

Understandings of the Nation in Russian Public Opinion: Survey Evidence from Putin's Russia (2001-2014)

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Abstract

Drawing on surveys conducted in Russia from 2001 to 2014, this article considers citizens' conceptions of the nation in the Putin period; whether views of the nation have been shaped by political, economic and social developments over this 15 year period; and the correlates of these national perspectives in terms of regime support and political mobilisation. We find, first, that understandings of the nation are multidimensional at the mass level, and in part reflect the main nationalist discourses in Russia. Second, we describe how contextual changes over this period - political, economic and social – relate to the ways in which the nation is understood. Third, we consider how different understandings of the nation connect to political attitudes and behaviours. The findings of this research have implications for how we should analyse nationalism and its bases of support in Putin's Russia.

Key words: Russian nationalism – Xenophobia - Public Opinion – Democracy – Authoritarianism – Liberalism - Conservatism

Introduction

It is widely accepted in both the mass media and scholarly research that nationalism has become the dominant discourse in Russian politics in the 2000s. Ideas about the nation and patriotism are part of the political mainstream. Parties from across the political spectrum regularly play the patriotic card to appeal to their voters and to demonise their opponents, and nationalistic themes have become central to the message of Russia's ruling authorities. When Vladimir Putin ran for the presidency in 2012, issues of ethnicity and the nation were key themes of his campaign. Therefore, Russian nationalism has a broad political appeal. It incorporates many different ways of understanding the nation, and it encapsulates different ways of thinking about how the nation ought to be organised politically.

In this respect, Russia is not unique. The comparative history of nationalism provides clear demonstration that how nationalists imagine the community is hugely varied. There are multiple forms that nationalism can take and, as the sprawling literature on nationalism also reveals, the experience of national identity is frequently – perhaps most frequently – messy, contradictory and always complex.¹ Scholars agree that nationalism is a constructed ideology: nationalist identities are continually being made and remade and the nature of the national programme and the form of its political organisation are therefore constantly shifting.

However, the comparative history of nationalism also teaches us that national identities are not formed in an historical vacuum. Nationalism does not arise *tabula rasa* but draws upon prior identities and existing political structures.² Thus, ideas of the nation are constrained by prior understandings of the national community and by the contemporary political context in which these ideas are played out.

¹ John Breuilly, *Nationalism and the State* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1994).

² Anthony D. Smith, *The Ethnic Origins of Nations* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1986).

In this article, we consider how Russian *public opinion* towards the nation and its political organisation relate to long-standing nationalist discourses, while adapting to a changing political context. Although there is a large literature on the ideology and organisation of Russian nationalism, the mass basis to nationalism during Vladimir Putin's rule is understudied.³ We first examine the different dimensions of thinking about the nation and how they connect to long-standing nationalist discourses. Then we then examine the extent to which public support for different conceptions of the nation have evolved over the course of Vladimir Putin's time in power in the context of changing political, economic and social developments. Over this period, Russia's political elite has showed greater assertiveness on questions concerning Russia's national values, interests and security; its military went to war on its territory and in its near abroad; its economy first boomed and attracted migrant labourers from neighbouring states, and then encountered severe recession and international sanctions. Finally, we consider how different dimensions of understanding the nation in Russian public opinion orientate normatively in terms of political organisation and support for the regime.

We gain empirical leverage on the effects of these developments through the analysis of original surveys (designed by the authors), which were conducted at regular intervals: 2001, 2003, 2007, 2009 and 2014. Consistent with the historical antecedents in Russian nationalist discourse, our findings suggest that Russian nationalism remains a complex and multi-faceted force, and its dimensions orientate towards the regime and the political system in distinct and even contradictory ways. While variance does occur within its different dimensions, which we cautiously suggest can be interpreted situationally, nationalist attitudes continue to lack a coherent programmatic structure. Given this

³ One recent exception is Theodore P. Gerber, "Beyond Putin? Nationalism and Xenophobia in Russian Public Opinion", *The Washington Quarterly* 37, no. 3, (2014): 113-134. This analysis based on survey research conducted in 2011 and 2012.

character, we argue, the capacity for mass mobilisation of Russian nationalism is constrained, which if true has important consequences for the dynamics of Russian politics.

Assessing majority nationalism in the Russian context

There are few literatures as voluminous as that on the subject of nationalism.⁴ While there is a great deal of debate within it about the causes,⁵ consequences,⁶ and trajectories of the phenomenon,⁷ considerable consensus exists that nationalism is a political movement that seeks to make the contours of the state and of the nation congruent. As such, nations require nationalists to address fundamental questions. Who and what comprises the national community? And what is the appropriate nature of the state with which it should be congruent?

When nationalists imagine the national community, they seek to define some of the building blocks for a nationalist programme that connects views of the community to the state. What is the relationship of the nation to its imagined pasts?⁸ Who can claim to be a member of the nation? Who should be included or excluded from the benefits of membership? How homogeneous should the community be?⁹ Must a national identity be

⁴ Rogers Brubaker, "Ethnicity, Race and Nationalism", *Annual Review of Sociology* 35 (2009): 21-42.

⁵ Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism* (London: Verso, 1991); Ernest Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993); Smith, *The Ethnic Origins of Nations*.

⁶ Kanchan Chandra, "Ethnic Parties and Democratic Stability," *Perspectives on Politics* 3, no. 2 (2005): 235-252; John Fearon and David Laitin, "Explaining Interethnic Cooperation," *American Political Science Review* 90, no. 4 (1996): 715-35; David Horowitz, *Ethnic Groups in Conflict* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985).

⁷ Mark Beissinger, *Nationalist Mobilization and the Collapse of the Soviet State* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002).

⁸ Anderson, *Imagined Communities*

⁹ Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan, *Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation. Southern Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe* (London: John Hopkins University Press, 1996).

exclusive or can it be inclusive of multiple identities, including loyalties to other communities?¹⁰ How ought the nation-state relate to the rest of the world?

One way to consider these building blocks is in terms of structures for understanding the nation. The materials may be assembled in many different ways, but the literature on nationalism does lead us to expect some specific ways in which the idea of the national community might be constructed. Nationalists – those advancing a case for the congruence of the nation with the political unit – seek to make their case in coherent ways, to provide a conceptual underpinning to their “imagined”¹¹ national community that is bound together programmatically.

In very general terms, two archetypes may be expected.¹² First, we can imagine a structure of national understanding that conceives of membership of the community by dint of citizenship or even residence on the national territory. It includes all regardless of their ethnicity, accepts criticism of the nation, allows for linguistic and cultural diversity, respects the rights and customs of minorities, and encourages international cooperation and engagement with foreign cultures. These understandings embrace *inclusive* understandings of the nation. Second, at the other extreme, we can imagine a structure to national understanding that consistently defines the national community by ethnic ties. It denies membership to non-co-ethnics and excludes them from benefits, insists on linguistic and cultural homogeneity, holds prejudicial views towards minority groups, demands loyalty of its members and restraint from criticism of the national community, and seeks limited

¹⁰ Lisbet Hooghe and Gary Marks, “Does Identity or Economic Rationality Drive Public Opinion on European Integration,” *PS: Political Science and Politics* 37, no. 3 (2004): 415-420.

