

# The Maidan, Past and Present: Orange Revolution (2004) and the EuroMaidan (2013-2014)

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## ***Introduction Déjà vu: a Ukrainian Revolution***

It happened again! On 21 November 2013, Ukrainians began protesting. The at first small protests, triggered by the government's refusal to sign the Free Trade and Association Agreements with the EU, took on the name of the EuroMaidan (European Square). On 24 November, the protests - organized by opposition political parties, student organizations, as well as, long-time activists - grew in size to approximately 200,000-300,000 in Kyiv. Tens of thousands of 'ordinary' Ukrainians<sup>2</sup> joined in Lviv (and across west Ukraine), and a few thousand to a few hundred joined in eastern and southern cities like Odessa, Crimea, Kharkiv, and Sumy. By 1 December, it is estimated that up to 800,000 'ordinary' Ukrainians joined the protest events in Kyiv, and even more when combining all those that protested in other cities across Ukraine (including in Donetsk and Luhansk, both considered Yanukovich strongholds).

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<sup>2</sup> 'Ordinary' Ukrainians or 'ordinary' citizens is used by the author to denote the non-activist, non-politicized citizens of a polity, who tend to be regularly disengaged from politics, other than when (and if) they vote in elections. Generally, they have not been active members of a Social Movement Organization, nor have they consistently participated in previous protests. Included are individuals of all socio-economic, employment and education levels. 'Ordinary' citizens draws on Nancy Bermeo's (2003) use of the term 'ordinary people.' The term is used to avoid 'the masses,' 'average people/citizens' or even 'median voter' as they depict a different concept of actors.

At first the EuroMaidan, seemed like something we have seen before: the 'Orange Revolution'. We were brought back to 23 November 2004, when observers of Ukrainian politics were shocked when they witnessed a sea of 'ordinary' Ukrainians, joined activists and opposition party members in a moment of mass mobilization. While Ukraine had previously experienced several smaller protest events, such as the 1986 Chornobyl disaster protests, the 1991 Revolution on the Granite, and the 2001 Ukraine Without Kuchma protests, the sheer size of the 2004 protests and the fact that participation quickly shifted to a majority made of 'ordinary' Ukrainians was unprecedented (Onuch 2014a). First heralded as a democratic awakening and the first step to Europeanization, but after the election of Viktor Yanukovich (the villain of the 'Orange Revolution') as president in 2010, academics agreed that for a variety of reasons, including protest fatigue, Ukraine would not see another mass-mobilization any time soon (Meirowitz and Tucker 2013). Thus, when the November 2013 protests grew to 800,000, political scientists had to go back to the drawing board. It was happening again, and again they did not see it coming. While it seemed like *déjà vu*, it was very different and not least because it was happening with the events of 2004 as the precedent.

This formidable moment of mass mobilization, quickly descended into a violence unprecedented in Ukraine since independence. Like the prying open of Pandora's box, the EuroMaidan protests divided the country, creating opportunities for radical voices - on both sides of the spectrum - to take centre stage. At the time of writing this chapter, the crisis included the annexation of Crimea by the Russian Federation; the rise of Russian sponsored guerrilla separatist conflicts in east of the country - which military experts interviewed<sup>3</sup> defined as a low level war; and a Presidential Election, plagued by violence and a record low turnout (Chossudovsky 2014; Sasse 2014). Thus, when a moment of mass mobilization, such as the EuroMaidan, takes the academe, the regime and even those who participate in it by surprise, we must first identify the boundaries of the protest events, who participated in the protests how and why? Moreover, seeing that the trajectories of the 2004 and 2013/14 mass mobilizations in Ukraine were so different, it is necessary to place the EuroMaidan into comparative perspective and through process-tracing, identify how the two

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<sup>3</sup> Due to the sensitive nature of the EuroMaidan protests, the potential that some informants are under threat or can be under threat, and the fact that there is an ongoing crisis in Ukraine, the author has decided to anonymize all informants interviewed, and is instituting Chatham House Rules to protect the informants' identities.

protest waves converged and diverged. This chapter is the first attempt to systematically tackle the different aspects of mobilization for the case of the Ukrainian EuroMaidan, and compare against a historic case of mobilization that ended peacefully and resulted in relative stability.

### *Outline*

This chapter's aim is to analyse and contextualizes the EuroMaidan as a critical case of mass protest, by placing it in comparative reference to the 'Orange Revolution'. First, the chapter will briefly outline the data used. Second, the chapter will highlight some key writing on mobilization and activism in Ukraine and identify potential contributions of this analysis to the literature. The majority of the text will assess the EuroMaidan mobilization. Employing interview and focus groups data collected by the author, we will be able to contrast and compare the parameters and trajectories of two protest waves (duration, location, and geographical diffusion); the central actors involved in the mobilization process and their main claims. At each step highlighting the convergence and divergence between the 2004 and 2013/14 mass mobilizations. Finally, once the main boundaries of the mobilization have been mapped out, the chapter will address the recent focus among the media and social scientists alike on: the rise of the right, the rise of violence, and the 'new' role of social media in the EuroMaidan mobilizations. This initial analysis seeks to provide a blue print for larger studies of the EuroMaidan mobilizations and in the conclusion will highlight key hypotheses for future testing.

### *Methodology and data*

The empirical findings presented in the discussion below, consist of data collected during two periods. The data was collected by the author and her team of research assistants between 26 November 2013 through to 24 July 2014 in Kyiv, Ukraine. This includes data from: an on-site survey of (n=1475) (for more information about the survey see: (Onuch 2014b, 2014c, 2014d)), and rapid on-site interviews with, protest participants; digital photos of slogans and posters held by protesters in the first four weeks of the protests; and 21 interviews and correspondences with activists, journalists and politicians (including both opposition and regime insiders). Due to the on-going nature of the crisis, interviewees have been anonymized, and the author is using Chatham House rules to protect the informants identities. To provide the comparative analysis, the author relies on interview (n=98) and focus group (n=15) data collected between 2005 and 2010 by the author, covering the 2004 mass protests but also

past mobilizations and activism in Ukraine (for more information about the data see: (Onuch 2011, 2014a). Process-tracing methodology was employed by the author to comparatively analyse the data (see: Bennett 2010; Collier 2010).

