

**PARTISAN POLITICS AND THE**  
**BRITISH FISCAL-MILITARY**  
**STATE, 1689-1713**

Submitted for DPhil in History  
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## **SHORT ABSTRACT**

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The rapid expansion in the size and effectiveness of the British fiscal-military state between 1689 and 1713 has been analysed by historians such as John Brewer and Michael Braddick as the outcome of increasingly impartial, rational and professional bureaucratic administration. Yet recent work on state formation in Britain and Europe has emphasised that effectiveness often arose from practices usually dismissed as inefficient or corrupt. This thesis provides a new paradigm by comparing fiscal-military structures to contemporary commercial enterprises, which functioned by coordinating the efforts of suppliers and buyers. Coordination was achieved in turn through mutual trust, which overcame principal-agent problems and reduced transaction costs. This thesis suggests that by analogy, those polities that could encourage cooperation and mutual trust between autonomous officials, agencies and private contractors enjoyed the greatest success as fiscal-military states.

In the mercantile or financial world trust was created through kinship and friendship, as well as common religious, ethnic or national identities, which contained inbuilt informal mechanisms for policing behaviour. This thesis examines the financing and supply of the British army in Ireland and Europe

between 1689 and 1713 to conclude that these elements also served to create trust within state structures, and that even political partisanship – normally dismissed as a disruptive, even destructive, influence – generated a community of shared political interests that encouraged trust and improved coordination. It also demonstrates that officials, politicians and financiers constructed politicised networks that interlocked efficiently with each other, permitting the improved coordination of public and private credit, and even informal financial intermediation intended to maintain the liquidity of the army's fiscal structures. It therefore concludes that the success of the British fiscal-military state during this period was the product of improved informal coordination rather than institutional change and bureaucratic reform, and that political partisanship was integral to this process.

## **LONG ABSTRACT**

'Partisan Politics and the British Fiscal-Military State, 1689-1713'

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Existing studies of state formation in early modern Britain and Europe have largely employed the paradigm of 'bureaucratisation', first developed by Max Weber: it is argued that as fiscal-military structures became more impartial, 'rational' and professional, they became more efficient. Failures, by contrast, are the product of inadequate or incomplete bureaucratisation, and corruption. John Brewer's study of the bureaucratising of the British fiscal-military state between 1688 and 1782 has defined all subsequent work, as has his argument that Parliament proved an aid rather than an obstruction to state formation since Parliamentary approval offered legitimacy that made bureaucratic reform acceptable. Later work has largely nuanced rather than fundamentally challenged his conclusions. Yet a closer study of British and European states between roughly 1660 and 1720 in the first chapter undermines this consensus. The effectiveness of European fiscal-military states shifted despite bureaucratic reform: the level of cooperation from local elites appears to be a far more effective barometer of eventual success in projecting power. It is therefore concluded that a new paradigm is necessary.

Modern research into early modern economic organisation provides such a paradigm. It stresses the vital importance of 'networks of trust' to success. Most

economic activity involved the coordination of resources – especially credit – across large distances, and by agents outside the immediate control of their principals. By employing trusted agents or building mutual confidence with counterparts, merchants could allow them increased commercial leeway, and access on more favourable terms the capital or credit needed to ride out fluctuations in supply and demand. Other spheres of economic activity, such as industry, retailing and finance, similarly relied upon networks of trusted contacts rather than formal, ‘rational’ institutions. Given that the activities of the fiscal-military state likewise involved the coordination of resources and credit, it is concluded that successful state formation can therefore similarly be analysed as a process of network- and trust-creation.

Trust within such networks was most frequently generated through an overlapping mixture of personal connections such as kinship, apprenticeship, or regional or religious origin, which provided cultural and social sanctions against misdealing. It was also generated through looser cultural communities that offered similar sanctions, such as friendship, commercial expectations, socio-cultural solidarity and even political ideology and allegiance. Notably, the most intensive period of state formation in Britain, between 1689 and 1713, coincided with an upsurge in ideological politics. The struggle between the tory and whig parties in Parliament and wider society created powerful ideological communities similar to regional or religious groupings, and likewise possessing informal sanctions and incentives that could create mutual trust. The thesis therefore examines how far state formation in Britain between 1689 and 1713 was the product of improved coordination created

by the closer cooperation arising from the colonisation of the fiscal-military infrastructure by partisan interests.

The second chapter examines the process of state formation within both Britain and Ireland during the invasion of Ireland by British forces under William III to dislodge the army of the deposed James II. Logistical failures in 1689 meant that the initial campaign was a costly fiasco. Its failure has usually been blamed upon the incompetence of John Shales, commissary-general of the provisions: the implication has been that if a professional, bureaucratic commissariat had existed then the supply of the army would have been carried out more efficiently. Yet closer examination demonstrates that Shales constructed an elaborate bureaucratic infrastructure. The commissariat instead failed because it cut across an underlying series of informal political networks that denied Shales cooperation and credit, leaving him unable and unwilling to coordinate his business. By the same token, poor relations left the Pay Office unable to operate. Indeed, the situation was only rescued from even worse disaster by the willingness of both sides to employ private networks of trusted figures to supply deficiencies in credit and supplies.

By contrast, far greater logistical success was achieved in 1690 and 1691, despite the commissariat and Pay Office retaining much of the same institutional infrastructure, and even in many cases the same personnel. What had changed was that both were more closely aligned with the underlying political networks, being absorbed into an informal administrative nexus that merged the respective hierarchies. This facilitated coordination, and the infusion of further whig loyalties into this network encouraged the incorporation of outside elements. The Pay Office similarly

benefitted, enjoying increased cooperation, and using trusted contacts to perform informal financial measures in Ireland that helped to maintain the army. In London, the Irish Pay Office was successfully orientated around close but informal interaction with the British Treasury, on which it was reliant for money. Effectiveness was therefore a product of the improved cooperation fostered by administrative overlap, the politicisation of the hierarchy, and the reinforcement of linkages of trust and obligation, which were even able upon occasion to incorporate remaining Tories into increasingly Whig political and administrative networks.

The third chapter argues that many of the same elements can be seen in the financial supply of the British army during its campaigns in the Low Countries during the Nine Years War between 1689 and 1697. During this period the army faced severe financial and economic challenges, and there was therefore a pressing need for informal financial intermediation in order to cushion such shocks. Although the Paymaster of the Forces, the earl of Ranelagh, has frequently been accused of corrupt personal aggrandisement that reduced the effectiveness of the Pay Office, this chapter argues that his activities – insofar as they can be reconstructed – suggest a different role. Administrative confusion and flexibility might appear a cloak for corruption, but they also appear to have enabled the true scale of the army's indebtedness to be concealed, and available cash to be used to answer the most urgent and immediate needs. Ranelagh and his staff also seem to have used personal leverage, and on occasion their private wealth, in order to maintain the flow of money to the army abroad.

Their success or otherwise appears to have had little to do with the institutional change and bureaucratic reform: indeed, continued corruption and personal patronage helped to reinforce the trust needed for Ranelagh to operate. Instead, his own effectiveness was defined by the shrinking size of his political and financial networks, which were increasingly out of step with changing political and financial conditions. This denied him credit and political leverage, and left him unable to cushion fiscal shocks. The gap was supplied by a range of other intermediaries, such as individual officers and contractors, as well as his own deputy-paymaster in Antwerp, Richard Hill. By building close linkages with local financiers, Hill appears to have been able to access credit informally in order to maintain the army. Similarly, the success of British remittance contractors such as the Bank in England in building trusted relationships with overseas bankers increased their own effectiveness, allowing them access to credit and contacts that improved their own operation. Once again, the extent to which a range of actors both inside and outside state structures could be persuaded to cooperate with each other in order to coordinate better the flow of resources within the system defined the overall effectiveness of the army.

The subsequent War of the Spanish Succession between 1702 and 1713 provided new challenges for the British fiscal-military state: that it was able to surmount them with fewer problems than in the Nine Years War reflected the construction within state structures of even closer personal linkages that were more directly aligned with underlying political and financial networks, themselves increasingly integrated. To some extent, the tenure of Charles Fox as Paymaster of the Forces Abroad between 1702 and 1705, discussed in the fourth chapter, shows the other

side of this coin. Like Shales in 1689, Fox appears to have attempted to construct a rational, bureaucratic infrastructure to administer army payments, insisting in particular upon financial probity and strict obedience to administrative procedures. The result appears to have been serious problems in the supply of money to the army, not least because the Pay Office did not attempt to supervise the coordination of important issues such as inland remittance. A mismatch between political networks also left cooperation lacking.

As in 1689, the situation was mainly rescued by the relaxation rather than enforcement of bureaucratic standards, and by informal financial intermediation from outsiders such as contractors, officers and officials not technically charged with responsibility for payments. Pay Office administrative instructions were ignored where necessary, especially in Portugal, where Fox could trust his appointee, a fellow High Church tory. Inland remittance was coordinated by local officials, who used their own financial contacts to secure additional credit for the army. Contractors in turn – including the most important remittance contractor Sir Henry Furnese – appear to have continued to draw their own effectiveness from close-knit commercial networks held together by personal trust and, increasingly, political partisanship. Partisanship therefore appears to have generated the contacts and connections needed for effective commercial and administrative activity: Fox's tenure shows that formal bureaucratic structures had to follow such networks in order to be mobilised and made effective.

This principle emerges most powerfully in the fifth chapter, which examines the conduct in the Low Countries of Fox's replacement, James Brydges, as Paymaster

of the Forces Abroad. Like Ranelagh, Brydges has been accused of extensive and debilitating corruption, but this chapter argues for a more nuanced understanding of his activities. Himself a partisan tory, Brydges appears to have exploited the introduction to a wider community that this offered in order to generate close, intensely-trusted linkages with a number of key officials, politicians, agents and bankers in Britain and the Low Countries. This permitted him to engage in extensive informal financial intermediation. He not only offered to guarantee the flow of subsistence to foreign regiments, in return for a percentage 'gratification' of the total, but also secretly approached such regiments to purchase their arrears at substantial discounts, thereby injecting liquidity into regimental finance. Such activities were profitable, though not as much as is often assumed, yet they were also conducted with the full consent of the regiments involved.

The networks of trust that Brydges had built upon through political partisanship appear to have been the bedrock upon which this important service was built, providing him with access to cheap credit, administrative flexibility and political leverage. Once again, his effectiveness was restricted mainly by continued and persistent failures of trust within these networks, especially his inability to incorporate or remove his deputy-paymaster in Amsterdam, Benjamin Sweet. Although personal linkages and patronage temporarily patched over these problems, Sweet's presence created a formidable bottleneck, and by 1710 serious failures of trust were emerging. Consequently, the fall of the whig ministry in 1710 and Marlborough's dismissal in 1712 offered Brydges opportunities that he was quick to exploit, not only by helping to construct formal structures around previously informal connections but also by removing Sweet and providing a partisan

replacement. The result, ironically, is that his illicit activities declined: partially this reflected the winding-down of the war effort, and a parliamentary witch-hunt against administrative corruption, but also the fact that the formalisation of vast swathes of the network made informal intermediation unnecessary.

Finally, the sixth chapter attempts to analyse the conduct of the war in Spain, Italy and Portugal along the same lines. This presented a more complex situation after 1705: whereas in the Low Countries key fiscal-military networks were, by and large, politically homogenous, in Spain and Portugal the British hierarchies were heterogeneous, reducing the opportunities for creating wide-spread and close-knit partisan connections. Combined with favourable financial circumstances in Portugal, this appears to have reduced any need for intermediation there before 1710, except in one specific instance where the presence only of personal connections allowed limited and risky informal intermediation. In Spain by contrast the weakness of Furnese's remittance networks created demand for intervention, which was met through a partisan financial and administrative network that eventually ran through Italy, incorporating British diplomats almost entirely outside the bureaucratic control of the Pay Office in London. Their effectiveness reflected the strength of their local financial networks, and trusted connections created through personal obligations and the sensitive use of patronage.

Conditions in 1710 led to a series of changes. In Spain, the reinforcement of trust through the appointment of partisan connections allowed further intermediation, some of it along the lines identified in the Low Countries, that allowed a severely underfunded army to act reasonably effectively. By contrast, in Portugal the events

of 1710 exacerbated pre-existing partisan divisions, preventing the construction of trusted networks and any but the most limited and opportunistic financial intermediation. Thus the effectiveness of the Pay Office in Portugal and the Mediterranean, both as an administrative concern and as an outlet for informal financial intermediation, had little to do with formal structures. Instead, it was more often an outcome of close cooperation, which could incorporate outside elements and push uncooperative outsiders to the periphery, and was frequently based on political partisanship.

This thesis ends by examining the fate of James Brydges' networks after he resigned from his post at the end of the War of the Spanish Succession in 1713. It demonstrates that many of his social and commercial connections – which might otherwise have been dismissed as artefacts of his official role – remained even after this point, and continued to be exploited by Brydges for a series of commercial, cultural and financial ventures. This reinforces the overall argument that state formation – understood as the growth in the effectiveness of fiscal-military structures – cannot be conceptualised and explained as a process of bureaucratisation, whereby increasingly rational and impartial bodies were able to exercise power more efficiently. Although it is not denied that certain institutional changes occurred, these have to be seen as a product rather than a cause of increased effectiveness, as formal structures were brought into alignment with informal networks of trust that were increasingly willing and able to exploit their connections to coordinate business.

It is also suggested in this thesis that political partisanship was key to this process. Although remaining a disruptive influence between 1689 and 1713, it nevertheless helped create a community of interest that built trust, and both enabled and encouraged various actors within and outside state structures to cooperate in order to coordinate business. This conclusion also helps account for the continued growth of the state for the remainder of the eighteenth century, which remained dominated by partisan discourses within Parliament and society. Such conflict would have continued to sharpen ideological identities and loyalties, and ultimately encouraged coordination and cooperation within an increasingly homogenous whig fiscal-military state. Indeed, since ideological allegiance was able to bridge gaps between officials, politicians, financiers and merchants, it may even have enabled the British state to mobilise and coordinate a far larger amount of resources than the more narrow factionalism or personal clientage prevalent in other early modern European fiscal-military states, offering Britain a competitive advantage and contributing to the particular effectiveness on which historians have remarked.

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## **CONVENTIONS: DATES, CURRENCY AND SPELLING**

Dates are given as in the original sources: letters from Britain and Ireland under the Julian calendar are given in old style (o. s.), and in Europe under the Gregorian calendar in new style (n. s.), with the year beginning on 1 January in both cases. Before 1700, there was a ten-day difference between the calendars; thereafter this increased to eleven days.

Financial values are given either in British pounds sterling or the currency of account used by the Pay Office to calculate exchange rates. Ireland did not have its own currency, but sterling generally carried a premium of between 6 and 8 percent: unless otherwise noted, all figures referring to Ireland are given in British pounds sterling.<sup>1</sup> In the Low Countries, the basic unit of account was the Amsterdam *guilder* or *florijn* (fl) comprising 20 *stuivers* (st), and payments to north German princes such as Prussia were generally accounted in *rixdollars* or *reichsthalers* (rx), of which each principality had its own particular version. In Portugal payments were denominated in the *millreis* of 1,000 *reis*, and in Spain the silver *peso* or *dollar* of eight *reals*, otherwise known interchangeably as the Spanish dollar, crown or piece of eight.

Exchange rates shifted continuously, not least because the relative values of British gold and silver coinage were themselves itself in flux. On average £1 was equivalent to 10 fl, but this occasionally rose to 11 fl or fell to 9 fl, while 1 dollar bought between 4 and 5 shillings and one millreis around 6 or 7 shillings. A survey

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<sup>1</sup> The following paragraphs are based on John J. McCusker, *Money and exchange in Europe and America, 1600-1775: a handbook* (London, 1978)

by the Mint in 1702 found that Italian and Spanish gold *pistoles* were generally worth between 16 or 17 shillings, the various imitations of the Spanish dollar – the Florentine and Livornese *crowns*, the *patacoons* or *rixdollars* of Holland and Flanders, and the assorted German reichsthalers – likewise between 4 and 5 shillings, and the Genoese silver *lire* around 10 pence.

Where possible, the conventions employed in Henry Snyder (ed.) *The Marlborough-Godolphin Correspondence* (3 vols., Oxford, 1975) have been applied to the spelling of personal and topographical names. Otherwise, the most common form in the original sources has been used. The spelling and punctuation of quotations have also been altered where necessary for greater clarity, with contractions or abbreviations expanded.

**LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS****ARCHIVES**

<b>AS</b>	Amsterdam Staatsarchief, Amsterdam, The Netherlands
<b>Baker Lib.</b>	Baker Library, Harvard University, USA
<b>BEA</b>	Bank of England Archive, London
<b>Bein. Lib.</b>	Beinecke Library, Yale University, USA
<b>BL</b>	British Library, London
<b>Bod. Lib.</b>	Bodleian Library, Oxford
<b>CAC</b>	Churchill Archive Centre, Churchill College, Cambridge
<b>CKS</b>	Centre for Kentish Studies, Maidstone
<b>CUL</b>	Cambridge University Library, Cambridge
<b>DHC</b>	Dorset History Centre, Dorchester
<b>DRO</b>	Devon Record Office, Exeter
<b>HL</b>	Henry E. Huntington Library, California, USA
<b>LRO</b>	Leicestershire Record Office, Leicester
<b>NAS</b>	National Archives of Scotland, Edinburgh
<b>NLCS</b>	North London Collegiate School, London
<b>NLI</b>	National Library of Ireland, Dublin, Ireland
<b>NRO</b>	Northamptonshire Record Office, Northampton
<b>PRONI</b>	Public Record Office of Northern Ireland, Belfast
<b>SA</b>	Shropshire Archives, Shrewsbury
<b>Staff. RO</b>	Staffordshire Record Office, Stafford
<b>Suff. RO</b>	Suffolk Record Office, Ipswich
<b>TCD</b>	Trinity College, Dublin, Dublin, Ireland

<b>TNA</b>	The National Archives of the United Kingdom, London
<b>WCL</b>	Worcester College Library, Worcester College, Oxford

### **PRINTED PRIMARY AND SECONDARY SOURCES**

<b>CJ</b>	<i>Journals of the House of Commons</i>
<b>CSPD</b>	<i>Calendar of State Papers Domestic</i> (1660-1704), various eds., (London, 1860-1972)
<b>CTB</b>	<i>Calendar of Treasury Books</i> (1660-1718), ed. W. Shaw (32 vols, London, 1904-62)
<b>CTP</b>	<i>Calendar of Treasury Papers</i> (1596-1728), ed. J. Reddington (6 vols, London, 1868-89)
<b>HIP</b>	E. Johnstone-Liik (ed.), <i>History of the Irish Parliament, 1692-1800</i> (6 vols, Belfast, 2002)
<b>HMC</b>	Historical Manuscripts Commission
<b>HOP (1660-90)</b>	B.D. Henning (ed.), <i>House of Commons, 1660-90</i> (3 vols, London, 1983)
<b>HOP (1690-1715)</b>	E. Cruickshanks, S. Handley and D.W. Hayton (eds.), <i>House of Commons, 1690-1715</i> (5 vols, Cambridge, 2002)
<b>HOP (1715-54)</b>	R. Sedgewick (ed.), <i>House of Commons, 1714-54</i> (2 vols, London, 1970)
<b>London (1710)</b>	<i>The poll of the livery-men of the City of London, at the election for Members of Parliament</i> (London, 1710)
<b>London (1713)</b>	<i>London politics, 1713-1717</i> , eds. H. Horwitz, W.A. Speck, and W.A. Gray (London, 1981)

- Middx. (1705)** *The poll for members to serve in the ensuing Parliament, for the county of Middlesex (London, 1705)*
- Middx. (1714)** *Freeholders names, and the parishes, towns, and places where their freeholds lye who in the last controverted election voted for Mr. Bertie and Mr. Smithson (London, 1714)*
- ODNB** Oxford Dictionary of National Biography
- PH** Cobbett (ed.) *Parliamentary History of England* (36 vols., London, 1806-20)
- TJHSE** Transactions of the Jewish Historical Society of England

## **CHAPTER 1: HISTORIOGRAPHY AND METHODOLOGY**

In Jonathan Swift's *Gulliver's Travels* (1726), the eponymous hero encounters the island of Glubbdubbdrigg, where the governor, skilled in necromancy, permits him to call up a series of historical figures for questioning. Disillusionment is the result:

I was chiefly disgusted with modern history. For having strictly examined all the persons of greatest name in the courts of princes, for a hundred years past, I found how the world had been misled by prostitute writers ... How low an opinion I had of human wisdom and integrity, when I was truly informed of the springs and motives of great enterprises and revolutions in the world, and of the contemptible accidents to which they owed their success.

Yet Gulliver's – or Swift's – disdain for these 'contemptible accidents' has not prevented historians attempt to understand the 'springs and motives' of the enormous changes that English society underwent during the early modern period, not least the enormous expansion in the size, scope and ambitions of the English or (after 1707) the British state. Between 1660 and 1720 its effectiveness increased enormously, with the biggest and most sustained growth taking place during the wars in Europe between 1689 and 1713, a development mirrored by other European states during this period. This chapter will review historiographical explanations for this phenomenon, and will argue that they are ultimately unsatisfactory, since they draw links between bureaucratic reforms, institutional growth and overall effectiveness that are fundamentally unsustainable. Instead, it will argue, state formation occurred through the construction of informal personal networks for the more efficient and effective coordination of administrative activity, a process potentially aided by factors such as corruption and political partisanship that have invariably been seen as divisive or disruptive elements.

## THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

Both the process and effects of state formation in Britain and Europe during the early modern period were complex and multi-faceted phenomena, which were not restricted simply to changing patterns of warfare and finance. Between the sixteenth and eighteenth centuries the British state acquired increasingly elaborate and extensive structures intended to enforce social and religious policy, at a rate which at times – such as the early seventeenth century – far outstripped the creation or effectiveness of fiscal and military structures.<sup>1</sup> Yet it is arguable that the capacity of early modern states to wage wars and, by extension, find the resources to do so, was the most important development of this period, since little else could maintain their territorial and political integrity against external threats. Those who were unable to construct or deploy fiscal-military structures effectively enough to resist attack – such as the Jacobite regimes in England in 1688, in Ireland between 1689 and 1691 and in Scotland in 1715 – went to the wall.<sup>2</sup> How states responded to the fiscal and military pressures they faced is therefore one of the key questions of early modern political, constitutional, administrative and military history.

Even crude measures such as the number of men deployed by armies and monies raised show that successful states by and large experienced large increases in these totals in the early modern period, particularly in the latter half of the seventeenth

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<sup>1</sup> Michael Braddick, *State formation in early modern England, c. 1550-1700* (Cambridge, 2000) pp. 1-46, 103-79, 287-336; Stephen Gunn, David Grummitt, and Hans Cools, 'War and the state in early modern Europe: widening the debate', *War in History*, 15 (2008) pp. 371-88

<sup>2</sup> J.G. Simms, *Jacobite Ireland 1685-91* (London, 1969) pp. 18-73; D. Szechi, *1715: the great Jacobite Rebellion* (London, 2006) pp. 110-7, 127-37; Steven Pincus, *1688: the first modern revolution* (London, 2009) pp. 143-78

century.<sup>3</sup> These changes were initially linked by Michael Roberts, Geoffrey Parker and others with a parallel ‘Military Revolution’ in tactics and technology that created pressures for a greater fiscal and military involvement by the states of early modern Europe, but which also provided rulers with the tools to achieve this.<sup>4</sup> It was argued that larger militaries facilitated not only the development of political absolutism – the doctrine of complete political control over a given society and the unadulterated exercise of the ruler’s will – but also that absolutism in turn permitted the growth of rational and efficient fiscal-military bureaucracies that could exploit resources with the highest degree of effectiveness. Many of these conclusions have since been challenged: Jeremy Black, Jan Glete and Roger Morriss, for instance, all argue to varying degrees that even if outside forces drove military change, the ability of state structures to respond was the key variable.<sup>5</sup> However the most fundamental axiom, that bureaucratic administration was necessarily and inherently superior to any other form, has gone largely unquestioned. The following section will outline the reason for this, and provide a survey of how this principle has been applied to the analysis of state formation in the British Isles – but, in practice, mainly to England – during the period between what has been called the ‘long eighteenth century’ between 1660 and 1830.

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<sup>3</sup> Jeremy Black, *A military revolution?: military change and European society 1550-1800* (Basingstoke, 1991) pp. 28-34; Jan Glete, *War and the state in early modern Europe: Spain, the Dutch Republic and Sweden as fiscal-military states, 1500-1660* (London, 2002) pp. 31-8; John A. Lynn, *Giant of the grand siècle: the French army, 1610-1715* (Cambridge, 1997) pp. 34-64; Braddick, *State Formation* pp. 214, 222, 225-6; John Brewer, *The sinews of power: war, money and the English state, 1688-1783* (London, 1989) p. 30

<sup>4</sup> Geoffrey Parker, *The Military Revolution: military innovation and the rise of the West, 1500-1800* (Cambridge, 1988) and the footnote below.

<sup>5</sup> See essays in Clifford J. Rogers (ed.), *The military revolution debate: readings on the military transformation of early modern Europe* (Oxford, 1995); Black, *A military revolution?*; Jan Glete, *War and the state*; Roger Morriss, *The foundations of British maritime ascendancy: resources, logistics and the state, 1755-1815* (Cambridge, 2010) pp. 1-32

Bureaucratic administration, as the paragraphs below will show, has invariably been understood as the conduct of administration and policy according to impartial or rational norms, unaffected by sectional pleading and based upon the analysis of information and creation of policy in the service of the broader ‘public’ interest. The physical manifestations of this are a specialised and professional administrative service, with promotions solely by merit, and reliant upon standardised forms and procedures intended to eliminate disorder, confusion and corruption. Ultimately this relies upon the definitions of the German sociologist Max Weber and his key work *Economy and Society*, which defined both the bureaucratic ethos and its administrative manifestations.<sup>6</sup> He concluded that

experience tends universally to show that the purely bureaucratic type of administrative organism ... is, from a purely technical point of view, capable of attaining the highest degree of efficiency and is in this sense formally the most rational known means of exercising authority over human beings. It is superior to any other form in precision, in stability, in the stringency of its discipline, and in its reliability ... it is finally superior both in intensive efficiency and in the scope of its operations, and is formally capable of application to all kinds of administrative tasks.<sup>7</sup>

This was contrasted with the ‘charismatic’ or ‘patrimonial’ states, based upon personal charisma or entrenched socio-economic power which is fundamentally irrational and therefore unable to determine and implement the public interest most efficiently and effectively: consequently, he continued, bureaucratisation was ‘at the root of the modern Western state’.<sup>8</sup> Until 1989 early modern Britain was therefore widely presented as inefficient and ineffective as a fiscal-military state, at least compared to exemplars such as France and Prussia, because it had failed to reorganise its institutions as they had done accordingly to this bureaucratic ideal: the

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<sup>6</sup> Max Weber, Gunther Roth, and Claus Wittich, *Economy and society: an outline of interpretive sociology* (2 vols., London, 1979) ii, 220-1

<sup>7</sup> Ibid. ii, 223

<sup>8</sup> Ibid.

presence of representative institutions such as Parliament prevented the wholesale trampling of traditional sectional interests and customs required for administrative efficiency.<sup>9</sup>

Many of these conclusions were fundamentally challenged by the publication by John Brewer in 1989 of *The Sinews of Power*, which argued that Britain not only possessed a bureaucratic ‘fiscal-military state’ optimised for warfare, but also that this was both compatible and consistent with Parliamentary rule. New fiscal structures created after 1688 offered bureaucratic features, not least an ‘ethos of public duty and private probity’, for which a Weberian ideal-typology was an explicit yardstick:

dependent upon a complex system of measurement and bookkeeping, organized as a rigorous hierarchy based on experience and ability, and subject to strict discipline from its central office, the English Excise more closely approximated to Max Weber’s idea of bureaucracy than any other government agency in eighteenth-century Europe.<sup>10</sup>

This did not necessarily imply that the excise was fully bureaucratic, merely that greater effectiveness was enjoyed as it approached this ideal: as Miles Ogborn has subsequently argued in the same vein, ‘it is possible to consider *processes* of bureaucratisation, differentiation or monopolisation rather than expecting their full realisation’.<sup>11</sup> Moreover, Brewer argued, the voting of taxes by Parliament provided legitimacy and authority for their collection: with careful management, ‘the constraints on power meant that when it was exercised, it was exercised fully’,

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<sup>9</sup> John Brewer, *The sinews of power: war, money and the English state, 1688-1783* (London, 1989) pp. xvii-xviii, 9-10

<sup>10</sup> *Ibid.* pp. 65-87, 95-112

<sup>11</sup> Miles Ogborn, *Spaces of modernity: London's geographies, 1680-1780* (London, 1998) pp. 161-2

allowing Britain to overtake states such as France and extract a larger percentage of national income for the purposes of power projection and warfare.<sup>12</sup>

In so doing this model has provided a framework for unifying various other reinterpretations of Britain in the ‘long eighteenth century’. At the time it contextualised accumulating evidence of bureaucratisation and professionalisation within administrative structures from historians such as Geoffrey Holmes and Gerald Aylmer<sup>13</sup>, as well as a series of works on the increasingly professional and rational conduct of the Treasury and associated revenue bodies.<sup>14</sup> It has also placed the events of the ‘Financial Revolution’ that began in the 1690s into wider context. Peter Dickson and others argued that the changing effectiveness of the state reflected mainly the growing maturity, scale and sophistication of domestic financial markets in the eighteenth century, and in the state’s ability to exploit them through the creation of new forms of public borrowing, improved management, and a long-term national debt that could be supported with lower annual interest rates: all these factors increased the state’s financial power and thus its overall effectiveness.<sup>15</sup> In concert with others such as Patrick O’Brien, Brewer has therefore provided a crucial conceptual linkage, arguing that ‘an effective tax system, providing the government with a substantial and regular income, was a

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<sup>12</sup> Brewer, *Sinews of Power* p. xx

<sup>13</sup> Geoffrey S. Holmes, *Augustan England: professions, state and society, 1680-1730* (London, 1982) pp. 239-61; Gerald Aylmer, ‘From office-holding to civil service: the genesis of modern bureaucracy’, *Transactions of the Royal Historical Society*, 5th ser, 30 (1980) pp. 91-108

<sup>14</sup> Stephen Baxter, *The development of the Treasury, 1660-1702* (London, 1957) pp. 167-264; J. E. D. Binney, *British public finance and administration 1774-92* (Oxford, 1958) pp. 168-70, 251-4; P.G.M. Dickson, *The financial revolution in England: a study in the development of public credit, 1688-1756* (London, 1967) pp. 39-64, 342-64; Henry Roseveare, *The Treasury: the evolution of a British institution* (1969) pp. 58-116; Henry Roseveare, *The Treasury, 1660-1870: the foundations of control* (London, 1973) pp. 17-82; C.D. Chandaman, *The English public revenue, 1660-1688* (Oxford, 1975) pp. 270-80

<sup>15</sup> Dickson, *Financial Revolution*, especially pp. 457-520

*necessary* condition of the new credit mechanisms'.<sup>16</sup> Brewer's work has also helped to make sense of successive reconceptualisations of English society during this period. J.C.D. Clark has argued that England was 'ancien regime', undifferentiated from those elsewhere in Europe and organised around an intellectually coherent set of 'interlocking relations between the monarchy, the patrician elite and the Church', while J.H. Plumb similarly concluded that the growth of political stability in Britain after 1715 was the outcome of a growing oligarchic tendency.<sup>17</sup> Both of these conclusions have been challenged, and the changing nature of eighteenth-century society upheld, but all are inconsistent with the existence of efficient, coercive and 'bureaucratic' fiscal-military structures.<sup>18</sup> Brewer's conclusion that the legitimacy and authority Parliament lent the state improved its overall effectiveness therefore avoided what would otherwise have been, as Lawrence Stone put it, 'this paradox of, on the one hand, the use of a massive, external military empire ... and, on the other, the preservation of internal liberty and the rights of private property'.<sup>19</sup>

Given the central importance of Brewer's thesis, subsequent work on state formation in Britain and Europe has tended to refine rather than challenge the conceptual framework he introduced. For instance Thomas Ertman has extended this paradigm to its logical conclusion, uncoupling the political and administrative ideal types entirely to argue that, under suitable conditions, efficient 'bureaucratic'

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<sup>16</sup> Brewer, *Sinews of Power* pp. 88-133; Patrick O'Brien, 'The political economy of British taxation, 1660-1815', *Economic History Review*, 2nd ser, 41 (1988) pp. 1-32; Huw Bowen, *War and British society, 1688-1815* (Cambridge, 1998) pp. 21-30; Braddick, *State Formation* pp. 266-9

<sup>17</sup> J.C.D. Clark, *English society, 1660-1832: religion, ideology and politics during the ancien regime* (Cambridge, 2000), quotation at p. 20; J.H. Plumb, *The growth of political stability in England: 1675-1725* (London, 1967) pp. 159-88

<sup>18</sup> Joanna Innes, 'Jonathan Clark, social history and England's "ancien regime"', *Past & Present*, 115 (1987) pp. 165-200 and the criticisms of Plumb in *Albion* 25:2 (1993)

<sup>19</sup> Lawrence Stone, 'Introduction', in Lawrence Stone (ed.), *An imperial state at war: Britain from 1689 to 1815* (London, 1993) p. 6

states might evolve in either ‘absolutist’ or ‘constitutional’ regimes.<sup>20</sup> Jan Glete has borrowed the economic metaphor of ‘protection-selling’ and concluded that states achieved legitimacy and support through the military security achieved by efficient, bureaucratic administration.<sup>21</sup> The result was ‘interest aggregation’ as local elites lent support to fiscal-military structures for their own protection.<sup>22</sup> Most recently, Steve Pincus has argued that structural change between 1685 and 1695 constituted a conflict between two comprehensive, competing but equally revolutionary bureaucratic ‘visions of modernity’.<sup>23</sup> By contrast, historians such as Michael Braddick and Steve Hindle have focussed upon Brewer’s insight into cultural forms of legitimation, arguing that as the state expanded it was most effective where it deployed appropriate cultural rhetorics and intellectual formulations to justify and authorise its activities, not merely that of Parliamentary sanction.<sup>24</sup> For instance, the control of social and moral welfare was often best legitimated by an appeal to traditional values of paternalism, but the growing fiscal-military state structures, above all the new and unpopular excise officers,

legitimated their authority in ways that were quite different from the authority claimed by magistrates. Their authority depended on knowledge, precision, and the application of impersonal norms ... [via] the neutral, bureaucratic officer applying standard and rationalised rules to his conduct ... expressed in our terms as professionalisation, specialisation and bureaucratisation.<sup>25</sup>

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<sup>20</sup> Thomas Ertman, *Birth of the leviathan: building states and regimes in medieval and early modern Europe* (Cambridge, 1997) pp. 20-33

<sup>21</sup> Glete, *War and the State* pp. 6-42, 51-167, 213-7

<sup>22</sup> *Ibid.* pp. 59-61

<sup>23</sup> Pincus, *1688* pp. 143-50, 159-62, 178

<sup>24</sup> Michael Braddick, ‘The early modern English state and the question of differentiation from 1550 to 1700’, *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, 38 (1996) pp. 92-111; Braddick, *State Formation* pp. 270-83; Steve Hindle, *The state and social change in early modern England, c. 1550-1640* (Basingstoke, 2000) pp. 1-36, 230-7

<sup>25</sup> Braddick, *State Formation* pp. 260-3; See also Miles Ogborn, ‘The capacities of the state: Charles Davenant and the management of the Excise, 1683-1698’, *Journal of Historical Geography*, 24 (1998) pp. 296, 303-7; Ogborn, *Spaces* pp. 163-200; William J. Ashworth, *Customs and excise: trade, production and consumption in England 1640-1845* (Oxford, 2003) pp. 87-93, 261-89

Their activities were therefore made acceptable by a rhetoric of impersonal authority that promised and imposed impartiality and equal treatment.<sup>26</sup>

## **BRITISH STATE FORMATION**

Consequently, *The Sinews of Power* has both built on and entrenched into the historiography of state formation a linkage between efficiency and rational, impartial 'bureaucratic' administration in the Weberian mould. Analysing the British fiscal-military state during the long eighteenth century, Brewer and others have linked failures in the excise administration with the survival of inefficient, unbureaucratic practices<sup>27</sup>, while other studies have drawn even more emphatic conclusions concerning the customs service: Ashworth has argued, for instance, 'the history of [the] customs is also a history of reams of empty regulations and unrealistic expectations'.<sup>28</sup> Studies of the Land Tax mainly argue that it was administratively inefficient because it remained unbureaucratic.<sup>29</sup> The Exchequer, a mediaeval institution responsible for the receipt, issue and auditing of all government money, has been deemed unfit for purpose because it was riddled with placemen and cramped by unworkable legal procedures.<sup>30</sup> By contrast, as was noted above, the increased effectiveness and importance of the Treasury has been linked with a series of bureaucratic reforms that institutionalised and regularised its administration. Work on the navy has argued that it became more effective as its

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<sup>26</sup> Braddick, *State Formation* p. 87

<sup>27</sup> Brewer, *Sinews of Power* pp. 65-87, 95-112; Chandaman, *Public Revenue* pp. 51-76; Ogborn, 'Capacities of the State', pp. 289-312; Ashworth, *Customs* pp. 117-30

<sup>28</sup> Elizabeth Hoon, *The organization of the English customs system, 1696-1786* (Newton Abbot, 1968) pp. 195-89; Chandaman, *Public Revenue* pp. 22-36; Ashworth, *Customs* pp. 141-69, 342-6

<sup>29</sup> Colin Brooks, 'Public finance and political stability: the administration of the land tax, 1688-1720', *Historical Journal*, 17 (1974) pp. 281-300; Chandaman, *Public Revenue* pp. 77-109; John Beckett, 'Land tax administration at the local level 1693-1798', in Michael Turner and Dennis Mills (eds.), *Land and Property: the English land tax 1692-1832* (New York, 1986) pp. 161-79

<sup>30</sup> Baxter, *Treasury* pp. 110-66; Binney, *British public finance* pp. 237-43

individual agencies such as the Victualling Board reshaped themselves around an increasingly bureaucratic administrative ethos.<sup>31</sup>

Similar criticisms have been made of the army during this period. Shortfalls in effectiveness have been linked with the fact that the responsibility for administration was divided ambiguously amongst the commander-in-chief, the War Office, the Pay Office, the Muster Office, the Board of General Officers, the Ordnance Office and the Treasury, as well as the two – occasionally three – secretaries of state.<sup>32</sup> The militia was organised and run by the local lords-lieutenant and their deputies, a separate and largely amateur hierarchy, and has thus been dismissed as a joke in military terms.<sup>33</sup> The lack of a professional military commissariat has been particularly condemned, since it forced the army to create a logistical infrastructure from scratch for every campaign, or rely on unscrupulous undertakers driven mainly by profit rather than public service.<sup>34</sup> John Childs for instance has argued that the

resort to civilian merchant syndicates ... was the ultimate admission that the early modern state was only a half-modern institution. It was insufficiently developed both in administrative technique and capacity to undertake the maintenance of the armies which it raised ... It did not rent the functions of

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<sup>31</sup> Morriss, *Foundations* pp. 131-82, 271-354; Janet Macdonald, *The British Navy's victualling board, 1793-1815: management competence and incompetence* (Woodbridge, 2010) ; R.J.B. Knight and Wilcox Martin, *Sustaining the fleet, 1793-1815: war, the British Navy and the contractor state* (Woodbridge, 2010)

<sup>32</sup> R.E. Scouller, *The armies of Queen Anne* (Oxford, 1966) pp. 1-79; Alan J. Guy, *Oeconomy and discipline: officership and administration in the British army 1714-63* (Manchester, 1985) pp. 23-46; John Childs, *The British army of William III, 1689-1702* (Manchester, 1987) pp. 164-7

<sup>33</sup> J. R. Western, *The English militia in the eighteenth century: the story of a political issue, 1660-1802* (London, 1965) pp. 1-74; John Childs, *The British army of William III, 1689-1702* (Manchester, 1987) p. 189

<sup>34</sup> Binney, *British public finance* pp. 176-9; Scouller, *Armies* pp. 203-35; Norman Baker, *Government and contractors: the British Treasury and war supplies, 1775-1783* (London, 1971) pp. 64-91. Bannerman provides a useful summary of this historiography: Gordon Bannerman, *Merchants and the military in eighteenth-century Britain: British army contracts and domestic supply, 1739-1763* (London, 2008) pp. 8, 17-21

state to private entrepreneurs from ideological commitment but because it was too primitive to administer its own creations.<sup>35</sup>

Contractors were therefore used because the state lacked the professional bureaucratic infrastructure to undertake their functions more efficiently, rather than because they offered any particular logistical advantage. It has also been argued that the structures for paying the army were corrupt and inefficient, not least because for much of the eighteenth century regiments were essentially the proprietary concern of the colonels and agents, who blended public funds and private credit in their operation.<sup>36</sup> Successive Paymasters of the Forces, such as James Brydges (1705-13), have been charged with inefficiency, corruption, and a series of 'devious financial malpractices' that materially affected military operations<sup>37</sup>, or in the case of the earl of Ranelagh (1685-1702) with '17 years of slipshod administration and gross malversation'.<sup>38</sup> Between 1671 and 1675 Ranelagh also led the 'Undertaking' in Ireland: 'quite simply a farm of the Irish Treasury and office of vice-treasurer', Sean Egan argues that it was undertaken 'on the back of immense corruption'.<sup>39</sup>

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<sup>35</sup> John Childs, *The Nine Years' War and the British Army 1688-1697: the operations in the Low Countries* (Manchester, 1991) p. 151

<sup>36</sup> Binney, *British public finance* pp. 150-9; Scouller, *Armies* pp. 22-34, 131-48; Baker, *Government and contractors* pp. 175-83; Guy, *Oeconomy and Discipline* pp. 53-161; Childs, *William III* pp. 139-42

<sup>37</sup> C. H. Collins Baker and Muriel I. Baker, *The life and circumstances of James Brydges, first Duke of Chandos, patron of the liberal arts* (Oxford, 1949) pp. 47-58; Godfrey Davies, 'The Seamy Side of Marlborough's war', *The Huntington Library Quarterly*, 15 (1951) pp. 21-34; John Sperling, 'Godolphin and the organization of public credit, 1702-1710', (Unpublished PhD thesis, University of Cambridge, 1955) pp. 130-66; *HOP (1690-1715)* i, 319

<sup>38</sup> Sperling, 'Public credit', pp. 135, 137; Childs, *William III* pp. 143-5; *HOP (1660-1690)* ii, 662; *HOP (1690-1715)* iv, 525-6

<sup>39</sup> Sean Egan, 'Finance and the government of Ireland, 1660-85', (Unpublished PhD thesis, TCD, 1983) i, 231-53; ii, 1-51

Yet these studies also often reveal, sometimes almost unwillingly, a level of effectiveness within supposedly inefficient institutions precisely because of unbureaucratic conduct. Egan also concluded that, in Ireland, Ranelagh

ran a ruthless and efficient operation. He brought in money faster than any previous vice-treasurer had managed. Much of this he achieved through coercion and corruption, but its effect was to make the Irish Treasury more efficient.<sup>40</sup>

R.E. Scouller similarly noted that, as Paymaster-General, Ranelagh was handicapped by outside factors, mainly the fact that he was frequently without money, and that he can now be seen ‘to have dealt straightforwardly with a complicated problem’.<sup>41</sup> This confusion is even evident in John Sperling’s assessment of Brydges, whom he alternately dismisses as ‘a person of mediocre talents in the large sense’ but also ‘an excellent man of business’: it is ultimately concluded that ‘the quality of craftiness which made Brydges such an artful dodger also made him an excellent administrator in an office which, by eighteenth century standards, was exceedingly complex’.<sup>42</sup> Reflecting this, Sperling simultaneously condemned and absolved Godolphin for failing to enforce rigorous standards of honesty and bureaucratic conduct, ‘since it is clear that while Brydges was Paymaster the work was handled efficiently, there was no confusion, and Parliamentary enquiries could be met with no difficulty’.<sup>43</sup>

Indeed, several studies of financial officials have challenged these conclusions more directly. Alan Guy’s analysis of eighteenth-century army agents has concluded that they operated as efficiently and effectively as could have been expected from any

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<sup>40</sup> Ibid. i, 11-12; ii, 46-7, 50-1

<sup>41</sup> Scouller, *Armies* p. 29

<sup>42</sup> Sperling, ‘Public credit’, pp. 138-40

<sup>43</sup> Ibid. pp. 164-5

official bureaucracy.<sup>44</sup> Christopher Clay has argued that between 1662 and 1679 ‘corruption’ within the Pay Office served a useful purpose: at their own request, Sir Stephen Fox, Paymaster of the Forces, guaranteed to the army that they would receive punctual payment of their wages and expenses in return for a five percent deduction.<sup>45</sup> The deduction helped him to pay the costs of borrowing money cheaply, and by the 1670s the ‘Great Undertaking’ meant that Fox also had access to the ‘running cash’ of the excise service for the same purpose. The result, Clay concludes, is that army was better paid and more effective than it would otherwise ever have been:

it has usually been assumed that he [Fox] grew rich by exploiting the soldiers ... this judgement is neither accurate nor fair ... He raised money for which he had to pledge his own credit as collateral security along with his tallies, and then re-lent to the government to enable it to pay its forces ... the government’s financial difficulties in the 1660s were such that it could not afford prompt payment for the Guards in any other way, a fact which the officers clearly realised when they embraced the idea of a private undertaking so readily.<sup>46</sup>

He argues though that after the 1680s this type of operation became both impossible and unnecessary. In his recent study of the Irish Treasury in the eighteenth century A.P.W. Malcolmson has similarly determined that Nathaniel Clements, successively teller and deputy vice-treasurer, appears to have mingled without reserve the public and private monies he handled, maintaining the smooth operation of the public finances in return for the opportunities for enrichment that this offered.<sup>47</sup> These studies suggest not only that corruption was a far more complex phenomenon than

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<sup>44</sup> Alan J. Guy, ‘Regimental agency in the British standing army, 1715-1763; a study in Georgian military administration’ (Parts I-II), *Bulletin of the John Rylands Library*, 52 (1979-80) pp. 424-5, 442-3, 448 and 53 (1980-1) pp. 35-8; Childs, *William III* pp. 140-1; A. P. W. Malcolmson, *Nathaniel Clements: government and the governing elite in Ireland, 1725-75* (Dublin, 2005) pp. 144-7

<sup>45</sup> C.G.A. Clay, *Public finance and private wealth: the career of Sir Stephen Fox, 1627-1716* (Oxford, 1978) pp. 32-110

<sup>46</sup> Clay, *Public finance* p. 38

<sup>47</sup> Malcolmson, *Nathaniel Clements* pp. 121-7, 157-61, 216-38

at first sight it appears, but also that it might actually support the wider effectiveness of the fiscal-military state by plugging the gaps left by inefficient administration elsewhere. However very few of these insights have been absorbed into the wider literature.

Other areas, such as military contracting, have also been reassessed: even forty years ago Norman Baker argued that ‘the long-established impression ... of eighteenth century administration as generally corrupt, inefficient and inactive needs considerable revision’.<sup>48</sup> A series of studies have argued that civilian undertakers for the army were generally as effective as a formal commissariat would have been, despite their temporary, non-bureaucratic nature, since they often brought superior commercial, financial or industrial experience to the logistical challenges they encountered.<sup>49</sup> Both in Britain and Spain, private hospital contractors were capable of providing perfectly acceptable medical support when given adequate funding and sufficient supervision.<sup>50</sup> Herbert Kaplan and others have shown that military remittance was made more effective during the Napoleonic Wars by the private access that financial contractors enjoyed to private, informal or even entirely illegal commercial networks.<sup>51</sup> Other studies have emphasised that the militia was often effective precisely because its administration

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<sup>48</sup> Baker, *Government and contractors* p. vii

<sup>49</sup> Ibid. pp. 95-134, 241-54; G. Perjes, ‘Army provisioning, logistics and strategy in the second half of the seventeenth century’, *Acta Historica Academiae Scientiarum*, xvi (1970) pp. 149-50; David Hancock, *Citizens of the world: London merchants and the integration of the British Atlantic community, 1735-1785* (Cambridge, 1995) pp. 222-39; Erik A. Lund, *War for the every day: generals, knowledge, and warfare in early modern Europe, 1680-1740* (Westport, CN, 1999) pp. 5-16, 66-92; Bannerman, *Merchants* pp. 23-109, 139-50

<sup>50</sup> Eric Gruber von Arni, *Hospital care and the British Standing Army, 1660-1714* (Aldershot, 2006) pp. 181-8; Christopher Storrs, ‘Health, sickness and medical services in Spain's armed forces c.1665-1700’, *Medical History*, 50 (2006) pp. 325-50

<sup>51</sup> Baker, *Government and contractors* pp. 177-8, 181; Herbert H. Kaplan, *Nathan Mayer Rothschild and the creation of a dynasty: the critical years 1806-1816* (Stanford, 2006) pp. 48-89, 99-177; Bannerman, *Merchants* pp. 35-7, 42-6

was in the amateur hands of local elites, who possessed both the private means and local leverage to make it work.<sup>52</sup> Both Guy and J.A. Houlding have speculated that the army declined in effectiveness between 1714 and 1760 not primarily from any administrative shortcomings but because regiments were perennially short of manpower and lacked the opportunities to train, and because the ‘royal and bureaucratic initiatives’ which removed regimental prerequisites steadily squeezed out professional officers who lacked independent means.<sup>53</sup>

By the same token, most studies of the Ordnance Office conclude that ‘the impression generally given . . . is of an office endeavouring to do its best within the limits of the administrative system of the time’.<sup>54</sup> The naval boards remained heavily reliant on private contractors, and Knight and Wilcox have argued that the practice offered even distinct advantages over direct administration, especially in victualling ships at temporary or remote out-ports.<sup>55</sup> Naval finance has also been reassessed: Daniel Baugh and Clive Wilkinson have argued that the ambiguities and administrative deceptions of naval finance allowed the Treasurer of the Navy to ignore restrictive Parliamentary appropriation of revenue and create a consolidated

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<sup>52</sup> Victor Louis Stater, *Noble government: the Stuart lord lieutenancy and the transformation of English politics* (London, 1994) pp. 67-182; Anthony Fletcher, *Reform in the provinces: the government of Stuart England* (New Haven ; London, 1986) pp. 316-48; Braddick, *State Formation* pp. 226-31

<sup>53</sup> J. A. Houlding, *Fit for service: the training of the British Army, 1715-1795* (Oxford, 1981) pp. 388-95; Alan J. Guy, *Oeconomy and discipline* pp. 162-7

<sup>54</sup> Binney, *British public finance* p. 167; Howard Tomlinson, *Guns and government: the Ordnance Office under the later Stuarts* (London, 1979) pp. 147, 162-4, 220-1; Jenny West, *Gunpowder, government and war in the mid-eighteenth century* (London, 1991) pp. 84-5, 99; Morriss, *Foundations* pp. 183-222

<sup>55</sup> John Ehrman, *The navy in the War of William III, 1689-1697: its state and direction* (Cambridge, 1953) pp. 48, 144-57; Bernard Pool, *Navy board contracts, 1660-1832: contract administration under the Navy Board* (London, 1966) pp. 141-4; Stephen Conway, *War, state, and society in mid-eighteenth-century Britain and Ireland* (Oxford, 2006) pp. 46-8; Knight and Martin, *Sustaining* pp. 210-5; Morriss, *Foundations* pp. 271-320

fund from which money could be reapplied, illicitly, to the most urgent demands.<sup>56</sup>

Indeed, Wilkinson concludes that

among historians there has been an entrenched view that the Navy's finances were at best haphazard, inefficient and liable to exploitation by dishonest officials. This view stems from a fundamental misunderstanding of how the financial structures of the Navy worked and why it was organised in the way it was. For the most part there has been a failure to appreciate that, despite any perceived inadequacies, the end result was a high successful naval force.<sup>57</sup>

Under Sir Robert Long, Auditor of the Exchequer between 1660 and 1673, the Exchequer had been active, efficient and increasingly influential, and Stephen Baxter argues that 'this activity showed what the Receipt [of the Exchequer] might have been, given strong Auditors and a weak or non-existent Treasury office'.<sup>58</sup> Even the effectiveness of the Treasury itself, and the influence it exercised over other departments, tended to depend far more upon the personal characters and political powers of its principals rather than institutional or administrative innovations.<sup>59</sup>

Most importantly, the equation made by Brewer and Braddick between bureaucratisation and effectiveness within revenue bodies cannot be sustained. Studies of hearth and land taxes after 1660 have acknowledged that these taxes were often more acceptable and 'legitimate', and thus collected with greater ease and less expense, precisely because they were not administered by a central bureaucratic agency, but by an amateur hierarchy of local elites who exercised control over

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<sup>56</sup> Dickson, *Financial Revolution* pp. 399-406; Daniel A. Baugh, *British naval administration in the age of Walpole* (Princeton, 1965) pp. 453-87; Clive Wilkinson, *The British Navy and the state in the eighteenth century* (Woodbridge, 2004) pp. 37-65

<sup>57</sup> Wilkinson, *British navy* p. 35

<sup>58</sup> Baxter, *Treasury* pp. 126-7, 135-6

<sup>59</sup> *Ibid.* pp. 4, 10-11, 28-36, 53-4, 88-108; Binney, *British public finance* pp. 261-82; Dickson, *Financial Revolution* pp. 58-9

assessment, applotment and collection.<sup>60</sup> Even Brewer concluded that private interest and public duty were not incompatible in the excise, while Colin Brooks has suggested that customs and excise hierarchies were often only accepted and aided by local elites because they offered opportunities for patronage and that, moreover, this did not necessarily lead to poor administration because it was in the interests of patrons to put forward capable clients.<sup>61</sup> Indeed, as Ashworth puts it, ‘the whole credibility and future of the excise system of measurement depended on local cooperation ... to pursue a national policy required careful and ongoing local negotiations’.<sup>62</sup> Braddick, Baxter and Ogborn have all noted that the actions of excisemen were equally legitimated and accepted through the restraint exercised over them by local magistrates, that excise officers might ‘compound’ with brewers to spare both the costs of precise and rigorous assessment, and that officers were therefore engaged in a continual process of negotiation where personal character was frequently more important than impartiality or administrative power.

## REGIONAL COMPARISONS

Thus, changing patterns of effectiveness within the British fiscal-military state were by no means necessarily the outcome of the professional and rational bureaucratic

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<sup>60</sup> Chandaman, *Public Revenue* pp. 77-109, 139-95; Beckett, ‘Land tax’, pp. 161-76; Andrew M. Coleby, *Central government and the localities: Hampshire, 1649-1689* (Cambridge, 1987) pp. 116-25, 191-4; Joan R. Kent, ‘The centre and the localities: state formation and parish government in England circa 1640-1740’, *Historical Journal*, 38 (1995) pp. 376-91, 401-4; Braddick, *State Formation* p. 256

<sup>61</sup> Colin Brooks, ‘John, 1st Baron Ashburnham, and the state, c.1688-1700’, *Historical Research*, 60 (1987) pp. 66-76; Colin Brooks, ‘Interest, patronage and professionalism: John, 1st Baron Ashburnham, Hastings, and the revenue service’, *Southern History*, 9 (1987) pp. 57-66; Brewer, *Sinews of Power* pp. 74-6

<sup>62</sup> John Money, ‘Teaching in the market-place, or "Caesar adsum jam forte: Pompey aderat": the retailing of knowledge in provincial England during the eighteenth century’, in John Brewer and Roy Porter (eds.), *Consumption and the world of goods* (London, 1993) pp. 351-3, 359-60; Michael Braddick, *Parliamentary taxation in seventeenth-century England: local administration and response* (Woodbridge, 1994) pp. 211-20; Ogborn, *Spaces* pp. 180, 184-5; Ashworth, *Customs* p. 130

administration in a Weberian mould. This is strengthened by the comparison of the English state with its analogues in Ireland, and Scotland before 1707. Both were in a sense colonial regimes, enjoying at best a circumscribed autonomy from England, but Sean Connolly has advanced – and others have endorsed – the idea that Ireland at least should be seen ‘as first and foremost a part of the European *ancien regime*’.<sup>63</sup> William Doyle has since argued that differences in external forms should not be taken to conceal underlying similarities since ‘the whole essence of the institutional *ancien regime* was that nothing *was* quite like anything else.’<sup>64</sup> In Ireland the full panoply of English fiscal-military institutions existed, and historians such as T.J. Kiernan, Charles McGrath, Malcolmson and Patrick Walsh have argued that they experienced a similar transformation. The Irish Treasury and its officials grew in political and administrative stature.<sup>65</sup> After 1684 the revenue system was brought under direct management, apparently under ‘a permanent, professional bureaucracy’<sup>66</sup>, while a standing army had emerged with an extensive civil infrastructure.<sup>67</sup> Thomas Bartlett has argued with reference to the Irish state after 1660 that ‘both the range of operations and the scope of its concerns were

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<sup>63</sup> S. J. Connolly, *Religion, law, and power: the making of Protestant Ireland, 1660-1760* (Oxford, 1992), quotation at p. 2; Toby Barnard, ‘Farewell to old Ireland’, *Historical Journal*, 36 (1993) pp. 909-28; Jacqueline Hill, ‘Convergence and conflict in eighteenth-century Ireland’, *Historical Journal*, 44 (2001) pp. 1039-63

<sup>64</sup> William Doyle, ‘The Union in a European Context’, *Transactions of the Royal Historical Society*, 6th ser., 10 (2001) p. 171

<sup>65</sup> T.J. Kiernan, *History of the financial administration of Ireland to 1817* (London, 1930) pp. 76-94, 242-73; Egan, ‘Finance, 1660-85’, ii, 143-94; Charles Ivar McGrath, *The making of the eighteenth-century Irish constitution: government, parliament and the revenue, 1692-1714* (Dublin, 2000) pp. 24-72; Toby Barnard, *A new anatomy of Ireland: the Irish Protestants, 1649-1770* (London, 2003) pp. 143-76; Malcolmson, *Nathaniel Clements* pp. 101-72; Patrick Walsh, *The making of the Irish Protestant ascendancy: the life of William Conolly, 1662-1729* (Woodbridge, 2010) pp. 140-3, 149-51

<sup>66</sup> Charles Ivar McGrath, ‘The Irish revenue system: Government and administration, 1689-1702’, (Unpublished PhD thesis, University of London, 1997) p. 156

<sup>67</sup> Kenneth Ferguson, ‘The army in Ireland from the Restoration to the Act of Union’ (Unpublished PhD Thesis, TCD, 1981) pp. 15-18; Barnard, *New anatomy of Ireland* pp. 177-203; Alan J. Guy, ‘The Irish military establishment, 1660-1776’, in Thomas Bartlett and Keith Jeffrey (eds.), *A military history of Ireland* (Cambridge, 1996) pp. 211-30

impressive'.<sup>68</sup> Work on the post-1660 Scottish fiscal-military state is lacking, but the Scottish Treasury before 1708 showed a similar trajectory, and A.L. Murray has identified administrative innovation and activity, especially after the reconstruction of the Treasury along English lines in 1667.<sup>69</sup>

Yet undergirding these superficial changes appear to have been much the same forces as in England. Irish revenues expanded mainly because the Irish Parliament became more willing to vote increased taxation, thanks in no small part to the growth of partisan politics: McGrath argues that

the outbreak of English-style party politics in the Irish Parliament, rather than undermining the developing framework, actually helped to embed it in Irish parliamentary and governmental practice ... Both parties used the provision of supply as a pivotal aspect of their negotiations with the executive'.<sup>70</sup>

The new fiscal, military and administrative structures therefore remained dominated by personal, political and partisan linkages, which nevertheless often lent the state efficiency, especially where they could incorporate local interests and elites into their operation.<sup>71</sup> In Scotland the officials of the Treasury also appear to have been obliged on occasion to raise substantial sums from their own private credit, and even by 1688 supposedly bureaucratic reforms appear to have done little to improve the Treasury's effectiveness in supervising its own officials.<sup>72</sup> In a recent PhD

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<sup>68</sup> Thomas Bartlett, 'From Irish state to British Empire: reflections on state building in Ireland, 1690-1830', *Etudes Irlandaises*, 20 (n.s.) (1995) pp. 23-34

<sup>69</sup> A. L. Murray, 'The Scottish treasury, 1667-1708', *Scottish Historical Review*, 45 (1966) pp. 89-104

<sup>70</sup> McGrath, *Irish constitution* pp. 88-90, 132, 155, 192-210; David Hayton, *Ruling Ireland, 1685-1742: politics, politicians and parties* (Woodbridge, 2004) pp. 210-13

<sup>71</sup> Ferguson, 'Army', pp. 64-120; Egan, 'Finance, 1660-85', ii, 150-1, 166, 172; Bartlett, 'Irish state', pp. 30-4; Barnard, *New anatomy of Ireland* pp. 149-53, 208-37; Malcolmson, *Nathaniel Clements* pp. 23-56, 67, 103, 144-7, 171-2; Walsh, *William Conolly* pp. 144-9, 157-78; D. A. Fleming, *Politics and provincial people: Sligo and Limerick, 1691-1761* (Manchester, 2010) pp. 194-236

<sup>72</sup> Murray, 'Scottish treasury', pp. 99, 104

thesis Charles Wemyss has also suggested that between 1667 and 1682 the treasury board was pervaded by the patronage networks of the earl of Lauderdale, Charles II's political manager in Scotland, and that the various tax farms were gifted to close associates.<sup>73</sup> Thus, as in England, improvements in effectiveness were not necessarily achieved by administrative reform along bureaucratic lines.

## **FOREIGN COMPARISONS**

This challenge to the model of the bureaucratic fiscal-military state is supported by a sustained comparison with the British state's counterparts in Europe between roughly 1660 and 1720. Examining in turn France, Savoy, Spain, Sweden, Prussia and the Dutch Republic, this section argues that these states experienced, if anything, an even stronger discordance between effectiveness and bureaucratic reform, and that their ability to secure cooperation from various groups within society – the overall process of ‘interest aggregation’ mentioned by Glete – provides a far better guide to the eventual overall effectiveness of the state.

Until recently, the French state between 1660 and 1715 was widely seen as the paradigm of successful absolutist and bureaucratic state, its efficient military forces being used by Louis XIV to impose rational and effective government upon a cowed populace. Over the past thirty years a far more sophisticated and nuanced picture has emerged, one that has emphasised the ‘social collaboration’ amongst the crown and various elite groups, mainly through existing but often reworked

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<sup>73</sup> Charles Wemyss, ‘A study of aspiration and ambition: the Scottish Treasury Commission and its impact upon the development of Scottish country house architecture 1667-1682’, (Unpublished PhD thesis, University of Dundee, 2008) i, 57-88, especially pp. 72, 80

institutions.<sup>74</sup> Even new and supposedly impartial royal agents such as the *intendants* in provinces such as Languedoc, Burgundy, Alsace, Franche-Comte and Brittany continued to exercise key fiscal-military functions in collaboration with local elites, often through revitalised representative bodies or semi-independent courts such as the *Parlements*.<sup>75</sup> Confirming and entrenching corporate or personal privileges, such as the recognition of proprietary right in the sale, occupation and inheritance of public offices, made for poor bureaucratic standards but gave public and provincial officials financial security, enabling them to borrow money for the state at lower rates of interest than it could achieve directly.<sup>76</sup> Cooperation was secured by negotiation, and by the creation of clientage networks which offered conduits for information and favour, and at least the illusion of access to the crown.<sup>77</sup> Coercion and ‘absolutist’ rule by royal diktat were not unknown, but these were essentially *ad hoc* and unplanned, rather than being part of a wider political or administrative programme.<sup>78</sup>

Thus the core administrative agencies of the French fiscal-military state in particular were most effective when the level of personal contact and obligation was increased. Military finance remained confused and complex, but survived because

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<sup>74</sup> This is summarised in William Beik, ‘The absolutism of Louis XIV as social collaboration’, *Past & Present*, 188 (2005) and amplified in the citations below.

<sup>75</sup> William Beik, *Absolutism and society in seventeenth-century France: state power and provincial aristocracy in Languedoc* (Cambridge, 1985) pp. 117-46; Peter George Wallace, *Communities and conflict in early modern Colmar, 1575-1730* (New Jersey, 1995) pp. 96-114, 181-228; Julian Swann, *Provincial power and absolute monarchy: the Estates General of Burgundy, 1661-1790* (Cambridge, 2003) pp. 43-226; Darryl Dee, *Expansion and crisis in Louis XIV's France: Franche-Comte and absolute monarchy, 1674-1715* (Rochester, NY, 2009) pp. 40-84, 150-78; Sara E. Chapman, *Private ambition and political alliances: the Phélypeaux de Pontchartrain family and Louis XIV's government, 1650-1715* (Woodbridge, 2004) pp. 32-86, 144-75

<sup>76</sup> Swann, *Provincial power and absolute monarchy* pp. 189-91; Mark Potter, *Corps and clientele: public finance and political change in France, 1688-1715* (Aldershot, 2003) pp. 95-157

<sup>77</sup> Sharon Kettering, *Patrons, brokers, and clients in seventeenth-century France* (New York, 1986) pp. 99-237; Swann, *Provincial power and absolute monarchy* pp. 43-89, 162-4, 172; Chapman, *Private ambition* pp. 32-61, 78-82

<sup>78</sup> Dee, *Expansion and crisis* pp. 40-84; Roy L. McCullough, *Coercion, conversion and counterinsurgency in Louis XIV's France* (Leiden, 2007) pp. 11-122; Wallace, *Colmar* pp. 96-114

*tresoriers* were expected to dip into their own pockets to lubricate the workings of the machine, mingling public and private credit networks.<sup>79</sup> Thus, Guy Rowlands has argued that

the entire French [military] financial system hinged around giant slush funds created by fiscal office-holders, who, until they needed to pass on the money to the state under the terms of their office would invest it.<sup>80</sup>

At a local level personal links between *intendants*, *tresoriers* and local officials and elites enabled the state to enforce and implement central directives, even when the fascia of rational, bureaucratic administration had been stripped away by the pressures of war after 1688.<sup>81</sup> Tax collectors – both state officials and tax farmers such as the *Ferme-Generale* – operated by incorporating their private funds.<sup>82</sup> Indeed the latter ‘collected an antiquated array of taxes with modern efficiency’, although its bureaucratic nature was probably superficial: Matthews has argued that recruitment continued to be dominated by patronage and favouritism, which ‘provided a legitimate way of training a professionally minded corps bound to the organisation by ties of loyalty’.<sup>83</sup> Indeed, he even argues that in some respects it was too bureaucratic, leading to a rigid and inefficient administrative structure.<sup>84</sup> The blurring of boundaries between public office and private credit was therefore integral to the continued fiscal and military power of the French crown.

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<sup>79</sup> Guy Rowlands, *The dynastic state and the army under Louis XIV: royal service and private interest, 1661-1701* (Cambridge, 2002) pp. 109-42; Lynn, *Giant* pp. 75-9, 91; James S. Pritchard, *Louis XV's navy, 1748-1762: a study of organization and administration* (Kingston, 1987) pp. 184-205; Geoffrey Symcox, *The crisis of French sea power, 1688-1697: from the guerre d'escadre to the guerre de course* (The Hague, 1974) pp. 39-43

<sup>80</sup> Rowlands, *Dynastic state* p. 131

<sup>81</sup> Dee, *Expansion and crisis* pp. 85-169; Chapman, *Private ambition* pp. 61-114, 175

<sup>82</sup> J. F. Boshier, *French finances 1770-1795: from business to bureaucracy* (Cambridge, 1970) pp. 67-71, 92-110; Eugene White, ‘From privatized to government-administered tax collection: tax farming in eighteenth-century France’, *Economic History Review*, 57 (2004) pp. 636-663; Julian Dent, *Crisis in finance: crown, financiers and society in seventeenth-century France* (Newton Abbot, 1973) pp. 17-22; George Matthews, *The royal general farms in eighteenth-century France* (New York, 1958) pp. 185-227

<sup>83</sup> Boshier, *French finances* pp. 74-6; Matthews, *Royal general farms* pp. 185, 197, 209

<sup>84</sup> Matthews, *Royal general farms* pp. 188-9, 199

Moreover, John Lynn has concluded that any narrative of modernisation and bureaucratisation is ‘flawed, because the real paradox . . . was that changes in the institutions of central government never really matched the magnitude of army expansion’: essentially the fiscal-military bureaucracy remained unchanged despite startling increases in effectiveness under Louis XIV.<sup>85</sup> In response Rowlands has argued that these changes reflected the personal political power of the marquis de Louvois, Secretary of State for War between 1666 and 1691, who used his clientage networks to mobilise the administration.<sup>86</sup> The same was true of fiscal structures, where the effectiveness of a *contrôleur-général des finances* such as Jean-Baptiste Colbert or Louis Phelypaux, comte de Pontchartrain ultimately depended upon his political standing and clientage networks.<sup>87</sup> Both David Parrott and Alan James have shown that Richelieu did likewise before 1642, incorporating state structures into loyal patronage networks.<sup>88</sup> The massive increases in effectiveness after 1660 did not reflect institutional change, but rather the fact that Louis XIV was able to impose firm direction on such networks: indeed, he was best served when he could choose competent ministers and increase their personal political power and their own private patronage networks, since such networks would then be used to carry out royal business. The experience of the French navy illustrates both sides of this coin. Under Colbert and then his son the marquis de Seignelay as Secretary of State of the Navy in the 1680s, the force achieved unprecedented effectiveness, mainly because both men had the political power and clientage networks to implement their

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<sup>85</sup> Lynn, *Giant* pp. 67-106, 112, 147. Quotation at p. 597

<sup>86</sup> *Ibid.* p. 106; Rowlands, *Dynastic state* pp. 73-108

<sup>87</sup> Matthews, *Royal general farms* pp. 203-5; Bosher, *French finances* pp. 45-8, 58-65; Chapman, *Private ambition* pp. 61-114; White, ‘Tax collection’, pp. 643-8, 661-2

<sup>88</sup> David Parrott, *Richelieu’s Army: war, government and society in France, 1624-42* (Cambridge, 2001) pp. 435-62, 552-6; Alan James, *Navy and government in Early Modern France, 1572-1661* (London, 2004) pp. 64-77, 166-8

objectives. Although superficially an impersonal bureaucratic agency, Geoffrey Symcox has argued that by 1691 it was ‘for all practical purposes a fief of the Colbert family, imbued with their traditions and staffed by their appointees’.<sup>89</sup> Yet after Seignelay’s death in 1692 it was taken over by Pontchartrain, who lacked Colbert’s political power, administrative drive and strategic vision, and was largely unable to incorporate Colbert’s clientage network into his own. The effectiveness of naval administration therefore plunged precipitately.

Other states in southern Europe, of which the Habsburg territories in Spain and the duchy of Savoy are representative examples, show a similar correlation. Savoy enjoyed a steady rise in power and importance after 1660, whereas the Spanish kingdom and its satellite territories in Naples, Milan and the southern Netherlands experienced a sharp decline after 1665 and then a mild resurgence after 1700. In his studies of these two kingdoms, Christopher Storrs has argued that bureaucratic reforms were crucial even in Spain, whose decline has, he suggests, been overstated.<sup>90</sup> In Savoy, the success of the duchy involved ‘the development of administrative bodies at the centre of the state, which ensured the mobilisation of human and other resources, as well as effective control ... and more efficient spending of still exiguous resources’.<sup>91</sup> Bureaucratic innovations based on French models, such as intendants, were imposed upon provincial elites, while central

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<sup>89</sup> Geoffrey Symcox, *The crisis of French sea power, 1688-1697: from the guerre d'escadre to the guerre de course* (The Hague, 1974) pp. 103-9, 117-27, 173-7; James, *Navy and government* pp. 160-6; Chapman, *Private ambition* pp. 115-43

<sup>90</sup> Christopher Storrs, *The resilience of the Spanish monarchy, 1665-1700* (Oxford, 2006) pp. 1-14, 231-4. See also Henry Kamen, *The War of Succession in Spain 1700-15* (London, 1969) pp. 25-41

<sup>91</sup> Christopher Storrs, ‘The Savoyard fiscal-military state in the long eighteenth century’, in Christopher Storrs (ed.), *The fiscal-military state in Eighteenth Century Europe: Essays in honour of PGM Dickson* (Farnham, 2009) p. 209

administration was consolidated.<sup>92</sup> However the Savoyard bureaucracy, for all its rational and impersonal appearance, ultimately ‘depended enormously upon the king, whose instrument it was ... and whose oversight was crucial to its effective working’.<sup>93</sup> Victor Amadeus II invariably ruled through cooperation and collaboration, the fiscal and military power of the state being used judiciously, as in France, to reorientate rather than replace querulous institutions such as the provincial assemblies or the *camera di conti* in Turin.<sup>94</sup> In the provinces, both the provincial governors and new intendants required local power, influence and clientage – in other words, the informal mechanisms of political cooperation – in order to carry out their roles effectively.<sup>95</sup>

Other studies suggest a similar reassessment of the Spanish state: indeed, Ruth Mackay has written that ‘the Castilian example ... directly contradicts generally held assumptions about the parallel courses of modern warfare and a central bureaucracy’.<sup>96</sup> Admittedly even the ineffective rule of Charles II between 1665 and 1700 saw bureaucratic reforms, modelled on French examples.<sup>97</sup> Yet the overall effectiveness of the state nevertheless declined because Charles II was, in John Lynch’s words, ‘the last, the most degenerate and the most pathetic victim of Habsburg inbreeding’, who lacked the political power and personal character to

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<sup>92</sup> Christopher Storrs, *War, diplomacy and the rise of Savoy, 1690-1720* (Cambridge, 1999) pp. 62-7, 89-92, 173-85; Geoffrey Symcox, *Victor Amadeus II: absolutism in the Savoyard State, 1675-1730* (London, 1983) pp. 26-38, 119-25, 191-224

<sup>93</sup> Storrs, ‘Savoyard state’, pp. 119, 186-97, 210

<sup>94</sup> Ibid. pp. 212, 218-27; Storrs, *Rise of Savoy* pp. 89-102, 201-6, 267-76, 293

<sup>95</sup> Storrs, *Rise of Savoy* pp. 179-90; Christopher Storrs, ‘Provincial governors and the absolute state: Piedmont 1713-48’, *European History Quarterly*, 37 (2007) pp. 35-60

<sup>96</sup> Ruth Mackay, *The limits of royal authority: resistance and obedience in seventeenth-century Castile* (New York, 1999) p. 10; Glete, *War and the State* pp. 70-119

<sup>97</sup> Storrs, *Spanish monarchy* pp. 107-8, 119-21; Kamen, *War of Succession* pp. 13-35

restrain the factionalism of the *grandees*.<sup>98</sup> Military structures were weakened through a lack of money, willing cooperation and, above all, strategic direction.<sup>99</sup> The revival of Spanish royal power after 1700 mainly reflected political change rather than bureaucratic reform. Philip V, the new Bourbon monarch, introduced a raft of administrative changes ‘modelled entirely on the French pattern’, yet their effectiveness was ultimately based his political power and success in securing the support of the Spanish *grandees*, and because such reforms ‘were consonant with Spanish practice and aspirations’.<sup>100</sup> Thus cooperation from elites was key to fiscal-military effectiveness among states in southern Europe: the adoption of the paraphernalia of bureaucratic control appears if anything to have been almost an outcome of this process, as rulers with the power to mobilise resources and impose effective administration modelled their changes upon French examples.

Much the same process occurred in northern Europe. Jan Glete has argued that Swedish power in the seventeenth century was an outcome of its entrepreneurial institutions, which acted as institutional ‘containers’ for bureaucratic skills, expertise and experience.<sup>101</sup> Yet other studies have emphasised that the Swedish state proved so effective because representative forums such as the *riksdag* allowed the Swedish crown to negotiate with various noble, ecclesiastical and urban interest groups, and after 1660 gave the Swedish crown the leverage to push through measures aimed at mobilising aristocratic resources, whose own interests were

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<sup>98</sup> Storrs, *Spanish monarchy* pp. 151-89; John Lynch, *The Hispanic world in crisis and change, 1598-1700* (Oxford, 1992) pp. 229-76; Glete, *War and the State* pp. 109-39

<sup>99</sup> C. Storrs, ‘The army of Lombardy and the resilience of Spanish power in Italy in the reign of Carlos II (1665-1700)’ (Part I-II), *War in History*, 4 (1997) pp. 378-9, 387-96 and 5 (1998) pp. 1-5, 9-15, 18-21; Glete, *War and the State* pp. 68-70, 121-39; Storrs, *Spanish monarchy* pp. 17-104

<sup>100</sup> Kamen, *War of Succession* pp. 84-119, 202-7, 231-41, 300-60

<sup>101</sup> Glete, *War and the State* pp. 174-8, 210-2; Jan Glete, *Swedish naval administration, 1521-1721: resource flows and organisational capabilities* (Leiden, 2010) pp. 19-25, 241-53, 647-9

recognised by allowing them to colonise state structures such as the navy.<sup>102</sup> Many of these administrative measures and aims were almost feudal, such as the use of the *reduktion* to reconstruct the royal demesne, but were effective because under the cover of modern bureaucratic institutions they exploited existing political and economic strengths within Swedish society to increase the fiscal-military power of the state.<sup>103</sup> Glete concedes that the death of Charles XII in 1718 caused an administrative breakdown that ‘illustrate[s] how closely related the navy had been to the will and political authority of the dynastic state ... when that ruler was gone and the political scene was in turmoil the navy was temporary paralysed’.<sup>104</sup> Danish absolutism after 1660 was similarly held together by popular consent, fostered by an ideology of access rather than state machinery.<sup>105</sup> Even the feared Prussian bureaucratic fiscal-military state was ultimately reliant on demesne revenue and a neo-feudal canton system that linked regiments to their recruitment areas, as well as on negotiation with surviving provincial assemblies: notwithstanding its external appearance, the system appears to have worked mainly because it was grafted on top of a compliant society.<sup>106</sup>

The final and most extreme example can be found in the Netherlands in the United Provinces or Dutch Republic, universally regarded as one of the most effective

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<sup>102</sup> Anthony F. Upton, *Charles XI and Swedish absolutism* (Cambridge, 1998) pp. 131-78; Glete, *War and the State* pp. 192-4

<sup>103</sup> Upton, *Charles XI* pp. 39-89, 162-9; Glete, *Swedish naval administration* pp. 583-609

<sup>104</sup> Glete, *Swedish naval administration* pp. 114-31, 306-11, 639

<sup>105</sup> Thomas Munck, *The peasantry and the early absolute monarchy in Denmark, 1660-1708* (København, 1979) pp. 39-106, 239-43

<sup>106</sup> Rudolf Vierhaus, ‘The Prussian bureaucracy reconsidered’, in John Brewer and Eckhart Hellmuth (eds.), *Rethinking Leviathan: the eighteenth-century state in Britain and Germany* (Studies of the German Historical Institute, London, and Oxford, 1999) pp. 149-66; Edgar Kiser and Joachim Schneider, ‘Bureaucracy and efficiency: an analysis of taxation in early modern Prussia’, *American Sociological Review*, 59 (1994) pp. 187-204; Peter H. Wilson, ‘Prussia as a fiscal-military state, 1640-1806’, in Christopher Storrs (ed.), *The fiscal-military state in Eighteenth Century Europe: Essays in honour of PGM Dickson* (Farnham, 2009) pp. 95-124

states of the period, which deployed sufficient military power between the sixteenth and eighteenth centuries to resist Spanish and French invasions at home and English competition overseas.<sup>107</sup> Yet the Dutch state lacked even the appearance of a rational, centralised and streamlined bureaucracy. Tax collection was decentralised: over eighty percent of revenues were collected and disbursed by individual provinces, through patrimonial and thoroughly unbureaucratic fiscal structures.<sup>108</sup> The Dutch army and navy were actually agglomerations of seven provincial armies and five separate admiralties, each reliant upon separate revenue streams.<sup>109</sup> Yet far from being inefficient and ill-coordinated, when given strong political leadership the separate admiralties were effective and useful naval forces, particularly by virtue of their close links with local elites.<sup>110</sup> The linkage of army regiments with individual provinces provided increased financial security, and the incorporation into the state of *solliciteurs-militair* – essentially semi-independent financiers who provided credit for regiments – enabled them to overcome temporary shortages in cash-flow.<sup>111</sup> The fiscal infrastructure itself relied upon colonisation by local financial networks and interests in order to operate.<sup>112</sup> As in France, public office provided officials with the security necessary to take up private loans, while kinship and friendship links created mutual trust with lenders, who thereby achieved a stake

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<sup>107</sup> Marjolein 't Hart, *The making of a bourgeois state: war, politics and finance during the Dutch revolt* (Manchester, 1993) pp. 2-9, 217-25; Glete, *War and the State* pp. 140-73

<sup>108</sup> 't Hart, *Making of a bourgeois state* pp. 191-200; Marjolein 't Hart, 'Mutual advantages: State Bankers as Brokers between the City of Amsterdam and the Dutch Republic', in Oscar Gelderblom (ed.), *The political economy of the Dutch Republic* (2009) pp. 119-23

<sup>109</sup> Olaf Van Nimwegen, *The Dutch Army and the Military Revolutions, 1588-1688* (Woodbridge, 2010) pp. 30-64, 292-3, 317-25; Glete, *War and the State* pp. 162-9

<sup>110</sup> Glete, *War and the State* pp. 166-7; Jaap R. Bruijn, *The Dutch navy of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries* (Columbia, 1993) pp. 3-39, 99-110

<sup>111</sup> 't Hart, *Making of a bourgeois state* pp. 38, 199; Glete, *War and the State* p. 159; Van Nimwegen, *Dutch army* pp. 64-84, 330-78

<sup>112</sup> 't Hart, *Making of a bourgeois state* pp. 39-58; Glete, *War and the State* pp. 148-9

in the continued effectiveness of the Dutch fiscal-military infrastructure.<sup>113</sup> Thus, although the power of the Dutch state ultimately rested upon its precocious economic and financial development, its effectiveness was also a product of its success in tapping such resources, a process that required the cooperation and collaboration which patrimonial state structures facilitated rather better than impartial bureaucratic ones.

