Are Europeans ready for a more democratic European Union?

New evidence on preference heterogeneity, polarization, and crosscuttingness

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Abstract

Some scholars and policy-makers argue in favour of increasing democratic contestation for leadership and policy at the European level, for instance by having European-wide parties campaign for competing candidates for president of the European Commission ahead of European Parliament elections. But would such changes put the survival of the EU at risk? According to the consociational interpretation of the EU, the near absence of competitive and majoritarian elements has been a necessary condition for the stability of the EU political system given its highly diverse population. This paper contributes to the debate in two ways. First, it develops a more precise understanding of "problematic" diversity by examining how three variables – the heterogeneity, polarization and crosscuttingness of citizen preferences over public polices – affect the risk of democratic contestation generating persistent and systematically dissatisfied minorities. Second, it uses opinion surveys to determine whether the degree of diversity of the European population is problematically high compared to that of established democratic states. We find that the population of the EU is slightly more heterogeneous and polarized than the population of the average member state, although policy preferences in several member states are more heterogeneous and polarized than the EU as a whole. Strikingly, however, policy preference cleavages are more crosscutting in the EU than in nearly all member states, reducing the risk of permanent minorities. Moreover, policy preferences tend to be less heterogeneous and polarized, and nearly as crosscutting, in the EU as a whole as in the United States. For observers worried about how high polarization and low crosscuttingness in policy preferences may combine to threaten democratic stability, our findings should be reassuring.

Introduction[1]

Would politics in the European Union (EU) benefit from greater contestation over policy, or is the European public too diverse and divided to sustain the kinds of democratic procedures practiced in its member states? Different perspectives on this question came to the fore in the process of selecting the president of the European Commission in 2014. The Lisbon Treaty provides that the European Parliament (EP) elects the president of the European Commission on the basis of a proposal made by the European Council, taking into account the EP elections. The main European-wide political parties selected candidates for Commission president (*Spitzenkandidaten*) in preparation for the EP elections held in May 2014. The candidate of the party that gathered the largest share of the vote, Jean Claude Juncker of the European People's Party, was nominated by the European Council in June 2014 and then elected as Commission president by the EP in July 2014. While some hailed the *Spitzenkandidaten* experiment as a successful step towards the democratization of the EU, others maintained that the process had weakened the legitimacy of the EU, arguing that the democratic legitimization of EU policy-making ultimately depends on the consent of national governments accountable to national electorates via national parliaments.[2]

The position that democracy in the EU would benefit from greater contestation over political leadership and policy had been discussed among scholars long before it was taken up by the parties competing in the 2014 election. Simon Hix and Andreas Follesdal presented particularly forceful and systematic arguments on the desirability and feasibility of increased democratic contestation in EU politics. It is desirable, the argument goes, because the ability of citizens to consider and choose between alternative policy platforms offered by competing political coalitions is a core democratic value (Hix 1997; Follesdal and Hix 2006; Hix 2008; Follesdal 2011). It is feasible because politics has already been moving in a more competitive direction within the main EU institutions: the European Commission, the Council of Ministers and, especially, the Parliament.

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[1] We are grateful to Simon Hix, Mareike Kleine, Jonathan White, and three anonymous EJPR reviewers for insightful comments. Robert Goodin helped us improve an important aspect. We remain responsible for all shortcomings.

[2]For an analysis of the controversy see Shackleton (2014). The president of the Eurosceptic European Conservatives and Reformists explained his group's decision not to nominate a candidate by stating that the lack a European demos makes any process of directly electing a European Commission president illegitimate (Keating 2014). For another critical perspective see, for instance, The Economist (2014).

Such arguments advocating more contestation over political leaders and policies run against an interpretation of the EU that has attracted considerable support in the past twenty years. According to this interpretation, the EU has survived for more than half a century precisely because it lacks majoritarian features. The institutional and political characteristics of the EU are analogous to those found in "consociational democracies": all major political groups are included in the policy-making process and, within limits, they are able to veto key decisions. According to an influential political science theory, consociational institutions and practices promote the stability of democracy in divided societies, which would otherwise be at risk of mass disaffection and even breakdown under a majoritarian system. The implication of the consociational interpretation of the EU is that strengthening the majoritarian elements in the EU would be risky as long as Europeans' policy views remains highly diverse. For instance, Fritz Scharpf stresses that the EU is much more heterogeneous than any national "consensus democracy" and warns that the multiple-veto community method of European legislation "could not be replaced by the constitution of a Europe-wide Westminster-style democracy without destroying the legitimacy of the union" (Scharpf 2015, 271). Already in the wake of the adoption of the Maastricht Treaty, Joseph Weiler had cautioned that allowing minorities to be outvoted by majorities "may bring about a decline in the social legitimacy of the polity with consequent dysfunctions and even disintegration" (Weiler 1993, 23).

To be sure, what is at stake in the debate is not the EU's transformation from a "pure" consociational to a "pure" majoritarian system, but the consequences of a shift along the intermediate regions on the continuum between those two poles. The empirical evidence Hix presents in support of the readiness of the EU for such a shift does not assuage the concerns raised by the consociational interpretation. He shows that competition based on political ideologies is increasingly important for a variety of political actors at the European level. But the consociational argument refers not only to the behaviour of political elites but also to the attitudes of ordinary citizens. The problem solved by consociational institutions and practices is located mainly at the *societal* level, in the structure of social cleavages in a society. Thus, European political elites may be ready for more majoritarianism and competition, but we need to ask whether European citizens are ready as well.[3] This article investigates this question.

We do so by analysing and subjecting to empirical scrutiny a key assumption of the consociational argument, i.e. that the boundaries of the EU encompass a *highly divided society*. This involves several tasks. First, we examine the logic of pluralist and consociational theories and conclude that

[3] See White (2010) for another attempt to enlarge the focus of the debate to include citizens' attitudes, but approaching the question from an angle that is critical of the cleavage-based approach taken here.

for both theoretical approaches the problem of persistent minorities – sizeable population groups that are systematically outvoted on most issues they care about – represents the main threat to the stability of a democratic system. Second, we develop a precise understanding of what makes a society highly divided that is based on three concepts and related empirical measures: the heterogeneity, polarization and crosscuttingness of citizen preferences over public polices. We argue that the risk of persistent minorities is particularly serious when two conditions are present at the same time: polarization on policy issues is high and crosscuttingness across issues is low. Third, we develop an empirical strategy for the measurement of those variables, including a novel method for assessing the crosscuttingness of public policy preferences, and apply it to data drawn from European and global opinion surveys, which focus on the economic left-right dimensions, the cultural traditionalism-libertarianism dimensions, and the pro-/anti-European integration dimension (due to data limitations we cannot address support/acceptance for redistribution across countries). Fourth, we compare the values of crosscuttingness and heterogeneity of the EU as a whole with those of its member states, with various regional groupings within the EU, and with the United States of America. We use this comparison as a basis for assessing whether policy preferences among EU citizens should be considered problematically divided of not. In sum, our aim is to assess the *empirical* basis of an important objection to calls for an increase of democratic competition in the EU.

Our analysis reveals some striking findings. The population of the EU is slightly more heterogeneous and polarized than the population of the average member state, although policy preferences in several member states are more heterogeneous and polarized than the EU as a whole. Moreover, we find that the EU as a whole is usually not more heterogeneous/polarized than each of its subregions (northern, southern, and eastern member states). At the same time, policy preference cleavages are more crosscutting in the EU as a whole than in almost all member states. Moreover, policy preferences tend to be less heterogeneous and polarized, and nearly as crosscutting, in the EU as a whole as in the US. For observers worried about how high polarization and low crosscuttingness may combine to threaten democratic stability, our findings should be reassuring: slightly above-average heterogeneity and polarization in the EU as a whole is balanced by above-average crosscuttingness. We conclude that, to the extent that the structure of substantive policy preferences matters, European citizens are ready for more democratic contestation in EU institutions.

This conclusion removes a key objection to increased majoritarianism in the EU. But we do not aim to offer an exhaustive discussion of the issues. First, we do not directly address the question of whether an increase in democratic competition would be normatively desirable in the light of

philosophical theories of political legitimacy. Second, for reasons we explain below we do not address the important question of how democratic competition may *shape* the policy preferences of citizens and the formation of a collective democratic identity. Third, we do not touch a number of issues that are relevant for the broader debate on the democratic legitimacy of the EU, such as the appropriate balance between "input legitimacy" and "output legitimacy" and the possibility of a pan-European deliberative sphere. [4]

Contestation and stability in the European Union

Hix points at two prerequisites for the kind of "limited democratic politics" that he advocates for the EU: "(1) an *institutional* design that allows for a contest for leadership and control of the policy agenda, at least for a limited period; and (b) a pattern of elite *behaviour* where contestation is accepted and where losers in decisions are willing to accept the legitimacy of winners" (Hix 2008, 4; see also p. 110). One of Hix's central theses is that these two prerequisites are already in place in the EU. With regard to the institutional dimension, the EU has acquired some important majoritarian elements since the 1980s, notably the expansion of qualified majority voting in the Council and of the role of the European Parliament in the legislative process. With regard to patterns of elite behaviour, Hix notes that political conflicts in the European Parliament, the Council and the European Commission are increasingly structured by left-right partisan divisions.[5] Attempts to increase the democratic quality of EU politics through political contestation can build on these institutional and behavioural trends.

It is notable that Hix does not explicitly mention any particular distribution of policy preferences among ordinary citizens as a "prerequisite" for limited democratic politics. This is probably due to his belief that "European citizens have remarkably similar basic economic and political values compared to the rest of the world" (Hix 2008, 22). To support this contention, he presents cross-

[4] Important contributions to the vast literature on democracy in the EU include Lord (2001); Majone (2010); Moravcsik (2004); Nanz (2006); Neyer (2010); Papadopoulos (2010); Schmidt (2013); Schmitter (2000); Zürn (2000). Our findings are directly relevant to the normative idea of a European "demoicracy" in so far as its supporters are concerned about the outcomes of majoritarian decision rules. For instance, Kalypso Nicolaïdis notes that, "Above all, the lack of a European demos means that European citizens will not and should not accept to be bound by a majority of Europeans." (Nicolaïdis 2013, 356). See also Cheneval and Schimmelfennig (2013) and Bellamy (2013).

[5] For a selection of studies that document this trend, see Hooghe (2001), Mattila (2004), Hix et al. (2007), and Hagemann and Hoyland (2008).

national data on income inequality and religiosity, which are interpreted as showing a clustering of EU populations compared to the values displayed by non-EU countries. It seems fair to say that, in presenting the case for more political contestation in EU politics, Hix does not examine the degree of diversity in policy preferences among EU citizens in much depth. But is it necessary to do so? How much does this aspect really matter for determining whether "the EU is ready for limited democratic politics" or not? (Hix 2008, 110).