¹¹ Anderson, *Imagined Communities*

¹² For a critical overview see Rogers Brubaker, “The Manichean Myth: Rethinking the Distinction between “Civic” and “Ethnic” Nationalism”, in Hanspeter Kriesi, Klaus Armingeon, Hannes Siegrist and Andreas Wimmer, eds., *Nation and National Identity: The European Experience in Perspective* (Zurich: Rüegger 1999): 55-71.

engagement with the outside world. Such understandings of the nation take an *exclusive* form.

At the same time, how each of these archetypes of the nation view the question of the political organisation of the national community - democratic and liberal or authoritarian and illiberal – is shaped by context. There is no necessary connection between particular conceptions of the nation and their political formation, though empirically some may be more common than others. Exclusive forms of nationalism, for example, might be connected with intolerance of diversity by insistence on cultural and political homogeneity. But, by excluding the “other” from community membership, it need not be anti-democratic since once the *demos* is formed it may extend full rights to all citizens.¹³ Similarly, there is no necessity for a particular form of nationalism to contain each and every aspect of the programmatic structure just ascribed to it. For example, a country escaping the rule of another might well both emphasise the value of ethnicity as a base of national imagination and appeal to a broader international environment in its support.¹⁴ These are empirical questions, shaped of course by the historical and cultural legacies available to those seeking to construct a national ideal and by the conditions in which they find themselves.

These two archetypes of nationalism have parallels in the Russian case. There are long traditions of *Rossiiskii* (being Russian depends on being in Russia) and *Russkii* (being Russian depends on being ethnically Russian) conceptions of the nation, each facing the challenge of responding to a multi-ethnic state in which ethnic Russians are in a clear

¹³ Linz and Stepan, *Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation*

¹⁴ Stephen Whitefield, Robert Rohrschneider and Rasa Alisauskene, “Support for European Integration in the Baltic States”, in Robert Rohrschneider and Stephen Whitefield, eds., *Public Opinion, Party Competition and the European Union in Eastern Europe* (London: Palgrave, 2006): 187-202.

majority. Consequently, there has historically been a dispersal of thinking about the nature of the nation.

Russian majority¹⁵ nationalism is notoriously multi-faceted. In post-Soviet Russia, as Laruelle argues, nationalism has become a “unifying slogan”¹⁶ for all political forces. It incorporates extreme right-wing groups that understand the nation in exclusively ethnic terms; imperialists who seek to re-establish a greater Russian nation including territories and peoples outside of the Russian Federation who were formerly part of the Soviet Union; and statist or “patriotic” nationalists who emphasize the need to preserve the unity of the existing Russian nation, irrespective of ethnic differences.¹⁷ These agendas appeal to wide and varied swathes of the population.

The way Russian nationalists relate to politics and the political organisation of the state also takes different forms. Nationalist opponents of the post-Soviet political order seek to mobilise the population against what they perceive to be the failure of Russia’s post-Soviet political transition, while statist use nationalism to promote loyalty to state institutions. There are also important differences in terms of the understanding of Russia’s post-Soviet political development. There are democratic and non-expansionist understandings of Russian nationalism, which conceive the contribution of nationalism to democratisation in both ethnic and non-ethnic terms.¹⁸ These perspectives have become less prominent in official circles in the 2000s, as the authorities have used nationalism for

¹⁵ For detailed analysis of minority nationalism in Russia see Dmitri Gorenberg, *Minority Ethnic Mobilization in the Russian Federation* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003).

¹⁶ Marlene Laruelle, *In the Name of the Nation: Nationalism and Politics in Contemporary Russia* (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2009): 13.

¹⁷ John Brookfield, “Russian Nationalism”, in Graeme Gill and James Young, eds., *Routledge Handbook of Russian Politics and Society* (Routledge: Abingdon, 2012): 388.

¹⁸ Dmitri Furman, “Ot Rossiiskoi imperii k Rosskomu demokraticheskomu gosudarstvu”, *Neprikosnovennyi zapas* 73, no. 5 (2010), <http://magazines.russ.ru/nz/2010/5/fu3.html>, accessed 27 May 2016.

authoritarian state strengthening purposes, albeit with a continued commitment to Russia's global economic integration.¹⁹ There are also anti-system forms of nationalism that maintain Russia's uniqueness and separateness from globalisation, and reject any notion of liberal democratic development.

But to what extent do these different nationalist discourses resonate in public opinion? In the next section, we introduce the findings of our survey analysis to identify three main dimensions of understanding the nation in Russia. We then discuss how conceptions of the nation connect to traditional nationalist discourses, and how the changing political context of the Putin period may have affected patterns of support. In the final section, we analyse how different understandings of the nation connect to political attitudes and behaviours.

2. Understanding the Nation

To explore how different understandings of the Russian nation form at the mass level, we first analysed 12 questions addressing different aspects of the nation that were asked in public opinion surveys conducted in Russia in 2001, 2003, 2007, 2009 and 2014.²⁰ (Full details of sampling can be found in Appendix A).

The 12 survey questions covered stances on who should be a member of the nation, and the rights and benefits they should receive as members; cultural and linguistic conformity; requirements for loyalty to the state; prejudice against historically discriminated groups; and questions related to the costs and benefits of integration into the global community. We measured each of these on a five-point agree/disagree scale, which were

¹⁹ Laruelle, *In the Name of the Nation*

²⁰ The survey conducted in 2014 also included respondents in Crimea, and so results including and excluding Crimea are reported separately. We wish to thank the John Fell OUP Research Fund of the University of Oxford for supporting this research.

coded so that they were attitudinally consistent with an inclusivist/ exclusivist nationalist direction of responses:

- Membership: Everyone who lives in Russia should have the right to become a citizen regardless of their ethnic origins.
- Benefits:
 - The ethnic group a person belongs to should not influence the benefits they can get from the state.
 - Minority ethnic groups in Russia should have far more rights than they do now.
- Conformity: All minority ethnic groups in this country should have to be taught in Russian.
- Loyalty: People in Russia are too ready to criticize their country.
- Prejudice:
 - There are too many Gypsies in Russia
 - Jews in Russia today have too much power and influence.
- Global integration:
 - We have a lot to learn from other countries in running Russia's affairs.
 - Russia should cooperate with other countries even if it means giving up some independence.
 - Russian people should be free to emigrate even if Russia needs their skills.
 - Foreign ownership of enterprises might be accepted if it improves our state of the economy.
 - Russians are treated unfairly.

Using exploratory factor analysis, we detected three distinct dimensions or factors that structured responses to these questions. These factors are highly stable over time, both with respect to their relative strength (eigenvalues) and to their component structures.²¹ They include, first, what we term the “citizenship dimension”: this factor loaded those questions that dealt with the membership and benefits of citizenship, and divided between citizenship understood in inclusively civic terms and exclusively ethnic terms. Second, what we call the “international dimension”: this factor loaded those questions that dealt with global integration, and distinguished between those for whom Russia’s place in the world was understood either inclusively in terms of greater integration or exclusively in terms of greater isolation. Third, what we call the “prejudicial dimension”: this factor loaded those questions that probed attitudes towards historically discriminated minorities, and distinguished unprejudiced (inclusive) from xenophobic (exclusive) attitudes. The distinct factor loadings were consistent across all surveys and provided evidence for conclusions about the multi-faceted nature of nationalist attitudes found in other recent studies of nationalist public opinion in Russia.²²

Using the factor analysis as a guide only, we identified two questions that loaded strongly (>.5) and consistently on each dimension across all surveys (see Table 1). Each pair of questions was then combined to form scales for the appropriate dimension. Given that each question offered five response categories, their combination formed scales that

²¹ This analysis is available on request.