This comparative survey has therefore argued that contemporary *ancien regime* fiscal-military states in Europe offered as many contradictions as in Britain. These states were internally complex and heterogeneous, ruling most effectually through cooperation from local elites: such collaboration was not necessarily achieved by consensus, being periodically compelled and even occasionally coerced.

Nevertheless the evidence suggests that in the long run states proved most effective at exploiting their resources efficiently where they enjoyed rather than imposed cooperation, since alienating local elites would have denied central bodies easy access to the resources that they controlled. It also challenges the more fundamental assumptions identified above that Weberian bureaucratic structures were inherently and intrinsically effective, and work on state formation should be focussed on how such structures were legitimated. Instead, it appears necessary to fall back upon an earlier insight mentioned by Braddick but not incorporated into his subsequent work: ‘the state may become more powerful without institutional innovation ... if cooperation and support can be more effectively mobilised ... In sum, it is my contention that the seventeenth-century state grew more powerful in the absence of

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<sup>113</sup> ‘t Hart, ‘Mutual advantages’, pp. 133-4; Julia Adams, *The familial state: ruling families and merchant capitalism in early modern Europe* (Cornell, 2005) pp. 38-105

significant institutional change'.<sup>114</sup> Similarly, Gerald Aylmer concluded that 'changes among the individuals at the top and in the wider political context were of more consequence [for the state] than any institutional developments'.<sup>115</sup> The difficulty lies in finding an alternative paradigm capable of adequately replacing the Weberian conceptual framework retained by John Brewer and others.

## ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES

Fortunately, parallel work on economic organisation during the early modern period already provides such a paradigm. Indeed the overlap is already widely recognised. Huw Bowen has argued that in India after 1756 the directors of the East India Company 'applied to the government of empire the basic lessons that they had absorbed from the successful management of the long-distance trade'.<sup>116</sup> Ogborn has written that both Charles Davenant and Sir Streynsham Master, commissioner of the excise and governor of Fort St George in Madras respectively, 'were charged with regulating and restructuring ... complex and geographically extensive administrative mechanisms, dealing with the roles of local functionaries, with the law, and with ensuring 'good practice''.<sup>117</sup> The only difference was that Davenant legitimated his activities with reference to public service and royal authority rather than commercial profit, but other studies have argued that even the East India Company employed ideas of sovereignty and civic allegiance to organise and justify

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<sup>114</sup> Michael Braddick, 'State formation and social change in early modern England: a problem stated and approaches suggested', *Social History*, 16 (1991) pp. 2, 6

<sup>115</sup> Gerald Aylmer, *The crown's servants: government and the civil service under Charles II, 1660-1685* (Oxford, 2002) p. 20

<sup>116</sup> Huw Bowen, *The business of empire: the East India Company and imperial Britain, 1756-1833* (Cambridge, 2006) pp. 184-217, 256-62

<sup>117</sup> Miles Ogborn, 'Wherein lay the late seventeenth-century state? Charles Davenant meets Streynsham Master', *Journal of Historical Sociology*, 15 (2002) pp. 96-101

its quasi-governmental activities.<sup>118</sup> Analysing commercial activity as an exercise in state formation, and vice versa, is therefore not unprecedented, and this section will argue that recent paradigms of early modern commerce and trade focussed upon networks, coordination and the creation of trust can be applied to other forms of economic activity such as finance, industry and retailing, and thus even to the operation of the fiscal-military state itself.

Commerce in the early modern world – mercantile trade, both with foreign and domestic markets – is now largely analysed as an exercise in cooperation and collaboration between a number of widely-scattered principals and agents, with the aim of coordinating the flow of materials, money and information. For instance, in his study of Atlantic trading networks David Hancock has argued that merchants ‘coordinated people, materials and capital across merchant sectors and among geographically disposed areas’.<sup>119</sup> Coordination in turn was achieved by building up a network of competent, reliable and, ultimately, trustworthy correspondents: Richard Grassby has argued that ‘the core of any business relationship was always trust’, and that ‘the most important task for any new businessman was creating a network of business associates and a client base’.<sup>120</sup> Understandings of trust vary, and have often drawn heavily upon anthropological or sociological work, but most

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<sup>118</sup> Sudipta Sen, ‘Colonial frontiers of the Georgian state: East India Company rule in India’, *Journal of Historical Sociology*, 7 (1994) pp. 368-92; Philip J. Stern, ‘Politics and ideology in the early East India Company-state: the case of St Helena, 1673-1709’, *Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History*, 35 (2007) pp. 1-23

<sup>119</sup> Hancock, *Citizens* pp. 16, 81-4

<sup>120</sup> Richard Grassby, *Kinship and capitalism: marriage, family, and business in the English speaking world, 1580-1740* (Cambridge, 2001) pp. 300, 302; Hancock, *Citizens* pp. 81-4; David Hancock, *Oceans of wine: Madeira and the emergence of American trade and taste* (London, 2009) pp. 142-5, 216; Francesca Trivellato, *The familiarity of strangers: the Sephardic diaspora, Livorno, and cross-cultural trade in the early modern period* (London, 2009) pp. 153-5; Nuala Zahedieh, *The capital and the colonies: London and the Atlantic economy, 1660-1700* (Cambridge, 2010) pp. 65-73; Sebouh David Aslanian, *From the Indian Ocean to the Mediterranean: the global trade networks of Armenian merchants from New Julfa* (Berkeley, CA, 2010) p. 167; Tijl Vanneste, *Global trade and commercial networks: eighteenth-century diamond merchants* (London, 2011) p. 67

historians have usually employed definitions which stress mutual obligation and reciprocity, and the expectation that a trusted individual will behave in a predictable way or in accordance with previously agreed criteria.<sup>121</sup> Trust therefore permitted merchants to circumvent informational asymmetries by allowing their correspondents the discretion to respond to opportunities: thus, the wider and deeper a merchant's circle of trusted agents was, the more effective he would generally prove as a commercial dealer.

Most historians are also agreed that credit – in the form of both investment and working capital – was of crucial importance to commercial success.<sup>122</sup> Jacob Price, for example, in an article entitled 'What did merchants do?', has answered that most mercantile functions could be delegated or contracted-out to trusted suppliers, packers, warehousemen and correspondents and that 'a successful merchant devoted little time to such matters ... but no merchant could delegate the giving of credit or neglect the balance sheet of his firm'.<sup>123</sup> Working capital was as necessary as starting capital, enabling merchants to exploit opportunities and ride out fluctuations in supply and demand. It underpinned commercial networks as varied as the British textile trade<sup>124</sup>, the north American fur trade<sup>125</sup>, and English breweries.<sup>126</sup> In the

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<sup>121</sup> Trivellato, *Familiarity* pp. 11-12; Vanneste, *Global trade* pp. 28-30; Zahedieh, *Capital and the colonies* pp. 94-6; Aslanian, *Armenian merchants* pp. 168-71

<sup>122</sup> B. L. Anderson, 'Money and the structure of credit in the 18th century', *Business History*, 12 (1970) pp. 85-101; Jacob M. Price, 'What did merchants do? Reflections on British overseas trade, 1660-1790', *Journal of Economic History*, 49 (1989) pp. 278-84; Julian Hoppit, *Risk and failure in English business 1700-1800* (Cambridge, 1987) pp. 98-101, 160-8, 175; Craig Muldrew, *The economy of obligation: the culture of credit and social relations in early modern England* (Basingstoke, 1998) pp. 97-119; Hancock, *Oceans of wine* pp. 184-93; Zahedieh, *Capital and the colonies* pp. 93-5

<sup>123</sup> Price, 'What did merchants do?', p. 278

<sup>124</sup> Michael Zell, 'Credit in the pre-industrial English woollen industry', *Economic History Review*, 49 (2nd ser.) (1996) pp. 676-86; John Smail, 'The culture of credit in eighteenth-century commerce: the English textile industry', *Enterprise and Society*, 4 (2003) pp. 299-322

<sup>125</sup> Walter S. Dunn, *Frontier profit and loss: the British army and the fur traders, 1760-1764* (Westport, CN, 1998) pp. 8-25

<sup>126</sup> Peter Mathias, *The brewing industry in England, 1700-1830* (Cambridge, 1959) pp. 281-9

Atlantic slave and tobacco trades, and in the East Indies, the long duration of trading ventures tied up large amounts of capital and created enormous liquidity requirements that could only be overcome by access to credit.<sup>127</sup> Credit was also vital for the payment of wages in labour-intensive enterprises, where the continual need for low-value payments in coin likewise threatened liquidity.<sup>128</sup> In his study of eighteenth century business failures Julian Hoppit has concluded that most bankruptcies were in fact technical insolvencies: typically the debtor had sufficient capital tied up in merchandise such as stock, slaves, bonds, trade credit or other debts, but lacked the credit necessary to borrow on their security and thereby retain liquidity.<sup>129</sup> Thus merchants who enjoyed privileged access to credit enjoyed a decisive advantage: Samuel Rosenblatt has argued that ‘the ability to command commercial credit in times of duress was more important to success in eighteenth century commerce than any technical or administrative skill a merchant might possess’.<sup>130</sup> However access was as dependent on trust as any other commercial activity, and Hoppit has emphasised that ‘central to the relationship between the debtor and the creditor was mutual confidence’.<sup>131</sup>

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<sup>127</sup> Jacob M. Price, ‘Credit in the slave trade and plantation economies’, in B. Solow (ed.), *Slavery and the rise of the Atlantic system* (Cambridge, 1991) pp. 293-339; K.G. Davies, *The Royal African Company* (London, 1957) pp. 74-96; K.N. Chaudhuri, *The trading world of Asia and the English East India Company, 1660-1760* (Cambridge, 1978) pp. 418-52; Kenneth Morgan, ‘Remittance procedures in the eighteenth-century British slave trade’, *Business History Review*, 79 (2005) pp. 715-49; Zahedieh, *Capital and the colonies* pp. 79, 83, 93

<sup>128</sup> L. S. Pressnell, *Country banking in the industrial revolution* (Oxford, 1956) pp. 14-22; Michael W. Flinn, *Men of iron: the Crowleys in the early iron industry* (Edinburgh, 1962) pp. 178-82; Craig Muldrew and Steven King, ‘Cash, wages and the economy of makeshifts in England, 1650-1800’, in Peter Scholliers and Leonard Schwarz (eds.), *Experiencing wages: social and cultural aspects of wage forms in Europe since 1500* (New York, 2003) pp. 155-75; Craig Muldrew, ‘Wages and the problem of monetary scarcity in early modern England’, in Jan Lucassen (ed.), *Wages and currency: global comparisons from antiquity to the twentieth century* (New York, 2007) pp. 391-410

<sup>129</sup> Hoppit, *Risk and failure* pp. 71-162; Anderson, ‘Money’, p. 97

<sup>130</sup> Samuel M. Rosenblatt, ‘The significance of credit in the tobacco consignment trade: a study of John Norton and Sons, 1768-1775’, *The William and Mary Quarterly*, 19 (1962) p. 387

<sup>131</sup> Julian Hoppit, ‘The use and abuse of credit in eighteenth-century England’, in Neil McKendrick and R.B. Outhwaite (eds.), *Business Life and public policy* (Cambridge, 1986) p. 65; See also Muldrew, *Economy of obligation* pp. 123-30

Early modern commerce must therefore be treated as an exercise in the creation and maintenance of trust, overwhelmingly generated through personal linkages. Both inland and overseas merchants tend to form partnerships with close or adoptive family members, or employ relatives as factors, correspondents or agents: kinship linkages and obligations created informal incentives and sanctions that could control behaviour.<sup>132</sup> Religious connections, within small communities already densely linked by marriages, allowed Jewish, Quaker, Armenian and Huguenot merchants and financiers to use communal structures to supplement kinship linkages, forming additional sanctions that helped bolster mutual trust.<sup>133</sup> Regional or national identity might also generate close connections and obligations.<sup>134</sup> There were also institutional venues, such as civic or guild structures or overseas ‘factories’, while clubs and societies in eighteenth-century Britain helped shopkeepers and merchants make business contacts and find credit.<sup>135</sup> Thus the cultivation of diverse but overlapping series of personal linkages underpinned early modern commerce, generating trust between merchants and their correspondents or agents, and thereby allowing more sophisticated forms of commercial coordination.

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<sup>132</sup> Grassby, *Kinship* pp. 217-51, 290-6, 300-11; Trivellato, *Familiarity of strangers* pp. 132-44; Hancock, *Oceans* pp. 145-7; Aslanian, *Armenian merchants* pp. 145-9, 197-9

<sup>133</sup> Trivellato, *Familiarity* pp. 21-41, 132-76, 194-233; Vanneste, *Global trade* pp. 95-148; Jacob M. Price, ‘The great Quaker business families of 18th century London: the rise and fall of a sectarian patriciate’, in Jacob M. Price (ed.), *Overseas trade and traders: essays on some commercial, financial and political challenges facing British Atlantic merchants, 1660-1775* (Aldershot, 1996) pp. 368, 384-90; Gedalia Yogev, *Diamonds and coral: Anglo-Dutch Jews and eighteenth-century trade* (Leicester, 1978) pp. 191-7; Jonathan I. Israel, *European Jewry in the age of mercantilism: 1550-1750* (Oxford, 1989) pp. 123-44; Zahedieh, *Capital and the colonies* pp. 108-12; Aslanian, *Armenian merchants* pp. 136-65, 185-99

<sup>134</sup> See the essays in David Dickson, Jan Parmentier, and Jane H. Ohlmeyer (eds.), *Irish and Scottish mercantile networks in Europe and overseas in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries* (Ghent, 2007) pp. 16-124; Steve Murdoch, *Network North: Scottish kin, commercial and covert association in Northern Europe, 1603-1746* (Leiden, 2006) pp. 16-124; Aslanian, *Armenian merchants*; Hancock, *Oceans* pp. 147-56

<sup>135</sup> Grassby, *Kinship* pp. 252-7; Zahedieh, *Capital and the colonies* pp. 103-6; Robin Pearson and David Richardson, ‘Business networking in the Industrial Revolution’, *Economic History Review*, 54 (2001) pp. 663-77; Peter Clark, *British clubs and societies 1580-1800: the origins of an associational world* (Oxford, 2000) pp. 152-4; Hancock, *Oceans* pp. 193-7

In recent years the importance of culturally constructed forms of commercial trust has also come to the fore, reflecting an increased interest upon what Francesca Trivellato has called ‘the ways economic cooperation worked across geopolitical, linguistic and religious boundaries’.<sup>136</sup> Although merchants might chose to trade within their own social and cultural group, at some point they invariably had to form trusted connections with buyers or sellers who were outside the informal sanctions and obligations that common culture, community or kinship provided. Friendship – expressed in person or through correspondence – was a potent means of generating trust.<sup>137</sup> Indeed, in functional terms friends acted as ‘fictive kin’, and Naomi Tadmor and others have emphasised that the languages of kinship such as ‘relation’, ‘kin’, or ‘cousin’ could be used ‘to claim recognition ... [and] serve as a powerful matrix for incorporating many non-kin into any kinship groups’.<sup>138</sup> Gift exchange and the maintenance of ‘good correspondence’ could be used to build up trust and mutual obligations, and Ilana Ben-Amos has argued that even credit itself ‘functioned as something akin to gift exchange, binding individuals to one another until accounts were balanced or loans repaid’.<sup>139</sup> The exchange of information concerning character and reputation through correspondence likewise created incentives for honesty, since failures of trust would be circulated rapidly: merchants therefore had to protect their reputation in order that their correspondents retained confidence in them.<sup>140</sup>

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<sup>136</sup> Trivellato, *Familiarity* p. 1

<sup>137</sup> Naomi Tadmor, *Family and friends in eighteenth-century England: household, kinship, and patronage* (Cambridge, 2000) pp. 166-236; Trivellato, *Familiarity* pp. 181-4, 192; Vanneste, *Global trade* pp. 84-7

<sup>138</sup> Tadmor, *Family and friends* pp. 103-65; Grassby, *Kinship* pp. 241-50; Murdoch, *Network North* p. 38; Trivellato, *Familiarity* pp. 134-42

<sup>139</sup> Ilana Krausman Ben-Amos, *The culture of giving: informal support and gift-exchange in early modern England* (Cambridge, 2008) p. 359; Hancock, *Oceans* pp. 173-80; Zahedieh, *Capital and the colonies* pp. 99-103

<sup>140</sup> Aslanian, *Armenian merchants* pp. 95-100; Hancock, *Oceans* pp. 156-61; Trivellato, *Familiarity* pp. 167-76; Vanneste, *Global trade* pp. 81-91

Correspondence and self-consciously constructed cultural codes also helped generate trust by creating a framework of shared expectations about proper behaviour. Thus Trivellato argues that ‘the use of shared rhetorical and legal conventions [in letters] provided merchants ... with a decipherable code of expressions and nouns and regularised behaviour and expectations’, facilitating cross-cultural trade.<sup>141</sup> John Smail has identified similar principles in English textile networks, where the languages of honour, obligation and friendship helped to provide informal sanctions that could bolster trust:

confronted with a breakdown in the trust that made commerce possible, merchants articulated their expectations about proper behaviour in the commercial world using a language of honour. In doing so, they sought both to compel others to behave according to the accepted standards and to establish that their own actions met such standards.<sup>142</sup>

Neither need these cultural codes necessarily have been strictly commercial. In 1986 P.J. Cain and A.G. Hopkins argued that British imperial expansion after 1688 was dominated by ‘gentlemanly capitalism’, which built up trust through the incorporation of gentry principles such as honour, reputation and honesty.<sup>143</sup> More recently Susan Whyman has concluded that the commercial and financial networks of John Verney, a Turkey merchant and younger son of a gentry family, were reinforced by principles of ‘trust, honour, personal contact and the oath ... [which] overlapped with those of the gentry’.<sup>144</sup>

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<sup>141</sup> Trivellato, *Familiarity* pp. 177-93, 225-49; Hancock, *Oceans* p. 180; Vanneste, *Global trade* pp. 67-94

<sup>142</sup> John Smail, ‘Credit, risk, and honor in eighteenth-century commerce’, *Journal of British Studies*, 44 (2005) p. 449; See also Muldrew, *Economy of obligation* pp. 130-8, 148-56, 173-92

<sup>143</sup> Peter Cain and Antony Hopkins, ‘Gentlemanly capitalism and the British expansion overseas, 1: ‘The old colonial system, 1688-1850’, *Economic History Review*, 39 (2nd ser.) (1986) pp. 501-25

<sup>144</sup> Susan E. Whyman, *Sociability and power in late-Stuart England: the cultural worlds of the Verneys 1660-1720* (Oxford, 1999) pp. 43-8, 70-84

Admittedly much recent work on the larger, quasi-institutional commercial enterprises of the period has argued for the importance of rational, bureaucratic structures. K.N. Chaudhuri and Huw Bowen have stressed for example the growing bureaucratisation of the East India Company after 1660, and Ann Carlos and Stephen Nicholas have done likewise for the Hudson's Bay Company.<sup>145</sup> Ogborn has argued that the 'paper world' this created imposed a recognisably Weberian division between public and private business, and facilitated auditing and accountability, thereby helping to overcome problems of trust and communication.<sup>146</sup> Yet Bowen also notes that Thomas Munro, the Governor of Madras, thought the East India Company's records 'a mass of useless trash', and argues that their accumulation was in practice virtually a symbolic act:

the increasingly well-regulated paper empire they created inside East India House acted as a surrogate for the territorial empire that had been established on the subcontinent, and they hoped that the order they imposed on the former could be projected onto the latter through the application of high standards of accuracy and attention to detail.<sup>147</sup>

Others have argued or acknowledged that in the East India and other chartered companies bureaucratic structures were frequently imposed on top of existing social and cultural linkages and connections, and to a greater or lesser extent these companies merely served as corporate umbrellas under which private interests

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<sup>145</sup> Bowen, *Business of empire* pp. 139-78; Chaudhuri, *Trading world* pp. 19-20, 57-76, 131, 436-7, 455-61; Ann Carlos and Stephen Nicholas, 'Agency problems in early chartered companies: the case of the Hudson's Bay Company', *Journal of Economic History*, 50 (1990) pp. 853-75

<sup>146</sup> Miles Ogborn, 'Streysham Master's office: accounting for collectivity, order and authority in 17th-century India', *Cultural Geographies*, 13 (2006) pp. 127-55

<sup>147</sup> Bowen, *Business of empire* pp. 178-81. See also Chaudhuri, *Trading world* pp. 412-3, 416; Davies, *Royal African Company* (London, 1957) pp. 156, 238

operated largely autonomously.<sup>148</sup> The commercial advantages offered by bureaucratic reform may therefore have been a chimera: most commercial relations remained heavily personalised, the formation of trust through personal connections continuing to underpin successful mercantile activity.

## ALTERNATIVE APPLICATIONS

Crucially, this model of coordination and cooperation, can also be applied to other spheres of economic activity, such as finance. Many of the functions now connected with banking – remittances, loans, currency exchange, the maintenance of deposit accounts – were often the purview of merchants, traders and other commercial actors, suggesting an initial overlap of methods and measures.<sup>149</sup> In the early phases of the ‘financial revolution’ in the 1690s, key functions such as stock-broking and arbitrage remained dominated by personal linkages.<sup>150</sup> Goldsmith-bankers in London formed close personnel connections with their clients and each other, facilitating after 1660 an informal system of mutual clearing that relied on ‘familiarity and reputation’ as security.<sup>151</sup> Although the scrivener-banker Sir Robert Clayton laid down complex regulations for the conduct of his provincial and domestic agents, Melton has concluded that in reality the whole enterprise

<sup>148</sup> Carlos and Nicholas, ‘Agency problems’ pp. 858, 872-5; Chaudhuri, *Trading world* pp. 21-2, 69-70, 133-51, 213; Soren Mentz, *The English gentleman merchant at work: Madras and the City of London 1660-1740* (Copenhagen, 2005) p. 262

<sup>149</sup> Pressnell, *Country banking* pp. 4-69; Eric Kerridge, *Trade and banking in early modern England* (Manchester, 1988) pp. 45-81; L. M. Cullen, ‘The exchange business of the Irish banks in the eighteenth century’, *Economica*, 25 (1958) pp. 326-38; D. R. Hainsworth, *Stewards, lords and people: the estate steward and his world in later Stuart England* (Cambridge, 1992) pp. 75-107

<sup>150</sup> Yogevev, *Diamonds and coral* pp. 53-9, 185-208; Larry Neal, “‘For God’s sake, remit me’”: the adventures of George Middleton, John Law’s goldsmith-banker, 1712-29’, *Business and Economic History*, 23 (1994) pp. 32-6, 53-5; Stephen Quinn, ‘Gold, silver and the Glorious Revolution: arbitrage between bills of exchange and bullion’, *Economic History Review*, 49 (2nd ser.) (1996) pp. 482-6; Anne L. Murphy, *The origins of English financial markets: investment and speculation before the South Sea Bubble* (Cambridge, 2009) pp. 114-209; Kaplan, *Rothschild* pp. 56-8, 64-5, 84

<sup>151</sup> Stephen Quinn, ‘Goldsmith banking: mutual acceptance and inter-banker clearing in Restoration London’, *Explorations in Economic History*, 34 (1997) pp. 411-27

ultimately relied on trust and the construction of personal linkages, with key employees being incorporated into Clayton's household and family.<sup>152</sup> The success of provincial or life insurance ventures relied on 'the embeddedness of trust in the social and business networks' of those involved.<sup>153</sup> Even new institutions such as the Bank of England and Bank of Scotland relied heavily upon personal connections and obligations for their commercial and financial effectiveness.<sup>154</sup> Financial enterprises during this period can therefore be understood in terms of coordination and cooperation.

The same also appears to have been true in a whole range of other economic ventures. With reference to Scottish industrial enterprises in northern Europe during this period, Steven Murdoch has argued that 'as with more familiar mercantile networks', successful industrialists used their connections to build up businesses through the mutual trust and access to credit these created.<sup>155</sup> Although Peter Mathias has stressed the importance of 'a strict accounting system and an efficient office administration' in his study of English brewing in the eighteenth century, he has also emphasised the crucial importance of personal connections, which offered access to credit, capital, markets and expertise.<sup>156</sup> Ambrose Crowley's ironworking enterprise, despite an elaborate quasi-bureaucratic infrastructure that proved impossible consistently to enforce, ultimately depended

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<sup>152</sup> Frank T. Melton, *Sir Robert Clayton and the origins of English deposit banking, 1658-1685* (Cambridge, 1986) pp. 68-94

<sup>153</sup> Robin Pearson, *Insuring the Industrial Revolution: fire insurance in Great Britain, 1700-1850* (Aldershot, 2004) pp. 102-33, 235-95; Geoffrey Clark, *Betting on lives: the culture of life insurance in England, 1695-1775* (Manchester, 1999) pp. 176-87

<sup>154</sup> J. H. Clapham, *The Bank of England: a history* (Cambridge, 1945) i, 141; Richard Saville, *Bank of Scotland: a history, 1695-1995* (Edinburgh, 1996) pp. 3, 11-16, 21, 52

<sup>155</sup> Murdoch, *Network North* pp. 173-204

<sup>156</sup> Mathias, *Brewing* pp. 252-96, 448-73

upon his commercial acumen and close supervision for success.<sup>157</sup> Large-scale clothiers acted mainly as organisers and administrators, sub-contracting out production to a network of individual workshops: the contribution they offered was capital, credit, their political connections to the state, and their skill at coordinating these respective activities.<sup>158</sup> On the retail side of the clothing and Madeira trades, wider networks of correspondents and trusted agents offered improved access to alternative markets to ‘buffer the peaks and troughs’ of demand.<sup>159</sup> In the pottery trade Lorna Weatherill has argued that ‘it was through these personal contacts that the trade was knitted together into a framework of people who knew one another and who could discuss and influence the development of the industry’, while for other retailers such linkages also offered access to credit and thus liquidity.<sup>160</sup> The analytical model of coordination, cooperation and mutual confidence, expressed in commerce through overlapping networks of personal and informal connections, therefore has the potential to explain many other forms of economic activity.

Indeed, some understanding of the importance of coordination and cooperation in the activities of the fiscal-military state has already informed some of the literature on state formation. For instance, Baker argued that the confusing, overlapping divisions of fiscal-military administration ‘made [the] relationships [of the Treasury] with other government departments of relevance to the efficient fulfilment of its own responsibilities’, and that it was successful in part because it

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<sup>157</sup> Flinn, *Men of iron* pp. 98-145, 184-216, 252-5

<sup>158</sup> Beverly Lemire, *Dress, culture and commerce: the English clothing trade before the factory, 1660-1800* (Basingstoke, 1997) pp. 14-22; D.J. Smith, ‘Army clothing contractors and the textile industries in the eighteenth century’, *Textile History*, 14 (1983) pp. 157-63

<sup>159</sup> Beverly Lemire, ‘Consumerism in pre-industrial and early industrial England: the trade in second-hand clothes’, *Journal of British Studies*, 27 (1988) pp. 6-21; Lemire, *Dress, culture and commerce* pp. 32-9; Hancock, *Oceans* pp. 133-71, 200-71

<sup>160</sup> Lorna Weatherill, ‘The business of middleman in the English pottery trade before 1780’, *Business History*, 28 (1986) pp. 51-71; Nancy Cox, *The complete tradesman: a study of retailing, 1550-1820* (Aldershot, 2000) pp. 146-96; Hancock, *Oceans* pp. 245-70

enjoyed or enforced a high level of cooperation.<sup>161</sup> Tomlinson and West have concluded that although the Ordnance Office was subject to corruption and inefficiency, ‘ultimately it is impossible to differentiate between the culpability of the Ordnance Office and the other departments ... the root causes of inefficiency lay quite outside the power of any one department to control.’<sup>162</sup> David Syrett has shown that the organisation of transports invariably suffered because they required consistent cooperation between a number of agencies, each with their own agenda.<sup>163</sup> As noted above, studies of the revenue agencies have acknowledged the importance of cooperation from local elites, while the need to coordinate enforcement or policing with military and naval forces has also been identified.<sup>164</sup> Naval victualling improved in the 1740s, and where failures occurred Baugh has concluded ‘it was almost always because something went wrong after the Victualling Office had completed its part of the job’.<sup>165</sup> Morriss has acknowledged that while internal departmental efficiency was important, ‘collaboration between departments was necessary’.<sup>166</sup> Wilkinson has stressed the importance of communication, political power and personal character to the dynamic interaction of naval departments.<sup>167</sup>

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<sup>161</sup> Baker, *Government and contractors* pp. 20-1

<sup>162</sup> Tomlinson, *Guns and government* pp. 130-64; Jenny West, *Gunpowder, government and war in the mid-eighteenth century* (London, 1991) pp. 79-117

<sup>163</sup> David Syrett, *Shipping and the American war, 1775-83: a study of British transport organization* (London, 1970) pp. 5-24, 101-5, 140, 192-207, 245-6; David Syrett, *Shipping and military power in the Seven Years War: the sails of victory* (Exeter, 2008) pp. 32-3, 72-3; Morriss, *Foundations* pp. 321-54

<sup>164</sup> Coleby, *Hampshire* pp. 122-4; Paul Muskett, ‘Military operations against smuggling in Kent and Sussex, 1698-1750’, *Journal of the Society for Army Historical Research*, 52 (1974) pp. 89-110; Hoon, *Customs system, 1696-1786* pp. 86-91. Also see above n. 62

<sup>165</sup> Baugh, *British naval administration* p. 443

<sup>166</sup> Morriss, *Foundations* p. 70

<sup>167</sup> Wilkinson, *British navy and the state* pp. 24-31

## **PARTISAN POLITICS**

Thus the British fiscal-military state has already been seen as an exercise in coordination, cooperation and negotiation, albeit largely from the inside out, a viewpoint that the Weberian model – with its focus upon bureaucratisation, centralisation and formal institutional change – appears to be unable to conceptualise. By contrast, the economic model of coordination through mutual trust appears to offer an established but adaptable framework for such an analysis. Applied to state formation, it would suggest that the effectiveness of a given fiscal-military state would increase as the personal connections and mutual trust between its departments, at the level of individual officials, improved, and that the most successful states were those that could build the strongest linkages between the greatest number of agents. These might even include the merchants, contractors and financiers upon whom military and naval forces relied, as shown above. Yet by definition state formation is also a political activity, ultimately subordinated to political aims, and therefore any model of coordination and cooperation would be incomplete without considering the importance of politically-driven interaction. This final section will argue that successful coordination with the British fiscal-military state would inescapably involve the cultivation of politicised linkages between officials, contractors and politicians, and that as political interactions in Britain became more partisan and ideologically driven between the Exclusion Crisis in 1679-81 and, at the very least, the death of Queen Anne in 1714, the state not only accommodated this but became more effective as a result.

The importance of close political connections even for commercial effectiveness has been powerfully emphasised. The success of the Bank of England ultimately reflected the close links of its directors with Parliament.<sup>168</sup> Other financial institutions such as the Bank of Scotland and the Land and Orphans' banks in London rose and fell by virtue of similar connections.<sup>169</sup> The East India Company relied on good relations with Parliament and the ministry, as well as with local rulers in India, although excessively close links could prove a double-edged sword: the Royal African Company tied itself too closely to James II and the tory regime and suffered after 1688 as a result.<sup>170</sup> The same was true of contractors or farmers operating on the borders between the public and private sphere. During Sir Stephen Fox's 'Great Undertaking', the success of the venture rested on the breadth of his financial contacts and private capital – created in part by acting as private banker to the Restoration court – as well as his close and trusted personal connection with Charles II.<sup>171</sup> Nichols argues that Fox's successors in 1679 lacked both his capital base and political standing, and that this made them unable to withstand Fox's political attacks, which forced them out the following year.<sup>172</sup> Similarly the success of the Irish 'Undertaking' by Ranelagh reflected his good connections with English

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<sup>168</sup> Clapham, *Bank* i, 14-17, 53-4, 73-6; Dickson, *Financial Revolution* pp. 19, 54-6, 64; Dennis Rubini, 'Politics and the battle for the banks, 1688-97', *English Historical Review*, 85 (1970) pp. 693-714; Pincus, *1688* pp. 389-96

<sup>169</sup> I. G. Doolittle, 'The City of London's debt to its orphans, 1694-1767', *Bulletin of the Institute of Historical Research*, 56 (1983) pp. 46-59; Saville, *Bank of Scotland* pp. 3-7, 28, 30-41, 56, 79-80, 90-2; Richard Kleer, '"Fictitious Cash": English public finances and paper money, 1689-97', in Charles McGrath and Christopher Fauske (eds.), *Money, power and print: interdisciplinary studies on the financial revolution in the British Isles* (Newark, DE, 2008) pp. 70-103; Pincus, *1688* pp. 393-4

<sup>170</sup> Davies, *Royal African Company* pp. 103-47; Chaudhuri, *Trading world* pp. 109-21; Henry Horwitz, 'The East India trade, the politicians and the constitution 1689-1702', *Journal of British Studies*, 17 (1978) pp. 1-18; Pincus, *1688* pp. 372-88, 398; Zahedieh, *Capital and the colonies* pp. 114-23

<sup>171</sup> Clay, *Public finance* pp. 15-16, 29, 124

<sup>172</sup> *Ibid.* pp. 103-8; G.O. Nichols, 'Intermediaries and the development of English government borrowing: the case of Sir John James and Major Robert Huntington, 1675-79', *Business History*, 29 (1987) pp. 27-46

and Irish financiers<sup>173</sup>, but also the administrative leverage that he enjoyed as Chancellor of the (Irish) Exchequer and head of the Revenue Commissioners, and consistent political support from Charles II and the Lord Treasurer the earl of Danby.<sup>174</sup> Indeed, Ranelagh noted in 1673 that ‘whilst the king is our friend we are and shall be safe ... and therefore in all things we must please and honour him’.

Thus even those organisational structures operating on the periphery of the state were more than usually sensitive to political connections and patronage, suggesting that formal state structures were even more firmly attuned to the nuances of contemporary politics, and benefitted from close cooperation. Yet the situation is complicated by the rise of ideologically-driven political partisanship in England after at least 1679 and the emergence of whig and tory political ‘parties’. This has overwhelmingly been considered a divisive, even destructive, force within state formation which prevented the growth of an apolitical administration based on professionalism and impartiality, thereby disrupting bureaucratic growth. Studies of the army and navy during this period have condemned partisan or political interference, and equated professionalism and effectiveness with the suppression of such loyalties.<sup>175</sup> With reference to the revenue, Ward concluded that partisan squabbles between commissioners of the land tax ‘undoubtedly contributed to the serious decline in the efficiency of collection’, although Colin Brooks argues that it made no difference.<sup>176</sup> This section will, firstly, assess existing scholarship concerning the reality of partisan politics between 1689 and 1713, and then suggest

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<sup>173</sup> Egan, ‘Finance, 1660-85’, vol. i, 212-6, 240-3; vol. ii, 8-10, 36-43

<sup>174</sup> Ibid. vol. ii, 8-10, 101-8

<sup>175</sup> Tomlinson, *Guns and government* pp. 63-7, 78-83; Scouller, *Armies* pp. 73-4; Childs, *William III* pp. 53-8; Brewer, *Sinews of Power* pp. 74-5, 78, 82, 150; N. A. M. Rodger, *The command of the ocean: a naval history of Britain, 1649-1815* (London, 2005) pp. 123-4, 201-2

<sup>176</sup> W. R. Ward, *The English Land Tax in the Eighteenth Century* (London, 1953), 48-65; Brooks, ‘Administration’, pp. 289-96

that political partisanship may actually have offered a number of advantages to the process of state formation. If, as it is argued above, state formation can be understood as a process of more successful coordination through improved collaboration, then political partisanship may have served as effectively as a common nationality or religion to create the personal trust and mutual obligation that underpinned cooperation.

The importance of partisanship to politics between the 1680s and 1720s has not been unchallenged. In the 1950s, building on Lewis Namier's earlier deconstruction of partisanship in British parliamentary politics in the 1760s, Robert Walcott argued that ideology was similarly unimportant in this earlier era, and that what appeared to be partisan conflict was instead the interaction of kinship-based factions.<sup>177</sup> Dennis Rubini has similarly argued for the preeminent importance of 'court' and 'country' divisions in politics during this period.<sup>178</sup> The first has been defined as an ideological alignment around service to the court and the king's wishes, and the world of realpolitik, with the latter one of civic virtue and attachment to the unhindered workings of the 'Ancient Constitution', as well as a suspicion of political or economic innovation. Yet in the wake of work by Geoffrey Holmes the central importance of political partisanship – modified in individual circumstances by 'court' or 'country' loyalties, as well as kinship, friendship and private interest and ambition – is now generally accepted as historiographical orthodoxy.<sup>179</sup>

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<sup>177</sup> Robert Walcott, *English politics in the early eighteenth century* (Oxford, 1956)

<sup>178</sup> Dennis Rubini, *Court and country, 1688-1702* (1968) ; H. T. Dickinson, *Liberty and property: political ideology in eighteenth-century Britain* (London, 1977) pp. 91-109

<sup>179</sup> Geoffrey S. Holmes, *British politics in the age of Anne* (London, 1987). For the significance of this work, see David Hayton and W. A. Speck, 'In no one's shadow: *British Politics in the Age of*

Although arguably possessing a longer ideological pedigree, explicitly tory and whig divisions arose between 1679 and 1681 during the Exclusion Crisis, an unsuccessful attempt to deny the succession to James, Duke of York, brother to the childless Charles II and the Catholic heir to his English, Scottish and Irish thrones. Most whigs, many of them associated with Protestant Dissent, feared the effects of a Catholic heir and wanted James passed over, with Parliamentary sanction, in favour of a Protestant heir such as Charles' illegitimate son the duke of Monmouth. By contrast, most tories – even though they were in favour of the Restoration settlement that had excluded Dissenters and Catholics from public life, and re-established the Anglican church – sought to uphold traditional principles of hereditary succession, divine right and the royal prerogative. The debate was therefore over both religious and constitutional principles, both sides presenting particular understandings of what constituted the national interest, and thus the aim of all public service. Neither party survived unscathed either James's accession in 1685 or his removal in 1688 during the 'Glorious Revolution', supporters on both sides having collaborated with his absolutist and arbitrary regime, as Pincus has recently emphasised.<sup>180</sup> Nevertheless ideological conflict expressed in partisan terms continued virtually unabated, and J.C.D Clark has argued that the partisan labels created during the Exclusion Crisis continued to define and delineate political discourse for much of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.<sup>181</sup>

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*Anne* and the writing of the History of the House of Commons', *Parliamentary History*, 28 (2009) pp. 1-12

<sup>180</sup> Pincus, *1688* pp. 91-122, 179-217

<sup>181</sup> J.C.D. Clark, 'A general theory of party, opposition and government, 1688-1832', *Historical Journal*, 23 (1980)

The existence of partisan politics, particularly during the so-called ‘rage of party’ between 1680 and 1720, is therefore an inescapable fact. Statistical studies of division lists have shown that whig and tory loyalties outweighed even court and country divisions in importance between 1690 and 1715.<sup>182</sup> Partisanship and political ideology have been shown to have saturated political pamphleteering and discourse.<sup>183</sup> A range of other studies have also emphasised the penetration of party politics into society, and especially state structures. From 1679 until at least 1715, administrative institutions – the lord-lieutenancies, the militia, county benches of JPs, and fiscal-military hierarchies – were successively purged and reconstructed according to the prevailing political situation.<sup>184</sup> Urban, rural and corporate communities also became suffused with partisan politics, as local partisans fought over political issues: as Clark has argued, ‘localism ... was obviously not inconsistent with the existence of national ideological polarity, whig vs tory, which was fully comprehended within the country gentry community’.<sup>185</sup> Political partisanship was therefore a real phenomenon and not exclusively a façade behind which public figures could hide their private interests.

At the same time the political parties that dominated contemporary society were by no means homogeneous: kinship and clientage groupings with parties remained of

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<sup>182</sup> *HOP* (1690-1715) i, 437-44

<sup>183</sup> Mark Knights, *Representation and misrepresentation in later Stuart Britain: partisanship and political culture* (Oxford, 2005) pp. 109-381

<sup>184</sup> Lionel K. J. Glassey, *Politics and the appointment of justices of the peace, 1675-1720* (Oxford, 1979) pp. 262-9; Norma Landau, *The justices of the peace, 1679-1760* (Berkeley, 1984) pp. 69-93; Beckett, ‘Land tax’, p. 64; Ward, *Land tax* pp. 36, 42, 48-65; Coleby, *Hampshire* (Cambridge, 1987) pp. 159-78; Stater, *Noble government* pp. 131-46, 166-78

<sup>185</sup> J.C.D. Clark, *Revolution and rebellion: state and society in England in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries* (Cambridge, 1986) p. 56; William Speck, *Tory & Whig: the struggle in the constituencies, 1701-1715* (London, 1970); Gary Stuart de Krey, *A fractured society: the politics of London in the first age of party, 1688-1715* (Oxford, 1985) pp. 1-39, 121-271; Paul Halliday, *Dismembering the body politic: partisan politics in England's towns, 1650-1730* (Cambridge, 1998); Knights, *Representation and misrepresentation* pp. 67-108; John Miller, *Cities divided: politics and religion in English provincial towns, 1660-1722* (Oxford, 2007)

importance, as well as more diverse forms of association and mutual interest.<sup>186</sup> They absorbed economic, religious, provincial and other sectional interests in England and overseas who often found that their own particular interests were best served by linking themselves with a party at Westminster.<sup>187</sup> Neither were the parties ideological monoliths. Although deriving much of their identity and impetus from distinct approaches to religion, royal power, the succession, and foreign and – arguably – economic policy, these formed an overlapping and often internally inconsistent set of priorities.<sup>188</sup> ‘Court’ and ‘country’ distinctions in particular continued to cut across partisan loyalties: in the 1690s the whig party split into two wings, the ‘old’ or ‘country’ whigs eventually merging with the ‘country tories’. By 1704 the tory party had similarly split into a rump ‘court’ wing and a larger, more amorphous group of ‘country’ tories and independent backbenchers, and was also riven by splits between supporters of the Protestant ‘Hanoverian’ and Catholic ‘Jacobite’ succession. Nevertheless, the overall effect was that of a partisan division in politics: a study of the division lists has suggested that out of the 1,982 members of Parliament between 1690 and 1715, only seven can truly be classed as politically neutral courtiers who ‘genuinely stood above, or outside, a party affiliation’.<sup>189</sup>

Indeed, so pervasive was political partisanship during this period that it penetrated almost every aspect of society. Even patterns of material consumption were

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<sup>186</sup> Holmes, *Politics* pp. 217-84; Knights, *Representation and misrepresentation* pp. 18-28

<sup>187</sup> Speck, *Tory & Whig* pp. 33-71; Holmes, *Politics* pp. 285-344; Stuart Handley, ‘Provincial influence on general legislation: the case of Lancashire, 1689-1731’, *Parliamentary History*, 16 (1997) pp. 171-84; Perry Gauci, *The politics of trade: the overseas merchant in state and society, 1660-1720* (Oxford, 2001) pp. 3-13, 108-232

<sup>188</sup> The following paragraph is based on Henry Horwitz, *Parliament, policy, and politics in the reign of William III* (Manchester, 1977) and Holmes, *Politics*

<sup>189</sup> *HOP* (1690-1715) i, 482

affected: Charles Medlycott wrote to the whig magnate Lord Wharton from Portugal in 1713 that

understanding these country white wines are at present a fashionable drink, especially among those worthy opponents of the [tory] French bill, makes me presume to send your Lordship a hogshead of the best Calcavellas.<sup>190</sup>

In her study of the Verneys, Whyman has also argued that modes of sociability were intertwined with the shifting patterns of partisan politics, and that partisan loyalties even spilled over into marriage alliances, sports events and local patronage.<sup>191</sup>

Alongside financial and commercial interests, political parties also colonised the new club and coffee-house culture: the Kit-Cat club, which combined whig politics with sociability, conviviality and artistic patronage, was simply the most well known of many.<sup>192</sup> Mark Knights has demonstrated that politicking and electioneering – making use of an expanded and politicised public sphere – even attacked fundamental concepts such as truth, trust and ‘credit’: ‘truth became relative to partisan conviction, and party institutionalised a system of rival truth claims’.<sup>193</sup> In this respect it was even functionally akin to financial trust: ‘at a national level, public credit and party identity rested on partisan truth claims and credibility’. Thus political partisanship was a means of structuring the alignment of interests, a process akin to creation of commercial trust within other, more diverse networks of friendship or kinship connections, or nationality and religion.

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<sup>190</sup> NRO, Cokayne MS C/2922, Medlycott to Wharton, 29/12/1713; Gauci, *Politics of trade* pp. 234-70; John V. C. Nye, *War, wine, and taxes: the political economy of Anglo-French trade, 1689-1900* (Princeton, NJ, 2007) pp. 32-43

<sup>191</sup> Whyman, *Verneys* pp. 147-76

<sup>192</sup> Clark, *Clubs and societies* pp. 55-7, 61-2, 73; S. Pincus, “‘Coffee politicians does create’: Coffeehouses and restoration political culture’, *Journal of Modern History*, 67 (1995) pp. 807-34; Ophelia Field, *The Kit-Cat Club: friends who imagined a nation* (London, 2008); Linda Colley, ‘The Loyal Brotherhood and the Cocoa Tree: the London organization of the Tory party, 1727-60’, *Historical Journal*, 20 (1977) pp. 77-95

<sup>193</sup> Knights, *Representation and misrepresentation* pp. 6, 59, 272-332

The influence of partisan politics upon commerce and public finance has already been identified by several historians. Gary de Krey and Nuala Zahedieh have shown that both chartered companies and the wider mercantile community were split along partisan lines, their allegiances ‘informed by the experiences they shared with trading colleagues who pursued the same specialisations’, although Steve Pincus’ argument that companies were fundamentally structured around specifically partisan economic ideologies is less convincing.<sup>194</sup> More specifically, Bruce Carruthers has argued that patterns of stock trading in the whig Bank of England, tory South Sea Company, and mixed East India Company demonstrate a stronger degree of ‘endogamy’ than can be accounted for by chance: only trading relationships between close-knit religious and ethnic groups such as Jews and Huguenots demonstrate a higher degree.<sup>195</sup> The private customers of Hoare’s Bank were linked by common kinship, religion or politics, often tory, and Anne Laurence concludes that ‘personal relationships, assured by family links, shared political and religious views, and charitable activities in common were a significant factor in creating reputation’.<sup>196</sup> Elsewhere, Antoin Murphy has identified Irish financial networks in Spain held together by both Catholic and Jacobite loyalties.<sup>197</sup> These examples therefore suggest that economic networks could be structured around the trust created by political connections, reinforced where necessary by other elements, and thus that fiscal-military administrative structures functioning in a similar fashion may have benefitted from the effect of strongly partisan identities upon their integral networks.

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<sup>194</sup> de Krey, *Fractured society* pp. 121-247; Pincus, *1688* pp. 372-88, 398; Zahedieh, *Capital and the colonies* pp. 113-36

<sup>195</sup> Bruce Carruthers, *City of capital: politics and markets in the English financial revolution* (Princeton, 1996) pp. 137-94

<sup>196</sup> Anne Laurence, ‘The emergence of a private clientele for banks in the early eighteenth century: Hoare’s Bank and some women customers’, *Economic History Review*, 61 (2008) pp. 577-84

<sup>197</sup> Antoin E. Murphy, *Richard Cantillon: entrepreneur and economist* (Oxford, 1986) pp. 24-9

## METHODOLOGY

However, even aside from the fact that individual political identity is not always consistent, a central methodological problem is that historical figures only very rarely make their allegiances or opinions explicit in surviving material, let alone state how this affected their financial or commercial conduct. David Hancock has identified similar methodological problems in studying commercial networks, pointing out that most letters were concerned purely with business, and that

little was said about the harmony or tension that prevailed among partners, the division of responsibilities among those in the counting house, the physical setting for their business transactions, or their reasons for going into new areas of business.<sup>198</sup>

As a result, he argues that the careful accumulation of material is necessary, in order to extrapolate or infer such elements from patterns of behaviour, conduct or patronage. A similar approach has been taken by the *History of Parliament* volumes to assess partisan allegiance. The voting record of a member, as recorded by division lists or private papers, offers a useful but not infallible indication of partisan allegiances.<sup>199</sup> For those not in Parliament, similar information can often be extracted from the polling books kept by constituencies in the eighteenth century. Both sets of sources cannot be used uncritically, but can be supplemented by less formal but often equally explicit indications of allegiance, such as the patronage of distinctively partisan political or economic causes or institutions.<sup>200</sup> Although individually such pieces of evidence are not conclusive, and may even on occasion

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<sup>198</sup> Hancock, *Citizens* p. 9

<sup>199</sup> *HOP* (1690-1715) i, 22-4, 435-8, 481-2

<sup>200</sup> *Ibid.*, i, 462-99

be mutually contradictory, it can be argued that when assembled they present at least circumstantial evidence for partisan or political allegiance and affinity.

It should therefore be possible to consider the extent not only to which the fiscal-military infrastructure was politicised and subject to partisan influences during this period, but also how such loyalties and allegiances fed into the construction of wider networks. If political partisanship, a cultural and ideological construction that carried its own incentives and sanctions, had the potential to support trust and cooperation, the effectiveness of the British fiscal-military during this period would be found to have been underpinned by the politicisation, rather than the professionalisation, of its administrative and operational infrastructure. The following chapters will explore precisely this issue. The intention is not to provide a comprehensive chronological study of each individual transaction, or even attempt to quantify these elements, which would in any case unnecessarily duplicate existing work identified above, but rather to identify and isolate the broader dynamics underlying these systems.

Beginning with the campaigns in Ireland during its invasion by British forces under William III (1689-91) and then moving to the wider war in Flanders during the Nine Years War (1688-97) it will be argued that these conflicts not only demonstrate the crucial importance of mutual coordination to the effectiveness of the army, but also the extent to which cooperation was assured by personal and political linkages. In Ireland, an overlapping series of administrative and political networks helped to coordinate a range of formal and informal agencies, while in Flanders a series of personal linkages – buttressed by institutional support but not dependent upon it –

permitted a range of questionable financial practices that materially aided the financial standing of the army. Effectiveness was therefore a function of both the strength and depth of the respective networks: in Flanders, the declining range of Pay Office networks ultimately restricted high levels of informal financial intervention, while in Ireland in 1689 the attempt to construct formal bureaucratic hierarchies without the underlying cooperation and mutual trust needed for their operation proved ineffective.

The succeeding chapters will then analyse the operation of these forces during the War of the Spanish Succession (1702-13), for which there exists far richer documentation, both official and informal. Examining the Pay Office and its activities between 1702 and 1705, while under the leadership of Charles Fox, shows that its effectiveness was circumscribed by an insistence upon inflexible bureaucratic procedure, which restricted the unofficial activities required to maintain the liquidity of the army, and led to a reliance upon a series of informal networks, operating through trust and personal contacts. By contrast, under James Brydges, Paymaster of the Forces between 1705 and 1713, the Pay Office achieved a high level of effectiveness, because Brydges was willing, even eager, to combine an extensive series of informal connections and obligations with a programme of proactive financial intermediation that improved the army's solvency. Through a series of partisan or political connections Brydges built strong linkages with a range of politicians, officials and financiers, coordinating the flow of money through those trusted individuals on whose cooperation he could rely. One chapter will argue that in Flanders this proved highly effective, because sufficient partisan contacts existed to make this possible: the other will argue that informal intermediation was less

successful in Spain, and far less successful in Portugal, both because there was less immediate call for it but also because he had fewer personal linkages with the fiscal-military networks there, which were also more politically mixed. Lacking a larger range of partisan connections, his ability to act was consequently circumscribed, although once again other actors drew upon their own informal networks to provide similar services.

Brewer argued in *The Sinews of Power* that although reliance on Parliament restricted the state's options, 'the constraints on power meant that when it was exercised, it was exercised fully', and the overall effectiveness of the state thereby increased.<sup>201</sup> This thesis will ultimately argue that because coordination and cooperation, rather than 'rational' bureaucratic or institutional growth, lay at the heart of state formation during this period, the importance of ideologically-driven politics can be similarly reassessed. Although in one respect it may have inhibited the actions of the fiscal-military state, just as representative bodies superficially restricted the absolute power of the French or even the British crown, the constraints on power that political partisanship imposed meant that when such power was exercised, it was exercised even more fully, and that the fiscal-military state in Britain became even more effective as a result.

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<sup>201</sup> Brewer, *Sinews of Power* p. xx

## **CHAPTER 2: IRELAND 1689-91**

The Williamite wars in Ireland between 1689 and 1691 represented the first real test of the post-Restoration military establishment. British troops had served at home and abroad since 1660, but in small numbers on short campaigns as in 1685 and 1688, in small garrisons such as Tangiers in Morocco, or in the context of a wider military campaign where logistics and supply had largely been handled by their French or Dutch allies.<sup>1</sup> Having fled or been driven out of England in December 1688 by the ‘Glorious Revolution’, and deserted by the English army, James II landed in Ireland in March 1689 in order to recover his kingdoms with the aid of France and the Irish Catholics.<sup>2</sup> Mobilising Ireland around him, and purging its political structures of those sympathetic to the invasion of William of Orange – crowned in England as William III jointly with his wife, James’s daughter Mary, in April 1689 – his actions posed a fundamental threat to the new English regime, in the process of gearing up for deployment against France in the Low Countries.

An invasion, to subordinate Ireland again directly to English rule, was therefore necessary, but it would need to be achieved by an English or British fiscal-military state whose ability to project power beyond its own shores and in the defence of its own interests remained fundamentally untested. In addition, the new Williamite regime faced formidable logistical challenges. Troops had to be provided with sufficient supplies such as bread or biscuit, beef, cheese and pease, as well as beer or other spirits, and their horses with both ‘green’ forage such as grass and ‘dry’

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<sup>1</sup> John Childs, *The army of Charles II* (London, 1976) pp. 115-95

<sup>2</sup> The following is based on Horwitz, *Parliament, policy and politics* pp. 1-44; Simms, *Jacobite Ireland* pp. 44-73; Tim Harris, *Revolution: the great crisis of the British monarchy 1685-1720* (London, 2006) pp. 97-236; John Childs, *The Williamite wars in Ireland, 1688-91* (London, 2007) pp. 1-117

forage such as hay, oats and straw. Even on the Continent, where a well-developed logistical and economic infrastructure existed capable of supplying these wants, intensive organisation was required for effective supply, not least because key provisions such as bread or biscuit could not simply be acquired by foraging but required fixed or semi-permanent ovens and mills.<sup>3</sup> These problems were multiplied in Ireland, which had an underdeveloped agricultural economy: the rapid conquest of Ireland by Parliamentary forces in 1649 and 1651 had only been achieved with overwhelming logistical backing from England.<sup>4</sup> The success of the campaign in 1689 and thereafter would therefore be defined in a large part by the effectiveness of the overlapping fiscal-military infrastructures of the British and Irish states.

The following chapter will argue that although these structures expanded in their scope and effectiveness during this conflict, this cannot be explained by a traditional narrative of bureaucratic reform and the cultivation of impartial or 'rational' norms of conduct. The first section will demonstrate that in 1689 the bureaucratic experience or ability of a given official often counted for little when he was unable to secure the cooperation of others. Dominated by competing partisan networks, which could only coordinate their business effectively within their own particular spheres, the result was a breakdown in the coordination of pay and logistics that underlay many of the problems that the duke of Schomberg, the German commander-in-chief of the British army in Ireland, experienced during his campaign.

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<sup>3</sup> Perjes, 'Army provisioning', pp. 1-51; John Lynn, 'Food, funds and fortresses: resource mobilisation and positional warfare in the campaigns of Louis XIV', in John Lynn (ed.), *Feeding Mars* (Boulder, CO, 1993) pp. 137-59; Lund, *War for the every day* pp. 66-75

<sup>4</sup> James Scott Wheeler, 'The logistics of conquest', in Pádraig Lenihan (ed.), *Conquest and resistance* (Leiden, 2001) pp. 177-99

The succeeding sections will argue that military logistics and supply operated far more effectively in the campaigns of 1690 and 1691, but that this was not accompanied by bureaucratic reforms. Indeed, after 1690 the fiscal-military infrastructure arguably became less bureaucratic, and increasingly entangled within informal political or clientage networks. The key difference is that one particular network – a broadly whiggish one structured around the clientage network of the dukes of Ormond – came to dominate not only the commissariat but also other areas of state, not only removing the causes for competition but also improving coordination by providing personal incentives for cooperation. Administrative structures therefore provided mainly the framework within which this system could operate, and allow the logistical challenges the British state faced to be rather more successfully overcome.

### **COMMISSARIAT 1689**

The 1689 campaign has been regarded by historians, with some justice, as a costly fiasco. Having landed in Ireland in March 1689, by April James II controlled almost all of the kingdom except the strongly Protestant northern counties in Ulster, and had placed the city of Londonderry under siege.<sup>5</sup> The Williamite regime in England organised an expedition to relieve and resupply the city, while from June a separate expeditionary force was assembled under Schomberg in order to bring James II to battle and return Ireland to English control. After assembling at Chester the army – some 12,000 strong – landed near Belfast on 13 August, and

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<sup>5</sup> Simms, *Jacobite Ireland* pp. 95-135; Childs, *Williamite Wars* pp. 51-184

having captured Carrickfergus marched south towards Dundalk, where James II's army waited under his viceroy, Richard Talbot, earl of Tyrconnell. A stand-off ensued, until Schomberg's army left the field in November and retreated to winter quarters in Belfast: meanwhile the spread of sickness meant that over 5,000 men died.

Although the strategic mistakes belonged to Schomberg, it has been widely argued that he had been painted into a corner by the incompetence of John Shales, the Commissary-General of the Provisions, whom Schomberg and others accused of Jacobite loyalties.<sup>6</sup> Had a properly-constituted commissariat existed, staffed by experienced professionals, the argument runs, Schomberg would have enjoyed far more effective logistical support. However, a series of papers and accounts that have been almost entirely ignored by historians – including a series of Shales' own letters, and a 600-page minute- and entry-book from the Privy Council committee for Ireland – inverts this interpretation entirely. The following section will argue that the commissariat was at least as bureaucratic as any department of the British fiscal-military state, but that this made little difference, because the logistical problems that the army experienced were ones of poor coordination and inadequate credit arising out of a lack of cooperation between the various agencies involved, caused by a basic loss of trust and mutual confidence.

In fact, much of the initial responsibility for provisioning the army in 1689 was undertaken by the Victualling Board of the navy, chronically inefficient in its own

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<sup>6</sup> Simms, *Jacobite Ireland* pp. 121, 126-7; Horwitz, *Parliament, policy and politics* pp. 38, 90; Childs, *Nine Years War* p. 18; Wheeler, 'Logistics of conquest', p. 204; David Hayton, *Ruling Ireland, 1685-1742: politics, politicians and parties* (Woodbridge, 2004) p. 41; Eric Gruber Von Arni, *Hospital care and the British Standing Army, 1660-1714* (Aldershot, 2006) pp. 60, 62

right, who agreed in June to purchase and transport the supplies ‘but not take care of it any further’.<sup>7</sup> Receipt, storage and disbursement to the army was therefore undertaken by Shales, who later noted that he had been left ‘the business of distribution only’, and that ‘in sum I was so far from being a Commissary-General that I was but a storekeeper to receive, issue and account for stores bought by other person’.<sup>8</sup> Yet this at least should have been done efficiently, since Shales was in many respects almost the quintessential Weberian professional bureaucrat. By 1689 he had nearly thirty years of ‘service and experience in the Victualling in all its parts,’ having begun as a victualling storekeeper in Portsmouth in 1660 and ended up as commissary-general of the Provisions to James II, including a time as auditor to the earl of Danby as Lord Treasurer between 1673 and 1679.<sup>9</sup> To organise the storage and shipment of victuals from Chester, in both England and Ireland he created an intricate bureaucratic infrastructure that far exceeded the ‘two or three incapable men’ that Schomberg described.<sup>10</sup> Two under-commissaries in Ireland oversaw storekeepers in Londonderry, Coleraine, and Carrickfergus, with a central hub at Belfast.<sup>11</sup> Agents and assistants were appointed to organise shipping.<sup>12</sup> In north-west England Shales employed six agents, along with four clerks, six assistants and a cashier and his deputy. He even proposed to set up a formal ‘Victualling Office’ at Woodside, opposite Liverpool on the Wirral peninsula<sup>13</sup>, and although never implemented in full it formed a major transshipment centre, with an

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<sup>7</sup> TNA, PC6/2 fos. 3v, 9r, 33v, 37v-38v, 68v-69r

<sup>8</sup> TNA, T48/48, 'Letter to the Speaker' and Shales to Committee, 16/10/1689; TNA, PC6/2 fos. 34r, 37v

<sup>9</sup> BL, Egerton mss 3337 fo. 45r. Shales' own description of his service can be found in TNA, T48/39

<sup>10</sup> TNA, PC6/2 fo. 34r; CSPD (1689-90) p. 256

<sup>11</sup> TNA, T48/48, 'Under-Officers', and Shales to Schomberg, 28/12/1689; TNA, PC6/2 fos. 52v, 81r-v

<sup>12</sup> TNA, T48/48, 'Instructions for Mr Twigg' and 'Copy of a Letter to the Speaker of the House of Commons'.

<sup>13</sup> *Ibid.*, Shales to Blathwayt, [June] 1689; BL, Egerton mss 3337 fos. 44v-45r; TNA, PC6/2 fos. 41r, 42v, 53r, 57r, 60r-v, 64r

agent and at least six assistants being appointed to ‘take account and care of provisions shipped there’. His chief baker and his staff were appointed ‘to see the wheat bought, dried, ground, packed and shipped for Ireland’.<sup>14</sup>

These were also men of experience and ability. One of the under-commissaries was Bartholomew van Homrigh, a Dutch merchant who had settled in Dublin before the war and ‘knew business and languages and had the choice of my under-officers, refugees who also knew the country, and whose business and interest it was to be strenuous and diligent in the present service’.<sup>15</sup> The agents for transports were a Dublin merchant Robert Twigg and Edward Singleton, a Protestant alderman from Drogheda.<sup>16</sup> The agents in England – Matthew Portman, Charles Ruxton, Charles Nicholson and Arthur Bushe – were mainly ‘Protestant gentlemen from Ireland’ who had been attainted by the Jacobite Parliament in 1689, as well as Charles Fryth, who had served as commissary of provisions to the English garrison in Tangiers until 1683, and then as collector for the excise in Chester until September 1689.<sup>17</sup> This structure was backed up in London by the Committee for Ireland, a Privy Council committee set up in February 1689 to organise the relief of Londonderry and then Schomberg’s expeditionary force.<sup>18</sup> In effect a clearing house for information and orders, the Committee’s minutes show that it was expected to coordinate the myriad overlapping efforts of the War Office, the Admiralty, the

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<sup>14</sup> TNA, T48/48, ‘Under-Officers’

<sup>15</sup> Ibid., ‘Letter to the Speaker’; TNA, PC6/2 fos. 80v-81r. For van Homrigh, see McGrath, ‘Irish revenue system’, pp. 119-22; *HIP* vi, 464-5

<sup>16</sup> TNA, T48/48, ‘Under-Officers’; TCD, MS 1181 fo. 189; Anthony Hewitson (ed.), *Diary of Thomas Bellingham, an officer under William III* (Preston, 1908) pp. 61, 89; *HIP* ii, 275-6; vi, 275; John Thomas Gilbert (ed.), *Calendar of ancient records of Dublin* (18 vols., Dublin, 1889-1944) vii, 9-13, 21, 33, 37; Hayton, *Ruling Ireland* p. 104

<sup>17</sup> TNA, T48/48, ‘Under-Officers’; TNA, PC6/2 fos. 81r, 95v, 130r; CTB ix, 895-6, 909; *HIP* iii, 334. Bushe also had extensive service with the Irish revenue service: McGrath, ‘Irish revenue system’, pp. 192-3, 207, 210

<sup>18</sup> TNA, PC6/2 fo. 1v; Horwitz, *Parliament, policy and politics* pp. 34, 38

Navy and Victualling boards, and the commissariat, as well as referring business to the Privy Council, Treasury and Customs Board where necessary. It was chaired by Danby, elevated in April 1689 to marquess of Carmarthen, as Lord President of the Council, and his influence was probably central to Shales' appointment as commissary-general in June.<sup>19</sup>

On paper there therefore existed a rational and ordered bureaucratic structure of experienced and semi-professional officials, but this does not appear to have offered appreciable advantages in the operation of the commissariat. For instance, despite employing a number of Irishmen Shales lacked local knowledge, and confessed to Carmarthen in August of his surprise that the warfare and economic turmoil had left no provisions available for purchase, 'believing till I came hither that all sorts of provisions might be had at easy rates, and that the soldier would desire money and buy his own victuals'.<sup>20</sup> He was therefore forced hurriedly to disembark stores intended for the relief of Londonderry, and organise at short notice the building of ovens at Armagh and Dundalk to bake biscuit.<sup>21</sup> In north-west England by contrast he enjoyed detailed knowledge, despite being 'a stranger to that part of England'.<sup>22</sup> Immediately after his appointment he sent a servant to Whitehaven to gather 'information of what could be done in these parts', and then received detailed information from the colliery steward of local tory magnate Sir John Lowther of

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<sup>19</sup> Horwitz, *Parliament, policy and politics* pp. 17-43; Clayton Roberts, *The growth of responsible government in Stuart England* (Cambridge, 1966) p. 439

<sup>20</sup> BL, Egerton mss 3337 fos. 113r-v; TNA, PC6/2 fo. 125v; L.M. Cullen, *Anglo-Irish trade 1660-1800* (Manchester, 1968) pp. 38-40; Ferguson, 'Army' pp. 33-5; Jean Agnew, *Belfast merchant families in the seventeenth century* (Dublin, 1996) pp. 17-20

<sup>21</sup> CSPD (1689-90) p. 231, 261; BL, Egerton mss 3337 fo. 113v; TNA, T48/48, Shales to Schomberg, 16/10/1689

<sup>22</sup> TNA, T48/48, 'Case of Mr John Shales'

Whitehaven, a commissioner of the Admiralty.<sup>23</sup> Shales followed this up by visiting the region himself, and when he saw that supplies of beer, biscuit and oat-sacks were low he immediately arranged for beer to be brewed in Liverpool and Chester, requested that the Committee send 2,000 sacks from London ‘that I might lose no time’, and proposed the victualling yard at Woodside.<sup>24</sup> Bureaucratic structures were therefore no more efficient than informal networks at transmitting information, and sometimes less so.

There were also continual complaints concerning shortfalls in bread or biscuit, but Shales’ agents had scoured the Cheshire and Lancashire countryside for grain before embarkation, and the teams he bought over to Dundalk and Armagh in September produced what he claimed was ‘the best bread I ever saw in my life’.<sup>25</sup> The problem instead was transportation, the *sine qua non* of any logistical enterprise.<sup>26</sup> Shales employed a formidable staff in England and Ireland: he hired some 200 drivers, along with twenty conductors, one chief conductor, a clerk, a commissary of the draught horses and several wheelwrights and carpenters, as well as 400 horses.<sup>27</sup> Yet he noted to the Committee on 27 December that ‘what was most wanting was horses and carts necessary for carrying a sufficient quantity of provisions for the daily supply of the whole army on their march’.<sup>28</sup> Later he argued that the Committee had been slow to provide the initial wagon train at

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<sup>23</sup> Ibid., ‘Letter to the Speaker’ and Shales to [?Carmarthen], [undated] 1689; TNA, PC6/2 fo. 31r; BL, Add. mss 38146 fo. 86v; Hainsworth, *Stewards, lords and people* pp. 124-5; *HOP* (1690-1715) iv, 689-90

<sup>24</sup> TNA, T48/48, ‘Letter to the Speaker’, and Shales to Committee, 17/6/1689, [July] 1689; TNA, PC6/2 fos. 52v, 56r, 57v-58r; BL, Egerton mss 3337 fo. 44v

<sup>25</sup> TNA, T48/48, ‘Letter to the Speaker’, ‘Case of Mr John Shales’ and Shales to Committee, 3/9/1689, 17/9/1689; BL, Egerton mss 3337 fos. 113r-v, 115r-v; CSPD (1689-90) p. 261, 276-7

<sup>26</sup> CSPD (1689-90) p. 251-2, 256, 261, 276-7, 313; Lynn, ‘Food, funds and fortresses’, pp. 140-1; Perjes, ‘Army provisioning’, pp. 10-11, 26-9; Bannerman, *Merchants* pp. 18, 66-7, 114-5

<sup>27</sup> TNA, T48/48, ‘Under-Officers’; TNA, PC6/2 fos. 39r-v, 81r-v

<sup>28</sup> CSPD (1689-90), 257-8, 276, 283, 286-7, 320, 365, 411, 420, 437; TNA, PC6/2 fos. 96v, 123v-124r, 155r

Chester, that the horses had therefore been overworked, that the transport ships had landed the wagons and horses in penny packets across northern Ireland, and that Schomberg had arbitrarily detached over 70 wagons for use by the hospital.<sup>29</sup> The hiring of transport ships had been dogged by poor credit, and he also reported in July 1689 that one of his charters had been ‘cut to pieces and fitted for a fireship by the Duke’s order’.<sup>30</sup> The Committee may also have failed to pass on advice that English carts were too heavy for Irish roads.<sup>31</sup> Poor coordination and factors that Shales felt to be outside his control ensured that even when bread was baked it could not always be sent to the troops, hence his claim that ‘the want of my teams and carriages in Ireland ... was not my fault’ appears to have some justice.<sup>32</sup> Similar failures of coordination underpinned the shortages of oats, beer, water and many other provisions.

Shales was also subject to external interference, which restricted his administrative freedom but which he lacked the political or personal leverage to overcome, namely the appointment of two comptrollers-general of provisions, Israel Feilding and William Robinson, who were required to counter-sign his warrants in person, prevent fraud and otherwise exercise direct and restrictive control over his conduct.<sup>33</sup> He complained that he had ‘no mind to be a schoolmaster to people where instead of whipping I may be whipped for their faults’, and considered the whole process an *ad hoc* innovation imposed upon him by ‘industrious enemies at

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<sup>29</sup> TNA, T48/48, 'Letter to the Speaker' and 'Case of Mr John Shales'; TNA, PC6/2 fos. 102r, 114r, 140v, 175v

<sup>30</sup> TNA, T48/48, Shales to Committee, [September 1689]; TNA, PC6/2 fos. 76r-v

<sup>31</sup> TNA, PC6/2 fos. 43v, 140v, 150v, 153r, 175v-176v; CSPD (1689-90), 283, 287, 299, 346, 365

<sup>32</sup> TNA, T48/48, 'Case of Mr John Shales'

<sup>33</sup> TNA, PC6/2 fos. 27r, 37r, 41r, 42v, 46r, 47r; CTB ix, 220-1, 228

court' such as the earl of Ranelagh.<sup>34</sup> This is borne out by closer study, which shows that this development was the product of court politics dating back over twenty years. In 1679 the earl of Ranelagh had arranged with the earl of Danby to dismiss Sir Stephen Fox as paymaster-general and install his clients in his place, but after Danby fell Shales had allied with Fox to remove them.<sup>35</sup> This explained, he told Blathwayt, why Ranelagh had 'always industriously opprest me in my business of Commissary-General', and why rumours had been circulated at court that he was 'a man indeed fit for the business I had undertaken but not to be trusted without comptrols over me'.<sup>36</sup>

In fact the business appears to have been even more complex than Shales suspected. Feilding's father Basil was a key client in Carlisle of the tory MP Sir Christopher Musgrave<sup>37</sup>, while Israel himself had served the second duke of Ormond's late brother between 1682 and 1684, and had recently been recommended to the duke by his Irish client Francis Aungier, earl of Longford, as 'an honest and sincere man ... and too ingenuous and too much a gentleman to play fast and loose'.<sup>38</sup> Yet his appointment as comptroller in May 1689 was actually sponsored by the whig MP William Harbord, now vice-treasurer and paymaster- and receiver-general of Ireland, and a former secretary of Arthur Capel, first earl of Essex, the Lord Lieutenant of Ireland between 1672 and 1675 and an iconic whig figure, especially

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<sup>34</sup> TNA, T48/48, 'Case of Mr John Shales' and Shales to Blathwayt, [undated] 1689; Shales to Committee, [June 1689]; BL, Egerton mss 3337 fo. 93

<sup>35</sup> Clay, *Public finance* pp. 103-8; Nichols, 'Intermediaries', pp. 39-40

<sup>36</sup> TNA, T48/48, 'Case of Mr John Shales' and Shales to Blathwayt, [undated] 1689

<sup>37</sup> Hainsworth, *Stewards, lords and people* pp. 86-8; D. R. Hainsworth (ed.), *The correspondence of Sir John Lowther of Whitehaven, 1693-1698: a provincial community in wartime* (London, 1983) pp. 221, 673-4

<sup>38</sup> HMC Ormond vii, 282, 289, 291, 293; viii, 10; BL, Add. mss 28876 fos. 202r-v

after his death in 1683.<sup>39</sup> Essex and Harbord had quarrelled with Ranelagh and Danby and the first duke of Ormond during this period, although by the 1680s Ormond had already drawn closer to the whiggish ‘Irish interest’ represented by Essex, Harbord and others.<sup>40</sup> It is impossible to untangle this complex web of partisan politics and court intrigue, but it is nevertheless clear that Shales was constrained by failures of trust that occurred due to his status as a client to Carmarthen, and his own record as an active supporter of tory causes in the 1680s.<sup>41</sup> Indeed he was subsequently made a scapegoat by the whigs in Parliament for the failures of the campaign precisely in order to discredit Carmarthen.<sup>42</sup> Lacking the security that came from political support, he appears to have lacked both the confidence and incentives to concern himself with logistical business outside of his formal remit, such as delays in receiving provisions from the Victualling Board: ‘and if I did not receive them’, he subsequently wrote, ‘I could not issue them and looked upon myself no farther accountable.’<sup>43</sup>

Thus bureaucratic structures did not necessarily offer more effective or efficient administration, particularly where they cut across an underlying network of informal political connections and allegiances, which explains in turn why the commissariat was consistently underfunded. As with any merchant involved in the provisions trade, the commissariat required a ‘working capital’ in order to operate

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<sup>39</sup> TNA, PC6/2 fos. 31r, 37r, 46v, 107r; CTB ix, 45, 48; *HOP* (1660-1690), ii, 482-3; *HOP* (1690-1715), iv, 198-200

<sup>40</sup> Egan, ‘Finance, 1660-85’, ii, 11-51; *HOP* (1660-1690) ii, 483-8; Mark Knights, *Politics and opinion in crisis, 1678-81* (Cambridge, 1994) p. 26; John Gibney, *Ireland and the Popish Plot* (Basingstoke, 2009) pp. 24-152

<sup>41</sup> Narcissus Luttrell (ed.), *A brief historical relation of state affairs from September 1678 to April 1714* (6 vols., Oxford, 1857) ii, 179; CSPD (1682) p. 229, 233; *HOP* (1660-1690) i, xvii, 476-7; Gary Stuart de Krey, *London and the Restoration, 1659-1683* (Cambridge, 2005) p. 251

<sup>42</sup> Horwitz, *Parliament, policy and politics* pp. 34, 38; Roberts, *Responsible government* pp. 249-57; *HoP* (1660-1690), i, xvii

<sup>43</sup> TNA, T48/48, ‘Letter to the Speaker’ and Shales to Committee, 16/10/1689; TNA, PC6/2 fos. 34r, 37v

efficiently, particularly after Shales landed in Ireland in September and discovered that ‘this country is so barren that the soldier can find no use of his money’.<sup>44</sup> Yet credit structures in northern Ireland and north-west England were relatively basic, and unable to advance large sums.<sup>45</sup> Shales was therefore forced to rely upon strong financial support from the fiscal-military state itself, which largely proved unforthcoming. He received, for instance, only part of some £3,000 left at Chester for his use, and complained that he was thereby ‘lamed in the King’s business’.<sup>46</sup> He also reported that William Harbord had refused to pay his staff, claiming that no money had been assigned to him by the Treasury for that purpose.<sup>47</sup> Charles Fryth repeatedly complained that Harbord’s deputy in London had failed to answer bills drawn from Chester, which ‘has put so great a stop to my proceedings that none will take any more bills, but expect payment on the place ... people are discouraged from bringing corn’.<sup>48</sup> Shales later complained, for example, that despite having advised the urgent purchase of oats and sacks, he ‘had neither orders or money to do it myself’, and wrote to the Committee for Ireland in June 1689 that ‘it will be high time I should have credit for money ... that I may not want to pay for what I buy’.<sup>49</sup>

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<sup>44</sup> Ehrman, *Navy* pp. 148, 157; Bannerman, *Merchants* pp. 30-3, 52-3, 63-4, 94; Knight and Martin, *Sustaining* pp. 40-1; David Dickson, *Old world colony: Cork and south Munster 1630-1830* (Cork, 2005) pp. 139, 147-8

<sup>45</sup> BL, Egerton mss 3337 fos. 113r-v; TNA, PC6/2 fos. 64v, 81r; Cullen, *Anglo-Irish trade* pp. 158-74; John Beckett, *Coal and tobacco: the Lowthers and the economic development of West Cumberland, 1660-1760* (Cambridge, 1981) pp. 147-8; Agnew, *Belfast* pp. 155-66

<sup>46</sup> CSPD (1689-90) p. 261; TNA, PC6/2 fos. 81r, 82v; CTB ix, 52, 248-9

<sup>47</sup> TNA, PC6/2 fos. 76r-v, 81r, 83r, 140v, 142r

<sup>48</sup> TNA, T48/48, Shales to Schomberg, 16/10/1689; TNA, PC6/2 fos. 88v, 94r, 114r, 119r, 121v, 124r, 128r-130r, 135v, 188v

<sup>49</sup> TNA, T48/48, 'Letter to the Speaker' and Shales to Schomberg, 16/10/1689; Shales to Committee, 17/6/1689, [July] 1689; TNA, PC6/2 fos. 56r, 62v

## PAY OFFICE 1689

Closer examination suggests some of the reasons why this was the case. For credit and capital Shales was dependent upon the English and the Irish Pay Offices, but both offices were occupied by long-standing political opponents: the earl of Ranelagh as Paymaster-General in England, and William Harbord, who as paymaster- and receiver-general of Ireland was the main conduit for the flow of money to Shales and had overall financial responsibility for the Irish campaign.<sup>50</sup> As noted above, Harbord was a whig MP who had clashed personally with both Ranelagh and Danby, and whig principles and connections suffused the administrative structures that he created to control the disbursement of funds in England and Ireland. His London agent, the goldsmith James Herriot, besides being worthy of ‘trust ... with such considerable sums, as pass through my hands’, was both ‘my good friend’ and a whig from within Essex’s former orbit.<sup>51</sup> In Chester his ‘*homme d’affaire*’ was Sir Joshua Allen, a Dublin merchant who had been a proto-whiggish Lord Mayor of Dublin in 1673-4 when Essex had been Lord Lieutenant.<sup>52</sup> Two assistants in the Pay Office in Ireland, Robert Curtis and Mordecai Abbott, had served in the Irish Treasury during the 1670s and remained close.<sup>53</sup> Curtis was one of the joint Auditors of the Exchequer, and this would have provided a connection with Luke King, a commissary of the musters and Chief

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<sup>50</sup> McGrath, ‘Irish revenue system’, pp. 10-11, 17, 233

<sup>51</sup> J. R. Woodhead (ed.), *The rulers of London, 1660-1689: a biographical record of the aldermen and common councilmen of the City of London* (London, 1965) p. 89; TCD, MS 749 i, 32; TNA, PC6/2 fos. 87r, 89v, 91v, 104v; TNA, PROB 11/412 (Harbord, William)

<sup>52</sup> CSPD (1689-90) p. 209, 215, 261; TNA, T48/48, Shales to Committee, [July] 1689; TNA, PC6/2 fos. 32v, 53r; Jacqueline Hill, *From patriots to unionists: Dublin civic politics and Irish protestant patriotism, 1660-1840* (Oxford, 1997) pp. 48-55

<sup>53</sup> BL, Add. mss 51335 fo. 16r; Patrick Melvin, ‘Letters of Lord Longford and others on Irish affairs, 1685-1702’, *Analecta Hibernica*, 32 (1985) p. 79; CSPD (1689-90) p. 556; TNA, PC6/2 fo. 104v; CTB xi, 156; HMC Lords (1690-1) p. 16; (1695-6) pp. 522-6; Bod. Lib., MS Rawl. A.236 fos. 1, 43; Egan, ‘Finance, 1660-85’, ii, 8-9; *HIP* iii, 572; TNA, T1/24/60(c); T1/66/38; T1/73/37

Remembrancer in the Exchequer since 1680, and another of the ‘particular friends, being of a family’ of Curtis and Abbott in Ireland.<sup>54</sup> Shales was therefore reliant for credit and working capital upon an organisation both suffused with antithetical political allegiances and staffed by figures whom his own political patron had repeatedly disobliged in the 1670s. Thus the failure of credit within the commissariat was, fundamentally, a political rather than administrative problem, one which bureaucratic reform would have done little to solve without a wider realignment of the partisan networks underpinning their operation.