According to the consociational interpretation of the EU,[6] the political beliefs of the EU's population matter a lot. In brief, the consociational interpretation consists of two propositions: (A) the EU polity encompasses a population that is very diverse with regard to politically relevant values and policy preferences; (B) a polity with such a degree of diversity has been able to survive only thanks to its consociational institutions and practices. Proposition B can also be stated in terms of a "trilemma" that connects high political diversity, majoritarianism and stability: at most two of them can exist at the same time, never all three. We will discuss what problematic political diversity consist of in the next section. What it is important to note here is that some proponents of the consociational interpretation are also explicit in stating an implication of the attempts to reduce the consociational nature of EU politics and strengthen its majoritarian and competitive dimensions risks compromising the stability and survival of the EU (Gabel 1998, 471)Scharpf 2015, 271). Matthew Gabel warns that, "until the political salience of cross-national cleavages surpasses national cleavages, the deficit in public control over and participation in EU policymaking is necessary for stability" (Gabel 1998, 473). However, other proponents of the consociational interpretation see less of a tension. For instance, Yannis Papadopoulos and Paul Magnette refer to the experiences of Switzerland and Belgium to argue that the consociational system of the EU could absorb a significant degree of politicization before its stability would be compromised (Papadopoulos and Magnette 2010).

In this article we do not attempt to evaluate proposition B directly. We rather aim to assess the empirical accuracy of its premise, i.e. proposition A. However, in order to understand what counts as diversity in the consociationalist interpretation, we need to reconstruct the logic on which it is based.

[6] In the following we summarize the essential arguments of various authors, with the proviso that their views and emphases may differ on important points. See Chryssochoou (1994); Costa and Magnette (2003); Crepaz (2002); Gabel (1998); Lindberg (1974); Papadopoulos and Magnette (2010); Scharpf (2015); Slater (1982); Taylor (1991). See also Fabbrini (2015).

Consociational theory emerged as a response to the classical pluralist theory of the conditions of stability of political systems, specifically democratic systems. Pluralism located the crucial conditions of stability at the societal level, and specifically in the structure of politically relevant social divisions, or "cleavages. The crucial conceptual innovation of pluralism is that it did not see cleavages as such as problematic for political stability, but only those cleavages that reinforce each other. In an early contribution, E. A. Ross (1920, 164-165, quoted in Coser (1956, 76-77) noted that a society "which is ridden by a dozen oppositions along lines running in every direction may actually be in less danger of being torn with violence or falling to pieces than one split just along one line. For each new cleavage contributes to narrow the cross clefts, so that one might say that society is sewn together by its inner conflicts." Seymour Martin Lipset summed up the key insight of this tradition by writing that "...the chances for stable democracy are enhanced to the extent that groups and individuals have a number of crosscutting, politically relevant affiliations" (Lipset 1960, 88-89).[7]

The consociational theory pioneered by Arend Lijphart builds on the pluralist theory of cleavages but denies that reinforcing cleavages necessarily lead to instability (Lijphart 1968, 1996). It shares with pluralism the idea that "[s]egmented societies, defined by distinct subcultures with reinforcing social cleavages, are unstable settings for majoritarian democratic institutions--one party government, absolute majority rule, and centralized power" (Gabel 1998, 465). But it maintains that even democracies characterized by deep and reinforcing cleavages can be stable if institutions and practices conform to consociational principles. Based on the study of the Netherlands and other cases, Lijphart identified four such principles: "(1) grand coalition governments that include representatives of all major linguistic and religious groups, (2) cultural autonomy for these groups, (3) proportionality in political representation and civil service appointments, and (4) a minority veto with regard to vital minority rights and autonomy" (Lijphart 1996, 258). A necessary condition for consociational stability is that mainstream political elites support integration and that opposition is confined to the fringes.

Several authors have argued that, for most of its history, the EU met these or equivalent criteria and should therefore be considered a consociational political system.[8] First, EU policies were decided mainly by political elites supportive of integration and acting as a grand coalition, where key decisions were subject to either formal unanimity requirements or informal consensus practices, often shielded from public scrutiny. Second, member states retained substantial autonomy in

[7] See also Truman (1951, 514), Dahl (1956, 104-105) and Dahrendorf (1959, 215).

[8] See especially the works cited in footnote 5 above.

particularly sensitive policy areas, such as taxation, education, health and military affairs. Third, all component nationalities were represented in EU political and administrative bodies, with special attention to ensuring adequate representation to the smaller member states.[9] As noted, for some scholars it is precisely the consociational character of the EU that explains its survival despite the existence of deep and reinforcing divisions (Gabel 1998).

Which kind of divisions threaten stability?

The preceding discussion of pluralist and consocionational theory was vague on which kind of divisions threaten the stability of political systems and how. While the literature on "cleavages" is substantial and diverse,[10] we regard Nicholas Miller's systematic reconstruction of the pluralist argument particularly clear and helpful as a theoretical foundation because of its focus on causal mechanisms. Pluralist theory relates "the pattern of group affiliations and conflict in society with patterns of political preferences and in turn relates these preference patterns to the stability of the political system, i.e., whether there is widespread acceptance of existing constitutional arrangements or whether the political system is threatened by such factors as civil war, revolution, separatism, widespread discontent, organized violence, and deep alienation" (Miller 1983: 735). He introduced the term "preferences clusters" to denote sets of individuals having (more or less) the same policy preferences. The number of preference clusters is higher in societies where different political divisions are related to one another in a crosscutting rather than reinforcing pattern. Miller specified four mechanisms through which crosscutting preference patterns lead to political stability. First, such patterns cause moderate attitudes. In pluralist societies, individuals are subject to cross-pressures that tend to make their attitudes more moderate or less intense. Second, crosscutting preference patterns cause moderate behaviour. When preferences are pluralistically distributed, "those who are enemies in one situation are sometimes required to act as allies in another situation. With an eye on future co-operation, they restrain their behaviour in present competition" (Bailey 1970, p. 129, cited by Miller (1983, 736). Third, crosscutting preference patterns encourage political stratagems. If preferences are pluralistically distributed, then majority preference is typically cyclical, and this gives present losers on a particular issue hope to become winners *on the*

[9] As Lord and Pollak (2013) note, this was achieved by balancing equal representation of indviduals and equal representation of states within all main EU bodies, rather than organizing each body only according to one of the two principles.

[10] From the seminal discussion by Lipset and Rokkan (1967) to the more recent analyses by Bartolini (2005) and Caramani (2015).

same issue, if they successfully engage in political manoeuvers such as vote trading, coalition building and splitting, agenda manipulation, strategic voting, and patronage. The flux of politics prevents temporary losers from desiring a collapse of democratic procedures. Fourth, pluralistic preference patterns distribute political satisfaction. "In the absence of a majority preference cluster, political outcomes are brought about by shifting coalitions of smaller clusters. Political outcomes probably please and displease nobody all the time; rather they please almost everybody some of the time. Political satisfaction, although probably nowhere total, is widespread" (Miller 1983, 737). In this view, any persistent minorities could be quite large and have both the motive and the resources to destabilize the political system.

While all four causal mechanisms are plausible, we regard the latter as being especially important. In any real political system, a sizable proportion of citizens may be obliged to comply with policies that they dislike, but the destabilizing effect of this fact increases when the same section of the population systematically experiences "political dissatisfaction" (to use Miller's term) across multiple decisions and issues. The key importance of this factor is stressed not only by the classical pluralists, but also by the participants in the current debate about increasing competition in EU politics. As noted above, Joseph Weiler had cautioned that allowing minorities to be outvoted by majorities "may bring about a decline in the social legitimacy of the polity with consequent dysfunctions and even disintegration" (Weiler 1993, 23). More recent contributions stress the possibility of groups of people being "permanently" and "systematically" outvoted. Hix (2008, 106) remarks that "If a section of society feels that it will be permanently on the losing side, the members of this group will not only oppose the government of the day but will also start to oppose the political system as a whole…". Similarly, Papadopoulos and Magnette (2010) note that, "in a heterogeneous polity like the EU, the problem is how to ensure that a competitive game will not generate structural minorities, that is, groups who deny their support because they feel that they are systematically losers in political competition."

This discussion indicates that an assessment of the potentially destabilizing effects of increased political competition in the EU should focus on the problem of persistent minorities in relation to policy preferences. Two caveats are in order. First, the classical pluralist literature assumed an unproblematic correspondence between social group membership (e.g. economic class or religious affiliation) and policy preferences (Miller 1983). Recent research suggests that, at least nowadays, the correlation is complex and in some cases fairly weak.[11] For this reason, in the next section we will employ measures that capture political preferences rather than "objective" group affiliations, as

[11]Kriesi (1998); De La O and Rodden (2008); Dion and Birchfield (2010); Guillaud (2013); Kitschelt and Rehm (2014).

they provide more direct insight into the degree and distribution of dissatisfaction with political decisions.

Second, a focus on *existing* policy preferences could be criticised with reference to a theory of democracy that stresses the potentially transformative effects of democratic processes on preferences. Follesdal and Hix (2006, 545), for instance, note that a "key difference between standard democratic and non-democratic regimes…is that citizens form their views about which policy options they prefer through the processes of deliberation and party contestation that are essential elements of all democracies. Because voters' preferences are shaped by the democratic process, a democracy would almost definitely produce outcomes that are different to those produced by 'enlightened' technocrats." We are sympathetic to this argument. An adherent of the consociational interpretation of the EU, however, may retort that the introduction of further competitive/majoritarian elements in the EU would risk compromising its stability before their transformative effects on preferences could have a chance to unfold. Therefore, establishing whether the distribution of "untransformed" preferences are problematic for stability or not remains an important task.

Having stressed the crucial issue of persistent minorities, we now need to specify under which conditions they are more likely to emerge. We derive from literature on pluralism and consociationalism three main influences: first, the degree of preference heterogeneity in a population; second, the degree of polarization of policy preferences; third, the extent to which divisions regarding policy preferences are crosscutting rather than reinforcing. We see these three factors as related in an interactive rather than additive way. The link between polarization and crosscuttingness is especially important. When policy preferences on individual issues are not polarized, democratic satisfaction is likely to be widespread even at low levels of crosscuttingness. The more preferences on individual issues are polarized, the more high crosscuttingness is necessary to ensure that democratic statisfaction is widespread. The problem of highly unequal democratic satisfaction and persistent minorities is severe when polarization is high and crosscuttingness is low.

As noted above, our aim is to assess the contention that the EU polity encompasses a population that is highly diverse with regard to politically relevant values and policy preferences ("proposition A"). But how can we tell whether the heterogeneity, polarization and crosscuttingness of preferences are low or high in the EU as a whole? Earlier we referred to Hix's point that economic and political values are on average more similar within Europe than they are between EU and non-EU countries (Hix 2008, 22). But this does not necessarily mean they are similar enough to prevent the destabilizing effects of increased political competition. An additional point of reference and

comparison is required. We argue that the degree of heterogeneity, polarization and crosscuttingness of the EU as a whole are best compared with that of its member states, both because these member states are good examples of political stability and because the "performance" of the EU is, explicitly or implicitly, regularly compared to that of the established democracies that compose it. The question that we address in the remainder of this paper is therefore: *How do the levels of heterogeneity, polarization and crosscuttingness of preferences in the EU population as a whole compare to the levels in the population of individual member states?* In addition, we compare the structure of policy preferences in the EU population with that of another large and complex polity, the United States.

