PERSONS, LANGUAGE AND HOLISM:
AN INQUIRY INTO SOME ISSUES OF THE ONTOLOGY
OF THE SOCIAL WORLD

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to the memory of my father

and

for my mother
ABSTRACT

The thesis pursued in this dissertation raises and examines a specific philosophical problem, essential to the study of the ontology of the social world. This problem has its origin in the question: 'how is it possible that the social world is constituted as a unified totality or complex whole?'. It is argued that the defining feature of a viable theory of social holism is that it is able to posit this metaphysical kind of problem. In this sense, the holist discourse that provides the terms for expressing the meaningfulness of this problem or the conditions of its legitimacy is, equivalently, an attempt to answer it, giving the form of the social world as an ontological domain. Thus this thesis discloses what is here proposed as the formal ontology of social reality and investigates the cluster of issues relevant to this. The study consists of three related stages (Parts).

Part One spells out the formal mode of ontological inquiring and lays down the metatheoretical validity of holism. On the one hand, the principal idea is that the introduction of certain principles of relationality and of the "moment/whole" problematic establishes the basis of a non-extensional constitution of the social world; it is essential that individuals have the formal character of "entelechial Leibnizian monads" being in conceptual communication. On the other hand, the status of holist categories and commitments involves a transcendental mode of reasoning on the metaphysics of the social world.

Part Two examines the three necessary moments of the conceptual communication in virtue of which individuals are constituted as essentially social persons. The first concerns the cluster of socio-cultural concepts, the second the possibility of meaningful linguistic expression and the third the intentionality of thought. It is argued that by means of this notion of entelechial social personhood the categories of the 'individual' and the 'social' are integrated so that: a 'fact' about the individual's mind is not something enclosed within it, and the 'social' is not an empirically given environment 'containing' or causally influencing the mind.

Part Three completes this holist non-extensional/non-atomic ontology by incorporating the semantics of the language of events characterizing the complex form of social states of affairs. Social events are shown to be complex wholes irreducible to their subjects. Furthermore, the temporal identity of the social world in the course of historical change depends on the reality of events; the interconnection of social events instantiates an intensional nexus of relations between ineliminable social properties.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TABLE OF CONTENTS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Introduction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>PART ONE</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter I:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter II:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter III:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>PART TWO</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter IV:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter V:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter VI:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>PART THREE</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter VII:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter VIII:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Appendix:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conclusion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bibliography</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
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INTRODUCTION

The aim of this dissertation is to put forward and examine a definite philosophical thesis about the ontology of the social world. This thesis, it is argued, must be the kernel of a novel theory of social holism. It is proposed that the distinctive feature of what can be designated as holism is that it posits the metaphysical problem as what kind of ontological domain the social world, as a whole, is possible to be. This is made precise by raising the following fundamental Question: 'How is it possible that the social world is constituted as a unified totality or whole?'. Thus the specific thesis pursued throughout this study comprises a cluster of certain ontological issues that determine the answer to this Question.

The principal idea, to which this thesis draws attention, is that holism discloses what I shall specify as the formal ontology of the social world. The philosophy of holism expressed by the language of formal ontology ensures that the meaningfulness of the notion of 'social world' - or the legitimacy of denoting it thus - is entailed by the essential property of 'being a unified totality'. So it should be stressed that I do not start with a prior conception of 'unified'; rather, the latter acquires meaning in the course of inquiring into formal ontology.
throughout this dissertation - not the other way round. In this sense, then, holism should be regarded as the philosophical theory that establishes the principles of social ontology so that it can be significantly referred to as the "social world".

What is distinctive, then, about this proposal is that holism's concern with ontology is placed at the level of the social world as a whole, the meaning of which it sets out to study. This approach is the converse of that which would account only for the irreducible status of particular social wholes. In fact, my treatment of the issues necessary to my task justifies that the positing of this concern in this manner is what gives significance to the more particularised holist claims which can be assessed as subsumed under the central thesis expounded here.

Now, if we reflected on the ideal of a complete description of social reality in its entirety (which is of course not what I endeavour to do), we would realise that such a viewpoint itself denies any departmentalisation of holist issues and, correlatively, of entities. That is, unless we secure a certain understanding of what the central concern of holism may be, we end up with a series of issues gathered together in an additive fashion or with a set of entities supplementary to each other. But such a picture, as I shall show, would be internally contradictory and, hence, would defeat its purpose by failing to be faithful to the peculiar type of domain it depicts. This problem invites the following crucial consideration.
I wish to emphasise that the underlying and philosophically puzzling idea of 'Part-Whole' relations (which was behind the division into "holists" and "individualists" in the recent past and which has been confined mainly to the case of social groups and the like) shall now be cast in a quite different mould. For this purpose, formal ontology makes three related points, stated here in general but encountered in the text in a precise manner. The first point is that this puzzle concerns the form of the constitution of social reality itself, as I have already indicated, that is, its possibility; and as a consequence of placing it at this primary level, the Part-Whole problem is seen to permeate all other levels or aspects so that the Part-Whole relation is seen to re-appear constantly in an ordered hierarchy at each level of complexity of social relations; but now (to refer back to the previous paragraph) the more concrete issues or sources of discordance between individualists and holists take on significance by reference to the ground-level problem - this latter being at the centre of holism as stated above. In order to accomplish this, the further point made is that the notion of 'relation' assumes logical precedence over those of 'part' and 'whole'; that is, the latter terms have no role to play in isolation from the various formal relations that the present thesis puts forward as the preconditions for the possibility of the constitution of the social world. Accordingly, it follows as a third point that the terms of this type of relations themselves acquire a different meaning altogether; that is, the picture of parts as "atomic pieces" of an "extensionally divisible" whole is refuted by the holist thesis whose formal kind of
discourse transcends the separation of the domain under investigation into two independently circumscribed realities, namely, that of 'the individual' and that of 'the social'; and which also transcends the question of the causal priority of the elements of one of these realities over those of the other.

Thus, the alternative basic categories that the discourse of formal ontology introduces for this purpose are embedded in: (I) its defining principles with respect to the non-extensional constitution of the social world, and accordingly its metatheoretical legitimation; and in conformity with this, (II) the concept of 'social person' and (III) the event-structure of social states of affairs.

This is the cluster of issues (mentioned in the title and above) upon which the thesis pursued here is founded. The synopsis just stated corresponds to the three Parts of the dissertation.

Before giving a detailed overview of the contents of this study, I shall elaborate further on the subject of the origins of, or motivating rationale behind this metaphysical problem of how it is possible that the social world is constituted as a unified totality. First, I wish to stress the distance the present inquiry keeps from that famous dispute between methodological individualists and holists or collectivists in the philosophy of the social sciences.
Although the historical lineage of ideas concerning the irreducibility of social entities can be traced back to that dispute, it must be admitted that ontological queries were marginal to it. Moreover, some proponents of individualism explicitly rejected metaphysical pursuits as of no import to questions of explanatory method. However, later commentators and a few participants have declared, to various degrees, that the original debate was really a direct conflict of ontological views. I do not find this reading persuasive since I believe that the explicit exclusion of ontological pursuits itself reflected only a concealed, indirect ontological concern on the part of some individualists, which further ramified into tacit moral and political pronouncements. As, I hope, it emerges from my study, the constant preoccupation with social explanation or with the 'laws' of social science, statistical regularities and the like, and the corresponding suppression of ontological questions are not merely accidental to individualism. Rather, it should be stressed that it was in the nature of individualist doctrines to elevate the discussion of methodological problems into the position of sole arbiter adjudicating ontological status to entities indirectly or hypothetically; that is, against an epistemological background at the centre of which was the tendency to ask whether some entities have causal efficacy or not. Furthermore, even the conception of causation employed was adopted uncritically.

Thus, within the framework of the discourse of formal ontology stated above we shall place the requirement that the role and the idea of causality as well as those of the epistemological backdrop be seen in a new light altogether (this being one of the issues I elaborate on).
These remarks introduce the basic claim characterizing this re-orientation of our concern with holism proposed here, namely, that a viable ontology of holism cannot be offered from an empiricist standpoint. As I shall try to bring out, our philosophical position must make room for a theory of holism that is not trapped within an individualism/holism dichotomy already framed by individualist presuppositions. Therefore, I should make clear at the outset that my target is not simply to score points against individualist positions nor to provide a defence of a pre-existing version of holism.

This inquiry, then, moves clearly beyond the perimeter of methodological disputes and it does not address matters of social explanation. Recent work on the rationality of action-explanation within the context of decision theory, or on collective vs. single action, though important in itself, falls outside the present topic; so do some older and by now familiar discussions about reasons vs. causes, the intentional character of human action-under-description and the controversy as to whether there are any social-scientific laws. It must be noted, however, that the question of explanation is raised at the very end, specifically in the context of the ontology of events.

The next point on this line of thought about the motivating origins of this re-orientation of ontological pursuits is this. This concern with the ontology of the social world arises, in general, once we attempt to pass from a pre-theoretical standpoint to the construction of a philosophical theory; that is, from what can be called the stage of
simple empirical observations we are naturally inclined to make, to the stage at which a philosophical theory of social ontology not only offers the categories by means of which we are able to reflect on the central question of the possibility of the unified constitution of the social world, but at the same time it provides its own legitimating grounds: i.e. its conditions of validity.

Now, given this last point (itself one of the issues I dwell upon), as well as the considerations adduced so far, I maintain that the vantage point from which to focus on our question is this: the passing from the one stage to the other involves the traditionally puzzling relation between the 'social' and the 'individual'. And this relation, I hold, is the most basic expression of the 'Part-Whole' problematic.

In order to appreciate the aim of constructing a general philosophical theory of social ontology, we should demand of such a theory that prior to anyone of its various commitments it should be able to posit and express in its own categories the rationale of this puzzling relation of the 'individual' to the 'social'. And this study is intended as a contribution to this central problem (as it has already been mentioned at the very start). For this, it puts forward the formal mode by means of which we are in a position to grasp the terms of the problem. To the extent that we have to introduce ourselves into the picture of the individualist/holist dichotomy through the medium of parts and wholes, the relation of the 'individual' to the 'social' should express the re-definition of the 'Part-Whole' problematic as this was adumbrated a few pages above, i.e. as involving three main points. However, we should
recall that what is distinctive about the discourse of formal ontology
is that the initiating (metaphysical) question invites us to reflect on
the possibility of the social world being constituted as a unified totality.

Now, this line of thought ensures that we do not prejudge the issue.
That is, given all the considerations so far, we are not forced to choose
to which 'end', as it were, (i.e. the individual or the society) we
ought to start applying the Part-Whole problematic. This is so because
the question is not put in terms of a taxonomy of two separate classes
of things, namely, one pertaining to the individual and another made
up of so-called social entities.

Thus I emphasise that my purpose is to attempt to demonstrate no more
than that re-orienting the point of the theory of holism can be success­
ful as being the only way to guarantee the phrasing of the primary
problem in terms of conditions of possibility. This is the key idea.

In view of all this, it is crucial to appreciate that the approach
to the formal ontology of the social world denies the idea of something
which could be regarded as playing the role of the "cement" that keeps
the social world together (i.e. that it brings together what is attributed
to the 'individual' and what to the 'social'). This is denied in both
of the following two senses (covered in the text). On the one hand, from
the point of view of a metatheory of knowledge: in which case, the idea
of a "cement" would claim that there should be two different philosophi­
cal theories involved, namely, one about the individual human being and
one about holistic entities. This view may arise as a corollary of the
second sense, i.e. from the standpoint of ontic commitments: this has to do with the problem of 'reality' or 'existence', that is, it concerns the question of distinguishing the reality of social entities from anything accepted as observable or given. In both of these senses, this idea is denied by the discourse of formal ontology because it would result in infinite regress and/or circularity: if we were trapped within such an idea, we would have to ask whether this "cement" is itself a part of the world. What the formal mode avoids, then, is postulating such a tertium quid which would appear to escape any descriptions by means of which holism individuates and identifies the types of elements that constitute the social world as such.

This last point makes clear that the formal mode avoids the above question-begging approach that would lead to an arbitrary separation of the question of the ontological status of the constituent elements from the problem of the unified form of the social world. To the extent that the considerations adduced so far are convincing in making us appreciate the key idea stated on the previous page: namely, that the attempted re-orientation of holism is successful because it is founded on the basis of the possibility of the constitution of the social world; then, it follows that the latter requires that certain kinds of relations are inherent to the ontological identity of the basic types of the world's constituent elements. But furthermore, as I shall try to show, by putting the matter in these terms we are led to acknowledge a certain sense of necessity attributed to this formal requirement of relationality.
The upshot is that such a discourse is searching for what can be called the **transcendental locus** which guarantees that the formal constitution of the social world is not a contingent truth.

A logical consequence of this point (in conjunction with what has been said so far) is that: unless holism introduces transcendental conditions according to which the subject is defined as a **social person** (in a sense that I shall specify in this study), a non-individualist solution to our philosophical problem of the constitution of a unified world is not forthcoming. If we do not follow this path, we end up saying that individuals are picked out as "members" of social sets by descriptions which assign social properties contingently to them; and this would imply that social reality is a contingent 'given' that plays the role of a somehow independently identified 'context' that is extrinsic to the individuals it "contains". But the alternative proposal, which the formal mode allows for, arrives at the category of social personhood by raising the question of "how is it **possible** for individuals to **think**?": in which case, individuals are not construed as "atoms" in causal interaction. Rather, what this alternative invites us to take into account are those requirements necessary to the constitution of the mind by means of which individuals are in **conceptual communication** (and not within a causal order in which each individual's psychological states depend empirically on the social context).

These considerations, however, reach their concluding stage by inviting us to acknowledge the category of **social events** as an indispensable moment of the proposed re-interpretation of holism.
Opponents of individualism have been busy dealing with so-called social substances (e.g. groups) displaying a relative neglect about the importance of events. But the latter, given the different point of view adopted here, should be recognized as essential constituent moments of social reality. That is, the picture delineated so far requires for its completion to show how the emergence of social reality as necessarily a formally unified ontology (i.e. as a social world) depends also on the existence of social events. In fact, an examination of the ontological status of social events should be presupposed by the more particularized discussions on the reality of social substances (as it has already been held as a general claim). It should be stressed that specifying the identity-conditions of such events reveals that they are themselves complex wholes and that they should thus be integrated into the underlying reconsidered Part-Whole problematic. In this case, however, what is distinctive of such a feature of complexity is - as I shall endeavour to demonstrate - the temporal aspect of events, which ensures the dynamic cohesiveness of the social world: that is, its non-discontinuous identity in the course of historical change.

So the reason for initiating a discussion on events is this: since the formal unity of social reality as a complex whole requires that it must not be represented as an extensional 'space' containing atomic individuals and mereological wholes; and since no causal dependency and hence 'priority' can be sustained between the allegedly autonomous spheres of 'the individual' and 'the social'; then the dissolution of such a
logic of 'boundaries' implies that a social state of affairs is a complex synthesis and in particular an exemplification of a social property by a subject at a time. And the theory of events is called upon to convey this. The most crucial service of such a theory should be to offer a semantics that could capture this: the ontological status of social events involves on the one hand, their irreducibility to individual agents and on the other, the relational identity-conditions of events in historical time, which are expressed by concepts of ineliminable social properties. Thus once holism adopts this point of view we could speak in terms of an "event-dense" social world in which the atomic individual cannot arise.

And with this last point the considerations on the motivating rationale that generates the present study are completed. They contain the seeds of the cluster of issues to be raised in the three stages indicated a few pages back and have been unfolded so far.

In the rest of this Introduction I wish to restate in a precise formulation the thesis pursued and then present an overview of how the main issues discussed in each chapter contribute to it. As I have already stated the thesis is structured around three interrelated Parts; its architectonic incorporates explicit cross-references within each chapter. The general approach employed is mainly, but by no means exclusively, in line with some developments in analytical philosophy.
The Argument of the Thesis proceeds as follows:

This dissertation raises and examines a specific philosophical problem, essential to the study of the ontology of the social world. This problem has its origin in the question: 'how is it possible that the social world is constituted as a unified totality or complex whole?'. It is argued that the defining feature of a viable theory of social holism is that it should be able to posit this metaphysical kind of problem. Hence, in this sense, a holist discourse that could provide the terms for expressing the meaningfulness of this problem, or the conditions of its legitimacy, is, equivalently, an attempt to answer it, giving the form the social world is possible to have. Thus the task of this inquiry is to disclose what is here proposed as the formal ontology of the social world, and to investigate the cluster of issues relevant to it. For this:

The first step [PART ONE] must be to spell out the formal mode of ontological inquiring and lay down the basic requirements for the validity of holism as a theory. That is: On the one hand, the principal idea is that the introduction of a certain type of relationality and the radical reconsideration of the form of the 'part/whole' problematic give us a non-extensional constitution of the social world; it is essential of the latter that individuals have the formal character of "entelechial Leibnizian monads" being in conceptual communication. And on the other hand, the required metatheoretical status of holist categories should be sought for in an a priori mode of reasoning on the metaphysics of the social world. As a consequence of this, holism is not merely an alternative to individualism option, and its claims cannot be validated by a notion of 'reality' restricted to an uninterpreted empirical 'given'. 
Consequently:

The second step [PART TWO] will be to focus on the individual as a thinking, language-using subject. It is proposed that there are three necessary moments involved in the conceptual communication in virtue of which individuals are constituted as essentially social persons. By means of this notion holism aims at dissolving the cleavage between the two allegedly autonomous spheres of 'the individual' and of 'the social'. In accordance with the above character of the philosophical theory of holism, what is crucial here is the reinterpretation of what is sometimes misleadingly put as the relation between the extrinsic social context and the intrinsic propositional-attitude content. It is claimed that on the one hand, the category of 'the individual' is not exhausted by an empirical "inner privacy", while on the other, the 'social' is not an empirically given environment "containing" the individual mind.

The third step [PART THREE] towards the unravelling of social world's formal ontology will be to show that such a non-extensional, and its counterpart the non-atomic, ontology must incorporate a theoretical discourse that addresses the notion of events that characterizes the complex form of social states of affairs. An examination of the identity-conditions of events as constituents of social reality shows that social events are indispensable instances of the reconsidered 'part/whole' logic. In this sense, such events are complex wholes irreducible to their subjects. But furthermore, the temporal identity of the social world in the course of history depends on the reality of events; the interconnection of social events, in turn, instantiates an intensional nexus of relations between ineliminable social properties.
Part One comprises three chapters. **CHAPTER I** introduces the *relational principles* of the formal mode and what they entail with respect to the non-extensional individuation and the non-causal identification of the types of elements constitutive of the social world. These considerations are carried further by scrutinizing and rejecting the extensional model of the part/whole relation. The latter is replaced by the Husserlian idea of special relations between "moments" and wholes. This is complemented by the crucial claim that the formal character of the individual is that of "entelechial Leibnizian monad". It is argued that this ensures that each individual retains his/her particularity without being a solipsistic self. The latter involves the idea of the conceptual co-relation of individuals, which is analysed as the possibility of: possessing and applying social concepts, meaningful linguistic expression, and mental intentionality. The discussion is completed by raising and exploring an antinomy that makes us appreciate certain important features of holism with respect to its metatheoretical validity. This is taken up and enlarged upon by the next two chapters. Thus **CHAPTER II** puts forward the transcendentual ground of the activity of *theoretical representations* by means of which we gain access to social reality. This notion of 'reality' is being examined in connection to that of 'necessity' so that the formal constitution of the social world can be seen to be a non-contingent truth. This requires a re-evaluation of the controversy over the status of necessary truths, which invites the idea of the *a priori* mode of reasoning against the empiricist viewpoint that gives rise to individualism. This is advanced further in **CHAPTER III** which brings forth another transcendentual property of the theoretical language of holism. This has to do with the Popperian 'impossibility argument'
concerning the growth of knowledge. Trying to establish the validity of this argument will show how the active role of theoretical terms is involved in holism's ontological commitments. The upshot of this discussion is that the Gödelian rationale behind this argument, adapted to our purposes, requires that, for holism, claims about the individual should be consistently integrated with those about social entities. Moreover, this integration itself should be internal to holism.

In view of these presuppositions Part Two proceeds to analyse in detail the three essential properties constitutive of the "entelechial Leibnizian monads" as social persons. Thus CHAPTER IV deals with the first entelechial factor: the individual's possession and application of socio-cultural concepts. By employing the Kantian idea of Schematism these concepts are shown to have a special function: that is, they are "context-determining". This means that instances of social reality that are 'shaped' by these concepts are not to be construed as an external to the individual constant "environment" against which the mind's activity of possessing and applying the relevant concepts is carried out. Given this idea, CHAPTER V deals with the second entelechial factor: the possibility of meaningful linguistic expression (broader in scope than the previous one). Here the discussion centres around the well-known Wittgensteinian considerations on 'rule-following' and the 'anti-private language argument'. These ideas introduce the notion of personhood and repudiate "inner privacy" as the mark of the mental. The pivotal point of this argumentation will be to propose a certain analysis of the crucial question of "how meaning is possible". The significance of this is that
it presents the logical form of the simultaneous emergence of the
categories of the 'individual' and the 'social'. Based on this inter­
pretation the discussion goes on to present two alternative routes
towards the elucidation of the 'social'. These arguments are then
complemented by an investigation of the alleged 'privacy of emotions',
in the special, and most significant, case of aesthetic apprehension.
Finally, CHAPTER VI analyses the third entelechial factor: the
intentionality of mental acts. This brings forth the special kind of
relationality between a public object and a thought about it. The
discussion starts with phenomenological considerations and then demo­
nstrates in detail the conditions according to which in ascribing
propositional-attitude contents to individuals, terms of social entities
and properties appear meaningfully and function referentially. This will
involve a re-assessment and a defence of certain contemporary views on
the anti-individualist character of the mental. Thus the synthesis of
the three entelechial properties establishes in what precise sense the
'social' is not to be construed as a mereological entity but, rather, as
the expression of the possibility of the conceptual communication
between Leibnizian individuals-qua-social persons.

This picture is completed by an examination of the idea of
social events carried out in Part Three. CHAPTER VII introduces the
topic by considering the relevant literature with respect to the
semantics of event-language. It criticises certain views in order to
arrive at the most adequate notion of events that should be adopted by
holism as characteristic of social states of affairs: the latter are construed as complex wholes of social subjects, social properties and historical time. Being integrated into the moment/whole problematic social events play the indispensable role of determining that the social world is a unified totality also from the diachronic point of view. Thus lastly CHAPTER VIII inquires in detail into the logic of the identity-conditions of events by considering the issues of events' spatial location and temporal ordering. While the former has implications for the irreducibility of events to their subjects, the latter brings forth the manner in which social events interconnect. For this, a certain model is proposed which together with the idea of "historical narrative associations" require that the causal contexts into which events enter are conveyed by an intensional idiom: this latter expresses the ineliminability of social properties by means of which we can specify a social phenomenon as a non-mereological complex of events in time.

These are, then, the conditions for the possibility of the constitution of the social world as a formally unified totality signifying the proposed reconsideration of holism.
PART ONE
Chapter I

SOCIAL HOLISM: CONSIDERATIONS OF FORMAL ONTOLOGY
INTRODUCTION

The task of Part One is to spell out the formal mode of ontological inquiries and lay down the conditions to be met if social holism is to be possible.

The opening chapter contains a cluster of considerations according to which an account of the constitution of the social world is entailed by the basic principles of formal ontology. Thus the initial step is to put forward these principles or requirements that specify the sense of 'formal'. Probing into the validity of these principles will establish why, and how in particular, holism construes the social world as a formally unified totality.

Section 1 considers what the formal mode entails in contradistinction both to the 'substantive' and the 'empirical' ones. In contrast to the former it is argued that social reality cannot be the result of constituent elements plus their external relations. If such a picture were adopted, it would lead to the impasses of infinite regress or circularity (this issue reappears throughout this chapter). It is thus stressed that the distinguishing and superior mark of the formal inquiry is that it repudiates the untenable assumption that: the kinds of constituent elements are not in themselves adequate for the determination of social ontology because they are in need of additional, extrinsic, connecting features that would transform them into the complex whole of social reality. In opposition to this, then, the formal mode discloses the reality of (specific kinds of) internal relations: in simple terms,
this allows us to grasp that to individuate these elements is to acknowledge the manner in which they are combined. Therefore the first basic principle that holism should adopt is the non-extensional individuation of its domain's constituent elements.

Second, in contrast to the empirical mode, the formal inquiry posits the modal condition according to which the existence of one type of constituent entity is logically related to - rather than causally dependent on - another's existence. This second basic principle of the non-causal identification of types of entities asserts that it is impossible to identify one such type without thereby referring to its relatedness to another. A prominent instance of this condition will be shown to be that for holism the identification of propositional attitudes about social reality is not a matter of the causal influence exerted by the so-called social context. This amounts to the crucial distinction between asking what and how people come to believe (i.e. as a result of causal dependencies) and asking how it is possible for persons to think (i.e. the formal approach).

Having specified the sense of 'formal' the next task will be to inquire into the kind of part/whole relations exhibited by social phenomena. Respecting what the two principles establish, in sections 2 and 3 I proceed to construct a complicated version of a notable individualist argument to the effect that the relevant part/whole relations should stemm from the extensional model of mereological essentialism and, hence, that "social wholes" are abstract terms. A detailed scrutiny of this
argument will attempt to demonstrate that it is both inconsistent with respect to its theory of meaning and contradictory with respect to its claim about the unreality of social wholes. The refutation of this strengthened argument reveals fallacious individualist assumptions about the characterization of individuals, of social wholes and the role of theoretical knowledge, all of which are superseded by formal ontology.

This idea that extensional part/whole relations are to be rejected as a mistaken representation of social phenomena is pursued further in section 4 which extracts novel implications of the thesis that what have been called social substances are not sets of individuals. In this vein, section 5 deals with a further purpose for which it may be alleged that the extensionalist idiom is needed for the specification of any totality: viz., avoiding problems of circularity which the formal discourse has set out to eschew. This has to do with the classic problem of "impredicative totalities" which is here applied to the social case. Section 6 rounds off this line of critical argumentation by presenting and evaluating the formal antithesis between the ontological statements of an atomistic and those of a non-atomistic model of part/whole social phenomena.

Taking into account all these considerations the main proposal argues as follows. The extensional model of parts and wholes should be replaced by the alternative Husserlian idea of hierarchical relations of foundation between "moments" and wholes (section 7). Given this, formal ontology requires further that individuals—qua-social persons are to be
understood as Leibnizian monads. The possibility of their relating to each other rests upon each monad's inherent "entelechy". As a consequence of this property monads are removed from the causal-mechanical order of connectedness (i.e. the extensional part/whole picture) and are placed in conceptual communication. The latter is effected through the application of social concepts, the meaningful linguistic expression and the mental property of intentionality (section 8).

The final section concludes the discussion with a consideration of the ideal of "informativeness" which links up with the following chapter. This has to do with those formal features of the holist theory of social ontology that ensure gains in informative power. My intention is to raise a number of points which help us appreciate certain problems that holism should avoid.
1. When a general theoretical account of the formal ontology of a particular domain of investigation is required, the first task is to specify the sense of 'formal'. In this thesis 'formal' is contrasted both to 'substantive' and to 'empirical', when the latter take the following specific senses. By 'substantive' I mean a mode of inquiry which posits the ancient ontological question as to 'what there is' [i.e. what kinds of entities] and attempts to answer it by focussing on the distinction between particulars and universals (of first or higher degree) and perhaps - though it is debatable - relations, both between - particulars and between universals.