### *Contributing to the literature on Ukrainian activism and protest*

Ukrainian activism and mobilization is rarely examined in the social sciences, until there is a mass protest (2002, 2004, 2013). Moreover, most analyses have failed to provide a historical contextualized and comparative perspective. This being said there are several valuable studies of mobilization in Ukraine. I should note that this is far from, and is not intended to be, a conclusive list. Key studies include research on: the Ukrainian labour movement (Crowley 1997; Marples 1991), women's movements (Hrycak 2006; Martsenyuk 2005), and Dissident activism (Zakharov 2004). Still, the vast majority of studies focusing on activism and protest in Ukraine has been limited to the 'Orange Revolution'. I have argued elsewhere that there are three dominant streams of studies of the 'Orange Revolution' (Onuch 2014a): those focusing on the role of intra-regional knowledge transfer (Beissinger 2007; Bunce and Wolchik 2007); those arguing that foreign actors helped finance, train and or coordinate, the activists, their organizations and protests in 2004 (Åslund and McFaul 2006; McFaul 2007; Wilson 2006); and those which focus on the role of elites in the formation of social movement organizations (SMOs) and masterminding the protests (Åslund and McFaul 2006; D'Anieri 2006; Way 2008). Several recent studies have also attempted to problematize micro-level participation in Ukrainian mobilizations (Beissinger 2013; Lane 2008; Meirowitz and Tucker 2013; Onuch and Serra 2010; Onuch 2011, 2014a, 2014c; Tucker 2007). Recent survey work by the Ukrainian Protest Project, the Kyiv Institute of Strategic Studies, and an NSF sponsored research team headed by Henry Hale, will help to continue fill in this gap. This chapter combines and addresses the different above perspectives on mobilization in Ukraine, and in doing helps connect empirical gaps. By placing it into comparative perspective with the 'Orange Revolution', the chapter will allow us to begin to understand not only the EuroMaidan better, but will also further elucidate the patterns and politics of mobilization in Ukraine. Perhaps helping us to better understand why the 'Orange Revolution' ended peacefully, and the EuroMaidan resulted in a geopolitical crisis. But first we need to unpack what was the EuroMaidan a case of, and then we can move to contrast and compare it to the 'Orange Revolution'.

### *The case of EuroMaidan: what is it a case of?*

To facilitate a deep understanding of extra institutional political behaviour, activism, social mobilization and democratization more broadly in Ukraine, it is crucial to briefly address a central question of our puzzle: what was the EuroMaidan a case of? The 2013/2014 EuroMaidan was both an instance of mass mobilization, and a wave of activist protest events. Thus there are, as is the case with most moments of mass mobilization, two separate phenomena that require our attention. The first, a longer mobilization *process* pursued and participated in by activists and the political opposition; and the second (and as we saw in the case of the EuroMaidan simultaneously), the phenomenon of a large protest event, a moment of mass-mobilization, when 'ordinary' citizens join the activists in the streets *en masse*.

### ***Apples and oranges?: the EuroMaidan and Orange Revolution***

If we look to what makes the EuroMaidan different from the 'Orange Revolution' we can identify several crucial points of divergence and convergence. First, we will unpack the duration, location and size of the protests. This will provide us with clarity as to what series of protest events the analysis refers to. Paying specific attention to how the 2004 and 2013/2014 protest waves differed geographically. We will explore how from the very first weekend, the mobilization spread to regions that previously did not see any serious protest events, and thus, where not as had been reported confined to the center and west of the country. Secondly, we will briefly clarify the different actors involved in the mobilization process, and identify their differing roles. Here we will highlight how the composition of protests shifted throughout the different phases of the protests. Employing process tracing, including survey and interview data, we will explore which actors are perceived to have taken the lead and which actors actually took center stage in the 2004 and 2013/14 protests. We will investigate how the role of SMOs differed in 2004 and 2013/14. Next, we will unpack the central demands/claims and repertoires employed by the protesters. And while there has been much ado in the media about the rise of the nationalist right in Ukraine, employing digital documentation protester posters, onsite rapid interviews and focus groups we will explore if ethno-linguistic claims have received the same, more or less support in 2013/2014 than they did in 2004. Moreover, the dramatic and *unprecedented* rise in radical and violent repertoires will be elucidated in greater detail. And lastly, the use of new technologies will be problematized.

### ***Size, spatiality and geographic diffusion of protest events***

The EuroMaidan was reported, in mainstream news (BBC World News Report January 21, 2014), CNN International Report February 19, 2014) to be a longer

lasting and significantly larger mobilization as compared to the 'Orange Revolution', but still taking place in the same locations demonstrating the same east west geographic divide in both cases. Thus, first we must address the temporal boundaries of the EuroMaidan mobilizations and assess if this greatly differed to the mobilizations in 2004. Second we must assess the spatiality and the geography of participation. And lastly we can attempt to account for the size of the mobilizations.

#### *When? And How long?*

As we know initial day of protest on the EuroMaidan was 21 November 2013, the following Sunday, 24 November, was the first day when we can consider the protest having taken on a mass (or large protest) quality, but it is not until the weekend of November 30, and specifically 1 December that the EuroMaidan becomes a mass mobilization, and when we see a cross class cross cleavage coalition beginning to form in the streets and squares of most large cities in Ukraine. While meetings of the Maidan continued after, we can consider the date Yanukovich fled the country 21 February 2014, the final day of the EuroMaidan mobilization (even if the crisis continued, shifted and expanded there after). Thus, the multiple protest waves lasted three months.

The EuroMaidan went through four distinct phases and at least four waves of protest and repressions (Onuch and Sasse 2014b). The first phase, 21 November to 30 November, was sparked by the government's announcement that it will not sign the free trade and association agreements with the EU. The second phase began after the 30 November brutal clearing of the Maidan and beating of students and journalists by *Berkut* militia forces in Kyiv. This also marked the first escalation of protest repertoires and increase in militia violence, and protests grew in size until mid December. The third wave of protests began after the announcement of the anti-protest laws on 16 January by the *Verhovniya Rada* (parliament) making it illegal to protest and lasted until 19 January. Some protesters, who were organized in smaller groups of *Sotni* (groups of 100), employed more violent repertoires. The state escalated their repressions, and included army and special forces militia who used live ammunition, resulting in four deaths. The most violent encounters took place on Hrushevsky street approximately 600 meters from the *Maidan*, while other protest zones remained relatively peaceful throughout. This phase particularly saw the diffusion of protests, including regional direct action campaigns, road blockades and government building takeovers, to the east and south of the country (Onuch and Sasse 2014b). The fourth and final wave of mass repression began on 18 February, when the regime attempted to clear the Maidan in a military operation

including snipers employing live ammunition. This final phase of protests and violence ended only with the fleeing of Yanukovich to Crimea, and a storming of the presidential administration in Kyiv.