²² Gerber, “Beyond Putin?”

provided 9 possible outcomes within the range of 1 to 5.²³ We use these scales in all the analysis that follows.²⁴

[TABLE 1 HERE]

The dimensions of nationalism that the factor analysis reveals relates in part to modes of nationalism that have historically been politically salient in Russia and in the Putin period. The first two dimensions – the citizenship and international dimensions - correspond to traditional nationalist discourses, while the third (the prejudicial dimension) is less ideologically coherent, and is dispersed across the wider population.

First, the citizenship dimension, which centres on ethnicity as the basis for membership of the nation, connects with the divide between far-right radical ethno-nationalists²⁵ and those who define the nation in more inclusive “civic” terms.²⁶ Ethno-nationalists are a relatively small voice within Russian politics, although their presence increased from the late 1990s when concerns about immigration and mobilisation in the ethnic titular republics, especially in Chechnya, was associated with the failure of democracy.²⁷ This opposition to the regime peaked in the electoral protests of December

²³ Given the short nature of these scales (only two items in each) Cronback Alpha values were low: between .4 and .7. Thus, it was more appropriate to check the reliability of each scale by calculating the mean inter-item correlation for the items (Stephen R Briggs and Jonathan M. Cheek, “The Role of Factor Analysis in the Development and Evaluation of Personality Scales”, *Journal of Personality* 54, no. 1 (1986): 106-148.). The inter-item correlations fitted the optimal range of >.2.

²⁴ Note, our analysis does not directly model the factor dimensions.

²⁵ Leonid Radzikhovskii, “Idei'nye marshruty,” *Rossii'skaia gazeta*, 5 November 2014.

²⁶ Valerii Tishkov, *Ethnicity, Nationalism and Conflict In and After the Soviet Union: The Mind Aflame* (London: Sage Publishers, 1997).

²⁷ Peter Rutland, “The Presence of Absence : Ethnicity Policy in Russia”, in Julie Newton and William Tompson, eds., *Institutions, Ideas and Leadership in Russian Politics* (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2010): 116-136; Emil Pain, “The Ethno-Political Pendulum: The Dynamics of the Relationship between Ethnic Minorities and Majorities in Post-Soviet Russia,” in Oleh Protsyk and Benedikt Harzl, eds., *Managing Ethnic Diversity in Russia* (Abingdon: Routledge, 2013): 153-172.

2011.²⁸ Thereafter, the regime proved to be more effective at countering such groups through repression and the construction of an official narrative that engaged with elements of ethno-nationalism.²⁹

Second, the international dimension relates to the division between radical imperialists and/or more moderate official statist (particularly on political questions)³⁰ who favour a distinctive geo-political perspective on the “Russian Idea,” and those who favour Russia’s integration into the democratic and liberal world.³¹ Those supporting an integrationist approach have become less prominent within official circles as the authorities have taken a more assertive and aggressive position in foreign policy. This shift was evident in Putin’s 2007 Munich speech which challenged the post-Cold War order, and Russia’s military engagement in Georgia (2008) and Ukraine (2014-present).

Third, the prejudicial dimension deals with attitudes towards historically discriminated minorities (from unprejudiced to xenophobic), and captures a set of stereotypes that exist across the entire population. These attitudes do not connect to a particular nationalist discourse. Although they are closely associated with nationalist support,³² they do not have a “clear cut ideological character.”³³

Thus, conceptions of the nation in public opinion are multi-dimensional, and at least two of these dimensions link to dominant discourses in Russian nationalism. But, to what

²⁸ Paul Chaisty and Stephen Whitefield, “Forward to Democracy or Back to Authoritarianism? The Attitudinal Bases of Mass Support for the Russian Election Protests of 2011–2012,” *Post-Soviet Affairs* 29, no. 5 (2013): 387-403.

²⁹ Lyudmila Alexandrova, “Xenophobia, Nationalism in Russia Ease Over Years,” Tass, 23 October 2015, <http://tass.ru/en/opinions/831469>, accessed 27 May 2016.

³⁰ On economic questions, official nationalism has remained committed to integration into the global economy, while in the political sphere greater emphasis has been placed on “sovereignty” in the 2000s.

³¹ Furman, “Ot Rossiiskoi imperii k Rosskomu demokraticheskomu gosudarstvu”

³² Pain, “The Ethno-Political Pendulum”

³³ Laruelle, *In the Name of the Nation*: 38.

extent have these attitudes shifted during Vladimir Putin's time in power? While we are limited in making strong causal claims by the relatively few surveys that are available, the timing of our surveys nonetheless captures important developments and events during the 2000s that provide leverage on this question. This period witnessed high-profile terrorist attacks led by Chechen and Islamist terrorists: the Moscow theatre siege (2002); the Moscow metro bombings (2004); the Beslan terrorist attack (2004). It produced ethnic violence targeted at migrants: Kondopoga (2006), Moscow Manezhnaya square riots (2010), Moscow Biryulyovo district riots (2013). It was also punctuated by economic crises (2008 and 2014) and war: Chechnya (2000), Georgia (2008), and Ukraine (2014).

The size of mean support for those who supported exclusivist ethnic, isolationist, xenophobic attitudes on each dimension over this period (expressed by the scales described in Table 1) is summarised in Figure 1 for all surveys.

[FIGURE 1]

These results are broadly in line with the relative public political prominence of extant nationalist discourses. First, radical ethno-nationalist views (citizenship dimension) are held by a relatively small share of respondents: five per cent in 2001. This is consistent with what is known of support for radical nationalism in Russia.³⁴ But their number increased steadily by 10 per cent between 2001 and 2009, during a period of rising immigration and ethnic violence.³⁵ The peak in attitudes in the late 2000s – in our analysis captured by the 2009 survey – coincides with the global financial crisis and discontent that manifested in the electoral protests of 2011-2012. The subsequent fall in ethno-nationalist attitudes in 2014 reflects the state's effectiveness in repressing extremist groups and in

³⁴ Laruelle, *In the Name of the Nation*: 36-7.

³⁵ Rutland, "The Presence of Absence": 124.

appealing to ethno-nationalist support. Conversely, those respondents supporting inclusive attitudes fell decisively on this dimension. As can be seen in Figure 2, there is a sharp decline (30 per cent) in ethnically inclusive views of the nation between 2003 and 2007, before responses stabilise.

[FIGURE 2]

Figure 1 shows marginally more support for isolationist nationalist views, which remained stable until 2014. This suggests that the hardening of the official position on the post-Cold War settlement in the mid-2000s, and military invasion in Georgia in 2008 did not produce an immediate increase in isolationist attitudes. Yet, there was a sharp fall in the percentage of those respondents who favoured greater international integration (see Figure 2). Between 2001 and 2007, the percentage of respondents who were more likely to favour Russia's integration into the global system fell by 15 per cent (although the fact that these attitudes strengthened after the Georgian war highlights the war's limited impact on attitudes). The Ukrainian crisis of 2014 did appear to have a stronger additional effect. In our 2014 survey, the percentage of those citizens taking an isolationist position increased by approximately 10 per cent, while those favouring integration fell by 7 per cent. Thus, it appears that attitudes on this dimension were more sensitive to state-driven efforts at mobilising nationalist support during the Ukrainian crisis.