Measurement strategies and data

In this section we explain why we focus on public opinion, what dimensions we measure, how we construct the measurements, and which data we employ. First, we focus on the public policy preferences of European citizens as captured by opinion polls. Some studies use socio-demographic indicators such as religious affiliation, language and ethnicity as proxies for preference heterogeneity and, more recently, for crosscuttingness.[12] Given our research question, we find it more useful to try to capture directly citizens' preferences over public policies. While opinion surveys display a number of well-known limitations, they are still a useful approach for uncovering broad patterns in what people want from public authorities. Certainly they are preferable to socio-demographic indicators that assume relative preference homogeneity amongst all members of a certain religious, linguistic, socio-economic, or other group. While heterogeneity and polarization have often been studied with opinion data, this paper is the first, to our knowledge, to quantify crosscuttingness with survey responses.

Second, we must determine which preferences matter for the majoritarian-consociational debate. In order to identify the most relevant policy dimensions for our analysis, we rely on a sizeable corpus of research on the dimensionality of politics in EU institutions and parties (e.g. Marks and Steenbergen (2004)). The attention of researchers has focused on three main dimensions. First, there is an economic left-right dimension, which concerns issues such as the relationship between governments and markets and the redistribution of income and other resources across economic

[12] Alesina et al. (1999), for instance, treat ethnic heterogeneity as proxy for preference heterogeneity. On crosscuttingness applied to ethnic and religious identities and income see Gubler and Selway (2012); Selway (2011a); Finseraas and Jakobsson (2012).

strata. Second, there is a cultural dimension that pits libertarian against traditionalist positions (or Green-Alternative-Libertarian against Traditional-Authoritarian-Nationalist, to use the GAL/TAN labels from Hooghe and Marks (2009)). Third, there is the question of European integration itself, or more specifically, how policy-making competences should be distributed between the national and the European levels of governance.[13] There are lively debates in the literature on whether positions on the economic and cultural dimensions are so highly correlated that in practice they amount to a single left-right dimension, and on whether positions on European integration are simply a reflection of GAL/TAN cleavages (Marks and Steenbergen 2004). Including European integration as a distinct dimension of contestation allows us to address the emerging literature on EU politicization (De Wilde and Zürn 2012) and assess the concern by Bartolini (2006) that the EU-level politicization of such "constitutive" issues would intensify conflicts along national rather than partisan lines, with detrimental effects on the EU's stability. Factor analysis and principal component analysis of the data we use confirm that the specific survey questions used in this study form these three groups, and correspond to the dimensions identified in the literature.[14]

We must also consider dimensions that are within the current competences of the EU or could conceivably come under the purview of the EU in the future. The economic, cultural, and integration dimensions selected meet this criterion.[15] We focus on policies that would apply to all member states in a similar way, and we deliberately ignore one issue that raises special questions that we cannot address here because of data limitations: economic redistribution across countries.[16]

Third, we must decide how to measure the key concepts in the majoritarian-consociationalist debate. In the previous section we stated that an appropriate assessment of the diversity of the EU needs to take into account three factors: heterogeneity, polarization and crosscuttingness of preferences. There are various options for operationalizing these variables, none of which is obviously more appropriate than the others.

Heterogeneity refers simply to the extent to which views are distributed across a population, without reference to the "shape" of that distribution. To measure the heterogeneity of views on

[13] Including European integration as a distinct dimension of contestation allows us to take into account Bartolini (2006)'s point that EU-level politicization may concern such "constitutive" issues as well as what he calls "isomorphic" issues, which are covered in our two other dimensions.

[14] Web-Appendix A presents this analysis.

[15] See Schakel et al. (2015) for an overview of how EU competences have changed across policy fields between 1950 and 2010.

[16] See Bechtel et al. (2014) on this issue.

individual policy issues, we use the Herfindahl index. The Herfindahl index ranges between 1/n and 1 (for large sample sizes like ours, effectively 0-1); to ensure that higher numbers reflect higher degrees of heterogeneity, we subtract it from unity. Our measure of heterogeneity for each individual question is therefore:

$$H = 1 - \sum_{k=1}^{p} Y_k^2$$

where Y_k is the proportion of the population giving a certain response to the question, and p is the number of responses for the question.

We also consider a measure of heterogeneity that aggregates across questions. Here we employ Lieberson's (1969) A_w, often used for public opinion data, which subtracts the Herfindahl measure from unity and allows for the possibility of combining various dimensions. The formula is:

$$A_w = 1 - \left(\sum_{k=1}^{p} \frac{Y_k^2}{V} \right)$$

Where A_w is the heterogeneity in population w, Y_k is the proportion of the population falling in a given category within each of the questions, V is the number of questions, and p represents the total number of categories k possible for all the questions (Lieberson 1969). Larger values indicate more heterogeneity.

Polarization must capture not only how distributed preferences are across a population, but the extent to which preferences cluster at opposite ends of a given dimension. Lindqvist and Östling (2010, 563) provide a helpful discussion of alternative ways of measuring polarization, understood as the level of 'social dissensus' in a country (Bartels 2013). They compare the standard deviation, the measure developed by Esteban and Ray (1994), and a simple measure of bipolarization, the proportion of respondents that select the highest and lowest values, finding significant correlation across these dimensions. The dimensions we consider tend to follow relatively normal distributions (see below), with most Europeans clustered toward the center. We are interested in comparing the degree of bipolarity in the EU with that of its member states, and employ the standard deviation and Lindqvist and Östling's simple measure of bipolarization because they are transparent and easily interpreted.

Crosscuttingness is the most nuanced of the concepts we examine. While long discussed in the pluralist literature, the concept's empirical meaning was first developed by Douglas Rae and Michael Taylor (Rae and Taylor 1970). They explain the idea as follows:

> "If…all those who held a particular religion were also in the same class (and vice-versa) so that the two sets of groups…were considered identical, then the two cleavages are said to "reinforce" each other. If, however, some of those who were of a particular religion were divided among several social classes, then we say that the two cleavages "cross-cut" each other. Cross-cutting, then, is the extent to which individuals who are in the same group on one cleavage are in different groups on the other cleavage" (Rae and Taylor 1970, 82).

We capture capture crosscuttingness through a measure of statistical association, which indicate the extent to which membership in a category on one dimension can be predicted from membership in a category on another dimension (Selway (2011b). Specifically, we employ Goodman and Kruskal's gamma, an ordinal measure of association:

$$\gamma = \frac{P_s - P_d}{P_s + P_d}$$

where P_s is the probability that a randomly selected pair of observations will place in the same order and P_d is the probability that a random pair will have a different order (Goodman and Kruskal 1954). Gamma varies from [-1, 1], with -1 indicating perfect divergence, 1 indicating perfect convergence, and 0 indicating no association. Because we are not concerned with the *direction* of association, just whether the dimensions are crosscutting or reinforcing, we obtain our measure of crosscuttingness by subtracting the absolute value of gamma from unity:

$$XC = 1 - |\gamma|$$

To our knowledge the present paper is the first to operationalize crosscuttingness with reference to policy preferences using public opinion data.[17]

Fourth, we must decide which data to employ. Our goals set significant constraints on the survey questions that we can use. First, the surveys need to have sufficient coverage, i.e. they need to encompass either all EU member states or a substantial proportion of them. Second, to measure crosscuttingness we need to know how the *same* individuals responded to questions on *at least two*, and ideally more, distinct policy dimensions. In other words, different surveys cannot be aggregated without committing an ecological fallacy. Third, an additional constraint posed by the need to measure polarization is that we need to have *at least three,* and ideally more, relevant response categories for each question, otherwise the concept would be undistinguishable from heterogeneity. Fourth, and most difficultly, we need to select questions that maximize comparability across diverse

[17] See Web-Appendix B for a discussion of alternative approaches to measuring cross-cuttingness and an explanation of our choice.

national contexts. Respondents may describe their policy preferences relative to what they perceive to be the average preference in their country, and/or the policy status quo there, making it difficult to aggregate responses across Europe. For example, respondents who identify as progressive in a relatively conservative country may not be as "objectively" progressive as respondents who answer the same way in a relatively progressive country. While some degree of context "anchoring" is inherent in all survey data, we aim to minimize reliance on explicitly relativist questions (e.g. "Do you prefer *more* or *less* public spending on X") or those that refer to national contexts. Unfortunately, many of the questions in the datasets with the broadest country coverage are of this nature. We therefore employ less relativist question from datasets with smaller coverage as well, to make sure that national anchoring is not driving our results. With these considerations in mind, we rely principally on the European Electoral Survey (EES), though each calculation has also been carried on similar questions from the European Values Survey (EVS) and International Social Survey Programme (ISSP) to ensure the robustness of our findings. Table 1 summarizes the survey information. Our measures for the EU as a whole draw on the responses for all EU countries, with each country's contribution weighted by its population.[18]

TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE

For the EES data, four economic questions are assessed individually and, together, form our composite economic left-right measure: we call them STATE-MARKET 1, STATE-MARKET 2, STATE-MARKET 3, INCOME EQUALITY 1.[19] Similarly, we use six EES cultural questions, which we call MULTICULTURALISM 1, MARRIAGE, ABORTION, CIVIL LIBERTIES 1, AUTHORITY, AND GENDER, and a single measure for integration, EUROPEAN INTEGRATION 1. Since averaging multiple survey items greatly reduces measurement error and reveals coherence in voter preferences (Ansolabehere et al. 2008) we use simple averages of the key questions (re-orienting them as appropriate) to create measures of our composite dimensions. The alternative approach of esitimating factor scores makes little difference to the results reported below. Drawing on the other two surveys, we use five questions that capture the economic left-right dimension (we labelled them INCOME EQUALITY 2,

[18] While weighting country responses by population provides the most accurate measure of the distribution of preferences in the EU as a whole, the results are largely similar with no weighting. Unweighted measures for the EU are included in the appendix tables as well, for reference.

[19] The wording of all survey questions used in this paper is presented in Web-Appendix C.

INCOME EQUALITY 3, ECONOMIC RESPONSIBILITY 1, ECONOMIC RESPONSIBILITY 2, and STATE-MARKET 4), four questions that capture the cultural libertarian-traditionalist dimension (MULTICULTURALISM 2, ENVIRONMENT 1, ENVIRONMENT 2 and CIVIL LIBERTIES 2), and one question on the pro-/anti-integration dimension (EUROPEAN INTEGRATION 2).

Findings

Heterogeneity. The application of our heterogeneity measure to the EES data for the 28 member states and the EU as a whole shows that the EU is more heterogeneous than most, but not all, member states.[20] On the aggregate economic measure it is the 5th most heterogenous polity; on the cultural dimension, it is 4th. Using Lieberson's A_w, which we calculate using all the EES questions, it is third. But, strikingly, it is not *much more* heterogeneous than many member states, falling well within the range of European countries, albeit in the upper range of the group.

