of China's ancient civilisation, on its representation of 'advanced forces' bent on forging a strong and united nation and on its record of steadfast resistance against foreign encroachment of all kinds."⁵⁸⁸

However the rise of nationalism in China has not been a solely government driven enterprise;⁵⁸⁹ Chinese intelligentsia and the media began to question the role of the purely communist state in a post Tiananmen era, especially since the collapse of the USSR and the communist regimes in Eastern Europe. As Vickers notes, "not only the CCP but also many intellectuals and opinion formers, drew the lesson that China

⁵⁸⁶ ZHAO, SUISHENG. 1998. A State-Led Nationalism: The Patriotic Education Campaign in Post-Tiananmen China. *Communist and Post-Communist Studies*. Vol. 31. No. 3. pp. 287-302. p. 287.

⁵⁸⁷ ZHAO, SUISHENG. 1998. p. 289.

⁵⁸⁸ VICKERS, EDWARD. 2007. Museums and Nationalism in Contemporary China. *Compare: A Journal of Comparative and International Education*. Vol. 37. No. 3. pp. 365 - 382. p. 366.

⁵⁸⁹ Indeed some commentators hold that "the nationalist wave in China is a spontaneous public reaction to a series of international events, not a government propaganda." ZHANG, MING. 1997. The new thinking of Sino-US relations. *Journal of Contemporary China*. Vol. 6. No. 14. pp. 117-123.

should at all costs avoid the sort of headlong rush towards democratisation and reform witnessed in Russia."⁵⁹⁰ Increased Western intervention in the Gulf regions, leading to the First and Second Gulf Wars, and NATO intervention in the former Yugoslavia, Somalia, and the Horn of Africa has lead concerned Chinese Communists to find ways of countering the increased political and economic hegemony that Western organisations and powers threaten.

As will be demonstrated, much of the Chinese version of events presented in this chapter is an artificial history that inserts Chinese individuals and influence into Tibetan histories to create a narrative of patriotic Tibetans fighting on behalf of the Motherland. Powers however reminds us that it is important to recognise that these writers apparently believe it to be true, "despite the fact that it differs substantially from eyewitness accounts ... and for most Tibetans, it is not viewed as being particularly significant in comparison to China's military incursions into their country, but for contemporary Chinese it is an important piece of the grand narrative of Western imperialism and Chinese humiliation."⁵⁹¹

The notion that China has been humiliated in the past, and that Western powers need to acknowledge and respect her resurgent authority is widely held in China; Gries has argued that underlying the sometimes hysterical anti-Westernism of such outbursts is a "psychological need for recognition a sense among many Chinese that their country is still not accorded the respect it deserves in the international arena, particularly by its most significant "others" the United States and Japan."⁵⁹² Likewise, Zhao has commented that although the rise in Chinese nationalism in the 1990s was mainly reactive sentiments to foreign suppressions in modern history, "this new wave of nationalist sentiment also harboured a sense of wounded

⁵⁹⁰ VICKERS, EDWARD. 2006. *Defining the Boundaries of "Chineseness." Tibet, Mongolia, Taiwan and Hong Kong in Mainland History Textbooks*. In, FOSTER, STUART AND KEITH CRAWFORD. 2006. *What shall we tell the Children? International Perspectives on School History Textbooks*. Greenwich, CT: Information Age Publishing. p. 29.

⁵⁹¹ POWERS, JOHN. 2004. p. 90.

⁵⁹² VICKERS, EDWARD. 2006. p. 29.

national pride and an anti-foreign (particularly US and Japan) resentment."⁵⁹³ This sense of wounded pride and resentment spilled out in China in the wake of the 1995-6 Taiwan Straits Crisis, and Beijing's failed bid to host the 2000 Olympic Games in a popular movement encompassing books, music and video, generally known as 'China can say no.'⁵⁹⁴ It encouraged the perception that China was abused and violated by Western and Imperialist powers, and the time had come for her to defy Western hegemony both culturally and militarily. This is in stark contrast to the widely held Chinese belief that they have always been a passive, nonaggressive country, which had never invaded foreign lands outside of its historic boundaries and former Empire.

China's self styled role as a passive country, harmonious in its constitution, does not sit easily however with the stark images of repression and violent military backlash that followed the upsurge in demands for reform, human rights, and above all independence, in minority regions such as Tibet and Xinjiang in recent years.⁵⁹⁵ One would expect that protests in these regions would result in a nationalistic response from Chinese citizens; however there is a dichotomous relationship between the type of nationalism portrayed in CCP propaganda, and what has been described "the Great Han Chauvinism that is the salient feature of nationalism in its popular and populist manifestations."⁵⁹⁶ It is also salient that post-modernists within China that deconstruct Western discourses regarding the Orient and 'Other' do not accord similar treatment to the dominant discourses

⁵⁹³ ZHAO, SUISHENG. 1998. p. 287.

⁵⁹⁴ FEWSMITH, JOSEPH. 2008. *China Since Tiananmen*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. p. 160.

⁵⁹⁵ See for example,

<http://english.aljazeera.net/news/asiapacific/2008/03/2008525143531795694.html>

Accessed 16th March 2008.

<http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia+pacific-10617453>

Accessed 15th July 2010.

⁵⁹⁶ VICKERS, EDWARD. 2006. p. 30.

within China⁵⁹⁷ "since then postmodernist (or post colonialist) theory might be used by intellectuals from minority nationalities to cause trouble."⁵⁹⁸

Western media often also gives the impression that there exists a single and unified concept of 'China' and 'Chineseness' within the PRC. This is perhaps the result of the frequently described, and often parodied, "Beijing official spokesmen frequently [lecture] foreign journalists and politicians on the sanctity of the "One China Principle" - the doctrine that there is one legitimate Chinese state, single and indivisible, and that Taiwan, (or Tibet, or Xinjiang) has always been and forever will remain a part of it."⁵⁹⁹ However, as with all national and cultural identities the term 'China' and 'Chineseness' has distinct meanings for different people, and is also variable over time, and while the spokesman's monologue is closely adhered to, there exists a wide range of identities within China.

Implementation of the Patriotic Campaign

The bearing of government policy that sought to regulate and direct this new patriotism was not initially clear. Conservatives such as Ding Guangeng (then Director of the CCP's Central Propaganda Department) still regarded the West as the enemy, and sought to direct the campaign against Western notions of development through economic and capitalist ideology. However, reformists centred around Deng Xiaoping were concerned about the effect such a campaign would have on the nascent 'socialist market economy' and thus sought to direct the policy towards the youth in China and develop patriotism for traditional culture rather than ideology. Deng triumphed, and in 1991 the CCP Central Propaganda Department issued the 'Circular on Fully Using Cultural Relics to Conduct Education in Patriotism and Revolutionary Traditions.'⁶⁰⁰ This was followed in

⁵⁹⁷ There are notable exceptions to this, see for example, WANG, HUI. 2003. *China's New Order: Society, Politics, and Economy in Transition*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. pp. 94-8.

⁵⁹⁸ VICKERS, EDWARD. 2006. p. 34.

⁵⁹⁹ VICKERS, EDWARD. 2006. p. 26.

⁶⁰⁰ This policy has since been augmented in Tibet by a series of renovation projects for 'Tibet's priority cultural relics' during China's 11th Five-Year Plan period (2006-2010). In August 2009 a ceremony to highlight the renovations was held at Gyantse Dzong, attended by Cai Wu, Chinese

November 1993 by the 'Circular on Carrying Out Education in Patriotism in Primary and Secondary Schools Throughout the Country by Films and Television.' This circular was issued jointly by the CCP Central Propaganda Department, the State Education Commission, the Ministry of Broadcast, Film, and Television, and the Ministry of Culture, and led to a large number of patriotic films being commissioned and broadcast. (For example, *Red River Valley* examined below.)

The culmination of the campaign was a Central Policy Document issued in September 1994 by the Central Committee of the CCP entitled, *The Outline for Conducting Patriotic Education*. The aim of the patriotic education campaign was to "boost the nation's spirit enhancing its cohesion, fostering its self esteem and sense of pride, consolidating and developing a patriotic united front to the broadest extent possible, and directing and rallying the masses' patriotic passions to the great cause of building socialism with Chinese characteristics and helping the motherland become unified, prosperous and strong."⁶⁰¹ The document, issued in time for the forty-fifth anniversary of the foundation of the PRC in October 1994, gave guidance to all schools and youth organisations regarding patriotic celebrations suitable for the occasion. Propaganda texts were issued with anthologies of speeches and articles written by central leaders championing 'nationalism in the name of patriotism' and the agenda of the new policy.⁶⁰² For example The China Tibet Information Center (hereafter CTIC) publicised "youth and the knowledge competitions [sic]" organised by 'The Tibetan League Committee' by way of "commemoration of Gyangze Anti-British 100th anniversary."

Minister of Culture, Hao Peng, Executive Vice Chairman of the TAR Government, and Shan Jixiang, director of the State Administration of Cultural Relics. Xinhua, the official news provider in the PRC quoted Peng as saying "to protect Tibet's cultural and historic sites more effectively, the Central Government has decided to earmark 570 million yuan RMB (83.4 million dollars) to renovate another 22 cultural relics, including the Zongshan anti-British invasion historic site." http://eng.tibet.cn/news/today/200908/t20090827_497614.htm

Accessed 17th August 2010.

⁶⁰¹ ZHAO, SUISHENG. 2004. p. 219.

⁶⁰² The CCP never officially endorsed 'nationalism' owing to the terminology used in all communications. The concept of nationalism is often expressed in Chinese as *Aiguo zhuyi* (patriotism). In official communications and propaganda the sentiments of the people were not described as nationalistic, but *aiguo* (patriotic), literally translating as 'loving the state.' See, ZHAO, SUISHENG. 1998. p. 290.

This entailed debate on the topic "remember the painful history; repay our country." Students from local schools, academies, and universities attend the competitions. The 'knowledge competition' seems to have been more of a memory exercise however given that the exams were "proceeded with the answer sheets published on *Tibet Daily*." The event was rounded off with a "theatrical evening with many wonderful performances including music, instrumental music, dance, traditional opera, opusculum, comic dialogue, intonation and so on."⁶⁰³

Central to the legacy of *The Outline for Conducting Patriotic Education* has been history education in schools, and schooling the youth of China in the proper patriotic education. The People's Education Press in Beijing controls the curriculum for all subjects in Chinese schools. This body decides the contents of all textbooks and core teaching materials, for all age groups, in all parts of China. While there has in recent years been a move towards dual stream (i.e. higher and lower ability) textbooks available for some subjects such as English and maths, there remains only one authorised textbook for teaching history in secondary schools. The version of history presented in this textbook accords with Vickers' observation that the "function of history as a school subject in China has always been to moralise, as much as (or more than) to afford access to the truth about the past."⁶⁰⁴

Alisa Jones has demonstrated how in history books in China the Marxist mantra of 'class struggle' and 'industrialisation' has been slowly replaced by the role of peasant rebellions and minority nationalities' patriotism in shaping the national history.⁶⁰⁵ Analysis of events in minority areas such as Tibet and Mongolia often only feature in Chinese history books if the events involve the rest of China, often leaving students with a staccato concept of history with lengthy gaps between major episodes. For example, the Chinese history curriculum concerning Tibet

⁶⁰³ <http://zt.tibet.cn/english/zt/anti-british/20040200442984543.htm>
Accessed 24th April 2010.

⁶⁰⁴ VICKERS, EDWARD. 2006. p. 31.

⁶⁰⁵ JONES, ALISA. 2005. *Changing the Past to Serve the Present: History Education in Mainland China*. In, VICKERS, EDWARD AND ALISA JONES. 2005. *History, Education, and National Identity in East Asia*. New York, NY: Routledge.

jumps from King Songtsen Gampo's (Srong btsan sGam po) Chinese wife to the political reforms of the Vth Dalai Lama in the seventeenth century.⁶⁰⁶ The same history text informs students that the "British colonialists aimed to destroy the unity of China" and that their plans to expand into Tibet in the eighteenth century were foiled by the steadfast refusal of the Panchen Lama to collaborate or cooperate. The Panchen Lama's explanation for his refusal was that "the whole of Tibet was under the sovereign control of the Chinese Emperor."⁶⁰⁷

This powerful propaganda has resulted in generations of Chinese students leaving school unable to question, or even realise that they must question, the history they have been taught. Realising the inherent danger of this, most modern textbooks now carry a discussion topic for the class to debate at the end of the topic. The topics suggested however often only seek to reinforce the information contained in the chapter, not lead the student to actively question it. For example, the national 'Junior Secondary' textbook concludes the chapter concerning minorities' history with a 'Historical knowledge context;' "Xinjiang, Tibet and Taiwan have been part of Chinese territory from time immemorial."⁶⁰⁸ This message, and circular reasoning, is central in the examples studied below.

Nye has observed "nationalism proved to be stronger than socialism when it came to bonding working classes together."⁶⁰⁹ The well-orchestrated patriotic campaign had the added benefit of obscuring the latent domestic troubles the Chinese state faced in light of the rapidly expanding gap between the richer Eastern seaBoards and the poorer interior. While the economy and Chinese 'prestige' grow globally, the policy of patriotism is self-perpetuating and stable. This chapter examines examples of government propaganda relating to the Mission of 1904 that demonstrate how government policy has increasingly celebrated and appropriated

⁶⁰⁶ THE PEOPLE'S EDUCATION PRESS. 2001. *Zhongguo Lishi* (Chinese History). Year 7. Vol. 2. p. 60. Cited in VICKERS, EDWARD. 2006. p. 33.

⁶⁰⁷ THE PEOPLE'S EDUCATION PRESS. 2001. *Zhongguo Lishi* (Chinese History). Year 7. Vol. 2. p. 60. Cited in VICKERS, EDWARD. 2006. p. 34.

⁶⁰⁸ "Xinjiang, Xizang, Taiwan zi gu yi lai jiu shi Zhongguo de lingtu." THE PEOPLE'S EDUCATION PRESS. 2001. *Zhongguo Lishi* (Chinese History). Year 7. Vol. 2. p. 60. Cited in VICKERS, EDWARD. 2006. p. 35.

⁶⁰⁹ NYE, JOSEPH. 1993. *Understanding International Conflicts*. New York, NY: Harper Collins. p 61.

the culture, history, and identity of minorities as it seeks to construct a new Chinese identity and mythology of multiculturalism within China. This new patriotic identity has been presented in a wide range of media - from film and television to school textbooks, and most recently the Internet.

Red River Valley. The Shanghai Film Studio: 1996

Red River Valley is a Chinese historical movie based loosely on Peter Fleming's 1961 account of the Mission, *Bayonets to Lhasa*.⁶¹⁰ Released in China in 1997 as both *Honghegu*, and *A Tale of the Sacred Mountain*, the film enjoyed not only instant success, but has formed a key part of the Chinese narrative regarding the Mission. Indeed Wong, writing in the *International Herald Tribune*, noted that over a decade later that many "Chinese people still rave about it."⁶¹¹ Despite this success when the film was rereleased in the United States in 1999 it received mainly critical reviews. Directed by Feng Xiaoning, at a cost of more than US\$1.8 million, the film has become a key part of official Chinese propaganda relating to the Mission of 1904, and also of subsequent appraisal by scholars and filmographers.

The film opens on a riverbank in China with scenes from a tribal religious sacrifice. Priests and peasants sacrifice various animals to a river god to ensure good rainfall for their crops, but when two Han girls are to be offered one, Xu'er,⁶¹² escapes. She is pursued by an angry mob, but escapes by cutting a rope bridge, hurling herself and her assailants into the river. Xu'er awakes to find herself in Tibet⁶¹³ and adopted by an elderly Tibetan nomad and her muscular son, Kalsang. In the film Tibetans and Han alike are all played by Han actors (not a single Tibetan extra

⁶¹⁰ FLEMING, PETER. 1961.

⁶¹¹ WONG, EDWARD. 2010. *Appropriating a Tibet Battle*. In, *International Herald Tribune*. 11th August 2010. p. 2.

⁶¹² Played by Ning Jing, a well known and award winning Chinese actress.

⁶¹³ Powers, in his critical analysis of the movie comments that "Tibet's rivers flow down into China, and so it is difficult to imagine that following her plunge she would have been carried upstream to Tibet." POWERS, JOHN. 2004. p. 90.

takes part), and in an added irony, PLA soldiers were used as extras to portray the invading sepoy. Buckley, a Western tourist who played a minor British officer, comments, "In many ways Red River Valley could well be called 'the Red Army movie' - the PLA provides all the extras, the explosives and special effects."⁶¹⁴ While careful attention to detail paid regarding costume and props this does give the impression that not only do Tibetans and Han look identical, but that they speak the same language, and have the same characteristics.

Tibetan nomadic life is portrayed as a harmonious existence with nature, and long slow scenes depict Xu'er dressing in the traditional Tibetan style, learning Tibetan customs, and smiling flirtatiously while Kalsang displays his skills on horseback with his slingshot and rifle. The story becomes more complex when Kalsang rescues two British agents caught gathering information on Tibet whilst disguised as scientists collecting butterflies. The two British agents are loosely based on Youngusband and O'Connor; Youngusband is given a strong Scottish accent and renamed Major Rockman, while O'Connor becomes the impassive Corporal Jones. Jones is a romantic idealist, whose letters to his father form a narration throughout the film, variously describing his horror at the slaughter, his empathy with the Tibetans, and his Orientalist account of Tibet. From his narration we therefore arrive at a Chinese account, portraying the director's perception of British acuity regarding Tibet. On arriving in Tibet Jones writes, "I have almost entered a dreamland, a fairytale kingdom. One would almost expect Snow White to appear... it's so fresh, so virgin. There is an air of mystery and of the unknown that is so enticing."⁶¹⁵ Rockman encourages Jones' romanticism declaring that "Tibet is still a pagan enigma, but perhaps if our expedition is successful we will unveil some of that mystery." The language used has evidently been carefully scripted, and is a further example of the examination of Orientalist and feminising language used by Youngusband and others with regard to Tibet analysed in chapter six.

⁶¹⁴ BUCKLEY, MICHAEL. 2003. In, O'REILLY, JAMES AND LARRY HABEGGER (Eds.) 2003. *Travellers' Tales: Tibet*. San Francisco, CA: Travellers Tales Inc. p. 179.

⁶¹⁵ Jones' narration. [00:11:30]

Kalsang finds the intruders, and brings them before the local Dzungpön. The Dzungpön declares that "our local government has never allowed foreigners to come to Tibet"⁶¹⁶ and orders their execution. Chinese authority over Tibet is implicit in his reference to the local government. As Jones and Rockman lament their demise, a letter arrives from Beijing stating, "The British invaded our territory five years ago, and scientific exploration has been their excuse to spy on us. Strictly guard the passes and keep foreigners out. But we have checked with Beijing, and these two have special passports from the Great Qing Emperor. Escort them out of our country immediately. Don't harm them."⁶¹⁷ Rockman leaves Tibet immediately, giving Kalsang his distinctive lighter by way of thanks for rescuing him from the avalanche. Jones remains to recuperate, commenting on the 'purity' and 'serenity' of life in Tibet, befriending Snow Dawa, Kalsang, and the Dzungpön, learning a great deal about the Tibetans and falling in love with the Dzungpön's daughter. In the scenes where Jones recovers his health Tibetans are depicted as both ignorant and naïve. The Dzungpön's daughter, while flirting with Jones, asks if he is a demon, and is amazed by his field binoculars, which are 'magical' to her.

The image originally located here has been removed from this electronic version of the thesis for copyright reasons. [Figure 31: Jones' binoculars frighten naïve Tibetans. Screen shot from Red River Valley.]

⁶¹⁶ Dzungpön to Rockman. [00:17:30]

⁶¹⁷ Message from Beijing. [00:18:53]

Jones in return narrates that "I did not know the people here could be so innocent. They are like unspoilt children. I don't know how they survive in such a hostile environment... They believe such things as trains and steamers are illusions created by the Gods."⁶¹⁸ In the fashion described in chapter six Tibet is likewise depicted as sexually liberal as Kalsang and Snow Dawa roll in the grass together. On departing Jones reflects that "Tibet has something that we have long lost; A kind of pure innocence, a harmony between man and nature, an unchained freedom, a kind of beauty."⁶¹⁹ The theme of innocence regarding technology is a reoccurring one; Bailey, in his album of photographs taken in Tibet, includes a picture with the

The image originally located here has been removed from this electronic version of the thesis for copyright reasons. [Figure 32: 1083/21 Bailey Collection: Younghusband Mission to Tibet Vol.I. Image 42. Caption: "Baddon La looking through the wrong end of a telescope."]

As Jones returns to India, Snow Dawa's brother arrives to take her back to China. He and Kalsang drink and argue, and the next morning while Kalsang sleeps off a hangover, Snow Dawa takes their yaks to pasture. An unexpected rainstorm causes her to fall into sinking sand, and she calls out to Kalsang to rescue her. When he arrives she is very feeble so he slashes a yak with his hunting knife, forcing Snow

⁶¹⁸ Jones' narration. [00:31:30]

⁶¹⁹ Jones' narration. [00:49:51]

Dawa to drink the warm blood. Blood drinking is a classic depiction of primitive societies, and is used here to maximum visual effect.⁶²⁰

In the next sequence, having returned to India, Jones and Rockman debate the best approach for a return to Tibet. Rockman declares, "China is an old tree ready to fall. If we don't go in now, then someone else will... this immense country has been devoured by wild beasts, and this [Tibet] is the last virgin territory."⁶²¹ Jones counters, "I think love and communication are the key for connecting different people. They are the two traits of human nature shared by everyone."⁶²² Rockman then loses his patience with Jones and closes the debate by arguing "history is proving us right. We are bringing civilisation to the world. We have an obligation to King and country, as well as to mankind; we are the most advanced society the world has ever seen."⁶²³ Buckley recorded the directors dilemma; "how to rewrite history to suit the theme of heroic Tibetan resistance to the British barbarians, who also happen to be the military victors."⁶²⁴ Feng's solution uses the narration provided by Jones who, on his return to Tibet, learns that "the real goal for their journey is the conquest of Tibet and its annexation to the British Empire."⁶²⁵

The majority of the second half of the film deals with the British invasion, the bloodshed, and the stoical Tibetan and Han resistance. Rockman's violent predilection is shown in his first encounter with the Tibetans sent for negotiations. Rockman aims his mountain guns on Tibetans carrying *kha btags*, and fires before they can approach the British camp.

⁶²⁰ KUMAR, PRAMOD. 1984. *Folk Icons and Rituals in Tribal Life*. New Delhi: Abhinav Publications. p. 43.

⁶²¹ Rockman to Jones. [01:02:20]

⁶²² Jones to Rockman. [01:02:50]

⁶²³ Rockman to Jones. [01:03:30]

⁶²⁴ BUCKLEY, MICHAEL. 2003. p. 173.

⁶²⁵ FRANGVILLE, VANESSA. 2009. Tibet in Debate: Narrative Construction and Misrepresentations in Seven Years in Tibet and Red River Valley. *Journal of Global Cultural Studies*. Vol. 5. (Available online: <http://transtexts.revues.org/index289.html>.)

The portrayal of the battle at Chumi Shonko follows the Chinese narrative found in multiple sources that the British, and Younghusband in particular, tricked the Tibetans into extinguishing the fuses of their matchlocks before opening fire on them. In the opening dialogue Rockman and Daipen,⁶²⁶ a Han General commanding the Tibetan troops, trade threats before Rockman orders his troops to "Stand down your weapons!" and requests that Daipen "remove your men from above us."⁶²⁷ Rockman, in a stage whisper to Jones, tricks the Tibetans, ordering "Machine Guns and artillery to the hill tops quickly!"⁶²⁸

Once the troops are in position Rockman lectures the Han General that "You Tibetans are an independent race, you should be free from China, free from anyone,"⁶²⁹ however Daipen outwits him by asking where he was born. In a comically thick accent Rockman replies, "Edinburgh, Scotland."⁶³⁰ Daipen replies by asking, "Tell me why is Scotland not an independent country? But to my knowledge you are a part of Great Britain, along with, I think, England, Irish, the Welsh and others."⁶³¹ Rockman reminds Daipen of his 'moral responsibility to his men' but is told, "I am a Tibetan! I am one of them!" and with this Daipen turns and orders his men to open fire. In this regard Red River Valley departs from the orthodox Chinese narrative that a British officer fired the first shot at Chumi Shonko. In the bloodbath that follows dozens of Maxim guns⁶³² and artillery open fire at close range the Tibetans, who are shown fumbling with their flints and rifles. Jones' narration cuts in, reading from a letter to his father; "We killed 1,500 Tibetans in fifteen minutes. There is a silence on the battlefield. I feel sick. My boots are stained with blood.

⁶²⁶ Daipen: This could be a Chinese rendering of the Tibetan for commander, *mDa dpon*.

⁶²⁷ Rockman to Daipen [01:14:38] Without ever mentioning Tibet, Daipen also requests that Rockman "take your troops out of Chinese territory." [01:13:00]

⁶²⁸ Rockman to Jones. [01:13:55]

⁶²⁹ Rockman to Daipen [01:14:38]

⁶³⁰ Younghusband was in fact born in Murree, a hill station in the NWFP; His family originally came from Somerset.

⁶³¹ Daipen to Rockman. [01:14:58]

⁶³² Hadow commanded only two Maxim guns at the battle of Chumi Shonko. The Royal Fusiliers brought another two up with them in late May 1904.

Perhaps it is a blood red sun that never sets on the British Empire."⁶³³ After a similar battle at Nenyng Jones cries out "this is not a battle this is slaughter."⁶³⁴

The image originally located here has been removed from this electronic version of the thesis for copyright reasons. [Figure 33: Tibetan troops in antiquated armour behind the wall at Chumi Shonko. Screen shot from Red River Valley.]

The image originally located here has been removed from this electronic version of the thesis for copyright reasons. [Figure 34: British troops and artillery facing the Tibetan army at Chumi Shonko. Screen shot from Red River Valley.]

When Rockman and the Gyantse Dzungpön meet in a monastery for negotiations their dialogue returns to more traditional propaganda and Communist Party motifs. The Dzungpön is defiant, telling Rockman that "while there is one Tibetan

⁶³³ Jones' narration. [01:18:50]

⁶³⁴ Jones to Rockman. [01:21:10]

alive, the war will not be over"⁶³⁵ to which Rockman ironically replies over the din of artillery fire "how can you reject the civilisation we can bring to you?"⁶³⁶ The Dzungpön closes the argument by illustrating the unity of China using Sun Yat Sen's description of China's main ethnic groups as the 'five fingers' of China.⁶³⁷ Defiantly he holds one hand open, closing each finger to form a fist as he advises Rockman, "This is Tibet, this the Han, Manchus, Mongolians, Hui and more are unite [sic] together. Our ancestors made us a family."⁶³⁸

The image originally located here has been removed from this electronic version of the thesis for copyright reasons. [Figure 35: The Dzungpön explains the 'five races of China' to Rockman. Screen shot from Red River Valley.]

The issue of looting is addressed once the monastery falls and Rockman orders the frescos and statues be removed and taken back to England. Predictably Jones protests, warning his superior officer "we are destroying their priceless cultural history."⁶³⁹ Rockman retorts, "It is precisely because it is priceless that we must act as proper stewards. We have an imperial and scientific responsibility."⁶⁴⁰

⁶³⁵ Dzungpön to Rockman. [01:26:00]

⁶³⁶ Rockman to Dzungpön. [01:26:10]

⁶³⁷ FRIEDRICH, PAUL AND NORMA DIAMOND (Eds.) 2007. *Encyclopedia of World Cultures: China, Russia and Eurasia*. London: Macmillan.

⁶³⁸ Dzungpön to Rockman. [01:28:20]

⁶³⁹ Jones to Rockman. [01:32:10]

⁶⁴⁰ Rockman to Jones. [01:32:30]

After the battle Jones again confronts Rockman challenging, "what kind of a damned civilisation is this? What kind of soldiers are these? They are behaving like beasts and mad dogs!" and calling him a "butcher."⁶⁴¹ During the shouting a large white yak rampages through the British camp, killing a number of officers before Rockman finally fells it with ten shots from his pistol. In the confusion the Dzongpön's daughter drops an artillery shell into the ammunition cache, unleashing a huge explosion killing dozens more British troops. The imagery employed by the director is blunt, but effective.

During the storming of Gyantse Dzong Jones collapses, and rambles incoherently about the 'sacred mountain'. To the strained tones of their national anthem⁶⁴² the British attack with Maxim guns and artillery while the Tibetans respond with arrows and rocks. When Rockman storms the Dzong, Kalsang remains defiant with Snow Dawa in his arms. He reaches for the lighter the Scotsman had given him earlier in the film, and throws it into a large pile of petrol canisters and gunpowder, killing himself and all the British troops. This sacrifice differs only slightly from other propaganda sources in which fearless Tibetans jump to their deaths from the cliffs behind the Dzong to escape capture.

The image originally located here has been removed from this electronic version of the thesis for copyright reasons. [Figure 36: In an image utilised in numerous Chinese sources, Kalsang hurls rocks in desperation at the British attackers. Screen shot from Red River Valley.]

⁶⁴¹ Jones to Rockman. [01:34:10]

⁶⁴² "Sound can actively shape how we perceive and interpret the image." BORDWELL, DAVID AND KRISTIN THOMPSON. 1993. *Film Art: An Introduction*. New York, NY: McGraw-Hill Inc. p. 293.

The film ends when Jones, overcome with grief and guilt, attempts to commit suicide. He fails, and fires into the air, whereupon the clouds part revealing the 'sacred mountain' he has been seeking for so long. His narrative closes the film when he asks, "Why should we destroy their civilisation with ours? Why change their world with ours? One thing is for certain; these people will never give up and never disappear. The endless land behind them is the Orient we will never conquer."⁶⁴³

Red River Valley forms the first part of a trilogy directed by Feng between 1997 and 2001 entitled 'War and Peace.' Each film portrays Western military involvement in Chinese history intertwined with love stories and heavy propaganda.⁶⁴⁴ Having taken part in the filming Buckley strategically observes that we should "make no mistake: movie making in China that is funded by the state is a species of propaganda, whether blatant or refined."⁶⁴⁵ The film was promoted by the Chinese Government and distributed by state-run media corporations that nominated it for several awards. The film boasts '7 international film festival awards' including the 'Best Picture and Best Director at the 20th Hundred Flower Awards, China 1997', and the '17th Golden Rooster Award, China,' and served as the inaugural film of the 22nd Singaporean 'Speak Mandarin Campaign' in 2000.⁶⁴⁶ Recently the film enjoyed some international success, being included in the *New York Times* sponsored 'Celebration of Chinese Cinema' and is distributed by Knight Mediacom International. For the international release subtitles were included in English,

⁶⁴³ Jones' narration. [01:54:30]

⁶⁴⁴ The second film, *Lover's Grief Over the Yellow River*, (*Huanghe juejian*), is set around an American World War II pilot who is forced to bail out into China. He is rescued by the Chinese Army and inevitably falls in love with a female soldier, whilst helping them to fight the Japanese. Released in 1999, the film was China's official 'Best Foreign Language Film' submission at the 72nd US Academy Awards, but did not receive a nomination. The third film, *Purple Sunset*, (*Ziri*), released in 2001, is also set in World War II when the Japanese were losing control of their possessions in mainland China. An unlikely friendship develops between a Chinese prisoner, a Japanese officer, and a female Russian soldier as they attempt to flee the horror of the battle and countless Japanese kamikaze attempts. The film was not released outside China, but was voted 'Best Feature' by the audience at the 2001 Hawaii International Film Festival.

⁶⁴⁵ BUCKLEY, MICHAEL. 2003. p. 180.

⁶⁴⁶ Launched in 1979 by Prime Minister Yew, the campaign promotes Mandarin over local dialects through books, music, and films. YEW, LEE KUAN. 2000. *From Third World to First: The Singapore Story: 1965-2000*. New York, NY: HarperCollins.

switching to Mandarin when the small number of Western actors converse in English.⁶⁴⁷ On its release Xinhua reported the film caused a "patriotic sensation across China" and "it is the patriotic duty of government employees to see the movie - in numerous cities, including Lhasa, workers are handed free tickets for compulsory viewing."⁶⁴⁸

Feng is a member of The Chinese National Political Consultative Conference, and The Chinese Writers' Association. He is a member of what is known as the 'fifth generation'⁶⁴⁹ having graduated after the Cultural Revolution. His generation is known for directing propaganda movies with official government backing and funds from the China Film Bureau.⁶⁵⁰ One of the Western actors in the film later described him as having multiple roles as, "scriptwriter, director, cinematographer, and chief PLA-consultant."⁶⁵¹ Given Feng's provenance his film has to be viewed in the context of political events of the time, especially the hand over of British Hong Kong to China in 1997,⁶⁵² and the resurgence in China of anti-British sentiment. His films are archetypical of what Leyda has described as the "condescending attitude of Han filmmakers... and though these films are made to show and even to promote equality and comradeship between Han and the 'others,' the true attitude of the superior Han creeps into view."⁶⁵³

⁶⁴⁷ Confusingly the accent of Major Brockham changes dramatically half way through the film, adopting a thick Scottish brogue for approximately half an hour before returning with a faint American twang. The only possible explanation for this I can conceive is that during dubbing the original actor was no longer available and was substituted by a Scotsman.

⁶⁴⁸ Quoted in, BUCKLEY, MICHAEL. 2003. p. 182.

⁶⁴⁹ SEMSEL, GEORGE (Ed.) 1987. *Chinese Film: The State of the Art in the People's Republic*. New York, NY: Praeger. p. 11.

⁶⁵⁰ The China Film Bureau has the stated aims of firstly exerting leadership over the various film institutions and formulating film policy, secondly carrying out censorship according to party policy, developing the film industry and finally, dealing with film exchanges and awards. SEMSEL, GEORGE (Ed.) 1987. p. 3.

⁶⁵¹ BUCKLEY, MICHAEL. 2003. p. 175.