Third, support for xenophobic nationalist attitudes on the prejudicial dimension is much greater than its equivalents on the other two dimensions. This chimes with the view that xenophobic attitudes are spread across Russian society and do not connect exclusively to any one nationalist ideology. The growth in the percentage of respondents holding xenophobic attitudes between 2001 and 2003 (26 to 35 per cent) was notable. This is in line with the start of the terrorist campaign that followed the end of the military phase of the

second Chechen War. Yet, fluctuations in other years tended to occur within stable intervals. Our survey data suggest that the global financial crisis (2008-09) had little impact on xenophobic attitudes, and the share of respondents holding non-prejudicial attitudes remained stable across all surveys (see Figure 2).

Therefore, in part, attitudes at the mass level connect with traditional discourses in Russian nationalism. The citizenship and international dimensions capture understandings of the nation that predominate in nationalist discourse, while the xenophobic dimension captures attitudes that are not specific to any one strand of thinking. Over the Putin period, certain events do appear to have shaped these attitudes, such as the second Chechen war and the Ukrainian crisis. However, these effects are mixed: events like the war in Georgia appear to have had little impact on popular attitudes. In the next section, we consider how each facet of nationalism relates to broader political stances by analysing batteries of questions that assess attitudes towards democracy/authoritarianism, liberal/conservative values, the existing political system and different modes of political participation.

3. The congruence of attitudes towards the nation and politics

From one perspective, we might expect all three dimensions to share similarities in terms of their relationship to democratic and liberal attitudes. With the rejection of official nationalist narratives that had previously emphasized individual rights and democratic participation in the 1990s,³⁶ the ascendant forces of nationalism in the 2000s – their exclusive ethnic, isolationist, xenophobic variants – are generally associated with authoritarianism and conservative or illiberal values. However, given the de facto distinctiveness of each dimension, there is an equally plausible expectation that each would

³⁶ Rutland, “The Presence of Absence”

have variant political characteristics. For example, extant analysis of different nationalist discourses (both official and unofficial) would lead us to expect that attitudes towards political engagement would vary in accordance with support for the regime. Furthermore, we would expect variation in relation to contextual developments that have affected regime support during this period, such as war and economic crisis.

Scholarly work on Russian politics makes a general distinction between those nationalist groups that oppose the Putin regime and its political system of power, and those that accept the political status quo. Although some commentators have raised questions about the relationship between the authorities and certain groups,³⁷ radical ethno-nationalism is ideologically opposed to the existing political system. Such groups are extra-parliamentary: they boycott parliamentary elections, reject “managed democracy”, and call for the overthrow of the regime, which is associated with oligarchy and corruption.³⁸ Therefore, on the citizenship dimension, we would expect respondents holding ethno-nationalist attitudes to oppose the Putin regime from an anti-democratic and illiberal perspective.

In contrast, isolationist nationalism contains a “patriotic” tendency that supports the political status quo. Although Russian imperialist nationalism incorporates opposition forces, the desire to protect Russia’s “sovereignty” and a distinctive path of development is one embraced by both the ruling elite and official opposition. Such isolationists support Russia’s political institutions and seek to de-politicise and de-mobilise the population. Therefore, on the international dimension, we expect isolationist nationalists to support the Putin regime from an anti-democratic and illiberal perspective.

³⁷ Paul Goble, “Russian National Identity and the Ukrainian Crisis,” *Communist and Post Communist Studies* 49, no. 1 (2016): 37-43.

³⁸ Laruelle, *In the Name of the Nation*

Furthermore, xenophobic nationalists are less clear-cut in their support for Putin and the existing political system. Although this constituency favours anti-democratic and illiberal attitudes, the weak ideological connectedness of xenophobes (in terms of understanding the nation) means their attitudes towards the status quo are less distinctive.

To analyse the political orientation of each dimension of nationalism statistically, we deploy ordinal logistic regression. This method of analysis is appropriate for dependent variables created from the two questions that loaded strongly and significantly on each dimension (see Table 1). The scale for each dependent variable has an implicit order of responses: 9 possible outcomes within a range of 1 to 5.

We regressed on each dependent variable a number of attitudinal variables addressing aspects of political ideology and behaviour. The items (all five point scales) are coded from strongly disagree to strongly agree,³⁹ unless stated otherwise. They covered:

- Political attitudes:
 - What do you think about the idea that a democracy, in which multiple parties compete for power, is the best system for governing Russia?
 - It will be worthwhile to support a leader who could solve the main problems facing Russia today even if he overthrew democracy.
- Social and economic attitudes:
 - Young people today don't have enough respect for traditional values.
 - Homosexual relationships are always wrong.
 - And what do you think about the idea that a market economy, in which there

³⁹ 1= strongly disagree; 2= disagree 3= neither agree nor disagree 4= agree 5= strongly agree.

is private property and economic freedom to entrepreneurs, is the best system for Russia.

- Bribery, corruption, and "knowing the right people" are not important phenomena.
- Attitudes towards Europe and USSR:
- European institutions have been helpful and supportive of our country. OR European institutions have been interfering in our affairs and using our difficulties for their own advantage.⁴⁰

Mobilisation indicators:

- How would you evaluate the actual practice of democracy in Russia?⁴¹
- What this country needs is more participation by ordinary people in running the country's affairs.
- There is no point in voting because the government can't make any difference.
- I think I am better informed than most people about politics.
- The main political parties in this country all offer the same sorts of programmes.

We also included political and demographic variables that predict nationalist attitudes in Russia and elsewhere. They include support for Putin, ideology (left-right), age, education, ethnicity, affluence, class self-identity and residence (urban or rural). The full specification of these variables are available in Appendix B. (Other predictors, such as

⁴⁰ 1= definitely the second opinion; 2= the second opinion rather than the first; 3= in between; 4= the first opinion rather than the second; 5= definitely the first opinion.

⁴¹ 1=very negatively; 2=negatively; 3 = neither negative nor positive; 4= positively; 5=very positively.

gender, group membership, support for the ruling party, and religion, were added in earlier models but were excluded because of consistent lack of significance.) Finally, we controlled for any potential effect from the relatively limited correlations between the three dimensions.⁴² Because the output from ordinal logistic analysis is voluminous, the results for each dimension are summarised in separate tables.

The results for the citizenship dimension are summarised in Table 2. Consistent with the ethnically exclusive position taken by radical ethno-nationalists, respondents who took an ethno-nationalist position on the citizenship dimension were more likely to be ethnically Russian. Bar the 2014 survey that excluded Crimea, this effect was consistent across all surveys. This finding is distinctive. For all the other dimensions of nationalism, exclusivist attitudes were not significantly more likely to be held by ethnic Russians. With the exception of the 2003 and 2014 surveys, ethno-nationalists were also more likely to identify with Russia rather than the Soviet Union. Again, this is a distinctive feature of this dimension of nationalism in Russia, which we see as shaped by the Soviet legacy of inclusion of at least minority elites in nationalities policy.

[TABLE 2 HERE]

However, in terms of attitudes towards democracy, the existing system of power, social values and international orientation, the results are weaker and less consistent across all surveys. In the 2014 survey, there was evidence to support the hypothesis that respondents who took an ethno-nationalist position would be significantly less likely to have a normative commitment to democracy, but this was the exception. In earlier surveys, the democratic attitudes of ethno-nationalists were not significantly different from those who took a more inclusive position on the question of citizenship. There was some evidence in

⁴² These results are not reported in the final models.

