Abstract of thesis

A distinction between different notions of existence in the writings of St Thomas Aquinas, and its use to distinguish logic from metaphysics.

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Frege's doctrine of the existential quantifier solves the problems of the Ontological Argument. Attempts are often made to apply this notion to existence-statements whose subject is a name. Those whose subjects are empty names, however, are best dealt with by considering senses of names. Sentences which attribute actual existence - e.g. 'X is alive' - cannot be adequately expressed in terms of the quantifier. Thus there is another notion of existence, called *esse* by Aquinas.

Williams's attack on this notion - attempting to show that to use a predicate to express it is paradoxical - and his alternative account , by means of quantifying 're-identifying predicables', both fail.

Aquinas, besides a developed theory of *esse*, shows an appreciation of the Fregean doctrine, distinguishing what is said in answer to the questions *quid est?* and *an est?*: the former including *esse*, the latter being *esse ut verum*. In this sense the verb 'esse' means 'aliquod dictum est verum': 'X est' depends for support on some true affirmative proposition about X. If 'X' is a *nomen naturae* (concept-word) it can appear in this supporting proposition as a predicate. Kenny denies this, but the evidence is against him.

Attempts to explain away *esse*, or reduce it to *esse ut verum*, can be shown to assume it. The distinction between the two notions can be used

to dissolve a number of philosophical chimeras. Facts are a confusion between the senses of sentences and *per accidens* actualities: objects, between names and things. Object theory (ontology) is a confusion between logic and metaphysics, which are distinguished by means of the distinction between the two notions of existence.

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Foreword

This thesis is supposed to be a development of work done for the B. Phil. in 1981. In fact nothing of that work has been incorporated unchanged. The first reason for this is the fact that in autumn 1981 there appeared C.J.F. Williams's *What is Existence?* This book appeared to refute decisively one-half of what I had written, and put the other half far more cogently than I had done, or ever could. I think that Chapter II of this present work succeeds in meeting Williams's attack on the notion of actual existence: and though I am forced to disagree with him a great deal on this topic, I am very grateful for the extra work this defence has meant, as it has enabled my thoughts on the topic to achieve a definition they could scarcely have attained without having Williams to argue against. Williams's discussion of Quine, in Chapters VI and VIII of his book, is still unrivalled: and certainly far better than the sloppy and bad-tempered attack in my B. Phil. work. Hence here the discussion of Quine has been limited to a couple of pages.

The other reason for abandoning much of the work already done was that I have had the great good fortune to have Professor Geach as my supervisor since starting on the present work. His help has been incalculable, and I can never express my gratitude for his kindness, patience, and encouragement. If there is anything amiss in the present work, as there must be, it can only be attributed to my lack of response to his influence.

The bulk of the research for the rather more scholarly Chapter III was done during the summer vacation of 1981 at the University of Navarre. I should like to thank my kind hosts there for their generosity and encouragement, and in particular to draw attention to the help I received from Prof. Llano, from whom I first heard of *esse ut verum*.

Others who are responsible for what is good here are Mr Kirwan, of Exeter College, and Mr Bostock, of Merton, who supervised me for the B. Phil.: and my old tutor, David Mitchell, who first introduced me to Frege.

Though a Thomist, I have the Ockhamist prejudices suitable to my education: and if what is attempted here can be summed up in one word, that word is 'demythologising'. I hope, by a consideration of St Thomas's doctrines, and by the application of ideas drawn from those doctrines, to demythologise both the notions of existence: that expressed by the existential quantifier, and that of actual existence. In the process I hope to be able to demythologise objects and object-theory, concepts and facts, and a few other notions (such as fictional characters) on the way. Most of the myths arise from an unholy confusion of logic and metaphysics: and while there can be no grasp of the limits of meta-physics without the notion of *esse*, this notion becomes encrusted with myths unless it is clearly distinguished from that of *esse ut verum*. To make these distinctions we have to bring together the greatest of metaphysicians, St Thomas, and the greatest of logicians, Frege. It is to this task, which has been done so well by Prof. Geach, that this work hopes to make some contribution.

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Williams's logical symbols

In *What is Existence?* Williams uses the Polish notation made familiar by A.N. Prior, together with some of Prior's own symbolism for tense logic. Since I have to quote passages of Williams in which he uses this notation, I append a table of equivalences between this notation and other more familiar formulae, and with the streamlined English in terms of which they are usually explained. In Chapter IV I have to discuss some of Williams's formulae: to do so I have used the Polish/Prioresque notation as well.

Polish	Russellian	English
Np	$\sim p$	Not *p*
Apq	$p \vee q$	Either *p* or *q*
Kpq	$p \cdot q$ $(p \,\&\, q)$	Both *p* and *q*
Cpq	$p \supset q$ $(p \rightarrow q)$	If *p* then *q*
Epq	$p \equiv q$ $(p \leftrightarrow q)$	*p* if, and only if, *q*
Lp	$\Box p$	Necessarily, *p*
$\Sigma x \phi x$	$(\exists x)(\phi x)$	For some *x*, ϕx
$\Pi x \phi x$	$(x)(\phi x)$	For every *x*, ϕx
Ixy	$x = y$	*x* is the same as *y*

Prioresque

Pp	It has been the case that *p*
Pnp	It was the case *n* time-units ago that *p*

Williams's

$I^{A}xy$	*x* is the same *A* as *y*

Chapter I: The Problem of Existence

Williams tells us that in modern philosophy interest in existential propositions has stemmed in the main from disputes about the validity of what is known as the Ontological Argument for the existence of God. Accordingly he begins his second chapter with a discussion of this argument and its shortcomings. We can scarcely do better than to follow his example. The argument is associated principally with the names of St Anselm and of Descartes. The argument of Anselm presents special features that make it less easy to solve from the simple consideration of the notion of existence, though perhaps easier to solve in other ways. Hence it is of more interest to examine the argument of Descartes, not because it is a better argument, but because in it the issues we want to discuss are clearer. Barnes, in his work on this argument, quotes the fifth *Meditation*: (*The Ontological Argument*, p.16)

> ... whenever it pleases me to imagine a first and supreme being, and as it were to bring down an idea of him from my mind's treasury, it is necessary that I should attribute to him all perfections, even though I neither then enumerate them all nor attend to each one: and this necessity is plainly sufficient that afterwards, when I notice that existence is a perfection, I rightly conclude that a first and supreme being really exists.

Barnes goes on to say, surely rightly, that

> The argument can fairly be represented like this:
> (1) Necessarily, a God has all perfections.
> (2) Existence is a perfection.
> Therefore: (3) God exists.

The most famous, and in a sense the most successful, critic of this argument was Kant. Barnes discusses Kant's criticism, but not at great length: Williams goes into greater detail, even giving us an appendix on the question. Nevertheless both apparently fail to notice one crucial passage which is, to my mind, on its own fatal to the argument of Descartes. It is also the passage in which Kant most clearly foreshadows the complete solution of the problems of this argument

which is given by Frege. Curiously, the passage is noticed by Gilson in *Being and some Philosophers* (p. 4): although Gilson was no friend to the Ontological Argument, he was equally hostile to Kant's account of existence. The passage in question is to be found in the *Critique of Pure Reason, Transcendental Dialectic,* Bk II, Ch. 3, sect.4 (B628)

> Being is evidently not a real predicate, or a concept which could be added to the concept of a thing. (...) By whatever and however many predicates we may think a thing - even if we completely determine it - we do not make the least addition to the thing when we further declare that the thing <u>is</u>.

This is rather obscurely expressed: but it is clear that what Kant means is that predicates tell us what kind of thing something is. Hence no predicate will tell us whether or not there is anything of that kind. We can grant to Descartes that anything which is of the kind of thing which we call 'God' will possess all perfections. We can also grant that at most one thing could be of that kind. We may even grant that fulness of eternal life, or existence, is one of the perfections which will necessarily belong to whatever is of that kind. But we cannot derive from this that <u>there is</u> anything of that kind. Kant puts this the other way round: he says that <u>there being</u> something of such-and-such a kind is not a determination of something that is of that kind: it is not something that can be expressed by a predicate which tells us what kind of thing that kind is.

Both Williams and Barnes, presumably following Anscombe and Geach in *Three Philosophers*, draw attention to Schopenhauer's insight that Aristotle had already seen this point. In *Three Philosophers* (p. 21) we are referred to the famous passage in the *Posterior Analytics* (92b 14) which tells us that being is not a genus:

> There is no such kind of thing as <u>the things that there are</u>; that <u>there is such a thing as it</u> is not <u>what</u> anything is.

We might just as well have been referred to the absolute distinction

made throughout Aristotle's works between the questions τί ἐστι and εἰ ἔστι, *quid est* and *an est*, as the mediaevals put it: between <u>what</u> a thing is and <u>whether</u> such a thing exists.

With this key the more complicated parts of Kant's account, like the famous or infamous comparison between a hundred real thalers and a hundred imaginary thalers, become clear. Indeed, the comparison with scholastic Aristotelianism helps to clear up Kant's own positive account of existence statements, which he gives in terms of positing. The use of the verb 'ponere' was common in mediaeval philosophy in, for example, discussions of whether saying that a thing is good adds any determination to it (an ponit aliquid). A stock answer would be that saying that a horse is a good horse, once one has already determined it as being strong, intelligent, fast, docile, frugal and so forth does not add anything in absolute terms, as to say that it was clear-sighted would add something: rather it adds a relative determination, relative to the needs for which we require horses. (Non ponit aliquid absolute, sed relative tantum). Kant twists this idea around to say that when we say that something exists we are not positing anything relative to the thing that exists, not making any determination of it: rather we are, as he says, positing the thing in itself. A number of suggestive passages which are typical of the ideas which Kant may be here following can be found in the *De Veritate* of Aquinas.

Be that as it may, it means that some defences of the ontological argument miss the point. It is no good to say that ' - exists' can be a predicate: because in the sense of ' - exists' which is relevant to proving the existence of God, we have seen that ' - exists' cannot express what is expressed by any predicate. Dummett says, and Barnes agrees, that

> There is a prevalent misconception that Kantian arguments have shown that 'exists' cannot be taken as forming a predicate 'ξ exists'. In fact, the arguments, when rehearsed, always prove to assume the point which is really at issue. They assume, that is, that if 'exists' were a predicate, it would be a predicate that was true of everything; and they then have little difficulty in establishing that such a predicate would be very unlike others. (*Frege: Philosophy of Language*, p. 278)

This does not in the least affect the account that has been given here of Kant's criticism. Dummett is surely right to want to be able to get the ontological argument off the ground: to understand it as a fallacy, not as senseless. But what Dummett goes on to say in defence of the use of 'exists' as a predicate is really rather odd. It is certainly very unFregean. Part of the time he seems to be insisting that 'exists' is as a matter of fact apparently used in this way in ordinary language: but he does not here make the point that the meaning of this usage is usually to be explained in terms of Frege's account of 'exists' as a second-level predicable. A predicate must be significantly deniable: and although Dummett insists that his predicate would be deniable, he does not seem to attach much of a recognisable sense to its denial. Denials of existence tend to generate paradox when 'exists' is taken as a first-level predicate. If Dummett's is not to do so, then it must be taken as a far less perspicuous, ordinary-language expression for what is expressed by the existential quantifier. It is even stranger that Dummett says later (p. 386) that if 'exists' could be used as a first-level predicate as well as for what the quantifier expresses it would be simply equivocal; particularly as he says this in the course of calling into question the notion of tensed existence, which can be genuinely expressed by a first-level predicate, and significantly denied without generating paradox, and which provides the true explanation of the problems around the ontological argument.

If the account given above of Kant's criticism of the ontological argument is correct, we can see to what extent he foresaw the complete account given by Frege. Frege speaks of this briefly and luminously in the *Grundlagen*. Having rejected erroneous accounts of numbers, he tells us that a number attaches to a concept: that is, to a kind of thing, as we said above. It is not a mark, *merkmal*, something which can or must attach to the things that fall under that kind: it cannot be expressed by a first-level predicate that can be true of objects that fall under that concept, of things of that kind. Rather it is a property, an *Eigenschaft*, of the concept itself: something incidental to that kind of thing, that there is some number of them. The expressions that stand for *Eigenschaften* assign to the attribute signified by a concept-word or first-level predicate a mode of occurrence: in fifteen instances, or in some, or in none. Then Frege makes the remark which Williams takes as a motto for his title-page: (*Grundlagen* 53)

> In this respect, existence is analogous to number. Affirmation of existence is in fact nothing but denial of the number nought. Because existence is a property of concepts the ontological argument for the existence of God breaks down.

This is to repeat what has already been said. The existence of God which the ontological argument seeks to prove is the denial that 0 objects fall under the concept 'God'. No amount of consideration of the marks of this concept, of what an object must be if it falls under this concept, is ever going to tell us how many objects do in fact fall under it. We can perhaps establish that at most one object could fall under it: but we cannot by these means establish that any does. There could be, according to the story, at most one phoenix at any time: but the examination of this and other marks of the concept 'phoenix', even if they include immortality, cannot help us establish whether in fact there is one.

This, of course, is brought out immediately by any attempt to formalise the ontological argument in any logical notation or streamlined natural language that embodies Frege's insights about first- and second-level predicates. The ontological argument, as set out above, then reads:

(1) Necessarily, for any x, if x is a God, for any perfection φ, φx.

(2) Existence is a perfection.

Therefore: (3) There is an x such that x is God.

The fallacy has clearly nothing to do with treating 'exists' as a predicate: for this predicate does not appear in the conclusion, which we are at pains to deny. The fallacy lies in shifting from the universal quantifier in (1) to the existential quantifier in (3): the rest of the argument plays no part in this shift, but only serves to obscure the jump. (3) does not follow from (1) and (2) together, any more than from (1) alone. All that really follows from (1) and (2) is:

(3a) For any x, if x is God, x exists

which no atheist would deny.

There is no danger in admitting the possibility that ' - exists' has two senses, in one of which it is a first-level predicate, which stands for a perfection. We are not by this admission forced to admit also the validity of the ontological argument. It is to be hoped that the making of this point will help defeat the charges of Cartesian obscurantism which tend to be levelled against any suggestion that there might be another sense of 'exists' besides that expressed by the existential quantifier. It would be obscurantism to deny that what we have in (3) is the existential quantifier sense, or that it is the existence of God in this sense that the theist wishes to establish. We have to hold fast to Frege, or chaos will come again: but we need not

suppose that he said the last word on the topic of existence. Williams's attempt to reduce all existence propositions to fit within the framework of the Fregean insight is, as it turns out, a failure.

Before discussing a couple of cases in which the Fregean analysis, at first sight, cannot help us, it is of interest to consider the various ways in which the ordinary uses of the English language help to obscure or clarify this insight. Reading the literature it is clear that there is some demythologisation to be done.

To say 'God exists' or 'Tame tigers exist' certainly makes it look as though we are predicating something of God or of tame tigers. This appearance is deceptive; what we are talking about is what the concept-words 'God' or 'tame tigers' stand for, saying that this concept is instantiated in at least one case. We have in English the 'There is a ...' or 'There are ...' locutions which tend a little away from this deceptive appearance: if we say 'There is a God' or 'There are tame tigers' we do not seem so much to be making a predication of an individual or individuals. But these locutions should not be elevated into a canonical form for the expression of existence propositions. Certainly they should not be seen, as a matter of grammar with logical importance, as being an example of an existential use of the verb 'to be'. This use of the verb 'to be', with inversion of the normal English word order of subject and verb, and a prefixed 'There ...' is only a variant of a copulative use of the verb 'to be' which finds parallels in the uses of other copulative and semi-copulative verbs.

To give a particularly clear example: 'There came a knight a-riding' is only a different way of saying 'A knight came a-riding'. It does not have any additional existential content: indeed, it has no additional content at all, only a difference of force. In the same way, 'There's a

man at the door with a bill' is no more existential than 'A man with a bill is at the door'. We might say that what gives existential content is not the 'There is ...' but the 'a': or, more accurately, the existential quantification of the sentence, of which the use of the indefinite article is, in idiomatic English, the most easily isolated sign,at least in the singular. In the plural there is nothing so isolable: but that does not mean that 'There are tame tigers' is not existential, nor that 'There are ...' has some special existential content.

We have to be clear that the use of the verb 'to be' in 'There is a ...' and 'There are' is not an isolable existential use of this verb. The same is true in Greek, as Kahn sees when he relates what he finds it necessary to call 'existential' uses of εἶναι to copulative or veridical uses. But there is one exception, which he makes to this relation: the use of this verb, usually with a temporal qualification, to mean ' - is alive'. This use - exemplified by Homer's talk of 'θεοὶ αἰὲν ἐόντες', the gods who ever are, or live for ever - which Kahn aptly calls the 'vital' use, stands apart from other 'existential' uses, and, unlike them, cannot be seen as a transform of 'copulative' or 'veridical' uses.

This 'vital' use is so rare as to be almost unknown in English: indeed, it is scarcely found except in translations from Latin or Greek. We can conclude, then, that there is no properly existential use of the verb 'to be' in English. This enables us to ignore 'Philosophies of Being' unless they can be properly translated: and we can even demand, if we wish, a canonical form other than ' there is ...' for the Englishing of existential propositions in a formal language. Since there is such a form (provided by 'Something is a ...' or 'Some things are ...') we can get clear, once and for all, of all talk of 'being', except,

perhaps, where a use of the verb 'to be' provides the simplest translation from Latin or Greek. Even then we should take this use as having only metaphorical value in English, whose cash value is provided by a sentence with 'Something' in it, or, as we shall see, by one which uses ' - is alive' or one of its analogues.

But it is not clear that all sentences which apparently contain the predicate ' - exists' can be paraphrased by a use of the existential quantifier or by a use of 'Something is ...' in English. We can take first the case of fictions. In the *Phaedo* we find the names 'Crito' and 'Asclepios' used: one is a name for a friend of Socrates, the other for a god that Socrates worshipped. We may well have reason to say 'Crito exists (or existed) but Asclepios does not exist'. How are we to analyse this? 'God exists' can be analysed as 'For some x, x is God', because 'God' is a predicable expression: but 'Crito exists' cannot be so analysed, because 'Crito' is a name. The negative existential propositions of this kind, such as 'Asclepios does not exist', which are rather more common than affirmative ones, also give rise to the problem which Quine calls 'Plato's Beard'. How can we even talk about Asclepios, as in such sentences we do, if Asclepios does not exist? How can we predicate anything of him if there is nothing of which the predication can be made? If we can say anything of him, then he must in some sense exist, in which case 'Asclepios does not exist' must be false.

Quine's own way out of this problem is to assimilate names to predicates. He proposes an extension of Russell's Theory of Descriptions to cope with such sentences as 'Pegasus does not exist'. ('On What There Is' in *From a Logical Point of View*, p.7)

> We have only to rephrase 'Pegasus' as a description, in any way that seems adequate to single out our idea: say, 'the winged horse captured by Bellerophon'. Substituting such a phrase for

> 'Pegasus' we can then proceed to analyse the statement 'Pegasus is' or 'Pegasus is not' precisely on the analogy of Russell's analysis of 'The author of *Waverley* is' and 'The author of *Waverley* is not'.
>
> In order thus to subsume a one-word name or alleged name such as 'Pegasus' under Russell's theory of description, we must, of course, be able first to translate the word into a description. But this is no real restriction. If the notion of Pegasus had been so obscure or so basic a one that no pat translation into a descriptive phrase had offered itself along familiar lines, we could still have availed ourselves of the following artificial and trivial-seeming device: we could have appealed to the *ex hypothesi* unanalyzable, irreducible attribute of <u>being Pegasus</u>, adopting, for its expression, the verb 'is-Pegasus' or 'pegasizes'. The noun 'Pegasus' itself could then be treated as derivative, and identified after all with a description: 'the thing that is-Pegasus', 'the thing that pegasizes'

This suggestion disposes of Plato's Beard well enough, and it seems to have the great advantage of bringing this kind of existence statement within the scope of the analysis proposed for 'God exists'. But we should perhaps feel that as a price for this the disappearance of the category of names is too much to pay. Quine thinks that the category of names is one which we can well do without, and he perhaps shows a way in which we can do without them on a certain level. But we need to reach that level: and in logic there are no ladders which can be removed once they have been climbed. So it is not clear that he is able to dispose of them altogether: the suggestion here that 'Pegasus' means 'thing that pegasizes' can only be sustained at one level. At a more basic level the order of explanation must be reversed. How are we to understand the 'unanalyzable, irreducible attribute of being Pegasus', except in the terms in which Quine in fact introduces it, as being an attribute true solely of Pegasus, that obscure and basic notion? Things are no better if we maintain that Pegasus is <u>not</u> an obscure and basic notion, that in this case at least we have what Quine calls 'a pat translation into a descriptive phrase ... along familiar lines': typically, 'the winged horse that was captured by Bellerophon'. But how are we to find such a pat translation, or, once found, how are we to understand it,

unless we can understand such familiar sentences as 'Pegasus is a winged horse captured by Bellerophon'? And if we can understand such sentences without being able to analyse the name 'Pegasus' out of them, surely understanding of a name - even of an empty name - is something prior to understanding Quine's analysis? Quine may be able to offer us a dodge to avoid using this name when to do so looks paradoxical, but he does not give us an explanation of how we come to be using such a name in the first place, and what its status is: and it is this that is the real conceptual problem posed by Plato's Beard.

In any case, as we see from the problems Frege poses about the example of Dr Lauben in 'The Thought', it is a mistake to offer to explain names in terms of definite descriptions. Hence it is a mistake to want to bring the analysis of 'Pegasus does not exist' within the scope of Frege's analysis of such existential propositions as 'God exists'. This mistake leads Quine to adopt the slogan 'To be is to be the value of a variable', which explicitly contradicts the Frege-Russell insight he is committed to defending: for ' - is the value of a variable' is once again a first-level predicate. Frege regarded 'Julius Caesar exists', if analysed as 'There is Julius Caesar' as being just as ill-formed as the second sentence obviously is. It is worth noting that Williams avoids this mistake: his avowed aim is to extend the Frege analysis as far as it will go, but he gives quite a different account of sentences such as 'Pegasus does not exist' from that given by Quine.

An obvious way of dealing with these is to say that 'Pegasus does not exist' is a statement about the name 'Pegasus': explaining it as equivalent to 'No horse bears the name "Pegasus"', for example. This seems quite a reasonable move, but it has the disadvantage that from time

to time 'No horse bears the name "Pegasus"' is quite likely to be false, while 'Pegasus does not exist' we know to be true. Hence they cannot be equivalent. Admittedly, in the case of Pegasus we can have recourse to another analysing sentence, 'No flying horse is called "Pegasus"', which since there are unlikely to be any flying horses is likely to remain true: but not all empty names have this kind of recourse available. And in any case, surely I can rightly assert 'Toby Shandy never existed' without checking carefully through early eighteenth-century prosopography to establish that, as a matter of fact, there was at that period no retired infantry officer with a penchant for fortification who was called 'Toby Shandy'?

We have to recognise empty and fictional names as names, or at least as expressions within the same vaguely delimited category as names, with their own senses. If we could not recognise the senses, we would have no way of finding out whether these expressions in fact have a reference to what they purport to refer to or not. Thus the question arises: do we say that names like 'Toby Shandy' have no reference at all, or that they have reference, but to something other than that to which they purport to refer? in this case, to something other than an early eighteenth-century retired infantry officer?

This second possibility is not likely to be accepted by more sober logicians: we should find ourselves with a crowded slum that offends our taste for desert landscapes, in Quine's words. But while some of the reasons adduced in favour of empty names' having a reference are quite bad, some of those adduced against this notion are not a lot better (though they are adduced on the right side, of course). It is of interest to examine some of these,on both sides, as part of the general programme of demythologisation.

We can certainly rule out the view that 'Toby Shandy' does in fact refer to a retired soldier, but to one who, as a matter of fact, happened not to exist, or at least not in this world. We just have to say robustly that the only soldiers there are are those who exist or at least have existed: and the only world is this one. A strong line on this can be found well-argued in Williams's book, in Chapter VII, 3. A defence of the incoherent view that fictional names do have reference in this way is sometimes attempted by appealing to the fact that 'Toby Shandy was interested in military engineering' seems to be true: at least when compared with 'Toby Shandy was not interested in military engineering', which one might show to be false by consulting the book. It is to be admitted that reference to the book allows us to rule out the second of these sentences from serious discussion of English Literature, but only confusion can result from allowing the two sentences to be contrasted in point of truth and falsity. We should continue to show robustness, and say that 'Toby Shandy was interested in military engineering' is false, all appearances to the contrary notwithstanding. In a suitably serious context anyone would do the same: for example, in comforting a child who has been frightened by our fairy stories. Anyone who does not do so is certainly an untrustworthy teller of fairy-stories: and that means he would be an untrustworthy reporter, too. Another, more robust, word for the same thing is 'liar'. We should notice, indeed, that even without a serious context we take the same view: we frequently contrast truth and fiction, even proverbially: and we seldom allow even such an innocuous falsehood as 'Father Christmas comes down the chimney on Christmas Eve and leaves presents for good boys and girls' to survive for very long. We all know what it is to tell fictions about real people: Plato would call them lies, and rightly. We cannot make them true by telling them about fictional characters. Stories about Doctor Spooner

are frequently told and widely believed, and by no means all of them are true. Are we to believe that if I invent a character called Spoctor Dooner, tell all these stories about him, and get them widely accepted as part of the 'belief-world' of Oxford anecdote, I can thereby make these stories truer than they were before? Surely not.