In the case of the Orange Revolution most analyses agree that, while planning for protest events took several months, activists and opposition mobilization was launched around the time of the first round of presidential elections on 21 October (Beissinger 2013; Bunce and Wolchik 2007; Nikolayenko 2007; Onuch 2014a). There is also a general level of agreement that the protests turned into a moment of mass mobilization around 23 November 2004 (after the official announcement of the 21 November fraudulent election results) and ended on or close to 27 December following the re-run of the second round of the presidential elections and the election of Viktor Yushchenko as President (26 December). Thus, the 'Orange Revolution' lasted approximately around two months. While the general duration of the protests is similar, it is certain that for the first month of the 'Orange Revolution', the protests could not be counted as either large protests or mass mobilization, for it was not until 23 November that 'ordinary' Ukrainians joined in the protests *en masse*, whereas this escalation and expansion of participants happened at a much faster rate in 2013. Moreover, while the beginning of the longer mobilization process in 2004 could be traced back to at least January/March 2004, when SMO networks began actively coordinating protest groups and a plan of action for the fall election, little if any evidence today, shows that activists and the opposition were anticipating the protests. Thus, one could argue that while the mass mobilization component and the crisis resulting from the EuroMaidan lasted longer, the mobilization process was much longer and as we will see below better coordinated in 2004 than in 2013/2014. While we are unable to fully explore this longer mobilization process in this chapter, for a more detailed analysis of the different waves and phases of mobilization in 2004 see Onuch (2014a) and of the 2013/2014 mobilization see (Onuch and Sasse 2014a, 2014b).

#### *Where: in the cities*

When scholars of Ukrainian politics first saw the amassing crowds in the *Maidan Nezalezhnosti* (independence square) in the centre of Kyiv, it was assumed that the 2013 protest was a mini-Orange Revolution, one BBC world newscaster stated in his report that it was striking how it was "the same square, same time of year, [and] same city" (BBC Reporter, December 1, 2013). Within days activists erected a stage at the base of the statue of independence adorning the southern section of the *Maidan* and also set up tents with food and medical supplies. From the stage, activists and politicians made speeches and musicians sang songs. The

same thing happened in Lviv and several smaller west Ukrainian towns and cities. The space in which protest took place was symbolic and historically important, connecting the past struggles to the current one.

Alas, there were crucial differences in the spatiality of the EuroMaidan protests as compared to the 'Orange Revolution' from the very beginning. Namely, in most cities and towns (including Kyiv), there were at least two competing (but not in opposition to each other) meeting spaces or protest locations. Sometimes these would be situated in the same square, but at times in different locations of city entirely. One location would be the activist, journalist, student and or self-organized community location, and the other, was chosen and used mainly by opposition parties and their immediate supporters. In Kyiv the former group was, from the very first day, based in the *Maidan Nezalezhnomy* and the second group was at first based in the *Evropeiska Ploshcha* (European Plaza) some 900 meters eastward. Once the protests united (in Kyiv this took place over several days between 24 and 27 of November), the squares were still portioned off into different zones. Each group or stakeholder involved had developed their distinct protest areas. Thus, from the very beginning even the physical space of the protest zones showed divisions between different groups of actors. For instance, the often referred to, and now rebranded into a political party *Pravyi Sektor* (Right Sektor) was well into mid December simply a location in the *Maidan* protest zone. It was the right-hand corner of the *Maidan*, where a variety of SMOs, Parties (some within right-wing networks, but not all) and individuals, who were willing to take part in front line protest activities, and provide security to the other protesters would meet (see image 1). The spatiality of the protest zones was important as it allowed for different groups, with different approaches to and aims of protest, carve out their own version of the EuroMaidan.

Image 1 Photo of the Meeting Place of the Maidan Initially Called The Right Sector



[Insert Image 1 Here]

(Picture taken on 29, November 2013, Copy Right: Ukrainian Protest Project, Olga Onuch and Tamara Martseniuk 2013)

While, during the Orange Revolution, the *Maidan* was also divided between different groups, and some would argue zones, there was one united (even if temporarily) coalition of activist and party coordinators from the very beginning of the protests. In 2004, as explained by the coordinators themselves, the different networks of activists and political opposition forces cooperated, coordinated and even signed a formal deal in 2004 (Vladyslav Kaskiv, yellow Pora activist and National Deputy Pora Party, 4/19/2008, Kyiv; Volodymyr Viatrovych, black Pora activist, 7/10/2007, Zoloti Vorota, Kyiv; Yevhen Zolotariov, yellow Pora and human rights activist, 7/9/2008, Kyiv). Whereas in 2013 the coordination and cooperation was complicated and highly conflictual. This was specifically the case between activist networks and politicians, but also a problem between different generations of activists (author's interview unnamed student activist, February 25, 2014). Thus, while the stage scenery and the general theatre of the EuroMaidan and the 'Orange Revolution' seemed similar, the divisions were physically visible in the architecture of the 2013/2014 *Maidan*. The lack of

coordination between the actors, as well as the prominence of self-organized 'ordinary' citizens, altered the boundaries of the contentious performance.

*Where: In the country*

Beyond this, subtle shift in the spatiality of the protests at the local level, there was a more important expansion and extension of protests at the national level, in Ukraine in 2013/14. While we know that protest participation did differ regionally, unlike the 'Orange Revolution', which was most certainly a centre and west Ukraine phenomenon, the EuroMaidan was a national phenomenon, even if the largest protest events were still taking place in the centre and west of the country. From the very first weekend we observed small protest events in large cities in Crimea, Odessa, Donetsk, Kharkiv and even Donetsk among other east and southern Oblasts (Onuch and Sasse 2014b). These protest events also took place in the central squares and outside of local government buildings, but they took place in cities and towns that rarely saw protest events since independence, but also in places considered to be strongholds of the Party of Regions and Viktor Yanukovich supporters. Thus, meaning protest spread to places where the risks involved with protesting were even higher than in Kyiv, as protesters knew that the level of support for the regime was higher. It is this geographic diffusion of protest events that was one of the most interesting and novel aspects of the EuroMaidan protests.