2001 and 2009 to suggest that ethno-nationalists were willing to support an authoritarian leader if he solved Russia's problems. However, this changed significantly in 2014. Holding all other predictors at their means, ethno-nationalists were 8 per cent more likely to oppose than support authoritarian leadership in the 2014 survey.⁴³

There is something puzzling about these findings for 2014: ethno-nationalists on the citizenship dimension became less committed to democracy than civic nationalists, but also less supportive of anti-democratic leaders. These results are highly stable to different model specifications and hold in the bivariate as well as multivariate setting. We interpret them to mean something substantively interesting and important: the growing divide between ethno-nationalists and the leadership of Vladimir Putin. Although our analysis suggests that ethno-nationalists were significantly more likely to be Putin's opponents from as early as 2007, their concerns about authoritarianism appear only later during Putin's third term when radical groups encountered greater repression. Thus, it appears that ethno-nationalists were becoming more critical of Putin personally and the type of leadership he offered, despite their general antipathy towards democracy. It is also notable that this group of ethno-nationalists was more likely to profess strong right-wing ideological convictions on a left-right scale in the 2014 survey.

At the same time, ethno-nationalists were not more likely to reject Russia's post-Soviet political system. Their evaluation of Russian democracy was no more critical than other respondents on this dimension, and they were no more likely to believe that there was no point in voting, despite the opposition of radical nationalist movements to Putin's system of "managed democracy." Interestingly, ethno-nationalists were also less likely to support

⁴³ All the predicted probabilities reported in this section are used to interpret the substantive impact of statistically significant variables when the values of all other predictors are held at their means.

mass engagement in politics. On average, ethno-nationalists were 11 per cent more likely to disagree than agree that ordinary people should play a greater role in running the country's affairs. Instead, it seems that ethno-nationalist preferred party alternatives to the current system. Our surveys frequently found that ethno-nationalists disagreed with the statement that parties offered no choice in Russia. This apparent lack of enthusiasm for mass engagement may reflect a desire for political stability rather than revolution, which is trait of far right-wing supporters elsewhere in post-communist countries.⁴⁴

Finally, the results for social attitudes and broader identities were generally weak for this dimension. Surprisingly, those respondents who took an ethno-nationalist position were no more likely to be traditionalist or homophobic. Yet, there was evidence of a hardening of attitudes towards relations with Europe, which appears to have been strengthened by the Ukrainian crisis. Demographic variables controlling for age, education and class were relatively weak, too.

[TABLE 3 HERE]

Table 3 summarises the results for the international dimension. As expected, isolationist nationalists on this dimension consistently held the most critical attitudes towards the European Union (EU) than those taking an exclusive nationalist position on any other dimension. Isolationists were, on average, 16 per cent more like to agree than disagree with the statement that 'European institutions have been interfering in our affairs and using our difficulties for their own advantage' (see Figure 3). This attitude strengthened during the 2000s, with the main increase detected in 2007 before the wars in either Georgia or Ukraine.

⁴⁴ Alina Polyakova, *The Dark Side of European Integration Social Foundations and Cultural Determinants of the Rise of Radical Right Movements in Contemporary Europe* (Stuttgart: ibidem Press, 2015).

[FIGURE 3]

In terms of their normative commitment to democracy, integrationists on this dimension were significantly more likely to embrace democratic norms than those who took an isolationist position. Isolationists were on average 10 per cent more likely to reject than support the idea that multi-party democracy was the best system for governing Russia across all surveys, bar 2009. However, this did not mean that isolationist nationalists were more likely to favour anti-democratic leadership. In fact, the opposite was the case: isolationist nationalists were more likely to reject the notion that democracy ought to be sacrificed for the sake of effective leadership. As with ethno-nationalists this finding is puzzling, but our interpretation is different. While isolationists were less supportive of democracy in principle, they were much more likely to support the political status quo and Vladimir Putin in particular. Hence, we suggest that their preference was for what they understood to be Russia's form of democracy (as opposed to a liberal variant) rather than an authoritarian alternative to it. This was most clearly indicated by the 2014 survey results: isolationists had the most positive evaluation of Russian democracy than exclusive nationalists on any other dimension. Furthermore, isolationists did not take a distinctive conservative and anti-liberal stand on social questions. Those favouring greater isolation from the international system were significantly less likely to agree that young people did not have enough respect for traditional values. In the 2014 survey (excluding Crimea), isolationists were 15 per cent more likely to oppose than support this notion.⁴⁵ This was not because isolationists were likely to be younger; on the contrary, older respondents were more likely to support isolationist positions.

The Ukrainian crisis appeared to have a significant impact on the orientation of isolationist nationalists towards the political leadership of the country. In contrast to ethno-

⁴⁵ Results were slightly higher for the survey that included Crimea (see Figure 5 below).

nationalists, isolationists were significantly more likely to support Vladimir Putin in 2014. The Ukrainian crisis also appeared to strengthen their support for the existing political system: they had a positive evaluation of Russian democracy; they rejected the idea that there was no point in voting; and they were more likely to reject the statement that political parties offered no choice. For instance, those who supported the isolationist position were 24 per cent more likely to disagree rather than agree with the statement that there is no point in voting. Thus, it appears that the 2014 crisis *in its internationalist dimension* attracted respondents who were loyal to the regime and its political system. This pattern was detectable before 2014, but its effect became statistically significant in terms of support for Putin in the 2014 survey, which that was conducted at the peak of the Ukrainian crisis in December 2014.

[TABLE 4 HERE]

The prejudicial dimension provides further attitudinal variation. This dimension clearly divides respondents in terms of their support for authoritarian leadership and conservative/illiberal values. Of all the nationalist dimensions, xenophobic nationalists on the prejudicial dimension were much more likely to countenance authoritarian leadership if it solved Russia's problems. On average, xenophobes were 25 per cent more likely to support rather than oppose the idea of authoritarian leadership, and this probability remained strong across all surveys (see Figure 4).

[FIGURE 4 HERE]

Similarly, xenophobic nationalists were much more likely to hold illiberal and conservative values than ethno-nationalists and isolationists. Despite homophobic attitudes

being a feature of radical ethno-nationalism in Russia,⁴⁶ these attitudes were not evident amongst our survey findings for ethno-nationalists. In fact, ethno-nationalists were more likely to oppose the idea that homosexuality is always wrong - though this only achieved statistical significance in 2003. In contrast, xenophobes on the prejudicial dimension were consistently homophobic. These attitudes were significant across all surveys. On average, xenophobic nationalists were 21 per cent more likely to agree rather than disagree with the statement that homosexuality is always wrong. Likewise, xenophobes were significantly more likely than isolationists to agree that young people did not have enough respect for traditional values. As Figure 5 shows, xenophobic and isolationist nationalists were diametrically opposed on this question, while ethno-nationalists fluctuated between the two.