But to regard fictions as untrue takes away a strong weapon from the hands of those who would oppose the idea that empty names have reference. Quine argues (in 'On What There Is') that the baroque slum of possible entities has to be cleared because it is a breeding-ground for unruly elements: that is, that the kind of object which names like 'Toby Shandy' are supposed to refer to will be supposed to have inconsistent predicates true of them. This will no longer be the case. We will not take any of the predications made of Toby Shandy in the book as true, so if the book contains inconsistencies we will not hold that they are both true: though we will hold that anyone who asserts seriously either 'Toby Shandy was interested in military engineering' or 'Toby Shandy was not interested in military engineering' is uttering a falsehood. There is quite a good possibility of making fictional characters obey quite strict rules: rules which will allow us to say that Toby Shandy is a fictional character, a creation of Lawrence Sterne, one of the most vivid characters of literature, and even rather like my grandfather, while denying that he was interested in military engineering. ' - was interested in military engineering' is not the kind of predicate that can be true of a fictional character, if we take fictions as generally false. We can, however, admit that Lawrence Sterne tells us that Toby Shandy was interested in military engineering, and reject any suggestion that Lawrence Sterne tells us that he was not so interested. Thus our literary discussions can carry on, safely enclosed within the intentional contexts of 'Lawrence Sterne tells us that ...'

or 'According to the book ...' It will thus not matter if according to the book inconsistent predicates are true of Toby Shandy, as we will hold that none of them are true anyway. Fictional characters will not be unruly.

However, this project, which in any case needs some means other than simple intuition for delimiting those predicates that can be true of fictional characters and those which cannot, is at best a futile complication. It is dealt with here even at this brief length not merely *pour épater*, but to try to introduce even at this early stage a slight doubt about the notion of 'object'. If it could be shown - as, with a great deal of misguided ingenuity, I think it could be shown - that fictional characters can be made to behave themselves and are thus suitably orderly candidates for admission into the class of objects, it might help to demythologise this notion a little. But for myself I am neither so ingenious nor so misguided.

Even if this project is possible it is by no means necessary. We can live up to Ockhamist principles by refusing to admit that fictional names in fact refer to anything at all, even if fairly orderly referents could be elaborated. We need admit no more than what has already been insisted on: that such names or name-like expressions have a sense as names do, which enables us to know what they are meant to be names for.

To this it can be immediately objected that any account which talks about the senses of names is bound to be a Fregean one: and we are thus faced with an inconsistency between Frege's doctrine that sentences with an empty name in subject position lack reference - that is, they are neither true nor false - just as their subject does, and the common-sense idea mentioned above, that in ordinary serious discourse we say that fictions are false. The ground can be cleared a little: Frege

would take definite descriptions as belonging to the same logical category as names, but on this we could adopt, consistently with Frege's doctrine on names, a Russellian position which would allow us to say that sentences with a vacuous definite description in subject position are in fact false. But we can do this - if we want to - because on this Frege was wrong: definite descriptions are not in the same logical category as names. But names themselves, for this very reason, cannot be explained away in such a way that sentences with fictional names in subject position come out as false, as common sense would demand.

However, there is no real cause for alarm here. We should notice that common sense relates to normal circumstances as a background: and in normal circumstances 'It is true that p' is equivalent to plain 'p'. But while 'Toby Shandy was interested in fortification' is, on Frege's account, neither true nor false, 'It is true that Toby Shandy was interested in fortification' is certainly false. The falsity of the second sentence, on the common-sense view, gets carried back to the first. Indeed, more to the point, in normal circumstances we mean our sentences to be true. If they miss the truth, whether they fail of truth-value altogether or are simply false makes no difference in practical terms. In either case we have failed: and to take either kind of sentence as a guide for our actions would be equally disastrous.

Indeed, we might say that just as ' - is true' gives a true/false context for any sentence with sense, even if its parts lack reference, so in ordinary speech ' - exists' gives a true/false context for any name with sense, even if it has no reference. Something of the sort may have been in Aquinas's mind when he said, as we shall see, that the sense of 'est' in which it means no more than 'aliquod dictum est verum' can be said of individuals, as when one says 'Socrates est'. A suitable

context for saying this would be the one mentioned above, in which Socrates would be contrasted with Asclepios. Again, making sense of the fairly ordinary locution 'Dionysius exists' was one of the reasons for Dummett's putting forward his unFregean view about the use of 'exists' as a predicate.

But there is no need to be too exhaustive or doctrinaire on this point. All we need to see is that Frege's point that sentences containing empty names are devoid of truth-value need not be seen as wholly irreconcilable with the common-sense insight that fictions are false. All we need to see is that the common-sense notion of falsity is likely to be equivalent to 'not true' rather than 'contradictorily opposed to true'.

We have to admit, as we have seen, that even fictional names have a sense. We know at what post the word is stationed, in Wittgenstein's phrase: and we know, too, what the name is a name for. To see this, we can consider that we can find out, after long research perhaps, that a name is in fact empty, or in fact is not. If the doubtfully empty name had no sense, the search could not even start. Moreover, a sentence containing an empty name clearly expresses a thought, and thus has a sense: so its parts must have sense too.

What is more, these sentences are recognisable and identifiable. We may not be very sure how this is, but it is certain that it is so. A sense of a name is not to be identified with a definite description, or even with a family of definite descriptions - the example of 'Dr Lauben' in 'The Thought' makes that clear - but what we say about the object named does have a role to play in establishing the sense of the name. The sense is given in our use, which is usually that of making the

name a subject of predications. So too for fictional and empty names: we cannot say that the sense of the name is given by what we say of the object named, as *ex hypothesi* there is no such object. However, we do have a use for the name: and we can easily sort out standard uses from non-standard. Someone who said 'Toby Shandy is the highest mountain in Utopia' would unquestionably not be sharing the standard use of the name 'Toby Shandy'. Williams compares works of fiction with games of 'let's pretend': and in such a context even children are perfectly able to distinguish those who are genuinely entering into the game with the others, even if they make (helpful) innovations, from those who introduce innovations which are subversive of the game which is being played.

An identifiable use of a name, given in the case of fictions by the accepted text of a novel, say, or by an accepted traditional story, is an identifiable sense of that name. Once this is granted we can give a good account of our literary discourse: and we can attach a clear meaning to 'Toby Shandy does not exist', as being roughly equivalent to 'The ordinary sense of the name "Toby Shandy" does not identify any referent'. This account has several advantages over the formerly suggested account in which fictional characters, the referents of empty names, are a kind of object. Firstly, it is better on Ockhamist grounds: we should have to admit identifiable senses of names in any case, and by this account this is all we need to recognise: not also an equal number of fictional characters. Secondly, it also fits cases where the use of an empty name is the result of a mistake. This sort of case is quite common: and it is dangerous to concentrate on cases such as 'Toby Shandy' where we have a well-known and enduring sense, and the illusion of a stable object, a fictional character.

A couple of examples will help to bring this out. There is the famous story of the undergraduate who thought that Hannibal had a colleague called Hitherto - certainly a Punic-sounding name - because he had misread a sentence about Hannibal that began 'Hitherto, the Carthaginian general ...'. Or, less apocryphally: a few years ago the Spanish correspondent of *The Economist* attributed a great deal of political activity to the Communist leader Fulano de Tal. 'Fulano de Tal' is the Spanish for 'so-and-so': the correspondent had evidently misread something in a Spanish paper saying that <u>any</u> Communist leader could be found undertaking such activity. Would we really want to say that either the undergraduate or the correspondent had invented a fictional character? And what happens to the fictional character when the mistake is pointed out? 'Toby Shandy' has a tendency to be used again and again in our discourse, because we like talking about literature: 'Hitherto' and 'Fulano de Tal' are unlikely to be used by anyone in the sense which the undergraduate and the correspondent used them, and if they were not good anecdotes and good logical examples, as most cases of this kind of mistake are not, we would be unlikely ever to even hear of these senses.

There is another case where we can still identify a sense, though a very confused one, but where we would be at a loss to know what kind of fictional object it should be. This would be the case of the British diplomat who thought that Burma and Bermuda were the same place. In default of further information, we simply do not know whether he used the name 'Burma' in an idiosyncratic sense to refer to Bermuda, or vice-versa: or whether he had in mind a completely imaginary country with (some of) the attributes of either.

Lastly, the account in terms of senses will deal with cases where

not existence but identity is in doubt. The name 'Cathay' referred to an oriental country visited by Marco Polo: the name 'China' to an oriental country visited by Portugese mariners and missionaries. There is no question of failure of reference here: neither country is fictional. Nevertheless it was a question that was only answered by long and heroic exploration, whether the two names referred to the same oriental country or different ones: that is, whether the quite different senses of 'China' and 'Cathay' identified one referent or two. That they identified some referent was never in doubt. Hence we can conclude that the account of empty names in terms of their identifiable senses having no referent is simpler and deeper than that which speaks of their having reference, but to a fictional rather than a real object. It is also a recognisable part of a more general theory about senses, rather than something worked out *ad hoc*.

Another kind of existential proposition where, at first sight, the Fregean analysis cannot help is one in which we say, for example, 'Queen Anne does not exist any more'. Normally we would say 'Queen Anne is dead', but it would be a mistake to think that this is significant. ' - is dead' means ' - is not alive any more', and what we want to discuss is the kind of existence which is expressed by ' - is alive' in the case of animate beings and plants, and in other ways in other cases. A building which no longer exists is no longer standing rather than no longer alive: but it is surely none the less clear that 'Henry VIII no longer exists' and 'Nonsuch Palace no longer exists' employ the same notion and say of the palace just what they say of its builder. A policy that no longer exists is one that is no longer implemented: but we may say of a statesman who died of a broken heart when his life's work was undone that he and his achievement ceased to exist within a short time of each other, and we are not just making a pun.

In this sense, it looks as though ' - exists' is a genuine predicate of individuals. We cannot, at first sight, apply the Fregean analysis. 'There is no longer Julius Caesar' is no better-formed than 'There is Julius Caesar'. We can say 'There are no more heroes any more', and this makes it look as if the difference between the meaning of the existential quantifier and that of this predicate of 'actual existence', as I shall call it, does not depend solely on tense: and we need not confine the use of this predicate, either, to making singular predications of individuals. 'Dodoes do not exist any more' is as true as 'Queen Anne does not exist any more'.

The fact that 'Dodoes do not exist any more' can be analysed in a way that does not make use of the predicate of actual existence - as 'There are no dodoes any more' - does not make it impossible that the analysis in terms of this predicate can apply. The following argument is clearly valid:

Poets no longer exist. (i.e. all the poets are dead)

Homer is a poet.

Therefore, Homer no longer exists.

This argument is impossible to formalise if we analyse the first premiss as 'There are no poets any more', i.e. nothing is a poet any longer. The possibility of applying a Fregean analysis to certain kinds of sentences where the predicate of actual existence is used does not mean that this predicate is unnecessary even in those sentences. If there are alternative analyses of a sentence, one need not be better than another: only if it can do all that the other does and more can one be said to be better.

However, the fact that 'Dodoes do not exist any more' admits of a Fregean analysis has led many to try and find an application of the

Fregean doctrine to 'Homer does not exist any more'. There is, as it were, a prima-facie case for holding that the existence expressed by the existential quantifier and that expressed by the predicate of actual existence are not equivocal notions. Besides this, it is a fact that these two notions are expressed by similar expressions in many different language groups. Pure equivocations tend to be bound to one language, or at least to a group of cognate languages.

On the other hand, the above valid argument would seem to be a prima-facie case for arguing that the two notions are not univocal. Can we put these two together, and say that a prima-facie case against univocity and a prima-facie case against equivocity together make up a prima-facie case that the two notions are analogous?

Be that as it may, it is certain that we cannot do without the notion of actual existence: that sense of 'existence' in which we can say that an individual comes into existence, continues in existence, and passes out of existence. It is also used when we say that an individual depends for its existence on another, or is kept in existence by it. These notions are not much dealt with in the literature which discusses existence, and they will not be dealt with here: but there is something important in them which needs to be investigated, and this cannot be done, in my opinion, without the notion of actual existence. But there is hostility to this notion on the part of those who think that to admit any kind of predicate of existence is to abandon the gains made by and since Frege and to deliver oursleves bound hand and foot into the hands of the partisans of the ontological argument. We have seen that Frege's insight means that even if there is a predicate of existence the ontological argument is still invalid; and we shall see that the predicate of actual existence does not give

rise to paradox, as might be feared, and that indeed by admitting it we can avoid paradoxes that otherwise we might fall into. We shall also see that even if a way of expressing this notion can be found which does not use a predicate ' - exists', that on its own will not dispose of the notion, which is one that we need. It will in fact be argued that to use such a predicate is a more perspicuous way of expressing this notion than any of the suggested alternatives, but this is not essential to the argument. If a more perspicuous way of expressing the notion could be found, this will not essentially affect what will be argued for here, which is the value of the notion itself. How it is expressed matters very little. This is not just another piece against the slogan 'Existence is not a predicate': we already have enough of those.

The most serious alternative means of expressing the notion of actual existence is that which explains 'Homer no longer exists' as 'Homer is no longer a man'. This view involves finding a suitable predicate to substitute for ' - exists', something which the subject in question no longer is, and which it ceased to be when it ceased to exist. Woods, in his paper 'Existence and Tense', collected in Evans and MacDowell's *Truth and Meaning: Essays in Semantics*, develops this idea: but he unfortunately limits it to the tensed existence of substances. Not only substances come into existence and pass away: individual accidents, like the colours of a photograph, do so, and so do events like battles, and artifacts. Even pieces in a game of chess do so: meaning by this, not the individual lumps of wood or plastic, but Pawns and Queens: for a pawn can pass away and a Queen come into existence when the pawn reaches the eighth rank in a game. These are all more difficult to deal with than substances.

The main attraction of this project - for it is only a project,

as it has never been fully worked out - is that it seems to bear a relation to translating 'Dodoes no longer exist' as 'There are no dodoes any more', and thus brings all existence-statements into a relation with the Fregean analysis. It enables us, too, to make some sense of the syllogism given earlier. We could argue:

No poet is now a man (equivalent to 'Poets no longer exist')

Homer is a poet

Therefore, Homer is not now a man (equivalent to 'Homer does not exist')

The connection with the existence expressed by the existential quantifier is presumably given by the fact that 'Homer is not now a man' entails 'For some x, x is not now a man'. Admittedly it is hard to see how this quantified proposition, in which the negation is inside the quantification, can be a negative existential proposition. We thus have 'Homer does not now exist', clearly a negative existential proposition if it is existential at all, entailing the affirmative existential proposition 'There is an x such that x is not now a man': and this is supposed to supply the connection between the two senses of 'exists'. It would surely be better to deny that 'Homer does not now exist' is existential at all. But the equivalence of 'Dodoes do not exist any more' with 'There are no dodoes any more', which inspired this attempt at analysing 'Socrates no longer exists', gives us reason to doubt this.

It may be that this analysis is possible, and that it can be extended to cover all actual existents. If so, we may hope that it does indeed provide a connection, even if an indirect one, between actual existence and what is expressed by the existential quantifier: for if the two notions are analogous, there must be some connection. Perhaps, as Woods and Williams suggest, it is provided by a generalisation of 'Homer is no longer a man', by means of quantifying predicate-variables. This would give us 'For some ϕ, Homer no longer ϕ's' as a translation

of 'Homer no longer exists'. But this analysis, if it is possible, will not explain away the notion of actual existence.

In the first place, when we say 'Henry VIII and Nonsuch Palace have both ceased to exist' we will no longer be saying the same thing of two different subjects: for while for some interpretations of 'ϕ' and 'ψ' we will get 'Henry VIII is no longer ϕ' and Nonsuch Palace is no longer ψ', presumably the interpretations of 'ϕ' and 'ψ' will have to be different. Thus in 'Henry VIII and Nonsuch Palace have both ceased to exist' we would be employing the tired old figure of speech known as Zeugma, exemplified by 'She went home in a flood of tears and a sedan-chair'. This does not look right.

Secondly, we have the problem of fixing the range of ϕ. We cannot limit it to substantial terms, as we have seen: and this leaves us with a problem with our syllogism. If it is to work, we cannot admit 'poet' as being within the range of ϕ: for thus we should have to deny the second premiss 'Homer is a poet', which leaves us with the argument in ruins. But surely we should normally say that a poet is a kind of man: what reason can we give for admitting 'man' to the range of ϕ and excluding 'poet'? Nor does this problem arise merely with our syllogism. In general we shall have the problem of deciding what predicates can be, and which cannot be, true of the dead. How can we make this specification? and even if we find a way to do this, all we will have done is to include the sense of ' - exists' within the sense of the whole range of predicates so specified. We will not have given a separate, independent account of the notion of actual existence: all that we will have done is to express it by means of more familiar predicates, specified probably in an unfamiliar way, which by this specification will be understood as meaning what ' - exists' means. These problems will be discussed at more length later.

One attempt to save this or similar accounts would make use of tenses. We would admit 'Homer is a poet', provided that it is understood as 'Homer was a poet': that is, equal in existential content to 'It was the case that, for some x, x is a poet'. This might seem to offer a way to avoid the difficulties of specifying what predicates can be true of the dead, the specification being done by the tensing. This would still fail to explain away the notion of actual existence, which is what it is intended to do: but in any case, it falls foul of the following consideration. How by this means are we able to distinguish between the fact that God is supposed to <u>be alive</u> all the time, and the fact that <u>there is</u> always an even prime? If actual existence is supposed to be no more than <u>there being</u> something right now, then it belongs to numbers as well. But this is clearly wrong.

We can grant to the last-mentioned account that there is indeed a connection between actual existence and tense: this will be dealt with in Chapter IV. To the earlier account, the one which fell foul of the Zeugma, we can grant that actual existence, besides bearing an analogy to the existence expressed by the quantifier, is itself an analogical notion. It has, as it were, an internal analogy. For each statement of the form 'x exists' we should, if we were clever enough, be able to find a statement of the form 'x is F', where 'F' stands for the kind of actual existent that x is. As Aristotle pointed out, the existence of a threshold, as opposed to that of a lintel, involves being in a certain position (besides being a wooden beam): and that of breakfast as opposed to that of dinner, being at a certain time (as well as being food). To be, for a living being, is to be alive.(*Met.* 1042b19ff, *De An.* 415b13)

This does not make the notion equivocal: to admit that would be to admit the Zeugma. In a similar way, the qualities of a good horse are

not those of a good man: but for all that, goodness is not an equivocal notion. Nor is identity, though the criteria of identity of the same man are not those of the same ship, and both differ from those of the same lump of gold.

The programme to be followed from here on is not one of elucidating the notion of actual existence: rather it is one of clarifying and defending the distinction which has been here drawn between actual existence and what is expressed by the existential quantifier. A number of terms can be used to make this distinction: it is the distinction between *Wirklichkeit* and *Esgibtexistenz*, in Frege's terms, or between *esse* and *esse ut verum*, in St Thomas's. Most illuminatingly, also in St Thomas's terms, it is the distinction between what is said in answer to the question *quid est?* and what is said in answer to the question *an est?* As such it has nothing to do with the well-known *realis distinctio* which St Thomas makes between the *esse*, the actual existence, of a thing, and its essence. These both fall on one side of the distinction which is being made here, the side of *quid est*. The *realis distinctio* can be illustrated by the difference between ' - is alive' and ' - is a living being'. That these are different is brought out by comparing the truth of 'Every cat is a living being' and the falsehood of 'Every cat is alive'. But these considerations are clearly not relevant to the distinction under discussion here. This is not a piece on the *realis distinctio*.

Chapter II:

A discussion of Chapter V of C.J.F. Williams's *What is Existence?*

This book is the most comprehensive attempt which has yet appeared to apply Frege's insight to every kind of existence-statement. The author argues against every apparent use of ' - exists' as a first-level predicate, by showing, typically, that sentences in which such a use appears to be embedded are capable of another analysis, and that the analysis which allows for the use of the first-level predicate are confused, inadequate, or paradoxical. Chapter V contains an attack on the notion of tensed or actual existence, claiming that to analyse propositions such as 'Arkle no longer exists' in such a way as to demand that ' - exists'be taken as a first-level predicate leads to paradox, and offering a different analysis.

Williams suggests that 'Arkle no longer exists' means 'It used to be the case that Arkle exists, and Arkle does not exist'. Here we have a negative existential proposition, 'Arkle does not exist', of the kind that gives rise to the paradox of Plato's Beard: that if a proposition is about something, then that thing must exist. In the case of general existential propositions, we can avoid the paradox by applying Frege's analysis: 'Aristocratic Australians don't exist' means the same as 'No-one is an aristocratic Australian'. Plato's beard can be avoided by pointing out that 'Aristocratic Australians' should not be understood as a logical subject: but 'Arkle' in 'Arkle does not exist' can only be a logical subject. So, as Williams says, there is no side-stepping the paradox of reference in this case: Arkle must exist for 'Arkle does not exist' to be significant.

Williams goes on:

> Arkle, however, need not exist now for propositions about him to be true or false.Arkle does not have to be alive in 1987 if we are to be able to say of him in that year that he won the Derby in 1967.

He quotes Wittgenstein's point (Philosophical Investigations, I, 40)

> When Mr N.N. dies one says that the bearer of the name dies, not that the meaning dies. And it would be nonsense to say that, for if the name ceased to have meaning it would make no sense to say 'Mr N.N. is dead'.

and admits that one of the things that we seem to be able to say of a racehorse is precisely that it he is dead, i.e. that he no longer exists.

One might draw the conclusion from this that since 'Arkle no longer exists' is obviously quite in order, the sentence 'Arkle does not exist', which it is plausibly thought to contain as a conjunct, must also be quite in order, and the impression that it is paradoxical is illusory. This would seem to be a part of what Wittgenstein was saying. Williams, however, is convinced that 'Arkle does not exist', is paradoxical, and that thus 'Arkle no longer exists' is also involved in the paradox, all appearances to the contrary notwithstanding, unless we can find another way of analysing it. The rest of Chapter V is devoted to drawing out the paradox, dealing with attempted solutions, and setting out and defending his alternative analysis.

The paradox in which he sees 'Arkle does not exist' as involved in is what he calls the tensed or qualified version of Plato's Beard. The unqualified version of Plato's Beard is that 'if an expression is used as a name, there must at some time have been something which was the bearer of the name'. It seems obvious that 'Arkle does not exist' is not entangled in this version of the paradox. Williams does, indeed, discuss whether it is, on the grounds that if 'Arkle at some time

existed' is to be true, then its contradictory, 'Arkle never existed' must be false, and therefore significant. But this sentence could not be true without making 'Arkle' devoid of reference. In the end, however, he dismisses this possibility, and admits that the unqualified version of Plato's Beard in fact raises no insuperable difficulties for 'Arkle no longer exists'.

This leaves us with the qualified version. This Williams sets out in section 3 of Chapter V: (p.109)

> On reflection, however, there is a class of things which we do not seem to be able to say of the dead, and it is not obvious that their having ceased to exist is excluded from this class. We cannot say of those who no longer exist that they are engaged in any activity. The dead are not now up and doing. How much is included in the scope of 'activity' and 'doing' here? There is a sense of 'do' in which it is mere dummy verb, a predicative variable, as 'thing' is a dummy noun or individual variable. In this sense of 'do' we might enunciate as a general law that if *a* is truly said to do anything at time *t* there must be such a thing as *a* at time *t*. Metalinguistically this can be expressed thus: if any predicate is truly applicable to (holds of) an object at a given time there must at that time be such an object. It is difficult to avoid ambiguity in the statement of this claim, but steps can be taken to avoid misinterpretation. It is not being claimed that if a person at time *t* ascribes a predicate ϕ to an object *a* there must be such an object as *a* at time *t*. Rather, the claim is that if a person at any time says truly of an object *a* that at time *t* it ϕ's there must at time *t* be such an object as *a*. If Queen Anne died in 1714 we cannot at any time truly say of her that she yawned in 1715.