We find similar results in the EVS and ISSP data.[21] For the former, the EU's A_w score makes it the 8th most heterogenous polity. Moreover, we find little support for regional clustering within the EU. Instead, the EU as a whole is *never* more heterogenous than the most heterogeneous subregion (northern, southern, and eastern regions), and is often less.[22] The ISSP data also allow us to compare EU states and the EU as a whole to another large, diverse democratic polity with significant contestation over the power of the central government versus the component governments: the United States of America. Interestingly, the US is more heterogeneous than the EU on two of the four dimensions we measure (CIVIL LIBERTIES 2 AND ENVIRONMENT 2).

Polarization

Our measurements of polarization tell a similar story. For each dimension, we calculate both the standard deviation within each country and for the EU as a whole, as well as the proportion of responses that fall in either the highest or lowest category (i.e. 1 or 10, or 1 or 4). Measured either way, the EU's polarization relative to member states is remarkably consistent across dimensions,

[20] See Web-Appendix D, Table D1, for the heterogeneity values of all member states and the EU in relation to the EES questions.

[21] See Web-Appendix D, Tables D2 and D3, respectively.

[22] See Web-Appendix E for an analysis of heterogeneity in the three EU subregions.

falling around the middle of the group.[23] It is no more or less polarized than the average EU state. When compared to various regional groupings, the EU looks similarly reassuring. For all dimensions, there is always at least one regional cluster of EU members that is more polarized than the EU as a whole.

These findings are corroborated by data from the EVS and ISSP, using the same measures of standard deviation and bipolarization.[24] By these measures the EU is slightly more polarized, on average, than the EU states polled, but well within the range of EU states. It also tends to be less polarized than the United States.

Crosscuttingness

Finally, we turn to crosscuttingness. Even though the EU is not particularly heterogenous or polarized compared to the average EU member state, we might be worried about majoritarian procedures if we found Europe-wide cleavages to reinforce one another. Instead, we find that they are crosscutting. Using the aggregate dimensions from the EES data, we examined how the EU compares to member states with respect to crosscuttingness on pairs of policy issues (ECONOMIC X CULTURE, ECONOMIC X EUROPEAN INTEGRATION 1, CULTURE X EUROPEAN INTEGRATION 1)[25]. The EU tends to be more crosscutting than the average European country; for the latter two pairings, it is the most crosscut polity, and for the first it scores toward the middle of the distribution. This trend appears even more strongly in the EVS and ISSP data, with the EU consistenly appearing toward the top of the distribution.[26] Interestingly, from the ISSP data we find that this puts it at almost the same position as the United States in terms of crosscuttingness.

What prospect for permanent minorities?

Above we argued that the risk of permanent minorities is particularly high when heterogeneity and polarization are high and crosscuttingness is low. Our results show that the EU as a whole does not have such risky combinations of heterogeneity/polarization and crosscuttingness, and they can be

[23] See Web-Appendix D, Tables D4 and D5, for polarization values in relation to the EES questions.

[24] See Web-Appendix D, Table D6 and D7, for polarization values in relation to the EVS and ISSP questions.

[25] See Web-Appendix D, Table D8, for crosscuttingness values in relation to the EES questions.

[26] See Web-Appendix D, Table D9 and Table D10, for crosscuttingness values in relation to the EVS and ISSP questions.

summarized most succinctly in Figures 1 and 2, which show three scatterplots each comparing crosscuttingness and polarization. Member states and the EU itself are plotted with EES measures of bipolarization on the horizontal axis and three EES measures of crosscuttingness on the vertical axis.[27]

FIGURES 1 and 2 ABOUT HERE

We would be most concerned about democracy in the lower right portion of the plots, where polarization is high and crosscuttingness is low. This creates a strong possibility of permanent minorities. In contrast, the upper left portion of the plots is the safest location for democracies, where crosscuttingness is high and polarization low.

The results are striking. While the EU sits toward the middle of the distribution in terms of polarization, it tends to come at or near the top in measures of crosscuttingness. This keeps it decisively out of the lower right quadrant and, more relevantly, comfortably to the northwest of many of its member states. We conclude that citizens are not subject to a higher risk of falling into a persistent minority under a more competitive EU government than they are in their own country.

While it is beyond the scope of this article to explain why policy preferences across European states and the continent as a whole distribute as they do, the findings suggest a higher degree of convergence than many observers assume, consistent with growing research on the development of European party systems. The array of factors that, in the analysis of Caramani (2015), produced a remarkable convergence of elections and party systems across Europe - shared historical experiences such as the National and Industrial revolutions, supranational forces like European institutional integration, and the transnational diffusion of ideas and norms – have probably played an analogous role in shaping the political beliefs and policy preferences of its citizens.

Conclusion

Our analysis of the policy preferences of European citizens has shown that the EU as a whole is slightly more heterogeneous and polarized than the average member state, although several member states are more heterogeneous and polarized than the EU polity. Differences in views on public

[27] The three measures of bipolarization are from Table D4 and the three measures of crosscuttingness are from Table D8 in Web-Appendix D. Figure D1 in Web-Appendix D replicates this analysis with EVS data.

issues are significantly more crosscutting in the EU polity than in the average member state. Moreover, policy preferences tend to be less heterogeneous and polarized, and nearly as crosscutting, in the EU as a whole than in the United States.

These findings have important implications for the debate on increasing the level of democratic contestation in EU politics. The consociational interpretation of the EU suggests that such an increase would be dangerous, as the divided nature of European society means that substantial groups of the EU population may be locked in the position of a persistent minority. Our analysis shows this risk to be low. Polarization on individual policy issues leads to skewed and systematic dissatisfaction with the outcomes of the democratic process only when cleavages are reinforcing rather than crosscutting – in other words, if people are systematically outvoted on a range of policy issues they care about, rather than being sometimes on the winning and sometimes on the losing side. The relatively high level of crosscuttingness in the EU polity makes the adverse scenario unlikely.

Our findings should assuage concerns about the existence of persistent minorities if EU politics becomes more democratically competitive than it is at the moment. To the extent that the structure of policy preferences matter, European citizens seem ready for more democracy in the European Union. But we should also note two issues that our analysis has not addressed and that would be important topics for further research. First, satisfaction with policy decisions is not all that matters in politics, and thus democratic stability would not be *guaranteed* in a more competitive system. Here we focused on satisfaction and dissatisfaction with policy decisions, including decisions that distribute policy-making competencies between the national and European level, but not satisfaction and dissatisfaction with *who* ultimately has the right to decide, as opposed to *what* is decided. To illustrate this difference with a stark example, a citizen may face two scenarios: (a) a policy change she supports is adopted by an EU-wide majority against the wishes of a majority in her own state; (b) the policy change that she and an EU-wide majority supports is successfully vetoed by a majority of her own co-nationals. It is conceivable that the citizen in question might favour scenario (b), i.e. she would rather see her preferred policy defeated than imposed on a majority of her co-nationals by a transnational majority that includes herself. How many citizens would make that choice in today's Europe is a matter of speculation. What can be said is that, if such an orientation was widespread, then it would raise concerns about the strengthening of the competitive elements of EU politics beyond the distribution of policy preferences that are the focus of this paper.

Second, as we noted in the introduction, we are not pointing at the pattern of policy preferences in the EU as an argument *for* strengthening the competitive elements in EU politics, but in order critically question the empirical assumptions of an argument *against* it. A positive endorsement of

increasing contestation still depends on whether we are convinced by the philosophical argument by Follesdal, Hix and others that political contestation is essential to democracy or that, in the words of Norberto Bobbio (1987, 25), democracy requires that 'those called upon to take decisions, or to elect those who are to take decisions, must be offered real alternatives'.

While these scope conditions suggest avenues for futher research, the paper's central findings put in question a core assumption of many scholarly and popular observers who see the European polity as deeply divided on policy preferences along national or regional lines.

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Table 1. Public opinion surveys used in this paper

Survey	**EU member-states covered (out of 28)**	**Percentage of EU population covered**	**Years used**	**Respondents per country**
European Electoral Survey (EES)	28	100%	2009	~1000
European Values Survey (EVS)	28	100%	2008	~1000
International Social Survey Programme (ISSP)	15	74.1%[28]	2006	~1000

[28] National census data compiled by Eurostat.

Figure 1: Crosscuttingness and economic polarization (bipolar measure) in the EU and member states, EES data







Figure 2: Crosscuttingness and cultural polarization (bipolar measure) in the EU and member states, EES data







Are Europeans ready for a more democratic European Union?

New evidence on preference heterogeneity, polarization, and crosscuttingness

Web-Appendices

CONTENTS

WEB-APPENDIX A: SELECTING THE DIMENSIONS OF INTEREST

A large body of literature has explored the dimensions along which political opinion cleaves. Following Rovny and Marks,[29] we selected our principal dimensions of interests largely from theoretical considerations and from common findings in the existing literature. To then confirm our selection of economic, cultural, and integration dimensions as the primary cleavages of interest, we performed factor analysis and principal component analysis on the items from the European Election Survey (EES) and the European Value Survey (EVS) that we use in this paper (see Web-Appendix C for details on those items and the labels we use for them). The results, reported below, provide support for this approach.

In the EES data (which combines four economic questions, six cultural ones, and one integration question) factor analysis yields a single dimension (roughly Left-Right) over the threshold for rejection (eigenvalue 1.54, accounting for 67% of the variance). Principal component analysis, instead, yields four, although one

[29] Jan Rovny and Gary Marks, Issues and Dimensions in Public Opinion, unpublished manuscript available at http://www.unc.edu/~gwmarks/assets/doc/rovny%20and%20marks.%20issues%20and%20dimensions.pdf (accessed 12 September 2015)

of these is quite weak (0.002 above the threshold for rejection). The other three correspond nicely to the economic, cultural, and integration dimensions (table A1).

Table A1. Principal Component Analysis, EES data.

	ECONOMIC	CULTURE	INTEGRATION	Uniqueness
EUR. INTEG. 1	0.0296	0.0012	0.9492	0.0981
MULTICULTURALISM 1	0.6347	0.0063	0.163	0.5704
STATE-MARKET 1	0.5016	0.1337	-0.1372	0.4325
MARRIAGE	0.421	0.5638	0.0848	0.4504
STATE-MARKET 2	0.1411	0.1033	0.0769	0.4407
ABORTION	0.1717	-0.7985	-0.0262	0.3209
STATE-MARKET 3	0.4857	-0.0004	0.0226	0.7537
CIVIL LIBERTIES 1	0.6882	-0.0238	0.0565	0.4998
EQUALITY 1	0.1572	-0.038	-0.1956	0.5439
AUTHORITY	0.6095	0.0542	-0.0851	0.5956
GENDER	0.3145	0.5878	-0.1444	0.5081

The EVS data are even more straightforwardly along the lines we assume (table A2). Because different questions were asked in different years, we are able use either ENVIRONMENT 1 or MULTICULTURALISM 2 as the "culture" measure, with the three economic measures. For the same reason, EUROPEAN INTEGRATION 2 is only available with MULTICULTURALISM 2, not with ENVIRONMENT 1. Using MULTICULTURALISM 2, the three economic measures, and EUROPEAN INTEGRATION 2 yields three dimensions above the threshold for rejection (eigenvalues > 1) using both factor analysis and principal component analysis. Using ENVIRONMENT 1 (instead of MULTICULTURALISM 2) and the three economic measures (and therefore dropping EUROPEAN INTEGRATION 2) yields two dimensions in both factor and principal component analysis. This finding also supports our interpretation, as the integration dimension is not included in this calculation.