The other side of the coin was that the presence of informal networks, linked by trust, offered opportunities to circumvent uncooperative or inefficient state structures and coordinate the movement of resources directly. To overcome further failures of credit Shales not only advanced money to his agents from his own pocket, but also instructed Fryth to draw bills for reimbursement directly upon his son Charles Shales, a goldsmith banker in London who had been apprentice to the tory financier Charles Duncombe.<sup>55</sup> His other son Henry served as Shales’ contact in Chester and London, and both men voted for tory candidates in Middlesex in 1705 and 1713.<sup>56</sup> Another agent was John Barker, his chief baker in 1687.<sup>57</sup> Political partisanship may also have played a role: the agent for shipping at Highlake and Whitehaven, Arthur Bushe was a client of the dukes of Ormond who

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<sup>54</sup> McGrath, ‘Irish revenue system’, pp. 374-5; CTB ix, 215; TNA, T64/95 p. 101

<sup>55</sup> TNA, T48/48, ‘Memorandum for Mr Fryth’ and Shales to Schomberg, 16/10/1689; John Martin, *“The Grasshopper” in Lombard Street* (London, 1892) pp. 28, 203; TNA, PC6/2 fos. 60r, 109v, 135v; CTB v, 617; ix, 282, 794. Duncombe was partner to Richard Kent, the client of Sir Stephen Fox, which may explain Shales’ connection with Fox in 1679-80: Clay, *Public finance* pp. 81-2, 107, 142, 176; *HOP* (1690-1715) iii, 937-8; Nichols, ‘Intermediaries’, pp. 39-40

<sup>56</sup> CSPD (1689-90) p. 215; TNA, PC6/2 fos. 39v, 57r-v, 63v, 81r; Middx. (1705) p. 68; London (1710) p. 83; London (1713) p. 115; Middx. (1714) p. 23;

<sup>57</sup> TNA, PC6/2 fos. 63v, 75r; TNA, T48/48, Shales to Committee, 17/6/1689 and ‘Account of Under-Officers’

later showed tory loyalties, as would Edward Singleton.<sup>58</sup> Shales received several unsecured advances of over £1,200 in September 1689 from Mark Wildbore, the collector of customs at Whitehaven, who had connections with both Sir John Lowther of Whitehaven and Robert Griffith, a former naval purser who by 1689 was on Shales' staff.<sup>59</sup> Charles Fryth had been sympathetically and systematically recommended to the Commissioners of the Excise for employment by a tory Treasury Board in 1684 and 1685.<sup>60</sup> He also appears to have used his experience and contacts as excise collector to secure money and provisions from Liverpool, Chester, Shrewsbury and elsewhere worth nearly £5,000.<sup>61</sup> A collection of personal, frequently political or partisan, linkages therefore allowed Shales to secure greater cooperation from his officials but also to overcome some of the shortfalls in credit.

By the same token, manifold personal linkages enabled Harbord to compensate for failings with Shales' logistical infrastructure by making use of the local Protestant landowner, James Hamilton of Tollymore, as his intermediary. Both men were whigs, albeit from different sides of the Irish Sea, and this appears to have encouraged cooperation, Hamilton also acting as one of Harbord's deputy-paymasters in Ulster.<sup>62</sup> Informed in September of a shortage of oats amongst the

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<sup>58</sup> David Hayton, 'Dependence, clientage and affinity: the political following of the second duke of Ormonde', in Toby Barnard and Jane Fenlon (eds.), *The Dukes of Ormonde, 1610-1745* (Woodbridge, 2000) pp. 224, 227, 240; Melvin, 'Letters', pp. 64, 70; Hayton, *Ruling Ireland*, 104

<sup>59</sup> TNA, T48/48, Shales to Committee, [June] 1689; CTB ix, 303, 313, 676, 814, 857, 867, 2000; xxi, 305; TNA, PC6/2 fos. 76r-v, 81r; Hainsworth (ed.), *Lowther Correspondence* p. 682; TNA, ADM 106/371/364; J.R. Tanner (ed.), *A Catalogue of Naval MSS in the Pepysian Library* (Naval Record Society vol. 36, 1908) iii, 178

<sup>60</sup> CTB vii, 1238; viii, 78, 364; ix, 909, 1332; xviii, 309

<sup>61</sup> *Ibid.*, ix, 791, 867; CTP i, 137

<sup>62</sup> CSPD (1689-90) p. 36 (This letter is wrongly dated as 1689 rather than 1690). For Hamilton, see *HIP* iv, 339-40; Hayton, *Ruling Ireland* pp. 37, 47-51, 73, 95

army in Ireland, Harbord ‘summoned’ local inhabitants to bring grain to Lisburn.<sup>63</sup> In October, Harbord worked with Hamilton to secure oats in Co Down, writing that Mark Hodges – a local Protestant tenant of Hamilton, and cornet in Harbord’s independent troop of horse<sup>64</sup> – should ‘imbark in this matter with all his might and main, and with the help of those who know the Country exactly’.<sup>65</sup> Hodges in turn exploited his local networks, advising Hamilton that he had written to the High Sheriff of Co Down, to ‘go through his half Barony and to hasten the oats in’.<sup>66</sup> As vice-treasurer Harbord had access to local customs revenues – the comptroller and accountant-general was William Smith, another of the ‘particular friends’ of Abbott and Curtis – and this undoubtedly allowed him to advance large sums to his agents as working capital, up to 400 guineas at one point.<sup>67</sup> Thus close personal and political connections enabled Harbord to mobilise local knowledge in order to plug gaps within the commissariat.

Finally, partisan politicking equally disadvantaged Harbord as much as Shales, since both were ultimately dependent upon each other’s cooperation. As paymaster-general to the armies in Ireland Harbord required muster rolls and provisions accounts from the Muster Office and commissariat respectively in order to calculate net off-reckonings and issue clearings to the troops. A Treasury warrant of 29 July 1689 had ordered him to stop up to 4d per diem from every foot soldier for subsistence upon fortnightly accounts from Shales, and prohibited him from making

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<sup>63</sup> CSPD (1689-90) p. 261, 276-7; TNA, PC6/2 fos. 104r-v, 111v, 121r

<sup>64</sup> CSPD (1689-90) p. 93; TNA, T64/95 'Accompt of Provisions Delivered' fo. 101; PRONI, MIC147/8, Hodges to Hamilton, 23/3/1688, 19/11/1689

<sup>65</sup> CSPD (1689-90) p. 293-4; PRONI, MIC147/8, Harbord to Hamilton, 16/10/1689, 19/10/1689, 22/10/1689; Hamilton to Harbord, 19/10/1689; Hodges to Hamilton, 4/11/1689

<sup>66</sup> PRONI, MIC147/8, Hodges to Hamilton, 26/10/1689; Hodges to Hill, 22/10/1689

<sup>67</sup> CSPD (1689-90) p. 372, 509; CSPD (1690-1) p. 309; McGrath, ‘Irish revenue system’, pp. 11-13, 195, 204

clearings until this was done.<sup>68</sup> Payments were therefore thrown into confusion in October 1689 when Harbord complained to Shales ‘that he could not pay the army for want of my accompts of issues of provisions to them’.<sup>69</sup> A committee was formed within the army in Ireland to establish the rates of individual supplies, but although Shales claimed that he delivered the accounts ‘weekly or as he directs ever since, so that no omission has been on my part’, the necessary vouchers were only finally delivered in January 1691.<sup>70</sup> His successors found the entire system ‘in confusion’ in May 1690.<sup>71</sup>

As a result, although Shales might defend himself with some justice that the accounts were only needed for clearings and ‘if my accounts had been sunk into the sea the subsistence of the army might be paid’, his failure to cooperate nevertheless disrupted almost entirely the work of the Pay Office in Ireland, which thereby found itself unable to clear the army and close its own accounts.<sup>72</sup> As might be expected, the army accordingly continued to receive subsistence, often upon account, but experienced lengthening delays in the payment of clearings, as indicated by Schomberg’s continual complaints about the ‘officers’ arrears’<sup>73</sup>, as well as the Treasury order to Harbord in November 1689 that

although the Commissary-General [Shales] has made no exact return of what provisions are delivered out, yet you should have made deductions out of the subsistence according to the best conjecture that you could make, for want of which ‘tis feared the King may suffer some loss.<sup>74</sup>

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<sup>68</sup> TNA, PC6/2 fos. 52v, 57r; CTB ix, 201, 301

<sup>69</sup> TNA, T48/48, 'Letter to the Speaker'; TNA, PC6/2 fos. 77v, 92r, 105r, 108v-109r, 125v-126r, 141v

<sup>70</sup> TNA, T48/48, 'Letter to the Speaker' and Shales to Schomberg, 28/12/1689, 22/9/1690; CTB ix, 301, 826, 1030-1; BL, Egerton mss 3337 fos. 115v, 150r-v

<sup>71</sup> NLI, MS 13654, Robinson and van Homrigh to [?S]’gravenmore], 8/5/1690

<sup>72</sup> TNA, T48/48, 'Letter to the Speaker'

<sup>73</sup> CSPD (1689-90) p. 35-6, 276-7, 283, 299-300, 346, 352, 365-6, 367-9, 372, 401, 452, 557-8

<sup>74</sup> CTB ix, 301; TNA, PC6/2 fo. 135v

When he formally handed over his accounts in May 1690 it was estimated that arrears or clearings of some £406,337 were still outstanding, but that this would be lessened once it was clear how many provisions had been delivered, ‘because he had not received sufficient accounts of provisions delivered to know which sums to deduct’.<sup>75</sup>

The other side of the coin is seen in relations with the Muster Office in Ireland, under the Muster-Master-General Abraham Yarner, which were close and thus comparatively efficient.<sup>76</sup> On 28 September Harbord was able to report that the troops had been mustered and the rolls would be closed that same night, and that he would therefore be able to clear them for July and August as well as subsisting them for that month.<sup>77</sup> He complained the next month that that ‘I cannot get our muster-master to give you “that ease in my payments, as he ought”’, but this was because the rolls themselves had not yet been closed – one of the deputy-commissaries was still on his way back from Carrickfergus – and Harbord was therefore optimistic that in a few days he would ‘settle the matter better’.<sup>78</sup> There is no sign of conflict or poor cooperation, a situation that was probably due to the mass of personal and political linkages between the officials involved. Yarner was closely connected by marriage to Sir John Temple, a former solicitor-general of Ireland and whig MP whom it had been rumoured in 1679 would have been appointed attorney-general of England ‘at the mediation of my Lord of Essex’.<sup>79</sup> His deputies included Luke King

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<sup>75</sup> BL, Add. MSS 51335 fos. 30r-v; CSPD (1690-1) p. 3

<sup>76</sup> Ferguson, ‘Army’, p. 17

<sup>77</sup> CSPD (1689-90), 275-7, 283

<sup>78</sup> Ibid., 299-300; BL, Add. mss 20176 fos. 7r-v

<sup>79</sup> ODNB, ‘Temple, Sir John (1632-1705)’ (2011)

and John Franckes, who were linked with Mordecai Abbott and Robert Curtis and members of Harbord's circle in England.<sup>80</sup>

Thus, this section has suggested that, upon a closer study of the evidence, the logistical failures experienced by the Williamite army in Ireland in 1689 occurred despite an intricately structured set of bureaucratic hierarchies. In the absence of close cooperation, neither the commissariat nor the Pay Office could operate efficiently and effectively, and the supply of the army suffered accordingly. To the extent that the situation was retrieved, it appears to have been by the exploitation of informal networks, which were mobilised to provide credit or provisions to compensate. At one level these findings therefore support Childs' conclusions that John Shales was largely a scapegoat for the failing of others, and that

he was both corrupt and incapable, but several other parties were equally culpable ... The Treasury was disorganised and failed to release sufficient funds; the army itself was divided in loyalty and did not give Schomberg its full backing; William was more interested in campaigning in the Low Countries and failed to take the necessary measures to support his general, whilst his developing dislike of Schomberg became an obstacle.<sup>81</sup>

To this might be added intense political and partisan conflicts, in some cases dating back nearly twenty years. Yet even if such factors had been absent, it is difficult to see how greater and more extensive bureaucratisation of the commissariat would have greatly improved effectiveness, especially given Shales' attitude that he was not responsible for factors outside his formal remit. It has even been shown that such conflicts often succeeded in consolidating informal administrative networks that crossed bureaucratic boundaries and were able to coordinate business with far

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<sup>80</sup> CSPD (1689-90) p. 125; Hewitson (ed.), *Diary* pp. 117, 135; BL, Add. mss 20176 fos. 1-13; HMC Lords (1689-90) pp. 139-42; TNA, T1/8/14

<sup>81</sup> Childs, *Williamite Wars* p. 19

more efficiency than would otherwise have been the case. Given this situation, it seems likely that the most effective administration would not arise from a depersonalised administrative system, but out of the expansion and integration of one or other of these close-knit informal networks into the entire structure of the fiscal-military states of Britain and Ireland so as to stimulate even greater levels of cooperation and coordination.

### **COMMISSARIAT 1690-91**

The remainder of this chapter will argue, using a number of sources almost never before consulted in studies of this campaign, that this was precisely what occurred in Ireland in 1690 and 1691, contributing heavily to the visibly improved effectiveness of state structures. In the wake of Schomberg's failed campaign preparations were made over the winter of 1689 for a renewed expedition, with William III crossing over to Ireland in June 1690 in order to take personal command of the army, which had been reinforced with British, Dutch and Danish troops.<sup>82</sup> Moving south, the army encountered the Jacobite forces at the Boyne and routed them there on 1 July, causing them to abandon Dublin and James II to flee the country entirely. The Williamite army then occupied most of the east and south of the kingdom, while a detachment under Major-General James Douglas moved south from Ulster via Sligo, penning the Jacobites into the province of Connaught in the west of Ireland. The first siege of Limerick in 1690 was unsuccessful and led to a final campaign in 1691: William III appointed the Dutch general Goddard van Ginkel as commander-in-chief, and he was able to rout the Jacobite army at the

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<sup>82</sup> The following paragraph is based on Childs, *Williamite Wars* pp. 185-394; Simms, *Jacobite Ireland* pp. 136-265

Battle of Aughrim on 12 July, capture key Jacobite strongholds at Athlone and Galway and then conclude a successful siege of Limerick, negotiating the surrender of the town and the remaining Jacobite forces on 23 September 1691.

By the winter of 1690 Williamite forces therefore occupied vast swathes of Irish territory, bringing much of the central administrative infrastructure of the Irish fiscal-military state back under Williamite control but also increasing the logistical demands expected of it: the army had to be supported on campaign and while divided as individual garrisons in winter quarters. The following sections will argue that, on the whole, both British and Irish fiscal-military structures began to work with greater efficiency than they had in 1689, not from bureaucratic reform but through closer incorporation into the informal personal and political networks. This not only removed the causes for open conflict, but provided strong incentives for cooperation and collaboration, encouraging otherwise separate institutions to work together to coordinate and control the flow of resources. A commissariat also remained vital, not least because the army could not maintain itself from the countryside: the Jacobites had stripped the country of livestock and burnt what crops they could not carry, requiring most of the provisions to be sent out from Dublin.<sup>83</sup> In 1691, for instance, Ginkel suggested providing the troops with money to purchase provisions locally, but was told that some form of logistical support was necessary, ‘for though they had double pay they must starve when bread is not to be had for money’.<sup>84</sup> Some provisions continued to be provided from England by the Committee of Ireland in London, which spent most of the winter of 1689 organising

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<sup>83</sup> Kevin Danaher (ed.), *The Danish force in Ireland, 1690-1691* (Dublin, 1962) pp. 47, 49, 53, 61; TCD, MS 749 ii, 182, 206, 225, 239; v, 490; CSPD (1689-90) p. 264, 272, 277, 300; DHC, Fox-Strangeways MSS, D/FSI Box 238, Coningsby to Fox, 21/9/1690. For a similar situation in Scotland after 1746, see Bannerman, *Merchants* pp. 103-19

<sup>84</sup> PRONI, D638/12/40, Ginkel to Coningsby, 7/7/1691; TCD, MS 749 ix, 862

the purchase of oats and hay in London, south- and north-west England and Wales, and coordinating its shipment across the Irish Sea. However by 1691 its role in the supply of provisions was increasingly vestigial, and even its existence did not negate the need for a formal commissariat: shipments still had to be transported inland from Dublin, Belfast, Waterford or Cork, as did the growing amount of supplies being sourced directly in Ireland.

Consequently the increased effectiveness of the commissariat after December 1689 was not achieved through a major programme of administrative reform and bureaucratic change. If anything the state's involvement shrunk as its effectiveness increased, with major functions such as the provision of bread and wagons being outsourced to independent private contractors. Instead, it will be argued that a reshuffling of personnel – one which brought administrative structures more closely into line with the informal political networks that ran them – was crucial.

Essentially the commissariat was purged of its tory components, and integrated into a broadly whiggish political nexus structured around an informal clientage network. Thus, Shales for example was stripped of his role in December 1689 and hauled before both Parliament and a Treasury commission for questioning.<sup>85</sup> He was replaced by two joint commissaries, one of them his former deputy Bartholomew van Homrigh. The other was the former comptroller-general of provisions William Robinson, who had not only occupied senior roles in the Irish Treasury and Ordnance Office since the 1670s but was also a client of the dukes of Ormond.<sup>86</sup>

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<sup>85</sup> CTB ix, 348-9 and n. 42 above.

<sup>86</sup> *HIP* vi, 168-9; Rolf Loeber, *A biographical dictionary of architects in Ireland, 1660-1720* (London, 1981) pp. 88-95; Hayton, 'Dependence', pp. 216, 220, 224, 231

This transition was sealed in December 1689, when Robinson and van Homrigh chose to dismiss the commissariat Shales had employed in England, and therefore his closest supporters, and appoint two new deputies.<sup>87</sup> One was Francis Cuffe, nephew of Ormond's ally Lord Longford, and a former Lieutenant of the Irish Ordnance Office under whom Robinson had served in the 1670s.<sup>88</sup> The other was James Vickars, who had been hired in 1689 to operate the Irish packet service by Major Wildman, the Postmaster-General and a radical whig: this had been recommended to the earl of Shrewsbury, whig Secretary of State, by Harbord and Sir Joshua Allen, who had also conscripted Vickars' boat the *Ormonde* to carry provisions to Londonderry in June 1689.<sup>89</sup> Allen himself had originally been nominated.<sup>90</sup> Thus, Robinson appears to have drawn upon a mixture of personal and political connections afforded by his position within the Ormond clientage network in order to staff the new commissariat. It would be precipitate to read back into this network a self-consciously partisan colouring: Hayton has argued that political parties did not exist in Ireland in any meaningful sense until the 1690s, and that the first duke of Ormond had mainly acted as the centre for a court rather than self-consciously Irish tory political interest.<sup>91</sup> Nevertheless, even if the clientage network that his grandson the second duke – 'a hearty Orangist at the Revolution' – had inherited in July 1688 was initially politically uncharged, the absorption of whig partisans such as Vickars and Allen suggests that it was rapidly acquiring political overtones. Such connections appear to have helped knit local contacts and

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<sup>87</sup> TCD, MS 749 i, 94; TNA, PC6/2 fos. 130v, 187v; WCL, Clarke MS 7/4 fo. 30

<sup>88</sup> HMC Ormond iv, 170-4; vii, 188-9, 219; CSPD (1679-80), 187; CTB x, 339; xx, 411, 413; Gerald Aylmer, 'The first duke of Ormond as patron and administrator', in Toby Barnard and Jane Fenlon (eds.), *The Dukes of Ormonde, 1610-1745* (Woodbridge, 2000) p. 127; Hayton, 'Dependence', p. 216; *HIP* iii, 551; Loeber, *Architects* p. 89

<sup>89</sup> CSPD (1689-90) p. 161, 199; TNA, PC6/2 fos. 49r, 104r, 184v, 292v; CTB ix, 332; x, 218; xii, 208

<sup>90</sup> TNA, PC6/2 fo. 133r; *HOP* (1660-1690) iii, 721-3

<sup>91</sup> Hayton, *Ruling Ireland* p. 37

influence into the commissariat in England, improving its access to local resources and expertise. For example an Exchequer case shows that Vickars drew upon a chain of close-knit commercial connections in Cheshire to provide oats for the army, contracting with the Chester merchant William Fernihaugh who in turn sub-contracted part of the undertaking to Daniel Danvers in Liverpool, who sourced oats from his brother-in-law Richard Cliveland and a number of local corn dealers.<sup>92</sup>

By contrast, the commissariat structures in Ireland which had been built up by Bartholomew van Homrigh in 1689 escaped major reconstruction: if the structure of the commissariat in Ireland in 1693 is any guide, the new system in 1690 resembled the old, with a network of storekeepers in major towns, agents elsewhere and a few clerks and other staff at the central hub in Dublin.<sup>93</sup> There was a similar continuity in personnel, Shales noting in December 1689 that of his remaining officers ‘most of them [are] entertained by Mr van Homrigh’.<sup>94</sup> His fellow under-commissary John Murray worked with Robinson after 1690, and Murray’s servant William Roberts was appointed storekeeper at Cork in 1691, where had served as sheriff the year before.<sup>95</sup> Twigg and Singleton were dismissed as agents for transports but Singleton remained an ‘agent of the provisions’.<sup>96</sup> Peter Partington had been storekeeper in Belfast in 1689, and by 1691 was the agent at Dublin: he named his son Bartholomew, and not only deputed for van Homrigh as agent to Ginkel’s

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<sup>92</sup> BL, Add. MSS 51335 fos. 3r, 6r; TNA, E134/5W&M/Mich 34 (Fernihaugh vs Danvers); Diana Ascott, Fiona Lewis, and Michael Power (eds.), *Liverpool 1660-1750: people, prosperity and power* (Liverpool, 2006) pp. 103-4, 127-31

<sup>93</sup> TNA, T37/5 ('Accounts of Disbursements ... 1693/4') and TNA, T37/6 ('Receipts and Payments ... to 30 April 1699')

<sup>94</sup> TNA, T48/48, Shales to Schomberg, 28/12/1689; TNA, PC6/2 fo. 176v

<sup>95</sup> TNA, T48/48, 'Under-Officers'; TNA, T37/5 fos. 7-12, 31, 37, 61; TNA, T37/6 fo. 406; TCD, MS 749 xiii, 1281-2; Richard Caulfield (ed.), *The council book of the corporation of the city of Cork* (Guildford, 1876) p. 1175

<sup>96</sup> TCD, MS 1180 fo. 101r; CTB ix, 362, 477, 547, 625

estates in Ireland in the 1690s but also served as his executor.<sup>97</sup> Mr Rosco, storekeeper at Carrickfergus in 1689, acted as agent to Partington in 1696.

New figures were also appointed, probably through similarly personal or political linkages. For instance the new deputy commissary-general, John Kent, had been employed as a landwaiter at Belfast in 1684 and then customs surveyor at Dublin between 1686 and July 1690, when he was dismissed by the new Williamite regime.<sup>98</sup> Yet Kent had been in office under Robinson, and there are hints of a closer connection with the Ormond circle in a letter written to George Clarke in August 1691 which recommended Joseph Coughlan, attorney-general to Ormond's palatinate courts in Tipperary, for a place as receiver of customs at Limerick and noted that 'Mr Kent [will] to give you a fuller accompt and character of him'.<sup>99</sup>

Where this did not exist, other hierarchies were exploited: the agent at Waterford, Nathaniel Giles, had served as a customs landwaiter there in 1686<sup>100</sup>, while the agent in Clonmell was John Hanbury, a former mayor who had been accused in 1685 of whig sympathies in supporting Monmouth's revolt against James II.<sup>101</sup>

New agents were therefore incorporated into the commissariat through a series of informal linkages, including personal contact, patronage, and even political affinity

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<sup>97</sup> TNA, T48/48, 'Under-Officers'; TNA, T37/5 fos. 31-4; TNA, T37/6 fo. 19; Wouter (Ed.) Troost, 'Letters from Bartholomew van Homrigh to General Ginkel, earl of Athlone, 1692-1700: from the Huisarchief Amerongen, Amerongen Castle, near Utrecht', *Analecta Hibernica*, 33 (1986) pp. 77, 78, 81; Bruce Arnold, '"A Protestant purchaser": Bartholomew van Homrigh, merchant adventurer', *Swift Studies*, 15 (2000) p. 50

<sup>98</sup> TNA, CUST20/56-7 (Irish Revenue Board: Establishment books: 1684-6); John Oldmixon, *Memoirs of Ireland from the Restoration, to the present times* (London, 1716) p. 156; CJ, x, 677, 689-90; TCD, MS 749 iii, 336, 343

<sup>99</sup> TCD, MS 749 x, 977; Hayton, 'Dependence', p. 216

<sup>100</sup> TNA, CUST 20/57 (Irish Revenue Board: Establishment book: 1686); TCD, MS 749 iii, 350; iv, 379; xiii, 1256, 1259, 1281-2; TNA, T37/5 fos. 17-19, 61; WCL, MS 7/4 fo. 133

<sup>101</sup> TCD, MS 1181 fo. 191; TCD, MS 749 iv, 393; TNA, T37/5 fo. 62; WCL, MS 7/4 fo. 309; Harris, *Revolution* p. 111

that would have served to reinforce trust, encourage cooperation and thereby improve the coordination lacking in 1689.

Even the effectiveness of outside agents was dependent upon their integration into these networks. Upon open tender the supply of bread was turned over in January 1690 to the Dutch provisions contractor Isaac Pereira, who had supplied William of Orange's campaigns in Flanders since the 1670s: it is usually argued that his experience and extensive links to Jewish mercantile networks further afield formed the basis of his effectiveness.<sup>102</sup> Yet neither proved of much immediate use in Ireland: Robinson told Blathwayt in March that Pereira 'find[s] much difference betwixt this country and Holland'.<sup>103</sup> In April 1690 van Homrigh complained to the Committee for Ireland that they had handed over to Pereira their stores of bread, biscuit, flour and ovens, but

that His Majesty's affairs might not suffer I have laboured very hard to give Mr Pereira (who was altogether unprovided with wagons, utensils etc and a stranger and unacquainted with the country) the possession of full stores in all the several [garrisons] ... and give him the assistance and use of the most of the wagons under our care ... to carry the provisions to the frontiers, all in the same methods as we managed that affair ourselves for Their Majesties' service.<sup>104</sup>

Neither did his effectiveness necessarily stem from an extensive and experienced professional staff: in October 1690 he only had 'eight agents and other necessary officers employed in the several storehouses' along with agents in Chester and London.<sup>105</sup> Although they included fellow Sephardim such as his brother Francis Pereira, David Machado de Sequeira and a Mr Castillio, the Jewish population of

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<sup>102</sup> CSPD (1689-90) p. 401, 436-7, 452; TNA, PC6/2 fos. 34v, 134v, 138v-139r; TCD, MS 749 i, 12; Israel, *European Jewry* pp. 127-34; van Nimwegen, *Dutch army* pp. 368-72

<sup>103</sup> NLI, MS 13654, Robinson to Blathwayt, 24/3/1690; CSPD (1689-90) p. 509, 543, 556-7

<sup>104</sup> TNA, PC6/2 fos. 220v, 238r

<sup>105</sup> WCL, MS 7/4 fos. 88-9; WCL, MS 7/8, Order of 28/5/1691

Dublin in 1690 was small and thus would not have afforded him particularly privileged access either to credit or provisions.<sup>106</sup>

Consequently Isaac Pereira's effectiveness as a bread contractor in Ireland after 1690 appears to have been based upon his capacity to incorporate local Irish officials and agents into his commercial operation, and in particular to integrate it with the wider administrative structures operated by Robinson and van Homrigh, who also informed the Committee in June 1690 that 'to enable Mr Pereira the more, we have lent him some of the choice of the officers employed by us'.<sup>107</sup> John Hanbury acted as agent to Pereira at Clonmell, although oddly in June 1691 van Homrigh dismissed him for this very reason, 'saying it's inconsistent with Their Majesties' service'.<sup>108</sup> Elsewhere, the agent at Drogheda and Belturbet was Henry Sybbalds, a former customs gauger from Armagh.<sup>109</sup> An excise officer was sent to Cork in September 1690 to help Francis Pereira take stock of Jacobite provisions captured there.<sup>110</sup> In London Pereira relied upon an agent William Bridges, a loose client of the earl of Ranelagh since the 1670s, to represent his interests to the Committee for Ireland and Treasury Board.<sup>111</sup> Commercially, he made use of Robert Buckle, a large-scale corn factor in London who must have had his own extensive commercial contacts with the 'galaxy of corn dealers, wholesale and retail, as well as millers, mealmen, flourmen, maltsters, brewers, and distillers' who

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<sup>106</sup> PRONI, T689/1, 'Commissary-General of the Bread'; TCD, MS 749 v, 487; Louis Hyman, *The Jews of Ireland: from earliest times to the year 1910* (Shannon, 1972) pp. 15-20

<sup>107</sup> TNA, PC6/2 fos. 220v, 238r. For a similar overlap in Scotland in 1746, see Bannerman, *Merchants* pp. 36-8, 105-10

<sup>108</sup> TCD, MS 749 viii, 799

<sup>109</sup> PRONI, T689/1, 'Commissary-General of the Bread'; TCD, MS 1180 fo. 101; TNA, CUST 20/57 (Irish Revenue Board: Establishment books: 1686)

<sup>110</sup> TCD, MS 749 ii, 207; iv, 466

<sup>111</sup> *HOP* (1690-1715) iii, 326-7; TNA, PC6/2 fo. 309; CSPD (1690-1) p. 264, 270, 279; NLI, MS 2558 fos. 34, 48; TCD, MS 749 xiii, 1268

organised the transport, purchase and processing of grain during this period.<sup>112</sup>

How Pereira generated trust and cooperation between these figures is unclear, but it can nevertheless be seen that he appears to have been reliant upon a series of local officials who were able to connect him with existing commercial networks in Britain and Ireland, presumably enabling him to act more effectively.

Finally, early in 1690 Schomberg, Robinson and van Homrigh advised, even urged, that the wagon train be likewise contracted out to Pereira to resolve the transportation problems of the last campaign, writing to the Committee that ‘it is impossible for us to take the needful care of them together with the provisions’, and stressing ‘the necessity to have them managed by undertakers’.<sup>113</sup> The shift to more effective management of the wagons by private contract was therefore done with the support and encouragement of the commissariat itself, although it also remained firmly embedded within these same informal networks: when Pereira refused to renew the contract in November 1690, van Homrigh and Robinson brought in Francis Cuffe to replace him.<sup>114</sup> When Cuffe became ill the following month, temporary replacements were still sourced by personal recommendation within the same network: Robinson noted that ‘Mr Cuffe has recommended by Mr van Homrigh’s advice and approbation one Captain Mitchell, who I think altogether as well qualified’. Thus the argument that Pereira was especially effective because of his previous experience, or privileged access to close-knit Jewish networks, must be

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<sup>112</sup> DHC, Fox-Strangeways MSS, D/FSI Box 276 fo. 51; CTB ix, 893, 912, 915; Norman Gras, *The evolution of the English corn market from the twelfth to the eighteenth century* (Cambridge, MA, 1915) pp. 183-209; Ray Westerfield, *Middlemen in English business, particularly between 1660 and 1760* (New Haven, 1915) pp. 130-86; J.A. Chartres, ‘The marketing of agricultural produce’, in Joan Thirsk (ed.), *The agrarian history of England and Wales, 5: 1640-1750* (Cambridge, 1985) p. 228; Dennis Baker, ‘The marketing of corn in the first half of the 18th century: north-east Kent’, *Agricultural History Review*, 18 (1970) pp. 126-50

<sup>113</sup> TCD, MS 749 iii, 332, 336; TNA, PC6/2 fos. 123r, 132v, 134v, 144v-145v, 150v-153v, 144r-v, 175v-176r; WCL, MS 7/4 fo. 154

<sup>114</sup> TCD, MS 749 iii, 332, 347, 349; WCL, MS 7/4 fo. 168

substantially qualified: his effectiveness arose instead from the cooperation and assistance of official and informal networks in England and Ireland into which he had become embedded.

The cooperation of other organs of the fiscal-military state was also required. Indeed, informally integrated with the revenue service – van Homrigh was a commissioner of the revenue, and Robinson deputy vice-treasurer – the commissariat exploited the overlap of these interlocking administrative hierarchies to coordinate business more effectively. For instance, in July 1690 Christopher Carleton, the collector of customs at Carrickfergus, was ordered to disembark and place in store all provisions from transport ships in northern Ireland; subsequently promoted to Cork, van Homrigh noted in October 1691 that to organise shipping to transport Jacobite prisoners to France, ‘I have joined the Collector Mr Christopher Carleton of Cork with [the commissary agent] Mr William Roberts to manage that affair’.<sup>115</sup> The governor at Waterford even expressed surprise that the customs collector there had received no orders to take up ships.<sup>116</sup> It also provided the commissariat with increased access to cash or credit, which remained vital: van Homrigh reminded the Committee for Ireland in December 1689, shortly after Shales was dismissed, that

I am weekly to pay under-commissaries, agents, assistants, conductors, wagonneers, bakers, carpenters, smiths, farriers, bricklayers, porters, boatmen, warehouses, rent, forage and hay for the horses, which I cannot maintain without being proportionably supplied with money. So that I am like to be at a stand for want of money to the great prejudice of Their Majesties’ affairs, for for want of due payment all will desert me, therefore I do most earnestly pray your lordships to order me a needful and continual

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<sup>115</sup> TCD, MS 749 i, 56; WCL, MS 7/4 fo. 25; McGrath, ‘Irish revenue system’, pp. 363-4

<sup>116</sup> TCD, MS 749 xiii, 1287

supply of money for the support and the exact management of the great trust reposed upon me.<sup>117</sup>

Yet, as noted below, the commissariat appears on the whole to have been adequately supplied with money once the two networks had fused by June 1690. Pereira also appears to have access to independent sources of credit that assisted his role: in January 1691 he lent £50 to repair the road between Clonmell and Carrickfergus for the use of the provisions train, as well as advancing some £660 to the army, including over £120 for the purchase of 300 gallons of brandy from local suppliers.<sup>118</sup>

However effectiveness also relied upon the cooperation of a much broader range of central and provincial administrative and political agencies in Ireland. After the army arrived at Dublin in July 1690, the Lord Mayor and other magistrates were ordered to assist van Homrigh to ‘make diligent search and enquiry’ for stores that might have been left by the retreating Jacobite troops or embezzled by locals, as was the excise collector in Cork in September.<sup>119</sup> Civic officials elsewhere were asked to find hidden or embezzled supplies, and to outfit confiscated properties as storehouses, offices or hospitals.<sup>120</sup> Sheriffs, constables and other local officials were also ordered to supervise the purchase or hire of horses and carts, the impressment of local workmen for work on fortifications, the applotment of forage and the quartering of troops.<sup>121</sup> Perhaps due to the substantial overlap of informal

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<sup>117</sup> TNA, PC6/2 fos. 145r-v, 151r, 154r, 168v, 173r, 184v, 186v-187r

<sup>118</sup> TCD, MS 749 iv, 393, 411, 423, 438-9

<sup>119</sup> *Ibid.* i, 74; ii, 207; WCL, MS 7/4 fos. 6, 29, 30

<sup>120</sup> TCD, MS 749 i, 74; ii, 195, 252; iv, 393

<sup>121</sup> *Ibid.* v, 548-9, 554; x, 973, 981, 983; xi, 1159; xii, 1189, 1211; BL, Add. mss 38146 fos. 3v, 4r-v, 27r-v, 158r-159r, 176r; Caulfield (ed.), *Cork* pp. 209, 211, 214-6; Richard Caulfield (ed.), *The council book of the corporation of Youghal* (Guildford, 1878) pp. 380-3, 388; Richard Caulfield (ed.), *The council book of the corporation of Kinsale, from 1652 to 1800* (Guildford, 1879) pp. 191-

networks, the extensive estate infrastructure of the duke of Ormond in Co Tipperary and Co Kilkenny was smoothly absorbed into the commissariat.<sup>122</sup> Ormond's officials offered provisions to the army that they had received as rent, while in March 1691 civil and military officers were ordered in turn to assist them in collecting arrears, 'provided that ... [they] turn over to the army such seized goods as may be necessary for their own provision'.<sup>123</sup> Other resources arose through the Commission of Enquiry, which worked between July and November 1690 to identify and manage forfeited lands of Jacobite supporters. Although separate from the Irish Treasury, there was substantial overlap, not least because the commission included William Robinson, Sir Joshua Allen and other Ormond clients such as the earl of Longford, the bishop of Meath, Joseph Coughlan, and Edward Corker.<sup>124</sup> Altogether they seized hay, wheat, oats and other grains worth around £6,700, some 3,918 horses, 9,003 cattle, and 3,434 sheep, as well as 6,867¼ acres of winter corn and 5,593½ acres of spring corn, all of which could be used by the army.<sup>125</sup> Sub-commissioners of local 'interest and authority' were appointed in each county to seize property, with the assistance of the army, revenue officers and local officials.<sup>126</sup> They too were ordered to turn over horses, provisions, property and grazing land to the service of the state: for instance, the sub-commissioner in Kilkenny was ordered in September 1690 to hand over to Pereira's agent 'all such corn as you have seized ... it being for His Majesty's service'.<sup>127</sup>

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2; Seamus Pender (ed.), *Council books of the Corporation of Waterford, 1662-1700* (Dublin, 1964) pp. 284, 286-7

<sup>122</sup> For details of the estate infrastructure, see Hayton, 'Dependence', pp. 211-41

<sup>123</sup> TCD, MS 749 viii, 815; WCL, MS 7/4 fos. 288-9, 299

<sup>124</sup> BL, Add. mss 38146 fos. 14r-15r, 25r, 105v, 176r-177r; HMC Ormond ii, 442-3; J.G. Simms, *The Williamite confiscation in Ireland, 1690-1703* (London, 1956) pp. 30-44; Hayton, 'Dependence', pp. 216, 224, 232, 241

<sup>125</sup> CJ x, 475

<sup>126</sup> TCD, MS 749 iv, 388; BL, Add. mss 4761 fos. 9v-10v; HMC Ormond ii, 443; BL, Add. mss 38146 fos. 14r-15r, 167r-168r

<sup>127</sup> BL, Add. mss 38146 fos. 37r, 165r, 185v; WCL, MS 7/4 fos. 62, 103, 132

Extensive use was also made of regional commercial networks to supplement the bread or biscuit supplied in Dublin, who in many cases could exploit local resources far more effectively than centrally-appointed or –directed officials. For instance, a contract was placed in August 1690 with local Protestants to collect 20,000 bushels of forfeited wheat, barley, oats, peas and beans from Co Limerick, ‘where the charge exceed[ed] the profit’ of direct collection.<sup>128</sup> Efforts to restore local markets for the supply of the army required particular cooperation between civic, civil and military officers. For instance, on 17 September 1690 a proclamation was issued instituting a new market at Cashel in Co Tipperary, and ordering those within twelve miles of the town to bring in corn for sale to the army at fixed prices.<sup>129</sup> The High Constables in each barony of the county were required to ‘find out’ provisions and compel the owners to bring them to market.<sup>130</sup> Local landowner George Evans argued that the army should even ‘send into the country understanding *providores* as victuallers or storekeepers to buy up proper commodities for provision ... [or] have undertakers to victual the camp’, and noted that ‘proper persons may be easily had and two Protestants may be named in every barony to vie [sic] information in whose hands in such barony proper provision is.’<sup>131</sup> Nearby garrison commanders were ordered to prevent inhabitants droving cattle north ‘to the impoverishing of these counties’<sup>132</sup>, while measures were taken to protect merchants by punishing looting by soldiers and militia.<sup>133</sup>

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<sup>128</sup> TCD, MS 749 ix, 941; xi, 1057, 1116; BL, Add. mss 38146 fos. 29r-30r, 165v-166r, 187r; TCD, MS 1180 fos. 111, 117; WCL, Clarke MS 7/12, Orders: 17/9/1690, 26/9/1690, 7/12/1690

<sup>129</sup> TCD, MS 749 i, 180; WCL, MS 7/4 fos. 79-80

<sup>130</sup> TCD, MS 749 x, 978; PRONI, T2812/4/29, Granard to Keane O’Hara, 12/9/1691; WCL, MS 7/4 fos. 80, 102

<sup>131</sup> TCD, MS 1180 fos. 111, 117

<sup>132</sup> WCL, MS 7/4 fo. 166

<sup>133</sup> TCD, MS 749 ii, 129, 145, 239; iii, 293; vii, 752; viii, 755, 759, 772; x, 957, 1046; BL, Add. mss 38146 fos. 113r, 118v, 121v

Indeed, the imposition by the army of law and order was integral, since bandits or rapparees posed serious problems to the supply of the army, and the direct military contribution that effective local militias could provide by making districts safe for commercial activity has rarely been recognised.<sup>134</sup> George Evans argued that ‘raising the militia ... will pacify the country and encourage people to bring in the harvest and sell it at market’, and Sir Robert Southwell noted in August 1690 that if only the militia were armed ‘they could deal well enough with this sort of foe, and perhaps in more things do better than those of the standing army’.<sup>135</sup> The militia therefore had to be properly armed and outfitted by the state, which issued them in 1690 and 1691 with arms seized by local officials or from stocks refurbished by the Irish Ordnance Office.<sup>136</sup> On active service the militia also required provisions – in June 1691 the sheriff of Co Westmeath noted that ‘some of the militia refused to march or take their bread without cheese, which I was forced to buy’ – and the commissariat was therefore regularly ordered to issue victuals to units on active service.<sup>137</sup> Supplied with provisions and equipment through the cooperation of the commissariat, Ordnance Office and other agencies, the militia could therefore make an important contribution to the operation of the army in Ireland, whose own effectiveness was similarly dependent upon the coordination of a much wider number of official and informal networks and hierarchies, for which mutual cooperation was a basic requirement.

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<sup>134</sup> Simms, *Jacobite Ireland* pp. 198-200; Cullen, *Anglo-Irish trade* p. 40; Dickson, *Old world colony* pp. 56-60

<sup>135</sup> TCD, MS 1180 fos. 117-8; Ferguson, ‘Army’, pp. 45-52, 101-5. For the deployment of the militia, see BL, Add. mss 38146 fo. 121v; TCD, MS 749 ii, 160; iv, 375, 388, 423; ix, 911; x, 948

<sup>136</sup> TCD, MS 749 ii, 190, 201; v, 513; viii, 760; TNA, PC6/2 fos. 141v, 162v; TNA, WO55/1794 fos. 82r, 88r, 131r, 168r, 180r, 187r-198r; BL, Add. mss 38146 fos. 17v-19r, 129r; Ferguson, ‘Army’, p. 45; WCL, MS 7/4 fos. 45, 53, 57, 59, 63, 139

<sup>137</sup> TCD, MS 749 iv, 393; vi, 649; vii, 747; x, 1040; WCL, MS 7/4 fos. 45, 240, 246, 253, 255

Finally, the effectiveness of the commissariat relied upon the support of George Clarke as military secretary first to William III and then to Ginkel. He acted as a clearing-house for a vast amount of official and semi-official business, and his cooperation and flexibility appear to have been crucial.<sup>138</sup> For instance, he was asked by van Homrigh in November 1690 to draw up several warrants for stores that had already been issued out to several remote garrisons: ‘I desire they may be antedated as there noted’, wrote van Homrigh, ‘being the time they began to be sent away and issued out’.<sup>139</sup> He was therefore asking Clarke to authorise retrospectively an action that had already occurred and for which he had no formal warrant: that Clarke was able to do so without any apparent qualms demonstrates a level of trust and mutual confidence that at first sight seems incompatible with the growing importance of strongly-politicised administrative systems, since Clarke was a self-consciously tory official and MP. His correspondence in Ireland shows that he had close connections with Sir Thomas Clarges, a country tory and fellow MP for Oxford, ‘[who] takes it ill’, he was told in June 1690, ‘[that] you do not hold a better correspondence with my Lord Nottingham’.<sup>140</sup> This was reinforced when he arrived in June 1690 and took onto his staff Israel Feilding, now second secretary to the Lords Justices in Ireland and noted above as a man of tory antecedents, and who as deputy to Clarke appears to have enjoyed considerable trust: in July 1691 for example he informed Clarke that to find some papers ‘I was necessitated to break open your scrutoire ... but have nailed it up honestly not so much as seeking for the

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<sup>138</sup> *HOP* (1660-1690) ii, 81-2; *HOP* (1690-1715) iii, 598-600

<sup>139</sup> TCD, MS 749 iii, 325; iv, 379

<sup>140</sup> *Ibid.* i, 104, 107; ii, 189; vii, 689; viii, 762; PRONI, D638/6/4, Ranelagh to Coningsby, 15/7/1690

least secret, though I should have obliged you by keeping it if it had fallen in my way'.<sup>141</sup>

Yet Feilding also retained his connections to the Ormond clientage network, enabling him to serve as a bridge between Clarke and the other – whiggish – members of this clientage circle. For example, in a long-running contest over the appointment of a Clerk of the Council and his deputy, he nominated his fellow Ormond client Francis Cuffe, ‘a fair dealer and one [whom one] may live with’.<sup>142</sup> Clarke already had close personal links with Ormond – he had been travelling with him in November 1688 when William III landed, and in December 1690 the duke offered Clarke accommodation at Kilkenny castle<sup>143</sup> - but Feilding appears to have served as an equally useful intermediary. In March 1691 for instance, William Robinson wrote to Clarke that ‘though Feilding wants no help yet when occasion offers you may be sure of my help’, and Feilding in turn affectionately referred to Robinson as ‘a damn’d sharp campaigner’.<sup>144</sup> Both men did their best to look after Clarke’s newly acquired estate in Co Kilkenny, Feilding hiring one of Ormond’s clients John Langrishe of Knocktopher – at the recommendation of Col Richard Coote, himself a tory linked to the Ormond interest – to supervise its purchase.<sup>145</sup> Clarke was therefore able to cooperate satisfactorily with the other, whiggish agencies of the Irish state in 1690 and 1691 because of the connections offered by the Ormond clientage circle, which facilitated his incorporation.

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<sup>141</sup> John Sainty, ‘The secretariat of the chief governors of Ireland, 1690-1800’, *Proceedings of the Royal Irish Academy*, 77 (1977) pp. 13, 23; TCD, MS 749 i, 14; v, 555; viii, 782, 828

<sup>142</sup> TCD, MS 749 viii, 828

<sup>143</sup> *Ibid.* iii, 318;

<sup>144</sup> *Ibid.* iii, 331; v, 556; vii, 748

<sup>145</sup> *Ibid.* viii, 757; x, 1039; xi, 1139; Hayton, ‘Dependence’, pp. 224, 226-7; Thomas Power, ‘Parliamentary representation in County Kilkenny in the eighteenth century’, in William Nolan and Kevin Whelan (eds.), *Kilkenny: history and society* (Dublin, 1990) pp. 307, 318-9

The logistical situation, administrative structures and even in most cases the personnel of the commissariat in 1690 and 1691 were therefore almost identical to what they had been a year before – if anything the state had retreated from the bureaucratic high-water mark this represented – yet the overall system apparently functioned with greater efficiency and effectiveness after 1690, suggesting that changes which had sacrificed strict bureaucratic principles in order to align hierarchies more closely with the underlying networks had provided these gains in efficiency. The effectiveness of the army therefore continued to be grounded upon effective coordination between its component parts, and the incorporation of resources through the mobilisation of appropriate networks. The preceding section has emphasised the importance of informal cooperation, mediated by networks of association and obligation, and ultimately by trust, to this process. The change was the product of new configurations of private and public connections: patronage and partisanship in particular appear to have played a role, bringing together comparatively disparate elements into a cohesive whole.

### **FINANCE AND THE PAY OFFICE 1690-1**

The same pattern occurred within the army's financial structures in 1690 and 1691. As noted above, wider cooperation was crucial in coordinating the flow of money and paperwork, especially where the Irish Pay Office or Treasury was minded to follow official procedure. The following section will argue that the army was more successfully financed after 1690 but, once again, not necessarily because it was more bureaucratic. Indeed, between July and November 1690 administrative

controls over spending were almost entirely defunct: it was ordered that local collectors should

not insist upon having Exchequer acquittances at the present for the payments so to be made by them, or having the said bills or assignments first entered or countersigned by the officers of the Receipt of our Exchequer as was accustomed in time of peace, which we think fit to dispense with during the continuance of the present war, and until our courts and offices of records shall be restored to their former legal sittings and practices.<sup>146</sup>

Even in April 1691 a survey found that ‘the Treasury here ... [is] without a daily control or check’, a state that persisted for much of the eighteenth century.<sup>147</sup> As with the commissariat, effectiveness was achieved by embedding fiscal structures even more firmly within informal political and commercial networks in Ireland and in England, and a relaxation of bureaucratic standards such as openness, impartiality and professionalism was integral to this process.

This is not to say that financial problems did not persist. Officials and officers complained continually about shortages of pay causing the troops to plunder the local inhabitants: it was acknowledged in March 1691 that ‘all our mischief proceeds from the not better and more regularly paying of the army’, and Robinson wrote the following month that ‘we are all sensible of the backwardness of the campaign ... it is the want of money that chiefly occasioned it’.<sup>148</sup> Nevertheless the removal of Harbord as paymaster- and receiver-general of the Irish Treasury at the start of the campaign in July 1690 proved a decisive step, even if, as noted below, neither the structure or the staff of the Treasury otherwise altered. The posts were then exercised jointly between 1690 and 1698, the separate duties of the post in

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<sup>146</sup> BL, Add. mss 38146 fo. 30v; McGrath, ‘Irish revenue system’, pp. 12-13, 16, 19, 181-91, 233

<sup>147</sup> TCD, MS 1180 fo. 146; Malcolmson, *Nathaniel Clements* pp. 104-5, 114-22; T.J. Kiernan, *Financial administration* pp. 94-143, 263-73

<sup>148</sup> TCD, MS 749 v, 554; vi, 600; x, 971

Ireland and England being turned over to Thomas Coningsby and Charles Fox respectively. Coningsby, an English MP from Herefordshire with no financial or Irish experience, was appointed mainly by virtue of his whig loyalties and court loyalties – ‘accustomed to fawn upon the powerful and bully the powerless, he naturally gravitated to government’, according to David Hayton – and in September 1690 he was also appointed a Lord Justice of Ireland, charged with its civil government and thus at the centre of the Irish fiscal-military state.<sup>149</sup>

In practice Coningsby’s political duties required most of his attention, and the day-to-day business of the Treasury and Pay Office was handled by his deputy William Robinson, who was charged – alongside his other duties – with attending ‘the dispatch of business in quarters or in the camp’.<sup>150</sup> The teller or cashier was William Fownes, a client of Charles Fox: he later became a tory MP, and married the daughter of Stephen Sweet, an official connected with the Ormond estate.<sup>151</sup> Harbord’s appointees Robert Curtis and Mordecai Abbott served as clerks.<sup>152</sup> However boundaries remained fluid: Luke King, still a deputy-commissary of the musters, noted in June 1691 that ‘here I am alone concerned in the public cash and upon hard duty’, and complained a week later that he had disbursed over £100,000 to the troops ‘having not a hand to help me but one clerk’.<sup>153</sup> In December 1690 Isaac Pereira distributed £6,250 and Israel Feilding £300 to the troops in the field on behalf of the Pay Office.<sup>154</sup> In March 1691 money for the army was transported to

<sup>149</sup> *HOP* (1660-1690) i, 115-6; *HOP* (1690-1715) iii, 671-5

<sup>150</sup> PRONI, T689/1, 'Payments out of Poundage'; McGrath, 'Irish revenue system', pp. 239-42, 376

<sup>151</sup> BL, Add. MSS 51335 fos. 16r-v; CTB ix, 950; Hayton, 'Dependence', pp. 220, 225, 228; Hill, *Patriots to Unionists* p. 75n; *HIP* iv, 232; McGrath, 'Irish revenue system', p. 376

<sup>152</sup> TCD, MS 749 ii, 208; iii, 351; iv, 384; viii, 792; BL, Add. MSS 51335 fos. 16r, 70r, 76r, 78v; BL, Add. mss 20176 fo. 13r

<sup>153</sup> BL, Add. mss 20176 fos. 13v-15r

<sup>154</sup> PRONI, T689/1, 'Regiments on English Establishment'; WCL, MS 7/4 fo. 189

Kilkenny and lodged with Amyas Bushe, the excise collector of the town and later a tory MP, but also, not unincidentally, another Ormond client, whom Robinson told Clarke he had ‘sent orders to pay it out as he shall be directed’.<sup>155</sup> Thus Harbord’s whiggish financial infrastructure was absorbed essentially unchanged and mingled with the whig clientage network sheltered under Ormond’s political umbrella: indeed, so seamless was this integration that in March 1691 Robinson wrote to George Clarke asking his favour for Mark Hodges, Harbord’s cornet and former agent in Ulster, ‘a honest brave fellow lately broke’.<sup>156</sup>

The Irish Pay Office’s agent in Chester, responsible for coordinating the receipt, transshipment and dispatch of money between London and Dublin, was equally embedded within these networks. Initially Francis Cuffe was proposed but, Coningsby told Fox, ‘to have all the same persons concerned in the one as in the other I thought would be liable to cause objection’: Sir Joshua Allen was therefore chosen instead to ‘manage the correspondence between us’.<sup>157</sup> No doubt encouraged by this close integration, Allen incorporated his own capital into the public networks: in July 1690 he informed Fox that he had been ordered to receive £3,000 from a local excise collector, but that if this did not arrive in time he would borrow the sum upon his own credit.<sup>158</sup> When Allen returned to Dublin in August 1690, he suggested in turn that Fox replace him with his brother William Allen, an alderman of Chester and an ‘honest, able and careful person in the city’.<sup>159</sup> Thus, effective coordination of business in Chester was achieved by embracing, rather than denying, the possibilities offered by incorporating the post into a wider series

<sup>155</sup> TCD, MS 749 i, 50; Hayton, ‘Dependence’, pp. 225n, 227; *HIP* ii, 333

<sup>156</sup> TCD, MS 749 v, 560; vi, 566

<sup>157</sup> DHC, D/FSI Box 238, Coningsby to Fox, 9/7/1690; BL, Add. MSS 51335 fos. 5r, 12r-24r

<sup>158</sup> BL, Add. MSS 51335 fos. 18r, 20r

<sup>159</sup> *Ibid.* fo. 5r; NLI, MS 2558, *passim*

of interlocking political and personal networks. More broadly, the office bore a marked similarity to the Irish Treasury under Nathaniel Clements in the eighteenth century, which was similarly dominated by Clements' family, clients and dependents: yet, Malcolmson argues, 'the inter-relationships of these insiders expedited those offices and made it possible for administration to function'.<sup>160</sup>

Just as merging fiscal and logistical infrastructure assisted the operation of the commissariat, the effectiveness of the Pay Office appears to have been increased by this practice, not least because the overlaps made it easier to coordinate the necessary accounting. For instance, in September 1690 Robinson noted that the army could not receive more money from the English Treasury until the Irish Pay Office received the paperwork for 'provisions by us delivered ... and other accounts tedious and difficult to be forthwith got', and proposed that Curtis be sent to Dublin with all the commissariat's vouchers to speed up the process.<sup>161</sup> It was only the erosion of this administrative nexus once Robinson moved to London in January 1692 that caused problems to occur: the accounts from van Homrigh soon fell into arrears and Robinson asked that Coningsby 'press him to it and that he sign and swear to it ... He is the most tedious creature for public business I ever met with'.<sup>162</sup> The Muster Office also remained 'in the worst management in the world', wrote Coningsby, but because 'I well know how far we are concerned with them' he and his staff appear to have found ways to accommodate this by drawing upon the personal and partisan linkages with Yarner, King and others.<sup>163</sup> For instance, although admitting in February 1691 that the Pay Office had 'neither establishment

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<sup>160</sup> Malcolmson, *Nathaniel Clements* pp. 16-38, 106-17, 132-7, 204-5

<sup>161</sup> TCD, MS 749 ii, 191, 208; iv, 391; BL, Add. mss 38146 fo. 5v

<sup>162</sup> PRONI, D638/166/4, 6-9, Robinson to Coningsby, 9/1/1692, 27/1/1692, 30/1/1692, 9/2/1692

<sup>163</sup> TCD, MS 749 v, 540; vi, 619-20; BL, Add. MSS 51335 fos. 96v-97r; TCD, MS 1180 fo. 146

or rolls' for the Dutch forces, Robinson suggested that Ginkel should pay them 'what he thinks fit' on account, confident that the rolls would eventually be returned and the paperwork brought into alignment.<sup>164</sup> Finally, the Pay Office also relied upon cooperation from George Clarke as military secretary: as deputy vice-treasurer Robinson appears to have been able on occasion to issue money without waiting to receive the necessary warrants or debentures, noting to Clarke in December 1690 that a warrant of £681 might 'bear any date you please' since it authorised the disbursement of money that had already been issued to the army.<sup>165</sup> Thus a broad relaxation in bureaucratic stringency, presumably permitted by mutual trust and created by informal obligations and personal connections, allowed the business of the Pay Office to be carried out with greater effectiveness, and the flow of money more closely coordinated.

This wider informal nexus also facilitated the actual provision of money to the army. Ireland's inland financial networks, already very basic, largely collapsed during the war.<sup>166</sup> Specie could be transported to the army in the field, but to do so the Pay Office needed the cooperation of the army for escorts and the commissariat for carriage, a process facilitated by the informal linkages between Robinson, van Homrigh, Pereira and others.<sup>167</sup> It was also standard practice in England and Ireland for the balances held by local revenue collectors to be used for the payment of the army.<sup>168</sup> An order of August 1690 therefore instructed local collectors, 'for the

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<sup>164</sup> TCD, MS 749 v, 490

<sup>165</sup> DHC, D/FSI Box 238, Coningsby to Fox, 28/9/1690, 5/10/1690, 27/10/1690, 28/12/1690; PRONI, T1135/3/2-3, Coningsby to Fox, 18/9/1690, 16/10/1690; TCD, MS 749 ii, 208; iii, 336, 344, 349, 361

<sup>166</sup> Cullen, 'Exchange business', pp. 326-8; Dickson, *Old world colony* pp. 147-8

<sup>167</sup> PRONI, T1135/1, Coningsby to van Homrigh, 5/8/1690; TCD, MS 749 ii, 173, 182, 191, 201, 236, 257

<sup>168</sup> Cullen, *Anglo-Irish trade* pp. 168-9; Pressnell, *Country banking* pp. 378-90; McGrath, 'Irish revenue system', pp. 74, 184, 189, 222, 232-3; Malcolmson, *Nathaniel Clements* pp. 118-21, 143-4

more convenient and ready payment of such part of our forces ... in several places in the county', to answer all bills drawn on them, and there are numerous instances of collectors being ordered to turn over the cash held in their hands for the use of the army.<sup>169</sup> From November 1690 officers and governors were also authorised to issue notes or bills to 'prevent the county being any way prejudiced by the non-payment of quarters' or the officers issuing private notes<sup>170</sup>, and in September 1691 Coningsby again wrote that 'it will be absolutely necessary that some project or other be bound out by tally or tickets to be given out of the Treasury here which may be a credit between the soldiers and the county for their support', a practice replicated in north America in the eighteenth century under similar conditions of low specie levels.<sup>171</sup> Yet the system basically involved the circulation of a departmental scrip whose validity and utility relied upon close cooperation of civilian and military officials: the rates at which provisions were to be bought with this scrip had to be coordinated in consultation with Clarke in October 1690, while local commissaries, sheriffs and other local officials were ordered to assist in collecting these notes in February 1691 and forwarding them to Dublin to be enrolled and paid, and thereby retain their value as acceptable paper currency.<sup>172</sup>

Credit was also sourced from private connections built even more heavily upon personal trust. Numerous officers and governors were forced to subsist their troops out of their own pocket.<sup>173</sup> At the height of the financial crisis in December 1689,

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<sup>169</sup> TCD, MS 749 iii, 351; iv, 384; x, 1031; xiii, 1275; TNA, PC6/2 fo. 198r; PRONI, D638/12/21, Ginkel to Coningsby, 26/3/1691; BL, Add. mss 38146 fos. 38v-39r

<sup>170</sup> TCD, MS 1180 fos. 145-6; Danaher (ed.), *Danish Force* pp. 40, 106

<sup>171</sup> BL, Add. MSS 51335 fos. 84r-85r, 91r; David Syrett, 'The raising of American troops for service in the West Indies during the War of the Austrian Succession, 1740-1', *Historical Research*, 72 (2000) pp. 26-32; Julian Gwyn, 'Financial revolution in Massachusetts: public credit and taxation, 1692-1774', *Histoire sociale / Social History*, 17 (1984) pp. 64-5

<sup>172</sup> TCD, MS 749 ii, 227, 239, 245, 251; iii, 269; v, 490; xiii, 1350; WCL, MS 7/4 fos. 191-2, 271

<sup>173</sup> TCD, MS 749 vii, 716; viii, 773, 785; ix, 857, 860

Schomberg had noted that army agents were lending money to the men at high rates of 5 or 6 percent, and later complained in May 1690 that ‘I am unable to borrow any more from the merchants, who previously lent me money, it not having been repaid to them in London’.<sup>174</sup> In March 1691 the commissary storekeeper at Cork borrowed £200 on his own credit.<sup>175</sup> Robert Haines, one of the deputy-commissaries of the musters, told Clarke in September 1690 that he had advanced £2,000 to the troops at Lisburn ‘to relieve them from perishing’.<sup>176</sup> In October 1691, the assize judge Richard Cox reported that he had kept control of the army ‘and often borrowed money for them in their distress, and did them all other good offices that I could’.<sup>177</sup> In November 1690 the city of Cork issued municipal bonds to raise money to support the army, then took up further loans of £300 and £780 in 1691 to prevent the local garrison ‘tak[ing] a-loose’.<sup>178</sup> The army was therefore able to subsist by incorporating – occasionally by compulsion – private credit from a variety of sources, and its own solvency therefore depended upon the effectiveness of the private financial networks that such individuals or institutions could access through trusted connections.

Where Coningsby appears to have been most active as paymaster- and receiver-general in Ireland was – with the help of Sir Joshua Allen – in finding ways to maximise the overall solvency of the Irish Treasury, and thereby provide a level of ‘working capital’ sufficient to cushion delays in remittance from England and respond to immediate financial needs: as Coningsby noted to Fox in May 1691, ‘we

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<sup>174</sup> CSPD (1689-90), 365-6, 369; CSPD (1690-1), 5; TNA, PC6/2 fo. 205r

<sup>175</sup> TCD, MS 749 nos. 556, 866

<sup>176</sup> *Ibid.* ii, 169, 172

<sup>177</sup> TCD, MS 1180 fo. 159

<sup>178</sup> Caulfield (ed.), *Cork* pp. 211, 213, 219-20, 223. See also Caulfield (ed.), *Youghal* pp. 384-6; Caulfield (ed.), *Kinsale* pp. 191-3; Pender (ed.), *Waterford* pp. 288-9, 294

have a thousand difficulties rise here every moment that can't be possibly be seen on your side, and must be provided against here'.<sup>179</sup> Although Ivar McGrath has emphasised that internal revenues ultimately did little to sustain the war effort – they contributed only £108,242 of the £2,445,399 received between March 1689 and October 1691 – they nevertheless provided a useful supplement: Coningsby noted in October 1690 that 'had not the revenue of this country done beyond expectation we had been before now at a full stop'.<sup>180</sup> There were also incidental contributions, such as quantities of coin seized as part of the forfeitures.<sup>181</sup> However, many of the means used to maintain the solvency of the army were essentially informal, and depended upon the same combination of private networks and mutual trust for their effectiveness.

For instance, the scarcity of specie in Ireland meant that coin often carried higher value, offering opportunities for profits through arbitrage: Allen noted to Fox from Chester in July 1690 that guineas in Ireland now passed for 23 shillings 'in which Their Majesties' advantage might be considered in getting the most profitable coins'.<sup>182</sup> Overall, between June 1690 and March 1691 the Pay Office brought to account profits from remittance amounting to just over £10,800, a profit of some 4.2 percent on the sums they handled.<sup>183</sup> Because the exchange normally ran against Ireland, offering bills in Dublin on London not only provided a hedge against delays in remittance, but also a premium of anything between four and fourteen percent:

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<sup>179</sup> DHC, D/FSI Box 238, Coningsby to Fox, 13/5/1691

<sup>180</sup> McGrath, 'Irish revenue system', pp. 235-6; PRONI, T1135/3/3, Coningsby to Fox, 16/10/1690; BL, Add. MSS 51335 fo. 16r

<sup>181</sup> BL, Add. MSS 51335 fo. 16r; TCD, MS 749 ii, 188; PRONI, T689/1, 'Miscellaneous Receipts'

<sup>182</sup> BL, Add. MSS 51335 fo. 14r; CSPD (1689-90) p. 369

<sup>183</sup> PRONI, T689/1, 'Profits of formal remittance' and 'Profits by private remittance'

some £20,550 was received in this fashion between June 1690 and March 1691.<sup>184</sup> Occasionally these even involved breaking administrative arrangements and drawing heavily upon London when the overall effectiveness of the army demanded it. For example, in October 1690 Coningsby wrote to Fox that there was an urgent need to subsist the Dutch Guards at Chester for their march to London, and therefore ‘I am forced to break the orders and ... draw bills on Alderman [William] Allen for £1,200 which I hope the Lords of the Treasury will pay’.<sup>185</sup> He similarly apologised in December 1691 for drawing bills on Fox ‘contrary to your orders’, but explained that an opportunity had offered to embark the Danes and therefore avoid subsisting them for the whole winter.<sup>186</sup> In the end the convoy left before the Danes were fully embarked, but he defended himself by arguing that ‘had it succeeded which it was ten to one but it would, no bills had ever done the king more service’.

Some measures were even more *ad hoc* and unofficial. Coningsby informed Fox in July 1690 that Sir Joshua Allen had flagged his bills with a ‘private mark’ so that the Pay Office in London could prioritise their payment, and thereby protect his credit in Dublin over that of others.<sup>187</sup> In May 1691 he wrote to Fox that ‘the general has been forced to order me to draw bills upon you’ to clear various regiments, but that he would delay drawing the bills for ten days and give them at ten day’s sight, ‘therefore you have time enough to consider what to be done in it’.<sup>188</sup> On occasion he also appears to have made use of his own resources: he told Fox, for instance, in 25 November 1690 that he had been forced to ‘make shift to

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<sup>184</sup> DHC, D/FSI Box 238, Coningsby to Fox, [Aug 1690]; PRONI, T1135/3/3, Coningsby to Fox, 16/10/1690; BL, Add. MSS 51335 fos. 88r-90r. For remittance to Ireland, see Cullen, *Anglo-Irish trade* pp. 173-86

<sup>185</sup> DHC, D/FSI Box 238, Coningsby to Fox, 16/10/1690

<sup>186</sup> *Ibid.*, Coningsby to Fox, 22/7/1690, 26/7/1690; BL, Add. MSS 51335 fos. 96r-97r

<sup>187</sup> DHC, D/FSI Box 238, Coningsby to Fox, 16/7/1690, 25/8/1690

<sup>188</sup> *Ibid.*, Coningsby to Fox, 13/5/1691

borrow in this town upon my own credit £20,000 to make a small dividend of £25,000 to the army at a juncture when it was extremely wanted in regard of a ship to send over'.<sup>189</sup> Thus the credit of the Pay Office in Ireland was built upon close cooperation between a variety of formal and informal networks and structures, which even possessed the potential to become mutually reinforcing. Aside from the examples noted above, the power of patronage that Coningsby possessed as Lord Justice would have enabled him to reward those who put their credit and connections at the service of the state: he promised Fox for instance that 'as far as I am able [Sir Joshua Allen] shan't be forgotten for I really think he deserves better, being an honest and ... punctual man'.<sup>190</sup>

The Irish Pay Office in London was similarly structured around a close-knit informal network, and for the same reasons. Duties were exercised in London by Charles Fox, son of Sir Stephen Fox and a former Paymaster of the Forces between 1682 and 1685.<sup>191</sup> Clay and McGrath have argued that the appointment was mainly a means of embedding Sir Stephen Fox, also appointed a Lord of the Treasury in March 1690, and his private financial networks more firmly into the state, thereby encouraging him to add his own personal credit into his operation. As a financier Sir Stephen likewise had access to a substantial stream of 'running cash' through the appointment in 1689 of his nephew Thomas Fox as cashier of customs, and by June 1690 he had therefore essentially reconstructed the administrative nexus that had sustained the earlier 'Great Undertaking' before 1679, the Pay Office being supported by credit of the revenue services.<sup>192</sup> As McGrath shown, the vast bulk of

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<sup>189</sup> Ibid., Coningsby to Fox, 25/11/1690; TCD, MS 749 ii, 127, 182. See also xiii, 1275

<sup>190</sup> DHC, D/FSI Box 238, Coningsby to Fox, 18/10/1690

<sup>191</sup> McGrath, 'Irish revenue system', p. 236

<sup>192</sup> Clay, *Public finance* pp. 234-9, 245

the money spent in Ireland was received from England, which meant that ‘the receiver- and paymaster-general [was] a *de facto* employee of the English Treasury ... more answerable to the English government, and less a part of the Irish Exchequer *per se*’.<sup>193</sup> He would therefore have functioned most effectively by cultivating close linkages with the English Treasury and key sources of credit, and this is exactly what can be observed, the Irish Pay Office in England comprising in fact a wholesale extension of the extensive Fox clientage network. A key linkage was John Knight, a client of Sir Stephen Fox and Thomas Fox’s deputy as cashier of customs, who was now given an interim appointment as deputy to Charles Fox.<sup>194</sup> Shortly afterwards, Knight was replaced by Edward Pauncefort, another client of the family.<sup>195</sup> Indeed the entire Irish Pay Office was constructed around personal clientage linkages: by 1693 other places in the office were occupied by relatives John Rawkins and Nicholas Fenn, who had both served in the English Pay Office in the 1670s<sup>196</sup>, as well as Robert Georges or Gorges, first as a clerk and then as accountant and cashier, who may have been from Gloucestershire and thus adjacent to the bulk of the Fox estates.<sup>197</sup>

The Irish Pay Office in London was therefore entirely but informally orientated, as it had to be for maximum effectiveness, around its interaction with the English Treasury. As in Ireland this offered obvious advantages for administrative coordination: for instance in August 1690 Knight reported to Charles Fox that three regiments of horse at Chester had already been paid half the £1,575 they required,

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<sup>193</sup> McGrath, ‘Irish revenue system’, pp. 235, 239

<sup>194</sup> Clay, *Public finance* pp. 235-6; BL, Add. MSS 51335 fos. 12r, 15r, 18r, 20r, 24r, 26r

<sup>195</sup> Clay, *Public finance* pp. 271-3; *HOP* (1690-1715) v, 114-6. For the structure of the Pay Office, see NLI, MS 2558 fos. 210, 307; CTB ix, 950

<sup>196</sup> Clay, *Public finance* p. 144; PRONI, D638/166/7-8, Robinson to Coningsby, 30/1/1691

<sup>197</sup> TNA, T1/260/38. For Fox’s estates, see Clay, *Public finance* pp. 334-5

‘which your father gave me this evening’.<sup>198</sup> Fox’s role as one of the anchors for his father’s Fox’s financial networks was equally important: besides the £83,127 that Clay has argued Sir Stephen lent the state after 1689, the Treasury books suggest that Charles Fox lent some £296,750 for the use of the army in Ireland, although it is difficult to say how much of this figure overlaps with that provided by his father.<sup>199</sup> So effective was this financial network that Coningsby’s efforts to have ‘Mr Evans’ – almost certainly the whig financier Sir Stephen Evance – appointed as banker and cashier to the Pay Office in London appear to have been ignored, despite the access to additional credit and connections this would have offered.<sup>200</sup> Just as whig connections created informal bonds that helped Coningsby disburse the money, so the extension of personal, even political, bonds in London appear to have helped Charles Fox receive and remit money to Ireland more effectively than would otherwise have been the case.

Indeed the only discontinuity within this collection of interlocking networks was the connection of trust between Fox and Coningsby. One was a court whig of apparently boundless personal ambition, the other a principled tory whose wife advised him in 1703 that he should ‘be governed by nobody, your temper is not fit to have to do with designing people, that have something else at the bottom than what appears uppermost’.<sup>201</sup> The gap was apparently bridged by an unlikely friendship: in July 1690 for instance Coningsby wrote to Fox that ‘I wish myself sometimes with you and our old company’.<sup>202</sup> This was cemented by the exchange

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<sup>198</sup> BL, Add. MSS 51335 fos. 24r, 26r

<sup>199</sup> CTB ix, 1019-1258; Clay, *Public finance* pp. 234-8

<sup>200</sup> DHC, D/FSI Box 238, Coningsby to Fox, 4/7/1690, 16/7/1690; CTB ix, 51, 278, 359-60, 476; *HOP* (1690-1715) iii, 993-5

<sup>201</sup> BL, Add. MSS 51335 fo. 55r

<sup>202</sup> DHC, D/FSI Box 238, Coningsby to Fox, 16/7/1690, 5/8/1690

of gifts: aside from promising Fox ‘any news worth your knowing’, Coningsby also requested that he discharge small favours such as buying periwigs for him – ‘you know the colour I wear’ – and in return he worked to promote Fox’s clients in the Pay Office and army.<sup>203</sup> Friendship therefore facilitated close cooperation, although without the stiffening provided by common political loyalties it was so attenuated by 1698 that Coningsby was able to dispense with Fox entirely.<sup>204</sup> By contrast, those networks held together by political partisanship as well as friendship appear to have been far more durable, and as the following chapters will show these tended to survive beyond even the removal of the formal administrative frameworks that had supported them.

## CONCLUSION

This chapter has therefore argued that the campaigns of the British fiscal-military state in Ireland between 1689 and 1691 require fundamental reassessment. The standard narratives have linked chaotic conditions of 1689 with the incompetence of the commissary-general John Shales, and the wider absence of an experienced and professional commissariat capable of organising the supply of victuals to the army. Yet Shales was perhaps one of the most qualified men in Britain to conduct such an operation, and as an example of an administrative system organised according to bureaucratic principles the structures that he created cannot be faulted. He was ultimately handicapped not by any absence of bureaucratic zeal, but by political factors that were almost entirely out of his sphere. His standing as a tory official proved divisive, and led to poor cooperation with overwhelmingly whig networks in

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<sup>203</sup> Ibid., Coningsby to Fox, 16/7/1690, 19/8/1690, 27/10/1690, 9/11/1690, 6/1/1691

<sup>204</sup> Clay, *Public finance* p. 270; *HOP* (1690-1715) iii, 682, 1099-1100, 1105

England and Ireland that led to a breakdown in cooperation and coordination, and therefore logistical failures. By contrast, although the state enjoyed greater success in 1690 and 1691, this was achieved using essentially the same administrative machinery, and in many cases even the same personnel. The difference was that that machinery had now been brought into alignment with the underlying political and personal networks, and this encouraged cooperation between a wide range of otherwise distinct individuals.

Consequently, it is clear that political partisanship, at least in this instance, was a distinctly double-edged sword. In 1689 it proved divisive, and in 1690 possible tensions between George Clarke and the remainder of Ormond's increasingly whiggish patronage and administrative network appear to have only been defused by the operation of private friendship and personal connection. Yet the other side of the coin is that political partisanship also appears to have been capable of mobilising far larger numbers of people and to much greater effect than would otherwise have been the case through narrow personal or clientage networks. Common whig allegiances, broadly construed, not only linked Harbord with his administrative machinery, but also with a range of financial and social elites in England and Ireland that provided trust, mutual confidence, and incentives for interaction. By the same token, they allowed Coningsby not only to absorb the rump of Harbord's administrative networks but also to extend them, and to link them up with others in Ireland and England, while in London the Irish Pay Office was orientated around an overlapping set of financial, political and administrative connections that facilitated the incorporation of private credit into public structures. It is even reasonable to suppose that an even more intensely partisan or politicised

fiscal-military state would have permitted even greater levels of effectiveness, and this is a conclusion that the next chapter will therefore explore.