Since'Arkle no longer exists' is to be analysed as containing 'Arkle does not exist' as a conjunct, Williams suggests that here we fall into paradox. He deals with apparent exceptions to his rule, from intentional or causal contexts, then says:

> If we are able to take care in this way of the apparent exceptions to the rule that a predicable can hold of an object only at a time when there is such an object, the rule reintroduces paradox into the claim that Arkle does not exist in 1981, where ' - does not exist' is regarded of predicating something of Arkle. This can be true only if there is such a horse as Arkle in 1981: i.e. it can be true only if it is false. (p.116)

Williams does not seem to notice that this rule, if it introduces paradox into 'Arkle no longer exists', also introduces it into 'Arkle no longer races', if Arkle is indeed dead. 'Arkle no longer races', said now, contains as a conjunct 'Arkle does not race'. This, according to Williams's rule, cannot be true, as the predicate ' - does not race' cannot be true of Arkle at a time when he does not exist. If by this we are to understand that 'Arkle does not race' must be false, as we must if 'Arkle does not exist' is to be paradoxical, rather than truth-valueless, then we must presume that its contradictory,'Arkle races' is true. But in fact it is not true, and, again, cannot be true according to Williams's rule. We therefore have the conclusion that by Williams's rule two contradictories both turn out false. This is surely enough to condemn the rule without more discussion.

In fact, Williams's rule cannot be right, if he hopes to make 'Arkle does not exist' paradoxical by it: that is, if his rule is to be understood as saying that predicates must uniformly be false of a subject that no longer exists at the time at which the predicate is said to hold. For, for any predicate which is false of a subject, we can find a predicate that is true of it, that is, its contradictory. If we 'cannot at any time truly say' of Queen Anne that she yawned in 1715, then if this is taken to mean that ' - yawned in 1715' is false of Queen Anne, then ' - did not yawn in 1715' must be true of her. Williams's rule admits of more exceptions than merely the causal and intentional ones: we can find a counter-example for every example produced.

Williams might have a way out if he were willing to distinguish 'Arkle does not exist' from 'It is not the case that Arkle exists': the first could be false, the second true. But this would not serve his

purpose of making all uses of ' - exists' as a first-level predicate unintelligible. In fact, in any case, there could be no good grounds for making this distinction between internal and external negation of a sentence when the subject is a proper name, and Williams himself argues well and at length against this view, which he attributes to Miller.

There is another way out, which makes Williams's view less obviously false. This would be to admit the rule, but to understand it as saying that all present predications made of a subject that no longer exists must be, not false, but truth-valueless. The first thing to note here is that in this case the paradox of 'Arkle does not exist' disappears: this sentence is no longer paradoxical in that it has to be false to be true; it is merely truth-valueless. This truth-valuelessness it would share with 'Arkle does not race'.

But surely we do not want 'Arkle does not race' to be lacking in truth-value? If this were so, since I can only know what is true, it could never be the case that I know that Arkle is no longer racing, but am not sure whether he is still alive, because by this account 'Arkle no longer races' could not be true. But as a matter of fact I know that any horse that won the Derby in 1967 cannot still be racing, while I simply have no idea whether Arkle is alive or dead, and winning the Derby in 1967 is, so far as I know, consistent with being alive in 1983.

Surely the enormous proliferation of truth-valueless talk which the acceptance of Williams's rule would mean is something to be avoided. It means, moreover, to assimilate the names of the dead to empty names, and to do this is to miss the Wittgenstein point. We could never truly say 'Mr N.N. is dead'. To be sure, Williams does give an analysis of 'Arkle no longer exists' which does not involve making

present-tense predications of the dead, but only past-tense ones. But it is not clear if this is to be allowed. On standard views of reference, once a name has a reference, it always has a reference. It seems that Williams should deny this, and maintain that a name can become empty. If this is so, he owes us an account of how a now-empty name can be used now as the subject of a predication. It looks as if he should have a non-standard theory of reference, but he does not attempt to give it.

What is basically the same point can be made another way. Williams uses a Prioresque tense-logic, a standard one, in which tense-operators operate on propositions, thus: 'It was the case seventeen years ago that (Arkle is winning the Derby)'. But 'Arkle is winning the Derby' is, as it stands, truth-valueless, if the rule holds. How can 'It used to be the case that' turn truth-valueless propositions into true ones? And if 'It was the case *n* time-units ago' can do this, should it not be able to do so for all truth-valueless propositions? If we want to deny the truth of 'For some *n*, it was the case that *n* time-units ago (Sam Weller steps into the witness-box with a jaunty air)', what account of reference can Williams give that will enable us to do so?

It might be suggested that there is nothing new about an operator which turns truth-valueless propositions into true ones: it might be suggested that 'Charles Dickens wrote that - ' will turn the truth-valuelessnesss of 'Sam Weller stepped into the witness-box with a jaunty air' into the truth of 'Charles Dickens wrote that Sam Weller stepped into the witness-box with a jaunty air'. An obvious answer to this would be that the longer sentence about Charles Dickens is no more true than the shorter one about Sam Weller: that it has been confused with the similar sentence, 'Charles Dickens wrote "Sam Weller stepped into the witness box with a jaunty air"'. This is in many ways a better

account than the former, and it is one that Williams ought to favour, as he frequently uses a distinction of use and mention to clear up similar problems.

In any case, the way in which 'Charles Dickens wrote (or implied) that - ' turns the sentence about Sam Weller from truth-valuelessness to truth is by embedding it in an oblique context, as Frege would say. The result of this is that the name-like expression 'Sam Weller' ceases to have its normal reference - that is, nothing - and takes on an indirect reference to its easily-recognised sense, which is provided for us by the text of 'The Pickwick Papers'. But we cannot hold that 'It was the case *n* time-units ago' does this. Propositions embedded in a past-tense context do not show any signs of obliqueness. There is no reason for supposing that they are oblique, and there is no case that can be made for considering them so.

This brings us to the last point against Williams's rule. There is certainly at least one operator, which does not create an oblique context, which when applied to a truth-valueless sentence produces a longer sentence that is true: 'It is neither true nor false that - '. But from this it follows that it is true that it is not true that Arkle races, or that Arkle exists. But Williams holds, generally, that 'It is true that p' is equivalent to plain p. Hence we find that Arkle in fact does not exist, which Williams has been concerned to deny. There is no room in Williams's theory for truth-gaps: and he must reject his own rule, or offer us a new theory of truth, as well as a new theory of reference, and a new theory of tense. This is a high price to pay for a rule that does not even look plausible.

The question is, where has Williams gone wrong? It seems that this must be right at the beginning, in the exposition of the rule, or even before. The exposition of the rule is clearly wrong, as if it is to be consistent with Williams's theory of truth it must be false. His claim that 'Arkle no longer exists' is involved in paradox surely shows that he has taken his rule as consistent with his theory of truth, and holds that predicates must be false of a subject that no longer exists. How could he come to think that this obviously false rule could be true?

Paradoxically enough, his mistake arises from his refusal to admit the use of ' - exists' as a first-level predicate. By trying to show that this notion leads to contradiction, he has ended up in contradiction himself. This is itself quite a strong *prima-facie* argument for the notion: not only has it not been shown to be impossible, but an attempt to do without it and manage in some other way has been shown to be impossible.

The mistake arises in this way: there is indeed a range of predicates that can hold of a subject only while that subject exists; what Prior called E-predicates. The dead are not at this moment involved in any activity; they are not now up and doing. But it is not true that all predicates must be false of the dead: the sense of 'doing' here is emphatically <u>not</u> the sense in which it is a mere dummy. If it were, then we could not say that the dead are not up and doing, or involved in any activity: for they are doing something, involved in some activity, viz. being dead. But we can say that the dead are not up and doing, not involved in any activity: the contradictory of an E-predicate is not itself an E-predicate. But this has nothing to do with the paradox of Plato's Beard: it is not a logical fact about reference and truth, it is a fact about activities, and about certain kinds of things.

In fact, Williams has to notice this later on, for he is forced to admit that his analysis of 'Arkle no longer exists' needs some qualification: he makes it in terms of the instantiation or non-instantiation of what he calls 're-identifying predicables', and provides a definition of such predicables, but then has to stipulate that predicables satisfying his defining formula will not be re-identifying predicables if they are definable in such a way as to make the formula equivalent to a theorem of any system of tense-logic. He insists that this stipulation is not a mere bit of *ad hoc* machinery to side-step objections:

> The notion of properties of re-identification is intended to capture the criterion of identity which is implicit in the concept of a substance which persists through time. Such substances develop according to laws appropriate to their own kind; and the necessity which makes a man now answering to such-and-such a description the same as one who *n* years ago answered to another such description is a natural necessity derived from these natural laws. It is not, therefore, to be confused with logical necessity, and no laws of logic are sufficient to generate ... re-identifying predicables. (p.143 n.33)

The point that Williams is making here seems to be a valid one, but it is not clear that it is consistent with the nature of the rule with which he began, which had nothing to do with the natural laws of the persistence of a substance through time, but was rather to do with whether a predicate could hold of an object. Or rather, the point made here is consistent with the rule, but if some reflection on the persistence of substances has to be made at some time, as it clearly must, should it not be made at the beginning, thus showing the rule to be false and indeed irrelevant to the problem at issue.

So far the argument has been directed to showing that Williams fails to prove that there is any need to analyse 'Arkle no longer exists' in a way that does not use ' - exists' as a first-level predicate. However, it might still be the case that Williams's own analysis, though shown to be unnecessary, might still be an adequate

analysis. If he is really able to interpret such sentences in a Fregean way, he will have shown that a predicate of actual existence is not necessary, and he might show, though this I would deny, that the very notion is unnecessary. In any case his analysis, if successful, will be a more elegant way of expressing actual existence than a proper predicate, as it will bring all existence-statements within a unified system.

However, his analysis is not adequate. His general account is as follows: (pp. 141-2)

> If we possess some criterion of identity for *A*'s we must know that there are some predicables, ϕ and ψ, and some number, *n*, such that, for every *x* and for every *y*, necessarily, if it has been the case *n* time-units ago that *x* ϕ's and is now the case that *y* ψ's, *x* is the same *A* as *y*; there must be some predicables, that is, satisfying the following formula for a given *n*:
>
> (10) $\Pi x \Pi y LCPn\phi xC\psi y I^{A} xy,$
>
> where $I^{A}xy$ means '*x* is the same *A* as *y*'. Let us call predicables satisfying (10) for some particular *n* and *A* '*n*-*A*-reidentifying predicables', and predicables which satisfy any formula obtained by substituting any name of a kind for *A* and any number for *n* 'reidentifying predicables'. Reidentifying predicables stand for properties of reidentification. To say that *a* no longer exists is to say that there are two such properties, one of which belonged to *a* at some time in the past, and the other of which now belongs to nothing. Alternatively we may say that there are two reidentifying predicables and some number, *n*, such that *n* time units ago the first predicable held of *a* and now the second predicable holds of nothing. Formally, we get:
>
> (11) $\Sigma\phi\Sigma\psi\Sigma nK(\Pi x\Pi y LCPn\phi xC\psi y I^{A} xy)KPn\phi aN\Sigma z\psi z,$
>
> where the part of the formula in brackets is the same as (10), or, more simply,
>
> (11A) $\Sigma\phi\Sigma\psi\Sigma nKPn\phi aN\Sigma x\psi x,$
>
> where ϕ and ψ are *n*-*A*-reidentifying predicables. The only non-logical constants in these formulas are *a* and *A*. *a* was introduced as an abbreviation of 'Arkle', but it can stand for any proper name. Given that we know what a proper name means, we know to what kind it belongs. (...) So given *a* we know what *A* is.

With this method Williams is also able to analyse 'Arkle still exists' and 'Arkle came into existence'. He has thus, it seems, given

an account of existence, coming to exist, and ceasing to exist, which is what was demanded.

The question is, has he? Some people might challenge the use of quantifiers to bind other than object variables, But Williams gives quite a good account of this in a later chapter, and in any case it is possible to discuss what would be an instantiation of (11) without admitting that (11) is unobjectionable as it stands.

To do this we need to find two reidentifying predicables for some kind. It is unfortunate that Williams gives only one example of such a pair, and still more unfortunate that it seems to be a bad example. He suggests, for horses, 'For some τ, - occupies τ' and ' - has reached the place where it is now by a continuous route over *n* units of time from τ, and - is an animal'. If these two predicables are substituted for ϕ and ψ in (11), we are to suppose, the result will be equivalent to 'Arkle no longer exists'. τ is a variable whose substitution instances are designations of places, and 'place' is to be understood in such a way that the place which Arkle occupies at any given moment is precisely that portion of space delimited by the surface of Arkle's body.

One's first reaction is 'Surely it can't be as easy as that! '. It would seem that it can't.Firstly, we should ask how the second predicable, with its perfect tense, is to be interpreted. Surely it is not possible to express ' - has reached the place where it now is by a continuous route over *n* units of time from τ' without at least entailing, or even including as a conjunct, ' - was at τ *n* time-units ago'. In any case, on any interpretation of 'continuous route' strong enough to make a reidentifying predicable, the former certainly entails

the latter. If this is so, we will be saying that it was the case that Arkle ϕ'ed and it is not the case that something ϕ'ed. Moreover, even if we can avoid this absurdity, if we make these substitutions for ϕ and ψ in (10), (10) will become a logical truth. But as we have seen, Williams expressly stipulates that a pair of predicables ϕ and ψ are not reidentifying predicables if when put into (10) they make it into a logical truth. When he makes this stipulation he is clearly right, but if 'continuous route' and'place'are defined in a way strong enough for his examples to fit (10) it is logically necessary that whatever has reached wherever it is by a continuous route over *n* time-units from τ was at τ *n* time-units ago.

There are other questions, too. Why has Williams put an *L* ('necessarily') into his formulas? The most natural and obvious meaning for *L* is 'Necessarily by logical necessity': but, as we have seen, the laws of nature by which we can find criteria of identity and hence reidentifying predicables are not, as he insists, logically necessary. Does Williams's account depend on the measureability of time? If so, does he hold that we cannot say that anything ceased to exist beefore there were clocks and calendars? And does he demand, as he seems to demand, that the pair of predicables ϕ and ψ, have to be different predicables? Surely we quite often in fact reidentify things on the basis that if anything was ϕ and anything is now ϕ, they are the same *A*. Obviously Williams is right not to rule out the possibility of a pair of different predicables, but things would be a lot simpler if it were clear that he would accept a double use of the same predicable. We could find implausible cases that would satisfy (11) without difficulty. For example, no two racehorses have the same name, at least in this country, and no racehorse has more than one name: couldn't ' - is called "Arkle" in the United Kingdom' serve to reidentify Arkle? This is in fact how

most of us reidentify racehorses. But the rules for the naming of racehorses, and the fact that they are generally observed, are not only not logically necessary, but could be otherwise without racehorses being any different from what they are now: and a horse could be renamed, even if illegally, without ceasing to exist.

This looks like a bit of a cheat, so perhaps a better example of a pair of reidentifying predicables for a given kind can be found. One way in which people can and in fact do find out whether x is the same man as y is to check whether x and y have the same fingerprints. If it is true that the fingerprints of no two hands are exactly alike, then it looks as though ' - has left-hand fingerprints of characteristics XYZ' and ' - has right-hand fingerprints of characteristics UVW' should satisfy (10), for any *n*. If they do not, it must be because there is no logical necessity that men should in fact have different fingerprints: we might all have the same fingerprints. But since we do in fact reidentify men by their fingerprints (the identity of fingerprints is necessary by the natural necessity derived from the natural laws appropriate to men, in their development) this provides yet another reason to drop the *L* from (10). At least we can refuse to accept it until Williams can produce a pair of reidentifying predicables which satisfy (10) as it stands without falling foul of his stipulation that they should not make (10) into a logical truth.

But if we are permitted to weaken (10) by dropping the *L* or by interpreting *L* to mean 'necessarily by natural necessity', then the two predicables offered in the last paragraph do satisfy it, and thus provide a good way of reidentifying men. However, then (11) can be true even if *a* has survived an accident in which he has lost his right hand. (11)

thus weakened cannot mean the same as '*a* does not exist any more'.

To avoid this conclusion we might try another way of strengthening (10). Williams's strengthening seems incoherent, and certainly inconsistent with his stipulation about logical necessity and natural necessity. We might demand, instead, a ϕ and ψ such that if, for any x and for any y, if x was ϕ then if x is the same A as y , y is ψ. Should we then re-strengthen the weakened (10) in this way:

(10)revised $\Pi x \Pi y C P n \phi x C I^{A} x y \psi y$?

But if we do so, we get an (11):

(11)revised $\Sigma \phi \Sigma \psi \Sigma n K (\Pi x \Pi y C P n \phi x C I^{A} x y \psi y) K P n \phi a N \Sigma z \psi z$.

And from this it follows that $\Pi y N I^{A} a y$, nothing is the same man as *a*, or *a* is not the same man as anything . Many would be willing to admit this, but Williams cannot do so. He has expressly denied that anything can be true of Arkle once he is dead: and he has also said: 'To say that Arkle no longer exists is hardly to say that Arkle used to be Arkle, but is so no longer'.

We can conclude, then, that Williams is unable to give an analysis of 'Arkle no longer exists' which is adequate to avoid the paradoxes which he claims arise on the obvious analysis. It may be that the revised (11) gives what is in fact an adequate analysis, since Williams's reasons for denying that when Arkle is dead Arkle is not the same horse as anything are mistaken: but it is clearly unnecessary. We can reduce it to the much simpler $K P n I^{A} a a \Pi x N I^{A} a x$. While there are objections to this analysis, we may ignore them if we notice that I^{A} must be introduced in some such terms as $\Pi x \Sigma \phi C \phi x I^{\phi} x x$. In this case the identity analysis can be reduced to $\Sigma \phi K P n \phi a N \phi a$. But this predicates something of the dead, which Williams cannot accept: and it is also Woods's account, which he rejects.

Williams's account, then, collapses into Woods's. We have seen in Chapter I that while Woods's account may be true as far as it goes, and may go some way towards supplying the connection between actual existence and what is expressed by the existential quantifier, which there must be if the two notions are to be analogical, it, too, fails to explain actual existence away. This will be dealt with again in Chapter IV. What we can conclude now is that the attack made by Williams on the notion of actual existence, an attack made with all the resources available, and as part of a good general account of existence statements based on Frege, has failed: and thus that this notion which has been outlined still stands , and deserves investigation.

Chapter III: the notion of *esse ut verum* in the writings of St Thomas

1. St Thomas and the notion of *esse*

We have seen the notion of actual existence briefly expounded and defended against the attack of Williams. It has been put forward as a generalisation of 'being alive': that is, as a sense of ' - exists' in which it makes sense to say of anything that it has come into existence, continues in existence, or has ceased to exist, just as of a living being we can say that it has been born, is alive, or is dead. Geach argues that this notion is the same as that which St Thomas deals with under the name of *esse*, drawing attention, for example, to St Thomas's endorsement of the Aristotelian tag, *vivere viventibus est esse*. This view is expounded in 'Form and Existence' in *God and the Soul*, and in the relevant sections of the 'Aquinas' essay in *Three Philosophers*. Here we can limit ourselves to saying that unless this view is accepted, it is hard to make any sense of this notion which is basic to St Thomas's work.

But it will be objected that this notion cannot in any case be valuable if it was the only notion of existence that St Thomas had. It only makes sense to us against a background provided by Frege's insight about what is expressed by the existential quantifier. If it has to deal with all existence statements it will consist of two radically different parts, one of which may be the valid treatment of actual existence, but of which the other will be a hopeless attempt to deal with Esgibtexistenz, the whole thing embodying what Frege called 'the grossest possible confusion'.

Against this we might argue that since St Thomas's interests were not primarily in what is now called philosophical logic, the confusion need not be as disastrous as all that. It might be perfectly

possible to sort out the good from the bad. Here, however, I shall argue, following Geach, that in fact St Thomas did have a fairly good grasp of the Fregean insight, and hence that his treatment of *esse* is free from the confusions that we fear in a pre-Frege philosopher. This is part of an attempt to show that a proper grasp of both actual existence and *Esgibtexistenz*, or as St Thomas calls them, *esse* and *esse ut verum*, is essential to avoid certain philosophical problems, and that on this St Thomas, who made most use of the notion of actual existence, is as good a guide as can be found.

What I intend to do, then, is to try and establish that in a number of places where St Thomas makes a distinction between different senses of the Latin verb '*esse*' he is distinguishing between senses that correspond to the uses in English of ' - exists' as a first-level and as a second-level predicate. His distinction between *esse* and *esse ut verum* corresponds to that made by Frege between *Wirklichkeit* and *Esgibtexistenz*. Then I shall consider how well his account of *esse ut verum* corresponds to the notion of a second-level predicate, and lastly I shall consider the means he uses to explain this notion, without having the recourses of modern logic, or even of a natural language which possesses an indefinite article.

2. The distinction between *esse* and *esse ut verum* corresponds to the distinction between the uses of ' - exists' as a first-level and as a second-level predicate.

This distinction is made over a dozen times by St Thomas, in works stretching over most of his career: sometimes on its own, introduced by 'Ens dupliciter dicitur', or as part of a more exhaustive division, introduced by 'Ens dicitur multipliciter'. The notion of *esse ut verum* is expounded in other contexts a couple of times as well. (1).

(1) For a collection of texts, see Appendix.

It is of interest that the distinction is first made right at the start of the first of his works after the *juvenilia*: in c.1, n.1 of the *De Ente et Essentia*. The passage runs:

> Ens per se dicitur dupliciter. Uno modo quod dividitur per decem genera; alio modo, quod significat propositionum veritatem. Horum autem differentia est, quia secundo modo potest dici *ens* omne illud de quo affirmativa propositio formari potest, etiamsi in re nihil ponat; per quem modum privationes et negationes entia dicuntur. Dicimus enim quod affirmatio est opposita negationi, et quod caecitas est in oculo. Sed primo modo non potest dici aliquid quod sit ens, nisi quod in re aliquid ponat. Unde primo modo caecitas et huiusmodi non sunt entia. (2)

This passage is confused and sketchy compared with some others, and there is clear evidence in the same work that St Thomas was not yet able to distinguish the two notions very clearly. But some things are already here which do not vary. One side of the contrast is very clear: ' what is divided up into the ten kinds' is clearly what we have called the actually existent. St Thomas speaks here of *ens* rather than of *esse* or of *actus essendi*, though he uses these terms in speaking of this distinction elsewhere. Just as often,though he continues to speak of *ens* and of ' *quod dividitur per decem genera*'. It is worthwhile drawing attention to the fact that in this way he makes it clear that the distinction he wishes to make in these contexts is nothing to do with the well-known metaphysical distinction, the *realis distinctio*, as it is called, between *essentia* and *esse*, or between *id quod est* and *quo est*: in this distinction all these sit on one side, that of the first sense, the sense of actual existence.

We should notice that the examples of what can be said to exist in the second sense do not exhaust this sense. Privations and negations, we are told, can be said to exist in that affirmative propositions can

(2) See Appendix, Passage A

be formed about them, but clearly they are not the only things about which affirmative propositions can be formed. The point is made explicitly in a slightly later and more complete account, that given at *In II Sent. 34, 1, 1, sol.:*

> Quaecumque ergo sunt entia quantum ad primum modum sunt entia quantum ad secundum modum. (3)

This second sense of *esse*, then, is not true merely of privations and negations. Nor is it to be confined to appearing in sentences whose subjects are not complete substances, as we shall see Dr Kenny seems to maintain.

In the *De Ente* passage St Thomas seems to give some examples of 'propositiones affirmativae', which deserve some attention. In the first place, they do not seem very existential. Either could be translated into English without using an obviously existential locution. Neither can be put into easy English by using a part of the verb 'exist'. We could use the existential locution 'there is ...' in putting 'caecitas est in oculo' into English as 'there is blindness in an eye' , but we cannot do this for 'affirmatio est opposita negationi'. This just does not look existential at all.

An obvious answer to this would be that the reason is that the passage is not about existence or existence statements or existential uses of the verb *esse* at all. It would be possible to make this claim, and to say that here St Thomas is distinguishing between the use of *esse* to express actual existence and its use as a copula. But it would be hard to maintain this argument. In this very passage, we are told that that of which *esse* in its second sense is said to be true 'is said to be *ens*'. We are told something about the subject of a sentence, not

(3) See Appendix, Passage D

about some other part of the sentence.

We should notice, instead, that the examples given are not meant as examples of the second sense of *esse*, but rather of the affirmative propositions whose truth is signified by this second sense of *esse*, or which allow us to attribute *esse* in this sense to what they are about. It is on account of the truth of affirmative propositions such as these that we can say 'caecitas est' and 'negatio est': and it is these sentences which are examples of the use of *esse* in its second sense. To read them as attributing actual existence to blindness and negation would make them false instead of obviously true: so St Thomas explains that all they mean is that there are true affirmative propositions about blindness and negation, such as the examples he gives, 'caecitas est in oculo' and ' affirmatio est opposita negationi'.

It is important to appreciate that St Thomas is not here offering an analysis of 'caecitas est' as 'caecitas est in oculo' or of 'negatio est' as 'affirmatio est opposita negationi'. His admirers have given him the title of 'perennial philosopher': but this means only that the things he has to say are of perennial interest, as are the things that any respectable philosopher has to say. It does not mean that in an age in which analytic philosophy is popular he can be read as making linguistic analyses. In this case there may be little temptation to do so: but there are other places where the temptation to read him as giving an analysis of a sentence or sentence-kind will be very strong. The temptation should be resisted unless there is conclusive evidence that this is what he is doing. We should not be misled by his phrase '*Esse* in this sense means the truth of propositions'. He uses this phrase here, where we can see that he is not giving an analysis: we should bear this in mind when he uses similar phrases in contexts where

analysis may seem to us to be more appropriate.