Table A2. Principal component analysis, EVS data.

Variable	ECONOMIC	INTEGRATION	CULTURE	Uniqueness
MULTICULTURALISM 2	0.2411	0.2486	0.8545	0.1498
EQUALITY 2	0.3552	0.653	0.0841	0.4404
RESPONSIBILITY 1	0.7353	-0.2546	-0.1731	0.3646
STATE-MARKET 4	0.7628	-0.1419	-0.1393	0.3786
EUROPEAN INTEGRATION 2	0.0051	0.7116	-0.4655	0.277
ENVIRONMENT 1	0.1207		-0.7572	0.412
EQUALITY 2	-0.2572		0.6353	0.5303
RESPONSIBILITY 1	0.7841		0.0819	0.3784
STATE-MARKET 4	0.7628		0.2498	0.3557

There are two approaches to measuring crosscuttingness. The first approach is to connect crosscuttingness between categories to heterogeneity within categories, so that crosscuttingness is necessarily lower at higher levels of heterogeneity. This is the approach chosen by Rae and Taylor, who render the concept of crosscuttingness mathematically as:

$$XC = \sum_i p_i^2 + \sum_j p_j^2 - 2\sum_{i,j} p_{ij}^2$$

where $\sum_i p_i^2$ is the sum of the proportion of individuals in each category of a dimension with *i* categories, $\sum_j p_j^2$ is the sum of the proportion of individuals in each category of a second dimension with categories *j*, and $\sum_{i,j} p_{ij}^2$ is the sum of the proportion of individuals at all possible combinations of the two dimensions, $i \times j$. The concept can be rendered as a contingency table that assigns observations to dimension one in *i* columns and dimension two in *j* rows. Crosscuttingness is then just as the sum of the proportion in each row plus the sum of the proportion in each column, minus twice the sum of the proportion in each cell.

The alternative approach is to capture crosscuttingness through measures of statistical association, which indicate the extent to which membership in a category on one dimension can be predicted from membership in a category on another dimension, irrespective of how heterogeneous the dimensions are. This is the approach chosen by Joel Selway (2011b), who has recently reintroduced the concept of crosscuttingess in the comparative politics literature in order to understand the effects of linguistic and ethnic cleavages on civil war. Selway employs the standard chi-square test that measures the independence of two variables. To ensure comparability across dimensions that may have different numbers of categories, Selway uses Kramer's V, which normalizes the χ^2 statistic by the product of the categories of the two dimensions under consideration.

Since we find it useful to keep a clear conceptual distinction between heterogeneity and crosscuttingess, we adopt an approach similar to Selway's. But because we are concerned with the crosscuttingness of policy preferences as ordinal variables, not discrete linguistic or ethnic groups, Kramer's V is not appropriate (Selway 2011b, 52). Instead we rely on Goodman and Kruskal's gamma, an ordinal measure of association:

$$\gamma = \frac{P_s - P_d}{P_s + P_d}$$

where P_s is the probability that a randomly selected pair of observations will place in the same order and P_d is the probability that a random pair will have a different order (Goodman and Kruskal 1954). Gamma varies from [-1, 1], with -1 indicating perfect divergence, 1 indicating perfect convergence, and 0 indicating no association. Because we are not concerned with the *direction* of association, just whether the dimensions are

crosscutting or reinforcing, we obtain our measure of crosscuttingness by subtracting the absolute value of gamma from unity:

$$XC = 1 - |\gamma|$$

Note that gamma is sensitive to the number of categories within each dimension, meaning that our measure of crosscuttingness will not be directly comparable across dimensions that have different numbers of categories (Rae and Taylor 1970, 84). Happily, working with public opinion data allows us to elide this limitation, because we can select questions that have the same number of possible responses, allowing crosscuttingness to be compared directly. We believe the present paper is the first to operationalize crosscuttingness with reference to policy preferences using public opinion data.

Table C1. Overview of survey questions used in the paper

Our label	Question	Response categories	Source and question code
INCOME EQUALITY 1	Income and wealth should be redistributed towards ordinary people	1 strongly agree ↑ ↓ 5 strongly disagree	EES [q63]
INCOME EQUALITY 2	On this card you see a number of opposite views on various issues. How would you place your views on this scale?	1 incomes should be made more equal ↑ ↓ 10 we need larger income differences as incentives	EVS [e035]
INCOME EQUALITY 3	On the whole, do you think it should or should not be the government's responsibility to reduce income differences between the rich and the poor?	1 Definitely should be 2 Probably should be 3 Probably should not be 4 Definitely should not be	ISSP [V31/7g]
ECONOMIC RESPONSIBILITY 1	On this card you see a number of opposite views on various issues. How would you place your views on this scale?	1 Individuals should take more responsibility for providing for themselves ↑ ↓ 10 The state should take more responsibility to ensure that everyone is provided for	EVS [e037]
ECONOMIC RESPONSIBILITY 2	On the whole, do you think it should or should not be the government's responsibility to provide a job for everyone who wants one?	1 Definitely should be 2 Probably should be 3 Probably should not be 4 Definitely should not be	ISSP [V25/7a]
STATE-MARKET 1	Private enterprise is the best way to solve COUNTRY NAME's economic problems	1 strongly agree ↑ ↓ 5 strongly disagree	EES [q57]
STATE-MARKET 2	Major public services and industries ought to be in state ownership.	1 strongly agree ↑ ↓ 5 strongly disagree	EES [q59]
STATE-MARKET 3	Politics should abstain from intervening in the economy	1 strongly agree ↑	EES [q61]

		↓ 5 strongly disagree	
STATE-MARKET 4	On this card you see a number of opposite views on various issues. How would you place your views on this scale?	1 the state should give more freedom to firms ↑ ↓ 10 the state should control firms more effectively	EVS [e042]
MULTICULTURALISM 1	Immigrants should be required to adapt to the customs of COUNTRY NAME.	1 strongly agree ↑ ↓ 5 strongly disagree	EES [q56]
MULTICULTURALISM 2	Which of these statements is the nearest to your opinion?	1 for the greater good of society it is better if immigrants maintain their distinct customs and traditions ↑ ↓ 10 for the greater good of society it is better if immigrants do not maintain their distinct customs and traditions but adopt the customs of the country	EVS [g043]
ENVIRONMENT 1	I would agree to an increase in taxes if the extra money is used to prevent environmental pollution.	1 strongly agree 2 agree 3 disagree 4 strongly disagree	EVS [b002]
ENVIRONMENT 2	On the whole, do you think it should or should not be the government's responsibility to impose strict laws to make industry do less damage to the environment?	1 Definitely should be 2 Probably should be 3 Probably should not be 4 Definitely should not be	ISSP [V34/7j]
CIVIL LIBERTIES 1	People who break the law should be given much harsher sentences than they are these days.	1 strongly agree ↑ ↓ 5 strongly disagree	EES [q62]
CIVIL LIBERTIES 2	Suppose the government suspected that a terrorist act was about to happen. Do you think the authorities should have the right to detain people for as long as they want without putting them on trial?	1 Definitely should have right 2 Probably should have right 3 Probably should not have right 4 Definitely should not have right	ISSP [V41/9a]
EUROPEAN INTEGRATION 1	Some say European unification should be pushed further. Others say it already has gone too far. What is your opinion? Please indicate your views using a scale from 0 to 10, where 0 means unification 'has already	1 unification has already gone too far ↑ ↓	EES [q80]

	gone too far' and 10 means it 'should be pushed further'. What number on this scale best describes your position?	10 Unification should be pushed further	
EUROPEAN INTEGRATION 2	Some people may have fears about the building of the European Union. I am going to read a number of things which people say they are afraid of. For each tell me if you - personally - are currently afraid of: The loss of national identity and culture	1 very much afraid ↑ ↓ 10 not afraid at all	EVS [g047]
MARRIAGE	Same- sex marriages should be prohibited by law.	1 strongly agree ↑ ↓ 5 strongly disagree	EES [q58]
ABORTION	Women should be free to decide on matters of abortion	1 strongly agree ↑ ↓ 5 strongly disagree	EES [q60]
AUTHORITY	Schools must teach children to obey authority.	1 strongly agree ↑ ↓ 5 strongly disagree	EES [q64]
GENDER	A woman should be prepared to cut down on her paid work for the sake of her family.	1 strongly agree ↑ ↓ 5 strongly disagree	EES [q66]

WEB-APPENDIX D: VALUES OF PREFERENCE HETEROGENEITY, POLARIZATION AND CROSSCUTTINGNESS

Table D1. Preference heterogeneity in the EU as a whole compared to member states. EES data