### **CHAPTER 3: THE LOW COUNTRIES 1689-1697**

The wars in Ireland may have been the first major test faced by the post-1660 British – or, in effect, English – fiscal-military state, but their scale and scope bore no comparison to the campaigns in the Spanish Netherlands (modern-day Belgium) between 1689 and 1697 as part of the Nine Years War.<sup>1</sup> This was broadly conceived as a means of checking the apparently unbounded territorial expansion of France under Louis XIV, thereby protecting the Dutch Republic, the north German principalities, and the Habsburg territories in central Europe. There was also concern over the eventual succession to the Spanish crown and its far-flung territories, both in Europe and the New World, which would inevitably become a greater issue once the Spanish king Charles II died without heirs. Finally, to William III and his new kingdoms the war was also a means to secure the political and religious gains of the Glorious Revolution and prevent a Stuart restoration. It was therefore fought by Britain, the Dutch Republic, Spain, the duchy of Savoy and the Emperor against France, in Catalonia, northern Italy and the Rhine as well as the Spanish Netherlands. However, the experience of the British troops in Flanders was mainly one of stalemate. Defeats at Steenkirke in 1692 and the loss of Namur were balanced by the recapture of Namur in 1695. The breakthrough occurred elsewhere: in 1696 Louis XIV concluded peace with the duke of Savoy, which allowed him to consolidate his gains in Catalonia and transfer troops north, and although desultory fighting continued into 1697 this mainly served to cover continued negotiations by both sides which culminated in the Peace of Ryswick in 1697.

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<sup>1</sup> This accounts draws on Childs, *Nine Years War*

Of equal importance was that both sides had fought themselves to an economic and financial standstill. In particular, the war did immeasurable damage to England's overseas trade, as did the declining value of the English coinage, leading to the 'Recoinage Crisis' in 1695-6 when all silver specie was essentially recalled and revalued. D.W. Jones has argued this economic crisis and its consequences defined the effectiveness of armies abroad, and that in the 1690s Britain's financial commitments overseas eventually outstripped its ability to fund them out of the profits of its foreign exports.<sup>2</sup> Both he and P.G.M. Dickson also argue that the Treasury, and thus by implication the entire British state, also still lacked sufficient fiscal instruments, financial acumen and administrative capacity to tap what wealth did exist at home and abroad.<sup>3</sup> By contrast, others have argued that the problems arose primarily from the continued inefficiency of British administrative structures. John Childs argues that William III 'created a system which just about worked but was a hand-to-mouth affair', drawing on the thesis of Louis Waddell, who likewise insisted that the wealth of England was not really sapped by the cost of the army: 'if the politics and society had been organised more solidly behind the struggle a much larger expedition could undoubtedly have been maintained overseas'.<sup>4</sup>

Yet the previous chapter has shown that economic circumstances were not necessarily a bar to effectiveness, where administrative and financial mechanisms could compensate for their effects, but also that such mechanisms did not need to conform to Weberian standards of bureaucratic conduct to be effective. The

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<sup>2</sup> D. W. Jones, *War and economy in the age of William III and Marlborough* (Oxford, 1988) pp. 29-65, 96-126

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.* pp. 274-300; Dickson, *Financial Revolution* pp. 54-8, 352-7

<sup>4</sup> Louis M. Waddell, 'The administration of the English army in Flanders and Brabant from 1689 to 1697' (Unpublished PhD thesis, University of North Carolina, 1971) pp. 33-54, 164, 173-4; Childs, *William III* pp. 8, 29

following sections will argue that this likewise occurred in the British war effort in the Low Countries. Examining first the Pay Office in London, and then its subsidiary in Antwerp, it will be shown that although both were riddled with private connections and corruption, these factors permitted a degree of informal financial intermediation that helped maintain the solvency and thus the effectiveness of the army. The final section will then analyse the networks employed by the remittance contractors charged with transmitting money to Flanders, and argue that their effectiveness in turn was built upon similarly personal linkages that could likewise support the army where they could be adequately mobilised by those involved.

### **THE PAY OFFICE IN LONDON**

The impact of the Recoinage Crisis and the general failure of credit upon the state was magnified, to an extent, by the heavy reliance of both the British and allied armies in Flanders – more so than in Ireland – upon private civilian contractors such as the firm of Machado & Pereira.<sup>5</sup> Only a skeleton commissariat remained, reducing the state's administrative burdens but increasing its financial ones, since effective supply now mainly involved maintaining the flow of money.<sup>6</sup> On the one hand this simplified matters, particularly given the sophistication and maturity of financial markets in the Netherlands, which were closely connected with English markets and at the centre of a web of multilateral exchange that was already used to settle trade balances run up across Europe, north America and the Near East.<sup>7</sup> On

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<sup>5</sup> Jones, *War and economy* pp. 84-7; Waddell, 'Administration', pp. 49-52, 397-439; von Arni, *Hospital care* pp. 78-94; Childs, *William III* pp. 247-52; Childs, *Nine Years War* pp. 46-62

<sup>6</sup> Bannerman, *Merchants* pp. 12-14

<sup>7</sup> Larry Neal, *The rise of financial capitalism: international capital markets in the age of reason* (Cambridge, 1990); Pit Dehing and Marjolein 't Hart, 'Linking the fortunes: currency and banking, 1550-1800', in Marjolein 't Hart, Joost Jonker, and Jan Luiten Van Zanden (eds.), *A financial history*

the other, it placed a particular priority upon efficient administration and intermediation, the effectiveness of the Pay Office, and the administrative and financial skills of Richard Jones, earl of Ranelagh, the Paymaster-General during this period. As noted previously, he has been subject to particular criticism as a corrupt and ineffective administrator whose unbureaucratic actions materially harmed the army.<sup>8</sup> The following section will argue that the reverse was true, and that the army in all probability could not have functioned without his actions.

Scattered correspondence from the Pay Office and its staff to various officials in London and overseas indicates that administrative flexibility remained key: Ranelagh complained in March 1692 to William Blathwayt, military secretary and secretary of state to William III on campaign, that he urgently needed the new establishment for that year, ‘having no rule to guide my payments by until I have it’, but asked that the document be dated before William III had left England since he had already begun to pay out the money.<sup>9</sup> Waddell has noted the leeway that Richard Hill, the deputy-paymaster in Flanders, was allowed in the payment of contingencies, but on several occasions orders were also given to pay various regiments or contractors out of funds appropriated for other purposes.<sup>10</sup> For example, in August 1692 Hill was told that no adequate authority existed for the payment of a regiment at Antwerp, and that until this could be secured he should pay them out of other funds, ‘as much of it as the[ir] scruples ... will bear, till the

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*of The Netherlands* (Cambridge) pp. 37-62; J.G. Sperling, ‘The international payments mechanism in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries’, *Economic History Review*, n.s. 14 (1962) pp. 461-6; Jacob M. Price, ‘Multilateralism and/or bilateralism: the settling of British trade balances with the north, c. 1700’, *Economic History Review*, 14 (2nd ser.) (1961) pp. 254-74; Jones, *War and economy* pp. 39-42, 91-4; Chaudhuri, *Trading world* pp. 160-74

<sup>8</sup> Waddell, ‘Administration’, pp. 81-3, 230-6, 494-6; Childs, *William III* pp. 143-5

<sup>9</sup> BL, Add. mss 56242 fo. 77

<sup>10</sup> SA, (Attingham mss) 112/1/4, 5; BL, Add. mss 56241 fos. 30r, 35r, 76r, 86r-v, 88r-v; Bod. Lib., MS Eng Hist D.146 fos. 1, 9, 29, 81-2, 89, 105, 109-11, 115, 117, 183; BL, Add. mss 9730 fos. 11r-v, 21r; Waddell, ‘Administration’, p. 117

whole can be settled'. Two months later Hill also noted to William Blathwayt that he had paid some 75,523 fl intended for contingencies to subsist various troops

and how I shall replace these sums on their proper heads I know not. I have indeed [also] replaced 35,500 fl which I sent to Ostend to subsist the forces, and the Duke of Leinster's contingencies, from the money I received for the subsistence of the troops, and for contingencies I shall be glad to replace the rest if I knew how.<sup>11</sup>

Indeed by 1696 Hill reluctantly accepted that he would have to use all the money he received to pay subsistence and contractors, regardless of its formal appropriation, and active intervention was required from Blathwayt 'to help a tender conscience which you have expressed in the matter sometimes'.<sup>12</sup> Money was therefore borrowed from separate heads such as contingencies or off-reckonings in order to support more urgent needs, resembling the practice of successive Treasurers of the Navy in the eighteenth century who similarly consolidated individual receipts into a single fund that could target the most urgent financial needs of the service.<sup>13</sup>

However, the navy concealed such actions behind their privilege of internal audit, whereas the army's accounts were subject to detailed and direct examination: consequently, the confusion noted within Pay Office accounts both by historians and contemporaries – when Parliament came to audit Ranelagh's accounts in 1702 the commissioners found for example that 'some of his Lordship's vouchers for payments are only loose papers, put into warrants, with a name, and nothing more, writ on them' – may have served a useful purpose in concealing such illicit practices from direct view.<sup>14</sup> A particular criticism was that, as a result, many if not all

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<sup>11</sup> Bod. Lib., MS Eng Hist D.164 fos. 25, 37-9, 43

<sup>12</sup> BL, Add. mss 56241 fos. 88r-v, 90v-91r; BL, Add. mss 9730 fos. 12r-v, 45v

<sup>13</sup> See above, p. 16

<sup>14</sup> *PH* vi, 102

regiments had not been cleared for ten years and that all payments made to them since 1692 had been on account, the overall balances being carried over to avoid clearing them.<sup>15</sup> Waddell noted that ‘the ultimate effect ... was to conceal an enormous burden of military indebtedness until the war was over’ but, as for the navy in the eighteenth century, this would have permitted the Pay Office to maintain its credit among the bankers and officials on whom it relied for financial support, and to dole out money as necessary to answer urgent demands such as subsistence rather than important but less urgent requirements such as clearings.<sup>16</sup>

The operation of the Pay Office was therefore built in part upon calculated corruption and administrative confusion, for which Ranelagh would have required trusted subordinates. Indeed even its day-to-day operation relied upon this:

Ranelagh claimed in 1702 that

it is neither just nor reasonable to asperse any principal officer for miscarriages, supposed to be committed (nor indeed, though actually committed) by any of his inferior officers, since it cannot be presumed that any principal officer can be always inspecting their proceedings, nor can any Paymaster pretend to judge of the variety of hands which go through his office.<sup>17</sup>

Although admittedly offered in his own defence, it does suggest that even under normal circumstances the paymaster-general ultimately had no means of auditing the performance of his subordinates, and that the Pay Office should ultimately be assessed as an exercise in the creation, maintenance and mobilisation of confidence and mutual trust.

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<sup>15</sup> Ibid. vol. vi, 119-20; Waddell, ‘Administration’, pp. 449-78; Jones, *War and economy* p. 82; *HOP* (1690-1715) iv, 525-6

<sup>16</sup> Waddell, ‘Administration’, pp. 164-6, 235-6; Childs, *William III* pp. 149-52

<sup>17</sup> *PH*, vi, 116

In 1688 the Pay Office consisted largely of experienced and professional figures who had staffed it under Charles Fox in 1685, and were therefore part of this patronage connection. The deputy was Charles Toll, a financier in own right who had risen as a client of Baron Ashburnham, a tory MP and Cofferer of the Royal Household.<sup>18</sup> There also remained Roger Hewett, ‘a man of substance and credit’ who had been cashier to the Pay Office since 1680, and clerk or deputy to William Hewer as treasurer of the English garrison at Tangiers between 1679 and 1683.<sup>19</sup> How Ranelagh successfully incorporated Fox’s officials into his own networks, especially given the competition noted earlier, is unclear, but sociability and conviviality probably helped: Ranelagh joked to George Clarke in March 1691 that ‘Toll hath no time to pursue his usual employments of whoring and drinking’, and in June 1690 that ‘Roger Hewett lay last night in the Round House at Finsbury, being found by the Watch drunk, and with a whore, walking, or rather reeling, thereabouts at two in the morning. So that you see what a virtuous office I have’.<sup>20</sup> These networks were also embedded within the patronage provided by the Royal Hospital in Chelsea, under Ranelagh’s control since 1685: Hewett was appointed Clerk of the Works in 1688, and surveyor of Horse Guards Parade in 1680.<sup>21</sup> A series of formal and informal frameworks therefore served to support the activities of the Pay Office by creating friendship, obligations, and thus mutual trust between those involved.

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<sup>18</sup> Clay, *Public finance* pp. 83, 92, 144-5; John Sainty and R.O. Bucholz, *Officials of the Royal Household, 1660-1837* (London, 1997) i, 155; Waddell, ‘Administration’, pp. 283-4

<sup>19</sup> BL, Add. mss 36418 fos. 137r-138r; CTB viii, 1769; Charles Dean, *The Royal Hospital, Chelsea* (London, 1950) pp. 120, 125; Clay, *Public finance* p. 145

<sup>20</sup> TCD, MS 749 nos. 43, 107, 562

<sup>21</sup> Dean, *Royal Hospital* p. 120

Moreover, even though the Pay Office experienced a fairly rapid turnover of personnel after 1691, new officials continued to be selected through personal connections that would have bolstered trust. Toll had been ‘tormented with the stone’ since August 1690 and died in November 1691, while at some point after September 1692 Hewett ‘fell into a distracted condition and was forced to be put into a madhouse’.<sup>22</sup> Toll’s duties were taken up by Matthew Ingram, who had served the Pay Office as paymaster to the army out-pensioners since 1685, and had been appointed Lieutenant-Governor of the Royal Hospital in January 1692.<sup>23</sup> An intermediate link was probably Ranelagh’s Irish client Ralph Cooke, who had been installed as deputy-treasurer of the Hospital in 1691 and who replaced Ingram in 1692 as paymaster of the out-pensioners.<sup>24</sup> One of the Pay Office clerks in 1692 was the Brian Mortagh: in 1686 he and Cooke had witnessed a land transaction in Ireland for Ranelagh.<sup>25</sup> Mordecai Abbott also left the Irish Pay Office in 1692 to serve as bookkeeper under Ranelagh, and then became his deputy in 1694 after Ingram died.<sup>26</sup> Lord Coningsby, Ranelagh’s colleague and future son-in-law was probably the intermediary, especially given Ranelagh’s solicitation to Coningsby in 1697 ‘to desire your friendship to a concern of my deputy Mr Abbott ... [he is] entirely your servant’.<sup>27</sup> Although Abbott retained his whig connections from Ireland, acting as a London agent to Robert Curtis in 1695 and employing Luke King as his deputy as Receiver-General of Customs in 1699, he also integrated himself into Ranelagh’s networks, acting as agent to Ralph Cooke in 1695.<sup>28</sup> Trust,

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<sup>22</sup> TCD, MS 749 i, 106; vi, 622; vii, 749; PRONI, D638/6/10, Ranelagh to Coningsby, 21/11/1691; TNA, T1/69/52

<sup>23</sup> Dean, *Royal Hospital* pp. 63, 72; Waddell, ‘Administration’, pp. 284-5

<sup>24</sup> Dean, *Royal Hospital* pp. 96, 143

<sup>25</sup> SA, 112/1/12; NRO, Gunning (Horton) Collection, G(H)163

<sup>26</sup> SA, 112/1/62; NLI, MS 2558 fos. 210, 307; Waddell, ‘Administration’, pp. 284-5

<sup>27</sup> Baker Lib., Harvard University, Kress collection, Ranelagh to Coningsby, [undated 1697]

<sup>28</sup> HMC Lords (1694-5) p. 521-5; CTB xvi, 151, 367, 372; CSPD (1695) p. 49; Dean, *Royal Hospital* pp. 79, 127

created through the intermingling of personal or patronage networks, therefore structured the operation of the Pay Office in London.

The same was true of the Pay Office as it was constituted in Flanders after 1689. Between 1689 and 1692 most monies were provided by William Schulenburg, paymaster of the Dutch army in the Low Countries, who raised the money by drawing bills upon the Pay Office in London: the ‘agent’ in Flanders, Roger Sizer, was simply given the task of disbursement.<sup>29</sup> Sizer had been ‘principal clerk’ in the Pay Office in 1682: his father had served in the Royal Household under Charles Toll, who appears to have brokered his introduction.<sup>30</sup> Admittedly the system was not infallible, since Sizer was accused of playing the exchange rates for personal profit and in March 1692 Ranelagh was forced to dismiss him.<sup>31</sup> His replacement was Richard Hill, a former fellow of St John’s College, Cambridge and a moderate tory who had been introduced to Ranelagh via their mutual patron Laurence Hyde, earl of Rochester, the prominent tory politician.<sup>32</sup> Subsequent exchanges of gifts and favours – Hill purchased bay trees in Antwerp for Ranelagh and Ingram, and agreed to assist in selling clothing to the regiments – cemented this partisan connection.<sup>33</sup>

Finally, Hill’s own formal office in Antwerp may have been constructed along similar lines. The second clerk was James Bruce, whom Waddell argues was the son of the Jacobite earl of Ailesbury and went on to become an court tory MP in

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<sup>29</sup> BL, Add. mss 56242 fo. 5r; Jones, *War and economy* p. 83; Waddell, ‘Administration’, pp. 94-104, 116

<sup>30</sup> Sainty and Bucholz, *Royal Household* ii, 147, 155; Edward Chamberlayne and John Chamberlayne, *Angliæ Notitia* (1682) p. 140; CTB ix, 263; Bod. Lib., MS Eng Hist D.146 fos. 169-71, 173, 186

<sup>31</sup> Waddell, ‘Administration’, pp. 287-8; BL, Add. mss 56242 fo. 5r; Bod. Lib., MS Eng Hist D.146 fo. 57; Jones, *War and economy* p. 82

<sup>32</sup> Waddell, ‘Administration’, pp. 285-7; ODNB ‘Hill, Richard (1655/6-1727)’ (2011) and ‘Jones, Richard, earl of Ranelagh (1641-1712)’ (2011)

<sup>33</sup> SA, 112/1/6, 8, 21, 39

1702 and Comptroller of Army Accompts in 1711, although this judgement has not been endorsed by the *History of Parliament* volumes and Bruce's exact identity is therefore uncertain.<sup>34</sup> A greater enigma is Hill's chief clerk Benjamin Sweet, whom Waddell argues was the son of Sir Giles Sweit, the Dean of the Arches.<sup>35</sup> Yet Sir Giles' will mentions no sons, and Sweet later told Hill that his father had been born in Modbury in Devon and brought him up in humble circumstances. One possible connection is that Sweet had cousins named Mary and Isaac Taylor, while Ingram – himself from nearby Bridgewater in Somerset – left a bequest to Captain John Taylor of Westminster and his two (unnamed) daughters in 1694.<sup>36</sup> Nevertheless in almost every other connection between the Pay Office in London and Antwerp and their officials it is possible to discern more strongly an overlapping integrated series of personal connections, which provided the trust necessary to run the office.

### **THE PAY OFFICE AND INFORMAL CONNECTIONS**

The importance of trust and personal obligation, and the structuring of relationships around its cultivation, can also be seen in the relations of the Pay Office with the outside world. As in Ireland, fluctuations in supply risked starving the army of money. In May 1695 for example Ranelagh wrote that regular payment 'is certainly necessary to the keeping them in good order', while the previous year Hill had complained to Blathwayt that the ban on drawing bills on London, which had choked off an important avenue for supplementary credit, 'has almost broke my

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<sup>34</sup> Waddell, 'Administration', p. 288; *HOP* (1690-1715) iii, 369

<sup>35</sup> Waddell, 'Administration', p. 288; BL, Add. mss 62526 fo. 106r; HL, ST58 xii, 119; TNA, PROB 11/340 (Sweit, Sir Gilbert)

<sup>36</sup> TNA, PROB 11/419 (Ingram, Matthew) and 11/736 (Swete, Benjamin), and below p. 206-7

heart, or my brain ... 14 days hence we shall have almost 50,000 men in a starving here in a country where we have not credit for a turnip.<sup>37</sup>

In order to avoid this Ranelagh ultimately resorted to private credit, including his own. Thus he 'prevailed' with the government's chief remitter, Sir Joseph Herne, in September 1692 to provide a further sum for the Hanover troops, 'and for this sum I have been forced to engage my own security ... I am still at stake for the remaining five and thirty thousand, not knowing when Their Lordships will clear it'.<sup>38</sup> The following year he secured bills discharging £6,000 in forage debts, 'with which I have pawned my credit to Sir Joseph Herne'.<sup>39</sup> He also noted in June 1696 that he had accepted all the bills drawn on him,

as [I am] in duty bound ... and by my acceptance I am liable to pay every farthing of those bills, or to be arrested and my goods seized for not doing it ... I have engaged my own credit and furnished all that possibly I could get together to support Mr Hill's credit abroad.<sup>40</sup>

Of even greater importance was that he was occasionally able to convince others to advance their own money. As gaps opened up in 1693 the remittance contractor Sir Joseph Herne was persuaded to extend £6,000 for the use of the hospitals and 20,000 rx for the Hanover subsidy.<sup>41</sup> By June 1694 Herne and his partners had advanced nearly £45,000, and although Ranelagh reported that they 'protest solemnly to me they dare not draw any more bills', he also said that he had 'prevailed with Sir Joseph to promise to give me bills on Friday'.<sup>42</sup> Through force

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<sup>37</sup> Bod. Lib., MS Eng Hist D.146 fos. 27, 69-71, 143, 149-51, 209-13; BL, Add. mss 56242 fo. 50r; BL, Add. mss 56241 fos. 25r, 31r

<sup>38</sup> BL, Add. mss 56242 fo. 15r; SA, 112/1/8; Waddell, 'Administration', pp. 104-31

<sup>39</sup> BL, Add. mss 56242 fos. 21-5; Waddell, 'Administration', p. 149

<sup>40</sup> Baker Lib., Kress coll., Ranelagh to Blathwayt, 30/6/1696; SA, 112/1/536

<sup>41</sup> SA, 112/1/63-5

<sup>42</sup> BL, Add. mss 56242 fos. 27r, 31r, 33v

of personality and private negotiations Ranelagh was therefore able to increase levels of liquidity within the Pay Office.

Of equal importance was that the acceptance and payment of the bills the Pay Office sent or received was not a mechanical process, but a private transaction between the office and individual bankers and merchants, leaving room for negotiation and private influence.<sup>43</sup> For instance, the correspondents could chose in what form they accepted payment: Abbott wrote to Hill in March 1696, at the height of the Recoinage Crisis, that

you cannot imagine the perplexity we have been and are still in here about our coin, and the difficulties all people find in paying foreign bills, all refuses [sic] to take the clipped money and we have little else yet passing and guineas continue a dead stock. Some will receive payments in foreign bills only in the Bank of England notes, others will not meddle with them but demand [notes on] the Orphan's Fund<sup>44</sup>, and there are others will take neither but must have some particular goldsmith's notes, of all these sorts I have had to do with in the payment of your bills, and it has cost me all this day (as it has done several before) to find out way to humour 'em all.<sup>45</sup>

Correspondents might therefore choose to wait until suitable payment emerged, neither protesting nor encashing their bills, and thereby allowing the Pay Office a respite: Abbott noted in the same month that Jacob de Connick's correspondent in London had refused to accept anything but new coinage or Bank of England notes for a bill that Hill had drawn, 'and chose rather to stay than to take any payment I could make him'.<sup>46</sup> Because the exercise of personal judgement and individual discretion was key to the system, it was therefore open to influence, and the overall

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<sup>43</sup> Anderson, 'Money', pp. 91-3; B. L. Anderson, 'The Lancashire bill system and its Liverpool practitioners: the case of a slave merchant', in William Henry Chaloner and B. M. Ratcliffe (eds.), *Trade and transport: essays in economic history in honour of TS Willan* (Manchester, 1978) pp. 62-80

<sup>44</sup> Doolittle, 'Orphans', pp. 55-9

<sup>45</sup> SA, 112/1/522

<sup>46</sup> SA, 112/1/522; SA, (Attingham mss) 112/1A fo. 156

effectiveness of the Pay Office was advanced where its staff could create and exploit the informal leverage created by trust, character and mutual connections. Several months later, for instance, Abbott apologised to Hill that ‘I have been this day hunting out the several persons in whose hands your bills are, and using the best rhetoric I could to prevent their return’, although in the end it also required a loan of £6,000 ‘in good milled money’ from Solomon de Medina to prevent the bills being protested.<sup>47</sup>

Even Exchequer bills were subject to the same forces. Essentially negotiable, interest-bearing fiduciary instruments secured on the general credit of the Exchequer, their success or survival is usually linked with support from Charles Montagu, Chancellor of the Exchequer and a member of the whig Junto, who insisted that they not be subject to individual discounting but only be issued at par in order to keep up their value.<sup>48</sup> Yet in May 1697 Ranelagh complained that no-one would accept Exchequer notes, ‘so that we are now forced to try all manner of ways to turn those bills of the Exchequer into money, which we shall not be able to do without a considerable loss’.<sup>49</sup> In order to encourage acceptance, private profit was incorporated rather than overridden: in June 1697 £20,000 of Exchequer bills were issued to repay cash lent in Amsterdam by the mercantile house of Messrs George and Isaac Clifford. Ranelagh noted that

I have a private direction from their Lordships to let Mr Hill know (which already I have done) that whatsoever losses Clifford shall sustain by taking Exchequer notes for that sum shall be paid him by the said bill, by way of a contingent charge. But this must be kept as a great secret for should it take

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<sup>47</sup> SA, 112/1/534-5, 538; Baker Lib., Kress coll., Ranelagh to Blathwayt, 24/7/1696; BL, Add. mss 9730 fos. 63r-64r

<sup>48</sup> Dickson, *Financial Revolution* pp. 365-73; Horwitz, *Parliament, policy and politics* pp. 180-1

<sup>49</sup> Baker Lib., Kress coll., Ranelagh to Blathwayt, [May 1697] (dated by Ranelagh's reference to the recent subscription for Exchequer bills); Waddell, ‘Administration’, pp. 161-2

air we must prepare to allow a discount for all Exchequer notes, when distributed to any part of the service, then which nothing can be more fatal, especially at a time when we are labouring all we can to make our bills equal to money, which certainly in real value they are.<sup>50</sup>

In September, a consortium of remitters were similarly given a two percent allowance for accepting the notes, while Ranelagh noted to Blathwayt that he had ‘prevailed’ with the Treasury and various remitters to allow or accept the bills.<sup>51</sup>

## PERSONAL NETWORKS

The effectiveness of the army and its financial support in Flanders therefore depended, as it had in Ireland but to a far greater extent, upon the strength and scope of a variety of intersecting and interlocking personal networks that knitted together various parts of the administration and civil society both in Britain and overseas. Thus, the effectiveness of the Pay Office, as a source of credit and financial intermediation, depended not only upon the strength of its own internal linkages, but also upon the breadth and depth of the trusted connections that could be formed with other parts of the state, as well as with the bankers, financiers and remittance-contractors whose forbearance and assistance was vital to the coordination of public and private credit, and thus the wider liquidity or solvency of the office. Ultimately, the weakness of several key connections limited the scope of either Ranelagh or his staff to intervene most effectively to maintain the flow of money to the army.

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<sup>50</sup> Baker Lib., Kress coll., Ranelagh to Blathwayt, 1/6/1697; CTB xii, 33

<sup>51</sup> Bein. Lib., Osborn mss 31, Box 1, Folder 4, Bateman to Hill, 30/9/1697; CTB xii, 83; Bein. Lib., Osborn mss 31, Box 1, Folder 6, Bateman to Hill, 23/9/1697; Baker Lib., Kress coll. Ranelagh to Blathwayt, 17/8/1697, 27/8/1697, 31/8/1697 (The first letter has been dated by a reference to CTB xii, 72-3, the second by CTB xii, 74-5)

On the one hand there were close connections between Pay Office staff and key remittance contractors. In 1697 Ranelagh called Sir Joseph Herne ‘my good friend’ and as a favour to him lobbied Blathwayt to secure some £2,000 Herne was owed, while as early as April 1692 Ingram remarked to Hill that ‘Sir Jos[eph] Herne gives you his service, and thanks to you for your being his champion’.<sup>52</sup> This may have been closely linked to Herne’s visibly tory loyalties, as an alderman, MP and financial investor.<sup>53</sup> Mordecai Abbott appears to have acted as a financier in his own right, founding and investing in the Million Bank in 1693 and the Lincoln’s Inn (Land) Bank in 1695, both of which were popularly seen as whig ventures to support the public credit.<sup>54</sup> In 1697 he helped organise the subscription for circulating the Exchequer bills, also in effect a whig project, and was elected a trustee by popular acclaim. In March 1696 during the Recoinage Crisis he supported the arguments of the Bank of England and whig notables such as John Locke, ‘who I think are in the right’, that Parliament should reduce the official price of gold guineas and restore the silver coinage so that its specie value once again matched the face values.<sup>55</sup> The issue was primarily a partisan one, with tory pamphleteers and a number of government officials favouring a formal devaluation of the silver coinage instead to match its specie value: that Abbott was prepared to cast his lot so visibly with the whig side of the debate is strongly indicative of the

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<sup>52</sup> Baker Lib., Kress coll., Ranelagh to Blathwayt, 15/6/1697; SA, 112/1/4, 27

<sup>53</sup> *HOP* (1690-1715) iv, 343-6; Woodhead (ed.), *Rulers of London* pp. 88-9; Waddell, ‘Administration’, pp. 289-94

<sup>54</sup> CTB xii, 143; *HOP* (1690-1715) iii, 132; Dickson, *Financial Revolution* pp. 6, 52, 270, 366; Kleer, “Fictitious Cash”, pp. 70-103; Waddell, ‘Administration’, pp. 167-8; de Krey, *Fractured society* pp. 109-11, 125-30; TNA, T1/73/37

<sup>55</sup> SA, 112/1/518; Dickson, *Financial Revolution* p. 349; Horwitz, *Parliament, policy and politics* pp. 159-69, 176-88, 205-9; Jones, *War and economy* pp. 21-6, 235-47

partisan-political and -financial connections which he could and no doubt did employ in service of the Pay Office.<sup>56</sup>

A study of Ranelagh's cash-books for the years between 1685 and 1691 even suggests that his first deputy Charles Toll enjoyed a closer and more direct relationship with financial markets, acting in a manner akin to Sir Stephen Fox during the 'Great Undertaking' before 1679, and using his own resources and connections to advance money to the army in return for a percentage of the total. The cash-books show a series of 'profits', at least £2,369, being paid to Toll in May and June 1685 at the same time as the army deployed to counter the duke of Monmouth's invasion.<sup>57</sup> In 1688, as news reached England of the Prince of Orange's invasion force, the payment of 'profits' resumed. Toll received only £256 between 19 July and 4 October as the army slowly mobilised, but as it entered the field the 'profits' paid to him increased enormously, with £10,916 being paid over between 4 October and 8 December, when James II's army collapsed.<sup>58</sup> In 1689 some £22,680 more was paid, and a further £14,755 between January and June 1690, suggesting an upward trajectory consistent with the growing size of Britain's armed forces. Being cash-books rather than ledgers these accounts do not indicate the purpose of these payments, but they cannot be matched with any Treasury orders, and thus one likely inference is that they represent payments made to Toll in return for money he had advanced to the army to bridge the gap between its needs and inadequate Treasury payments. Thus, although both Waddell and Clay argue

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<sup>56</sup> BL, Add. mss 56241 fo. 72r; *HOP* (1690-1715), i, 402, 422, 449-50; Montagu thought that the (tory) Land Bank were deliberately pushing to keep the rate of guineas high: BL, Add. mss 34355 fo. 2v

<sup>57</sup> DHC, Fox-Strangeways MSS, D/FSI Box 278 ('Profit' is the term used by the cash-books for all payments under miscellaneous heads, such as poundage or Exchequer fees)

<sup>58</sup> *Ibid.* vol. iii. For mobilisation, see John Childs, *The army, James II, and the Glorious Revolution* (Manchester, 1980) pp. 168-202; Pincus, *1688* pp. 224-53

that the Pay Office did not engage in informal intermediation after 1685, until at least June 1690 Toll had probably fulfilled exactly this function, fusing his financial networks with those of the office and exploiting his official position as security for his informal lending in the fashion predicted by G.O. Nichols.<sup>59</sup>

The death of Toll in 1691 would therefore have posed a particular problem, since by this date Ranelagh lacked the private resources and connections to support the army in a similar fashion, and which had underpinned his own ‘Undertaking’ in Ireland during the 1670s. Christopher Clay argues that by the 1670s Fox had an income of some £20,000 per annum and immense personal wealth, which could be lent directly to the army or else used to pay interest on the money he borrowed.<sup>60</sup> By contrast, although Childs wrote that ‘we can only imagine what fantastic sums Ranelagh awarded himself from the poundage on over two million pounds a year’, his income was rather more modest: in 1692 he turned down a salary worth over £10,000 a year ‘to avoid all objection which either the Commission of Accounts or my brethren of the House of Commons may make against so large a donative’ and accepted only half.<sup>61</sup> He also had a pension of £300 on the Irish establishment, and in 1691 the profits of his Irish estates were estimated at £3,000 per annum, despite his later claims that he had lost rents worth £12,000 due to the Jacobite wars.<sup>62</sup> Thus his income was probably around £8,000 per annum, and he admitted to the

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<sup>59</sup> Waddell, ‘Administration’, pp. 93-4, 495; Clay, *Public finance* pp. 108-10, 127-30; Nichols, ‘Intermediaries’, pp. 41-2

<sup>60</sup> Clay, *Public finance* pp. 38, 71-2, 77-8, 100-1, 107, 164, 188-97

<sup>61</sup> BL, Add. mss 9735 fos. 89r-v; Childs, *William III* pp. 139-40; *HOP* (1690-1715) iv, 521, 525. By comparison, Guy Rowlands concludes that French *tresoriers-generaux* enjoyed total salaries of some 2,000,000 livres or £15,000 per annum, albeit from a much higher volume of business: Rowlands, *Dynastic state* p. 133

<sup>62</sup> Walter Harris, *Remarks on the affairs and trade of England and Ireland* (London, 1691) p. 23; SA, 112/1/53; BL, Add. mss 56242 fos. 19r, 21r; Baker Lib., Kress coll., Ranelagh to Blathwayt, 26/5/1696, 9/6/1696, 10/7/1696, [undated 1697], 26/10/1697; Blathwayt to Ranelagh, [undated 1697]; *PH* vi, 117-8

commissioners of accounts in 1702 ‘he was never yet in a condition to lend money ... his folly having always led him to spend his income’ and in 1696 to Blathwayt that he had ‘not only spent the little ready money I had but I have also run myself into a considerable debt’.<sup>63</sup> Although obviously Ranelagh had a vested interest in exaggerating his distress, these repeated requests seem to suggest that he lacked the solid financial base that Sir Stephen Fox had employed in the past to subsist a far smaller army.

Furthermore by 1691 Ranelagh also increasingly lacked the broad-based links with financial markets necessary to secure credit for such a venture. During the Irish Undertaking in the 1670s he had relied upon a number of English financiers such as John Bence and his brother Sir Alexander, George Dashwood, Robert Huntingdon and Richard Kingdon, no doubt drawing upon their tangled web of political contacts and connections with London financial markets and the large cash reserves to which, as farmers of the English customs and excise revenues, they had access.<sup>64</sup> For example, Sir John Champante, appointed the deputy vice-treasurer of Ireland under Ranelagh in 1671, ‘agreed with several persons residing in London ... for the advance and loan of several sums of money’ at ten percent interest.<sup>65</sup> Yet by 1691 this was a broken reed, since Ranelagh had fallen out with Champante and most of the other financiers were dead: Sir Alexander Bence in 1676, John Bence in 1688, Richard Kingdon in 1675, Robert Huntingdon in 1684 and George Dashwood in

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<sup>63</sup> *PH* vi, 119; Baker Lib., Kress coll., Ranelagh to Blathwayt, 26/5/1696, 10/7/1696

<sup>64</sup> Egan, ‘Finance, 1660-85’, i, 241-3; ii, 6-11, 49; Woodhead (ed.), *Rulers of London* p. 29; Chandaman, *Public Revenue* pp. 63-9, 73; Clay, *Public finance* pp. 94-7, 103-8; *HOP* (1660-1690) i, 166-7, 369-70, 619-20; Nichols, ‘Intermediaries’, pp. 29-30; Aylmer, *Crown's Servants* pp. 166-7

<sup>65</sup> HMC Lords (1689-90) p. p. 440

1691.<sup>66</sup> His relations with the Bank of England, who took over as remitters between 1694 and 1696, were poor, reducing the likelihood of smooth cooperation and informal accommodation.<sup>67</sup> In September 1696 he branded their petition for £170,000 lost in remittances ‘very unreasonable and extravagant’, and noted to Blathwayt that he would no doubt ‘be represented by the gentlemen of the Bank as an opponent of their demands’.<sup>68</sup> His informal influence therefore appears to have been limited: in March 1695 Abbott assured Hill that although Ranelagh had convinced the Bank to pay bills worth £97,764 in a lump sum rather than instalments, ‘I assure you my Lord could do no more than he has done’.<sup>69</sup> After 1691 he and his office therefore appear to have lacked the extensive financial networks or resources to allow full-scale informal intermediation, leaving the Pay Office – like any other illiquid business – largely unable to cushion any financial shocks with private credit. However, most of his papers and accounts having failed to survive, it is impossible to place this conclusion upon firmer foundations.

Finally, Ranelagh’s position vis-à-vis the other agencies of the British fiscal-military state declined after 1692, as personal and political bonds weakened, and where these were absent the effectiveness of the Pay Office appears to have suffered accordingly. Although never guilty of an ideological commitment to anyone other than himself, by 1689 Ranelagh was tarred almost irrevocably as a court tory, not least because he had discomfited the king in February 1689 by voting with other tories that James II had not abdicated and that the British throne was therefore not

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<sup>66</sup> TNA, PROB 11/405 (Dashwood, Samuel); Arthur Edward Vicars, *Index to the prerogative wills of Ireland, 1536-1810* (Dublin, 1897) pp. 13, 127

<sup>67</sup> Waddell, ‘Administration’, pp. 131-63; Jones, *War and economy* pp. 83-90; Clapham, *Bank* i, 26-9

<sup>68</sup> Baker Lib., Kress coll., Ranelagh to Blathwayt, 8/9/1696. For Ranelagh’s report, see the copy in BEA, M5/13 (‘Earl of Ranelagh’s Report, 1696’)

<sup>69</sup> SA, 112/1/482

vacant.<sup>70</sup> He therefore lacked the trust and firm royal support that he had received from Charles II during the ‘Undertaking’ in Ireland, as well as close connections with the whig politicians who came to dominate British political life after 1694, especially the whig Junto and its members such as Charles Montagu as Chancellor of the Exchequer. The power of his tory patrons such as Carmarthen, Rochester – ‘[of] whose great friendship to me I have had a long and constant experience’ – and Sir Edward Seymour was likewise in decline: all were increasingly excluded from power after 1694 by the prominence of the whig Junto and the fissures developing between the court and country wings of the tory party.<sup>71</sup>

This does not mean that Ranelagh was without allies. The cooperation of William Blathwayt, secretary at war and secretary of state to the king on campaign, was key, notwithstanding his disclaimer to Hill that he was ‘only an assistant in these matters which you [and Ranelagh] are to adjust’.<sup>72</sup> Recent studies have challenged the idea that he was a mere political cipher, arguing that he was an ‘instinctive tory’ with ‘strong tory political connections’, which may have helped promote cooperation in the 1690s, although it is also concluded that ‘once released from his strict obligations to the Court [in 1704] he began to behave in key issues more as a Whig than as a Tory’.<sup>73</sup> Ranelagh’s relationship with Blathwayt was probably bolstered by shared administrative experience under James II as well as by friendship and the obligations created by gift exchange. In March 1692, for example, Ranelagh told

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<sup>70</sup> Horwitz, *Parliament, policy and politics* p. 67; *HOP* (1660-1690) ii, 661-3; *HOP* (1690-1715) iv, 520-5

<sup>71</sup> Horwitz, *Parliament, policy and politics* pp. 143-270; Holmes, *Politics* pp. 138-9; *HOP* (1690-1715) v, 409-25

<sup>72</sup> BL, Add. mss 9730 fo. 2v; Gertrude Ann Jacobsen, *William Blathwayt: a late seventeenth century English administrator* (Oxford, 1932) pp. 203-95; Waddell, ‘Administration’, pp. 209-21; Childs, *William III* pp. 164-7

<sup>73</sup> Stephen Saunders Webb, ‘William Blathwayt, Imperial Fixer: muddling through to empire, 1689-1717 (pt. ii)’, *William and Mary Quarterly*, 3rd ser, 26 (1969) pp. 377-80; Jacobsen, *Blathwayt* pp. 34, 51-9, 400-21, 469-81; *HOP* (1690-1715) iii, 235-42

Blathwayt good-naturedly that by setting aside the a number of fees ‘you have bribed me ... to serve you to the best of my power in that capacity’.<sup>74</sup> Political partisanship generated strong links elsewhere, such as with George Clarke, who had returned from Ireland late in 1691 to act as Blathwayt’s deputy in London.<sup>75</sup> A mutual friend of Ranelagh, Toll and Clarke was David Crawford, deputy-commissary of the musters.<sup>76</sup> Through Clarke, Ranelagh also had links with the tory officials Israel Feilding and John Murray, who ran the commissariat created for the Duke of Leinster’s expedition to Flanders in 1692 and 1693 and whose cooperation was likewise necessary in the settlement of affairs.<sup>77</sup>

Moreover, certain linkages remained that crossed party boundaries. Ranelagh was close to Thomas Coningsby, now Baron Coningsby and Vice-Treasurer of Ireland, although relations suffered after 1698 when Coningsby clandestinely married Ranelagh’s daughter.<sup>78</sup> Ranelagh also noted with regret in June 1691 that ‘my good friend Will Jephson [Secretary to the Treasury] died a week ago’.<sup>79</sup> This may have been as much of a blow as Toll’s death, given the crucial importance of close cooperation from the Treasury. Ranelagh already lacked influence with key figures such as the earl of Portland, William III’s favourite<sup>80</sup>, while relations with Charles Montagu were also probably bad, since as a member of the Junto Montagu had

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<sup>74</sup> BL, Add. mss 56242 fo. 5r

<sup>75</sup> TCD, MS 749 i, 104, 107; ii, 132, 134, 249; HMC Leyborne-Popham fos. 268-9; Waddell, ‘Administration’, pp. 221-30

<sup>76</sup> TCD, MS 749 i, 45, 104, 107; v, 562; Waddell, ‘Administration’, pp. 280-1; Dean, *Royal Hospital* p. 132; BL, Add. mss 56242 fo. 42r

<sup>77</sup> CTB x, 1712, 1714; xi, 76; CSPD (1692), 172, 198, 230, 271; BL, Add. mss 9732 fos. 65r, 130r; TNA, T1/24/60

<sup>78</sup> *HOP* (1690-1715) iv, 523. See also their correspondence in PRONI, D638/6/1-20

<sup>79</sup> TCD, MS 749 vii, 749; Dean, *Royal Hospital* pp. 113-6; *HOP* (1690-1715) vol. iv, 501

<sup>80</sup> David Onnekink, *The Anglo-Dutch favourite: the career of Hans Willem Bentinck, 1st Earl of Portland (1649-1709)* (Aldershot, 2007) pp. 147-74; Waddell, ‘Administration’, pp. 203-8

clashed repeatedly with Ranelagh's tory allies.<sup>81</sup> As noted in the previous chapter, Ranelagh and Sir Stephen Fox had similarly clashed in 1679 when Fox had contrived to have Ranelagh's clients removed from the Pay Office. Perhaps the only major figure on the Treasury Board with whom Ranelagh had good relations was with the court tory Sidney, Lord Godolphin 'whose kindness to me for several years I can never forget' he wrote in 1712, though adding that 'I cannot much brag of it of late years'.<sup>82</sup> Consequently the general tenor of his relations with the Treasury appears to have been poor: in May 1693 Ranelagh asked Blathwayt that warrants for his private arrears be signed by the king rather than go through the Treasury, 'which I would willingly avoid, since I am not sure of good usage there, though my pretence be never so just'.<sup>83</sup> In June 1696, Hill was put to a considerable amount of inconvenience after the Pay Office failed to inform him of a large remittance shortly to be made by the Bank of England, and he told Blathwayt that he suspected this was because they in turn had not been informed of these negotiations by the Treasury.<sup>84</sup>

## **PAY OFFICE IN FLANDERS**

Thus, alongside a creaking and largely obsolete network of financial contacts, Ranelagh appears to have suffered by 1692 from certain failures of cooperation from key organs of the fiscal-military state, as well as a more general decline in his political standing that would have reduced his ability to plead the case of the Pay Office with the Treasury. The result was that he was unable, by financial or

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<sup>81</sup> *HOP* (1690-1715) iv, 850-67; Horwitz, *Parliament, policy and politics* pp. 143-270

<sup>82</sup> TNA, PROB 11/527 (Jones, Richard, earl of Ranelagh)

<sup>83</sup> BL, Add. mss 56242 fo. 21r; Waddell, 'Administration', p. 231

<sup>84</sup> BL, Add. mss 9730 fo. 57v

political means, to cushion the increasingly severe shocks to which the office was more and more subject, and which prevented his deputy-paymaster in Antwerp, Richard Hill, from being provided with the means to supply the army with the money it required. Hill's letters and papers suggest that he overcame some of the problems this posed by constructing a series of personalised connections which allowed access to alternative sources of credit, and compensated to some extent for their absence in London. The following section will argue that the effectiveness with which this was done ultimately rested upon cooperation and mutual trust between these networks, and thus the cultivation of personal obligations and connections.

One series of networks were those surrounding contractors such as Machado & Pereira, who successfully provided bread, biscuit, forage and other provisions in Flanders by virtue of their own credit networks and private contacts.<sup>85</sup> As Hill noted to Blathwayt in February 1694, the contractors

have *commis* [clerks], and servants in every town already as they furnish the troops everywhere with bread, and for the same reason have credit everywhere ... [and therefore] I am persuaded these men could serve the king much cheaper and better and yet get more by their bargain than an angel of light can, who comes from England, and will be a stranger here.<sup>86</sup>

Accounts show that Machado and Pereira provided at least £58,500 in coin to Hill in Antwerp between 1692 and 1697 in return for his bills on London, helping to inject cash into what might otherwise have been a heavily illiquid financial

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<sup>85</sup> Van Nimwegen, *Dutch army* pp. 369-72; Waddell, 'Administration', pp. 400-8; Childs, *William III* pp. 249-50; Israel, *European Jewry* pp. 127-31; Childs, *Nine Years War* pp. 52-5

<sup>86</sup> Bod. Lib., MS Eng Hist D.146 fos. 6-7

operation.<sup>87</sup> Accounts show that their London agent Solomon de Medina likewise provided the Pay Office with bills on Amsterdam and Antwerp worth some £74,500 between 1692 and 1697, while in March 1697 he estimated that he was owed £50,000 for money advanced for the use of the army and had lost a further £23,000 by accepting discounted tallies.<sup>88</sup> Abbott noted to Hill in 1695 that without Medina's help 'we must have been at a full stop'.<sup>89</sup> The accounts also show that all of these bills were drawn upon a series of conspicuously Sephardi networks – including his own relations – demonstrating that the existence and operation of a series of personal connections – reinforced, as historians have stressed, through cultural and kinship obligations – was of material assistance to the effectiveness of the fiscal-military state.<sup>90</sup>

Indeed, the interaction between the British state and Jewish networks resembles the 'cross-cultural' commerce identified by Francesca Trivellato and others and noted in the introduction, and their conclusions that gifts and a 'good correspondence' helped reinforce obligations and trust provides some clues to how these networks were persuaded to interact so heavily and effectively in the absence of communal or cultural sanctions. For instance, in 1694 Ranelagh heard that Hill was 'not so friendly to them as you might', and requested that 'where you can justly befriend them in anything without prejudice to the King's affairs you would do it'.<sup>91</sup> He made this point explicitly to Blathwayt in 1696, asking that the Pay Office be

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<sup>87</sup> SA, 112/1A fos. 52, 134, 174, 147, 156, 179, 213, 251, 252; Bod. Lib., MS Eng Hist D.146 fos. 149-51

<sup>88</sup> BL, Add. mss 56242 fo. 3r; SA, 112/1/28, 39, 47, 48, 465, 466; SA, 112/1A fos. 31, 34-6, 87, 118, 125, 127, 13-8, 143, 145, 201, 273, 300, 310; Oskar K. Rabinowicz, Judith K. Tapiero, and Theodore K. Rabb, *Sir Solomon de Medina* (London, 1974) pp. 28-32

<sup>89</sup> SA, 112/1/486

<sup>90</sup> Rabinowicz, Tapiero, and Rabb, *Sir Solomon de Medina* pp. 33-4, 82-3

<sup>91</sup> SA, 112/1/466, 502

authorised to pay off some arrears ‘for certainly them who are willing to assist us in our present distress ought to be encouraged in their so doing’.<sup>92</sup> Some of this assistance strayed dangerously close to corruption, as in 1694 and 1696 when Ranelagh and William III asked that the contractors’ more expensive tender for the winter bread be accepted to enable them to make up their losses from the summer contract.<sup>93</sup> Yet such actions, it appears, need to be understood in their broader context, as part of a delicate web of informal obligation that enabled Ranelagh and the Pay Office to tap otherwise inaccessible sources of credit and to engage in cross-cultural financial intermediation for the support of the army.

As in Ireland, working capital in Flanders was also sourced from officials and officers. For instance the king’s Master of Horse, Hendrik, count of Nassau and Lord Ouwerkerk or d’Auverquerque, was charged in 1693 and 1696 with contracting for forage magazines in Zealand: he not only wrote to friends there for credit but offered to pawn his plate.<sup>94</sup> Minor officials offered smaller sums, as did individual officers and regimental agents in London and Flanders: many of these agents were state officials or financiers in their own right with access to private credit.<sup>95</sup> For example, early in 1693 the duke of Argyll agreed to take on the entire debt of his regiment in return for receiving a one-time payment of £4,000 in weekly instalments: Ranelagh had secured the sum by borrowing money from the London goldsmith Mr Fownes, ‘upon my assuring the said Fownes’, he told Blathwayt, ‘that

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<sup>92</sup> Baker Lib., Kress coll., Ranelagh to Blathwayt, 24/7/1696

<sup>93</sup> BL, Add. mss 56241 fos. 96v, 98r, 102r, 108r; BL, Add. mss 56242 fo. 48r; BL, Add. mss 9730 fos. 77r-78r, 79v, 81r-82r, 93r-94v

<sup>94</sup> BL, Add. mss 9730 fos. 7v, 20r, 22v; BL, Add. mss 56241 fos. 7r-v, 60v; Waddell, ‘Administration’, p. 180; ODNB ‘Nassau van Ouwerkerk, Hendrik van (1640-1708)’ (2011)

<sup>95</sup> Childs, *William III* pp. 140-3; BL, Add. mss 56241 fos. 19r, 60r-v, 63r-v; Waddell, ‘Administration’, pp. 258-68

I did verily believe the said weekly payments would be punctually complied with'.<sup>96</sup> Given that this wiped out a larger mass of accumulated debt by transferring it all to Argyll, Ranelagh therefore asked that the king order the Treasury to continue this payment, 'I being engaged in honour to solicit the performance of an agreement ... which if not performed will keep that regiment still on this side'. Personal honour and reputation, and mutual obligation and trust, therefore formed the cement of informal connections between officers, officials and independent creditors that underpinned effective finance.

Finally, Richard Hill appears to have employed his own private credit and personal connections to engage in informal financial intermediation, albeit upon a smaller scale than Fox, Ranelagh or Toll. In January 1696, for instance, he lent 24,000 *rx* to the Danish forces from his own pocket.<sup>97</sup> He also attempted to make the most effective use of the money he was lent: in 1692 he had held in his hands some 150,000 *fl* lent by Schulenburg but told Blathwayt that

to say a truth I am not willing to part with this same yet. My bills always come late ... [and] are not money in 10 or 20 days ... it is therefore a greater security to have this stock and I think it is very much for the King's service. His Majesty can hang me when he will if there wants one farthing of his money, and he shall hang me too if ever I make a farthing advantage of it, by lending or advancing it to anybody. But I shall use it very often this winter to answer the necessities of the troops, which I cannot otherwise do, let my Lord Ranelagh and Sir Joseph Herne do what they can, for the *banquiers* and [?chaser] here will always be behind with me, and I see not how it can be avoided. 'Tis no great loss to His Majesty to leave this 150,000 *fl* in my hands, so long as they are employed for his service, and Mr Schulenburg will lose nothing by it I believe.<sup>98</sup>

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<sup>96</sup> BL, Add. mss 56242 fo. 9r

<sup>97</sup> BL, Add. mss 9730 fos. 10r, 15v-16r; Bod. Lib., MS Eng Hist D.146 fos. 22-3

<sup>98</sup> Bod. Lib., MS Eng Hist D.146 fo. 27

As noted above, he also mingled funds upon his own initiative in order to answer the most vital services and maintain wider cooperation, advancing 30,000 fl to the forage contractors in October 1696, ‘without which the King ... would have no Horse’, and 20,000 fl to Machado ‘for a peace offering’.<sup>99</sup> Having already begun to issue promissory notes to regiments for money held in his hands, in 1695 he also proved them with notes or assignments upon anticipated revenues, in effect a form of short-term borrowing similar to that used in Ireland.<sup>100</sup> In July 1695 for example Blathwayt told Hill if he had insufficient ready money for the Hessian subsistence, ‘the next best thing is giving the Landgrave assignments payable as soon as may be, with which ... they have promised me to be satisfied’.<sup>101</sup>

Of equal importance was the role of private networks and connections in cushioning potential delays or shortfalls in remittances, especially where Hill received bills drawn at long usance: Ranelagh worried for instance in May 1695 that the bills the Bank of England had provided Hill were at excessive usance, and

how he will turn the papers I send him into actual money I cannot tell, sure I am if he doth not the forces there must sufficiently suffer, for instead of being in advance (which is certainly necessary to the keeping them in good order) they will be in arrears more than ever they were.<sup>102</sup>

In the commercial world – especially in the Atlantic slave trade, where bills might circulate at usance of months or even years – the solution adopted was to ‘discount’ such bills, selling them at a discount to a commercial or financial firm of greater

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<sup>99</sup> BL, Add. mss 9730 fos. 75r-76r

<sup>100</sup> Ibid. fos. 1-9; BL, Add. mss 56241 fos. 1r, 39-45; Bod. Lib., MS Eng Hist D.146 fos. 65, 69-71, 75, 169-77, 181-2, 185-7

<sup>101</sup> BL, Add. mss 56241 fo. 39r

<sup>102</sup> BL, Add. mss 56242 fo. 50r; SA, 112/1/465, 487; Waddell, ‘Administration’, pp. 137, 146

liquidity who was prepared to wait until the bills matured.<sup>103</sup> In Britain the Bank of England and Bank of Scotland provided this service<sup>104</sup>, but in the Low Countries this was largely in the hands of individual bankers, requiring Hill to cultivate strong linkages with local financial and commercial networks in order to discount such bills, and at low rates. Unable in 1694 to encash bills he had drawn on Ranelagh, he was forced to distribute them to the Hanoverian troops, presumably at such a heavy discount that ‘to sweeten the dose I paid ‘em what we owed for the forage ... this I paid ‘em in ready money, God help me’.<sup>105</sup>

However Hill’s accounts suggest that, at least between March 1695 and December 1697, he had more success, and was able to discount bills cheaply: they show that bills worth just under 7.4 million fl or £740,000 were discounted at 1 or 1¼ percent, around a third of the £2.2 million remitted to him in bills during this period, and a quarter of the £3 million that passed through his hands in total.<sup>106</sup> The official accounts also show that between March 1695 and November 1696 Hill borrowed 896,166 fl or roughly £80,000, mainly from the banker Jacob de Connick in Antwerp at a rate of interest of ½ percent per month, which could also have been used to anticipate delayed remittances and maintain the solvency of the army.<sup>107</sup> Indeed, these figures may only represent a lower bound, since they fail to include private borrowing or discounting which occurred off the books, or the forbearance

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<sup>103</sup> Jacob M. Price, ‘Credit in the slave trade and plantation economies’, in B. Solow (ed.), *Slavery and the rise of the Atlantic system* (Cambridge, 1991) pp. 316-9; Kenneth Morgan, ‘Remittance procedures in the eighteenth-century British slave trade’, *Business History Review*, 79 (2005) pp. 715-49; Anderson, ‘The Lancashire bill system and its Liverpool practitioners: the case of a slave merchant’, pp. 59-97; Yogeve, *Diamonds and coral* pp. 193-7; Kaplan, *Rothschild* pp. 99-105

<sup>104</sup> Clapham, *Bank* i, 122-9; Jacob M. Price, ‘The Bank of England’s discount activity and the merchants of London, 1694-1773’, in Jacob M. Price (ed.), *Overseas Trade and Traders* (Aldershot, 1996) pp. 97-114; Saville, *Bank of Scotland* pp. 43-4, 49-52, 79

<sup>105</sup> BL, Add. mss 56241 fo. 12r; Bod. Lib., MS Eng Hist D.146 fo. 197

<sup>106</sup> SA, 112/1A fos. 217-22. These figures cannot be calculated any more precisely, because Hill’s accounts do not always provide the exchange rate on monies he received or drew.

<sup>107</sup> *Ibid.* fos. 216-8

which prevented bankers in London protesting and returning their bills. This was not negligible: Hill noted in September 1696 that he might expect to pay charges of 12 or 13 percent of the value of protested bills, and between 1696 and 1697 his office paid £9,816 on protested bills for £56,576, around 17 percent.<sup>108</sup>

In order to make use of these financial services Hill was required to exploit with increasing effectiveness the cooperation of a variety of official and unofficial figures: Blathwayt asked him in June 1694 to use ‘your known skill and credit’ to raise money for the army, and later that year he again pressed him for ‘your advice what credit may be found in these countries [Flanders] for a month’s subsistence or more in case of necessary [sic]’.<sup>109</sup> Although Schulenburg’s role as financier to the army had ceased in 1692, he continued to act as a conduit for a series of loans to Britain by the Dutch Republic, and Hill was able to use his financial skills and personal influence to make the money go further.<sup>110</sup> For instance, in March 1696 Schulenburg was owed some 150,000 fl he had lent to Hill, who worked to convince him to leave the money with him for his use for as long as possible.<sup>111</sup> The duke of Portland helped Hill to arrange loans.<sup>112</sup> A range of army officials also occasionally advanced money for bills on London, such as Adam Cardonnel, the duke of Marlborough’s secretary, who provided some £7,434 between 1694 and 1697.<sup>113</sup> Blathwayt similarly told Hill in July 1697 that he would have ‘serve[d]’ him with 10,000 crowns if reliable tallies had been available, and he consulted with both Hill

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<sup>108</sup> BL, Add. mss 9730 fos. 71r-72r; SA, 112/1A fos. 206-14

<sup>109</sup> BL, Add. mss 56241 fos. 14r, 16r, 25r; Bod. Lib., MS Eng Hist D.146 fos. 209-13; BL, Add. mss 9730 fos. 37r, 41r

<sup>110</sup> BL, Add. mss 9730 fo. 7r; BL, Add. mss 56241 fo. 12r; Bod. Lib., MS Eng Hist D.146 fos. 5-7, 17, 25, 39, 53-9, 117, 209, 213

<sup>111</sup> BL, Add. mss 9730 fos. 28r, 33r, 37r-v, 45r, 47r, 70r, 75r-76r, 85r; Waddell, ‘Administration’, pp. 170-1; Jones, *War and economy* pp. 21-2, 83-4, 86, 319

<sup>112</sup> Waddell, ‘Administration’, pp. 207-8; Onnekink, *Anglo-Dutch favourite* pp. 165-8

<sup>113</sup> SA, 112/1A fos. 62, 125, 132, 135, 137, 141, 148, 154, 177, 210, 342, 351

and Montagu about what ones to request.<sup>114</sup> Hill's own staff also occasionally acted as correspondents for key London remitters, encashing the bills that they received: James Bruce accepted bills worth £23,675 for Sir Henry Furnese in August and October 1697, while Sweet encashed at least £35,825 for Sir Theodore Janssen over the same period.<sup>115</sup> Hill also appears to have employed a cashier named Mr Janssen, possibly the brother Andrew of the remitter Sir Theodore Janssen, who drew several bills on him in 1697.<sup>116</sup> In 1694 another clerk named Henry Hardwick or Hendrik Hardewijk entered the office: at the same time an Antwerp figure of the same name provided some £8,382 for bills drawn by Hill on London.<sup>117</sup> As in London, public structures and connections apparently served as a framework for private financial intermediation in support of the army.

The other side of the coin was that private financiers were equally embedded into public networks. Sweet wrote to Hill in October 1692 suggesting that a permanent balance of 5,000 fl be deposited with Bartholomew Contales, a merchant in Ostend, on which he could draw, creating in effect an informal office in the city.<sup>118</sup>

Although Hill's letters do not contain much information on his relations with local bankers, the fact that many of his correspondents such as Benjamin Poule, George Clifford and Nicholas Reeve remained in contact over a decade later suggests friendly connections.<sup>119</sup> He had particularly good links with Sir James Bateman, one of the Bank of England's directors sent out to Antwerp to run its agency there. Generally whig in his allegiances, Bateman nevertheless formed a firm friendship

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<sup>114</sup> BL, Add. mss 56241 fo. 78r; BL, Add. mss 34355 fos. 33v-34r

<sup>115</sup> SA, 112/1A fos. 344-5, 356, 358, 360, 364

<sup>116</sup> Ibid. fos. 233, 235, 301, 311, 337, 346, 349, 357, 361

<sup>117</sup> Ibid. fos. 58, 83, 88, 101, 107; HL, ST58 xii, 124; HL, ST58 i, 227-8

<sup>118</sup> BL, Add. mss 62526 fo. 21r

<sup>119</sup> SA, 112/1/1734, 1735, 1766, 1773, 1779; BL, Add. mss 62526 fo. 78v

with Hill, as evidenced in March 1697 when Bateman sent him a gold watch in a ‘studded case for your good self’.<sup>120</sup> On occasion this paid dividends for the state: when the Pay Office failed to honour certain bills in March 1697 Bateman wrote to Hill that ‘had I not firm reliance of your friendship I should repent I meddled with any bills on such persons whose payment no dependence can be made’, but that to honour their friendship he would wait several weeks before formally protesting them.<sup>121</sup> In July 1697 Bateman similarly arranged with Hill for ‘some friends’ to come in for a share of 50,000 fl in the remittances, broadening the credit base upon which the state could draw to support the army.<sup>122</sup> As with Machado and Pereira, personal connections with remitters were also buttressed by the manipulation of public patronage. Bartholomew Contales, for instance, was given a series of transport contracts from March 1696 worth at least £4,250.<sup>123</sup> In January 1697 Hill asked Blathwayt to have a government yacht carry Bateman and his wife back to England: ‘I have so many obligations to Mr Bateman who has served the King and the Bank so well here, and so long, that I can refuse him nothing’, not least a secure and relatively speedy passage.<sup>124</sup>

Finally, Hill’s personal conduct and character, and the impression of creditworthiness that he could create, was also important. He declared to Blathwayt in March 1694 for instance that he had promised to pay the Hanoverian troops their subsidies, ‘for I have given my word, which I have not yet been poor enough to

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<sup>120</sup> Bein. Lib., OSB 31, Box 1, Folder 4 [?March 1697]; *HOP* (1690-1715) vol. iii, 147-9

<sup>121</sup> Bein. Lib., OSB 31, Box 1, Folder 4, Bateman to Hill, 26/3/1697, 9/4/1697; Bein. Lib., Yale, OSB 31, Box 1, Folder 6, Bateman to Hill, 18/5/1697

<sup>122</sup> Bein. Lib., OSB 31, Box 1, Folder 4, Bateman to Hill, 2/7/1697, 9/7/1697, 16/7/1697, 20/7/1697, 30/0/1697; Bein. Lib., Yale, OSB 31, Box 1, Folder 6 fos., Bateman to Hill, 23/9/1697

<sup>123</sup> SA, 112/1A fos. 346, 369, 372

<sup>124</sup> BL, Add. mss 9730 fos. 29r-30r; Bein. Lib., OSB 31, Box 1, Folder 4, Bateman to Hill, 27/3/1697, 31/3/1697

break'.<sup>125</sup> Yet he also confessed to Blathwayt two years later of his anguish that he had borrowed money without providing the lenders with any real security, and that the thought of it

breaks my sleep, and I fear a great many more honest men sleep as ill, and that afflicts me to death ... on Wednesday I shut my doors till I receive some assistance, and will do penance the rest of my days for my own sins and the folly of those who have trusted me so much. I walk about as impudently as other men, but God knows I carry a serpent in my bosom which devours me. I told the King I would provide for this week; so I will, but unless I am assisted from heaven or from earth or from hell, I cannot get a schelling more than I shall pay away on Tuesday next.<sup>126</sup>

Private credit was therefore incorporated into public finance, by the appearance as much as the actual existence of trust. This section has therefore argued that Hill, no less than Ranelagh, contributed to the effectiveness of the British fiscal-military state in the Low Countries as far as the private, informal networks of trust that he created with local officials, agents and bankers allowed. This permitted him to access sources of credit that would otherwise have been closed to the state, and thereby maintain the wider solvency of the Pay Office abroad by converting illiquid or undesired bills, notes and tallies into cash at as little loss as possible. The creation of informal obligations and trust, through friendship and favours – or ‘corruption’ – was therefore of more material contribution to the overall effectiveness of British fiscal-military state abroad than the perfection of a bureaucratic infrastructure.

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<sup>125</sup> Bod. Lib., MS Eng Hist D.146 fo. 197

<sup>126</sup> BL, Add. mss 9730 fos. 63v-64r, 71r-79r

## REMITTANCE CONTRACTORS

By the same token, the strengthening by individual remittance contractors and financiers of their own personal credit networks must have contributed to the wider effectiveness of the state, since – as in any contemporary commercial operation – it would have lowered transaction costs and allowed them cheaper access to larger amounts of credit that could then be put at the state’s disposal. For instance although it is difficult to recover the exact nature of Sir Joseph Herne’s commercial connections, close cooperation and mutual trust was clearly of importance. To remit money to Italy he appears to have gone into partnership with a series of well-established Huguenot networks there.<sup>127</sup> One was Nicholas Tourton, who subsequently testified that there had been a ‘long ... friendship’ between them and that, for instance, although Herne had sold some £730 of pepper to Tourton in 1694 he ‘was so sensible that he was more indebted to the defendant that ... he never demanded ... any of the sums of money’.<sup>128</sup> The following section will argue that the effectiveness of other remittance contractors was similarly underpinned by the cultivation of close personal connections which thereby enabled the British fiscal-military state vicariously to mobilise wider financial and commercial networks on its own behalf.

This process can be followed in great detail for the Bank of England when it acted as a remittance contractor between 1694 and 1696. During this period the Bank made heavy use of correspondents abroad, not only to transmit trade credits in Spain or Portugal to Flanders for the support of the army, but also, as the East India

<sup>127</sup> CTB xiv, 218-9. For the Italian subsidies, see Symcox, *Victor Amadeus II* pp. 108-118; Jones, *War and economy* pp. 45-6, 88-91; Storrs, *Rise of Savoy* pp. 87-120

<sup>128</sup> TNA, C9/481/3 (Horne v Tourton)

Company did, to secure bullion from Cadiz.<sup>129</sup> Waddell suggests that the Bank ‘antagonized’ Herne’s contractors overseas and therefore refused to employ them: in fact, the Court of Directors declared that they would ‘prefer in their service as correspondents beyond [the] sea ... Englishmen rather than foreigners to correspond with’.<sup>130</sup> The operation was therefore based primarily on the trust created through common cultural identities and patriotic allegiances: personal linkages also appear to have informed, for example, the selection of Messrs Stratford & Free as correspondents in Hamburg, since one partner Francis Stratford was a director of the Bank.<sup>131</sup> Most visibly, personal politics and connections ultimately underpinned the official ‘Agency’ set up in Antwerp, an autonomous committee of Court of Directors set up to accept, encash and issue the bills that the Bank drew upon that city.<sup>132</sup> On the one hand, bureaucratic control was imposed, with books and accounts being kept and audits being undertaken.<sup>133</sup> Yet ultimately the Agency – which had only ever been created in April 1695 at the behest of William III, who ‘thought it necessary’<sup>134</sup> – provided nothing more than a framework for the operation of personal networks and connections. The directors were mainly paid by commission as independent agents, as indeed they were, with salaries only being paid after June 1696 so that Sir James Bateman would be ‘encouraged to continue at Antwerp’.<sup>135</sup> The Committee of Remittances were instructed by the Court of Directors at the Bank to manage the business ‘according to their own discretion for

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<sup>129</sup> Clapham, *Bank* i, 27-8; Chaudhuri, *Trading world* pp. 160-74; Jones, *War and economy* pp. 87, 91

<sup>130</sup> BEA, G4/1 (Court of Directors: Minute-Book 'A') fo. 165; Waddell, ‘Administration’, p. 144n

<sup>131</sup> BEA, G4/2 (Court of Directors: Minute-Book 'B') fo. 178; Jacob M. Price, *The tobacco adventure to Russia: enterprise, politics, and diplomacy in the quest for a northern market for English colonial tobacco, 1676-1722* (Philadelphia, 1961) p. 109; *HOP* (1690-1715) v, 586-7

<sup>132</sup> Clapham, *Bank* i, 26; Waddell, ‘Administration’, pp. 139-43

<sup>133</sup> BEA, G4/1 fo. 48; BEA, G4/2 fos. 75, 88, 90, 145, 146, 153, 154, 159, 161, 162, 218, 227, 228, 233-42; BEA, G7/1 (Court of Proprietors: Minute-Book 'A') fos. 38-44

<sup>134</sup> BEA, G4/2 fo. 12; Waddell, ‘Administration’, pp. 131-4

<sup>135</sup> BEA, G4/1 fos. 13-14, 24, 236-8; BEA, G4/2 fos. 140, 191, 194, 196

the best advantage': significantly, they were 'empowered to call such of the Directors to their assistance as they think fit, and to use their names if they see cause'.<sup>136</sup> This was given further weight in March 1695, when it was ordered that the committee 'and such other members as shall join with them' should be 'empowered for the future to make use of the credit of the Bank and their own credit for furnishing the money for supplying the public services and remittances into foreign parts by such ways and means as they judge best'.<sup>137</sup>

Moreover, while *in situ* in Antwerp the directors of the Agency appear to have engaged in extensive financial integration, incorporating external capital into their operations by drawing on their own personal credit and private networks. They protested to the Bank in 1697 that they had taken up nearly three million pounds during their time,

without charging commission for either notwithstanding we were personally bound for those vast sums, and at this day remain sureties (being liable in our persons and estates) for 3,000,000 fl still owing to the Dutch, all which borrowings were and ought to be esteemed a great benefit and service to the Bank.<sup>138</sup>

Faced with severe shortages of specie with which to encash the bills of exchange they received, they had proposed in May 1695 to set up 'a bank for current money in Amsterdam', and likewise lobbied the Spanish authorities to set up a mint to coin silver they received from England, although Waddell seems to have misinterpreted this as an attempt to set up a rival to the Bank.<sup>139</sup> They also noted that other *ex gratia* payments had secured the revocation of a law in the Spanish Netherlands

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<sup>136</sup> BEA, G4/1 fos. 76-9

<sup>137</sup> BEA, G4/2 fo. 2; Waddell, 'Administration', pp. 140-1, 146

<sup>138</sup> BEA, G4/2 fos. 239-40

<sup>139</sup> BEA, G4/1 fo. 48; CTB x, 1373, 1376; Luttrell (ed.), *Brief Relation* iii, 530-1; BEA, G4/2 fos. 17, 238; Waddell, 'Administration', pp. 138-46

prohibiting gentry, clergy and lawyers from lending money at interest, which ‘was money well laid out for the service of the Bank ... [and] did greatly promote and facilitate the loans that were made us at Antwerp’. The Agency was therefore, ultimately, an expression of personal initiative and enterprise in which personal, private and informal links appear to have been key.<sup>140</sup>

Unfortunately the letters and minutes that the Bank of England received from its agents in Antwerp have not survived, and it is therefore impossible to examine any further how these personal connections were translated into operational effectiveness. However a series of letters received in 1711 and 1712 offer an important opportunity to examine a similar process.<sup>141</sup> The situation was virtually identical to the 1690s: on 22 August 1711 the Treasury approached the Bank of England to advance £220,000 at six percent for the use of the army in Flanders, to be repaid within four months, to which the Court of Directors ‘after some debate’ agreed.<sup>142</sup> A committee was set up, and the business apportioned out to individual directors: Justus Beck drew a quarter of the sum on John Lucas Pels, who had also acted – via Peter Delme – as the Bank’s correspondent in 1709 during earlier remittances.<sup>143</sup> In February 1712 the Bank contracted for a further £200,000, and then another £100,000 in May: this time Beck employed Louis de Connick in Antwerp, who wrote to the Bank assuring them that he would ‘give you no cause to regret the recommendation which Monsieur Beck made concerning me’.<sup>144</sup> As in

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<sup>140</sup> This was also the case with the Rothschilds in 1814-5: Kaplan, *Rothschild* pp. 112-20, 151

<sup>141</sup> These have been consulted in translation

<sup>142</sup> BEA, G4/7 (Court of Directors: Minute-Book 'F') fos. 166-7; CTB xxv, 90, 91

<sup>143</sup> Baker Lib., Kress coll., Ranelagh to Blathwayt, 1/6/1697, [undated 1697]; BEA, G4/7 fos. 166-9, 171, 173, 175; BEA, 1A25/1, Pels to Bank, 3/11/1711, 9/2/1712; SA, 112/1A fos. 191, 224, 270, 282, 295, 308

<sup>144</sup> BEA, G4/7 fos. 199-201, 205, 211, 214; BEA, C137/1, Connick to Bank, 30/3/1712, 18/4/1712; CTB xxvi, 20-1, 24, 32, 34

the 1690s the Bank of England therefore did little more than institutionalise existing sets of personal connections, which continued to operate alongside formal contacts: Beck continued to deal privately with de Connick, while in December 1710 Pels noted that although he had not heard from the Bank for nearly two weeks ‘Monsieur Delme has passed on your little remark’ about an error in his accounts.<sup>145</sup>

Benjamin Sweet had already noted in January 1711 that it was necessary for a correspondent to be an ‘eminent merchant that has large capitals to supply forty or fifty thousand pounds out of their own stocks on any exigency’: surviving correspondence shows that as trust increased in 1711 so too did the efficiency with which the Bank could access and mobilise this stock of private credit for the benefit of themselves and the army.<sup>146</sup> In April 1712 Sweet and Henry Cartwright, deputy-paymasters in Amsterdam and Antwerp respectively, complained that the bills were being sent at excessively long usance, and urged that the Bank ‘find means that their own correspondents should discount ‘em at reasonable rates’.<sup>147</sup> Apparently in response, Connick reported in July that he had discounted the Bank’s bills upon his own initiative and thus saved them the cost of commission.<sup>148</sup> Connick had also been ordered to hold back 70,000 fl from a tranche of 282,000 fl he was to pay Cartwright, but upon meeting him at the Exchange Connick found that Cartwright was in desperate straits and had already been forced to borrow money upon his own credit to prevent the troops starving.<sup>149</sup> Connick therefore decided to advance him the whole sum upon his bond to repay the money: ‘I know that this is against your

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<sup>145</sup> BEA, 1A25/1, Pels to Bank, 19/12/1710

<sup>146</sup> HL, ST58 vii, 171

<sup>147</sup> BEA, G4/7 fo. 207; CTB xxvi, 256; HL, ST57 vi, 214-5, 217, 268; HL, ST57 vii, 96, 105, 110-11; HL, ST58 ix, 218-9; HL, ST58 x, 16-18; HL, ST58 xi, 26-9, 80, 85; HL, ST58 xii, 27-9, 80-1, 84

<sup>148</sup> BEA, C173/1, Connick to Bank, 18/4/1712, 16/7/1712

<sup>149</sup> *Ibid.*, Connick to Bank, 20/4/1712, 21/4/1712, 7/5/1712

orders’, he told the Bank, ‘but hope that you will not disapprove of my conduct for I am only trying to serve you faithfully’, and his action was subsequently approved. He also offered to advance some £7,000 or £8,000 from his own private capital – ‘you shall repay it as you think fit’ – to enable them to keep up their payments, and ‘for the honour and in the service of the Bank, which will not suffer any prejudice’.<sup>150</sup>

Personal connections and obligations also gave the Bank access not only to the credit but also to the connections of its correspondents abroad. In June 1712 de Connick noted that several bills drawn by the Bank on a firm in Amsterdam would be encashed, notwithstanding doubts about their credit, ‘as this was endorsed by Messrs Pels & Son who are close friends of mine [and] I shall come to an arrangement with them and we shall be able to settle the matter between ourselves’.<sup>151</sup> He also said that Cartwright would make no objection to Connick discounting some bills that had been sent to the deputy-paymaster for money that the banker had advanced Cartwright on the Bank’s account, ‘particularly as the relations between us are good’.<sup>152</sup> Finally, ‘to encourage you to continue with your orders’, he told the Bank in March 1712, ‘I am in a position to give you fairly large discounts on business transactions and to conduct negotiations in all the places you consider suitable’.<sup>153</sup> This sense of mutual interest as a source of trust is also seen more explicitly in Pels’ assurance in December 1711 that ‘I think I have been looking after your interests as though they were my own, which is always my

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<sup>150</sup> Ibid., Connick to Bank, 27/4/1712, 7/5/1712, 16/5/1712, 18/5/1712, 23/5/1712, 8/6/1712

<sup>151</sup> Ibid., Connick to Bank, 15/6/1712

<sup>152</sup> Ibid., Connick to Bank, 23/6/12

<sup>153</sup> Ibid., Connick to Bank, 30/3/1712

aim'.<sup>154</sup> Thus, between 1711 and 1712 the Bank of England appears to have carried out its remittances effectively, not by dint of bureaucratic control but by incorporating a series of private networks, linked by personal connections, obligations and credit, into its own networks.

The other side of the coin is seen in the steady alienation of Bateman by the Bank. After an intermediate audit in 1696, a final series of audits of the Antwerp agency in 1697 by the Court of Directors and then the General Court generated such ill-will that outside adjudicators were eventually required.<sup>155</sup> In August 1697 Bateman complained to Hill that he had failed to win re-election as a Bank director due to these disagreements and consequently 'I wish to God I had never gone ... to serve a society of ungrateful men as I have done'.<sup>156</sup> The following April he was reappointed, but told Hill that it was 'at the earnest persuasion of some particular friends', since he had been treated so badly that he was not particularly minded to sit again.<sup>157</sup> Bateman was, therefore, not over anxious to defend the Bank's interests. Most notably, the directors refused in 1698 to accept Exchequer bills for a bill of exchange for £8,315 that Hill had drawn on them for the use of the army, and protested it accordingly. However Bateman secretly advised Hill to

let not the bill ... any ways increase your trouble, rather let it return back again hither for 'tis for the Bank's account and let them take Exchequer bills or nothing ... Better they suffer a little than have you and your family undone ... it belongs to a public society that are able to bear it.<sup>158</sup>

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<sup>154</sup> BEA, 1A25/1, Pels to Bank, 21/12/1711

<sup>155</sup> BEA, G4/2 fos. 145-63, 218, 227-9, 233-47; BEA, G4/4 (Court of Directors: Minute-Book 'C') fos. 9, 14, 28, 76; BEA, G7/1 fos. 150-5

<sup>156</sup> Bein. Lib., OSB 31, Box 1, Folder 4, Bateman to Hill, 27/7/1697

<sup>157</sup> Bein. Lib., Osborn mss 31, Box 1, Folder 5, Bateman to Hill, 22/4/1698; SA, 112/1A fo. 267

<sup>158</sup> SA, 112/1A fo. 267; Bein. Lib., OSB 31, Box 1, Folder 4, Bateman to Hill, 2/7/1697, 6/7/1697, 16/7/1697, 20/7/1697, 3/8/1697; BEA, G4/4 fos. 8, 10

Hill's actions gave Bateman the leverage he needed to convince the Court of Directors to oblige the government and accept Exchequer bills, still trading at a discount and thus comparatively undesirable as payment. Thus the efficiency of the Bank's operations was compromised by a breakdown in internal trust and cooperation, the inverse of the efficiency offered by the consolidation of personal linkages and their incorporation into formal institutional structures.