Hence here, if St Thomas is not distinguishing the actuality sense of *esse* from the copulative use of the same verb, neither is he offering an analysis of *esse ut verum* in terms of the copula. It will be seen that he does see a close link between the existential use of *esse*, in this second sense, and the use of the copula: but this could not legitimately be extracted from the present text. All that he says here is that we can say 'X est' in this second sense of anything about which an affirmative proposition is formed. He also indicates, by his examples, that the affirmative proposition is not necessarily one in which the term 'X' appears in subject position, at least so far as Latin grammar is concerned. And while he does say that *esse* in this sense <u>means</u> the truth of such propositions, he is not to be taken as giving an analysis.

At the same time, it is to be insisted on that the discussion of these notions is to this extent linguistic, that St Thomas is talking about two different uses or senses of the verb *esse*. He does not think that he is discussing two kinds of existence. This confusion he has avoided, and it seems to be his aim to avoid it in future, by his insistence that one sense of *esse* does not mean *esse* in his technical sense, but only the truth of propositions. He is very clear that he is not making an ontological distinction. Quine's strictures in 'On what there is' against philosophers like 'Wyman' do not touch St Thomas.

Hence, as we have seen already, this distinction is not to be confused with the *realis distinctio* between *esse* and essence that forms such an important part of his metaphysics and natural theology. This point is worth insisting on, as Geach has observed that later on

in the *De Ente*, in c.5, St Thomas does make such a confusion, though it seems that he avoids it in all later works.

In that passage St Thomas seems to be arguing for the *realis distinctio* on the grounds that what a thing is is a different question from whether it exists. Geach, who had not noticed the passage in the *De Ente* c.1, uses this to argue that St Thomas later changed his mind and adopted the doctrine of *esse ut verum*. Dr Kenny draws attention to the earlier passage, and points out that thus the doctrine of *esse ut verum* cannot be a change of mind. So far so good: but it seems that Kenny wishes to explain the earlier passage in a way that will be consistent with the later. As the later passage is in fact nonsense, and makes nonsense of the doctrine of *esse*, it is surely preferable to regard the c.5 passage as a lapse from an idea which St Thomas already held in some form, as shown by c.1, and which he later develops elsewhere.

This need not rest on general probabilities. At *De Potentia* q.7 a.2 ad 1 we find this confusion expressly denied.

> Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod ens et esse dicitur dupliciter. Quandoque enim significat essentiam rei, sive actum essendi: quandoque vero significat veritatem propositionis, etiam in his quae esse non habent. (4)

Here we see that both *esse* (here called *actus essendi*) and essence are together to be distinguished from *esse ut verum*. From *De Ente* 1 we can see that although we know what the word 'blindness' means, and indeed know that blindness is not any kind of actuality and has no essence or *esse* to it (in re nihil ponat), it still remains an open question as to whether there is any to be found in the world. One cannot arrive at the *realis distinctio* by considering the difference between the questions *quid est?* and *an est?*, and everywhere except *De Ente* c.5 he knows this. On the one hand he frequently uses the difference between

(4) See Appendix, Passage F

these two questions to distinguish *esse* from *esse ut verum,* and on the other in the *Summa* I q.3 a.4 ad 2 (5) he is quite able to distinguish between the unknowable *esse* of God and the fact that God exists, which he is attempting to demonstrate.

This fact alone should be enough to establish that what St Thomas is discussing is the distinction between the use of ' - exists' as a first-level predicate and its use as a second-level predicate. He is distinguishing between what he calls *esse*, which is something that can be attributed to individuals, and what we call existence, which since Frege we know is expressed by a second-level predicate. It does not matter at present how confused his account of *esse ut verum* is, nor that it is not exactly the same as Frege's account of *Esgibtexistenz*. As a matter of fact the correspondence between the two accounts is remarkable, and will be discussed: but here what we are trying to establish is the correspondence between the two notions.

Clear evidence for this can be found in a number of passages where St Thomas says that *esse* appears in answers to the question *quid est?*, while *esse ut verum* appears in answers to the question *an est?*. In this way he shows that he has grasped the same distinction as that made by Frege, and that he has recovered from the momentary confusion of the *De Ente* c.5. The first of these is the conclusion of the long and interesting discussion at *In II Sent. 34, 1,1, sol.:*

> Ens autem secundum utrumque istorum modorum diversimode praedicatur: quia secundum primum modum acceptum, est praedicatum substantiale, et pertinet ad questionem *quid est*: sed quantum ad secundum modum, est praedicatum accidentale, ut Commentator ibidem dicit, et pertinet ad quaestionem *an est*. (6)

The Commentator is Averrhoes. and the *locus* referred to is his

(5) See Appendix, Passage I
(6) See Appendix, Passage D

commentary on chapter seven of the fifth book of the *Metaphysics*. (7) It is not, however, easy to trace much of a source for what St Thomas says here in that passage, except for the distinction of modes of predication, which he also uses elsewhere in discussing this notion, in one place using the idea of 'praedicatum accidentale' to explain the connection between existence and truth, and justifying a jump he makes to the level of discourse *de dicto*. (8)

The crucial point here, though, is surely the appreciation that the notion of *esse* belongs in the range of answers to the question *quid est?*, and hence has nothing to do with answers to the question *an est?*, whether there is any such thing as what is under discussion. With this, as a corollary, we find that the answer to the question *an est?* has nothing to do with anything that may be true of any individual - nothing to do with what a thing is, with any properties it may have, or with any predicates that may be true of it - and hence is not to be considered as what we would call a first-level predicate.

In the *Summa*, at I q.48 a.2 ad 2 we are again told:

> Alio modo dicitur ens quod significat veritatem propositionis, quae in compositione consistit, cuius nota est hoc verbum *est*: et hoc ens est quo respondetur ad quaestionem *an est*: et sic caecitatem dicimus esse in oculo.(9)

At *De Malo* q.1 a.1 ad 19 the same point is dealt with, and again this distinction is made:

> Ens dicitur dupliciter. Uno modo quod significat natura decem generum: et sic neque malum neque aliqua privatio est ens neque aliquid. Alio modo secundum quod respondetur ad quaestionem *an est*, et sic malum est, sicut et caecitas est. Non tamen malum est aliquid; quia esse aliquid non solum significat quod respondetur ad quaestionem *an est*, sed etiam quod respondetur ad quaestionem *quid est*.(10)

(7) See Appendix, Passage S
(8) See Appendix, Passage L
(9) See Appendix, Passage J
(10) See Appendix, Passage K

Here the notion of *esse ut verum* is actually introduced as what is used in giving an answer to the question *an est?*,is there such a thing?

It may plausibly be claimed that with this we have established all that we need to defeat prejudice against St Thomas's account of existence. We have seen that he clearly considers actual existence as expressed by a first-level predicate, something that comes into the answer to the question *quid est?* We have seen that he clearly distingushes this from what we express by the existential quantifier, from what we mean when we speak of ' - exists' as a second-level predicate. The only place where he confuses the two notions is in the *De Ente* c. 5. Elsewhere he in fact contrasts the two notions. We can therefore be sure that to follow his use of the metaphysical notion of *esse* will not involve us in Frege's 'grossest possible confusion'.

3. How closely does St Thomas's distinction correspond to Frege's?

We can begin by giving an account of the distinction St Thomas makes. Indeed this has already been started. It has been said that St Thomas is trying to explain the meaning of sentences of the form 'X est' which do not attribute *esse*, actual existence, to X. The first step in the explanation is given by saying that these sentences correspond to the answer to the question *an est?* We might observe that they might typically be used in actually giving an affirmative answer to such a question. We are told that what 'X est' means in such a case is the truth of propositions, or, as we find elsewhere, 'the truth of a proposition', or 'of a *compositio*' or affirmative predication. One or other of these phrases is to be found in nearly all of the passages in which this notion is discussed. (11) It would seem that they are to be understood as equivalent.

(11) See Appendix, Passages A, B, C, D, E, F, G, I, J, L, M.

What they mean is explained by what follows them in a number of passages, including the *De Ente* c.1 passage and the *In II Sent.* passage already mentioned (12): that when we say 'X est' in this sense we are entitled to do so on account of some affirmative proposition that can be formed about X. The connection between 'veritas propositionis' and 'affirmativa propositio formari potest de ...' is made explicit in the fullest exposition of the notion, at *Comm. in V Met.* l.9 n.895. This says:

> Ponit alium modum entis secundum quod *esse* et *est* significant compositionem propositionis, quam facit intellectus componens et dividens. Unde dicit, quod *esse* significat veritatem rei. Vel sicut alia translatio melius habet, quod *esse* significat quia aliquod dictum est verum. ... Cum enim dicimus aliquid esse, significamus propositionem esse veram. Et cum dicimus non esse, significamus non esse veram.(13)

Hence to say 'X est' is true because some affirmative proposition about X is true: or 'X est' is false because no affirmative proposition about X is true. St Thomas often says that 'X est' means that some affirmative proposition about X is true. As we have seen, this should not be taken to mean that 'Some affirmative proposition about X is true', or any of the affirmative propositions themselves, should be taken as giving an analysis of 'X est'.

Be that as it may, we are left with a number of problems, some larger and some smaller. One is: what is an affirmative proposition? We can give an intuitive answer to this, and one which will yield the results St Thomas wants it to yield, but it is well-known that no strict specification of affirmative propositions can be given. This can be left for later. More immediately, we have to face the questions, what sort of a term can 'X' be? and what is it for a proposition to be about X? On both these questions we already have some information. It seems that 'X' can be an abstract noun, and it seems that 'X' need not be the grammatical subject of the affirmative proposition in question.

(12) See Appendix, Passages A,D.
(13) See Appendix, Passage L

This is rather sketchy. Unfortunately, St Thomas does not give a very great range of examples: and sometimes, as we can see at *In II Sent.*, 34, 1, 1, sol., for example, (14), he seems to confuse examples of the use of *esse ut verum* with examples of the affirmative propositions on which such uses are based. Hence an examination of all the examples he does give may not be very enlightening, and might in any case be of merely historical interest. It will be better to take another way in.

What we are trying to do here is to make sense of some of the things that St Thomas says about existence statements, especially those that would be renedered into English by a use of the locution 'there is a ...' or 'Something is a ...': that would be put into a formal language by using the existential quantifier. Since what is meant by the existential quantifier, Frege's conception of existence as 'the denial of the number nought', is the only way in which these sentences can be properly understood, it is not anachronistic, but rather necessary, if we are to make sense of what St Thomas says, to see how far what he said corresponded to what Frege said. The question we have to discuss here is not how St Thomas grasped his doctrine, and how he expressed it and accounted for it. This will be dealt with in the next section.

The question under discussion is, to what extent did St Thomas's treatment of this distinction correspond to Frege's? Or, more particularly, how clearly does the former's notion of *esse ut verum* correspond to the notion of what is expressed by ' - exists' as a second-level predicate?

Geach, as we have mentioned, holds that the notions correspond very closely indeed. In his article on Aquinas in *Three Philosophers* (pp 88-9) he discusses what is said at *S.Th.* I q.48 a.2 ad 2. (15).

(14) See Appendix, Passage D
(15) See Appendix, Passage J

This, he says, is one of the clearest examples which show us that this distinction is not to be confused with the distinction between essence and *esse*.

> Blindness is not an *ens* and has no *esse*; for it is not among the things that are, being on the contrary precisely the absence of what would be an existing thing, viz. the absence of sight from an eye. All the same, we can truly say that there is blindness in a given eye, which is an affirmative answer to an *an est?* question. Thus the existence asserted in this case by saying 'there is ...' is quite different from Aquinas's *esse*.

To say this is no more than to make the point made in the last section. It only shows that St Thomas and Frege have the same distinction in view. It does not say that St Thomas was able to make the distinction as successfully as Frege did. However, Geach continues

> At Ia q.3 art.4 ad 2um (16), Aquinas actually uses the obvious difference in meaning that there would be between a statement that there is a God and a statement of what God is, as a *prima facie* objection to the doctrine that God's *esse* and nature are identical. His reply to the objection is that to know (by reason of a proof) that there is a God is not to apprehend God's *esse*; God's *esse* and his nature are alike beyond our knowledge in this life; and as a positive account of the assertion that there is a God, he tells us that this 'existence' consists in the truth of an affirmative predication (*compositio*). 'God exists' is true if and only if the term 'God' is affirmatively predicable. In other words: to say that there is a God is true, not because some attribute signified by 'there is' belongs to God, but because Divine attributes belong to something or other; just as blindness 'exists' in that 'blind' is truly predicable of some eyes, not because blindness has the attribute of existing. This view is clearly correct, and a firm grasp of it will enable us to steer through all the shoals of the Cartesian Ontological Argument.

The claim made here goes somewhat beyond that made in the last passage, and it is this claim which Kenny, in his discussion in Chapter V of *The Five Ways*, finds exaggerated. Some things which are said here, however, cannot be denied in the light of what has gone before. It is already very clear that for St Thomas the ' - est' in 'Deus est', taken in the relevant sense, does not stand for any attribute of God. In the

(16) See Appendix, Passage I

same way, following Frege, Geach says 'To say that there is a God is true , not because some attribute signified by 'there is' belongs to God ...'. This is clearly St Thomas's doctrine, too. It is, perhaps, questionable on the basis of what we have seen so far, whether St Thomas fully appreciates that 'There is a God' is true because Divine attributes belong to something or other. This is what is now under discussion. It is clear that he was able to appreciate at least one special case of this account, that given of 'blindness exists'. It is open to Kenny to object, as in fact he does, that this appreciation depends on accidental and special features of the 'blindness' case, and of others like it, and that it cannot be extended to, for example, 'Deus est'. This is a reasonable point, and it will be dealt with in due course. But it is surely fairly trivial to point out, as Kenny does elsewhere, that 'Deus est'is always dealt with by St Thomas as analysable with 'Deus' as the subject and ' - est' as the predicate. The crucial point is surely that St Thomas knows that here ' - est' does not stand for any attribute, and this point we have already seen. Anyone would admit that 'Deus est' is about God, and to that extent God is the subject of the sentence. Indeed, we might retort that this could be taken as evidence that St Thomas had a complete grasp of Frege's insight, and this grammatical analysis, in which 'Deus'is treated as the subject, is St Thomas's way of explaining that in this case the predicable expression 'Deus' is the argument to the second-level function expressed by ' - est'. Alas, it is not as simple as that: for there are passages which make it clear that such passages should not be analysed as containing ' - est' as a predicate. But this does dispose of Kenny's point.

It is worth quoting the last example which Geach gives, in particular because of the curious prominence which Kenny gives it.

> To cite just one more text: Aquinas teaches that Christ has not two *esses*, as God and as man, because a Divine Person with one *esse* and a man with another *esse* would be distinct persons, and to assert a distinction of persons in Christ is heretical. We are not here concerned with the dogmatic theology of this idea, but only with the fact that Aquinas brusquely dismisses the suggestion that there must be two *esses* in Christ because there being a God is different from there being a man: this 'there being', he says, has nothing to do with the case, for in the same way we can speak of 'there being' blindness, where there is no *esse* at all. (*Quodlibet*. IX q.2 a.3)(17) Once again, Aquinas has clearly decided that what he refers to as *esse* is not the existence signified by 'there is a ...' (*Three Philosophers*, p. 90)

For the sake of completeness, we may also quote a couple of other passages which are parallel with these, to show that the doctrine under discussion here is not a temporary or transient idea of St Thomas's. We find a very brief piece, for example, in the *Summa Contra Gentiles* (III c.9 a.6):(18)

> Ens enim dupliciter dicitur, ut philosophus docet. Uno modo, secundum quod significat essentiam rei, et dividitur per decem praedicamenta; et sic nulla privatio potest dici ens. Alio modo, secundum quod significat veritatem compositionis; et sic malum et privatio dicitur ens, in quantum privatione dicitur aliquid esse privatum.

When comparing this passage with the parallel passage in the *De Malo* (q.1 a.1 ad 19)(19) we find, as we might have expected, that 'Malum est' is a sentence treated on all-fours with 'Caecitas est'. This disposes of a minor objection of Kenny's. He says that if "Blindness exists' is to be explained in terms of 'Something is blind', then 'Something is a phoenix' would explain not 'A phoenix exist' but 'Phoenixhood exists'. We can see from this passage that this is not St Thomas's mind. Obviously only certain kinds of words will fit into the gap in ' - est' and yield an existential sentence. 'Caecitas' will, 'caecum' will not: but 'malum' will, and so will 'phoenix'. Hence though the existential sentence which 'aliquid est caecum' would explain is 'caecitas est',

(17) See Appendix, Passage G
(18) See Appendix, Passage E
(19) See Appendix, Passage K

the existential sentence explained by 'aliquid est malum' is 'malum est'. So there is so far no reason for denying that the existential sentence explained by ' aliquid est phoenix' would be 'phoenix est', rather than the rather odd 'phoenicitas est'. This is not a serious problem.

The passage from the *De Potentia* (q.7 a.2 ad 1) is similar:

> Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod ens et esse dicitur dupliciter. Quandoque enim significat essentiam rei, sive actum essendi: quandoque vero significat veritatem propositionis, etiam in his quae esse non habent: sicut dicimus quod caecitas est, quia verum est hominem esse caecum.(20)

And the same point is made in the course of a longer discussion in the *Expositio in Metaphysicorum* (In V Met 1.9 n.895):

> Dicitur enim, quod caecitas est, secundo modo, ex eo quod vera est propositio, qua dicitur aliquid esse caecum; non tamen dicitur quod sit primo modo vera. Nam caecitas non habet aliquod esse in rebus, sed magis est privatio alicuius esse. (21)

Lastly, the same account is given in the spurious *Scripta super libros Sententiarum ad Hannibaldum episcopum*.This is included here because it contains the same doctrine and shows that St Thomas taught it seriously enough for it to be repeated by another author of his circle (thought to be Annibalde Annibaldi, one of his successors in Paris). The passage is to be found at *In II Sent*.35 q.1 a.1:

> Malum hoc modo est, sicut et aliae privationes sunt, ut caecitas et surditas. Nam malum nihil est nisi privatio boni. Huiusmodi autem privationes dicuntur esse non quia habeant aliquam essentiam: sic enim nihil sunt; sed secundum quod esse significat veritatem propositionis prout respondetur ad quaestionem *an est?*: si enim quaeratur an caecitas sit, respondetur quod est propter hoc quod invenitur in oculo talis defectus. Si autem quaeratur quid est, respondetur nihil quia non habet essentiam.

All this gives Geach's view, and goes some way to backing it up.

Now we have to deal with Kenny's objections. Some of these, as we have seen, are not very serious. For a start, we can admit that St Thomas has not, as Geach suggested, changed his mind. Rather he had a momentary

(20) See Appendix, Passage F
(21) See Appendix, Passage L

aberration at *De Ente* V. The suggestion that St Thomas always treats 'Deus est' as being of subject-predicate form has been dismissed, as has the complication about abstract nouns like 'phoenixhood'.

Kenny's serious objection is more profound. He denies that St Thomas is giving a general account of expressions of the form 'X est'. In the first place, he treats St Thomas as giving an analysis of such sentences. Secondly, he sees the analysis as far more complex than Geach's account suggests. He admits that when 'X' is an abstract term standing for some form, or at least for the privation of a form, something that

> is not a complete substance, 'X est' is to be analysed in the switching-round way characteristic of the quantifier.(...) But when the X in question is a complete substance, the proposition whose truth is asserted by the proposition 'X est' is that proposition itself.

Thus

> the part of the blindness analysis which can be applied to all terms whatsoever, is simply that part which states 'X est' = 'Affirmativa propositio potest formari de X'. But the part of the blindness analysis which, as we saw, is not applied to God, and, as we shall see, is not applied to any kind of substance, is that the affirmative proposition is one in which the term X appears not in subject place but in predicate place.

We have already remarked that it is probably a mistake, and not necessarily a harmless one, to see St Thomas as giving an analysis, here or elsewhere. Here the problem is that St Thomas in fact wants to give, for every sentence "X est', another affirmative sentence which is in some sense about X, and which, as we shall see, is true and uses the verb 'esse' in its copulative sense, such that "X est' is true <u>because</u> this other sentence is true. He does not say that 'X est' must mean the same as this other sentence, or can be reduced to it, or can be analysed in terms of it: rather this second sentence - or rather its truth - is the grounds for the truth of 'X est'. It is not clear whether he

considers it as a necessary or sufficient condition.

But if that is the case it is nonsense to say that 'X est' is true on account of the truth of some proposition, viz., the same proposition 'X est'. St Thomas is attempting to explain: and Kenny would have him giving no explanation. We should notice that the charge of nonsense does not apply if St Thomas is genuinely giving an analysis. A sentence, after all, may be unanalysable. Kenny seems to suggest that it may be unanalysable in one way, or at one level, but capable of another analysis. This, though more complicated, is also possible. But it is certain that there is no way out if St Thomas is attempting not an analysis but an explanation.

Of course Kenny thinks that St Thomas is wrong here, or at least prone to mistakes in this field. But surely it is a little too much to have him start off with a totally vacuous explanation? It may be indeed for this very reason that Kenny thinks that St Thomas is offering an analysis here: that if he is offering an explanation, then on Kenny's understanding we end up in nonsense at once. But the trouble is that Kenny's own account runs into difficulties very shortly: and in any case, there is an interpretation which allows us to make perfectly good sense of this notion, and that is the interpretation proposed by Geach. We shall see good reason to suppose that this is what St Thomas meant.

The difficulty in Kenny's interpretation appears at the next stage of his account of the supposed analysis. He says that when X is a complete substance, 'X est' asserts the truth of 'X est'. The apparent absurdity is presumably to be explained away by the fact that the second 'X est' uses ' - est' in its actual-existence sense. But there are a number of problems about this. In the first place, it has to ignore St

Thomas's frequently repeated remark that ' - est' in the *esse ut verum* sense can be said of anything, indiscriminately, about which an affirmative proposition can be formed. If when it is said of a complete substance this sense universally reduces to the actuality sense, it is not clear how ' - est' in the *esse ut verum* sense is said other than equivocally of complete substances and, for example, privations.

Secondly, Kenny's restriction of this analysis to complete substances cannot be justified. It should also apply to individual accidents. There is a passage - *In II Sent.* 34, 1, 1, sol. - in which St Thomas appears to justify 'homo est' in terms of 'homo est'. The most natural explanation of this is that he has made a mistake, offering an example of the use of *esse ut verum* as an example of the 'propositio affirmativa'. But in any case this will not support Kenny: in the same way he justifies 'color est', which must make Kenny's restriction impossible, and also 'caecitas est', which shipwrecks Kenny's distinction altogether.(22)

If we pursue Kenny's theory further it breaks down altogether. The further analysis he gives of 'X est' where X is a complete substance makes it equivalent to 'X is F' where 'F' stands for the kind of substance that X is. Hence 'Socrates est' can be analysed as 'Socrates est homo'. But this presents difficulties as well. Firstly, no-one could expect that the 'turning-round' account of 'X est' could apply to 'Socrates est', as the name 'Socrates' could never be a predicate. We must admit that that St Thomas does think that 'Socrates est', with ' - est' taken in the *esse ut verum* sense, can be said of Socrates: see, for example, *Expos. in V Met.*, n. 895,(23) and the passage of Averrhoes

(22) See Appendix, Passage D
(23) See Appendix, Passage L

(*Commentary on the Metaphysics*, ad V 7 (24) referred to at *In II Sent.* 34, 1, 1, sol. (25). But he avoids giving an account of this idea, which ordinary Latin usage suggests, though it is not impossible to speculate on the question. His complete account of the notion of *esse ut verum*, which has more to it than just the turning-round account, does hint how the thing might be done: but it is not by any such absurdity as making 'Socrates' a predicate.

So if, when Dr Kenny says that the 'turning-round' analysis could not apply to sentences whose subject is a complete substance, he means that it could not apply to 'Socrates est', we shall have to agree. But what of the example which St Thomas himself gives: 'homo est'? According to Kenny this is true because an affirmative proposition about man is true. The proposition he has in mind is 'homo est'. We have already seen that for St Thomas a proposition about X does not have to have 'X' in subject position. But apart from that, it is not clear just what this second 'homo est' (in which, presumably, ' - est' is to be taken in its actual-existence sense) is supposed to mean: 'Man is an actual existent', perhaps. But this does not seem to be any support for the original 'homo est', which presumably tells us, if it tells us anything at all, that there are such things as men. Things are still worse if we interpret this second 'homo est' in the way that Kenny recommends: that is, as 'homo est homo'. This does not look as if it is going to have any bearing on the answer to an *an est?* question. (26)

Thus Kenny's account seems to be mistaken. Firstly, it turns what St Thomas says into nonsense. This is not a conclusive argument by any means: anyone, even St Thomas, is to be presumed capable of writing

(24) See Appendix, Passage S
(25) See Appendix, Passage D
(26) See Appendix, Passage P

nonsense occasionally: as we have seen, Homer nods. But it surely must be a mistake to interpret what does make sense in such a way as to agree with what doesn't: especially when as we have just seen, in this way we end up failing even to attempt an answer to the question which St Thomas is quite clearly concerned with.