	S-M1	S-M2	S-M3	EQ. 1	**ECON**	GENDER	MULTI 1	MARR.	CIV 1	AUTH.	ABORT.	**CULTURE**	EUR. 1	$\mathbf{A_w}$
Austria	0.767	0.758	0.751	0.774	**0.693**	0.782	0.715	0.757	0.774	0.783	0.643	**0.702**	0.844	**0.749**
Belgium	0.740	0.780	0.763	0.725	**0.667**	0.790	0.734	0.785	0.732	0.693	0.703	**0.676**	0.860	**0.742**
Bulgaria	0.767	0.738	0.756	0.703	**0.689**	0.781	0.694	0.739	0.423	0.406	0.641	**0.654**	0.838	**0.679**
Cyprus	0.732	0.756	0.749	0.710	**0.648**	0.648	0.681	0.760	0.652	0.552	0.727	**0.583**	0.827	**0.694**
Czech Rep.	0.770	0.769	0.754	0.787	**0.670**	0.775	0.602	0.780	0.633	0.595	0.612	**0.593**	0.872	**0.709**
Denmark	0.751	0.708	0.712	0.745	**0.675**	0.639	0.759	0.589	0.776	0.688	0.525	**0.633**	0.844	**0.696**
Estonia	0.702	0.678	0.742	0.782	**0.633**	0.739	0.634	0.733	0.643	0.693	0.599	**0.647**	0.865	**0.699**
Finland	0.714	0.764	0.733	0.698	**0.664**	0.721	0.584	0.764	0.682	0.601	0.614	**0.626**	0.828	**0.692**
France	0.762	0.772	0.699	0.704	**0.700**	0.771	0.710	0.731	0.771	0.694	0.478	**0.716**	0.851	**0.720**
Germany	0.728	0.662	0.730	0.756	**0.676**	0.744	0.698	0.711	0.736	0.740	0.645	**0.668**	0.860	**0.719**
Greece	0.765	0.768	0.729	0.636	**0.669**	0.665	0.730	0.779	0.686	0.661	0.668	**0.702**	0.851	**0.716**
Hungary	0.741	0.638	0.748	0.718	**0.641**	0.777	0.567	0.750	0.491	0.486	0.592	**0.624**	0.873	**0.665**
Ireland	0.736	0.770	0.756	0.706	**0.679**	0.728	0.731	0.765	0.621	0.630	0.674	**0.666**	0.812	**0.713**
Italy	0.747	0.778	0.765	0.707	**0.657**	0.738	0.692	0.792	0.630	0.706	0.643	**0.675**	0.839	**0.721**
Latvia	0.728	0.723	0.762	0.729	**0.674**	0.753	0.701	0.661	0.676	0.783	0.614	**0.667**	0.865	**0.718**
Lithuania	0.694	0.665	0.749	0.704	**0.646**	0.757	0.607	0.719	0.668	0.745	0.646	**0.655**	0.860	**0.701**
Lux.	0.736	0.733	0.701	0.746	**0.657**	0.773	0.668	0.702	0.762	0.725	0.628	**0.646**	0.869	**0.719**
Malta	0.715	0.748	0.700	0.600	**0.687**	0.628	0.663	0.767	0.689	0.558	0.753	**0.662**	0.826	**0.692**
Netherlands	0.700	0.699	0.574	0.655	**0.616**	0.653	0.658	0.598	0.686	0.605	0.585	**0.571**	0.864	**0.651**
Poland	0.749	0.754	0.765	0.776	**0.681**	0.772	0.689	0.706	0.632	0.696	0.741	**0.687**	0.836	**0.730**
Portugal	0.669	0.737	0.711	0.686	**0.658**	0.604	0.613	0.791	0.593	0.553	0.672	**0.593**	0.818	**0.669**
Romania	0.776	0.689	0.744	0.786	**0.710**	0.696	0.701	0.620	0.561	0.518	0.625	**0.620**	0.796	**0.680**
Slovakia	0.764	0.726	0.782	0.790	**0.678**	0.776	0.662	0.778	0.633	0.701	0.633	**0.654**	0.853	**0.725**
Slovenia	0.713	0.729	0.720	0.596	**0.612**	0.688	0.653	0.777	0.562	0.636	0.598	**0.603**	0.839	**0.671**
Spain	0.744	0.713	0.696	0.657	**0.663**	0.720	0.622	0.702	0.645	0.621	0.683	**0.625**	0.843	**0.687**
Sweden	0.753	0.789	0.747	0.792	**0.702**	0.630	0.764	0.606	0.768	0.786	0.470	**0.679**	0.842	**0.718**
UK	0.762	0.780	0.767	0.746	**0.709**	0.753	0.577	0.752	0.562	0.515	0.548	**0.674**	0.825	**0.690**
Country average	**0.738**	**0.734**	**0.733**	**0.719**	**0.669**	**0.722**	**0.671**	**0.726**	**0.655**	**0.643**	**0.628**	**0.648**	**0.844**	**0.702**
EU	**0.757**	**0.776**	**0.766**	**0.749**	**0.691**	**0.781**	**0.690**	**0.780**	**0.698**	**0.700**	**0.646**	**0.692**	**0.856**	**0.737**
EU rank	**8th**	**4th**	**3nd**	**8th**	**5th**	**3nd**	**12th**	**5rd**	**7th**	**7th**	**8th**	**4th**	**9th**	**3rd**

Table D2. Preference heterogeneity in the EU as a whole compared to member states. EVS data

	INCOME EQUALITY 2	ECONOMIC RESPONSIBILITY 1	STATE-MARKET 4	MULTICULTURALISM 2	ENVIRONMENT[30]	EUROPEAN INTEGRATION 2	A_w[31]
Austria	0.820	0.847	0.867	0.864	0.696	0.868	0.866
Belgium	0.884	0.878	0.873	0.857	0.724	0.893	0.874
Bulgaria	0.817	0.881	0.865	0.859	0.699	0.835	0.853
Croatia	0.865	0.885	0.867	0.881	0.666	0.865	0.871
Cyprus	0.875	0.870	0.871	0.829	.	0.864	0.855
Czech Rep.	0.887	0.885	0.889	0.888	0.595	0.894	0.890
Denmark	0.861	0.853	0.842	0.851	0.696	0.886	0.860
Estonia	0.888	0.887	0.880	0.883	0.619	0.893	0.885
Finland	0.885	0.878	0.870	0.870	0.665	0.887	0.876
France	0.890	0.875	0.883	0.872	0.713	0.878	0.878
Germany	0.864	0.878	0.892	0.888	0.667	0.894	0.891
Greece	0.880	0.894	0.878	0.871	0.674	0.880	0.876
Hungary	0.876	0.875	0.865	0.881	0.706	0.878	0.875
Ireland	0.891	0.875	0.863	0.891	0.648	0.858	0.871
Italy	0.890	0.886	0.889	0.884	0.656	0.887	0.887
Latvia	0.872	0.891	0.884	0.890	0.655	0.891	0.888
Lithuania	0.886	0.881	0.889	0.889	0.594	0.889	0.889
Luxembourg	0.882	0.863	0.876	0.872	0.705	0.884	0.877
Malta	0.861	0.873	0.879	0.857	0.618	0.868	0.868
Netherlands	0.862	0.870	0.867	0.862	0.640	0.888	0.872
Poland	0.892	0.885	0.887	0.876	0.699	0.880	0.881
Portugal	0.889	0.869	0.870	0.816	0.649	0.884	0.857
Romania	0.798	0.821	0.866	0.852	0.719	0.861	0.860
Slovakia	0.891	0.886	0.884	0.890	0.705	0.888	0.887
Slovenia	0.847	0.888	0.889	0.879	0.609	0.872	0.880
Spain	0.884	0.869	0.866	0.857	0.664	0.885	0.869
Sweden	0.882	0.870	0.868	0.867	0.655	0.890	0.875
UK	0.884	0.856	0.856	0.876	0.652	0.813	0.848
Average	**0.872**	**0.874**	**0.874**	**0.870**	**0.642**	**0.877**	**0.874**
EU	**0.891**	**0.884**	**0.884**	**0.882**	**0.694**	**0.887**	**0.884**
EU's rank	**2nd (tie)**	**10th**	**9th**	**9th**	**11th**	**10th (tie)**	**8th**
Pre-2000 EU	0.890	0.882	0.882	0.878	0.692	0.883	0.881
Post-2000 EU	0.888	0.887	0.888	0.883	0.701	0.883	0.885
East	0.888	0.887	0.888	0.883	0.700	0.224	0.665
North	0.888	0.872	0.875	0.876	0.705	0.874	0.875
South	0.893	0.884	0.885	0.878	0.664	0.891	0.885

[30] Data from Cyprus are not available for this question.

[31] A_w aggregates one question from each of the three dimensions studied: State-market, multiculturalism, and European integration.

Unweighted	0.893	0.885	0.887	0.886	0.696	0.890	0.888

Table D3. Preference heterogeneity in the EU as a whole compared to member states, ISSP data

	INCOME EQUALITY 3	ECONOMIC RESPONSIBILITY 2	CIVIL LIBERTIES 2	ENVIRONMENT 2
Czech Republic	0.735	0.664	0.721	0.588
Denmark	0.742	0.716	0.738	0.469
Finland	0.665	0.735	0.731	0.588
France	0.639	0.734	0.747	0.410
Germany	0.689	0.701	0.744	0.554
Hungary	0.609	0.574	0.732	0.531
Ireland	0.654	0.723	0.742	0.495
Latvia	0.633	0.635	0.689	0.573
Netherlands	0.693	0.727	0.735	0.616
Poland	0.585	0.560	0.716	0.514
Portugal	0.521	0.614	0.715	0.490
Slovenia	0.566	0.598	0.735	0.487
Spain	0.607	0.645	0.749	0.490
Sweden	0.708	0.730	0.724	0.591
United Kingdom	0.699	0.714	0.715	0.575
Country average	**0.650**	**0.671**	**0.729**	**0.531**
EU	**0.665**	**0.707**	**0.749**	**0.593**
EU Rank	**7th**	**8th**	**1st (tie)**	**2nd**
USA	0.747	0.732	0.747	0.514

Table D4. Polarization of policy preferences in the EU as a whole compared to member states, bipolarization measure, EES data