## **CONCLUSION**

This chapter has therefore argued that during the Nine Years War, the British fiscal-military state in Flanders enjoyed or experienced significant financial intermediation from a variety of sources of private credit, and that this was crucial to the continued operational effectiveness of the army. As in Ireland, informal intermediation was necessary, and perhaps inevitable given the severe pressures to which the financial system itself was subjected, especially after 1694. Such intermediation enabled the army to maintain its access to cash for key payments – in effect its solvency or liquidity – even at the expense of superficial expenses or allowances that the commissioners of public accounts labelled 'corruption'. Paperwork was improperly kept, payments were often made upon inadequate authority and receipts, contracts were issued upon considerations other than cost and strict commercial efficiency, and the officials and financiers involved appear to have accepted substantial sums of money.

However, private individuals could only be persuaded to incorporate their credit by accommodating and allowing for their private interests, and mutual trust was

required because such connections could be used – and occasionally abused – for the support of the army. Once officials exceeded the capacity of their private financial networks, as the earl of Ranelagh appears to have done after 1691, their efficacy was circumscribed accordingly. Of especial significance is the growing impact of political partisanship, first identified in Ireland in the previous chapter but evidently exercising increasing influence during the Nine Years War. Indeed, at times the key problem preventing greater success appears to have been that the state and its structures were inadequately politicised, which meant that personal quarrels continued to override the cooperation or mutual accommodation that a shared political identity or allegiance might have encouraged.

By the same token, an increasingly impersonal and impartial administration would have undermined rather than underpinned this system. As was noted at the start of this chapter, far from enabling the Pay Office to operate with greater efficiency, the constraints entailed by official auditing and accounting procedures appear to have threatened to overwhelm its activities. Effectiveness was achieved where accounts and funds could be intermingled, and where officials were able to act upon their own initiative in making payments rather than insisting upon the strict letter of the law. To do so likewise required mutual trust, created through the cultivation of personal connections and obligations rather than institutional actions. Indeed, the formal structures of bureaucracy appear to have been most useful where they could help to expand and embed these personal networks; the Pay Office and Royal Hospital at Chelsea, for example, being used by Ranelagh to buttress the personal obligations that his administrative and financial clients owed him.



#### **CHAPTER FOUR: THE PAY OFFICE, 1702-5**

While the Nine Years War perhaps represented the severest test of the British fiscal-military state since the Restoration, it nevertheless remained mainly restricted to the Low Countries. By contrast, during the War of the Spanish Succession between 1702 and 1713 the state deployed the same number of men across the Low Countries, Portugal and Spain, with further subsidies to the Duke of Savoy: it therefore faced a far more complex financial and administrative challenge. The immediate trigger for the war was the death of the Spanish king, Charles II, in November 1700: childless, he left his considerable inheritance – Spain, Naples and Sicily, Milan, the Spanish Netherlands and the Spanish colonies abroad – to Philip, duke of Anjou and grandson of Louis XIV.<sup>1</sup> Despite treaties concluded in 1698 and 1700 to partition this inheritance, Louis XIV accepted it wholesale, but his aggressive moves to cement his control enabled William III to ally Britain with the Dutch Republic and the Holy Roman Empire to enforce the terms of the Second Partition Treaty. From 1702 the British army under the duke of Marlborough was deployed in Flanders to take control of the Spanish Netherlands – now allied with Louis XIV and Anjou as the Bourbon claimant Philip V – to shield the Dutch Republic and relieve pressure on other theatres in Italy and along the Rhine. In 1703 the allied army captured Bonn, and in 1704 Marlborough took the risky decision to lead his army along the Danube to southern Germany, to prevent the French army advancing on Vienna and to knock Bavaria out of the war. Victory at Blenheim vindicated his decision, although an attempt the following year to break through the line of fortresses protecting the French frontier failed. At the same

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<sup>1</sup> Ivor F. Burton, *The Captain-General: the career of John Churchill, Duke of Marlborough from 1702-1711* (London, 1968) pp. 30-90; A. D. Francis, *The first Peninsular War, 1702-1713* (London, 1975)

time, although Portugal began the war in alliance with France, a successful diplomatic expedition by John Methuen in 1703 led to the signature of the Methuen Treaty, which brought Portugal onto the allied side and opened up another theatre.

Although the wider literature is mostly agreed on the importance of proper logistical and financial support, once again there is disagreement on how this was achieved. R.E. Scouller's work makes very little mention of the Pay Office and its methods of operation.<sup>2</sup> D.W. Jones concludes that the maintenance and supply of the allied army was achieved more successfully than in the 1690s because of the improved economic conditions in which the British state found itself, as well as greater success tapping domestic credit.<sup>3</sup> Other historians such as Peter Dickson and John Sperling have argued for the more effective mobilisation of domestic capital through a revived Treasury under the leadership of Sidney, Lord and then Earl Godolphin.<sup>4</sup> Yet, as noted in the previous chapters, economic change provides at best a partial explanation for changes in effectiveness, since it understates the ability of state structures to adapt and respond to changing financial conditions, while these chapters have also concluded in turn that this was not necessarily achieved through bureaucratic reform. This chapter will examine the efforts of Charles Fox as Paymaster of the Forces Abroad between 1702 and 1705 to achieve effectiveness through impartial and ordered administration that attempted to conform closely with recognisably bureaucratic standards. It will argue that because such efforts fundamentally ignored the vital need for cooperation and coordination at any cost, the imposition of impartial, impersonal bureaucratic standards actually came close

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<sup>2</sup> Scouller, *Armies* pp. 29-35

<sup>3</sup> Jones, *War and economy* pp. 161-210, 294-302

<sup>4</sup> Sperling, 'Public credit', pp. ii-ix, 1-50, 130-1, 225-6; Dickson, *Financial Revolution* pp. 59-64, 357-63

to wrecking the army by binding it into a rigid framework that was unable to adapt to circumstances or provide additional support. The army was only rescued by the efforts of other informal networks, which expanded their activities to compensate and drew on a web of personal – and, increasingly, politically partisan – connections to achieve this.

## **ORDNANCE OFFICE NETWORKS**

The increasingly partisan nature of political and personal connections during this period was perhaps inevitable, given the wider political shifts which occurred after 1697. Once the Nine Years War had ended, so too had the utility of the whig Junto ministry, and a shift back towards a tory ministry that had begun in 1700 was completed by the death of William III in March 1702 and the accession of Anne, whose political preferences were predominantly tory.<sup>5</sup> Although the new ministry brought back to power key tory politicians such as the earls of Nottingham and Rochester, the true power and direction of policy rested in the hands of the ‘duumvirs’: John Churchill, duke of Marlborough by 1702 and commander-in-chief of the allied armies in Flanders, and Godolphin, now in complete control of wartime finance as Lord High Treasurer. Their appointment owed much to their connection with Anne, via Marlborough’s wife Sarah, a close friend and favourite of the Queen, but also their partisan identity and allegiances, which permitted them to take the leading role in an overwhelmingly tory ministry that lasted until it was broken up by the events surrounding the ‘Tack’ at the end of 1704, as discussed in the following chapter.

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<sup>5</sup> Horwitz, *Parliament, policy and politics* pp. 247-304; Brian W. Hill, *The growth of parliamentary parties, 1689-1742* (London, 1976) pp. 76-102

The impact of these changes within the fiscal-military state, most particularly the increasing clarity of partisan political divisions and loyalties, can be gauged most immediately through a study of the structures used to pay and maintain the artillery trains in the Low Countries, which were controlled by the Ordnance Office rather than the army and thus part of an entirely separate administrative hierarchy, although still ultimately subject to Marlborough as Master-General of the Ordnance.<sup>6</sup> There was also a particular need of financial intermediation and assistance from informal credit networks since the Ordnance relied on deductions from army and navy budgets and lacked its own distinct Estimate, reducing its political and financial leverage in financial markets since its own sources of income were correspondingly less secure.<sup>7</sup> The following section will argue that between 1702 and 1706 a series of informal networks fulfilled these functions, and acquired or absorbed a distinct party-political identity that facilitated not only internal cooperation but also the coordination of business with other financial and commercial circles.

Between 1702 and 1705 the Ordnance Pay Office reflected the political loyalties of the Treasurer of the Ordnance, Charles Bertie, a relative of the earl of Danby and a staunch tory, who had also served as Treasurer between 1681 and 1699 before being reappointed in 1702 with the incoming tory government.<sup>8</sup> His deputy in 1702 was James Leece, who had been clerk in the 1690s to his previous deputy Edward

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<sup>6</sup> Tomlinson, *Guns and government* pp. 18-45, 130-4

<sup>7</sup> *Ibid.* pp. 169-74, 199-202; Binney, *British public finance* pp. 160-7

<sup>8</sup> *HOP* (1690-1715) iii, 192-5; iv, 916-9. Tomlinson's is therefore incorrect to classify Bertie as a court placemen Tomlinson, *Guns and government* pp. 73, 80

Hubbald.<sup>9</sup> As paymaster of the artillery train in Flanders, Bertie appointed William Leathes, from an Anglican family in Co Antrim, who had acted as a conductor to the train in the 1690s.<sup>10</sup> This appears to have been a strongly tory nexus: not only had Leathes served as a surveyor to the Forfeiture Commissioners in Ireland in 1700 – ‘the trustees were overwhelmingly tory, as were their employees’ – but he was also a long-standing client of the London merchant and financier Edward Gibbon, who had been paymaster of the artillery train in Flanders during the Nine Years War, in concert with the tory merchant Sir Joseph Herne. In 1702 Gibbon acted as remittance contractor to the Ordnance Office, with Leathes as his official contact and informal correspondent, and notwithstanding his grandson’s subsequent whitewash that ‘even his opinions were subordinate to his interest’ he appears, as the next chapter will show, to have been a strongly partisan tory.<sup>11</sup>

From January 1703 ordnance remittances for Flanders, as well as correspondence, had passed mainly through the house of Walter Senserf & Son, a firm of wine merchants in Rotterdam.<sup>12</sup> However from November 1705 Gibbon also made use of John Drummond, a Scottish merchant of tory views living in Amsterdam, who now acted as a local agent to Robert Harley, the recently appointed and increasingly tory secretary of state.<sup>13</sup> Drummond had been apprenticed in the 1690s to James Foulis,

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<sup>9</sup> Tomlinson, *Guns and government* p. 229

<sup>10</sup> BL, Add. mss 44085 fos. 32r, 34r; Suff. RO, de Mussenden Leathes MSS, HA403/T1039/7 fos. 4r, 5r, 7r; Suff. RO, de Mussenden Leathes MSS, HA403/T1039/8 fos. 281-2, 284, 285; Charles Dalton, *English army lists and commission registers, 1661-1714* (6 vols., London, 1892) iii, 65

<sup>11</sup> J. G. A. Pocock, *Barbarism and religion* (Cambridge, 1999) pp. 17-19; John Carswell, *The South Sea Bubble* (London, 1960) p. 278

<sup>12</sup> TNA, WO47/23 fo. 332; Suff. RO, de Mussenden Leathes MSS, HA403/T1039/5 fo. 654; Suff. RO, HA403/T1039/7 fos. 2r, 5r, 7r; Suff. RO, de Mussenden Leathes MSS, HA403/T1039/9 fos. 9r, 18r, 19r; Koenraad Jonckheere, *The auction of King William's paintings (1713): elite international art trade at the end of the Dutch golden age* (Philadelphia, 2008) pp. 144-5

<sup>13</sup> HL, ST58 i, 50. For Drummond see Ragnhild Hatton, ‘John Drummond in the War of the Spanish Succession: merchant and diplomatic agent’, in Ragnhild Hatton and M.S. Anderson (eds.), *Studies in diplomatic history* (Hamden, CA, 1970) pp. 73-7; *HOP* (1715-1754) i, 622

a prominent Scottish merchant and financier in London, and with his Dutch partner Jan Vanderheiden he now sat at the centre of an intermingled series of Dutch and Scottish commercial networks.<sup>14</sup> He had also been appointed, probably at Harley's instigation, as the government's agent abroad for the sale of Cornish tin. This network was itself strongly politicised: the Paymaster was Henry Scobell, brother of the tory 'Tacker' Francis Scobell, the Receiver another 'Tacker' John Anstis, and his deputy was the tory London goldsmith John Mead.<sup>15</sup> Having been 'in that trade pretty much before the Queen did undertake the Tin' Drummond was able to borrow substantial sums upon the security of these consignments for the use of the army, providing not only a profit of around £1,000 per annum but also a useful source of liquidity with temporary access to up to £20,000 in cash.<sup>16</sup> Neither was credit the only commodity. Gibbon, who leased the Sewardstone powder mill in Essex, offered gunpowder to the Ordnance Office on a regular basis<sup>17</sup>, while in 1706 Drummond was awarded a series of payments by the office 'in consideration of his extraordinary care about saltpetre' and for helping embark arms at Rotterdam.<sup>18</sup> Thus overlapping networks, bound together by a series of common political connections, appear to have permitted the rapid and unhindered coordination of credit and commercial assistance.

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<sup>14</sup> HL, ST57 i, 81; HL, ST58 i, 129; Saville, *Bank of Scotland* pp. 2, 13, 30, 34, 42-3, 66; Murdoch, *Network North* p. 142

<sup>15</sup> CTB xviii, 83-4, 89; xxii, 307-11; TNA, MINT 18/26-7 (Mint: Account Books for sale of Tin, 1704-11); *HOP* (1690-1715) iii, 39-40; v, 386-9, 788

<sup>16</sup> BL, Add. mss 70193 fos. 16-17; HL, ST57 i, 63, 64, 121; HL, ST58 i, 45, 47, 53, 56, 105-6, 199; CTB xx, 38-9, 50-1, 112, 253, 523, 558-9

<sup>17</sup> Glenys Crocker and K. R. Fairclough, 'The introduction of edge-runner incorporating mills in the British gunpowder industry', *Industrial Archaeology Review*, 20 (1998) pp. 27, 31; TNA, WO47/22 fo. 214; TNA, WO47/23 fo. 382; TNA, WO47/24 fos. 129, 247; TNA, T1/99/15

<sup>18</sup> Suff. RO, de Mussenden Leathes MSS, HA403/T1039/9 fo. 18r; HL, ST57 i, 2; HL, ST58 i, 79; BL, Add. mss 61397 fo. 13r; BL, Add. mss 61398 fo. 79r; TNA, WO46/6 fos. 20-1

The replacement of Bertie in May 1705 by the Hon Harry Mordaunt merely inverted this polarity. Mordaunt, brother of the earl of Peterborough, had strong whig loyalties.<sup>19</sup> Formerly appointed Treasurer in 1699, he had dismissed Hubald – contrary to expectations – and replaced him with the clothier and stationer William Churchill, a man ‘of fiercely whig principles’ whose sole qualifications were his political views and his kinship with Marlborough.<sup>20</sup> When Mordaunt was reappointed in 1705, it was again thought – even requested by Godolphin, Marlborough and the entire Ordnance Board – that he would retain Leece ‘as a matter as well for your own ease and safety as for the good of the service in general’.<sup>21</sup> Mordaunt nevertheless replaced Leece with John Lansdell, later an unadulterated whig MP and one of the four ‘very substantial people, but all merchants’ who had underwritten Mordaunt’s £10,000 security.<sup>22</sup> Another surety was the Dutch merchant Thomas Oubry or Oulry, brother-in-law to both Lansdell and the third surety Charles Hamilton.<sup>23</sup> Oulry had also dealt as early as 1703 with the fourth surety John Schoppens, another naturalised Dutch merchant, testifying to the web of personal connections that once again underpinned administrative and financial structures.<sup>24</sup> Efforts were also made to dismantle the wider tory network Bertie had created: within three months of Mordaunt’s appointment Sir Henry

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<sup>19</sup> Tomlinson, *Guns and government* pp. 225-6; *HOP* (1690-1715) iv, 196-9

<sup>20</sup> G. P. R. James (ed.), *Letters illustrative of the reign of William III, from 1696 to 1708, addressed to the Duke of Shrewsbury* (3 vols., London, 1841) ii, 283-4, 285; CTB xxv, 411; CTP iv, 456; *HOP* (1690-1715) iii, 552-5

<sup>21</sup> TNA, WO47/22 fos. 118-9; CTB xx, 340

<sup>22</sup> CAC, Erle-Drax mss, ERLE 3/19, Craggs to Erle, 3/7/1705, 7/7/1705; CAC, Erle-Drax mss, ERLE 3/2, Craggs to Erle, 10/7/1705; Tomlinson, *Guns and government* pp. 95, 97; *HOP* (1715-1754) ii, 198

<sup>23</sup> TNA, PROB 11/555 (Oulry, Thomas). Hamilton's father was Chrysostom Hamilton, and Lansdell's son was given this name: TNA, PROB 11/697 (Lansdell, John)

<sup>24</sup> LRO, Braye mss 23D57/2242 (Account Book of John Schoppens, 1703-4), *passim*

Furnese made an appearance before the Ordnance Board with an unsuccessful offer to undercut Edward Gibbon's commission as remittance contractor.<sup>25</sup>

There is also evidence of officials incorporating a wider range of personal and public credit. William Churchill subsequently petitioned that as Mordaunt's deputy between 1699 and 1702 he had 'often discounted tallies' for the convenience of the Office and refused to buy them for his own profit, even at 40 percent discount.<sup>26</sup> As clerk to the Clerk of the Ordnance since 1702, Thomas White – another unequivocally whig MP – had advanced small amounts of money for the service of the Ordnance since 1702, but the scale of his lending drastically increased after Mordaunt's appointment, such as in August 1705 when he advanced £400 to the Portugal artillery train.<sup>27</sup> Finally, by incorporating Lansdell into his office Mordaunt appears to have intended to embed it more firmly within a series of informal financial networks. James Craggs the Elder wrote to Thomas Erle, Lieutenant-General of the Ordnance, in July 1705 with some suspicion that

according to my intelligence Mr Lansdell is to have the disposing of everything, and the Brigadier is to have a certainty of £800 a year besides an immediate present, which [is] £300 a year more than the salary, which shows his deputy will make some use of the cash, which I can assure him will be pretty narrowly looked into.<sup>28</sup>

Although it is difficult to say exactly how this cash was used, the close integration between the office, officials and securities suggests that it would have enabled Mordaunt and Lansdell to pay the interest on money borrowed to assist the

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<sup>25</sup> TNA, WO47/22 fo. 423; Sperling, 'Public credit', p. 199

<sup>26</sup> Richard Chandler (ed.), *The history and proceedings of the House of Commons*, (London, 1742) iv, 364-5; CTP iv, 456

<sup>27</sup> TNA, WO47/22 fos. 27, 218, 351; TNA, WO49/225, entry for 20/9/1705; *HOP* (1690-1715) v, 850-1

<sup>28</sup> CAC, ERLE 3/19, Craggs to Erle, 7/7/1705; HL, ST58 i, 50; Tomlinson, *Guns and government* p. 229

operation of the artillery train, as Fox or Toll had done previously. Between 1702 and 1706 a series of informal networks were therefore created that spread beyond the formal boundaries of the office of the Treasurer of the Ordnance and were held together by personal and frequently political connections, but which by encouraging mutual cooperation apparently aided the coordination of credit, resources and information on behalf of the artillery train in Flanders.

### **PAY OFFICE 1702-1705**

However the evidence suggests that this did not occur in the Pay Office for the army after November 1702, when the earl of Ranelagh – persecuted by an unsympathetic commission of public accounts – resigned over the accusations previously noted that he had substantially misapplied vast sums of public money.<sup>29</sup> The office of Paymaster-General was split: John Howe, a former country whig now joining the tory benches, became Paymaster of Guards and Garrisons responsible for the troops in England, America and the West Indies, while Charles Fox – having been dismissed as joint Vice-Treasurer of Ireland in 1698 – now became Paymaster of the Forces Abroad.<sup>30</sup> Once again his appointment has generally been seen as an anchor for the incorporation of Sir Stephen Fox’s financial networks, but this ignores his administrative experience and strong tory convictions – what he called ‘[my] principles of loyalty to the Queen, and being firm to the constitution both of Church and State’.<sup>31</sup> However, the following section will argue that, unlike his father, he insisted upon strict and impartial adherence to the impractical and

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<sup>29</sup> *HOP* (1690-1715) iv, 524-6; Waddell, ‘Administration’, pp. 449-69; Holmes, *Politics* pp. 138-9

<sup>30</sup> Sperling, ‘Public credit’, pp. 133-4; Clay, *Public finance* pp. 270-2; *HOP* (1690-1715) iii, 1100-1; iv, 426

<sup>31</sup> BL, Add. mss 51324 fo. 59r

frequently unworkable bureaucratic norms that, if they had been even more strictly enforced, would no doubt have seriously damaged the liquidity of the army.

One of Fox's first acts as Paymaster was to resurrect what remained of the administrative machinery that had served him in the Irish Pay Office: once again his deputy was Edward Pauncefort, now a tory MP in his own right, and Robert Georges was promoted to chief clerk.<sup>32</sup> In the interim Georges had been deputy to Fox's nephew John Rawkins as receiver-general for the tax on Hackney carriages, and comptroller of customs at Bridgwater in Somerset, close to the Fox estates in that county.<sup>33</sup> Of the other staff, Nicholas Fenn had died in December 1705 and Rawkins in 1697, when Georges acted as his executor.<sup>34</sup> As in the 1690s, Fox therefore did what he could to create a Pay Office structured around close personal connections and, in some cases, political loyalties, in order to generate the trust needed for cooperation. This replaced Ranelagh's own office, much disordered after the death of Mordecai Abbott in 1700 but still recognisably structured around personal connections: aside from Pauncefort, another official was the Irish lawyer William Sloper, cousin of Ranelagh's 'faithful and true friend Simon Sloper', and his secretary was Bryan Mortagh.<sup>35</sup> Even after 1700 the Pay Office therefore remained dominated by informal personal linkages and possessed of a distinctly partisan edge.

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<sup>32</sup> DHC, Fox-Strangeways MSS, D/FSI Box 277, Flanders Entry Book, Pauncefort to Sweet, 8/9/1704; Georges to Sweet, 15/9/1704; Clay, *Public finance* pp. 271-3; *HOP* (1690-1715) v, 115-6

<sup>33</sup> CTB xvi, 21, 165; Clay, *Public finance* pp. 249, 334-5

<sup>34</sup> CTB xiii, 184; xx, 490

<sup>35</sup> *Ibid.*, xvii, 920; CJ, xiv, 326; TNA, PROB 11/527 (Jones, Richard, earl of Ranelagh); Hayton, 'Dependence', p. 33n; Ian R. Christie, *British 'non-elite' MPs, 1715-1820* (Oxford, 1995) pp. 52, 65; *HOP* (1715-1754) ii, 425-6

Ranelagh had appointed Benjamin Sweet – Richard Hill’s former chief clerk – as his deputy in the Low Countries in 1702, and he was retained by Fox at Marlborough’s insistence.<sup>36</sup> Yet, as the next chapter will show, Sweet appears to have had few partisan loyalties, requiring personal connections to be slowly constructed, although by June 1705 Pauncefort was able to tell Richard Hill that ‘he and I ... had the good fortune to understand one another so well that I believe there has [been] very few mistakes happened between us’.<sup>37</sup> By contrast there were warm relations between the Pay Office and Richard Hill himself, now sent to Turin as ambassador to the duke of Savoy and responsible for the payment of his subsidies.<sup>38</sup> Pauncefort’s letters to Hill are scattered with greetings from ‘all our friends here’, while Ranelagh was another common linkage, who thanked Hill for his letter in February 1705 which ‘confirm[ed to] me that I have still a place in your kindness, which I value more than I can easily express’.<sup>39</sup>

The same was true in Lisbon after 1703, where Fox chose as his deputy Thomas Morrice, a Canary merchant who had sat since 1700 on the Committee for Stating Debts due to the Army and Navy and had been the first choice of a Parliamentary committee dominated largely by country tories.<sup>40</sup> He was connected with tory figures such as Dr John Freind and George Clarke, as well as High Church clergymen such as Thomas Sprat, bishop of Rochester, and Francis Atterbury, dean of Carlisle, and was himself widely perceived as ‘a High Church man’ who

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<sup>36</sup> BL, Add. mss 61135 fo. 18r

<sup>37</sup> Bod. Lib., MS Eng Hist D.164 fo. 15v

<sup>38</sup> Jones, *War and economy* pp. 8, 10, 87-8; Symcox, *Victor Amadeus II* pp. 139, 142-3, 148-55; Storrs, *Rise of Savoy* pp. 87-120

<sup>39</sup> DHC, Fox-Strangeways MSS, D/FSI Box 277, Portugal/Italy Entry Book, Pauncefort to Hill, 4/1/1704, 28/4/1705, 2/5/1704, 18/8/1704, 26/1/1705; Bod. Lib., MS Eng Hist D.164 fos. 15r-v, 68r

<sup>40</sup> Luttrell (ed.), *Brief Relation* iv, 631; v, 333, 375

‘pretended to be of the Tory faction in England’.<sup>41</sup> His initial deputy was Richard Darby, who had acted as secretary to the committee on army debts appointed by Parliament in 1703, and whose death in Lisbon in October 1705 was deeply felt: Morrice wrote to Sprat that

I am in great trouble through the death of Mr Darby, who came to assist me in my affairs (for which no man could be more capable) and died suddenly while sitting at dinner one day this week.<sup>42</sup>

From January 1705 Morrice was also instructed to appoint at Gibraltar ‘some persons there that you can trust and depend upon’ and nominated William East, whom he had earlier advanced money in 1704 to travel ahead and ‘take care of supplying any regiment that might be separated and gone to Lisbon before us’.<sup>43</sup> Personal linkages, buttressed by partisan connections, therefore structured relations, even within the Pay Office.

Whole-hearted cooperation remained of the utmost importance to its operation, especially because Fox insisted his officials act by the book, placing a particular premium upon the proper flow of the information required. For example, cooperation in Lisbon between Morrice and the ambassador Paul Methuen – a whig MP – was essential, especially because Methuen had already disbursed substantial sums to the Portuguese troops, and he was therefore asked to be ‘aiding and assisting’ to Morrice.<sup>44</sup> But relations appear to have soured rapidly, probably due to

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<sup>41</sup> *HOP* (1690-1715) ii, 53; HMC Frankland pp. 185-6, 188; HL, ST57 vii, 181; HL, ST58 xii, 174; BL, Stowe mss 474 fo. 106v; CTB xxvi, 286; ODNB ‘Sprat, Thomas (1635-1713’ (2011); Holmes, *Politics* pp. 29, 267, 270

<sup>42</sup> DHC, D/FSI Box 277 (Portugal/Italy), Pauncefort to Morrice, 4/10/1705; Luttrell (ed.), *Brief Relation* v, 445; HMC Frankland p. 186

<sup>43</sup> DHC, D/FSI Box 277 (Portugal/Italy), Pauncefort to Morrice, 2/1/1705 and ‘Bill of Disbursements to 24 December 1704’; HMC Frankland p. 186

<sup>44</sup> DHC, D/FSI Box 277 (Portugal/Italy), ‘Instructions to Thomas Morrice Esq’; Godolphin to Methuen, 12/11/1703; Fox to Methuen, 18/1/1704, 20/1/1704; Pauncefort to Morrice, 28/3/1704;

differing allegiances, and Methuen consistently failed to hand over his warrants and receipts, or even his accounts: Pauncefort noted that this failure of cooperation threatened to disrupt the work of the office entirely, since without these ‘we can never be right in our accounts here, nor know what supplies to ask for’.<sup>45</sup> Although Fox wrote several letters to Methuen requesting his cooperation, and asked Godolphin to write more, they appear to have had little effect, and Pauncefort complained to Morrice in August 1704 that they were still ‘paying in the dark’.<sup>46</sup>

Similar problems occurred in the Low Countries in 1703 and 1704 because Gilbert Marshall, the commissary of the musters, consistently failed to submit on time muster rolls that were in any case subsequently found to be incomplete, misdated, unsigned, and otherwise ‘no better than waste paper’.<sup>47</sup> Cardonnel warned Marshall that inadequate instructions from the Henry Howard, Lord Walden, the Commissary-General of the Musters, was no excuse:

if you don’t know this and a great deal more ‘tis your fault, for not informing yourself, I am sure I am very sensible of it, without ever asking a question, though it be none of my business and if they may be remiss on this side in not sufficiently instructing you, you are no less so in not informing yourself ... a child of three years old would know this without telling.<sup>48</sup>

Yet as an appointee of Lord Walden, Marshall was immune to direct pressure from Cardonnel and the Pay Office: moreover, by 1703 Walden himself was in the process of defecting to the whig benches, reducing both the cooperation that they

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Jones, *War and economy* p. 83; A. D. Francis, *The Methuens and Portugal, 1691-1708* (Cambridge, 1966) pp. 246-9, 257-9; *HOP* (1690-1715) iv, 809-11

<sup>45</sup> DHC, D/FSI Box 277 (Portugal/Italy), Pauncefort to Morrice, 11/4/1704, 9/5/1704, 4/7/1704

<sup>46</sup> *Ibid.*, Fox to Methuen, 9/5/1704, 20/6/1704; Pauncefort to Morrice, 11/7/1704, 1/8/1704, 8/8/1704

<sup>47</sup> BL, Add. mss 61395 fos. 11r, 17v, 26r, 63v, 72v, 179r; TNA, T64/127 fos. 1r-v

<sup>48</sup> BL, Add. mss 61395 fo. 179r

could expect and the political leverage that they could exercise.<sup>49</sup> By June 1704 Cardonnel had therefore abandoned the effort, telling Pauncefort that nothing could induce Marshall to go faster; ultimately it was only when Walden realised that Marshall's errors threatened his own position that he took action.<sup>50</sup> Poor cooperation, linked in part to inadequate leverage on the part of the Pay Office, therefore prevented proper coordination and the redress of obvious inefficiencies.

This problem was further compounded by a strict insistence upon bureaucratic procedures and Parliamentary appropriation. Methuen's failure to provide accounts, for instance, harmed effectiveness because the Pay Office refused to issue clearings on account as Ranelagh had done, which Pauncefort insisted 'will always be as it is and not in Mr Fox's power to help it'.<sup>51</sup> He reminded Sweet in October 1703 that

not only in this case but as a standing rule to you in all that everything be clearly understood to be according to the Establishment and sufficiently vouched by warrant before you pay, and that you would not put yourself nor him to the trouble of an aftergame of procuring warrants and vouchers after the payments and perhaps the reason of making them forgot.<sup>52</sup>

Fox also refused to take notice of the various arrears of subsistence and clearings that remained due to the army after Ranelagh's dismissal in December 1702.<sup>53</sup> By contrast, Cardonnel noted to Sweet in December 1702 that Mortagh had broken appropriation to send a remittance of £10,000 desperately needed by the army to

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<sup>49</sup> *HOP* (1690-1715) iv, 402-3

<sup>50</sup> BL, Add. mss 61395 fos. 10v-11r, 25v; BL, Add. mss 61396 fo. 80r; BL, Add. mss 61397 fo. 123r

<sup>51</sup> DHC, D/FSI Box 277 (Portugal/Italy), Pauncefort to Morrice, 14/11/1704; Fox to Galway, 21/11/1704

<sup>52</sup> DHC, D/FSI Box 277 (Flanders), Pauncefort to Sweet, 15/10/1703

<sup>53</sup> *Ibid.*, Pauncefort to Sweet, 1/1/1703, 19/1/1703

carry it through winter quarters, 'for contrary to orders he sent you all the money that was intended to answer the stoppages on this side'.<sup>54</sup>

Moreover, British and auxiliary troops in the Low Countries were technically funded according to two separate Parliamentary votes, as well as a number of individual foreign treaties: in 1702 Ranelagh had ignored these distinctions and handled remittances not 'in a Parliamentary method' but 'in general', but in May 1703 Sweet was ordered to keep separate accounts for each treaty 'as if transacted in another office'.<sup>55</sup> Finding that Sweet had mingled balances in an account sent to the Treasury, Pauncefort chastised him, saying that

let the necessity be never so urgent or the Princes press never so much for their subsidies of last year, he [Fox] will not suffer it to be paid any other ways then as this year's money till the proper funds of last year will produce sufficient to answer them ... to heal this sore we have been providing money ... all of which must be brought into another account for the last year and not one penny of it mingled with what is solely appropriated to this, for if that is done we shall never know where we are.<sup>56</sup>

Remittances were also subject to Treasury approval. In April 1704, with the exchange to Portugal at its highest for years, Pauncefort apologised to Morrice that there would be a deliberate break in remittances, since Fox 'is not willing to agree with anybody for so large a sum but with his Lordship's approbation'.<sup>57</sup> Even when money had been secured, the insistence upon proper procedure caused problems. When complications arose for example over Danish levy money Sweet was instructed to forbear payment since 'until [Fox] has some directions in it he is not

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<sup>54</sup> BL, Add. mss 61394 fo. 114r

<sup>55</sup> DHC, D/FSI Box 277 (Flanders), Pauncefort to Sweet, 21/5/1703, 25/5/1703; BL, Add. mss 61411 fos. 190r-v; Scouller, *Armies* p. 89

<sup>56</sup> DHC, D/FSI Box 277 (Flanders), Pauncefort to Sweet, 25/4/1704

<sup>57</sup> DHC, D/FSI Box 277 (Portugal/Italy), Pauncefort to Morrice, 11/4/1704; DHC, D/FSI Box 277 (Flanders), Pauncefort to Sweet, 1/1/1703, 22/1/1703; Harold Fisher, *The Portugal trade: a study of Anglo-Portuguese commerce, 1700-1770* (London, 1971) p. 21

willing to misapply the money', and Morrice was informed in similar circumstances that it was 'not safe' to pay the Portuguese troops until formal directions had been issued.<sup>58</sup>

It is therefore incorrect to argue, as Clay has done, that Fox was merely a cipher in the Pay Office: however, his activity was clearly exercised along well-defined lines. By and large his correspondence confirms the admiring verdict of one contemporary that that he insisted upon

due caution and circumspection in the execution of his office ... for his accounts ... were found to be so regular, every circumstance of time and place so critically set down, and every sum and person so distinctly taken notice of, that no defect could any ways be found in him.<sup>59</sup>

The Pay Office mainly therefore operated in a fashion intended on the one hand to simplify the business of auditing and accounting, and on the other to support the fiscal side of the state at the expense of military effectiveness. Accounting appears to have become not merely a synonym but effectively a substitute for actual effectiveness, deployed specifically to reduce the scope for informal intermediation and coordination by networks embedded within the state.

#### **CAMPAIGNS 1703-4**

The impact of this upon the overall effectiveness of the army can be seen clearly in 'march along the Danube' in the summer of 1704, when Marlborough descended into Bavaria in a successful campaign, culminating in the victory at Blenheim on 13

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<sup>58</sup> DHC, D/FSI Box 277 (Flanders), Pouncefort to Sweet, 10/9/1703; DHC, D/FSI Box 277 (Portugal/Italy), Pouncefort to Morrice, 20/3/1705

<sup>59</sup> William Pittis, *Memoirs of the life of Sir Stephen Fox* (London, 1717) p. 88

August, to detach the Elector of Bavaria from his French alliance. Historians have long seen this as a masterpiece of political and strategic vision, and emphasised that the need to maintain the army so far from friendly territory required an immense logistical infrastructure capable of coordinating the provision of victuals and pay at such a distance.<sup>60</sup> A breakdown in payments, not only to the troops but also to the forage, bread, transport and hospital contractors risked disaster. Although the expedition was eventually a success, enjoying adequate logistical support, studies have invariably ignored the problems of finance and remittance which dogged the campaign and which were only narrowly overcome. These were caused in a large part by a profound failure of organisation and coordination that the Pay Office bureaucracy, if anything, accentuated.

These issues had already occurred in 1703 during Marlborough's campaign to clear the French out of the eastern territories of the Spanish Netherlands. Sweet had been swiftly disabused of his intention to continue supplying the army from Rotterdam while allowing small bills to be drawn on his correspondent Peter Boomhover in Maastricht.<sup>61</sup> However, plans to establish credit there collapsed within two weeks, and Colonel Archibald Rowe had to be sent to Liege to raise 20,000 crowns by drawing bills on the Pay Office in Rotterdam. This then pushed the exchange rate so high that it was decided to resume supply from Rotterdam, but it then proved impossible to transport it to a convenient forward magazine at s'Hertogenbosch and the regimental paymasters had been forced to wait for a week in Rotterdam while

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<sup>60</sup> Ivor F. Burton, *The Captain-General: the career of John Churchill, Duke of Marlborough from 1702-1711* (London, 1968) pp. 49-82; Martin van Creveld, *Supplying war: logistics from Wallenstein to Patton* (Cambridge, 2004) pp. 25-33, 41; Lynn, 'Food, funds and fortresses', pp. 143-4; Scouller, *Armies* pp. 215, 224

<sup>61</sup> BL, Add. mss 61411 fos. 194v-195r; BL, Add. mss 61395 fos. 79r, 79v

Sweet assembled the money.<sup>62</sup> Over a month later the army was still being forced to draw bills on Sweet from Liege at rates of exchange approaching 2½ or 3 percent.<sup>63</sup> Indeed so poorly coordinated was the remittance that it was only on 20 September, after at least 60,000 fl had been drawn on Sweet in Rotterdam, that his two bills for 80,000 fl on Liege and Maastricht arrived, which Cardonnel had been left 'at a great stand how to dispose of'.<sup>64</sup> The campaign in 1703 had therefore demonstrated that poor planning and coordination would leave the army without sufficient reserves of credit in Maastricht and Liege, potentially placing the whole campaign in jeopardy.

Arrangements for inland remittance in the 1704 campaign were probably discussed when Sweet had visited London in February 1704 for a series of meetings with Godolphin, Marlborough, William Blathwayt, Charles Fox, Cardonnel, Pouncefort, Ranelagh, and Moses de Medina, who had taken over from his father-in-law Sir Solomon as London agent to Machado & Pereira.<sup>65</sup> Godolphin had certainly been asked for at least a month's pay to be advanced to the army before it left its winter quarters, 'without which His Lordship was made sensible the troops could not well subsist in the field'.<sup>66</sup> Although this was released in London, Marlborough complained on 28 April and 2 May that 'Mr Pawsford [Pouncefort] is not very forward in returning the money, for we want 20,000 pounds to clear our subsistence ... instead of being in a month's advance we are in arrear'.<sup>67</sup> Part of the problem

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<sup>62</sup> BL, Add. mss 61411 fos. 196r, 200r, 202r, 206r; BL, Add. mss 61395 fos. 87v, 91v, 96v, 108r, 111v, 125v, 133r

<sup>63</sup> BL, Add. mss 61395 fos. 141r-v, 160r

<sup>64</sup> Ibid. fos. 165r, 165v

<sup>65</sup> Rabinowicz, Tapiero, and Rabb, *Sir Solomon de Medina* pp. 33-8; CTB xix, 11-13, 15, 16

<sup>66</sup> BL, Add. mss 61396 fo. 44v

<sup>67</sup> Henry Snyder (ed.), *The Marlborough-Godolphin correspondence* (Oxford, 1975) i, 278-9, 282; BL, Add. mss 61396 fos. 18v, 33v, 44v

was that urgent arrears remained from 1703, which the Pay Office in London insisted on ignoring until money was specifically made available but which Sweet had paid off with some of the cash sent out for the 1704 campaign.<sup>68</sup> Although additional funds had been ordered on 31 March, ‘there did happen an unlucky accident’ which prevented their remittance, and with both Godolphin and Lowndes out of town Fox felt unable to act until he received directions two weeks later on 18 April.<sup>69</sup> The campaign thus started with Sweet being ordered to take up money in Rotterdam as soon as possible in order to make a sufficient advance upon subsistence.<sup>70</sup> Arrangements for the payment of the advance were therefore compromised by poor coordination and an apparent timidity on the part of Fox that prevented him from acting without authority or instructions.

Procedures for inland remittance appear to have been equally confused. Advanced planning was once again necessary: Cardonnel noted to Pauncefort in June 1704 that

Mr Sweet will soon be sufficiently in cash to supply us the rest of the campaign, but the great difficulty will be in getting it as far as the Danube, the great number of troops in Germany making the specie very scarce, besides that the Elector has Ulm and Augsburg, the great towns for exchange.<sup>71</sup>

Yet Sweet had had very little time to arrange this: returning from Britain in April, he was captured by Ostend pirates *en route* and held for several weeks before being released.<sup>72</sup> Neither does the Pay Office appear to have made any attempt to

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<sup>68</sup> DHC, D/FSI Box 277 (Flanders), Pauncefort to Cardonnel, 25/4/1704, 19/5/1704; Pauncefort to Sweet, 25/4/1704, 2/5/1704

<sup>69</sup> *Ibid.*, Pauncefort to Sweet, 14/4/1704, 25/4/1704; CTB xx, 632

<sup>70</sup> BL, Add. mss 61396 fo. 46v; Snyder (ed.), *Correspondence* vol. i, 278-9, 282

<sup>71</sup> BL, Add. mss 61396 fos. 65v, 80r

<sup>72</sup> DHC, D/FSI Box 277 (Flanders), Pauncefort to Sweet, 14/4/1704, 25/4/1704; CTB xx, 632

supervise or direct measures that were technically outside its remit. It was only on 26 May that Fox enquired what arrangements had been made, and Pauncefort later reported that ‘he bids me tell you the reason ... was that he understood that my Lord Treasurer was informed he might save a great deal of money’.<sup>73</sup> Credit for the army was therefore arranged with little if any input or initiative from the Pay Office, which was best placed to coordinate effectively the transmission of money between London, Amsterdam and further inland.

The result was that the army experienced severe problems from May 1704 as it moved eastwards along the Rhine towards Bavaria. Although Sweet contrived to send 100,000 fl to the army at Maastricht, this was ‘unexpected’, and Marlborough had already ordered the army to encash bills on Sweet’s correspondent Boomhover.<sup>74</sup> The army had more success in Frankfurt when it arrived there early in June, although another of Sweet’s correspondents, Jean Nicholas Olenlager, proved excessively ‘scrupulous’ and refused to honour an improperly endorsed bill.<sup>75</sup> Cardonnel also complained that the paymasters had paid two percent more than he had for money he had raised informally on his own credit.<sup>76</sup> However, arrangements at Nuremberg were a fiasco. No credit had been established there when the army arrived later in June, so that Cardonnel was ‘very much afraid by that time the foot join us they will be quite out, and where or how to supply them God knows’.<sup>77</sup> A limited sum was secured on 12 June when Cardonnel arranged to

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<sup>73</sup> DHC, D/FSI Box 277 (Flanders), Pauncefort to Cardonnel, 19/5/1704; Pauncefort to Sweet, 26/5/1704, 9/6/1704

<sup>74</sup> BL, Add. mss 61396 fos. 56r, 56v

<sup>75</sup> Ibid. fo. 100v

<sup>76</sup> Ibid. fo. 83r

<sup>77</sup> Ibid. fo. 79v

cash a letter of credit in Frankfurt intended for the Prussian troops.<sup>78</sup> In a repeat of 1703, it was not until the end of the month that Sweet sent two letters of credit from the Amsterdam house of Messrs Clifford upon their Nuremberg correspondents, totalling 130,000 fl and 150,000 fl respectively, by which time money had already been taken up from local bankers such as Messrs Neufville & Behaghel.<sup>79</sup>

Consequently most of the money the army received was taken upon on credit: in October 1704 Cardonnel estimated that some £40,000 had been drawn from Germany in bills of exchange, and wrote to Sweet that ‘if Monsieur Behaghel had not supplied us [at Frankfurt] we should have been in a very ill condition’.<sup>80</sup> However this drew upon unfamiliar financial networks in which trust was low, imposing high transaction costs: bankers often insisted upon receiving news of the bills being cashed at Amsterdam before they would release the money in Germany<sup>81</sup>, and Cardonnel complained to Pauncefort that ‘the bankers in this country make us pay dear for this money’.<sup>82</sup> This derived in turn from the failure to establish not only prior credit but also prior connections with bankers in Germany so as to bolster trust pre-emptively. For example, in June Sweet suggested that as an interim measure the army take up credit upon him wherever they could find it. Cardonnel was astounded, writing that unlike in Flanders the army and its officers were unknown in Germany, and it was therefore impossible ‘that merchants in these parts should part with such sums to a mere stranger of whom they never heard in their lives’.<sup>83</sup> The next letter was ‘to my sorrow ... [in] perfect contradiction’ and

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<sup>78</sup> Ibid. fos. 76r, 78v, 85v, 86r, 89r, 91v

<sup>79</sup> Ibid. fos. 93r, 97v, 101r-102v

<sup>80</sup> Snyder (ed.), *Correspondence* i, 329; BL, Add. mss 61396 fos. 100v, 165v

<sup>81</sup> BL, Add. mss 61396 fos. 97r-v

<sup>82</sup> Ibid. fos. 121v, 126v

<sup>83</sup> Ibid. fos. 75r-76r, 82v-83r

equally unacceptable, since Sweet now suggested Cardonnel only take up money upon Messrs Cliffords' correspondents, such as Messrs Buretti in Frankfurt.<sup>84</sup>

Cardonnel also pointed out that without prior warning Buretti could only provide money in limited tranches of 10,000 crowns apiece, and yet 'this gentleman ... is one of your correspondents you so much value yourself upon'.

By July some of these issues had been addressed. When Cardonnel's agents were sent to Nuremberg in July they carried Sweet's letters of credit from Messrs Clifford, while the bankers had also been sent letters from Sweet, Cardonnel and the army's Frankfurt correspondents.<sup>85</sup> Further letters of credit were requested from Frankfurt to help bring down the price, to 'prevent our being imposed upon'.<sup>86</sup> Cardonnel was therefore confident that no further money would be required, especially since the army would return via Frankfurt and Maastricht where structures for remittance were already in place.<sup>87</sup> Nevertheless many of these measures took a while to coordinate, during which time the army, isolated in Germany, had no settled measures for its own supply, and the success of Marlborough's campaign therefore rested upon a knife-edge.

Finally the army was also handicapped by what might be considered a failure sufficiently to subordinate commercial incentives to the public interest. Cardonnel was alarmed to find in June that Messrs Clifford had written to Neufville & Behaghel warning them that bills drawn on Sweet in Rotterdam might be delayed or even protested, which he considered had been done 'on purpose to discredit us,

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<sup>84</sup> Ibid. fos. 97r-v

<sup>85</sup> Ibid. fo. 87r

<sup>86</sup> Ibid. fo. 141v

<sup>87</sup> Ibid. fos. 103r, 114r, 120r, 121v

making difficulties where there can be none'.<sup>88</sup> Sweet also appears to have been, at best, negligent – Cardonnel wrote to him in July that the army would 'suffer not only by the want of money but by the imposition of the bankers for want of due care on your side' – and at worst actively involved, since he had likewise pressed strongly for all bills to be taken up via the Cliffords' correspondents, although he later excused himself that he had been 'misled by the jealous[y] of the merchants'.<sup>89</sup> All in all, Cardonnel thought that the Cliffords' efforts to monopolise inland remittance and profit from commission had damaged the army's effectiveness: he wrote to them on 6 July that 'I cannot think we are much obliged to you on that score for the letter you writ to Mr Behaghel ... [which] savoured too much of your own interest and had very little regard to our credit or the good of the service'.<sup>90</sup> Thus, private networks required careful management in order to be effective, and inadequate integration into the administrative structures driven by public priorities risked undermining their operation entirely.

In conclusion, petitioning Robert Harley in 1712, Sir Stephen Fox wrote that while Paymaster of the Forces Abroad his son

took so great care of the remittances that the Duke of Marlborough said to him at the Treasury Chamber when His Grace was sitting with my Lord Treasurer, "Mr Fox, if it not been for your exactness never to have failed in furnishing the army under my command with 6 weeks pay beforehand, without I never wanted on the very day it was due, I could not have gone to the Danube, for which I do heartily thank you for your great exactness", whereupon my Lord High Treasurer turned and said to Mr Fox, "He seems we have done our business very well", so that one would have thought Mr Fox very secure.<sup>91</sup>

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<sup>88</sup> Ibid. fos. 9v-92r, 93r, 97r-v

<sup>89</sup> Ibid. fos. 83r, 97r

<sup>90</sup> Ibid. fos. 100v, 109v-110r

<sup>91</sup> BL, Add. MSS 51324 fo. 59r

This statement now appears extremely misleading, not least because the ‘great exactness’ upon which Fox insisted prevented the interlocking of public and private credit and their attendant financial networks that had sustained the war during the 1690s. Between 1703 and 1705, the Pay Office appears to have been ineffective not *despite* these rational procedures and bureaucratic forms but largely *because* of them. The corollary that will be explored in the next section is that a fundamental breakdown in military effectiveness was avoided because the numerous informal networks which had assisted the Pay Office in the 1690s appear to have expanded their activities to compensate for the vacuum left by the failure of informal intermediation.

### **INFORMAL OFFICIAL NETWORKS**

Even Fox – or his father – apparently made use of these informal networks and personal connections to encash the tallies issued to the office. For example, in February 1703 Fox was imprested some £300,000 of tallies on the Coal Act.<sup>92</sup> A Treasury document shows how at least £50,000 was distributed. At least half went to other government officials, and a quarter to merchants, goldsmiths and bankers.<sup>93</sup> One tally for £500 was assigned to a cousin-in-law Richard Dalton, another for £500 to the family client John Kent, five to Sir Samuel Moyer, Pauncefort’s father-in-law, and tallies worth £8,000 to a financial contact Lancelot Burton.<sup>94</sup> At least £200,000 was disposed of in this fashion, although by 3 September the Treasury was forced to go over Fox’s head and encash them with the Bank of England in

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<sup>92</sup> CTB xviii, 403-4

<sup>93</sup> This included £10,000 to Sir Henry Pelham, former Lord of the Treasury, and £11,000 to George Wright, Clerk of the Crown in Chancery

<sup>94</sup> Clay, *Public finance* pp. 154, 232, 237, 249; *HOP* (1690-1715) v, 114-5

return for raising the interest rate on them from four to five percent.<sup>95</sup> Similarly, the following year tallies upon the Seventh 4s Aid worth a further £7,000 with 5 percent interest were also assigned to Burton, and a further £23,500 to other merchants, officials, and courtiers, and even £3,000 to the whig MP for Middlesex Scorie Barker.<sup>96</sup> Fox therefore used private networks to dispose of the tallies he possessed, apparently often using his own and his father's contacts to do so.

Within the Pay Office itself, Edward Pouncefort also occasionally conspired with the deputy-paymasters to smooth out discrepancies and other problems in the accounts, permitting – even encouraging – the alteration of paperwork for this purpose. Noting that Major-General Stewart's regiment had been overpaid its clearings for the first half of 1703, Pouncefort wrote to Sweet that he had been forced to shift the recorded date of the last payment of some £222 from 31 May to 1 June 'to avoid so visible an excess'.<sup>97</sup> In August 1704 he reminded Morrice that the receipts taken for payments in 1703 should not run over into the current year, and 'if it should not be so, endeavour to get it altered, for it's very necessary to have it so that there may be proper vouchers to attend each year's accounts'.<sup>98</sup> Several months later he also told Richard Hill that the Duke of Savoy's accounts had been divided across 1704 and 1705 'the better to square with the annual appropriations of Parliament', and asked Hill that the receipts he took should reflect this.<sup>99</sup>

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<sup>95</sup> CTB xviii, 392-3, 396-8; BEA, G4/5 (Court of Directors: Minute-Book 'D') fos. 211, 212; BEA, G4/6 (Court of Directors: Minute-Book 'E') fo. 8

<sup>96</sup> CTB xix, 338, 403

<sup>97</sup> DHC, D/FSI Box 277 (Flanders), Pouncefort to Sweet, 19/4/1703

<sup>98</sup> DHC, D/FSI Box 277 (Portugal/Italy), Pouncefort to Morrice, 22/8/1704

<sup>99</sup> Ibid., Pouncefort to Hill, 1/12/1704

In addition, despite having no formal responsibility for Ranelagh's payments, Pouncefort recognised that the effectiveness of the army depended upon the resolution of all outstanding arrears. Remittances had been disrupted during the transition in December 1702, forcing Sweet to draw on Messrs Clifford for £10,000 by giving two bills upon Ranelagh.<sup>100</sup> Pouncefort recognised that the bill was in effect drawn upon the general credit of the Pay Office, and therefore needed to be paid 'that we may preserve your credit on Mr Fox's account'.<sup>101</sup> He therefore lobbied Marlborough, Godolphin and Lowndes to allow the payment, and managed to persuade the Cliffords' London correspondent Francis Eyles to let the bills 'sleep' in his hands until Sweet could return the necessary accounts. Pouncefort also did his best to help Ranelagh get his accounts cleared, chivvying Sweet for the accounts, vouchers and receipts from 1702 because he recognised that until the confusion was sorted out both Fox and Sweet would be still be troubled by claims for unpaid arrears: the business was therefore 'for your sake as well as my Lord R[anelagh]'s'.<sup>102</sup>

Circumstances also forced the Pay Office to loosen some of its strict financial control. Sweet was occasionally encouraged to advance the money for army, Pouncefort writing to him in November 1703 it had been impossible to secure a bill for paying off the army's clearings 'but you may depend on one by the next at sight to reimburse you if you pay [them] before it comes'.<sup>103</sup> The next year he told him that 'the service need not suffer when you can help out by borrowing for a little

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<sup>100</sup> BL, Add. mss 61135 fos. 18r-19r

<sup>101</sup> DHC, D/FSI Box 277 (Flanders), Pouncefort to Sweet, 26/1/1703, 5/3/1703, 27/4/1703; Pouncefort to Cardonnel, 9/4/1703; CTB xviii, 13, 17, 20, 36, 44, 169

<sup>102</sup> DHC, D/FSI Box 277 (Flanders), Pouncefort to Sweet, 9/4/1703, 19/4/1703, 28/9/1703, 12/5/1704; Pouncefort to Cardonnel, 9/4/1703

<sup>103</sup> *Ibid.*, Pouncefort to Sweet, 16/11/1703

time, and Mr Fox will not call that a misapplication'.<sup>104</sup> As in the 1690s, the deputy-paymaster in Flanders was also still expected to draw on informal influence so as to smooth out problems in payments: in February 1704, Pauncefort hinted to Sweet that discounting a set of bills would not be problematic, 'supposing that when you have it in your power you can order it so as to make it easier to those concerned'.<sup>105</sup> When Sweet borrowed the money from Messrs Clifford in December 1702, Ranelagh was in the process of being hounded from office by Parliament and it was unclear whether the bills would be answered, and Sweet was therefore forced to accept an extremely low rate of 10 fl 4 st, and to guarantee that the Cliffords would receive 6 percent interest on the money advanced if the bills were protested and returned by Eyles.<sup>106</sup>

Moreover, despite being prohibited from intermingling funds, Sweet nevertheless told Cardonnel in May 1703 that the army had been 'made so easy' in the last campaign because he had retained large amounts of the Danish subsidy, up to 7,000 fl in some cases, to bolster his liquidity.<sup>107</sup> The following month Sweet used bills sent out by Ranelagh to pay the Hessian troops not only 125,000 fl for the 1702 subsidy but also – on Marlborough's orders – a 75,000 fl advance for the following year, for which Fox was accountable.<sup>108</sup> This broke the rules about mingling accounts, and Pauncefort ordered that Sweet should stop further overpayments, secure two new receipts, and place the 75,000 fl from Ranelagh in his books as a credit against disbursements Sweet had already made from Fox's cash on

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<sup>104</sup> Ibid., Pauncefort to Sweet, 26/5/1704

<sup>105</sup> Ibid., Pauncefort to Sweet, 1/2/1704

<sup>106</sup> BL, Add. mss 61135 fos. 18r-19r

<sup>107</sup> BL, Add. mss 61411 fo. 193r

<sup>108</sup> DHC, D/FSI Box 277 (Flanders), Pauncefort to Sweet, 4/5/1703, 11/5/1703; BL, Add. mss 61411 fos. 198r-v

Ranelagh's account. However this rendered void a further sum of 31,250 fl that Sweet had already been sent by Fox for the second quarter of the subsidy. Sweet therefore proposed to Cardonnel that he use the credit to pay off a bill for £3,000 that he had earlier drawn on Ranelagh through Messrs Clifford but which had been protested in London, and use it to rescue his credit there before it was ruined by news of the protest, 'bills of exchange [being] sacred things in this world'.<sup>109</sup> This episode demonstrates the labyrinthine complexity of Sweet's financial dealings, yet it was precisely this confusion of accounts, so vexing to the Treasury and the Pay Office, that enabled Sweet to advance the Hessian troops 75,000 fl when Marlborough requested it and then skilfully redirect other cash in order to preserve his credit with commercial financiers.

Indeed, under circumstances of greater trust – deriving from direct appointment and common ideological loyalties – Thomas Morrice in Lisbon was allowed even greater leeway. Throughout 1704 Pouncefort continually permitted him to use money appropriated for set purposes 'for other more pressing services' such as the subsistence of the British troops.<sup>110</sup> In March 1704, when Godolphin refused to contract for remittances to Lisbon until the rates fell, Pouncefort bought up on the open market over £4,641 in small bills that Morrice might use in an emergency until funds arrived, even though 'this way of providing will be very troublesome both to you and me'.<sup>111</sup> Even Fox relaxed somewhat his strict supervision, and gave Morrice permission 'to act in those matters as you shall think most proper and safe',

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<sup>109</sup> BL, Add. mss 61395 fos. 98r, 111v; BL, Add. mss 61411 fo. 208r

<sup>110</sup> DHC, D/FSI Box 277 (Portugal/Italy), Pouncefort to Morrice, 15/2/1704, 29/2/1704, 8/3/1704, 5/12/1704

<sup>111</sup> *Ibid.*, Pouncefort to Morrice, 28/3/1704, 4/4/1704, 11/4/1704

or ‘do what appears most for the ease and benefit of the service’.<sup>112</sup> The higher levels of trust between Pauncefort and his more partisan paymaster therefore permitted a greater level of freedom, which – as in the 1690s – helped to cushion and absorb some of the largest fluctuations in remittances and thereby maintained the liquidity of the army.

Extensive accounts and correspondence relating to the Low Countries also indicate that financial pressures were eased through the continued incorporation of private credit and capital from other, often more illicit, sources. Up to 1705 Sweet held for Marlborough the profits of the 2½ percent deduction – ostensibly for contingencies – made from every sum that passed through his hands.<sup>113</sup> In 1711 this deduction would form the centrepiece of a tory campaign against Marlborough, but if the accounts drawn up by Sweet in 1712 in his defence are accurate then between May 1702 and November 1703 payments worth over 236,000 fl were made to this account, including 162,350 fl invested in 4% Bonds issued by the Province of Holland.<sup>114</sup> Both the cash and the bonds were evidently liquid and would have constituted a formidable security against which Sweet could have issued short-term bills, assignments or promissory notes, as Hill had done in the 1690s, to answer temporary demands upon an inflexible cash flow. Indeed Sweet himself appears to have possessed sufficient ready money to act as a correspondent to Sir Henry Furnese, as he had done at the end of 1697, encashing bills for him worth £165,833 between January 1703 and December 1704, some 15.1% percent of Furnese’s total business.<sup>115</sup>

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<sup>112</sup> Ibid., Pauncefort to Morrice, 30/5/1704, 11/7/1704

<sup>113</sup> See below p. 260

<sup>114</sup> BL, Add. mss 61406 fos. 3v, 14v

<sup>115</sup> DHC, D/FSI Box 277 (Flanders), *passim*

In order to do this he appears to have drawn upon his own informal financial network, such as Etienne Caillaud, a Huguenot banker and minister in Rotterdam who was also agent to the Walloon regiment of the Baron de Walleff, and encashed large numbers of bills for him before 1705.<sup>116</sup> As noted above, he also may well have collaborated with Messrs Clifford. The relationship was so close that when Furnese had decided not to use the Cliffords as correspondents in 1703, Sweet colluded with them to squeeze out the incumbent, Abraham Romswinkel: John Drummond reported to James Brydges in October 1705 that

about a year ago Sir H[enry Furnese] deserted Clifford and employed altogether one Mr Romswinkel here, who did the business for some time with much credit and reputation, but your commissary [Benjamin Sweet] and Clifford joining together made this Gentleman worried of it and assign it to Sir H[enry] ... so the whole returned into Clifford's hands where it still continues ... When Mr Romswinkel had the payment he was forced to pay Sir Henry's great bills on him to a day and so was obliged to sell bank money at any rate; now Mr Clifford having as much ease from your *commis* here as the army paymasters give him, it makes the business very easy to him.<sup>117</sup>

Five years later, Drummond again remarked that 'they chose their party very early'.<sup>118</sup> Sweet was therefore able to exploit his position, as John Drummond did his, at the centre of a series of interlocking networks in order to coordinate the flow of public and private money, although clearly the public good was not always his priority. Informal intermediation, as in the 1690s, could therefore smooth out remittances, but only within the limits allowed by Fox's instructions and his continued concern for proper bureaucratic procedure where possible.

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<sup>116</sup> HL, ST58 i, 256-7; BL, Add. mss 61397 fo. 138v; BL, Add. mss 61398 fo. 177v; BL, Add. mss 61402 fo. 196v

<sup>117</sup> HL, ST58 i, 46; NAS, GD24/1/464/A/37, Vanderheiden to Drummond, 16/9/1704

<sup>118</sup> HL, ST58 vi, 199

Sweet and Morrice also remained dependent upon cooperation from other officials and the political and administrative leverage that Fox could exercise. When Sweet experienced difficulties settling the 1703 accounts with the regimental agents, Pauncefort wrote to Cardonnel asking that Marlborough settle the matter: Cardonnel replied that although the regiments had objected ‘my Lord Duke has overruled [them] ... so Mr Fox may be no longer hindered in making up his accounts’.<sup>119</sup> However as Fox’s own political standing fell the effectiveness of the office appears to have declined accordingly. Pauncefort told Morrice in June 1704 that he had advised Fox to delay remonstrating with Methuen over a muster roll ‘for fear it might make him more uneasy with you [Morrice] than one would have him at least till you have entirely settled accounts’.<sup>120</sup> By August 1704, Pauncefort was forced to admit that it was proving impossible for Fox to complete the accounts ‘of others over whom he can have no influence’.<sup>121</sup> Finally, in January 1705 – after Fox had voted for the Tack, and was therefore for all intents and purposes a political lame duck – Pauncefort was forced to admit that ‘our master has been endeavouring to lay this whole matter before my Lord Treasurer ... but has not had admittance yet about it’.<sup>122</sup> Fox’s own increasing political weakness therefore prevented him from overcoming the problems of coordination that his own insistence upon proper paperwork imposed.

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<sup>119</sup> BL, Add. mss 61396 fo. 127r; DHC, D/FSI Box 277 (Flanders), Pauncefort to Cardonnel, 23/6/1704, 15/8/1704; Pauncefort to Sweet, 23/6/1704, 4/7/1704, 28/7/1704, 11/8/1704

<sup>120</sup> DHC, D/FSI Box 277 (Portugal/Italy), Pauncefort to Morrice, 20/6/1704; *HOP* (1660-90) iii, 1101

<sup>121</sup> DHC, D/FSI Box 277 (Portugal/Italy), Pauncefort to Morrice, 8/8/1704

<sup>122</sup> *Ibid.*, Pauncefort to Morrice, 10/1/1705

## INFORMAL UNOFFICIAL NETWORKS

This section will argue that these shortcomings meant that a constellation of other agents emerged as financial intermediaries, capable of further filling this void and coordinating the incorporation of other sources of private credit. During the Blenheim campaign the key figure was Marlborough's private secretary, Adam Cardonnel, notwithstanding his disingenuous disclaimer that 'I have been very little concerned in [this matter], more than by assisting in getting of credit'.<sup>123</sup> When Sweet's correspondent in Frankfurt, Monsr Olenlager, refused to pay out a bill in May 1704 the situation was only retrieved by Cardonnel drawing a bill for 4,736 fl upon the Huguenot bankers Messrs Neufville & Behaghel.<sup>124</sup> Because the future supply remained uncertain, and Olenlager 'very backward', Cardonnel ended up drawing some 170,000 fl on them over the next five months, and secured their letters of introduction to bankers in Nuremberg to allow them to take up money there.<sup>125</sup> Problems of coordination were therefore overcome by the intermediation of trusted informal networks: Cardonnel told Sweet on 12 June that 'what I procured from Messrs Behaghel and Neufville was from old acquaintance, and letters writ to them from Holland'.<sup>126</sup>

Moreover, he was also able to exploit his official standing and powers to coordinate with greater effectiveness the direct supply of money to the army. On 12 July 1704 for example he drew a bill in Frankfurt for 960 fl to enable Henry Davenant, the

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<sup>123</sup> BL, Add. mss 61396 fos. 141r-v, 165r. This comment was made in the context of an investigation into advantages gained from exchange rates.

<sup>124</sup> Ibid. fos. 64v, 70v, 100v

<sup>125</sup> Ibid. fos. 65r-v, 87v, 172v

<sup>126</sup> Ibid. fo. 75r; CTP ii, 447; Behaghel also acted as the Frankfurt correspondent for Richard Hill: see William Blackley (ed.), *The Diplomatic Correspondence of the Right Hon. Richard Hill* (London, 1845) vol. ii, 704

British diplomatic envoy in that city, to purchase a wagon and four horses to transport the 100,000 fl to the army.<sup>127</sup> Recognising the importance of coordinating the accounts of money received and disbursed in Holland and Germany, and the impossibility of Sweet dealing with each individual paymaster, he offered in May 1704 to appoint a correspondent who would act as a point of contact: ‘this I believe would be a very great help to you, and I can think of none fitter for it than Mr [Florance] Kane of Rowe’s regiment’.<sup>128</sup> Kane had over fifteen years of service in this regiment, the Royal Scotch Fusiliers, and Rowe himself was not only closely involved with the remittances in 1703 but, possibly coincidentally, had also married a niece of Sir Stephen Fox, whom he named his executor.<sup>129</sup> Cardonnel subsequently also acted as a point of contact between Sweet and Kane, who exercised this role until at least 1706.<sup>130</sup> Notwithstanding the absence of Pay Office officials – Cardonnel wrote to Sweet on 25 August that ‘I wish my Lord Treasurer or you had sent somebody with us to have managed this matter’ – he was therefore nevertheless able to construct a close-knit informal network, apparently bound together by mutual trust, to exercise the necessary functions with a high degree of efficiency.<sup>131</sup>

The army also continued to be supported by the private credit of a range of officers and officials, who often secured small, short-term sums to smooth over the gaps. Regimental paymasters and agents were permitted to take up credit in the field<sup>132</sup>,

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<sup>127</sup> BL, Add. mss 61396 fo. 109r

<sup>128</sup> Ibid. fo. 56v. For Kane, who later became the Second Major at Chelsea Hospital, see Dalton, *Army Lists* vol. iii, 264; Charles Dean, *The Royal Hospital, Chelsea* (London, 1950) pp. 180-1

<sup>129</sup> BL, Add. mss 61395 fo. 96v; BL, Add. mss 61396 fos. 66r, 70r-v, 71v, 97r; DHC, Fox-Strangeways MSS, D/FSI Box 235, Bundle 2 (Army Payments); Clay, *Public finance* p. 332

<sup>130</sup> BL, Add. mss 61396 fos. 65v, 97v, 99v, 109r, 119v; HL, ST58 i, 5, 119

<sup>131</sup> BL, Add. mss 61396 fo. 141r

<sup>132</sup> Ibid. fos. 65v, 66r, 66v

and in December 1704 Silvester Stuckley, agent to the regiment of Lord North and Grey, wrote to him that he was now owed over £300 by Captain George Green, the regimental paymaster, ‘a great deal of money to be out of pocket without any manner of interest’.<sup>133</sup> When John Drummond was approached in 1704 to act as *solliciteur-militair* for the Prussian forces, he was assured by his partner Jan Vanderheiden that ‘you could easily manage the business so that you be not obliged to be any thing in advance for the court’, indicating that an agent or *solliciteur* was usually expected to utilise his own credit for the support of the regiment.<sup>134</sup> In 1709 Drummond noted that the baron d’Algywyk, *solliciteur* to the Hessian troops, had ‘raised or taken up money here from his German banker’ upon the credit of remittances from England.<sup>135</sup> This can be seen in greatest detail in the accounts of William Leathes as regimental agent to the Royal Regiment of Ireland. His brother, Captain Moses Leathes, was the regimental paymaster, and close links between John Drummond and William Leathes as agents for the Ordnance allowed Moses to draw bills on Drummond when required.<sup>136</sup> In 1708 Moses received and paid out money received informally from Drummond, occasionally drawing private bills on his brother or Drummond to cover payment, as well as allowing officers to draw on ‘my Banck here’ or directly on his brother in Amsterdam.<sup>137</sup> This process of coordination and informal financial intermediation, even at a relatively small scale, was of definite utility, allowing Moses to boast in November 1708 that ‘I’m still a

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<sup>133</sup> Bod. Lib., MS North a.3 fos. 43r-44r

<sup>134</sup> NAS, GD24/1/464/A/29, Vanderheiden to Drummond, 7/2/1704

<sup>135</sup> HL, ST58 iv, 107-8

<sup>136</sup> Suff. RO, de Mussenden Leathes MSS, HA403/T1039/1 fos. 12r, 14r; Suff. RO, HA403/T1039/7 fo. 43r

<sup>137</sup> Suff. RO, HA403/T1039/1 fos. 20r, 24r, 28r, 30r, 38r, 39r; Suff. RO, de Mussenden Leathes MSS, HA403/T1039/5 fos. 654, 655

week at least before the other 4 regiments and our officers have not yet wanted, as the others have'.<sup>138</sup>

Finally, proactive intermediation was the *quid pro quo* expected of military remittance contractors, and the effectiveness of the army relied in part upon the cooperation that they were prepared to extend.<sup>139</sup> In 1704 the failure by Messrs Cliffords to conform to these expected standards lowered trust, and loosened the ties of mutual obligation identified in the previous chapter: Cardonnel wrote to Sweet on 1 July that now he would 'not be over-fond of their credit or profit ... and [I] am glad we are like to have no further occasion for such friends'.<sup>140</sup> Nevertheless, contractors mostly appear to have been willing, as in the 1690s, to accommodate problems in supply and cushion their impact. In December 1703, rather than delay remittances while the exchange rates and agio were negotiated, the three contractors in London provided Sweet with £40,000 in a series of small bills 'for the conveniency of discounting them' and ordered their correspondents to discount them at his request.<sup>141</sup> When an exchange rate was then settled a week later, they ordered the correspondents to pay the bills immediately at face value rather than profit from discounting them.<sup>142</sup> In 1704, when problems occurred securing money away from the Low Countries, Cardonnel was surprised by the arrival of the Hamburg merchant Francis Stratford at camp with an offer to provide cheap bills on Holland for the army. Cardonnel replied that this was several months too late, since sufficient credit had already been secured at the higher rates, 'but', as he then wrote

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<sup>138</sup> Suff. RO, HA403/T1039/1 fo. 30r

<sup>139</sup> For the assistance offered by remittance contractors in the eighteenth century, see Kaplan, *Rothschild* pp. 116-20; Baker, *Government and contractors* pp. 181-2

<sup>140</sup> BL, Add. mss 61396 fo. 97v

<sup>141</sup> DHC, D/FSI Box 277 (Flanders), Pauncefort to Sweet, 14/12/1703, 21/12/1703

<sup>142</sup> *Ibid.*, Pauncefort to Sweet, 14/12/1703, 21/12/1703

to Sweet, ‘tis all Sir Henry Furnese’s doings and ‘tis partly on his score I suppose that he comes’.<sup>143</sup> Crucial amounts of credit were therefore acquired through various unofficial and informal intermediaries, who expanded their operations in an example of the backwards- or forwards-integration that David Hancock has linked with eighteenth-century commercial entrepreneurialism.<sup>144</sup>

## REMITTANCE CONTRACTORS

Remittance contractors, Furnese more so than others, therefore offered vital services to the army that were beyond their formal remit, but which thereby helped to overcome some of the problems for which army officials were unable to compensate. Reconstructing the networks they utilised suggests that, as in the 1690s, contractors continued to be dependent upon personal connections and informal networks in order to bolster their effectiveness. In the case of Furnese, who after 1705 was awarded a monopoly of all future remittance contracts, there is evidence to suggest that the introduction of partisanship expanded both the size and strength of Furnese’s domestic networks, allowing him to borrow more widely and presumably at cheaper rates, thereby improving both his effectiveness and commercial competitiveness. Certainly in 1706 Drummond commented to James Brydges, the Paymaster of the Forces Abroad, that ‘I believe he [Gibbon] serves the Board at least as well as the other [Furnese] does your office’.<sup>145</sup>

The survival of a complete listing of bills remitted overseas to Flanders, Portugal and Italy during these three years allows a detailed reconstruction of the relative

<sup>143</sup> BL, Add. mss 61396 fos. 114r, 120r, 121v, 129v

<sup>144</sup> Hancock, *Oceans* pp. 133, 211-6

<sup>145</sup> HL, ST57 i, 62; HL, ST58 i, 50

importance of individual remitters and correspondents. These show that a small clique of financiers controlled much of the European end of the remittance business. In Flanders between 1703 and 1704 most of the bills passed through just two hands: Abraham Romswinkel took £588,099 or 32.3 percent and the brothers George and Isaac Clifford £745,121 or 41.0 percent. A further 9.8 percent was handled by Nicholas Reeve in Rotterdam, accounting for 93.2 percent of all the bills drawn on that city. In Portugal the firm of Milner, Bulteel & Baudoin dealt with 72.6 percent of all outward remittances, and a further 26.1 percent was handled by Ellis Ferrell and Hopkins, Bellamy & Co., while in Italy the firm of Columba & Calein in Turin dealt with just under 81.6 percent of all the monies sent out. The British end was more diverse, at least up to 1705. Portuguese payments were dominated by Furnese, who handed 85.1 percent of the outward remittances, although this falls to 62.7 percent once the bills Methuen and Morrice drew from Lisbon are included. In Flanders, Furnese handled 60.6 percent of the remittances, a further 33.9 percent was split amongst four others: Sir Theodore Janssen, the two Huguenot firms of Tourton & Guiguer and Coureau, Baudouin, Santini & Signoreta, and the various partnerships of Sir Stephen Evance. In Italy Janssen remitted only 32.0 percent of payments, with most of the remaining two-thirds being split equally between three other firms. Thus, up to 1705 remittances were handled by small coterie of financiers in which one normally possessed a dominant but not a monopolistic share.

Examining these networks also demonstrates that trust, mostly created through personal linkages, remained the cement that held these together. Both Jewish and Huguenot remitters appear to have drawn extensively upon their co-religionists in

Flanders and Italy. James Milner made most of his remittances to Portugal through the firm of Milner, Bulteel & Baudoin, while Janssen sent at least £25,060 or 18.7% of his business through his brother Andrew Janssen in Rotterdam, whom he had employed in the 1690s. Both Furnese and Janssen dealt almost exclusively with prior contacts such as Messrs Cliffords and Abraham Romswinkel in Amsterdam, Nicholas Reeve in Rotterdam, and Jacob de Connick in Antwerp whom they had employed in the 1690s, although as noted above this trust was not always reciprocated, by Messrs Clifford at least. The importance of personal trust in the creation of such linkages is further reinforced by the fact that in 1705 Richard Hill had approached John Drummond to act as an intermediary in the remittance of money from Britain to Savoy via Holland.<sup>146</sup>

It is also possible to reconstruct to some extent the domestic networks that contributed to Furnese's effectiveness, by allowing him to extend more credit and at lower rates than other remitters. Although he had substantial holdings in land, including an annual rent roll in Kent variously calculated as worth £5,567 or £13,000 per annum<sup>147</sup>, the credit he offered was not drawn from his own holdings: in 1710 Drummond informed Robert Harley that 'all his ready money is laid out on land, and what he undertakes is by credit as well as others do', strongly suggesting that his competitive advantage derived from the strength of his personal commercial or financial networks<sup>148</sup>. In the absence of any surviving papers, the only outline of his domestic connections comes from two Treasury documents listing the bills, worth around £30,871, that he sent to Messrs Clifford in Holland between July and

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<sup>146</sup> NAS, GD24/1/464/A/26, Vanderheiden to Drummond, 3/2/1704; BL, Add. mss 62526 fo. 77r

<sup>147</sup> Sperling, 'Public credit', p. 206

<sup>148</sup> HMC Portland iv, 583

December 1705 in order to establish credit there for remittances.<sup>149</sup> These lists provide an unequalled cross-section through Furnese's network, albeit at a slightly later point. Some 91 bills were sent, drawn by 58 individuals or firms, nearly three quarters on Amsterdam, around twenty percent on Hamburg, and the remainder on Livorno, Genoa and Rotterdam. Judging by the surnames, only 16 bills or 17.6% were drawn by Jewish merchants, but these accounted for £11,910 or just under 38.7% by value. By contrast, 13 bills worth £2,567 were drawn by definite or probable Huguenot merchants, accounting for 14.3% by number but only 8.34% by value. The remainder consisted of £3,200 drawn on the Quaker merchant Edward Haistwell<sup>150</sup>, a number drawn on alien or naturalized Dutch merchants such as Sir Theodore Janssen, and a number on a variety of British merchants and bankers. These suggest that Jewish financial networks may have played an important role in establishing Furnese's credit in Amsterdam, on which he drew for public remittances, but that he also maintained a wide ranging network of contacts from whom he could purchase bills for credit that they had established abroad.

The occupational profile of many of these contacts shows certain patterns.

Although some drawers were army contractors, or tobacco merchants such as Haistwell, by far the majority were men involved in some aspect of the textile industry or trade. These included the Leeds textile dealer and lukewarm tory William Milner<sup>151</sup>, the clothworker John Whittle<sup>152</sup>, and the draper Thomas

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<sup>149</sup> TNA, T1/95/37; T1/96/116. I can find no indication in the Treasury Books of why these lists were created. The Bank of England Drawing Ledgers (BEA, C98) record Furnese's transactions at considerable length but do not distinguish those intended for foreign remittances, and are therefore of little use.

<sup>150</sup> Price, *Tobacco adventure* pp. 106-7

<sup>151</sup> R.G. Wilson, *Gentlemen merchants: the merchant community in Leeds, 1700-1830* (Manchester, 1971) pp. 155, 246; Christie, *'Non-elite' MPs* pp. 61, 63; *HOP* (1715-1754) ii, 260

<sup>152</sup> London (1710), p. 33; London (1713), p. 126

Nisbett.<sup>153</sup> Several more, such as David Martin<sup>154</sup> or the Huguenot Simon Le Blanc<sup>155</sup>, were involved in the import or export of textiles such as silk, calico, and linen. As a textile merchant himself<sup>156</sup>, this suggests that Furnese was able to exploit the trust arising from existing commercial contacts to source the bills he needed to fulfil his public contracts, although admittedly the high volume of textile exports during this period would perhaps have made it inevitable most foreign bills would be linked to this trade.