It is not quite clear where this mistake arises from. Kenny says that his observations are based on a passage in the *Quodlibetales*.

> There is a distinction, Aquinas explains, among the things which have *esse* in Aristotle's second sense, as items under one or other category. Where the X in question is not a complete substance, but a form, then the proposition 'X est' will be analysed in the same way as for privations: to attribute *esse* to the wisdom of Socrates is to say that Socrates is wise. (Est sapientia Socratis = Socrates est sapiens)(*Quodlibb.* IX, 3)

The doctrine is familiar, and we have just discussed it. But it is not clear how the passage referred to supports what argues against Geach's view. What this passage (referred to elsewhere as *Quodlibb.* IX q.2 a.3) (27) says is that actual existence can be attributed to whatever falls under the categories, but in different ways according to whether it falls under the first category, that of substance, or under one of the others. 'Albedo dicitur esse, non quia ipsa in se subsistat, sed quia ea aliquid habet esse album' is the phrase of this passage which comes closest to saying what Kenny wants to say: but he wants to make a logical point, that to attribute *esse* to the whiteness of Socrates is to say that Socrates is white.(It would be better not to enquire too closely in which sense *esse* is to be taken here, for this argument.) What St Thomas actually says is that whiteness can be said to be an actual existent, not because it exists on its own, but because by it something or other, say Socrates, has this accidental actuality: being white. This is emphatically not a logical point.

(27) See Appendix, Passage G

Kenny thinks that what he says is true of blindness equally with whiteness. This is what makes it suitable to call it a logical point, and to wonder whether he can really be talking about actual existence when he speaks of attributing *esse*. Clearly he cannot be: for blindness has no *esse*. But in that case the point he is making cannot be derived from St Thomas's text, for St Thomas is clearly talking about *esse*, actual existence. To substitute 'caecitas' for 'albedo' in the phrase quoted above makes it simply false.

But Kenny's point is one that applies equally to whiteness (or, to take his example, wisdom) and to blindness. What he does not see is that this argues in favour of Geach's interpretation. 'Est sapientia Socratis' is indeed equivalent to 'Socrates est sapiens', just as 'Est caecitas Bartimei' is equivalent to 'Bartimeus est caecus'. This is a very useful and interesting point: for if the former of each pair is existential, as each of them manifestly is, then the second, equivalent sentence of each pair must be existential as well. But just as 'Est caecitas Bartimei' does not attribute actuality to Bartimeus's blindness - for if it did it would be false rather than true - so there is a sense of 'Est sapientia Socratis' in which it does not attribute actuality to the wisdom of Socrates, nor even the accidental actuality of being wise to Socrates. We shall see how this point is crucial for understanding what St Thomas has to say about *esse ut verum*, and about its relation to the copulative sense of the verb *esse*. As such we should be thankful for it, though it is not legitimately to be found in the text under discussion. But what Kenny does not notice is that what goes for Socrates's wisdom and whiteness, and for Bartimeus's blindness, goes also for the humanity of either of them. 'Socrates est homo' is equivalent to 'Est humanitas Socratis'. Now, sentences like

'Bartimeus est caecus' are what make 'Caecitas est' true: so 'Socrates est homo' must equally support 'Humanitas est'. But this last sentence is not one that St Thomas would use: he would prefer to say 'homo est', maintaining that the difference between 'homo' and 'humanitas' was *secundum modum significationis,* not *secundum rem significatam.* On Kenny's own showing, then, there is no reason to reject Geach's account.

Besides that, though, there is further evidence in support of Geach. The most striking evidence is provided by a passage at *In I Sent.* d. 28 in expositione textus. The context is one of Trinitarian theology, and the discussion is on whether the fact that one can say that there is a Father and that there is a Son - these being, so to speak, two separate existential propositions, about there being a Father and there being a Son - means that we must admit a plurality of *esses* in God. The orthodox answer is No, of course: and this view St Thomas defends, on the grounds that this 'there being' has nothing to do with what he means by *esse.* The Latin and the theology are both quite complex, and there is a question about the text: but even so we seem to have a very clear counter example to Kenny's claim that 'X est' cannot be 'turned round' when X is other than a form: in particular, when it is a complete substance.

> Esse dicitur dupliciter: scilicet prout significat veritatem compositionis, et secundum quod significat actum essentiae. Quando ergo dicitur, Aliud est Patrem esse, aliud est Filium esse, ita ut ly *esse* sit praedicatum dicti: significatur esse quod est accidens essentiae; unde falsa est, quia sicut una est essentia trium, ita et unum esse. Cum autem dicitur 'aliud est esse Patrem, aliud esse Filium' (28) ita quod ly *Patrem* praedicetur in dicto, in *esse* significatur veritas propositionis. (29)

(28) Mandonnet's text in fact reads 'aliud est esse Patrem, aliud Filium esse'. The Oxford manuscripts give 'aliud est esse Patrem etc.' Since St Thomas has insisted on changing the word order to 'esse Patrem' it seems likely that he means to change to 'esse Filium' as well. See *S. Th.* III q.16 a.7,c and ad 4, for the importance of word order for the *suppositio* of general terms. (See Bibliography, p. 127)
(29) Mandonnet punctuates: 'ita quod ly *Patrem* praedicetur in dicto inesse: significatur veritas propositionis', which gives no good sense.

The antithetical nature of this passage makes the meaning perfectly clear despite doubts about the text. On the one hand we have the actual-existence sense of *esse*. In this sense, the *esse* of Father and Son is one and the same: when we use ' - est' as a predicate in 'Pater est' and 'Filius est' (sentences which St Thomas puts into the accusative-and-infinitive construction of indirect statement), to signify actual existence, there is only one actual existence under discussion. But when, by contrast, in 'Est Pater' and 'Est Filius' it is not ' - est' which is the predicate, but 'Pater', then we are not in danger of falling into heresy: the ' -est' signifies the truth of a proposition. As we would say in English, there being a Father and there being a Son, different Divine persons, does not necessarily mean that there is more than one Divine act of existence. We have it here specifically stated that 'There is a Father' contains the word for 'Father' not as a subject but as a predicate.

There are other passages which point the same way: perhaps not so clearly, but in less abstruse matters. We have seen in the passage from the *In II Sent.* already mentioned (34, 1, 1, sol.)(30) that St Thomas is happy to talk about what makes 'caecitas est', 'homo est', and 'color est' to be true, all these to be thought of, as we have seen, as affirmative answers to the questions 'an est caecitas?','an est homo?', and 'an est color?'. So that while he is also willing to ask 'an est Socrates?' - a perfectly standard question in Latin - and to discuss what answers to it mean, he is also conscious of what it is to ask whether such-and-such a kind of thing exists, that is, whether anything is of such-and-such a kind.

(30) See Appendix, Passage D

This is brought out clearly in the discussion of God's existence. The term 'Deus', St Thomas mainatains, is just as much a nomen naturae, a general term, as is 'homo' or 'color'. (*S. Th.* I q.13 a.9). We can find evidence of its being used predicatively in a statement that God exists when we read the Five Ways (*S. Th.* I q.2 a.3). Each of these is a way of proving that there is a God. Each of them concludes with the arrival at, or positing of, some first cause, unmoved mover, necessary being that is a cause of necessity in all others, and so forth. All except the second way follow this up with a formula in which the term 'Deus' is naturally taken as being used predicatively: 'et hoc omnes intelligunt Deum','quod omnes dicunt Deum', 'et hoc dicimus Deum'. In each of these we would naturally read 'Deum' as the predicate which is true of this thing which we have concluded to exist: 'and this we all understand to be God'; 'which everyone says is God'; or 'and this, we say, is God'. The alternative reading 'and this everyone understands God to be' and so forth seems a less natural way of reading the Latin. What is more, since St Thomas has not yet established that there is only one God, it is strictly out of place.

There are yet more indications that St Thomas came close to anticipating the use of the quantifier notation to express existence. It is a part of his doctrine about *esse ut verum*, as has briefly been mentioned, that when we say 'X est', using the verb *esse* in the *esse ut verum* sense, this is a use of this verb 'prout est verbalis copula'. (31) This is quite a surprising doctrine, and quite alien to the modern account, but it can be defended, as we shall see. Here we can confine ourselves to saying that if in 'X est', taken in this sense, we see a use of *esse* as the copula, then 'X est' must be incomplete, elliptical,

(31) See Appendix, Passage C

and cannot be analysed, as Dr Kenny would have it, as the joining of ' - est' as a predicate to the subject X. If it is elliptical, the question of course arises, what has been omitted? Obviously that will depend on the linguistic category to which the term 'X' belongs. There seems no doubt, from the many examples which St Thomas gives, that when 'X' is a *nomen naturae* it is the subject that is missing. This gives an idea of how St Thomas would deal with such *esse ut verum* sentences as 'Socrates est', which ordinary Latin usage demands. "Socrates est' is going to have to be elliptical for 'Socrates is such-and-such', or at least based on it: while, as we have seen, 'homo est' will be based on a sentence in which 'homo' is the predicate: ' So-and-so is a man'.

Nowadays we would say: 'There are men' or 'Men exist' is true because something is a man. St Thomas only rarely says something like '"Homo est" verum est quia aliquid est homo': at *Summa contra Gentiles* III c.9 a.6 (32) and at *In V Met.* l.9, n.895 (33) for example, where we find 'privatio dicitur ens, in quantum privatione dicitur aliquid esse privatum' and 'Dicitur enim quod caecitas est secundo modo, ex eo quod vera est propositio, qua dicitur aliquid esse caecum'. But elsewhere he avoids using the word for 'something' to explain this notion, which we think of as the most natural explanation in ordinary language. The reason for this is clear from other texts: for him, 'aliquid' seems to carry some vague import of actuality. A stock way of asking whether something exists is 'Utrum X sit aliquid?', which we find for example in the *Summa* at I q.16 a.1, 'utrum fatum sit aliquid?' is there such a thing as fate? In any case he prefers, it seems, to use the word in a predicative way: we find phrases like 'non est ens neque aliquid', 'non tamen malum est aliquid; quia esse aliquid non solum significat quod respondetur ad quaestionem

(32) See Appendix, Passage E
(33) See Appendix, Passage L

an est sed etiam quod respondetur ad quaestionem *quid est*. (*De Malo* q.1 a.1 ad 19) (34) Or again at *In II Sent*. 34, 1, 1, sol.: 'nec tamen caecitas aliquid est in rerum natura'.(35) We could say that for St Thomas 'aliquid' in this usual predicative use means 'something actual'. We have startling evidence of this at *Quodlibb*.IX q.2 a.3 (36) where we find:

> Esse dupliciter dicitur: uno modo quod est verbalis copula significans compositionem cuiuslibet enuntiationis quam anima facit: unde hoc esse non est aliquid in rerum natura, sed tantum in actu animae componentis et dividentis.

It will be seen later that St Thomas had some kind of a reductivist programme: he thinks that whenever there is a true statement of *esse ut verum,* it should be causally dependent on some actuality. Here he claims that the only actuality in the world that has this relation to the truth of a statement of *esse ut verum* may be one in the mind of the one who forms the statement. We need not follow this through here, but the example goes a long way to explain why St Thomas found it impossible to express his grasp of the use of ' - est' as a second-level predicate by using the Latin word for 'something'.

In any case, we should not expect St Thomas to have given a word-for-word anticipation of Frege. He holds that general terms can have a mode of reference, a *suppositio,* in which they refer not to an individual of that kind, but to the form or nature (*S.Th*. III q.16 a.7c and ad 4), and he recognises that *in divinis* at least, numerical terms do not add anything real, 'non ponunt aliquid' (*S. Th*.I q. 30 a.3): but this is the nearest he comes to the notion of a second-level predicate. However, we have seen that there is good evidence that he grasped the basic features of the use of ' - est' as a second-level

(34) See Appendix, Passage K
(35) See Appendix, Passage D
(36) See Appendix, Passage G

predicate: that it does not stand for any attribute, and is used to say of a kind of things whether there is anything of that kind. Perhaps no more can be shown. St Thomas's concern was with actuality: he mentions *esse ut verum* only to get it out of the way. In a similar way, Frege's concern with mathematics led him to neglect *Wirklichkeit*. On mathematics St Thomas gives some hints that had he thought to apply the notion of *esse ut verum* in this field he could have done so: for example, at *S.Th.* I q.5 a.3:

> Videtur quod non omne ens sit bonum. (...) Philosophus dicit in III Meta. quod in mathematicis non est bonum. Sed mathematica sunt quaedam entia, alioquin de eis non esset scientia. (...)
> Ad quartum dicendum quod mathematica non subsistunt separata secundum esse, quia si subsisterent esset in eis bonum, scilicet ipsum esse ipsorum. Sunt autem mathematica separata secundum rationem tantum prout abstrahuntur a motu et a materia, et sic abstrahantur a ratione finis quod habet rationem moventis. Non est autem inconveniens quod in aliquo ente secundum rationem non sit ratio boni, cum ratio entis sit prior quam ratio boni.

And at *In De Generatione et Corruptione,* I l.3 n.24:

> Cum enim puncta, lineae, et superficies purae sint res mathematicae, non possunt causare ex seipsis aliquam passionem naturalem.

However, if St Thomas did not have the means to make Frege's discoveries - having only a natural language to work with, and one whose particular quantifier carried with it just the wrong implications - neither did he have the incentive, the interest in pure logic and mathematics. Given that, it is remarkable that he came to the grasp of the distinction that he did.

It is interesting to see the results of treating existence statements in the way that St Thomas suggests. He tells us that 'X est' is justified by the truth of an affirmative proposition about X. We have seen that the term 'X' can be a concept-word as well as a name, and thus a sentence which is 'about' X in the relevant sense need not use 'X' as a subject-term. We should check whether this account comes out

as equivalent to the account in terms of the existential quantifier.

To take first the more typical case, where 'X' is a *nomen naturae*: a sentence such as 'Asinus est' can be justified on the grounds of the truth of a sentence such as 'Asinus est fuscus' or 'Brunellus est asinus': 'A donkey is dark-coloured' or 'Brownie is a donkey'. Here the account needs supplementing with an account of the *suppositio*, or mode of signification, of concept words, which varies according to the role they play in a sentence. St Thomas speaks of this at *S. Th.* III q.16 a.7 ad 4:

> Ad quartum dicendum quod terminus in subjecto positus tenetur materialiter, id est pro supposito: positus vero in praedicato, tenetur formaliter, id est pro natura significata.

We should notice that St Thomas's terminology is here slightly different from that of the logicians: where he says a term 'tenetur materialiter' someone like Walter Burleigh would say it has *suppositio personalis*, and for 'tenetur formaliter' he would say it has *suppositio simplex*.

What this means is that in "Asinus est fuscus' 'Asinus' stands for,'tenetur pro' or 'supponit pro' some donkey, for instance Brownie: so the sentence is equivalent to 'Some donkey is dark-coloured'. This clearly justifies 'Asinus est', ' a donkey exists' or 'There is such a thing as a donkey'. Equally, if 'Brunellus est asinus' is true, then again 'Asinus est' is justified; as it would be by 'Fuscus est asinus', 'Something dark-coloured is a donkey'.

It is important to remember that the proposition which justifies 'X est' has to be both true and affirmative. Hence 'Phoenix est avis', 'A phoenix is a bird', does not justify 'Phoenix est', as it is not true. Conversely, 'Phoenix non est avis', 'a phoenix is not a bird', though true, does not justify 'Phoenix est' either, as it is not affirmative. We know that there is no strict distinction to be drawn between

affirmative and negative propositions, but quite a rough one will do for St Thomas's purposes. It would clearly not be enough to rely on the presence or absence of the Latin word 'non', but it would not take much effort to be able to rule out the above sentence as non-affirmative. Nor would it need very much subtlety in examining the notion of *adjectivum alienans* to be able to rule out 'Phoenix est avis fictus', 'A phoenix is a fabulous bird', as non-affirmative. We do not need to worry about the *suppositio* of 'phoenix' in these cases.

The same point, that untrue sentences and non-affirmative sentences about X do not justify 'X est', is just as relevant when the *nomen naturae* is in predicate place. 'Brunellus est phoenix', 'Socrates est asinus', 'Fuscus est phoenix' all fail to justify 'phoenix est' or 'asinus est' because they are not true.'Socrates non est asinus', though true, does not justify 'Asinus est' because it is not affirmative.

As has been mentioned, St Thomas thinks that *esse ut verum* can be attributed to individuals. This is clearly not true of what is expressed by the existential quantifier, but his own account gives a possibility of this. 'Brunellus est' - the answer to the perfectly reasonable question 'An est Brunellus?' - is justified by, for example, the truth of 'Brunellus est asinus'. But 'Jupiter est' has no justification: for though we can clearly say, for example, 'Jupiter est deus', this is not true: and while 'Jupiter non est deus' and 'Jupiter est deus falsus' are true, they are not affirmative. So 'Socrates est' is true, though Socrates is no more, if by ' - est' here we mean *esse ut verum*: that some affirmative propositions about Socrates are true.

4. By what means does St Thomas express this notion?

If we now examine the means which St Thomas himself employs to explain this notion we shall find the clarity of Frege definitely lacking. What we have seen already is that to say 'X est', using ' -est' in the *esse ut verum* sense, requires support from some true affirmative proposition about X. 'About X' is very vague. We have seen that St Thomas clearly gives examples indicating that 'X' need not be the grammatical subject of a proposition about X. Crucially we have seen that when 'X' is a *nomen naturae* then 'X' is to appear in the supporting sentence as a predicate, or at least that it can do so. This holds for concrete *nomina naturarum* such as 'homo' and 'Deus'. A specific example which St Thomas gives is the Trinitarian proposition 'Est Pater', though he does not, in this case, give the affirmative proposition on whose truth the sentence 'Est Pater' depends. Another specific example is rather different: when the term 'X' in 'X est' is in the linguistic category of abstract nominalisations of predicable expressions, then the supporting affirmative proposition will contain in predicate position the concrete predicable expression from which the abstract noun 'X' derives. Hence ' Caecitas est' depends on 'Aliquid est caecum'.

These are examples of a proposition's being 'about X', but they clearly do not exhaust this linguistic notion. We have seen that St Thomas thinks that ' - est' in the sense of *esse ut verum* can be said of Socrates: clearly the affirmative proposition which supports this, if it is 'about' Socrates, is bound to contain the name 'Socrates' as its subject term.

The other criterion for the supporting affirmative proposition which St Thomas gives is that it should contain a copulative use of the

verb *esse*. Indeed, as has been commented, he goes so far as to suggest that 'X est' is elliptical and the ' - est' used in the *esse ut verum* sense is in fact no more than a copulative use of that verb left high and dry in a sentence-fragment, which thus needs support from a complete sentence in which the copula has its proper role. (37) This goes some way to explaining how St Thomas could think that ' - est' in this sense could be said of individuals. He thus has a sense of 'Socrates est' in which it is true, as well as one in which it is now false, having been so since Socrates's death. This kind of sentence has a use, and St Thomas is able to fit them without *ad hoc* adaptations into his account. If 'X est' is incomplete or elliptical, a fragment containing the copula and one of the two parts of the sentence it is supposed to connect together, then we must gather from the nature of the term 'X' which is used just what part of the sentence has been left out, and complete or support 'X est' accordingly. If 'X est' is a predicable expression, then what is missing is a subject: the something-or-other to which 'X' applies. But if 'X' is a proper name, then it must be a predicate missing, the something-or-other that applies to X.

But this condition of the affirmative proposition's having to contain a copulative use of ' - est' will not help us very much to make St Thomas's doctrine more precise, or to clarify it for us. It will be remembered that St Thomas, following Aristotle, held that any sentence whatsoever could be re-phrased so as to contain a copulative use of ' - est'. So we cannot restrict the notion of 'affirmative proposition about X' in this way, nor can we cast light on it.

(37) See Appendix, Passage C

A more helpful line of enquiry is to examine his doctrine on the *quaestio an est* and the *quaestio quid est*, the Aristotelian notions which we first used to indicate what it might be that St Thomas meant by *esse ut verum*. This doctrine is to be found dealt with quite discursively in his commentaries on Aristotle.

The distinction between *quid est* and *an est*, which is a way of distinguishing 'exists' as a first-level predicate from 'exists' as a second-level predicate, is dealt with in the *Commentary on the Posterior Analytics*, II ll. 1-3, nn. 413-461 (38): but not, at first sight, in a very enlightening way. St Thomas tells us, following Aristotle, that they differ in that when we ask 'an est?' we want to know 'Is there a *medium*?', while when we ask 'quid est?' we want to know what the *medium* is. The *medium*, he tells us, is properly the definition. This looks like no more than putting the question one step higher on the scale of Aristotelian science, which is neither very helpful nor very profound. We may suppose that what he means is that when we ask 'Does thunder exist?', since the definition of thunder is 'the quenching of fire in clouds' we are in fact asking 'Is fire quenched in clouds?', whether we know it or not. In fact, very often we don't know it: so, St Thomas says, we have to ask not about what thunder really is, but about what the word 'thunder' means: using 'quid significat nomen' in the place of the definition, as a *medium*. He held, with Aristotle, that since there is no such thing as a goatstag, there could not be any essence or definition of a goatstag: so the definition of the goatstag cannot provide the *medium* we are seeking in the question 'an est hircocervus?'. Hence our inquiry has to fall back on what the word 'goatstag' means, not because of our ignorance, as it might be in the case of thunder, but from

(38) See Appendix, Passages P, Q, and R: cp. also Passage O

the very nature of the inquiry. Indeed, in this case, the inquiry looks more hopeful. What the word 'thunder' means is 'noise generated in the clouds', but 'Is noise generated in the clouds?' does not look very much more helpful than 'Does thunder exist?'. However, 'an est hircocervus?', does the goatstag exist, is greatly elucidated by 'Est quoddam animal compositum ex hirco et cervo?', is some animal made up of goat and stag. Here the question has once again been 'turned around', as Kenny would say, and we are asking about the applicability of a predicate to some animal or other. It is also worth noticing that in this new question the only use of 'esse' is, as St Thomas keeps insisting, copulative.

St Thomas in fact relates this discussion with the discussion of the demonstration of the existence of God at *S. Th.* I q.2 a.2 ad 2.(39)

> Ad secundum ergo dicendum quod cum demonstratur causa per effectum necesse est uti effecta loco definitionis causae ad probandum causam esse; et hoc maxime contingit in Deo, quia ad probandum aliquid esse, necesse est accipere pro medio quid significat nomen, non autem quod quid est, quia quaestio quid est sequitur ad quaestionem an est.Nomina autem Dei imponuntur ab effectibus, ut postea ostendetur: unde demonstrando Deum esse per effectum, accipere possumus pro medio, quid significat hoc nomen, Deus.

This passage ties the question of God's existence with the discussion in the *Commentary on the Posterior Analytics* of questions of existence in general. The trend is clearly that the aim is to prove that 'what the name signifies' is in fact God.

All the different strands in these discussions are brought together in the passages dealing with the notion in the *Commentary on the Metaphysics*: of which the chief is *In V Met.* 1.9, nn. 895-6 (40)

> Ponit alium modum entis secundum quod esse et est significant compositionem propositionis, quam facit intellectus componens et dividens. Unde dicit, quod esse significat veritatem rei. Vel sicut

(39) See Appendix, Passage H
(40) See Appendix, Passage L

alia translatio melius habet 'quod esse significat' quia aliquod dictum est verum. Unde veritas propositionis potest dici veritas rei per causam. Nam ex eo quod res est vel non est, oratio vera vel falsa est. Cum enim dicimus aliquid esse, significamus propositionem esse veram. Et cum dicitur non esse, significamus non esse veram; et hoc sive in affirmando sive in negando. In affirmando quidem, sicut dicimus quod Socrates est albus, quia hoc verum est. In negando vero, ut Socrates non est albus, quia hoc est verum, scilicet ipsum esse non album. Et similiter dicimus quod non est diameter commensurabilis (41) lateri quadrati, quia hoc est falsum, scilicet non esse ipsum non commensurabilem. (42)

(896) Sciendum est autem quod iste secundus modus comparatur ad primum sicut effectus ad causam. Ex hoc enim quod aliquid in rerum natura est, sequitur veritas et falsitas in propositione, quam intellectus significat per hoc verbum *est* prout est verbalis copula. Sed quia aliquid, quod est in se non ens, intellectus considerat ut quoddam ens, sicut negationes et huiusmodi, quandoque dicitur esse de aliquo hoc secundo modo et non primo. Dicitur enim, quod caecitas est secundo modo, ex eo quod vera est propositio, qua dicitur aliquid esse caecum; non tamen dicitur quod sit primo modo vera. Nam caecitas non habet aliquod esse in rebus, sed magis est privatio alicuius entis. Accidit autem unicuique rei quod aliquid de ipsa affirmetur intellectu vel voce. Nam res non refert ad scientiam sed e converso. Esse vero quod in sui natura unaquaeque res habet est substantiale. Et ideo, cum dicitur, Socrates est, si ille *Est* primo modo accipitur est de praedicato substantiale. Nam ens est superius ad unumquodque entium, sicut animal ad hominem. Si autem accipitur secundo modo, est de praedicato accidentali.