	S-M1	S-M2	S-M3	EQ. 1	**ECON**	GENDER	MULTI 1	MARR.	CIV 1	AUTH.	ABORT.	**CULTURE**	EUR. 1
Austria	22.27	22.66	21.78	26.01	15.60	28.73	39.43	40.98	29.08	29.64	45.29	14.80	13.98
Belgium	17.57	25.62	24.95	29.39	22.26	34.60	38.30	41.75	34.03	38.89	43.54	15.47	16.23
Bulgaria	25.06	35.01	34.67	40.74	19.40	28.48	38.07	49.78	72.57	74.41	46.66	20.80	21.52
Cyprus	22.43	23.98	24.58	31.74	13.70	41.70	40.55	38.09	44.26	57.01	32.41	12.60	31.75
Czech Rep.	23.01	28.98	23.35	29.77	14.12	25.80	50.79	32.13	47.61	52.97	54.37	8.43	15.20
Denmark	16.93	26.13	23.61	16.46	19.30	42.01	29.02	55.61	30.67	23.05	59.64	12.30	9.86
Estonia	21.69	41.10	32.05	26.97	15.79	20.92	43.15	42.01	45.71	34.58	42.83	15.59	17.75
Finland	16.68	26.06	25.62	31.31	13.40	33.13	46.98	45.22	35.08	45.47	50.76	10.40	5.77
France	30.34	39.71	40.76	37.27	22.50	45.10	45.02	57.42	39.96	49.75	70.78	15.40	18.86
Germany	19.07	22.94	15.09	22.42	11.85	20.72	32.43	31.41	27.28	20.60	39.23	10.76	14.90
Greece	30.36	34.73	31.19	43.83	15.80	42.77	42.79	40.65	48.24	47.11	48.07	16.20	25.03
Hungary	17.50	50.10	33.54	39.26	16.22	25.74	56.61	43.68	67.17	67.30	53.41	13.63	21.04
Ireland	32.98	36.58	41.53	43.72	15.88	49.79	41.95	44.57	56.78	51.92	52.28	10.29	11.70
Italy	25.16	26.74	31.15	33.47	18.60	28.94	40.80	39.20	50.36	32.44	44.73	15.00	28.48
Latvia	18.67	39.66	29.07	37.21	18.58	29.73	39.92	53.11	39.98	29.69	45.79	16.78	21.71
Lithuania	18.33	29.83	20.48	25.65	24.30	19.08	35.32	43.46	35.65	22.74	37.39	18.90	23.37
Lux.	18.44	29.78	23.31	19.60	14.99	29.23	36.80	44.55	27.43	29.47	50.76	11.59	12.15
Malta	27.71	25.17	33.71	22.63	33.80	25.97	42.41	34.68	30.19	41.39	38.62	25.20	27.76
Netherlands	7.24	17.30	14.08	13.00	10.95	25.30	22.18	38.31	20.16	24.10	32.50	6.27	11.30
Poland	23.68	33.99	28.33	26.91	18.36	27.86	31.93	52.40	53.50	36.17	45.93	18.66	25.39
Portugal	13.16	15.74	14.02	19.29	22.30	14.43	15.41	30.67	39.29	32.36	32.45	8.50	18.12
Romania	28.49	43.48	41.18	37.49	29.51	38.20	33.04	66.04	60.48	61.31	54.54	20.74	41.21
Slovakia	20.69	35.53	25.52	31.26	21.75	26.84	44.43	47.20	49.65	44.21	54.96	13.88	15.86
Slovenia	13.99	23.83	28.78	47.88	9.90	39.00	44.32	38.48	57.93	43.79	49.85	8.30	27.84
Spain	17.84	16.90	17.48	20.48	18.30	18.63	33.97	28.44	40.24	32.09	29.20	8.70	23.21
Sweden	19.46	33.30	32.33	31.46	17.07	55.65	32.45	64.21	30.70	31.77	71.50	18.66	12.37
UK	31.49	39.31	38.22	41.38	17.40	49.74	62.95	53.10	67.07	68.37	67.86	10.80	9.69
Country average	**21.49**	**30.52**	**27.79**	**30.61**	**18.21**	**32.15**	**39.30**	**44.34**	**43.74**	**41.58**	**47.98**	**14.02**	**19.34**
EU	**22.27**	**22.66**	**21.78**	**26.01**	**15.60**	**28.73**	**39.43**	**40.98**	**29.08**	**29.64**	**45.29**	**14.80**	**13.98**
EU rank	**9th**	**12th**	**14th**	**14th**	**13th**	**11th**	**13th**	**12th**	**12th**	**13th**	**11th**	**15th**	**12th**

Table D5. Polarization of policy preferences in the EU as a whole compared to member states, standard deviation measure, EES data

	S-M1	S-M2	S-M3	EQ. 1	**ECON**	GENDER	MULTI 1	MARR.	CIV 1	AUTH.	ABORT.	**CULTURE**	EUR. 1
Austria	1.17	1.17	1.19	1.26	0.96	1.29	1.14	1.34	1.22	1.31	1.00	0.95	2.39
Belgium	1.10	1.25	1.24	1.13	0.91	1.37	1.17	1.41	1.13	1.08	1.16	0.97	2.44
Bulgaria	1.18	1.15	1.19	1.08	0.91	1.26	1.08	1.36	0.63	0.63	0.97	1.13	2.46
Cyprus	1.13	1.26	1.27	1.12	0.84	0.99	1.07	1.29	0.96	0.78	1.25	0.91	2.73
Czech Rep.	1.20	1.24	1.16	1.30	0.93	1.24	0.86	1.33	0.88	0.85	0.94	0.83	2.45
Denmark	1.13	1.09	1.15	1.11	0.94	0.95	1.23	0.94	1.29	1.08	0.75	0.76	2.18
Estonia	1.00	1.06	1.16	1.27	0.91	1.11	0.93	1.20	0.90	1.04	0.82	1.03	2.56
Finland	1.09	1.28	1.24	1.05	0.85	1.17	0.79	1.43	1.01	0.85	0.98	0.87	1.99
France	1.34	1.44	1.19	1.18	0.91	1.45	1.26	1.50	1.33	1.27	0.90	0.97	2.50
Germany	1.09	1.06	1.13	1.23	0.93	1.22	1.09	1.15	1.14	1.18	0.99	0.88	2.44
Greece	1.32	1.36	1.34	1.01	0.83	1.10	1.35	1.44	1.17	1.11	1.19	1.05	2.55
Hungary	1.07	0.92	1.13	1.08	0.77	1.23	0.76	1.32	0.74	0.71	0.83	1.01	2.65
Ireland	1.22	1.40	1.40	1.23	0.91	1.40	1.33	1.45	1.10	1.07	1.27	0.90	2.11
Italy	1.17	1.28	1.31	1.07	0.87	1.18	1.08	1.43	0.94	1.08	0.99	1.01	2.66
Latvia	1.06	1.17	1.22	1.13	0.88	1.19	1.10	1.11	0.93	1.30	0.87	1.03	2.57
Lithuania	0.98	0.92	1.14	1.01	0.89	1.13	0.85	1.17	0.89	1.18	0.91	1.05	2.62
Lux.	1.14	1.25	1.12	1.18	0.90	1.32	1.04	1.21	1.19	1.20	1.01	0.87	2.36
Malta	1.16	1.25	1.21	0.97	0.92	0.97	1.10	1.38	0.99	0.73	1.36	1.22	2.57
Netherlands	0.99	1.15	0.91	1.00	0.72	1.04	1.01	0.93	1.06	0.93	0.91	0.72	2.20
Poland	1.14	1.20	1.20	1.24	0.95	1.25	1.09	1.30	1.03	1.08	1.33	1.10	2.37
Portugal	1.00	1.13	1.10	1.06	0.90	1.00	0.96	1.31	0.77	0.74	1.07	0.83	2.44
Romania	1.24	1.07	1.29	1.38	1.04	1.06	1.12	1.33	0.87	0.69	1.07	1.15	2.61
Slovakia	1.14	1.10	1.23	1.29	0.91	1.24	0.97	1.47	0.90	1.11	1.06	0.98	2.39
Slovenia	1.04	1.18	1.11	0.77	0.75	1.08	0.98	1.42	0.80	0.93	0.92	0.83	2.62
Spain	1.16	1.16	1.16	1.00	0.86	1.18	0.89	1.11	0.91	0.91	1.12	0.86	2.33
Sweden	1.11	1.33	1.17	1.30	0.93	1.04	1.24	1.20	1.20	1.33	0.85	0.84	2.24
UK	1.30	1.45	1.40	1.33	0.96	1.47	1.09	1.49	1.19	1.00	1.12	0.93	2.13
Country average	**1.14**	**1.20**	**1.20**	**1.14**	**0.89**	**1.18**	**1.06**	**1.30**	**1.01**	**1.01**	**1.02**	**0.95**	**2.43**
EU	**1.20**	**1.34**	**1.29**	**1.23**	**0.93**	**1.36**	**1.11**	**1.46**	**1.14**	**1.15**	**1.07**	**0.98**	**2.50**
EU rank	**6th**	**5th**	**6th**	**11th**	**8th**	**5th**	**9th**	**4th**	**9th**	**8th**	**9th**	**12th**	**12th**

Table D6. Polarization of policy preferences in the EU as a whole compared to member states, standard deviation and bipolarization measures, EVS data

	INCOME EQUALITY 2		RESPONSIBILITY 1		STATE-MARKET 4		MULTICULTURALISM 2		ENVIRONMENT 1[32]		EUROPEAN INTEGRATION 2	
	SD	Bipol	SD	Bipol	SD	Bipol	SD	Bipol	SD	Bipol	SD	Bipol
Austria	2.74	31.3	2.56	27.9	2.60	22.82	3.10	35.4	0.94	32.60	3.18	36.3
Belgium	2.83	14.3	2.67	12.8	2.64	12.87	2.39	25.3	0.95	36.63	2.86	21.5
Bulgaria	2.84	38.5	2.92	29.8	3.21	37.04	3.11	36.7	0.89	27.91	3.25	43.3
Croatia	2.74	25.1	2.96	25.6	3.09	27.13	2.86	26.4	0.82	34.21	3.38	41.2
Cyprus	3.04	32.8	2.90	29.9	2.85	30.27	2.98	41.1	.	.	3.10	35.6
Czech Rep.	2.83	16.8	2.63	17.9	2.65	15.76	2.61	17.4	0.72	15.71	2.94	24.7
Denmark	2.44	21.8	2.24	11.6	2.29	9.50	2.36	16.5	0.90	32.76	3.19	31.1
Estonia	2.63	18.1	2.65	18.2	2.58	14.41	2.69	19.4	0.79	18.22	3.05	25.8
Finland	2.75	19.1	2.45	13.9	2.28	8.52	2.37	20.5	0.89	21.33	2.96	25.9
France	2.87	19.9	2.49	16.6	2.76	15.75	2.62	19.7	0.98	44.16	2.97	29.0
Germany	3.04	25.4	2.69	19.6	2.73	15.69	2.66	16.7	0.90	46.47	2.91	22.4
Greece	2.91	14.5	2.74	22.4	2.80	27.50	2.82	23.3	0.85	27.08	3.06	43.5
Hungary	3.01	27.6	2.75	20.1	2.78	27.60	2.85	29.5	0.91	40.54	3.07	33.1
Ireland	2.84	31.2	2.63	18.6	2.42	15.64	2.73	25.0	0.81	19.79	2.97	32.2
Italy	2.81	21.1	2.75	22.7	2.82	21.80	2.64	19.7	0.82	20.03	3.16	37.1
Latvia	2.59	21.6	2.76	18.4	2.62	11.97	2.58	20.0	0.84	19.61	2.81	32.3
Lithuania	2.84	14.8	2.71	13.3	2.77	15.09	2.68	16.3	0.81	22.64	2.77	21.9
Luxembourg	2.63	13.5	2.36	13.7	2.50	15.55	2.63	19.7	0.92	29.83	3.17	21.0
Malta	2.97	18.4	2.99	15.2	2.89	31.19	3.34	21.0	0.82	13.77	3.32	32.0
Netherlands	2.13	34.2	2.17	32.2	2.11	7.87	2.16	43.2	0.80	17.42	2.64	40.3
Poland	2.93	7.2	2.62	10.0	2.92	20.24	2.44	11.9	0.92	29.17	2.82	16.2
Portugal	2.72	20.5	2.63	16.0	2.49	12.11	2.09	15.5	0.92	18.97	2.60	27.2
Romania	3.17	17.1	3.17	14.0	3.34	39.05	2.93	9.4	0.95	33.30	3.23	19.2
Slovakia	2.89	45.5	2.76	45.1	2.60	17.43	2.80	36.4	0.88	31.71	2.87	39.1
Slovenia	2.85	17.1	2.89	14.2	2.98	23.62	2.82	20.6	0.75	15.96	2.87	25.4
Spain	2.60	30.3	2.47	23.1	2.31	9.54	2.28	24.0	0.87	20.97	2.92	29.5
Sweden	2.57	14.8	2.31	9.4	2.26	14.62	2.39	11.2	0.94	37.43	3.13	26.3
UK	2.56	16.3	2.56	19.3	2.21	12.47	2.68	20.6	0.78	19.87	2.91	30.8
Average	**2.78**	**22.5**	**2.66**	**19.7**	**2.66**	**19.0**	**2.66**	**22.9**	**0.87**	**26.96**	**3.00**	**30.1**
EU	**2.74**	**20.2**	**2.58**	**18.5**	**2.61**	**17.5**	**2.67**	**20.4**	**0.89**	**27.25**	**3.10**	**26.8**
EU rank	**18th**	**15th**	**20th**	**14th**	**17th**	**12th**	**15th**	**16th**	**14th**	**14th**	**11th**	**19th**
Pre-2000 EU	2.67	18.0	2.52	17.0	2.52	15.0	2.60	19.5	0.88	26.84	3.06	22.1
Post-2000 members	2.90	27.2	2.74	23.4	2.85	25.2	2.73	23.3	0.89	28.61	3.05	41.1
East	2.89	27.1	2.74	23.3	2.85	25.1	2.73	23.1	0.89	28.67	3.05	41.0
North	2.63	17.1	2.42	18.3	2.43	13.7	2.61	21.2	0.94	30.82	3.04	19.4
South	2.75	19.5	2.51	15.1	2.58	17.2	2.55	17.0	0.80	20.86	3.05	26.3

[32] This question was not asked in Cyprus.