Historically Ukrainian activists hail from all parts of Ukraine, and there have been four regionally based activist *tusovky* (cliques or networks) that I have described as 'islands of contention' (Lviv in the west, Kyiv in the Centre, Kharkiv in the East, and Odessa in the south). But, protests by non-activists, or 'ordinary' Ukrainians were and are a rare occurrence in much of the east and south of the country. Even during the 'Orange Revolution', while there were instances of mobilization in east and south, these were flash points and exceptions. In the case of the EuroMaidan the diffusion of the protests, to other parts of the country were instantaneous, and occurred in three waves. The first wave of protest event diffusion began around the weekend of 24 November. These protests were quite small and generally self organized locally, only some were coordinating with local party offices, typically BYuT, Udar and Svoboda (while most have been taken down, on 29 November 2013, the author counted 38 initial groups, events and fan pages related to regional EuroMaidan protests on V Kontakte alone). The second wave of diffusion, followed the 30 November repressions by Berkut. With the expansion of the central protest claims to include universal civic and human rights, the continued diffusion of protest events to the regions was even more

pronounced and the protests grew significantly in size. The third wave took place between 17 January and 18 February, and saw the expansion of radical and direct action repertoires to regions, including government building takeovers and the increase of *Leninopads* (the demolishing of Lenin Statues). While local activists and opposition parties did coordinate some of these events, most were self-organized by local citizens. This was made clear by the images of shawl wearing grannies who stumbled into local government buildings, with their plastic carrier bags, along side hoodie wear youths, and both refused to leave the building in protest. One live news transmission from such a take over in *Kryviy Rih*, showed one elderly woman who explained "I do not know how to protest, you can take your protest, I am not interested, I am a citizen and I am not leaving until Yanukovych resigns." While, a more scientific analysis focusing solely on this geographic diffusion is necessary, it is clear that people, who never protested before, in places, that have not seen much if any protest since independence, were a key aspect of the EuroMaidan mobilizations.

Furthermore, in terms of the geographic landscape of the EuroMaidan, beyond the diffusion of protest events from the centre outwards, what is yet to be adequately documented and impossible to do in the space of this chapter, is that there was a great deal of protester migration throughout the country (author's interview with unnamed *Maidan* activist, Kyiv February 22, 2014). And while it is assumed that most of these migrants came, like during the 'Orange Revolution' from western oblasts to Kyiv, activists have explained - as was supported by findings of the Protester Participant Survey conducted by the author - that there was a significant portion of protesters coming from central and eastern oblasts. Moreover, many of the most radical protesters, including the leaders of the Pravyi Sektor, came from eastern oblasts (Dmytro Yarosh himself, and many of his closest colleagues hail from *Dnipropetrovsk*). Again this is a departure from 2004, when the leaders of the *yellow* and *black Pora's*, all came from western and central oblasts. Thus, a distinguishing aspect of the EuroMaidan, its trajectory and outcome, is how important and involved the eastern based SMO networks and 'ordinary' Ukrainians became in mobilization process, as compared to 2004.

#### *How many?*

The size and scale of protests in 2004 and 2013/2014 is comparable. At their height approximately 800, 000 people took part in the protest in Kyiv and close to 1.5 million across all of Ukraine. Depending on the time period, and location the protest participant counts range quite a bit. Recent work by Centre for the Study of Society, which has counted protests and estimated their size, is a good

reference (Roman Hankevych 2014). Alas, as noted by the Centre, it is not the size of the largest protests that distinguishes the EuroMaidan from the 'Orange Revolution' for instance by the number of protests events and incidents that took place over the three month period which is estimated at just under 4000 individual protest events actions, by the Centre for the Study of Society in Ukraine. This rate of protest events is likely to also be may be connected to both the lack of coordination between different types of actors and protesters, the geographic diffusion and self-organized nature of the many of the protest events. It is these actors, and their role in the mobilization process that we will turn to in the below section.

### *Actors involved in EuroMaidan mobilization process*

While identifying the dates, waves, boundaries, frequency, size and location of the protests is useful to help us come to grips with the phenomenon we are analysing, the next step requires us to examine which actors contributed to making of the EuroMaidan, at what point in time and how. In other comparative cross-regional research I have identified four types of actors that are integral to the mass mobilization process: activists and SMOs, political elite, 'ordinary' citizens, and foreign actors. Each type of actor can also be subdivided. For instance, activists and SMOs can be made up diverse and even competing networks and 'ordinary' citizens can represent broad cross-section of society or can be limited to a particular sub-group or electorate. Importantly politico-economic elite should be divided between those considered to be 'in power' (strongly linked to the regime), and those 'in opposition' (with no or few ties to the regime). And finally foreign actors, can include supranational institutions, individual states, their foreign leaders, politicians and bureaucrats, but also foreign activists and SMOs, journalists and citizens from neighbouring countries or expats and diasporas living abroad.

The three central theses identified above also focus on particular actors in their analysis of Ukrainian and other east European mobilizations: foreign actors - be they politicians, activists or financiers - can spark, guide and manipulate the mobilization process ; in the end mobilization is an elite game, defections of, and deals by, the political economic elite are central to explaining the trajectory and outcome of mobilization ; and since civil society is very weak, the people in the streets are those who get swept up by either emotions, partisanship and/or ethno nationalism and thus, do not represent a broad cross-cleavage spectrum of society (Beissinger 2013; Howard 2003; Kuzio 2010; Popescu 2012). Engaging with these frameworks, I will briefly investigate of the roles of the different sets

of actors in the 2004 and 2013/14 mobilizations, and identify key differences which can help us explain the different trajectories and outcomes of these two mobilizations.

### *Activists and SMOs*

While a scientific and detailed process-tracing of the different activists, SMOs and other organization networks involved in the mobilization process is not possible here, based on a small sample of interviews with activists, I will seek to identify trends and patterns of activist mobilization in 2013/14. It is clear that unlike in 2004 were at least two SMOs, the *black* and *yellow Poras*, became household names, no such SMO took centre stage during the EuroMaidan. Nonetheless, activists stressed that several *tusovky* (cliques or networks) of activists and SMOs involved in coordinating the protest events, and specifically the *Maidan* in 2013/14 were continuations or revivals of SMOs active in 2004 and 2010. They were brought together under umbrella groups like *Hromadskyi Sektor* (Civic Sector), *Opora* (Resistance), *Chesno* (Honest), Coordinating Committee Maidan, *Zhinocha Sotniya* (Women's 100, Squadron), *Avto Maidan* (Car Maidan), *Samo Oborona* (Self Defence), and *Pravyi Sektor* (Right Sector). Moreover, self-organization was not only a phenomenon among 'ordinary' citizens, it was also a phenomenon among activists who broke off from organized groups and launched their own activities. Unlike in 2004, when in order to be an activist you had to join a network, this time activists create new networks around their aims, strategies and tactics for revolution. Much like in 2004 (as well as in past mobilization like Ukraine Without Kuchma) the boundaries between journalist and activist networks and *tusovky* were heavily blurred. Mustafa Nayem, a well know journalist was identified as on of the key initiators of the protests. The rise of internet TV and internet journalism (including Spilno.TV, Hromadske.TV, Espresso.TV, RadioSovoba.TV, among others) seemed to have an activist flair, presenters used protest rhetoric in live 24 hour news coverage, and former activists, including some former coordinators of *yellow* and *black Pora* activities, were the camera operators stationed in the *Maidan*. For this reason, for the purpose of this discussion, I group these two types of actors together. For a more detailed analysis of the media, see Dyczok's analysis in this volume and elsewhere (Dyczok and Gaman-Golutvina 2009; Dyczok 2014).