Traditionally this inquiry purports to offer an analysis or account of the kinds of entities (i.e. sortals) that are found to constitute the world. Such an analytical "assay", however, must reveal the mode in which complex segments of reality are to be decomposed into their simple constituent elements, the crucial point being that such an analysis would give us the simple entities but not the connections between them that issue in the states of affairs being complex. So the initial problem from the perspective of 'analytical ontology' is that, for example, given the existence of entities such as Desdemona, loving and Othello, what is then missing if it is not in fact the case that

1. The way in which this ancient question is entirely different from the modern of 'what objects there are' (concrete and abstract) and for the claim that the latter was first posed by Frege and formulated as stemming from language (syntax and semantics) itself, see M. Dummett, Frege: Philosophy of Language (London: Duckworth, 1981), pp.471-3.

Desdemona loves Othello? That is, if the entities found as elements of reality could be (as such) combined so that they would issue in complex states of affairs different from those that actually obtain, the 'analytical' inquiry must face the task of giving an account of why they are thus combined. But ever since Bradley's celebrated attack on the reality of external relations any such attempt inevitably fails, since the purported analysis of relations leads either to an infinite regress or to circularity. Thus the mistake that a formal ontology must avoid is to assume the possibility that the constituent entities of reality be combined otherwise than they are.\(^1\)

The distinguishing feature of formal-ontological inquiries lies in that they repudiate the assumption that the world is composed of (kinds of) entities plus their connecting features.\(^2\) Such inquiries produce representations of their domains, e.g. social worlds, that reveal the specific kinds of internal relations\(^3\) which are these worlds.\(^4\)

In this sense, if human beings are picked out as one of the constituent entities involved in the domain of social world, such beings may be construed as "Parmenidean particulars"\(^5\), that is, individuals each of

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1. A brief telling critique along the same lines can be found in E. Allaire, 'Wolterstorff and Bradley on Ontology', J. of Phil., LXX (1973), pp.727-33. I endorse his criticisms though I do not agree with his division between ontological and non-ontological questions.

2. See also chap.8 below.

3. Two instances of such relations to be found in the recent literature are: B.Oilman's Marxist treatment of alienation in Alienation, 2nd Ed. (Cambridge, CUP, 1976), and G.Baker and P.Hacker's interpretation of rule-following in Scepticism, Rules and Language (Oxford, Blackwell, 1984).


5. The terminology and initial idea is due to R.Harre and E.Madden's Causal Powers (Oxford, Blackwell, 1975), pp.161-3. By contrast an "Aristotelean particular" is an entity whose identity is retained while its powers/properties are variable.
whose uniqueness or identity is the cluster of social powers or properties involved: e.g. a deputy sheriff. While these social properties constitute the relevant office, they are ante res with respect to the individual-qua-human being, i.e. they are ontologically separate from the human being exemplifying them. The important thing to stress here is that once the kinds of constituent elements are individuated we do not need to go on to discover the necessary 'missing link' that transforms these elements into the actual combinations.¹

Such a link is redundant for this type of inquiry in the same way that Leibniz argued that: there are no "purely extrinsic denominations", i.e. ways of identifying things by external relational properties that do not in some way involve some of the intrinsic properties of the things and yet such intrinsic properties refer to relations to some or all of the things (a predicate may denote a relation either implicitly or explicitly).²

The notion of individuation just mentioned brings us to the second contrast whereby questions of formal ontology of holism are distinguished from those that we may call 'empirical'. As understood here, if one type of entity causes another to come into existence, then the coming into existence of the latter is empirically dependent

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1. We must be careful to distinguish here between 'the property of being this world' and 'the property of being the actual world': for this see A. Plantinga, The Nature of Necessity (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1974), pp. 49-51.

on the former. But from the formal ontological point of view, the coming into existence of a type of entity is kept apart from its existence as logically dependent on another's existence. So one type could not exist, logically rather than causally, without a specified other type because it is impossible to individuate the former without thereby referring to its relatedness to the latter. The requirement that such relatedness is 'essential' to their nature may be formulated more accurately, as the modal condition that it is impossible to have access to them save by means of such relatedness. In this sense, the non-empirical holistic inquiry equates the question as to what the social world must be like if we are to be constituted and act in it as social persons, with the question as to how are we to think of it. This is a crucial formal requirement that any version of ontological holism in the social sciences must tackle. In this thesis I try to explore some of the issues I consider indispensable in this sense.

Contrasted to this, then, we find, on the empirical side the thesis of the social determination of the individual by the social/cultural/moral order. The latter idea must be made more precise by distinguishing in it two claims not necessarily jointly maintained: either, the societal context causally influences the content of the individual mind; or, the societal context causally influences the form (and hence the limits of content-variation) of the individual mind. The latter may be called the 'strong thesis' of the social constitution of the mind. R.Harré thinks that the former is a truism but I believe we can extract significant theoretical results from it as,
for example, in the work of S. Moscovici.  

Of course the stronger thesis, extended to other areas such as day-to-day scientific practice, has become one of the most controversial recent claims in the sociology of scientific knowledge. For my purposes, however, the strong thesis provides only empirical support to any kind of ontological holism as long as formal questions remain unanswered. We can distinguish between asking what (and how, i.e. causally) social persons believe, and asking how it is possible for social persons to think. In the sense adopted here, the first question is empirical (and one may argue that Marx's and Freud's theories should be classified under this heading, although viewed from an entirely different perspective they are not empirical) while the second question is formal.

It is one of the goals of my thesis to show how to approach the issue of social holism with the latter question in mind (Part Two) and make advances which may be subsequently relevant to social explanation and methodology.

1. Harré is referring in particular to the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis that linguistic forms determine psychological structures, as "now widely agreed to be too simplistic": Personal Being (Oxford, Blackwell, 1983), p.87; his theory purports to substantiate and supplement this hypothesis. For a debate between Harré and Moscovici with respect to the relative proportions of individualism and holism in Moscovici's notion of 'représentation' see their respective papers in Social Research, 51 (1984), pp.927-38 and 939-67.


3. Thus I disagree with A. F. Chalmers' point that social theory develops independently of any philosophical theses and that the former should influence the latter: 'Methodological Individualism: An Incongruity in Popper's Philosophy' in G. Currie and A. Musgrave (eds.), Popper and the Human Sciences (Dordrecht, Nijhoff, 1985), pp.73-87.
(as understood here) may be relevant is, for instance, the explanation/understanding of social action in its relation to issues of rationality, or moral deliberation, etc., or in its relation to the interpretation of political texts.

2. Having identified the formal mode of the questions that ontological holism poses, the second task is to investigate the sense in which its domain is represented as forming a unified totality. The question here is not which particular picture of all the (kinds of) social phenomena can best fit an independently fixed 'definition' of holism; On the contrary, it is the manner in which a representation of the formal features of such a totality is constructed that renders holism meaningful.

One initial idea is to construe the totality of social phenomena on the model of extensive wholes founded on part/whole relations that comprise principles of set theory, or of mereological essentialism, or of aggregates' composition. Historically speaking, the most extreme versions of ontological beliefs held by some methodological individuals can be seen to be associated with such part/whole relations. An indirect way to introduce this kind of part/whole relations is to start with the correct anti-positivist thesis that in all sciences we cannot identify, or make observations about, the objects of our various domains prior to our theories enabling us to think and talk about these objects. From this it is inferred that the objects of the social sciences are 'theoretical constuctions', from which, in turn, the false conclusion is drawn whereby 'theoretical constructions' are identified with 'abstract objects' nominalistically construed. Given this illicit

1. Nominalism here is taken in N.Goodman's sense denying the reality of abstract objects rather than in the traditional sense denying the existence of universals or relations.
conflation it follows that, with respect to the concrete objects that truly exist, those 'abstract' or 'holistic' entities that theory constructs are reducible to the former. Then, at that level of concrete, observable reality the only wholes that can be accepted as real are those founded on the above-mentioned part/whole relations.

The subtlety of the argument, as I am reconstructing it, is missed if we take it to be a simple identification of such social wholes like 'army' with the aggregate or class of its soldiers, officers, etc. The argument I am here confronting is not that simplistic but it is nevertheless inconsistent for the following reason. The argument starts with a non-positivist view of the status of theoretical terms and expressions repudiating the 'myth of the given' and asserting the 'guidance' of observations by theory. But it goes on to sharply distinguish the referents of the theoretical constructions effected by means of these theoretical terms on the one hand, and the referents over which non-theoretical, everyday, observational terms range, on the other. So the first move asserts the primacy of theory while the second that of observation divorced from theory. The further step holds on to the latter move and introduces the further questionable identification of concreteness with observability thus construed; this is based on a

1. It has been shown that the categories of social sciences can constitute people in the sense that they create kinds of ways for people to be: see a most illuminating paper of I.Hacking's 'Five Parables' in R.Roty, et al. (eds.), Philosophy in History (Cambridge, C.U.P., 1984), pp.103-24. Harre has also shown in his Personal Being how it is possible to construct a picture of the 'self' as a non-empirical, theoretical concept acquired in the course of social interaction whereby the 'self' is constituted by adopting relevant theoretical constructions available to the individual.

2. In The Poverty of Historicism (London, RKP, 1960), p.135, Popper gives a clear indication in this manner that the only concrete things are the men and women killed, not 'war' or 'army'. But in The Open Society And Its Enemies, 5th Ed. (London, RKP, 1966), ii, 91, he shifts the question to that about the behaviour or action of groups being reducible to those of human individuals. I am here dealing with the former only. Cf. S.Lukes, Individualism (Oxford, Blackwell, 1973), p.116 for a reply to a similar extreme view held by I.C.Jarvie. An interesting topic for further research would be to study the extent to which Popper's later views on the autonomy of 'World Three' and the reality of unobservables clash with his earlier argument.
naive verificationist theory of meaning whereby the meaning of a
theoretical statement (in this case one about social properties or
social wholes) is the method of confirmation or verification of its
truth conditions. Since the latter are tacitly assumed to be captured
only in terms of non-theoretical singular-terms and predicates that refer
or denote human individuals, the confirmation of the initial theoretical
statement is effected without reference to any 'abstract' objects, i.e.
theoretical constructions. If the meaning of the initial theoretical
statement is thus reducible, it follows that any ontological commitment
to social holistic aspects is empty since observation (as uncontaminated
by theory) provides no content for such commitments. The inconsistency
of the argument, then, lies in that it starts with a non-positivist
theory of meaning and ends by upholding a positivist theory.

3. For my purposes here, what is more important is that the inconsistent
argument I am exposing purports to give an account of the ontology
of social wholes. Given the structure of the argument as spelled out
above, it follows that statements about wholes are placed, after the
effected reduction, at the level of concrete particulars as understood
by modern nominalism. And as I indicated, at that level the only
part/whole relation forthcoming could not be other than the one
associated (with variations) with extensive wholes. To arrive at this
kind of part/whole relation the argument presupposes verificationist
semantics for 'abstract' singular-terms and predicates on the one hand,
and a nominalist ontology with respect to their referents and denotations.
The upshot is a characterization of individual human beings inherently
atomic in that their individuation by means of intrinsic properties
remains constant irrespective of their actual combination with each other
in forming social substances or of their actual appearance as subjects
of social events. But apart from the problem (explained at the
beginning of this chapter) that this involves with respect to the
question of how the actual combination is to be distinguished from
other possible ones, it would be instructive to note here an additional
contradiction that this argument leads to: on the one hand, the
ontological claim that follows from the nominalist assumption makes
'wholes' abstract; on the other hand, the result of the second,
verificationist, semantical move places them within the domain of the
material particulars, as mere aggregates or mereological sums. In
order for an individualist opponent to maintain that there is not in
fact any contradiction involved in this, he must-explicitly admit
that 'wholes' are of a different ontological status from aggregates
and the like. He would further want to claim that only the latter
are real but as long as the prior admission has been made not only
holism is not refuted but it is rather such a demarcation between
wholes and extensive magnitudes that holism, I believe, must rest upon.

In fact the unwarranted nominalist assumption about what is 'real'
coupled with the verificationist semantics behind an individualist
picture of social phenomena conceal - besides the contradictions I
derived - a fundamentally empiricist conviction which bifurcates into
a subthesis about the individual person and about the mind, and into a
subthesis about the role of our theoretical knowledge. A viable holist

1. That situational-logic as a methodological thesis of social
explanation contradicts individualism is a further controversial
issue. But I believe that methodological holists have given an
adequate account of this contradiction and my picture of ontological
holism as it emerges throughout the thesis lends support to
methodological holists.
alternative must clarify the sense in which ' wholes' are said to beeal, or certain properties essentially social. Abstract objects can
be seen to be real in a non-verificationist manner. This is possible
as long as we follow through the initial step of the argument we
started with and retain the non-positivist view about the reference
of theoretical terms and the meaning of theoretical statements.
Holism cannot rest on the same grounds as the individualist position
that imposes on our representations of social ontology conditions which
follow from the acceptance of extensive part/whole relations. Holism,
in the sense of this thesis, is not the empirical opposite of
individualism. If holism is to be an alternative it must, among other
things, start by repudiating the empiricist assumption that theoretical
terms in science, as opposed to observation terms, must refer to
a domain of entities that are unobservable (as defined by empiricist
tenets) and always remain so. But apart from the by now received
anti-positivist movement, which discredited the dichotomy of the
scientific vocabulary, we must also emphasize that as scientific
knowledge progresses we admit unobservables with observational properties
and observable things with non-observational properties. ¹ By conferring
an active role on our theoretical representations social holism
approaches the issue of the ontological status of so-called abstract
objects from a point of view that places emphasis on the 'syntactic'

¹. The individualist argument attacked in these pages could be
supported by recourse to the device of 'Ramsification' or to
Craig's Theorem. But it has been shown against such instrumentalist
moves that theoretical terms are ontologically indispensable even if
they are (by Craig's Theorem) logically eliminable for the
purposes of deductive or inductive systematization of scientific
theories: see J.J.C. Smart, Between Science and Philosophy (N.York,
(N.York, Springer-Verlag, 1973), chaps. I-IV. I must add, however,
that the argument I attack in the text is a reconstruction stemming
from the one in The Poverty of Historicism and that Popper himself
has attacked instrumentalism in physics.
criteria of language in general or of the various theoretical languages in particular. This is at base a Fregean method (stripped of Platonism) which by moving away from verificationist semantics (e.g. the predominance of the name/object model of reference) allows for ontological questions to be posited from within the structure of language(s) in a way that exposes certain nominalist fallacies. So we can block the assimilation of social phenomena to extensional part/whole relations by discarding the view of language the nominalist adopts.

4. Even if it can be shown that we can block a nominalist construal of social substances or social phenomena as 'abstract', it is instructive to consider, from a different point of view, the manner in which the employment of extensive part/whole relations is to be rejected as a mistaken representation of social totalities. From this alternative standpoint each social entity (i.e. everything other than the individual human being) is approached as being identical with (not eliminatively reducible to) the relevant class or set of the individuals that compose it. This is, surely, an extreme and perhaps uncharitable picture of individualism and although holists and others have given devastating

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1. C.Taylor, in 'Theories of Meaning', Proc.Br.Acad., LXVI (1980), has criticized this same model of 'designation' together with 'radical naturalism' and has given an alternative conception called 'expressive' view of meaning. His concern, though related to mine, is with the 'life-world' while I am here dealing with one of the metatheoretical aspects of social holism.

2. The best to my knowledge exposition and defence of this approach is to be found in the excellent study by C.Wright: Frege's Conception of Numbers as Objects (Aberdeen, Aberdeen U.P., 1983), esp. chaps. 1 and 2.

replies to it, I want to give some different reasons for rejecting it since this will facilitate the gradual emergence of some additional aspects of holism.

In saying that social totalities can be modelled as different instantiations of possible worlds of sets of individuals, it is pertinent to assume the employment of the Principle of Extensionality (as made familiar from the work of Quine and others in formal logic, esp. modal logic, and set theory). This Principle serves two purposes both of which are incompatible with social holism and are themselves questionable. In the first place, the Principle facilitates the definition and construction of sets; and in the second, it plays an important role in establishing identities of objects (or properties, if admitted) across different possible worlds. To the extent that sets are individuated by their members it has been conclusively demonstrated that, for example, social-groups' identity survives membership's identity. But we must take care of the structure of the argument against such identification. The argument is based on two premises: (1) Social substances, to use Ruben's blanket-term, change their members while retaining their identity (for the usual reasons). (2) Sets cannot change their members without ceasing to be the same. Therefore, social substances are not sets. Holists and others have proved the validity of (1) only, but we must also show that (2) holds, too. The latter has been demonstrated by R. Sharvy but as it clearly emerges from his argument the conclusion depends not only on the Principle of Extensionality (whose non-applicability in the social case was sufficient to establish (1)), but also on the principle that

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there are no temporal identities of things. The latter principle proved to be indispensable but it also proved something quite strong, viz., that if a thing is identical to one thing at one time, then it is not identical to another thing at another time.¹ But whereas precisely the opposite is required by (1) above, if we take 'thing' to refer to Parmenidean particulars as these were introduced a few pages above, then we must note the following. A Parmenidean particular (P-particular for short) is an entity wholly and exclusively characterized by its possibilities or powers as, for example, an individual is the Justice of the Peace only as long as he fully possesses the relevant powers; without them he is not such a particular any more.

The same individual human being may be, however, the local mayor. As defined these are two separate P-particulars at one time.

Complicating the picture in two ways, by admitting the same individual to hold, variably, different social or political offices and by taking the first occurrence of 'thing' in the principle to refer to human individuals, the principle then gives us: if an individual is identical to one P-particular at one time, then that same individual is not identical with another P-particular at another time. But this violates Leibniz's Law.¹ The only remedy I propose as being adequate to account for such cases is to espouse the thesis of 'relative identity'

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¹. A way out may be to accept vague objects, i.e. ones with fuzzy boundaries or ones referred to by ambiguous definite descriptions, and hence accept non-definite identity. G. Evans has proved the impossibility of this: 'Can there be Vague Objects?' Analysis, 38 (1978), 208; for a critique see H. Noonan, 'Vague Objects', Analysis 42 (1982), 3-6. D. Wiggins has adapted Evans' argument to social and other cases falling under the famous puzzle of Hobbes' "Ship of Theuseus": 'On Singling Out An Object Determinately' in P. Pettit and J. McDowell (eds.), Subject, Thought and Context (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1986), pp.169-80.
Another proposal might be to attempt to bridge the gap between substance or matter (i.e. the human individual) of which a thing is made and the thing itself, as for instance a certain statue and its material, by reference to 'qua-objects'; the latter could be taken as amalgams of given objects and the relevant properties. This would enable us to account for constitution-relations as part/whole relations within such objects. This solution, however, is not helpful to deal with P-particulars themselves within which the powers/properties of the relevant 'qua-object' are all there is. Generalized the result of these considerations must be that in different possible worlds individuation by means of P-particulars shows that holism requires the existence of social powers, properties or relations in order to do that. This further adds an important specification to our notion of P-particulars: viz., that the embedded social powers do not supervene on any non-social powers, as far as the issue of individuation is involved.

Thus attending to the structure of the usual argument against the identification of social groups to sets reveals some interesting implications for the ontology of social holism. Besides what I said above, the idea that we can model our notion of totality on that of possible worlds must be abandoned if it brings in principles of set-theory. In fact, different branches of natural science can be shown to operate with counterfactual statements (i.e. possible-world considerations) admitting the reality of natural properties. Besides

1. The existence of relative identities has been advocated by P. Geach in several places: see 'Identity' rept. in his Logic Matters (Oxford, Balckwell, 1972), pp. 238-47.
advantages in explanatory power, it can be further shown that
criteria for the individuation of properties are not as opaque
as nominalists think and that it is misleading to posit set-membership
as a standard for such criteria since the individuation of sets
themselves involves non-extensional, modal concepts.\(^1\) In view of sect.1
above it is instructive to note also a further ontological consideration
that Sober has put forward and can be generalized for holistic purposes
beyond evolutionary theory: he distinguishes between selection for
traits (causes) and the outcome of it, the selection of objects (effects);
the property selected for (or individuated) plays an explanatory rôle
in the causal (formal) story of the selection (individuation) of objects;
the latter can be of a variety of kinds, such as individuals and/or groups
and/or genes. The crucial thing here is that to decide which is the unit
of selection/individuation we must know whether the relevant explanatory
story/ontological schema refers to properties of individuals, or those
of groups, or of genes etc.\(^2\) Further, it has been shown that social
groups can be multiply detectable and thus exhibit degrees of "robustness"
(as theorised by D.Campbell) as uncontentiously as micro-entities are
thought to do.\(^3\)

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1. Ibid., pp.151-2.

2. Ibid., p.166; and cf. his 'Force and Disposition in Evolutionary
Theory' in C.Hookway (ed.), Minds, Machines and Evolution

3. See W.Wimsatt, 'Robustness, Reliability and Overdetermination
in Science' in M.Brewer and B.Collins (eds.), Scientific Inquiry
and the Social Sciences (San Francisco, Jossey-Bass, 1981),
pp.125-63.
5. The model of possible worlds, however, is further inadequate for social totalities since its semantics must overcome problems of its own with unwanted consequences for social holism. One of the most difficult of such problems is that of identifying individuals across possible worlds once we take individuals to re-appear in different sets of such worlds. Critics have pointed out that cross-identification becomes impossible to carry out without recourse to pragmatic or context-bound criteria. This would mean that there must be different ways in which to draw 'word-lines' identifying individuals and such differences would reflect prior assumptions of ontology in general or of theories in each particular discipline. Thus different conceptions of what it is to be a social person or an economic agent, or a type of propositional attitude, would result in different 'world-lines' by means of which we would be able to construct distinct representations of the different social worlds.  

In the field of sciences of man one approach, originating from R.Thom's 'Catastrophe Theory' in the field of differential topology, construes wholes, such as civilizations, cultures, or societies and other such items, as integral units (worlds) whose life can be analyzed and explained without recourse to a reductionist scheme that would provide explanations at the molecular level as in the usual model of the relationship of thermodynamics to mechanics in the behaviour of gases.  

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1. For an informative survey and proposals see J.Hintikka and M. Hintikka, 'Towards a General Theory of Individuation and Identification' in Leinfellner, et al., Language and Ontology, pp.137-50. For the opposition between the theses of 'transworld identity' and of 'worldbound individuals' with respect to de re necessities see Plantinga, op.cit., chap.VI.

applicability of its central claims to sociological theories, especially the idea of equilibrium discontinuities connected with the points at which changes of a particular complex system are sudden, has been forcefully, and I think, cogently, disputed for reasons other than transworld-identity problems). And so it appears social holism cannot avail itself of such totalities unproblematically.

There is, however, a second purpose for which the extensionalist idiom is adopted in the specification of totalities. This purpose is to avoid problems of circularity in such specifications, which may arise either from within Russell's class-paradoxes or from within questions of quantification in logic. What I have in mind is what is commonly called the 'vicious-circle' problem of impredicative totalities. This is I think crucial as far as we are investigating the form of social holistic ontology. In its general form: an 'impredicative totality' is one that contains members/objects definable only in terms of this totality or involving or presupposing this totality. The circularity of such totalities and their illegitimacy in logic and set-theory goes back in time and ramifies in various ways, but here I wish to bring out its core. Thus for instance, following Poincaré, in giving


2. These are the standard three forms given to the circularity involved. I follow K.Gödel's exposition in his 'Russell's mathematical logic' repr. in P.Benacerraf and H.Putnam (eds.), Philosophy of Mathematics, 2nd Edit. (Cambridge, C.U.P., 1983), pp.447-69, at pp.454-5. Gödel gives a Platonistic solution to the vicious-circle whereby the totalities themselves, since they are not created, are notcircular, they are so only as described by their definitions or specifications (p.459). For a criticism of this particular point see Dummett, Frege, pp.531-2.

an 'impredicative' definition of a chosen totality, we define \( x \) by postulating both that \( x \) is related in such and such a way to all the members of \( G \) and also that \( x \) is itself a member of \( G \). Alternatively, we define \( y \) by postulating that \( y \) is related in such and such a way to \( x \), that \( x \) is related in such and such a way to all members of \( G \), and finally that \( y \) is, itself, a member of \( G \). In all these cases, the distinction between predicative and nonpredicative classifications (of 'objects') comes down to this: the former cannot be 'disordered' by the introduction of new elements, while the latter are disordered (and hence altered) by such an introduction.

One of the problems such considerations pose for social holism is that: if the latter purports to be a representation of a totality of elements as other than a plurality such a holistic representation is bound to start with such a kind of plurality and then carry on to introduce new elements which are supposed to bestow to the same totality holistic features. Such elements may be, for example, relational properties or concrete events. Since we start with a given plurality of elements as infinite disjunction or conjunction thereof, the newly introduced 'objects' seem to be definable as related in such and such a way to all the members of the plurality and also that these 'objects' are themselves included in the plurality. This would appear to provide a holistic (i.e. non-atomistic) representation of the totality, since it includes elements that are distinct in kind from the original (atomic) ones; but this would be so at the cost of circularity. For the holist, in this case, would be asserting that the original elements could not exist without the introduction of the new ones on the one hand, and that the new ones can only be identified as definable in terms of the original ones.
This misleading result should be avoided. In view of what I said in the beginning of this chapter; such a result is the product of misleading attempts to approach holism as the direct opposite of individualism. The notion of social holism I wish to explore is not one which can be given within the confines of individualist presuppositions. Thus "impredicative classifications" of totalities may be seen to pose no threat to social holism at the metatheoretical level as long as we make sure we do not conflate extensional part/whole relations that result in purely 'extrinsic denominations' of constituent elements with other kinds of relatedness that operate non-mechanically. Social holism must allow that diverse social theories may in the course of their development redraft the representations of their domains by introducing new elements for specific purposes. Such purposes may range from explanatory adequacy to explicitly value-laden choices as to which is the best possible societal or political state of affairs; purposes such as these would alter the ways in which part/whole relations are to be conceptualized as non-mechanical. An instance of such a problematic is Aristotle's treatment of citizen/city relations in terms of the self-realization of inherently teleological tendencies towards the 'good'. So impredicativity or formal circularity arises only as long as extensional part/whole relations are held as independent criteria with respect to which all other forms of (social) relations proposed by diverse social theories are ultimately judged.

6. Given these considerations we may now inquire how the reality of social phenomena could be approached by positing two, *prima facie* antithetical, candidates of such representations. On the one hand, we may start with a given set of elementary building-blocks ('atoms') which when put together produce a certain structure by means of which we are able to depict the phenomena. On the other hand, we give a description of the totality of phenomena in virtue of which its parts are individuated. The fundamental principles on which these two representations depend may be given in the following way.¹

The 'atomistic' picture comprises the ontological claims that:

A1. Each 'atom' can be identified as an isolated substratum of properties the characterization of which involves no relations with other such atoms.

A2. Each atom can be individuated (i.e. is separate from each of the rest) by virtue of its own, 'inner', substance.

A3. A finite set of atoms can produce different possible structures in accordance with different rules of composition.

A4. Each such structure can be completely characterized by the enumeration of the atoms out of which it is comprised and the relevant rules of composition. (2)

The alternative non-atomistic picture makes the following ontological claims:

NA1. Each 'whole' can be given determinately as prior to its constituent elements.


2. An example of such an atomistic picture is what J.O. Urmson has called 'new level' or 'reductive' analysis (as opposed to the 'same level' analysis) that Logical Atomism propounded: see his Philosophical Analysis (Oxford, OUP, 1956), pp. 27-41: such reductive analysis reveals the ultimate structure of the world by acquiring new knowledge of the phenomena and not by acquiring knowledge of new phenomena (facts). In addition it must be noted that the manner in which I have laid out the picture excludes certain stringent axioms found in something like Leonard and Goodman's
NA2. Such wholes can be divided into constituents (or 'holemes')
each of which has a determinate function, or plays a certain rôle, specified with respect to the relevant whole.