Unweighted	2.89	22.3	2.73	19.5	2.75	18.9	2.77	22.6	0.89	27.46	3.07	29.8

Table D7. Polarization of policy preferences in the EU as a whole compared to member states, standard deviation and bipolarization measures, ISSP data

	INCOME EQUALITY 3		ECONOMIC RESPONSIBILITY 2		CIVIL LIBERTIES 2		ENVIRONMENT 2	
	SD	Bipol	SD	Bipol	SD	Bipol	SD	Bipol
Czech Republic	1.01	0.61	0.92	0.34	1.00	0.46	0.72	0.59
Denmark	1.09	0.38	0.95	0.66	1.17	0.41	0.61	0.49
Finland	0.89	0.48	1.02	0.49	1.05	0.57	0.72	0.68
France	0.98	0.47	1.07	0.34	1.13	0.47	0.57	0.51
Germany	0.90	0.60	0.94	0.41	1.05	0.52	0.63	0.74
Hungary	0.78	0.40	0.69	0.48	1.00	0.43	0.59	0.48
Ireland	0.93	0.52	1.04	0.42	1.14	0.39	0.60	0.55
Latvia	0.79	0.53	0.80	0.53	0.90	0.53	0.66	0.64
Netherlands	0.95	0.42	0.99	0.45	1.14	0.36	0.77	0.43
Poland	0.78	0.47	0.75	0.43	0.95	0.54	0.55	0.46
Portugal	0.65	0.57	0.82	0.37	0.96	0.32	0.57	0.55
Slovenia	0.70	0.62	0.74	0.60	1.03	0.38	0.60	0.63
Spain	0.83	0.55	0.87	0.54	1.12	0.50	0.57	0.63
Sweden	0.99	0.47	1.01	0.49	1.04	0.48	0.72	0.49
United Kingdom	0.93	0.38	0.94	0.41	1.04	0.50	0.68	0.51
Country average	**0.88**	**0.50**	**0.90**	**0.46**	**1.05**	**0.46**	**0.64**	**0.56**
EU	**0.92**	**0.51**	**0.98**	**0.46**	**1.10**	**0.47**	**0.62**	**0.59**
EU Rank	**8th**	**8th**	**6th**	**8th**	**6th**	**9th**	**8th**	**7th**
USA	1.11	0.50	1.02	0.42	1.09	0.47	0.65	0.63

Table D8. Crosscuttingness of policy preferences in the EU as a whole compared to member states, EES data

	CULTURE X ECONOMIC	CULTURE X EUROPEAN INTEGRATION1	EUROPEAN INTEGRATION 1 X ECONOMIC
Austria	0.972	0.962	0.96
Belgium	0.824	0.962	0.962
Bulgaria	0.727	0.956	0.958
Cyprus	0.823	0.956	0.956
Czech Rep.	0.883	0.961	0.963
Denmark	0.904	0.962	0.964
Estonia	0.754	0.96	0.958
Finland	0.905	0.959	0.961
France	0.850	0.962	0.962
Germany	0.788	0.963	0.963
Greece	0.842	0.963	0.962
Hungary	0.778	0.959	0.959
Ireland	0.934	0.961	0.963
Italy	0.875	0.959	0.96
Latvia	0.740	0.959	0.958
Lithuania	0.857	0.958	0.96
Luxembourg	0.624	0.962	0.962
Malta	0.913	0.955	0.955
Netherlands	0.725	0.962	0.962
Poland	0.882	0.962	0.962
Portugal	0.937	0.951	0.954
Romania	0.915	0.958	0.963
Slovakia	0.961	0.96	0.96
Slovenia	0.983	0.959	0.959
Spain	0.787	0.961	0.963
Sweden	0.841	0.963	0.965
UK	0.738	0.96	0.96
Average	**0.843**	**0.960**	**0.961**
EU	**0.847**	**0.967**	**0.978**
EU rank	**14th**	**1st**	**1st**

Table D9. Crosscuttingness of policy preferences in the EU as a whole compared to member states, EVS data

	Crosscuttingness between MULTICULTURALISM 2 and STATE-MARKET 4	Crosscuttingness between STATE-MARKET 4 and EUROPEAN INTEGRATION 2	Crosscuttingness between MULTICULTURALISM 2 and EUROPEAN INTEGRATION 2	Combined crosscuttingness
Austria	0.852	0.947	0.987	0.929
Belgium	0.938	0.940	0.924	0.934
Bulgaria	0.908	0.947	0.971	0.942
Croatia	0.983	0.942	0.942	0.956
Cyprus	0.955	0.956	0.962	0.958
Czech Rep.	0.911	0.873	0.973	0.919
Denmark	0.949	0.956	0.864	0.923
Estonia	0.977	0.944	0.958	0.959
Finland	0.969	0.910	0.904	0.928
France	0.982	0.995	0.968	0.982
Germany	0.773	0.831	0.879	0.828
Greece	0.975	0.991	0.913	0.959
Hungary	0.923	0.999	0.937	0.953
Ireland	0.900	0.986	0.975	0.954
Italy	0.999	0.943	0.940	0.961
Latvia	0.951	0.962	0.963	0.959
Lithuania	0.981	0.988	0.940	0.970
Luxembourg	0.968	0.935	0.966	0.957
Malta	0.940	0.819	0.939	0.899
Netherlands	0.993	0.981	0.880	0.951
Poland	0.989	0.827	0.994	0.937
Portugal	0.975	0.944	0.920	0.946
Romania	0.918	0.958	0.977	0.951
Slovakia	0.921	1.000	0.973	0.965
Slovenia	0.967	0.920	0.981	0.956
Spain	0.921	0.978	0.965	0.955
Sweden	0.936	0.915	0.851	0.901
UK	0.967	0.886	0.840	0.898
Country average	**0.944**	**0.938**	**0.939**	**0.940**
EU	**0.990**	**0.977**	**0.936**	**0.968**
EU rank	**3rd**	**9th**	**20th**	**3rd**
Unweighted	**0.979**	**0.996**	**0.975**	**0.984**

Table D10. Crosscuttingness of policy preferences in the EU as a whole compared member states, ISSP data

Country	Crosscuttingness between ENVIRONMENT 2 and CIVIL LIBERTIES 2	Crosscuttingness between ECONOMIC RESPONSIBILITY 2 and CIVIL LIBERTIES 2	Crosscuttingness between ECONOMIC RESPONSIBILITY 2 and ENVIRONMENT 2	Combined crosscuttingness
Czech Republic	0.98	0.94	0.63	0.85
Denmark	0.91	0.89	0.67	0.82
Finland	0.82	0.97	0.80	0.86
France	0.95	0.84	0.74	0.84
Germany	0.85	0.97	0.81	0.88
Hungary	0.95	0.74	0.75	0.81
Ireland	0.91	0.99	0.74	0.88
Latvia	0.90	0.92	0.84	0.89
Netherlands	0.89	0.88	0.71	0.83
Poland	0.88	0.93	0.80	0.87
Portugal	0.98	1.00	0.52	0.83
Slovenia	0.94	0.97	0.63	0.84
Spain	0.97	0.89	0.67	0.84
Sweden	0.83	0.90	0.76	0.83
United Kingdom	0.99	0.88	0.85	0.91
Country average	**0.92**	**0.91**	**0.73**	**0.85**
EU	**0.92**	**0.96**	**0.74**	**0.88**
EU rank	**8th**	**6th**	**8th (tied)**	**5th**
USA	0.87	0.98	0.80	0.88

Figure D1: Polarization and crosscuttingness in the EU and member states, EVS data



WEB-APPENDIX E: REGIONAL CLUSTERS IN THE EU

It is often maintained that the enlargements of the EU towards the South in the 1980s and towards the East in the 2000s substantially increased the union's heterogeneity with regard to the political beliefs and policy preferences of its citizens. The question of regional clusters is, amongst other things, relevant to current debates about the benefits and costs of maintaining and further extending patterns of differentiated integration in the EU.[33]

It is often assumed that Northern and Southern Europeans, as well as Eastern and Western Europeans, share affinities with their neighbours and not with more distant co-Europeans. If this were the case, we would expect heterogeneity to be lower in regional sub-sets of the EU than in the EU as a whole. We consider three regional sub-sets of the EU:

North: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Sweden, Great Britain.

South: Cyprus, Greece, Italy, Portugal, Spain, Malta.

East: Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Poland, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, Estonia.

In addition, we consider a subset of the EU population composed only of residents in countries that were already members before 2000, that is, before its significant expansion to include eastern countries (as well as Cyprus and Malta), many of which had been under the domination of the Soviet Union less than a generation before. This sub-set includes:

Pre-2000 EU: France, Germany, Italy, Belgium, Netherlands, Luxembourg, Ireland, Great Britain, Denmark, Greece, Portugal, Spain, Austria, Finland, Sweden.

Table D2 and D6 gives the level of heterogeneity and polarization in each of those sub-sets. As with our overall EU measure, these measures are not averages of national scores, but "raw" measures of all respondents in a subregion, weighted by population. We find little support for regional clustering within the

[33] See, for instance, Lord, Christopher. "Utopia or dystopia? Towards a normative analysis of differentiated integration." *Journal of European Public Policy* 22, no. 6 (2015): 783-798; Fossum, John Erik. "Democracy and differentiation in Europe." *Journal of European Public Policy* 22, no. 6 (2015): 799-815; Kölliker, Alkuin. *Flexibility and European unification: the logic of differentiated integration*. Rowman & Littlefield, 2006.

EU. Instead, the EU as a whole is *never* more heterogenous than the most heterogeneous subregion, and is often less. Instead, across all dimensions, the EU is comfortably within the range of regional divisions.