While it initially seemed as though activists did not play a key role in the 2013/14 mobilization (as compared to the branded and flag waving *yellow* and *black Poras* in 2004), most insiders (journalists, politicians, local diplomats and 'ordinary' citizens interviewed) highlight the role of activist/journalists- specifically in framing protest claims, sparking the initial mobilization and then in later acting

as connectors and intermediaries, between self-organized ordinary citizens, smaller activist groups, and politicians. Be it through tweets and Facebook posts, open letters and articles, or simply being the first to camp out in the Maidan, several small *tusovky* of activist/journalists were directly responsible for creating the space and opportunity for greater mobilization. In his Facebook post, Nayem and others, framed the non-signing of the EU association agreement as illegitimate and a violation of democratic rights (author's interview with unnamed journalist/politician, December 17, 2013). Yet, insiders have also explained early on, in December 2013, that it was this willingness of certain politicians and journalist/activists to take on the role of 'leaders', without a pre-arranged agreement, that divided the SMO networks before they could even begin to coordinate. Activists repeatedly point out that, "while in 2004 the leaders found common ground, in 2013 the SMO networks ...[were] fragmented and lacked cooperation, making much of the coordination and mobilization... much more complicated" (author's interview with unnamed Civic Network Activist, November 30, 2013). Activists have stated that even though the majority of SMO leaders in 2013/14 were key figures from past mobilizations and played active leadership roles in 2004, they not only had to quickly coordinate with other activists, but also with a new generation of university/student activists and networks. These two process of uniting activists and incorporating student networks into one common and coordinated plan of action, which in 2004 took months of preparation, had to take less than a few days in 2013. And even with the greater speed at which this could be done, using social media and the internet, it is because there were schisms at the activist leadership, SMO and politician levels, this process was still much slower and created opportunities for alternative sub groups to form.

Insiders have explained, that while activist leaders were able to rely on pre-existing (weak and loose) network ties, there were instantaneous conflicts and disagreements on how to proceed with the protests. This was further hampered by some individuals' willingness to take the spotlight, as well as, the opposition politicians' struggle to coordinate their own efforts. One former *yellow Pora* activist who played an important role in the EuroMaidan coordinating committee, explained that these differences of "how to mobilize, were the outcome of disappointments after 2004" (author's interview with unnamed activist, December 16, 2013). She explained that "some [activists] stressed that we should... prepare for a violent revolution, others did not want to cooperate with politicians... making it difficult to coordinate the protests and keep the peace" (author's interview with unnamed activist, December 16, 2013). She explained that these sentiments were not simply born out of, or in reaction to, as some

Ukrainian pundits want to promote, the regime's use of violence. The fragmentation of activists and the rise of violence "was not simply a cause and effect story, that is too simplistic", these ideas of violent revolution have been "developing over several years." Nonetheless, as she explained, these tactics were in some activists eyes certainly "legitimized, when the regime repressed those students and journalists on November 30<sup>th</sup>." Other long-time and experienced activists explained that the coordinating committee and 'old guard' activist leaders could not prevent sub-groups, who promoted the use violence and destabilized the situation from forming, because there was no clear idea where this mobilization should end. Unlike in 2004, when the aim was to prevent further *Kuchmizm* and thus, elect Viktor Yushchenko, the goal of the EuroMaidan protests was not clear, and shifted over time. Thus, it was difficult for activists to coordinate, specifically if different SMOs represented constituencies with different long-term interests including everything, from signing the EU association agreements, to the ouster of Yanukovych, to an ethno-nationalist agenda.

#### *Foreign actors*

In both 2004 and 2013/2014, foreign actors played an important role in the mobilization process. While in the two-year period leading up to 2004, Ukrainian activists could rely on funds and training from foreign Inter and Non Governmental Organizations (IGOs and NGOs) and grant giving bodies, making foreign actors of this kind important but still not definitive in the mobilization process. In 2013, the protests were triggered by a foreign policy issue, thus making the EU, its institutions and member states key actors in the mobilization process, specifically in its trajectory and outcome. Foreign NGOs and IGOs did indeed provide some small levels of support to several independent news groups, and SMOs in 2013, but this was clearly *ad hoc* and recipient actioned. Moreover, as was explained by one Kyiv based embassy worker, most foreign actors, be they diplomats or NGOs focused on elite actors and attempted to help broker a deal (author's correspondence February 14, 2014, NYC). Ukrainian political insiders, have informally also complained about the lack of initial interest and then later mismanagement of the EuroMaidan crisis specifically by leaders of the EU (and EU member states) and the United States. Thus it is difficult to discern the real influence these actors had on the mobilization process.

It is possible, as I have argued elsewhere, that our focus on foreign actors oftentimes over-exaggerates not only their role in the mobilization process, but also their ability to influence actors and events. Yet, it is also possible, and more

likely, that in 2013/2014, as opposed to Kuchma in 2004, the Yanukovych regime less concerned with the 'west'. The EU and US lacked any credible 'sticks' to threaten and punish, or 'carrots' to lure-in the administration. Furthermore, the regime was more heavily influenced by, or perhaps even dependent on Russia and Putin by the time the EuroMaidan began. Moreover, unlike in 2004, the Yanukovych regime was not composed of a broad coalition of interests, and thus had greater freedom 'not' to negotiate with EU and US diplomats. Equally likely, the western powers, as was demonstrated by the infamously leaked tapes, were only beginning to figure out who from the opposition side, is 'their horse in the race,' at least in the first few weeks, unlike in 2004 with a clear political leader, it was not certain who to back in 2013 ("Leaked Ukraine Call Embarrasses US" 2014). This brings us to the role politico-economic elite, both in power and in opposition and their role in the mobilization process.

#### *Politico-economic elite*

By 2013, it was clear that the Yanukovych regime was very different from the one managed and coordinated by Kuchma, a decade prior. Yanukovych's was a regime composed of only a small inner circle of family, friends, and business associates. The immediate party in power was made up of a clientelist network that heavily relied on intertwined patronage and nepotism, making it less susceptible to initial defections, and lessened the likelihood of interlocutors. In fact the first signs of defections were Tyhipko leaving the party Bloc and L'iovochkin, informally resigning, both men seen as to the Donbas clan. This immediate buffer also made it easier for Yanukovych to resist most of the foreign pressure to step down. In part due to this insulation, and in part due to differing world views, it has been suggested by insiders, that Yanukovych was more able and willing to use repressive force, something insiders have said Kuchma was reluctant to do in 2004 (author's interview with unnamed, Kuchma Presidential Administration insider 2, 2/7/2010). Thus, the regime was stronger and qualitatively different from Kuchma's semi-authoritarian rule.