[FIGURE 5 HERE]

However, unlike the other dimensions of nationalism, the prejudicial dimension did not appear to have a political home. This dimension did not correlate consistently and significantly with support for Putin or the left-right ideological divide. Moreover, while xenophobes claimed to be more politically educated than ethno-nationalists or isolationists, they appeared to be the most disengaged from the political process. Xenophobes were significantly more likely to believe that there was no point in voting; that the main parties in Russia were all the same; and were also more likely to support the idea that Russia would benefit from the involvement of more “ordinary people” in the political process. On average, xenophobes were 17 per cent more likely to agree than disagree that Russia needed more mass involvement in politics, and they were 15 per cent more likely to agree than disagree that there was no point in voting. On both questions, xenophobes were

⁴⁶ Radzikhovskii, “Idei'nye marshruty”

diametrically opposed to ethno-nationalists and isolationists (see Figures 6 and 7).

According to our survey data, there was little evidence to suggest that the 2014 Ukrainian crisis engaged politically those holding strong xenophobic views towards historically discriminated minorities.

[FIGURE 6 & 7 HERE]

Finally, like the other dimensions of nationalism, the demographic bases of the prejudicial dimension were weak. There was some evidence of class differentiation - members of the intelligentsia were more likely to take a non-prejudicial position than manual workers - but this could not be explained in terms of a middle/working class divide. Entrepreneurs and managers were either less likely than manual workers to take a xenophobic position or their preferences fluctuated between more or less non-prejudicial. In fact, economic prosperity made little difference to attitudes on this dimension. This chimes with findings from other studies of Russian nationalism, which have found that support for hard-line nationalist attitudes is not confined to economic losers.⁴⁷ Interestingly, we found that economic prosperity in the previous five years was more likely to correlate with ethno-nationalist attitudes.

Conclusions

Findings from five surveys over the last fifteen years reinforce the view that nationalism is a multi-faceted force in Russia. Our analysis shows that different discourses of Russian nationalism that are well known to scholars – ethno-nationalist, imperialist, statist – have their bases of support within the wider society.

⁴⁷ Laruelle, *In the Name of the Nation*: 44-45.

There is no evidence that a single dimension of thinking about the nation has emerged, far less one position that has achieved programmatic hegemony. Rather, the “Russian idea” remains fractured across dimensions that nationalists must address regarding membership of the national community, its place in the world, and its definition of out-groups. Moreover, the mass bases for these different discourses are distinct. Analysing a range of survey questions that probed attitudes towards different ways of thinking about the nation, we found that three separate dimensions of nationalist attitudes – citizenship, international, prejudicial - have formed consistently throughout the 2000s. The fact that these dimensions have remained robust over a long time period highlights the diversity of ways of thinking about the nation in Russia.

Notwithstanding the general growth in exclusive nationalist feelings in response to social change and crises – mass immigration, war, economic crises – no neat pattern emerged that might point to a clear understanding of nationalism forming. Moreover, there is little evidence to suggest that these nationalist constituencies could coalesce in any significant way. The demographic basis for each dimension is weak, and we found little evidence to suggest that economic factors influenced nationalist preferences. This may explain why the creation of a coherent nationalist narrative in Russian politics has proved to be problematic.⁴⁸ Although there is a mass basis for ethno-nationalist and isolationist discourses, xenophobic attitudes remain by far the largest and do not connect with any particular nationalist ideology.

Crucially, the fragmented nature of Russian nationalism extends to the different ways in which nationalists understand political organisation. As scholars of nationalism contend, politics is central to any nationalist ideology; nationalism is a political movement that seeks to make the nation and the political unit congruent. In our analysis, we considered whether Russian society connects understandings of the nation and political organisation in

⁴⁸ Goble, “Russian National Identity and the Ukrainian Crisis”

programmatic and coherent ways. This involved analysis of questions concerning democracy/authoritarianism, liberalism/conservatism, support for the existing political systems and its leadership. Our findings either uncovered weak and inconsistent connections between the way in which respondents comprehended the nation and political organisation, or found notable differences in the way that they connect across the different dimensions of nationalism.

The hypothesis that exclusivist nationalists would support authoritarian and illiberal attitudes on all three dimensions was not borne out. Ethno-nationalists (the citizenship dimension) did not differ significantly from civic nationalists in their normative commitment to democracy until 2014 (when they became distinctly anti-democratic), but at the same time they fluctuated from being in favour of authoritarian leadership to being opposed to it. They were also no more anti-liberal than civic nationalists, and on the question of homosexuality were less likely to be homophobic.

In contrast, isolationist nationalists (the international dimension) were more consistently opposed to democratic norms, but they were also much more likely to oppose authoritarian leadership than those favouring Russia's integration into the global community. We explain this puzzling finding in terms of their support for what they understood to be Russia's form of democracy (as opposed to liberal democracy). Isolationists were also less critical about society's respect for traditional values.

Finally, xenophobic nationalists (the prejudicial dimension) were not significantly more opposed to the idea of democracy than non-prejudiced nationalists (with the exception of one survey), but they consistently supported the idea of authoritarian leadership. This appears to be the result of a general disillusionment with Russia's post-Soviet political system. They were also consistently anti-liberal.

Based on our analysis, we contend that the political orientation of the different nationalist dimensions to the Russian regime and its political system in part accounts for some of the complexity we see, especially those between the citizenship and international dimensions. Ethno-nationalists were less likely to support Putin than isolationist nationalists, but they both appeared to support the political process. In contrast, xenophobic nationalists did not appear to have a political home. Xenophobes were no more likely to support Putin than non-prejudicial respondents; they rejected the existing electoral and party system, and were more likely to favour mass participation in politics than ethno-nationalists on any other dimension. Given the large and stable basis of support for this understanding of the nation, we expect that any political force that could mobilise this xenophobic constituency would pose a powerful challenge to the political status quo.

Finally, the complex and inconsistent picture that emerges highlights the dynamic nature of Russian nationalism. Although the different dimensions remain stable over time, the variance that we observe suggests that the different facets of nationalism may be quite situational, particularly since 2014. Some patterns correlate strongly with the Ukrainian crisis. The 2014 survey shows that the crisis correlated with increased support for isolationist nationalism and reduced support for ethno-nationalism. It was also related to more polarised support for Putin on the citizenship and international dimensions.

However, other patterns were evident before 2014. The growth in ethno-nationalism in the 2000s correlates with ethnic conflicts internal to Russia (notably the Second Chechen War) and mass immigration. Our survey in 2014 uncovered no evidence of a distinct growth in societal support for ethno-nationalism, despite deep economic crisis and war. This suggests that the involvement of ethno-nationalist groups in the fighting in Eastern Ukraine, and the subsequent involvement of extremists in politics and militia organisations, has not

been accompanied by a significant surge of ethno-nationalism at the mass level. Likewise, negative attitudes towards European institutions hardened amongst isolationist nationalists before the conflict in 2014 and the Georgia war of 2008. Our findings show that the main surge occurred between 2003 and 2007. This coincides with Putin's second term and the cooling of Russia's relations with the Western world. Both findings suggest that any elite-level engagement in a nationalist direction since 2012 is a response to nationalist impulses rather than a catalyst for them.

Therefore, no neat pattern emerges that might point to a clear and coherent form of nationalism crystalizing: neither an exclusive ethnic identity with an autarkic view of the world and opposition to democracy – or the opposite. Rather, the bulk of Russia's citizens appear in that messy, contradictory and complex in between space. These findings highlight the need to analyse carefully the nationalist foundations of support for either the Russian regime or its opponents.