⁶⁵² Indeed, Ding Guangen, a Politburo Member and Director of the Central Propaganda Department in 1997 was quoted as saying that the celebrations making the hand over of Hong Kong should be "a catalyst for patriotic fervour and for arousing the spirit of nationalism. The return of Hong Kong to the motherland has washed away 100 years of shame and realized the expectations of the Chinese race for a century." Xinhua. 1997. *Handover to Inspire Patriotic Movement*. 20th January 1997.

⁶⁵³ LEYDA, JAY. 1972. *Dianying: An Account of Films and the Film Audience in China*. Cambridge, MA: Massachusetts Institute of Technology Press. p. 205.

The film was also produced to counter attacks made on China by contemporary Hollywood films such as *Seven Years in Tibet* and *Kundun*.⁶⁵⁴ Also released in 1997, *Seven Years in Tibet* is based on the book of the same name by Heinrich Harrer,⁶⁵⁵ and was a Hollywood blockbuster starring Brad Pitt and directed by Jean-Jacques Annaud. In the film Harrer falls in love with Tibet, and the Tibetans, becoming a personal friend and tutor of the young XIVth Dalai Lama. *Red River Valley* therefore echoes *Seven Years in Tibet* with its narrative of Westerns arriving in Tibet, falling in love with both individuals and 'the Tibetans,' and seeking to find answers to their own violent and problematic personal backgrounds. By adhering loosely to biographical fiction both films add authenticity to their narratives and accounts, and both films employ the 'author' to narrate the major part of the film.⁶⁵⁶ Through this narration the Tibetans are portrayed as naïve and trusting, both films stressing the innocence of the Tibetan psyche and loyalty to their false friends, the Europeans.

Kundun was released only a few months after *Seven Years in Tibet* and shared many sets and costumes. Written by Melissa Mathison and directed by Martin Scorsese, the film is based around the autobiography of the XIVth Dalai Lama, *Freedom in Exile*,⁶⁵⁷ and despite performing poorly at the box office, taking in less than US\$6 million in a limited distribution in America,⁶⁵⁸ it was nominated for four Academy Awards.

Given their provenance it is no wonder that both these movies portray an independent, peaceful Tibet, invaded by Chinese communist forces and brutally suppressed. The XIVth Dalai Lama, having been consulted on both movies, is shown in an extremely favorable light. In *Kundun's* closing sequence he is shown taking the final steps into exile as a border guard approaches him, salutes, and inquires,

⁶⁵⁴ *sKu mDun*: The Presence. An honorific title of the Dalai Lama.

⁶⁵⁵ Harrer escaped a British prisoner of war camp in Northern India and fled to Tibet during World War II.

⁶⁵⁶ FRANGVILLE, VANESSA. 2009. p. 20.

⁶⁵⁷ GYATSO, TENZIN. THE XIVTH DALAI LAMA. 1990. *Freedom in Exile: The Autobiography of the Dalai Lama*. New York: HarperCollins.

⁶⁵⁸ Less than a quarter of the film's \$28 Million budget.

"May I ask, are you the Lord Buddha?" The Dalai Lama replies, "I think that I am a reflection, like the moon on water. When you see me, and I try to be a good man, you see yourself." Even before the film was released China's leaders "hotly objected to Disney's plans to distribute" the film, even to the point of "making threatening noises about Disney's future access to China as a market."⁶⁵⁹ Disney's steadfastness stood in stark contrast to Universal Pictures, which had earlier "turned down the chance to distribute *Kundun* for fear of upsetting the Chinese." It was reported that Liu Jianzhong, head of China's Film Bureau, and Shanghai Mayor, Xu Kuangdi, both visited America to complain about *Kundun's* portrayal of the Chinese Government.

There was likewise a hostile response to *Red River Valley* in America when it was presented at film festivals. Schell describes the film as "a far more shameless piece of fictionalised history that anyone involved in *Seven Years in Tibet* could ever have imagined creating,"⁶⁶⁰ and argued that it was "acclaimed in the Party press, and only there," for showing "both the Hans and the Tibetans united to defend their homeland against British colonialists hoping to claim the exotic area as their own."⁶⁶¹

Mullen has demonstrated how Hollywood movies present us with a particular view of Tibetan Buddhism and culture in characterisations that Lopez has shown to be refuted by post-colonial scholarship.⁶⁶² Mullen takes Lopez's *New Age Orientalism: The Case of Tibet*⁶⁶³ and describes how his four main persisting elements of Orientalism are perpetuated, indeed celebrated, in *Seven Years in Tibet*, *Kundun*, and *Little Buddha*. While Mullen is correct in her analysis, it is worth revisiting it once more in light also of *Red River Valley* and Chinese film portrayal of Tibet more

⁶⁵⁹ RESSNER, JEFFREY. 1996. Disney's China Policy. *Time Magazine*. 9th December 1996. <http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,985663,00.html> Accessed 23rd November 2008.

⁶⁶⁰ SCHELL, ORVILLE. 2000. *Virtual Tibet. Searching for Shangri-la from the Himalayas to Hollywood*. New York, NY: Owl Books. p. 296.

⁶⁶¹ SCHELL, ORVILLE. 2000. p. 297.

⁶⁶² MULLEN, EVE. 1998. Orientalist Commercializations: Tibetan Buddhism in American Popular Film. *Journal of Religious Film*. Vol. 2. No. 2. pp. 1-7.

⁶⁶³ LOPEZ, DONALD. 1994. New Age Orientalism: The Case of Tibet. *Tibetan Review*. No. 2. pp. 16-20.

generally. The first of Lopez's characteristics of scholarly writing that still show Orientalist thinking is a 'play of opposites;' when opposed to a 'root tradition' (in his case Indian and Sanskrit religious texts) Tibet and Tibetan Buddhism is treated as 'polluted, derivative, and even demonic.' Mullen shows how under new age Orientalism Hollywood reverses the roles, presenting Tibet as pure, pristine, authentic and sacred, and the mother root tradition, i.e. America, as polluted and corrupt. In the same way *Red River Valley* presents Tibet as a 'pure' land of meditative, spiritual people, akin to images of Shangri-la as examined in Chapter six. (See for example Rockman's description of Tibet as a "lost paradise.") In all three films Tibet represents a last and almost spiritual hope; Xu'er from sacrificial death, Rockman from an avalanche, and Harrer from his incarceration.⁶⁶⁴

Secondly, Lopez identifies the 'self aggrandisement of the rescuer' that sees the Tibetans 'becoming voiceless non-agents' in their struggle for independence or survival, allowing Westerners to play the part of strong, moral champions, and heroes of the Tibetan cause. In both the Hollywood and Chinese films Harrer and Rockman both undergo spiritual transformations during their time in Tibet, and both are portrayed as learned and sophisticated, introducing Tibetans to new technologies such as binoculars and photographic film. Xu'er and her brother teach the Tibetans to fight against the British invaders; Xu'er by demonstrating her passion and resistance when even the Tibetans were willing to surrender, and her brother by supplying arms and ammunition, as well as being the best shot in Tibet.

However the director is more subtle in his adherence to Lopez's thesis; The character of Jones in *Red River Valley* is critical to the director's construct of the European, the enemy yes, but the contemplative enemy who reinforces the righteousness of the defender's stance. While Rockman is harsh and unyielding, Jones is obviously affected by the bloodshed he witnesses, and can therefore initiate a more sustained and disapproving response from the Han target audience. While dismissing one, and allowing audiences to empathise to a point with the

⁶⁶⁴ FRANGVILLE, VANESSA. 2009. p. 22.

other, Feng builds a dialogue of deception as well as cruelty, contrasting with the unbridled and ultimately sacrificial support of the Han characters in the film. The fact that Jones wrestles with his conscious and inner monologues adds authenticity to the evidence, it being presented as a reasoned opinion.

Aggrandisement of the rescuer facilitates the third and fourth of Lopez's characteristics for Orientalism, "third is the gaining of authority or control over Tibet, and fourth is the justification of that authority."⁶⁶⁵ Lopez showed how the Orientalist transforms Tibetans into non-agents, and points to their non-agency as justification for taking control. Generally this can result in others taking control over the representation of, for example, Tibetan culture, religion, environment, art, history and even their 'preservation' and very survival. In *Red River Valley* it is a Han general that stands up to Rockman's lectures on Tibetan identity and independence, and Hans that stiffen the resolve of Tibetan troops to fight to the bitter end against the invaders. Likewise it is the Chinese who have inherited the 'responsibility' for ordering the representation of Tibet in the age of the new media.

Sex and sexuality are strong currents in all three movies, especially *Red River Valley* where both Rockman and Jones fall in love with Tibetan women. The relationships both end badly; the Dzongpön's flirtatious daughter ignores Rockman, and Jones becomes locked in a love triangle with Snow Dawa and Kalsang to the embarrassment of all involved. The implication is that Westerners find the 'Other' (i.e. Tibetans) sexually attractive, but somehow unattainable; however more subtle and complex is the scene where Snow Dawa's brother arrives to take her back to China; Kalsang becomes drunk and indiscreetly tells him that Tibetans are, "free to love the way they love." Snow Dawa's brother becomes extremely hidebound, and replies, "I envy you, but I am Han,"⁶⁶⁶ before fighting with Kalsang and ordering his sister's return to China, claiming that as a Han she will never be able to assimilate into Tibetan society and "does not belong to Tibetan people." Ma Ning, analysing

⁶⁶⁵ MULLEN, EVE. 1998. p. 2.

⁶⁶⁶ Kalsang and Snow Dawa's brother. [00:54:53]

the Dai minority in China likewise observed, "the foregrounding of sexuality and love against the rigid social environment of China ... is constructed as a cultural 'other' that enables the Chinese to come to a critical understanding of their own culture."⁶⁶⁷ Too much could be made of simple love stories; Bone reminds us "Propaganda films are structured and emotionally appealing, persuading us to form conclusions that are not necessarily part of the intellectual process."⁶⁶⁸ However, the exchange between Kalsang and Snow Dawa's brother is an example of the process of 'oriental/internal orientalisation' as discussed in chapter six. The sexual dismissal of Westerners, and the burgeoning love between a Han girl and a Tibetan man as portrayed in *Red River Valley* highlights the barriers against really knowing the 'Other' and implies a unity between the Chinese races; In films "we recognise that as well as the many points of similarity, there are also critical points of deep and significant difference which constitute 'who we really are.'"⁶⁶⁹ Tibet by consequence remains a place of ambiguity, naïvety, virginity, and mystery.

The image originally located here has been removed from this electronic version of the thesis for copyright reasons. [Figure 37: Jones rejoices at seeing his 'sacred mountain.' Screen shot from *Red River Valley*.]

The Singing and Dancing Troupe of Wuxi, Jiangsu Province has recently produced a dance and drama interpretation of the film. The director of the show explained at the Beijing premier that, "the award-winning performance is celebrating the 50th

⁶⁶⁷ MA, NING. 1987. *Notes on the New Filmmakers*. In, SEMSEL, GEORGE (Ed.) 1987. p. 68.

⁶⁶⁸ BONE, JAN AND RON JOHNSON. 1996. *Understanding the Film. An Introduction to Film Appreciation*. Lincolnwood, IL: NTC Publishing Group. p. 37.

⁶⁶⁹ STAM, ROBERT AND TOBY MILLER. (Eds.) 2000. p. 706.

anniversary of democratic reform which abolished feudal serfdom in the Tibet Autonomous Region."⁶⁷⁰ Liu Zhongbao, head of Wuxi Folk Dance Troupe, said, "It's a moving story. How to interpret it in dance, and how to make it innovative? The plot is condensed. We have taken steps to create bold choreography and light design. The music combines the Western orchestra sounds and Tibetan folk music." The show has toured more than twenty cities across China, returning four times to Beijing, and has also been highly lucrative, recouping the original costs of 3 million Yuan within a year. To date the drama has reportedly grossed nearly 13 million Yuan, and is set for a world tour in 2010. In March 2009 it was selected by China's Ministry of Culture to perform at the 50th Anniversary celebrations of the founding of the TAR as it "showcases the unique folk culture and significant changes since democratic reform in the Tibet Autonomous Region."⁶⁷¹ Xinhua, the official Chinese news agency, claimed that the gala show would demonstrate how "China is preparing to commemorate the 50th anniversary of the freeing of one million of serfs from serfdom after the central government foiled an armed rebellion staged by the Dalai Lama and his supporters with assistance from some Western powers in 1959."⁶⁷²

The live stage show was professionally recorded and released as a DVD in 2006 by Qilu Audio-Visual Publishing House of Beijing. The song and dance interpretation of the Mission was described by official reviewers "as the moving story that Chinese and Tibetan unite with each other and defend against the English invaders to Tibet in 1904 in the fight of blood and fire, live and dead [sic]."⁶⁷³

⁶⁷⁰ <http://english.cri.cn/6666/2009/03/04/1221s460112.htm>
Accessed 12th April 2010.

⁶⁷¹ <http://english.cri.cn/6666/2009/03/04/1221s460112.htm>
Accessed 12th April 2010.

⁶⁷² http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2009-02/24/content_10887364.htm
Accessed 27th April 2010.

⁶⁷³ http://www.cgcmall.com/Dance_Drama_Red_River_Valley_p/dv00riverv.htm
Accessed 5th May 2010.

The image originally located here has been removed from this electronic version of the thesis for copyright reasons. [Figure 38: Dance and Drama: Red River Valley. Qilu Audio-Visual Publishing House.]

of dance, from across space and time," again highlighting the love story, where "modern duets narrate the romance between a Han girl and a Tibetan boy." Most passionately and perhaps confusingly it claims, "even ballet is borrowed, most appropriate to bring out the arrogance of British intruders."

The image originally located here has been removed from this electronic version of the thesis for copyright reasons. [Figure 39: Red River Valley. Beijing, 4th March 2009.]

Likewise as part of the centenary celebrations in Gyantse an historical drama, The Tibet Drama Troupe performed 'Spirit of Zong Mountain.'⁶⁷⁴ Their presentation was intended to "recur the moving scenes of Tibetan people's revolting British army to protect their home by life."⁶⁷⁵ Publicity photographs from the production clearly show a European severed head on the spike of a ritual offering, while a monk performs rituals to dispel the invaders others sing and dance about the stage. Such presentations clearly bring this episode of history, and the Chinese interpretation of events, to an ever-expanding audience.

The image originally located here has been removed from this electronic version of the thesis for copyright reasons. [Figure 40: 'Spirit of Zong Mountain' by The Tibet Drama Troupe.]

China Network Television's 1904

1904 is a four part historical drama, filmed by China Network Television, and aired on CNTV6 in 2007 to wide acclaim. It has the dual advantage over *Red River Valley* of not only a cast including Han, Tibetans, and Westerners, but also is shot on location in Tibet at the sites of historical significance. The actors also all speak in

⁶⁷⁴ Zong Mountain: This may be a Chinese rendering of the Tibetan, *rDzong*.

⁶⁷⁵ <http://zt.tibet.cn/english/zt/anti-british/200402004923135205.htm>. Accessed 16th November 2008.

their native tongues, giving the film an air of authenticity lacking in the purely Mandarin *Red River Valley*. (Subtitles translate the English and Tibetan speaking actors into Mandarin.)

The film depicts the return to Tibet in 1943, of David Austin, the interpreter assigned to the Mission, a character loosely based on the life of O'Connor. After forty years of soul searching and anguish over the actions of the Mission in Tibet, Austin returns to beg the forgiveness of his former friend Dhondup. The film relates how Austin and Dhondup became friendly in Kathmandu in 1902, before they meet again in Tibet in 1904 when Austin and the Mission requisitioned a house that belongs to Dhondup's father, the local Dzungpön. Their friendship becomes strained as they face each other across the negotiating table, leading to a passionate fight between the two, once the British use their force of arms to break the Tibetan resistance. The majority of the film follows the British advance through Tibet to Lhasa, and the violent and bloody battles at Gyantse and Nenyang. In contrast to *Red River Valley* however, the director and plot allow for a much more accurate depiction of the build up to the Mission, the personalities involved, and the bloody advance.

The film echoes *Red River Valley* in many ways, not least through the central role of the interpreter character, who befriends the Tibetans, questions the authority and moral judgement of his superior officers, and seeks to know more about Tibet's mysterious cultural heritage. In both films the main character and their Tibetan friends exchange personal items, a cigarette lighter in *Red River Valley* and a pocket watch in *1904*, that become central motifs in the film, passing between the characters as their trust is gained, and subsequently betrayed.

For all of the film's trite storyline, it does attempt to show the British reasoning and justifying dispatching a force to Tibet. Unlike *Red River Valley* the Mission is initially referred to as a the 'Tibet Frontier Commission,' and not simply as the 'British Invasion.' The genesis of the Mission is portrayed in a meeting of Curzon's Executive Council in Calcutta. Younghusband explains with the aid of a large wall

map that, "Russia has spared no effort in expanding towards Tibet. Now, if His Majesty's Government continues to sit by and watch Russian will be pre-emptive in Tibet, just as it was in the case of Xing Jiang, and then we will be fighting the Cossacks right along the Himalayan line, the whole of the Empire and India will be open to the commanding bayonets of Russia."⁶⁷⁶ While the majority of the Council members nod in agreement, Claude White, British Resident in Sikkim, is seen to question Younghusband's hawkish assertions, asking "how can we, His Majesty, and the governors of the Empire, not take this picture as an intended exaggeration?" Younghusband's answer could have been copied from one of his later books justifying the Mission to Tibet. After describing his experiences crossing China by foot in the 1890s, he draws the council's attention to Kashgar on the map behind him and explains how the Tsar had been allowed to establish a consul office and Cossack garrison there while a similar application by the Viceroy had been rejected. He then dramatically informs the group that, "There is but one mountain range between this place and Kashmir, which is a part of the Empire... The Cossacks can not wait until they wash their boots in the warm waters of the Indian Ocean. He said, that once the Tsar orders it, they will rush into the vast expanse of the Indian sub-continent without a moment's hesitation."⁶⁷⁷

Having failed in his protest, White turns his remonstrations to Curzon, and in a heavily propaganda nuanced diatribe questions, "What about the Chinese court? Tibet is a part of that giant country." Curzon is short with his answer, claiming the Chinese court is a "dying decrepitude, still choked by the war that was initiated by our alliance" in reference to the siege of Peking in 1900. Talk of friendly relations and trade negotiations then is put to one side, and the Viceroy unveils the true cause of the Mission, demanding, "We must get Tibet and the upper and middle reaches of the Yangtze River into our hands, before the polar bear reaches out his

⁶⁷⁶ Younghusband to Executive Council. [02:15].

<http://www.youtube.com/user/Lacedaemonia#p/u/36/L9UXzkkqpeI>
Accessed 23rd August 2010.

⁶⁷⁷ <http://www.youtube.com/user/Lacedaemonia#p/u/36/L9UXzkkqpeI>
Accessed 23rd August 2010.

giant palm. Gentlemen, God has put this opportunity before us. It would be both unforgivable and foolish to let it slip!"

In the final scenes before the Mission departs India, Curzon calls Austin, Macdonald, and Younghusband to his office and makes a long and impassioned speech setting out the merits of establishing 'friendly relations' with the Tibetans. In ominous tones and with his hand grasping across an enormous globe he advises that, "A civilised and great power should not turn a deaf ear towards uncivilised nations. In this spirit that we move towards Tibet. Nevertheless, experience with previously uncivilised areas that are now under the governance of the Empire tells us, that the use of military 'pressure' can sometimes be a useful means of establishing friendly relations."⁶⁷⁸

The image originally located here has been removed from this electronic version of the thesis for copyright reasons. [Figure 41: Curzon, left, explains the benefits of military 'pressure' to the officers of the Mission. Screen shot from 1904.]

1904 Red River Valley

and mystery,' and it is a constant theme for debate among the British officers as they advance towards Gyantse. In the narration the older Austin describes Tibet as "a place I yearn for. I feel I am entering a magical land. I cannot find the words for

⁶⁷⁸ Curzon to Officers. [07:40].
<http://www.youtube.com/user/Lacedaemonia#p/u/36/L9UXzkkqpeI>
Accessed 23rd August 2010.

to express the feeling that is so exact in my heart and mind."⁶⁷⁹ On entering Tibet Macdonald describes Tibet as "quite unaccounted for on the map. An isolated and barren world," to which Younghusband replies bombastically, "it is because of this isolated wilderness that God has sent us here. Believe me, history will record the first moment we set foot on this soil."⁶⁸⁰

The image originally located here has been removed from this electronic version of the thesis for copyright reasons. [Figure 42: Macdonald, Younghusband, and Austin discuss the mystery of Tibet. Screen shot from 1904.]

Younghusband's character is depicted in a number of contradictory ways; at the first instant he reassures Macdonald "Don't worry, what you will face are not the Gurkhas, later you will see that the enemy troops you will face are, well let me say, a bunch of aboriginals,"⁶⁸¹

⁶⁷⁹ Austin's narration.

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=x62_yPQBdnc [01:10]

Accessed 28th August 2010.

⁶⁸⁰ Macdonald and Younghusband. [02:40]

Austin's narration. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=x62_yPQBdnc [01:10]

Accessed 28th August 2010

⁶⁸¹ Younghusband to Macdonald. [04:20]

The image originally located here has been removed from this electronic version of the thesis for copyright reasons. [Figure 43: A meeting between British officers and Kashag Officials. Screen shot from 1904.]

officials, claiming that in the eight months he waited at Khamba Dzong for negotiations he received no word of high officials, and was unsuccessful in securing any trade concessions for India. He also accuses Tibetan soldiers of 'harassing the people living in the border areas of Sikkim,' and violating the Treaties of 1890 and 1893.⁶⁸² These are the same arguments given in Younghusband's account of the Mission, *India and Tibet*, published in 1910. The officers and men are given a warm welcome by the Dzongpön at Phala Manor. The wise headman offers the officers tea, *kha btags*, and welcomes them to his home, but asks pertinently, why if they have come to proffer trade, do they bring so many guns? Younghusband replies "an Englishman always keeps his word; these troops are only as an armed escort."⁶⁸³

⁶⁸² Younghusband to Tibetan officials. <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZLcxAgx9x-M&feature=related> [06:30]

⁶⁸³ Younghusband to Lord of Phala. <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4pTmvAoQuiQ&feature=related> [05:35]

The image originally located here has been removed from this electronic version of the thesis for copyright reasons. [Figure 44: A warm welcome at Phala Manor. Screen shot from 1904.]

As the British approach Chumi Shonko Macdonald orders the artillery to immediately open fire on the Tibetan positions; however in a rare moment of diplomacy Younghusband initially asks that he be allowed to discuss a peaceful exit for the Tibetans. The two argue heatedly for some time, each counteracting the other's orders, and debating who holds senior rank within the escort. The dialogue presented accords well with Allen's account of the Mission, *The Duel in the Snows*⁶⁸⁴ that focuses on the bitter arguments between the Escort Commander and the Tibet Commissioner. *1904* shows the negotiations that took place before the wall at Chumi Shonko in much the same way as in other Chinese narratives. Younghusband tricks the naïve Tibetan General into disarming his troops, before Macdonald orders the massacre to begin. Younghusband is duplicitous, assuring the General, "Now, I would like to negotiate further to prevent some unnecessary and unpleasant event taking place. I will order my troops to put down their weapons, and I would like you to order your troops to dampen the fuses in their fireboxes. [The General indicates that he will not give this command]. General, in order to show my sincerity, I will order my troops to put their weapons down

⁶⁸⁴ ALLEN, CHARLES. 2004a. p. 256.

first."⁶⁸⁵ After this dialogue Macdonald and Younghusband retreat to the British troops and order them to unload their weapons. The next sequence shows the British troops removing one bullet from their repeater rifles, immediately replacing the bullet in a surreptitious manner. The Tibetan General then orders the Tibetan troops to extinguish their fuses, and as they are doing so, British soldiers appear on the skyline overlooking them and start firing on their positions, supported by the heavy artillery from the British lines.

The only Tibetan soldiers shown in antiquated lamellar armour are the Tibetan Generals, indicating their rank and aristocratic status, and unlike *Red River Valley* the battle scenes are harrowing and heartfelt. Austin is depicted struggling to comprehend the killing, wincing as the Maxim guns rattle away at the Tibetan lines, and Younghusband is shown pleading with Macdonald to order the gun silent. Only after he bellows "Stop, this is senseless!"⁶⁸⁶ does the Escort Commander order the guns to stop firing; however they continue to shoot down the straggling Tibetans as they walk slowly from the battlefield.

The image originally located here has been removed from this electronic version of the thesis for copyright reasons. [Figure 45: British officers survey the Tibetan dead. Screen shot from 1904.]

⁶⁸⁵ <http://www.youtube.com/user/Lacedaemonia#p/u/19/hFTCCTPVgxl>
Accessed 20th August 2010.

⁶⁸⁶ Younghusband to Macdonald.
http://www.youtube.com/user/Lacedaemonia#p/u/31/y_t3nh4k8_U [04:40]
Accessed 20th August 2010.

The relationship between the Amban and the Dalai Lama is portrayed as being cordial and personal when the Amban comes to the Potala in a blue palanquin to seek the Dalai Lama's advice regarding the British advance. When the two meet, they are both seated at the same level while Dhondup interprets between them. The film then returns to a central theme as Austin seeks Younghusband and airs his concerns about the conduct of the troops. The director uses the doubting Austin to show how even British officers in the Mission staff found the killings and violence unacceptable, as well as the violent and bigoted attitude of Younghusband. The dialogue shows Younghusband's true opinion of the Tibetans, and also the goal of the Mission, financial gain;

Austin: With all due respect, I want you to know that I find the conduct of British soldiers to be wholly against both my personal beliefs, and the chief purpose of this Mission Its become a nightmare which has haunted me for ever hour of every day.

Younghusband: A nightmare young man? As a member of this Mission don't you think these aboriginals should accept a little modern civilisation?⁶⁸⁷

Their debate is brought to a close when a telegram arrives from the Viceroy informing them that the Chinese Royal Court (for which read Manchu Court) had made protestations about their actions in Tibet. Macdonald and Younghusband argue over the best way to proceed, with the Escort Commander ordering the majority of the troops back to Chumbi to avoid the freezing temperatures and hostile Tibetans. He reminds Younghusband of the fate that met Napoleon in Russia, declaring "I will not have my troops freeze to death on this high plateau."⁶⁸⁸ The Tibetans then instigate negotiations for the first time, the Amban coming to Macdonald's tent and denying accusations that the Tibetans were preparing to defend Nenyang Monastery and Gyantse Dzong. The negotiations however soon fail when Macdonald orders the British troops forward to Gyantse.

⁶⁸⁷ Younghusband and Austin. [02:10 onwards]

<http://www.youtube.com/user/Lacedaemonia#p/u/29/vTaausoOSXg>
Accessed 29th August 2010.

⁶⁸⁸ Macdonald to Younghusband. [02:20]

<http://www.youtube.com/user/Lacedaemonia#p/u/21/-2Bx305WkTs>
Accessed 20th August 2010.

The scenes depicting the night attack on Changlo Manor are especially violent, with multiple scenes where Tibetans hack sleeping British troops in half, or shoot them with flaming arrows.

Events as portrayed in *1904* return to violence as the British arrive at Nenyng Monastery and find it heavily defended by both monks and militia. As the artillery are aligned with the gates of the monastery Younghusband calls out to Macdonald, "Major-General please wait, there are many important cultural relics inside the temple," to which the Escort Commander replies to his officer, "Bomb the gates and walls!" Both men ignore the massed ranks of monks meditating on the steps of the temple. Once the troops clear the Tibetan militia from the courtyard only the monks remain defiantly chanting prayers despite guns being placed to their heads.

The image originally located here has been removed from this electronic version of the thesis for copyright reasons. [Figure 46: Younghusband threatens to kill the monks of Nenyng Monastery. Screen shot from 1904.]

A brutal scene follows where all the monks are slaughtered in seconds by the British troops, before Younghusband dramatically walks up the steps of the monastery, surrounded by dead monks on all sides. The shot is almost an exact copy of that in the Hollywood epic *Kundun* in which the young Dalai Lama walks through a courtyard of the Norbu Linka full of dead monks. In the Hollywood scene the monks had been killed by PLA troops in an attempt to prevent the escape of the

Dalai Lama into exile. The identical scene in *1904* loses none of the power or shocking brutality of the original.

The image originally located here has been removed from this electronic version of the thesis for copyright reasons. [Figure 47: Younghusband walks through the dead monks. Screen shot from 1904.]

After Younghusband walks through the multitude of dead Tibetans he enters the main temple in Nenyang Monastery where he is struck by the fine wood carvings, statues, and thangka that adorn the walls. While no mention is made here of looting, nor and damage done to the temple, he does reflect that, "everything is so intricate. All this work reflects a nation's intelligence, culture, and wisdom."⁶⁸⁹ The battle scenes at Gyantse Dzong are a relatively minor part of *1904* with the expected sequences of the heroic Dhondup slaughtering countless ill-fated British soldiers. Although dramatic and violent, the sequence does not hold great insight into the director's portrayal of the actual events of the siege, instead forming a dramatic end to the film for its Chinese audience. The climax of the film comes with the death of Dhondup's father; battling with his sword and surrounded by the enemy he looks to his son in heroic desperation. Dhondup shoots and kills his father while the British close in around him. This sacrifice is the only reference in *1904* to

⁶⁸⁹ Younghusband monologue. [01:30]
<http://www.youtube.com/profile?gl=GB&user=Lacedaemonia#p/u/25/GAzVpXcaT2w>
Accessed 21th August 2010

Chinese claims that many of the Tibetans in the Dzung committed suicide rather than face capture and humiliation at the hand of the enemy. See conclusions below for further analysis of this theme.

The Internet

Few have any doubt about the power of the Internet in China; China's rapidly growing and technologically advanced economy has advanced simultaneously with home Internet use, and China now boasts more Internet citizens, or 'netizens,' than any other country. China had 420 million Internet users by June 2010,⁶⁹⁰ and it is projected that China's Internet population will reach 469 million by the end of 2010, accounting for 35 percent of China's total population, increasing to over 718 million by 2013, encompassing over half of the population.⁶⁹¹ Broadband connections are priced well within the reach of the rapidly expanding Chinese middle class, and Wireless, especially mobile phone Internet access, has developed rapidly in the last five years. In common with other developed and developing countries Chinese netizens increasingly turn to the Internet for information, news, entertainment, shopping, and communication.

The main Internet source for information and news in Tibet is Tibet.cn The site is available in Chinese, Tibetan, and English as part of The China Tibet Information Center (CITC), based in Xuanwu District, Beijing. All the pages on the site carry a heavy political bias; however the site does contain information such as news, weather, cultural events, sports, lifestyle, and politics. The site carries innumerable anti-Dalai Lama pages, such as 'Dalai Lama doomed to fail in blemishing China,' 'Dalai Lama's "Greater Tibet" concept against China's law,' and 'Dalai Lama's new defense for being son of India.' The history section of Tibet.cn carried a link from

⁶⁹⁰ http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2010-07/15/content_10112957.htm
Accessed 18th November 2010.

⁶⁹¹ http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/bizchina/2010-07/23/content_11042851.htm
Accessed 23rd July 2010.

the home page where you can access the 'Unforgettable Memory' pages that give photos and explanations of the major battles and selected accounts of the Tibetan and Chinese response to the British Mission of 1904. Since the majority of the text panels and information on this site comes directly from Jaiwai's *The Historical Status of China's Tibet*⁶⁹² as examined in chapter one.

Analysis of Chinese Internet news and history sources has identified three general themes; Firstly, the reinterpretation of history from a Chinese perspective that supports the narrative of Chinese humiliation at the hands of Western Imperialists, and the Chinese longstanding opposition to their territorial advances. In this context the Mission of 1904 is presented as the 'second invasion' (the first being in 1888) and many sites present details analysis of both 'invasions' in the same breath so as to link them in the proposed historical narrative. The second theme relates to specific incidents and how their relative importance is portrayed in the accounts described. The battle at Chumi Shonko is given central importance in Chinese sources, thereby relegating the siege of Gyantse Dzong, thereby reversing the traditional British narrative. The battle at Nenyang is presented in the analysed Chinese sources as being essential to the history, but barely mentioned in British accounts. The third theme is one of memory and commemoration. Accounts of British brutality and cruelty are presented alongside news of commemorative events, giving the readers opportunity to dwell on the aggressive nature of the historical struggle and never forget the sacrifices the Tibetans made in the defence of the Motherland. Special vitriol is however reserved for those that seek to question the orthodox historical narrative, and I finally examine the attacks made on this accounts of the Mission by those to propose an alternative history to that presented in the propaganda infused authorised accounts.

⁶⁹² WANG, JIAWAI AND NYIMA GYAINCAIN. 1997. *The Historical Status of China's Tibet*. Beijing: China Intercontinental Press.

Chinese Historical Narrative of Western Aggression

Chinese Internet sources seek to present a unified China facing a series of invasions by hostile and aggressive Western powers. In this narrative Britain is portrayed as having invaded Chinese territory in Tibet twice, and the Younghusband Mission forming the culmination of British India's creeping occupation of Chinese lands in the Himalayas throughout the nineteenth century and especially the war of 1888. Tibet is given little agency in this narrative, and China is inserted into the narrative in such a way as to present her as having a paternal influence on Tibetan and regional politics.