Furthermore, the party in opposition was nowhere near as united and coherent as they were in 2004. The divisions, visible conflicts and differing policy aims of key opposition party leaders, Yatseniuk, Klitchko and Tyahnybok also made any coordination difficult. As one Yanukovych administration insider explained, "they could not pose a legitimate political threat, they could not easily win an election, they were too different" (author's telephone interview unnamed former Yanukovych administration insider, January 28, 2014). As was explained in an informal meeting with a former SUB insider in 2012, the post 2010 opposition had few insiders within the regime that they could speak to, there were almost

no interlocutors, meaning that they would also not be able to prevent or stop the November repressive attack on protesters. Unlike the formal agreements made between the opposition in 2004, the initial lack of coordination and inability to stop the use of violence, resulted in a 'coalition of inconvenience'. Moreover, the party in opposition also struggled to coordinate with activists and SMOs. Not only was the regime stronger and more willing to engage in violence, the opposition was weak disoriented, and for the most part incapable of coordinating with, let alone controlling, the *Maidan*. This is a sharp contrast to 2004, when Yushenko's Our Ukraine Party, had near total control of the *Maidan* in December and in-fact co-opted much of the activists' and 'ordinary' citizens' mobilization as their own.

*'Ordinary' citizens: the median protester*

Out of all the actors involved in mass mobilization, it is the 'ordinary' citizens that are the most interesting. It is still puzzling to political scientists, why these generally disengaged individuals, join the activists and the political opposition *en masse*. While in 2004 there is a clear partisan cleavage which dominated the *Maidan*, the story is much more complex in 2013/2014. As the claims shifted from seeking greater association with the EU, to the protection basic civic and human rights, the participants in the protests came to represent a much broader cross-class, cross-cleavage coalition. Accordingly, in 2013/14 the average age of protesters surveyed was 36, the slight majority were men 59%. While 82% chose their mother tongue to be Ukrainian, and 12% chose Russian, 69% identified Ukrainian as their main language for communicating in their private lives and 22% identified Russian. Thus we can say that approximate just under, one quarter of respondents were predominantly russophones. According to the 2001 Census, this is representative of the general population in central Ukraine. Moreover, the majority of protesters surveyed were employed and had at least full secondary and some tertiary education.

According to our findings as part of the Ukrainian protest Protect, the 2013/14 protesters could be subdivided into three broad groups: the students and youth under 29; the working middle aged between the ages of 30-49; and the retirees and those over the age of 50. The youth and students called themselves the initiators of the protest, and said they sought abstract goals such as "freedom" and "a 'real' democracy." They reported being frustrated with their parents' generation for permitting the failure of democracy in Ukraine. The middle aged group saw themselves as the 'most important' protesters because they were 'workers' and 'voters' who were integral to winning elections and keeping the economy running. They explained that "unlike the students", they could not be

ignored because of this political and economic power. They were more focused on concrete claims, such as economic security, being able to travel to the EU, and after 30 November the illegitimacy of the Regime's use of repression. The final group to which, the "grandparents and retirees," saw themselves as the "guardians of the *Maidan*." This group of protesters, explained that unlike others, "less to loose" by standing out in the *Maidan*, they did not need to go to work, they had no children to take care of at home, and thus, it was their responsibility to stand out on the *Maidan*.

The preliminary results of our protest participant study coincide with findings from surveys and focus groups conducted after the 2004 mass mobilization. Namely, in rapid interviews, EuroMaidan protesters, like the participants of the 2004 protests, employed the rhetoric of rights in a profound and eloquent manner to describe the central motivating factor behind their mobilization. Protesters, were also able to identify the 30 November repression and the official announcement of electoral fraud as the moments when they "realized that this could happen to anyone and everyone..." (Rapid interview conducted onsite December 1, 2013 Kyiv). In 2013 even previous supporters of the Party of Regions explained in rapid interviews, that they understood this repression and infringement of rights could affect all citizens equally, where as they explained that in 2004 this same pressing necessity did not occur to most supporters of regime parties. She explained that "anyone who had internet and saw the videos stopped being a BYuT or Party of Regions supporter, and became a citizen" (rapid interview conducted onsite December 1, 2013 Kyiv). Furthermore, a review and comparison of focus group discussions conducted by the author with participants of the 'Orange Revolution' show also a distinction in how the claims were framed. In 2004 the protesters focused on civic rights (the focal point being a stolen election would explain this) whereas in 2013 the majority of protesters seemed to focus on first human rights, then socio-economic rights and then civic rights. The immediacy of the violence shifted the demands. As described by the protesters, the diversity and expansion of claims to broader ideas of basic human rights, combined with the ease of social media sharing, and the legitimacy of self-organization, seems to have brought a wider mix of people to the protests then in 2004.

#### *An expanding protestorate?*

While general participation and membership in civic organizations, unions, political parties among those surveyed is quite low, surprisingly only 63% participated in 'Orange Revolution'. Even if we account for all those who were too young to actively participant in the 'Orange Revolution' a significant portion

of our survey respondents were first time participants or 'novices'. This fact, coupled with our knowledge that the protests were larger in size and much more diffused through the entire country than during the 'Orange Revolution', points to an interesting phenomenon of an expanding *protestorate*. Moreover, it does seem that among the participants just under one tenth voted previously for the Party of Regions or for Yanukovich in past elections. Meaning that these protesters can not be simply understood as blindly partisan, but rather represent the type of middleclass, swing voter dynamic that we have observed in other countries. One could argue that not only does the EuroMaidan median protester point to an expanding *protestorate* but also to a more democratic cosmopolitan voter who will take away their political support if they deem a politician leader or party have broken their end of the electoral contract. A finding that can be further explored through electoral surveys and post election focus groups. Needless to say, the self-organizing 'ordinary' Ukrainians, are the central to the distinctions between 2004 and 2013/14. While in 2004 there were some examples of this, there was simply more grassroots self organization in 2013/14. Now that we have better a understanding of the protest events and the actors involved we can briefly address the four themes that have been relentlessly discussed in the media and in recent analyses: ethno-linguistic claims, violent repertoires, the rise of the right and social media.