Some of the more interesting features of this passage have already been mentioned: the use of the second sense of ' - est' of individuals, and the suggestion of a causal reduction of the second use to the first. What is of special interest is the shifting to the level of *de dicto* implied in his preferred reading of Aristotle: 'esse significat quia aliquod dictum est verum'. Also the continued insistence on the copulative nature of this use of ' -est', though we should call it existential, and his relation of this use to the 'veridical' use of the same verb. 'To be' is only rarely used in a veridical sense in English, but εἶναι is often used so in Greek, and thus so is *esse* in philosophical Latin, which could be considered, semantically and syntactically, as thoroughly Greekised.

(41) 'Incommensurabilis' in Cathala
(42) 'Commensurabilis' in Cathala

On this point it is quite startling to observe the parallels between the account St Thomas gives here of the use of *esse* in philosophical Latin and that which Kahn gives of the uses of εἶναι in Greek. For Kahn, the veridical use and all the existential uses of εἶναι,with one exception, are transforms of the copulative use: and it is hard not to see this same point in St Thomas's insistence on 'esse significat compositionis veritatem ... cuius nota est hoc verbum *est* prout est verbalis copula'. The exception which Kahn makes - the existential use of εἶναι which he does <u>not</u> relate to the copulative use - is what he calls the 'vital' use: that is, the use of this verb, usually with a temporal qualification, to mean actual existence. This is St Thomas's first sense of *esse*, which he distinguishes throughout from the existential use which is really copulative. If the usages of philosophical Latin correspond to those of Greek, as they do, we here see St Thomas giving a complete and accurate grammatical account of the uses of *esse*.

The account is completed by considering one further passage from the *Commentary on the Metaphysics,* together with a parallel passage from the commentary on the *De Interpretatione*. *In VI Met.* 1.4 n.1223 says:(43)

> Hic determinat de ente, quod significat veritatem propositionis ... Dicit ergo 'quod ens quoddam dicitur quasi verum', id est quod nihil aliud significat nisi verum. Cum enim interrogamus si homo est animal, respondetur quod est; per quod significatur propositionem praemissam esse veram. Et eodem modo non ens significat quasi falsum ... Hoc autem ens, quod dicitur quasi verum, et non ens, quod dicitur quasi falsum, consistit circa compositionem et divisionem. Voces enim incomplexae neque verum neque falsum significant; sed voces complexae, per affirmationem aut negationem veritatem aut falsitatem habent. Dicitur autem hic affirmatio compositio, quia significat praedicatum inesse subjecto. Negatio vero dicitur hic divisio, quia significat praedicatum a subjecto removeri.

What St Thomas is referring to here is the fact that 'Homo animal'

(43) See Appendix, Passage M

and 'Socrates albus', while significant, do not signify anything true or false. However, 'Homo est animal' and 'Socrates est albus' are both true. What is more, they can equally well be read as saying of what is referred to by the 'voces complexae' 'Animal man' and 'White Socrates' that they exist, as they can as saying of man that he is an animal and of Socrates that he is white. The difference between 'Socrates albus' and 'Socrates albus est' is the addition of the copula: which is the sign that 'albus' is being predicated of Socrates. Hence St Thomas attributes to this use of the copula the difference of existential import between the two. When 'est' is added, we find that we have something true, and something that signifies existence. So St Thomas says that there is a sense of the verb *esse* as a copula - 'proùt est verbalis copula' - which signifies existence only in the sense of truth - *esse ut verum*. This account is, as we have seen, generalised to cover all existential statements of this kind, not only those where what is said to exist is referred to by a complex term ready-made for the insertion of the copula.

This point is made in the commentary on the *De Interpretatione*, (44) I 1.3, nn.33 and 35, where the goatstag makes another appearance. 'Goatstag', though made up of two elements, is a simple term, not a complex one like 'White Socrates'. Nevertheless, something false is said when we say 'Hircocervus est'. Here there is no explicit *compositio*: nothing is affirmed of the goatstag just by tacking a copula on to its name. The problem is to be resolved by looking at the explanation given in the commentary on the *Posterior Analytics* referred to above: at II 1.3 n.461 (45). 'Hircocervus est' is elliptical for 'quoddam animal compositum ex hirco et cervo est', where the copula has its proper role.

(44) See Appendix, Passages N and O
(45) See Appendix, Passage R

The same will be true of any sentence of the form 'X est' in which ' - est' has the *esse ut verum* sense: there will be some sentence - 'aliquod dictum' - whose truth makes 'X est' true and in which ' - est' has its role as a copula, provided that we know what the term 'X' means.

It cannot be denied that this is only a partial account of what St Thomas says on this topic. We have not discussed the fact that he thinks that the connection between the two senses of *esse* is a causal one: that he thinks that in every case the actual existence of some thing can be adduced as the cause of the truth of the *esse ut verum* sentence. He does not work this out, but hints that sometimes the actual existence in question will be in the world, in other cases in a thinking mind. One might wonder whether in these two cases the causal relation will be the same: perhaps it might be a relation of formal causality in one case, efficient causality in the other. Either way it seems to fail. Certainly there is a sense in which the truth of'blindness exists' can be related to the phenomenon in the world of the actual existences, marred though they are, of certain animals: but it is not easy to see what actual existence is causally related, however tenuously, to the truth of 'There is an even prime'. (Though on this it is of interest to look at the passages about mathematics quoted at the end of the last section). If such a reduction as St Thomas suggests were possible it would answer to the hankerings of a robust sense of reality: but that's another story.

Chapter IV: the notion of *actual existence* defended

The notion of actual existence was introduced earlier as corresponding to a generalisation of what the predicate ' - is alive' stands for when applied to animals and plants: a generalisation that could be true of stocks and stones as well, and also of angels, sub-atomic particles, artifacts, sounds, and individual accidents. We have seen the failure of Williams's attempt to explain this away. In contrast, it has been seen that St Thomas, who took the notion of actual existence seriously, was able to reach the insights reached by Frege and well expounded by Williams, despite the comparative poverty of his logic. Hence a *prima-facie* argument against actual existence, that it involves a use of ' - exists' as a first-level predicate, and thus makes those who defend it incapable of understanding the crucial insights of Frege, is defeated.

So much for indirect defence of the notion: the time has come for a more direct treatment. The aim of this chapter is to expound, justify, explain, defend and illustrate the notion of actual existence. This is one task, not five: but it is more difficult than this programme would seem to make it, and though it clearly should fall under one chapter it would be very heterogeneous. In fact I have split it into two: but there is heterogeneity even within the parts. For if the notion of actual existence is a valid one, it is a very fundamental one. We are faced, then, not with the task of isolating some previously unobserved phenomenon and presenting it, neatly scrubbed, with a suitable label attached: rather with showing that a grasp of this notion is implicit in any kind of explanation of any of a whole series of phenomena. In particular it will be seen as implicit in any attempt to explain away this notion in terms of more familiar or more tractable ones.

That being so, the order of presentation presents difficulties: where is the best place to start? Should we start with a discussion of certain kinds of existence-statements, or rather more metaphysically, with a discussion of coming-to-be and passing-away? The objection to the first is that this is not supposed to be a logical investigation, and certainly not just another piece on the old question 'Is existence a predicate?': to the second, that it is not clear how 'coming-to-be' can be understood without a sufficient grasp of the notion of actual existence. I do not know who, apart from St Thomas, might be thought to have a sufficient grasp of the notion of actual existence: and this present work will not provide it, being aimed more at removing obstacles from the way to such a grasp. We are faced by the embarrassing fact that it is not easy to expound this notion without being clear as to the distinction between logic and metaphysics, while it is chiefly in terms of this notion that this difference can be understood.

Gilson, a great exponent of the notion of actual existence, claimed that it was 'ineffable'. He meant this as a theoretical point, and as such it has often been criticised: but as a practical point he seems to have been closed to the mark. Any one of the points discussed here could well stand first, put forward for a rough intuitive acceptance as a basis, from which we can argue to the others, and from these return to clarify the original point. This kind of procedure is obviously open to the suspicion of being an exercise in bootstrap-tugging.

Frege, faced with a problem that was theoretically far more intractable, had to appeal to his readers to take what he had to say '*cum grano salis*'. A similar appeal is in order here, though not for precisely the same reasons. Like Poe's 'Purloined Letter', what is

hidden here is so obvious that it cannot be noticed by the most careful search.

If this notion is a genuine one, if it has a part to play in our perception of the world, then it has a very large part. The evidence for it is to be sought everywhere at once, and to be judged as a whole. I hope to be able to show that there are several philosophical problems to which this notion provides a better approach than any other alternative account. But even if this is not so, and in every single case a better *ad hoc* solution can be found, this will not be an argument against the notion as such, as it provides a stronger theory. In a similar way, it was something like a hundred and fifty years after Copernicus that calculations based on his theory were anything like as accurate as those which had been based on the Ptolemaic system: but this did not stop the Copernican theory being accepted. It may be that in each case discussed here a better way of accounting for this problem might be found: another epicycle added in here or there to meet the discrepancies which are here put forward. But this would be to miss the point.

After such a great deal of fuss, I should like to begin, conventionally enough, with a glance at the analysis of sentences such as, for example, 'Arkle no longer exists'. We have discussed and rejected Williams's account of this: we ought to give some account of it, or at least to indicate the lines of such an analysis. It will come as no surprise that I am going to maintain that a perfectly adequate analysis is the one suggested by surface grammar, that here we have a proper predicate ' - exists' applied to a subject. But I wish to do so purely as a matter of convenience: purely, as it were, to establish the place of linguistic analysis within the current study.

For some attempts at the analysis of such sentences have clearly been attempts to explain away the notion of actual existence. Williams's own is one such; and, as he represents it, Woods's is another. Something of the same kind can be seen in some of the discussions of Dr Kenny in *The Five Ways*. This is not the place to discuss whether such a task lies within the possibilities of analysis, in theory: rather, the aim is to show that it fails in practice. The idea is that all these attempts to analyse such sentences as not containing a predicate of actual existence in fact rest on the notion that this predicate would express. Hence these analyses may succeed in removing an unfamiliar expression and replacing it with a complex string of more familiar ones. But if they succeed then all they convey is what the unfamiliar expression conveys: not because it is true that the unfamiliar expression really means no more than the complex string, in a reductivist sense, but because the notion which it expresses, actual existence, is fundamental to a grasp of the expressions used in the analysis, or in the worst case because it is tacitly understood that here this string of familiar expressions will be used to mean what this unfamiliar one means, with or without *ad hoc* justifications.

That is, it may be that 'Arkle no longer exists' is adequately analysed by a sentence that does not use ' - exists' as a predicate. But such an analysis will turn out to be just another way of expressing the notion of actual existence: and that it will not be possible to explain the notions used in the analysis without this notion. This notion may be difficult to explain: but it is impossible to explain away.

It is to be argued that this notion is of general usefulness: and in particular, that a grasp of the notion is demanded by any of the

attempts that are made to explain it away, or to analyses away the simplest and most obvious expression for it. It has already been argued that Williams's inability to delimit what predicables can be true of the dead, which leads him into a non-standard theory of reference and an inconsistent theory of truth, springs precisely from his inability to appreciate the notion of actuality. He finds the use of a predicate of actual existence paradoxical. But, as we have seen, it could only be plausible to say that 'Arkle no longer exists' is paradoxical if there is no difference between predicates that signify some actual existence in what they are true of and those that do not: if there is no difference between predicates that can be true of the dead and those that cannot. Similar criticisms can be made of other discussions.

Most of these attempts try to apply the Fregean insight on existence-statements to attributions of actual existence. Sentences in which one of the species of the predicate ' -actually exists' occurs are analysed by means of sentences that are existentially quantified. To make such an analysis is to accept that existence is an analogous concept: that it is not the case that the two kinds of existence-statement are so called by pure equivocation. This is an important point, because those who admit the notion of actual existence are likely to be told that if they manage to identify something for which ' - exists' as a predicate stands they will *ipso facto* have identified something other than existence,which is understood as being 'what the existential quantifier signifies'. Here we see that when there is no axe being ground thee is a *prima facie* argument for considering that this is a case of analogy rather than equivocation.

At the same time it is clear that ' - exists' is not univocal. For there are lots of dead, but they are no longer alive. So the use of the

existential quantifier alone, which there would be in any formulation of 'there are lots of dead', cannot express the difference between life and death. Moreover, 'the things that there are' includes numbers, which, if there is any sense in speaking of actuality, are not actual. An analysis of, for example, 'Arkle no longer exists' is going to differ from that of 'There is no even prime number greater than 2' in something more than in the use of the existential quantifier.

Hence it is sometimes argued that sentences in which ' - is alive' or its analogues occur will be reducible to sentences in which the quantifier is used *plus* something which will make a specific difference between these sentences and sentences in which the existence of, say, numbers or the dead is affirmed or denied. This 'plus something' may be: plus suitable rules about tenses, or plus quantification over concepts, or plus some rules about what kind of thing is being quantified over. It is most likely to be a combination of these: Williams's attempt can be seen to be of this kind. There is a similar idea used by Kenny, or rather touched on by him, which seems to try to pin the answer down to an ambiguity in the copulative verb 'to be'.

The first attempt to be considered is the 'quantifier plus tense' explanation. This has an immediate intuitive attractiveness: it is precisely the dead that are the problem, and the thing about the dead is that they are no more: they are not, for example, men any longer, or indeed anything any longer, though they used to be. 'There is a dead man' would thus mean 'there used to be a man'. But this account immediately falls foul of the fact that 'the dead are not anything any more' needs making more precise: for if it means that nothing is true of the dead then it is just false, as Williams's problems showed. So no account that does not specify what can or cannot be true of the dead

can be of value here. Hence it would seem that the attempt to rely on tense as providing the extra element that we need to add to the notion of what is signified by the existential quantifier in order to give an account of actual existence must collapse into the other suggested analysis, in which the relevant difference we need is added by an account of precisely what is being quantified over.

Before moving on, however, we may note that there are other major objections to using the notion of tense even as a part of the 'quantifier plus something' account of actual existence. We can begin by remarking that statements of mathematics, if true, are always true: and so at any time it is in order to use the present tense in a mathematical proposition. According to the criterion given above, then, we should maintain that any existentially quantified proposition of mathematics tells us of the actual existence of some mathematical being.

But this is nonsense. Numbers, for example, are not actual at all, let alone eternally so. 'There are more prime numbers between 1 and 10 than between 10 and 20' clearly does not attribute actuality to numbers any more than 'There are more dead than living' attributes actuality to the dead. But in the case of the dead we can find some way to use the past tense to avoid the suggestion of actuality: we cannot do this for numbers.

It seems right to say that mathematical propositions are not significantly tensed: but the reason for this is that numbers are not actual. We cannot use the fact that mathematical propositions are not significantly tensed to explain actuality: it has to be the other way about. What rationale could we give for a rule which would make it impossible to make past of future tensed propositions in mathematics,

or which would give a reason why present-tensed mathematical propositions, existentially quantified, do not mean what other existentially quantified propositions that are in the present tense are to mean? Indeed, what kind of a rule would it be? How could it be formulated at all?

An *ad hoc* rule would be that existential quantifications that are always true are not really present-tensed. But this is to rule out in advance the possibility of there being an eternally actual existent. Some philosophers do profess to find the notion of God incoherent: but surely there is nothing incoherent about this part of it, that there is a living being which does not die as we do but continues to live for ever? The only possible objection would be that such a being would have to be non-corporeal, perhaps, and that <u>this</u> notion is sometimes said to be incoherent: but this does not help to make the rule about tensing any more sensible. But either this rule stands, or we have to abandon the attempt to rely on tense as providing the relevant difference.

We can indeed see a more theoretical reason why this attempt must in any case be inadequate as an account of actuality. The fact is that tense is an expression of time; and time is the measure of change. Not all changes are actualities: by the only strict criterion of change that can be given, which tells us that *a* has changed if we have *Fa* true at one time and not true at a later time, there are lots of changes which are not themselves actualities and do not imply there being any actuality in the subject of the change. But all these non-actual changes are relational or intentional: whenever there is some change in the world, then somewhere there is what has been called a real change: a change that is or implies an actuality. For example, if it has come to be the case that Socrates is no longer taller than

Theaetetus, it may well not have been the case that anything has happened to Socrates: there has been no shrinking on his part. But in that case, Theaetetus must have grown: there has been a real change in Theaetetus, a change in his actuality. Equally, when four has ceased to be the number of a man's children, there has clearly been no real change in the number four: but there has been a real change in the world, because a human being has begun to exist or ceased to exist.

Hence, since there is no time without change, and no change without real change somewhere, there is no time or tense without real change. Real changes are themselves actualities, though imperfect or incomplete ones, as St Thomas says, and they occur in or to other actualities. So to try to explain away actuality in terms of tense is to try to explain it in terms of itself; unless, that is, some independent account of change can be given. But it is indeed one of the very great advantages of a theory of actuality, that it gives some account of the difference between real changes and other kinds of change, and gives some reason why among changes some should have a priority.

It also gives us a reason for denying that propositions about numbers are significantly tensed: since they are not actual, they do not suffer or initiate any real change and so they do not exist in time. Hence tense does not play an essential role in propositions about them, as it does in propositions about actualities. It also helps to show how difficult, or impossible, is the programme that St Thomas hints at, of relating all existence-statements to some actual existence. It is not clear that 'there is an even prime' bears any relation to any actual existence, nor is it clear what kind of relation this could be.

It seems that a similar suggestion to that of reducing the notion of actual existence to that of tense is made by those who, like Kenny, would reduce it to the difference between two kinds of copula. The idea is that there are two uses of the copulative verb 'to be', a classificatory use and an actual one. They might be distinguished by saying that, for example, the sentence 'Homer is a poet' is ambiguous. There are two ways of taking this sentence: and in one sense it is true, in another false. Taking the copula in the classificatory sense makes it true, taking it in the actual sense makes it false. Homer is a poet if anyone is, we might want to say: there is no doubt that what is referred to by the name 'Homer' falls under the concept 'poet'. But on the other hand, a poet is a kind of man: and Homer is not a man any more.

But this is an even clearer case of cart-before-horse than the last one. No account can be given of the difference between classificatory and actual uses of the copula which does not rely on the notion of actual existence, implicitly or explicitly. It is surely perverse to think that the difference between 'X is (classificatory) a living being' and 'X is (actual) a living being' can be used to explain what 'X is alive' means. It must be the other way around: starting from a classificatory or unspecified copula we can explain 'X (actual) is a living being' as meaning 'X is a living being and X is alive'.

An application of this distinction of copulas leads Kenny to claim that the doctrine of St Thomas, that God is his own *esse*, is reducible to a nonsensical stutter: using 'IS' for 'is (actual)' he makes this claim equivalent to 'God IS IS IS...', a string of copulas without a complement. But the actuality of the actual use of the copula, on which this rests, can only be explained in terms of 'is alive', and it is 'alive' that is supposed to supply the complement here. Obviously the

idea that God is his own life, or existence, is not one that is at once intuitively acceptable: but there is no need to make it equivalent to a repetition of a sentence-fragment. Indeed, it is not possible to have this fragment, with its use of the actual copula, without using the notion that is used to avoid that nonsense.

Incidentally, it is worth noticing that this attempt to explain actuality away leads to a bizarre result when applied to the simpler forms of the ontological argument. It is possible to say that the plausibility of this argument rests on a confusion between what is expressed by the existential quantifier and actual existence. But if actual existence itself is to be explained away as a confusion it is hard to see how the ontological argument could have had the least plausibility, or why, before Frege made the way clear, only St Thomas and Kant seem to have been able to provide a detailed answer.

But there is another part to the argument of Kenny in *The Five Ways*, one which looks of more interest in giving an account of actual existence, and one which, in one form or another, is followed by many authors: for example by Woods. The idea is to see the predicate itself - not its tensing or some copulative inflection involved in it - as the bearer of the notion of actuality. Kenny's account is of particular interest here in that an attempt is made to justify this by appeal to a principle used by St Thomas himself. The principle is 'quodlibet esse est secundum formam aliquam', or ' omnis res habet esse per formam': 'to <u>be</u> simply is to continue in possession of a certain form'.

But this is hopeless unless we can find a way of specifying those predicates, or concept-words, that signify a form, and those that do not. It is true that a form is signified by a concept-word, or

predicable expression, together with the incompleteness which is the distinguishing mark of predicables. But not every concept-word stands for a form: ' - is divisible by two', for example, does not. St Thomas tells us that a form is 'magis entis quam ens' - more something that <u>is of</u> some being than a being itself: but this does not mean that it is not actual.

St Thomas would agree that whenever '*a* actually exists' is true, then for some ϕ, *a* is ϕ: that is what the principle 'quodlibet esse est secundum formam aliquam' means. But among predicable expressions those that are suitable substitution-instances for ϕ in the above formula can only be picked out by seeing which predicable expressions signify actualities. And the only way of discriminating these is by using the notion of actual existence. We cannot use tenses, for the reasons explained above. And if we refuse to talk about actuality, and just give a long list of form-signifying predicables, the list will have had to be arrived at by an unacknowledged use of the notion.

Sometimes it is suggested that we can pick out clearly at least those predicables that signify substantial forms. This may be so: but then we should only have picked out <u>some</u> permissible substitution-instances for ϕ. Not only substances are actual: individual accidents, like waves and individual occurrences of colours, are also actual, as are *per accidens* existents like meals. In any case, unless we have the notion of actual existence, how do we know that numbers are not substances? We can indeed pick out substances from among actual existents with varying degrees of success by contrasting them with accidental actualities. If the whole realm of predicable expressions is thrown open to us, in contrast with what are we going to pick out those that distinguish substantial forms? Admittedly, substance-expressions must

bring with them clear criteria of identity: but this necessary condition cannot be promoted to sufficiency without destroying the notion of substance altogether.

The ways suggested above of explaining away the notion of actual existence will not do. Williams seems to be aware of the circularity of the attempts, saying, for example, that what he calls 'the Aristotelian paraphrase' - the explanation just discussed - ' is a striking case of *obscurum per obscurius* explanation'. This is a good point: but then he goes on to remark on 'the difficulties of the notion of substantial change', and claim that 'We can make no sense of the idea that Arkle has ceased to be a horse and has become something else. We can indeed make no sense of the idea that Arkle has ceased to be a horse'. The notion of substantial change is indeed a difficult one: but when the denial of the notion of actual existence leads an author to reject it as simply incoherent, we may take this as strong circumstantial evidence in favour of actuality.

Williams's rejection of actual existence is indeed thoroughgoing: he finds it impossible to make sense of it even in the simplest cases. In IX, 5, of *What is Existence?* he shows this in a discussion of unreal or one-sided relations. Some reference has already been made to this idea. The point is that just as some one-place predicable expressions signify or imply an actuality in their subject, so do two-place predicable expressions, or relational terms: some require an actuality in both subjects, others in only one, others in neither. The second kind, rquiring an actuality only in one, were much studied in the Middle Ages, as they are clearly of importance in the discussion of God's relation to the world. They were also of interest to the phenomenologists. Williams considers them under the style of 'quasi-

relations' or 'one-sided relations'. These are not perhaps very happy phrases, but in their defence we can say that they are a good deal less misleading than the mediaeval jargon 'unreal relations'.

Williams says:

> Professor Geach uses an illuminating example of a supposedly one-sided relation to assist our understanding of the Thomist doctrine on this matter. Suppose that a girl called Edith envies a boy called Herbert. There is plausibility in the claim that Edith's envy of Herbert corresponds to something real in Edith, while Herbert's being envied by Edith does not so correspond to anything in Herbert. The reason may be thought to be that Herbert possibly knows nothing of Edith's envy, or if he does is completely unaffected by it. He may even know nothing of Edith herself. But this will not do; for a man may be taller than another man, taller than Professor Findlay, for example, without knowing it and without being affected by it, and even without knowing of Professor Findlay's existence. But, according to Aquinas at least, a man's being taller than another man, *qua* relation of quantity, is a relation which really exists in him. It could hardly be a one-sided relation, in any case. If my being taller than Professor Findlay corresponds to nothing real in me, Professor Findlay's being shorter than I am will hardly correspond to something real in him.