NA3. Each such holeme can be replaced by another in so far as the essence of the relevant whole remains invariant, i.e. in so far as the substituting holeme has the same function in the whole.

NA4. The interrelation of a number of specified 'holemes' yields one and the same whole always. (1)

One way of emphasizing the crucial difference between the two pictures is by employing the notion 'plasticity' of types of phenomena, that is, their capacity to be realized in more than one way. (2) Two kinds of dimensions of plasticity may be distinguished. On the one hand, a type of phenomenon may exhibit 'compositional plasticity' when various possible realizations of that phenomenon differ in the sorts of entities that generate them or constitute them. On the other hand, a type of phenomenon may display 'configurational plasticity' in so far as its various possible realizations differ in the structural arrangement of their constituent parts. Now, the problem with the first picture is that it does not allow for types of holistic phenomena that may be compositionally stable but configurationally variable in the way they are realized. The inadequacy of the second picture is, in turn, that it does not allow for holistic phenomena that may exhibit (degrees of)

1. An example of such a picture might be K. Lewin's field theory as an analytical device of societal wholes: Field Theory in Social Science (London, Tavistock, 1952); see also H. May, Field Theory: a study of its application in the Social Sciences (London, RKP, 1972), esp. pp.16-17 for the two von Ehrenfels' criteria of part/whole relations adopted from the Gestalt theory of musical perception for the characterizations of groups, etc.

compositional plasticity in their realizations while remaining configurationally stable.

As given here, one may accept the 'atomistic' picture for certain kinds of phenomena and the 'holistic' for others. The former picture requires that the wholes in it should always be "extensive", that is, its atoms are parts relative to an extensive medium, i.e. space or time. The latter picture does not require spatial extension to accompany temporal extension always (depending on the characterization of events one adopts) and in some cases indeed spatial dimensions are entirely inappropriate as, e.g. in the determination of Gestalt qualities of certain phenomena. Historically speaking, however, there are complications in that the positivist thesis that "reality" is reduced to the given can be accepted as an atomistic picture while the 'given' may be a 'holeme', as for instance, Mach's acceptance of the Gestalt theory shows.¹ For Carnap 'Gestalt wholes' are useful for psychology and biology, while a psychological state is, for Logical Positivism, an autonomous logical complex characterized by the fact that all statements about it can be transformed into statements about its elements.² This latter sense of reducibility resurfaces in Carnap's idea that whereas the sphere of cultural objects is autonomous, all such objects are nevertheless reducible to their 'manifestations' (in psychological processes like beliefs and dispositions) and to their 'documentations' (by all the

¹. This is not meant to be a historically accurate picture; but see further, F. Lindenfeld, The Transformation of Positivism (Berkeley, U. of California P., 1980).
relevant physical objects in which the cultural life is solidified. But such 'analysis' does not mean decomposition into constituents, since Carnap insists that he is only giving a thesis of translatability and even then only in a moderate form: cultural objects are so reducible only because the psychological constructs enjoy epistemic primacy (in the traditional empiricist sense as we saw above), but nonetheless "we cannot [always] reproduce the sense of a statement about cultural objects in statements about psychological objects."  

We must also pay attention in distinguishing alternative pairs of pictures which may have some basic principles in common but their domain of application may well differ. Thus for Kant, a "totum syntheticum" differs from a "totum analyticum" in that the former is a whole composed of parts which are given separately (at least in thought) while the latter is a whole the parts of which are only possible or conceivable with reference to that whole. Kant thought the former to be applicable to bodies while the latter to space and time as such. A contemporary formalization of an atomistic part/whole relationship is one modelled on a theory of bodies adequate for the foundation of mechanics but such


2. Carnap, op.cit., p.92 and see. §§ 150-1 for a repudiation of psychologism; the only anti-individualist concession as regards social substances, such as groups and organisations, that Carnap is willing to make is that they are structures (as in my formulation of the atomistic picture) and not sets (p.232).

3. This is found in Kant's posthumously published 'Reflections'. I owe the information to H. Allison, Kant's Transcendental Idealism (N. Haven, Yale U.P., 1983), p.43 and n.26.

a model is inappropriate in the case of social substances, at
least, since it does not deal adequately with issues involved in
fallacies such as composition and division: e.g., what properties
are true of the atomistic parts are not necessarily true of
the whole. The latter has been a contested issue in the holism-
individualism debate in the social sciences in so far as ascription of
group-properties is irreducible to that of each member's properties.
The atomistic picture given above, together with its model from the
theory of bodies, is supposed to give us one token of mereological
essentialism the rationale of which was to give a representation of
wholes exhibiting collective, rather than distributive, predication.
However, it is not so clear that a version of individualism such as Popper's
situational logic could be assimilated to the atomistic picture since
A4 (see above) would entail that a social institution must be collectively
reducible to individual actions and intentions. But in view of the
explicit assumption of 'unintended consequences' a situational-logic
individualism should be better understood as exhibiting distributive
predication. In fact, it is consistent to give an atomistic representation

1. Cf. J.O. Wisdom's position which takes situational-logic's unintended
consequences to be distributively rather than collectively
predictable: 'Situational Individualism and the Emergent Group-
Properties' in R. Borger and F. Cioffi (eds.), Explanation in the
pp. 275-6. Wisdom ascribes "emergent consequences" to social
wholes, thus augmenting Popper's picture. This "transdividualism",
as Wisdom dubs it, allows for an emergent phenomenon (e.g.
'psycho-social depression' attributed to a whole social group)
to have independent power in that its scientific description is
not deducible from the given constituents (ibid., pp. 293-5).
Cf. A. Hauser's espousal of a 'holistic' situational logic in
matters of individual artistic creation in his The Sociology of Art
of social substances while accepting certain of the non-atomistic principles, e.g. NA3 but not NA4 (or not always), as being applicable to social events. However, such a position would be consistent only as long as an arbitrary individualist picture of social experience is presupposed; that is, only if delineating the boundaries of the individual person (within which the non-social resides) rests on the following two basic assumptions (a) that the individual mind has a structure which itself can be completely characterized (individuated and identified) in accordance with the above atomistic picture; i.e. that the mental contents of an individual subject are determined (logically) independently of social entities, and (b) whatever social objects or social properties are found to exist are given by contingently (not essentially) true, a posteriori statements only; no a priori or conceptual necessities are admissible from the underlying positivist perspective; and hence we are not allowed to posit the legitimacy of an alternative, transcendental inquiry which would provide the essentially holistic conditions that make the representation of the ontology of social reality possible.

I try to refute the former assumption in Part Two and the latter in the remaining of this Part.

7. Of phenomena in general, the most predominant alternative theories of wholes and parts were, on the one hand, that of mereology (from the precursors of Leśniewski to his followers, Leonard and Goodman), and on the other, that of set theory. Historically, the latter superseded the former mainly because mereology could not give expression to the distinction between 'inclusion of' (e.g. the totality of statements in the totality of Greeks) and 'membership of' (e.g. Pericles in that
totality). However, set-membership and set-inclusion are as inadequate as mereological distinctions in helping us represent the distinctive features of part/whole and non-causal dependencies or routes of individuation (as in sect 1 above) which is the task of social holism. The most elaborate and coherent alternative formal theory that social holism should employ is, I suggest, the one advanced by various thinkers at the turn of the century. This is a theory which makes room for the notion of 'moments' as distinct from those of parts or of members. The most explicit and worked out such theory is found in Husserl's work and in other pre-phenomenological writers who developed similar basic ideas during their research in various particular areas, e.g. psychology or law.

The crucial formal distinction to be registered first is that 'moments' are not 'pieces' in that while the latter are independent parts and can be presented separately from their wholes, moments are thus non-independent. In Husserl's sense moments are 'abstracta', i.e. they are, as entities, incomplete and can only be presented in their relation to the whole upon which they are founded. The notion of 'foundation' is logically more basic than that of the whole. By entering into a foundation-relation a moment becomes completed. But the relation amongst moments themselves and between them and the whole provides for a necessary and hierarchical ordering and so moments cannot be haphazardly


2. For a most valuable collection of such writings and recent work along the same lines, see B.Smith (ed.), Parts and Moments (München, Philosophia Verlag, 1982). See in particular the Introduction to this volume by B.Smith and K.Mulligan, 'Pieces of a Theory', pp.15-109.
blended with each other. Pieces, on the other hand, can be related in no particularly necessary (i.e. logical) structure; from which some of the fallacies mentioned above, e.g. composition and division, follow.

While moments are logically inseparable from their 'foundation relations', we can still treat moments as the subject matter of our inquiries, that is, we can discourse about them. This means that the distinction between moments and their wholes is an 'abstract' one in that the identity of moments is not separable or isolable from that of the others and from that of the relevant wholes: i.e., on this view, it is not accepted that their essence determines their existence. However, we can isolate moments in thought and speech (i.e. individuate them).

In this respect, Sokolowski emphasizes correctly that when a moment is mistakenly conflated with a piece or a whole "pointless dilemmas and paradoxes" arise as to how we are to proceed in unifying the disparate objects, and he gives, among other examples, that of the individual/community dichotomy between entities that "they should have not been detached philosophically in the first place". Although Sokolowski

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2. It would be interesting for further study to see how moments differ from Aristotle's definition of 'whole' (as distinct from the 'total') whereby the whole is either the form or "that which has the form": Metaphysics, Δ.1023b 12-25, 1024a; Z.10 and 17.1041b 12-34. Sokolowski, op. cit., notes a similarity to be found in the Categories, I.20; see for this G.E.M. Anscombe, 'Aristotle' in Three Philosophers (Oxford, Blackwell, 1961), pp. 7ff. A more interesting similarity can be found in Picino's 'holistic' theory of the mental: 'Concerning the Mind' in E. Cassirer, et al. (eds.), The Renaissance Philosophy of Man (Chicago, U. of Chicago P., 1948), at pp. 197-8.


4. Ibid., p. 16.
does not mention so, his point is reminiscent of Hegel's metaphor of the intricate unity between the specific 'individuality' and the 'universal being' as a "double gallery of pictures" reflecting each other (i.e. the individual and his external world). The philosophical questions about the individuation of a moment must be kept distinct from any empirical ones we wish to put forward. In this sense, for instance, anti-psychologism in logic or mathematics is like holism in social theory in that they are both based on philosophical grounds and not on empirical evidence. Thus when methodological individualism is thought to be superior to any kind of holism, because the latter is allegedly not empirically testable, individualism conceals from itself its prior philosophical standpoint from which the individual person/community duality has been placed within the medium of extensional part/whole relations.

8. We must further investigate, however, the formal character of the individual social person that the holistic picture of (hierarchical) structures of moments would require. Having moved away from the representation of the social world as a mechanical order of causal interactions between pluralities of atoms, I want to suggest that the alternative non-transitive, non-extensional, foundational relations amongst moments involve individual persons best understood as 'Leibnizian monade'. Although a monad was for Leibniz an individual, the possibility


2. In what follows I want to distinguish my use of the term 'monad' from that of "social monadism" attacked as individualistic by E.Gellner in his 'Explanation in History' repr. in J.O'Neill (ed.), Modes of Individualism and Collectivism (London, Heinemann, 1973), pp.248-63, at p.262. For an approach with some similarity to mine see the interesting paper by P.Koslowski, 'Maximum Coordination of Entelechial (cont...)
of a monad entering into relations with each other rests upon each monad's inherent 'entelechy'. Each such entelechy is "different or not completely similar to each other" and that their function is that they are "so many living mirrors or so many concentrated worlds". Two important points must be clarified and made precise: one, that a social person as a monad retains his/her own particularity and individuality; and second, the entelechial factor is responsible for each person's involvement in the non-mechanical nexus of foundation relations amongst moments. On the first requirement, each social person's individuality is not itself a unity or aggregate divided into sub-atomic parts (pieces) but is analyzable (by resolution) into constituents which are modifications or relational properties forming a complex (and not a compound) captured by each individual's "complete concept". Leibniz's notion of 'complete individual concept' must be understood as being

1 continued from previous page ....... Individuals: The Metaphysics of Leibniz and Social Philosophy', Ratio, XXVII (1985), 160-77; Koslowski's main concern is economic rationality and, although he wants to reconcile the individual and the social he attacks the wrong kind of holism (i.e. social essentialism). I must also stress that the notion of 'monad' here denotes a concrete entity and not a pure concept or a type/universal discussed by P.Strawson in Individuals (London, Methuen, 1959), pp.126ff.


3. This is congruent with Harré's project in Personal Being where the unique self or personal identity of each human being is established as a unity without recourse to 'modular' or 'sub-personal' independent entities.

a real definition rather than a nominal one. In the latter case all the predicates true of an individual person would be like an aggregate of pieces each of which exists independently of the whole individual. Rather, the individual is completely identified by a real definition which provides a description of the subject-predicates complex as one of 'identity', or 'agreement in intension' between each such predicate and the complex of all the predicates true of the individual person.1

Besides the singularity of each person guaranteed in this way, we can also see that the same approach can be applied to the case of what we called Parmenidean particulars. In this latter case, too, there is no distinction between real and nominal essence since these kinds of particulars are nothing over and above the relevant social powers or properties involved. These powers do not form an aggregate since we cannot exclude one or include another and still retain the identity of the particular.

That each monad relates with each other in a non-mechanical mode (unlike its supplement: the body) is a consequence of its inherent entelechy. This latter notion, originally Aristotle's own, has usually carried an unfavourable connotation due mainly to its employment in obscure organicist dogmas.2 However, we can extract a significant and


2. As far as I know, after Leibniz the idea was revived in the course of debates about vitalism in biology at the turn of the century; W.Driesch was the most prominent exponent of 'entelechy' as the formative powers of an organism and as existing outside space: see E.Cassirer, The Problem of Knowledge, Engl.Transl. (N.Haven, Yale U.P., 1950), pp.195-200.
useful notion when we specify the entelechial factor of a monad as the complex of teleological activity and self-consciousness. The entelechial character of "windowless" monads enables them to interrelate and communicate outside the causal-mechanical order.

The well-known Leibizian idea that each monad reflects of mirrors the whole universe in different degrees and each from its own perspective can be made more precise by approaching it in two complementary ways. From the point of view of the mental we may equate entelechy with the mind's activity the complexity of which can be analysed as involving at least the possession of concepts, the shared use of language and intentionality (these three themes take up the whole of Part Two below).¹ So we can understand the metaphor of reflection² as symbolizing the possibility of human conceptual communication; this would place social persons qua monads outside extensional part/whole relations. Parallel to this, the individuation of each person by the relevant 'complete individual concept' involves relational predicates³ by means of which

1. In this I depart from rendering 'entelechy' as either 'complete actuality' (as opposed to potentiality), or as 'perfection' or 'self-sufficiency'. The latter is Leibniz's own, and both of them together with that of 'activity' or 'movement towards telos' are all found in Aristotle's works. The grammatical form of the word itself is notoriously ambiguous and has given rise to competing interpretations.

2. Bosanquet spells out the relation between the individual mind and the social context in a manner strikingly similar to Leibniz's mirroring monads (without mentioning Leibniz) in his The Philosophical Theory of the State, 4th Ed., (London, Macmillan, 1923), 158-166.

3. Leibniz's 'monadism' was wrongly accused for being incompatible with the acceptance of relations or relational predicates that were necessary for other aspects of his system (e.g., the thesis of the plurality of possible worlds). Recent scholarship, however, has shown that in Leibniz's system non-monadic predicates are allowed: see Ishiguro (p.27, n. 2 above) and F.D'Agostino, 'Leibniz on Compossibility and Relational Predicates' rept. in R.S.Woolhouse (ed.), Leibniz (Oxford, O.U.P., 1981), pp.89-103.
persons co-exist within hierarchical structures of whole/moments relations. So the entelechial character of monads is in harmony with the demand that each person is a unique, non-repeatable self without being a solipsistic atom.

9. I would like to round off the discussion in this chapter by bringing in a further issue which links up with the following chapter. This issue has to do with the ideal or theoretical virtue of informativeness that any picture of social reality, either 'holistic' or 'individualistic', endeavours to attain. Here I will confine my remarks to considerations arising from within a 'holistic' enterprise as my purpose is to direct attention to a type of problem that must be acknowledged before the ontological commitments of social holism are to be assessed. The intuitive idea of a theory's informativeness can be associated with those formal features of a theory that ensure that by allowing more facts or a greater variety of facts to be intelligible descriptions of the world (or a segment of it) the theory gains in informative power. This initial rough sketch of informativeness brings with it the correlated ideal of enhancing explanatory power. We must notice, however, that if we characterize the former ideal in terms of the latter, it is quite consistent to hold that two competing theories or pictures share the same domain of application and that they only differ in that one of them is richer because it juxtaposes additional facts to explain the same phenomena. For instance, in determining the underlying ontology of a particular kinship terminology one theoretical account superimposes cultural facts upon merely biological relations in order to explain the same kinship phenomena. Similarly, in the case of so-called rational explanation
of an agent's actions there arises a divergence of the informativeness of those accounts that rely on the agent's own reasons for action (beliefs and desires) and those accounts that supplement these either with hermeneutical 'intersubjective meanings', or with 'objective interests', or the socio-economic factors causally responsible for the formation of the (contingently actual) beliefs and desires that the agent explicitly affirms. But the problem with such a type of informativeness, attached in this way firmly to the ideal of explanatory power, is that it makes difficult to appreciate the sense in which holism could be a genuine alternative ontology to individualism. It appears that holism turns out to be a mode of explanation either supplementary to or complementary with individualism without altering the latter's basic ontological presuppositions (tacit or not). That is, without abandoning, among other things, the individualist perspective from which an agent's beliefs, intentions and other propositional attitudes are identified.

But behind these and other more general problems lies a different approach to the kind of informativeness with which the formal character

1. Two examples (one general and one more specific) of a treatment in which such an explanatory divergence is shown as inescapable are G. Currie, 'The Role of Normative Assumptions in Historical Explanation', *Phil. of Sci.*, 47 (1980), 456-73; and R. Miller, 'Methodological Individualism and Social Explanation', *Phil. of Sci.*, 45 (1978), 387-414.

2. Here the term is taken in the strict sense of Bohr's 'Principle of Complementarity' with respect to the properties of macro-objects vs. those of micro-objects. For a clear exposition and interesting application of this see N. Brody and P. Oppenheim, 'Application of Bohr's Principle of Complementarity to the Mind-Body Problem', *J. of Phil.*, LXVI (1969), 97-113.

3. For instance, another problem is that a theory's informativeness is inversely proportional to its credibility from a point of view like van Fraasen's "constructive empiricism": see his 'Theory Confirmation: Tension and Conflict' in Weingartner and Czermak (eds.), *loc. cit.*, pp.319-29.
of the ontology of social holism can be associated with. We may conceive such informativeness as having two dimensions: for convenience, we may say that one direction tends towards 'comprehensiveness', while the other tends towards 'depth'. The former dimension is perhaps straightforward and relatively unproblematic. The crucial idea here is that social holism offers a specification of the individual person which is rich in informative content since each individual human being's mental states, actions, etc. are characterized concretely within the relevant nexus of whole/moments relations. In this way informativeness tends to be idiographic. Somewhat simplified, we may say that the more comprehensive or 'holistic' the description of the social context tends to be, the more concrete and singular the individual person becomes. However, problems arise when we turn to formal considerations pertinent to the other dimension of informativeness.

The arrow towards depth leads us to an examination of the possibility that there exist latent structures which may be taken as being responsible for the phenomena we want to explain or understand. Following this approach one comes up against the vital question of whether, and if so how, one is in a position to provide a legitimating account of postulating such latent and unobservable structures. But at this point two different types of considerations force themselves upon us: the one has to do with the nature of the subject-matter which each particular theory is investigating; the other is related to espistemological requirements and their implications for theory-construction. The former comprises a cluster of questions concerning both the internal logic and the pragmatic value of a theoretical account

which views its subject-matter as decomposable into specific elements. This strategy of dissecting purports to lead our analytical inquiries in such a way that explanatory adequacy cannot be attained unless we have reached the elementary constituents, and the properties thereof, of our domain or subject-matter. This may be a manifestation of a basic belief or attitude that understanding and explanation have the primary, if not the exclusive, piecemeal goal of illuminating only a tiny fraction of reality; besides, in the social sciences, this can, perhaps, be taken to be the opposite pole of 'grand theories'.¹ The second kind however are considerations whose sole function is to remind us of the traditional epistemological concern with the reliability of our knowledge. In this sense this cluster of questions examines the conditions which must be met before our beliefs about the reality of 'deep structures' can gain the status of true knowledge.

One qualification though is necessary here with respect to the 'reality' of the latent structures postulated. This has to do with the fact that although we can agree that something is correctly said to be observable, this does not imply that the status of 'being' or 'existent' we attribute to it has always the same sense. Here we may follow Aristotle's opinion that there are not different kinds but distinct senses of 'being'. Thus the common property 'unobservable' does not have to imply a unitary sense of 'being'.² Having this in mind we can appreciate the difference between saying that something in the realm of nature remains unobservable and that we can detect its presence only

² E.g. Metaphysics, B 1003ᵃ 33, Γ 1003ᵇ; Categories, 2ᵃ 11 - 4ᵇ 19.
through its manifested effects or dispositions on the one hand; and on the other, that something in the social realm remains unobservable while we have no reason to deny it the property of 'being' because we come to believe (via the acceptance of a theory see following chapters) that its essence, as it were, is to be thus unobservable. So if we accept Aristotle's metaphysical position whereby the different senses of 'being' are ultimately related (for him on the basis of "primary substance") and yet distinct, we can make justice to the idea that one of the fundamental distinctions between the natural and the social sciences lies precisely at this point: namely, that if we are prepared to countenance unobservable entities in both kinds of sciences it is the distinguishing mark of the social sciences that any such entities postulated have this characteristic inherent in them. Whereas it is a limitation of our human experiential faculties that an entity may remain unobservable it is no such limitation of ours that certain social entities remain unobservable. And this is because the reason why they are so lies elsewhere, namely, in that it is their essence (as determined by our theories) to remain unobservable because their 'being' has a different sense from that of physical entities. This approach has I believe the unique merit of retaining such social entities within the realm of the intelligible whilst avoiding unnecessary and in the end plausible objections that an alternative

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2. This does not, of course, imply that it is impossible for different, competing theories to give different equally plausible, such specifications.
approach would have attracted: i.e. that such social entities appear to be thoroughly mystical. In order to further illuminate this last point and thus approach the problem I have alluded to, it would be instructive to borrow an analogy from within the context of modern physics in which one can appreciate more fully the significance of the debate on field theories. I think one could trace some parallel considerations in favour or against the actuality of fields and the relative merits of theories which make use of such a notion. For instance, to the question how we know that the fields of physical science exist (i.e. as these are used to account for gravitation in the General Theory of Relativity and in many other branches of physics), we commonly receive the answer that we only know such a field by its effects. Furthermore, Berkeley-type epistemological arguments cannot be said to have a sting against the actuality of fields but not against that of point-particles, since the latter are themselves as remote from sense-data as fields are. The belief that the only entities to exist are material things (or, in the social world, individual agents) turns out to be unsupported in so far as material things (individual agents) can only exist in space and through time (in social reality actualized as configurations of political forces, and through historical time). But space and time (or spacetime) and other basic categories (e.g. causality), whatever the sense in which they are said to be instantiated, are features of reality and fields are only attributes of Space and Time. Thus it cannot be sustained, at least on the premisses of this argument, that fields are 'less real' than material things or that their reality is of a different kind. For this would entail a

contradiction. Analogously one who is prepared to accept the thesis of social holism according to which the actions and deliberations of individual agents issue from ascriptions of mental contents in which essentially social entities (see Part Two) appear meaningfully, then one cannot countenance such a notion of a 'person' as social agent without also attributing actuality to such social, non-individualistic, entities (e.g., states of affairs and their properties). For again it would be contradictory to assert both that the particular cognitive, connative and actional aspects of a person exist only in 'social space' and through historical time, and yet that the latter do not exist because we cannot observe their 'field'-like features directly but only through their effects, viz., through the formation of these aspects of a person's mental and praxiological life. As above, from the epistemic standpoint both the individual and the social 'field' are as relatively remote or as close to our theorizing about them as things and fields are, relatively, from sense experience. Thus the metaphor of a 'social field' can be initially of a considerable heuristic value and not merely a figure of speech no less misleading and obscure than the picture it purports to illuminate. But one should be reminded that as the debate about field theory in physics (as opposed to action-at-distance theory) turned on philosophical considerations, so too the issue concerning the actuality of 'social fields' cannot be settled by empirical investigation. This is so because we have first to be clear about what we mean when we claim that such entities can be actual, i.e. what such concepts imply and in what way their use constrains our further judgments, before we start to inquire about the validity of the results of empirical applications within the context of these notions.
This means that in order to move away from mere metaphors and give substance to our claims about the associated notions, e.g., 'social field', 'social space', etc., we must agree (perhaps only to some degree) on what criteria ascription of existence or actuality to the designated entities is to be based. For instance, one can point to a specified subset of effects or properties of the fields in physics, e.g., momentum and energy, in order to induce belief in their reality. However, in the case of social reality it is arguable if we can envisage a situation in which one can be quite clear and definite about which such effects or features should be elevated to the status of criteria by means of which 'social fields' and the like would be taken as real. It seems to me that it is, if not impossible, at least quite difficult to disentangle the question of what criteria are to be selected as appropriate from the question of what theoretical purpose our resultant investigations are to serve.

Which features are selected as relevant in order for us to be able to believe in the 'being' of entities such as 'social field', 'social forces', etc., - before our empirical studies based on them begin - determines to a large extent (if not entirely) our beliefs about the notion of personhood or of social agent that issues from the acceptance of such entities as real.

1. Similarly one may take Durkheimian "collective social propensities" as real properties of the whole social system and as analogous to physical propensities which in Popper's interpretation of probability turn out to resemble fields of forces: see P. Urbach, 'Social Propensities', Br. J. Phil. Sci., 31 (1980), 317-28.
If these points are valid then there are two ways we can view our predicament. One could maintain that as a further consequence of the distinguishing mark of 'unobservability' in social-theoretic discourse we must not expect that the manner in which our metaphysical pictures of the social world are constructed is that of 'input-output'. That is, it would be misleading for us to judge our pictures as quite independent of our initial criteria according to which we were led to ascribe actuality to those entities. On the other hand, one who feels uneasy about such actualities would immediately retort by claiming that if the above consequence is indeed unavoidable, then we cannot escape the charge of circularity. This would imply that, within the specific context of the formal character social holism/individualism, we would be begging the question if we came to accept a holistic understanding of the individual person (his/her mental and practical activity) on the basis of having, prior to this, accepted the existence of such holistic entities as 'social field' and the like.

Someone who places ontological parsimony quite high up in the list of theoretical virtues would be thus inclined to reject a picture of social holism that succumbs to such a vicious circle. It would indeed be question-begging if we commenced our investigations into the metaphysical and logical nature of persons as social individuals on the unshakeable presupposition that a 'social field' picture lies at the foundations. This would be equivalent to conceding that what it is we wish to investigate is already situated within a causal nexus for which a 'social field' is responsible. In this way a specific individual's belief-token could be represented as a specific point (and not as an atom) of a field. This would further mean that the principles
of individuation and identification for it would be determined by what we accepted as the particular character of this field. But the latter enjoys the status of actuality, as we saw above, only by virtue of its effects. But then, again, which features or effects are we prepared to consider as relevant criteria for the field's existence? If we answer by saying that we posited 'social fields' as existent on the basis of their observed effects, viz., the specific points within the causal nexus of the field, we would be undoubtedly moving into a circle. In other words the critic of this version of social holism based on the analogy of fields would have made a devastating objection: the holistic nature of the mental contents and actions ascribed to an individual follows from the fact that 'social fields' exist; that such social (holistic) entities exist, though unobserved, follows from the fact of the holism of the categories of the mental and of action.