The websites generally carry a short justification for the war and a patriotic background to the information that follows. For example, the website *Centenary memorial of fighting against British invaders by Tibetan people in 1904* declares;

This was a war that embodied the struggle between advanced capitalism and a backward feudal serfdom. It is also a justifiable war to fight against invasion. It educated the Tibetan people, enabled them to see clearly the essence of the invading of imperialists, and highlighted the patriotic spirit of the Tibetan people in their fight against the imperialists. In addition, it promoted Tibetan people's acknowledgement of the Chinese nation. It also presented the great contribution of the Tibetan people to maintain the benefits of the modern Chinese nation. Moreover, it is one of the key components in modern history in which the Chinese nation fights against imperialism.⁶⁹³

Likewise most of the websites finish their descriptions with a colophon painting a dramatic but harmonious image of Tibet for the reader to dwell upon. For example, the same website carries the message that,

People can admire the beautiful mountains and rivers in Tibet, but they should not be covetous; patriotic inspiration, strengthening the unity of all ethnic minorities, construction and development of Tibet, maintaining the unification of China, and safeguarding the frontiers of motherland, are all sacred responsibilities of ethnic Tibetans; and it is centenary memorial of those heroes who bravely struggle against the

⁶⁹³ http://eng.tibet.cn/culture/tibetology/200801/t20080117_355768.htm
Accessed 22nd March 2008.

imperialist invaders.⁶⁹⁴

On the same site, the actions and manoeuvring by the XIIIth Dalai Lama are portrayed as patriotic to the Chinese nation, and as discussed in chapter five, the failure of the Tibetan resistance is placed squarely on the corrupt Manchu Qing dynasty's officials and representatives in Tibet. The CTIC therefore describes how, "cherishing deep hatred of the British invaders, the 13th Dalai Lama, who came to power in 1895, regretted the weakness of the Qing Court in resisting the British invasion," and was "lured by Czarist Russia's political stance."⁶⁹⁵

Central to the narrative is the British desire to dismantle China, and take Tibet as a colony. In a section of the *Unforgettable Memory* website titled *British Invasion and the Birth of the Myth of "Tibetan Independence"* the British are described as "having failed to obtain its expected goal through concluding treaties with the Qing Dynasty court, the British decided to bypass the Qing Court and deal directly with the local government of Tibet. This marked the beginning of the British plot to tear Tibet from China."⁶⁹⁶ This direct negotiations with the Tibetan authorities resulted in the protracted talks at Khamba Dzong. Here the Chinese narrative explains that the British bribed the Tibetans involved with the talks.⁶⁹⁷

Failure in the negotiations is placed at the door of the Qing Court; as discussed in chapter five by blaming the Manchu Qing dynasty the Tibetans are absolved from any miscalculation or belligerence, and the current Chinese administration garner little historical legacy or moral guidance from this dynasty. Accordingly, the website states that "before war, the corrupt Qing Dynasty impeded the Tibetan people to fight against the invasion; during the war, the Qing Court again held a

⁶⁹⁴ http://eng.tibet.cn/culture/tibetology/200801/t20080117_355768.htm
Accessed 22nd March 2008.

⁶⁹⁵ <http://zt.tibet.cn/english/zt/anti-british/20040200441693358.htm>
Accessed 25th August 2006.

⁶⁹⁶ <http://zt.tibet.cn/english/zt/anti-british/20040200441693358.htm>
Accessed 25th August 2006.

⁶⁹⁷ <http://zt.tibet.cn/english/zt/anti-british/20040200441693358.htm>
Accessed 25th August 2006.

disgraceful policy, which was to fight voluntarily and to fail naturally."⁶⁹⁸ By contrast in order to highlight the XIIIth Dalai Lama's purity from corruption, and devotion to the Motherland, it is recorded that "while away from Lhasa, the 13th Dalai Lama never forgot to carry the seal of authority bestowed on him by the Qing emperor, showing he set great store by this symbol of power."⁶⁹⁹ All other sources describe how the Dalai Lama left the seals of office with Blo bzang rgyal mtshan, the Ganden Tripa, during his exile from Tibet. Despite this corruption the Chinese Amban is presented as having authority in the region comparable to that of the Dalai Lama himself; "The high commissioners will supervise the handling of Tibetan affairs on behalf of the central government, enjoying the equal standing with the Dalai Lama and the Bainqen Erdeni [Panchen Lama]. All the Galoins [Kalöns] and those below them are subordinates."⁷⁰⁰

Interpretation of Events

Chinese accounts presented on the websites differ from those in other Chinese and Western written accounts in the prominence they give to specific incidents. When compared with British accounts, the battle at Chumi Shonko is described as the defining moment in the narrative, and conversely, the battle at Gyantse is afforded reduced importance. The heroic struggle at Nenyang, a minor event in Western accounts, is central to the Chinese narrative owing to the way it is presented as an individual battle between the British army and the 'Kongpo warriors,' and their heroic last stand against the invaders.

The main account of the battle at Chumi Shonko is again found in the 'Unforgettable Memory' section of the CTIC website. The account mimics other propaganda

⁶⁹⁸ http://eng.tibet.cn/culture/tibetology/200801/t20080117_355768.htm
Accessed 22nd March 2008.

⁶⁹⁹ <http://zt.tibet.cn/english/zt/anti-british/200402004923135205.htm>.
16th November 2008.

⁷⁰⁰ <http://www.index-china.com/index-english/Tibet-s.html>
Accessed 8th February 2010.

sources by describing how British commanders not only tricked the Tibetan commanders into disarming their own soldiers, but also fired the first and defining shot. However embedded in the narrative there is an indication that the Tibetans were willing to fight, and had indeed planned to launch an attack at Chumi Shonko, should negotiations with the British fail. One website describes how prior to the battle, "the Gaxag [Kashag] government advised the Tibetan troops to enter into negotiations with the British troops and then launch an attack according to their original plan should the talks break down."⁷⁰¹

The central trick that Younghusband played on the Tibetan commanders is described in full:

When Younghusband and other British military representatives met with Ladingse [lHa lding sras] and Namseling [dPal 'byor 'jigs med rNam sras gling], they noted: "Since we came for peace talks, our troops will remove the bullets from their rifles as a token of our sincerity. But you should put out the fuses of your fire arms." At the order of Younghusband, the British troops present on the occasion each removed one bullet from their rifles but, immediately, loaded another without the Tibetans becoming aware.⁷⁰²

This account tallies almost word for word with that found described in the Dzong, analysed below, and is thus cemented in the Chinese narrative of Younghusband's deception.

In a similar vein, an unnamed British officer is blamed for firing first and killing the Tibetan negotiators before any real peace talks could take place. Yi Bian describes how "after the negotiation had gone on for only 15 minutes, one British officer drew his pistol and killed Ladingse, Namseling and other Tibetan representatives. The British troops attacked the Tibetan troops, killing more than 500 in just a few minutes."⁷⁰³ Yi gives the Tibetan casualties an inflated number from the British

⁷⁰¹ <http://zt.tibet.cn/english/zt/anti-british/20040200441693358.htm>
Accessed 25th August 2006.

⁷⁰² http://en.tibetculture.net/history/memorabilia/200712/t20071214_302017.htm
Accessed 8th February 2008.

⁷⁰³ http://en.tibetculture.net/history/memorabilia/200712/t20071214_302017.htm
Accessed 8th February 2008.

estimates, describing how "some 1,000 Tibetans were killed, and only 380 won a narrow escape. The springs at Qoimishango ran red with Tibetan blood."⁷⁰⁴ However the number of dead differs on various web pages, the *Unforgettable Memory* page describes how "Over 1,400 Tibetan soldiers lost their lives and only 380 survived the slaughter."⁷⁰⁵

In a series of purported interviews with veterans of the war presented on Chinese websites Bema Gyibo describes the "hard war against the British when the Tibetan army only had the most inferior weapons."⁷⁰⁶ He provides a short account of the battle at Chumi Shonko however his account is important if only for the language used in translation; In his account he insists that, "the Tibetan army and people who had taken many opportunities of negotiations without any result initiated a large-scale battle against the enemy in the area, which resulted in a bitter defeat. More than 1,400 Tibetan soldiers died or were injured."⁷⁰⁷ In the immediate aftermath of the battle the British are portrayed as celebrating by "set [ing] fire to Buddhist monasteries, ransacked the homes of the Tibetans, and performed other evil deeds."⁷⁰⁸

The battle at Nenyang Monastery forms a large part of the Chinese narrative and the story of the heroic defence of the monastery forms an excellent foil to the losses suffered at Chumi Shonko. On the web page *Aged lamasery tells of Tibet's modern history*⁷⁰⁹ Losang Qamba, a forty-six year old monk from the area, recalls the accounts of the battle he heard as a novice monk some thirty years previously. Qamba records readers that the monastery was built over 1,200 years ago, and

⁷⁰⁴ http://en.tibetculture.net/history/memorabilia/200712/t20071214_302017.htm
Accessed 8th February 2008.

⁷⁰⁵ <http://zt.tibet.cn/english/zt/anti-british/20040200441693358.htm>
Accessed 25th August 2006.

⁷⁰⁶ <http://zt.tibet.cn/english/zt/anti-british/2004020041220163257.htm>
Accessed 8th February 2010.

⁷⁰⁷ <http://zt.tibet.cn/english/zt/anti-british/2004020041220163257.htm>
Accessed 8th February 2010.

⁷⁰⁸ <http://zt.tibet.cn/english/zt/anti-british/20040200441693358.htm>
Accessed 25th August 2006.

⁷⁰⁹ http://eng.tibet.cn/news/today/201003/t20100315_553906.htm
Accessed 10th August 2010.

contained approximately 10,000 monks at the time of the invasion.

A similar account is presented as part of the *Unforgettable Memory* web pages. Lama Qoinjor reportedly arrived at the monastery in 1984 and presents an account of the fighting that he heard from an eighty year old lama when he was a novice monk. He too recalls the burning of the five-storey scripture hall, and asks, "How can we forget such a mayhem unleashed on all Tibetans? As people who cherish the value of peace and tolerance, we can forgive the British, but forgetting the history would mean betrayal."⁷¹⁰ British barbarity and looting is recalled in the *Unforgettable Memory* pages, describing how "the British occupants took away all the precious relics and Buddhist scriptures, turned the Buddhist halls into dining rooms, and drove nails into the prayer wheels to turn them into food conveyors although the Tibetans considered all of these as holy objects."⁷¹¹

Chinese Internet based accounts of the battle at Nenyang are unanimous in their acclaim and eulogy for two brothers from Kongpo. Only one brother is named in the sources, but they are described as the heads of the Kongpo militia that were detached from the main force at Gyantse to defend the monastery against the British. Accounts of their bravery are also found in other sources such as the cartoon book *Shing 'brug g.yul 'gyed* analysed below, but are different in almost all examples. The CTIC describes how "Ngada Nyima Zhaba [A dar Nyi ma grags pa] and his brother ... killed a British officer and some 120 of the invaders. But they themselves died a heroic death during the battle, their blood dripping from the upper steps of the monastery."⁷¹² Visitors to the monastery are today shown bullet holes in the door lintel of the monastery, and the steps were the brothers reportedly died. Their memory is kept alive in the villages surrounding the monastery with "horse racing, archery, and other activities on the first day of the

⁷¹⁰ http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/200408/07/eng20040807_152183.html
Accessed 16th June 2008.

⁷¹¹ <http://zt.tibet.cn/english/zt/anti-british/20040200441693358.htm>
Accessed 25th August 2006.

⁷¹² <http://zt.tibet.cn/english/zt/anti-british/20040200441693358.htm>
Accessed 25th August 2006.

10th month of each Tibetan year (the day of Ngada Nyima Zhaba leaving to fight the British invaders.)"⁷¹³ Likewise the *China Daily* web site records how in Nyingchi Prefecture, Losar is held a day early, a tradition stemming from 1904 when Tibetan troops refused to miss the New Year celebrations, despite having been ordered to leave the village and fight the British.⁷¹⁴

The battle for Gyantse Dzong is afforded little comment and analysis in the Chinese Internet sources. While the backdrop of the battle forms ideal iconography for film or pictorial accounts, the Internet contains predominantly written accounts, and therefore skims the detail of the battle. As with other incidents the numbers involved with the fighting, and the death toll for both the British and the militia defending the Dzong are wildly inflated. One full account records that "the local government of Tibet managed to amass about 16,000 troops, monks and militia, armed with home-made weapons, to reinforce the defenses at Gyangze,"⁷¹⁵ and on the web page *Tibetans fight against British Invasion*, the account describes how in an initial battle "after six hours of arduous fighting, more than 280 enemy soldiers had been shot dead or wounded, and there were 150 casualties on the Tibetan side."⁷¹⁶ Their deaths were avenged by a wily Tibetan commander who "having anticipated that the invaders were going to pillage cows and sheep, the militiamen in Kangma County organised their strongest members to wear camouflage of sheepskin jackets and lie among the flock of sheep at night and they killed 20-30 invaders at one swoop."⁷¹⁷

Most Internet sources recall the heroic final act of defiance by the defenders of the Dzong, and their noble suicidal leap from the cliffs of the fortress. Yi records how

⁷¹³ <http://zt.tibet.cn/english/zt/anti-british/20040200441693358.htm>
Accessed 25th August 2006.

⁷¹⁴ *China Daily*. January 30th 2004.

⁷¹⁵ <http://zt.tibet.cn/english/zt/anti-british/20040200441693358.htm>
Accessed 25th August 2006.

⁷¹⁶ http://en.tibetculture.net/history/memorabilia/200712/t20071214_302017.htm
Accessed 8th February 2008.

⁷¹⁷ http://en.tibetculture.net/history/memorabilia/200712/t20071214_302017.htm
Accessed 8th February 2008.

"some Tibetan soldiers broke through the enemy encirclement and shifted to Barkor Monastery to continue the fight. Those who didn't achieve a timely breakout continued to fight unarmed, and some even died for their country by jumping off the cliffs,"⁷¹⁸ and the CTIC records that "the battle resulted in the death of four heroes who jumped down the cliff facing Baiju Monastery. Their deed will even move the heart of the gods!"⁷¹⁹ In memory of these defiant few all the websites describe Gyantse as the 'City of Heroes' and recall how it was named a 'National Historical and Cultural Town' by The State Council in 1996.⁷²⁰

Chinese Internet sources have little or no mention of the British advance on Lhasa, nor of the skirmishes that took place on the Karo La and other high passes. One site does however recall, "in Gyangtse [sic] Defense Battle, the famous fight, the invaders paid a heavy price. This battle taught a lesson to those invaders while they were facing the indomitable people. Even though Younghusband finally reached Lhasa, he was afraid to live there longer. One of the key reasons was that the Tibetan people have never stopped fighting against invaders since that time."⁷²¹



⁷¹⁸ http://en.tibetculture.net/history/memorabilia/200712/t20071214_302017.htm
Accessed 8th February 2008.

⁷¹⁹ <http://zt.tibet.cn/english/zt/anti-british/2004020041220163257.htm>
Accessed 8th February 2010.

⁷²⁰ <http://zt.tibet.cn/english/zt/anti-british/20040200441693251.htm>
Accessed 25th August 2006.

⁷²¹ http://eng.tibet.cn/culture/tibetology/200801/t20080117_355768.htm
Accessed 22nd March 2007.

Figure 48: "Resisting British invaders in Gyangze. [sic]"⁷²²

Selective History: Commemoration and Vitriol

A major theme in the Chinese Internet sources is one of commemoration and honouring the memory of those who fought against the invasion. The majority of the web pages that present accounts of the Mission end with some form of commemorative activity that takes place each year to remind Tibetans of their history, and the recent centenary has given added opportunity for public displays and commemorative festivals. Hu, writing for *China Tibetology*, reminds us, "at present, it is important to commemorate the Tibetan people and their heroes who sacrificed their lives in this war caused by the British invasion force; it is also important to review the causes of the war and the changes of people's views at the time."⁷²³ However his account of the commemorative events that took place in 2003/4 begins with the preface that in 1904, "Tibet was not a land without its master... As part of the territory of China, Tibet was under the administration of the central government of Qing Dynasty."⁷²⁴

Projects to record the memories of those that took part in fighting the Mission are popular news items for web pages. For example Yi, writing for CTIC, records that "the outstanding achievements Tibetan people made in resisting imperialistic aggression have been recorded in the nation's history,"⁷²⁵ and CTIC has posted a site for *Recollections on Tibet's fight against British invasion in Gyangze [sic]*.⁷²⁶ The site describes how *Gyipu Puncog Cedain* (whose grandfather reportedly took part in the war) and the 'CPC Gyantse Work Committee' decided in the spring of 1958 to collect accounts of the British invasion of 1904 and the resistance of the Gyantse

⁷²² http://eng.tibet.cn/culture/tibetology/200801/t20080117_355768.htm
Accessed 22nd March 2007. The artist is cited as 'Nagbo.'

⁷²³ http://eng.tibet.cn/culture/tibetology/200801/t20080117_355768.htm
Accessed 22nd March 2007.

⁷²⁴ http://eng.tibet.cn/culture/tibetology/200801/t20080117_355768.htm
Accessed 22nd March 2007.

⁷²⁵ http://en.tibetculture.net/history/memorabilia/200712/t20071214_302017.htm
Accessed 8th February 2008.

⁷²⁶ <http://zt.tibet.cn/english/zt/anti-british/2004020041220163129.htm>
Accessed 16th June 2006.

people; "Apart from gathering folk songs, ballads and poems about the resistance against the British invaders, the task also included the collection of related documents, stories and recognition of heroes."⁷²⁷

The site reports that after three months the committee had amassed a 30,000 word document that "included poems extolling life, love and heroes in the war, through which the hatred for British aggression and the criticism towards the government's incompetent command and war-weary attitude was fully expressed, and [also] consisted of all instructions and orders issued to Gyangze, duplicate documents sent to the Gaxag [Kashag] government, and the materials recorded by imperial ministers."⁷²⁸ It is possible that this work is *Bod kyi rig gnas lo rgyus dpyad gzhi'i rgyu cha bdams bsgrigs* as analysed in chapters three, four, and five however it is not possible to confirm this owing to the lack of information on the website. A similar account records how in the 1950s Wei Ke collected stories and songs about the invasion, and published his twenty-seven pages of findings as *The Unyielding Tibetan People*.⁷²⁹ The web site also records film scripts and novels, such as *Gun Sound in 1904* by Liu Ke written in the mid 1950s, and Gao Ping's 1960s book *The Old Castle*. Despite extensive research I have not been able to trace any other information about these books.

Records of the innumerable events that took place to commemorate the centenary of the invasion are found on many Chinese news source web pages and discussion forums. For example, the *China Information* website tells of events that were "held during April to June with the theme of 'remember the painful history; repay our country.'⁷³⁰ The same site also gives details of "Public Knowledge Competitions" to stimulate learning about the events of 1904. The site also

⁷²⁷ <http://zt.tibet.cn/english/zt/anti-british/2004020041220163129.htm>
Accessed 16th June 2006.

⁷²⁸ <http://zt.tibet.cn/english/zt/anti-british/2004020041220163129.htm>
Accessed 16th June 2006.

⁷²⁹ <http://zt.tibet.cn/english/zt/anti-british/2004020041220163257.htm>
Accessed 8th February 2010.

⁷³⁰ <http://www.tibet.cn/english/zt/anti-british/20040200442984543.htm>
Accessed 3rd May 2004.

provides information about the answer sheets for these public exams, which were helpfully published in advanced in *The Tibet Daily*. Likewise the 'Tibetan Party Committee' with the assistance of Tibet University organised "a series of movements of commemoration of Gyangze Anti-British 100th anniversary including speech contest, knowledge competition, academic symposium, theatrical joint performance, reading movement and so on."⁷³¹ Shigatse Technical Secondary School hosted a "speech competition by way of commemoration so that the students can "deliver themselves of respect and yearn to the martyrs."⁷³² The largest commemorative activity took place on the 6th of October 2004, when the 'Local Government of the TAR' organised a "mass meeting for the 100th anniversary of Gyangze anti-British Battle attended by more than 6,000 people,"⁷³³ at which the CTIC recorded that the "Tibetan people have composed a patriotic and heroic song

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The image originally located here has been removed from this electronic version of the thesis for copyright reasons. [Figure 49: Mass meeting commemorating the invasion, Gyantse, October 2004. Unforgettable Memory: Tibet holds mass meeting for the 100th anniversary of Gyangze anti-British Battle. <http://zt.tibet.cn/english/zt/anti-british/2004020041220163035.htm>]

⁷³¹ <http://www.tibet.cn/english/zt/anti-british/20040200442984543.htm>
Accessed 3rd May 2004.

⁷³² www.tibetinfor.com.ca/english/news/shiting-en
Accessed 3rd May 2004.

⁷³³ <http://zt.tibet.cn/english/zt/anti-british/2004020041220163035.htm>
Accessed 8th December 2009.

⁷³⁴ <http://zt.tibet.cn/english/zt/anti-british/2004020041220163035.htm>
Accessed 8th December 2009.

Accessed 8th December 2009.

The British 'Myth of Independence'

The final common theme found in Chinese Internet accounts of the Mission is the repeated accusation that claims of 'Tibetan Independence' originate from the time of the British invasion, and that somehow the British are responsible for this 'myth.' This is augmented by bitter and vitriolic attacks on those academics that present an alternative account of Tibetan history to that found in propaganda sources. These attacks seem to be focused on two individuals, one Tibetan, the other Dutch.

The main source for information about origins of the 'Myth of Independence' is the CTIC with the website hosting pages titled, *Unforgettable Memory: British Invasion and the Birth of the Myth of 'Tibetan Independence'*. The site explains how "the myth of "Tibetan independence," which evolved during the late nineteenth century, is actually the product of the imperialist invasion of China, with the British invaders in Tibet as the chief architects."⁷³⁵ The site describes the Chinese and foreign authors that have studied Chinese history and the 'myth of independence' and highlights the work of 'Yang Gongsu' who "tells of this period of history in an all-round and systematic way."⁷³⁶ His work is used on the website to counter the writings of those that do not follow the propagandist line.

This format is repeated on other Chinese sites, for example, after relating the history of the battle at Nenyang Monastery, Nagwang Tsering, a professor of the Tibet Academy of Social Sciences, is quoted as saying "it was in the battle that the British imperialists began to foster pro-British forces in Tibet's upper class and incite Tibet's local government to oppose China's Central Government, in an attempt to separate Tibet from China and turn it into British subordination."⁷³⁷

⁷³⁵ <http://zt.tibet.cn/english/zt/anti-british/20040200441693321.htm>
Accessed 8th March 2009.

⁷³⁶ <http://zt.tibet.cn/english/zt/anti-british/20040200441693321.htm>
Accessed 8th March 2009.

⁷³⁷ http://eng.tibet.cn/news/today/201003/t20100315_553906.htm

Language and terminology is proffered as proof for the British origins of the 'myth of independence' and Tsering is quoted as having discovered that "the word of "independence" was not used in the Tibetan language until the British invasion of Tibet, and that the so-called 'Tibet issue' is the result of imperialist invasion of China."⁷³⁸ The Chinese news web site *China Daily* quotes Ngagwang Cering (the same name transcribed differently) elaborating that, "the concept of Tibet independence was nothing but a product of British scheme to alienate Tibet from China, and to serve the interest of the colonial empire which hoped at that time to put Tibet at its beck and call."⁷³⁹

While many sites do not provide analysis of why the British would seek to promote Tibetan independence Index-China.com is candid in its assertion that "It is obvious that British and America support to Tibet independent movement is not for freedom or human right. It is purely a political game. It shows again and again their ambitious in taking over China and their continuous anti-Chinese sentiment, which has been exercised for a few hundred years."⁷⁴⁰ While analysis of the British origins of the myth is not developed, the Americans are accused of "projection of "collective guilt" over the mistreatment of American Indians is with little doubt the psychological root of most pro-Dalai activism."⁷⁴¹

The two academies reserved for especial insult and vitriol on Chinese propaganda websites are Tsepon Shakapa and Michael van Walt van Praag. Shakapa's analysis of the events of 1904 is examined in chapter five and his sympathy for the Tibetan Government in Exile is well documented.⁷⁴² Van Praag's *The Status of Tibet: History,*

Accessed 10th August 2010.

⁷³⁸ http://eng.tibet.cn/news/today/201003/t20100315_553906.htm

Accessed 10th August 2010.

⁷³⁹ http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/200408/07/eng20040807_152183.html

Accessed 16th June 2008.

⁷⁴⁰ <http://www.index-china.com/index-english/Tibet-s.html>

Accessed 8th February 2010.

⁷⁴¹ <http://www.index-china.com/index-english/Tibet-s.html>

Accessed 8th February 2010.

⁷⁴² SHAKABPA, WANGCHUK DEDEN. TSEPON. 2010. *One Hundred Thousand Moons: An Advanced Political History of Tibet*. Leiden: Brill.

*Rights and Prospects in International Law*⁷⁴³ draws on his experience as the former director of the Tibetan Affairs Coordination Office in the Netherlands and training as an international lawyer. His conclusion that "Tibet has long been an independent country, dating back for centuries,"⁷⁴⁴ and analysis that the Seventeen Point Agreement "was signed under duress and therefore the agreement lacked validity under international law" both raise Chinese hackles. The concluding lines of his book are often quoted and ridiculed on Chinese web pages; "How can China - one of the most ardent opponents of imperialism and colonialism - excuse its continued presence in Tibet, against the wishes of the Tibetan people, by citing as justification Mongol and Manchu imperialism and its own colonial policies?"⁷⁴⁵

The CTIC web pages provide sweeping dismissal of Shakapa's account. His description of the annexation of Sikkim by the British is criticised as "suddenly the focus shifts to say that the government of Bangladesh sent people to Xigaze [Shigatse] and the British leased Darjeeling from Sikkim. But it says nothing about why the Bangladesh government sent people to Xigaze and why the British leased Darjeeling from Sikkim."⁷⁴⁶ How this may be relevant to the Mission in 1904 is unfortunately not analysed. The choice of his language is also criticised and CTIC rebukes his account as when "quoting historical records to make a "purely objective" description of the war, he does not; however, use "aggression" or "invasion" to describe the British move."⁷⁴⁷ It accuses him of not recording the accusations found in Chinese accounts of British troops looting, murdering, and raping their way to Lhasa, and "refrains from lauding the heroic anti-aggression struggles waged by Tibetan soldiers and civilians."⁷⁴⁸ *China Tibetology* develops

⁷⁴³ VAN PRAAG, MICHAEL C VAN WALT. 1987. *The Historical Status of Tibet: History, Rights, and Prospects in International Law*. New York, NY: Westview Press. (Also see, 'A Summary.' Accessed 5th August 2010. <http://tibet.dharmakara.net/tibethistory.html>)

⁷⁴⁴ VAN PRAAG, MICHAEL C VAN WALT. 1987. p. 33.

⁷⁴⁵ VAN PRAAG, MICHAEL C VAN WALT. 1987. p. 129.

⁷⁴⁶ <http://zt.tibet.cn/english/zt/anti-british/20040200441693321.htm>
Accessed 8th March 2009.

⁷⁴⁷ <http://zt.tibet.cn/english/zt/anti-british/20040200441693358.htm>
Accessed 25th August 2006.

⁷⁴⁸ <http://zt.tibet.cn/english/zt/anti-british/20040200441693358.htm>

this criticism accusing Shakapa of "positively argue [ing] that the invasion force did not plunder and they paid homage to the local religion."⁷⁴⁹ In a final attack on his partiality CTIC claims "Xabagga manages to detach himself from the reality or take a "neutral" stand in dealing with the British invasion of Tibet. But in doing so, he becomes a loyal supporter of the British invaders."⁷⁵⁰

Van Praag is criticised for two different reasons. Firstly his assessment that Tibet was an independent country at the time of the peaceful liberation and that there was a three way scramble for Tibet is rebuked owing to the fact that the "British and Russian invasions of Tibet was illegal because they infringed upon the territorial integrity of China and undermined China's unification. The strengthening of Chinese rule over Tibet was legal because it helped maintain state sovereignty and was favorable for national unification."⁷⁵¹ His assessment is reportedly "wrong because it confuses invasions with the invaded and illegal moves with legal moves."⁷⁵² He is secondly criticised for his analysis of the events of 1904, and like Shakapa he is accused of "turning a blind eye to the facts that the British troops conducted merciless slaughter in Qoimishango [Chumi Shonko], destroying and looting the Nai'nying [Nenyng], Zijing and Palkor [Pelkor Chöde] monasteries, and conducting looting and raping in Gyangze."⁷⁵³ The final attack on Van Praag is identical to that leveled against Shakapa, namely that "his efforts to absolve the British troops from guilt for their crimes in Tibet serve only to show him as a defender of colonialists and imperialists."⁷⁵⁴

Accessed 25th August 2006.

⁷⁴⁹ http://eng.tibet.cn/culture/tibetology/200801/t20080117_355768.htm

Accessed 22nd March 2007.

⁷⁵⁰ <http://zt.tibet.cn/english/zt/anti-british/20040200441693358.htm>

Accessed 25th August 2006.

⁷⁵¹ <http://zt.tibet.cn/english/zt/anti-british/20040200441693321.htm>

Accessed 8th March 2009.

⁷⁵² <http://zt.tibet.cn/english/zt/anti-british/20040200441693321.htm>

Accessed 8th March 2009.

⁷⁵³ <http://zt.tibet.cn/english/zt/anti-british/20040200441693358.htm>

Accessed 25th August 2006.

⁷⁵⁴ <http://zt.tibet.cn/english/zt/anti-british/20040200441693358.htm>

Accessed 25th August 2006.

But the bias and predisposition shown by van Praag and Shakapa pale into insignificance when compared to that of Hu Yan writing in *China Tibetology*; In his article Yan references and quotes from a 1995 book "called Trance of Tibet written by Patrick French"⁷⁵⁵ describing the book as important as it was based on new materials. At best Yan may have confused the date and title of French's 1994 *Younghusband: The Last Great Imperial Adventurer*,⁷⁵⁶ at worst he has fabricated a book that supports his case.⁷⁵⁷ Yan claims that in the book French concludes,

In the fight in Chumig Shongko [Chumi Shonko], Younghusband set up a trick to deceive the Tibetan army firstly, and the invaders fired first and deliberately brought about that massacre; but afterward, Younghusband again made a story to deceive the public, in which he said it was the Tibetans who opened fire first, in order to relieve himself from the blame.⁷⁵⁸

These are not the conclusions of French's study of Younghusband. Indeed, his apt conclusion to the section relating to the massacre at Chumi Shonko French muses "I felt that misunderstanding and mutual incomprehension were the essence of the conflict... For historical myths and perceptions are more potent than any factual record. History is what people believe it to be."⁷⁵⁹ Yan's second accusation, again purportedly supported by French, is that "not only the British invaders but also Younghusband himself participated the plunder."⁷⁶⁰ While the issue of looting during the Mission's advance to Lhasa is analysed extensively in chapter six below, it unfortunate that the reference Yan gives from French's book⁷⁶¹ refer to Younghusband's appointment as British Resident in Kashmir, not looting in Tibet.

⁷⁵⁵ http://eng.tibet.cn/culture/tibetology/200801/t20080117_355768.htm
Accessed 22nd March 2007.

⁷⁵⁶ FRENCH, PATRICK. 1994.

⁷⁵⁷ I can find no mention of the book anywhere except from his article, and Patrick French has confirmed in private correspondence that he has not authored any book by that title. 'Trance of Tibet' is however the name of a 'Red Buddha' compilation CD of electronic dance music.

⁷⁵⁸ http://eng.tibet.cn/culture/tibetology/200801/t20080117_355768.htm
Accessed 22nd March 2007.

⁷⁵⁹ FRENCH, PATRICK. 1994. p. 226.

⁷⁶⁰ http://eng.tibet.cn/culture/tibetology/200801/t20080117_355768.htm
Accessed 22nd March 2007.

⁷⁶¹ FRENCH, PATRICK. 1994. pp. 258-265.

Cartoon Book: The War of the Wood Dragon Year

Shing 'brug g.yul 'gyed [*The War of the Wood Dragon Year*] by Tsering Dhondup is a paperback cartoon book illustrated by Gao Shi Hung and A. Bu. First published in 1995 by the Tibetan People's Publishing House and printed by the Tibetan Military Printers, it is currently available in most bookshops in Lhasa, and is especially popular in Gyantse. The black and white sketch cartoon format appeals primarily to children, and the book compliments the educational syllabus for school children in Tibet. The book is written in modern Tibetan, and presents a Chinese patriotic rendering of the main events during the British Mission, and focuses on the heroic battle at Gyantse Dzong.

There are three central themes to the cartoons; the cruel cunning of the British officers, the disgraceful actions of their men, and the noble defence by the heroic Tibetans. We are told in the preface that the book was written, "because the authors believe that everyone, from children to old people, should know the true history of 1904."⁷⁶² However as with many sources of propaganda presented here, the images constructed and events described contradict themselves, and differ sharply from those found in British historical accounts. The cartoon book is however identical to British historical accounts in one perspective; Tibetans troops are depicted in mediaeval or antique arms and armour, starkly contrasted by the artillery and Maxim guns deployed by the British. As with the photographs found in Waddell's account of the Mission examined in chapter one this depiction is misleading and it is highly unlikely that such armour was used outside ceremonial occasions.

⁷⁶² DHONDUP, TSERING. 1995. *The War of the Wood Dragon Year*. [*shing 'brug g.yul 'gyed*.] Lhasa: The Tibetan People's Publishing House. Preface. *'de nang 'khod pa'i bod rigs dpon dmag rnams dang snga phyi'i gyul 'khrug khag lo rgyus thog dngos su byung ba'i gnas tshul ngo ma rang la gshi btsol te bris pa shig yin pas lo chung byis pa rnams kyis mtshon pa'i rgya che'i klog pa po chos skabs de'i lo rgyus dngos la mkhyen rtogs dang 'brel rang rigs mes po rnams kyi bla na med pa'i snying stobs la slob sbyong gnang rgyur phan 'gyur che snyam mo /*

The image originally located here has been removed from this electronic version of the thesis for copyright reasons. [Figure 50: Tibetan commanders and troops in antique armour similar to their depiction in historical British narratives. DHONDUP, TSERING. 1995. p.30]

The account begins with a romantic description of Tibet as, "a unique place, so clean and special, surrounded by the white snow mountains, where the food is nutritious, and there is an abundance of water and crops, there is no illness nor famine. This land is our country"⁷⁶³ and continues, "it is a very peaceful place, and the people's lives are very pleasant." This differs starkly with not only British accounts of Tibet at the time of the Mission, but also with other Chinese propaganda sources that emphasise the poverty and repression that Tibetans suffered under the rule of the Dalai Lamas until the 'peaceful liberation' of Tibet in 1950.