Williams is surely right to reject the fact that Herbert may possibly know nothing of Edith's envy, or be unaffected by it, as a reason for saying that this relation is one-sided. If Herbert knows of Edith's envy, and allows it to affect his conduct, we have a new relation, or two, or more, beside the original one of envy. 'A envies B' tells us of one relation: 'B resents A's envy' of another, though there is a connection. Similarly, 'A is B's grandmother' and 'B is forbidden to marry A' give us two different relations, though again they are connected. The second relation tells us nothing about the one-sidedness or otherwise of the first.

The one-sidedness of the relation 'A envies B' is seen rather in this: that while a suitable scrutiny of Edith will reveal in her a state of envy, even if this is only to be seen in behaviouristic terms,

there is no such thing, in anyone's terms, as a state of being-envied that any kind of scrutiny can reveal in Herbert. All that a scrutiny of Herbert can reveal is a state of awareness of being envied, or of resentment at being envied: but neither of these need be there, as Williams says, for it to be true that Edith envies him. In any case, even if they are there, they are not a part of the relation of being envied, to which there can correspond no actuality in Herbert.

Contrast the relation of quantity. The most cursory examination of Dr Williams will reveal some actuality, some accidental state in him which corresponds to his being taller than Professor Findlay, namely, his being of such-and-such a height. And equally, there is something about Professor Findlay, namely his being such-and-such a height, which corresponds to his being shorter than Dr Williams. This is so even if no-one, especially not the individuals concerned, is aware of their heights.

But Williams seems to miss this point, for he goes on to say:

> More promising, and more in line with what Brentano and Findlay have said, is the explanation that in order to be the object of Edith's envy Herbert needs to be considered under some descriptions rather than others: and, most significantly, does not need actually to exist.

The first point, about the object of envy needing to be considered under certain descriptions rather than others, seems to be in part at least a point about envy, or perhaps about intentionality as such, as much as a point about one-sided relations. But the second point is definitely true. It may be supposed that people have at times envied the Greek gods their immortality: and there is nothing impossible about someone both superstitious and malignant envying the number 13 its maleficent power: 'I wish I could bring bad luck on people like

that!' Admittedly, to envy the gods you have to believe that they exist, and live for ever in blessedness, and to envy the number 13 you have to have some pretty weird, but unfortunately not rare, beliefs about it, but this can be left on one side. Since, as we have said, the relation of envy does not involve any actuality on the part of the object of envy, an object of envy can genuinely be something with no actuality: whether something real but non-actual, like 13, or something that does not exist at all, like the Greek gods.

We must grant that there is a logical difference between 'Polycrates envies Apollo' and 'Polycrates envies Amasis'. (Now that I remember the story, it was Polycrates's friend Amasis who warned him to beware of the gods' jealousy of him, but the inaccuracy of the examples doesn't alter the logic.) 'Polycrates envies Amasis' expresses a one-sided relation, in that it implies an actuality in Polycrates, but none in Amasis. But the same is true of 'Polycrates envies Apollo'. The 'one-sided relation' question has no bearing on the difference here. The difference is brought out by saying that 'Polycrates envies Amasis' does predicate a relation to Polycrates of Amasis: not a relation which is actual in Amasis, as we have seen, but nonetheless a relation, that of being envied. But 'Polycrates envies Apollo', in my mouth at least, does not predicate being envied by Polycrates of Apollo: it does not predicate anything of Apollo, because 'Apollo' is not a name that can stand as the subject of any sentence. To that extent, then, it does not predicate any relation of Polycrates: but it does predicate a state of envy of him. If we imagine Polycrates as having imbibed a dose of Pythagoreanism, and finding himself envying the eternal justice of the number four, the case is the same as the Amasis one: it predicates a relation of four, and an actual relation of Amasis.

That is what makes it suitable, though hardly helpful, to speak of 'one-sided relations'. The fact that Polycrates has to think of 4 under certain rather odd descriptions - that of being just, typically - is neither here nor there. It will not stop him identifying four, rightly, as two twos. A Pythagorean would in fact say that it is precisely because four is two twos, or even evens, that he is able to recognise that it is just, or Justice.

Contrast Williams's view:

> These considerations, however, might lead us to doubt, not merely whether Herbert is really related to Edith, but whether Edith herself is really related to him. Is it clear that what we have here is in fact a relation at all, even a 'one-sided' one? Could it be that what Edith's envy amounts to is that she thinks that there is a person answering to such-and-such a description, and when she thinks of this she has such-and-such feelings. Herbert only comes into it as in fact answering to the description in question; but this is merely an optional extra. Edith's envy could remain even if Herbert failed to answer to them, and even if no-one answered to them.

It would clearly be an over-reaction to the dislike of admitting that 'Polycrates envies Apollo' expresses a relation between Polycrates and a non-existent deity, to deny that any sentence of the form 'A envies B' expresses a relation. Williams does not go so far: he claims that such sentences are ambiguous, and can be read either as expressing a relation or as merely telling us about the contents of A's mind.

> The first interpretation ... requires us to say that it relates Herbert to Edith just as much as it relates Edith to Herbert; the second interpretation allows us to deny that it relates Herbert to Edith, but only at the cost of denying that it relates Edith to Herbert or to anything at all.

The suggestion of ambiguity is unpleasing: and as we have seen, it is unnecessary. Moreover, if Edith is related to the Herbert-idea by entertaining it envyingly, and Herbert is related to the Herbert-idea, as he must be for it to be the Herbert-idea at all, then on either interpretation 'Edith envies Herbert' does relate Edith to Herbert, either directly or via the Herbert-idea. And are we to

believe that in 'Edith envies Herbert his riches, but Herbert is in fact quite poor' we have the name 'Herbert' used with two different *modus significandi*?

Even if this implausible account were to be accepted, it would have no bearing on the point at issue. St Thomas did not mean to deny that 'Edith envies Herbert' relates Herbert to Edith: all he would insist on is that to this relation there does not correspond any actuality in Herbert, while there does correspond to it an actuality in Edith. This is completely separate from any phenomenological point about intentional objects. The number thirteen is a real object and not in any way intentional, vague, thin, difficult to identify or suspect. But it can be an object of envy: and in this case 'Edith envies 13' expresses a relation between Edith and 13 as much as 'Edith envies Herbert' does. In neither case is being envied an actuality in the object of envy: if it were, then ' - is envied by Edith' could not possibly be true of 13, as numbers have no actuality about them. But these two sentences are logically on all-fours: 'Polycrates envies Apollo' is different, but for the obvious and well-understood reason that 'Apollo' is not a name. There is nothing special about the logic here.

It seems, from the passages under discussion, that Williams's rejection of the notion of actual existence springs from a genuine inability to grasp it. This would account for the way in which his discussion of 'one-sided' relations misses the point so. The idea of one-sided relations, which would better be called 'relations actual on one side', is meant to be obvious, and if the thing is not seen at once, it seems that no amount of discussion will lead round to it. Gilson used to claim that the notion of actual existence could only be

grasped by an immediate intuition. This claim was arguably confused, and it certainly looks like an example of what has wittily been called 'Thomysticism': but the idea looks more attractive in the face of the failure of a philosopher of Williams's talents to see anything in the notion of actual existence in such a clear and uncontentious case.

We may remark, by way of tying up this last discussion with the earlier parts of the chapter, that the principle, 'Quodlibet esse est secundum formam aliquam', whose use by Kenny was rejected, provides an answer to the challenge which Williams makes at the end of his Chapter III. There he says that those who maintain that ' - exists' can have a use not only as a second-level, but also as a first-level predicable owe an account not only of the first-level use, but also of the connection between the two uses. We have admitted that '*a* exists' always entails '*a* is something': that there is always some ϕ such that ϕa. This is sufficient to provide the necessary connection. What we have denied is that this connection provides an explanation of '*a* exists': we have insisted that the range of permissible substitution-instances for ϕ can only be fixed by paying attention to what is actual. But the relation to the use of the existential or particular quantifier has been given.

Chapter V: Various applications of this distinction

The time has now come to examine the value of the distinction between *esse* and *esse ut verum* by means of its applications. By this we should understand the applications not of either notion which we have distinguished, but rather of the distinction itself. The value of the notion of *esse ut verum* has been shown in many applications since Frege's time: the value of the notion of *esse* needs to be shown in applications that each merit separate treatment at length. Indications of what applications it might have can be found in Geach's works. Here the idea is to show that a number of philosophical errors consist precisely in a confusion which this distinction clears up.

We have already seen Geach's claim that the Cartesian ontological argument is a confusion of the two notions: and we have investigated Kenny's objections to this. Barnes, something of a friend to the Ontological Argument, tells us:

> The argument can fairly be represented like this:
> (1) Necessarily, a God has all perfections.
> (2) Existence is a perfection.
> Therefore (3) God exists (*The Ontological Argument*, p.16)

If this is so, the argument stands revealed as based on a confusion between the two notions. *Esse* is indeed a perfection that God must have, if <u>there is</u> a God: but is there? In Fregean terms, as we have seen, no amount of investigation of the marks of the concept *God* - what must be true of an object for it to fall under this concept - can tell us anything about the *Eigenschaften*, the properties <u>of</u> a concept, expressed by a second-level predicate which may or may not apply to this concept. The Aristotelian language which St Thomas would use is even clearer: no amount of consideration of 'quid est Deus', or more strictly, 'quid significat hoc nomen, *Deus*', can provide us with an answer to the question 'an est Deus?'

It is striking that Barnes fails to see this: but it is to be noticed that he does so precisely because of a confusion between *esse* and *esse ut verum*, or as he puts it in Fregean terms, between *Wirklichkeit* and *Esgibtexistenz*. On p. 62, *op. cit.*,he says:

> Frege's distinction, whatever its value, does not help us over the Ontological Argument. It is, of course, the *Wirklichkeit* of Gods, and not their *Esgibtexistenz*, that the atheist and theist dispute over and that the argument claims to settle.

'Of course' is good. It is hard to see how the dispute over whether there is a God - 'Es gibt einen Gott' in German - could fail to be a dispute about *Esgibtexistenz*. Generally both atheists and theists agree on what they are talking about: they agree on the nature that the term 'God' is supposed to stand for: an eternal, personal spirit, Creator and governor of the world. What the atheist denies, and the theist affirms, is that <u>there is</u> anything that has that nature, that answers to that description, or falls under that concept. How different is Hume's suggestion that the world was made by a senile God who has since died! or the suggestion that God, while eternal, is no more actual than the changeless, eternal, non-actual beings of mathematics! It is to be noticed that we should describe someone who held these views as a very odd kind of heretic, but not as an atheist. He is simply not party to the dispute which Barnes speaks of: but what he is party to is precisely a dispute about the *Wirklichkeit* of God, God's *esse*. Geach makes precisely this point in 'What Actually Exists' (*God and the Soul*, p.74), a passage which Barnes, amazingly, cites in defence of his view. There could hardly be clearer evidence of a connection between failing to grasp the distinction between *esse ut verum* and *esse*, and a failure to see the fallacy of the ontological argument.

The ontological argument is thus shown to rest on the confusion of these two notions, and may thus accurately be called chimerical: a

chimera being an unnatural fusion of two quite disparate elements, with monstrous results. I wish to show that two other philosophical notions, often called chimerical, are in the same strict way actually chimeras: and that they result from the same confusion. They are the notions of *facts* and of a *theory of objects*.

Facts, I intend to say, are a chimerical confusion of two quite genuine notions. One is the sense of sentences: which is a notion that belongs with *esse ut verum*, being in the realm of truth and logic, to which no actuality as such corresponds. On the other hand we have what St Thomas, following Aristotle, called *entia per accidens: per accidens* existents or actualities.

To take the second element first: Prof. Anscombe, writing on Aristotle in *Three Philosophers*, tells us the following: (p. 23)

> Let us suppose that the statement, that a certain man is flourishing, or is educated, is true. If this is so, then a flourishing man, or again an educated man, is among the things that exist, and Aristotle takes it that the copula here expresses this existence. (We should notice indeed that the Greek expression he uses may mean indifferently 'a man is educated' or 'an educated man exists'.) But, he says, a flourishing man, or again an educated man, is not a *per se* existent, but a *per accidens* one; or again, he would say he is not a *per se* unit, but a *per accidens* one. The predicate in 'The man is flourishing', however, indicates a *per se* existent, and so - he says, surely forgetting about 'yesterday' as an example of something in a category - is any predicate that signifies in any one of the categories: whether the particulars indicated by them are such as to exist in a subject, or, as holds when the predication is in the category of substance, are identical with the subject. Thus the fact that something exists, i.e. that there is such a thing does not shew that it is 'an existent' or 'a being' in the sense in which Aristotle says that the question is 'what is being?' Terms expressing privation, and terms standing for *per accidens* beings both stand for things that exist, or 'are to be found in the world', but neither stands for what Aristotle means by 'a being'.

This account of Aristotle's thought on the *per accidens* is sometimes attacked, though to my mind wrongly; but in any case it is certainly what St Thomas thought Aristotle said. In the *In V Met*. l. 9 para. 885

we find St Thomas discussing Aristotle's distinction of *ens per se* and *ens per accidens* (or *ens secundum se* and *ens secundum accidens*,as he puts it here):

> Sciendum tamen est quod illa divisio entis non est eadem cum illa divisione qua dividitur ens in substantiam et accidens. Quod ex hoc patet, quia ipse postmodum, ens secundum se dividit in decem praedicamenta, quorum novem sunt de genere accidentis. Ens igitur dividitur in substantiam et accidens, secundum absolutam entis considerationem, sicut ipsa albedo in se considerata dicitur accidens, et homo substantia. Sed ens secundum accidens prout hic sumitur, oportet accipi per comparationem accidentis ad substantiam. Quae quidem comparatio significatur hoc verbo, Est, cum dicitur, homo est albus. Unde hoc totum, homo est albus,(1) est ens per accidens.

Per accidens existents, then, are complex actualities in the world. They can be expressed by propositions, but also by other truth-valueless verbal complexes: they can be states of affairs, processes or events, or the like. Since they can be expressed, they can be grasped by the mind, and can thus be brought about by an agent, though they need not be: they may be brought about by the coincidental convergence of two or more natural causes. (*S. Th.* I q.116 a.1) But they are something in the world, something actual. The primeness of two, the truth of Pythagoras's theorem, or the fallacy of the ontological argument, though they can be spoken of, are not *per accidens* existents: my sitting at a desk typing, the rain pouring down outside, and the recent arrival of the window-cleaners, are. The examples which St Thomas gives are typically 'Homo est albus', as above, 'albus musicus', and, more exotically, 'Homo fodiens sepulcrum invenit thesaurum'.

Thus while every sentence has a sense, not all have any connection with a *per accidens* existence or existent. Some, like 'Socrates is a man' are connected with a *per se* existent, in this case Socrates, in the same way as 'A musician is pale' is connected with the *per accidens*

(1) It seems likely that the text is corrupt, and should read 'homo albus'.

existent, a white musician. What this connection or relationship is need not be investigated here. Other sentences have no such connection with any existent or existence or actuality at all, *per se* or *per accidens*, like 'two is prime'. Nevertheless they all have a sense: this, which is a necessary feature of a significant sentence, is something entirely non-actual, as Frege pointed out in 'The Thought'. Facts, which form the notion which we are approaching in this roundabout manner, are a 'sort of reality' postulated to give every sentence a similar connection to something to that which some sentences in fact do have to *per accidens* or *per se* existents. It should be clear that being a significant sentence simply depends on having a sense, not in standing in any such correspondence relation to any object such as a fact. Some sentences do have the special feature of standing in some such relation to actual existents: those theorists who supported an ontology of facts were generalising this special feature, thus obscuring its specialness, besides postulating an ever-increasing realm of objects for which there is no justification.

To see that facts are in this way chimerical, we can examine a typical alleged fact, such as Queen Anne's death. Of such a fact a number of things seem to be true. We can say that it was asserted or denied, doubted for a long time, or announced prematurely or the like. But this set of predicates is properly true of the sense of the sentence 'Queen Anne is dead'. On the other hand, we can say of Queen Anne's death that it was slow, painful or edifying: and this set of predicates is true of the event of Queen Anne's death: and as we have seen, events are a species of *per accidens* actuality. There is thus no need for the alleged fact: and what is more, since it would have to have have these two completely disparate sets of predicates true of it, we can conclude that there not only need be, there cannot be such an object

as the fact of Queen Anne's death. It stands revealed as just such another chimera as that on which the ontological argument rests: that is, a confusion of the order of *esse*, within which events such as deaths, as *per accidens* existents, fall, and the order of *esse ut verum*, within which perfectly genuine non-actual objects like the senses of sentences fall.

This point is made by Geach in 'What Actually Exists' (in *God and the Soul*) allowing for the reality and actuality of events, correcting his view in 'Some Problems about Time' (in *Logic Matters*) that all reference to events was made by dispensable onomatoids, nominalisations of sentences. There he speaks highly of Russell's view that

> a phrase like 'the Kaiser's death' is not even a description, let alone a name, of an object nameable by a proper name, but rather goes proxy for the corresponding proposition, 'the Kaiser is dead'. For example, people might in 1918 assert or deny or doubt the Kaiser's death; this shows that the onomatoid 'the Kaiser's death' goes proxy for a clause ' The Kaiser is dead'. (Observe that it would be nonsense to speak of asserting or denying the Kaiser's *spiked helmet* - this phrase <u>is</u> a description of a nameable object.

So far so good: but we could go on to say that the Kaiser's death, considered as an event or *per accidens* existent, was in his bed, while his spiked helmet - also, according to St Thomas, a *per accidens* existent, as is any artifact - was on top of the wardrobe. And ' - was in his bed' is not a predicate that can be true of the sense of a sentence.

We may willingly agree that reference to the Kaiser's death as a *per accidens* existent is something we could easily do without, reducing all sentences in which it occurs to sentences with no such reference, but only with reference to the Kaiser. But there are two observations to be made here. The first is that some references to *per accidens* existents are not so tractable, as is pointed out in 'What Actually Exists'.

'He uttered the sound *bek*' can scarcely be reduced to 'He beh'd, then he eh'd, then he kay'd'. But in any case we should be clear that this is not the same kind of reduction as the reduction of the apparent reference to the supposed fact of, for example, the Kaiser's death, where this is understood as the sense of the sentence 'The Kaiser is dead'. In this sense, 'the Kaiser's death', considered as a phrase purportedly referring to an alleged fact, can be seen as an onomatoid, a pseudo-name for a pseudo-object, and can, as we have seen, be reduced to the sentence 'The Kaiser is dead' or to its sense. This is a linguistic reduction of an expression in one category to a a more apposite expression in another category. Considered as an event, on the other hand, the Kaiser's death can be reduced to the Kaiser. This is not a linguistic reduction but a metaphysical one, the sort of reduction that Aristotle practises throughout the *Metaphysics*. Here the reduction is of an *ens per accidens* to the *ens per se* on which it rests. We have two different realms here, the realm of *esse ut verum* and that of *esse*, or that of logic and that of metaphysics: so we have two different reductions with two different results: in the one case the Kaiser, in the other case the sense of the sentence 'The Kaiser is dead'. The sense of this sentence is in a quite different order from its subject.

This is not a trivial point. Much of Williams's book rests on the failure to distinguish the two kinds of reduction; indeed, his whole attempt to reduce all talk of existence to the use of the quantifier, and thus to explain away *esse*, is itself a confusion of the two orders of reduction. A particularly grievous example of this confusion is to be found in his further suggested explanation of the quantifiers in terms of inference licences (p.281). The Creation, or less dramatically, anyone's birth, would thus be explained as the revoking

of an inference-licence: on the part of what licensing authority is not stated. It does not take the metaphysical insight of an Aquinas to see that there must be more to coming into existence than this. The clearest cases of this confusion are shown where he deals with historical topics: as, for example, when he says at ch. VII, 7, p. 184, that for Aristotle, or in general,

> The question, what substances are there, is thus the same as the question, what individual expressions do we need in order to say the things we have to say.

This is imply not true, either for Aristotle or in general. Most amusingly, he says in a footnote (n. 24 p.212):

> Because of this belief in the univocity of Σ, I find myself *pro tanto* in agreement with Scotus rather than Aquinas on the question whether *being* is univocal.

It may indeed be the case, for all I know, that considerations such as those relevant to the univocity of Σ are what led Scotus to a belief in the univocity of *esse*, though I doubt it: but if it is so, it only means that Scotus, like Williams, understood neither Aristotle nor St Thomas on this question.

Meanwhile, the rejection of facts is not without useful practical consequences. Facts blur the distinction between the meanings of sentences of sentences and actualities. It thus becomes more plausible to say that, if the world is the totality of facts, in one sense of that over-worked slogan, the world is a four-dimensional box in which four-dimensional timeless objects stand in four-dimensional timeless relations to one another. The genuine timelessness of senses, which is part of their non-actuality, as it is of that of numbers, gets carried over to the mythical facts. If we distinguish senses from events the absurdity of timeless events will make apparent to us the fact that four-dimensionalism fails to be an account of time because it fails to account

for change: that is, for actuality.

We turn now to objects, once seen as components of facts as names are of sentences: a miscellaneous category, under which both things and numbers would fall. We shall see that indeed objects, if we attribute any ontological status to them, are appropriate components of facts, as they are equally chimerical. There is no such ontological category.

To have a sensible grasp of the category, we have to turn to Wittgenstein's question, 'As opposed to what?' This question will enlighten us as to the criteria for this category, which are not ontological. For to get a sensible answer to this question, we have to turn to Frege, who tells us: as opposed to concepts. We find this elegantly put at *Grundlagen* para. 60:

> The self-subsistence which I am claiming for number is not to be taken to mean that a number word signifies something when removed from the context of a proposition, but only to preclude the use of such words as predicates or attributes, which appreciably alters their meaning.

('Self-subsistence' translates *Selbständigkeit*, which is the mark of objects as opposed to concepts).

This is enlightening because when we are thinking of objects we have a tendency to take them as given. We think first of actual objects, which <u>are</u> given: stocks and stones, people, stars and sub-atomic particles. Then we discover that if the notion of object is to be of any logical value, it has to be extended to cover numbers and the like, in short everything that can be named. Consideration of concepts should make us realise that this is the wrong way in. The notion of 'concept' is introduced by Frege in the only way possible, which is as what a predicable stands for: what we are talking about when we make higher-

level predications. It thus starts in the realm of language and never gets out of the realm of logic: it is something we talk about, and that's all there is to it. Realism about Fregean concepts - trying to work out what they are, and how they enter into the composition of the world - though possible, is less likely than an implicit realism about objects, which is often to be found under the name of ontology.

A useful example of this can be found in Kenny's discussions of the notion of form, in *The Five Ways* and the little book on Aquinas. Geach uses the notion of concept as an analogy for that of form: and it seems that it is a correct rejection of the idea of realism about concepts that leads Kenny to reject or question forms. Certainly some of his reflections are appropriate to concepts rather than forms. But this is a mistake: forms are supposed to be part of the actually existent, so to speak, in some sense actual themselves (though, we are warned, they are 'magis entis quam ens'). Their investigation thus genuinely starts from the world, rather than from language, and the analogy with concepts is supposed to be no more than a pedagogic device, comparing two things partly the same, partly different, to use the classic definition of an analogy.

Forms are like concepts in that they are incomplete, in some sense, and also in that some predicable expressions bear a similar relation to actual forms tc the relation which all predicables bear tc concepts. But not all predicables are so related to forms, any more than all sentences with a sense are related to a *per se* or *per accidens* existent. ' - is red and round' is a perfectly good predicable, but there is no form of being red-and-round, even though being red and being round are both actualities. Still less is there a form of being red-or-round, or of being divisible by 2. It is true that there is no rule by which we can

sort out those predicables which bear a relation to a form from those that do not: 'form' does not have any strict criterion of identity, in any case, any more than 'existent', 'thing', or 'event' do. But we can see some clear cases of predicables that do bear such a relation, and some clear cases of predicables that do not: and this is enough for us to be able to argue that realism about forms does not commit us to realism about concepts. The two notions, though analogous, arise in completely different ways: 'as opposed to' two completely different 'whats'.

Thus we can reject realism about concepts, because the notion of concept is a logical one that means no more than 'what a predicable means': and we can also throw into question realism about objects. Particularly we can throw into question whether there could be a theory of objects as such. There is no 'such' about them, any more than there is for concepts: for if objects are defined, as they should be, as opposed to concepts, as the other half of the object/concept distinction, and concepts are defined in terms of the expressions that refer to them, the only other specification of objects is, again, in terms of the expressions that refer to them. The object/concept distinction is on all fours with, and arises from, the name/predicable distinction.