It is important to note here that the criticism against this version of social holism, on the grounds given above, is not an instance of a related but distinct reasoning, viz., that of infinite regress. Rather, what we are facing here is a classic instance of the charge of "diallēlos" reasoning. Our critic points to the inherent circularity in any account of social holism which makes use of the idiom of functions such that: the value of a function is a specific individual but the argument of the function is not independently characterized. And thus we move from social wholes to individual agents and back again. This criticism is especially forceful when it is directed against a particular conception of holism whereby the proper subject matter of social scientific inquiry is the study of social wholes and individual
agents via wholes. By contrast if we were content with a different version in which holism offers prescriptions with respect to the study of social wholes only and not individual agents as such, we could maintain that the charge of circularity is not applicable in that case. For one could hold that such a demarcation of the objects of social inquiry is sufficient on its own to provide distinct explanations (understanding) in the two fields, i.e. with respect to macro- vs. micro-social phenomena. This line of thought according to which holism is only concerned with the study of social wholes qua wholes is what Popper takes to be the essence of the "historicism" he is fighting with.\footnote{1}

This somehow emaciated version of holism faces the additional difficulty of delineating the boundaries separating the macro-level from the micro-level when both overlap with the different distinction between wholes and individuals; besides it must justify its claim that there should be such a severance among theoretical pursuits and consequently among attendant methodological directives without prejudging the issue with respect to the two kinds of entities it allows for in its ontology; it is not easy to envisage how such a version of half- or quasi-holism, as it were, could ever get off the ground.

It thus appears that the second dimension of informativeness leads to a problem in so far we are interested in formal considerations of the ontology of social holism.\footnote{2} But the problem seems to dissolve if we

1. Poverty of Historicism, p.18 and passim.
construe social holism as a picture of whole/moments hierarchical relations and the individual social person as Leibnizian entelechy (as outlined above).\(^1\) However, in order to see more precisely the manner in which such a problem is to be avoided we must appreciate two more general requirements that a picture of social holism must take into account. One has to do with the character of some transcendental or a priori assumptions that are necessary in the construction of a holistic theory; this I discuss in the remainder of Part One. The other requirement is related to the way in which we can make more precise the social-holistic nature of the individual's mental contents; this is the theme of Part Two.

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CONCLUSION

The starting point has been that to understand how it is possible that the social world is constituted as a unified totality, holism should begin by following two formal principles. These establish the validity of modes of individuating and identifying the types of constituent elements. In the light of these, holism can be viable only if the problem of parts and wholes is solved in terms of the idea of hierarchical relations between "moments" and the wholes upon which they are founded. It is important to stress again the central point of this proposal, namely, that the notion of 'foundation' is logically prior to that of 'whole'.

The main point of these considerations was to show that the formal mode brings forth the significance of kinds of relations exhibited by social ontology. With respect to the individuation of elements it was maintained that there are internal relations (the case of 'P-particulars' was an exemplification of this). With respect to the identification of entities it was held that the relations are non-causal. It followed that we cannot accept a characterization of individual human beings as inherently atomic: i.e. that it is untenable that their individuation and identification by means of intrinsic properties remains constant irrespective of their combination with each other in forming social substances or, more significantly, of their actual appearance as subjects of social events. The individual would remain ontologically autonomous regardless of any individualist concessions about social situations, as long as the social world is taken to exhibit part/whole relations modeled on mereological essentialism or aggregates' composition or set theory. I tried to
refute this extensional model on various grounds and replace it with the above-mentioned alternative idea of "moments".

Given all this, holism was shown to construe the formal character of the individual-qua-social person as an "entelechial Leibnizian monad". Two important properties were ensured. One was that each individual retains his/her particularity without being a solipsistic atom. And the other was that once individuals are placed within the non-mechanical (non-causal) nexus of foundation relations amongst 'moments', their inter-relation takes the form of conceptual communication. The latter, I advocated, is analyzed as the possibility of possessing and applying social concepts, of meaningful linguistic expression (i.e., shared use of language) and of the intentionality of the mental. These three entelechial factors constitute the individuals as social persons. This is the theme of Part Two.

However, the inquiries into formal ontology have disclosed an indispensable feature of this reconsidered theory of holism: this has to do with the idea of necessity. The non-contingent character of what the two basic principles and the non-extensional moment/whole relations entail becomes apparent once we recall that it was required that: (i) the constitution of the social world should not be seen as the result of combinations of elements which could be combined otherwise than what the relevant internal relations establish; (ii) the reality of each type of entity should not depend on causal antecedents; and (iii) 'moments' are incomplete unless they are presented in relation to the whole upon
which they are founded. Consequently, it was suggested at various points that holism is not merely an alternative to individualism option. The reason for this lies in that holism, in putting forward the formal approach, was seen to require an anti-empiricist standpoint. This was brought forth more prominently by the antinomy discussed at length in the final section. There we observed why certain versions of holism should be discarded. The main problem was the criteria for the ascription of reality to social entities that are revealed by what I called "depth informativeness".

Thus the next chapter carries on the inquiry into the conditions to be met if holism is to be possible by looking into the notions of 'necessity' and 'reality'. Then in Chapter III, I take up the point made (at the end of section 3 of the present chapter) with respect to nominalism by presenting the active role of theoretical language in determining ontological commitments. This is incorporated into a discussion of Popper's impossibility argument which will give us a firm understanding of the logical grounds why holism cannot be the empirical opposite of individualism. Taken together the results of the next two chapters provide the requirements of a transcendental framework of holism.
Chapter II

SOME ISSUES CONCERNING 'A PRIORI NECESSITY' AND 'REALITY'
INTRODUCTION

At various points in the previous chapter (and especially in its last section) the considerations of formal ontology have made clear that holism cannot be legitimized unless it overthrows the empiricist conviction that whatever social elements (e.g. social events) or social properties are found to be real are to be discovered by contingently true, a posteriori statements only. In what follows I propose that problems of ontological commitment (in particular with respect to the unobservability of certain social entities) are associated with the philosophical question of what the idea of 'theory' involves. Before going into the issue of the reference of theoretical terms (next chapter), I should first inquire into the kind of theoretical knowledge that should govern the existential commitments of holism.

Therefore the aim of this chapter is to demonstrate the transcendental aspects of the activity of theoretical representations by means of which we gain access to the social world. Such an activity is the philosophical theory of holism unfolded in this dissertation. In this way we confer transcendental validity to the ascription of 'reality' to the elements and relations of holism's ontological domain. But an indispensable feature of this would be the introduction of the notion of a priori necessity. The latter, it is argued, characterizes the mode in which holism posits the formal constitution of the social world. As we saw, this was one of the results of the preceding chapter which receives a fuller treatment here.
A summary of the discussion is this. Section 1 explains how the notion of theory involves a certain relation between epistemology and the ontological question of 'what is'. This argument is the starting point of section 2 which considers in detail the manner in which theoretical representations are formed. In a series of reflections on scepticism I try to show how the complex notion of 'reality vs. appearance' arises and that it is connected to the possibility of our epistemic access to truth (i.e. our theoretical activity of constructing representations). The particular purpose of these points is to provide the general philosophical ground on which the above-mentioned transcendental aspects of our holistic account lie. In this sense we begin to appreciate the indispensability of the idea of necessity and its specific applicability to the claims of holism: section 3. In order to specify the status of necessary statements, in section 4 I first analyze and criticize the traditional empiricist view and then look at the conventionalist one. In section 5 I dwell on the third view, the well-known Quinean stricures against the analytic/synthetic distinction, and try to see how we can safeguard the a priori conception of necessity demanded by our inquiry. Finally in the last section I present three instances of a priori modes of reasoning in the history of the philosophy of the social sciences; although distinct from mine, these are complementary attempts to eschew empiricist positions that give rise to an individualist outlook.
1. In the final section of the previous chapter I claimed that social holism faces problems of ontological commitment one possible solution of which is to embrace the idea that 'to exist' has different senses. This is an option for one who believes that, in general, if different kinds of things qua subject-matters of theoretical inquiry have different constitution or properties, then it follows that the sense in which we want to ascribe existence to these kinds differs in each case — as, e.g., in statements about numbers, God, witches, cultural artefacts, etc. Alternatively, one may think that this way of putting the matter prejudges what, in the end, only our theories can say exists. Quine\(^1\) who is usually taken to be promoting a unitary notion of 'existence', was not in fact so much interested in the meaning of the term, as to how we come to know what an already formulated particular theory commits itself to (i.e. its domain of objects).

He further claimed that we can only find out what a certain theory says there is by translating its existence-statements to those of another with which we work our way through. The upshot is not whether there are different senses of 'to exist' (for Quine there aren't) but that there must always be an inevitable background of theory against which we can check various ontological commitments.

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If the general term 'theory' refers thus to an axiomatic system of existence statements about the world we are free to postulate at the outset the fundamental axioms on which alternative theories are built. In this sense the neutrality of this mode of talk refers to the fact that nothing prior stands in our way of choosing a particular theory rather than another. To be sure such a selection will be based upon independently held criteria of various sorts. Among the latter we may choose to focus on that of 'simplicity of hypothesis' which enjoys a reverent history of primacy in the canon of historical positivism: the locus classicus of the positivist syntactical criteria for a theory-cum-satisfactory explanation is the 16th cent. Osiander's notorious Preface to Copernicus' De Revolutionibus in which the first formal criterion is akin to the usual D-N model while the second prescribes that if we are faced with a situation in which more than one theory meets the former requirement then the simplest is to be chosen.  

The two aspects inherent in any initial analysis of the idea of 'theory', viz. that of the metaphysical question of 'what is' (and its relation to different senses of 'what is real') on the one hand, and the question of the strictly methodological virtues that we attach to our own intellectual constructs, i.e. theories, on the other, can be better understood if we appreciate their interrelation in the following way.

1. For a list of such criteria or 'virtues' (such as conservatism, modesty, simplicity, generality, refutability) see W. Quine and J. Ullian, The Web of Belief (N.York, Random House, 1978) ch.VI: 'simplicity' is here most prominent.

2. For a cogent critique of this see Harré and Madden, Causal Powers pp.119-23: where the famous paradoxes resulting from the underlying assumption of the independence of empirical predicates are discussed.
These two basic or primary ideas, about the ultimate goal and the best method of attaining it that we assign to our theories, enjoy their status against a common epistemological backdrop: this is the importance we place upon one of the functions of theories, namely that of explanatory power. I think that both the metaphysical or primary question about reality and the associated debate between realism vs. anti-realism in science, on the one hand, and the methodological strictures connected with the actual (i.e. existent or applied) scientific inquiries on the other, converge on the point at which we choose to pick out as the most significant function that of explanatory power. Though the desiderata belong, strictly speaking, to two different categories (metaphysics and methodology respectively) there is an underlying 'attitude' that informs both of them: namely, what is understood to be involved in, or how we make sense of, our engagement in the scientific enterprise, when we focus on explanatory power as the centre, or primary aim of our theoretical activities.

As is commonly understood the notion of explanation so intimately linked to that of theory involves that of informativeness as introduced in Chapter I. The idea of informativeness brings forth the common element that the two questions above share. It further enables us to ascertain some additional implications of it. The idea of informativeness then, associated with explanatory power attached to theories, provides the common epistemological backdrop against which we can appreciate the

1. It is important to note here the distinction between 'reticular' or 'abstractive' vs. 'hypothetical' or 'explanatory' forms of theory, a distinction central to the debates between positivists and realists: see R.Harré, Matter and Method (London, Macmillan, 1964), pp.8-20; and for its historical background see E.Nagel, The Structure of Science, pp.125-9.
meanings of our two questions, i.e. about the real as well as about the method. The common element which emerges through our focusing on explanatory power and from this on to informativeness is our interest in coming to believe, i.e. to know, what our theories inform us there is and in what manner. The latter is connected with our further worrying about the epistemological reliability\(^1\) of our theories. Thus informativeness presupposes the rather basic idea or intuitive conviction that there is something about which we wish to be informed (be knowledgeable) in a warranted manner.

In view of such considerations the intelligibility of the two questions can be seen as anchored within the traditional controversy between the realist vs. idealist theories of truth (correspondence vs coherence) and its modern version with respect to scientific theories. Taking our theories to be our own intellectual products we naturally posit the questions of (in Aquinas' words) "\textit{adequatio rei et intellectus}". My contention then is that, though the question of what is real and the problem of the reliable method belong initially to two distinct categories, they nevertheless converge at the point at which we choose explanatory power (involving informativeness) as the most significant function assigned to our theories.

The notion of 'adequation' which I have just extracted out of this cluster of points has of course a venerable history although it has appeared in many disguises. One could readily name a few instances or areas in which I wish to claim we come up against this

\(^{1}\) Versions of the reliabilist programme of the justification of beliefs has been attacked as circular; for a defence of it see J.Heil, 'Reliability and Epistemic Merit', \textit{Austr.J. of Phil.}, 62 (1984), 327-38.
problem. Apart from the notorious difficulties that invalidate a naïve correspondence theory of truth, we encounter the same question in the application of the medieval distinction between suppositio and significatio; in the hermeneutical interpretation of the historical past and the social present; in one variety of the subject-object dichotomy and some Marxist attempts to overcome it: in a contemporary brilliant attempt to apply a corrected version of Lockeian ideas about language in scientific problems of naming; in Winch's interpretation of social theory that brings together the tradition of Kant and the later Wittgenstein, and of course in the course of investigating the analytic-synthetic distinction. The problem I want to emphasize comes out clearly in a particular passage in the 'Dialectic of Aesthetic Judgement' in which Kant distinguishes and contrasts the 'intuitive' mode of knowledge with that of 'discursive' knowledge. He says revealingly:

1. This Marxist position is associated predominantly with Lukács and in particular with his category of "possible consciousness" as the maximum adequation to reality possible by the collective consciousness of a class (although it might not realize it); this has been further elaborated by L. Goldmann in his Lukács and Heidegger (London, RKP, 1977).


"Intuitions are always required to verify the reality of our concepts ... But to call for a verification of the objective reality of rational concepts, i.e. of ideas, and what is more, on behalf of the theoretical cognition of such a reality, is to demand an impossibility, because absolutely no intuition adequate to them can be given." (3)

My claim that by isolating the idea of informativeness of theories we can appreciate the connection between the two demands or questions rests on a further claim about the direction of this dependence. And I think that my present thesis runs counter to the received or orthodox interpretation that one is offered in historiographical texts on the matter. Commonly the explication given starts by presenting the general metaphysical quest for what 'is' or what is 'existent'; and then the central or defining notion of epistemology proper is introduced, namely the quest for a warranted or most reliable method which would justify our beliefs in what is 'real'. Contrary to this, I submit that our concern with the legitimation of our beliefs determines our disposition to posit something which we conceive as 'reality' as opposed to mere 'appearance'. This might be misleading if my claim is taken to be asserting something different which, though related, is not what I have in mind: viz., that abiding by what we are convinced to be the epistemologically most reliable method determines what we perforce accept as real. This is of course by definition true and indisputable. But it has to do with the application of our prior concern with the central idea of epistemology and concerns, as it were, the particular 'form' that this central idea or 'worry' assumes. In this sense empiricism, for instance, cashes this idea ultimately in the bank of experience only. And then what the empiricist allows to be a belief-qua-

knowledge of what is real follows suit. Other mainstream philosophical doctrines propose different such legitimations.

What my idea points at, however, is the prior connection on which the one above is based: that the very inception of the idea of epistemology, irrespective of its variety of forms, determines our positing of the question of the 'real'. If we look at science, for instance, we see that in the dispute between realism and anti-realism a sophisticated version of the former position argues from explanatory success to truth - which anti-realistis find question-begging. But whether we go along with realism in science or not, its claim highlights my thesis that at the foundations of this claim lies the connection I am pointing at: that our wish to concentrate on or favour explanatory success in scientific theories (which at the practical level amounts to our attempt to profitably control nature for our needs), as the realist would understand it, determines our wish to discriminate appearance from reality (or fallibility from certainty).

2. My reflections so far fall within the area known as 'philosophical anthropology' which, following Hacking, we shall place within what Kant, late in his life, inaugurated by asking his fourth major philosophical question: "What is Man?"  


2. I must, however, stress that Kant's own lectures and scattered notes on anthropology reveal that his approach and aim were entirely empirical. In this sense I do not follow the historical Kant; see G.A.Kelly, Idealism, Politics and History (Cambridge, CUP, 1969), pp.133-9.
Hacking's own proposed anthropological 'story' begins with the image of human beings as essentially representers, that is, not as homo faber but rather as homo depictor. People first create theories as public representations and once there exists such a practice a second-order concept is created, namely the concept of 'reality'. Then at the third stage when the systems of representations multiply, scepticism ensues and the concept of 'appearance' is introduced, this time by philosophy. Prima facie, I find this evolutionary picture highly original and interesting but my discussion so far could not be accommodated within it. This three-tier picture is incorrect in that it imposes a strict structural segmentation on the origins of the concepts and the practices, such that the order of priority offered does not seem to avoid the traditional readings and thus not to present us with an entirely novel alternative interpretation.

One is left unclear whether Hacking construes his 'story' in such a sense that would make the subject of philosophical anthropology virtually identical with the subject-matter of the 'physiology of the concepts of the human understanding' as practiced by Locke. Only in this latter 'sense' is Hacking's picture indeed novel for, as he himself notes, Locke proposed that we first have appearance, then form mental representations and finally, seek reality. ¹ But if the discipline of philosophical anthropology is to be akin to the Kantian concern with the transcendental grounds of the possibility of all experience, then Hacking's picture is not really an alternative reading of the history of philosophy. If we turn to consider the central problem here, namely the traditional concern to give an answer to the Cartesian sceptical

¹. Hacking, op.cit., p.141.
challenge, we can clearly detect the sources from which my present 'picture' gets its strength.

If we accept a 'story' such as Hacking's as an example of an 'as a matter of fact' philosophical anthropology then we would end up with an instance of what I want to deny: viz., a reading which explicitly espouses the cleavage between the origins of the metaphysical question on the one hand, and those of the epistemological question on the other. Since I wish to deny that this is at least a plausible interpretation or 'story' I shall construe the subject-matter of philosophical anthropology as being about the relation, or order of priority, between these two questions. And in this sense I argue that it would be wrong to admit such a cleavage and then try to construct a plausible 'story' that purports to account for the causal directions involved.

This would be wrong because if we do not want philosophical anthropology to be a purely empirical study of the formation of some basic concepts, or of the actual use of a language, etc., then to merely discover and isolate the causal factors responsible would be question-begging. We would not have provided our premisses with a basis of legitimation. To achieve the latter we have to look at the 'transcendental' (in Kant's sense only) and not at the empirical relation between diverse proposed answers to the two fundamental questions. Although I could not do justice to all the complexities of this metaphilosophical problem I would like to present briefly a line along which one could profitably search for such a relation, and thus construct an alternative picture or 'story'. 
I believe the general question of scepticism lends itself as a pivotal point here. One could point right at the outset that the character of the specific relation we are after is what modernity bequeathed to us in the very title of Descartes' own famous Discourse as a general method "of rightly conducting the reason and seeking for truth in the sciences." By following the vicissitudes of the modern version of the sceptical challenge to our knowledge of the reality of the external world one can appreciate the extent to which this variety of philosophical scepticism differs from ancient Pyrrhonism and thus avoids positing a reality totally inaccessible to human beings - which would easily invite the reply that if such is indeed our unavoidable predicament then what concern could it ever be of ours? Besides if this was our reading of the challenge Descartes posed then it would follow that such a concept of 'reality' is merely a philosopher's invention. We would thus be imprisoned within the confines of a purely empirical standpoint and the a priori character of the discipline of philosophical


2. But cf. M. Burnyeat's scholarly demonstration of Descartes' scepticism as a radicalization of the whole ancient tradition in: 'Idealism and Greek Philosophy: What Descartes Saw and Berkeley Missed' in G. Vessey (ed.), Idealism - Past and Present Cambridge, CUP, 1982), pp. 19-50, esp. 41-3 and 49; see also his 'The sceptic in his place and time' in R. Rorty, et al. (eds.), Philosophy in History, pp. 225-54. I think the issue turns on how to construe 'external' empirical reality, i.e. either as the social environment or as the one of natural phenomena, and then enquire about the positioning of the 'inner' according to ancient sceptics. For an intricate reading of the fine complexities within the ancient tradition of scepticism itself see M. Frede's paper following Burnyeat's in Rorty, ibid. For the conservative social implications of Pyrrhonian 'ataraxia' and of some modern re-affirmations of it, see B. Williams' contribution to M. I. Finlay (ed.), The Legacy of Greece (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1981) pp. 202-55, at 240-1.
anthropology would be lost. Moreover such a conception would be question-begging once more since it would presuppose what it sets out to challenge, namely our everyday notion of empirical reality the knowledge of which nothing would seem to threaten. If, that is, we confine our scepticism only within a reality which is 'invented' by philosophical speculation for its own sake, then such a conception of 'reality' would presuppose the ordinary one (i.e., at least as being contrasted with the everyday one). Whether Descartes' proof is convincing or not my claim here is that one cannot even examine the conclusion if one fails to appreciate the link between the two questions - i.e. truth and method - as revealed by the title of Descartes' essay. Thus separating the questions results in the two problems I have just identified. In addition even if we disregard these complications a 'story' like Hacking's would be at odds here since he explicitly wants to assert that only 'appearance', and neither 'representation' nor 'reality', is a thoroughly philosophical concept.¹

If we dwell a little more on this pivotal point we can find an additional confirmation of the view I am advocating, that is, that we cannot make sense of a human practice of representing independently of or prior to any notion of 'reality vs. appearance'. This supporting claim has to do with Descartes' separation of true (reliable) knowledge from dreaming. In his scheme of scepticism a Cartesian employs a tacit presupposition to the effect that such a separation or distinction is

meaningful as existing in advance, i.e. as basic. This means that Descartes' sceptic could not even present his argument unless he had already presupposed that, unlike dreaming, reliable knowledge by means of the senses is supposed to guarantee the existence of external reality. Though he would challenge that we would ever be certain that we attain the latter - i.e. that we can ever devise tests safeguarding reliability by founding these tests on sense experience itself - this very doubt could not have been intelligible (and thus have the force it has had) had it not been anchored on the general idea that the possibility of our epistemic access to the truth (both in the form of everyday beliefs and scientific theories-qua-representations), itself issues in the complex notion of 'reality as opposed to appearance'. Otherwise this version of scepticism could not even have a target against which it would be directed. The notion of appearance would not present any threat to the legitimacy of the practice of representing if it was, as it were, merely an afterthought of ours about methodological scruples.

Furthermore, the claim that modern scepticism is the proper ground on which to conduct our investigations of philosophical anthropology can be heard as echoing in Kant's famous dictum about the "scandal to philosophy" whereby reality as opposed to appearance would be represented (i.e. known) by us merely on the basis of "faith" and with no "satisfactory

1. We can further appreciate this point by placing it in parallel to Descartes' insistence that being aware of doubting as a deficiency presupposes the idea of God as a Being "more perfect than myself, in comparison with which I should recognise the deficiencies of my nature": Meditation III in Philosophical Works, i, 166, my emphasis (and cf. p.183). The contemporary equivalent of comparison-in-degrees takes the form of the possibility of a disparity between ideal theory and truth in the realism-antirealism controversy in the philosophy of science.
proof".¹ For Kant, the sceptic — though ultimately misguided and thus wrong — should be considered as "a benefactor of human reason".² Thus we see again here that we cannot accept as intelligible a conception of representation of reality which takes the latter as prior and free of the epistemological scruples generated by the metaphysical idea of a diversity between reality and appearance. The sceptical doubts about the legitimacy of the human practice of representing cannot be intelligibly divorced from the conception(s) of the object(s) of representations.³ For the same reason, the equation between the structure of our conceptual representations and that of the (Kantian) noumenal world is not available to Kant for in his system the transcendental conditions of our representations are at the same time the ontological boundaries between the phenomenal and the noumenal worlds.⁴ But what I put forward as crucial here is that it is within the former world that the appearance-reality dichotomy is re-posited as distinct from the dichotomy between the two worlds themselves. The former dichotomy is epistemically posited in order to be resolved eventually by the development of science, but the outcome of this resolution (elimination of error) will be always transcendently dependent upon the more

2. Ibid., A377.
fundamental dichotomy. Within the phenomenal world this (scientific) outcome is transcendentally real, generally (or in Putnam's sense "internally real" from the point of view of actual scientific practice and the canons of rationality); but compared to the Kantian ineffable and incognizable noumenal world, this outcome is not transcendentally real.  

The special relationship between our representations and what they are representations of can also be seen to be reflected on one level higher up. We encounter the same considerations - but within a different domain - when we inquire into the relation holding between: 'knowing for certain that p' and 'knowing for certain that we cannot (logical impossibility) "know for certain that p". This issue has to do with the various logical proofs that have been offered against the possibility of attaining certainty along the lines of traditional (Leibnizian or Cartesian) rationalist constructions of our knowledge (i.e. reducing science to mathematics). In addition Radnitzky suggests in the article quoted


2. For the further problem of 'Affektion' see Allison, Kant's Transcendental Idealism, chap.11: Allison distinguishes the thing-in-itself (as an epistemological category) from the noumenon (as an ontological one) on p.239.

3. For the significance of the impossibility or 'limitive' theorems of modern logic, see the excellent paper by G.Radnitzky, 'Reflections on Scepticism, Pyrrhonian and Other', Ratio, 7. (1965), 117-44, esp. pp.124-5 and fn.15.

4. For the modern origins of the demand for absolute truth and certainty (achieved only at the theoretical level), as the essential characteristic of the "Tragic Man" and his vision of the world, see L.Goldmann's The Hidden God (London, RKP, 1964), pp.66ff. Cf., from a different point of view, Foucault's conception of "technologies of the self" vital to his thesis of the relationship between modern subjectivity and the (Christian) desire/obligation for the search for truth and certainty; see R.Sennett's and M.Foucault's contribution to Humanities in Review, ed. by D.Rieff (Cambridge, CUP, 1982), i, 3-21.
that, outside formal contexts, it is unwarranted to seek knowledge
or truth in the absolutist or 'ordinary' sense both for metascientific
reasons (e.g. Popper's 'verisimilitude thesis') and for certain
philosophical reasons, e.g., because of

"... an asymmetry in the absolutist use of 'know'. I can know
that p implies that p; hence, if I know p then I cannot
(logical impossibility) know that not-p. But a plausible
adequacy requirement for explicata of the concepts of 'know',
etc.... is that truth-functional compounding must not alter
the knowability-in-principle ... of a sentence. Hence the
ordinary sense of 'know' does not even provide a suitable
explicandum." (1)

This point then also confirms my view that when scepticism invades
our practice of representing, this is not merely an empirical matter -
in the sense that we are concerned with the inherent limitations
of human experience - but it is primarily a transcendental issue about
the very possibility of constructing such representations (everyday
beliefs or scientific theories), faithful or not. This reading of
mine is congruent with B.Stroud's cogent interpretation of Kant's own
view on how we must understand the Cartesian challenge. 2

Having thus indicated, from within the context of philosophical
anthropology, the way in which our intuitive ideas about 'theories'
are related to the concept of 'representing', we can I think appreciate
the nature of the underlying or fundamental "epistemological backdrop"
of informativeness which can be delineated once we are prepared to
recognize the connection between the two primary questions, viz.,

1. Radnitzky, op.cit., p.130 n.23. See also my Appendix to
Chapter 8 below.

2. See B.Stroud's The Significance of Philosophical Scepticism,
164.
the metaphysical one about 'being' and the epistemological one about
the most 'reliable access' to the former.