Another, more significant, characteristic of these connections is the strong partisanship that they shared, as revealed by cross-referencing their names with surviving poll books from elections in 1705, 1710 and 1713. Only eight bills valued at £1,630 or 5.3% of the whole were drawn by identifiable tories. These included men with whom Furnese shared occupational connections, such as his tory brother-in-law Thomas Vernon<sup>157</sup>, or the linen-draper William Luce.<sup>158</sup> Nevertheless the vast majority of the bills purchased, both by volume and value, had been drawn by merchants and financiers of distinctly whiggish complexions and sympathies. At least £2,400 was sent in bills drawn by Walter Cock, a Surrey merchant who voted for whig candidates in the 1705 and 1710 elections.<sup>159</sup> Several were also bought up from Richard Cock, either a merchant tailor or glover, both of whom voted for a whig slate in 1710.<sup>160</sup> Bills worth £950 were bought from Henry Boock, an Amsterdam merchant involved in a whig political club in 1715, and £580 from the

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<sup>153</sup> London (1710), p. 52; London (1713), p. 106

<sup>154</sup> *Journal of the Board of Trade* iv, 112-8

<sup>155</sup> D. W. Jones, 'London merchants and the crisis of the 1690s', in Peter Clark and Paul Slack (eds.), *Crisis and order in English towns, 1500-1700: essays in urban history* (London, 1972) pp. 328-9

<sup>156</sup> Jones, *War and economy* pp. 84-91; *HOP* (1690-1715) iii, 1125-6

<sup>157</sup> *HOP* (1690-1715) v, 749-50

<sup>158</sup> London (1710), p. 24

<sup>159</sup> *The poll for Knights of the Shire for the county of Surrey* (London, 1705) p. 5; *The poll for Knights of the Shire for the county of Surrey* (London, 1710) p. 12

<sup>160</sup> London (1710) p. 111

merchant Robert Hackshaw, who not only voted for whig candidates in the London elections but had been arrested in 1685 for circulating defamatory pamphlets about the death of the whig earl of Essex in the Tower of London in 1683.<sup>161</sup> Other ones had been drawn by whig merchants such as Sir Randolph Knipe and Sir Isaac Rebow, or the Irish bankers Alexander and Henry Cairnes.<sup>162</sup> Alongside these visible whigs were the numerous Jews, Huguenots and Dissenters who existed outside the formal electorate but nevertheless, it is argued, commonly entertained whig views.<sup>163</sup> These lists therefore demonstrate that – as with Sir Stephen Fox – the domestic networks constructed by Furnese were marked by personal connections, many of them political, suggesting that a common political identity or allegiance created mutual trust that allowed access to alternative sources of credit and at lower rates.

## CONCLUSION

This chapter has therefore argued that, in the initial years of the War of the Spanish Succession, military effectiveness continued to depend upon the constant intermediation and incorporation of private credit, as well as a flexible approach to financial matters, in order to maintain the liquidity of the army and prioritise the discharge of most urgent needs. It has also argued that the operation and effects of the political partisanship that had dominated military-fiscal matters during the Nine Years War became far more visible in the hot-house environment of the early years of Anne's reign. Financial networks were suffused with partisan loyalties, which

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<sup>161</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 145; London (1713), p. 50, 90; CSPD (1684-5) p. 271, 306

<sup>162</sup> *HOP* (1690-1715) v, 262-4; Price, *Tobacco adventure* p. 106; *HIP* iii, 357-9

<sup>163</sup> *HOP* (1690-1715) i, 207-11; De Krey, *Fractured society*; de Krey, *London*; Holmes, *Politics* pp. 97-108

offered a range of overlapping and intersecting connections between officials, politicians and financiers and encouraged mutual trust and cooperation. As a result, a figure such as John Drummond – entirely outside the formal structures of government – was enabled to make important contributions to military effectiveness by coordinating and consolidating a variety of revenue streams. Where problems occurred, it was often where administration was insufficiently partisanised, and where tory officials such as Thomas Morrice at Lisbon were forced to coordinate efforts with whig officials such as John Methuen with whom mutual trust was lacking.

However, it is also evident that partisan networks by themselves only ever represented a potentiality; they needed to be actuated in order to make a contribution. The fiscal-military state continued to depend upon the coordination of external resources such as social, political and financial capital in order to function, a process that required the devolution of trust, responsibility and discretion by principals to their overseas agents. Where such trust was lacking, and informal coordination prohibited, bureaucratic systems were unable to substitute effectiveness: indeed, in some conditions they actually made matters worse. If the problem throughout the 1690s was that Ranelagh lacked the close financial networks necessary to back a much broader process of informal financial intermediation, the problem between 1702 and 1705 was that Fox refused to allow his networks to be used for this purpose. Although various peripheral bodies – the deputy-paymasters, ambassadors, Marlborough's private secretary, regimental agents and paymasters, and remittance contractors – attempted to compensate, they were unable to engross these functions entirely because they were unable to

coordinate their efforts fully, in no small part because they lacked a common partisan identity. Successful military remittance, and the wider effectiveness of the fiscal-military state, therefore required a Paymaster-General with both partisan networks and a willingness to put them into operation.

## **CHAPTER 5: THE LOW COUNTRIES 1705-13**

Charles Fox was dismissed as Paymaster of the Forces Abroad in June 1705, mainly because of his support for the Tack, the effort by hard-line and High Church tories in November 1704 to append to a supply bill a clause attacking Dissenters and penalising the practice of Occasional Conformity.<sup>1</sup> Fox's departure was part of a wider reconfiguration by the duumvirs that saw similarly partisan figures such as the earl of Nottingham leave office, to be replaced by a broad-bottom ministry of court politicians and moderate tories with qualified support from the whigs.<sup>2</sup>

Crucial offices were given to tory politicians of less extreme views, such as Robert Harley and Henry St John. Fox was replaced by the Hon. James Brydges, son of the eighth Baron Chandos and by 1705 a man of roughly the same political stripe: indeed, he wrote to Harley in 1711 that they had 'come into business about the same time and upon the same principle'.<sup>3</sup> More immediately, Brydges was a political client of the duke of Marlborough and a supporter of the duumvirs' political programme, '[which] nothing shall be wanting on my part', he promised, 'towards promoting and rendering successful'.<sup>4</sup> His own merits had secured his appointment to the Commission of Public Accounts in 1701 but it was Marlborough's influence that gave him his seat on the Admiralty Council between 1702 and 1705.<sup>5</sup> His friend, the tory political economist Charles Davenant, encouraged him in 1704 not to undervalue himself, while another friend, the theologian and linguist William

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<sup>1</sup> BL Add. mss 51324 fo. 59r; Clay, *Public finance* pp. 270-2

<sup>2</sup> Holmes, *Politics* pp. 101-3, 198-9, 260-9, 372-5; H.T. Dickinson, *Bolingbroke* (London, 1970) pp. 41-5; Angus McInnes, *Robert Harley, Puritan politician* (London, 1970) pp. 75-6; Brian W. Hill, *Robert Harley, speaker, secretary of state, and premier minister* (New Haven, 1988) pp. 83-5; *HOP* (1690-1715) iv, 244-69; v, 339-47

<sup>3</sup> HL, ST57 v, 75-6

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*, 248, 256-7, 260, 262-3

<sup>5</sup> *Ibid.*, 255-6, 248; Baker & Baker, *Chandos* pp. 7-41; *HOP* (1690-1715) iii, 377-83

Wotton, later commented that he had been appointed Paymaster because he was ‘known to be in every way fit for it: your honour, integrity, quality and capacity, made you (perhaps) the fittest man in the kingdom to be trusted with so weighty a charge’.<sup>6</sup>

This chapter will analyse Brydges’ conduct as Paymaster of the Forces in the Low Countries during this period. Drawing extensively upon his extensive private letter-books at the Huntington Library, which existing studies have arguably largely ignored or misinterpreted, it will suggest that in the Low Countries he materially contributed to the effectiveness of the army through informal financial intermediation. As a partisan tory he had privileged access to a wide-ranging and close-knit network of contacts, but his entrepreneurial character – Arthur Onslow later wrote that he was ‘a bubble to every project and a dupe to men that nobody else almost would keep company with’<sup>7</sup> – meant that he was prepared to exploit these connections. Thus, although David Hayton, John Sperling, Godfrey Davies and others have written of ‘the egregious James Brydges, perhaps the most disreputable of all government servants of this period ... a byword for corruption’ this chapter will present a far more nuanced analysis of his activities.<sup>8</sup> Without necessarily contradicting the arguments of D.W. Jones and P.G.M Dickson that prevailing economic conditions and Godolphin’s mastery of the Treasury and public finance continued to impact on the effectiveness of military finance, this chapter will argue that Brydges acted as a key financial intermediary, using his personal

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<sup>6</sup> HL, ST58 viii, 141; Baker & baker, *Life and circumstances* pp. 23, 65, 83; Godfrey Davies and Marjorie Scofield, ‘Letters of Charles Davenant’, *The Huntington Library Quarterly*, 4 (1941) pp. 309-13; ODNB ‘Wotton, William (1666-1727)’ (2011)

<sup>7</sup> Quoted in Baker & baker, *Chandos* p. 337

<sup>8</sup> Baker & baker, *Chandos* pp. 47-9, 51-8; Davies, ‘Seamy Side’ pp. 21-44; Sperling, ‘Public credit’ pp. 138-40; *HOP* (1690-1715) iii, 378, 383-4, 387

credit and contacts to underwrite the wider effectiveness of the British fiscal-military state overseas.

### **LOW-LEVEL FINANCE 1705-13**

James Brydges served as Paymaster of the Forces Abroad between 1705 and 1713, controlling the flow of money to Flanders through and beyond all of Marlborough's remaining campaigns. In 1706 Marlborough managed to bring the French army to battle at the decisive engagement at Ramillies, which enabled him to reconquer the remainder of the Spanish Netherlands and capture Antwerp and Dunkirk.<sup>9</sup> After a year of consolidation, the battle of Oudenarde in 1708 allowed Marlborough to advance beyond his borders into France and capture the crucial frontier fortress of Lille after a protracted siege. This opened the way for an advance on Paris, but although the battle of Malplaquet in 1709 ended with an allied victory it was a pyrrhic one, since severe losses prevented Marlborough from advancing on Paris. Nevertheless, exhausted by warfare, Louis XIV opened negotiations with the allies, which ultimately proved unsuccessful because they insisted not only that the Bourbon claimant the duc of Anjou give up the Spanish throne – the so-called 'no Peace without Spain' – but also that Louis XIV commit himself to enforcing this if Anjou refused. These terms proved unacceptable, and thus the war continued after 1710.

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<sup>9</sup> Burton, *Captain-General* pp. 83-162

The severity of the terms that Britain and the allies demanded reflected in part the political changes that occurred between 1705 and 1710.<sup>10</sup> The moderate tory ministry created by the duumvirs, reliant upon whig support at crucial points, was inherently unstable, and Marlborough and Godolphin were increasingly forced into a closer alliance with the Junto whigs and others. This came to a head in November 1707, when a clerk in Harley's office was accused of misconduct, and in February 1708 both he and St John left the ministry, having attempted to lure Marlborough away to form a more stable moderate tory government without Godolphin. As a result, the duumvirs were increasingly forced to bring the whig Junto and its allies into government, particularly Charles Spencer, earl of Sunderland as Secretary of State, to complement 'Lord Treasurer's whigs' such as Robert Walpole as Secretary at War who were already part of the ministry but not necessarily aligned with Junto policies. In strategic terms, the overall impact was an increased insistence within the ministry that the war not be concluded without a Habsburg succession in Spain that would not only protect the Spanish Netherlands from French control but also grant Britain privileged commercial access to Spanish colonies in America.

Brydges therefore served as Paymaster of the Forces at a time when greater financial demands were being made upon the army, increasing the need for informal intermediation capable of cushioning some of their worst effects. As shown in the previous chapter, some of the slack continued to be taken up by officials and officers, with credit also being provided by bread, forage and hospital contractors, especially in their reluctant acceptance of increasing arrears.<sup>11</sup> Finally Benjamin

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<sup>10</sup> Holmes, *Politics* pp. 220-42; Hill, *Robert Harley* pp. 101-32

<sup>11</sup> BL, Add. mss 61398 fos. 150v-152r; BL, Add. mss 61399 fos. 135v-136r; BL, Add. mss 61401 fos. 24v, 50v, 78v, 87r, 89r; BL, Add. mss 61402 fos. 36v-37v, 45v, 52r, 102v; HL, ST57 iv, 265; HL, ST58 vi, 95

Sweet, reluctantly retained as deputy-paymaster, appears to have continued to engage in his own informal financial intermediation. The following sections will argue that these mirrored, upon a small scale, Brydges' own increasingly elaborate and sophisticated financial interventions, which contributed materially to the effectiveness and operational efficiency of the British army in the Low Countries. The system was only restricted by the limits of trust within the networks employed, and by the failure of Brydges either to absorb Sweet into these linkages or exclude him entirely.

### **INLAND REMITTANCES**

One of the issues was inland remittance for the army. As was previously noted, in 1704 the Hamburg merchant Francis Stratford had cooperated with Sir Henry Furnese to remit money from Amsterdam to Germany.<sup>12</sup> In 1705 and 1706 Stratford was again employed, this time in collaboration with William Cadogan, Marlborough's trusted chief of staff, 'to pillage the army, pretending to give them credit by supplying them with money in Germany', as Sweet later wrote.<sup>13</sup> Indeed, in 1706 Brydges proposed that Stratford act as a 'banker' to the army, remitting them money from Amsterdam at a fixed rate 'that they themselves shall allow to be fair and reasonable ... let the army be where they will'.<sup>14</sup> Sperling has suggested this was a corrupt venture intended to exploit the profits of exchange, but Brydges, Cadogan, Marlborough and Cardonnell all wrote to Godolphin that the army preferred to receive the species at a fixed rate and let Stratford accept both the risks

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<sup>12</sup> See above pp. 183-4

<sup>13</sup> BL, Add. mss 61351 fo. 241r

<sup>14</sup> HL, ST57 i, 118-20; HL, ST58 i, 6-9, 12, 70; BL, Add. mss 61397 fos. 46r-v, 50r-v; BL, Add. mss 61398 fos. 30r-32r, 36r-v, 99v, 111v-112r

and the profits, the latter being ‘a gratification they themselves thought reasonable to allow him for his risk and trouble’.<sup>15</sup> Only Sweet objected.<sup>16</sup> However it emerged in May 1707 that Sweet had advanced up to 500,000 fl of public money to Etienne Caillaud, the *soliciteur-militair* to Baron de Walleff’s regiment, to purchase gold cheaply at Rotterdam for resale at profit to the army.<sup>17</sup> Outraged, Brydges wrote to Sweet that ‘‘tis easy now to discern by what sort of spirit those letters of good advice were dictated’.<sup>18</sup>

The discordance caused by poor cooperation, and the clash of several overlapping networks, therefore frustrated efforts to elevate inland remittances to a formal system. As Sperling and Davies have shown, it remained unofficial, Brydges and Cadogan developing an arbitrage network embedded within existing informal connections.<sup>19</sup> Between 1707 and 1708 Cadogan or his wife received cash from agents in Amsterdam and used it to purchase coin cheaply from bullion dealers, then shipped it to Antwerp via William Burroughs, a cornet in his regiment<sup>20</sup>, who passed it over to Brydges’ deputy-paymaster Henry Cartwright to be paid out to the troops at the higher rate. Trust between Brydges and Cadogan – probably generated, despite differing partisan loyalties, through a common connection to Marlborough and an earlier acquaintance at Westminster School – facilitated cooperation: by May 1707 Brydges could assure him that ‘I have such a confidence

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<sup>15</sup> HL, ST57 i, 4-8, 36, 112, 115, 118-21, 218; HL, ST58 i, 96; Snyder (ed.), *Correspondence* ii, 608-10, 618, 625, 630-1; Jones, *War and economy* pp. 76-82; Sperling, ‘Public credit’, pp. 152-4

<sup>16</sup> HL, ST57 i, 50, 55; HL, ST58 i, 75, 82-3; BL, Add. mss 61351 fos. 241r-v

<sup>17</sup> HL, ST57 i, 103, 153, 173, 180-1; HL, ST57 ii, 35; HL, ST58 i, 163-4, 217-8, 239, 244-5, 253-61; HL, ST58 ii, 14-16, 21, 30, 109-10, 164-5, 181; BL, Add. mss 61398 fos. 177r-178r, 183r-184r, 193v, 194v, 201r, 214v

<sup>18</sup> HL, ST57 i, 162-4, 164-5; *PH* vi, 1190

<sup>19</sup> Davies, ‘Seamy Side’, pp. 25-32; Sperling, ‘Public credit’, pp. 152-4. For comparison, see Kaplan, *Nathan Mayer Rothschild*) pp. 48-65

<sup>20</sup> Dalton, *English army lists* vi, 110

in your good judgment and friendship that there's nothing you can propose that I will not with all the readiness imaginable come into'.<sup>21</sup>

Although Sweet was initially offered a share in Stratford's enterprise, his intransigence meant that he was eventually excluded entirely, Brydges warning him in December 1706 that 'you are not concerned in any wise to take notice of any manner or rates the payments are made [in Antwerp] ... there will be no occasion at all of your entering into the detail of the prices at which the several species are taken'.<sup>22</sup> Instead it was organised through Cartwright.<sup>23</sup> In April 1707 Brydges also brought into the network William Sloper, his deputy-paymaster in London, telling Cadogan that 'I take him to be one that we may safely confide in'.<sup>24</sup> Although Stratford was only peripherally involved after December 1706, he acted as a crucial intermediary, introducing Cartwright to key allies such as the Amsterdam merchant and financier Abraham Romswinkel, and the English merchants William Willis and Edward Haistwell: all four had been involved in the 'Tobacco Adventure' of 1699, a largely whig-inclined concession to export tobacco to Russia.<sup>25</sup> Another key contact was Jan Hallangias, *soliciteur-militair* for several German princes at The Hague and London, who acted as a channel for the secret remittance of money to Holland.<sup>26</sup> Brydges therefore built upon a set of trusted personal connections in order to remit money inland to the army, at a profit, resembling in many respects the informal system of remittances employed by Nathaniel Clements in Ireland fifty

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<sup>21</sup> Davies, 'Seamy Side' pp. 33-4; HL, ST57 i, 106

<sup>22</sup> HL, ST57 i, 36, 37, 45, 134, 243, 245

<sup>23</sup> Ibid., 4, 64; HL, ST58 i, 132, 147-8, 155-7

<sup>24</sup> HL, ST57 i, 99, 105; HL, ST57 iii, 139

<sup>25</sup> Jacob M. Price, *Tobacco adventure* pp. 27, 29, 36, 106-7; HL, ST57 i, 40, 49, 97, 101, 179, 225; HL, ST58 i, 82, 85; Suff. RO, HA403/T1039/7 fo. 42r; HMC Cowper iii, 168

<sup>26</sup> Jonckheere, *Auction* p. 97; HL, ST57 ii, 211

years later.<sup>27</sup> Yet it is also clear that the army appreciated and approved of the service, welcoming the convenience of a consistent system of inland remittances that put all the risk upon Stratford's shoulders.

### ORDINARY ADVANCES

An identical set of priorities and problems underlay the practice of making advances to troops for their subsistence, a venture in which Sweet was, in a small way, also engaged: he wrote in 1707 that he had accepted a gratification of 6 fl a day from de Walleff's regiment to advance them money on his own credit, 'for which they have [given] me a great many thanks, and acknowledged that I had drawn them out of the jaws of the lions'.<sup>28</sup> Bread, forage, hospital and wagon contractors were accustomed to offer gratifications of one percent or more to deputy-paymasters 'for prompt payment'.<sup>29</sup> Once again, this resembled nothing less than the 'Great Undertaking' Sir Stephen Fox had organised for the army at their own request after 1662, or Charles Toll's more informal intervention before 1691: the following section will argue that after 1706 Brydges also took up the practice of advancing subsistence to foreign regiments in British pay, but upon a far larger scale and to greater effect, being able to mobilise an interlocking series of informal financial and administrative networks in order to cushion shortages in public credit.

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<sup>27</sup> Malcolmsen, *Nathaniel Clements* pp. 118-21, 215-9

<sup>28</sup> HL, ST58 i, 257; NLCS, Winne Myers mss, Box 3 (Chandos at Canons Park), Sweet to Watkins, 22/7/1710

<sup>29</sup> CJ, xvii, 16, 24; HL, ST57 v, 75, 163, 231; HL, ST58 v, 36; HL, ST58 ix, 19; Rabinowicz, Tapiero, and Rabb, *Sir Solomon de Medina* pp. 61-70. However Sweet denied this in 1711: HL, ST58 x, 138-40

The basic agreement offered was that in return for a certain percentage Brydges guaranteed that the regimental agents and *soliciteurs-militair* would receive their subsistence or Ordinary payments 42 days in advance ‘because’, as Sweet later put it, ‘they would not stay until the public money was issued and remitted hither’.<sup>30</sup> As with Fox, this advance would help regiments ride out fluctuations in public remittances, maintaining the liquidity of their internal economy and preventing mutiny among the troops for lack of pay.<sup>31</sup> Thus, in 1707 Brydges thought that the troops of the Landgrave of Hesse, for example, ‘would be very willing to agree to that, to have the advantages the other troops have do [of] it, viz. of being constantly and punctually paid 42 days in advance’.<sup>32</sup> In September 1706 the Palatine, Prussian, Saxon, Walloon and Holstein regiments were already signed up, the Hessians joined by May 1707, and Brydges noted in July 1712 that only the Hanoverian and Danish troops had consistently refused.<sup>33</sup> On occasion money was similarly advanced by Brydges and Cadogan to local communities who had provided forage or supplies and were prepared to allow 3 or 4 percent gratifications ‘for speedy payment’, while in March 1708 Cartwright even suggested advancing money to the Spanish troops in Flanders, which yielded a risk-free profit of 19,500 fl.<sup>34</sup>

Moreover, whereas Fox had accepted a gratification of one shilling in the pound or five percent on every transaction<sup>35</sup>, Brydges offered lower rates: in July 1712 he

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<sup>30</sup> HL, ST57 i, 38; HL, ST58 x, 8

<sup>31</sup> Clay, *Public finance* pp. 29-30, 38. The same problems occurred with Italian subsidies: Storrs, *Rise of Savoy* pp. 113-5

<sup>32</sup> HL, ST57 i, 38, 51

<sup>33</sup> *Ibid.*, 3-4, 123; HL, ST57 vii, 126-7; HL, ST58 i, 247

<sup>34</sup> HL, ST57 ii, 15, 19, 23, 43, 82-3, 177, 186; HL, ST57 iii, 160; HL, ST58 i, 145, 160-1, 195-6; HL, ST58 iii, 206; HL, ST58 v, 65, 128-9

<sup>35</sup> Clay, *Public finance* pp. 33-7

recalled that ‘the Saxon corps ... allowed 2 percent, the Hessians 1½, the other corps 1 percent except the Danes and Hanovers, ... these as I recollect were the old standing gratifications’.<sup>36</sup> The rate was adjusted in response to risk. When Hallangias became solicitor of Baron de Walleff’s regiment in June 1707 Brydges required 2 percent because ‘I foresee the confusion that regiment is running into will go near to burn the fingers of those who meddle with it’.<sup>37</sup> The gratification Brydges accepted was not, therefore, an automatic and unchanging prerequisite. It was instead a dynamic sum reflecting the risks involved, not least the fact that – like Fox – Brydges conducted most of his operations before 1710 with his own personal resources: he wrote to Sweet in October 1707 that the money he advanced was on his own account, ‘either sometimes by my own money, or at other times by my own credit’.<sup>38</sup>

What this meant in practice was that the profits of his undertakings were often directly recycled back into further loans, his agents being ordered in the first instance to draw upon the private balances they held for him.<sup>39</sup> If this was insufficient, they were repeatedly directed to draw private bills upon him in London: for instance, he wrote to Sweet on 8 September 1706 that ‘if at any time you should not be in cash sufficient for it, that you will draw upon me’, and that by this means ‘it will be impossible but that they [the regiments] must be always paid punctually as I have promised them’.<sup>40</sup> Brydges therefore initially financed his interventions by borrowing, the gratifications he accepted being used to cover the

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<sup>36</sup> HL, ST57 vii, 126-7; HL, ST58 iv, 81

<sup>37</sup> HL, ST57 i, 174-5, 232-3; HL, ST57 ii, 85; HL, ST58 ii, 245-6

<sup>38</sup> HL, ST57 i, 245

<sup>39</sup> *Ibid.*, 66, 73-5; Clay, *Public finance* pp. 33-7

<sup>40</sup> HL, ST57 i, 2-3, 40, 48, 52; HL, ST57 ii, 59, 89, 152, 194, 202

cost of finding the money for advances.<sup>41</sup> Thus he wrote to Sweet in September 1707 that the 1½ percent gratification he received was ‘but bare interest for the money’, and several years later Sweet himself wrote that the gratifications paid by the solliciteurs were ‘no more than [for] reimbursing the charges which have been paid out [by Brydges] for raising monies for their service’.<sup>42</sup> In September 1707 Brydges also complained to Stratford that although arrears had been purchased for 10½ percent, Stratford had taken 1 percent as commission, Hallangias a further ½ percent, and 2½ percent had been set aside for Marlborough’s deduction. Consequently Brydges had been left with 6½ percent, some 7,245 fl, ‘which will not be above 2 percent interest for my money, by that time I shall be reimbursed it again’.<sup>43</sup> It is perhaps no surprise that Sweet told the various solliciteurs in confidence in September 1710 ‘that there was rather loss than profit by serving them’, since the existence and extent of these overheads is proof that the gratifications were being used in a large part to provide an important level of informal financial intervention intended to support the liquidity of the foreign regiments within the allied army.<sup>44</sup>

Underlying this enterprise continued to be a network of informal contacts, often united by political or patronage connections. Brydges’ initial deputy in London was Henry Cartwright, a former army officer and secretary to Brydges on the Commission of Public Accounts in 1701: even after 1705 Cartwright remained in close contact with former commissioners such as the tory MPs Henry St John and

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<sup>41</sup> Clay, *Public finance* pp. 31-7, 53-5

<sup>42</sup> HL, ST57 i, 217; HL, ST58 x, 8

<sup>43</sup> HL, ST57 i, 234-5

<sup>44</sup> HL, ST58 vi, 215, 223

Sir Thomas Coke.<sup>45</sup> In October 1706 he was replaced by William Sloper, Ranelagh's former deputy.<sup>46</sup> The teller or cashier of the Pay Office was Humphrey Walcot, a merchant, a relation by marriage from Hereford and later a tory MP.<sup>47</sup> Nicholas Philpot was 'computer of the musters in my office',<sup>48</sup> and Robert Clayton a clerk: Philpot too was a relation, and both men were from Herefordshire.<sup>49</sup> Overseas, Cartwright was appointed to the Antwerp office in 1706 because Brydges insisted that he required 'a person there with whom I was acquainted, and on whom I could rely, and such an one I take Cartwright to be'.<sup>50</sup> For clerical support Cartwright relied initially on Richard Arnold, a client of Brydges, and on a second clerk who had been recommended to him by Francis Stratford.<sup>51</sup> When an agent was required to escort a consignment of bullion from London to Flanders in 1708, it was entrusted to Col Thomas Moore, the brother of tory MP Arthur Moore and apparently a tory voter in his own right.<sup>52</sup>

As had been the case under Ranelagh and Charles Fox, the formal structures of the Pay Office after 1705 were therefore buttressed by both regional and strongly political connections that would have served to facilitate cooperation with other parts of the fiscal-military state. Through Marlborough, Brydges had access to Godolphin at the Treasury, as well as his whig clients such as James Craggs the

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<sup>45</sup> CTB xx, 141, 374; HL, ST57 i, 34; HL, ST58 i, 157; HL, ST58 ii, 257; HL, ST58 vii, 207; HMC Cowper ii, 308, 414, 438; iii, 13, 33-5, 168; *HOP* (1715-1754) i, 534

<sup>46</sup> CTP iii, 468; TNA, T1/99/126

<sup>47</sup> HL, ST57 iii, 247; HL, ST58 iv, 37; Baker & Baker, *Chandos* pp. 30, 42-3; *HOP* (1690-1715) v, 762-3; *HOP* (1715-1754) ii, 504; SA, MS 151/4076 (Indenture of Humphrey Walcot, 1691)

<sup>48</sup> HL, ST57 i, 7; HL, ST57 ii, 258; HL, ST57 iii, 23; HL, ST57 iv, 191; HL, ST58 ix, 105

<sup>49</sup> HL, ST57 iii, 128; HL, ST57 xiv, 206-7, 371-3; HL, ST58 iii, 15-16; HL, ST58 ix, 85-7; HL, ST58 xii, 114-5; *HOP* (1715-1754) ii, 346

<sup>50</sup> HL, ST57 i, 64; BL, Add. mss 61398 fos. 80r-v

<sup>51</sup> HL, ST58 i, 172; HL, ST57 vii, 141

<sup>52</sup> HL, ST57 ii, 88, 93; HL, ST58 iii, 72-5, 94, 97, 117; CTB xxiii, 446; xxiv, 180; xxv, *clxix*; xxxi, *clvii*; Middx. (1705) p. 72; Middx. (1714) p. 23

Elder, the Clerk of the Ordnance.<sup>53</sup> Brydges was connected to Henry St John, the secretary at war, by tenuous kinship links and strongly-overlapping political loyalties<sup>54</sup>; with Robert Harley by Herefordshire connections and the partisan allegiances noted above<sup>55</sup>; and with Arthur Moore, one of the comptrollers for army accounts, a tory MP and financier who acted as stockbroker to both men.<sup>56</sup> Overseas, Marlborough's secretary Adam Cardonnel was a consistent ally, helped no doubt by a series of gifts, such as 3,000 fl in May 1707 from the profits of Stratford's 'bank' but also by a genuine friendship and mutual confidence.<sup>57</sup> There were likewise a series of gifts to the tory official Henry Watkins, formerly a secretary in the War Office and now clerk to Cardonnel, such as 1,000 fl in January 1707 as a mark of appreciation 'for the dispatch that the affairs of my office ... meet with by your means'.<sup>58</sup> As noted above, Brydges also enjoyed very close connections with Cadogan.

However, the keystone of Brydges' network abroad was John Drummond, the Scottish merchant in Amsterdam who remained almost entirely outside formal administrative hierarchies but was nevertheless at the centre of his public, semi-public and entirely private business.<sup>59</sup> Most likely the introduction was brokered in 1705 by Robert Harley, a mutual contact, but thereafter the connection was grounded upon close friendship and common tory loyalties<sup>60</sup>, affirmed and

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<sup>53</sup> *HOP* (1690-1715) iii, 775-82

<sup>54</sup> Dickinson, *Bolingbroke* pp. 7, 20, 49, 65

<sup>55</sup> *HOP* (1690-1715) iii, 378-81

<sup>56</sup> Sperling, 'Public credit', pp. 161-2; HL, ST57 ii, 205; HL, ST58 i, 4; HL, ST58 ii, 224; *HOP* (1690-1715) iv, 905-15

<sup>57</sup> HL, ST57 i, 124, 125, 133, 156; HL, ST57 iv, 192; HL, ST57 v, 231; HL, ST58 i, 170, 211; *HOP* (1660-1690) iii, 458-61

<sup>58</sup> HL, ST57 i, 63-4, 127-8, 245; HL, ST57 ii, 49; HL, ST58 ii, 134; HL, ST58 iii, 6; Sperling, 'Public credit', p. 161

<sup>59</sup> Hatton, 'Drummond', pp. 77-9

<sup>60</sup> Baker & baker, *Chandos* p. 45; Hatton, 'Drummond', p. 77; Jonckheere, *Auction*, p. 134

reinforced by official patronage: for instance, Brydges continually recommended Drummond to Sir Theodore Janssen as his correspondent for the remittances to Italy, or the remitting of some 658,473 fl in Hessian arrears to their *soliciteur-militair* at The Hague, Baron Johann d'Algywyk in 1709.<sup>61</sup> More successfully, from 1708 Vanderheiden & Drummond held the contract for transmitting money to prisoners in France: for this they drew on commercial contacts such as Louis Duvizier in Bayonne and Messrs Senserf in Rotterdam.<sup>62</sup>

While these connections offered administrative, financial and political support in the Low Countries, a series of personal but also invariably partisan connections offered Brydges access to large- and small-scale credit in London in order to support his activities. When Drummond required a discreet sum of money in Flanders in December 1707, Brydges suggested that he draw on Edward Gibbon, Drummond's correspondent for the Ordnance Office.<sup>63</sup> He also formed close links with Sir Theodore Janssen, both through politics – Geoffrey Holmes argues that by this point Janssen was a tory financier – as well as a common antipathy to Furnese, who had sabotaged the payments to d'Algywyk in 1709: although offered a share, Janssen refused, 'knowing Sir H[enry] too well', Brydges told Cardonnel, 'to be concerned with him'.<sup>64</sup> From at least December 1706 Brydges also employed Drummond's contact John Mead, the tory goldsmith in London.<sup>65</sup> From January 1710 he also made use of another tory goldsmith, John Lund, who had been banker

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<sup>61</sup> HL, ST57 ii, 97, 213, 214; HL, ST58 iii, 103

<sup>62</sup> HL, ST57 i, 211; HL, ST57 ii, 128; HL, ST57 iii, 47; HL, ST57 iv, 7; HL, ST58 iii, 27-8, 66, 252; HL, ST58 iv, 33, 116, 121-2, 144, 151; CTB xxii, 416

<sup>63</sup> HL, ST57 i, 62; HL, ST58 ii, 50

<sup>64</sup> HL, ST57 ii, 233; HL, ST58 iv, 169; Holmes, *Politics* pp. 44, 464; *HOP* (1715-1754) ii, 171-2

<sup>65</sup> HL, ST57 ii, 62, 249; HL, ST57 iii, 145, 205, 214-6, 258; HL, ST58 iii, 23; HL, ST58 i, 58-9; HL, ST58 iv, 4, 13, 14, 15, 68

to Henry St John and Brydges' tory friend Anthony Hammond since 1706.<sup>66</sup> Yet another tory goldsmith from May 1709 was Charles Shales, the son of John Shales.<sup>67</sup> Finally, Brydges employed his friend Sir Matthew Decker, a financier and merchant of Dutch origins who tended to move within tory circles: he was heavily involved in the tory South Sea Company after 1711, entered Parliament in 1719 as Brydges' client, and in 1710 married the sister of Henry Watkins.<sup>68</sup>

Brydges' informal financial network, like those of Sir Stephen Fox and Nathaniel Clements<sup>69</sup>, was therefore built upon the trust generated by private connections and contacts, but was also reinforced by personal gifts and commercial patronage that generated further mutual obligations. Aside from those mentioned above, for Drummond, Cardonnel and Watkins, from 1707 he used his correspondents for a growing number of increasingly complex private financial drawings and redrawings which are almost impossible to follow in detail, but which provided those involved with substantial fees for commission and brokerage.<sup>70</sup> Koenraad Jonckheere has argued that Decker, Drummond, Senserf, Hallangias and Stratford, as well as their own correspondents such as Louis Duvizier and Gilbert Black, a Scottish merchant in Rotterdam, acted as *soliciteurs-culturel* for Brydges: resembling contemporary *soliciteurs-militair*, they likewise provided him with the credit and connections to

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<sup>66</sup> HL, ST57 iii, 145, 258; HL, ST57 iv, 61; HL, ST58 ii, 48; Bod. Lib., MS Rawl. D.695 fo. 31v; *London (1713)*, p. 101; Peter Temin and Hans-Joachim Voth, 'Private borrowing during the Financial Revolution: Hoare's Bank and its customers, 1702-24', *Economic History Review*, 61 (2008) pp. 563-4

<sup>67</sup> HL, ST57 ii, 204; HL, ST57 iii, 258; HL, ST57 iv, 85, 180, 191, 250; *London (1710)*, p. 83; *London (1713)*, p. 115

<sup>68</sup> HL, ST57 iii, 205; HL, ST57 iv, 137; HL, ST58 v, 63, 177-9; HL, ST58 xii, 158; HMC Portland iv, 656; *HOP (1715-1754)* ii, 608; Jonckheere, *Auction* pp. 139-40

<sup>69</sup> Clay, *Public finance* pp. 57-74, 79-88, 106-10; Malcolmson, *Nathaniel Clements* pp. 339-52

<sup>70</sup> The later complexity of his private transactions may be gauged from Baker & baker, *Chandos* pp. 208-13; R.S. Neale, *Bath 1680-1850* (London, 1981) pp. 127-9; Neal, 'George Middleton', pp. 53-5; Murphy, *Cantillon* pp. 175-85

secure wine, food, artwork, books, textiles and other luxuries.<sup>71</sup> The overlapping and intersecting nature of Brydges' personal, political and public networks strongly suggests that they were mutually-reinforcing, trust and confidence built up in one transaction being employed to drive forward others, improving in this case the overall efficiency of financial intermediation within the British fiscal-military state overseas.

Finally a workable level of mutual trust was built up with Sweet, whose cooperation was essential, but who could neither be wholly trusted nor replaced. In September 1706 Brydges had requested to Cardonnel that 'in case I find Mr Sweet persists to delay the payment of the foreign troops ... whether ... my Lord Duke would be satisfied if I remitted the money for those corps to another person, vizt to Mr Drummond'.<sup>72</sup> However Marlborough intervened to protect Sweet, while Cardonnel tried to patch up relations by telling Sweet that 'I am persuaded [Brydges] never designed you the least injury, whatever some people may have buzz'd into your ears for their own interests'.<sup>73</sup> To Watkins however he observed that Sweet had failed to demonstrate the loyalty needed for Brydges to have an 'entire confidence in him', and went on that 'I think I may venture to tell you my opinion, that he is not so happy as to be endowed with all the good sense requisite for his employment'.<sup>74</sup> Disputes continued, such as when Sweet tried to take over

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<sup>71</sup> Baker & Baker, *Chandos* pp. 65, 69-83, 92, 188; Jonckheere, *Auction* pp. 134-44, 215-20

<sup>72</sup> HL, ST57 i, 1-2, 56

<sup>73</sup> HL, ST57 ii, 91; BL, Add. mss 61398 fos. 59v-60r, 111r

<sup>74</sup> BL, Add. mss 61398 fos. 111r-v

the agencies of de Walleff's regiment in April 1707 and of the Saxe-Gotha regiments in 1708 when Brydges wanted them for Hallangias.<sup>75</sup>

A reconciliation was ultimately effected via George Murray, who married Sweet's cousin Mary Taylor in 1707 and became Sweet's clerk: a person 'who you could entirely rely upon', Brydges later commented to Sweet, 'as knowing him to be fix't in your interest'.<sup>76</sup> He was the son of Anthony Murray, a tory agent at the Hanoverian court, and a former page to the Electress Sophia: this no doubt helped create trust, as did his offer in 1709 for Brydges to act as godfather to his newborn son.<sup>77</sup> For his own part Brydges worked to secure improved salaries for both men<sup>78</sup>, repeatedly strove to fulfil his promise to Sweet in October 1706 that if he cooperated 'you would taste the benefits as well as myself'<sup>79</sup>, and assured him that 'if it is left to me to name it [the baby], I shall certainly name it Benjamin'.<sup>80</sup> For a time this served to incorporate Sweet into the network, to the extent that Brydges did not demand a security from him or any of his other deputies until 1711, and only then because 'from intelligence I have that it will be inquired into what security I have from those employed by me, and impute it [sic] to me a fault, if I do suffer any to act without it'.<sup>81</sup> In practice most remained unpaid, suggesting that Brydges continued to rely upon an intermixture of public and strongly-politicised private

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<sup>75</sup> HL, ST57 i, 103, 135, 174-6, 181, 187, 190, 211, 240, 243, 255, 257; HL, ST58 i, 217, 239, 244-7; HL, ST58 ii, 14-20, 69-71, 74, 77-8, 92, 100, 109, 164-9, 175, 179-82; BL, Add. mss 61398 fos. 184r, 214v

<sup>76</sup> TNA, PROB 11/736 (Swete, Benjamin); BL, Add. mss 61135 fo. 26; HL, ST58 ii, 77, 97, 166; HL, ST57 ii, 21; HL, ST58 iv, 45; J.F. Chance, 'Corrections to James Macpherson's "Original Papers"', *English Historical Review*, 13 (1898) p. 536

<sup>77</sup> HL, ST58 ii, 97; HL, ST57 ii, 216; HL, ST58 iv, 45

<sup>78</sup> HL, ST57 i, 75, 79, 251, 257; HL, ST57 iii, 223; HL, ST57 iv, 13; HL, ST58 ii, 134, 179, 257; HL, ST58 iii, 1

<sup>79</sup> HL, ST57 i, 38

<sup>80</sup> HL, ST57 ii, 204, 216, 248; HL, ST58 iv, 45

<sup>81</sup> HL, ST57 v, 159, 169, 179-80, 193, 197, 209; HL, ST57 vi, 1-2, 87-8, 90, 208, 223; HL, ST57 vii, 177, 198; HL, ST58 viii, 213; HL, ST58 ix, 15, 19, 168, 195; HL, ST58 x, 3, 216; HL, ST58 xi, 144; HL, ST58 xii, 264-5, 271

networks to build up the mutual trust needed for coordinating effective administration and financial intermediation. The effectiveness of the British fiscal-military state abroad therefore appears to have been enhanced through informal financial networks buttressed by high levels of political affinity, even after 1708 under an increasingly whig ministry.

### **EXTRAORDINARY ARREARS**

The utility of trusted networks to wider financial effectiveness is demonstrated by the more hazardous forms of intervention that Brydges undertook after 1707. Like Ranelagh in the 1690s, Brydges showed himself ready to pay out money informally at Marlborough's verbal command, without insisting on written warrants. For instance, he told Cardonnel in September 1706 that Sweet 'knows very well that it hath been constantly my desire to him that whatever directions he received from my Lord Duke, they be immediately obeyed without any manner of delay whatsoever'.<sup>82</sup> This included paying out money from other funds, such as £45,000 paid out for forage and bread in 1709 'which hath been taken out of the subsistence and must consequently make that fund fall short of the time to which it is directed by the Treasury books'.<sup>83</sup> The same service was offered in 1708 to Cadogan by Brydges, who wrote that he had instructed Cartwright to draw bills on London to cover 'whatever advances you judge proper to be made for the service of the troops against they take the field, or on account of the contracts'.<sup>84</sup>

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<sup>82</sup> HL, ST57 i, 1; HL, ST57 iii, 21

<sup>83</sup> HL, ST57 i, 220; HL, ST57 ii, 220-2; HL, ST57 iii, 51, 67, 101, 151, 174; HL, ST57 iv, 1-2, 47-9, 81; HL, ST58 iv, 101, 148, 164, 1690; BL, Add. mss 61399 fo. 202v

<sup>84</sup> HL, ST57 iii, 2, 5, 19, 50, 54, 58, 196; HL, ST57 ii, 101; HL, ST58 ii, 230, 237

Another and potentially even more explosive set of transactions was the purchase of the arrears owed to foreign regiments for their Extraordinaries. These often suffered long delays in payment, and many troops therefore appear to have been willing to sell or discount what amounted to illiquid scrip for ready cash: Ranelagh had cleared the Irish army's arrears in this fashion in the 1670s, even buying up some arrears at a 65 percent discount.<sup>85</sup> Vast sums could be made, and the army provided with money for otherwise useless paper, but the risks were commensurate: writing to Cardonnel in July 1707, ironically enough to deny completely justified accusations of purchasing arrears, Brydges noted that

would any man in his wits buy up arrears of foreign Extraordinaries at eight percent discount? Is it not an uncertainty greater than ten to one whether ever the Parliament will make them good, and is there not an uncertainty as great as the other uncertainty that if ever they should ever allow them, it would not be till after the peace some time ... and lastly ... these arrears might even then be bought up at a much larger discount than at present, when the hopes of their being paid by the Parliament would grow less.<sup>86</sup>

In practice he was being disingenuous: like Nathaniel Clements and Sir Stephen Fox, his position at the Pay Office gave him a unique leverage as a commercial financial intermediary.<sup>87</sup> As he explained to Sweet in October 1706 'this nobody can venture upon so well as me because nobody knows so well what will and what will not be paid', and he went on to say that the payment itself 'depends pretty much upon my solicitations and memorials for it'.<sup>88</sup> Nevertheless this could not eliminate risks entirely: Brydges noted to Hallangias that 'it's I myself alone that runs the risk of their note being made good by Parliament', and to Drummond that

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<sup>85</sup> Egan, 'Finance, 1660-85', i, 11-15; ii, 45-51

<sup>86</sup> HL, ST57 i, 171

<sup>87</sup> Malcolmson, *Nathaniel Clements* pp. 67-8; Clay, *Public finance* pp. 95-110

<sup>88</sup> HL, ST57 i, 38, 76, 194; HL, ST57 ii, 17, 166

‘a very understanding man of business’ had told him of Ranelagh buying several unanswered arrears in the 1690s for which he was still out of pocket.<sup>89</sup>

It was therefore with a mixed motive of profit and public service that Brydges wrote to Drummond on 22 November 1706 that

I have sent you a list of the Extraordinaries due for the years past of this war to the several foreign corps and fancy their solicitors would be glad to compound for those old debts, which considering the hazard whoever buys them runs in not having them repaid, I think deserve very well a good large discount, and the more remote they are, the greater the discount ought to be.<sup>90</sup>

He similarly wrote to Stratford that it would be ‘of great benefit as well as satisfaction to the whole troops’, and again to Drummond in December that it was ‘an opportunity for a considerable advantage, which I should be sorry to lose’.<sup>91,92</sup> Hallangias was also used, mainly to purchase the arrears of individual regiments rather than larger national contingents.<sup>93</sup> Trust was crucial, not least because Brydges relied upon his agents’ discretion and judgement: for example, Drummond reported in 1707 that Baron de Walleff’s papers and certificates were hopelessly disorganised and advised Brydges should not proceed with the bargain.<sup>94</sup>

The standard rate for discounting ‘ordinary’ Extraordinaries, whose payment was reasonably certain, was five percent, and from 1707 Sweet was consistently ordered to pay them immediately upon receipt of warrants from Marlborough and the proper

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<sup>89</sup> HL, ST57 i, 81, 196; Childs, *William III* p. 151; Clay, *Public finance* p. 251

<sup>90</sup> HL, ST57 i, 38, 48

<sup>91</sup> *Ibid.*, 40, 58

<sup>92</sup> *Ibid.*, 41-4, 58

<sup>93</sup> *Ibid.*, 195-7, 213; HL, ST57 ii, 9, 34, 169; HL, ST58 i, 230, 246, 254; HL, ST58 ii, 3, 13, 16, 19, 29-30, 71, 73, 93, 115, 254; HL, ST58 iii, 216; HL, ST58 iv, 120

<sup>94</sup> HL, ST57 i, 80-1; HL, ST58 ii, 114, 115-6, 144

certificates signed by Slingerlandt.<sup>95</sup> To all intents and purposes they resembled the system of loaning money for Ordinaries. For the riskier ‘extraordinary’ Extraordinaries, the sort Brydges mentioned in his letter to Cardonnel, the rate varied from 5 percent for the arrears of the Münster regiments in October 1706 to 15 or 18 percent in September 1707, and 25 percent from the Saxon regiments.<sup>96</sup> These too worked in roughly the same fashion: Sweet mentioned to one solliciteur ‘that you [Brydges] have not rec’d the public monies for the Extraordinaries and that what I pay him is to be raised out of a private cash’.<sup>97</sup> The fluctuating rates of discount strongly suggest that Brydges and his agents were negotiating individually with solliciteurs, ‘pricing’ the varying risk of different arrears against calculations concerning the likelihood of repayment by the Treasury. Indeed, from March 1709 Brydges began to refuse even to discount ‘ordinary’ Extraordinaries: the regiments’ pretensions had begun to exceed Parliamentary provisions, and the distinction between ‘ordinary and ‘extraordinary’ Extraordinaries was breaking down. In August 1710 he similarly told Hallangias that

I don’t think I ought to continue accepting that, in regard I shall not be able to pay them punctually ... [since] their demands exceed so far a Parliamentary provision ... it will require me to be in advance a much greater sum of money than I am master of, and for a longer time than the gratification will pay ever so much interest of.<sup>98</sup>

Once again it is impossible to dismiss Brydges’ profit as a mere percentage arbitrarily skimmed off the top of the money he handled. It was instead a

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<sup>95</sup> HL, ST57 i, 136, 201-3; HL, ST57 iii, 34-5, 62, 91, 169; HL, ST57 ii, 107; HL, ST57 iv, 15, 60; HL, ST58 i, 82, 175, 245, 258; HL, ST58 ii, 129, 140, 165, 168, 179-80, 204; HL, ST58 iv, 22, 76, 128; HL, ST58 v, 192; HL, ST58 vi, 83, 160, 206, 224

<sup>96</sup> HL, ST57 i, 36, 48, 131, 197, 213, 222, 233-4

<sup>97</sup> HL, ST58 i, 82

<sup>98</sup> HL, ST57 ii, 85, 94, 113, 182-4; HL, ST57 iii, 114, 196-9, 220; HL, ST57 iv, 125-6, 128; HL, ST58 iv, 198, 246; HL, ST58 v, 192; HL, ST58 vi, 187-8, 222; BL, Add. mss 61399 fo. 243v

commercial transaction, which provided some profit but also covered the costs of borrowing the money at interest for a financial service of real value to the army.

### **BLACKMAIL, NEGOTIATION AND OBLIGATION**

John Sperling, still the only historian to have studied these transactions in any depth, has argued that Brydges was effectively blackmailing the troops under his care, and cites several incriminating episodes in 1706 and 1707 as proof of this.<sup>99</sup> However, these are at worst isolated incidents, and Sperling largely omits to mention that Brydges consistently, persistently and insistently instructed his correspondents that all deductions were to be voluntary. He reminded Sweet for instance in October 1711 that ‘the one percent ... [was] a voluntary gratification made me for the good usage they receive[d] from me’, and Walcot in June 1712 that ‘you’ll remember the gratification of one percent but you must not insist upon it so as to refuse payment in case they decline to make it’.<sup>100</sup> In March 1708 he insisted that if an allowance was accepted from the forage undertakers ‘they must be persuaded to it by fair means and no manner of force used to compel them’.<sup>101</sup> When Sweet negotiated with the Saxe-Gotha troops to underwrite their ‘ordinary’ Extraordinaries the following year, he was told that ‘you must be sure to take care that the gratification they make of the five percent is wholly voluntary, and no agreement made with them by you or conditions whereby you are induced to pay them’.<sup>102</sup> Indeed, he told Sweet in May 1707 that

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<sup>99</sup> Sperling, ‘Public credit’, pp. 154-60

<sup>100</sup> HL, ST57 vi, 50, 90-1; HL, ST57 vii, 113

<sup>101</sup> HL, ST57 ii, 19-21; HL, ST58 ii, 204

<sup>102</sup> HL, ST57 i, 173, 217; HL, ST57 ii, 34-5, 38, 169; HL, ST58 i, 245

if upon the knowledge you have of the temper of [all] these troops, you judge the gratification they make to be too much, I am very willing to be content with less, and receive it with their good will, than have what they now give, with an unwilling mind from them, and with their thinking that they are not well and generously used.<sup>103</sup>

This is further evidence of the essentially commercial dynamics underlying these transactions.

Indeed, negotiation and obligation was paramount: Brydges even attempted to infuse his activities with a shared cultural paradigm of gentility and civility, just as Francesca Trivellato and John Smail have argued that a common commercial rhetoric helped create a basis for cross-cultural trade.<sup>104</sup> These rhetorics lent structure to the moral obligations imposed by the gratifications Brydges accepted: he wrote to Sweet in June 1708, for instance, that those regiments which ‘are so generous as to make a gratification as you mention ought I am sure to be treated with all the civility as well as justice imaginable’.<sup>105</sup> The other side of the coin was that in August 1710 Brydges received a strong letter from Walleff demanding financial support and ‘twitting me with the gratification his regiment makes me’: he therefore ordered that Sweet should forbear accepting further gratifications, since ‘I am resolved to be no longer under obligation to him’.<sup>106</sup> Reputation and honour also helped reinforce a sense of obligation. When Furnese contrived to disrupt the Hessian remittances in June 1709, it emerged that Baron d’Algwyk had already borrowed money upon these remittances and risked having his bills rejected.<sup>107</sup>

Drummond felt obliged to borrow on his own credit, saying that ‘we [would] rather

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<sup>103</sup> HL, ST57 i, 136

<sup>104</sup> See above pp. 36-7

<sup>105</sup> HL, ST57 i, 73, 75, 131; HL, ST57 ii, 38, 48, 160; HL, ST57 iii, 89-90, 246

<sup>106</sup> HL, ST57 iv, 121; HL, ST58 vi, 164, 206; HL, ST58 vii, 13

<sup>107</sup> HL, ST57 ii, 226, 232-6, 241, 248-9, 255-6; HL, ST57 iii, 1, 79, 134-5; HL, ST58 iv, 42, 98, 101, 104, 105-6

lose a £1,000 by the bargain than have it ever said that we did not pay regularly what we have accepted', and Brydges likewise stated that he was 'bound in honour and justice' to assist.<sup>108</sup> Personal factors, such as reputation, honour and even a wider sense of cultural obligation, therefore served to buttress the effectiveness of the services that Brydges offered to the army.

Admittedly the purchase of 'extraordinary' Extraordinaries was an exception, where Brydges went to great lengths to avoid being seen.<sup>109</sup> For example, Sweet was told in November 1706 that 'both your enquiry and your buying of them must be wholly from yourself, and without giving the least umbrage, that I am any ways concerned in it', and when Sweet ignored these directions Brydges immediately closed down direct contact and asked Drummond to act instead, making a lower offer for verisimilitude and freezing Sweet out of all future deals.<sup>110</sup> Similarly, he noted to Drummond in January 1707 that he had seen a letter to Marlborough from the duke of Württemberg, commander of the Danish contingent,

full of complaints for want of the Extra[ordinary] due to the Danes, in it he said that there had been first Mr Hallangias, then Mr Stratford of Hanover, and lastly Mr Drummond of Amsterdam, all in my name (though he supposed without my knowledge, I tell you the words of this letter) that had made proposals for buying up those arrears at the rate of 10 percent discount, that he desired my Lord Duke would put a stop to it, and order the arrears to be paid them. It was so angry a letter that Mr Cardonnel and I agreed it was not fit for my Lord Duke to see ... [we] agreed that 'twould be best not to stir further in this matter, at least it must be managed more cautiously, I have wrote to Mr Sweet to pay them the 150,000 fl due to them for their horses lost in the battle and otherwise, which will be all they'll receive, they have a great arrear besides, and when they see they cannot get it and that other Corps by an agreement with you get theirs, it may perhaps towards Spring induce them to [?feel] for it of you themselves.<sup>111</sup>

<sup>108</sup> HL, ST57 ii, 241-2; HL, ST58 iv, 107

<sup>109</sup> Baker & baker, *Chandos* pp. 55-8

<sup>110</sup> HL, ST57 i, 36, 40, 47, 51, 62; HL, ST58 i, 75, 82

<sup>111</sup> HL, ST57 i, 65; HL, ST58 i, 70-2, 106

Nevertheless, by and large Brydges appears to have presided over a complex and relatively open system of informal financial intermediation and intervention. Like Sir Stephen and Charles Fox, he was able to draw upon a diffuse network of merchants and financiers with superior access to credit, through the use of personal and partisan connections, and like the earl of Ranelagh he was willing, even eager, to engage in informal intermediation and adopt flexible administrative practices via a strongly politicised network of trusted officials and agents.

### **COORDINATION IN FLANDERS**

The central importance of political partisanship in the construction of strong linkages and coordination of financial administration and intermediation can be seen most clearly of the relations between Brydges, Benjamin Sweet and Henry Cartwright before 1710. There are no signs in any of Sweet's correspondence or activities of any wider partisan or political affiliation, only narrow private loyalties to patrons such as Marlborough and Richard Hill, or commercial partners such as Sir Henry Furnese or Messrs Clifford. Absent such connections, and with a demanding character – Walcot subsequently wrote that 'his temper varies the most I ever saw in any man' – Sweet appears to have found it impossible to secure trusted staff. Two clerks – Henry Hardewijk and Isaac Bardeau – left in stormy circumstances, and Drummond warned Brydges in September 1709 that Bardeau 'threatens to turn informer if he's not satisfied', forcing both men to step in and arbitrate.<sup>112</sup> Indeed, three years later partisanship even trumped kinship linkages: when Sweet contrived to lose some £10,000 of public money in 1712, as described

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<sup>112</sup> HL, ST57 iii, 27, 30, 45, 54, 81, 106, 229-31, 254, 261; HL, ST57 iv, 15; HL, ST57 x, 171, 210; HL, ST58 i, 227; HL, ST58 iv, 182-3, 220-1, 234-5; HL, ST58 xii, 124-5

below, both George Murray and his wife, Sweet's cousin, wrote to Brydges dissociating themselves from his actions.<sup>113</sup> Partisan connections between Sweet, Brydges and his networks were therefore absent and, notwithstanding the efforts to generate trust and cooperation described above, this appears in the long run to have seriously damaged the coordination of business in the Low Countries.

For instance, although Brydges told Sweet in March 1707 that 'a good understanding and firm friendship betwixt us will be for both our advantages', in January 1710 he was forced to chastise Sweet for a letter he had sent to William Sloper, saying with some exasperation that Sweet's 'false and villainous aspersion[s]' were 'by no means fit for one gentleman to use towards another, especially betwixt those whose business ought to oblige them to entertain a friendly correspondence together'.<sup>114</sup> As early as January 1706 John Drummond wrote that 'I see daily more and more that he [Sweet] inclines to traverse me as much as he can', while Hallangias eventually concluded, with some justice, that 'his jealousies and envy will never rest to make me uneasy'.<sup>115</sup> Francis Stratford and Abraham Romswinkel also felt disobliged<sup>116</sup>, and Sweet likewise consistently refused to cooperate informally with Cadogan, disrupting the private remittances to Antwerp and refusing to answer the contingent bills Cadogan drew on him for army business: Brydges wrote to Sweet in January 1710 that

though you can very well justify your refusing his bill ... yet considering Mr Cadogan's character and figure in the world it would have been much better to have honoured it and would have been a mark of respect and civility that

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<sup>113</sup> HL, ST57 vii, 49; HL, ST57 ix, 51; HL, ST58 xii, 243-5, 268

<sup>114</sup> HL, ST57 i, 79; HL, ST57 iii, 137; HL, ST58 ii, 52

<sup>115</sup> HL, ST58 i, 56, 219

<sup>116</sup> HL, ST57 i, 40, 97, 102, 106; HL, ST58 i, 192, 202, 225; HL, ST58 ii, 96, 209, 225-6

would have been taken kindly by him and such a one as you could have run no hazard by it'.<sup>117</sup>

Poor relations, fuelled by envy and lacking a partisan component, therefore threatened the effectiveness of both informal intermediation and the overall effectiveness of the army.

However, the central issue was the worsening relationship between Sweet in Amsterdam and Henry Cartwright in Antwerp, who were expected to coordinate between them the payment of subsistence, stoppages and Extraordinaries to the troops both in winter quarters and the field. In theory Cartwright would receive a proportion of the subsistence in Antwerp, take receipts in return, then send them to Sweet in Amsterdam to add these sums to his own payments, producing a total that could be used to calculate clearings.<sup>118</sup> However even on his arrival in Flanders in November 1706 Cartwright noted that Sweet 'told me that he was satisfied with my coming but I am very sure his words did not agree with his thoughts'.<sup>119</sup> From 1707 Sweet frequently complained that Cartwright was slow in delivering the officers' notes, leaving him unable to organise payments.<sup>120</sup> This may well have been true, but poor communication and mutual antipathy made the situation much worse: Cartwright complained to Brydges in February 1708 that Sweet had circulated amongst the army a paper about remittances, but 'I got it by chance, for he never corresponds with me in anything ... though I find he concerns himself much in my

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<sup>117</sup> HL, ST57 i, 7, 86-8, 214; HL, ST57 iii, 152, 162; HL, ST58 i, 133, 192-3; HL, ST58 ii, 72, 161-2, 169; HL, ST58 iii, 2; BL, Add. mss 61399 fos. 57v, 236r

<sup>118</sup> HL, ST57 i, 50; HL, ST57 ii, 17, 23; HL, ST58 ii, 200-2

<sup>119</sup> HL, ST57 i, 91-2

<sup>120</sup> *Ibid.*, 223; HL, ST57 ii, 98, 114, 125, 130, 141, 152, 155; HL, ST57 iii, 3, 8, 145; HL, ST58 i, 223; HL, ST58 ii, 38, 197, 201

affairs underhand'.<sup>121</sup> The result was that as early as the end of 1707 there were already growing problems of regiments over-drawing in the confusion and receiving the same sums at both Antwerp and Amsterdam.<sup>122</sup>

To resolve this, in January 1708 it was decided to have Cartwright receive one-third of their subsistence in Antwerp, and Sweet the remainder in Amsterdam, and let regiments draw on him privately as necessary.<sup>123</sup> Optimistically, Brydges remarked to Cadogan that 'if Captain Cartwright and Sweet will but maintain a good correspondence together, and send each other exact and frequent accounts of their payments, there can be no interruption happen', although in the end Cadogan was proved right that the practice would be 'in itself, very inconvenient, if not impractical'.<sup>124</sup> It remained impossible to coordinate completely either the drawing of bills or the payment of stoppages, leading to overpayments that left regiments lacking money.<sup>125</sup> In March 1710 Cartwright once again attempted to secure a deputation that would have streamlined administration by giving him sole control of all English payments and reduced Sweet's disruptive influence'.<sup>126</sup> However Sweet hysterically opposed this move: Cardonnel reported to Brydges that 'if you knew it what manner the poor man [*i.e.* Sweet] would have resented it, you would have think [*sic*] him fitter for Bedlam than any other place', and both rather

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<sup>121</sup> HL, ST58 ii, 201, 205

<sup>122</sup> HL, ST57 iii, 218; HL, ST58 i, 208; HL, ST58 ii, 58, 198-9

<sup>123</sup> HL, ST57 ii, 15, 23, 31; HL, ST58 ii, 200-4, 222-3; BL, Add. mss 61399 fos. 35v, 36r, 179v, 185r-v, 190r, 250r-v; CTB xxxiv, 7

<sup>124</sup> HL, ST57 ii, 15; HL, ST58 ii, 92, 201, 203

<sup>125</sup> HL, ST57 ii, 131; HL, ST57 iii, 249-51; HL, ST57 iv, 1, 13-14, 48, 59; HL, ST58 ii, 241-2; HL, ST58 iii, 204; HL, ST58 iv, 56; HL, ST58 v, 213-4, 274-5; HL, ST58 vi, 28, 66-7; BL, Add. mss 61401 fos. 28r, 30r, 38r, 39v, 60v, 66v, 73v, 92v

<sup>126</sup> HL, ST58 iv, 56

pessimistically agreed that the only answer was to require regular accounts and to advise Sweet ‘to a regular and friendly correspondence with Mr Cartwright’.<sup>127</sup>

Thus, the expansion of the Pay Office bureaucracy in 1706, far from providing more effective administration, merely introduced administrative confusion. As in Ireland in 1689, the fundamental problem was that the new administrative structures were misaligned with the informal networks whose interaction underpinned both informal intermediation and the official activities of the Pay Office. While increased impartiality might have lessened such problems, it would also have removed the props underpinning the informal financial intermediation that sustained the army. Arguably the problem instead was that once connections were politicised, the continued existence of personal, non-political patronage linkages left Brydges and his agents unable to secure consistent cooperation from Sweet, whose loyalties appear to have been to Marlborough and himself, and not always in that order. Clearly the more effective solution was to increase the level of politicisation so as to enable these networks to be mobilised more efficiently and consistently.

### **CASE STUDY: LILLE 1708**

The combined effect of all of these intersecting and overlapping elements is best seen in Marlborough’s campaign between August and December 1708, when he moved the allied army beyond its secure supply routes to besiege the fortress of Lille, the main gateway to northern France.<sup>128</sup> He faced the same problems of financial supply as in the Blenheim campaign of 1704: as Cardonnel wrote to

<sup>127</sup> HL, ST57 iii, 182, 202-3, 216-7, 221, 244; HL, ST57 iv, 1-2; HL, ST58 v, 214, 260; HL, ST58 vi, 66-7

<sup>128</sup> Burton, *Captain-General* pp. 136-42

Brydges in October, it was no use for Cartwright to assemble money at Antwerp while the army starved and mutinied at Ostend or Lille for want of it, and that ‘had he the treasure of the Indies [at Antwerp] we should not be the better for it’.<sup>129</sup> However, in contrast to Sweet in 1704, Cartwright appears to have made extensive personal efforts to supply the army at Lille, either by sending bills on nearby towns such as Courtrai or by sending bullion directly, albeit initially with only mixed success: Cardonnel told Cartwright on 7 September that ‘I am so concerned that I know not what to write, for I think truly never was so great remissness in a matter of this concern’.<sup>130</sup> He complained in particular that Cartwright had failed to send forward bullion with the escorts provided or in the quantities required.

However, Lieutenant-General Thomas Erle at Ostend found Cartwright ‘very zealous, and ready to do everything that may forward the service’, while Cartwright himself later wrote to Brydges on 17 December 1708 that he had waited on Marlborough to justify himself, but

His Grace in a wonderful kind manner laying his hand on mine told me I must not mind what was said and bid me throw off all concern, for to the contrary of his being angry he was very well satisfied that I had done all that was possible at such a juncture ... I hinted to His Grace that I had been misrepresented to you, he assured me he knew nothing of it but will take care to set me to rights in your favour. As for Mr Cardonnel he was extremely civil ... he promised me before Major-General Cadogan that he would write to you, what should be to my full satisfaction and justification.<sup>131</sup>

From the Pay Office in London, Brydges also helped to coordinate other aspects.

An expedition was sent to Ostend under Erle in order to open an alternative axis of

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<sup>129</sup> HL, ST58 iii, 64

<sup>130</sup> HL, ST57 ii, 83-5, 98, 123, 130, 140; HL, ST58 iii, 64, 70-3, 76, 104, 117; BL, Add. mss 61399 fos. 213-56; BL, Add. mss 61400 fos. 1-55

<sup>131</sup> HL, ST57 ii, 93, 130, 140, 177, 184-5; HL, ST58 iii, 94, 97, 156-8, 172-3, 202-3; BL, Add. mss 61400 fos. 129v-130r

communication with Marlborough: Brydges nominated the paymaster of the expedition, and both he and Cardonnel corresponded continually with Erle and Cartwright about how the paymaster, John Barker, should draw money on Amsterdam or London for the supply of the forces at Ostend and Lille.<sup>132</sup> Brydges' own informal and official connections were also integrated into this nexus: not only was Cartwright instructed to 'use your utmost endeavours' to assist, but John Drummond was requested to encash the bills drawn on him from Ostend and remit as much money as possible – some £20,000 in total – to Erle, which would 'come very seasonably to him, and you'll thereby get a finger into the money matters'.<sup>133</sup>

Nevertheless, to plug the remaining gaps in the system Cardonnel was once again forced to rely upon some of the same mechanisms he had in 1704, taking up money for the army from local bankers in Courtrai or Lille on his own credit<sup>134</sup>, or demanding bills from close contacts such as the hospital and forage contractor John Hudson.<sup>135</sup> Cadogan similarly raised money in Courtrai and drew bills on Amsterdam and Antwerp via his aide-de-camp Captain Thomas Foxon<sup>136</sup>, while Erle drew bills for £700 on Romswinckel's correspondent David White, a Belfast merchant in Bruges, and advanced each regiment at Ostend 50 pistoles from his own credit.<sup>137</sup> Sweet sent a letter of credit for 150,000 fl in November 1708, but once again it arrived late, and Cardonnel replied that '[I] know not whether I shall

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<sup>132</sup> HL, ST57 ii, 74, 87-8, 91, 93, 106-7; HL, ST58 iii, 40-1, 70, 72-6, 94, 117-8, 134; BL, Add. mss 61400 fos. 14r-v; CAC, Erle-Drax mss, ERLE 3/23, Erle to Walpole, 29/5/1708; Erle to Sunderland, 23/10/1708

<sup>133</sup> HL, ST57 ii, 74-5; HL, ST58 iii, 67, 134, 191, 219

<sup>134</sup> HL, ST57 ii, 105; HL, ST58 iii, 64, 104, 124; BL, Add. mss 61399 fos. 245v, 249r-51v; BL, Add. mss 61400 fo. 31v

<sup>135</sup> BL, Add. mss 61399 fos. 245v, 249v; BL, Add. mss 61400 fos. 7r, 10v, 11v, 13v, 25r, 47r; von Arni, *Hospital care* pp. 112, 137, 144

<sup>136</sup> BL, Add. mss 61399 fos. 251v-252r; BL, Add. mss 61400 fos. 7v, 32v, 34v, 47r; Dalton, *Army Lists* vi, 167

<sup>137</sup> HL, ST57 ii, 94, 106-7, 109-10; HL, ST58 iii, 94, 96, 117

have the opportunity or occasion to make use of it'.<sup>138</sup> The siege of Lille in 1708 was therefore not without many of the same problems of the Blenheim campaign, but these problems not only appear to have been less serious but also less directly the outcome of specifically administrative or financial faults within the Pay Office. Brydges' active involvement, and the personal and partisan-political linkages and obligations he shared with his officials and correspondents, appear to have encouraged a higher level of mobilisation and effectiveness in 1708 than in 1704 and, by implication, for his tenure in office between 1705 and the reconfiguration of British politics that accompanied the fall of the whig ministry in August 1710.

### **THE CHANGE OF MINISTRY 1710**

Just as the 'Tack' had destroyed the tory ministry in 1704, the efforts by an almost entirely whig ministry to prosecute the tory and High Church clergyman Henry Sacheverell for a fiery attack in December 1709 on Nonconformists, whig politicians and by implication the Revolutionary Settlement of 1688 fatally undermined their power.<sup>139</sup> Building on wider dissatisfaction in both the court and the country with the whig ministry, and in alliance with the Queen's new tory favourite Abigail Masham, Robert Harley was able to force out first Sunderland and then Godolphin in August, reluctantly installing himself at the head of a new and strongly tory ministry that also drove Marlborough to the sidelines. After 1710 Brydges was in some doubts about whether to surrender his own employment, but his strongly-held tory principles both convinced and permitted him to remain, which at first sight seems paradoxical given Jonathan Swift's subsequent judgement –

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<sup>138</sup> BL, Add. mss 61400 fos. 32v, 57r

<sup>139</sup> Dickinson, *Bolingbroke* pp. 63-133; Holmes, *Politics* pp. 247-84; Hill, *Robert Harley* pp. 133-92

widely repeated – that Brydges was merely ‘a great complier with every court’.<sup>140</sup>

Yet although he had remained in the ministry as it swung towards the whigs after 1708, this was out of loyalty to Marlborough and Godolphin, and largely on sufferance: in January 1709 it was rumoured he would be replaced by the Junto politician the earl of Manchester, and in September 1710 Brydges noted that he had been ‘one of those whom for some years late past my Lord M[arlborough] and Lord G[odolphin] were allowed to protect, but not permitted to do anything for’.<sup>141</sup>

Brydges therefore welcomed the new ministry, considering himself to be ‘confirmed in my employment on such a foot as is agreeable to my principles’, and confiding privately to Drummond that ‘it is upon an entire Tory bottom the administration is now founded. I am convinced in my own thoughts it is right’.<sup>142</sup> He survived attempts to dislodge him through the favour shown to him by Harley and St John, and by the linkages he had built with Masham.<sup>143</sup> He therefore continued to oversee the pay of the army as Harley and St John – the latter now northern secretary of state – negotiated secretly with France for a peace treaty that would recognise the Bourbon possession of Spain in return for commercial concessions in Spanish America. However, the army continued to campaign: Marlborough succeeded in capturing Bouchain in August 1711, thereby breaking through the final barrier of fortresses protecting the French frontier, but he was politically weakened and was dismissed from his position as commander-in-chief in December 1711.<sup>144</sup> Command was given over to the second duke of Ormond, by

<sup>140</sup> HL, ST58 vi, 213; Baker & baker, *Chandos* pp. 58-9; *HOP* (1690-1715) iii, 385-7

<sup>141</sup> HL, ST57 ii, 142, 147; HL, ST58 iii, 167, 223; HL, ST57 iv, 164

<sup>142</sup> HL, ST57 iv, 135, 150, 213; *HOP* (1690-1715) iii, 385-7

<sup>143</sup> HL, ST57 iii, 270; HL, ST57 iv, 93, 136; HL, ST57 v, 154-5, 202; HL, ST57 viii, 164-5; HL, ST58 vi, 220-1 Baker & baker, *Chandos* pp. 59-62; *HOP* (1690-1715) iii, 386

<sup>144</sup> Burton, *Captain-General* pp. 163-83

now a strongly tory political figure allied with the ministry, who was instructed merely to maintain a holding action. As a result, he withdrew British troops from the allied army before the battle of Denain in July 1712, which resulted in a French victory and allowed them to regain lost ground before the war was brought to a close the following year in the Peace of Utrecht.

Thus, despite political changes at home the army remained in the field in 1711 and 1712, and therefore in continued need of both formal and informal financial support. Yet the importance of Brydges as a financial figure has been consistently underrated in discussions of this period: Scouller and Jones give departmental finance after 1710 only cursory attention, Sperling's thesis ends in this year, while financial studies by P.G.M. Dickson and others focus instead almost exclusively on Harley's efforts at the Treasury.<sup>145</sup> Yet Brydges was clearly valued: Harley consistently refused to allow him to resign, both Marlborough and Godolphin insisted that he remain, while Drummond noted that Brydges 'understood the nature of the business better than some new Commissioners perhaps may do for some time'.<sup>146</sup> William Wotton also wrote to him in January 1712 that

a new man must for some time be a stranger to the affair and some time (and that I fear not a little) [be] requisite to create an entire confidence between him and those with whom he must contract to remit such vast sums abroad. This must necessarily streighten the government at this time, which a good man who loves his Country would be very unwilling to do.<sup>147</sup>

The final section of this chapter will argue that Brydges was retained by the new tory government not only because he was in sympathy with Harley's own political

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<sup>145</sup> Jones, *War and economy* pp. 85, 87; Dickson, *Financial Revolution* pp. 62-79

<sup>146</sup> HL, ST57 iii, 274; HL, ST57 iv, 30-1, 89-90, 148, 201-2, 214-5; HL, ST57 v, 46, 75-6, 95; HL, ST57 vi, 163-4; HL, ST57 viii, 111-2, 246-7; HL, ST58 vi, 213; HL, ST58 viii, 130-1, 236 Baker & baker, *Chandos* pp. 103-5; *HOP* (1690-1715) iii, 386-7

<sup>147</sup> HL, ST58 viii, 141-2

aims but also because he offered the new ministry almost unique access to a pre-existing set of financial connections. After 1710, the informal networks that he had built up since 1705 – like those of Nathaniel Clements in Ireland in the eighteenth century – were steadily woven into state structures, and lent a bureaucratic fascia and institutional identity, even though their operation continued to rest upon effective cooperation, improved coordination, and the cultivation of personal trust.

### **FURNESE AND FINANCIAL CRISIS**

This level of expertise was particularly necessary because since 1709 the British state had been in tightening grip of a credit crisis which Godolphin's departure had only exacerbated, having caused a loss of confidence in financial markets in Britain and Europe that had pushed up the costs of borrowing and driven the state to the limits of public credit.<sup>148</sup> This coincided with the disordering of financial markets overseas caused by the failure of the former Huguenot banker Samuel Bernard, which undermined not only remittances but the entire international financial system. Sweet and Cartwright both noted for instance in April 1709 that 'the consternation was so great amongst the merchants and monied men occasioned by the bankrupts of the French account that there was a full stop for the present to all circulation of money'.<sup>149</sup> Despite a brief recovery, in July 1710 Drummond admitted that 'the exchange is so run down that I rather be a ploughman than a banquier at present'.<sup>150</sup>

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<sup>148</sup> Dickson, *Financial revolution* pp. 62-3, 361-2, 403-4; Roy A. Sundstrom, *Sidney Godolphin: servant of the state* (Newark, 1992) pp. 214-5, 242; Holmes, *Politics* pp. 177-8; Brian W. Hill, 'The change of government and the "loss of the City", 1710-1711', *Economic History Review*, 24 (1971) pp. 396-9

<sup>149</sup> HL, ST57 ii, 176, 191, 211; HL, ST58 iv, 11, 58-9, 72; Fernand Braudel, *Civilization and capitalism, 15th-18th century* (3 vols., Berkeley, 1992) iii, 331-3. On the interconnected nature of French and Dutch credit, see BL, Add. mss 70193 fos. 2-35, 73, 86-7

<sup>150</sup> HL, ST58 v, 246; HL, ST58 vi, 104, 145-6, 209

Between September and November 1710 the Pay Office bills were traded at a discount of between 4 and 6 percent, while even in June 1712 Drummond complained that Sweet was finding it impossible to encash bills and had instead paid them over in lieu of money to the solliciteurs, who in turn had been forced to discount them at 8 or 9 percent.<sup>151</sup> In August 1710 the Bank of England had choked off the flexibility provided by the discount market in London by refusing to encash or discount foreign bills of exchange except in unpopular Exchequer bills, which Drummond thought a whig manoeuvre against the new tory government and a ‘damned villainous Jesuitical fanatical resolution ... which is much worse than if they had refused to discount at all’.<sup>152</sup>

There was therefore an urgent need for experienced financial officials, not least because Sir Henry Furnese was also dismissed as remittance contractor for the Low Countries in August 1710. This has invariably been presented as a short-sighted act which deprived the new tory ministry of vital financial assistance in order to settle political scores with a whig financier.<sup>153</sup> Yet the following section will argue that there were strong reasons for this decision that relate directly to the decision to retain Brydges, not least because Furnese had, like the Bank, immediately stopped all of his bills: in September Brydges told Drummond that ‘what he did ... is so much resented that I question much whether he will not hear of it in Parliament’.<sup>154</sup> More importantly, historians have not recognised that by August 1710 Furnese’s personal credit, and thus his effectiveness as a financier, was near collapse. As

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<sup>151</sup> HL, ST58 vi, 231, 251, 261, 265, 272; HL, ST58 vii, 9, 46, 67-8; HL, ST58 xii, 27-9

<sup>152</sup> HL, ST57 iv, 170, 216; HL, ST58 vi, 272; HL, ST58 vii, 47-8, 96; BEA, G4/7 fo. 87; CTB xxiv, 75, 90, 475; Hill, ‘Change of government’ pp. 398-407; Holmes, *Politics* pp. 172-5; Price, ‘Discount activity’, pp. 96-7

<sup>153</sup> Sperling, ‘Public credit’, pp. 193, 205-6; Hill, ‘Change of government’, pp. 401, 403; Jones, *War and economy* p. 85; *HoP (1690-1715)*, pp. 1129-30

<sup>154</sup> HL, ST57 iv, 150

D.W. Jones has noted, between 1705 and 1710 Furnese increasingly relied upon answering bills drawn upon him rather than remitting money to the Low Countries, although he glosses over the magnitude of this transition.<sup>155</sup> In 1705 over eighty percent of his remittances had been made by purchasing bills in advance and sending them over, but by 1710 nearly seventy percent of Furnese's remittances were made by the Bank of England or by answering bills drawn from abroad, which would have reduced financial pressures by staggering the dates of repayment. Correlating as much as possible the minute-books from the Bank of England with a comprehensive list of Furnese's remittances, overlooked by Jones in his calculations, suggests that from 1705 he borrowed or discounted increasing amounts of tallies and bills, in a fashion that only have been intended to provide emergency short-term liquidity:

**Table 1: Bills discounted and money borrowed by Sir Henry Furnese, 1702-11**

Year	£ discounted	£ borrowed	£ total	£ remitted	Percentage
1702	£0	£0	£0	£7,500	0.0
1703	£0	£0	£0	£589,682	0.0
1704	£0	£0	£0	£783,782	0.0
1705	£25,000+	£0	£25,000+	£805,694	3.1
1706	£70,000+	£60,000	£130,000+	£1,258,182	10.3
1707	£43,500	£20,000	£63,500	£1,353,208	4.7
1708	£70,000	£55,000+	£125,000+	£1,101,119	11.4
1709	£176,000	£35,000	£211,000+	£928,910	22.7
1710	£117,000	£25,000	£142,000	£672,211	21.1
1711	£0	£15,000	£15,000	£?	?