***Protest claims then and now: foreign policy, civic and ethno-linguistic claims***

Recent news coverage has focused heavily on the ethno-linguistic and ethno-nationalist component in the EuroMaidan (Higgins 2014; "Pro-West Protesters Defy Riot Police, Shiver in Ukraine's Snowy Capital" 2013, "The Eastern Wall" 2014). By saying things like protesters were "mostly Ukrainian-speakers," these news reports are trying to link ethno-linguistic issues and identity with protester discontent. The reality is that *most* Ukrainians according to both state and private statistics are in fact Ukrainian speakers (2001 Census stated that 65% of the total population are Ukrainian speakers). Ukrainian ethno linguistic identities in are complex, fluid and generally poor predictors of political behaviour, and that rather region, has more explanatory power in this regard (Sasse 2010). The analysis of Ukrainian activism through the prism of ethno-linguistic identity is not new and was best explained for the case of the 'Orange Revolution' by Beissinger (Beissinger 2013). When we compare past focus group discussion and recent rapid interviews, it is certain that in 2004 identity had a greater influence on claims and protesters more generally than in 2013/14. Furthermore, If we compare the digital documentation of protest posters as displayed on the Maidan in 2004 and 2013/14, we see fewer references to language and ethnic identity

issues in 2013/14, and we can observe more Russian language posters than in the past.

Moreover, the mobilization on a foreign policy issue (i.e.: the signing of the Association Agreement) was also somewhat novel in Ukraine. In the past we only saw smaller protests in the past with an anti-Russia and anti-Nato focus (“В Центрі Києва Протестують Проти НАТО” 2008, “На Майдані Триває Акція Протесту Проти НАТО” 2005). When our research team spoke to protesters, they did not actually discuss their demand in foreign policy or geopolitical terms but rather in terms of socio-economic rights that would be protected by signing the agreements and the illegitimacy and lack of accountability of the Yanukovich government by going back on a promise of closer ties with the EU (“Yanukovich Promises Reforms to EU” 2010). Nonetheless, the media’s focus on the ‘divided’ Ukraine overlooked the fact that in both 2004 and even more so in 2013/14, the majority of the posters focus on the Regimes’ corruption, on the fact that Yanukovich is a criminal, and that the ‘bandits must go’. If it were not for the striking difference that the Yushchenko campaigns orange and the EU flag’s sky blue that also adorned many of these posters, it would be hard to identify the year of the protest. Thus, while a minority of protesters seem to be pre-occupied with ethno-linguistic issues, we have actually observed an expansion of protest claims in 2013/14, but the majority of protesters, as in 2004 demanding civic rights and protections.

### *Expansion in protest repertoires: the rise of violence*

Although for the most part there seems to be much continuity between 2004 and 2013/14, the use of extreme violence both by the regime and by the protesters is a substantial departure from a long history of the non-violent repertoires by dissidents, activists and opposition parties. I have previously, mapped out the history of activism and SMO networks in Ukraine, from the 1960s onwards, dissidents and activists have described a calculated effort to abstain from violent repertoires. They preached a philosophy of change through non-violent action to several generations starting with the *sixtiers*, *Rukh*, the Revolution of Granite, the Ukraine without Kuchma (which saw only some direct action repertoires) all the way to the ‘Orange Revolution’. The majority of activists, interviewed in the past took their practice of non-violent repertoires of protest seriously. In one past conversation with former leaders of *black* and *yellow Poras*, when they painstaking explained the tactics to prevent protest violence, and they also prevented further escalation of regime repression. In focus groups it was remarkable how activists described their self-restraint and refusal to use violent

tactics at any cost (Activist focus group Ukraine #2, yellow Pora, (men only), 8/5/2007, Lviv). As one activists noted “ any act of vandalism, drunken disorder, what ever can give the militia an excuse to put us all in jail” (Ostap Kryvdyk, yellow Pora activist and journalist, 7/18/2007, Kyiv). Non-violence was a religion that all activists had to swear by during the ‘Orange Revolution’.

Such highly experienced activists were met with frustration, in 2013/14, that they “were unable to control the activists, the crowds and the provocateurs” and thus unable to stop the spread of violence (author’s interview with unnamed Civic Network Activist 2, November 30, 2013). Still, violent repertoires spread among a minority of the more radical protesters, these participants were often at the front lines of protests and their actions and the most violent events were highly visible and media fodder. This does not mean that this escalation to a ‘Molotov revolution’ did not occur, it did, but images of fighters, fire walls and masked young men, did not, and do not represent the larger groups that turned out well into February to join the evening demonstrations in city squares.

Still, this shift in the repertoires of Ukrainian protest should be concerning, if not only because the activists were previously so opposed to such activities. It is odd for many activists in Ukraine to learn from Ketchley (2014), that Egyptian protesters used Ukrainian videos on how to make Molotov-cocktails. But as many have explained it was their lack of coordination and control over the protest events that allowed the spread of violent repertoires. This brings us to ask who sparked the used of violent repertoires, and who was able to gain prominence through it.

### *The rise of the right and divisive nature of the protests*

Ukrainians have voiced recent focus group discussions that the EuroMaidan was divisive and in some citizen’s eyes did more damage than good. The violent repertoires and violent repression employed by the state together, helped divide the country, they said. Yet, the clear focus of the of western (and Russian) media coverage of the protests from mid January onwards was not only on the escalating violence, but also on the right-wing groups, who were increasingly branded as the dominant groups of the *Maidan* (see: Darden and Way 2014). This focus on ‘Banderite’ ‘nationalists’, would provide even greater opportunity for dividing the Ukrainian population. Dyczok in her recent analyses has explained how the media used these competing images and developed fear of the enemies next door, be it they violent Banderites or the repressive Berkut (Dyczok 2014).

The central focus has been on an entity called the *Pravyi Sektor* (Right Sector). As noted above, while currently a formalized political party, this was a coalition of several ring-wing and nationalist groups, but also of individuals who wanted to participate in the security and frontline activities (author's interview with unnamed *Pravyi Sektor* activist, February 10, 2014). Some of the participants, including the leaders, were long time members of organizations like *Tryzub* (Trident), the Ukrainian National Assembly–Ukrainian National Self Defence (UNA–UNSO), Patriots of Ukraine, the Social-National Assembly, *Karpatska Sich* (Carpathian Sich), *Volia* (Freedom) and *Bilyi Molot* (White Hammer), but others had and have no organizational affiliation. While Darden and Way, pointed to these organizations west Ukrainian origins, the leader of *Pravyi Sektor* Dmytro Yarosh was from Dnipropetrovsk, as were several other coordinators of *Pravyi Sektor*. It was *Pravyi Sektor*, the party, and Dmytro Yarosh, the politician, which have gained the most of the spread of violent repertoires and the prominent focus on right-wing groups in media. How new was this 'rise of right'?

There are and have been right wing groups in Ukraine since independence. There is a lack of evidence that would help understand if these groups and participation in them is on the rise or if it has actually stayed consistent. While observations of the rise of right-wing groups are not yet confirmed through a systematic analysis, we saw in recent elections that these groups were unable to attract any real electoral support.