3. Discussing the transcendental aspects of theoretical representations
from within the province of philosophical anthropology we come close to
what may be called, in this respect, the "essentialist thesis" with
which holism must be associated. This thesis posits the ascription
of a 'social self' to individual persons not as an option for the
individual (i.e. a contingency) but as the very (complex of) activity¹
by which each individual constitutes himself or herself as a social
person, necessarily. In making such a statement we attribute a
necessary property to an entity not as existing independently of it but
as constitutive of it.² Such a statement has the logical form of a
necessary statement. If we consider Parmenidean-particulars as being
identical with the relevant social powers (see previous chapter) we
may understand the latter as essential in a sense opposite, for
instance, to those properties which Anselm thought as non-essential
attributes of God: i.e. being supreme and being greater than anything
else are not essential properties of God because if nothing else than
the Supreme Nature (God) existed "... it would not be conceived as
either supreme or greater, yet it would not, therefore, be less good,

1. 'Activity' is here taken in a broader sense that just cognitive
activity; in the latter case the "essentialist thesis" would be
entangled with the problem of how it is possible for me to
'constitute' my thoughts while not being able to see them coming
into being in the full light of day, "but merely know myself
through them": M. Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, Engl.

2. That is, a cluster of properties are de re (and not merely de dicto)
or suffer detriment to its essential greatness in any degree.\(^1\) On the contrary, the ascription of a 'social self' or entelechy as essential, or social powers as constitutive implies that if nothing else existed - or equivalently if no relational properties were ascribed - we could not maintain that there is a residual 'substratum' which remains intact. Such necessary truths may be the outcome of the employment of traditional transcendental arguments which purport to establish (apodeicticly) conditions of possibility with respect to the experiential field by means of which a social person is constituted. The results we arrive at in this way illuminate certain necessary aspects of the relation between the individual and the relevant social context, or less vaguely, the boundary conditions of individuality, personhood, agency within the social world.\(^2\) But if such an inquiry draws necessary conclusions, at least of local validity (i.e. with reference to certain areas of experience), it must be made clear what kind of necessary truths or a priori argumentation is involved here.

That is, we must explore the sense in which necessary statements can be indispensable in the determination of the formal character of social holism.

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2. For how this can be done with respect to the category of "embodied agents", see C.Taylor, 'The Validity of Transcendental Arguments', Proc.Arist.Soc., n.s. LXXIX (1978/9), 151-65. For a more general account with an allusion to some limitations with respect to social totalities see K.Hartmann, 'On Taking the Transcendental Turn', Rev. of Metaph., XX (1966), 223-49, esp. 247-8.
4. According to the positivist canon, necessary truths are truths by
convention, i.e. analytic, and have no factual content. It is important,
however, to dwell on the connection between the terms, 'analytic' and
'necessary'. If we view the world as one among a number of other equally
possible worlds, i.e. as contingently of this or that nature, then
necessary truths have no place in knowledge for to know the contingent
(actual) world we need only synthetic statements; the latter are the
sole vehicles by which the contingent nature or structure of the world
(e.g. its events, entities, conceptual connections) is displayed. The
factual content of synthetic truths expresses what our theories discover
about the world as existing independently of our cognitive activity.
By contrast, the content of analytic statements depends on our activities,
in particular our linguistic stipulations or logical conventions: the
latter criteria correspond to the two traditional definitions of analytic
statements as truths following from the meanings of their terms, and as
truths that cannot be denied without contradiction, respectively. Thus
analytic truths, in this respect, cannot display knowledge of the
contingently actual world since they express what our theories (e.g.
logical systems or mathematical theorems) invent irrespective of how
the world happens to be. Knowledge thus equated with discovery must be
a coherent system of synthetic statements, the truth of which depends
upon and is constrained by knowledge-independent reality. Here the
distinction between appearance and reality is presupposed. But this
empiricist standpoint can only admit the 'given', i.e. it occupies
the traditional "phenomenalistic" position about the nature of the
data of sensory experience, and we end up in a contradiction. By

1. Cf. L. Kolakowski, The Alienation of Reason (Garden City: N.Y.,
contrast, analytic statements are not thus constrained and their truth depends only on (various types of) convention. Here the distinction between appearance and reality collapses; since analytic statements are about language itself there is no reality to be depicted in this case - and not because there doesn't arise the familiar epistemological worry about appearances deceiving us. This reconstruction offers us a view of the meaning of 'necessity' that positivism is prepared to allow for the non-factual content of analytic statements. Only if there is not already 'something' to be depicted or represented by our theories' statements, can we attain 'necessity'; we are free to ascribe necessity to statements only as long as these statements are 'free of the world'. In accordance with empiricist presuppositions, the necessity we end up with can be characterized as "internal necessity" with no ontological commitments.

The problem with this line of thought that I want to bring out is the following. The argument begins by presupposing the 'necessary-contingent' distinction as meaningful since the existing world is defined as one among many possibilities that might have been actualized (or are being actualized). Hence synthetic statements are non-necessary. Then we end up by defining the 'necessity' of analytic statements only on the grounds that they are not factual/contingent. So the claim is that the only necessary truths that should be admitted are analytic statements for they do not refer to (i.e. are about) a contingent reality existing independent of such statements. Now, the crucial question is, I believe, that: if we wish to claim that there are necessary truths about reality (i.e. loosely speaking, that they are referential), then our task is to make clear whether we accept the traditionally positivist
criteria for 'necessity', 'analytic/synthetic' and 'reality', or whether we must define them differently.

From this point of view, Quine's\(^1\) alternative thesis - i.e. that the whole body of knowledge faces the tribunal of experience together - retains the anti-essentialist core element of empiricism in that a necessary truth is not what refers to essences but one we chose to hold onto (in relative degrees of revisability). On the other hand, Quine has attacked the conventionalist criterion of truth, (esp. in logic and mathematics) as adding nothing to our understanding of such statements (as either \textit{a priori} or of merely behaviouristic origin) when they are characterized, by the conventionalist, as true by convention.\(^2\) But by attacking the analytic/synthetic distinction as positivistically understood, he managed further, to 'outdo' the conventionalsists by showing that \textit{all} statements' truth depends on our own decisions and that therefore we cannot succeed in establishing a distinction which would describe some of them as analytic and the rest as synthetic, and he thereby "espouse(s) a more thorough pragmatism".\(^3\)

In order to assess the status of ontological commitments, the conventionalsists argue, it would be either a mistake or an invitation to scepticism if we tried to do this without paying due attention to the

\begin{enumerate}
\item 'Two Dogmas', \textit{loc.cit.}, p.46.
\end{enumerate}
idea of conceptual frameworks. Such a framework could be thought of as a world-picture or metatheory, such as social holism, within which we are allowed to ask questions of empirical import. But accepting the relevant conceptual apparatus is simply a decision that we should think and talk in terms of social substance, or social persons, social events and processes, etc. For Carnap it is fundamental that one must distinguish between two kinds of questions concerning the existence or reality of entities. If new entities are to be introduced in a discourse, then there must be constructed a new language that will enable us to speak about these new entities, i.e. a system of new ways of speaking, subject to new syntactical rules; this procedure Carnap calls "construction of a framework for the new entities in question". The two kinds of questions then are: (a) 'internal': existential questions within the framework; and (b) "external": questions about the existence/reality of the framework itself. The crucial differentiating characteristic is then that whereas the answers to internal questions can be given by scientific procedures (i.e. logical and/or empirical methods), the answers to the external questions are fundamentally distinct and cannot be given in terms of applied science. Carnap cites several examples in order to clarify his point but the moral to be drawn is that to question the certain (conceptual) framework within which you conduct your empirical and other investigations is not a matter of theory but a "practical" one, "a matter of a practical decision concerning the structure of our language." If then it is all a matter of choice of


3. Ibid., p.211.
framework, it is clear that to accept a certain conceptual scheme means to accept the language with which you speak about the entities that are denizens of the domain. But we refrain from saying 'entities that exist ...', since to accept the general framework does not imply a belief in the reality/existence of the entities to which the chosen language refers to. To accept the language is to accept the truth of certain statements within it (in accordance with certain semantic and syntactic rules). Given this, Carnap's crucial assertion is that the acceptance of one particular framework does not depend on the introduction of new constants as terms purporting to name the new entities (since some such naming terms may already occur prior to the introduction of the new framework). What is then the essential criterion? It is first, the introduction of a predicate of higher level for the new entities in order to be able to say which of these belongs to which kind (e.g. "red is a 'property'" but "five is a 'number'"). And second, the use of variables whose range of values is the domain comprising the new entities (this is attributed to Quine). Having formed this apparatus we can say that if a sentence is factually true is synthetic, and if it is logically true is analytic; in both cases within the chosen language. The practical criteria guiding our selection procedure of a certain language are: expediency, fruitfulness, simplicity, etc. They have no theoretical import, since for Carnap to question whether the framework is real is a pseudo-question, without any cognitive interest. Therefore Carnap's semantical method does not commit him to accepting the reality of abstract universals. He says: "(r)eferences to space-time points ...
unconscious complexes in psychology, to an inflationary trend in economics, and the like, do not imply the assertion that entities of these kinds occur as immediate data."¹

5. Espousing a more thorough pragmatism - by 'radicalizing conventionalism' - is a repudiation of the analytic/synthetic distinction when the latter is understood as a reflection of a dichotomy between how much of our scientific knowledge is contributed by a linguistic component and how much by the 'brute facts' of empirical reality. This is a "spurious question which itself arises wholly from a certain particular type of language".² In Chapter 1, I tried to show how a positivist conception of a (molecular) verifiability-criterion of meaning was responsible for an individualist belief in the non-existence of social substances or social events, beyond the individual and his/her actions. Here we are faced again with the same kind of language but, now viewed from a different perspective, we may wish to abandon this picture of language and espouse the alternative, 'organic' (as opposed to molecular) picture of language as a network of interrelations. The latter would be, primarily, the upshot of coming to grips with what has by now become a commonplace, viz., our 'linguacentric predicament', or the impossibility/unintelligibility of the scheme/content distinction.³

¹. Ibid., p.226.

². Quine in 'Identity, Ostension, and Hypostasis' repr. in From A Logical Point of View, pp.65-79, at 78.

However, the plausibility of a Quinean model of language as organic can be shown to be in tension with a total elimination of synthetic and analytic sentences. It is, nevertheless, more important to note that such a model must not be interpreted as allowing only a one-way direction of the transmission of revisability. In view of Chapter I, the model must be accepted as placing considerable weight to the core or highly-entrenched non-observational, theoretical sentences; the latter should be allowed to play an active rôle in determining revisability towards the periphery. This condition, congruent with this model of language as an articulated structure (i.e. the semantic analogue to Duhem's epistemological holism), brings us to a further criticism with regard to the injunction "no statement is (singly) immune to revision" as being equivalent to asserting that there are no necessary propositions whatsoever. The criticism, I believe, may be two-pronged. On the one hand, we may argue that if there are no statements which cannot be subject to revision on the face of empirical evidence, then there is at least one proposition which escapes revision, namely this very injunction. In connection with my remarks about appearance vs. reality above, we can find here a parallel line: that is, the intelligibility of the distinction between all statements facing the tribunall of experience and holding some as 'true come what may'. I want to claim here that even if we abandon the empiricist error of distinguishing between analytic-synthetic (as


between matters of meaning - matters of fact), and even if we move on
to accept the pragmatist model of 'organic' language, in repudiating the
existence of necessary truths (as beyond experience) we must thereby
grasp (the idea of) the distinction between necessary and non-necessary
statements. The second, related, criticism is that by purging all
discourse of any necessary statements we do not allow for the
employment of the notion of necessity in areas in which it would be
indispensable. For instance, one proposal 1 is that the nature of
certain philosophical propositions makes them resemble propositions
representing the determinable-determinate relationship; these could
be propositions whose necessity does not depend on the validity of
scientific laws. The latter, if equated to scientific principles
in which certain concepts occur as "law-cluster" concepts, 2 and as
long as such scientific laws hold true they would give us only something
akin to conditional necessities (see also pp. 35-7 above for a parallel
point). But if certain philosophical propositions exhibit a modality
stronger than conditional necessity, then they should not be subject
to revision on the basis of scientific principles or empirical evidence.
One type of such propositions, transcending both the empirical findings
of science and the trivially analytic (i.e. stipulative definitions of
the terms involved), are precisely those by means of which we discourse
about the notions of necessity and analyticity. Such a priori considerations
can be found, more concretely exemplified, in studies that spell out the
applicability of whole/moments relations (as outlined in Chapter I) to
particular areas of social ontology, e.g. legal institutions, etc. 3

1. J. Moravcsik, 'The Analytic and the Nonemirical', J. of Phil.,
LXII (1965), 415-29, at 427.
2. See H. Putnam, 'The Analytic and the Synthetic' repr. in Mind, Language
and Reality (Cambridge, C.U.P., 1975), pp.33-69. For Putnam all
analytic statements are those in which the concepts involved are not
law-cluster ones, and in this sense the analytic-synthetic distinction
is a trivial one.
3. See the writings of A. Reinach translated in Smith (ed.), Parts and
Moments, esp., pp.297ff; and, in the same volume, the work by E.
Ginsberg, pp.265-87, esp. #10.
6. In connection to this last point I should mention briefly three instances of *a priori* modes of reasoning in the history of philosophical discussions about social sciences. One is Simmel's Kantoid theory on 'how is society possible?' which stresses three *a priori* principles both as presuppositions for the organization of our knowledge of society and as necessary conditions for the emergence of society as 'a consciousness of unity' of its members: (a) the abstract and general reconstruction of individuals into types; (b) the 'non-socialized' part of each individual's personality as a condition for the fact of his group - etc. membership; and (c) that each individual's own position within his social context is also a position actually present in the social whole.¹

In a way antithetical to Simmel, the second well-known case of *a priorism* is that of L. von Mises whose anti-psychologistic methodological *a priorism* refers to the essential and necessary character of the logical structure of the human mind.² Man's abilities for grasping reality (though evolutionary acquired) are logically prior to any experience. Conflicting social theories must be appreciated beforehand on the ground of *a prioristic* reasoning. For von Mises, just as we conceive logical and mathematical truths *a priori*, without reference to experience, in exactly the same manner

1. I am here giving only a crude summary relying on the extended interesting discussion of Simmel (via Talcott Parsons) to be found in H.Bershady, *Ideology and Social Knowledge* (Oxford, Blackwell, 1973), pp.72-79.


we gain knowledge about the fundamental categories of action.

Attacking Weber's 'ideal type' von Mises considered the latter as inappropriate for the theoretical, law-stating sciences of sociology or economics which, based on purely conceptual and deductive procedures, entail what he conceived as tautologies and analytic judgments which, nevertheless, are not empty of cognitive information (since they were for him 'mental tools' opening the approach to a complete grasp of reality).\(^1\) This brings me to the last example, that of M. Hollis and E.J. Nell's\(^2\) cogent attempt to rehabilitate the indispensability of non-deterministic rationalist principles in economic theory. Attacking both positivist and pragmatist conceptions of analyticity and necessity, they offer a criterion for the acceptance of "conceptual truths" as necessary ones in which some constants, which do not belong to formal logic, occur essentially. Such truths are 'conceptual' in that they employ basic concepts "under which an activity must fall, if it is to be correctly identified as theoretically significant activity",\(^3\) and that at least some theories rest on axioms embodying real definitions.

My intention in mentioning these diverse formulations about the legitimacy of a priori and necessary elements in a philosophical discourse about social science is not to take issue

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1. Hintikka has constructed a logical model within which he discusses the notions of information and deductive argument steps in relation to analyticity and, further, with some interesting insights into the self-reflective nature of conceptual systems (alluding to Winch), in his Logic, Language - Games and Information (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1973), chaps. VI-X.


3. Ibid., p.172.
with them or simply adopt them. They are significant, however, when understood as attempts to eschew empiricist positions traditionally associated with or issuing in individualist doctrines about man and society. At least in the case of M.Hollis and E.Nell this is made explicitly clear, but my own concern with these matters is other than to accept or not that there are informative necessary truths at the level of human action and corresponding a priori principles of rationality (itself justifiably disputed).

My concern lies at the level of the metatheory of social holism rather than with various principles that can be deduced from it with the purpose of being incorporated to the explanatory apparatus of actual social-scientific theorizing.

My intention in this chapter was to offer a cluster of interrelated reflections and raise some problems in an attempt to elucidate the formal features of a holistic picture of social reality which can be justified as falling within the context of transcendental anthropology. This is only the beginning, but I believe a significant step nevertheless, towards the construction of a framework which can help us understand and discourse about the nature of necessity which marks the essentialist theses of holistic ontology; some of which theses are put forward throughout the present study.
CONCLUSION

I began by explaining that the considerations of the previous chapter demanded that the existential commitments of the holist formal ontology should be characterized as transcendentally valid. In this sense we can appreciate why the initial fundamental question of this dissertation as to "what kind of ontological domain the social world is possible to be" cannot be answered by an empiricist position that construes the constitution of the social world as contingent. The 'transcendental turn' presented in the preceding pages refers to the validity of the way a theory represents its domain.

For this, the first main point I established - by confronting Hacking's 'story' and reflecting on scepticism - was that the notion of 'reality' cannot be philosophically dissociated from that of 'appearance' and, consequently, that we cannot make sense of the practice of representing independently of the complex notion of 'reality as opposed to appearance'. Thus the epistemic legitimation of representing cannot be intelligibly divorced from the conception of the object(s) of representation.

It follows that, since the meaning of 'what is real' is (for our present purposes) thus settled philosophically within the confines of this complex notion, the latter cannot allow the related distinction of 'contingent/non-contingent' to be dissolved either by the positivist canon or by the Quinean strictures. We first encountered the idea of the non-contingent character of formal ontology in the previous chapter;
this was my present point of departure. But, furthermore, in section 3 above I drew attention to certain aspects of holist claims which invite the idea of necessity.

The second main point established, then, was that we can safeguard a notion of necessity despite positivism or pragmatism. I showed that the former view leads to contradictions because it presupposes and at the same time nullifies this notion of 'reality vs. appearance' (vid. first two paragraphs of section 4). Hence our holist theory rejects the view that necessity is ascribed only to statements which are "free of the world". I then offered two arguments claiming that the Quinean strictures cannot eliminate the very intelligibility of the a priori conception of necessity (vid. section 5).

I should repeat that this chapter was not meant to be a thorough examination of the logic of necessity; rather, as I have stressed, it offers a justification of the a priori mode of reasoning which provides the conditions to be met if holism is to be possible. This is advanced further in the next chapter.
Chapter III

AN IMPOSSIBILITY ARGUMENT AND ITS BEARING ON HOLISM
INTRODUCTION

In discussing the way in which we can block the nominalist attack on social wholes (Chap. I, sct. 3) I argued that holism approaches the ontological status of unobservable or non-ostensible entities (cf. Chap. I, sct. 9) in terms of a non-empiricist view of theories and of the reference of theoretical terms. The former, i.e. the kind of theoretical knowledge adopted, was the theme of the preceding chapter. The latter will be considered here. But although a defence of the active role of theoretical language in determining ontological commitments is indispensable for this reason, I should underline that the aim of the present discussion reaches further.

Thus my intention is to integrate certain theses on reference in the philosophy of science with the logical validity of an 'impossibility argument' of Popper's; my purpose is to extract a further transcendental property of theoretical discourse and ascertain its specific consequences for the theory of holism. This is in harmony with the demands of the a priori mode of reasoning introduced already in the previous chapter.

This impossibility argument which lays a condition upon all theoretical knowledge states that: we cannot predict now results which shall obtain in the course of the growth of our knowledge. I maintain that this impels us to focus our attention on the status of the referentiality of theoretical terms; in this way we can show the validity of the argument and then base on this the above-stated purpose. My strategy unfolds thus:
Section 1 considers the history of the argument, formulates specifically the relevant version thereof and explains its general significance. Then section 2 puts forward in detail the relationship between the argument and the problem of the reference of theoretical terms. I wish to demonstrate why a present theory cannot assert what a future theory says there is unless their respective theoretical terms are somehow connected. The specific form such a connection may take is designated in section 3: I review four such attempts from the relevant literature in the philosophy of science and reveal their underlying thread. The results obtained with respect to the active role of theoretical terms in determining ontological commitments are reconsidered in detail in section 4 in order to prove the validity of the impossibility argument. That section ends with an overview of the stages of the discussion and draws conclusions with regard to the claim of this dissertation that holism is not an empirical thesis in opposition to individualism.
1. Given the nature of formal-ontological pursuits with respect to the holistic status of the social world, as outlined previously, and in particular the character of transcendental or conceptual necessity encountered there, one specific a priori condition should be further explored. This has to do with the conceptual impossibility of predicting, scientifically, the future growth of knowledge or future scientific discoveries. This argument, the validity of which I want to demonstrate in this chapter, may take two forms. On the one hand, the condition the argument imposes may be embedded within a comprehensive discussion of indeterminism in general. This version has been made familiar by the writings of Popper and is claimed to be applicable to all areas of human knowledge and creative endeavour. A succinct formulation of his argument with respect to scientific knowledge is that "we cannot predict, scientifically, results which shall obtain in the course of the growth of our own knowledge", while his generalised thesis, encompassing social and artistic phenomena as well, reads that "for strictly logical reasons, it is impossible for us to predict the future course of history". Here I am interested in the former version

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1. The first quotation (italicized in the original) is from Popper's Postscript to his *The Logic of Scientific Discovery*: K. Popper, The Open Universe (London, Hutchinson, 1982), p.62; the second quotation is from his *The Poverty of Historicism*, 2nd Ed. (London RKP, 1960), pp.v-vii. A recent critique of Popper's thesis with respect to creativity can be found in E. Gellner's 'Positivism against Hegelianism' in *Relativism and the Social Sciences* (Cambridge, C.U.P., 1985), at pp.26-9, with reference to the 'Mozart Argument' put forward in Popper's *Objective Knowledge*, at p.223. The Gödelian argument has been applied to show that a human being cannot be described completely in terms of physical variables by J. Lucas in *The Freedom of the Will* (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1970). This issue is not my concern here.
of the impossibility argument only, but before going on I should briefly introduce its alternative form.

In its second form the argument purports to specify its applicability only to social theory and thereby establish what is thought to be the fundamental difference in method between the sciences of man and natural sciences. This thesis is most prominently espoused by P. Winch whose formulation of it may be properly characterized as transcendental.¹ I am claiming that the a priori character of this thesis' argument rests on the crucial idea that, prior to our various studies concerning what are contingently true facts about human beings and their thought and behaviour, we must first posit the question of what it means to be a human being in general. That is, before inquiring into this or that specific determination that happens to be true of human beings we must first bring them under a nexus of concepts by virtue of which we are able to state the ontological presuppositions of our inquiries. Thus, on this view, subsequent empirical investigations are founded on the possibility of experiencing and understanding human beings as social persons by means of concepts. That the latter prove to be necessarily the ones employed by the agents themselves is, however, a further, highly disputed, transcendental requirement.² However, for the purposes of the specific a priori condition which is the theme of this


chapter we may safely disregard that additional step. But I should point out that in so far as the additional requirement is used (by Winch) as a premiss in order to show that the social sciences differ in method from the natural ones, it is, I believe, mistaken. For as it will be revealed in my discussion, even within the natural sciences predicting the discovery of (future) knowledge is problematic. Further, as S. Toulmin has cogently shown, hermeneutic principles are, and should be, applicable just as well to the natural sciences as to the humanities.¹ One must of course note, however, that Winch's target is the idea of predicting future social phenomena rather than future social- or natural-scientific theories which is my concern here. In the history of the philosophy of the social sciences one can find many lines of thought converging on the thesis that it is impossible to know in advance social developments of any sort;² in this way the thesis involves debates on objectivity and value in social theory and research.

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1. S. Toulmin, 'The Construal of Reality: Criticism in Modern and Postmodern Science' in W. J. T. Mitchell (ed.), The Politics of Interpretation (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1983), pp. 99-117; see esp. pp. 114-7 for an innovative discussion of the history of the antitheses logic vs. rhetoric (Aristotle), episteme vs. doxa (Plato), natural sciences vs. humanities, and the importance that Frege's narrowing of the field of logic had for our modern oversimplified reading of these antitheses. I would like to suggest as an example of such a reading, placed within its historical and academic context, the position of von Mises to the effect that social theories are appreciated prior to experience, on the ground of a prioristic reasoning, whereas in natural sciences theoretical hypotheses are tested by experience: Human Action, pp. 32ff. Cf. also H. Osborne, 'Interpretation in Science and in Art', Brit. J. Aesth., 26 (1986), pp. 3-15.

2. The manner in which this conclusion is reached may vary. One idea incorporates Heisenberg's uncertainty principles in order to show both the unpredictability of social behaviour and that of social-theoretic developments, as for instance, in R. Lichtman, 'Indeterminacy in the Social Sciences', Inquiry, 10 (1967), pp. 139-50. Another proposal may employ the 'machine analogy' in order to highlight an important difference between the domains of natural and social sciences: no learning machine can operate in an environment that is either very unstable or with which it is in very strong interaction; cont. . . . .
As I indicated, Popper's logical-impossibility argument touches upon this alternative form of the a priori condition (see note 1, p.407) but I wish to stick closely to his formulation for my purposes. This enables me to stress the relevance of this conceptual reasoning concerning the growth of theories for the idea of social holism as conceived here. My strategy is to throw light on the issue of the logical character of the relation between the cognitive activities of 'prediction' and 'discovery' by placing it against the background of the radical-discontinuity thesis of scientific growth. But if this thesis is rejected can we still maintain the validity of the impossibility argument? This brings in the demand that any metatheoretical account of our knowledge must play close attention to the status of the theoretical terms employed in our scientific theories. Ontological commitments of social theory, put forward in the form of theoretical statements, purport, among other things, to make referential claims to certain unobservable elements. If such claims are about holistic aspects of social reality, then we must be clear about the status of theoretical terms and descriptions involved. That reference, especially in the context of unobservability, is not to be divorced from theoretical beliefs,

footnote 2 continued from previous page .....then, if natural science is knowledge of a domain in which these instability conditions do not obtain, the environment of social sciences is unstable in both respects. This formulation appears in M.Hesse's 'In defence of objectivity; Proc.Brit.Acad., 58 (1972) and in Structure of Scientific Inference, p.51. For a discussion of how extreme relativism in cultural anthropology relates to the logical refutation of the possibility of a Laplacean demon see H.P.Duerr, Dreamtime, Engl. trans. (Oxford, Blackwell, 1985) at p.97, esp. n.55.

1. Though this notion is crucial in what follows in this chapter, it also incorporates my remarks of chapter I above, pp.59ff. The important point to note initially is that the category of the unobservable should not be conflated either with that of the abstract or the non-material, or that of the micro-element. As D.Mellor points out, while behaviour of th macro-entity (gas) is observable independently of the relevant scientific theory (kinetic theory), in the case of entities such as culture in archaeology they cannot be approached, obviously, in any other way than via the assertions of the relevant archaeological theory. He goes on to show that "...cultures are not definable by or reducible to their archaeological traces ...[and] ... they are not definable in terms of their members.": 'Do Cultures Exist?' in C.Renfrew (ed.), The Explanation of Culture Change (London, Duckworth, 1973), pp.59-72, at p.65 and p.70.
is then of singular importance in evaluating the merits of any holistic social theory whose validity rests on its ontological commitments (as e.g. 'alienation', 'anomie', or the reality of first-order social properties, like 'being a mayor', etc.). This view of the status of theoretical concepts (on which my argument against the possibility of predicting the discovery of theories is based) emphasizes the active rôle of theory against empirical realism, as e.g., in political science or sociology, or against behaviourism in the philosophy of mind as W. Sellars' work has shown. Such a transcendental property of all theories, on which the two basic questions, that of ontology and that of epistemic reliability, are forged (as I claimed in Chapter II above), and the eventual justification of the impossibility argument provide the theme of the discussion that follows.