Sources: *BEA, Court of Directors Minute Books G5/6-7, passim*  
*Bod. Lib., North MS A.3 fos. 240-8*  
*DHC, Fox-Strangeways MSS, Box 277 (Low Countries, Portugal, Italy), passim*

Thus, in the last two years of his contract Furnese was apparently relying upon the Bank for something over a fifth of his total working capital.

<sup>155</sup> Jones, *War and economy* p. 86; CTB xxi, *clxxix-clxxxi*

On the one hand these actions are indicative of the strength of Furnese's informal networks, favourable connections with the Bank permitting him to operate above and beyond his narrowing financial base. He was also given strong Treasury support, as in February 1709 when Godolphin spoke directly to the Bank asking them 'to assist Sir H[enry] Furnese and Mr Brydges by advancing money on the tallies in their respective hands for the better carrying on of the public service'.<sup>156</sup> On the other hand, their aid required reciprocal concessions that cut into his own financial flexibility. When the Bank offered to remit £300,000 abroad for Furnese in December 1709, they also insisted that 'in regard the Bank are always ready to assist Sir H[enry Furnese] in his affairs for the public service, he should do what in him lies to serve the Bank by keeping his cash there', an important concession since Furnese could now not deposit it elsewhere at better rates of interest.<sup>157</sup> Finally, the impression of increasing financial pressure is supported by other evidence. Furnese had always made strong efforts to close down alternative channels of private remittance that would have raised the exchange rate and decreased his margins: when Brydges secretly attempted this in 1706 Furnese forced him into a hasty retreat.<sup>158</sup> However by 1709 Furnese's efforts appear to have become increasingly frenzied.<sup>159</sup> In June 1709, for example, when Brydges attempted to remit the Hessian arrears to Drummond via Sir Theodore Janssen, Brydges noted that Furnese had gone to the Treasury 'in the greatest passion imaginable ... '(one would have

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<sup>156</sup> BEA, G4/6 fo. 249; CTB xviii, 3

<sup>157</sup> BEA, G4/7 fos. 38-41, 46; CTB xxiii, 34-5

<sup>158</sup> HL, ST57 i, 47-60

<sup>159</sup> HL, ST57 ii, 204, 211, 221, 223, 229-34, 252-3; HL, ST57 iii, 4, 124, 236, 251; HL, ST58 iv, 101, 104-6; HL, ST58 v, 70; BL, Add. mss 61399 fos. 167v, 170r; CTB xxiii, 22-3, 26-7, 36

thought) out of his wits', and threatened to abandon his contract altogether unless this was reversed.<sup>160</sup>

John Sperling has suggested that these actions represented Furnese's zeal for the public service.<sup>161</sup> They should perhaps be understood instead as increasingly forceful efforts to hold down costs at a time when his financial margins were narrowing. In Flanders, and – as the next chapter will show – in Portugal and the Mediterranean, he appears by August 1710 to have been nearing the limits of his credit, reducing his ability to support the army and cushion wider financial shocks as other remitters such as the Bank of England had done during the 1690s. Even in May 1709 he had written to James Stanhope in Spain that

I have been obliged to support our armies in Flanders and Portugal and what has been paid in Italy by my own credit, so that my burthen is excessive[ly] great, having received nothing all this year but tallies which are very difficult to be turned into money.<sup>162</sup>

His removal in August 1710 was therefore a reflection, rather than a cause, of the government's wider financial difficulties: Drummond, for instance, recommended to Harley that Furnese only be kept on temporarily, 'that he may not do mischief, till you can do without him'.<sup>163</sup> However, combined with the departure of Godolphin it also created an increased need for financial expertise and the retention of allied figures – such as James Brydges – who were prepared to mobilise their experience and contacts for the service of the state, and even to do as Furnese had done and convert private networks and connections into public ones.

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<sup>160</sup> HL, ST57 ii, , 232-4, 248-9; HL, ST58 iv, 107-8, 115, 123-4, 143-4

<sup>161</sup> Sperling, 'Public credit', pp. 158, 199-201, 205-6

<sup>162</sup> CKS, U1590/O139/13, Furnese to Stanhope, 12/5/1709

<sup>163</sup> HMC Portland iv, 583

## PRIVATE TO PUBLIC NETWORKS

The financial assistance that Brydges offered took various forms. He reminded Harley in June 1711 of ‘my acquaintance in the City and among the monied men’, and at his instigation Charles Davenant visited the tory banker and financier Charles Duncombe to secure his support for Harley’s ‘present schemes’.<sup>164</sup> When Harley proposed to set the crippling National Debt upon a firmer footing by forcing holders to accept stock in the new South Sea Company, Brydges and his stockbroker Sir James Marye petitioned to be appointed to the Court of Directors, ‘having engaged that little I am master of in that bottom, and done what I could to persuade my friends to follow my example’.<sup>165</sup> In September 1711, Matthew Decker wrote to Brydges that ‘it is like there will be some quarrel’ at the upcoming General Court of the South Sea Company, and therefore asked him to attend with Sloper ‘and some more of your friends ... that we may have the majority to make all business go on easily’.<sup>166</sup> As shown in the following chapter, in 1710 Brydges was also able to mobilise his private connections and credit to answer bills drawn from Italy, while in February 1713 he was again asked to raise £30,000 ‘for several pressing services of my office’ upon South Sea stock: he took the liberty of subscribing £1,500 for his relation and colleague Humphrey Walcot.<sup>167</sup>

Brydges also helped to set up a consortium of remittance contractors to supersede Furnese. Both he and Drummond recommended the employment of their associate

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<sup>164</sup> HL, ST57 iv, 98-99; HL, ST57 v, 95

<sup>165</sup> HL, ST57 v, 95; HL, ST58 viii, 176-7

<sup>166</sup> HL, ST58 ix, 119

<sup>167</sup> HL, ST57 viii, 243

Sir Theodore Janssen<sup>168</sup>, and Drummond also pressed for Sir James Bateman, who not only had ‘great credit’ in Antwerp but had been ‘disobliged this year by the Whig cabal of the East India Company’.<sup>169</sup> Other remitters were the merchants and financiers Samuel Shephard and Sir John Lambert, as well as Edward Gibbon, whom Drummond told Harley undertook the business ‘by my intelligence and concurrence’.<sup>170</sup> The consortium also included both the tory banker Sir Richard Hoare and his son Richard, a merchant, for whom Drummond also acted as correspondent.<sup>171</sup> Francis Stratford was also involved, offering to make a series of advances with Gibbon and Lambert upon tin to be sold in Hamburg, although Drummond warned Brydges in September 1710 that ‘Mr Stratford is so much Sir H[enry] F[urnese]’s humble slave’.<sup>172</sup> In November 1712 Brydges also fed Matthew Decker inside information to encourage him to bid for remittances in association with the house of Messrs Pels in Amsterdam.<sup>173</sup>

The new consortium of remitters was therefore enmeshed in a series of personal connections. Not all of them were necessarily partisan. Gibbon and Hoare were long-standing tories: Shephard, Bateman and Lambert were mainly whigs, but all three had been disobliged by their own party – as Bateman had been in 1697 – and thus, as so often, a shared sense of antipathy appears to have helped strengthen bonds.<sup>174</sup> Brydges already had connections with Janssen, Decker and Gibbon, and worked to build up linkages with others: he noted to Drummond in July 1711 for

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<sup>168</sup> HL, ST57 iv, 86, 122; HL, ST58 vi, 200, 231; HL, ST58 vii, 99, 179

<sup>169</sup> HMC Portland iv, 583

<sup>170</sup> *Ibid.* iv, 583

<sup>171</sup> Henry Hoare, *Hoare's Bank: a record 1672-1955, the story of a private bank* (London, 1955) pp. 5-6, 22-3; *HOP* (1690-1715) iii, 366-8

<sup>172</sup> HL, ST57 iv, 98; HL, ST58 vi, 200, 231; CTB xxiv, 42, 44, 88, 112

<sup>173</sup> HL, ST57 viii, 81, 146; CTB xxvi, 85, 88

<sup>174</sup> *HOP* (1690-1715) iii, 148-9; v, 460-3; Holmes, *Politics* pp. 157, 171, 264

instance that Lambert and Decker ‘with some other of your friends’ would dine with him later that week, ‘where we shall not fail your health’.<sup>175</sup> Harley promoted Gibbon to the Customs Board in 1711 and made him Receiver of the £2 Million Lottery, where Hoare and Shepherd acted as his securities.<sup>176</sup> Finally, as noted previously, the Bank of England also remitted substantial sums abroad in 1711 and 1712, mainly through a pre-existing network of personal contacts such as Louis de Connick and Jean Lucas Pels, whose own credit and connections was mobilised on the Bank’s behalf in order to support its operations overseas.<sup>177</sup> The continued effectiveness of the army overseas was therefore underpinned by the creation and cultivation in London of informal linkages – through friendship, mutual interest and, in many cases, political partisanship – amongst remittance contractors and their networks that appear to have helped generate trust, encourage cooperation, and thereby improve the coordination of public and private monies.

Of equal importance was the eventual strengthening of both public and private networks in Flanders. By 1711 poor relations between Cartwright and Sweet had led to serious problems concerning stoppages and overpayments, despite Brydges’ pious hope that the situation might be rescued by ‘laying down and giving them strict rules for their government’: Drummond commented in February that ‘they are at such variance that they do much discredit to the service’.<sup>178</sup> Matters were not helped when Sweet heard rumours that Brydges would replace him with Francis Stratford, or when Cartwright attempted again in June 1711 to secure the

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<sup>175</sup> HL, ST57 v, 125; HL, ST57 viii, 11

<sup>176</sup> CTB xxv, 68; Dickson, *Financial Revolution* pp. 71, 112-17

<sup>177</sup> See above pp. 142-5

<sup>178</sup> HL, ST57 v, 60; HL, ST58 viii, 67-8, 98-9, 210-11; HL, ST58 ix, 105, 141-3; BL, Add. mss 61401 fos. 113r, 116r-v, 135v-136r, 144v, 116r, 117v; BL, Add. mss 61402 fo. 36r

deputation.<sup>179</sup> Around this time Brydges discussed with Gibbon and Stratford about replacing both men with someone ‘who would be more observant of orders, and more easy in the execution of them’.<sup>180</sup> One candidate was Charles Le Bas, a trusted banker and army agent closely linked to Adam Cardonnel and Edward Pouncefort: he subsequently served as executor to both.<sup>181</sup> The other was William Leathes, Gibbon’s client, who thought the matter so certain he jumped the gun and wrote to Cardonnel for his support, commenting that he believed Brydges’ intention was ‘purely to remove the inconveniencies that attend the bad correspondence that has always been betwixt the two present Paymasters’.<sup>182</sup> However this was again frustrated: Drummond had recommended in May 1711 that ‘if it could be contrived they ought to live in better friendship’ – although he commented that this had been frustrated by ‘Mr Sweet’s untractable humour, notwithstanding all the pains Mr Cardonnel and Mr Watkins have taken’ – while Cardonnel once more warned Brydges in September 1711 that ‘upon reading your letter to my Lord Duke he directed me to give you this advice not to think of removing him [Sweet], and that he does not think it would be for your interest’.<sup>183</sup>

Nevertheless, almost immediately after Marlborough was dismissed on 31 December 1712 Brydges was already plotting Sweet’s dismissal, writing to Harley on 11 February 1712 that ‘I cannot say Mr Sweet stands entirely satisfied in my opinion as to his conduct’ and suggesting that they ‘lay hold’ of his refusal to

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<sup>179</sup> HL, ST57 iv, 151, 156; HL, ST57 v, 162, 167-8; HL, ST57 vi, 33, 71; HL, ST58 vi, 200; HL, ST58 viii, 205-6; HL, ST58 ix, 29-30; BL, Add. mss 61402 fos. 54v, 60r, 82r

<sup>180</sup> HL, ST57 v, 185, 220-2, 224; HL, ST57 vi, 15; HL, ST58 ix, 122

<sup>181</sup> HL, ST57 ii, 206, 214; HL, ST57 iii, 56, 210; HL, ST58 iv, 37, 62, 102, 200; TNA, PROB 11/567 (Cardonnel, Adam) and 11/610 (Pouncefort, Edward). For Le Bas, see Dickson, *Financial Revolution* p. xxxviii

<sup>182</sup> HL, ST58 ix, 114-7, 122

<sup>183</sup> HL, ST57 v, 221-2, 224; HL, ST58 viii, 113-4, 269; HL, ST58 ix, 29, 122, 150-1, 161

provide a security to replace him with Drummond.<sup>184</sup> The bankruptcy of Vanderheiden & Drummond the following month, described below, ended this plan, and Drummond recommended to Harley that Sweet be temporarily retained: although ‘violent for his old friends, and very rich ... [he] is now used to the business’.<sup>185</sup> However, in March 1712 Sweet had received a public bill for 312,000 fl drawn on Drummond by Sir John Lambert, and failed to withdraw some 100,000 fl from the firm before it collapsed, although he claimed to Brydges this had been done ‘to preserve the public credit etc. and not to affront Mr Drummond, who I knew you always had so great a value [for]’.<sup>186</sup> He then disclaimed responsibility and refused to settle with Drummond with the spurious excuse of having sworn an oath never to sign such a composition, even when Richard Hill – ‘who has the greatest influence’, Brydges wrote, ‘of anybody over him’ – was brought in to add leverage.<sup>187</sup> Sweet blamed the business on Drummond and Francis Stratford, writing to Hill that they had ‘stirred him up to be my enemy for their own self-interest, and not for his good’, but Brydges used the opportunity finally to dislodge Sweet from his post, noting to Drummond in July 1712 that he refused to exert himself ‘for the sake of one who (though my agent) has not deserved I should give myself so much trouble for him’.<sup>188</sup>

The dismissal of Marlborough therefore allowed the final removal of the impediment that had blocked the further politicisation and efficiency of fiscal-

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<sup>184</sup> HL, ST57 vi, 180, 200-1, 217, 226, 228; HL, ST57 vii, 25

<sup>185</sup> HL, ST57 vi, 208, 228-9, 246-8; HL, ST58 x, 216-8; HL, ST58 xi, 25-6; HMC Portland v, 165

<sup>186</sup> HL, ST57 vi, 200, 205, 218, 227, 268-9; HL, ST57 vii, 1-9, 21-2, 43, 65-7, 86, 100-1, 107, 114-6, 142-3, 161-2, 253-4; HL, ST58 xi, 104, 114, 209, 231; HL, ST58 xii, 19-26, 74-6, 83-7, 94, 115-9, 220-3, 227

<sup>187</sup> HL, ST57 viii, 12, 181-2, 196-7; HL, ST57 ix, 66-7, 70, 78, 89, 131; BL, Add. mss 62526 fos. 78r-102v, 170r; CTB xxvii, 17-18

<sup>188</sup> HL, ST57 vii, 161; BL, Add. mss 62526 fo. 84v

military networks abroad, finally bringing formal structures into line with their underlying linkages. Thus, Sweet was replaced in June 1712 by Humphrey Walcot, Brydges' brother-in-law and the cashier of the Pay Office: Sloper wrote that 'I know nobody you can better trust with such a charge than one through whose hands so very great sums have passed.'<sup>189</sup> Admittedly Walcot immediately refused to act in partnership with Cartwright, mainly through lack of trust:

I am very ready to believe him careful and diligent in your concerns, and like him very well enough for a correspondent or friend, but do not approve of him for a partner, which is little less than to be married to him ... I was formerly a very great sufferer by partnership, so would gladly avoid the like for the future.<sup>190</sup>

Indeed, Brydges later heard rumours that Cartwright had brought Walcot before a court-martial, and noted that 'their resentments against each other may occasion frequent disputes ... which must end in prejudicing the service', but on the whole these appear to have been more easily resolved than the conflict with Sweet.<sup>191</sup> In a reinforcement of informal networks, Walcot was also introduced, as Cartwright had been, to Brydges' contacts such as Hallangias, Romswinkel and Senserf, who promised Walcot 'the best counsel I can of what he desires from me'.<sup>192</sup> Other bureaucratic changes were similarly underpinned by partisan networks. Various Tory figures recommended that Brydges employ the Scottish merchant Michael Kinkaid as his agent at Dunkirk.<sup>193</sup> Cardonnel's successor as military secretary was Henry Watkins, who was also appointed to examine the pretensions for

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<sup>189</sup> HL, ST57 iii, 247; HL, ST57 vii, 111-2; HL, ST58 iv, 37; HL, ST58 ix, 204

<sup>190</sup> HL, ST57 vii, 201, 216-8; HL, ST57 viii, 82-3; HL, ST58 xii, 232, 254-8, 261, 271

<sup>191</sup> HL, ST57 viii, 118, 120-2, 124

<sup>192</sup> HL, ST58 xii, 70, 80, 88, 91, 95, 139

<sup>193</sup> HL, ST57 vii, 178, 193, 236; HL, ST57 viii, 68, 183, 458; HL, ST57 xii, 111, 271, 272; HL, ST57 xiii, 3, 10; Saville, *Bank of Scotland* pp. 16, 65-6

Extraordinaries of the foreign regiments, now hopelessly run into confusion.<sup>194</sup>

Brydges encouraged both Hallangias and William Hetzler, secretary to the British embassy in The Hague, to assist.<sup>195</sup> Connections in Flanders after 1710 therefore remained firmly embedded within wider informal or personal networks.

A further contribution was made by John Drummond, now even more firmly embedded into both formal and financial networks. Aside from his appointment as deputy-paymaster and the new ministry's diplomatic agent at The Hague, Brydges and Harley pressed Janssen and the other remitters to employ Vanderheiden & Drummond as their correspondents in Amsterdam.<sup>196</sup> As correspondent Drummond intervened proactively, writing to Brydges for example in July 1711 that 'Mr Sweet by the want of 4 mails from England was pressed by some foreigners for money ... some friends having assisted us a little we have offered him 200,000 fl in advance till the letters come'.<sup>197</sup> Drummond also made use of his personal reputation, informing Brydges in December 1710 that

you know my circumstances are not equal to the figure I have of late made and to the great credit I have acquired on this Exchange even in the most difficult times, without which I could not have been so assisting in the public payments ... I have been at very great expenses, and made my entertainments on this new turn of affairs to get into the company of our people of the first rank, and to put them right as far as my capacity could reach and I flatter myself I have been successful and the clearest demonstration I have of it, is that I have always found money on discount, even upon scurvy bills, with ease, when others have been streightened.<sup>198</sup>

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<sup>194</sup> HL, ST57 vi, 206-7; CTB xxvi, 10, 80, 152, 194-5, 206-7, 266; HL, ST57 vii, 54, 73, 84, 92-3; BL, Add. mss 61402 fo. 10v. Their correspondence survives in Bod. Lib., MS Eng Hist D.149. Such an agency had been suggested by Sweet as early as May 1711: HL, ST58 xi, 79-80

<sup>195</sup> HL, ST57 v, 212; HL, ST57 vi, 206-7, 214; HL, ST57 vii, 26-7, 54, 84, 93-4, 102, 112; HL, ST58 xi, 29-30, 191, 237, 273; HL, ST58 xii, 35-8, 81-3, 202; HL, ST58 xiii, 32; NLCS, Myers mss, Box 3, Brydges to Hetzler, 8/6/1712

<sup>196</sup> HL, ST57 iv, 122; HL, ST58 vi, 200, 202, 210; HL, ST58 viii, 179; Hatton, 'Drummond', pp. 79-81, 90-6

<sup>197</sup> HMC Portland v, 11, 196; HL, ST57 v, 145; HL, ST58 vi, 217; HL, ST58 vii, 46; HL, ST58 viii, 236

<sup>198</sup> HL, ST58 vii, 95

In order to effect this Drummond continued to exploit a web of commercial connections, many of them created before 1710. Money was remitted via and advanced by the Scottish merchant Gilbert Black, who also acted as banker in Rotterdam to Henry Cartwright.<sup>199</sup> Drummond also cultivated close linkages to the house of Andries Pels, ‘the most powerful of this place’.<sup>200</sup> Alongside persistent but small-scale efforts by Cartwright and Sweet to intermingle separate funds, and exploit their own personal credit and private linkages either to lend money or discount bills, this appears to have allowed the Pay Office to cushion the worst effects of this crisis in credit.<sup>201</sup>

Indeed, so enmeshed was Drummond in this chain of personal and partisan connections that he eventually overreached. Despite only having a capital base of some £20,000 or £25,000, by September 1710 he already had public bills worth £60,000 under acceptance: by October this had climbed to over £100,000, peaking at around £200,000 in March 1712, so that Drummond wrote to Brydges that ‘you will think me very hearty for my friends and for carrying on the public payments’.<sup>202</sup> The failure of Francis Stratford in March 1712 with £7,000 of their money therefore bankrupted them<sup>203</sup>: Senserf and Brydges agreed that ‘they were rising men, had they kept in their sphere’, although this contained a touch of

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<sup>199</sup> HL, ST57 v, 144-5, 192; HL, ST58 viii, 269-70; HL, ST58 ix, 53, 221; HL, ST58 x, 116; HL, ST58 xi, 86; NAS, GD24/1/464/A/26, 31, 38-9, 77, Vanderheiden to Drummond, 3/2/1704, 11/2/1704, 23/9/1704; Black to Vanderheiden & Drummond, 1/11/1706; NAS, GD24/3/248/1-5, Black to Vanderheiden & Drummond, 28/10/1709, 31/10/1709, 4/11/1709, 6/11/1709

<sup>200</sup> HL, ST57 iv, 51-2, 242; HL, ST58 vii, 98-9, 179

<sup>201</sup> HL, ST58 vi, 165, 224, 230-1, 240, 252; HL, ST58 vii, 9, 207, 208; HL, ST58 viii, 36, 42, 44, 53, 164; HL, ST58 ix, 144; HL, ST58 x, 7-8, 106-7, 116, 188, 193-4; HL, ST58 xi, 16-8, 184, 207-8, 230-1; HL, ST58 xii, 262

<sup>202</sup> HL, ST58 vi, 248-9; HL, ST58 vii, 45, 68, 95; HL, ST58 x, 217-8; HL, ST58 xi, 110; HMC Portland iv, 578; v, 111

<sup>203</sup> HL, ST58 x, 224, 246-7; HL, ST58 xi, 110; Hatton, ‘Drummond’, pp. 85-90

hypocrisy since Brydges had done more than anyone to exploit Drummond's credit.<sup>204</sup> It also damaged the networks on whom he had relied for additional credit and liquidity, pointing to their close integration. Although no longer the agent for the sale of tin<sup>205</sup>, since 1709 Drummond had been agent to the East India Company for the purchase of bullion<sup>206</sup>, and correspondent to British merchants such as Richard Hoare, who lost £8,000 when Drummond failed and was himself bankrupted.<sup>207</sup> Thus, after 1710 a series of interlocking personal networks, formalised but not created by institutional recognition, and still reliant upon mutual – and strongly politicised – trust for their operation, continued to underpin the army overseas. Bureaucratisation was at best an irrelevance, and at worst an obstruction, to their effectiveness.

## INFORMAL TRANSACTIONS

Finally, the strengthening of Brydges' network of contacts and agents in Flanders after 1710 enabled him to continue to engage in informal financial and administrative intervention, although this now both increasingly risky and unnecessary. Even in September 1710 Brydges had continued to encourage Sweet to bring gratifications to account, and reprimanded him for having told the solliciteurs that he intended to desist.<sup>208</sup> He was also vindicated in his confident prediction that having served the foreign regiments so well in the past, 'I don't

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<sup>204</sup> HL, ST57 vii, 48; HL, ST58 xi, 263

<sup>205</sup> HL, ST58 vi, 199; HL, ST58 xii, 21-2, 25

<sup>206</sup> HMC Portland v, 160; HL, ST58 vi, 150; HL, ST58 xi, 114; HL, ST58 xii, 21; Chaudhuri, *Trading world* p. 167

<sup>207</sup> HMC Portland v, 150, 170; HL, ST58 xi, 114, 257-8; BEA, G4/7 fos. 239-41

<sup>208</sup> HL, ST57 iv, 140, 149; HL, ST57 v, 48, 79, 136, 162; HL, ST57 vi, 50, 90-1, 200-1, 205; HL, ST57 vii, 113, 125-7; HL, ST57 viii, 202, 210; HL, ST58 vi, 206, 223; HL, ST58 vii, 2, 33-4, 54, 148, 251; HL, ST58 x, 95-6, 189-90; HL, ST58 xi, 228-9; HL, ST58 xii, 80, 92

doubt but they'll be willing to show the like civility, as they did formerly, when they see that they have as good treatment as they had before'. In 1711 he also arranged with Cardonnel and Le Bas to advance money to the forage contractors<sup>209</sup>, and told Walcot in June 1712 that although all extraordinary expenses were to be referred back from Flanders to the Treasury, if Ormond asked for an advance upon a pre-approved head such as subsistence 'I believe in such case you need not scruple gratifying the Duke and complying with it, but only at Watkins' discretion'.<sup>210</sup>

However by and large such informal financial interventions ceased after March 1712, due mainly to the campaign waged by the tories in Parliament against Marlborough, Cardonnel, Sweet and Robert Walpole for accepting various gratifications from the troops and contractors, such as Marlborough's 2½ percent deduction.<sup>211</sup> Although Brydges was protected by the joint efforts of Harley, St John and other members of the new ministry<sup>212</sup>, this appears to have encouraged him to write to Sweet and order him to desist from any further deductions,

the Parliament having declared their dislike of it. I am resolved no more to be under any such obligations to them, not that I think it an ill thing in itself, but because I will not continue in a course which they have passed so harsh a vote upon, I mean that which was fixed upon Mr Cardonnel.<sup>213</sup>

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<sup>209</sup> HL, ST57 iv, 224, 231; HL, ST57 v, 30-1, 55-6, 75, 163; HL, ST57 vi, 145, 219, 221; HL, ST57 viii, 55, 85, 273; HL, ST58 viii, 8-9, 151-2

<sup>210</sup> HL, ST57 vii, 111-2

<sup>211</sup> J.H. Plumb, *Sir Robert Walpole: the king's minister* (London, 1960) pp. 171-88; D. Szechi, *Jacobitism and Tory politics 1710-14* (Edinburgh, 1984) pp. 107-8; Burton, *Captain-General* pp. 187-9; Rabinowicz, Tapiero, and Rabb, *Sir Solomon de Medina* pp. 61-70; *HOP* (1690-1715) iii, 386-7, 462-3

<sup>212</sup> HL, ST58 viii, 139; Baker & Baker, *Chandos* pp. 103-7; Dickinson, *Bolingbroke* p. 83; Holmes, *Politics* p. 142; *HOP* (1690-1715) iii, 386-7

<sup>213</sup> HL, ST57 vii, 220, 225

The only exceptions were a number of reliable Extraordinary arrears purchased by Hallangias and Walcot, ‘when they [the troops] agree to do the fair thing’.<sup>214</sup> Thus it was mainly political and administrative conditions which heightened risk that helped close down Brydges’ activities, rather than any Damascene conversion: discussing the gratifications with Hallangias in December 1712, he wrote that ‘I am not ashamed, but rather proud of having received such a mark of their friendship’.<sup>215</sup> Added to this was the disappearance of most of the foreign regiments from the army after the battle of Denain in July 1712 – he agreed with Walcot in August 1712 that ‘it is not worthwhile to take the one percent from those few foreigners left with the Duke of Ormonde and [I] desire you’ll accordingly forbear it’ – as well as the increasing likelihood that the Extraordinaries incurred would never be reimbursed by Parliament.<sup>216</sup> Informal financial intervention therefore became increasingly unsafe, unprofitable and apparently unnecessary, and it was correspondingly curtailed.

## CONCLUSION

This chapter has therefore argued that the historiography of the British fiscal-military state in the Low Countries after 1705, and the tenure of James Brydges as Paymaster of the Forces Abroad, requires substantial revision. Although undoubtedly ‘corrupt’ in his actions, like Sir Stephen Fox, Nathaniel Clements or the earl of Ranelagh, he appears to have been aimed at more than merely personal aggrandisement. From 1706 he began to offer to the British army and its allies in

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<sup>214</sup> HL, ST57 iv, 199; HL, ST57 vii, 143, 178-9, 191, 193, 195; HL, ST57 viii, 140; HL, ST58 vii, 2-3, 13; HL, ST58 xi, 162

<sup>215</sup> HL, ST57 viii, 171

<sup>216</sup> HL, ST57 vii, 93, 204; HL, ST58 xii, 89

the Low Countries a range of financial services that contributed materially to the effectiveness of the army by helping them to cushion and absorb the financial shortages that had caused so many problems in earlier campaigns. The process, by and large, reflected a fusion of public service and private profit, Brydges being willing to undertake these operations in an entrepreneurial spirit because the deductions that he demanded were calibrated so as to compensate him for the risks involved. It is hard to see how an outside contractor without the political and administrative leverage that Brydges possessed could have offered lower rates, unless they had access to substantially more credit or political favour.

Brydges' operations in the Low Countries therefore demonstrate the huge gains in the effectiveness of fiscal-military infrastructure abroad offered by a fusion of the administrative and fiscal manipulation demonstrated by Ranelagh and Hill in the 1690s and the wide-ranging financial networks deployed by Sir Stephen Fox and his son Charles between 1702 and 1705. In both cases a widespread network of trusted associates allowed improvements in overall effectiveness that had little to do with bureaucratic structures or conduct, permitting informal financial intermediation or access to extensive levels of private credit, and in both cases such networks appear to have been strongly partisanised, with common political loyalties and connections providing a sound basis for trust. After 1705, Brydges appears to have been able to combine both, integrating a partisan administrative core – including figures such as John Drummond or Adam Cardonnel who were outside formal Pay Office structures – with a series of informal financial connections in London and the Low Countries in a fashion that both enabled and encouraged far higher levels of financial intervention. The decline of informal intermediation after 1710 reflected

the higher risks, reduced requirements, and the fact that substantial elements of the network had been recognised and formally incorporated into the British fiscal-military state without being substantially altered.

Moreover, to the extent that Brydges remained unsuccessful in cushioning or absorbing fluctuations in remittances, this appears to have reflected to some extent the limits of his own financial resources and the continued presence of agents such as Sir Henry Furnese and Benjamin Sweet, whom Brydges – perhaps quite reasonably – could never entirely trust, and which limited his freedom as a financial intermediary. Unable to rely on their cooperation, and frequently lacking any partisan connection, he was unable to exploit all of the opportunities for informal financial intervention as they arose. Thus, the changing effectiveness of the British fiscal-military state in the Low Countries after 1705 rested, in the final analysis, upon the shifting strength of the informal networks that underlay its activities, rather than the rationality or impartiality of the bureaucratic matrix within which they operated.

## **CHAPTER 6: THE MEDITERRANEAN 1705-13**

Although the previous chapter has identified the existence of several overlapping and intersecting partisan networks in the Low Countries, and the material benefits this almost certainly offered to the operation of the army, this still represents at best only one case study, under what may well have been atypical conditions. The ultimate test of the analytical and conceptual model advanced in this thesis, of an interaction between coordination, cooperation and mutual trust deriving above all from partisan connections, would come from a more heterogeneous and politically mixed environment, and one where fiscal-military and financial infrastructures were visibly less sophisticated. Such a series of tests are provided by a closer study of the maintenance and supply of the British and allied forces in Portugal, Spain and the Mediterranean during this conflict, which ultimately witnessed little of the success that the duke of Marlborough enjoyed in the Low Countries. Although detailed logistical studies of the war are lacking, D.W. Jones once again links the success or failure of supply with the underlying economic infrastructure, while Eric Gruber von Arni has equated logistical failures with insufficiently bureaucratic and professional administration.<sup>1</sup>

In Portugal, the Portuguese general, the marques das Minas, had invaded Spain in 1706 and reached Madrid before being forced to retreat.<sup>2</sup> The following year Henri de Massue, the earl of Galway and a Huguenot general in Britain's service, led a similar invasion which was routed by Spanish and French troops at the Battle of Almanza in April 1707. Thereafter the focus shifted towards the defence of the

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<sup>1</sup> Jones, *War and economy* pp. 161-210, 294-302; von Arni, *Hospital care* pp. 157-82, 186

<sup>2</sup> This following is based on A.D. Francis, *The first Peninsular War, 1702-1713* (London, 1975) pp. 171-402

Portuguese frontiers, and the expansion of a bridgehead gained in Catalonia. In 1705 an expedition had been sent to the Mediterranean under the earl of Peterborough, which had successfully besieged Barcelona. This had been reinforced by a further contingent under Earl Rivers in 1706, and even succeeded in linking up with allied forces in Madrid in August but this was ultimately frustrated by Peterborough's eccentric conduct, and he was recalled to Britain in March 1707. Thereafter the command fell to James Stanhope, who secured the capture of the island of Minorca, complementing the capture of Gibraltar in 1704 by allied troops under Prince George of Hesse-Darmstadt. Alongside the new commander of the Imperial or German troops in Spain, Guido Wald Rudiger, count of Staremberg, a series of inconclusive battles followed, and in 1710 Madrid was again occupied and lost in a campaign which culminated in the serious allied defeats at Brihuega and Villaviciosa. Between 1705 and 1710 Britain and the Dutch Republic also continued to subsidise the duke of Savoy in northern Italy, maintaining another theatre against France.

Ultimately this chapter will argue that this war effort was sustained through the continued operation of coordination and cooperation within the fiscal-military structures at home and abroad, which were forced into a higher gear by the conditions encountered. With only rudimentary financial systems, there was a correspondingly greater reliance upon the informal financial intermediation that had supported warfare in the Low Countries, and although initially these appear to have been provided by Sir Henry Furnese, as remittance contractor, as his networks successively failed in Spain, Italy and Portugal, due in part to inadequate levels of trust, others arose to take their place. The final section of this chapter will conclude

that, as in Flanders, the change of ministry allowed the further embedding of trusted informal networks into institutional structures, only limited once again by bureaucratic or administrative restrictions imposed by the Treasury. However, such trust was predominantly generated by political connections or affinities: where strongly partisan networks existed, the efficacy of intermediation was increased, but as fiscal-military structures became more heterogeneous, levels of trust and cooperation, and thus coordination, decreased.

### **PORTUGAL 1705-10**

In contrast to the Low Countries, informal financial intervention by the Pay Office in Portugal between 1705 and 1710 appears to have been extremely limited: Brydges' letters and accounts are overwhelmingly silent on the topic. Thomas Morrice was retained as deputy-paymaster in Lisbon but reported to Brydges in 1710 that he had never had any private dealings, since 'there never was occasion for it but once which was in December 1705 when I advanced them near two months subsidy ... borrowed [a] good part on my credit'.<sup>3</sup> Charles Davenant suggested in May 1707 that Morrice secure a gratification from the Portuguese for Brydges 'for the extra trouble he is at in soliciting their respective payments from the Treasury and Exchequer and for the quick remittance he makes to the princes concerned', but this attempt was unsuccessful, and when Morrice hinted at it again in 1711 Brydges noted that it had been 'in vain endeavoured to have got done for these 2 or 3 years past'.<sup>4</sup> The following section will argue that these offers were not taken up because

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<sup>3</sup> HL, ST58 iii, 56-7; Baker & Baker, *Chandos* pp. 52, 57

<sup>4</sup> HL, ST58 i, 173, 240; HL, ST57 v, 194-5; HL, ST58 ii, 9, 17

they were largely unnecessary, and that informal intermediation only occurred where the efficiency of other networks broke down.

Thus the cause was not any weakness within the Pay Office networks. Morrice continued to employ his son William Morrice, later the son-in-law of the High Church Tory bishop Francis Atterbury, and an additional clerk, John Leaves, between 1705 and 1709.<sup>5</sup> Leaves was a trusted client of Davenant, who noted that ‘having bred Mr Leaves from a child, I knew I could depend upon his fidelity’.<sup>6</sup> Both men served in turn as paymaster and solicitor for the Gibraltar garrison, ‘a business of some repute, but very little profit’.<sup>7</sup> However Paul Methuen remained in Lisbon until 1708, and as late as August 1706 Edward Pauncefort was still complaining about his conduct to Morrice.<sup>8</sup> Methuen in turn enjoyed close relations with Galway, with whom his father had worked between 1697 and 1701 when Galway was a Lord Justice of Ireland.<sup>9</sup> Thus although Brydges had trusted correspondents in place in Portugal, neither he or Morrice necessarily had the wider official connections that existed under Marlborough or Ormond.

Moreover, although the financial infrastructure in Portugal was relatively unsophisticated – James Milner noted in 1710 that ‘there’s no discounting of bills at Lisbon, as in Holland, [and] there’s no redrawing but at vast disadvantage’ – the British Isles enjoyed, as H.A.L. Fisher and D.W. Jones have emphasised, an

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<sup>5</sup> HL, ST57 i, 140, 228; HL, ST57 iii, 186; G.V. Bennett, *The Tory crisis in church and state 1688-1730: the career of Francis Atterbury, Bishop of Rochester* (Oxford, 1975) pp. 201, 303-6; HL, ST58 i, 58, 135; HL, ST58 ii, 43, 216, 218; HL, ST58 iii, 54; HL, ST58 iv, 90; HL, ST58 v, 100, 150-2; HL, ST58 vi, 5, 65, 112

<sup>6</sup> HL, ST58 i, 173, 240; HL, ST58 ii, 17; HL, ST58 v, 150-3; HL, ST57 ii, 13

<sup>7</sup> HL, ST58 i, 135; HL, ST58 ii, 43, 216, 218; HL, ST58 iii, 54-5, 142, 234; HL, ST58 iv, 26, 54-5, 86

<sup>8</sup> DHC, D/FSI Box 277 (Portugal/Italy), Pauncefort to Morrice, 20/8/1706

<sup>9</sup> Francis, *Methuens* pp. 67-71, 263-5

excellent balance of trade, while the recent discovery of gold in Brazil allowed that credit to be converted into coin.<sup>10</sup> Also of importance was the close control that Sir Henry Furnese, the sole remittance contractor after 1705, exercised over his Lisbon correspondents such as Messrs Milner, Bulteel and Baudouin, or the merchant Ellis Ferrell, ‘the best correspondent that ever I had’.<sup>11</sup> So complete was this control that Morrice was unable to persuade Adam Bulteel to undertake some private business in February 1710, reporting that ‘Bulteel says if it’s discovered Sir Harry will make great embroils about it’.<sup>12</sup> Unfortunately, lacking Furnese’s accounts these cannot be examined any further: they were in any case equally opaque to contemporaries, and Morrice noted to Brydges in August 1710 that ‘they having fully discharged them [the bills] they are not to give any account which way they came by the money ... the consul has no authority over them, nor can oblige them to give any oath, but with their own consent.’<sup>13</sup>

Nevertheless Morrice also admitted that the correspondents ‘have been the only persons that would undertake to supply the sums [required]’, and that ‘I can’t say but Sir Henry’s correspondents are our best friends hitherto’.<sup>14</sup> They were able, for instance, to redraw on Furnese with their own bills if remittances were delayed: Morrice noted with concern in September 1709 that ‘money now is become so scarce here that Sir Harry’s correspondents can’t raise it on their bills to answer the continual call we have on this side’, suggesting that usually the opposite occurred, and that an entire system of redrawing and intermediation akin to that in the Low

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<sup>10</sup> HL, ST58 vi, 191-2; Jones, *War and economy* pp. 4, 40-1, 88, 182, 194; Fisher, *Portugal trade* pp. 13-20

<sup>11</sup> CKS, U1590/O138/9, Furnese to Stanhope, 14/5/1708; HL, ST58 vi, 193

<sup>12</sup> HL, ST57 iii, 147; HL, ST58 v, 140-1, 148

<sup>13</sup> HL, ST57 iv, 147; HL, ST58 vi, 14-5, 182-3. The actions of Rothschild’s correspondents in 1814 suggest some of the complexity involved: Kaplan, *Nathan Mayer Rothschild* pp. 81-9

<sup>14</sup> HL, ST58 vi, 183

Countries initially supported the supply of money to Portugal.<sup>15</sup> The only agency that Morrice appears to have been able to exercise was, as in Flanders, in the demands made of the contractors: he told Brydges in October 1710 that

it has always been my method to have the business of the service go smooth and keep down the exchange as low as possible ... [thus] I did not always press for money on the day, nor ... note [*i.e.* protest] a bill for fear of the public credit, and indeed they here did in some measure correspond by sending us good sums of money when we had neither bill nor credit on this side ... for the future if you think fit I'll protest every bill that's not pay on the day, though it may not be so well for the service, and hinder people from contracting but at extravagant rates.<sup>16</sup>

In 1707 and 1708 he also occasionally provided money without waiting for Galway's warrants: as Brydges later pointed out he 'had the discretion to have kept the money in his hands till they had been signed'.<sup>17</sup> Informal intermediation otherwise appears to have been limited, a situation that almost certainly reflects the strength of Furnese's networks and the extent to which they crowded out the involvement of others.

The exception that confirms this rule was the payment of a number of separate Spanish regiments raised in Portugal in 1707 by Padre Alvaro Cienfuegos, the ambassador in Lisbon of the Habsburg claimant Charles III, out of Spanish deserters from the Bourbon forces.<sup>18</sup> Despatched to Catalonia early in 1708, they continued to be paid from Lisbon via Thomas Martin, a British merchant hired by Cienfuegos to act as his paymaster or cashier.<sup>19</sup> Administrative and financial confusion

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<sup>15</sup> HL, ST58 iv, 194-5, 254

<sup>16</sup> HL, ST57 v, 17-18; HL, ST58 vii, 14-15; HL, ST58 viii, 134

<sup>17</sup> HL, ST57 xii, 298; HL, ST57 xiv, 10-11, 37, 71

<sup>18</sup> CTB xxi, 139; xxii, 109

<sup>19</sup> BL, Stowe mss 475 fo. 66r; HL, ST57 ii, 171-2, 247-8; HL, ST57 iv, 36; HL, ST58 iv, 17-18; HL, ST58 vi, 96-7; HL, ST58 v, 208-9; CSPD (1704-5), 101; CTB xxiii, 159; xxx, 284-5; xxxiii, 178,

occurred, and the surviving correspondence of those involved, especially that of Col John Richards, commander of the regiment at Alicante, shows that this was only overcome through the mobilisation of informal connections. For instance, for provisions and payment Richards exploited the credit of a local contractor Domingo Chappulli<sup>20</sup>, and also told Morrice in September 1708 that ‘I have likewise advanced money for the carrying on the fortifications, the artillery, and the bread’.<sup>21</sup> This was underpinned by private contacts and connections: Chappulli provided bread worth some 8,000 dollars on credit because he had also concluded a commercial partnership with Richards to import Brazilian sugar and tobacco to Alicante, via Lisbon, where Thomas Martin would act as their agent.<sup>22</sup> Rhetorics of friendship, obligation and the public interest were employed to cement these connections: Richards complained to Martin for instance that ‘I was in hopes that whatever your affairs might necessitate you to do to others that our friendship would at least have exempted me’, and when asking for a loan from John Mead, the deputy-paymaster in Barcelona, he said that he ‘confide[d] in your friendship to me and your zeal of the public service’.<sup>23</sup>

Richards had been driven to exploit these networks because of delays in receiving remittances from Lisbon, which he blamed in part upon misconduct, claiming that Morrice had lined his pockets from clothing the regiments and that Martin had been

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220; CAC, Erle-Drax mss, ERLE 3/20, ‘Copy of the Opinion ... concerning the Spanish Officers’ (3/12/1706)

<sup>20</sup> BL, Stowe mss 475 fos. 23v, 25v-26r, 36r, 42v-43r, 49v; Charles Rubens, ‘Joseph Cortissos and the War of the Spanish Succession’, *TJHSE* 15 (1975) pp. 121-4

<sup>21</sup> BL, Stowe mss 474 fo. 112v; CTB xxix, 438; BL, Stowe mss 475 fos. 94v, 112v, 131r

<sup>22</sup> BL, Stowe mss 468 fos. 117r-118r, ; BL, Stowe mss 474 fos. 107r-v, 127r; BL, Stowe mss 475 fos. 8r, 11r, 12r, 29v, 70v-71r, 77v

<sup>23</sup> BL, Stowe mss 474 fos. 92r, 101v; BL, Stowe mss 475 fos. 36r, 39r, 49r-51r, 57v, 81r

‘so far knave and fool as to make ducks and drakes with the public money’.<sup>24</sup> Yet part of the problem were the difficulties of remittance to Spain, described below, as well as the fact that even remittances from London were uncertain. Cienfuegos complained to Brydges in December 1708 of the

great inconveniencies that result from my not being advised the sum appointed for these sums ... for without such advice I cannot take my measure for the distribution of it to such as come over, nor can Mr Martin anticipate the necessity for such casual succours and monthly payments more especially under the uncertainty of when or how he shall be [re]imbursed, always exposed to contingencies or humours of others ... for ever since December last year till now [I have] been under a perpetual care and suspense how and which way to disengage Mr Martin in the sums he had advanced at my occasions.<sup>25</sup>

He also appears to have allowed Morrice at least five percent of the money that passed through his hands, and although Richards thought it pure blackmail – Cienfuegos ‘finding that he could never get from Morrice ... [the money] with that readiness and punctuality as his necessities required’ – it is possible that this represents a system of advances akin to that operated by Brydges in the Low Countries, the high percentage reflecting the high risks and costs involved.<sup>26</sup>

This conclusion is strengthened by a similar allowance of two percent that Brydges accepted from 1708 in return for representing Cienfuegos’ interests at the Treasury with particular vigour.<sup>27</sup> Obligation was implicit in the exchange, and in September 1708 Morrice reported that Cienfuegos ‘positively insisted’ that Brydges allow £1,000 to be advanced out of the general cash, ‘otherwise [he] won’t take you for so

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<sup>24</sup> BL, Stowe mss 474 fos. 58r, 71r-v, 92v, 101r, 106v; BL, Stowe mss 475 fos. 25r, 27r, 60v, 66v, 71v, 74r, 98v

<sup>25</sup> HL, ST58 iii, 155; iv, 18

<sup>26</sup> BL, Stowe mss 475 fos. 39v, 50r, 65r, 68v, 98v

<sup>27</sup> HL, ST58 iii, 110, 143, 154-5; HL, ST58 iv, 57, 66-7

good a friend as he now conceives'.<sup>28</sup> Brydges had turned down the initial gift of 100 guineas in May 1708 for the same reasons: 'to confess ingenuously to you', he told Morrice, 'I think it is a little too little for me to put myself under an obligation to him for'.<sup>29</sup> Thomas Martin was also incorporated into this nexus in other ways: Brydges offered to push remittance business his way or involve him in an arbitrage operation, and observed to his correspondent George Wade that Martin was 'one who[m] I have had some intercourse with and who is no friend to Sir He[nry] Furnese'.<sup>30</sup> Where circumstances required, a chain of personal connections permitted informal financial intermediation, but absent common partisan connections and held together only by friendship and common interest it appears not to have been particularly stable: as noted above, Richards was quick to blame Morrice and Martin for corruption. Nevertheless the experience of the British fiscal-military state in Portugal between 1705 and 1710 strongly suggests that informal or personal networks continued to underpin the operational efficiency of the army, even if in this instance they were not exercised by Brydges and his agents in the Pay Office

### **SPAIN 1706-10**

The remittance of money to the Mediterranean – specifically Spain and Italy – between 1706 and 1710 demonstrates the other side of this dynamic. As Jones and Kamen have emphasised, the control of Cadiz and most of mainland Spain by Bourbon forces meant that the British fiscal-military state lacked access to most of

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<sup>28</sup> HL, ST58 iii, 55

<sup>29</sup> HL, ST57 ii, 29, 37, 198; HL, ST58 ii, 217, 247, 249; HL, ST58 iii, 154-5

<sup>30</sup> HL, ST57 ii, 159, 198-9; HL, ST57 iii, 13; HL, ST58 iv, 193-4; HL, ST58 v, 232-3.

the country's financial networks.<sup>31</sup> Commercial networks of exceptional strength and depth, capable of incorporating vast amounts of private capital, would have been required to compensate for this: the following section will argue that Furnese lacked such a network in the Mediterranean and that this left him unable to respond effectively to the needs of the army. As in Germany in 1704, other actors and networks arose with stronger levels of trust, driven in part by political partisanship, which reduced transaction costs, improved access to credit and ultimately resulted in improved financial intermediation occurring through structures and networks not initially intended for this purpose.

This is not to say that Furnese was powerless. Several times in 1708 he told James Stanhope that 'I have done my part to help up credit and have advanced a very considerable sum', partly by accepting as payment either long-dated tallies or Exchequer bills at one percent discount and partly by trying to hold down the rate of exchange.<sup>32</sup> In July 1709 he organised the private shipment of gold bullion from Portugal 'at my own risk and without any orders', foreseeing that the public remittances would arrive late.<sup>33</sup> Yet remittances were marked by repeated delays and disruptions because he was forced to rely upon correspondents in whom he had little confidence and who were not prepared fully to cooperate, and thus were therefore ultimately unable to coordinate the business satisfactorily. For instance, in May 1708 a bill for 100,000 dollars or £23,750 that Furnese sent to Barcelona was protested there by John Mead, Brydges' deputy-paymaster, for non-payment, although it subsequently emerged that the correspondents, Messrs Shallett & Crowe,

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<sup>31</sup> Jones, *War and economy* pp. 87-8; Kamen, *War of Succession* pp. 78-9, 168-96

<sup>32</sup> CKS, U1590/O138/9, Furnese to Stanhope, 14/5/1708, 28/5/1708, 23/7/1708, 13/8/1708

<sup>33</sup> CKS, U1590/O139/13, Furnese to Stanhope, 8/7/1709

already had the sum in their hands.<sup>34</sup> As Furnese explained, ‘they are utter strangers to me, and ‘twas only the suddenness of the business that made me draw on them’ – and without mutual trust they were unwilling to release the money without a letter of advice which had not yet arrived.<sup>35</sup> Neither had they written to him, which he considered ‘uncivil’ behaviour and made him ‘loath to trust my estate with people that won’t write to me’. Furnese asked Stanhope to recommend another correspondent or even convince Ellis Ferrell to resettle in Barcelona, but neither was successful and by November Furnese was once more forced to rely on Shallett & Crowe for his remittances.<sup>36</sup> He also noted that ‘I fear Mr Mead is not my friend’, since the deputy-paymaster had decided to protest the bill after the initial refusal, whereas had he ‘lent a helping hand’ and delayed the protest it could have been answered.<sup>37</sup>

Furnese therefore lacked the close-knit connections, and the cooperation from the local fiscal-military networks, needed to overcome an inherently weak financial structure. Unsurprisingly, he therefore appears to have attempted to push much of his business through his strong networks in Portugal, repeatedly insisting that it was most effective to remit credit to Lisbon and then transport it to Spain in specie.<sup>38</sup> Yet most contemporaries disagreed. The Portuguese prohibited the export of bullion to Spain or elsewhere, and this could only be circumvented at considerable risk.<sup>39</sup> It also relied upon Morrice coordinating the despatch of shipping with local

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<sup>34</sup> CKS, U1590/O138/2, Brydges to Stanhope, 15/6/1708

<sup>35</sup> CKS, U1590/O138/9, Furnese to Stanhope, 14/5/1708, 20/5/1708, 28/5/1708

<sup>36</sup> CKS, U1590/O138/9, Furnese to Stanhope, 14/5/1708, 10/11/1708

<sup>37</sup> CKS, U1590/O138/9, Furnese to Stanhope, 20/5/1708, 10/11/1708 and CKS, U1590/O138/10, Brydges to Craggs the Younger, 9/7/1708

<sup>38</sup> CKS, U1590/O138/9, Furnese to Stanhope, 13/8/1708, 10/11/1708; CKS, U1590/O139/13, Furnese to Stanhope, 8/7/1709, 29/11/1709

<sup>39</sup> CKS, U1590/O138/2, Craggs the Younger to Brydges, 4/6/1708; CKS, U1590/O138/17, Mead to Stanhope, 22/6/1708; CKS, U1590/O138/21, Morrice to Stanhope, 1/9/1708; HL, ST58 v, 150-2;

naval commanders, and was vulnerable to poor cooperation or even utterly external factors such as the weather.<sup>40</sup> The only advantage was the profits of the exchange, some seven or eight percent, which Stanhope was able to bring to the public account in 1709<sup>41</sup>, but otherwise Lisbon was widely regarded as a financial bottleneck. By June 1708 Stanhope's secretary, James Craggs the Younger, estimated that a backlog of £80,000 had built up there, and Brydges was forced to defend Morrice against unfair accusations that he was deliberately delaying the transfer of money in order to loan out at interest.<sup>42</sup> Thus by June 1708 Furnese was already pressing Stanhope to allow his correspondents more favourable terms, such as providing their bills at much longer usance and at a high exchange, 'for even at that price I shall be no gainer, considering the time I have been out of my money'.<sup>43</sup>

An urgent need for informal financial intervention therefore existed, and the following section will argue that this was both allowed and encouraged by the strength of pre-existing Pay Office networks in Catalonia, where cooperation was already a basic precondition of administrative effectiveness. Galway, for example, told Brydges in March 1707 that he had written to Morrice 'to keep a good correspondence with Mr Mead, to whom I have recommended the same'.<sup>44</sup> This appears to have been facilitated by strong personal and partisan linkages. Like Morrice, Mead was a Canary merchant: his uncle and namesake was Brydges'

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HL, ST58 vi, 5; CTB xxii, 92; CTP iv, 11; Fisher, *Portugal trade* pp. 20-4, 92-106; Jones, *War and economy* p. 88

<sup>40</sup> CKS, U1590/O138/21, Morrice to Stanhope, 1/9/1708; CKS, U1590/O139/24, Morrice to Stanhope, 24/7/1709, 10/10/1709; CKS, U1590/O140/35, Morrice to Stanhope, 9/5/1710

<sup>41</sup> CKS, U1590/O132/1, Stanhope to Sunderland, 22/6/1708; HL, ST57 i, 224, 227; BL, Stowe mss 475 fos. 26r-v, 68r

<sup>42</sup> CKS, U1590/O138/2, Craggs the Younger to Brydges, 4/6/1708; CKS, U1590/O132/1, Stanhope to Sunderland, 22/6/1708

<sup>43</sup> CKS, U1590/O138/9, Furnese to Stanhope, 25/6/1708, 10/11/1708, 24/12/1708, 31/12/1708; CKS, U1590/O138/17, Mead to Stanhope, 10/9/1708

<sup>44</sup> BL, Egerton mss 891 fo. 11r

goldsmith and banker, and his father Richard a further commercial contact.<sup>45</sup> His cash-keeper was Gervase Read, whose brother had likewise been a Canary merchant.<sup>46</sup> Other clerks included Samuel Scott and John Armfield, formerly a clerk to Galway's secretary Thomas Le Fevre.<sup>47</sup> Indeed, earlier appointees had also been marked by personal and partisan connections. Two deputy-paymasters were sent out in 1706 with Lord Rivers' expedition. One was Peter Hartopp, son of tory alderman Thomas Hartopp: the other, Henry Hatley, was the son of a whig alderman and merchant of the same name, but may also have been linked with George Hatley, partner in the London tobacco and wine firm of Cary & Hatley with whom Francis Stratford did business.<sup>48</sup> Before Mead's appointment in 1707 it was also rumoured that Brydges would appoint as deputy Henry Buck, a tory merchant in London.<sup>49</sup> In 1703, as a member of the Admiralty Council, he had nominated his brother-in-law, the Levant merchant Alexander Jacob, as remittance agent in Smyrna for the victualling board.<sup>50</sup>

Moreover, Pay Office networks were embedded within a wider set of informal official and administrative connections within Spain. In 1707 the commissary of the stores in Spain was Henry Vincent, who had briefly been appointed deputy-paymaster there in 1705 by John Howe as Paymaster of Guards and Garrisons, although the *History of Parliament* volumes confuse him with a commissioner of

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<sup>45</sup> HL, ST58 ix, 258-9; HL, ST58 i, 58; HL, ST58 v, 43, 46; HL, ST57 v, 105; HL, ST57 vi, 119, 258; HL, ST57 vii, 192; *Middx. (1705)*, (London, 1705) p. 58; *Middx. (1714)*, (London, 1714) p. 22

<sup>46</sup> *The answers of several persons concerned in the report of the commissioners sent into Spain, with the replies of the said commissioners* (London, 1714) p. 50; TNA, PROB 11/598 (Reade, Gervase)

<sup>47</sup> CKS, U1590/O138/13, Mead to Stanhope, 15/8/1708; CKS, U1590/O140/33, Mead to Stanhope, 3/9/1710, 11/9/1710, 21/9/1710; Stanhope to Mead, 26/8/1710; CTB xx, *cci*; xxx, 350; TNA, T64/128 fo. 104r

<sup>48</sup> CTP iv, 397; HL, ST58 i, 85, 97; Woodhead (ed.), *The rulers of London* pp. 85, 86; Price, *Tobacco adventure* pp. 29n, 107

<sup>49</sup> HL, ST58 ii, 58; London (1713) p. 74

<sup>50</sup> HL, ST58 i, 33

victualling of the same name.<sup>51</sup> The new commissary was actually the brother of the tory MP Sir Francis Vincent, and a close friend of Arthur Moore, whose wife was appointed his heir and executrix in 1711.<sup>52</sup> His clerk was Theophilus Blyke, a Herefordshire client of Brydges<sup>53</sup>; when Vincent's departure was delayed in August 1707, Humphrey Walcot petitioned that his brother George – a Spanish merchant and former tory MP – be appointed in his stead.<sup>54</sup> This appointment reflected in turn the networks underlying the supply of clothing, which was organised by Brydges and Henry St John, or Arthur Moore as one of the comptrollers of army accounts, making use of their connections with associates such as James Craggs the Elder and the tory clothier Richard Harnage.<sup>55</sup> Once in situ in Spain these networks rapidly interlocked. Vincent and Blyke were ordered to turn over spare cash to Mead for the use of the army, while Mead in turn was asked to help them to dispose of the clothing.<sup>56</sup> Although Vincent was dismissed in March 1710 his replacement was James Craggs the Younger who retained Blyke as his deputy and continued to cooperate with Mead out of friendship.<sup>57</sup>

Finally, trust between Mead and Stanhope – personal, apparently, rather than partisan – also improve the effectiveness of the army by permitting a flexible administrative approach. In June 1708 Mead 'took the liberty' to advance money

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<sup>51</sup> *HOP* (1690-1715) v, 753-4

<sup>52</sup> *Ibid.*, v, 752-3; HL, ST57 i, 190, 226; HL, ST57 iv, 159-60; HL, ST57 xiv, 143; HL, ST58 i, 140, 141; HL, ST58 ii, 26-7, 53, 76, 148; HL, ST58 x, 156; HL, ST58 xi, 52-3, 91-2; Bod. Lib., MS North C.11 fo. 8r; TNA, PROB 11/582 (Vincent, Henry)

<sup>53</sup> HL, ST57 x, 246; HL, ST57 xi, 123

<sup>54</sup> SA, MS 151/4076 (Indenture of Humphrey Walcot, 1691); HL, ST58 ii, 46-7, 49; *HOP* (1690-1715) v, 761-2

<sup>55</sup> Dickinson, *Bolingbroke* pp. 13, 46, 126-8; Sperling, 'Public credit', pp. 163-4

<sup>56</sup> HL, ST57 ii, 24-5, 40, 181; HL, ST57 iii, 150, 179; HL, ST57 iv, 256; HL, ST58 ii, 225-6; HL, ST58 iii, 4

<sup>57</sup> HL, ST57 iii, 179-81; HL, ST57 vi, 186; HL, ST58 vii, 124, 125, 129, 153; HL, ST58 viii, 11-15; DRO, Drake of Colyton MSS, 1700M-0/C/P/68A, Craggs to Burton, 10/8/1710; Craggs to Blyke, 12/8/1710; Craggs to Mead, 9/8/1709, 17/9/1710

for their repair of the fortifications at Tortosa, ‘although contrary to my instructions, as having no orders from you’, since he considered the good of the service at stake.<sup>58</sup> In July 1709 Stanhope dispatched a number of warrants to Mead, but noted that ‘I do not intend ... to streighten you by the immediate payment of them, which I leave to your discretion’, while for his own part Mead asked Stanhope for a back-dated warrant, ‘that it may appear I make this stoppage by your directions’.<sup>59</sup> He also later admitted that in 1710 he had made deductions from the German troops ‘by estimate [and] stopped what he judged sufficient’, presumably so that the delay while these were calculated would not prevent the payment of subsistence and clearings.<sup>60</sup> Questioned in 1712, Mead also admitted that he had frequently exchanged currency ‘for conveniency of carriage at the request of persons receiving’<sup>61</sup>, and other evidence suggests that he allowed officers to draw bills on him from the field.<sup>62</sup>

In 1706 Peterborough had been forced, he claimed, to advance £10,000 of his own money for the public service: he complained in June 1706 that ‘I must turn heaven and earth to get money’ to support the Spanish troops in British pay, since ‘they must starve, or rob, if I do not find ways to support them at the hazard of my own fortune.’<sup>63</sup> Stanhope’s letters after 1708 show no evidence of similar actions, apparently because Mead was prepared to tap into private credit and connections. In August 1710, for example, he borrowed around £300 for each regiment and some

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<sup>58</sup> CKS, U1590/O138/17, Mead to Stanhope, 14/6/1708, 20/6/1708

<sup>59</sup> CKS, U1590/O132/2, Stanhope to Mead, 17/7/1709, 6/8/1709; CKS, U1590/O139/21, Mead to Stanhope, 24/7/1709

<sup>60</sup> *Answers*, p. 59

<sup>61</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 52

<sup>62</sup> CKS, U1590/O138/17, Mead to Stanhope, 14/6/1708

<sup>63</sup> James Stanhope (ed.), *Letters from the Earl of Peterborough to General Stanhope in Spain* (London, 1834) pp. 3, 8-11, 15, 22, 25-7

2,000 pistoles for the commissariat, noting over the following months that he had ‘drained my friends to discharge bills from camp and other services’ to do so, that it had been a miracle to assemble even 10,000 dollars for the army and that ‘if I were to be crucified I can’t get 10,000 more here upon any terms ... and it is as much as I can do to borrow small sums to pay bills daily drawing on me from Mahon and other places’.<sup>64</sup> In 1712 he recalled that five years earlier he had negotiated several loans in Catalonia, ‘for which [I] have been obliged to allow considerations’, and that money had on occasion been taken up at the rate of one percent per month or twelve percent per year.<sup>65</sup> As in the Low Countries, he also issued notes of hand as sub-departmental scrip, writing to Stanhope in August 1708 that his cash in hand was nearly exhausted and that these bills, payable on demand, were ‘in effect ... the same as money, being what the present circumstances will admit of’.<sup>66</sup> He was later accused of doing so in order to discount them with local financiers and split the profits, but both Stanhope and Brydges vouched for his honesty, and Mead himself insisted that he had never given such notes ‘but at times of greatest difficulties, and want of remittances ... [and] always without any the least advantage to himself’.<sup>67</sup>

Finally, the most active intermediation in which Mead engaged, and which required the greatest degree of trust, coordination and cooperation, was his redrawing upon London, either directly or via the Italian peninsula. As in Flanders the process required careful control: Brydges worried, for instance, in July 1708 that merchants in Barcelona were ordering their correspondents in London deliberately to protest

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<sup>64</sup> CKS, U1590/O140/33, Mead to Stanhope, 2/8/1710, 5/8/1710, 3/9/1710; Stanhope to Mead, 5/8/1710, 26/8/1710, 13/9/1710; CKS, U1590/O142/10, Mead to Furley, 23/10/1710

<sup>65</sup> *Answers*, pp. 48-50

<sup>66</sup> CKS, U1590/O138/17, Mead to Stanhope, 15/8/1708, 20/8/1708; *Answers*, pp. 65, 67

<sup>67</sup> HL, ST57 i, 225; *Answers*, pp. 54, 62, 102-3; HL, ST57 ii, 72, 181; HL, ST57 iii, 13, 149

bills so as renegotiate more favourable contracts.<sup>68</sup> In London Mead made use of his father, the tory merchant Richard Mead, to represent his interests.<sup>69</sup> The exchange of gifts and favours – patronage for Mead’s brother Richard, the purchase of a horse for Brydges from north Africa – appear to have been used to cement this connection.<sup>70</sup> Although unfortunately it is unclear which networks Mead exploited, the accounts of John Jeffreys, the paymaster of the artillery in Spain after 1708, show him drawing upon a wide range of local merchants and officials while also receiving several tranches from Edward Gibbon that, ironically, were likewise drawn on Messrs Shallett & Crowe.<sup>71</sup> However the account book of Manuel Levy Duarte, a Jewish merchant in Amsterdam and correspondent or associate of Joseph Cortissos, the forage contractor in Spain, shows that Duarte accepted and encashed a range of bills drawn on him from Barcelona by Peterborough, several English regiments, and ‘Don Juan Mead, pagador de las tropas de Inglaterra en Espana’ (Treasurer of the English troops in Spain).<sup>72</sup> Between 1707 and 1709 Duarte appears to have accepted bills from Mead worth at least 346,972 dollars or nearly £75,000, as well as smaller sums from ‘Dom Alexandro Stevensons, pagador dos regimentos ingleses’ and ‘Dom Samuel Shot [Scott], oficial mayor des Don Juan Mead’.<sup>73</sup>

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<sup>68</sup> HL, ST57 ii, 72; CKS, U1590/O138/2, Brydges to Stanhope, 26/8/1708; Brydges to Craggs the Younger, 9/7/1708

<sup>69</sup> CTB xxiv, 457, 572; xxvi, 437, 506

<sup>70</sup> HL, ST57 ii, 72; HL, ST57 iii, 149; HL, ST58 iii, 4; HL, ST58 vii, 184-5; CTB xxiv, 129

<sup>71</sup> TNA, WO49/225, nos. 1-7; TNA, T1/145/13

<sup>72</sup> AS, 334/5/2/7/1/4/1 no. 690 (Account Book of Manuel Levy Duarte (1705-9); Charles Rubens, ‘Manuel Levy Duarte (1631-1714): an Amsterdam merchant jeweller and his trade with London’, *TJHSE* 27 (1978-80) pp. 14, 24-5

<sup>73</sup> AS, 334/5/2/7/1/4/1 no. 690, p. 42, 44, 45, 47

## ITALY 1708-10

The problems of remittance were also overcome, in part, by interlocking networks in London and Barcelona with other, largely unrelated, networks in Italian cities such as Turin and Genoa, themselves important financial centres. The following section will argue that, by incorporating these networks, the fiscal-military structure in Spain was able to maintain its liquidity, through access to both credit and remittances, but that for this to be done effectively and efficiently it continued to require strong networks and trusted correspondents. Although Sir Henry Furnese initially monopolised the remittance business, the increasing inflexibility of his networks – probably driven in part by his own financial problems in England – piled additional pressure on others, causing a string of failures. The situation was rescued by the British envoys in Turin and Genoa, who built upon their own, superior set of informal linkages – in Italy, Spain and Britain – in order to operate with more flexibility and provide more effective financial intermediation.

The problem that every fiscal network faced in Italy was that, as in Spain, British trade was limited, reducing the sums that could be raised. Although financial networks in Italy, especially Genoa, were of greater sophistication than in Portugal or Spain<sup>74</sup>, they nevertheless imposed further limitations, as revealed in the letters of John Chetwynd, secretary to Richard Hill as ambassador to Savoy after 1703 and his successor in 1706.<sup>75</sup> Chetwynd complained to Stanhope several times in 1708 that ‘we must never expect to get any considerable sum, for none of the bankers do

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<sup>74</sup> Braudel, *Civilization and capitalism* iii, 171-3, 331-3

<sup>75</sup> *HOP* (1715-54) i, 545-7; William Blackley (ed.), *The Diplomatic Correspondence of the Right Hon. Richard Hill* (London, 1845) ii, 550, 630-1, 685

ever keep much cash by 'em', and warned Brydges that it would be difficult to cash large public bills,

not ... out of any fear of the bills not being punctually paid, but because the merchants can employ their money much better other ways, and as for private bills they can negotiate 'em anywhere and only go so far as their wants do require, which is generally for small sums, but to get a great one is not easy or can every banker give it.<sup>76</sup>

In addition, after Samuel Bernard's bankruptcy in 1709 both Chetwynd and Furnese feared that the Huguenot financial networks which dominated remittances in northern Italy and were connected to French networks via Amsterdam and Switzerland might similarly collapse.<sup>77</sup>

Furnese nevertheless attempted to remit money through Italy as well as Portugal: 'I thought this a better way', he told Stanhope in May 1708, 'than to engage to pay the money at Barcelona, there being no person there fit to correspond with'.<sup>78</sup> In Genoa his chief correspondents were the Huguenot merchants Messrs Boissiers, who had handled his remittances to Turin between 1702 and 1705, while in Livorno they were the British houses Arundell & Bates and Howe & Gould. All were established houses, and Chetwynd agreed that Messrs Boissiers were 'one of the best here ... I have always found 'em very ready to serve our country on all occasion'.<sup>79</sup> However they failed, for example, to provide Chetwynd with the sums he required in May 1708, and Furnese therefore told Stanhope that he had 'writ very angrily to 'em and

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<sup>76</sup> Staff. RO, Chetwynd of Ingestre mss, D649/15, John Chetwynd to Stanhope, 13/7/1708, 24/11/1708; John Chetwynd to Brydges, 19/7/1708, 21/7/1708

<sup>77</sup> Ibid., John Chetwynd to Furnese, 9/5/1709; John Chetwynd to Brydges, 9/5/1709; CKS, U1590/O139/13, Furnese to Stanhope, 12/5/1709; CKS, U1590/O140/, Stanhope to Godolphin, 25/4/1710; Jones, *War and economy* pp. 88-9; Braudel, *Civilization and capitalism* iii, 331-3; Kamen, *War of Succession* pp. 78-9, 168-96

<sup>78</sup> CKS, U1590/O138/9, Furnese to Stanhope, 14/5/1708, 20/5/1708, 28/5/1708

<sup>79</sup> Staff. RO, D649/8/15, John Chetwynd to Stanhope, 13/7/1708; John Chetwynd to Furnese, 13/7/1708; CKS, U1590/O138/17, Mead to Stanhope, 14/6/1708

showed my resentment'.<sup>80</sup> In May 1709 Chetwynd similarly wrote to Brydges of 'the inconveniencies which daily occur, by the bankers preferring their private advantages to the prejudice of the public', and that this would continue 'so long as nobody in these parts hath power to oblige them to do what is right and best for the service'.<sup>81</sup> Weaknesses in Furnese's networks there appear to have caused increasing interruptions to the smooth transfer of funds from Britain to Italy and thence to Spain.

The problem appears to have been inadequate incentives: Chetwynd had earlier noted to Stanhope in March 1709 that Furnese

must trust to his correspondents, to whom he allows but a small gain for their provision. I fear you must expect no great matters from them, yet I should think his interest and honour are so much engaged that he should make 'em share with him in the profit rather than not come off with honour by serving you well.<sup>82</sup>

As noted in the previous chapter, by this point Furnese was under accumulating financial pressure and narrowing commercial margins, suggesting that in Italy he was forced to reduce the profits he was able to offer his correspondents, thereby reducing any incentive to exert themselves on his behalf and respond to shifting circumstances. For example, early in 1709 Stanhope demanded that he be supplied silver crowns from Italy, rather than gold pistoles, to be recoined as debased specie at the Barcelona mint.<sup>83</sup> However Messrs Howe & Gould refused to go beyond their contract in order to oblige Chetwynd's brother William, now installed in

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<sup>80</sup> CKS, U1590/O138/9, Furnese to Stanhope, 11/6/1708

<sup>81</sup> Staff. RO, D649/8/15, John Chetwynd to Brydges, 10/5/1709

<sup>82</sup> Ibid., John Chetwynd to Stanhope, 5/3/1709

<sup>83</sup> Jones, *War and economy* pp. 89-91; CKS, U1590/O132/1, Furley to Mead, 20/6/1708; Stanhope to Sunderland, 22/6/1708; CKS, U1590/O138/3, Stanhope to Brydges, 25/8/1708; CKS, U1590/O138/9, Furnese to Stanhope, 10/11/1708

Genoa as envoy to the Republic.<sup>84</sup> ‘Give me leave to tell you’, John Chetwynd wrote to Furnese in response, ‘that we and not your correspondents are to be judges of what species are properest for the service ... they have so little regard to your reputation as not to make things so easy as they might be’.<sup>85</sup>

Furnese was therefore squeezed between two inflexible forces that he was unable to answer or accommodate, and the effect appears to have been a spiral of decline that alienated the Chetwynd brothers and denied him their cooperation, leading to further disintegration of his network. In July 1708 John Chetwynd had agreed to accept an underweight consignment of pistoles from Messrs Boissiers at an excessive agio, since ‘I did think it better to take something than nothing’ and did not want to ruin Furnese’s credit by protesting his bills.<sup>86</sup> However by October Chetwynd was under considerable pressure to provide prompt remittances, and when Arundell & Bates insisted upon an extravagant agio and used ‘so many little tricks and shifts to delay the payment’, Chetwynd refused to make allowances on Furnese’s behalf, telling him that ‘I shall always be willing to give them as much time as I can, and make things easy to them, but as the endorsement of your letters to me run payable upon sight ... I must follow my orders’.<sup>87</sup> In so doing, he therefore imposed increased strain upon Furnese’s networks, while his brother’s refusal to accept pistoles from Howe & Gould meant that ‘the money has laid dead

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<sup>84</sup> Staff. RO, Chetwynd of Ingestre mss, D649/8/15, Furnese to John Chetwynd, 10/12/1708, 31/12/1708; Staff. RO, Chetwynd of Ingestre mss, D649/8/16, Furnese to John Chetwynd, 12/5/1709, 27/5/1709; Staff. RO, D649/8/15, John Chetwynd to Furnese, 24/1/1709, 10/4/1709, 16/9/1709; John Chetwynd to Stanhope, 9/4/1709, 16/5/1709; John Chetwynd to Brydges, 10/5/1709

<sup>85</sup> Staff. RO, D649/8/15, John Chetwynd to Furnese, 19/6/1709

<sup>86</sup> Ibid., John Chetwynd to Stanhope, 13/7/1708; John Chetwynd to Furnese, 13/7/1708, 24/1708

<sup>87</sup> Ibid., John Chetwynd to Furnese, 3/10/1710; John Chetwynd to Brydges, 3/10/1708

in their hands ever since'.<sup>88</sup> A lack of cooperation therefore placed additional pressure upon what appear already to have been overstressed financial margins, leading to an accelerating spiral of decline.

By contrast, John and William Chetwynd were able to act, in effect, as remittance contractors in Italy after 1708, and although Furnese strongly opposed them – as he had similar efforts by Brydges to break his monopoly in the Low Countries – Chetwynd defended his actions as unavoidable: 'I never did take up one penny without giving your correspondents the refusal', he told Furnese in January 1709, 'but they never would do anything with me or offer me a reasonable exchange ... and that was the reason I made use of others'.<sup>89</sup> For example, when Arundell & Bates had made difficulties about payments in October 1708 Chetwynd wrote to Brydges that 'they take it for granted that I can deal with nobody else, but I shall show them the contrary when I get to Genoa'.<sup>90</sup> In their place he mainly used the Huguenot firm of Charrier & Grenouilleau, whom he had previously employed to ship grain to Barcelona.<sup>91</sup> In 1709 they were again given the contract to transport grain from Austria to Spain, Chetwynd telling Stanhope that 'it will be a particular favour to Charrier and as he hath lately done us one in letting us have the £30,000 sterling I am willing to oblige him as far as I can'.<sup>92</sup> When problems occurred he mobilised official connections, urging successive British envoys in Vienna 'to procure something which may encourage the banquiers to deal with me another

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<sup>88</sup> CKS, U1590/O139/13, Furnese to Stanhope, 10/3/1709, 12/5/1709, 8/7/1709; Staff. RO, D649/8/16, Furnese to Chetwynd, 27/5/1709; Staff. RO, D649/8/15, Chetwynd to Furnese, 19/6/1709

<sup>89</sup> Staff. RO, D649/8/15, John Chetwynd to Stanhope, 15/12/1708, 24/4/1709; John Chetwynd to Furnese, 24/1/1709

<sup>90</sup> Ibid., John Chetwynd to Brydges, 3/10/1708

<sup>91</sup> Ibid., John Chetwynd to Stanhope, 30/11/1707; CKS, U1590/O132/2, Stanhope to Mead, 17/7/1709; Stanhope to John Chetwynd, 7/8/1709

<sup>92</sup> Staff. RO, D649/8/15, John Chetwynd to Stanhope, 24/11/1708, 30/3/1709, 16/5/1709, 19/5/1709; John Chetwynd to Meadows, 13/7/1709, 17/7/1709; John Chetwynd to Palmes, 15/2/1710

time, else I shall be so far from finding credit to carry on the Spanish service'. This helped strengthen personal connections that Chetwynd was then able to mobilise to secure credit: he noted to Stanhope in May 1709 that 'if Charrier out of friendship and consideration for me had not let us have something, it would not only have been impossible for us to send you a supply ... so far as our own credit and simple fund could be useful we have spared neither', and to Brydges that 'besides the public credit we [have] made use of our own private interest'.<sup>93</sup> As elsewhere, official patronage was used to reinforce personal connections and obligations.

Finally, personal credit was employed. Richard Hill had made use of his own resources in January 1706, advancing some 120,000 crowns or £30,000, as well as some 20,000 crowns for the Dutch troops in Catalonia:

they have sent their assignments hither ... for so much, but none of the Dutch merchants will meddle with them. I can find credit here for that sum, and shall trust the Pensioner [for repayment], in hopes that he will approve of my zeal and goodwill for the service.<sup>94</sup>

In June 1708 Chetwynd similarly took up some 7,000 pistoles at two percent interest for the Palatine troops, 'having engaged', he said, 'my credit with our ministry and that of Holland to procure the execution of the contract, without which they never could have got one penny of money'.<sup>95</sup> The following month, he reported that bills Mead had sent from Spain to be encashed had not yet arrived, and that he had 'made bold to give [them] my own bills for what his do impart'.<sup>96</sup> This is a process seen most clearly in 1710, when Stanhope arranged a loan of some

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<sup>93</sup> CKS, U1590/O139/7, John Chetwynd to Stanhope, 16/5/1709; Staff. RO, D649/8/15, John Chetwynd to Brydges, 9/5/1709; John Chetwynd to Stanhope, 16/5/1709

<sup>94</sup> Blackley (ed.), *Diplomatic Correspondence* ii, 668-76, 683-4, 688-90

<sup>95</sup> Staff. RO, D649/8/15, John Chetwynd to Brydges, 26/6/1708, 21/7/1708

<sup>96</sup> *Ibid.*, John Chetwynd to Brydges, 21/7/1708; John Chetwynd to Stanhope, 19/8/1708, 4/9/1708; John Chetwynd to Cardonnel, 22/8/1708

£100,000 from the cantons in Berne, to be sent to Genoa and then remitted to Spain.<sup>97</sup> A series of delays meant that the money only arrived intermittently, and although Chetwynd noted in June that ‘I have and can always borrow 5[000] or £6,000 sterling upon my credit, but £20[,000], 30[,000] or 50,000 are more than I must pretend to’, he nevertheless managed eventually to borrow at least 400,000 Genoese livres, well over £50,000.<sup>98</sup> The construction of close-knit commercial connections with local bankers, therefore appears to have enabled John Chetwynd and his brother to respond more effectively to Stanhope’s needs than Furnese was able with his own, less integrated, networks.