Table 1. Dimensions of Nationalism

Dimension	Survey Items	Spectrum of attitudes (inclusive to exclusive)
Citizenship	i) Everyone who lives in Russia should have the right to become a citizen regardless of their ethnic origins. ii) The ethnic group a person belongs to should not influence the benefits they can get from the state.	Inclusively civic to exclusively ethnic
International	i) We have a lot to learn from other countries in running Russia's affairs. ii) Russia should cooperate with other countries even if it means giving up some independence.	Greater integration to greater isolation
Prejudicial	i) There are too many Gypsies in Russia. ii) Jews in Russia today have too much power and influence.	Highly unprejudiced to highly xenophobic

Figure 1. Percentage supporting and strongly supporting the an exclusive understanding of the nation




Figure 2. Percentage supporting and strongly supporting an inclusive understanding of the nation




Table 2: Citizenship dimension

	2001	2003	2007	2009	2014 (incl. Crimea)	2014 (excl. Crimea)
Political attitudes						
Democracy best system	-0.04	-0.02	0.09	-0.08	-0.17**	-0.11*
Tolerate authoritarian leaders	0.13**	0.05	0.03	0.14**	-0.17***	-0.25***
Social and economic attitudes						
Traditional values not respected	0.01	-0.07	-0.10*	0.12**	0.07	0.08*
Homosexuality always wrong	-0.03	-0.17***	-0.03	-0.02	-0.08	-0.09
Private property best system	-0.16**	-0.06	-0.17**	0.05	0.07*	0.05
Corruption not important	0.09**	0.05	0.04	-0.06	-0.07	-0.05
Attitudes towards Europe and USSR						
EU helpful	0.08*	-0.01	0.01	-0.06	-0.13**	-0.13**
Identify with USSR	-0.10*	-0.01	-0.13**	-0.16***	-0.02	0.02
Mobilisation indicators						
Evaluation of Russian democracy	0.11*	0.08	0.04	0	0.02	-0.01
Favour more mass participation	-0.15***	-0.17***	-0.25***	-0.12*	-0.26***	-0.29***
No point in voting	0.07	-0.03	0.06	0.06	-0.07	-0.05
Informed about politics	0.08	0.07	0.16**	-0.02	-0.05	-0.04
Parties offer no choice	-0.17***	-0.02	-0.17**	-0.07	-0.13**	-0.15**
Predictors of nationalist attitudes						
Putin supporter (1)	0.07	-0.11	-0.22*	-0.28**	-0.55***	-0.54***
Ideology (left-right)	-0.02	0.01	-0.07*	0.01	0.12***	0.11***
Age	-0.01*	-0.01**	0	0	-0.00*	0

Education	0.05	-0.06	-0.11	-0.11	-0.07	-0.07
Ethnicity	0.65***	0.66***	0.78***	0.90***	0.51**	0.3
Individual prosperity (past)	0.07	0.07	0.16***	0.02	0.11*	0.17**
Individual prosperity (future)	-0.19***	-0.02	-0.22***	-0.12*	0.01	0.06
Social class (2)						
<i>Entrepreneur</i>	-0.02	0	-0.03	-0.2	0.12	0.13
<i>Manager</i>	0.06	0.14	0.26	-0.04	-0.22	-0.2
<i>Intelligentsia</i>	-0.14	0.07	-0.07	0.01	-0.21	-0.16
<i>Peasant</i>	0.12	-0.07	-0.13	0.18	-0.38**	-0.36**
<i>Office worker</i>	N/A	N/A	0.01	0.02	-0.31	-0.21
<i>Other</i>	0.19	0.06	-0.18	0.24	-0.29	-0.2
Urban	0.32**	0.06	0.37***	0.12	-0.11	-0.24*
Pseudo R-square	0.03	0.02	0.03	0.02	0.04	0.05

Note

*<0.5 **<01 ***<001

(1) In the years when Putin's candidacy was not certain (2007 and 2009), we coded the likely regime candidates: Medvedev/Ivanov (2007), Putin/Medvedev (2009).

(2) Reference category: Manual worker

Table 3: International dimension

	2001	2003	2007	2009	2014 (incl. Crimea)	2014 (excl. Crimea)
Political attitudes						
Democracy best system	-0.20***	-0.14**	-0.18**	-0.01	-0.19***	-0.21***
Tolerate authoritarian leaders	-0.09*	0.03	-0.07	-0.16***	-0.19***	-0.18***
Social and economic attitudes						
Traditional values not respected	-0.24***	-0.20***	-0.05	-0.11**	-0.17***	-0.16***
Homosexuality always wrong	-0.01	0.09*	-0.08	0.07	0.07	0.05
Private property best system	-0.09*	-0.15**	-0.05	-0.02	-0.14**	-0.16***
Corruption not important	0.02	-0.03	-0.00	-0.09*	0.01	0.02
Attitudes towards Europe and USSR						
EU helpful	-0.33***	-0.22***	-0.35***	-0.35***	-0.23***	-0.21***
Identify with USSR	0.09*	0.00	0.02	0.08*	0.05	0.03
Mobilisation indicators						
Evaluation of Russian democracy	-0.05	0.01	-0.00	0.05	0.13**	0.13**
Favour more mass participation	-0.04	-0.16***	-0.23***	-0.07	-0.09	-0.07
No point in voting	-0.15***	-0.19***	-0.08	-0.09	-0.30***	-0.30***
Informed about politics	0.02	-0.04	-0.03	-0.13**	-0.25***	-0.28***
Parties offer no choice	-0.06	-0.09*	-0.02	0.02	-0.27***	-0.29***
Predictors of nationalist attitudes						
Putin supporter (1)	-0.09	-0.13	0.12	0.14	0.35***	0.33***

Ideology (left-right)	-0.00	-0.02	-0.03	0.06*	-0.00	0.01
Age	0.01***	0.01***	0.01***	0.01*	-0.00	-0.00
Education	0.01	0.05	0.03	0.11	-0.03	-0.04
Ethnicity	0.02	0.26*	-0.02	-0.26	0.02	0.09
Individual prosperity (past)	-0.11**	-0.03	-0.03	0.01	0.09	0.08
Individual prosperity (future)	0.03	-0.01	0.01	-0.02	0.11*	0.08
Social class (2)						
<i>Entrepreneur</i>	-0.18	-0.02	0.15	0.06	-0.06	-0.02
<i>Manager</i>	0.07	-0.24	0.09	0.07	-0.09	-0.04
<i>Intelligentsia</i>	-0.14	0.05	0.19	-0.02	-0.22	-0.18
<i>Peasant</i>	-0.04	0.17	0.03	-0.12	-0.17	-0.15
<i>Office worker</i>			0.02	0.23	0.12	0.08
<i>Other</i>	-0.00	0.22*	0.02	-0.00	0.06	-0.06
Urban	0.12	-0.04	0.16	-0.05	-0.26**	-0.19
Pseudo R-square	0.04	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.08	0.08

Note

*<0.5 **<01 ***<001

(1) In the years when Putin's candidacy was not certain (2007 and 2009), we coded the likely regime candidates: Medvedev/Ivanov (2007), Putin/Medvedev (2009).