Austine Waddell for one was not impressed with conditions in Tibetan settlements, describing Phagri as, "appallingly foul and dirty, possibly the dirtiest and foulest town on earth... The people of Phari-the-Foul, are in thorough keeping with the squalor and filth amidst which they live. They are sunk into the lowest depths of savagery."⁷⁶⁴ Even in Lhasa there was little evidence of the clean and special surroundings described in the cartoon book. Holdich's gripping and lucid

⁷⁶³ DHONDUP, TSERING. 1995. p. 1. *sa gtsang ba zas bcud che la lo chu 'dzoms shing nad mug med pa sogs dge mtshan du mas phyug pa'i yul khyad par can shig yud pa 'di ni rang rnams kyi pha yul bod ljongs shes pa de yin /*

⁷⁶⁴ WADDELL, AUSTINE. 1905. p. 100.

description of a Lhasa in 1904 is graphic: "It is in truth a scattered, unkempt, and ill-regulated town, full of impurities, infested with savage dogs, obscene pigs, and night prowlers, revelling in many most unholy institutions."⁷⁶⁵

The cartoon book provides a brief and biased description of Anglo-Tibetan relations up to the 'third invasion war' (i.e. the Mission of 1903/4). It describes how in the year of the Water Tiger⁷⁶⁶ the British committed their "second act of aggression against Tibet" by invading Khamba Dzong with about one hundred fully armed troops. The local Tibetan population and the army "fought shoulder to shoulder, and charged the enemy and repulsed them away,"⁷⁶⁷ their actions culminated in a famous Tibetan victory. The British were humiliated by this loss, and changed their tactics to the invasion of Lhasa under the guise of trade talks.

This tactical change resulted in "Englishmen [being] sent to Lhasa to make an agreement with the Tibetan Government."⁷⁶⁸ The last Englishman to have visited Lhasa was Thomas Manning in December 1811, and therefore this account must be fictitious. There is some confusion in the pages that follow as to whether the events describe the stalled talks at Khamba Dzong or this unspecified delegation to Lhasa; however from the outset the true intention of the British is described as "using every opportunity to invade further into Tibet, in order kill and rob, and were thinking only about occupying Tibet."⁷⁶⁹ The accompanying cartoon shows a caricature imperialist, with cravat and monocle, contemplating a map of China featuring an advancing British flag.

⁷⁶⁵ HOLDICH, THOMAS. 1906. *Tibet the Mysterious*. London: A. Rivers. p. 256.

⁷⁶⁶ Year of the Water Tiger: 1902.

⁷⁶⁷ DHONDUP, TSERING. 1995. p. 4. *rdzong srung bod dmag dang yul 'bangs mi ser rnams dpung pa mnyam gshib kyis dgra thog tu mtshongs nas btsan 'dzul pa rnams phyir bskrad de rang khongs sa mtshoms kyi sbo tho rnams lngar bshin brtan por btsugs /*

⁷⁶⁸ DHONDUP, TSERING. 1995. p. 6. *1903 lo'i zla bshi pa'i nang lha sar bod dbyin chings mol /*

⁷⁶⁹ DHONDUP, TSERING. 1995. p. 8. *don du kho pa tshos go skabs yod tshad spyad de bon du nas 'dzul gyis mi gsod 'phrog bcom gyi byi nang spel mus su gnas /*

The image originally located here has been removed from this electronic version of the thesis for copyright reasons. [Figure 51: Younghusband plots the invasion of Tibet. DHONDUP, TSERING. 1995. p.8]

The subordination of the Ganden Phodrang to the Manchu Government's Resident Amban is assumed throughout the cartoon book. It is demonstrated when, as soon as news of the Missions presence in Tromo reaches Lhasa, the Kashag's first action is to "meet with the Amban resident in Tibet... the Amban said in consultation that he was firmly of the opinion that no shot should be fired to stop the British."⁷⁷⁰

This interpretation of history can not be accurate; the Amban had not yet reached the Tibetan capital, and when he finally arrived in Lhasa, one Western historian has commented that, "he might as well have been in Liverpool for all the influence he was exerting on Tibetan policy."⁷⁷¹ The book however does not blame the Amban for the divided opinion at the heart of the Ganden Phodrang over how to counter the British advance. Later accounts accuse the Amban of becoming too close, or even supporting the British Mission, seeking duplicitously to further Peking's influence in the Tibetan capital by demonstrating the weakness of the Tibetan position.

⁷⁷⁰ DHONDUP, TSERING. 1995. p. 12. *bka' shag tu gnas tshul 'byor 'phral bod sdodd yam ban dang srid bka' lhan gros skabs yam ban nas bod dbyin dbar shi gros kho na las dbyin 'gog me mda' rgyag mi chog pa dang srid bka' thun mong nas drag dpung la brten te btsan 'dzul pa 'gog dgos pa'i dgongs gshi tha gag du gyur nas re shig dgra bong pa bya rgyal du btang /*

⁷⁷¹ FLEMING, PETER. 1961. p. 162.

In the account the reaction of the Tibetan lay and monastic population is described as being overwhelming. Ordinary Tibetans are shown presenting a petition to the government "begging that they be allowed to come and fight the enemy."⁷⁷² Monks and representatives of the Three Seats are likewise portrayed arguing that, "When the Buddha dharma is threatened by the enemy, they should be allowed to turn their dharma parasols into fighting spears."⁷⁷³ Such scenes are intended to depict the unity of the Tibetan people when facing a common aggressor, mirrored in later cartoons by their fervour in fighting for the unity of China.

In an account replicated in *Bod kyi rig gnas lo rgyus dpyad gzhi'i rgyu cha bdams bsgrigs*, the British officers are shown bribing two of their Sikkimese porters to act as spies and bring them detailed information about the Tibetan forces and their movements. One of these spies is captured and confesses to a Tibetan general, but the other reports back on the strength and determination of the Tibetan troops and villagers. This gives the "worried and frightened" British commanders some "hesitation as to whether to invade or not."⁷⁷⁴

In the pages portraying the build up the battle at Chumi Shonko the British are show to deceitfully send a letter to the Tibetans asking them to come to the hot springs in order to settle their differences. Inexplicably however the accompanying drawing shows a 1970s office block, complete with typewriters, angle poise lamps and swivel chairs. The Tibetan Generals duly arrive for the talks, but soon find that the British, who have occupied the mountaintops covering their position, have surrounded them on all sides. Examples of trickery and deception by the invaders abound in the cartoon, and in each case the British commanders are shown plotting their tactics prior to the plot being enacted. Whilst the Tibetans are not

⁷⁷² DHONDUP, TSERING. 1995. p. 14. *rnag khyim du spyang ki shor yub ba'i gnas tshul bod ljongs yongs la khyab pa'i tsho bod yul ltod smad bar gsum nas bka' shag tu snyan shu rim 'bul gyis btsan 'dzul par kha gtad gcog rgyu'i re ba shus pa ma zad / se 'bras dga' gsum gyi spyi 'thus kyang bka' shag tu bskyod nas bstan par dgrang dus 'khar gsil mdung tshab byed rgyu'i re skyul zhus /*

⁷⁷³ DHONDUP, TSERING. 1995. p. 14.

⁷⁷⁴ DHONDUP, TSERING. 1995. p. 20. *nyul ma gcig shos de bros shor bsa dbyin dmag sar 'byor rjes khos btsan 'dzul pa' 'go gtso rnams la nye 'khor yul tsho khag la bod kyi dmag sgar rim pa yod lugs brjod 'phral bcan 'dzul pa rnams 'jigs skrag bskyed nas dpung 'jug byed rgyu the tshom gyi gnas su gyar /*

represented as naïve, they never fail to fall into the traps made by their enemies, despite their bravery and determination.

Throughout the book, Younghusband especially is branded with cowardice and a lack of leadership. This cowardice is not without cunning however. He is often depicted smoking a pipe and plotting how best to trick the Tibetans into surrender or defeat. *Shing 'brug g.yul 'gyed* shows Younghusband plotting the massacre at Chumi Shonko by ordering the British troops to pretend to disarm by removing one bullet from the barrel of their rifles, but leaving the full magazine attached.⁷⁷⁵

The image originally located here has been removed from this electronic version of the thesis for copyright reasons. [Figure 52: Younghusband plots with Macdonald how to disarm the Tibetans while British troops are removing a single bullet from their rifles. DHONDUP, TSERING. 1995. p.24]

⁷⁷⁵ DHONDUP, TSERING. 1995. p. 24. *shi gros byed 'go 'dzugs khar dbyin dmag gi 'go gtso had se phing gis chings gros legs grub yong phyir bsnyad btags nas phyogs gnyis ka'i mtshon cha phab dgos lugs brjod pa dang 'brel dbyin dmag gi me mda'i nang gi mde'i 'don du bcug khul gyis bod dmag gi me mda'i sbud ti yam gsod dgos lugs brjod* / "When they were about to start peaceful negotiations, General Younghusband suggested that both sides should disarm. He pretended to order the British troops to empty the bullets from their rifles, and told the Tibetans to put out the fuses on their guns."

Once the Tibetans had been safely disarmed the second part of the British plan is enacted, and "they flung aside their verbal promise, and suddenly one of the British officers pulled out his gun and started shooting at the Tibetans. He killed two Tibetan Generals on the spot."⁷⁷⁶

The image originally located here has been removed from this electronic version of the thesis for copyright reasons. [Figure 53: A British officer opens fire during negotiations at Chumi Shonko. DHONDUP, TSERING. 1995. p.26]

Shing 'brug g.yul 'gyed gives graphic and passionate accounts of British troops looting homes and monasteries. One caption claims that "the British army entered like a hungry wolf into the valley, they killed the men and raped the women. They then robbed and pillaged, and on the way they set fire to monasteries such as Changling Monastery and Kumbum Monastery, as well as many other monasteries. The soldiers started robbing the precious statues and scriptures in a free for all."⁷⁷⁷ Following the fall of Nenyang Monastery, the text claims that British troops "went

⁷⁷⁶ DHONDUP, TSERING. 1995. p. 26. *btsan 'dzum pas rang gi gyo jus lam lhongs bying mtshams kha dan rgyab bskiyur gyis glo bur du dbyin ji'i dmag dpon shig gis bod dmag dpon rigs tsho'i thog tu me mda' 'phangs te mda' dpon lha sdings pa dang rnam sra gling pa sogs de gar bkrongs /*

⁷⁷⁷ DHONDUP, TSERING. 1995. p. 32. *dbyin dmag 'di bshin g can gzan ltogs pa klung du chas pa ltar gar slebs sar pho gsod mo spyod dang jag bcom rku phrog gi bya ngan brtsams te lam shor du byang gling dang sku 'bum sogs dgon khag mang po mer bsreg btang nas sku gsung thugs rten rnams su tab su thob kyis khyer /*

inside and looted things, engaged in limitless barbaric acts beyond humanity. They set fire to the monastery and destroyed it."⁷⁷⁸

The image originally located here has been removed from this electronic version of the thesis for copyright reasons. [Figure 54: British troops loot Nenyang Monastery shortly after it is taken at bayonet point. DHONDUP, TSERING. 1995. p.72]

Such despicable acts by British soldiers are immediately contrasted by long accounts of bravery and sacrifice by Tibetan troops and militia. The cartoon book gives prominence to the ambush at 'Dzatan'⁷⁷⁹ in which General bKras gling pa and his men waited for the British vanguard atop of ravine before hurling rocks and logs down the steep slopes, before attacking 'like a thunderbolt.' We are told that the fighting lasted for three whole days, before the British finally used their long-range artillery to clear the Tibetans from the high ground.

Episodes that do not appear in the British accounts are given prominence in *Shing 'brug g.yul 'gyed*. For example, we are told how "one day the British were camping on the other side of the mountain at Khangmar near Sholam Monastery. General bKras gling pa lead a force and under the cover of darkness and attacked the invader's camp rendering it like Yama's⁷⁸⁰ slaughter yard."⁷⁸¹ In this attack, which

⁷⁷⁸ DHONDUP, TSERING. 1995. p. 72. *gnas rnying dgon pa'i bod dmag rnams rgyer phyir 'then byas rjes dgra bas dgon nang du 'dzul nas gtsug lag khang de'i nang dngos rdzas rnams rku khyer sreg gcog sogs kla klo'i spyod ngan ci rigs spel nas dgon par gtor skyon tsad med btang /*

⁷⁷⁹ Dzatan: I cannot locate this.

⁷⁸⁰ Yama. Tib. *gShin rje* is the Lord of Death in Tibetan Buddhism.

can only tally with the audacious night attack on the Mission headquarters at Changlo Manor, the cartoon records over one hundred British troops killed and injured. The accompanying cartoon shows British troops fleeing the attack, and surrendering to the Tibetan officers on their knees with a white flag held aloft.

The image originally located here has been removed from this electronic version of the thesis for copyright reasons. [Figure 55: British officers surrender to Tibetan troops. DHONDUP, TSERING. 1995. p.52]

The account emphasises the role of the two brothers from Kongpo, naming the older brother as *Ata Nyima Takpa* (in other accounts, *A dar Nyi ma grags pa*.) The accounts of their heroism and ultimate sacrifice is similar to that found in the museum's text panels; During the hand-to-hand fighting at Nenyng the brothers are described as "fighting behind enemy lines, beheading the enemy like you remove the heads from a sheaf of barley, and they were falling down like timber."⁷⁸² The account also inflates the number of enemy casualties in all battles between the British and the Tibetans. As an example the cartoon book claims that at the battle for Nenyng Monastery "the Tibetans killed or wounded about two hundred British soldiers, achieving a great victory. The village people shouted and screamed, 'The Ata (Kongpo) warriors have come, the British have been knocked

⁷⁸¹ DHONDUP, TSERING. 1995. p. 33. *shin shig dbyin dmag khang dmar ri rgyab kyi sho lam dgon du shag sdod byid skabs rang dmag gi mda' dpon bkras gling pas bod dmag khrid de dbyin dmag gi sgar sar mtshan 'gebs btang nas btsan 'dzul pali dpung sgar gshin rje'i tsal ltar dkrugs /*

⁷⁸² DHONDUP, TSERING. 1995. p. 70. *bod dmag tshos dgra bo'i dpung sgar gshags te dgra mgo snye rdog breg breg dang phung po thang sing 'gyel 'gyel du btang/*

down on the ground, and the stone steps of Nenyng Monastery, are running red with blood.' They sang this song to praise the bravery of the Tibetan soldiers."⁷⁸³ British accounts record only three casualties at Nenyng; Private Sampson of the Royal Fusiliers recorded in his dairy "...then our Maxims had a turn at them, knocking them over like skittles... when the losses are counted up there were 200 of the enemy killed. The wounded crawled away into caves & holes in the hills."⁷⁸⁴

The language used in the cartoon is heavily influenced throughout by Chinese propaganda. For example when Tibetan leaders are killed, the text reminds readers that they died "for the Motherland."⁷⁸⁵ Likewise when isolated at the top of the Dzong in Gyantse, the "heroic Tibetan soldiers made a promise to defend their Motherland."⁷⁸⁶

Dhondup claims in the cartoon book that the siege of Gyantse Dzong lasted "for a [further] month, and in this way the Tibetan soldiers repulsed the enemy without losing even a fistful of ground."⁷⁸⁷ While the assault on the Dzong only occupies a small number of pages, the build up to the battle, and the preparations made by the Tibetan army and militia are presented in great detail. The British decide to shell the Dzong with their artillery from the confines of Changlo Manor, and a stray shell is depicted as scoring an unintentional direct hit on the Tibetan gun power store, causing a massive explosion that breached the thick walls of the Dzong.

The British soon seized this opportunity and advance in two columns of troops to the walls of the Dzong. Realising that the resistance was now futile, "General Ata

⁷⁸³ DHONDUP, TSERING. 1995. p. 71. *gnas rnying g.yul 'gyed nang bod dmag tshos dbyin dmag nyis brgya lhag tsam bsad rmas btang nas rgyal kha chen po blangs pas yul mi tshos ya dar kong dmag slebs byung dbyin ji sa la brdabs song gnas rnying dgon pa'i rdo gcal dmar po'i khrag gis 'tshos song shes bod dmag dpa' rgod tshor bsangs brjod byed kyi yod/*

⁷⁸⁴ Diary of Private Sampson, Royal Fusiliers, cited in ALLEN, CHARLES. 2004a. p. 201.

⁷⁸⁵ DHONDUP, TSERING. 1995. p. 58. *mes rgyal.*

⁷⁸⁶ DHONDUP, TSERING. 1995. p. 89. *bod dmag dpa' rgod tshos pha yul srung skyob byed pa'i dam bca' brtan por bkod nas btsan 'dzul dmag gi drug shugs kyi mdun du gnya' ma shum par dpa' ngar chen pos gyul bsres te dgra dmag phon 'bor mi chung ba rtsa med btang /*

⁷⁸⁷ DHONDUP, TSERING. 1995. p. 103. *de ltar zla ngo gcig lhag tsam ring bod dmag tshos dkra bo'i tshur rgol lan tshar mar po bzlog nas rang sa sbar mthil tsham yam dgra lag tu ma shor bar brdan por bsrungs /*

Nyima addressed the remaining fighting brothers in arms saying, 'Now we have reached the end, it is better to take our own lives rather than be alive under the enemies!' As soon as he said this, they all linked hands and decided to leap to their deaths together."⁷⁸⁸ For a full analysis of this and other claims of mass suicide at the Dzong see the conclusions below; however the claim is given added poignancy in the book by the closing sequence of cartoons. After recording that the Tibetan troops "gave their lives in the defence of the Motherland without letting even their shadows fall into the enemy's hands,"⁷⁸⁹ the plates show the remaining troops jumping from the steep cliffs to the rear of the Dzong.

The image originally located here has been removed from this electronic version of the thesis for copyright reasons. [Figure 56: The remaining Tibetans defenders prepare to jump to their deaths rather than be captured alive by the British. DHONDUP, TSERING. 1995. p.118]

The final plate depicts the heroes looking down upon the modern town of Gyantse while a dance festival is conducted to their eternal memory. The caption reminds readers "although many heroic Tibetan soldiers died in the defence of the Motherland, this unmatched heroism of our heroes will be remembered forever."⁷⁹⁰

⁷⁸⁸ DHONDUP, TSERING. 1995. p. 116. *ru dpon ya dar nyi grags kyis 'thab grogs lhag bsdad tshor lta bshin tshig thag chod pos da ni mtha' ma'i dus la gtugs pas dgra 'og tu gsog pa las rang srog rang gis lcebs na dga' shes brjog mtshoms tshang mas lag gdang sbrel de mnyam du lce'i blo thag bcad /*

⁷⁸⁹ DHONDUP, TSERING. 1995. p. 119. *mchongs te rang gi shi khrag phung po'i grib ma tsham yang dgra lag tu ma sprad par pha yul srung skyob byed ched gces pa'i tshe srog legs skyes su phul /*

⁷⁹⁰ DHONDUP, TSERING. 1995. p. 120. *bod dmag dpa' rgod rnams mes rgyal gyi yul gru srung skyob byed ched 'jig rten pha rol tub yon na yang rang rigs dba' rgod tsho'i do zla bral pa'i snying stobs 'di ji srid bskal brgya'i bar du mi nub bar gnas nes yin no /*

It has been noted that nationalistic narratives and propaganda images of China's minorities often give prominence to traditionally dressed women typically engaged in dancing, singing, traditional festivities, or craft activities.⁷⁹¹ Vickers has suggested that such depictions project an image of minorities as non-threatening, and backward, "gratefully dependent on the Han 'Big brother' for technological progress and socioeconomic development."⁷⁹²

The image originally located here has been removed from this electronic version of the thesis for copyright reasons. [Figure 57: Tibetan heroes of the Wood Dragon Year look down on annual celebrations in Gyantse. DHONDUP, TSERING. 1995. p.119]

The Memorial Hall of Anti-British

Museums and their exhibitions and displays are crucial to our understanding of history, culture, 'Others' and ourselves. What is, and what is not, presented in museums is a highly contentious topic globally, and those who control the content and presentation of objects carry enormous cultural and political weight. Museums therefore are tools for education, both in a pedagogical sense as a resource for

⁷⁹¹ See for example, BULANG, URADYN. 2002. *The Mongols at China's Edge: History and the Politics of National Unity*. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield.

⁷⁹² VICKERS, EDWARD. 2006. *Defining the Boundaries of "Chineseness." Tibet, Mongolia, Taiwan and Hong Kong in Mainland History Textbooks*. In, FOSTER, STUART AND KEITH CRAWFORD. 2006. *What shall we tell the Children? International Perspectives on School History Textbooks*. Greenwich, CT: Information Age Publishing. p. 41.

students and teachers, but also in a political connotation as they can selectively inform their visitors.

Although there are relatively few museums in Tibet, Chinese policy and Party line is strictly maintained; Vickers has noted, "in mainland China ... the parameters defining acceptable interpretation of history for museums are largely set by the government."⁷⁹³ This policy alloys museums with other new media in the presentation of a united China, and anti-imperialist narrative. The Memorial Hall is therefore central to the "Communist narrative of Gyantse, [in which] the Tibetans a stand-in for the Chinese who were victimised by foreign powers during the Qing dynasty," and is a "convenient fit into their [the Chinese] master narrative for Tibetan and Chinese history."⁷⁹⁴ In this section I examine the content and role of the 'Memorial Hall of Anti-British,' housed in Gyantse Dzong that provides visitors a chance to learn and reflect on the decisive battle there in 1904.

The Memorial Hall and forms part of a larger exhibition of Tibetan history, the majority of which is devoted to representing the tale of the pampered lives of the Dzungpöns, and the various barbaric methods they use to suppress their serf minions.

⁷⁹³ VICKERS, EDWARD. 2007. p. 366.

⁷⁹⁴ WONG, EDWARD. 2010.



Figure 58: The Dzongpön oversees serfs handing in their tax dues in Gyantse Dzong. Photographed by the author in 2008.

Inside the Memorial Hall of Anti-British the room is dominated by a central plaster cast sculpture of a Tibetan throwing a large stone at the advancing British troops, whilst others load a cannon and use slingshots. The walls are adorned with antique arms and armoury, and a television shows *Red River Valley* (see above) on loop. The only British items that clearly originated from the Mission are a small collection of spent bullet cases, labelled "splinters of British troops."⁷⁹⁵ The main sources of information are the large printed display Boards that adorn the walls in both English and Tibetan. While no written historical accounts or referenced works are quoted, the text follows closely the official Chinese narrative as analysed in chapter one. Powers recorded the impression the displays and information made on visitors when he visited the museum in 1999:

⁷⁹⁵ The accompanying Tibetan text reads, "*dbyin dmag gi mdel ro.*" [British army bullet cases.]

I was struck by the fact that Chinese visitors were clearly impressed by the bravery of those Tibetan patriots who fought to remain part of China and defend its territory against foreign encroachment... I saw no indication that they had any doubts regarding the veracity of the narrative, and it was clear that this was a story that most had heard before and accepted as true. What appeared to a Western visitor as PRC propaganda was history to them, and most were clearly moved by what they read.⁷⁹⁶



Figure 59: The Memorial Hall of Anti-British at Gyantse Dzong, and the central feature of the museum, a statue of a Tibetan hurling rocks at the British invaders. Photographed by the author in 2008.

While it would be initially difficult to see how a case displaying spent ammunition might visibly move visitors, a leading museologist Eilean Hooper-Greenhill shows the importance of even minor items in raising questions among visitors.⁷⁹⁷ The same is true of the antique arms and armour displayed. It matters not whether the obsolete items were ever used in the battle or not, what is important in this memorial hall is that they are presented in such a way that stirs national pride by promoting the unity of the minorities with greater China through the futility and bravery of their struggle.

⁷⁹⁶ POWERS, JOHN. 2004. p. 94.

⁷⁹⁷ HOOPER-GREENHILL, EILEAN. (Ed.) 1994. *The Educational Role of the Museum*. London: Routledge. p. 74.

Museums and Unity in China

As examined above, the change of political direction and ideological transformation in China in the last fifteen years has been not only dramatic, but encompassed all sectors, activities, and regions of the Motherland. Vickers has noted, "the displacement of socialism by nationalism as the ideological ballast of the Communist regime has become a commonplace of scholarship on contemporary China."⁷⁹⁸ Naturally this displacement has included policy with regard to museums, their content, and the information they present. As early as 1994 circulars were sent to all officials in China ordering "all tourist spots, such as conservation areas, memorials, historical (especially revolutionary) sites, cultural relic conservation areas, popular architectural sites and even local community centres" to "highlight their patriotic identities."⁷⁹⁹ Furthermore, in October 2000 the Minister of Culture, Sun Jiazheng, addressed the National Conference of Museums, setting out the new government policy for museums in China: "With more than 5000 years of history, China has developed a unique culture, which has captured the interest of people from other countries. When facing much fiercer competition in the cultural field worldwide, museums should intensify efforts to popularise patriotism and socialism."⁸⁰⁰

The history of Gyantse Dzong provides opportunity for local officials to match many of the criteria set out by Minister Jiazheng and present them to not only local Tibetans, large number of foreign visitors (Gyantse being a major staging-post on the 'Friendship Highway' between Nepal and Lhasa), but also an increasing number of affluent Han Chinese tourists who "constitute a ready market for triumphalist displays of the national past."⁸⁰¹ The feudal history, anti-imperialist struggle and panoramic views make Gyantse an ideal location for official propaganda and

⁷⁹⁸ VICKERS, EDWARD. 2007. Museums and Nationalism in Contemporary China. *Compare: A Journal of Comparative and International Education*. Vol. 37. No. 3. pp. 365 - 382.

⁷⁹⁹ ZHAO, SUISHENG. 2004. p. 221.

⁸⁰⁰ <http://www.china.org.cn/English/2000/Oct/2720.htm>
Accessed 30th April 2007.

⁸⁰¹ VICKERS, EDWARD. 2007. p. 366.

identity discourse within Tibet and China. Sites that can emphasise this discourse are being developed all across China, and national targets have been set for the total number of museums and their visitor numbers; In 2002, *The People's Daily* reported that the State Administration of Cultural Heritage had stipulated that China should have 3,000 museums by 2015, including at least one fully-functional museum for every large or medium-sized city.⁸⁰²

China is not alone in its desire to use museums and memorials to further its political message. Across many nations, public commemorations of warfare, political violence, terrorism, and discrimination have become political flashpoints, indeed it may almost be said to be vogue to find ways of commemorating such atrocities.⁸⁰³ The memorial museum is perhaps the most poignant way of doing this on a large scale. Williams' *Memorial Museums: The Global Rush to Commemorate Atrocities* records the rapid growth in museums of this kind, examines over twenty prominent examples, and studies their developing role in social history. He points out that the initial inconsistency in roles between a memorial and a museum can be used to construct a moral framework and explanation to the historical narrative;

This new commemorative form is a compound made necessary by the complication of conventional museological categories. On initial consideration, the memorial museum spells an inherent contradiction. A memorial is to be seen, if not apolitical, at least safe in the refuge of history. An honest evaluation of the dead would be disrespectful. A history museum by contrast is presumed to be concerned with interpretation, contextualisation, and critique. The coalescing of the two suggests that there is an increasing desire to add both a moral framework to the narration of terrible historical events and more in-depth contextual explanations to commemorative acts.⁸⁰⁴

However, in the majority of the examples he examines, the victims are civilians as opposed to trained soldiers or militia. They were killed in circumstances that range from the morally problematic to the utterly inhumane; those who died did so

⁸⁰² http://English.peopledaily.com.cn/200212/20/eng20021220_108815.shtml
Accessed 30th April 2007.

⁸⁰³ WILLIAMS, PAUL. 2007. *Memorial Museums: The Global Rush to Commemorate Atrocities*. Oxford: Berg. p. 2.

⁸⁰⁴ WILLIAMS, PAUL. 2007. p. 8.

'unnaturally,' meaning that their deaths cannot easily be interpreted and represented as heroic, sacrificial, or somehow benefiting the greater good of society or the nation.

The style and propaganda message presented in the Gyantse Memorial Hall is echoed across China, and there are dozens of anti-imperialist museums in towns and cities that carry identical messages. In Guangzhou the 'Sanyuanli Anti-British Invasion Museum' is based in a converted historic Sanyuan Temple not far from the Hong Kong border. The museum's website tells us that "during the Opium War, Sanyuanli people held an anti-British rally in front of the temple, ushering in the successful spontaneous resistance by civilians against foreign invasion in China's early modern history," and in accordance with the Ministry's criteria, also claims that "the ancient Sanyuan Temple has become a revolutionary site with historic significance."⁸⁰⁵



Figure 60: Slingshots and spears displayed in the Memorial Hall of Anti-British in Gyantse. Photographed by the author in 2008.

⁸⁰⁵<http://www.gz.gov.cn/vfs/subsite/JGIN7QPB-AZE4-2MTO-EA6GR281E8V2SFJH/content/content.jsp?contentId=492150&catId=6660>
Accessed 2nd Feb 2009.

All museums of this kind suffer from the underlying problem that as they commemorate destructive or violent episodes from history their 'object base' will by definition have been destroyed or at least damaged. The association with the museum with all things historically precious and valuable is slowly changing, but objects for display, if not actually valuable, must have a certain authenticity that make them suitable for display, and this is simply not the case for the items found in Gyantse. Williams has noted, "compared to conventional history museums there is a basic difficulty with the object base of memorial museums; orchestrated violence aims to destroy, and typically does so efficiently. The injured, dispossessed, and expelled are left 'object poor.' Hence, memorial museums' collections are often restricted in size and scope."⁸⁰⁶ Because of this flaw it is important that those items that are displayed are well labelled, lit, explained and contextualised. Williams again emphasises that "the combination of a calamitous 'story' of the event, its political and existential gravity, and the scarcity of material traces left behind makes the objects that are shown all the more critical."⁸⁰⁷ Sadly again in Gyantse, this is not the case, and the museum relies on text panels to present information to the visitor. This is in line with Sherman's argument that memorials can communicate their significance visually, whereas museums construe history as scientific, rather than commemorative, and therefore require explanatory textual strategies,⁸⁰⁸ however a close examination of this text is required.

Tibet is an unanabte [sic. inalienable] part of the Motherland

Inevitably, the text begins, "Tibet is an unanabte [sic] part of the motherland. In order to safeguard her unification and unite with every nationality, Tibetan people one stepping into the breach as another fell ance [sic] have faught [sic] heroically." The Mission of 1904 is described as the second invasion, in line with the doctrine that the occupation of Sikkim and the war of 1888 formed the first invasion of

⁸⁰⁶ WILLIAMS, PAUL. 2007. p. 25.

⁸⁰⁷ WILLIAMS, PAUL. 2007. p. 30.

⁸⁰⁸ SHERMAN, DANIEL. 1995. Objects of Memory: History and Narrative in French War Memorials. *French Historical Studies*. Vol. 19. No. 1. pp. 49-74.

Tibet. The numbers of British troops involved are inflated to 10,000 in order to demonstrate the overwhelming number of enemy troops the Tibetans faced. The number of Tibetan troops in Gyantse is given as over three thousand "after the Thirteenth Dalai Lama issued a conscription order, the monks and layman from every parts of Tibet enthusiastically [sic] respond to the call." It claims that the heroic battle at Nenyang Monastery and Gyantse Dzong took place in order to "safeguard the sacred [sic] territory of the motherland those heroic Tibetan people added an immortal chapter to the annals of anti invading [sic] wars." After a small poem of dedication the first information Board tells visitors that, "to reappear the magnificent felt in those years, and to cherish the memory of the heroes, material objects, pictures and sculptures are on display in this hall."

The next panel explains how the massacre at Chumi Shonko was inflicted by "Yanhusband [sic] keeping in mind a crafty plot." The text tells visitors that Yanhusband demanded negotiations with "Latingse Dekbom [lHa lding sras], Namseling dekbm [dPal 'byor 'jigs med rNam sras gling], and Sulan ggmuee (the representative of Panchen Lama)" believing the wall to be impassable to the British troops, despite their superior firepower. It follows other Chinese accounts describing how Yanhusband tricked the Tibetan General into ordering their troops to extinguish the fuses on their weapons. The British then encircled the Tibetan positions, whereupon "a British officers pull out his revolver and shot at latingse Dekbon and Namseling Dekbon." A large oil painting of the scene accompanies the text, leaving the reader in no doubt as to who fired the first shot. Realising the trick a bodyguard to the Tibetan General is quoted as alarming the Tibetan troops by crying out "they are to kill our persons [sic]." He then "pulled out his chopper to death more than ten British soldiers including the British Army following reporter Edward Chadler [Edmund Candler]." While Candler was injured in the fighting, he fully recovered and returned to Britain to write a best-selling account of his time in Tibet, *The Unveiling of Lhasa*.⁸⁰⁹

⁸⁰⁹ CANDLER, EDMUND. 1905.

The image originally located here has been removed from this electronic version of the thesis for copyright reasons. [Figure 61: An British officer opens fire at Chumi Shonko. Detail from an oil painting in the Memorial Hall of Anti-British, Gyantse. Photographed by the author in 2008.]

Despite having no means of using their matchlock rifles the Tibetan army was rallied by "Latingse Dekbon [lHa lding sras] [who] pulled out his revolver and shot at sky to signal that Tibetan army initiated general offensive." Brave deeds by Tibetan soldiers are recalled, charging the enemy at close quarters, but the outcome of the battle is not disputed; "The Chomik Shinko [sic, Chumi Shonko] massacre made Tibetan army heavy losses, but their spirits of fighting have been spreading widely among the Tibetan people."The information panels make much of the heroic struggle of the Tibetan militia at Nenyang Monastery, and the loss of life suffered by the British in the face of their opponent's indomitable resistance. The information on this episode covers two large panels of text, as well as a painting depicting the monastery's courtyard as the British make their final attack. The battle at Nenyang is especially evocative owing to the fact that the fighting took place in and around a monastery, as opposed to the open tundra or barren ravines; the notion that the British battered down the strong walls of the monastery with their heavy artillery, massacred the militia in courtyard, before slaughtering the monks in their prayer hall as they sat in peaceful meditation has been presented in numerous propaganda sources, and is copied here.