2. Thus my starting point is to inquire as to whether we can make any sense of the proposed thesis that, within the scientific context, a predictor could predict its own future results without necessarily discovering them. That is, I would like to raise the question concerning the logical (im)possibility which may be found to connect the "logical space" of (scientific) predicting and that of discovering.¹ As I indicated,

¹ I must here point out that the problem I raise is not to be confused with the different but related issue arising one level below, as it were, with respect to the question whether the practice of discovery is in need of a separate (or none at all) philosophical treatment from that of the practice of justification, within particular scientific contexts. For a defence that the former practice includes the latter (and thus supporting my own general approach) see G. Gutting, 'Science as Discovery', Rev. Int. de Phil., 131-32 (1980), pp. 26-48. For a Popperian view, upholding the distinction of the context of discovery from the context of justification, and its implications for the problem of value-ladenness in the social sciences see H. Albert, 'Social Science and Moral Philosophy: A Critical Approach to the Value Problem in the Social Sciences' in M. Bunge (ed.), The Critical Approach to Science and Philosophy, (London, Free Press, 1964), pp. 385-409, esp. sect. III.
this problem is more puzzling than it first appears to be because the whole issue can be profitably studied only if we place it squarely within one of the most central (if not itself the core) of the crucial debates in contemporary philosophy of science. By this I mean what has come to be known as the "Radical Meaning-Variance" Thesis (RMV for short), propounded by Kuhn and Feyerabend primarily,¹ in connection with the problem of the employment of theoretical terms by successive scientific theories (after revolutionary crises and shifts).

Since no one to my knowledge² has ever subscribed to any extreme position (i.e. extreme constancy, or variance, continuously), it is my contention that the issue I am discussing, viz. prediction and discovery, should best be tackled against the background of different proposals put forward in order to deal with the implications of the RMV claims. This, in addition, strengthens the test that the impossibility argument must pass.

What is the importance of RMV? As it has become clear the significance of this thesis is that if it is plausible it poses a

1. Von Weizsäcker reports that fifteen years before Kuhn, Heisenberg described the phenomenon of revolutionary shifts as the transition from one "closed" theory to another, whereby "closed" it was meant a theory based on a consistent mathematical formalism; of course, Kuhn's idea focused on the semantic rather than the mathematical-structural side: C.F. von Weizsäcker, 'The Preconditions of Experience and the Unity of Physics' in P.Bieri, et al. (eds.) Transcendental Arguments and Science, pp.123-58, at p.131. Another precursor might be L.Fleck.

2. Even Kuhn himself, in his replies and his recent work, has admitted that he does not in fact believe in 'anarchy' (but does Feyerabend?). His critics, sympathetic or otherwise, never maintained that there is no such conceptual shift. They have correctly though shown that the issue is much more intricate and complex than sweeping generalizations would make it look like. In fact all those discussing or adopting so-called "extensional, or referential semantics" do so only in a critical mood and are quite careful to dismiss any easy answers (or equally extreme models) to meaning-variance.
paradox: the paradox of "incommensurability" which amounts to saying that if conceptual relativism holds across successive theories then these theories cannot be compared by means of criteria internal to either; it does not though make them inconsistent or incompatible. It makes them immune to comparison because the radicality of the problem is not underdetermination of theory/translation/language by facts or evidence [i.e. we should not in the end preclude the possibility of comparing the "dead" theory with a number of present theories proposed according to different translation manuals, i.e. to different theories of reference for the initial "dead" language.] The problem is rather that we cannot formulate the disagreement at all as a result of a revolutionary shift.

Pre-empting the issue in advance I can state at this point one of the conclusions which one could aim at:

If such formulation is unavailable (as it follows from RMV), then if a predictor predicts now the advent of a new scientific theory subsequent to a revolutionary shift, then what it in fact does is nothing else than generating a new theory whose vocabulary and language the predictor formulates now. "Hence the predictor knows (now) the new meanings (referents) of the theoretical terms 1 employed.

1. As it will appear below the primary task is to focus on philosophical semantics and sorting out things along the traditional Fregean lines whereby the meaning of a word is a pair consisting of the concept or sense or mode of presentation expressed by the word, and the reference of the word, what the word is true of, the referent. This would imply that, since two terms may have different meanings while being co-extensional we would allow conceptual change between two successive theories to be accompanied by referential stability or ontic invariance/rigidity. The latter will guarantee inter-theoretic comparability since in this case the growth of scientific knowledge is inter alia nothing else than a succession of theoretical descriptions cont.......
But this appears to be contradictory. For since there is no independent language in which the computer would be required to formulate the disagreement between a theory and its successor, it follows it will not be in any programme-state which could generate the desired comparison. And this in fact is the central claim of the extreme conceptual-relativist position. Hence the computer cannot in principle predict the future discovery of a scientific theory conceptually incommensurable with a present one.

footnote 1 from previous page... of the same, theory-independent, entities. This is claimed to be "the only hypothesis that can account for the communicability of scientific results": H.Putnam, 'The Meaning of "Meaning"', in Mind, Language and Reality (Cambridge U.P. 1975), p.237 (my italics). Kuhn himself has explicitly taken issue with this.

For my own purposes at this juncture of the discussion it is pertinent to state what is perhaps one of the most fundamental tenets of positivist philosophy of natural science, namely the holistic conception of the meaning of theoretical terms. By this I mean the conception which, while keeping the observation-vocabulary stable and theory-independent, it construes the theoretical vocabulary as theory-laden. The Kuhn-Feyerabend-Hanson alternative (which is proclaimed as anti-positivist) retains the latter point but radicalizes it to the extent that observation-terms themselves become theory-dependent, too. For a critique of this see W.H.Newton-Smith, The Rationality of Science (London RKP, 1981), chaps. II and VII. Therefore this is how I employ the word 'know' in this sense within a theoretical context: in other words, it would be contradictory to claim that the predictor could state the incommensurable theory without knowing, viz. explicitly stating, the vocabulary of the theoretical terms employed.

1. For the untenability of this extreme position with respect to our ordinary language see B.Stroud, 'Conventionalism and the Indeterminacy of Translation' in D.Davidson and J.Hintikka (eds.), Words and Objections, Rev.Ed. (Dordrecht, Reidel, 1975), pp.82-96.
However there is no \textit{a priori} reason why a predictor could not predict the discovery of a number of rival theories which are available to genuine comparison. In this less extreme case the computer is in a position to provide a formulation of the various disagreements that separate these theories in an independent language (i.e. \textit{via} a translation manual); though of course as we have learned from Quine the facts of the matter will never be sufficient to resolve these disagreements. This is mainly due to the fact that truth is \textit{immanent} to the conceptual scheme.  

The question now is: could we plausibly contend that the predictor is able to predict that such a new (rival) discovery will be made without in fact (i.e. \textit{eo ipso}) discovering it? Again the answer should be given in terms of conceptual possibility:

Since the computer could generate a programme-state in which the comparison is carried out, then it is a conceptual contradiction to say that the computer compares two systematic bodies of statements (theories) without knowing the meanings of the theoretical terms employed in either or in both. 

Therefore, the predictor cannot predict without discovering.

My discussion has been conducted in very general terms up to now. As I hinted above (p. \textit{112}, n.2) the literature on the subject contains much more detailed theses and it would be advisable to consider the

\footnote{1. Given that Quine has distinguished between the theory of meaning from that of reference, his talk about truth (esp. \textit{Word and Object} (Cambridge, Mass., MIT Press, 1960), p.24) must be taken as apposite to referential relativism. See previous note.}
issue of prediction and discovery against this more elaborate and
detailed background. In particular one has to take into account
specific proposals of how to deal with conceptual relativism itself
and, above all, to examine the exact nature (precluding obviously
false and historically misguided extreme positions) and limits of
this phenomenon.

The starting point should be in this case to remark that a careful
study of the relevant writings on the subject reveals the fact that
any critical discussion of conceptual relativism in the development
of scientific knowledge is conducted along the lines of the recent models
of extensional or referential semantics. What in fact happened was that
the Kuhnian challenge was met (successfully or not) by invoking the
recent work on the theory of reference that originated in the writings
of Putnam, Kripke, Donnellan, Kaplan et al. However, the views of
the latter proved to be equally extreme at least as far as science is
concerned and so various other alternative versions were put forward.
Here is a brief critical discussion of the most (if not all)¹ interesting
ones. With the exception of one (H.Field's article which is somewhat
more difficult to categorize) they all borrow, criticize or modify the
main idea behind extensional semantics in order to deal with the problem

1. Some interesting examples of attempts to provide criteria for
comparability of theories thus dissolving an extreme RMV thesis, are:
N.Koertge, 'Theory Change in Science' in G.Pearce and P.
Maynard (eds.) Conceptual Change (Dordrecht, Reidel, 1973),
Theories', Phil. of Sci., 38 (1971), 467-85; M.Levin, 'On
Theory-Change and Meaning-Change', Phil. of Sci., 46 (1979),
407-24; and W.Balzer, 'Incommensurability, Reduction and
of conceptual revolutionary (i.e. total) shifts.

3. (1) One such attempt to respond to the historical claims made by Kuhn and Feyerabend, which carefully avoids the pitfalls of extreme positions against any radical meaning-change, is that of P. Kitcher. He correctly distinguishes (as all authors do) between conceptual (meaning) relativism and the thesis that the referents of some expressions are changed after a scientific revolution.

The problem with RMV is that it is of any interest only as long as the problem is understood in a radical sense: a situation involving a special type of referential change which culminates in a mutual inability to specify the referents of terms used in presenting the rival position. It is thus most important (as all writers agree) to specify and refine this notion of referential change.

Kitcher's own remedy is to adopt and modify the so-called "historical or causal theory" of reference at the centre of extensional semantics in such a way that the main idea is maintained without its monolithic character. Briefly, instead of a single connecting causal chain of the tokens of a term we should admit the existence of a multiple (ramified) chain or rather a plurality of such chains linking the terms to the world in continuous uses in time. Hence the connection is constantly


2. I. Scheffler's position, trying to combat conceptual relativism by claiming stability of reference throughout revolutions is shown by Kitcher to be unnecessarily strong. On this see M. Hesse's version in The Structure of Scientific Inference, pp. 61ff.

renewed (i.e. continuous re-application and re-definition).¹

Thus the referents of different tokens of some scientific terms are fixed via events ("initiating events" in which the original entity was causally involved), or alternatively via events (a set thereof) in which different descriptions-qua-identifying-criteria feature prominately. But if the latter, then what happens when different such descriptions are used? If we have sets of different (renewed, augmented, partially abolished, etc) descriptions compared to what was the set of initial ones, then, for Kitcher, we have: radical conceptual revision without conceptual discontinuity. But what is in fact the problem posed by the relationship between description and reference in this context?

(2) One explicit attempt to rehabilitate, as it were, the signifying status of descriptions in scientific context is that of Berent Enç's 'Reference of Theoretical Terms'.² His main aim is to show that there is a class of theoretical terms which defy analysis along the lines of the thesis of extensionality.

His starting point is the recognition that we should distinguish between referents of terms which are "ostensible" objects from those which are "non-ostensible". The difficulty arises of course when terms refer to the latter kind.

Now his contention is that both as a matter of fact and as a normative postulate a scientist introducing a new theoretical term denoting

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¹ We will encounter the same idea with respect to socio-cultural concepts in the next chapter.

a non-ostensible entity has only one kind of reason for supposing this entity exists: namely, his belief that the supposition (and the associated new theoretical framework) will help him explain a set of phenomena he is interested in. This means that "we know first what kind of thing we are naming and second that the kind of thing we are naming is a new kind of thing". Beliefs (originating in descriptions) provide the grounds for introducing any new theoretical terms denoting non-ostensible entities in the world. Otherwise we fall victims to a kind of obscurantism which results from 'blindly' accepting, as it were, the (extreme) extensionalist thesis to the effect that such an entity is "whatever it is that is responsible for the phenomena", i.e. a kind of essentialist "I-don't-know-what".

I agree with Enç's diagnosis of why a uniformly extensionalist treatment of reference is wrong. This brings us in fact to the problematic notion of 'essence' in the scientific domain. When we are talking about "gold", "cats", "water" and the like we are in effect talking about entities which are right there in vitro (Enç's term) and we do not have any problem in finding out which of the many things around us we are talking about (although we may well be mistaken about their essential properties, etc.). Hence a baptismal resolution of naming (via an initiating event) accompanied by a rigid causal chain of reference is quite appropriate.

However, when we speak of "phlogiston", "the id", "entropy", "alienation" or "quarks" we do not know what it is we are talking about unless we are told what sort of things these are, what is said to be essential of them. And this is how descriptions are indispensable

1. Ibid., p.277, my italics.
for successful reference in this respect.

(3) Thus we arrive at the question as to whether knowledge of essences is or should be the proper aim of scientific inquiry.¹

A.Fine² who has criticized both approaches, i.e. the Kuhnian and that of Putnam et al., has come up with a level-headed proposal which admits that we ought to learn to live with the fact that even if we allow the relevant evidence (facts) to speak freely they will not themselves decide sameness or difference of reference. Leaving this aside what I find significant is Fine's reply to the Putnamian extensionalism. He claims that "not only can one be mistaken and later rectify the mistake, but one can also choose a subject of study and later change one's mind."³ This approach presupposes a certain degree of indeterminacy (without incommensurability) of reference which is the topic of H.Field's extensive discussion (of which below (4)). But it is also an interesting gesture towards an alternative conception of the aims of science.

This last point has been quite recently taken up by D.Shapere⁴ again within the context we are discussing. Shapere's main contention

4. 'Reason, Reference and the Quest for Knowledge', Phil. of Sci., 49 (1982), 1-23.
is that extreme extensionalism about essences is both descriptively and prescriptively false as far as the aim of science is concerned. For him the development of natural science as a constant re-classification, re-description and re-naming enterprise compels us to change our views in the light of what we learn. Furthermore — and this is his central argument — "we not only learn, but also learn how to learn".¹ Science incorporates new beliefs into its very conception of the subject-matter of its inquiry.

Once more we realize that reasons (in the form of scientific beliefs and explanatory hypotheses) play a fundamental rôle in what it is we are talking about. In this respect the aim of science is not the search for 'essences' in any specific (i.e. restrictive) sense of this term; "we search for whatever we find".² We should not (and as a matter of historical fact we never did or do) pre-empt the issues.

More particularly Shapere is against a conception of science (implicit in the early-Putnam/Kripke model) according to which science must make "metaphysical presuppositions" (his term which is slightly misleading). This means that we ought to give a bifurcated account of the scientific enterprise: on the one hand we have the content of scientific beliefs, established on the basis of 'epistemic' considerations; and on the other, there is the aim of science, independent of the content and its associated epistemic considerations.

For Shapere it is a mistake to assert that the aim is thus independent of the beliefs: included in the process of scientific reasoning is "the

¹. Ibid., p.13; my italics.
². Ibid., p.17.
shaping - the internalization - of its own goals in the light of what we learn. This is precisely what guarantees continuity in the sense that successive theories are connected through a series (chain) of specifiable reasons.

This last point brings to mind, I propose, the rather wider scope and the depth of the problematic phenomenon we are accustomed to call 'conceptual relativism', beyond the narrow confines of natural science. It is connected in particular, in this context, with Collingwood's idea of a "constellation of absolute presuppositions". This kind of relativism and incommensurability is the particular one that leads to the impasse which arises when thought through: namely, how in fact change gets under way, what is the mechanism (if any) which is responsible for the movement, within historical time, from one set of such absolute metaphysical postulates or presuppositions to the next?

I should remark, however, that 'metaphysical' in this respect does not necessarily imply something external or beyond the content of natural sciences. So, for instance, the compositional micro-world picture employed in the (perhaps) 'dead' language of chemistry should properly be included as a certain paradigmatic case of a metaphysical presupposition; an alternative to it may possibly be the quark picture of the fabric of the micro-world.

Collingwood's alleged inability to solve the problem posed by the impasse above has been interestingly recounted and criticized by Toulmin

1. Ibid., p.19.
who rightly insists that this issue is properly connected with the Kuhnian revolution against the then received view in the philosophy of the natural sciences. Toulmin attempts to offer a remedy or a way out by distinguishing between considerations of theory and considerations of disciplinary aim. His contention is that while the former exhibit discontinuity \(\text{à la} \) Kuhn, the latter can be seen as providing steady continuity (apart from extremely exceptional cases such as Newton's theory of colours \(\text{vs.} \) Goethe's).

It is prima facie plausible for such a distinction to hold good. But it seems to me that it implicitly provides a criterion of demarcation between science and all other discourses. Toulmin fails to see this implication and he thereby undermines his own solution - unless this is made the explicit upshot of the distinction between theory and discipline. This is in fact borne out by the chosen example itself above.\(^1\)

Furthermore such a distinction can be countenanced neither by a too extreme reading of Kuhn's original work (or Feyerbend's avowals themselves) in which even meta-scientific discourse is itself paradigm-relative;\(^2\) nor by a Shapere-type idea of what the aim of science (as a discipline) is. For as I have mentioned above, in the latter case an account of the aims of science is interwoven with the content of the

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1. Another such example may be the work of Paracelsus. Here we would have what Hacking has called incommensurability as "dissociation": see his *Representing and Intervening*, pp.69-71.

relevant scientific beliefs; it does not transcend it and thus it cannot claim for itself the status of an independent criterion of demarcation (of whatever sort).

To make this point clearer we might adopt I. Hacking's reading of the contemporary philosophical scene. Thus Collingwood would be classed together with the later Putnam and also with Kant and all called "conservative nominalists": there is no way out of our conceptual scheme. Kuhn on the other hand may be called a "revolutionary nominalist" in the sense that our categories of classification and understanding are liable to change through time although we pretend that at each stage of our scientific development we are in fact empirical realists and think as if we are using natural kinds, essences, real properties and the like.

(4) I would now like to return to the issue of 'radical indeterminacy of reference of singular and general terms, which I mentioned in the opening of (3) above in connection with Fine's proposal. The most extensive treatment of this particular subgroup of problems has been offered by H.Field. He argues with the help of an example from mechanics that a certain sort of indeterminacy - which is revealed after

2. Perhaps Shapere's attack on the earlier Putnam is somewhat unjustified for during the same period the latter had attacked the view that there is an aim of science as well as its related background stemming from 'fictionalism': viz. that there is a distinction between the factors that make it rational to accept a theory for "scientific purposes" and those which make it rational to "believe" it as an approximation to truth. See Putnam's critique of this in his Philosophy of Logic (London, Allen & Unwin, 1971), esp. pp.68-74. He explicitly rejects the basic implicit prerequisite of fictionalism that one should accept a transcienfific method (e.g. Thomistic metaphysics as in Duhem or "absolute presuppositions", etc.) as superior or prior to the actual scientific method.
scientific revolutions have taken place - compels us to revise the
so-called Fregean account of references and truth in order to accommodate
the following problem:

that there are sentences with perfectly determinate truth
values which contain referentially indeterminate names and
predicates.

This problem originates not from our inability to know what a certain
term in a superseded scientific theory really denoted, but rather
from the fact that the evidence available makes clear that the term
denoted more than one entities (or physical quantities). This leads
Field to assert that what we are indeed confronted with is a case of "partial
denotation"\(^1\) which goes to show that a **token** of a term (**not** an expression-
type), when used, partially denotes two different entities or has two
sets of extension (whereby we have "partial extension" for general
terms as well).\(^2\)

The upshot of Field's investigations is that the RMV thesis with
respect to reference is much more complicated than it was initially
thought to be. We are no longer confronted with the supposedly only
three alternatives, **viz.**: (i) a term \(t\) has switched denotations
during a revolution \(r\); (ii) \(t\) has acquired denotation during \(r\);
(iii) \(t\) has kept the same denotation through \(r\). A further much more

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1. Field, *op.cit.*, pp.474ff. Phenomena similar to the physical ones
Field tries to capture with his account of 'partial denotation' appear
in the social-anthropological theories of kinship terminology. The
problem there is, for a certain school of thought, how to construct
an appropriate set of etic concepts the reference of which equates
emic entities in different cultures and languages (emic-etic distinction
comes from K.Pike): see W.Goodenough, *Description and Comparison in

important possibility arises: that (iv) \( t \) has undergone a "denotational refinement" during \( r \). This I take as another version of the claim made by Kitcher. Both proposals allow conceptual change and revision while denying complete incomensurability along with the corollary of the impossibility of objective comparisons between theories.\(^2\)

There is only one misgiving that I have with a certain point in this analysis. Field states that with regard to tokens of predicate terms we could similarly say that they "signify", or if they are indeterminate in the above sense they "partially signify" each of their partial sets of extensions. But this seems to me to be neither a definition in any strict sense nor informative in any intuitive sense. To 'signify' remains unclarified and any intensional – as opposed to purely extensional – idiom is not thus banished. This is all the more so in view of Field's explicit disavowal of any view which brings in the notion of belief; that is, beliefs which scientists hold with regard to the entity denoted by a theoretical term.\(^3\) This also contrasts with the views of Enc's outlined above. So until further analysis with regard to predicate-expressions specifically is forthcoming, the assimilation of the notion of 'signification' to the other non-intensional categories question-begging.

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1. Ibid., p.479.

2. Field's main example, Newtonian vs. Einsteinian "mass", has been shown to work against his desired semantic result by J. Earman and A. Fine in 'Against Indeterminacy'. J. of Phil. LXXIV (1977), 535-38. More strongly, they argue that it cannot even be applied to any other example.

4. Having gone through this brief critical discussion of certain detailed attempts to cope with the paradox of incommensurability which lies at the heart of the RMV Thesis and having tried to reveal a common basic thread in them, I will now like to return to the impossibility argument concerning the relation between prediction and discovery. As I explained this issue proves to be puzzling and important as soon as we place it against the background of the problematic of the RMV Thesis. I will now try to show the manner in which the relation between predicting and discovering of scientific theories is directly affected by the results obtained from the examination of the status of theoretical terms.

The specific version of Popper's argument I am examining occurs also within the context of his polemic against what he regards as the perennial faults of historicism and as such I must stress that I am not here interested in taking up this issue. The impossibility argument as an a priori condition of theoretical discourse is independent from Popper's own controversial formulation of 'historicism' as a philosophy of history and from his methodological individualism. As I indicated at the beginning of this chapter the impossibility argument is about a logical issue at the level of theories and not about discovering social laws, historical trends or predicting social changes. In so far as holism is associated with historical-inevitability theses or any kind of social determinism I must make clear that my thesis on ontological holism

1. For some criticisms of Popper's views against 'historicism' see A. Donagan, 'Popper's Examination of Historicism' in P. A. Schilpp (ed.), The Philosophy of Karl Popper (La Salle: Illinois, Open Court, 1974), ii, 905-924; and W. A. Suchting, 'Marx, Popper and "Historicism"', Inquiry, 15 (1972), pp. 235-66.
is foreign to these. It is, further, possible to accept the impossibility argument interpreted as a transcendental condition on social-scientific concepts (as in my reading of Winch given at the outset), and yet deny situational logic as a model of explanation or Popper's well-known views on piecemeal 'social engineering' urging the primacy of the moral standpoint of the individual.¹

Thus the question is: "Can a predictor predict its own future discoveries?" Popper's proof aims at demonstrating that "no scientific predictor - whether a human scientist or a calculating machine - can possibly predict, by scientific methods, its own future results."²

This goes on to show that any such attempt will turn into a retrodiction and not a prediction.

Gödel's second incompleteness theorem is employed by Popper in this proof. This is coupled with an informal counterpart:

If there is such a thing as growing human knowledge, then we cannot anticipate today what we shall know only tomorrow.

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1. As in fact Winch does (i.e. denies Popper's views on social science) in 'Popper and Scientific Method in the Social Sciences' in P.A. Schilpp (ed.), op. cit., pp. 889-904.

2. From the 1957 Preface to The Poverty of Historicism, p.vi. The logical proof of the "refutation argument" (against historicism) is contained in Popper's earlier articles 'Indeterminacy in Classical Physics and in Quantum Physics', Br.J.Phil.Sci. I (1950), Pt.I: pp.117-33; Pt.II: pp.173-95, esp. pp.179-88. This paper appears to have left Popper dissatisfied so he refers the reader (in the 1957 Preface) to the Postscript to his Logic of Scientific Discovery (see n.1, p. 107 above). The relevant parts from the latter work are §§ 20-22 of chap.III.
P. Urbach, who has studied this issue in detail, has tried to show that Popper's "refutation" argument is invalid because it is not a logical truth that if P predicts at $t_1$, the discovery of theory $T$, then P discovers $T$ at $t_1$.

It is not a logical truth since we may conceive of cases in which a scientist 'predicts' his future discoveries through a computer but is not 'informed' of this because he happens to leave the computer output undecoded - so the argument runs. But it seems to me that it all depends on what it is we are talking about when we say that a certain computer output provides us with "information" whose content, when left undecoded, remains concealed and that thus we can have a situation in which a scientist has predicted something without having discovered it. So what is it exactly that the predicted but not discovered "information" amounts to? We should perhaps distinguish the following three possibilities in order of ascending complexity (and thus of present interest):

(a) 'information' refers to novel observational predictions inferred from an existing theory only.

(b) the anticipated information refers to a novel theory which is either a commensurable successor to the one (or to the set of those) existing already and used by the computer, or stands to the previous one in the reducing-to-reduced relationship.

1. 'Is Any of Popper's Arguments Against Historicism Valid?', Brit. J.Phil.Sci., 29 (1978), 117-30 (the thesis I am criticizing appears in the last section of this article); see also his 'Good and Bad Arguments Against Historicism' in G. Currie and A. Musgrave (eds.), Popper and the Human Sciences, pp.133-46.
(c) the information predicts the discovery (if possible) of a new theory incommensurable with the existing one(s).

It is I think clear that in the case (a) and perhaps in both the sub-cases in (b) Urbach's claim holds true. To be sure if one could show that no instance of case (b) countenances the logical separation of predicting from discovering - an admittedly too strong a claim - it would then be relatively easier to admit that in case (c) we cannot separate the two activities. But the problem of reduction is notoriously difficult and, more importantly, it comprises a multiplicity of categories of reducibility that demand a detailed analysis of methodological claims beyond the province of this thesis. However, I must point out that, for instance, rejecting a certain reductivist account of a phenomenon may itself prove to be a revolutionary shift suggesting different hypothetical mechanisms that would further entail different existential choices. In such a case, then, predicting the rejection of a reducing-to-reduced relationship of theories amounts to possessing (entirely new) information as actual historical examples in science may attest to.

With these reservations in mind we now come to type (c) possibilities which, I believe, refute Urbach's claim. If a physical predictor, i.e. a scientist or a computer, is able to construct a new theory in the sense that


2. For a treatment of such cases see M. Greene, 'Reducibility: Another Side Issue?' in M. Greene (ed.), Interpretations of Life and Mind (London, RKP, 1971), pp.14-37. For a cogent critique of the ideal of micro-reductionism in social explanation see A. Garfinkel, Forms of Explanation (N. Haven, Yale U.P., 1981) (especially his remark on p.59 that the fact that "something 'is' something else does not mean that we can reduce the explanations involved").
the predictor predicts the occurrence of a certain revolutionary shift, then it is logically impossible for the predictor not to have discovered what theory exactly (or theories or subsections of a type of theory) such a shift would entail. It would be contradictory to assert the 'future' revolution without eo ipso asserting the associated theory; these are, as it were, two different descriptions of the same (cognitive) state. To assess the plausibility of my claim let us examine how it fares with respect to some of the proposals above.