Now as a matter of fact St Thomas would reject the idea of a theory of objects, for reasons quite different from those which would usually be advanced nowadays, but which still have a certain validity. A theory of objects would have to be a theory of all objects, actual and non-actual: he has no real idea of the non-actual, but he rejects even a general theory of actual objects. Hence *a fortiori* he would reject a general theory of objects, which would include the non-actual, if they could have been brought to his attention. 'The actual' includes the

per accidens: and following Aristotle, he holds that the *per accidens* cannot be a proper object of study. The cause of the *per accidens* - we might say the coincidental - is indeterminate, as it is typically the result of the convergence of more than one stream of causality, and thus there cannot be *scientia certa per causas* about it, as there is no one cause assignable. He uses this notion to reject certain superstitions, particularly divination. If a man finds a treasure while digging in his field, there is no doubt a reason why he is digging just there: and no doubt a reason why the treasure was buried there in the first place. Thus there is already sufficient reason for his finding the treasure, provided by the convergence of the two lines of explanation: there does not need to be a reason why he should be-digging-just-there-where-the-treasure-was-buried-and-thus-discover-it: and if there is no such reason, it cannot be discovered by divination. This is not to say that there cannot be a reason for this: the man who buried the treasure in the first place, perhaps a latter-day St Nicholas, might have sent him to dig just there so as to dig it up as if by chance. The *per accidens*, since it can be expressed by a proposition, can be grasped by the human mind and thus brought about. But it need not be: and it usually isn't. Thus a general theory of the actual, and *a fortiori* a general theory of objects, is impossible. Of course everything actual is made up of substances and accidents, and as *entia per se* these can be studied by metaphysics: and anything which happens can be expressed by a sentence and can thus, *sub ratione veri*, be studied by logic: so everything would get covered by sciences which St Thomas admits. But in each case the science has its proper object, *objectum formale*: the object of metaphysics being *ens per se*, and that of logic being truth. Hence there is a theory of actual objects, *sub ratione entis per se*, and indeed a theory of all objects, *sub ratione veri*. But there is not, and cannot be, a general

theory of objects as such: for that as such is not a *ratio* that can determine a formal object.

We would want to say something of the same kind.If objects are to be thought of in some ontological way, as the things that there are, then there can be no study of that kind of things as such: for there is no such kind. Objects as such have no handle, no *ratio*, for us to be able to deal with them. The only *ratio* that they do have is not an ontological one, not one that belongs to them as such: it is the one alluded to earlier, the logical one, the fact that they are what names refer to. Since they are what names stand for, the study of them is not a special science, ontology or *Gegenstandstheorie*, but a part of logic. Dummett makes this point forcibly on pp. 56-57 of *Frege: Philosophy of Language:* saying that the answer to the question of whether numerals are names cannot be made to depend on whether numbers are objects: if numerals logically behave like non-vacuous names, then they are names, and numbers must thus be recognised as the objects to which numerals refer. He rejects the contrary view, that we are capable of

> first apprehending a linguistic expression as standing for a certain entity, e.g. a number, then recognising, by the character of that entity, to which ontological category it belongs, and finally assigning the linguistic expression to an appropriate category in accordance with the categorization of the entity it stands for.

We can say that a number is not an entity, and to interpret 'object' as 'kind of entity' is to make it as empty of meaning as 'entity' is.

Mistakes in this line are quite common. Meinong's real mistake, which is seldom identified by his critics, was to think that 'object' provided a *ratio* which would enable us to have a quite general *Gegenstandstheorie*, explicitly denying that the *ratio* could be such as to bring the notion of object under metaphysics, epistemology or logic.

In this way he made the *ratio* of object so vacuous as to include anything under it: with ridiculous results.

Quine, Meinong's critic, appreciates that object-theory, or ontology, has to be a part of logic. But he is attempting, alongside his Ockhamist project of doing away with *entia non grata*, to do away with names as well. As a result his talk of existence, entities, ontological commitment, which he wants to use as a purely logical means of specifying objects without using the notion of 'name', obscures and confuses this very real difference from Meinong. Even if he manages to give a way of doing without names, at a certain level, it is not clear that he succeeds in specifying objects without a use of names. One of the earliest criticisms of 'On What There Is', that made by Geach in the symposium of the same name in *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society,* Supp. Vol. 25, made this very point. As Williams says (p. 216), it is not clear, in the end, whether he is specifying ' - exists' in terms of ' is an object', or ' - is an object' in terms of ' - exists'. The two have this in common, that ' - is an object' is open to the same paradoxes as ' - exists', being likewise a first-level predicate: but precisely for that reason it fails to account for the use of the existential quantifier, and cannot be used to explain ' - exists'. The attempt to specify objects without recourse to names fails: and in its failure it becomes, once more, just another chimera.

Part of this point is made by Geach in various places by saying that 'object' has no clear criterion of identity. To say that an object is what is self-identical is nonsense, and leads to the more baroque nonsense of Meinong: to say that it is what exists, or what there is, involves us in Quine's circularity: to say that it is something complete

(understood by contrast with the *Ungesättigtheit*, incompleteness or unsaturatedness, of the concept) only has a relevant, specifiable meaning if we take it to mean that the expressions which refer to an object are complete: that is, that they do not have the unsaturatedness which is characteristic of concept-words, predicable expressions. Again the comparison with concepts helps us: for it is more obviously wrong to suggest that concepts have a unsaturatedness which is in some way independent of the unsaturatedness of the expressions that stand for them, than it is to suggest that objects have a completeness (*Selbständigkeit*) independently of that of their names. Frege, as we have seen, was under no illusions about either point. But if we understand 'completeness' in this way, as we should, we are brought back again to a logical criterion for distinguishing objects.

This criterion is the only one. There is no ontological criterion for distinguishing objects because there are no such entities as objects: and no such entities as entities, either. Objects have no 'ontological status': nor, we might add, does anything, as 'ontological status' has no meaning unless it means 'metaphysical status', which is not the way it is generally used. Objects are just what names refer to, just as concepts are only what predicable expressions refer to. Object-theory and ontology, understood as the study of 'what there is' are thus pseudo-sciences: all we are left with is an important part of logic which tells us what expressions are permissible, which can be retained, which dispensed with. 'Object' is a perfectly valid notion if not detached from that of a name, and object-theory is a perfectly valid study if not detached from logic. The word 'ontology', however, is probably best avoided as a name for this study, because it was at first used as a variant for 'metaphysics': it is thus very apt to be used for

the chimerical study which we are here engaged in exploding. It goes hand-in-hand with the word 'entity': and while the word 'object' is one that we cannot well do without, though we must be careful to mean no more by it than 'what a name stands for', we need have no regrets at losing 'entity'. This chimera can be studied by neither metaphysics nor by logic. The object of logic is truth, as Frege says: we might, as a concession, allow it to be said in Thomistic style that it is *esse ut verum*. But in this handy couple of words, it is *verum* that wears the trousers.

We should notice that just as 'object' as such determines no *ratio*, neither does *ens*, according to St Thomas. In this it resembles its species such as 'thing' and 'event'. There is no science of actual existents in general, because, as we have seen, there can be no science of the *per accidens*. We might say: 'actual existent' has no clear criterion of identity: indeed, how could it, when kinds of actual existent like'thing' and 'event' have no such criterion either? But *ens per se*, substances and accidents, does determine a *ratio*: even though the criterion of identity of accidents is fairly problematical. But this does not present a problem, because at the last accidents can be identified at least by the substance in which they inhere: and for 'substance' we are more sure of the criteria of identity. In the course of the study of *ens per se* everything which goes to make up *ens per accidens* is studied: so metaphysics, based on a sufficient *ratio* of *ens per se* does study everything that actually exists, just as logic, based on its *ratio* of truth, extends to all objects whatsoever: to everything that can be named. We might say: to all *ens ut verum*, or more misleadingly, to everything that there is. In this sense we could say that the scope of logic is wider than that of metaphysics, as St

Thomas in fact does say in *C.G.* III c.59 and elsewhere.

On the other hand, St Thomas does not make the distinction between object theory, as a part of logic, and metaphysics, which he has enabled us to make: he does not use *esse ut verum*, distinguished from *esse*, to mark out the scope or object of logic as opposed to metaphysics. Admittedly he does say at *In VII Met.* 1.17 n.1658:

Logicus enim considerat modus praedicandi, et non existentiam rei (incidentally using 'existentia', as he only rarely does), which gives us just the kind of distinction we want. But more usually, as has been mentioned, he does not think that there are any objects other than those which actually exist. He thinks, as since Frege's time we have not been able to think, that numbers, for example, are in some sense mental constructs out of the world. He also thinks that the 'compositio' whose truth supports statements of *esse ut verum* is something that the mind constructs (quam anima adinvenit). Thus to every *esse ut verum* there corresponds some actual *esse*, either in the world, linked to the *esse ut verum* by a relation of (apparently) formal causality, as we saw in the passage from the *In V Met.* 1.9 nn.895-6, quoted in Chapter III as passage L: or in the mind (which of course is something in the world as well) at least, linked to the *esse ut verum* by a relation of efficient causality. It is to be noticed that St Thomas was not a realist in logical matters, and regarded language as a sign of mental language: that is, of actual processes and events in a thinking subject. Hence he often says that the only *esse*, the only actuality, which may have any relation to an *esse ut verum*, is an actuality in someone's mind. This can be seen in a number of passages: for example, *Quodlibetales* IX q.2 a.3, quoted in Chapter III as passage G:

> Hoc esse non est aliquid in rerum natura, sed tantum in actu animae componentis et dividentis.

Other passages are *In III Sent.* d.6 q.1 a.2 ad 2:

> Esse dupliciter accipitur: scilicet esse rationis, unum de alio affirmantis vel negantis; et hoc est praedicatum accidentale, et est in mente quod praedicatur de subjecto mediante hoc verbo 'Est' ut copula.

In IV Met. 1.17 n. 736:

> Verum autem et falsum pertinent proprie ad considerationem logici; consequuntur enim ens in ratione de quo considerat logicus: nam verum et falsum sunt in mente, ut in sexto huius habetur.

and *In VI Met.* 1.4 n.1241-2:

> Excludit ens verum ... dicens quod compositio et divisio ... est in mente et non in rebus. ... Entis veri causa est 'aliqua passio mentis', id est operatio intellectus componens et dividens. Et ideo pertinet ad scientiam de intellectu.

For these reasons, too, he often speaks of the object of logic as being *ens rationis*, or *ens, sub ratione veri*. Thinking that he can make this reduction to reality, he has no reason to worry about non-actual objects. Indeed, even if he had worried about them, he would probably have given the same answer. He would have been loath to admit that there could be anything outside God that was not created by God: and surely numbers are neither part of God nor of creation?

This is the problem in which we find ourselves. As far as we can see, convinced by Frege, numbers simply are non-actual objects. Both Frege and St Thomas, if properly understood, show us that we need not be afraid of this: we are not postulating an infinite realm of shady entities. But a doubt still remains. Frege, while insisting that numbers are objects, and that they are not mind-dependent, said at *Grundlagen* 105:

> In arithmetic we are not concerned with objects which we come to know as something alien from without through the medium of the senses, but with objects given directly to our reason and, as its nearest kin, utterly transparent to it.

And, as we know from Wittgenstein's anecdote of him, sometimes he seemed to see a difficulty in the theory that numbers are objects. So while we

can rest with a good logical conscience, acquiescing in the existence of such non-actual objects, sure that neither their existence - which means that we can quantify over them and no more - nor their objecthood - which means that we can name them - involve us in unwanted 'ontological commitments', if at times even this oppresses us we can buoy ourselves up with the hope that perhaps St Thomas's reduction can be made to work. But as we have already said, that's another story. This one has been brought to a conclusion: and if we have to, we and non-actual objects can live happily together ever after.

Appendix: Full texts of passages discussing or using the notions of *esse ut verum* or *quaestio an est*

Bibliography

Appendix: full texts of passages discussing or using the notions of *esse ut verum* or *quaestio an est*.

A. *De Ente et Essentia*, c.1 n.1

> Ens per se dicitur dupliciter. Uno modo quod dividitur per decem genera; alio modo, quod significat propositionum veritatem. Horum autem differentia est, quia secundo modo potest dici ens omne illud de quo affirmativa propositio formari potest, etiamsi in re nihil ponat; per quem modum privationes et negationes entia dicuntur. Dicimus enim quod affirmatio est opposita negationi, et quod caecitas est in oculo. Sed primo modo non potest dici aliquid quod sit ens, nisi quod in re aliquid ponat. Unde primo modo caecitas et huiusmodi non sunt entia.

B. *In I Sent.* d.28, in exp. textus

> Esse dicitur dupliciter: scilicet prout significat veritatem compositionis, et secundum quod significat actum essentiae. Quando ergo dicitur, Aliud est Patrem esse, aliud est Filium esse, ita ut ly esse sit praedicatum dicti: significatur esse quod est accidens essentiae; unde falsa est, quia sicut una est essentia trium, ita et unum esse. Cum autem dicitur 'aliud est esse Patrem, aliud esse Filium' ita quod ly Patrem praedicetur in dicto, in esse significatur veritas propositionis.

C. *In I Sent.* d.33 q.1 a.1 ad 1

> Tertio modo dicitur esse quod significat veritatem compositionis in propositionibus, secundum quod *est* dicitur copula: et secundum hoc est in intellectu componente et dividente quantum ad sui complementum.

D. *In II Sent.* 34, 1, 1, sol.

> Ens multipliciter dicitur. Uno enim modo dicitur ens quod per decem genera dividitur: et sic ens significat aliquid in natura existens: sive sit substantia, ut homo; sive accidens, ut color. Alio modo dicitur ens, quod significat veritatem propositionis: prout dicitur, quod affirmatio est vera, quando significat esse de eo quod est; et negatio, quando significat non esse de eo quod non est; et hoc ens compositionem significat, quam intellectus componens et dividens adinvenit. Quaecumque ergo dicuntur entia quantum ad primum modum, sunt entia quantum ad secundum modum; quia omne quod habet naturale esse in rebus, potest significari per propositionem affirmativam esse: ut cum dicitur *color est*, vel *homo est*. Non autem omnia quae sunt entia quantum ad secundum modum sunt entia quantum ad primum; quia de privatione, ut de caecitate, formatur una affirmativa propositio, cum dicitur, caecitas est; nec tamen caecitas aliquid est in rerum natura, sed est magis alicuius entis remotio: et ideo etiam privationes dicuntur esse entia quantum ad secundum modum, sed non quantum ad primum. Ens autem secundum utrumque istorum modorum diversimode praedicatur: quia secundum primum modum acceptum, est praedicatum substantiale et pertinet ad quaestionem *quid est*: sed quantum ad secundum modum, est praedicatum accidentale, ut Commentator ibidem dicit, et pertinet ad quaestionem *an est*.

E. *Summa contra Gentiles*, III c.9 a.6

> Ens enim dupliciter dicitur, ut philosophus docet. Uno modo, secundum quod significat essentiam rei, et dividitur per decem praedicamenta; et sic nulla privatio potest dici ens. Alio modo, secundum quod significat veritatem compositionis; et sic malum et privatio dicitur ens, in quantum privatione dicitur aliquid esse privatum.

F. *De Potentia*, q.7 a.2 ad 1

> Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod ens et esse dicitur dupliciter. Quandoque enim significat essentiam rei, sive actum essendi: quandoque vero significat veritatem propositionis, etiam in his quae esse non habent: sicut dicimus quod caecitas est, quia verum est hominem esse caecum.

G. *Quodlibetales*, IX q.2 a.3

> Ens dupliciter dicitur: uno modo quod est copula verbalis significans compositionem cuiuslibet enuntiationis quam anima facit; unde hoc esse non est aliquid in rerum natura, sed tantum in actu animae componentis et dividentis. Et sic esse attribuitur omni ei de quo potest propositio formari, sive sit ens, sive privatio entis; dicimus enim caecitatem esse. Alio modo esse dicitur actus entis in quantum est ens, idest quo denominatur aliquid ens actu in rerum natura. Et sic esse non attribuitur nisi rebus ipsis quae in decem generibus continentur: unde ens a tali esse dictum per decem genera dividitur. Sed hoc esse attribuitur alicui dupliciter. Uno modo sicut ei *quod* proprie et vere habet esse vel est. Et sic attribuitur soli substantiae per se subsistenti: unde quod vere est dicitur substantia in *I Physicorum*. Omnia vero quae non per se subsistunt, sed in alio et cum alio, sive sint accidentia sive formae substantiales aut quaelibet partes, non habent esse ita ut ipsa vere sint, sed attribuitur eis alio modo, idest *quo* aliquid est; sicut albedo dicitur esse, non quia ipsa in se subsistat, sed quia ea aliquid habet esse album. Esse ergo proprie et vere non attribuitur nisi rei per se subsistenti. Huic autem attribuitur esse duplex. Unum scilicet esse resultans ex his ex quibus eius unitas integratur, quod proprium est esse suppositi substantiale. Aliud est supposito attributum praeter ea quae integrat ipsum, quod est esse superadditum, scilicet accidentale; ut esse attribuitur Socrati cum dicitur: Socrates est albus.

H. *Summa Theologica*, I q.2 a.2 ad 2

> Ad secundum ergo dicendum quod cum demonstratur causa per effectum necesse est uti effecta loco definitionis causae ad probandum causam esse; et hoc maxime contingit in Deo, quia ad probandum aliquid esse, necesse est accipere pro medio quid significat nomen, non autem quod quid est, quia quaestio quid est sequitur ad quaestionem an est. Nomina autem Dei imponuntur ab effectibus, ut postea ostendetur: unde demonstrando Deum esse per effectum, accipere possumus pro medio, quid significat hoc nomen, Deus.

I. *Summa Theologica*, I q.3 a.4 ad 2

Ad secundum dicendum, quod esse dupliciter dicitur. Uno modo significat actum essendi; alio modo significat compositionem propositionis, quam anima adinvenit conjungens praedicatum subjecto. Primo igitur modo accipiendum esse, non possumus scire esse Dei, sicut nec eius essentiam, sed solum secundo modo. Scimus enim, quod haec propositio, quam formamus de Deo, cum dicimus *Deus est*, vera est: et hoc scimus ex eius effectibus.

J. *Summa Theologica*, I q. 48 a.2 ad 2

Ad secundum dicendum quod sicut dicitur in *V Metaphysicorum*,ens dupliciter dicitur. Uno modo secundum quod significat entitatem rei, prout dividitur per decem praedicamenta, et sic convertitur cum re; et hoc modo nulla privatio est ens, unde nec malum. Alio modo dicitur ens quod significat veritatem propositionis, quae in compositione consistit, cujus nota est hoc verbum *est*; et hoc ens est quo respondetur ad quaestionem *an est*; et sic caecitatem dicimus esse in oculo.

K. *De Malo*, q.1 a.1 ad 19

Ens dicitur dupliciter.Uno modo quod significat natura decem generum: et sic neque malum neque aliqua privatio est ens neque aliquid. Alio modo secundum quod respondetur ad quaestionem an est, et sic malum est, sicut et caecitas est. Non tamen malum est aliquid; quia esse aliquid non solum significat quod respondetur ad quaestionem an est, sed etiam quod respondetur ad quaestionem quid est.

L. *In V Met.* 1.9 nn.895-6

Ponit alium modum entis secundum quod esse et est significant compositionem propositionis, quam facit intellectus componens et dividens. Unde dicit, quod esse significat veritatem rei. Vel sicut alia translatio melius habet ' quod esse significat' quia aliquod dictum est verum. Unde veritas propositionis potest dici veritas rei per causam. Nam ex eo quod res est vel non est, oratio vera vel falsa est. Cum enim dicimus aliquid esse, significamus propositionem esse veram. Et cum dicitur non esse, significamus non esse veram; et hoc sive in affirmando sive in negando. In affirmando quidem, sicut dicimus quod Socrates est albus, quia hoc verum est. In negando vero, ut Socrates non est albus, quia hoc est verum, scilicet ipsum esse non album. Et similiter dicimus quod non est diameter commensurabilis lateri quadrati, quia hoc est falsum, scilicet non esse ipsum non commensurabilem.

(896) Sciendum est autem quod iste secundus modus comparatur ad primum sicut effectus ad causam. Ex hoc enim quod aliquid in rerum natura est, sequitur veritas et falsitas in propositione, quam intellectus significat per hoc verbum est prout est verbalis copula. Sed quia aliquid, quod est in se non ens, intellectus considerat ut quoddam ens, sicut negationes et huiusmodi, quandoque dicitur esse de aliquo hoc secundo modo et non primo. Dicitur enim, quod caecitas est secundo modo, ex eo quod vera est propositio, qua dicitur aliquid esse caecum; non tamen dicitur quod sit primo modo vera. Nam caecitas non habet aliquod esse in rebus, sed magis est privatio alicuius entis. Accidit autem unicuique rei quod aliquid

de ipsa affirmetur intellectu vel voce. Nam res non refert ad scientiam sed e converso. Esse vero quod in sui natura unaquaeque res habet est substantiale. Et ideo, cum dicitur, Socrates est, si ille Est primo modo accipitur est de praedicato substantiale. Nam ens est superius ad unumquodque entium, sicut animal ad hominem. Si autem accipitur secundo modo, est de paredicato accidentali.

M. *In VI Met.* 1.4 n.1223

Hic determinat de ente, quod significat veritatem propositionis ... Dicit ergo 'quod ens quoddam dicitur quasi verum', id est quod nihil aliud significat nisi verum. Cum enim interrogamus si homo est animal, respondetur quod est; per quod significatur propositionem praemissam esse veram. Et eodem modo non ens significat quasi falsum ... Hoc autem ens, quod dicitur quasi verum, et non ens, quod dicitur quasi falsum, consistit circa compositionem et divisionem. Voces enim incomplexae neque verum neque falsum significant; sed voces complexae, per affirmationem aut negationem veritatem aut falsitatem habent. Dicitur autem hic affirmatio compositio, quia significat praedicatum inesse subjecto. Negatio vero dicitur hic divisio, quia significat praedicatum a subjecto removeri.

N. *In De Interpretatione,* I, 1.3, n.33

Concludit ergo ex praemissis quod, cum sola circa compositionem et divisionem sit veritas et falsitas in intellectu, consequens est quod ipsa nomina et verba, divisim accepta, assimilentur intellectui qui est sine compositione et divisione; sicut cum homo vel album dicitur, si nihil aliud addatur: non enim verum adhuc vel falsum est: sed postea quando additur esse vel non esse fit verum vel falsum.

O. *In De Interpretatione,* I, 1.3, n.35

Deinde cum dicit: Signum autem, etc., indicat signum ex nomine composito, sc. hircocervus, quod componitur ex hirco et cervo et quod in graeco dicitur tragelaphos: nam tragos est hircus, et elaphos cervus. Huiusmodi enim nomina significant aliquid, sc. quosdam conceptus simplices, licet rerum compositarum; et ideo non est verum vel falsum, nisi quando addatur esse vel non esse, per quae exprimitur iudicium intellectus. (...)
Signanter autem utitur exemplo ex nomine significanti quod non est in rerum natura, in quo statim falsitas apparet, et quod sine compositione et divisione non possit verum vel falsum esse.

P. *In Posteriora Analytica,* II 1.1 n.413

Deinde cum dicit: Dico autem quia aut si est etc.: manifestat quod dixerat, quod *quia est* et *si est* differunt sicut in parte et simpliciter. Cum enim quaerimus utrum deficit luna aut utrum augeretur, est quaestio in parte; et huiusmodi enim quaestione quaerimus si luna est aliquid; puta si deficiens, vel aucta, aut non. Sed cum quaerimus an luna sit, sive an nox sit, est quaestio de esse simpliciter.

Q. *In Posteriora Analytica,* II 1.1 n. 417

Non potest ostendi de aliquo an sit, nisi prius intelligatur quid significatur per nomen.

R. *In Posteriora Analytica,* II 1.3 n.461

Quia enim non entis non est aliqua quidditas vel essentia, de eo quod non est, nullus potest scire quod quid est: sed potest scire significationem nominis, vel rationem ex pluribus nominibus compositam: sicut potest aliquis scire quid significat hoc nomen tragelaphus, vel hircocervus, quod idem est, quia significat quoddam animal compositum ex hirco et cervo: sed impossibile est scire quod quid est hircocervi, quia nihil est in rerum natura.

S. Averrhoes, *Commentarium in Metaphysica Aristotelis,* ad V 7

Cum enim dicimus aliquid esse, demonstramus ipsum esse verum, et quando dicimus aliquid non esse, demonstramus ipsum non esse, sc. ipsum esse falsum. Deinde dicit et similiter esse in affirmativa et negativa, etc., et intendit per ens hic ens illud quod sonat verum aut simpliciter aut composite, scil. in quaesito singulari et composito. In propositione autem composita, sicut dicimus, quia Socrates est musicus, aut Socrates non est musicus; in quaestione autem simplici, sicut dicimus utrum Socrates sit aut non sit, et universaliter hoc nomen ens non significat nisi verum. (...) Sed debes scire quod universaliter hoc nomen ens, quod significat essentia rei, est aliud ab ente, quod significat verum,et ideo expositores diversantur in quaesito simplici, scil. dicere utrum aliquid sit, in secundo Topicorum, utrum collocetur in quaestionibus accidentis aut generis. Qui enim intelligit de ente illud, quod est commune decem praedicamentis, dicit quod collocatur in quaestionibus generis: et qui intellexit de ente illud, quod intelligitur de vero, dicit quia collocatur in quaestionibus accidentis.

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