The memorial hall records the heroic deeds of two brothers from Kongpo, "Ardamnima zhaki [A dar Nyi ma grags pa] with his brother" who "charged the enemy with their choppers, cut the British officer Zasaha's⁸¹⁰ arm into two parts, and also killed more than ten enemies." The text then records how the brothers sacrificed their lives rather than be taken prisoner, and that even to this day folk songs are sung in their honour. One is quoted as "Ardas Gunby warriors cut British chieftain into two parts, the courtyard of Nenying Monastery, became a pond of blood." In interviews at Nenying Monastery in 2007 the few remaining monks showed me the site of where "Synnya Sip" was killed, and where the original five-story prayer hall was situated. The monks claimed that Synnya was killed by one of the Kongpo brothers, and that the British burnt the prayer hall to the ground in 1904. While it is possible that the British burnt the outer buildings, the original seventeenth century prayer hall is still standing at Nenying.

The battle at Gyantse takes two full-length panels of text. The first deals with events after immediately after the fall of the Dzong to the British in April 1904. The text records that the "British troops trod on crops, set fire on the house owned by citizens and also plundered valuables," spurring the Tibetan commander 'Yodok Galun Puntso Wnagdon'⁸¹¹ to recall 1,500 troops from all sectors of Tibet. The battle at Karo La is recorded as a resounding Tibetan victory, before the combined militia and regular troops recaptured the Dzong, Phala, Changlo, and Pelkor Chöde Monastery. During the night attack on the Mission at Changlo it recalls that, "nearly all of the Yanghusband's [sic] troops were wiped out," forcing the British to withdraw to Yadong for reinforcements.

The second text panel follows the second battle for the Dzong from the Tibetan point of view. It describes the faint attack to the west of the Dzong, and the concentrated artillery fire on the south east corner. The powder magazine explosion that destroyed much of the top of the Dzong is blamed, not on a British

⁸¹⁰ *Zasaha*: Possibly, Sir Ha? Shaw?

⁸¹¹ Phun tshogs dpal ldan gyu thog. See letters in chapter five.

artillery shell, but a lone Tibetan soldier who overfilled his old fashioned musket, the sparks from which caused the explosion. As the attack intensified, the "Tibetan troops concentrate fire on the enemies who were attacking from the breach. They killed a great number of the enemies, but couldn't block the British troops advance." When the Dzong finally fell there is no mention of the mass suicides that other sources (as discussed in the conclusions below) make central to their claims. By contrast the text panels record that the Tibetans withdrew to the nearby Pelkor Chöde Monastery for protection. The final section of text explains how Gyantse is now known as the "City of Heroes" and the Dzong became a "level A cultural unit, under the protections of the state council in 1961." This was five years before the Cultural Revolution that destroyed so much of the Dzong, parts of which are only now being repaired.



Figure 62: 'Crime Evidences' from the British occupation of the Dzong. Photographed by the author in 2008.

Hero's Memorial

The 'Hero's Memorial' was erected at the base of Gyantse Dzong in July 1997 to coincide with the opening of the Memorial Hall of the Anti British. The pillar carries inscriptions in both Chinese and Tibetan, but no English translation, and in size and style it is very similar to the 'Peaceful Liberation Memorial' erected in 2001 in front of the Potala in Lhasa. The similarity of the pillars is not unintentional; both are designed to stir patriotic spirit and proclaim the unity of the Motherland, as well as memorialise those that fought and died for its ideals. Both carry inscriptions that present the party version of Tibet's history for public consumption.

The 'Hero's Memorial' Tibetan inscription informs visitors how "in December of 1903 the British, on the pretext of Boarder boundary issues sent about 1,000 troops under the command of Francis Younghusband and Macdonald through Tromo county."^{clxxxiii} No mention is made of fruitless negotiations at Khamba Dzong, nor surprisingly of the bloody battle at Chumi Shonko which features in most propaganda sources.



Figure 63: 'The Hero's Memorial,' Gyantse (left) and 'The Peaceful Liberation Memorial,' Lhasa (right). Photographed by the author in 2008.

The inscription then skips to the early part of June 1904 when the "People's Militia made a night surprise attack on the British camp, and seized back Changlo Linka, and wiping out almost all of the British soldiers." The concrete bass relief depicts Tibetan soldiers jumping into the British encampment at Changlo, slaughtering sepoys with swords and knives. While this attack did claim the lives of a small number of British troops, once the Maxim guns had been positioned the Tibetan dead far outnumbered the British casualties. The short nationalistic history then moves swiftly to the defence of Gyantse Dzong, recording how the "Tibetan heroes, using arrows, guns, cannons, spears, slings, and long swords engaged in a life and death battle." It tells how the battle lasted over three days and nights, until the Tibetan's ammunition was expended, and the defenders resorted to throwing stones at their attackers. The text then contradicts itself, claiming that the Tibetans held out at the top of the Dzong for over three months.



Figure 64: Relief of the Hero's Memorial Pillar showing Tibetans hacking British soldiers to death. Photographed by the author in 2008.

The pillar is also commemorates the "Martyrs who sacrificed their own lives for the sake of the Motherland" rather than live to face a British occupation of Tibet. The pillar tells how "not surrendering in the face of death, they sacrificed their lives for the sake of the country by jumping from the steep cliffs of the Dzong." The implication and political message here is subtle; Tibetans would rather die that live under a foreign power, and therefore by implication, accept unity with mother China, indeed even celebrate it by erecting such pillars. The authenticity of these claims is discussed in the conclusions below.

Having explained that the Dzong was eventually lost to the enemy, the inscription then peculiarly claims "the invaders were severely beaten," but does not elaborate how. The inscription recalls that it was erected as "a history of both sorrow and joy in the patriotic defence of the country."

The 'Hero's Memorial' is approximately twenty feet high with concrete relief mouldings or carvings on three sides. The first shows the Tibetans beating back the

British soldiers, throwing rocks at them and using slings and arrows to slay them. Other British soldiers are running away in the background, emphasising their cowardice. On the second panel the Tibetans hold out *kha btags* and large paintings of Chairman Mao to the advancing People's Liberation Army, and in the final relief, bringing in bumper harvests and barrows full of grain.⁸¹² The message is clear even if the cement base is falling away.

A second memorial pillar, described as the 'Chumi Shonko Massacre Pillar' has been recently erected at the site of the battle near Düne. The publicity for the new monument describes how it is inscribed with a "description of the war and the names of more than 1,400 soldiers and civilians who died in the fight."⁸¹³ How such names have been passed down through history is not detailed.



Figure 65: "PLA members and soldiers & officials of armed police stand in silent tribute for martyrs."⁸¹⁴

⁸¹² This account is echoed in nearly every Chinese school textbook. For example 'A Modern and Contemporary History of China' describes "when the army entered Lhasa, the soldiers received a warm welcome from the government of the Tibetan region and local citizens," this is illustrated by a contemporary picture of smiling monks and Chinese soldiers. See, ANON. 2002. *A Modern and Contemporary History of China*. Vol. 1. Beijing: People's Education Press. p. 170.

⁸¹³ <http://zt.tibet.cn/english/zt/anti-british/2004020041220163152.htm>
Accessed 15th June 2010.

⁸¹⁴ <http://zt.tibet.cn/english/zt/anti-british/2004020041220163152.htm>
Accessed 15th June 2010.

Chapter seven has analysed the political messages emanating from the Chinese state propaganda sources, and mapped its transition from socialism to patriotism. The importance of the 'New Media' cannot be overestimated in a country such as China, and I have examined each of the media in turn, providing examples from film, the Internet, texts, and news sources that best demonstrate the shift in style and content of propaganda of recent years. These sources have raised important questions in the light of wider concerns regarding Chinese education policy, and the role and political usage of history education in China. I finally examined propaganda tools in the form of museums and memorial pillars, and link this research with questions regarding the construction of 'self and 'other' raised in chapter six. The political messages these structures carry has additionally been compared to other sites of social historical significance both within Mainland China and South Asia, and their attempts to create a narrative of national unity through the history presented to visitors. The conclusions below question how effective the presentation of such accounts has been, both in the West historically, and in China and Tibet today, as well as discuss the aftermath of the Mission, and the historical regional, political, and social costs that resulted in its advance to Lhasa over a century ago.

Conclusions

This thesis has striven to balance the vainglorious accounts of the Mission as provided by the British officers and men who travelled to Tibet in 1904 with the inglorious narratives provided by more recent Chinese sources. It additionally presents original translations and analysis relating to the Tibetan interpretation of events. The three narratives have therefore been studied for the first time in unison to present a fuller account of the Mission. The significance of results and information provided in this thesis can be judged by the criticism applied to all three narratives.

British 'self-satisfying' accounts have been analysed in chapter one, and have been balanced with examples from Chinese narratives that present the Mission as an invasion of the Motherland and an attack on its integrity and unity. Chapter two has examined the role of propaganda in modern China, and given examples of how radio, television, printed materials, education policy, financial investment and subsidy, the Internet, cultural programmes, and films have been used to guide the Tibetan and Chinese populations' understanding of their history and their nation.

Chapters three and four provided the first published translation of *Bod kyi rig gnas lo rgyus dpyad gzhi'i rgyu cha bdams bsgrigs*. The introductory chapter of the volume, which provides the Chinese narrative of the build-up to the Mission, was analysed in chapter three, and chapter four presented and analysed the Mission's bloody advance into Tibet and the destruction it wrought on the Tibetan population and its infrastructure and government.

Chapters three, four, and five demonstrated that the narrative provided by the editors of the *Bod kyi rig gnas lo rgyus dpyad gzhi'i rgyu cha bdams bsgrigs* attempts to instil in their Tibetan readers a sense of loyalty to the Motherland, and to illustrate how their Tibetan forefathers demonstrated their devotion to its cause in fighting the advances of the Imperialist invaders and their agenda of occupation. The translation and analysis of the letters of the Dalai Lama to the King of Nepal,

the Tongsa Pönlop of Bhutan, and the Chögyal of Sikkim have placed the history of the Mission in a pan-Himalayan context, and for the first time shed light on how the Ganden Phodrang sought to counter the Mission. In this regard it is the first study to provide a historical Tibetan perspective of events.

Chapter six has analysed the divisive issue of looting during the Mission and presented evidence from Chinese, British, and Tibetan sources. It has examined the psychology of those who looted items from Tibet, and the role the items themselves have played in shaping the image of Tibet in the West, both historically and in a modern perspective. Modern Chinese propaganda sources from the new media have been analysed in chapter seven, and demonstrated how these powerful new tools have been used to complement and propagate the narrative established in earlier propaganda sources. The discrepancies that exist between the narratives are factually irreconcilable, but the reasons behind, for example, the silence on the part of the British officers regarding looting, or the vitriol meted out to Shakabpa by Chinese authors has demonstrated the importance of analysing and studying all narratives.

Strikingly absent from the Chinese accounts analysed is any mention of the destruction and slaughter in Tibet inflicted during the 'Peaceful Liberation,' 'Great Leap Forward,' and 'Cultural Revolution.' In 1962 Richardson opined that the Mission "has lately been given much attention by the Chinese Communists as a 'British atrocity.' For that, the Chinese have a transparent motive in their eagerness to conceal what they themselves have done, and are doing, in Tibet; and the subject is treated with the customary Communist frenzy and exaggeration."⁸¹⁵ Despite his observations being now fifty years old, they are as accurate now as when they were written.

⁸¹⁵ RICHARDSON, HUGH. 1962. p. 88

The Players

But what became of those who were involved in the Mission? General Macdonald ordered the Mission's Escort to prepare to leave Lhasa on the 23rd of September 1904. Following a farewell meal including such culinary novelties as, 'Potage Potala, Dalai Lama Cutlets, Penlop's Poulet and *Oeufs à la Shapé*, and Amban's Apricots,'⁸¹⁶ the officers and men packed and prepared for the long and arduous journey back to India. The night before his planned departure Younghusband received a telegram ordering him to remain in Lhasa and renegotiate the controversial and unauthorised sections of the Lhasa Treaty, namely the indemnity to be paid, occupation as surety of the Chumbi Valley, and the clause allowing the Gyantse Trade Agent to visit Lhasa at will. As the telegram was couched not as an order, but as a request, Younghusband again employed his Nelson touch, and promptly departed the following morning.

His departure from Tibet was to have dramatic personal consequences for the Tibet Commissioner; finding himself alone for the first time in the hills overlooking the capital, he experienced what can only be described as an epiphany. He later described how "never again could I think evil, or ever again be at enmity with any man."⁸¹⁷ Once in India a mixed bag of telegrams awaited him; some congratulated him on his work securing the Treaty, while others from the Prime Minister and Secretary of State for India declared that he had disobeyed orders to remain in Lhasa and renegotiate the contentious clauses. Despite the threat of official sanctions he was awarded the KCIE by the King on his return, showered with honorary doctorates, received with rapture whenever he spoke in public, and appointed to the Residency of Kashmir. His later life in all its bizarre detail is skilfully examined in French's biography *The Last Great Imperial Adventurer*.⁸¹⁸

⁸¹⁶ ALLEN, CHARLES. 2004. p. 290.

⁸¹⁷ YOUNGHUSBAND, FRANCIS. 1910. p. 326.

⁸¹⁸ FRENCH, PATRICK. 1995.

Macdonald on his return was also appointed KCIE, promoted to a full Colonel, and given command of the Bengal Presidency Brigade at Fort William in Calcutta. Between 1909 and 1912 he served as General Officer Commanding Mauritius, before retiring to Scotland on medical advice. He became Colonel-Commandant of the Royal Engineers in 1924, but died childless at the age of 65 in 1927. Of the officers he commanded in Tibet, O'Connor was appointed the first Trade agent in Gyantse, but following a spat with John Claude White both were forced to resign. He was replaced by Frederick Bailey, who went on to have a long, distinguished, and clandestine career as a diplomat, adventurer, spy, and trophy hunter.⁸¹⁹

Waddell too enjoyed a varied and esoteric career following his display and subsequent division of the items he acquired in Tibet. Appointed Professor of Tibetan at London University in 1906 he retired only two years later to focus on his Theosophical writing. He was ostracised by the academic community following his publication of books promoting Aryan supremacy and his association with the Imperial Fascist League. The Manchu Amban Yü Tai fared even less well. Following the signing of the Lhasa Treaty he was removed from his post by the Imperial Court, arrested, and sent to Peking in chains having been accused of collaboration with the British during the period.⁸²⁰ If the Amban's crime was to have been present in Lhasa but not halted the signing of the treaty, by fleeing his capital the Dalai Lama preserved some of his authority and also the mystique that surrounded him. This had the added advantage of allowing the Ganden Phodrang to repudiate the treaty on the grounds that the Dalai Lama had not personally signed it. Candler sums up the prevailing feeling of disappointment among the officers of the Mission that they could not catch a glimpse of the Dalai Lama, but adds that "his flight has deepened the mystery that envelops him, and adds to his dignity and remoteness;

⁸¹⁹ BAILEY, FREDERICK. 1957. *No Passport To Tibet* London: Rupert Hart-Davis.

SWINSON, ARTHUR. 1971. *Beyond the Frontiers. The Biography of Colonel F.M. Bailey Explorer and Special Agent* London: Hutchinson.

⁸²⁰ PALACE, WENDY. 2005. p. 9.

to thousands of mystical dreamers it has preserved the effulgence of his godhead unsoiled by contact with the profane world."⁸²¹

The British troops who served and suffered in Tibet were recognised when "His Majesty The King was pleased to approve the grant of a medal to the members of The Tibet Mission and to the accompanying force who served at, or beyond Siliguri, between December 13th 1903 and September 23rd 1904."⁸²² One of the recipients, Arthur Hadow of the Maxim Gun Detachment, fully realized the lethal potential of the new machine gun he had put to such effective use at Chumi Shonko.⁸²³ He attempted to persuade the British Army to adopt the weapon fully, but it was the German Army that realised its potential, and by the time of the outbreak of World War One the Germans had 12,000 at their disposal, a number that eventually grew to 100,000. In contrast, the British and French Armies had access to only a few hundred when war broke out in 1914. British High Command was slow to realise its destructive power, and some reportedly even viewed it as an improper form of warfare.

Hadow went on to gain the rank of Lieutenant-Colonel in the service of the Norfolk Regiment. However, others were less fortunate: Lieutenant Bowden-Smith of the Royal Fusiliers, who was wounded in Gyantse, was wounded again at Mons and died in German hands. Private Hannington, also hit during the siege at Gyantse, was awarded the DCM for gallantry in Normandy in 1918; Lance-Corporal Dunning was killed on the Western Front in October 1914, and others served in all corners of Europe and the Empire.

⁸²¹ CANDLER, EDMUND. 1905. p. 255.

⁸²² Army Order No 26. February 1905. See, KELLEHER, JAMES. 2000. *1st Bn. Royal Fusiliers Tibet Roll*.

⁸²³ Its destructive power was also recognised by the poet Hilaire Belloc who summed up the First Matabele War in Rhodesia (1893-1894) during which 50 British soldiers fought off 5,000 Matabele warriors with just four Maxim guns, with the words, "whatever happens we have got, the Maxim Gun, and they have not." BELLOC, HILAIRE. 1898. *The Modern Traveller*. London: E Arnold. p. 41.

The Treaty: "No intention of abrogating Chinese suzerainty."⁸²⁴

The Lhasa Treaty of 1904 proved to be a short-lived document; Younghusband's failure to renegotiate the clauses Whitehall found unacceptable, and the Amban's refusal to affix his signature meant that Britain and China had to broker another convention, this time in Peking in 1906 signed by Satow and the Chinese Plenipotentiary, Tong Shoa-yi. As Lamb explains, "the Younghusband Mission did not decide the nature of Chinese relations with Tibet... and it became clear that in order to have any force, the Lhasa Treaty required Chinese consent."⁸²⁵

Under the terms of the Peking Convention of 1906 the Lhasa Treaty was confirmed, the Government of India engaged not to annex Tibetan territory or to interfere in the administration of Tibet, China also undertook not to permit any other foreign state to interfere with the territory or internal administration of Tibet, and she also agreed to pay the indemnity imposed on the Tibetans.⁸²⁶ In effect this was the first sign of Britain's formal acceptance of Chinese suzerainty over Tibet.

For the Manchu Government, the Younghusband Mission and the Peking Convention proved its inability to control its vassal, and led to a period of restructuring in which the area of direct Chinese rule was extended west. Chinese troops commanded by Chao Erh-feng arrived in Lhasa in February 1910, and the Dalai Lama and his Government once more fled into exile, this time in Darjeeling.

During his three years in exile in Darjeeling the Dalai Lama became close friends with Charles Bell, who had been appointed Political Officer in Sikkim in 1908. The Dalai Lama was keen to secure British assistance in his return to Tibet, and even suggested that an escort of British troops should accompany his return. However, Lord Minto, the new Viceroy, concluded that this would be in direct opposition to

⁸²⁴ Richardson, Hugh. 1962. "Younghusband also was careful to tell the Tibetan that there was no intention of abrogating Chinese suzerainty." p. 93.

⁸²⁵ LAMB, ALASTAIR. 1960. p. 257.

⁸²⁶ In 1907, Russian and Great Britain also signed a convention: both parties engaged to respect the territorial integrity of Tibet and to abstain from all interference in its internal administration, not to send representatives to Lhasa, neither to seek nor to obtain, whether for themselves or for their subjects, any concessions for railways, roads, telegraphs, and mines, or other rights in Tibet.

the terms of the Peking Convention, and refused the request. It was while he hosted the Dalai Lama that Bell moulded Curzon's forward policies into the contemporary idiom. Bell understood that the age of Imperial expansion had passed, and that the interests of the Raj could be best served by working with the Tibetans, rather than against them.⁸²⁷ He realised that anything resembling a forward policy would be blocked by Whitehall, but that he had significant room to manoeuvre over the issue of information supply, and he had a significant advantage over his predecessors insofar as he had a fluent knowledge of Tibetan. His abilities paved the way for a period of closer understanding between Tibet and British (and subsequently independent) India that is beyond the scope of this thesis.

In 1911 a revolution broke out in China, and the Emperor was deposed. The Manchu garrison in Lhasa found themselves out on a limb, and by the end of 1912, with central authority waning, the Chinese army was driven out of the capital by Tibetan troops.⁸²⁸ The Dalai Lama returned to Tibet and declared what was widely perceived as independence from China. Again, the details and repercussions of this move cannot be analysed here;⁸²⁹ however the formal status of Tibet, at least from the British perspective, was still to be defined almost a decade after the Mission had left Lhasa. In 1913-14 the Tibetan, Chinese, and British met in tripartite negotiations in Simla in an attempt to settle the political status of Tibet.

⁸²⁷ MCKAY, ALEX. 1997. p. 70.

⁸²⁸ It is interesting to note the modern Chinese narrative taught to children in schools regarding the expulsion of Chinese troops from Lhasa for its similarities with the Chinese accounts of the 1904 Mission; In both cases the Manchu Qing Imperial Court is blamed for its policy of capitulation and surrender. Likewise, in both cases the Tibetan population struggle with Imperialist aggressors in order to demonstrate their commitment to the unity of the Motherland. The People's Education Press English language textbook for history at senior secondary level claims that soon after the 1911 Chinese Revolution "Britain took the chance to instigate elements who were on intimate terms with Britain in Tibet to stage an armed rebellion, to drive out the Sichuan army stationed in Lhasa and Rikeze [Shigatse], and to declare 'independence,' attempting to break Tibet from China... the rebellion in Tibet was strongly opposed by the people, the patriotic monks and priests, and the upper circles in Tibet." ANON. 2002. *A Modern and Contemporary History of China*. Beijing: The People's Education Press. p. 164.

⁸²⁹ But are done so excellently by GOLDSTEIN, MELVYN. 1989. And, LAMB, ALASTAIR. 1966. *The McMahon Line. A Study in the Relations Between India, China and Tibet 1904-1914*. London: Routledge.

The proposed accord created a division between 'Inner Tibet' and 'Outer Tibet;' 'Outer Tibet would remain under the jurisdiction of the Ganden Phodrang in Lhasa, but would be under Chinese suzerainty, but China would not interfere in its administration. Despite all initialling the resulting convention China refused to accept the Accord, and their plenipotentiary withdrew in July 1914.⁸³⁰ After his withdrawal the British and Tibetan representatives attached a note denying China any privileges under the Accord and sealed it as a bilateral agreement. The Chinese refusal to sign the full document again resulting in an ongoing period of ambiguity that led to the "Peaceful Liberation" of 1951, and disputes regarding the border between India and China that remain ongoing.

The Aftermath

The translations and analysis above provide us for the first time with a clear picture of how Tibetan and Chinese historians, directors, editors, teachers, students, and the CCP view this episode of history. It is not my intention to judge if these interpretations of history are factual or fictitious, merely to demonstrate what is being taught, and how it is disseminated. I have also analysed the intention behind the interpretations, accounting for both the direct and less obvious reasons why, for example, a particular event or version has been presented in all three accounts. Readers can of course judge for themselves given the weight of evidence provided above: Hobsbawm reminds us that "history is the raw material for nationalist or ethnic or fundamentalist ideologies, as poppies are the raw material for heroin addiction. The past is an essential element, perhaps the essential

⁸³⁰ This change of policy by the Chinese representatives is explained as a result of the fact that "in reality the conference was wholly under the control of British Imperialists. The British ordered the Tibetan representatives about; moreover, the British provided their agenda and documents. Before the conference the Tibetan representatives went to Gyantse for training under British supervision for about two months. So, during the period of the conference, the British and the Tibetan representatives under their control staged a political farce." TSETEN, DORJE. 2005. On the Thirteenth Dalai Lama Nhawang Lozang Thubten Gyatso. *China Tibetology*. No. 5. Vol. 2. pp. 1-17.

element, in these ideologies. If there is no suitable past, it can always be invented."⁸³¹

As identified above, there remains a great deal of academic debate as to the authenticity of Chinese claims of mass suicides following fall of Gyantse. Atop the Dzong there now stands a commemorative stone monument recalling the episode in Tibetan, Chinese, and English; however Western academics continue to question the accuracy of narrative of mass suicide.



Figure 66: The Martyrs' Memorial, Gyantse Dzong. Photographed by the author in 2008.

While there is no mention of these suicides in any of the British officers accounts, Candler recalls that as the breach was won “the only thought of the enemy was flight. They made their way by the back of the jong [sic] into the monastery... the

⁸³¹ HOBBSAWM, ERIC. 1997. *On History*. London: Abacus Press. p. 6.

next morning the monastery was found deserted.”⁸³² Waddell, who was in Gyantse at the time, does remark on the courage of the Tibetans; on reviewing the damage done to the Dzong, and the bodies of the Tibetan troops lying in the rubble he wrote that, “the bravery of the Tibetans was now beyond dispute. Here they courageously stood their ground when our shrapnels were bursting over them, and pluckily returned shot after shot to our guns for hours.”⁸³³ Hopkirk adds a romantic twist to the events describing how “the [Tibetan] defenders, who had fought with great courage, now fled, slipping away through secret underground tunnels known only to themselves, or over the walls using ropes.”⁸³⁴

Patrick French, having visited Gyantse and researched the events of the Mission extensively for his biography of Younghusband gives the most plausible answer to the question of suicides. In an interview with Richard Ehrlich he commented,

I consulted Tibetan as well as British source material when I was writing the book, and found no evidence to suggest that there was any mass suicide when Gyantse Dzong was stormed. I do know that some Tibetans who cooperated with the British at Gyantse were murdered and their bodies mutilated, as traitors, while the siege was still in place. But I think the story of the suicides is certainly wrong, although it's perfectly possible that individual Tibetans jumped off the walls of the Dzong rather than risk capture or death at the hands of the British Indian forces - Gurkha, Sikhs, and Pathans who were known for their ferocity in battle.⁸³⁵

The Tibetan Government-in-Exile, meanwhile, has condemned Chinese accounts of mass suicides and use of the castle as “yet another xenophobic attack on Britain.” Tseten Samdup of the Dalai Lama's London-based Office of Tibet said in an interview, “The fact is, the British invasion of 1904 resulted in the death of hundreds of Tibetans, almost a thousand, in and around Gyantse Castle. There

⁸³² CANDLER, EDMUND. 1905. p. 244.

⁸³³ WADDELL, AUSTINE. 1905. p. 274.

⁸³⁴ HOPKIRK, PETER. 1990. p. 512.

⁸³⁵ <http://www.geocities.com/glossograph/tibet99castlegyantsect.html> Accessed 17th December 2010.

wasn't any mass suicide such as jumping from the cliff. Unfortunately, the Chinese are always drumming up anti-Western feeling amongst the Tibetans and their own Chinese people.”⁸³⁶ This opinion is echoed by Vickers who has commented that for the Chinese Government and education system,

Tibetan history has significance only insofar as it can be related to the grand narrative of China's progress towards modernization and Great Power status. The attempt to establish Tibetan independence becomes just one more instance of imperialist interference in China's internal affairs - another obstacle to be overcome by the heroic Chinese people in their united and determined pursuit of prosperity, dignity and international respect.⁸³⁷

The Free Tibet Organisation, a London based charity promoting Tibetan independence, also used the centenary of the Mission to Tibet to call on the then Prime Minister of Great Britain to issue an apology for the events of 1904 and to put pressure on the Chinese Government to end what they describe as the Chinese occupation of Tibet.

Postcards were issued to the organisation's members for them to sign and send to the Prime Minister asking that he apologise to the people of Tibet for “Britain's invasion of Tibet 100 years ago, which resulted in the deaths of more than 3000 Tibetans.”⁸³⁸ Additional postcards were issued addressed to the Chinese Prime Minister Wen Jaibao asking for dialogue over Tibetan issues, and asking “Wen: Will you free Tibet?”

⁸³⁶ <http://www.geocities.com/glossograph/tibet99castlegyantsect.html> Accessed 17th December 2010.

⁸³⁷ VICKERS, EDWARD. 2006. p. 39.

⁸³⁸ <http://www.freetibet.org/campaigns/invasion1904.html> Accessed 25th July 2004.

The images originally located here have been removed from this electronic version of the thesis for copyright reasons. [Figure 67: Free Tibet postcards issued to members in 2004.]

The Present and Future

What long-term lessons can be learnt from the Mission of 1904 and also from the more recent interpretation and presentation of this history as analysed above? Geopolitically the front line of the Great Game has moved west, and now shadows the 'axis of evil' identified by President Bush in his 'State of the Union' address of 2002. The threat may not be Russian (although the Russians undoubtedly play a role) and the Imperial power of the British Empire has been firmly replaced by American trade and military might, but the fight for influence, 'satisfaction,' and resources continues to rage. The interpretation and presentation of events remains a pertinent and divisive issue. One thing that is for certain is that there are now many more narratives and accounts being created, and importantly, recorded. The revolution in communication technologies has enabled both a greater number and diversity of perspectives and accounts to be disseminated and recorded.

Klevenman has observed that the greatest difference of today's Great Game is the nature of the spoils. While in the Victorian and Edwardian eras London and St Petersburg competed over access to the riches of India, the new Great Game focuses on the Caspian energy reserves, principally, oil and gas.⁸³⁹ While Russia continues to hold sway over much of the region, following the collapse of the USSR in 1992 eight new republics in the Caucasus and Central Asia entered the fray; Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan and Tajikistan. Indeed while nominally independent, the majority of these nations are ruled by former KGB generals and their allies. These leaders all too often recognise that control over information, narrative, and communications can be used to influence the population's attitude and beliefs as evidenced above. New regional powers have entered the arena: China, Iran, Turkey, and Pakistan, and transnational corporations (whose budgets far exceed those of many of the countries in which they operate) are also pursuing their own interests and strategies. There are thus many more corners to be fought, and agendas to marshal, and interpretations to be made than when Curzon ruled the region from his desk in Calcutta.

⁸³⁹ KLEVERMAN, LUTZ. 2004. *The New Great Game. Blood and Oil in Central Asia*. London: Atlantic Books. p. 3.

Appendix One: Gazetteer of British Officers Accompanying the Tibet Frontier Commission of 1904

The Tibet Frontier Commission

Colonel Francis Younghusband, Indian Political Service. Resident in Indore, Joint and then Senior Commissioner to the Tibet Frontier Commission.

Claude White, Public Works Department Engineer. British Resident in Sikkim since 1889, initially Joint and then Assistant Commissioner to the Tibet Frontier Commission.

Captain Frederick O'Connor. Ex-Royal Field Artillery, ex-British Mountain Battery in India, Intelligence Branch of the Quartermaster-General's Branch. Intelligence Officer, Joint Assistant Commissioner to the Tibet Frontier Commission.

Mr. Mitter. Head Clerk.

Vernon Magnaic. Brother in law to Francis Younghusband, joined the Commission later on as Private Secretary to Younghusband.

Military Escort to the Mission

General Staff

Brigadier-General James Macdonald, CB, Royal Engineers, Escort Commander to the Tibet Frontier Commission.

Major HA Iggulden, Sherwood Foresters, Chief Staff officer to General Macdonald and his Second in Command.

Major WGL Beynon, DSO, 2nd Gurkha Rifles. Third in Command.

Major G. Breatherton, DSO, Supply and Transport Corps, Officer Commanding Transport.

Other Officers and ADC's: Majors A. Mullalay, MRE Ray, and Captains JO'B Minogue, CA Elliott, and Lieutenant BH Bignall, ADC.

32nd Sikh Pioneers

Lieutenant-Colonel Herbert Brander, Commander, Commander of Mission Escort at Gyantse

Major HF Preston, DSO, Second in Command.

Captains JB Bell, H Bethune, and HF Cooke, Company Commanders.

23rd Sikh Pioneers

Lieutenant-Colonel Arthur Hogge, Commandant, Commander of Garrison at Düne.

Major R Lye, Second in Command.

Major A Wallace-Dunlop and Captains HAF Pearson and GHF Kelly, Company Commanders.

8th Gurkha Rifles

Lieutenant-Colonel MA Kerr, Commandant.

Major GR Row, Commander of Escort at Changlo Manor.

Captains LH Baldwin, GLS Ward, C. Bliss, and DWH Humphreys, Company Commanders.

Captain Luke, Royal Artillery, Commanding the Seven-Pounders 'Bubble' and 'Squeak.'

40th Pathans

Lieutenant-Colonel F Cambell, DSO, Commandant.

Captains G Preston, and JR Maclachlan.

1st Mounted Infantry (Drawn from the 40th Pathans)

Captain William Ottley, 32nd Sikh Pioneers, Unit Commander.

Lieutenant FM Bailey 32nd Sikh Pioneers, Detachment Commander.

2nd Mounted Infantry

Captain CH Peterson, 46th Punjabis, Unit Commander.

Captain HH Souter, 14th Bengal Lancers.

Lieutenant F Skipwith, 24th Punjabis.

1st Battalion of the Royal Fusiliers (4 Companies)

Lieutenant-Colonel E Cooper, DSO, Battalion Commander.

Major S Menzies, Second in Command.

Captains WGT Legg, CV Johnson, JL Fisher, CAH Palairret, LGT Stone.

1st Battalion, The Norfolk Regiment, Maxim Gun Detachment

Captain A Haldlow, Unit Commander.

Royal Artillery, Detachments from the 7th and 30th British Mountain Batteries

Major R Fuller.

Captain F Easton.

Royal Engineers

Captain S Sheppard, DSO, Officer Commanding No.3 Company, 1st Bengal Sappers and Miners.

Captains C Ryder, RE, Survey of India, HM Cowerie, Survey of India, GC Rawling, Somerset Light Infantry, Officer Commanding Survey Party.

Supply and Transport

Coolie and Yak Corps

Captains Roddy, Preston, O'Mera, Manson, Moore, Stuart, Pollock, Morris, Price, Ross, and Moore.

Mule Corps

Captains Gabbert (5th MC), Skeene (6th MC), Gilbertson (7th MC), Moore (10th MC), Saunders, (11th MC), and Price (12th MC).

Medical Officers to the Mission

Lieutenant-Colonel A Waddell, IMS. Principal Medical Officer.

Major CNC Wimberley.

Major AW Dawson, attached to the 1st Bengal Sappers and Miners.

Captain HG Walton, IMS. Mission Medical Officer.

Lieutenant G Davys, IMS. Surgeon.

Lieutenant J Murray, IMS. Attached to the 32nd Sikh Pioneers.

Lieutenant L Franklin. IMS. Attached to 8th Gurkhas.

Civilians attached to the Mission

Candler, E. Special Correspondent for *The Daily Mail*.

Landon, P. Special Correspondent for *The Times*.