If we compare the role of right-wing organizations in past protest, events it is certain individuals who were participants of organizations like *Tryzub* (Trident), the Ukrainian National Assembly–Ukrainian National Self Defence (UNA–UNSO), *Ukrainske Bratstvo* (Ukrainian Brotherhood) among others, even took top leadership positions in the SMOs active in 2004. Thus, it would be difficult to say that this is a new element. Insiders also disagree that this portion of participants grew between 2004 and 2013 (author's interview with unnamed *Pravyi Sektor* activist, February 10, 2014). But their taking centre stage, and their use of radical, direct action and violent tactics certainly has changed significantly. One activist explained that "there was more discipline among activists and party organizers in 2004, but with the rise of the internet, the ability of anyone to create their own group/protest event, the control of the situation by activists declined and so did their ability to stay disciplined" (author's interview with unnamed Civic Network Activist, November 30, 2013). He reminded me of a conversation we had in Kyiv in the summer of 2009, when activists were preparing for the 2010 Presidential Elections, "back then people were saying, we failed in 2004, we need to start a armed revolution... with the disarray of 'self-organization' they got

their opportunity to do this.” Thus, pointing out yet again, that disorganization and a lack of coordination among the opposition and activist networks created the opportunity for the rise of right-wing elements to prominence. A fate that was prevent in 2004.

*New technologies, social media and samo-orhanizatsia (self-organization)*

Finally, we turn to the Facebook, Vkontakte and self-organization phenomenon of the EuroMaidan. It is not clear if self-organization was high because of social media or if social media use was higher because of a high propensity for self-organization. But in the case of 2013/14, the two went hand in hand. Yet, while lauded as a solution to collective action problems, aiding the spread of information and democratizing protest, as pointed out by the civic sector activist above, there can be drawbacks to ‘selfies’ on social media, and ‘self-organization’ more broadly.

Using rapid interviews and survey, I have found that social media was not mobilizing in itself. It is clear from initial findings that social networks, specifically friendship networks (participants attended the protest with close friends and family members), were integral to getting people out to the streets. This does not mean that social media was not influential, it certainly was and by all accounts from the protest participants it was an important *tool* for information dissemination and coordination. While twitter, was predominantly used by activists, organizers, politicians and practitioners, it was Facebook and Vkontakte was used by ‘ordinary’ citizens, who would create their own pages, groups and events related to the EuroMaidan protests. This was particularly important in the regions, where people who could not easily access information, were able to instantaneously access information about the protests. Moreover social media works in a different manner to internet media, you do not need to know where to look to the get the information because your Vkontakte or Facebook news feed lets you know that your friends are reading certain articles, watching certain internet news sites and going to certain events. Even so, you needed people to created the posters and events, which would be shared. It was also far too easy to simply like and share an item and feel like one as already participated, made a difference, where as physical bodies in the square were the real protest, and not only changing one’s profile picture. Social media activity was also seen as safe, free of risks for the most part. Yet, it exposed activists to regime repression, by making them easily identifiable. Moreover, the spread of photoshop-ed and aggressive propaganda also created opportunities for the spread of violence. Thus, while social media may have had a democratizing effect as noted by one

activist “there is a dark side to social media... you can safely voice radical views... you can spread misinformation... and just like it was a space to battle regime propaganda, it also allowed opponents of the EuroMaidan to demonize us” (author’s interview unnamed student activist, February 25, 2014).

Several activists explained that they also saw the self-organization and social media-fication of the EuroMaidan, as contributing to the problem of a lack of coordination and inability to promote discipline and non-violent tactics. Some explained in interviews that they believe that this rise in Facebook activism, has also contributed to the rise of the right and escalation of violence. While further analysis is necessary, and the causal directionality of the relationship is still unknown it is certain that we can see a pattern developing. One that could be test in Ukraine, but also in other mass mobilization contexts internationally.

### *Conclusions: directions for further study*

While the initial impression of the 2004 and 2013/2014 protests leads us to believe that the two events were very similar this chapter has identified key differences. First while the mass mobilization component and the crisis resulting from the EuroMaidan lasted for a longer period of time, the general mobilization process was much longer better coordinated and better planned in 2004 than in 2013/2014. Physically, the protest site also differed in how they were run. Each group or stakeholder involved had developed their distinct protest areas. Thus, from the very beginning even the physical space of the protest zones showed divisions and lack of coordination between different groups of actors. It was argued that the spatiality of the difference in the protest zones was important as it allowed for diverse groups, with different approaches to and aims of protest, carve out their own version of the EuroMaidan. Furthermore, the protests did mostly only take place in Kyiv and west Ukrainian cities as in the case of the 2004 – the protests were quickly diffused throughout the country and from the very beginning we could observe – albeit small – protest events in eastern and southern oblasts. It is hypothesized in this chapter that social media platforms specifically Facebook and VKontakte, aided in this diffusion process and specifically through the dissemination of valuable information through trusted channels. This is something that deserves further analysis by social media experts. Furthermore, the diffusion and geography of the protests can be better understood, through the employment of spatial analysis tools. While the actors involved in the two mass mobilization were generally the same (or appeared in in similar formulations), they were not adequately able to coordinate their activity. While this horizontality has been applauded by many observers and

activists alike, the lack of clear boundaries and leadership also allowed for radical voices the space to expand and even push the protesters to engage in violent repertoires of protest. This brings us to the last issue discussed in the chapter the extreme violent nature of the protests. Unlike in 2004, in 2013/2014, both the regime and the protesters engaged in violence. Unlike in 2004, the regime employed massive repressions and extreme force against the citizens of Ukraine. These were blatant violations of human rights, and undoubtedly stoked a more aggressive or desperate response from the protesters. Kuchma, unlike Yanukovich, was unwilling to use the state apparatus to repress protesters in 2004 – a deep analysis into the inner-workings of the two presidential administration will allow to better understand this process. But the use of violent repertoires was a significant shift among Ukrainian activists, who have long employed a variety of non-violent tactics. This is, in the author's opinion one of the most significant differences between 2004, when non-violence and protest management was a 'religion' among the SMO leaders, and quickly became uncontrollable in 2013/2014. The repercussions of this move to violent repertoires needs to be understood as contributing to the escalation in violence, and as having delegitimized the protests/protesters in some Ukrainians eyes. Recent focus group research conducted by the author demonstrates that Ukrainians believe that not only has the violence of the Maidan left a generation of Kyivians traumatized, has in the eyes of some participants provoked the division of Ukrainian society. The turn to violence by the regime and the continued escalation by the regime (and small group of protesters) will require study for many years to come, but also if we are to offer evidence based advice on how to unite the Ukrainian society, a deeper and sensitive understanding of those who participated in the violence will be necessary, in order to move forward.

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