(1) First, we have Kitcher's view on how an adequate theory of reference for scientific terms should be in order to avoid complete conceptual discontinuity. Here incommensurability is shown to be avoided: but note how, instead, we have a picture of referential continuity via continuous "initiating events" or renewed descriptions. In both cases the referent of a token of a scientific term is fixed by an associated set (including experimental results, etc.) of such events and descriptions; the latter are jointly responsible for our cognitive commitment to claims about the existence of the relevant entities. Such an epistemic standpoint is provided for us by our belief or hypothesis that the relevant theoretical and experimental corpus - within which the theoretical terms acquire their meaning (qua reference) - holds true.

But if "theoretical concepts must absorb theoretical hypotheses"1 how can we plausibly claim that we can have the former, i.e. grasp their meaning, without any prior belief (supposition) in the latter? In a parallel fashion our predictor cannot generate any information concerning the former, i.e. the referential changes, refine-

ments, etc. of the theoretical terms, without thereby committing itself to the associated theoretical hypotheses. Now if this is correct then our predictor has generated new information concerning the associated set of theoretical hypotheses; it thus generated their content.

Could we still then say that it is a logical possibility to assert that a predictor who (or which) is in such a cognitive state has not discovered the contents of his/its own epistemic claims?

(2) To see why it seems to me that we cannot, let us strengthen this logical-connectibility argument by focusing on the description-side of this issue which is after all especially suited to provide the further grounds we need. Thus if we turn to Enç's proposal we find that in the special case of non-ostensible entities (which is obviously the most puzzling) descriptions play an indispensable rôle in that we cannot plausibly claim that when we talk about these entities - via the relevant theoretical terminology - we do not know what sort of things it is we are talking about.

Even if we are not inclined to adopt an essentialist idiom about theories concerning 'entities' such as, for instance, "entropy", "the id" or "collective representations" (in the sense that they are ontologically distinct from gold, water or cats); even if, that is, we are not prepared to be old-fashioned realists about these 'entities' there is nevertheless no reason why we should not be guarded realists about the theories which purport to explain the phenomena for which the manifest properties of these entities are causally responsible - to the extent that these theories are found to be successful as
explanations. The latter is only another way of pressing home the same point: we do not know what kinds of things and properties we are studying and employing in our explanations unless we provide relevant descriptions (about causal power, etc.) for these things.

This I take to establish that the predictor cannot use the terms referring to such entities without also stating the theoretical hypotheses or description-sentences from which the meaning of these terms (i.e. their supposed referents) follows.

Furthermore we could embed this sketch of the picture I am offering into the more comprehensive issue of what is involved in discussions about the aim of science. We have seen that recent writings on the subject eschew any talk about "the search for fundamental essences" or any other thesis which depicts scientific aims as clear-cut, unitary and radically separated from scientific beliefs. Perhaps the dictum "we learn how to learn" may be quite instructive in this context for if it is possible for a physical predictor to foresee a certain kind of scientific revolution then his/its learning process assumes the form of a continuum of acquired knowledge which leads to the discovery as an end result[N.B. In this case a physical predictor may be taken to be the whole or a subsection of a scientific community].

1. This of course would complicate matters for a philosophical approach to the concept of truth. For a discussion of how Peirce's idea of 'community of inquirers' might be compared with Quine's 'naturalized epistemology' and further with evolutionary epistemology, see C.Hookway, 'Naturalism, fallibilism and evolutionary epistemology' in C.Hookway (ed.), Minds, Machines and Evolution, pp.1-15.
(4) Finally, one could take into account Field's proposal in favour of the thesis that a term may undergo referential/denotational refinement during a scientific revolution. By delineating (perhaps with degrees of approximation) what is involved in such a refinement of denotation when a term is detected to be referentially indeterminate we are in a position to examine the extent and limits of any connection that we find between successive theories or even between parts of a single theory. Although Field does not subscribe to Quine's well-known thesis of "extra-theoretic meaninglessness" and he thus believes that after referential indeterminacy is cleared up through denotational refinement we can avoid incommensurability, it nonetheless follows from his central thesis that a predictor cannot effect this refinement without thereby generating new theoretical propositions. In fact such a refinement, as Field's paper makes clear, was necessitated by the existence of contradictory theoretical statements which were found to prevail between theories separated by a revolution or within a single one.

Thus I conclude that: for more than one reason Popper's specific conceptual-impossibility argument is valid.

However, the argument, apart from its intrinsic logical interest, has an important consequence because it allows us to formulate a necessary condition to be met by holism as a metatheory of social science.

The first step of the discussion in this chapter has been the introduction of the problem as to how are we to move away from the impasse or 'paradox' of the RMV thesis. The presented proposals with respect to conceptual change strengthened the test the impossibility
argument had to pass. But, further, they thereby offered valuable insights into the character of theoretical terms employed in specifying the ontological commitments of scientific theories. We saw in what way the aim of scientific knowledge is not independent of beliefs, and that the latter originate in descriptions. The status of theoretical terms, as playing an active rôle guiding the formation of novel scientific beliefs, runs parallel to the arguments I gave in Chapter II (sect. 2) about how to interpret the complex notion of 'reality as opposed to appearance' in the context of philosophsical anthropology. And it is within this latter context and with special reference to the problem of representing that some of the formal ontological presuppositions of holistic metatheory are to be placed—as I have already urged.

The importance of Popper's argument is that it offers strong support to the claim that social holism is not an empirical thesis in opposition to individualism. The ontological commitments of holism are not to be measured by individualist standards. This is shown by a brief overview of the elements that make up the discussion of this chapter. First, however, talk about predicting could be dropped at this stage as having exhausted its validity and use in giving us an access to the problem of the denotation of theoretical terms and facilitating the drawing of conclusions as above. Then we have the analogy with the metatheoretical requirements of Gödel-consistency and provability/derivability imposed upon a systematic body of knowledge. This imposes restrictions on the reference of theoretical terms and statements. The requirement of consistency and the restrictions on the manner in which ontological claims are
arrived at, posit a condition on social holism as a methatheory. This is in effect that ontological claims about social wholes (social substances, events, etc.) are to be consistently integrated with those about the individual as a person. The important point to emphasize here is that this integration itself must be an element in the construction of the holist picture. This is the task of Part Two below. But from the considerations of this chapter it follows that a formal requirement for holism is that its claims about social wholes issue in a distinctive approach to how facts about the individual are to be conceived, especially facts about psychological states as it will appear in Chapter VI sect. 5 in particular. The present chapter was intended to show that, given the impossibility argument (and its basis on 'Gödel sentences'): if $p_1$ is a theoretical proposition (about human beings as persons) that is 'provable' in a system $s_1$, then the statement $s_1$, to the effect that $p_1$ is provable in $s_1$, must itself be provable in $s_1$, (where $s_1$ may be taken as comprising the metatheory of social holism).
CONCLUSION

The discussion of the issues raised in this chapter completes this Part's task to spell out the formal mode of the inquiry into the ontology of the social world and to lay down the conditions to be met if social holism is to be possible. The former was carried out in the opening chapter which, in turn, led to the study of the latter undertaken in the last two chapters of this Part.

In Chapter I the first crucial argument has been that holism reveals the significance of certain kinds of relations exhibited by the various types of constituent entities. I then considered how this enables us to recast the 'part/whole' problematic in a novel mould and, consequently, to propose the formal character of the individual as an 'entelechial Leibnizian monad'. The principal idea discussed throughout was that such a thesis rejects and replaces the extensional model of social reality.

Scrutinizing and defending the non-extensional view introduced by formal ontology throughout this dissertation disclosed that this conception of holist ontological commitments (cf. Chap. I, sct. 9) requires that its conditions of possibility should originate from an anti-empiricist framework of knowledge. The defining features of the latter were argued to be, with special reference to the topic of this study: (1) a particular conception of the philosophical notions of 'reality' and 'necessity' (Chapter II), as well as (2) the implications of the impossibility argument (present Chapter). These two, taken together, concern the metatheoretical status of holism.
Thus this chapter's particular contribution is:

The proposed link of the impossibility argument with certain views in the philosophy of science explained how the active role of theoretical categories (such as those posited by holism) blocks nominalist assumptions and verificationist semantics that would deny reality to social wholes (as we saw in sections 2 and 3 of Chap. I). This is one important result.

But as I stated at the beginning, this chapter's discussion meant to reach one step further: I have maintained that by proving the validity of the impossibility argument and thus accepting its Gödelian rationale we can assert (taking into account the considerations of the last three pages of Chapter I) that: claims about wholes should be consistently integrated with those about the individual; and furthermore, that such a synthesis should itself be a moment of holist ontology. In this sense, a holist universe of discourse cannot, as it were, grow out of, or supervene upon, an individualist one. Therefore the considerations adduced in this chapter (vide. closing statement of sect 4) offer an accurate expression of the crucial proposition that: holism can be viable as long as it is not conceived as the empirical opposite of individualism. I should point out that this whole line of thought bears upon the refutation of the idea of a "cement" discussed in the main Introduction.

Finally, the underlying thesis that reality is not a bare 'given' will be encountered again in the case of social events at the very end.
PART TWO
Chapter IV

SCHEMATISM AND THE ANALYSIS OF SOCIO-CULTURAL CONCEPTS
INTRODUCTION

I come now to study in this Part the constitution of individuals as social persons in accordance with the ontological form of the social world presented so far. As I maintained at the outset, having moved away from representing the social world as a mechanical order of causal interactions between pluralities of atoms, the alternative non-extensional moment/whole foundation relations involve individuals represented as 'entelechial Leibnizian monads'. It was argued, further, that their interrelation is rendered possible as a specific kind of conceptual communication realized by the individuals' (i) possession and application of socio-cultural concepts, (ii) meaningful linguistic expression and (iii) mental property of intentionality. These three are the issues analyzed in this Part's chapters. They are examined in this order because they are shown to be stages of a unified argumentation.

I have emphasized at various points that the notion of 'social person' is an integral moment of the crucial idea of holism, namely, that the constituents of social reality cannot be individuated and identified unless certain kinds of relations are exhibited (Chapter I). To understand how it is possible for individuals to relate to each other in order for us to arrive at the unified constitution of social reality, we must offer an account of non-causal relations. The latter, I argue, are instantiated by the conceptual communication I am studying here.

The upshot of my investigations will be to manifest the complexity of the issue at the heart of the philosophical motivation of holism:
this issue, as I have explained right from the start, permeates this
dissertation. This has to do with how holism posits the relation between
the category of the 'individual' and that of the 'social'. In Chapter I
this issue was expressed by the problem of impredicative totalities and
re-appeared when I probed into the criteria for the reality of "social
fields"; then it acquired meaning within the transcendental considerations
(Chapter II) and, subsequently, it was cast as the formal requirement
that ontological claims about social substances should be consistently
integrated with those about the individual; and it was stressed that this
integration itself must be intrinsic to holist ontology (Chapter III).

In this sense, this Part is an attempt to demonstrate that:

once formal ontology allows us to distinguish between empirical questions
of causal interactions and questions of logical interrelations, then
holism cannot allow that:

[A] a 'fact' about the individual's mind must be something to be
discovered within the individual mind; and

[B] the 'social' must be understood as a 'container' within which
the independently identified psychological states of the individual are
placed bearing the causal imprint of such a social context.

The previous Part has provided the necessary philosophical ground on
which to pursue here the proposed alternative thesis that the categories
of the 'individual' and of the 'social' emerge simultaneously through the
notion of social person; i.e. that they cannot be circumscribed as
autonomous of each other. Hence the non-causal/conceptual relations
between Leibnizian individuals-qua-social persons.
The present Chapter offers an analysis of the first entelechial factor: the individual's possession and application of socio-cultural concepts. The starting point is the problem of how to account for the connexion between possessing the meaning of a term and using it. My strategy is to employ the Kantian theory of Schematism to show (1) that the cluster of socio-cultural concepts resembles that type of concepts for which possession and application coincide. Then I argue that (2) this is the case because the intension of such concepts includes specific justification-conditions for the corresponding social practices and beliefs. Hence, (3) the possession/application of these concepts determines the individuation of social events, practices, etc. Therefore, (4) the instances of social reality thus 'shaped' cannot be construed as an external to the individual constant (or contingently given) "environment" against which the connexion between concept-possession and application is resolved. This means that - as far as this analysis goes - we cannot philosophically countenance two 'possible worlds' being indistinguishable with respect to social states of affairs but discernible with regard to the individuals' corresponding states of mind.

The discussion proceeds as follows. The first three sections introduce and develop the issue through the idea of Schematism. Then section 4 launches and defends step (1). Section 5 deals at length with steps (2) and (3) in terms of a critique against an argument of Gellner's. Section 6 brings together the stages of my argumentation formulated as two contrasting Propositions adding a symbolized exposition thereof. Finally section 7 presents three philosophical themes parallel to my own inquiries and ends with a conclusion of what the present chapter accomplishes.
1. There is a number of suggestions and arguments that have been put forward in connection with problems central to any account of concept-possession and concept-application. Some of these issues are found to be common both to Kantian scholarship and to contemporary analytical concerns. It has been correctly suggested that there is a very similar, if not identical, repudiation of the so-called naive 'imagistic' theory of concept-use to be found in the Critique of Pure Reason [e.g. A133/B172] and in Wittgenstein's Blue Book and Philosophical Investigations: this, as is well known, turns on the infinite regress argument against the justification of rule-following via images.¹ Some commentators on Kant have suggested that, for Kant, we must distinguish two faculties which neatly pair off with the two mental states/processes we are discussing: thus the 'understanding' is the faculty of rules or of relating concepts to other concepts (i.e. possessing concepts); the faculty of 'judgement' however is that of applying concepts to their concrete instantiations (i.e. concept-application). S.Körner has named the former "non-referential" rules in contradistinction to the latter which he calls "referential rules" of use.²

However, a problem arises as soon as one starts examining the possibility of clearly delineating what is involved when the second

'faculty' is active. That is, we cannot avoid being entangled within the circle of concepts we have in our possession or those we eventually come to acquire. This, I submit, is another instance of what has been known as the 'hermeneutical circle' in a different tradition. How can the problem be avoided?

2. With regard to those concepts which Kant classifies as 'empirical' he is quite certain how their application to the data (of inner and outer sense) is secured and effected within his own theory of positive experience. But as far as what he calls 'pure concepts' are concerned he is in need of his theory of 'Schematism' in order to guarantee their employment. Against this latter point there is an argument to the effect that instances of pure concepts, such as causality, unity or possibility, can never be perceived in the way instances of empirical concepts could (in principle) be perceived.

The reply to this objection - a reply which I think is correct and necessary if Kant's theory is to have any value at all - suggests the following distinction: whereas it is true that it is impossible to apply pure concepts solely on the basis of the sensory given (as input provided by 'intuition'), they can nevertheless be applied as 'schematized' categories to the sensory given.

In what follows I try to develop this line of thought and pursue some implications it has for the metaphysics of social experience and

1. For some reservations on this clear-cut distinction see L. Chipman, 'Kant's Categories and their Schematism', rept. in R.C.S.Walker (ed.), Kant on Pure Reason (Oxford, O.U.P. 1982), pp.100-16. The reply mentioned below in the text is Chipman's.

2. This objection Chipman attributes to G.Warnock, 'Concepts and Schematism', Analysis, IX (1948-9), 77ff.
Some commentators agree that, for Kant, empirical concepts are unique in being, i.e. being identical with, their schemata themselves (via the notion of a 'rule'); while pure concepts and the categories are not so. Now if this is the case then possession of an empirical concept (i.e. grasping its meaning) is in fact identical with the ability to apply it in experience under favourable circumstances (i.e. excluding illusions, hallucinations, etc., that is, preventions due to sensory inabilities only; and also excluding cases where the objects/instances of these empirical concepts simply do not happen to be within the sensory field of the subject). Hence, it is concluded that: regular misapplication of a concept of this kind by a subject should lead us to legitimately infer that s/he does not possess this concept.

1. Bennett thinks it was correct for Kant to insist that concept-possession requires the ability to use it in 'rules', but this should only be a necessary condition and not a sufficient one as well. Bennett goes on to invoke Wittgenstein's famous treatment of this topic and he relates the whole issue to the more basic philosophical problem of whether speechless animals can be said to possess the ability of judging: see Bennett, op.cit., §24 and his Rationality (London, RKP, 1964), §§ 9-11. For a modern version of the thesis that creatures which lack language lack concepts such as 'belief', and that thought depends on speech see D.Davidson, 'Thought and Talk' in S.Guttenplan (ed.), Mind and Language (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1975), pp.7-23. Davidson here tries to eschew a one-sided view that takes speech ontologically and causally prior to thinking. This view, I think, must be distinguished from a more subtle one advanced by W.Sellars who maintains that linguistic behaviour is conceptual activity in a primary sense, i.e. it does not simply express conceptual activity: for a defence of Sellars' position against charges of circularity, etc. see R.Tuomela, Human Action and its Explanation (Dordrecht, Reidel, 1977), esp. chaps. 3 and 4; see also my following chapters.
But in contrast to this it has been argued that the same conclusion is not warranted on the basis of the subject's regular non-application of the concept (even securing that the favourable circumstances obtain). Why is this plausible?\(^1\)

The line of argument that I find convincing gives the following reply: certain empirical concepts have 'infested' our culture simply because as a matter of contingent fact we happened to have lived and worked in close experiential proximity to areas of sensory discrimination. The upshot is that we develop the ability to easily recognise instances of these particular concepts (e.g. 'dog'). The same is not true of other empirical concepts: although we can legitimately show that we do know their meaning (i.e. grasped their 'sense') we are nevertheless in no epistemic position in being able to individuate and recognize an object as an instance falling under such a concept, even 'when we are in fact', or could possibly be confronted with such an instance in the most favourable of circumstances. Leaving some queries of Kantian exegesis aside I now turn to consider the implications of this view for issues of my own concern.\(^2\)

I would begin by pointing out that this line of thought can be seen to have two prongs:

1. This argument is put forward by Chipman against Bennett and is endorsed by Walker.

2. My present examination may be situated within the broader intellectual framework originating from Cassirer's *The Philosophy of Symbolic Forms* (N.Haven, Yale U.P., 1953). i, 80, where he explicitly maintains that the Kantian "critique of reason thus becomes a critique of culture". Both in his earlier *The Problem of Knowledge* and in his later critical examination of Heiddeger's 'Kant', Cassirer formulates his more general idea that critical philosophy is a philosophy of freedom and of morality and that this may be extracted from the Schematism chapter. I take this latter point from N.Rotenstreich, 'Schematism and Freedom', *Rev.Int.de Phil.*, 110 (1974), 464-74.
(a) It is, I will argue, relevant to an analysis of the logic of social and cultural terms; and

(b) it is pertinent to the question of how theoretical terms employed in science exclusively can be used to refer to unobservables (this latter problem becomes even more acute when quantum mechanics is incorporated into the construction of our general picture of the micro-constitution of the physical world).

3. It would be instructive I think to start off with the latter issue in view of the preceding chapter. Thus in the case of (b) — which in contradistinction to (a) might be labelled as the level of theories, especially in the natural sciences — it is not a logical, or rather a conceptual, contradiction to claim that one may correctly be ascribed the possession of, say, the concept of a mesotron (i.e. one grasps the meaning/sense of '------') without also being able to recognise instances thereof. Moreover, it is the case in some areas that as a matter of principle we are unable ever to do so.

For possession of such a concept requires being able to use it on a broad variety of contexts in the sense that one knows a certain (limited of course if he is not himself a trained scientist) amount of what the theory enveloping these concepts is all about; and further it requires that one can make a number of intelligible and coherent statements (therefore statements capable of being true or false) about

1. M. Dummett makes a similar point, for different purposes, in 'What is a Theory of Meaning?' in Guttenplan (ed.), op. cit., p. 431 and cf. his Frege, p. 488. Furthermore, I think a Fregean specification of sense for singular terms can dispose of counter examples, as e.g., that we can use such a term in utterances registering that we do not know its meaning.
conceptual interrelations within the theory which is espoused (as we saw in more detail in Chapter III above).

This, however, by no means implies that one has _ipso facto_ the ability (apart from a very limited one) to know in advance what one is entitled to recognize as empirical evidence establishing (i.e. confirming or disconfirming) his theoretical claims whenever one is asked to produce such evidence.

Thus it seems to me to be correct to suggest that it is only with a certain subclass of empirical concepts, _viz._ those that happen to inform our culture and our everyday life continuously, that a person cannot be said to possess such a concept unless s/he is able to apply it correctly in experience at least most of the time. Within the Kantian framework the same point is put thus: only in the case of those concepts that "do no more than classify what is empirically given" the distinction between concept and schema breaks down.

In a sense what we are claiming here is that we can safely delineate a certain region of experience mostly if not primarily relevant to our own everyday-life practical needs and pursuits; this field of experience is that with respect to which our mental activity and our correlated linguistic behaviour are in _direct, unmediated_ relation. In other words the 'given' in this case is immediately present to us _through_ and _only_ through the conceptual apparatus which we have devised, inherited and employed

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2. To dispel possible confusion I must stress that the use of 'unmediated' or 'immediately present' in my text follows precisely Kant's own in the _Critique of Pure Reason_, A138/B177.
It now turn to the analysis of socio-cultural terms which
will occupy the rest of this chapter.\footnote{For other aspects of 'Schematism' see the more comprehensive treatments of R.C.S. Walker, 'Synthesis and Transcendental Idealism', Kant-Studien, 76 (1985), 14-27; R.Aquila, 'Categories and Forms of Judgment', Ratio, XVII (1976), 31-49; M. Woods, 'Kant's Transcendental Schematism', Dialectica, 37 (1983), 201-19.}

4. It is clear that certain of the concepts classified as socio-cultural, are also concepts which are empirical in the above sense. Hence we might legitimately extend the above line of thought to these concepts and claim that in their case as well it would be wrong to distinguish between concept and schema-qua-rule. However, I want to emphasize that there is an important asymmetry between the specific set of empirical concepts that I discussed above and the cluster of socio-cultural ones.

My suggestion here is that with respect to political, social and cultural terms the possession of the meanings of the corresponding concepts by the individual social person is (identical with) the ability that s/he exhibits in employing them. But, this I believe to be the case for the following reason: the terms in question can acquire meaning (i.e. can be regarded as meaningful in the sense of significant) only if they are so used (applied). In fact it would be better to claim that it is precisely because they are so used and because they were in the first instance perhaps generated in order to be so used and then passed on through generations of speakers, that these concept-words have the sense they are found to have.
Of course, this does not imply the existence of any specific, historical "initiating event", or that, as regards the fixing of reference, we should always associate a rigid causal-chain of use with such concept-words. In fact, I want to allow, as it emerges later on in this chapter, that concepts from the field of human action and social institutions exhibit, as H. Pitkin has suggested, an essential tension between purpose and institutionalization or between substance and form through time.¹

Now the formulation of the direction of dependence in my argument is in need of further clarifications if it is to withstand possible objections. In the course of rebutting two major such objections that I take to be crucial, I put forward, below, an analysis of socio-cultural concepts as an indispensable condition that a holistic picture of social persons must satisfy. The two objections I envisage to my claim above is that it is a new version of verification or a replica of Wittgenstein's views on word-usage.

It is not a verificationist theory of meaning because I do not claim that it is universally the case that meaning is the way we verify sentences; and in fact I am not dealing with whole sentences here. The following point is sufficient for my present purposes in making clear the manner in which my discussion so far relates to and differs from verificationism.

1. H. F. Pitkin, Wittgenstein and Justice (Berkeley, U. of California P., 1972), pp. 186-8. I would also cite as such an example the concept of "being a Christian" which can be seen to have exhibited such a non-rigidity during the early stages of its institutional history. Complex cases like these lie at the heart of socio-cultural life and are not susceptible to static or idealized principles like the one given by G. Evans (in the course of emending Kripke's ideas on reference) in his The Varieties of Reference (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1982), at p. 387.
According to one standard formulation of the central idea behind realism with respect to theories of language the realist will not refrain from ascribing to problematic assertions a subject matter of an inaccessible kind. By 'problematic' we mean that set of statements which is characteristically regarded as such on the basis that the evidential grounds of this set are statements about the past, other minds, religious or moral beliefs, social and political judgements, mathematical truths or aesthetic values and counterfactual conditionals.

For the realist an assertion (if meaningful) is capable of being true or false even when the appropriate evidence is in principle unavailable. An instance of such a case may be taken to be the referents of the entities of modern advanced physics. In this case realism is the view that the subject matter of statements is their truth conditions. Therefore the latter, i.e. the truth-conditions of an assertion, are other than the assertibility-conditions of the utterance of the assertion. The anti-realist considers such a way of looking at language confused but his picture of the matter is not quite the opposite; it is rather a repudiation of the realist claims to objectivity. According to one proposal there can be a plausible realistic construal of certain statements in the socio-cultural domain. These are taken to be evaluative in kind for certain very strong reasons. Although evaluations are assertions capable of being true or false the possibility that the relevant truth conditions should come apart from assertibility conditions does not arise.

What is in effect suggested here is a kind of 'evaluative realism' according to which it is correct to render statements in the realist...
mode and thus ascribe to them truth conditions. However the further realist claim that these truth conditions (subject matter or content) should be different from the utterance's justification-conditions is dropped.¹

Hence what we have here is a plea for recognizing that the rather too clear-cut division between realism and anti-realism is misleading in the case of socio-cultural understanding. The special feature of this domain is that we can have ascription of truth-values (realism) and an identification of the assertibility conditions with the truth conditions. This is the result of the ubiquity of the evidential constraints of evaluative judgements. In other words, the verificationist constraint is not violated because there is no need for it to arise in the first place.

Moreover, as I will try to show this holds because evaluative statements determine their evidential (i.e. factual) constraints. This squares with my claim that what is special about the socio-cultural terms is that grasping the meaning of such concepts is not detached from experience. For an integral part of their sense ('Sinn') itself provides the conditions for the possibility of the relevant experience. This is achieved because the 'signification function'² of such concepts gives rise to a certain kind of experience and cognition (i.e. in this case, social) and thus the Kantian device of


Schematism is inappropriate.

This is another way of strengthening the general thesis that the socio-political experience of a person is self-constituting, i.e. the subject constitutes her/himself through it. The individual-qua-social person is constituted as such in the process of having and developing this conceptual capacity of cognition and the corresponding experience. This amounts to saying that one is able to carry out one's own activities only within the relevant evaluative/conceptual framework. The agent is thus in no need to somehow first constitute her/himself as a social person and then try to acquire social knowledge by integrating himself to this social/conceptual framework. These are not two separate stages of a mysteriously unitary 'social-developmental' process; any claim in favour of such a conceptual 'ceasura' is fallacious.\(^1\) Obviously my position here does not imply that empirical investigations into the mechanisms of (ontogenetic) socialization-processes are denied of any subject-matter. What I want to stress is that this idea of constitution accords with what I put forward as a requirement of social holism in Chapter I: namely, that

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1. This point is congruent to a primarily Vygotskian conception of how social psychology ought to proceed: See L.Vygotsky, *Mind in Society* (Cambridge: Mass., Harvard U.P., 1978), esp. pp.56-7; and cf. his *Thought and Language* (Cambridge: Mass., MIT Press, 1962), chap.4. This could be contrasted with J.S.Mill's individualist statement: "the laws of the phenomena of society are... the laws of individual human nature" (as quoted in S.Lukes' *Individualism*, p.112). In *Emile*, Rousseau asserts that if it were possible to know perfectly each individual's psychological constitution we could thereby predict all their combined effects in the body collective: Of course, psychologism of such an extreme kind does not have to be linked with methodological individualism, as Popper claims. However, sometimes it is so linked: e.g. a strikingly Roussean assertion has been made by K.Arrow as quoted on p.53 of A.Garfinkel's *Forms of Explanation*. 
the individuation of entities should, from the formal-ontological point of view, involve a condition of logical (rather than causal) (im)possibility in the characterization of the essential properties of such entities. In this sense of individuation, keeping the two aforementioned stages logically distinct would make their connection impossible.