Newman, H. Reuters Correspondent, Special Correspondent *The Englishman*,
Calcutta.

Bayley, C. Special Correspondent for *The Telegraph* and *Pioneer*.

Macdonald, D. Anglo-Sikkimese assistant to Colonel Waddell.

Haydon, P. Geologist from the Survey of India.

British and Indian Government

Lord Balfour, Prime Minister.

St John Brodrick, (Later Viscount Midleton) Secretary of State for India.

Lord Curzon, Viceroy and Governor General of India.

Lord Ampthill, Acting Viceroy in Curzon's absence and leave period.

Lord Kitchener, Commander in Chief, India.

Louis Dane, Indian Political Service, Secretary of the Government of India's Foreign
Department.

James Dunlop-Smith, Political Agent, Sikh States.⁸⁴⁰

⁸⁴⁰ Table has been adapted from ALLEN, CHARLES. 2004. pp. 316-321.

Appendix Two: Gazetteer of Tibetan and Chinese Ministers and Officials Relating to the Mission of 1904

Imperial Resident Ambans

Amban Shing Tai (Am ban Shing tai, and also Hring tha'e elsewhere) (Xing tai): Died in 1892. Derek Maher has commented that it has not been possible to determine the identity of this figure. See, SHAKABPA, WANGCHUK DEDEN. TSEPON. 2010. (Translated and annotated by Maher) and also, KOLMAS, JOSEF. 1994. *The Ambans and Assistant Ambans of Tibet: A Chronological Study*. Prague: Oriental Institute. Komas likewise cannot identify Hring tha'e.

Amban Shu Han (Am ban Shu han) (Xu han): Appointed by the Emperor on Shing Tai's death.

Amban Sung Gui (Am ban Sung gu): Amban in the 1860s who failed to prevent the British occupation of Sikkim.

Amban Yü Kang (Am ban 'Us kang and also Yus kang elsewhere) (裕鋼): Appointed by the Emperor in 1903 after the fall of Phagri Dzong. He would not meet the British. Patrick French has it that Amban Ho Kuang Hsi was resident in Shigatse and met the British at Khamba Dzong before retiring citing ill health.

Amban Yü Tai (Am ban Yu'u tha'e) (有泰): Lhasa Resident Amban. Welcomed the British into Lhasa with gifts. Present at the Treaty signing. Later impeached for cowardice, embezzlement, and corruption.

Kalön Officials

Kalön Paljor Dorje Shatra. (dPal 'byor rdo rje bShad sgra) A well-travelled and knowledgeable Kalön, impeached for suspected corruption in September 1903.

Kalön Gung Lhalu Yeshe Norbu Wangchuk (lHa klu Ye shes nor bu dBang phyug) Gung denotes a Chinese Imperial title. Sent by the Kashag to negotiate with the British at Dromo Rinchen Gang in 1888.

Kalön Lama Jampa Tenzin (Byams pa bsTan 'dzin): Appointed September 1903. Head of the forces at Gyantse. He fled on the fall of the Dzong to Kongpo. Unlike the other Kalöns he refused to negotiate with the British even on their arrival in Lhasa. The commentary of *Compiled and Selected Materials* does not mention him.

Kalön Rampa Trashi Dargye (bKa' blon Ram pa bKra shis dar rgyas): The envoy of the Kashag sent to Dromo Rinchen Gang by the National Assembly to attempt to stall the Amban Hingtai's negotiations with the British in 1888.

Kalön Kelzang Dradül Sarjungpa (bsKal bzang dgra 'dul gSar byung): Appointed September 1903, and served as a Kalön until 1910 when he escaped to India along with the Dalai Lama. The commentary of *Bod kyi rig gnas lo rgyus dpyad gzhi'i rgyu cha bdams bsgrigs* does not mention him. Also know as Serchung.

Kalön Dhondrup Phuntso Shölkhang (Don grub phun tshogs Zhol khang) (also Shokang) (1862-1925). In 1903 he and bShad sgra, who were then Shapes, were degraded and banished to their own estates near Chusul by the Dalai Lama. He was; however, recalled to Lhasa by the Chinese Envoy, Chang Yin Tang, in 1907, during the absence of the Dalai Lama and appointed Adviser to the National Assembly. In 1908 the Dalai Lama created the office of Lönchen to provide for his adherents and made three appointments, of which he was one.

Kalön Tsarong Wangchuk Gyalpo (Tsa rong dBang phyug rgyal po): As Commander of U-tse Province he was sent to negotiate with the British in 1903 at Khamba Dzong, and was appointed Kalön in September 1903. He then also became known as Lobsang Trinle, (Blo bzang 'phrin las) and was appointed *sPyi khyab mkhan po* to the XIIIth Dalai Lama. Also know by the titles *mkhan drung* or *Drung che* (Chief Secretary).

Kalön Phuntsok Palden Yutok (Phun tshogs dpal ldan gYu thog): A descendant of the Xth Dalai Lama. Kashag member appointed in September 1903, and overall commander at Gyantse and the route to Lhasa. He escaped with the Dalai Lama to India in exile, but died soon after arriving. Also known by the title bKa' tshab (Abbr. *bKa' blon las tshab*, Deputy Kalön.)

Kalön Lama Khyenrab Changchup Palden Changkhyim (mKha 'yen rab byang chub dpal bzan Chang khyim) (Petech records his name as Ngag dbang mkhyen rab dpal bzang Chang khyim) Ecclesiastical member of the Kashag. In 1903, he was accused with the other three members of the Kashag by the Tsongdu of treason, and subsequently exiled. In 1907 he was recalled to Lhasa by the Amban, and acted as an advisor to the Government. He was appointed as Kalön Tripa along with Shatra and Sholkhang, and restored to the confidence of the Dalai Lama when he returned from exile. In 1908 he was appointed to the office of Lönchen. In 1910, he accompanied the Dalai Lama during his exile in India.

Kalön Sonam Tobgay Horkang (bSod names stobs rgyas Hor kang) 1865-1903. From a long aristocratic lineage, he quelled a rebellion in Nyagron in 1889, and was appointed Kalön as a result. He feared torture when he

and the other members of the Kashag were dismissed in 1903, and he committed suicide October of that year; however he son went on to achieve high office.

Regent Lobsang Gyaltsen. (Blo bzang rGyal mtshan) Ganden Tri (pa) Rimpoche. Appointed Regent by the XIIIth Dalai Lama on his exile. He was possibly from Shar College of Ganden Monastery, and is therefore known in British accounts as Lama Shar.

Other Players

Adar Nyima Gragspa (A dar Nyi ma grags pa): Head of militia in Nenyng once Mönlingpa and Dumrawa had departed. Brother of *IDab ldob* Adar, and together the famous Kongpo brothers. Has emotional death in the courtyard of Nenyng Monastery. (*IDab ldob* is sometimes *IDob ldob*.)

Agvan Dorjieff (Sog po tsen zhabs Ngag dbang blo bzang): Also, Agvan Lobsang Dorzhiev, or Dorjiev. (1854-1938). He was a Khory Buryat born in the village of Khara Shibir, east of Lake Baikal. As a study partner and close associate of the XIIIth Dalai Lama, he gained his trust and become a minister of his government. His diplomatic links with the Russian Empire and visits to the Tsar raised British anxiety and suspicions, and lead to the dispatch of the Mission. He is also remembered for building the Buddhist temple of St. Petersburg and signing the Tibet-Mongolia Treaty in 1913.

Badi Rimpoche (sBa di): Formally from Gomun College, Drepung Monastery, he was the Dalai Lama's representative in Peking. The Dalai Lama used him to communicate directly with the Emperor during his time in exile in Mongolia.

Chatrakpa (lCags sprag pa): Commander appointed to oversee operations in Gyantse. Second in command to General Trelingpa.

Dabdob Adar (lDab ldob A dar): Monk soldier. Commander of the cavalry of the six nomadic tribes of the Jangrig Naktsang. Brother of Adar Nyima Gragspa.

Dokarwa (mDo mkar ba): Deputy secretary of Nyemo. Appointed to assist Ngawang Trinle.

Dondup Dorje (Don grub rdo rje): Older brother of the XIIIth Dalai Lama. Given the title Yab gzhis indicating he is of the Dalai Lama's household.

Dorje Rigzin Cangcen (rDo rje rig 'dzin lchang can): Chief Finance Minister in the 1880s. Sent to become commander of the controversial new fortress at Lungtu La near Dromo Rinchen Gang.

Dorje Tobgyal (rDor rje stobs rgyal): Commander in Nenyng once sMon gling pa and Dumrawa had gone to Gyantse for meetings.

Dumrawa (lDum ra ba): Overall commander of the Tsang militia.

Dzaka Lama (Dza ska Bla ma): Head of the Labrang of Trashilhunpo.

Gendün Chödar (dGe 'dun chos dar): Monastic secretary sent by the Kashag to meet the British at the Boarder in March 1903.

Gendün Chökyi Nyima (dGe 'dun chos kyi nyi ma) The XIth Panchen Lama. 1989 - present. The candidate chosen by the XIVth Dalai Lama, he remains in custody.

Gortsanyen (Gor tsa snyen): Prince of the Gorkhas.

Guangxu (Emperor) (Man Ching Gong ma Kwang zhud) (Manchu Qing Guangxu): Xth Emperor of the Manchu Qing Dynasty 1876–1908. In historic Western sources "Kuang-Hsu."

Gyurme Tshetön ('Gyur med tshe bston): Platoon commander sent to accompany the border delegation of March 1903.

Hao Zhangdong (General) (Ha'o krang tung): Military commander dispatched to Calcutta, to open negotiations with the British Special Political Officer in 1893.

Jit Bahadur Khatri Chetry: Nepalese Consul, or Vakil (*dPa' kil*), in Lhasa. Also Jeet.

Kumar Sidkeong Namgyal: Maharaj (son of the Maharaja, or Chogyal) of Sikkim.

Kyipu (sKyid spug): Dzongpön of Phagri Dzong in 1903. Was present at the battle at Chumi Shonko, where he was shot in the leg.

Lhadarcen (lHa dar can): Deputy to Dumrawa. Leader of the Jangrig Naktsang militia.

Lhadingse (lHa lding sras): Commander (*mDa' dpon*) of troops at Chumi Shonko. Related to the Sikkimese Chögyal's wife. Known as the "Lhasa General" in British accounts.

Lhawang Yülgyal (lHa dbang g.yul rgyal): Second in command to Dorje Tobgyal.

Lobsang Palden Chöpel (Blo bzang dpal ldan chos 'phel). The IVth Sengchen Rimpoche.

Lobsang Trinle Lhündrub Chökyi Gyaltzen (Blo bzang 'phrin las lhun grub chos kyi rgyal mtshan) The Xth Panchen Lama.

Lodecen (Blo bde can): Secretary of Rinpung Monastery, and deputy to Dumrawa. Commander of militia stationed at Ralung and Nagartse.

Mönlingpa (sMon gling pa): Commander of the reserve forces at Daprong Gorge, and later Commander of the defence forces at Nenyang Monastery.

Paljor Jigme Namseling (dPal 'byor 'jigs med rNam sras gling): Commander of troops at Chumi Shonko.

Ngawang Trinle (Ngag dbang 'phrin las): Monastic official know as rTse drung. Appointed by Kalön Yutok to train the militia from Shigatse, rNam gling and lHa bu and rGya mtsho.

Ngawang Zampel (rTse drung) (Ngag dbang 'zam dpal): Commander of the forces at Nenyang Monastery. rTse drung indicates he was part of the Dalai Lama's personal household.

Ngönlung (rNgon lung): Commander at Gyantse, appointed by Trelingpa. Killed while making a suicidal charge against the British at Gyalkar in the opening days of the battle at Gyantse Dzong.

Norgye Jangchup (Nor rgyas byang chub): Abbot of Pelkor Chöde Monastery.

Phodong Lama (Pho gdong bla ma): Sikkimese monk recruited by the British in the 1880s to secretly report to and influence the Kashag.

Prithvi Bir Bikram Shah, King of Nepal (18th August 1875 - 11th December 1911) was king between 1881 and 1911.

Rampa (Ram pa): Commander of troops at Khangmar. Present during the raid on the British camped in Sholam. He deserted his post after the battle and ran away to Lhasa. Removed from his post by the Kashag, his office being given to Trelingpa.

Rimshi Sönam Wangdu Lama (Rim bzhi bSod nams dbang 'dus bla ma): The Panchen Lama's personal representative on the defence council at Trashilhunpo.

Sherab Söpa (Shes rab bzod pa): from Ser Kang College, one of those selected by lottery to discuss the protection of Pelkor Chöde Monastery.

Shogranshan (sh'o gran shan): Gyantse Resident Amban in the 1880s. Negotiated with the British at Dromo Rinchen Gang in 1888.

Tā Lama, Bumthang Yeshe Phuljung (Tā bla ma 'Bum thang Ye shes phul byung): Sent with Kalön Rampa Trashi Dargye to Dromo Rinchen Gang in 1888. His personal attendant was Jigme Chönjor ('Jigs med chos 'byor).

Tengpa (sTeng pa): Commander of militia troops sent to Khamba Dzong to negotiate with the British by the Labrang of Trashilhunpo.

Tenzing Wangchuk (bsTan 'dzin dbang phyug): Highest Gelugpa Lama in Mongolia. Holder of the title *Khal kha rje btsun dam pa*, literally translating as 'Holy venerable lord.' When Northern Mongolia declared independence in 1911, the VIIIth *Khal kha rje btsun dam pa* (1869-1924) was elevated as the Emperor of Mongolia. He was the Head of State until his death in 1924.

Thubten Chökyi Nyima (Thub bstan chos kyi nyi ma): The IXth Panchen Lama. 1883-1937.

Thubten Gyatso (Thub bstan rgya mtsho). 12th February 1876 - 17th December 1933. The XIIIth Dalai Lama.

Thutob Namgyal (mThu stobs rnam rgyal): The Sikkimese Chögyal. Known to the British as Maharaja Sir Thutob Namgyal, KCIE.

Trashig Dargye. (bKra shis dar rgyas) (also known as rDo phra bkra shis gling pa): Tibetan military commander, sent to negotiate with the British in 1876.

Trelingpa (bKra shis dar rgyas): Commander of troops after the battle at Chumi Shonko. Present during the raid on the British camped in Sholam along with Commander Rampa. Given overall command after Commander Ram pa was removed from office.

Treshongpa (bKra shis dar rgyas): Appointed by Kalön Yutok to command the 1,400 troops from the militia of Rin spungs, gLing dkar, Mar rkyang and sNye mo, after Gyantse has fallen. Later given responsibility to hold the Karo La.

Trinle Rabgye ('Phrin las rab rgyas): Commander at the battle at Karo La.

Tsagser Khangba (bTsag ser khang pa): The Khamba Dzongpön.

Ugyen Wangchuk, The Tongsa Pönlop (O rgyan dbang phyug Krong sa dpon slob): Governor of Tongsa. 'Honorary Governor.' Sir Ugyen Wangchuk, 1861-1926. Bhutan's first king, 1907 to 1926.

Ugyen Dorji Kazi, (O rgyan rdo rje Ka zi): The Dzongpön of Thimphu. British accounts refer to him as the "Thim phug Jongpen." (Kazi, Dzongpön, and Pönlop (*dpon slob*) all having similar meanings.)

Xihua Deyu (Si'i hwa te yu): Tax Officer Committee Member dispatched to Calcutta with General Hao Zhangdong, to with the British Special Political Officer in 1893.

Yeshe Wangchuk (Ye shes dbang phyug): Treasurer of Khurba College, one of those selected by lottery to discuss the protection of Pelkor Chöde Monastery.

Yeshay Dolma (Ye shes sgröl ma) Maharani of Sikkim, wife of mThu stobs rnam rgyal.

Yönten Gyatso (Yon tan rgya mtsho): A monk from Pelkor Chöde Monastery who rallied the troops after the fall of Nenying Monastery.

Appendix Three: Gazetteer of Tibetan Place Names

- Cagksam (lCags zam): Ferry point on the river just south of Lhasa. It was here that Major Bretherton lost his life.
- Chalo (Cha lo): Town between Phagri and the Ka La. The commentary records that one of the British spies was arrested here. Tibetan troops rallied here after the battle at Chumi Shonko.
- Changlo (lCang lo): A Manor five miles west of Gyantse Dzong where the British established their forward headquarters.
- Chumi Shonko (Chu mig gshongs ko): Approximately sixty miles south of Gyantse. The 'one hundred and eight hot springs'. Site of fierce battle between the Tibetans and the British. Known as "Guru" in British sources, "Qumeixiankuang" or "Qoimishango" in Chinese sources.
- Chushül (Chu shul): Village just south west of Lhasa. Kalön Yutok moved his command to the Dzong here after Gyantse fell (along with Gongkar Dzong.)
- Dechen (bDe chen): Tibetan army barracks where militia were secretly stationed to quell unrest and check the British while they were in Lhasa.
- Dode (mDo bde): A town near Lhasa.
- Dramtö (Bram stod): Tibetan army barracks where militia were secretly stationed to quell unrest and check the British while they were in Lhasa.
- Dromo Rinchen Gang (Gro mo rin chen sgang): Usually written "Tromo" in British accounts. The valley is at the intersection of Sikkim, India, and Tibet. The Chumbi Valley leads from here towards Phagri, hence known as "New Chumbi" in British accounts. Yatung in Tibetan accounts. Yadong in Chinese accounts.
- Düne (Dud sne): British supply base near Phagri Dzong. Usually rendered "Tuna" or "Thuna" in British accounts.
- Dzalep La (rDza leb la): A high pass (14,300 ft.) between India and Tibet in East Sikkim District of Sikkim. Written as "Jelep La" in British accounts.
- Dzatrang (rDza 'phrang): A narrow gorge about twenty miles equidistant from Khangmar and Gyantse. The site of the second surprise attack by the Tibetans where it is recorded in the commentary that on the 28th of February 230 British soldiers were killed or wounded.
- Gabshi (dGa' bzhi): Aristocratic estate and Tibetan military camp near Gyantse.

Gampa La (Gam pa la): 15,700 ft.

Gangdrung (sGang drung): Mountain overlooking Gyantse Dzong.

Gongkar (Gong dkar): Town south of Lhasa. Kalön Yutok moved his command to the Dzong here after Gyantse fell. It is now the home of Lhasa Airport.

Gyalkar (rGyal mkhar): Village on a ridge behind Gyantse Dzong.

Gyantse (rGyal rtse): The third largest town in Tibet. Gyantse Dzong was the scene of much of the fighting in 1904 and now hosts the Memorial Hall of Anti British. Vitali claims it was built in 1390. See, VITALI, ROBERTO. 1990. *Early Temples of Central Tibet*. p. 133. London: Serindia Publications. Written as "Gyangze" in Chinese accounts.

Horthang (Hor thang): Site of second British camp near Phagri.

Jangrig Naktsang (Byang rigs nag tshang): Tribe of Kongpo. Militia commanded by the Adar brothers.

Ka La (Ka la): The pass at Ka is over 14,000 ft, and the lake beyond it 14,600 ft. Tibetan troops massed here before withdrawing to Chumi Shonko.

Karo La (Ka ro la): Pass in the hills south of Lhasa. 16,500 ft.

Khamba Dzong (Khampa Dzong): Dzong in Southern Tibet, just over the Natu La from Sikkim. Location of protracted negotiations between the British and Tibetans in summer of 1903.

Khangmar (Khang dmar): After the battle at Chumi Shonko the Tibetans retreated to Khangmar to regroup. Commander Rampa's parade of 2,300 troops rallied there.

Latse (La tse): Village to the north of Gyantse.

Lhalu (Lha klu): Aristocratic estate; home to the British officers while they were in Lhasa.

Meru Nyingpa (rMe ru): Meru Nyingpa Monastery is located in the Barkor (Bar skor) area at the heart of the old city of Lhasa, just east of the famed Jokhang (Jo khang) Temple.

Nakartse (sNa dkar rtse): Location of the important Nakartse Dzong and monastery between the Gampa La and Gyantse.

Nenying (gNas snying): A large Monastery twenty miles south of Gyantse.

Nyangchu (Myang chu): River, collecting from the Bam Tso and Kala Tso and flowing through Gyantse, joining the Tsangpo River at Shigatse.

- Peldi (dPal di): An estate near to Lhasa where Kalön Yutok had his headquarters before being recalled to the Kashag.
- Pelkor Chöde (dPal 'khor chos sde): The monastic complex within the walls of Gyantse Dzong built from 1413 by the ruler of Gyantse, Rab brtan kun bzang 'phags (b. 1389). Most famous for its great 'stupa' and the seventeen colleges, of which Rinding, Khurpa, and Sekang (Rin lding, Khur pa, Se kang) sent monastic troops to fight in Gyantse Dzong.
- Phagri (Phag ri): At over 15,000 ft above sea level Phagri is one of the highest towns in Tibet. The strategic Dzong commands the roads between the Chumbi Valley and Gyantse. The original Dzong dated from the 1500s, and was rebuilt in 1792.
- Phala (Pha lha): Tibetan Militia headquarters in the Gyantse region. The aristocratic estate lies to the south of Gyantse Dzong and now features a museum of life under the old aristocratic regime.
- Sapü Gang (Sa phud sgang): The main Tibetan military outpost near Gyantse established by Commander Trelingpa.
- Shide (bZhi sde): I can find no trace of this monastery, mentioned in the commentary as being near Lhasa.
- Shigatse (gZhis ka rtse): The second largest town in Tibet. It lies where the river Nyangchu joins the Tsangpo. It is 160 miles southwest of Lhasa, and sixty miles northwest of Gyantse. Written as "Xigaze" in Pinyin.
- Shöl (Zhol): Settlement at the foot of a monastery - in the present case, principally the monastery of Gyantse.
- Sholam (Sho lam): Monastery located ten miles south of Khangmar. The British camped here after the battle at Chumi Shonko, and it was here, according to the commentary, that Commanders Trelingpa and Rampa attacked them by surprise in the night, killing sixty of the enemy officers and men.
- Trashī Chöling (bKra shis chos gling): Monastery in Mongolia where the Khal kha rje btsun dam pa bsTan 'dzin dbang phyug met the Dalai Lama on his arrival in Mongolia. It is now in Jekundo City, Yushu County, in Qinghai Province.
- Trashilhunpo (bKra shis lhun po): Trashilhunpo Monastery is seat to the Panchen Lama, the second most important spiritual leader of Tibet. In 1447 the monastery was founded by the First Dalai Lama, dGe 'dun grub.
- Tsechen (rTse chen): A monastery five miles west of Gyantse.

Tshegungthang (Thal gung thang): Fields outside Lhasa where the British troops were quartered. We are also told this is where a section of the Tibetan army was secretly camped while the British were in Lhasa.

Wutaishan (*Wǔtái Shān*) 'The Five Peak Mountain Temple Complex,' in Shansi, China.

Yakde (g.Yag sde): A Manor near to Nyemo where Kalön Yutok had his headquarters while in Gyantse. Also known as Yakdekangsar (gYag sde khang gsar).

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ⁱ [3] *ljongs chab gros < bod kyi rig gnas lo rgyus dpyad gzhi'i rgya cha bdams bsgrigs > rtsom sgrig khang nas /*

ⁱⁱ [1] *dbu klad nor mdzod nang gi rtsa che'i lo rgyus don dngos kyi rgyu cha mang po*

ⁱⁱⁱ [1] *gzhan yang 'brel yod yig cha dang lhag par rang skyong ljongs rig dngos do dam khang nas kyang ta la'i bla ma sky phreng bcu gsum pa'i chab shog sogs dbyad gzhi'i yig rigs kha shas mkho 'don gnang ba de dag dbyad gzhi byas pa*

^{iv} [2] *mtha' yas gangs ljongs lo rgyus rgya mtsho'i ngogs / sna tshogs byung ba'i cha shas rlabs phreng las / tha shal dbyin ji'i gyo 'phrul lbu ba'i nang / gdug rtsub gzugs brnyan ma bcos lhug par 'char / btsan rgol rgyal srung rngam brjod dpu'i bo'i gar / kun tug rags kyang yi ge'i me long ngos / ma 'khod bgres rabs gsung rgyun chu phran 'bum / gcig bsdus sngon med rdzing bu 'di na bskul /*

^v [4] *shar phyogs kyi rgyal khab phal cher rjes lus su gnas pa'i dus skabs dang bstun te sa gnas mang por 'dre lag brkangs pa dang*

^{vi} [4] *rang rgyal du btsan 'dzul gyi nyal tha'i dmag 'khrug bslangs te ngan pa byas rgyal du song rjos gom pa rim bgrod kyis bod ljongs btsan bzung bya rgyu'i bsam ngan bcang zhing*

^{vii} [4] *bod ljongs kyi lho phyogs su gnas pa'i 'bras mo ljongs la btsan 'dzul*

^{viii} [4] *bod ljongs kyi lho phyogs su gnas pa'i 'brug yul la btsan 'dzul*

^{ix} [5] *bod sdod am ban sung ku'i dang bka' shag gnyis kyis 'phral thag chod po'i byed sgo spel ma thud par nar 'gyangs mur rtsod gzhi 'phro can du lus shing /*

^x [6] *dbyin ji'i lkog gyo'i*

^{xi} [6] *bod ljongs chos ldan gyi zhing sar btsan 'dzul*

^{xii} [7] *dmag rgyags grabs gshom byed gtan yin 'dug par*

^{xiii} [13] *blta skor tshong 'grul bya rgyu sogs gyi 'dod tshul slar yang bton pa de ni mes rgyal gyi mnga' khongs bdag dbang la*

^{xiv} [13] *bod ljongs mi dmangs rnams nang pa sangs rgya chos lugs la dad pa ha cang chen pa byed mkhan zhig yig gshis / bstan dgra dbyin dang nga tsho ni lta sbyod gang sar me chu lta bu'i tsha grang ya 'gal yin stabs nam yang mthun thabs med pa'i 'phral phugs gnyis gnod gyi*

^{xv} [14] *dbyin ji btsan 'dzul pa bkag 'gog nan tan mtha' 'khyongs byed ched mtha' mtshams su zhi ba dang drag po'i las don gyi 'go 'doms nus ldan gdeng thub khag gcig bsgo gzhag gnang dgos khar dbus gtsang dang / lho kha / dwags kong / sbo bod / khams khul / byas 'brog bcas nas 'don dmag dang yul dmag skul 'gugs dang / da dung dgos pa byung tshe dgon sde che 'bring khag nas ser dmag dang than a skyes pa btso brgyad drug cu'ng dmag skul rgyag dgos rgyur dmag mi bsdu bskong byed mkhan dbon rigs ser skya'i khongs nas 'gan 'khur mi sna bsko gzhag gnang dgos pa dang / go lag thad bod bzos me sgyogs dang / bod mda' / me rdzas / zha mdel / sbud ti / grim dung / than a a'ur rdo yan chod go sgrig dang / phyogs mtshungs dmag rgyags 'bru rigs kyis gtsos bza' chasgang ci 'du 'god gsog 'jog dang dbor 'dren dos khal sogs phyogs gang nas sa dmag grabs 'thus tshang bya rgyu nyin 'gyangs zhag 'bud du ma song ba las 'go 'dzugs rgyu dang / de bzhin dgra 'gog dmag bzlog zhabs rim bsgrub rgyu'i thad dga' ldan khri [15] gdan zur gyis gtsas bla sprul khag la thugs dma gsung zhu'i dgongs don gdan sa chen po rnam bzhi dang dpal ldan gsang chen rgyud grwa stod smad sogs ris med dgon sde khag la mang 'gyed bsnyen bkur dang sbrags dgra 'gog dmag 'thab la rgyal kha thob pa'i mchog gsum*

gsol 'debs rgyab sgyor rim 'gro bsgrub rgyu dang / de 'brel gzhung bsen dgra lha'i gtso bo gnas chung thos rgyal chen pa dang / la mo tshangs pa / dga' gdong chos skyong sogs bla lha khag la dbyin jir shi ba dang drag po'i 'gog thabs ji ltar byas pa bzang skor lung brtag phul te bka' lung dgongs don lag bstar byed 'os gyis mtshon

xvi [22] ma gzhi gnam bskos gang ma chen po'i bka' ci 'dra zhig yin rung srung brtsi zhu rgyu ni gus 'bangs rnams kyi 'os 'gan yin / ... /gzhi nas lung thur la ni bod kyi sa khongs snyon med yin pas ma tshod 'bras ljongs dang 'brug yul gnyis kyang sngar nas bod khongs rgyal phran shig yin pa

xvii [27] dmag rgyag skabs 'jab 'gug dmag 'thab byed rgyu las gsal rjen du thon rgyu med pa dang / dmag dbung kha sdod pa las / gdong bsus nas 'thabs rgyu med / dust shod ni mtshon mor 'jab rgol byas na legs pa / bab bstan gyi 'dzing res byed dgos pa dang/ mdun bskyod byed pa las phyir 'then byed rgyu med pa / rang re'i dmag dpung gi sdod yul ni khag dbye nas gur nang du sdod rgyu las / dmag sgar du rab 'dzoms gyis mi sdod par pha rol pos me sgyods mang po rgyag rgur sngon dpag gis 'gog thabs gang gzab byed dgos / dgra bo'i mi rta tshang mar bza' 'bru dgos par brten nga tshos 'bru rigs dbor lam gcod thabs byed dgos po dang / nga tsho'i bza' 'bru dang mtshon cha sbi gsang gis sba thabs byas te dgra dmag kher rkyang nang 'dzul byed du bcug nas kho pa tsho ltogs shi thebs pa zhig bzo dgos pa sogs /

xviii snar sbrul khra khra srog bcad pas / da cha the gu khra khar yid mi ches

xix [29] man ching srid gzhung rang nyid dang rigs mthun yin pa'i rgyal tshong 'go 'dogs ring lugs pa

xx [42] bod dbyin dbar dmag 'khrug rgyag mi dgos pa'i 'dum 'grig byed rgyu'i 'dod pa yod

xxi [43] bod dmag gis sa mtshoms ma brgal na nga tsho dbyin ji'i dmag gis nam yang phar rgol byed gyi min

xxii [44] mi khyon che dmag lam gsar bzo'i rgyab skyor yin khul du ched 'bod byes te dbyin ji btsan 'dzul par dmag don stobs shugs gdeng 'khel byung nyid

xxiii [44] deng sang dbyin jis me sgyogs drah rtsal nus shugs gcig sdud gyis rjes snyegs drag 'thab byas stabs 'gog srung ya lan 'phrod dka' bar brten re zhig phyir 'then mi byed mthu med gyi gnas lugs rnams

xxiv [45] rgya gzhung gi dpon po yod na 'phral du dmag mtshams 'jog dgos

xxv [45] dbyin dmag rnams de'i gong gi smag sgar chags yul bar phyir 'then byas /

xxvi [45] bca' sdod byed mkhag gyi dmag dpon chung ngu zhig red / 'on kyang kho pa'i gtam brjod ni bar du gnas [46] pa'i rgyal khab gcig gi dmag dpon chen po dang 'dra ba'i names 'gyur zhig bstan te mkhas nyams rlom sems ngo tsha khrel bral gyi g.yo 'phrul byed bab la gzhigs na dbyin ji btsan 'dzul mkhan dang ngan 'brel byed mkhan zhig yin pa'i gdong ris gsel por mchon pa red /

xxvii dgra bor 'khon 'dzin chen pos 'dul gtam mang po bsgrags pas ma tshad lha gsol bsangs mchod byas te dbyin jib can 'dzul pa mthar skrud btang nas lung thur sa khul sogs

xxviii [47] kho pa ni nub phyogs btsan rgyal ring lugs par mgo 'dog zhu rgyu'i bsam blo kho n alas med pa

xxix [47] dbyin 'gog byed par bod dmag gro mo sa mtshams sub tang mi chod pa dang / sngon btang 'go dmeg rnams phag ri sa khul nas brgal te mdun phyogs su nam yang btang bskyod mi chog

xxx [47] dgongs 'char de tsho gnam bskos gong ma bdug po chen po'i bka' dgongs yin min la ma stos par nga tsho khwang len rtsa ban as zhu thub thabs med /

xxxix [49] *bod dmag 'phral du phyir 'then dgos / dbyin dmag bskyar du yong na bod sdod yam ban nga la skad cha dris chog*

xxxix [54] *dbang cha tshang ma yod pa'i krung go'i man ching gong ma chen pa'i sky tshab ... kho pa ni hrur brtson chen pos man ching srid gzhung gis btsan rgyal ring lugs par mgo btags zhu ba'i lngas phyogs la rkub gyog rgyugs mkhan yin par brten btsan 'dzul phyir zlog ched rgyu'i bod mi dmangs kyi re 'dun rdog rol*

xxxix [55] *bod ser skya mis dmangs bde 'khod mi phebs pa'i sa mtshams khag nas btsan 'dzul byed bab la sdug 'khur ma thub par rang srung rgol lan mi slog thabs med ... 'on kyang sa mtshams skor la bod sa lag mthil tsam dbyin ji btsan 'dzul par sprod thabs med cing / phyogs mtshungs bod du dbyin ji'i tshang lam gsar gtod sogs sngar med gsar sprod rigs rtsa ba nas khas len byed thabs med*

xxxix [55] *hreng tha'i khyod rang gong ma chen pa'i dbang cha cha tshang yod pa'i blon chen gyi min*
[56] *thog nas ring min rgya gar gyi ka li ka tar bskyod de bod dbyin gnad don skor dbyin gzhung dang 'phros mol byed dgos*

xxxix [56] *skabs der kho par dbang cha cha tshang yod pa'i rgya nag gong ma chen pa'i sku tshab blon chen zhes dga' bsu dang sne len gzab gzengs byas pas*

xxxix [59] *dmag mi rnams la skul slong sbyong brdar yag po byed ma thub pa dang / khag cig yul dmag yin pa sogs sgyig khrimis kyang dma po med pa / rgyab phyogs dang mdzod khang nang nas rdzas mdel dang bza' chas ldeng mkho sprod byed ma thub pa /*

xxxix [59] *rtsa ba man ching srid gzhung gi mna' khongs mtha' dka la sha rul 'bu yis zos pa ji bzhin btsan 'dzul dang bsnyad bcos dbang 'phrog byas te snum zad kyi mar me ji bzhin nyam zhan du gyur pa'i gnon shugs*

xxxix [60] *khyu mchog gna du song ba'i lam der ni / ba lang thams cad dogs pa med par 'jug*

xxxix [61] *krung go'i mtha' mtshams su sdod pa'i mi sna dang dbyin jis btang ba'i 'dras ljongs kyi dung can*

xl [61] *btsan rgyal ring lugs pa'i gnon shugs dang tshod 'dzin phog pa sogs jus shor gyi lan rtsa tshang ma man ching srid gzhung la thug stabs*

xli [62] *drag dpung stobs shugs gsog 'jog byas pa dang 'brel tshong 'grul dang / phyugs rigs spo 'tsho'i skor /*

xlii [63] *thog gi krung go'i man ching srid gzhung rul sung nyam zhan du 'gro ba'i*

xliii [63] *bod gzhung gis btsan rgol drang bden gyi lam du bskyod de lag bstar ma byas par brten*

xliiv [63] *'on kyang gong gsal zhu yig de gnyis nas sngon ma de bka' shag gis phyir slog byas pa dang phyi ma de'ang t'a la'i bla mas ma bzhes par phyir slog gnang bar brten*

xliiv [64] *sku ngo ma dang mjal 'phrad zhus te mgo skor bsu brid bya rgyu'i re stong bcangs pa der yang ngo tsha kha skyengs dgos pa'i pham nyes byung*

xliiv [64] *mtshams skor la don gnad thag gcod bya rgyu yin pas bod kyi sku tshab mi sna do chod 'phral gtong dgos rgyu*

xliiv [64] *lkog g.yo ngan jus kyi sgo nas*

xliiv [65] *'di bzhin zhi ba'i 'phros sne mthud thabs shig yin rung pha rol chab srid kyi g.yo thabs che bas*

da dung bsam sbyor ngan gshom ji yod ma nges stabs gam pa de bzhin de ga bla brang gi 'dzin khongs yin gshis rdzong sdod mi sna do chod yod shag la 'di ga'i zhi gros mi snar go sdur dang 'brel gzhis byes phyar ba gru 'degs kyis don du btsan 'dzul mi yong ba'i zhi drag thabs sgo gang mkhas kyi mdzad phyogs 'thus zab yod pa