(2) Reference category: Manual worker

Figure 3: International dimension: The net probability that isolationist nationalists agreed that “European institutions have been interfering in our affairs and using our difficulties for their own advantage”




Table 4: Prejudicial dimension

	2001	2003	2007	2009	2014 (incl. Crimea)	2014 (excl. Crimea)
Political attitudes						
Democracy best system	-0.04	-0.00	-0.13*	-0.14*	-0.00	0.02
Tolerate authoritarian leaders	0.18***	0.22***	0.23***	0.16***	0.23***	0.21***
Social and economic attitudes						
Traditional values not respected	0.03	0.15***	-0.01	0.14**	0.26***	0.26***
Homosexuality always wrong	0.24***	0.21***	0.25***	0.14**	0.11*	0.11*
Private property best system	-0.00	0.05	0.05	-0.03	0.07	0.09*
Corruption not important	0.07	-0.00	0.07*	0.01	0.03	0.04
Attitudes towards Europe and USSR						
EU helpful	-0.11**	-0.08*	-0.10*	-0.07	-0.06	-0.09*
Identify with USSR	0.01	-0.01	0.07	0.02	0.11**	0.13**
Mobilisation indicators						
Evaluation of Russian democracy	0.05	-0.12*	-0.03	0.08	-0.05	-0.06
Favour more mass participation	0.21***	0.12**	0.19***	0.11*	0.10*	0.08
No point in voting	0.08*	0.13***	0.19***	0.09*	0.08	0.09*
Informed about politics	0.17***	-0.00	-0.02	0.10*	0.12**	0.13**
Parties offer no choice	0.15**	0.06	0.10	0.02	0.17***	0.17***
Predictors of nationalist attitudes						
Putin supporter (1)	-0.06	0.08	0.31**	0.03	0.05	0.05
Ideology (left-right)	-0.03	-0.07*	-0.03	-0.05	0.02	0.02
Age	-0.00	-0.00	-0.00	-0.00	-0.00*	-0.00
Education	0.08	-0.08	-0.02	-0.05	-0.01	-0.03

Ethnicity	0.07	0.16	0.45**	0.13	0.26	0.21
Individual prosperity (past)	-0.03	-0.05	-0.02	0.09	0.11*	0.09
Individual prosperity (future)	0.03	0.05	0.05	-0.11	-0.08	-0.06
Social class (2)						
<i>Entrepreneur</i>	-0.13	-0.08	0.19	0.44	0.22	0.18
<i>Manager</i>	-0.44*	0.05	-0.74**	-0.18	0.12	0.17
<i>Intelligentsia</i>	-0.37**	-0.10	-0.37*	-0.12	-0.34*	-0.33*
<i>Peasant</i>	0.11	0.11	-0.05	0.02	0.25*	0.24*
<i>Office worker</i>			-0.12	-0.11	-0.05	-0.04
<i>Other</i>	0.17	-0.00	0.12	0.01	0.47**	0.43*
Urban	-0.08	-0.00	-0.11	-0.03	0.09	0.04
Pseudo R-square	0.03	0.03	0.04	0.02	0.05	0.05

Note

*<0.5 **<01 ***<001

(1) In the years when Putin's candidacy was not certain (2007 and 2009), we coded the likely regime candidates: Medvedev/Ivanov (2007), Putin/Medvedev (2009).

(2) Reference category: Manual worker.

Figure 4: Prejudicial dimension: The net probability xenophobes agreed with the statement "it will be worthwhile to support a leader who could solve the main problems facing Russia today even if he overthrew democracy"




Figure 5: Net probability that isolationists and xenophobes agreed with the statement that "young people today don't have enough respect for traditional values"




Figure 6: Net probability that isolationists and xenophobes agreed with the statement that “There is no point in voting”





Figure 7: Net probability that ethnic, isolationist and xenophobes agreed with the statement that “What this country needs is more participation by ordinary people in running the country’s affairs”



Appendix A: The Surveys

Russia

	SAMPLING FRAME	SAMPLING	RESPONSE RATE
2001	Adult pop. (18+) Control Quota on age, sex and education	1. 11 Territorial - administrative units + Kaliningrad; 2. 110 settlements including Moscow and St. Petersburg 3. 446 sampling points 4. Multistage proportional representation sampling and random route with last birthday selection	Households contacted: 4061 Respondent non-contact: 670 Refused: 3277 Achieved contact: 2000 Response rate: 0.49
2003	Adult pop. (18+) Control Quota on age, sex and education	1. 7 Territorial - administrative units 2. 6-step stratification by region 3. 97 sampling points 4. Multistage proportional representation sampling and random route with last birthday selection	Households contacted: 3551 Refused/unable: 1551 Achieved contact: 2000 Response rate: 0.56

2007	Adult pop. (18+) Control Quota on age, sex and education	1. Stage 1: Territorial Administrative Unit (7 regions) 2. Stage 2: Settlement (allocated to 6 strata in proportion to the population of each stratum); 3. Stage 3: Sampling Location (PSU) 4. Stage 4: Random Route for selecting households and the most recent birthday method for selecting respondents	Respondent Contact: 5201 Achieved contact: 2000 Response Rate: 0.38
2009	Adult population (18+) Control Quota on age, sex and education	1. Stage 1: Territorial Administrative Unit (7 regions) 2. Stage 2: Settlement (allocated to 6 strata in proportion to the population of each stratum); 3. Stage 3: Sampling Location (PSU) 4. Stage 4: Random Route for selecting households and the most recent birthday method for selecting respondents	Respondent Contact: 6765 Respondent Non-contact: 3936 Respondent contact: 2829 Achieved contact: 1500 Response Rate: 0.53

2014	Adult population (18+) Control Quota on age, sex and education	Stratification Method Stage 1: Selection of regions (6 regions as used in the official statistics) Stage 2: Selection of settlement (allocated to 6 strata in proportion to the population of each stratum) Stage 3: Selection of random routes Stage 4: Selection of households (random route method with a predetermined starting point) Stage 5: Selection of respondents within households (the most recent birthday method; only one respondent per household was interviewed)	Successful contacts Completed interviews: 2001 Non-contacts Eligible respondent refused: 429 Household unreachable: 826 Eligible respondents unreachable: 422 Empty dwelling: 8 Response Rate: 0.54
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Appendix B: Variables in the Analysis

Question	Variable	Values
“If there were a presidential election tomorrow, which of these candidates would you be most likely to vote for?”	Putin supporter	0 = other 1 = Putin
Many people think of political attitudes as being on the "Left" or the "Right". This is a scale stretching from the Left to the Right. When you think of your own political attitudes, where would you put yourself?	Ideology (left-right)	Scale from 1 to 10
	Age	Open ended
“Which is the highest qualification which you yourself have passed?”	Education	1= Secondary or less 2= Vocational 3= Higher/uncompleted higher
“Here is a list of ethnic groups in Ukraine today. To which one do you consider that you belong yourself?”	Ethnicity	0= other 1 =Russian
“Compared with five years ago, has your household's standard of living fallen a great deal, fallen a little, stayed about the same, risen a little, or has it risen a lot?”	Individual prosperity (past)	1= fallen a great deal; 2= fallen a little 3= stayed about the same 4= risen a little 5= risen a lot
“And looking ahead over the next five years, do you think that your household's standard of living will fall a great deal from its current level, fall a little, stay about the same as it is now, rise a little, or rise a lot from its current level?”	Individual prosperity (future)	1= will fall a great deal; 2= will fall a little 3= will stay about the same 4= will rise a little 5= will rise a lot
“To which of these social groups do you feel you belong?”	Social class: Entrepreneur Manager Manual worker Intelligentsia Peasant	0 = all other categories; 1 = specific category

	Office worker Other	
	Urban	0=rural 1=urban