Their effectiveness, moreover, appears to have reflected political as well as financial or commercial linkages, and in particular John Chetwynd’s confidence that he had sufficient leverage in Britain for his actions to be confirmed retrospectively: he confessed to James Brydges for example in August 1708 that ‘I do assure that for my part I always tremble when I am to take up money for fear what I do should not be approved’.<sup>99</sup> The influence of key figures was also employed, such as the duke of Marlborough: Chetwynd wrote to Adam Cardonnel in July 1708 asking that, ‘if there should be occasion’, Marlborough would ‘be pleased to assist me with his credit for a due payment of my bills’.<sup>100</sup> He likewise developed close relations with John Mead, with whom he needed to cooperate ‘that I may keep myself so within compass as not [to] draw more bills than I know will be complied with’.<sup>101</sup> Already in 1707 Chetwynd was emboldened enough to ask Mead to accept his brother

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<sup>97</sup> Jones, *War and economy* p. 89; Dickson, *Financial Revolution* p. 62

<sup>98</sup> Staff. RO, D649/8/15, John Chetwynd to Stanyan, 9/6/1710, 18/6/1710, 25/6/1710, 2/7/1710, 9/7/1710

<sup>99</sup> *Ibid.*, John Chetwynd to Brydges, 16/8/1708

<sup>100</sup> *Ibid.*, John Chetwynd to Cardonnel, 10/7/1708

<sup>101</sup> *Ibid.*, John Chetwynd to Mead, 22/2/1708, 13/11/1708, 15/11/1708; John Chetwynd to Stanhope, 12/10/1708, 14/11/1708

William as his clerk.<sup>102</sup> In September 1709 also Chetwynd thanked Richard Powys, chief clerk of the Treasury and a family connection of Richard Hill, for being ‘so particularly kind to interest yourself [at the Treasury] for my brother and me ... when Sir H[enry] Furnese and his correspondents took so great pains as to asperse us’.<sup>103</sup>

Of even more importance were the strong linkages built between Stanhope, a conspicuous whig, and John Chetwynd, who had after all begun his official career as secretary to the whig earl of Manchester in 1699.<sup>104</sup> Both Chetwynd and his brother William also voted with the whigs when they entered Parliament after 1715, albeit in opposition after 1730. Indeed Chetwynd told Stanhope in July 1709 that

the friendship and consideration which I shall always have for you will make me always ready to employ my own credit, so far as it may be for the service, but I am sure you will not, cannot desire me to act so in relation to the public.<sup>105</sup>

Personal connections and obligations, rather than the more abstract, impartial assurances therefore underpinned Chetwynd’s actions. In 1709 he proposed to abandon Furnese entirely and set up a monthly contract with Charrier & Grenioulleau to draw £20,000 a month from Britain. Unsurprisingly Furnese opposed this, and Stanhope’s secretary James Craggs the Younger reported from London in August 1709 that Furnese had such credit with Godolphin ‘that ‘tis not only a difficult but a dangerous matter to oppose his schemes and propositions’.<sup>106</sup>

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<sup>102</sup> Staff. RO, Chetwynd of Ingestre mss, D649/8/15, Brydges to John Chetwynd, 2/3/1708; Staff. RO, D649/8/15, John Chetwynd to Brydges, 18/2/1708; John Chetwynd to Mead, 5/4/1708

<sup>103</sup> Staff. RO, D649/8/15, John Chetwynd to Powys, 11/9/1709; John Sainty, *Treasury officials, 1660-1870* (London, 1972) p. 145

<sup>104</sup> *HOP* (1715-54) ii, 545-7

<sup>105</sup> Staff. RO, D649/8/15, John Chetwynd to Stanhope, 9/7/1709

<sup>106</sup> DRO, Drake of Colyton mss, 1700m-0/C/P/68A, Craggs to Mead, 9/8/1709

Nevertheless the support that Stanhope offered, both personally and via what was presumably a wider network of whig contacts – Craggs used his visit to London to inform key figures of the ‘insolence’ of Furnese’s correspondents in Italy<sup>107</sup> – proved decisive, and enabled his proposal to be accepted, and remittances freed from the constraints imposed by Furnese’s failing financial network.

Although the connections with Stanhope and Craggs suggest a whig affinity, the linkages with Marlborough, Hill, Mead and Powys – whose step-brother was the tory lawyer Sir Thomas Powys<sup>108</sup> – all also point to some form of tory connection, probably deriving from Chetwynd’s time as secretary to Richard Hill. This may also account for his close linkages with Brydges, who had served with Hill on the Admiralty Council for a time.<sup>109</sup> By June 1708 Chetwynd was already offering to do Brydges ‘anything for your service in these parts’, and thanking him for ‘the obliging manner in which you are pleased to write me and the several marks of friendship you have given me’<sup>110</sup>, and sending him letters to Furnese ‘open for your perusal’.<sup>111</sup> In return Brydges offered Chetwynd both political and financial aid. Early in 1709 he and Furnese persuaded the Bank of England to advance nearly £100,000 to answer bills that Stanhope had drawn, writing beforehand to Stanhope that some holders would ‘not be prevailed upon to keep them a week after they are due without protesting and returning them’ but then concluding that ‘the remainder are in such hands that we are assured will keep them’ until the government could

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<sup>107</sup> *Ibid.*, Craggs to William Chetwynd, 12/8/1709

<sup>108</sup> *HOP* (1690-1715) v, 197-9

<sup>109</sup> John Sainty, *Admiralty officials, 1660-1870* (London, 1975) p. 131; HL, ST57 ii, 87; HL, ST58 i, 35, 69

<sup>110</sup> Staff. RO, D649/8/15, John Chetwynd to Brydges, 26/6/1708

<sup>111</sup> *Ibid.*, John Chetwynd to Brydges, 3/10/1708

discharge them.<sup>112</sup> As relations with the financier worsened, Brydges also lent his political capital to Chetwynd, who noted in June 1709 that although Furnese had attacked his practice of drawing upon London, ‘which he was pleased to do in so public a manner one day at the Treasury Chambers ... Mr Brydges and Mr Powys were so kind as to treat him somewhat roughly and took our part in a very obliging manner’.<sup>113</sup>

The extent to which Brydges drew upon his own political or financial contacts in order to lend security to the Italian remittances is seen best in the months after the change of ministry in August 1710, when a series of bills that John and William Chetwynd had drawn from Italy risked being completely protested for want of payment, which Brydges noted would be ‘a prejudice considerably to our credit in those parts’.<sup>114</sup> The issue was a lack of confidence, Messrs Boissiers and Messrs Columba & Calcino ‘having a little of St Thomas’ faith, desiring to touch the money before they’ll believe their bills are paid’, and William Chetwynd told Brydges that ‘the most I can do being to pick up wherewithal to answer the several bills he has drawn upon me of late’. At the instigation of the Lords of the Treasury, Brydges wrote to John Drummond and Walter Senserf in Holland asking them to lend £15,000 each, accepting long-dated bills from the Treasury in return for shorter-dated bills that could then be discounted at the Bank of England for cash.<sup>115</sup> Senserf only reluctantly agreed, and in November 1710 told Brydges that he and his partners were resolved ‘not to burden ourselves with too many bills on us to hinder

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<sup>112</sup> CKS, U1590/O139/2, Brydges to Stanhope, 12/2/1709, 17/3/1709; BEA, G4/6 fo. 249

<sup>113</sup> Staff. RO, D649/8/15, John Chetwynd to Stanhope, 12/6/1709

<sup>114</sup> HL, ST57 iv, 119-20, 130-1, 233-4, 249; CKS, U1590/O142/10, Chetwynd to Mead, 5/10/1710; HL, ST58 vii, 141, 158-61, 163, 222-3; CUL, Add. mss 6570 fos. 9v, 12r, 16r; Staff. RO, Chetwynd of Ingestre mss, D649/8/17, Brydges to John Chetwynd, 4/11/1710

<sup>115</sup> HL, ST57 iv, 88-9, 119-20, 130-1, 177, 231; HL, ST58 vi, 209-10; HL, ST58 vii, 28

our trade, or strain our credit by redrawing'.<sup>116</sup> By contrast, motivated by his personal and political loyalties, Drummond declared that 'we are ready to venture all for the service of the public, and the Queen's immediate servants'.<sup>117</sup> Not only did he mobilise the new tory remittance network on Brydges' behalf, arranging in September for bills to be provided by James Milner, Edward Gibbon and Samuel Shephard, he also pushed his credit to the limit to do so.<sup>118</sup> Brydges likewise noted that this was 'a sum I have in some measure taken upon me by virtue of my own credit to have answered'.<sup>119</sup> He was therefore able to mobilise what was in effect an entirely unrelated set of financial networks on behalf of the state, although once again it appears that partisan connections proved more effective than merely personal ones at incorporating otherwise inaccessible reserves of credit.

The preceding sections have therefore argued that as official or semi-official fiscal networks broke down in Spain and Italy, a fluid conglomeration of informal connections and contacts were able to take over many of their functions. In Italy, networks that began as an ad hoc series of informal contacts became so efficient that they eventually became institutionalised, formal recognition and institutional existence reflecting the wider contribution they were making to the liquidity of the army in Spain. Moreover, at the core of such networks was not an impartial bureaucratic ethos or infrastructure, but rather a series of interlocking personal – and frequently partisan or political – connections that were reinforced through the cultivation of private obligations and mutual trust. Where such trust was lacking, as in Furnese's networks in Spain, or where they lacked the flexibility to operate

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<sup>116</sup> HL, ST57 iv, 177; HL, ST58 ix, 5; HL, ST58 x, 256; HL, ST58 vi, 209-10; HL, ST58 vii, 170

<sup>117</sup> HL, ST58 vi, 217-8

<sup>118</sup> *Ibid.*, 217-8, 237, 248; HL, ST57 iv, 155

<sup>119</sup> HL, ST57 v, 2

efficiently, as in Italy, the networks broke down and, in a self-reinforcing spiral, placed additional pressure upon other linkages until the system collapsed entirely.

### **MEDITERRANEAN 1710-13**

The political and financial changes that accompanied the entrance of the tory ministry into office in August 1710 led to a reconfiguration of both formal and informal financial networks within Portugal and Spain. In order to rein in increasing expenditure, the Lords of the Treasury issued new instructions in May 1711 to both Mead and Morrice, insisting among other things that strict appropriation be observed, and that no money be paid out for Extraordinaries that exceeded £20,000 without prior permission, which again placed Brydges in a difficult position.<sup>120</sup> On the one hand, he noted, only a strict compliance ‘can keep me out of the power of those who may bear any ill will to me’, but John Campbell, duke of Argyll and the new commander-in-chief in Spain, also wrote to England that the new instructions were unworkable and even, he thought, ‘must appear to any reasonable man either to proceed from mistakes or to be falsely copied by the clerk who transmits them’.<sup>121</sup> The degree to which the worst effects of these restrictions was overcome was determined by the informal connections that existed for Brydges, as in Flanders, to exploit. In Spain, where an embedded tory administrative network was reinforced in 1711, a wide-ranging set of financial measures were used to inject liquidity into the army. In Portugal, where the relevant connections were much weaker, the scope and effectiveness of these measures was more limited.

<sup>120</sup> *Ibid.*, 225; HL, ST57 vi, 2-3, 7, 23-4; HL, ST58 viii, 221; HL, ST58 ix, 14; CTB xxv, 31, 50, 56, 61, 72, 77, 234-5, 271-4

<sup>121</sup> HL, ST57 vi, 142-3; HL, ST57 vii, 234-5; CUL, Add. mss 6570 fos. 12-13v, 16r, 19v-20r

Although Stanhope was captured in the allied defeat at the battle of Brihuega in December 1710 during the retreat from Madrid, John Mead and Theophilus Blyke remained. The new commander-in-chief in 1711 was John Campbell, duke of Argyll: although allied to the new regime, Argyll was not a tory by conviction<sup>122</sup>, and the potential therefore existed for poor cooperation. When Mead received permission to return in 1711, Brydges sent out his close personal friend, the tory MP Anthony Hammond in July.<sup>123</sup> Partisan loyalties, and a common obligation to Brydges, overcame personal disagreements between Hammond and Mead: even though by July 1712 he thought Mead ‘insufferable’ he promised Brydges that ‘I keep my temper, and will part with [him] upon good terms’.<sup>124</sup> Accompanying Hammond was the Pay Office clerk Richard Cantillon, and Brydges also encouraged him to employ Blyke and Mead’s other clerks.<sup>125</sup> Cantillon’s presence allowed Brydges to access the financial network of exiled Irish Jacobites around Daniel Arthur in Madrid, and use him to remit money to the British prisoners in Spain. New officials in 1711 were therefore firmly embedded within an existing informal network of partisan and personal connections.

This appears to have allowed them, in turn, to compensate for that fact that financial structures in Catalonia were under serious pressure: there was a desperate shortage of specie, while the army’s own credit had been damaged by the delays – despite Brydges’ best efforts – in answering the bills drawn from Spain and Italy late in

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<sup>122</sup> Holmes, *Politics* pp. 106, 226; Hill, *Robert Harley* p. 125

<sup>123</sup> HL, ST57 v, 105, 108, 169; *HOP* (1690-1715) iv, 175; Baker & baker, *Chandos* p. 32

<sup>124</sup> HL, ST57 v, 180-1, 242-3; HL, ST57 viii, 90, 196; HL, ST58 vii, 192, 196; HL, ST58 viii, 233; HL, ST58 xi, 36

<sup>125</sup> HL, ST57 v, 143-4, 181; Murphy, *Cantillon* pp. 24-9, 35-9

1710.<sup>126</sup> Instructed by the Treasury to draw bills via Genoa, Argyll thought it unworkable, and wrote to William Chetwynd that ‘in short the whole letter is so grotesque that I send you the copy of it to laugh at’.<sup>127</sup> Argyll’s letterbook shows the continued importance of private credit and connections: in August 1711 he demanded that Mead procure money at any cost, ‘and I hope you will make use of your credit to that end, which I know to be very good, as I have seen the Queen’s paymasters do in other parts’, while William Chetwynd prevailed also upon the forage and bread contractors in Italy to supply the 1711 campaign upon account.<sup>128</sup> Two Genoese ships had been captured in October 1710 with over 2,000,000 silver dollars aboard from Cadiz, and this was eventually confiscated as a forced loan to be recoined as lightweight dollars in Barcelona, although William Chetwynd complained that it had destroyed financial structures in Genoa as a result.<sup>129</sup> Hammond undertook similar measures after his arrival in August 1711. Once he arrived Hammond was also permitted by Brydges, even encouraged, to draw sums directly on London to supplement remittances: for instance in December 1711 Argyll successfully ordered Hammond to draw £50,000.<sup>130</sup> The following year Brydges explained to Argyll that Hammond had been ordered to pay out the limited cash in his hands as his own discretion, ‘that he might the better lengthen out the money remitted him, in order that the British troops might run the less danger of being in want’.<sup>131</sup>

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<sup>126</sup> CUL, Add. mss 6570 fos. 5v-16r; HL, ST58 viii, 158-61; HMC Portland v, 9

<sup>127</sup> CUL, Add. mss 6570 fo. 17r

<sup>128</sup> *Ibid.* fos. 9v, 16v, 25r

<sup>129</sup> *Ibid.* fos. 4v, 5v, 8r; HL, ST57 vii, 135-6, 154, 161; HL, ST58 vii, 161; HL, ST58 xii, 31; CKS, U1590/O142/10, Mead to Furley, 23/10/1710, 8/11/1710; William Chetwynd to Mead, 5/10/1710; CTB xxv, *passim*

<sup>130</sup> CUL, Add. mss 6570 fos. 61v, 67v, 68r; HL, ST57 vi, 241; HL, ST58 xi, 118-9

<sup>131</sup> HL, ST57 viii, 131-3

Such measures were incapable of resolving all problems, and it was reported in August 1711 the army was nine months in arrears, and in July 1712 that ‘want of money fetters the service’.<sup>132</sup> Nevertheless, the situation appears to have been somewhat ameliorated, especially since the fundamental problem was a lack of money in London, and Argyll actually noted in December 1711 that ‘I think we have come off by mistake [during the previous year] far beyond at least what reasonably could have been expected from us in England’.<sup>133</sup> Key to this was the reinforcement of cooperation and mutual confidence that occurred upon Hammond’s arrival. His first duty was to clear the air and explain more fully the Treasury restrictions on drawing, Argyll confessing in August 1711 that ‘money matters being in all the world what I understand the least’: Hammond reported back to Brydges that ‘if they had been as well explained to him as I explained ‘em, I do not think they would have been the occasion of so much discourse here’.<sup>134</sup> Argyll and Harley were also initially nervous about the appointment of Hammond, a debt-ridden figure, and Brydges worked to reassure both men.<sup>135</sup> In February 1712 Hammond was therefore able to report that he and Argyll ‘parted very good friends’.<sup>136</sup>

Of equal importance was that Brydges now had a trusted friend and political colleague in Catalonia. Upon Hammond’s arrival, Brydges wrote to him that

you are not ignorant I presume of the gratification or present many of the foreign princes make me for the readiness I have shown to serve them in the execution of my office, and the dispatch I have given to their officers wherever it lay in my power ... if he [Mead] would take an opportunity of

<sup>132</sup> CUL, Add. mss 6570 fos. 10v, 15r, 16r, 36v, 47v, 67v; HL, ST58 xii, 200; HMC Portland v, 155

<sup>133</sup> CUL, Add. mss 6570 fos. 67v, 68r

<sup>134</sup> Ibid. fos. 38r-v; HL, ST58 ix, 170-1

<sup>135</sup> HL, ST57 v, 169-70, 179-80; HL, ST57 viii, 131-3, 268-9; CUL, Add. mss 6570 fo. 69r

<sup>136</sup> HL, ST58 xii, 197; HL, ST57 viii, 196

representing to them the trouble I have met with in my accounts ... I am certain they would not be unwilling to make the same present that others do.<sup>137</sup>

In March 1712 he likewise encouraged Hammond to negotiate for the arrears of the Imperial troops serving in Spain, and ‘try and find out what abatement ... Count Staremberg would make for an immediate payment of the whole arrear’.<sup>138</sup> Once again the process was dynamic rather than mechanical, Brydges telling Cantillon that the repayment of certain arrears was so unlikely that an eight or ten percent discount might be negotiated, although eventually these were paid by other means and without the deduction.<sup>139</sup> Hammond was also instructed to help Theophilus Blyke dispose of the remaining private stocks of clothing sent out, and a further shipment of cloth sent to Spain by Brydges’ friend, the tory merchant Thomas Vernon.<sup>140</sup>

Finally, the presence of Hammond in Barcelona allowed Brydges to resolve some particularly complex administrative problems, and a large proportion of his letters were preoccupied with matching up warrants and receipts in order to reduce a complex mass of accumulated paperwork to some form of order. For example, in November 1712 Brydges ordered Hammond to place £37,125 paid to the Imperial troops that year into the 1711 account, leaving out an equivalent value of bills received in 1712, ‘by which means your account will agree with the Imperial Commissary’s and with my books here’.<sup>141</sup> Hammond would then take general

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<sup>137</sup> HL, ST57 vi, 81-2; Baker & Baker, *Chandos* p. 52

<sup>138</sup> HL, ST57 vi, 240-2, 246

<sup>139</sup> *Ibid.*, 253-4; HL, ST57 vii, 2-5, 39-40, 55-8; HL, ST57 viii, 262-7; Murphy, *Cantillon* pp. 37-8

<sup>140</sup> HL, ST57 vi, 187-91, 231-3, 243; HL, ST57 vii, 173; HL, ST57 viii, 39, 60-2, 217-8, 220, 239, 261, 265; HL, ST58 xi, 272; HL, ST58 xii, 76-7; HL, ST58 xiii, 14-15; *HOP* (1690-1715) v, 749-50; Murphy, *Cantillon* pp. 38-9

<sup>141</sup> HL, ST57 viii, 88-99

receipts, and Brydges would make use of either the original or altered account ‘according as I shall find the disposition of people and as it will best suit with the circumstances of affairs here when I come to pass the accounts’. On another occasion Hammond was ordered to draw a series of undated or blank bills on local bankers for money that had actually been paid over to the Imperial ambassador in London, ‘as if they had really furnished you the money’.<sup>142</sup> The persistence and reinforcement of partisan networks in Spain therefore appears to have made a material contribution to the financial standing of the army.

### **PORTUGAL 1710-12**

By contrast, informal intermediation in Portugal after 1710 proved less effective, even though such efforts were even more necessary, due not least to the increasing fragility of Furnese’s own networks. Morrice reported to Brydges in October 1709 that ‘I lie under very great difficulties for want of timely remittances’ while by the end of 1710 Brydges, Morrice and the London merchant James Milner all suspected that Furnese’s correspondents were bridging the growing gap in remittances by redrawing upon London or Holland at expensive rates.<sup>143</sup> The following section will argue that although this created a space for the sort of informal financial intermediation, the absence of strong sets of interlocking networks – due in no small part to entrenched partisan discord – limited the scope of such intermediation, and therefore the effectiveness of the army.

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<sup>142</sup> HL, ST57 vii, 2-5, 39-40, 55-9, 89-90, 172, 262-4, 272-3; HL, ST58 ix, 30, 32

<sup>143</sup> HL, ST57 iv, 147-8; HL, ST58 iv, 193-5, 254; HL, ST58 v, 57; HL, ST58 vi, 192-3; HL, ST58 vii, 14

As in Flanders, after the fall of Godolphin in August 1710, immediate efforts were made to replace Furnese as remitter to Portugal in which Brydges, unsurprisingly, was particularly active, although the criteria he used was personal rather than political. He immediately approached the financiers John Ward and his brother-in-law Sir John Bucknall, both whig MPs: Ward not only held Bank of England stock for Brydges, but also acted as one of his personal stockbrokers.<sup>144</sup> A Portugal merchant who dabbled in bullion, Ward was an ideal remittance contractor, and Brydges flattered him that

I know nothing can be more conducive to the effectual carrying on of the public affair with honour and safety than for a person of your known wealth, credit and ability to engage in the supply of them, and therefore I thought it my duty to my country as well as a respect to you, to consult your thoughts in the first place and take your opinion upon it, that I may from thence gather how far yourself are willing engage in it and if you are upon what terms.<sup>145</sup>

Perhaps unsurprisingly Ward turned down this offer to act for the new tory ministry but Brydges was eventually able to secure the services of James Milner, a whig merchant who not only already had links with William Sloper and John Drummond but was also in competition with Furnese: Morrice had written to Brydges in August that ‘I wish the heats betwixt Sir Harry and Mr Milner would end’.<sup>146</sup> As so often, antipathy therefore appears to have sealed the deal. Milner was likewise a Portugal merchant and bullion dealer, whose effectiveness also rested on his domestic contacts: Drummond recommended to Harley in August 1710 that he secure ‘Milner and his cabal for the Portugal affair’, said cabal being ‘men of substance’, and Bank of England records show that the bills drawn on him from Portugal were endorsed

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<sup>144</sup> HL, ST57 iii, 143; HL, ST57 iv, 91; HL, ST58 vi, 186; HL, ST57 v, 104-5; HL, ST57 viii, 80; Fisher, *Portugal trade* pp. 104, 138; *HOP* (1690-1715) iii, 393; v, 793-6

<sup>145</sup> HL, ST57 iv, 91; HL, ST58 vi, 186

<sup>146</sup> HL, ST57 iv, 90, 98; HL, ST58 ii, 241; HL, ST58 iv, 93, 98; HL, ST58 vi, 182, 186, 191, 202; HL, ST58 viii, 204; *HOP* (1715-1754) ii, 259-60

by Furnese's former ally Moses Beranger as well as Sloper himself.<sup>147</sup> Between 1710 and 1713 the Bank not only discounted foreign bills for him worth £52,500 but also lent him some £23,000 a year, also at six percent, including one sum of £10,000 that was rolled over for nearly five months.<sup>148</sup> Personal linkages and connections therefore helped structure financial networks, taking up the slack left by Furnese's forced withdrawal.

However of equal importance was the existing situation in Portugal, where a severe breakdown in cooperation – incipient since 1708 – disrupted the mutual trust and informal official networks necessary for effective intermediation. In 1707, Morrice had been charged with the disposal of clothing sent out to Portugal by the same loose consortium that had supplied Spain: at various points it would include Brydges, Henry St John, and Arthur Moore, as well as Richard Harnage, the goldsmith John Mead, James Craggs the Elder, and the whig merchant William Pate, 'a friend of mine', Brydges wrote to Morrice, 'and acquaintance of yours'.<sup>149</sup> In Lisbon, Morrice had then entered an informal partnership with the Lisbon merchant Arthur Stert, who was acting as agent for his own group of London textile merchants, in order to dispose of the clothing to the Portuguese state.<sup>150</sup> Another key figure was John Whitton, an agent to some of the regiments in Gibraltar from 1709 and 'a broken Canary merchant, an agent of Mr Morrice's and one of that gang'.<sup>151</sup>

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<sup>147</sup> HMC Portland iv, 559, 573; BEA, G4/7 (Court of Directors: Minute-Book 'F') fos. 163-4, 166, 215, 222; BEA, G4/9 (Court of Directors: Minute-Book 'G') fo. 2; NRO, Cokayne MS C/2922, Medlycott to Milner, 20/8/1713, 4/10/1713

<sup>148</sup> BEA, G4/7 and G4/9, *passim*

<sup>149</sup> HL, ST58 i, 202; HL, ST58 ii, 49, 51, 148, 175; Chandler (ed.), *History and proceedings* v, 78-86

<sup>150</sup> HL, ST57 ii, 12-13, 25, 29, 36-7, 51, 53; HL, ST58 ii, 148-9, 152, 170-2, 175, 246-7; CTB xxii, 110-1; *HOP* (1715-1754) ii, 446

<sup>151</sup> HL, ST57 vi, 165; HL, ST58 iii, 177-8; HL, ST57 x, 141; NRO, MS C/2922, Medlycott to Bladen, 29/12/1711; CTB xxvi, 192, 450

However this neat set of overlapping commercial and personal linkages had been disrupted by the replacement of Henry St John by Robert Walpole as secretary at war in March 1708.<sup>152</sup> To accompany new clothing stocks sent out in the summer, Charles Medlycott was sent out as commissary of the stores: he had already replaced the tory official Martin Lluellyn as commissary of the provisions for Portugal in 1706.<sup>153</sup> Prior to that he had been a clerk to one of the tellers of the Exchequer, and had also been, as Brydges later remarked, ‘very friendly to me, and his brother[s] likewise (who are both in Parliament) were very earnest with me to put him in the place I have’.<sup>154</sup> He was also possessed of a self-confessed ‘whiggish character’, while Brydges later told Morrice that

the great inducement that led me to add to his care the charge of the stores was the assurance I rec’d from others as well as himself of his being perfectly well with and very much in my Lord Galway’s favour.<sup>155</sup>

Ironically enough Galway confessed to Brydges that ‘I did not that I remember recommend him to anybody’, but common whig loyalties probably eased Medlycott’s integration once he arrived in Portugal.<sup>156</sup>

This necessarily conflicted with the existing personal and political networks in Lisbon, as shown in extensive detail by Medlycott’s correspondence with Brydges, as well as his own personal letterbook between 1709 and 1714, both of which have been almost entirely neglected by historians. Indeed, they had already caused

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<sup>152</sup> J.H. Plumb, *Sir Robert Walpole: the making of a statesman* (London, 1956) pp. 129-70

<sup>153</sup> CTB xvii, 8, 45, 50; xviii, 235; xxii, 364; CTP iii, 38; HL, ST58 iii, 35, 237

<sup>154</sup> HL, ST57 viii, 177, 198; HL, ST58 xii, 177-8, 198, 199; *HOP* (1690-1715) iv, 789-92; *HOP* (1715-1754) ii, 250-1

<sup>155</sup> NRO, MS C/2922, Medlycott to James Medlycott, 17/1/1711; HL, ST57 ii, 116

<sup>156</sup> HL, ST58 iii, 133, 208

problems in Portsmouth, where Medlycott had clashed with the local tory merchant James Harmond or Harman, to whom the clothes had been consigned by Richard Harnage and James Craggs for embarkation.<sup>157</sup> In Portugal, Medlycott constructed a commissariat marked by his personal loyalty to Brydges, and his political or partisan links to Galway. In February 1709 for example he offered the post of storekeeper at Estremos to Brydges and his client James Baldwin ‘or anyone else you please to recommend’<sup>158</sup>, although a delay meant that the place went to Abraham Sandoz, Galway’s secretary, a fellow Huguenot and a former Ordnance storekeeper in Duncannon or Waterford in 1685.<sup>159</sup> In the regional depots such as Evora and Aveiro he made use of local English merchants or officials, ‘being encouraged’, he told the vice-consul at the Aveiro, ‘by Lord Galway and [the consul] Mr [John] Milner to write to you’.<sup>160</sup> There were also contacts via his friend Peter Delaporte, a British merchant in Lisbon. Medlycott therefore relied almost entirely upon his own political contacts to coordinate the supply of clothing.

Indeed, immediately upon his arrival he set about uprooting the existing networks, complaining to Brydges that Morrice and Stert were monopolising the Portuguese negotiations and promising that he would ‘endeavour for the future to break the neck of these affairs by contracting cheaper than they’.<sup>161</sup> Even after he was ordered to cooperate with Morrice, he continued to suggest that Stert be excluded

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<sup>157</sup> TNA, WO4/7 fos. 300, 324; HL, ST58 iii, 33-6, 40; *HOP* (1690-1715) ii, 244-5. Miller only suggests, rather than proves, that Harman was a whig: John Miller, *Cities divided: politics and religion in English provincial towns, 1660-1722* (Oxford, 2007) pp. 266-7, 298

<sup>158</sup> HL, ST58 iii, 238. Baldwin had been recommended to Medlycott by Brydges in August 1708, as ‘an honest good sort of man, and upon your telling me you wanted a clerk, I have recommended him to you. He writes a tolerable good hand, and is a very good accomptant’: HL, ST 57 ii, 74. He was probably related to the cousins of Humphrey Walcot: *HOP* (1690-1715) iii, 122-3

<sup>159</sup> HL, ST57 ii, 190; HL, ST58 x, 269; NLI, MS 3558 (‘A list of the principal and inferior officers ... belonging to His Majesty’s Train of Artillery in Ireland’); NRO, MS C/2922, *passim*

<sup>160</sup> NRO, MS C/2922, Medlycott to Talman, 3/6/1710; Medlycott to Delaporte, 11/7/1710; Medlycott to Lee, 14/1/1710, 21/2/1710. For Delaporte, see Dickson, *Financial Revolution* p. 114 n

<sup>161</sup> HL, ST58 iii, 116, 176

entirely, ‘who never would have ventured to meddle with it if Mr Morrice had not been his friend’. Ultimately Medlycott did recognise that cooperation was necessary, writing to Brydges in December 1708 that the contract could be secured if only Morrice and Stert would ‘heartily join with me’, and promising to attempt ‘friendly discourses’ with Morrice in order to resolve it.<sup>162</sup> For his own part Brydges demanded cooperation from Morrice, warning him his assistance would be ‘a service to the public, as well as a friendship to me’, to which Morrice promised in reply ‘the best correspondence I can’.<sup>163</sup> However this was never fulfilled.<sup>164</sup> Medlycott instead formed closer relations with Galway’s secretaries and ‘chief favourites’ Martin Bladen and Ralph Bucknall – the first a former army officer, the second almost certainly a relative of the whig merchant Sir Ralph Bucknall – who set themselves in turn against Morrice.<sup>165</sup>

These connections, moreover, formed the core of a self-contained, semi-partisan network with Brydges that mirrored almost exactly the whiggish one constructed in Flanders with Cadogan and his clients, down to the fact that Bladen too had attended Westminster School.<sup>166</sup> From 1709, Bladen and Brydges – via Medlycott – attempted to run a ‘private management’ to sell stocks of private clothing and stores to the Portuguese state, until the change of ministry in August 1710 and Walpole’s dismissal made it unsafe to continue.<sup>167</sup> He and Bladen also attempted to discount the notes issued by Prince George of Hesse-Darmstadt in 1706, in which Morrice –

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<sup>162</sup> *Ibid.*, 176

<sup>163</sup> HL, ST57 ii, 101, 115, 116; HL, ST58 iii, 110, 208

<sup>164</sup> HL, ST58 iii, 177-9, 179-80

<sup>165</sup> *Ibid.*, 215. Ralph Bucknall was almost certainly related to Sir Ralph Bucknall (see above p. 277).

For Bladen see *HOP* (1715-1754) i, 465-6

<sup>166</sup> HL, ST57 ii, 156; HL, ST58 iii, 243

<sup>167</sup> HL, ST57 ii, 156, 170-1; HL, ST57 iii, 23, 71-2; HL, ST57 iv, 19-20, 51, 144-5; HL, ST58 iii, 236; HL, ST58 iv, 131, 140; HL, ST58 v, 33, 164-5, 237; HL, ST58 vi, 1, 20, 101, 161-3; HL, ST58 vii, 38, 128; Baker & Baker, *Chandos* pp. 56-7

who held many of the notes himself – appears to have been unwilling to cooperate.<sup>168</sup> The need to open up a new and more cooperative channel of remittance probably underpinned Brydges’ offer in February 1710 to Ralph Bucknall, now serving as Galway’s personal secretary and paymaster of mule money, to draw bills on him in London for ‘providing in due time for the carrying on the services under His Excellency’s care ... [since] Mr Morrice is not always in cash to answer the same’.<sup>169</sup> The grouping around Medlycott therefore formed an informal administrative nexus of which Brydges was part, and which offered public service and private profit even as it conflicted with other, tory financial networks. While Furnese’s networks, his own personal credit, and wider financial markets in Lisbon and London remained strong, the administrative discordance that these conflicts caused was manageable, probably because the various networks involved were not required to engage in more high-intensity operations such as informal financial intermediation.

However, as the economic situation and public credit grew worse in 1710, the situation changed, and the following paragraphs will argue that these corrosive political conflicts discouraged cooperation and hindered coordination, making the British fiscal-military infrastructure in Lisbon less effective. The new commander-in-chief in Portugal – David Colyear, Lord Portmore – was also subject to the new Treasury instructions, and grew as frustrated as Argyll about them: Morrice noted to Brydges that ‘our new General is angry I obeyed the warrants ... and the old [*i.e.* Galway] was the same I did not pay it sooner, so that an honest man has a fine time

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<sup>168</sup> HL, ST57 iii, 193, 241; HL, ST58 v, 157; HL, ST58 vi, 100-1

<sup>169</sup> HL, ST57 iii, 147, 176, 239, 241; HL, ST58 v, 144, 157, 206-7, 210-3, 254, 256; HL, ST58 vi, 58-9

of it'.<sup>170</sup> Geoffrey Holmes notes that Portmore was 'was credited with tory views though he claimed to have "never affected to be a party man"', which should at least have provided firm ground for cooperation with Morrice, not least since Portmore also resented Bladen for a separate letter in which, Brydges reported, '[you] wrote over that you were glad my Lord Galway and you were come away [from Portugal] before the vessel was sunk'.<sup>171</sup> Yet relations soon broke down entirely, over what Portmore perceived as Morrice's refusal to pay the warrants he issued, and Medlycott reported to Bladen in October 1711 that the two men had literally come to blows: Portmore and John Conduitt, his secretary, had imprisoned Morrice and forced him to sign a confession, which Morrice then ran to the British envoy George Delaval to retract, 'and are both writing ding-dong against one another'.<sup>172</sup>

This discord occurred, and proved incapable of resolution, because Portmore had become enmeshed within these pre-existing partisan conflicts, particularly the whiggish cluster of Charles Medlycott and Ralph Bucknall, who attempted to poison relations with Morrice and his circle, such as Delaval, 'with whom', Medlycott admitted, 'I am not upon very good terms'.<sup>173</sup> It also included Conduitt, despite his description by Medlycott in November 1713 as 'a creature of Lord Bolingbroke'.<sup>174</sup> The aim of this grouping appears to have been to replace Morrice as deputy-paymaster with Medlycott, who had been promised the place in 1708 and believed himself to be the best qualified.<sup>175</sup> From October 1710 Portmore himself

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<sup>170</sup> HL, ST58 vii, 100, 231; HL, ST57 vi, 1-3; HL, ST58 x, 225

<sup>171</sup> HL, ST57 iv, 52, 84, 144; HL, ST58 vi, 162, 169; Holmes, *Politics* p. 28

<sup>172</sup> HL, ST58 ix, 266-7; HL, ST58 x, 122-3; *HOP (1690-1715)* i, 609-10; TNA, SP89/21 f. 340, 352, 360

<sup>173</sup> NRO, MS C/2922, Medlycott to Lynn, 12/9/1712

<sup>174</sup> *Ibid.*, Medlycott to James Medlycott, 7/11/1713; Richard S. Westfall, *Never at rest: a biography of Isaac Newton* (Cambridge, 1983) p. 893; *HOP (1715-1754)* i, 569-70

<sup>175</sup> NRO, MS C/2922, Medlycott to Montandre, 26/10/1711; Medlycott to James Medlycott, 26/11/1711; HL, ST58 iii, 115-6

began to explore this option, and rumours circulated in 1710 and 1712 that Bucknall or Bladen would be appointed deputy-paymaster.<sup>176</sup> Possibly in support of this venture, Medlycott wrote to Brydges that Morrice had been spreading malicious rumours of his dismissal in London, accusations repeated by Brydges' nephew James Leigh, whom Medlycott had insisted remain in his household after arriving in Lisbon.<sup>177</sup> By the same token, he also attempted to stabilise Portmore's relations with Brydges, key to the reconfiguration of the network, writing to him that 'I know he'd be glad to have this matter adjusted and keep a friendly close correspondence with you'.<sup>178</sup> For his own part Portmore also wrote to Brydges directly, and did what he could to gain his support by promoting Brydges' clients within the regiments under his control.<sup>179</sup>

Meanwhile, the tory circle around Morrice also retained its vitality: he wrote home accusing Portmore of making impossible demands that he had neither the money nor the authority to answer.<sup>180</sup> Theodore Vesey, William Sloper's brother-in-law and Morrice's friend, wrote letters to Brydges defending Morrice and attacking Portmore's conduct.<sup>181</sup> Thomas Townshend, Lord Barrymore and Anthony Hammond reported that they had heard that Medlycott's character 'has always been very vile' and that he had embarrassed Brydges by his conduct, which Brydges replied – with unusual candour – was 'too true'.<sup>182</sup> The fiscal-military infrastructure in Lisbon, riven by partisan conflicts and fundamental failures of trust, was

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<sup>176</sup> HL, ST57 iv, 35; HL, ST58 v, 157; HL, ST58 vi, 58-9, 101, 115; HL, ST58 vii, 105-6, 108-9; HL, ST58 viii, 24; NRO, MS C/2922, Medlycott to Bladen, 4/1/1712

<sup>177</sup> NRO, MS C/2922, Medlycott to Bladen, 30/3/1712; HL, ST58 x, 39, 73-4; HL, ST58 xi, 140

<sup>178</sup> HL, ST57 vi, 1-2; HL, ST58 ix, 127-8, 267-8; HL, ST58 x, 73-4; HL, ST58 xi, 144

<sup>179</sup> HL, ST58 viii, 25, 26; HL, ST58 ix, 127-8

<sup>180</sup> HL, ST58 vii, 235-6, 236-40; HL, ST58 ix, 15-16, 79

<sup>181</sup> HL, ST57 vi, 85; HL, ST58 ix, 75, 77, 79, 269; HL, ST58 x, 122, 124, 227; HL, ST58 xi, 173-4, 175

<sup>182</sup> HL, ST58 xii, 177-8, 198, 199; HL, ST57 viii, 177, 198

therefore in no condition to take on the business of wholesale financial intermediation.

This conclusion is supported by the fact that a limited amount of informal intervention did occur, but only through highly trustworthy correspondents and networks. Brydges wrote to Hammond in December 1711 that the King of Portugal and his ambassador in Spain had allowed him a two percent gratification on all payments from the beginning of that year, ‘in consideration of my trouble in soliciting the payments and looking after the concerns of those corps’.<sup>183</sup> In 1712 he and Bladen appear to have exploited their network – including personal contacts such as Charles Medlycott, Thomas Martin, Abraham Romswinkel and John Ward – to discount the arrears owed to these troops, and although he was alarmed to discover in December 1712 that ‘Mr Morrice talks very much of great matters he can discover about that transaction ... there is nothing in it that can affect me’.<sup>184</sup> Finally when John Leaves was sent out again to Lisbon in December 1712, Brydges asked him to negotiate with the King of Portugal over compounding for the Extraordinary arrears still owed,

and what profit he would allow me and some other merchants that would venture to furnish him with the money. I think (considering the risks we should run, how long at the best we should be like to stay for the payment of it, and what loss we may suffer upon the tallies or stocks we should be paid with) 50 percent discount is a reasonable demand.<sup>185</sup>

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<sup>183</sup> HL, ST57 vi, 81-2, 143, 235-9; HL, ST57 vii, 4-5, 40, 58-9, 172, 233; HL, ST58 xi, 31-2, 160-1, 163-4

<sup>184</sup> HL, ST57 vii, 37-8, 45, 74, 181, 255; HL, ST57 viii, 103, 156-7; HL, ST57 x, 149; HL, ST58 x, 262-5; HL, ST58 xi, 3-5, 88-91, 176, 179, 181-3, 234-5; HL, ST58 xii, 4, 90, 96, 147-8, 173, 174, 237; NRO, MS C/2922, Medlycott to Bladen, 6/8/1713; Medlycott to Leaves, 6/8/1713

<sup>185</sup> HL, ST57 viii, 177-8, 207; Brydges later noted that Stert might have concluded the bargain for 35 percent: HL, ST57 xii, 224, 233

Limited intermediation therefore occurred but on a small scale and through trusted correspondents, the lack of a more general network preventing more general or systematic arrangements.

Indeed, the continued operation of the Pay Office in Portugal may only have survived because from December 1711 it was reconfigured around the political splits, with William Morrice being replaced as Paymaster of Gibraltar by Charles Medlycott.<sup>186</sup> His correspondence shows that in this new role he continued to rely upon sets of personal linkages and trusted connections. His brothers, and friends such as Martin Bladen, Peter Delaporte and the whig goldsmith John Warner, were asked to underwrite his security.<sup>187</sup> Upon the arrival of the moderate whig Thomas Stanwix as governor of Gibraltar in 1711, Medlycott reported that ‘he often favours me with his company’, and wrote to Stanwix that ‘I shall make it my business to cultivate a friendship and a good correspondence [with you]’.<sup>188</sup> Thus by March 1713 Medlycott was willing to ‘venture’ to pay Stanwix’s warrants even though he had received no orders and had given Brydges a £10,000 bond as security for his obedience.<sup>189</sup> He also relied heavily on English merchants in Lisbon such as James Bulteel, with whom he placed the entire office cash during a visit to London early in 1713, ‘for safety to myself ... and my clerks drew for it as they had occasion’.<sup>190</sup> When Thomas Morrice refused to release some 500 moedas – around £670 – in October 1712 Medlycott mobilised alternative networks, pressing the merchant

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<sup>186</sup> HL, ST57 vi, 87-8; HL, ST58 xi, 141-2, 147; NRO, MS C/2922, Medlycott to James Medlycott, 29/12/1711, 22/4/1712

<sup>187</sup> NRO, MS C/2922, Medlycott to James Medlycott, 1/2/1710, 29/12/1711, 12/4/1712; Medlycott to Thomas Medlycott, 29/12/1711; Medlycott to Bladen, 2/6/1711; Ambrose Heal, *The London goldsmiths, 1200-1800* (Newton Abbot, 1972) p. 263; Middx. (1705) p. 25; *The poll for Knights of the Shire for the county of Surrey* (London, 1710) p. 40; London (1713) pp. 124

<sup>188</sup> NRO, MS C/2922, Medlycott to Watkins, 22/4/1711; Medlycott to Stanwix, 31/5/1712; *HOP* (1690-1715) iv, 554-5

<sup>189</sup> NRO, MS C/2922, Medlycott to Brigadier Stanwix, 31/5/1712, 8/2/1713, 14/3/1713

<sup>190</sup> *Ibid.*, Medlycott to Leaves, 6/8/1713

Thomas Martin to lend the sum either in specie or notes for remittance to Gibraltar.<sup>191</sup> Medlycott likewise suggested to several officers that they employ Martin, or the English merchant John Sherman, as their agent in Lisbon, ‘who everybody knows are very responsible’, demonstrating further efforts to improving efficiency by collapsing the boundaries between public and private networks.<sup>192</sup>

Medlycott’s effectiveness was also defined by his relations with the Pay Office and its staff, with whom, from the outset, he found it difficult to coordinate his business. Delays in remittance were blamed upon the resentment of William Knipes, regimental paymaster in Gibraltar and ‘a very notorious troublesome fellow’, upon whose actions Medlycott blamed in August 1713 the ‘late coldness’ from Stanwix.<sup>193</sup> Having sown the wind by pitting himself against Thomas Morrice, Medlycott now reaped the whirlwind: until his death in November 1712 all monies for Gibraltar passed through Morrice, and he refused to cooperate by releasing the necessary sums.<sup>194</sup> In the Pay Office itself, Medlycott suffered obstruction and minor inconveniences from William Sloper, Vesey’s brother-in-law, and despite numerous gifts of wine and snuff: his brother, James Medlycott, was therefore dispatched to find out the reason and smooth things over, it being ‘very necessary we should have a right understanding together’.<sup>195</sup> In the meantime Medlycott made contact with John Leaves and the Pay Office clerk Charles Tollet, both of whom he had earlier met in Lisbon.<sup>196</sup> Indeed, Tollet had briefly fled the Pay Office

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<sup>191</sup> *Ibid.*, Medlycott to Martin, 24/10/1712

<sup>192</sup> *Ibid.*, Medlycott to Montgomery, 15/11/1712; Medlycott to Congreve, 23/11/1713; Medlycott to Williams, 23/11/1713

<sup>193</sup> *Ibid.*, Medlycott to Leaves, 6/8/1713; Medlycott to Congreve, 15/9/1713

<sup>194</sup> *Ibid.*, Medlycott to Brigadier Stanwix, 12/8/1712, 2/11/1712, 25/11/1712

<sup>195</sup> *Ibid.*, Medlycott to Sloper, 9/11/1710, 27/10/1710, 17/1/1711, 20/1/1714; Medlycott to James Medlycott, 22/4/1712; Medlycott to Leaves, 8/9/1713; HL, ST58 vii, 103

<sup>196</sup> NRO, MS C/2922, Medlycott to Charles Tollet, 22/4/1712 ns; HL, ST58 vi, 177; HL, ST58 x, 103; HL, ST57 vi, 245; HL, ST58 xi, 147

to the Mediterranean in 1711 ‘because he could not agree with Mr Sloper, words and challenges often passing between them’, and this probably cemented his connection to Medlycott. After Tollet was again dismissed in May 1712, Medlycott made use of his friend from Lisbon, the merchant Peter Delaporte, to rebuild connections.<sup>197</sup> To secure relations with Brydges he accepted his client James Williams as his deputy-commissary, as well as sending a raft of gifts.<sup>198</sup> Similar methods were employed to smooth relations with the War Office, now under a succession of tory appointees such as George Granville and Sir William Wyndham. Medlycott reluctantly accepted Granville’s client William Hammond as his clerk, despite him being ‘not used to business nor apt to learn’; he also asked his tory brother Thomas to help by ‘using your power’ with Wyndham, and his whig brother James not to disoblige Wyndham by voting against him at the next election.<sup>199</sup>

Finally, like other deputy-paymasters abroad, Medlycott drew upon his own financial and social capital. In November 1712 he offered his personal bond to convince William Morrice to release £3,000 that his father had taken up before his death, and went on to exploit unassigned or unspent balances of public money in order to subsist the regiments under his care.<sup>200</sup> In January 1713 he advanced 200 moidas to Col Sankey and his regiment ‘for your sake’, and then £450 to Stanwix in August 1713 and further sums the next month ‘which without orders I have ventured to take up’, as well as drawing 14,400 millreis upon Brydges.<sup>201</sup> Indeed,

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<sup>197</sup> NRO, MS C/2922, Medlycott to Peter Delaporte, 24/5/1712

<sup>198</sup> HL, ST57 vi, 133; HL, ST57 vii, 24; HL, ST58 xi, 177, 201; NRO, MS C/2922, Medlycott to Hammond, 5/8/1713; Medlycott to Williams, 23/11/1713

<sup>199</sup> NRO, MS C/2922, Medlycott to Granville, 30/1/1712; Medlycott to Lynn, 24/5/1712, 13/7/1712, 1/3/1713, 16/1/1714; Medlycott to Thomas Medlycott, 7/11/1712; Medlycott to James Medlycott, 22/6/1713

<sup>200</sup> Ibid., Medlycott to Stanwix, 25/11/1712, 8/2/1712; Medlycott to Milner, 28/7/1713

<sup>201</sup> Ibid., Medlycott to Sankey, 8/2/1713; Medlycott to Stanwix, 7/8/1713, 21/8/1713; Medlycott to Leaves, 6/8/1713; Medlycott to Milner, 18/8/1713, 20/8/1713; Medlycott to Congreve, 15/9/1713

he used this last transaction to strengthen his own commercial linkages, bullying Baudouin into drawing half the sum on Brydges via James Milner in London rather than wholly via Furnese's former agent Moses Beranger so as to be able to profit from exporting bullion out of Portugal on his return.

## **CONCLUSION**

Circumstances therefore forced both Medlycott and Morrice into the same patterns of financial intermediation observed elsewhere, predicated upon the informal networks that they could adopt or adapt for this purpose. However, they appear to have been far less effective, not least because continued political and personal squabbles reduced mutual trust and acted as disincentives for cooperation, preventing the more efficient coordination of public and private monies. This can be seen as evidence of the disruptive and divisive effects of partisan animosities, and an argument for the inherent effectiveness of a depoliticised administrative hierarchy free from such elements. However, the example of the chain connecting remittances between London, Lisbon and Alicante demonstrates the limitations of such structures for the informal financial intermediation required to maintain the liquidity of the army. Unless backed up by far more substantial bases for trust and cooperation, such as close kinship or common political partisanship, looser or more contingent elements for trust such as friendship and common cross-cultural norms appear to have been fragile, and unable to resist the strain placed upon them by such intermediation.

This chapter has therefore demonstrated that the most effective form of fiscal-military infrastructure was instead a set of partly- or wholly-politicised networks, uniting officials, merchants and other interested parties and encouraging mutual cooperation. In both Spain and Portugal, such networks allowed the flexible coordination of public and private capital or credit, maintaining the liquidity of the army and therefore its ability to operate. The challenge for the state, therefore, was to construct a sufficiently homogeneous network to allow close cooperation.

## **CHAPTER 7: CONCLUSION**

James Brydges was finally allowed to resign as Paymaster of the Forces Abroad in May 1713, although this was delayed to August ‘in regard of the present muster having been broke into, by my having paid several sums and accepted bills of exchange drawn towards carrying on the subsistence of the forces to that length of time’.<sup>1</sup> Yet remarkable continuities remained. His replacement was Col Thomas Moore, who had been on the staff of the Pay Office since at least 1708, and although Moore appointed his own agents Brydges retained until at least 1718 a substantial staff of some 25 officials to deal with clearings and arrears, ‘which the necessity of business did require’.<sup>2</sup> These included William Sloper, Robert Clayton, John Leaves, John Barker and even Moore himself after 1714. Nicholas Philpot served in 1713 and 1714 as joint-Paymaster of the Half-Pay Officers: his colleague, Captain William Morgan, was appointed at Sloper’s solicitation, and Charles Le Bas likewise applied to be made agent at Cardonnel’s recommendation.<sup>3</sup> When the Debenture Office was created in 1718 to continue the payment of outstanding arrears owed to the army, Moore and Leaves were nominated as joint paymasters.<sup>4</sup> Sloper was suggested to Harley by Brydges in August 1713 as an interim Paymaster until Moore was appointed: he then served as deputy Paymaster-General to Robert Walpole and the earl of Lincoln until 1720, Brydges noting to Philpot in August 1714 that ‘Mr Sloper has engaged himself with my consent’ with Walpole.<sup>5</sup>

Theophilus Blyke served as deputy to his former master James Craggs the Younger

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<sup>1</sup> HL, ST57 ix, 92, 115, 121, 170

<sup>2</sup> HL, ST57 x, 175-6, 188; HL, ST57 xi, 246, 265; HL, ST57 xii, 198-9; HL, ST57 xiii, 2, 67; HL, ST57 xiv, 9, 138, 153, 161, 185, 306-7; HL, ST57 xv, 253; CTB xxxi, 97-8

<sup>3</sup> HL, ST57 ix, 134, 192; HL, ST58 xi, 127, 129-30; CTB xxviii, 3, 4; xxix, 650; CTP iv, 486; NLI, MS 2497 nos. 278, 285

<sup>4</sup> HL, ST57 xv, 253; CTB xxxii, 126-8; CTP iv, 422, 458; CTBP, iii, 231

<sup>5</sup> HL, ST57 x, 274; Christie, *Non-elite MPs* pp. 52-3, 65; *HoP (1715-1754)*, ii, 425-6

as Secretary at War between 1717 and 1718, while his will of that year nominated Nicholas Philpot and John and Richard Mead as his executors, and was witnessed by John Armfield.<sup>6</sup> Brydges also managed to preserve at the War Office his client Richard Arnold, who succeeded Blyke as deputy-secretary between 1719 and 1746.<sup>7</sup>

Other sets of administrative connections created independently of Brydges also retained their shape. Henry Cartwright left Antwerp in February 1713, but his daughter subsequently married Cadogan's aide-de-camp William Burroughs, and under the joint patronage of Brydges and Cadogan he went on to enjoy a long and profitable official career.<sup>8</sup> By the same token, after 1713 Benjamin Sweet served as financial agent to the duke and duchess of Marlborough, settling in Oxford less than ten miles away from Blenheim Palace.<sup>9</sup> William Leathes subsequently became Resident at Brussels and, in 1717, envoy to the United Provinces and deputy to William Cadogan as ambassador, though he maintained financial connections with his financial patron Edward Gibbon.<sup>10</sup> Having brought to Portugal administrative connections forged in Ireland, Galway did the same upon his return there as a Lord Justice between 1715 and 1716, Martin Bladen serving as his Chief Secretary.<sup>11</sup>

Brydges also preserved many of the informal networks that he had developed during his years in office. A 'Book of Strangers' listing who dined at Canons in 1721 and 1722 includes names such as William Cadogan, Martin Bladen, John Drummond,

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<sup>6</sup> TNA, PROB 11/568 (Blyke, Theophilus); Michael Roper, *The records of the War Office and related departments, 1660-1964* (Kew, 1998) p. 21

<sup>7</sup> HL, ST57 x, 268-9; DRO, Drake of Colyton MSS, 1700M-0/C/P/ 111; Roper, *Records* p. 21

<sup>8</sup> *HoP (1715-1754)*, i, 509, 524. See also PROB 11/679 (Will of Henry Cartwright)

<sup>9</sup> BL, Add. mss 61351 fos. 236-51; *Victoria County History (Oxfordshire)* iv, 270, 332, 446; xii, *passim*

<sup>10</sup> Toby Barnard, *A new anatomy of Ireland: the Irish Protestants, 1649-1770* (London, 2003) pp. 193-4, 196-7; T. C. Barnard, *Irish Protestant ascents and descents, 1641-1770* (Dublin, 2004) pp. 251, 255-6; Suff. RO, de Mussenden Leathes MSS, HA403/T1039/8 fos. 30-1

<sup>11</sup> Hayton, *Ruling Ireland* pp. 112, 216; Walsh, *William Conolly* p. 158; *HOP (1715-1754)* i, 466

Humphrey Walcot, Nicholas Philpot, Henry Cartwright, Sir Matthew Decker, Mr Pels, Richard Arnold, a Mr Bucknall and a Mr Gibbon, as well as key figures within the new whig regime.<sup>12</sup> In April 1715 Walcot made a trip to Dusseldorf to arrange the payment of arrears to ‘our old friend Mr Steinghertz’, to whom Brydges wrote that it might be possible to secure further sums ‘if it proves worthwhile to take the trouble upon ourselves of applying for it’, and Brydges also continued to correspond with Jan Hallangias concerning army arrears.<sup>13</sup> Matthew Decker, Walter Senserf and John Drummond were among a growing number of financiers he employed at home and abroad for a series of financial and commercial ventures – he remained ‘a bubble to every project’ – as was Hammond’s former clerk Richard Cantillon, whom Brydges recommended to Senserf as a correspondent in August 1716 when Cantillon settled in Paris.<sup>14</sup> Commercial deals were struck with Francis Stratford and Richard Mead, while Louis Duvizier, Decker, Senserf, Hammond, Cantillon, Hallangias and Charles Davenant’s son Henry continued to act as his *soliciteurs-culturel* in Europe, and Decker and Drummond as his contacts in the East India Company.<sup>15</sup>

Finally, as a Hanoverian tory already known at the Elector’s court, Brydges was able to ride out the death of Anne in August 1714 and even secure promotion, being made Earl of Carnarvon in 1714 and Duke of Chandos in 1719.<sup>16</sup> He celebrated the

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<sup>12</sup> HL, ST59 (‘Book of Strangers’, 1721-2),

<sup>13</sup> HL, ST57 xi, 143, 320; HL, ST57 xii, 195, 199, 257, 284-5; HL, ST57 xiii, 4-5, 66; HL, ST57 xiv, 400; HL, ST57 xv, 81, 167

<sup>14</sup> HL, ST57 xiii, 39; Baker Baker, *Chandos* pp. 206-13, 221-35, 265-364; Murphy, *Richard Cantillon* pp. 29-31, 33; Neale, *Bath 1680-1850* pp. 123-9; Neal, “‘For God’s sake, remit me’” pp. 53-5

<sup>15</sup> HL, ST57 xi, 292; HL, ST57 xii, 41, 58; HL, ST57 xiv, 212, 266; HL, ST57 xv, 248, 269; Baker & baker, *Chandos* pp. 65-83, 125, 188; George K. McGilvary, *East India patronage and the British state: the Scottish elite and politics in the eighteenth century* (London, 2008) pp. 5-66, 195-6; Jonckheere, *Auction* pp. 146-50, 154, 157; Mentz, *English gentleman merchant* pp. 231, 234-8

<sup>16</sup> Baker & baker, *Chandos* pp. 93-113

arrival of George I from Hanover by hosting a dinner for significant supporters of the new dynasty such as Richard Hill, William Cadogan, James Stanhope, Marlborough and the Hanoverian minister Baron Bothmer.<sup>17</sup> Colley argues that after 1714 he became one of the leaders of the Hanoverian Tories in Parliament, and other research suggests that he maintained tenuous influence over at least five or six boroughs and a loose political following of around ten court, Whig and even outright Tory MPs over the following decades, including former Pay Office clients such as Walcot, Philpot, Cartwright, Decker and Drummond.<sup>18</sup> The informal networks which surrounded the Pay Office after 1705 were not, therefore, either accidental or mere appendices to formal structures: their survival and continued vitality after 1713 is strong evidence that an underlying core of mutual trust and personal obligation existed that was sufficiently durable to persist even in the absence of the institutional framework that had been superimposed on top of it.

The previous chapters have argued that the existence of such informal networks was crucial to the effectiveness and operation of the British fiscal-military state, especially the payment and supply of armies abroad in Ireland and Europe, during a time of almost permanent warfare between 1689 and 1713. It has been argued that, contrary to prevailing historiographical opinion, bureaucratic reform and the imposition of impersonal, impartial standards of conduct upon officials did not necessarily provide an organisational advantage. Indeed, the imposition of rule-bound, institutionally-focussed mindsets were more often part of the problem than

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<sup>17</sup> Ibid. pp. 107-8, 192; Linda Colley, *In defiance of oligarchy: the Tory Party 1714-60* (Cambridge, 1982) pp. 86, 124, 162, 191; HL, ST57 x, 196, 199, 203, 249-50, 253

<sup>18</sup> *HOP* (1715-1754), i, 257-8, 309-11, 338, 380-1, 467, 499-500, 608, 623-4; ii, 22, 346, 379-80, 504-5, 545-6; R.G. Schafer, 'The parliamentary influence of the first duke of Chandos', *English Historical Review*, 77:303 (1962) pp. 318-20; Clyve Jones, 'James Brydges, earl of Carnarvon, and the 1717 Hereford By-Election: a case study in aristocratic electoral management', *Huntington Library Quarterly*, 46:4 (1983) pp. 310-20

the solution, since the fluid nature of warfare and the slow speed of communication meant that central bodies were forced to devolve control to their agents in order to be effective: as Sweet commented to Brydges in June 1711,

all the Paymasters-General before you left the direction of the payments to the commanders-in-chief, because it is impossible for any paymaster that it not on the spot to be so competent a judge in many accidental occasions as the commander-in-chief that is on the *champ de bataille*.<sup>19</sup>

This is not to deny that other factors such as political partisanship, factionalism or plain incompetence underlay failures within the fiscal-military state, merely to argue that on the one hand bureaucratic reforms did not automatically produce improvements, that on the other hand effectiveness often increased without such reforms, and thus that a Weberian paradigm of ‘bureaucratisation’ is an inadequate explanation of ‘state formation’.

Instead it had been argued that the business of state was essentially similar to that of commercial, industrial or financial enterprises, once the particularly politicised conditions under which it operated are taken into account. Historians have largely concluded that commerce was carried out most effectively in the early modern period through the construction of personal networks capable of cooperating with each other to coordinate the flow of information and resources on a regional, national or global scale. Mutual trust was the oil which lubricated the machine of commercial enterprise, above all where it provided access to credit. Even amongst large commercial organisations such as the Bank of England or East India Company, and the various ‘farms’ created to organise the collection and disbursement of revenue, personal connections and the cultivation of informal

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<sup>19</sup> HL, ST58 viii, 212

political and financial networks were crucial. Thus, while this thesis supports the argument of Braddick and others that a fiscal-military state cannot be defined in functional or institutional terms, since the same structures and functions were common to governmental and economic enterprises, it also argues that states were not necessarily legitimated by the deployment and enforcement of rhetorics of impartial conduct and impersonal state authority. The networks used to pay and supply the British army abroad were mixtures of selfless and selfish motivation, in which there was often no contradiction between personal profit and public service.

This was because states functioned through coordination, both internally and with outside commercial or political agents, and were therefore required to build up mutual cooperation in order to operate. Cooperation was secured in turn through mutual trust, which could best be created in the same fashion as a merchant or financier would have gone about creating a cross-cultural commercial network in the late-seventeenth or early-eighteenth century. It was, moreover, a process that had to take place at every level of the hierarchy: when Henry Cartwright and Jan Hallangias briefly fell out in 1713 over payments to Baron de Walleff's regiment, Brydges urged Hallangias to apologise, telling him that

I cannot think you so ignorant in business as not to know that let a principal be never so hearty to serve a friend, if the person employed under him is not also well disposed, he shall raise those difficulties and give such delays in the execution of it as shall render the intended kindness of the other in a great measure useless and unprofitable.<sup>20</sup>

Thus even theoretically hierarchical organisations such as state bureaucracies partially resembled the decentralised, mutually-supportive and even self-organising

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<sup>20</sup> HL, ST57 viii, 171-2

commercial networks David Hancock has recently identified within early modern trans-Atlantic trade.<sup>21</sup> Their effectiveness was often fundamentally supported by the strength of interlocking connections and linkages rather than any centralised, rational or ‘bureaucratic’ administrative structure: indeed, several chapters have shown that such structures may sometimes have done more harm than good.

This thesis has also examined the role of political partisanship in state formation during Britain and Ireland’s ‘(r)age of party’. On the one hand it has been shown that there is some justice to the argument that political partisanship was profoundly destructive of administrative or military effectiveness. Not only did the rapid turnover of ministries continually alter strategic and operational goals, but the sectional loyalties generated by ideologically driven conflict and allegiance frequently prevented effective cooperation. One conclusion, which has underlain most of the historiography, is that the fiscal-military state would have been most effective if it had been removed from such partisan conflicts altogether. However, this thesis has concluded that in actual fact the state functioned best when political partisanship occurred in fiscal-military and financial structures at a sufficient concentration to allow the creation of strong informal networks between those involved. Moreover, in an era marked by political partisanship that spread well beyond Westminster, and in which large sections of society became engaged and invested in partisan loyalties, a common political identity offered an immediate connection between those in government and those outside it, particularly within the financial markets that ultimately underpinned the effectiveness of the British fiscal-military system. Like kinship, friendship or a common religious or ethnic identity,

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<sup>21</sup> Hancock, *Oceans* pp. xiv-xxv

political partisanship offered a much stronger cement for commercial or financial trust, carrying with it its own sanctions and incentives, and avoiding the need laboriously to build up informal networks held together by nothing more than selfish self-interest. As noted in the Introduction, although political partisanship could impose constraints on the power of the British fiscal-military state abroad above and beyond those of an active representative assembly, those constraints meant that when the politicised state exercised power, it did so fully, and effectively.

Moreover, the success of political partisanship in promoting and incentivising close connections not just within the state but also within the surrounding society appears to have offered a clear administrative and financial advantage. Not only did it encourage and facilitate much wider coordination and cooperation, but it also made for the more flexible mobilisation of patronage networks within fiscal-military state structures. These chapters have shown that officials were often repeatedly reincorporated into a succession of close-knit administrative networks, since a common partisan identity frequently facilitated the transition and transfer of loyalties. This was far more difficult amongst the personally-based clientage networks that mobilised other European state structures. As noted in the Introduction, the death of Seignelay in 1692 left the French naval administration, essentially his own clientage network, leaderless, and Pontchartrain was unable to absorb it into his own when he was appointed the new Minister of the Marine.<sup>22</sup> Similarly, the death of Louvois in 1691 required the appointment of his son the marquis de Barbezieux, only 23 years old, rather than a more experienced man, as

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<sup>22</sup> See above pp. 24-5

one of the few people capable of managing the patronage network that his father had created.<sup>23</sup> By contrast, this thesis has argued that political partisanship helped to weld together a broad series of interlocking networks, in Britain, Ireland and further overseas, into a cohesive and coordinated whole. Thus, although divisive, when sensitively managed political partisanship offered the fiscal-military state a competitive advantage over all other forms of coordination and cooperation, being broad and open enough to encompass all necessary actors while remaining specific enough to maintain and enforce its own identity. Moreover, to the extent that these networks needed to be supported and maintained by the liberal dispensing of patronage and favours, which helped cement bonds by creating trust and obligations, the effectiveness of the state was maintained by corruption, inefficiency, and other unbureaucratic forms of organisation. Formal institutional structures formed a useful framework for the organisation of such networks, but were not integral to its operation.

Thus, it may be suggested that the continued development of the British fiscal-military state after 1714 occurred due to the extension and expansion of these factors. The accession of George I witnessed one of the most thorough-going purges of the early modern period, as openly tory partisans down to level of county commissions of the peace were excluded from government, a proscription that lasted nearly half a century, the period of 'political stability' identified by Plumb. Yet the tory party itself – and its Jacobite shadow – retained a visible existence, sharpening party loyalties and preventing the serious erosion of the political solidarity that would have irretrievably loosened party bonds. They therefore

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<sup>23</sup> Rowlands, *Dynastic state* pp. 62-71

remained sufficiently strong to encourage continued cooperation, and to act as a basis for mutual trust, preventing the fiscal-military state from unravelling after the direct pressure of overseas warfare had been removed. The plentiful availability of sinecures, pensions and other inducements, known by the 1780s as ‘Old Corruption’, could have built up mutual obligations even further. The continued and improving effectiveness of the British fiscal-military state over the course of the long eighteenth century may well have occurred precisely because of, rather than despite, widespread inefficiency, patronage and corruption. Indeed, the process was satirised by Jonathan Swift in 1726: during the same session on the island of Glubbdubbdrubb with which this thesis opened, Lemuel Gulliver recorded that

three kings protested to me, that in their whole reigns they never did once prefer any person of merit, unless by mistake, or treachery of some minister in whom they confided; neither would they do it if they were to live again, and they showed, with great strength of reason, that the royal throne could not be supported without corruption, because that positive, confident, restiff temper, which virtue infused into a man, was a perpetual clog to public business.

## APPENDIX: MILITARY PAYMENTS, ACCOUNTING AND REMITTANCE

### CATEGORIES

The basic division in military finance was between *Ordinary* and *Extraordinary* payments.<sup>1</sup> The first were the basic costs of subsisting and clothing the soldiers, and were calculated on the basis of so much, such as 8d per infantryman, per capita per diem. For British or foreign troops in direct pay, the Ordinary was voted the winter before a campaign on the basis of *Estimates* drawn up by the Treasury, War Office and other departments and presented to Parliament. Having approved the Estimates, Parliament would ideally go on to assign or *appropriate* certain revenues or funds to cover their cost. Where the payment of foreign troops or subsidies was governed by *treaty*, this too was added to the Estimates: occasionally this occurred mid-way through the year and would be added retrospectively, in which case they became what might be called '*extraordinary*' *Ordinaries*, whose payment was assured even if money had not been appropriated at the beginning of the year. Once passed, the Estimates formed the standing *Establishment* for that year. Between 1688 and 1713 there existed at different times separate English establishments for England ('Guards and Garrisons') and colonial service, for the armies in the Low Countries, Portugal, Italy and Spain, and independent Scottish and Irish establishments for troops stationed in Scotland and Ireland.

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<sup>1</sup> No work adequately summarises this complex topic for the period 1689 to 1713. The following is based on Scouller, *Armies* pp. 29-35, 126-48; Clay, *Public finance* pp. 29-39, 146-60; Guy, *Oeconomy and Discipline* pp. 53-131; Malcolmson, *Nathaniel Clements* pp. 117-21, 138-66; Binney, *British public finance* pp. 150-69

The Extraordinaries were essentially those costs incurred during a campaign – the provision of forage, bread and transport, the cost of fortification and hospitals, the maintenance of general and staff officers, and any other contingencies – whose exact scale could not be predicted beforehand. Since Parliamentary rules required specific authorisation of each individual expenditure, in principle these could only be authorised and repaid retrospectively. In practice two types existed. The cost of some Extraordinaries could be predicted beforehand, and provision made for them in the annual Estimates: these ‘*ordinary*’ *Extraordinaries*, as this thesis calls them, would then have money appropriated and could then be paid almost automatically when the commander-in-chief or another accredited authority issued warrants. Where expenditures were unforeseen, or where the warrants issued outstripped any prior provision, ‘*extraordinary*’ *Extraordinaries* – as this thesis likewise calls them – were the result. These claims or *pretensions* were collected and laid before Parliament after the campaign for payment.

### **ACCOUNTING: IN THEORY AND PRACTICE**

In theory the Extraordinaries were paid in tranches as bloc grants, as money was released by the Treasury. By contrast, the Ordinaries were split up into a number of complex charges. Out of the basic salary of 8d per diem for a foot soldier, the sum of 6d was set aside for *subsistence*. Provisions delivered – whether by the commissariat, the victualling or transport boards, or an outside contractor – were deducted at a set rate. Usually the contractor received an *advance* on the credit of this, with the remainder paid later upon production of his *receipts*. Whatever remained, subject to further deductions, could be spent by the soldier at his own

discretion. The other 2d constituted *gross off-reckonings*, and was subject to further deductions. Half, known as *poundage*, was set aside as a fund for the payment of hospital charges and military administration.

The remaining 1d constituted the *net off-reckonings* which were placed on the credit of the regiment in England to be used for the purchase of clothing and equipage, the purchase of remounts, the payment of widows and other necessary and unanticipated expenditures. Theoretically the subsistence was paid to the army in advance at the beginning of each two-month or six-week *muster-period* when regimental musters were taken, the total subsistence being tailored to the number of men present or *effectives*. Men in hospital had their subsistence stopped from the regiment and paid to the hospital contractor. Various *allowances*, *stoppages* or *respits* might be placed upon the regiment's pay, which would deduct a set amount of money from the net off-reckonings and hold it in credit for other uses. Provided that frequent and accurate musters could be held, the system was therefore watertight, accounting for every penny received and spent.

However, in wartime monthly musters were unknown, and the system almost unworkable. In practice it therefore worked in two stages. Deputy-paymasters would pay out each month a lump sum, often based on the regiment's size on the establishment. Depending on the number of those dead, sick, wounded, in prison, in transit or otherwise absent, this constituted an *under-* or *over-payment* of a varying size. Once the regimental muster rolls, and the hospital, transport and prisoner returns had been received by the Pay Office, often many months afterwards, the true subsistence owed could then be calculated and set against payments already made

*on account*. Any remaining stoppages, respits or charges would then be deducted and the net off-reckonings determined: known as *clearings*, these would then be paid to the regiment, at which point the Pay Office was no longer liable for anything further.

## **ISSUING MONEY**

The payment of subsistence, based on the establishment approved by Parliament, required no further authority: it was simply paid over to the regimental agent or paymaster in return for a receipt, often called an *officer's note*. Once clearings had been calculated, a *debenture* or certificate of debt would be drawn up and sent to the War Office, where the Secretary at War and his staff, who had also received copies of receipts and muster rolls, would double-check the figures and then counter-sign the debenture. This was then handed to the regiment or its agent, who could then present it at the Pay Office for payment once money was available.

For the payment of provisions or forage, a regimental officer would sign receipts for the supplies he received. These would be sent by the contractor to the Pay Office to serve as proof of delivery, and permit deductions to be made. At intervals a debenture would be drawn up, checked and counter-signed, and then cashed at the Pay Office. Clothing was arranged by each individual regiment: clothiers were either paid in cash by the agent or, far more often, given bills or notes upon the net off-reckonings of the regiment at the Pay Office, to be paid once clearings were issued. Departments such as the commissariat, Victualling Board or Ordnance Board that provided supplies also took receipts that enabled them to draw up paper

credits and debits that would periodically be balanced and any excess either paid or carried over.

For Extraordinaries, both ‘ordinary’ and ‘extraordinary’, the necessary warrant would be signed by the commander-in-chief and counter-signed either by his military secretary or the Secretary at War in London, usually after seeing valid receipts. In Flanders between 1702 and 1711, a different system prevailed. The deputy-paymasters were ordered to rely upon certificates from Simon van Slingerlandt, secretary to the Dutch Council of State, that the demand was valid and the United Provinces had already paid their share: upon presentation of both the certificate and the warrant, the claim would be deemed valid and either paid immediately or included in the claims made to Parliament.<sup>2</sup> In most cases it was also common practice for deputy-paymasters to return individual receipts to the regimental agents at the end of each year and receive a general receipt instead, in order to reduce the paperwork involved.

## **DEFICIT FINANCE**

Numerous factors complicated military finance, most particularly the mechanics of translating paper credits and debits into cash and transmitting this to the regiments. Most tax revenues were paid in gradually: the Treasury gained cash by negotiating loans or advances upon the security of these revenues, issuing in return negotiable, interest-bearing assignments upon specific revenues known as *tallies*.<sup>3</sup> The lender

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<sup>2</sup> *PH* vi, 1186

<sup>3</sup> The following paragraphs are based on the works noted above, supplemented by Dickson, *Financial Revolution* pp. 341-406; Chandaman, *Public Revenue* pp. 282-301; Baxter, *The*

would periodically present the tally to the Exchequer to receive his interest and, eventually, the principal itself. Most taxation bills contained a defined yield to prevent excessive tallies being issued: technically the moment a bill was passed this credit was established at the Exchequer. In practice the Paymaster-General would be *imprest* a specified sum by the Treasury at the Exchequer through the use of a *sign manual* under the *Privy Seal*, so that they held authority to draw on the Exchequer for money up to the limits of that sum. When it was exhausted, a further bloc of credit would be imprested, until the total appropriation was exhausted. However this all remained essentially book or paper credit, since the Treasury was issuing money that might not yet have been paid in.

When the need for money arose, the Paymaster-General would submit a *memorial* to the Treasury laying out the details. If accepted the Treasury would decide from which fund to pay the money, then send an order to one of the Tellers of the Exchequer to issue the given sum from the Paymaster's imprest account. This might be in specie, in government paper such as Exchequer bills or, after 1711, in stock in the South Sea Company. However by far the most common were Exchequer tallies on a given fund, which – through the elegant legal fiction of the *fictitious loan* – could be inverted and used to anticipate payments rather than record receipts. To gain money the Pay Office would sell and *endorse* or sign over the tallies to a purchaser, who thereby gained the right to be repaid from that fund at the Exchequer as if they had paid it into the Exchequer originally. This could then be presented for repayment in the same fashion as other tallies. Where doubts

existed about the security of the funds on which they were drawn, the tallies might need to be sold or issued at a *discount*.

## **REGIMENTAL FINANCE**

Once in possession of the cash the Pay Office would then pay over defined proportions to the *regimental agents* or ‘solicitors’ empowered by a letter of attorney from the regimental colonel to receive the money. The agents in turn paid it over to a *regimental paymaster*, who distributed it to the individual captains for dispersal. Where regiments were quartered in Britain away from London, agents sent cash or *inland bills of exchange*, essentially negotiable financial instruments from one person giving the purchaser a credit on a third person, or the Treasury might order a regiment to accept money from a local tax collector. This order, together with a receipt, would be used by the Pay Office to charge the sum to regimental account and by the collector – via the Treasury – to discharge themselves of so much money owed to the Exchequer.

An extra layer of complexity was posed where the army served abroad. To remit money overseas the Treasury mostly relied on contractors, who sometimes shipped bullion over but more often furnished the Pay Office with *overseas bills of exchange*, drawn on a merchant or financier abroad. In return the contractor would be paid in cash, bills, notes or tallies, in the procedure described above. These bills were then posted over to the deputy-paymaster, who would present them to be

*encashed* to the contractor's *correspondent*. Payment was usually in cash but might also be in *assignments* or notes upon local bankers, bills of exchange, or other negotiable instruments, which could then be remitted inland to the army.

Occasionally the deputy-paymaster or correspondent would reverse the process and *draw* a bill on the Pay Office or contractor in London, which would then be sold to local bankers or merchants who would send it over to their correspondent in London for encashment there by the Pay Office.

## CONCLUSION

The process of converting tax revenues into pay for the troops was therefore long and complex, and in theory entirely mechanical: James Brydges claimed in his own defence in November 1710 that 'I have been but a ministerial officer, receiving with one hand and paying with the other, pursuant to authoritative directions, there is nothing [else] I am answerable for in it'.<sup>4</sup> George Stone, archbishop of Armagh, similarly noted in 1754 that 'there is no mystery in this Treasury. Receiving and paying is the whole operation; abilities are not requisite'.<sup>5</sup> Yet both statements are misleading: the process left considerable scope for independent judgement, reliant as it was not only upon internal coordination but also upon the cooperation of other agencies. In many instances bureaucratic procedures were also unworkable without an elaborate set of widely-accepted legal fictions intended to avoid what would otherwise have been interminable delays.

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<sup>4</sup> HL, ST57 vol. iv, 217

<sup>5</sup> Quoted in Malcomson, *Nathaniel Clements* p. 102

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