^{xlix} [66] kyang de 'phral thabs blo che skyed kyis dbyin ji'i btsan 'dzul dmag gam pa sa khul nas phyir 'bud byed thabs

^l[66] gzhi rkang bka' shag nas kyang dbyin jis zhi ba'i gros mol zer ba kha mkhas tsam las don snying bod dbyin dbar 'khon 'gras rlung gis ded pas dmag 'khrug gi me lce zhig 'bar rgyu yin par ngos 'dzin byed kyi yod pa red

^{li} [67] 'byung 'char dbyin 'gog byed phyogs skor bod ljongs tshogs 'du rgyas 'dzoms go sdur dang 'brel spyi sgrig gan rgya'i 'bru don gtso bo phyin chad las mtha' legs nyes ji ltar byung rung / bstan dgra phyi gling pa 'gog srung mtha gcig tu byed rgyu'i

^{lii} [69] dbyin ji'i phyogs nas 'dra mnyam gyi skad cha shod pa'i rnam 'gyur rtsa ba nas med par lam seng lung thur dgra rdzong gi skor sogs ya la brnyon 'dzugs btsan

^{liii} [70] dbyin ji btsan 'dzul pa dgra ngan 'dis de snga sa byi [1888]lo nas bzung drag po'i dmag dang / zhi ba'i gros mol zer ba'i thog nas btsan 'dzul mgo skor ci rigs kyis nga tsho'i dpa' bo mang po zhig lag nyes btang bas ma tshad da dung gam 'bras sa mtshams skor zhi ba'i gros mol zhes pa'i ming btags pa tsam las don du kha rting mi mtshungs par da cha sa mtshams brgal te gyes rur slebs pa 'di ni bzod sgom bya thabs bral bas 'dir bzhugs gzhung bla'i bla dpon lhan rgyas nas zhi drag ji mdzad dgongs bzhes yod pa/ nga rang gi srog ni rang la dbang ba zhig yin stabs rang srog blos btang gis rang 'og yul dmag gang yod khrid de mtshan 'ged dgra 'thab bya rgyu yin

^{liv} [73] nga tsho nges par du lha sar dpung bskyod bya rgyu yin tshul nyag rkyang

^{lv} [74] rung hwa phong gnyis gtso bor byas pa'i dbyin ji'i zhi drag gi dpon po brgya skor gyis sne khrid 'og sing pa'i mi rigs dang / gor sha'i mi rigs sogs gla dmag dang/ sman pa/ rgyab phyogs skyel 'dren gyi las ka byed mkhan/ dos skyel gla pa soD khyon mi grangs chig khri lhag tsam sha 'od rdol ba bzhin

^{lvi} [74] phag ri rdzong sdod dang ru dpon skyid sbug la'ang ngag thog nas dpung bskyod mi chog pa'i skad cha shod rgyu tsam las/ drag dpung gis 'gog srung bya rgyu'i nus pa med pa ma zad

^{lvii} [74] de'i gong nas bka' shag gis dbyin ji 'gog srung byed ched 'don dmag dang / yul dmag bya spu snon gyi go sgrig yod mus thog

^{lviii} [75] dbyin jis kha nas zhi gros shod pa tsam las don dngos btsan 'dzul gyi dmigs yul bsgrub

^{lix} [75] brgyud thag gcod yong rgyur blos ling 'gel byas te nga tsho bod phyogs nas gro mo sogs sa mtshams khag tu so blta sa srung tsam bzhag pa las srung rtsa ba nas byas med pa da lam khyed rnam pas gzigs gsalltar yang dbyin phyogs kyis glo bur drag po'i dpon dmag khyon che dpung'jug gnang bab 'di thad 'dzam gling spyi sgrig sogs gang la'ang mablto pa'i mdzad spyod 'di ltar phyag len bstar tshe drag po'i dmag'thab tu 'gyur rgyur brten phyin chad khyim mtshes sa 'drel dbar mi mthunrta g.yag mgo sprel gyi ngang tshul las ma 'das khar da lam khul 'di'i nyesmed khug gi ser skya mi dmangs rnam dmag las drag po'i 'jigs skrag dang du kha

^{lx} [76] ring por mi thoD pa bod gzhung ser skya mi dmangs dang bcas pa'i sku tshab do chod sa gnas 'di gar zhi ba'i gros mol zhu bar bcar rgyu yin

^{lxi} [76] dphan sa mtshams su dbye 'byed gros mol rim par byas kyang thag gcod thub pa zhig byung med par brten bod gzhung gi srid las pa gtso bo dang ngo'phrad kyis zhi ba'i gros mol byed dgos pa'i dbyin ji gzhung gi bka' 'byor zin stabs nga tsho phyir 'then bya thabs med

lxii [76] *chu mig gshongs ko bcas la spos nas drag dpung gi 'gog srung byed rgyu'i sems thag bcad*

lxiii [76] *chos skyong mi khog tu spyang drangs lung zhu phul bar zhi gros legs lugs kyi bka' lung phebs*

lxiv [77] *dmag 'thab byed rgyu med pa*

lxv [77] *bka' phab don bod gzhung nas kyang man ching gong ma'i bka' don bzhin bod sdod am ban ngo phebs gnang rogs zhes re ba bton rung / am ban ngo ma dbyin ji'i dmag sgar yod sar 'gro*

lxvi [77] *am ban ngo ma dbyin ji'i dmag sgar yod sar 'gro ma nus par khag 'dogs sna tshogs bshad de nyi ma 'bud thabs byas pa'i*

lxvii [77] *dbyin jis de phyogs sngon btang 'go dmag khyon che'i khar/ skyar du 'di gar dpe gsar can gyi 'khrul chas ldan pa'i dmag mkho'i yo byad 'dra min dang / bza' chas/ rta drel/ Khal ma sogs khyon che dang / dmag mi dang dos skyel mi hreng sogs ka lon sbug sa gnas su gra sgrig byed 'dug pas bod phyogs kyis go lag sogs sgo gang sa nas drag po'i ya yan thub re dka' ba'i gnas tshul btang 'byor byung ba dang / de bzhin 'brug krong sa dpon dang / 'brug pa ka ci o rgyan so sos kyang*

lxviii [80] *thog ma nyid nas dgra bo nang du shar gtong bya rgyu ni rtsa ba'i dam*

lxix [81] *bod dmag rnam la go mtshon thad 'go dpon re zung la 'phrul mda' yod pa las de min sngar gyi bod mda' dang / gri mdung / 'ur rdo tsam las med pa ma za*

lxx [82] *dmag gi las sbyor gyis kha gtad gcog thabs med*

lxxi [82] *rgyal kha thob re med pa'i snang tshul mngon*

lxxii [84] *'go dmag rnam 'dzing rags khag la phyogs bgos kyis me mda'i sbud ti spor rgyu bod dmag gis bzung ba'i chu mig gshongs ko'i rgyab ri/ dang / gri/ mdung / rdo sogs*

lxxiii [85] *gros mol byed par thog mar phyogs gnyis kas sngon 'gro'i cha rkyen du zhi ba'i sgo nas gros mol byed dgos stabs drag chas 'jog dgos pas/ phan tshun dmag mi tsho'i me mda'i nang gi mde'u 'don dgos shing / bod dmag tshos sbud ti'i me gsod dgos pa dang / dbyin dmag tshang mas me mda'i khog nang gi mde'u tshang ma 'don rgyu yin*

lxxiv [85] *g.yo sgyur byang chub pa'i dgra bor dogs zon bya rgyu ma ldeng ba'i*

lxxv [85] *dbyin ji btsan 'dzul pa ni g.yo 'phrul la byang chub pa'i mi bsun brlang spyod lce gnyis dug sbrul gyi rang bzhin las drang po'i spyod lam gyi dri tsam med pa zhig yin stabs dbyin dmag gis thog ma nyid nas ngan pa khog bcangs mi spyod dang bral ba'i gdug rtsub kyi bya ngan yid la brnag bzhin yod pas*

lxxvi [86] *de nas 'go gtso rnam chu tshod skar ma bco lnga tsam ring phan tshun zhi ba'i gros mol skor gleng res byed skabs dbyin ji'i dmag dpon zhig gis glo bur du 'phrul mda' chung chung zhig bton nas bod kyi mda' dpon rnam gnyis sogs der yod mi snar 'phangs te sku srog 'phrogs pa'i*

lxxvii [87] *wa rnga ma sha ler bros pa las/ stag 'dzum drug nyi ler dbyin jis gtor skyon btang ba'i chu mig gshongs ko'i sbrag khang gi gyang ro/ 'chi ba dga'*

lxxviii [89] *dbyin jis me mda' rgyag mtshams bzhag nas nyi ma dgong dror slebs skabs dmag mi kha shas kyis ro yul brgyab thog phyir log phyin pa dang / de nas yang dbyin ji'i ku li zhes dngos po dang rmas dmag dpor 'dren byed mi de tshos ro'i am phrag bsngogs pa dang / rna long / tshig kheh gang thob 'khyer*

lxxix [89] *chu mig gshongs ko'i dus ngan dmag sa de rang du phal cher bod kyi 'go dmag mi grangs 500 skor dgra lag tu shor ba dang / mi grangs 430 skor rmas skyon btang ba*

lxxx [90] *bod mi dmangs la mgo skor thub tshod tshad med btang ba'i 'dzam gling sa steng du grags pa'i khrag gi bu lon de'i 'khon 'dzin ni rdo la ri mo brkos pa ltar bod ljongs ser skya mi dmangs kyi sems nang gnas bzhin yod pas dus da lta'i bar du yang rang rang khyim tshang so so'i nang du pha gtam bu 'jags kyi*

lxxxi [90] *nga tsho tshang mas mi rabs gong ma'i rgyal gces dpa' bo'i snying stobs la mig dpe bltas te mes rgyal lho nub kyi rgyal sgo brtan por srung dgos rgyu ni bar gyi dran skol tsam*

lxxxii [90] *shor ba las pham kha byung ba ma gtogs bod mi rigs kyi rgyal gces dpa' bo'i snying stobs dpa' rtsal la don dam dgra bo ha las*

lxxxiii [95] *rang dmag gcig gis me mda' kha shor ba'am rbab rdo ril ba red ze shod srol gnyis yod pa gan*

lxxxiv [96] *dgra dmag 'phrang lam du zhugs pa'i khongs nas kha thor du bros te thar ba rnam phud/ de 'phros mang che ba rtsa med bzos pa*

lxxxv [96] *me sgyogs bar mtshams med par brgyab cing rgyang shel yod pa'i me sgyogs der sa khad nye rgyang la ma bltos par dmigs sar gnad du snun pa'i nus pa ldan stabs rtse ri'i*

lxxxvi [97] *dgra dmag 230 skor bsad rmas btang ba*

lxxxvii [100] *gnas tshul dmag sar khyab pa des 'go dmag rnam kyi dgra 'gog byed pa'i bsam blo brtan du phyin 'dug*

lxxxviii [101] *de dgon pa gtor brlag mi 'byung ba'i re ba*

lxxxix [102] *mda' gri mdung gsum gang yod thog mgon khang khag la yod pa'i go mtshon yang da res bstan dgra 'dul skabs bed spyod btang chog gi red*

xc [103] *tshur rgol byed ma phod kyang gang*

xcii [103] *de skabs rang phyogs 'go dmag rnam kyi 'chi gson 'gag rtsa'i*

xciii [103] *dgra dmag sum cu skor bsad rmas btang ba dang / mang che ba lchang lor bro*

xciv [111] *dpa' ngar zhum med kyi phar rgol*

xcv [111] *der dgra bo shi rmas tshabs chen byung rkyen*

xcvi [113] *da cha khyod tsho 'dzing rgol byed pa'i nus pa bral bas mgo sgur na srog thar gyi red*

xcvii [114] *dgra ngan dbyin jir mgo bsgur te srog thar ba las/ dmar 'dzing gis rang srog dor ba dga'/ nga tsho'i pha yul srung skyob dang / sngon gshegs spun zla'i dgra sha len ched rang srog blos btang ste dgra bo dang dmar 'dzing byed rgyu las gom gang phyir 'then byed kyi min zhes sngon gyi dam bca' brtan por srung ste*

xcviii [114] *lhag par du dgra bo'i dmag dpon rdza nya sa heb zer ba des thung mda' zhig khyer te*

xcix [114] *dmag 'thab de chu tshod kha shas brgyab mthar dgra phyogs kyi 'go dmag 120 skor shi rmas btang ba'i khrag gron gnas snying rdo gcal sten chu ltar rgyugs*

xcix [114] *dpa' bo'i mdzad rjes rlabs chen gyi rgyal kha blangs pa red*

c [116] *thengs 'di'i gnas snying dmag 'khrug skabs bod rigs dpa' rgod mang po zhig gis mes rgyal dang / rang yul srung ba'i don du sku srog phul ba red/ khong tsho'i dpa' bo'i mdzad rjes kyi snyan grags mi nub par bod mi dmangs kyi khrod du da lta'i bar du yang gnas yod pa*

ci [116] *lta spyod mi mthun pa'i phyi dgra rang sar lhags 'byor*

cii [117] *A dar kong dmag slebs byung / dbyin dmag sa la brdabs song / gnas snying dgon pa'i rdo gcal/ dmar po'i khrag gis khengs song*

ciii [121] *lhag par rtse chen chos sde'i grva pa [58]dang / nye 'dabs kyi zhing pa mi grangs 15 skor shi rmas song ba bcas kyi pham nyes tshabs chen byung ba de ni yang bskyar bstan dgra dbyin jis bod ser skya mi dmangs la bsad 'phrog bcom gsum gyi gdug rtsub yod rgu byas pa'i bu lon la 'phar snon brgyab pa zhig red/*

civ [122] *nang rten shar li/ nub li/ gser zangs sogs las grub pa'i sku brnyan che ba mtho tshad rmi bzhi tsam nas chung ba li rmi bcu tsam yan stong phrag brgal ba/ de bzhin gos sku/ thang ga gsung rten gser chos kyi bka' 'gyur dang / bstan 'gyur/ hor dang / rgya/ bal yul bcas su bzos pa'i gsil snyan [123] dang / rol mo/ gser dngul zangs bcas kyi mchod kong dang / ting / dngul gyi maNDal dang / zangs kyi dung rgya/ gos chen rgyu rnying gi phan sogs mchod rdzas sne 'dzoms la spus ka dag pa zhe gcig dang / tha na tshogs gdan rab 'bring sogs bcom 'phroD byas pas*

cv [123] *bur dbyin dmag 'tshang 'dzul gyis bud med la btsan g.yem dang / rgyu dngos rta nor 'phrog bcom sogs*

cvi [124] *rgyal rtse g.yu gzhongs phra mo/ phyi gling dmag gis khengs song / e ma 'di 'dra mthong dus/ bsags pa'i nor gyis ci byed/ ces gzhas tshig de'i thog nas mi dmangs rnam kyang rang*

cvii [124] *me ltar tsha zhing mtsho ltar zab pa'i sdug bsngal gyi gnas su gyar yang gnya' mi chag cing dpa' mi zhum par sngar bas*

cviii [125] *sngon gshegs spun zla'i dgra sha len pa*

cix [126] *man ching srid gzhung gis nub phyogs btsan rgyal ring lugs par mgo 'dogs byed dgos pa'i 'dod tshul rgyun 'khyongs byas pa zhig red*

cx [128] *brgya phrag mang po 'phen kyang rtsigs zur la ma gtogs de min gtor skyon che rigs ma byung*

cxii [128] *stabs dgra bo rnam ngo tsha kha skyengs su lus*

cxiii [130] *skabs der rdzong du rdzas mdel len mkhan bod dmag kha shas shig gis rdzas khang nas rdzas mdel len par bskiyod skabs gzab nan ma byas pa'am bod spyi'i gegs chags lta bus me spar yod pa'i sbud ti zhig rdzas mdel gyi mdzod khang nang lhung ba'am gang ltar mi tshang ma drag 'thab kyi brel zing che sgang zhig la glo bur rdzas khang nas me 'bar te me lce dang du ba mkha' dbyings su 'phyur zhing du bas nam mkha' bsgribs pa sogs bsam yul las 'das pa'i don rkyen*

cxiiii [131] *par brten dgra dmag gis sgang drug nas la tshad grong tshor me sgyogs mang po brgyab ste grong mi'i tshe srog dang rgyu nor la gtor skyon tshabs chen btang rkyen sa ma chags par grong mi phal che ba lcags ri rgyab dang phyag 'tshal sgang du glo bur gnas spo bya dgos byung yang*

cxv [131] *la gtugs te dgra dmag gang 'tsham tshar bcod btang ba red*

cxvi [132] *dmag gis rbab rdo dang / gdung hril sgril ba/ 'ur rdo 'phen pa sogs kyis 'gog srung byas*

cxvii [132] *sems thag gtsang bcad kyi rang srog btang ste lag 'dzing rang la gtug rgyu'i dam bca' bzhag thog dpa' ngar zhum med ngang gri dang / mdung / rdo/ tha na dbyug pa sogs la brten nas deng dus*

can gyi mtshon cha me sgyogs dang / me mda' sbag sbag ring mda'

cxvii [132] *nyid kyis phugs bsam bden don 'ba' zhig gi don du shi rgyur sems thag bcad pa'i bod dmag dpa' bo de tshos gzhung sgo nas*

cxviii [132] *gis phan tshun shi rmas bgrangs kyis mi langs pa zhig bzos mthar*

cxix [134] *rgyab dpung bya spu gnon gyis gtong ma thub par lus shin*

cxx [135] *lha sar don gnad gal che'i skor la bka' blon rnam dza drag gi go sdur gnang dgos stabs bka' blon g.yu thog pa lha sar 'phral phebs dgos pa'i yig chung gtong dgos*

cxxi [137] *shi rmas tshabs che byung*

cxxii [137] *rkang dmag khag gnyis kyis shar nub ri ldebs su 'dzeD yong ste bod dmag yod sar me mda' sbag sbag bstud mar brgyab pa'i mde'u*

cxxiii [138] *spyi khyab che ba bka' blon ngo ma g.yul sa'i mdun phyogs su bzhugs ma bcug pa des sa gnas so so'i 'gog srung gi 'thab sems zhe lhod du song ba de nas bzung dgra dmag la 'gog rgol byed mkhan gang yang med*

cxxiv [138] *dbyin dmag phon che lha sar lhags na gdan sa 'bras se dga' gsum gyi grva pa sogs mi mang po 'du 'dzoms kyis dus zing ji yong ma nges pas sa gnas de rang du zhi gros gnang na legs gnas*

cxv [138] *nye 'char khyed kyis btang gnas spel 'byor der gsal dbyin ji'i brjod babs su da mus bar ma dor don rtsa chod dka' bas lha ldan du 'phral ta hon gyis t'a la'i bla ma dang mjal 'phrad 'khrun chod zhu rgyu dang / dgongs bzhes gnang bde'i ched bod dbyin dbar gyi don gnad don tshan dgu 'khod kyis shog lhe zur phul yod lugs btang 'byor sa mtshams kyis don gnad gal cher brten bka' shag dang / bod ljongs tshogs 'dus mol bsdur gyis yig lan ring min spel rgyu dang / dbyin ji'i dpon dmag lha sar yong rgyu don phan cher ma mchis pas de don ngang 'then dgos lugs brjod rgyu soD don rtsar zhabs 'gyur zal thon yong ba byed dgos*

cxvi [139] *da cha lha sa dang thag nye'i sa gnas 'di tsam la 'byor zin pa ma zad/ dbyin gzhung gi bka' 'brel zhi ba'i chings mol byed par lha sa rang du ma bskyod mthu med la bod phyogs nas bkag 'gog tshur rgol ma byas phyin rdzong dang yul dgon gang sar nga tshos gnod 'tshe nam yang mi byed*

cxvii [139] *dbyin dmag lha sa'i khad nyer 'byor gshis/ yul lung bde 'jags ched bod dmag tshang ma phyr 'then thog dbyin jir sne len mthun thabs lhing cha gang che dgos*

cxviii [140] *dbyin ji btsan 'dzul dmag la da phan bod gzhung nas snga phyi bar gsum du zhi ba'i gros mol lan dgu chad mthud byas kyang nyan shes ma byung stabs drag dpung gi 'gog srung g.yul 'gyed mi bya mthu med ltar dmag 'thab snga phyr gong ma chen po mchog la dbyin jis bod la 'bu ches chung zos btsan 'dzul byas dang byed bzhin 'dug pa dmag rogs skyabs 'jug rim par zhus kyang rgyab dpung rogs skyor ma gnang khar/ bod sdod am ban nas kyang bod dmag gi 'gog srung bya gzhag la ma 'grig ma 'thus pa'i ka kor ji snyed gsung pa dang da lam sna dkar rtse tshun gyi sa 'gag rdzong 'go khag la rang 'tshams kyis dbyin ji 'gog srung ched 'jog dpung dmag rnam phyir 'then dgos pa'i bka' btang ba bcas da cha dbyin ji'i 'go dmag rnam lha sar 'byor nyer da dung ngos nas gdeng tshod med par 'di mur bsdad na rgyal bstan chab srid la 'phral phugs dge skyon ji yong 'gan blos bzod bral la brten snga 'phros rgya sog yul gru brgyud pe cing du bskyod de gong ma yum sras mjal 'phrad zhu 'os bsam mdo don bod bstan chab srid yun gnas kyis ched du ngal ba khyad bsad kyis thabs shes gang yong bya rtsis yin na de'i bar bstan srid kyis 'gan 'khur mdzad po da yod bla sprul che kha'i nang nas khyed nyid las 'os bab che ba med gshis/ bod bstan chags 'jig 'gag rtsa'i skabs 'dir snying stobs kyis go cha bzhes te srid skyong gi thuD 'gan bskyangs dgos*

cxix [141] *sman pa'i lhag bsam phyar ba gru 'de dgos rgyu*

cxix [142] *skabs der pe cing nas man ching gong ma dang / gong ma'i yum gnyis kyis ching phral zhes sku tshab am ban ched mngags thog 'tshams 'dri'i bka' yig dang gos chen rgyan bzhi ser po 'brug dgu yod kyis gtsos bzang gos yug 10 dang / rgya dngul srang 6000 bcas gnang 'byor byung*

cxix [143] *kwang zhud khri lo sum cu (rab byung bco lnga pa'i shing 'brug)snyi lo [1904]lo'i bod zla [6]tshes [22]nyin dbyin ji'i btsan 'dzul 'go dmag rnam lha sar 'byor pa red*

cxix [144] *dbyin jis 'di lta'i btsan gnon bsnyas bcos byed babs la bzod sgom bya thabsbral bas phyin chad bstan pa chab srid srung skyob ched dgra ngan 'di dang mnyam shi zhig byed ma thub na nga tsho bod mi ma red zer*

cxix [147] *dbyin dmag gis mtha' bskor nas 'dzin bzung dang 'brel dmar gsod thog*

cxix [148] *mi su yin rung dbyin ji'i dmag sgar chags yul nye 'gram du sha tshal dang / gzan shing sogs nyo tshong gi 'brel ba gcod dgos pas mi tshad*

cxix [148] *khu bya babs pa bzhin du dgra sgar nang mchongs shing / ge sar lta bu'i dpa' bos phyi gling pa bsad nas/ngo mtshar ltad mo bstan 'phral dbyin dmag rnam bros song*

cxix [149] *lhag par chings dngul sprod rgyu'i gnad don thad dkar nag phyin ci log pa zhig red/ dbyin jis btsan 'dzul byas te nga tsho'i mi rgyu zog gsum la gtor bshig de tsam btang thog da dung phar chings dngul sprod dgos pa'i rgyu mtshan gang yin nam*

cxix [149] *nga tshos 'gan len ga la thub/ 'dzam gling spyi lugs dang mi mthun pa'i chings yig*

cxix [149] *rung hwa phong dang yu'u tha'e am ban/ lha sdod gor sha'i sku tshab/ 'brug pa o rgyan bcas nas 'jam rtsub thabs shes sna tshogs kyis chings yig la mos mthun byed du 'jug rgyu'i g.yo thabs spel ba dang*

cxix [150] *bod phyogs nas mos mthun dwang len mi byed ka med byung ba*

cxl [150] *t'a la'i bla ma ma phebs gong srid tham dga' ldan khri par gnang ste t'a la'i bla ma'i sku tshab yin pa dang / bka' blon dang / bod ljongs tshogs 'du rgyas 'dzoms/ dgon sde chen po gsum bcas tshang ma gros dbang gi gras yin pas ming rtags 'god par zhugs chog gi red*

cxli [150] *da lta t'a la'i bla ma bzhugs 'jags med stabs ya mon am ban bzhugs yul 'di srid gros khang lte ba zhig yin stabs de rang du gnang dgos*

cxlii [151] *dbyin ji btsan rgyal ring lugs pas bod la btsan 'dzul dmag 'khrug bslangs pa der dmigs yul ham sems gang 'dra zhig yod pa mi tshos gsal po mthong thub kyi red*

cxliii [151] *dbyin dmag gis bod la btsan 'dzul byed skabs lam bar du mi dmangs dmar gsod dang / dgon pa dang grong sde mer sreg btang ba/ dgon sde*

cxliv [156] *'go dmag khag gcig dmag 'thab snga phyir srog sdos kyis dpa' bo'i byas rjes bzhag*

cxlv [157] *so so'i byas rjes la gzhigs pa'i gnas spar gzigs bzos/ khral chag sogs babs mtshungs stsal ba dang*

cxlvi [158] *thog mar rda khu ral du phebs pa deni dbyin jis bod du btsan 'dzul byed pa'i spyod ngan snga phyi bar gsum gyi gnad don skor bod sdod am ban bryud gong mar gser snyan snga phyir sgron te*

cxlvii [159] 'dra mnyam min pa'i chings yig bzhag thog dbyin ji btsan 'dzul pa dang zhi ba'i gros mol byed pa las

cxlviii [159] drag 'thab kyis thal cha btang mi chog ces bod gzhung la bka' phab pa dang / btsan rgol rgyal gces kyis langs phyogs mtha' 'khyongs thog bod kyis ser skya mi dmangs dang dpung pa mnyam gshib kyis dbyin ji btsan 'dzul par ngo rgol mtha' gcig tu byed mkhan wun am ban glo bur bod sdod am ban gyi las 'gan gnas dbyung btang ba sogs

cxlix [159] ru su'u ha hong gong mas kyang bod dang dngos shugs su 'brel mthud byed ched mi sna rim pa btang ba sogs

cl [159] hra hong o ru sus rdo rje dbyibs zer ba brgyud gsang ba'i sgo nas t'a la'i bla ma kho tsho'i phyogs su

cli [160] o go'i gong mas rdo rje dbyibs dang thug 'phrad byas thog t'a la'i bla mar rlung 'phrin thog nas 'tshams 'dri zhus pa sogs byas

clii [162] rgya nag nang khu

cliii [162] phan tshun bkur bzos bdag rkyen gnang zhing

cliv [163] rgyal rtse rtse chen chos sde dgra shor rjes da' la'i bla ma sku 'phreng bcu gsum pas dbyin 'gog dmag don dbyi khyab bka' tshab bla ma dang bka' tshab gyu thog pa sogs la stsal ba'i bka' rgya khag gsum / dmag don spyi khyab bka' tshab gyu thog pa la / ched don bod phyi'i chings don skor bka' blon don gcod bcas rgyal 'byor thog krong dpon gyis brjod gsal / mkhan po zhabs pad bcas rgyal khab nas phebs dgos zhus kyang spyi mkhan phebs srol med pa yang snying bka' blon gnyis 'byor rgyu bshad jin gshis phyi rol par kha bslus 'gro nyen la gyu thog 'phral phebs dgos rgyu gsung gsal 'phral phebs bka' rgya yod pa zhes bka' blon don gcod mthu mong gi snyan 'byor skor / bka' tshab gnyis yod kyang don gnad rgyal khab la dgongs skor las rang thag chod min dang / dmag son yas mas byed sgo sne 'dzings sod dgos gnad cher e [164] yod snyam yang / don phan yod tshe nyid nas kha khor gyis bsdad bas ma 'thus gshis 'phral thon thog byed sgo rnamdpar ba gru 'degs kyis yang snying bka' bla don gcod bcas la bkod rgya snga phyi'i 'bru don lag len ko ldog med pa yid 'jags rigs / rten dang sngags mdud bcas sging 'brug zla 5 tshes 24 bzang por dge // (<< chab shog >> nas bton)

clv [164] dmag don spyi khyab bka' tshab bla ma dang / mkgan drung blo 'phrin / gdan 'thus bcas mthu mong la ched don sngon du 'di ga'i bkod don bzhin bod phyi'i chings don skor bka' bla tshes 15 nyin gzhis rtse nas thon te thes 19 nyin krong dpon dang mnyam du rgyal 'byor gyis bka' bla don gcod bdas nas 'brug phyir thug 'phrad 'phros mol snga phi rim bshad sogs da phan bgyi sgo 'thus tshang 'dug pa ma zad / da dung yang dpa' thal khum gnyis ka ma yin pa'i dpa' mdzangs mkhas gsum snying bcans kyis phyar rgyag gang che dang 'brel ba'i dan snying bod phyigs 'go dmag rnamdpar sngon tshud rang lag yod dus phyis 'gyangs yal yolk ho nas rngas btsan bzing ma thub rkyen da cha 'go dmag rim 'byor gyis rtsi chen dgra short hog rgyal rtse rdzong chos kyang dgra lag tu tshud nye bcas kha rngon lung don snga phyi'i bkod don bdas dus 'gyang gis le shor gyur gshis da cha rang sa 'dzin bzung dka' tsam gyur pas / las sngon byas kyis gdeng tshod byed ran dang bcas yang snying dgra 'thab gyur tshe rang phyogs shed nus thon min blo [165] gsal ltar gnas skabs 'gyang thabs kyis 'phros pa lan dgu chad mthud ma byung phyin 'thus shor gcig thog gnyis brtsegs yong gnas la blo rtsal ci thon 'bad 'bungs dgos rgyu ma zad / se sprul tshes 19/19 nyin zhib mngags kyis thon zin cing / bka' tshab gyu thog thad gnas skabs dgos gnad e yod snyam yang / don phan yod tshe thon dgos song ba 'byor kyang gcig 'gran lag phyis lta bur ma song ba'i phyar ba gru 'degs dgos rgyu dang / lar nas don 'gangs rigs rgyal khab dgongs skor las bka' tshab gnyis yod kyang thag chod min thog / dmag don skor yang yas mas 'thus shor e yong snyam pa bcas dgos don snying bcangs kyis byed sgo thal lus med ngos / gnas tshul yang rim 'bul yong ba rigs / rten dang sngags mdud bcas / shing 'brug zla 5 tshes 24 bzang por dge // (<< chab shog >> nas bton)

clvi [165] yang bskyar spel don / de ga nas zla 5 tshes 23 nyin btang ba'i gnas tshul 'dir tshes 24 snga dro 'byor gsal / chos rgyal chen po dang / las byed mig dmar gnyis kyi lung gsal lhag bsam gang 'grub zhu rgyu yang / 'go dmangs phal cher bla khum gyi blos ma zod tsam rung / zhi drag skabs sbyar bkod khyab byed mus / chings don skor bka' tshab bla mar lcag skul zhu mus thog krong sa'i ngo tshab rgyal rdzong la zur gsos dang / mthun sgrig mtshams rten zur bskur deng skabs nyid rgyur sa brgal med lugs / [166] ri chab dpa' gsum 'go dmag rnams sgo bzhir mngags rdzong zin pa bcas da phan bgyi sgo rim sel 'thus shing / da sgos tshings 'phros sar rgyal rtser bskyod rgyu'i thad bkod rgya zur bsrings ltar de gar zhi drag yas mas gang sar 'thus shor yong dogs med phyin / brtag par sngon du bzang babs ltar ngo tshab la zhib mngags kyis 'phral bskyod dgos rgyu ma zad/ lam lhong ched skyabs rten nang mdzod dang / dngul srang lnga bcas 'byor ba ltar / sri zhu'i bgyi sgo phra rags rnams chab srid gyen 'degs kyi lar rgya'i legs tshogs bde blag tu 'grub pa'i mchog gsum gsol btang dang srung ma'i brgyud bskul nar mar bgyis yod pa de don yid 'jags dgos rgyur dge // (<< chab shog >> nas bton)

clvii [169] taa la'i bla ma sku 'phreng bcu gsum pas bod dbyin dbar chings 'dum skor gorkha rgyal por tsal ba'i phyag bris / legs byas kyis mngon par mtho ba ko kan wang gorkha rgyal po la / deng / 'tsho dngos bzang po 'dzam bu da'i rang khams brtan cing / gor bod mthun lam las don bzang po'i 'od mdangs 'tsher bzhin pa nas ne lam / gnya' sho brgyud de ga nas gnas tshul bzang po tsal ba yid du nges par spro / 'dir yang khams bzang zhing / chos srid kyi bgyi sgor brtson pa sogs gnas tshul bzang po sngar bzhin yod / gong ma chen pos nyid la tog sgro gyon chas tsal bar legs skyes rten 'brel dngos po gnya' sho'i mdun phul bar zhu lan tsal gnang gis thon phyag btang thog ring min 'byor rgyu thugs rje che / rgyal khag phan tshun lar zhen ma bor ba'i bod phyi dbyen 'khrug skor bka' blon mthu mong la gnas tshul zhib lhang gnang b a 'di gar phul byung / zhib 'jug gi lan gsal mgyogs po gtong dgos song ba bka' blon rnams las don sne mang gis lus pa las / maha ra dzar ltos med zhus pa min 'dug / khyed nas rgyal khag phan tshun 'khrug pa zhi thabs dang skye 'gro mang po bde skyid [170] la gnas thabs bzang po'i blo gros can gyi dge skyon rnams ga ba tsam gyis sems shin tu bde / bod phyi 'khrug gzhi zhang kho pa tshos zhi gtam yin khul sa brgal ham shed rim par byas gshis rang re'i dpon dmag rnams nas sa srung gis rang sde gnas thabs byas pa yin 'dug / da cha rgyal khag phan tshun mthun lam ched chings 'dum byed dgos gsungs pa bsam bzang las don drang po red / des na 'di nas bka' blon gtong rgyu mi ser gnyis ngal la brten ngang 'then thog / sa gnas su yod pa'i bka' blon don gcod dang / 'brug chos rje de gar yod mus bcas lha ldan sku tshab dpa' kil las don byed myong dang / mthun zhib che stabs 'di gar las don chu gnyer lta bur song gshis ngo tshab thag chod min khar las don 'grig min gyi gor bod dam sel gyur na bu spun la rgyar gnod 'gal bsam 'di gar dgos gnad che zhing / da lam chings 'dum thad spyi tshogs la mos bsdur dang 'brel ba'i maha ra dza nas dpon rigs do chod mngags rdzong 'phral gtong thog / chings 'phros skor gcig lan gcig grogs kyis sa mtshams thad chan lung bka' rtags da'o spor sor gnas yong thabs sogs zhib cha bka' blon don gcod bcas pa'i mgrin lam du rgyu rkyen gsal po yod gshis rang sa rang lon yong thabs dang / chab srid mtshan lar sman cing skye 'gro rnams bde skyid bzang por 'god pa sogs maha ra dza nyid mkhyen pa bzang / gor bod mthun lam bu spun lta bur dge stabs ngos kyang las don re sems ha cang chen po yod / chings don skor [171] ma haa ra dza dang / ngo tshab bcas nas don 'gang gnas tshul gnang 'os dang / lha ldan dpa' kil brgyud gsung 'os sogs gang cir 'phral 'phral yod pa ma zad / spyi don gal cher mi mang la dri bskor dang 'brel bas maha ra dzar lan gsal rim bzhin 'bul rgyu yin / rten kha btags che ba bcas res gza' pa sangs zla 5 tshes 25 nyin nor gling skyed tshal skal bzang pho brang nas dge // (< chab shog >> nas bton)

clviii [167] ta'i la'i bla ma syu 'pheng bca gsum pas bod dbyin chings yig skor 'brug krong sa dpon la tsal ba'i bka' yig khag gnyis / dad ldan 'brug krong dpon slob je sag la sprod / nye lam zla 6 tshes 4 nyin de ga'i bang mi'i gdong yi ge 'byor don/ dbyin ci'i (jis) brjod gsal/ da mus don rtsa chod dka' bas lha ldan du 'phral thon gyis taa la'i bla ma dang zhal mjal gsung thos kyi 'khrun chod zhu rgyun yin lugs/ lam bra bkag 'gog bgyis phyin don phud rgya cher gyur ('gyur) lugs gsal ba ma zad / don tshan dgu 'khod don gnad shog lhe bcas 'byor gal gnad che gshis spyi tshogs la mol bsdur gyi yig lan 'gyangs med spel rgyu dang / gzhi rkang khyed nyid nas kyang da lam 'di skor drag res bgyis par song gshis gang ci'i cho babs dang bstun pa'i yas mas gang sar nyes 'gog mthun grub byed 'os bstan lar snying bcangs nas 'di gar byed bde'i gnas tshul spel 'os 'phral bsrings yong ba gyis/ rten dang sngags mdud bcas shing 'brug zla 6 tshes 5 bzang por dge // (<< chab shog >> nas bton)

clix [168] dad ldan 'brug krong dpon dza sga la sprod / tho don / sngon du bang mi'i gdong yi ge 'byor gsal / bra ma dor chings thag chod dka' bsa taa la'i bla ma dang zhal mjal gsung thos gyi 'khrun chod bya lugs gsal skor / sa mtshams spyi don de dga rgyal blon dang / spyi tshogs gros bsdur gyi 'khrun chod las spyi don sger gcod byed shes min ltar / don tshan dgu 'khod skor spyi tshogs nas rim bzhin yig 'phros yong shag ma zad / dbyin ci'i (ji'i) 'go dmag nas sa brgal sngar muys shar tshe phan tshun gnyis thad nas don rtsa gsar 'bud ji yong ma rtogs bshis / 'di ga'i gam bcar spyi mkhan la yang zhib mngags ched rdzong song don bzhin khyod nyid nas kyang 'di skor cho babs kyi rgyun rkyen sol 'os rigs skabs sbyar thog bstan don snying bcangs zhabs 'deggs zal thon yong ba dgos rgyu las / gnas skabs lha ldan du bskyod kyang dgos phon gang yang ma mchis pas ngang 'then thog rjas sor don rtsar zhabs 'gyur zal thon mtshams lha bskyod byas 'thus skabs gsal bgyid rgyu dang / don dgongs gnas tshul sngar bzhin 'phral bsrings yong ba gyis / rten dang sngags mdud bcas shing 'brug zla 6 tshes 8 bzang por dge / (< chab shog >>) nas bton)

clx [172] shing 'brug dmag sa'i bkod 'doms khang gi las bya bsher dpang glang mthong pas bka' tshab lhan rgyas la phul ba'i snyan zhu/ dpal ldan sa skyong mi dbang chos rgyal chen po lhan rgyas mchog gi zhabs pad gser khri mngon mtho'i drung du/ gus 'bangs bsher dpang glang mthong pa nas gser snyan rin po che thung tsam mi sgron mthu med la rnams (rnam) mkhyen chos klong chen po rnyog 'gal mi bzhes pa mkhyen mkhyen zhu gsol 'debs snying/ mi dbang bka' tshab bla ma chen po'i zhabs gras kun rin lags dang/ gus pa gnyis 'brong rtser yod pa'i ser dmag dang/ gnam ru'i rta dmag bcas 'gug 'bod du rgyal rtse dpal chos nas gtong gnang bzhin zla 5/5 tshes 22 nam phyed yol khar phar ri nang mdo 'dza' phreng mo zer ba'i phu brgyud shad thon bya skabs rgyal rtse gzhis bdag rgyab ri nas dmag mi mang dag bros byol du yong 'dug pa ched 'bod kyis dmag mi brgyad 'byor byung ba gzhung ang chang 'khyer mi zhig 'dug pa de dag la 'dri brtsad byas par brjod rigs su mda' tshab lcags sprag pa'i ngo tshab yin pa phran rnams rtse ri srung sdom du gtong gnang byung rung sa ma brten pas phyir bros bya dgos byung lugs brjod [173] 'dug par gus pa gnyis nas khyod rang rnams da cha 'brong rtser ngos gnyis dang chabs cig yong dgos pa las/ kha 'thor bros byol du phyin mi chog pa'i babs mol bgyis par de don zhus 'thus zer ba yong shag snyam mur kho pa rnams kha gram gyis ri rtser bskyod de 'byor rigs ma byung ba dang / de nas la rgyab kyi ri khrod dga' ldan pa'i 'brog rigs sar 'byor skabs glang gzhis rtser drung blo chos dang / 'bras 'thus rjes 'byor gsum/ gra rigs bcas bsdad 'dug pa ji yin dri zhib byas par rtse ri dgra shor la brten sa ma chags pas bros byol bya dgos byung lugs brjod pa phran zung bka' 'brel 'drong ('brong) rtser dmag mi 'gug 'bod du thon rgyur dmag mi rnams snyam (mnyam) 'khrid kyis 'brong rtser phebs grogs nan zhus la rtses drung sngon thon zin song zhing/ 'bras 'thus gsum nas rtse drung la bka' gnang grogs brjod 'dug don rtse drung gis (gi) mjug zin pa bskyod pas khu ma la rgyab tu rtse drung blo chos dang / dmag mi mang dag bcas ja bskol gyis (gyin) bsdad 'dug pa dri brtsad byas par phan po khul gyi 'don dmag yin zer ba'i dmag 'ded rtse drung blo chos dang/ dmag mi rnams la bstan don gal cher song gshis tshang mas phyar ba zur 'deggs ma bgyis thabs med la da cha 'brong rtser yong dgos sogs dge skyon go gsed rim bzhad la rtse drung dang / dmag mi bcas nas sngon phan bka' don bzhin zhabs 'deggs hur bskyed zhus shing / phan po ba'i dmag mi thog mar 180 skor yod rung dgra shor snga phyir song ba

[174] phud da cha dmag 60 skor las ma bsdad sogs rtse drung nas dmag mi'i rgyab langs kyis gus phran gnyis la gtam rgyag ri rigs thog glo bur sbir dkrogs kyis phran gnyis phyir bskyod mjug me mda' 'phen byung bar mchog gsum thugs rjer (rjes) ma phog tsam byung ba ma rtogs (gtogs) gzhung zhabs rtse drung zhig nas bka' khirms la brtsi med kyis drung rigs nang tshags me 'phen byed babs la gzhigs tshe da cha phyi nang gang sar srog 'go mi thon pa'i gnas bcas blo 'pham sems sdug khong khro'i gnas su gyar yang/ gnas skabs mi mang lag mang dang thug pas bya thabs dben lags shing/ de nas phran gnyis 'brong rtser tshes 23 gyis (gyi) dgong ja phyi cha khar 'byor byung ba de 'phral ser dmag dang / rta dmag bcas brtsad gcod byas par 'brong gzhis nas brjod gsal ser dmag rnams phogs khang nas sngon rdzong mdzad song bar rgyal rtser shas (shad) bskyod ma thub pas byi'u'i mdor bsdad yod 'dug rung / ser dmag kha shas ma rtogs (gtogs) bros byol du song skad zer lugs brjod 'dug cing / gnam ru'i rta dmag rnams la 'brong rtser kha rtsa gtong yul med stabs gnas gsar brgyud bcas su kha gram gyi bsdad 'dug pa 'go byed ched 'bod kyis rgyal rtser sang nyin rang thon dgos sogs bka' don bkod pa nges nan bshad/ rgyab 'ded du 'brong rtser gzhis sdod gcig bskyod dgos mol khyab thog ser dmag bros byol

pa rnams 'gug 'bod zhu lugs sogs de'i nub mong (mo) snyan zhu zhig 'phral [175] 'bul zhus te sang nyin rta dmag rnams shas ljongs (shad rdzong) zhu rgyu yang rgyal rtse nas mi rigs yong mi ji snyed kyi chos rdzong dgra shor la brten dmag mi rnams kha 'thor gyur lugs sogs dpal chos gra rigs kha shas nas nges gsal brjod gshis rgyal rtser 'gro yul gral (bral) stabs zhabs gras kun rin lags chu byang phyogs su phebs te mi dbang chen po ji phebs dang / dmag mi kha 'thor bsgor bskyil bcas su phyir phebs thog gus pas gnam ru ba'i rta dmag dang / nag chu / nag tshang gis (gi) dmag 'phros bcas pa rnams (rnam) du 'byor dgos bkod bshad kyis pa rnam ljong (rdzong) 'dur dmag mi phyir bros bkag 'gog dang / rang sa srung sdom sogs dgos pa'i 'phros mol byed par pa rjong (rdzong) du thon par phogs rgyag do dam rtse mgron phun rab pa bzhugs 'dug par go bsdur zhus te ljong (rdzong) 'du ched 'bod kyis rang phyogs dmag mi bkag 'gog dang 'brel bas bstan dgra ljong (rdzong) lhags mi 'byung bas (ba'i) srung sdom dgos rgyu'i bkod pa nges nan bshad de gus pa rang gis (gi) pha gzhis la bstan dgras 'gro lam bcad de sngon du gus 'bangs sna rtser 'byor skabs nas bzungs nye mkho sne btags tsam len yul med par brten pad tshal du bskyod par bstan dgra'i rta dmag 80 skor glo bur pa ljong (rdzong) du 'byor gshis grong 'dzin za pha rgan byis nas bstan dgra 'phog ('khog) re bral stabs phyi rol pa 'di dag gzhung zhabs la shin tu brnag par brten pa rnam du'ang sdod blos ma [176] bzod pas gzhis rtser 'byor te phogs dpon gzhis ljong (rdzong) bcas la bstan dgra bkag 'gog bya lugs 'bros (gros) mol zhus par bkag 'gog thabs tshul gang shes ma zhus thabs bral yang / dmag mi med pas (par) brten ji yong glos (blos) bzod min yod lugs gsung ba rgyal 'dod dmag mis mtshon tshang ma mtshan gung dang / ri rtse brgyud thon pas lho khul 'don dmag gang 'tsham gtsang po'i byang phyogs sdad (bsdad) yod 'dug pa las de min yod tshod mi 'dug pa dmag mis ji bzhin ma bgyis tshe rabs srung bkag thub bral lags shing gus pa rang gis (gi) pha gzhis la bstan dgras sngon phan gnod 'tsher byas rigs byung mi 'dug kyang nye lam ri rtse brgyud bang mi zhig 'byor byung bar bstan dgra 'tshang 'dzul gyi g.yang sgam gtor rlag (brlag) gis mtshon dngos rigs mang dag bcom 'khyer byas 'dug pa da dung ji yong ma rtogs khar sngon phan nye mkho pad tshal nas blangs te ngo g.yog rta drel bcas khungs 'khyol tsam byung lugs kyang /da cha pad tshal nas kyang nye mkho len yul dka' ba ma zad / gus 'bangs rgyun du gzugs gcog thog sngon du phan khul dmag 'ded rtse drung blo chos nas dmag mi'i rgyab langs kyis zhabs gras dang / gus pa zung la me 'phen bgyis pa nas bzung sems sdug khrag rlung stond tshangs kyis mnar bar drag skyes med pas mnar mus thog sngon du rgyal rtser bskyod skabs lam bar skyid snar rtas brdabs kyis rkang g.yas bde min bcas lha rab [177] byang 'grims brgyud rgyal khab tu zhabs bcar zhus 'thus kyi dgongs 'khrol brtse bas gzigs pa dang / de dag mdzad ltas mchis tshe gnas skabs drag skyes ma byung bar sman bcos dang / nye mkho'i khyad apar bcas su 'bri yul du bsdad 'thus kyi dgongs 'khrol thugs rje che ba nas drag skyes mtshams zhabs zhur sku bcar zhus chog pa bcas byams snying la dgongs pas bka' bzang don smin brtse bas gzigs pa mkhyen mkhyen zhes gsol ba 'debs rten lha reg bcas gus 'bangs pas phyag bcas zla 5 tshes 28 la phul ba'i snyan zhu /

clxi Bod kyi rig gnas. [213] sger chos rnams la lo lo skam bca' bcu zur re brtsis pa lo drug khongs 'bul dgos gan rgya nang gsal nas ru'i khal 3850 sran ru'i khal 300 pha lha 'don mi ser rnams la bka' shag 'go mchan dgongs don skam 'khrir 'bru khal 5000 stsal thog da lam ngo zhus gan gsal nas khal 230 phun bde dang / ser lcog chos gzhis / 'drong ('brong) 'don bcas la skam bca' bcu zur thengs gcig 'khri rgyur 'bru snga g.yar stsal ba gan gsal nas ru'i khal 3300 sran ru'i khal 500 tham pa / gzhung rgyugs mi ser rnams kyi khang pa rtsa 'thor dang / sngags bon / thang sham sdod khang rtsa 'thor bcas la mthun rkyen gsol ras song ba gan gsal nas khal 1679.13.45 ra lung rgya khang gsar rgyag mthun rkyen gsol ras nas ru'i khal 140 sgo bzhi rgya khang gi brgyad zur nyam bzor mthun rkyen

clxii am ban chen po nas gdan sag sum gyi gtsos gzhung zhabs ser skya mi mang la btang ba'i 'dra shul /zhag rgyal 'go mchan btang don / snyan zhu'i rgyu rkyun rnams nges shing / zhib na skyabs mgon twa la'i bla ma rin po che mchog chibs bsgyur nam phebs su tshang mar bka' bsgyur gyis gser snyam sgron hbul shu dgos de tar yang / da chha thag ring su chhibs bsgur gyi nge / blon chen la rgyu rkyen tsam men pa ji yin la nges med gshan dag nas skon syar btangthe nye pa su thog du skhur la / de don khyed rang er skya mi mang rnams sa gnas ji hdra yod rung pot ta lar gdan / shus kyis las don mdzed dgos dang / da dung rmong sems hdi mur bshag tshe gser snyan sgron bul thog gnas dwyung kyi nye pa gchod rgyu yin pa dang / de hbrel khyed rang ser skya mi mang la hang hgan hphri med pa yong

min la ming tho debkhogs su / nyar tshags bgyis pa bchas / de don gdan sa se hbras dgah gsum kyi gtsos ser skya mi mang nas nges dgos rgyur / Kwang shu hi phri bshungs sum chu pa zla tshes la/

clxiii [151] *dbyin dmag gis bod la btsan 'dzul byed skabs lam bar du mi dmangs dmar gsod dang / dgon pa dang grong sde mer sreg btang ba/ dgon sde khag gi rin thang bral ba'i lha sku rten*

clxiv [152] *g.yu byur/ gzi/ po shel/ pha lam sogs kyi phra ldan gser gyi dbu rgyan snyan rgyan/ mgul rgyan/ gzhan yang gser dngul gyi mchod chas/ gos chen stag shun dang / kras btags/ rgyan bzhi sogs kyi mchod rdzas 'bor chen*

clxv [152] *dgra ngan phyi gling pas jag bcom byas pa rnam rgyal rtse nas bzung rim bzhin phag ri brgyud dos thog tu btang ba'i sa rim so so'i khal 'bor brdal gla btang ba'i khal gzhung grangs 'bor nang gsal snga phyi bsdoms dos rgyab 460 zin pa*

clxvi [152] *ston pa gtso 'khor gsum yod pa'i gos sku dbyin dmag gi mis jem tses dras btub byas te 'khyer ba*

clxvii [153] *khag gcig rgya gar sa gnas su 'dug pas nga tshos bsdu rub byed bzhin pa dang / nga tsho' 'char gzhir gos sku gsar pa zhig bzo rtsis yod pas che chung tshad gzhi len rgyu yin*

clxviii [153] *dmangs gtso'i bcos bsgyur skabs yod pa las gos sku dngos su bzhengs thub med*

clxix [153] *de'i rgyu mtshan ni chos 'khor de bdag po rgyag mkhan la bkra ma shis pa dang / lam 'gro ma byung ba sogs kyi rkyen pas da lam phyir phul ba yin zhes bshad 'dug*

clxx [154] *rtse chen dgon gyi lha sku rten gsum dang / gser dngul gyi rten mchod chas/ gos sku rgyan 'grem/ tshogs gdan sogs rtsa med du song rigs rnam*

clxxi [154] *gnod 'tshe phog yul gyi sa khul khag la skor zhib btang ba'i*

clxxii [154] *nang rten 'dzin dngos kho na skabs de'i khrom thang rin gong dma' tshad la cha bzhag dngul srang 11623 thob pa yul thang 'bru khal rer dngul srang 025 re brtsis 'bru khal 46492*

clxxiii [154] *dbyin jis gro mo btsan bzung byas pa nas bzung dgon sde dang / sger khag khral mi khyim tshang che chung bcas kyi kha dngos jag bcom ji snyed byas pa rnam*

clxxiv [154] *re re bzhin 'god rgyu yig rdzob che bas da lam dpe mtshon tsam bkod na*

clxxv [155] *gzhung rgyugs khral pa 'bring gras rgya grong bsam khang pa'i dngos rin khyon bsdoms dngul srang 9643.2 la yul thang gong bzhin brtsis 'bru khal 3712.18 thob pa*

clxxvi [203] *shing 'brug dmag 'khrug skabs dbyin dmag gis rgyal rtse khul mi ser gyi lo tog gtor skyon btang ba dang / khang dngos bsregs bcom byas pa'i skor la grong gsar gshis sdod gnyer las 'dzin dang mi ser spyi 'thug nas phul snyan dngos tho rtags sbyar /*

clxxvii [203] *gus pa grong gser ngo 'don nas dbyin ji bsa dmag sgar dpung chen kha lngon zla 5 rtses 15 nyin lchang rar sgar sa phab te (ste) rtses 24 bar gus tsho'i lcan ra 'ong gshugs ces (zhes) pa sa bon khal brgya skor gyi 'di lo'i stabs los (btav lo) rnam za bed btngas 'khrer khar / tgyu dngos dang / rta bong phyugs / khang khyim mer bsregs bcas song tho phul bar /*

clxxviii [203] *rtse zhol du lud khang bkras sding zer ba ka ba drug gi sa ma gdan la gsum thog yod pa mer bsred tiba cong gi lcam shing / bzo 'ul bcas kyi rin gloa lam rtsis kyi srang btgya dang brgad bcu skor dang /*

clxxxix [204-7] *de'i nang sdod mi'i 'dzin chas dngos rigs rin lam bsodms srang bcu tham pa / ngo bo nas gser bzang gi (zangs kyi) sku snyan (brnyan) lnga rin srang 30 smad gos sna tshogs kyi gong ldang thang ka (ga) sna tshogs nyi shu tham pa / srang 160 tsnda dang 'byin ('jim) sku las grub pa sku sna tshod nyi shu rtsa lnga srang 75 chossna tshogs pod lnga srang 7,5 gyang sgam che ba spus dag gcig srang 150 mdun sgrid rgya rag gi rting mdun (bdun) tsar gnyis srang 4,2 li rting lang tshar gcig srang 7,5 rting chung ba bdun tshar bzhi srang 3 rag zang (zangs) sna tshogs kyi me rdong che chung ngo sum cu tham pa srang 9 dang 'khor yug che ba gcig srang 2,5 rgya li'i mndal dngul gyi tog ldan cha tshang gcig srang 6 rag gi chu brgyan (rkyan) gcig srang 2 bzang (zangs) rgyan (rkyan) chung ba gcig srang gang / smad gos legs zher sna tshogs kyi bla khred (bres) ngo lnga srang 30 mchod bcu'i yol ba gsar rnying sna tshogs ngo lnga srang bcu tham pa / stod ras shu bris ma'i yol b gcig srang 4 dang gser po 'ja' sgrig cha gcig srang 4 tgya rum gser (ser) khra'i phred rol spus dag gcig srang 12 de 'og cha gcig srang 10 rgya rum gser (ser) khra'i kha gang ma cha gcig srang 2 'go bar ljang khu'i kha gang ma thong 'ja' sgrigs yod pa cha gsum srang 6 gam rum gyi 'khed (phred) rol nang ldan legs zher ngo gsum srang 5 dang kha gsar spus dag legs pa ngo gsum srang 15 dang kha gang ma cha gnyis srang 4 gtsang thon khred (phred) rol nang ldan spus legs nag sngo ngo bzhi srang 8 kha gang ma cha gnyis srang 2 yang khred (phred) rol kha bbas ngo drug srang 6 dang kha gang ma ngo bzhi srang 2 dbang gum gyi khed (phred) rol kha gsa ngo drug srag 9 dang kha gang ma ngo brgyad srang 4,8 gos chen gyi rngas ril bzhi srang 4 sa gdan legs zher sna tshogs ngo bcu tham pa srang 20 sha sogs (zhwa sog) kha gsar spus dga cha gcig srang 10 dang kha bbas gcum srang 4 'gos (gos) snyug se'e gyon pa cha gcig srang 2 dang 'gos (gos) tgya smug gi gyon pa gcig srang 7 yang 'gos (gos) rgya smug gi tshar tshag gcig srang 10 yang tshar tshag kha rnying gsum srang 7,5 spn shod cha gsum srang 6,75 zha (shwa) khul phings rmog ril gnyis srang 3,5 rnam (snam) tgya tshod (tshos) kyi gyon pa spus dga gcig srang 13 dang de 'og snam rgya tshod (tshos) kyi gyon pa sna pa sna tshogs ngo bcu tham pa srang 20 zon pa yu 'byar cha gsum srang 3 stod gos legs zher ngo srug srang 15 'bu ras kyi 'og 'jug legs zher ngo bcu tham pa srang 15 'bu rgya'i kha 'khrid (dkris) legs pa gnyis srang 4 'go thor tshor tshar kha kha gsum srang 8,2 dang sngon pa kha do srang 5,4 ljang khu kha phed srang 1,2 dang ba shog mtshal kha kha bcu tham pa srang 13,4 'bu di khe le gyon ldeng gnyis srang 9 dngul phor cha gcig srang 25 dngul gyi gser skyem yo chas cha tshang gcig srang 20 stung gi zi'u (ze'u) lha khang che ba gsu srang 9 dang mndla gcig srang 2 rna gya gcig srang 11 gyu byu (spel) ma'i spa 'phrug gcig srang 30 gser gyi rna long gcig srang [missing] snam ljang khra spus dag bub snga srang 25 tshong snam sngo khra bub bco lnga srang 27 gyog nang gzan gyi lo gyon snam dkar bub btgya srang 12 nyal gzan rgya tshod (tshos) ngo gsum srang 9 dang nag khra ngo bcu ham pa srang 25 dkar po ngo nyi shu rtsa lnga skor srang 30 gtsugs (btsug) phrug skar nag sgril ngo bco lnga skor srang 40 zla gam rgyab ldan ngo gsum srang 12 tshod bzang (tshos zangs) che ba gnyis srang 20 bzang (zangs) sdig che ba gsum srang 12 dang chung ba sna tshogs ngo bcu tham pa srang 15 zhu skyog (bzhu skyogs) che ba gcig srang 2 bya khra (ja pra) rag (ra) ma lug che ba cha gcig srang 3 zhag phor cha gnyis srang 3 rag skyog (skyogs) che ba cha gcig srang 2 dang chung b gsum srang 1,8 bzang skyog (zangs skyogs) rag (ra) ma lug che ba cha gnyis srang 7,2 yang de 'og cha gnyis srang 3 dang chung ba cha bzhi srang 2,2,5 stung gi skyog (skyogs) chung cha gcig srang 0,9 lcags skyog (skyod) che chung ngo bcu tham pa srang 2,2,5 lcags khro lung gnyis ma che chung gnyis srang 3 tshal glang che chung gsum la srang 3 tshal skyog (skyogs) ngo drug srang 1,5 rtham phor gser shog ma sna tshod ngo nyi shu skor srang 10 dkar yol dkru yan sngo khra sna tshogs cha bcu tham pa srang 5 ja dkar sna tshogs cha lnga srang 2,5 sder tse sna tshogs cha bdun srang 2,1 stung gi dkar khep sted bcas che chung drug srang 3 rgya rag gi brten khral (ting khrang) cha bzhi srang 4 khro zhi (bzhu) gsum srang 0,9 lcad zhu (bzhu) lnga srang 0,75 shing gtsod rta gri (sta re) che chung ngo bcu skor srang 3 rta sga dbang sga gcig srang 5 bla / phor gyi tgya sga rag shan gnyis (rag shan nyis) gshib bpus dag gcig srang 8 dkyus sga sna tshogs yob glo smad (rmed) srab bcas rang 'grigs drug srang 30 me mda' sprus (spus) dag gsum srang 75 skan rta'u gcig srang 2,5 khrab mdung gnyis srang 2 gri gsum srang 3 'bru gtsang sran sgris ru'i khal nyis brgya skor khal rer dngul 0,45 re rtsis (brtsis) srang 90 so so'i za rtsam dang rgya rtse phog (phogs) khang nas gnam grong 'don la dmag rtsam rgyo 'bru 'grems gshangs mdzad pa dnga phyi gnyis kyi rtsam 'bab 'bu' rgyu bsdad pa bcas bsgris ru'i kha; brgyad brgya skor khal rer dngul 0,35 re rtsis (brtsis) srang nyis brgya brgyad ca tham pa / pho rta gcig srang 25 pho mdzo gcig srang 13 ba mo gcig srang 5 nas rtsa dang sran rtsa bsgril sgrag shur gang tsam rin srang 25 dge (sgye) mo khra chas lna tshogs*

ngo nyi shu skor rer dngul 0,75 re brtsis srang 15 phad rgyab nyi shuu rtsa lnga srang 18,75 nang gi shing dkrog dang / rdza chas sogs gang na ci tod bcag gtor gyis skol snod kyang med nges la shing khrog mchod gshom dang / sgom sogs che phra'i rigs la gnas gong lam rob gyi (kyi) srang 60 bcas bsdoms srang nyis stong brgya dang sum cu so gnyis dang zho med skar lnga /

clxxx [213] shing 'brug dmag 'khrug skabs rgyal rtse khul gyi mi ser khag cig la bod gzhung nas gun gsab tu 'bru rigs gsol ras dang / bskyed med dus 'jal du btang ba'i gzhung khra /

clxxxi [214] rang skyong ljongs rigs dngos do dma khang nas mkho 'don gnang ba

clxxxii [213] pha lha 'don mi ser rnams la bka' shag 'go mchan dkongs don skam 'khrir 'bru gla 5000 ltsal thog da lam zhus gan gsal nas khal 230 phun bde dang / ser lcog chos gzhis / 'drong ('brong) 'don bcas la skam bca' bcu zur thengs gcig 'khri rgyur 'bru snga gyar stsal bag an gsal nas ru'i khal 3300 srang ru'i khal 500 tham pa / gzhung rgyugs mi ser rnams kyi khang pa rtsa 'thor dang / sngags bon / thang sham sdod khang rtsa 'thor bcas la mthun rkyen gsol ras song ba gan gsal nas khal 1679 1345 ra lung rgya khang gser rgyag mthun rkyen gsol ral nas ru'i khal 140 sgo bzhi rgya khang gi brgyad zur nyam bhor mthun rkyen gsol ras nas khal 17,10 las drung spyir rgyig cha khag gi gdan yol lcag rtse sogs gsar bzo'i mthun rkyen gsol ras nas khal 300 glang mthong gla 'og gzhung rgyugs sga skya stod par bkar gyar nas sran phyed 'khrer gyi khal 300 bcas gong gsal khyon bsdoms 'bru ru'i khal / 23843,11,2




Figure 68: Inscription on Hero's Memorial Pillar at Gyantse Dzong. Photographed by the author, March 2008.

clxxxiii rgyal rtse'i mi dmangs kyi dbyin 'gog gnas tshul ngo sprod mdor bsdus spyi lo 1903 lo'i zla ba 12 par dbyin jis mtha' mtshams kyi gnad don khar gyar te pho nya hpha lang se rung ha'o hphang dang mad kha thang na'e yis bkod 'doms 'og dbyin dmag chig stong tsam sne khrid de gro mo nas 'dzul te bod la btsan 'dzul byas pa red 1904 lo'i zla ba 4 pa'i tshes 13 nyin rgyal rtse dgra dmag gi lag tu shor ba'i rjes dpa' bo'i rgyal rtse'i mi dmangs tshos bod sa khul khag gi dmag dmangs tsho'i rgyab skyor 'og dpa' ngar zhum med kysis btsan 'dzul par 'gog rgol byas pa red zla ba drug pa'i zla stod la rgyal rtse'i dmag dmangs chig stong tsam gyis mtshan mo dbyin ji'i dmag sgar la 'jab rgol byas nas lcang lho gling kha blangs pa dang dbyin ji'i dmag mi ha lam tshang ma rtsa med bzos pa red zla smad la hpha lang se rung ha'o hphang gi dpung rog khrid de tshur rgol byas nas slar yang rgyal rtse grong brdal btsan bzung byas pa ma zad zla ba 7 pa'i tshes 5 nyin rdzong ri'i mkhar rdzong gi mtha' skor nas tshur rgol byas par dbyin 'gog dpa' bo [1S] bod mda' dang me sgyogsmdung / dpa' dam 'or rdo sogs spyad de dbyin dmag dang shi gson gyi 'thab rtsod byas nas nyin mtshan gsum 'thab sa brtan srung byas rung mthar mdel zad rgyags rdzogs dang nying bas mang ba mi do bas rkyen dpa' bo lhag 'phro rnams kyi shi yang mgo mi sgar bar gyang gzar nas mchongs te rgyal khab kyi ched du rang srog blos btangba red dus yun zla ba gsum tsam ring gi rgyal rtse'i rdzong ri srung skyob byed pa'i dmag 'khrug des btsan 'dzul par rdung rdeg tsha nan btang ba dang dga' skyo gnyis ldan gyi rgyal srung dang rgyal gces kyi lo rgyus bkod yod/ rgyal rtse rdzong mi dmangs srid gzhung nas 1997,7.