5. I come now to address the second kind of objection envisaged. However convincingly it can be shown that my main thesis about the nature of social terms is not a return to verificationism another question may still be asked: is it a 'use-theory' of meaning?

Strictly speaking the phrase 'use-theory of meaning' is contradictory for according to Wittgenstein's dictum one should not look for meanings but for the use of words within shared forms of life. It is not my purpose here to go into fine exegetical details. Instead I propose to examine closely a concrete issue which may arise in this respect.

The line of argument I am interested in is most clearly and cogently presented in E.Gellner's 'Concepts and Society' which opposes what may perhaps be dubbed as the naive version of the use theory.

1. Furthermore, I agree with G.Baker's point (in his 'Criteria: A New Foundation for Semantics', Ratio, 16 (1974), 156-89) that Wittgenstein's later semantics, if identified with a so-called 'use-theory' becomes rather vacuous; unless, I believe, it is supplemented by a precise determination of the conditions that render concept-possession and application possible (as I am trying to do in this chapter with respect to socio-cultural terms).

This paper relates to my present concerns in as far as it appears to threaten the validity of my main thesis with respect to how social and political concepts function. Gellner's major contention is that in some very central cases "[t]here is ... a crucial divergence between concept and reality, a divergence which moreover is quite essential for the working of the social system." This is convincingly illustrated with an example of a pair of concepts taken from that author's own fieldwork (in Morocco).

I am in sympathy with Gellner's conviction underlying his suggestion that the contextualist modes of interpretation must go deeper than it is usually thought they should: that is, the traditional hermeneutic approach is, if not entirely misguided, at least incomplete and therefore incapable of delivering the goods it is expected to. What is imperative is an extension of the contextualist approach in a way that transcends those harmful 'idées fixes' which force us to be preoccupied with meaning-consistency and with avoiding vagueness in interpretation. This is in effect a demand for a more comprehensive understanding, a theoretical enterprise that would not shun explaining the essentially inconsistent use of a variety of social concepts.

There is however in that same paper the further claim that

"concepts generally contain justifications of practices, and hence that one misinterprets them grossly if one treats them simply as these practices, and their context, in another dress. The justifications are independent of the thing justified." (2)

1. Ibid., p.44.
2. Ibid., pp.44-5.
Now my objection is that of these last two assertions, whereas the former is a correct injunction in general, the second is I think clearly false if it is taken to imply that the justificatory conditions of certain socio-cultural practices are entirely divorced from what it is they are supposed to justify. In support of my claim I am going to offer an alternative account of how the analysis of this problem ought to proceed.

In the example from social anthropology he is working with, Gellner fails to distinguish between:

(1) on the one hand what plays the rôle of justifications with respect to the applicability of a predicate-term to a social person; thus distinguishing this particular individual from the rest in virtue of conferring properties, attributes and powers of sorts to this social person; that is, individuating 'Parmenidean particulars' (Chapter I);

(2) and on the other, what functions as a complex of justifications—qua-explanations of a more or less firmly delineated set of practices (i.e. actions on the part of the rest of the tribesmen) which follow from what is believed by them to be the case with respect to the chosen few on the basis of the kind of justifications adumbrated in (1) above.

For the sake of convenience let us call the first kind "$A#$-justifications" and the second class "$B#$-justifications". It is I believe clear from this brief formulation that $A#$ and $B#$ mould an interwoven network of justification-conditions. The misinterpretation occurs pace Gellner - as soon as we lose sight of this fact, and not when we correctly construe justifications of practices and representations of the practices thus justified as conceptually interrelated. In
particular this becomes clearer when we insist that as far as B#-justifications are concerned, the concepts employed contain justifications which act also as explanations (perhaps only for us) towards an adequate account of the practices involved.

Notice that as far as A#-justification go there is nothing whatsoever which could legitimately allow us to comment on the correct or incorrect applicability of the concept-term of the example. The justification-conditions involved at this node of the network are responsible for the 'genesis' of the particular concept in the following sense: without them, for instance, there would be no practice of 'divine selection' of 'igurramen' in our case-study.

This last point is connected, with my principal thesis in this chapter, namely, that the concepts-as-used of the particular sub-class I am exclusively concerned with is all there is as far as justifications go. The concepts-as-used contain these justifications as part of their meaning [Sinn]: possession and application of the concept are not two separate intellectual capacities/activities that the tribesmen, for instance, exhibit.

There is however, a crucial point here which should be given special consideration. The notion of 'application' in the present example clearly refers to a one-off practice in the sense that the "long-drawn-out process" of selection can be seen as an ensemble consisting of recursively enumerable instances. Hence apart from the trivial problem of re-identification of the chosen persons as

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1. Here we must note that we come up against a perplexing issue: in trying to account for what is an explanation for us, the interpreters, we should nevertheless ask to what extent such explanatory routes could be constantly blocked both for and by the agents themselves.
such (which let us be reminded is not the case with other empirical concepts as we have seen, e.g. instances of 'dog', etc., even if our culture is heavily infested with them), application involves in the case of our example what is brought in by the functioning of A#-justification conditions. That is we have application of concepts with reference to their own actions by the tribesmen themselves. Moreover these concepts (as applied subsequent to the original point) are clearly entailed by the meaning of the cluster of concepts which make up class A#, manifested in the initial selection of the chosen few.

Thus in view of these considerations I cannot see how one could coherently divorce the practices justified from the justifications involved (unless one is making the irrelevant point that acts and practices as social regularities and conventions are ontologically distinct from both linguistic meanings and mental states).

Notice moreover that there is here an excellent example of what I discussed above in section 4: the question of verificationist constraints does not arise when, for instance, a tribesman evaluates a certain action of his as, say, 'shameful' if this action does not accord with the norms laid down for him by the justification-conditions [A#] which are part of the particular concept. When applying the predicate-term which bestows the 'divine characteristic' on certain persons - either during the process of selecting those special members of the tribe or later in the process of making evaluative judgements concerning his actions in connection with those members, i.e. when the latter act in their capacity of divine, impartial judges or arbitrators in disputes - a tribesman does not have to have a 'schema'
in his possession that would function as a rule guiding him in the application-instances of his use of the concept.

In other words, there is nothing external or over and above his possession of the meaning of the concept-term, no 'supplement' as it were that would be responsible either for correct/incorrect application through time or for maintaining consistency and matching several real 'tokens' of use amongst a plurality of individuals at a time. The only (conceptually) prior minimum constraint is what is involved in the selection procedure, i.e. when the concept-term is used as a name designating its bearer as a particular individual upon whom a number of assorted characteristics ('powers') have been ascribed formally. But this is not to say that the justifications included in a concept are in need of a further intermediate 'schema' empirically generated and verifiable, constraining further applications founded on the justifications. That is, we do not need this tertium quid to link the justifications of practices contained in the meanings of the terms with the practices thus justified.

One could alternatively say that such a link is rendered 'unnecessary' but this terminology is misleading. It does not become superfluous; it is rather that the nature of the cases we are dealing with is such that it gives rise to concepts which function ab initio differently from

1. In using this term I have in mind the sense it has in deconstructionist debates on exteriority; cf., in particular N. Garver, 'Derrida on Rousseau on Writing', J. of Phil., LXXIV (1977), 663-73.

2. This point is directly related to the famous idea of Kant's about the "heterogeneity" between the pure concepts of the understanding and empirical intuitions; empirical concepts however are "homogeneous" with the sensible representations of their objects: Critique of Pure Reason, A137-147/B176-187. I should like to note also that one of the revealing (and sadly somehow neglected by commentators) passages of Kant's on Schematism appears in the Critique of Judgement, [First Part: Aesthetic], § 59.
those in need of such intermediary schemata. Only in this sense then it can be said that such a link fulfils no purpose because there is no 'gap' such that would require a "schematized" conceptual bridge to be provided. And there is no gap of this sort because, as I have been arguing, the dispositions and practices of the individual social persons in our example are what they are precisely because they are shaped in accordance with (that is by) the justifications-qua-partial meanings inherent in the concepts-as-used.

The word 'partial' of course is meant to denote here the essential discrepancy that Gellner's insightful paper showed to obtain between concepts and society as in our case study.¹ This however does not grant us license to talk as if the justifications do not enter into the practices.

Before closing this sub-theme I would like to indicate briefly an alternative line of thought which runs along a parallel ground. I have in mind certain theories in linguistics and in particular those focusing on speech-acts. Whereas most of the conclusions we get from linguistics studies are empirical in nature in the sense that they are about facts of everyday experience, my own investigations, however, aim at illuminating questions of the metaphysics of social experience and cognition. Thus whatever I have written in this chapter was explicitly advanced from a Kantian transcendental point of view (i.e. as a 'critical' inquiry into the 'possible').

¹. This by no means implies that such an essential incongruence or inconsistency is something totally alien to 'civilized' societies: consider, for example, familiar accounts of ideological constructions; or how the vocabulary of the language of ideology may be defined as a species of rhetorics: see M.Markovic, 'The Language of Ideology', Synthese, 59 (1984), 69-88.
I select as my starting point what is generally considered as one of the most fundamental features of the use of natural language. This has to do, namely, with the observation that everyday speech-act phenomena are in effect deeply instituted in more basic, potentially language-independent conditions of social interaction. Taken to its logical conclusion, it follows that the semantic elucidation of 'truth' is relativized to social contexts such as rituals, etc. In particular, when it comes to speech-acts such as the so-called 'explicit performatives' we find ourselves confronted with the question "How can a language lend itself to a 'verbal magic' in virtue of which such expressions are 'self-verifying'?"\[1\]

It has been shown that simply uttering an explicit performative is enough to make true the corresponding constative expressed by the same sentence. It is also true of conventionally regulated social interaction and symbolic practices that the following circular process appears to take place:

"One controls truth values of propositions because one controls the acts which determine them, but the acts themselves reduce to the expression of the propositions in question. How can language, an objective vehicle of truth values, become the subjective basis for their determination?"(2)

1. Significant insights in this area are found in the writings of French linguists and sociologists. An important and illuminating paper is G. Fauconnier, 'Social ritual and relative truth in natural language' in K. Knorr-Cetina and A. V. Cicourel (eds.), Advances in Social Theory and Methodology, (London, RKP, 1981), pp.175-202. The author also cites as his sources: B. de Cornulier's study on 'auto-interprétation' and P. Bourdieu's on 'authorizing language'.

2. Fauconnier, op. cit., p.184. The term 'subjective' is misleading here if it is taken to mean arbitrary will or personal taste; it is rather synonymous with 'psychological' or 'inner' as opposed to external or public.
It is obvious, however, that social conditions presupposed by linguistic use are not always sufficient (even if necessary) to account for self-verification: a ritual of selection for example contains as integral moments of its own all those symbolic speech-acts; but we can envisage a case in which an order is given by an explicit performative without the necessary social and psychological conditions being satisfied, and therefore without any ensuing ritual.¹

This last point is directly relevant to what I argued above in discussing Gellner's example. We see that for a ritual to take place in the sense of being effective the symbolic aspect of the relevant linguistic performances is interrelated with the whole of social-psychological conditions and actions. My own parallel line of argument was that the justification-conditions which form part of the meanings of the concepts employed are essentially interrelated with the ritual practices that take place.

This completes my defence against the two kinds of crucial objections to my thesis concerning what I consider as a unique feature of the conceptual dimension of the socio-cultural domain.

6. My intention in dealing with objections in sections 4 and 5 has been to make precise the conclusion, I initially arrived at,

¹ Cf. Bourdieu (as quoted by Fauconnier): "a performative utterance is doomed to fail every time it is not expressed by a person who has the power to utter it..." The psychological conditions referred to in my text are to be understood as the relevant complexes of beliefs and judgments (as mental states) about the social conditions (e.g. of hierarchy, etc.).
concerning concept-possession and application from the viewpoint of Schematism. That conclusion had been reached through a discussion centred around the distinction between a certain sub-class of empirical concepts (as opposed to pure categories and to some theoretical concepts of advanced science) on the one hand, and socio-cultural concepts on the other. I mentioned that one might, *prima facie*, be tempted to assimilate these two kinds of concepts as far as 'Schematization' is involved.

However, the point I wish to emphasize is that when we turn our attention to the realm of social understanding it would be misleading to identify the concepts involved with that sub-class of empirical concepts. One may easily be misled by the basic similarity between the two, namely, that in both cases it is wrong to distinguish between concept and schema-qua-rule (in Kantian terminology). This similarity does obtain only apparently and my analysis purports to show that hidden beneath it lies a fundamental difference with respect to the reason why concepts are not distinct from schemata in the two cases. Such a difference is, as I argue, due to the fact that the direction of the relation of dependence which obtains between concept-possession and concept-application in the two cases is respectively different.

I offer specifically a sketch of the metaphysics of this position by formulating two contrasting Propositions:
PROPOSITION 1

In the case of the subclass of empirical concepts mentioned above (such as Kant's own example 'dog') we should hold that:

- Posession of such a concept necessarily entails correct applicability (under suitable experiential circumstances);
- Such a connection is contingent (and only applicable to this sub-class);
- It is contingent because it is at base culture-relative in the sense that: because, as a matter of fact, our culture and everyday life is such that instances of such concepts are salient and ubiquitous, we cannot fail to be directly acquainted with such instances:
- Therefore possession and applicability coincide because the 'world' (empirical reality, culture and socio-political context) is as a matter of contingent fact as described above. To make the same point more poignant we may say that:

Owing to the specific nature of each cultural order, one who is in possession of an empirical concept salient in that culture is thereby in possession of some recognitional rule (schema) which enables one to go about correctly applying the concept to its instances when confronted with such. Thus schematization does not arise at all, because the local cultural-linguistic environment - as a sort of third entity (prior or independent element) - ensures that an individual's concept-application is an activity/process that always yields the correct results (excluding experiential disabilities and the like).

In other words, we keep the variable 'culture' constant and search for those concepts the possession of which is identical with the possession of a recognitional rule. It is not logically impossible, albeit difficult, to imagine hypothetical cases where different contingencies could have held.
PROPOSITION 2

Having formulated Case 1 we can get a perspicuous view of the difference I wish to highlight by stating from the outset that in the present case the converse holds. Here, of course, we concern ourselves with social and political concepts, not with empirical ones in general. Put in a nutshell the situation is I submit the following: we can no longer hold the cultural context as our constant against which we could solve the problem of concept-possession and application. We are no longer, that is, in a position to assume that the socio-cultural environment can be posited as an entirely independent (and thus concept-invariable) 'third element'; it is not a contingent 'given' as before.

If my discussion of the second objection above together with the picture of realist-antirealist dialectics of evaluative terms in general that preceded it, if these two theses are basically sound, it will be clear why I argue that in Case 2 we are faced with the converse of the relationship that holds in 1. This is so because, as I maintained, the justifications that inhere in the concepts used are not conceptually unrelated to the practices, and the context, they purport to justify (the emphasis being placed on the crucial distinction between A# and B# justifications).

As I have shown concept-possession and application themselves determine the individuation of practices and context in general (and make intelligible, rather than dissolve, whatever inconsistent or contradictory elements may be detected). From an epistemic point of view social activities and other social regularities cease to be meaningful and — what is more important — from a Kantian point of view, they could not have arisen in the first place without the cluster of justifications which inheres in the concepts under which social action and cognition falls. It is in this manner that the social person should be correctly viewed as a self-constituting agent; and that this self-constitution is founded upon concepts and their applications.
The structure of the argument may then be revealed as follows:

PROPOSITION 1

Empirical Concepts

We need to prove that if one possesses such a concept then one is necessarily in a position to apply it correctly (under suitable sensory circumstances).

For this we must first give the following definitional schemata:

(D₁) An empirical concept $F$ is 'world/culture-relative' $= \text{df}$

the intension of $F$ is framed relative to a world (culture) or segment thereof in which instances of $F$'s extension exist and obtain in a manner which is epistemically (i.e. experientially) salient for the inhabitants of each world (excluding biological disabilities, etc.)

(D₂) A concept $F$ is unusable (relative to a world) $= \text{df}$ the inhabitants of such a world cannot maintain that they possess $F$.

Argument: For a given $F$ which is world-relative and not unusable; and for a given individual denizen $x$ of such a world:

from (D₂): (P₁) If $x$ possesses $F$ $\rightarrow$ $x$ possesses $F$'s intension as framed relative to that world.

from (D₁): (P₂) If $F$'s intension is such $\rightarrow$ $x$ is in an epistemically privileged position being able to recognize instances falling under $F$.

Ergo: . . . (P₃) If $x$ is able to recognize instances of $F$ $\rightarrow$ $x$ correctly applies $F$. 
PROPOSITION 2

Socio-cultural Concepts

We need to prove that if the intension of such a concept includes the justification-conditions of social practices and the corresponding beliefs, then this kind of concept is 'culture/context-determining'.

For this we give the following definitional schemata [for an individual x and a concept G]:

\[(D_1)\] \(x\) possesses G iff \(x\) applies G.

\[(D_2)\] A concept G is applicable \(G\) marks discriminations (here evaluative) in the world in which instances of the concept occur.

Argument:

from \((D_1)\) (S\(_1\)) If \(x\) applies G \(\rightarrow\) \(x\) marks evaluative discriminations with respect to his totality of practices and beliefs.

and \((D_2)\)

from \((S_1)\) (S\(_2\)) If \(x\) marks such dichotomies (via G) \(\rightarrow\) \(x\)'s social world is carved up in accordance with instances of justifications (evaluations) that inhere in G.

Ergo, \(\therefore\) (S\(_3\)) If the intension of G justifies practices (in \(x\)'s world) and beliefs \(\rightarrow\) G is a culture-determining concept (in \(x\)'s world).
7. My discussion in this chapter is situated within the framework of an approach which is committed to producing an explanation of the meaning of 'knowledge' as such, that is, a critique of epistemology. From this perspective my arguments are meant to be a contribution to a critique of positivist philosophical presuppositions, a critique that makes room for a metatheory of social holism that is not trapped, as I have already pointed out, within the dichotomy individualism-holism already framed in accordance with individualist doctrines. To the extent that positivism replaces the philosophical (and historically Kantian) concerns of epistemology with the Theory of Science and Methodology, we can agree with Habermas\(^1\) that such a positivist exchange/reduction instantamount to the loss of the concept of the knowing subject and the suppression of the question of the constitution of the object of knowledge.

Before moving on to the next two chapters of this Part, I would like to point out three parallel issues or related areas which are congruent with the general drift of my argument. One is C.Taylor's well known idea that the knowing subject or social agent is a self-constituted entity transforming and developing him/herself by actively participating in issuing judgments and expressing thoughts and values by means of language.\(^2\) The second, related, idea concerns the intersubjective constitution of a public or essentially common space as the distinguishing mark of the political realm. In striking similarity, two thinkers, H.Arendt and J.G.A. Pocock\(^3\), have independently...

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2. The most succinct formulation of this is his *Social Theory as Practice* (Dehli, O.U.P. 1983).

emphasized the importance of language in creating the space or field within which human beings are situated politically. Arendt's main preoccupation was to show that the emergence of modern society altered entirely the distinction existing in the ancient Greek poleis between the meanings of 'public' and 'private'. She points out that 'political animal' entailed and was entailed by 'animal having language' and thus being a citizen presupposed the employment of concepts. The truly common world (of political activity) presented itself as the common meeting ground for all citizens so that each thing residing in such public space retained its identity while each citizen approached it from his own perspective. For my present concerns, the important notion Arendt makes us aware of is that 'reality' can only be manifested and grasped as long as such a public space safeguards the continuous existence of diverse perspectives; knowledge presupposes such a diversity which, further, underlies a conceptual difference between the political 'common' of antiquity and 'objectivity' or 'certainty' which marks modern scientific inquietude (cf. sects, 1 and 2, Chapter II above). Pocock's formulation of the public space as political also stems from considerations of language but this time the political emerges out of the structure of power relations created between speaker and hearer.

The third parallel I wish to draw with respect to the discussion of this chapter can be seen to follow from the above considerations. Here we encounter the idea, recently put forward by Putnam in the

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form of the 'Löwenheim-Skolem Paradox',\(^1\) emphasizing that the 'total use' of language (operational plus theoretical constraints) does not 'fix' a unique 'intended interpretation' among competing ones (as is similarly the case with models in axiomatic constructions). The upshot, briefly put, is that 'the world' itself does not pick models or interpret languages. The far-reaching implications of this argument (which, incidentally, must not be seen as an invitation to relativism) have been variously disputed but its importance lies in the way we choose to read the rationale behind it. To the extent that this line of argument emphasizes - as I interpret it - the importance of (re)gaining the notion of the knowing subject and the questioning of the constitution of the object of knowledge, we can appreciate how, both globally and locally, the possession of concepts and the practice of their application coincide to form what could be called the 'common space' (by extending Arendt's term).

Putnam, stresses how 'constructive mathematics', for instance, can tackle the sceptical paradox since the 'gap' between theory and 'objects' never appears in the first place: this is effected by taking seriously the active or constitutive rôle of proof (this can be seen as the global issue). This is a clear parallel to Proposition II which forms the core of the present chapter: I have argued by means of the idea of schematism that the analysis of certain socio-cultural concepts reveals one sense in which there is no gap between justification-conditions of social practices and beliefs on the one hand, and grasping the intension of such a concept on the other.

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Such a concept is 'culture-determining' in that the practice of its application is a creative or constructive process both with respect to the social person as a knowing subject and agent and also with respect to the 'common space' (i.e., from the local standpoint, the cultural order) which is effected and which is not a merely external to the individual environment, independently identified. To elaborate this further is the task of the following two chapters.
Chapter V

PERSONS AND 'PRIVACY':

FOLLOWING RULES AND EXPRESSING EMOTIONS
INTRODUCTION

I now proceed to consider the second moment of the conceptual communication in virtue of which the individual is constituted as a social person: this is the possibility of meaningful linguistic expression, broader in scope than its special case of socio-cultural terms just discussed. This issue is the subject matter of the well-known Wittgensteinian 'rule-following considerations' and the attendant 'anti-private language argument'. By going into this, as well as by developing a particular case about expressing emotions, I intend to show why, for holism, the subjective moment does not imply 'privacy of meanings', i.e. in the sense of 'being prior to public'. This will advance us further towards the idea that the categories 'individual' and 'social' are not, philosophically, independent sets of entities circumscribed by boundaries. As I have suggested, it is the notion of 'social person', being evolved in this Part, into which the two categories converge.

The reason why, at this stage, such a generalized version of the 'meaning question' demands our attention is this. In the preceding chapter we saw that to be able to ascribe the possession of socio-cultural concepts to an individual we have to reveal their instantiations in the course of their application in determining social states of affairs. This impels us to ask whether the individual is construed as a social person only because he/she applies such explicitly socio-cultural concepts. Is this a sufficient condition? The inquiries of the present chapter (and subsequently the next one) give a negative answer to this. I shall be showing that the notion of social person, put forward by holism, should
be formed by challenging received opinions about "where the social ends and the individual mind begins". Otherwise it would be question-begging, as formal ontology has made clear (in Part One).

I must stress that my argumentation here will rest on a pivotal point: this is the thought unfolded at the start of section 2. There I reflect on the structure of the general question 'how is meaning possible?', in order to argue that it involves a logical abstraction of two stages: one about how the individual succeeds in using words intelligibly and another about the rule-following considerations introduced to surpass the impass the former stage leads to; i.e. the stages of 'individual facts' and 'social facts', respectively. I propose that such a segmentation does not make sense once we acknowledge that the latter stage furnishes the presuppositions (and not additional, missing pieces of a picture) of the former stage. The significance of such a synthesis is that it offers, in the context of the conceptual communication under study, not just a model for, but the philosophical locus of the complex relation between the category of the individual mind and that of the social.

If thus the 'social' begins to emerge as soon as we ask whether meaningful linguistic expression is a "fact" about the individual taken in isolation, I shall first present in section 1 the Wittgensteinian view of the 'shared use of language' and claim that its validity goes beyond the rejection of the doctrine of privacy as the mark of the mental in that it invites us to start thinking about the notion of person without looking at empirical facts. However, the criteria for separating
'individual' from 'public' are not straightforward; but it is this difficulty that leads us to the corresponding notions of 'person' and 'social'. Thus in section 2 I propose the thesis (presented in the previous paragraph) on how to approach the question of meaning and proceed to develop, in the form of a dilemma, two elaborate alternative (but ultimately complementary) routes via which the 'social' is elucidated.

The study of the notion of personhood is further advanced in section 3 where I argue that the issue of the intelligibility of human action is homologous to the two-stage question of meaning. Thus at this point it can be maintained that by (a) attacking the distinction between the so-called "inner" and the "outer" as characteristic of the individual human being, the issues raised so far should not (b) be interpreted as simply a linguistic account of how communal agreement operates causally on each individual's use of words.

To see why this would be an unacceptable result, I bring in the problem of expressing emotions which appears to be the last resort of 'privacy'. This is first discussed within the contours of the Strawsonian account of 'person'. However, such a descriptive metaphysics of the non-corporeal predicates true of persons must not imply that subjectivity is capitulated to actual behavioural expression or linguistic facts. This is assessed in section 4 by focusing on the significant case of expressing emotions in aesthetic contemplation. Finally section 5 reviews and appraises the main points of this chapter's argument.
1. In ascribing meanings to someone's using words, that is, when the theme of the relation between concept-possession and application acquires its most general form, one of the crucial questions we find natural to ask is: is the possibility of meaningful linguistic behaviour a fact about the individual taken in isolation from anybody transcending the boundaries of his bodily and mental states? Even if an analysis such as the one proposed with respect to certain socio-cultural concepts in the previous chapter is taken into account, even if, that is, its central thrust is accepted as an account of the direction of ontological claims 'from the individual user to the social reality', it still remains to consider whether there is in addition a dimension along which certain ontological claims can be made, this time on the side, as it were, of the individual who possesses and applies those concepts. Of course, the previous considerations purport to illuminate both aspects, namely how concepts-as-used enter into the determination of regions of social reality by virtue of being possessed and applied by each social person. But what if we try to widen our viewpoint so as to encompass other kinds of concepts including especially those the employment of which has to do with the expression of emotions or of aesthetic appreciation (the combination of which as something even more strongly pertaining to each individual will be discussed later in this chapter) - i.e. a dimension of an individual's cognitive and conative life not directly related to the socio-political realm? Here we are more interested in deciphering what it is about each individual person which the meaningful employment of concepts consists in.
If the answer to this kind of question involves the searching for facts focused on the individual it is pertinent to ask further whether our inquiries ought to consider the individual as a res cogitans (if it exists) dwelling inside a res extensa (to put the matter in its most extreme form), or whether our inquiries should offer us an understanding of the individual as a person, i.e. give us a substantive content to the formal characteristics proposed in connection with Leibnizian entelechy. So this question of 'searching for facts' serves our explorations in the presuppositions of social holism in that it provides the means whereby the individual as a person is situated (by holism) in his/her relation to social substances, properties and events.

I believe that the Wittgensteinian considerations about rule-following and the anti-private language argument can be seen, when divorced from barren exegetical disputes, as furnishing something more than (to many, a questionable) 'theory' of meaning or prescriptions for 'ordinary language analysis'. I think they should be understood - at least for the purposes of this thesis - as valuable for performing two basic indispensable services: One is the demolition of the Cartesian doctrine of privacy as the mark of the mental;¹ and thus in particular the repudiation of the idea of the 'inner' as indubitable and incommunicable because essentially prior to the 'public'. In relation to this negative point, viz., an invitation to revise wholesale the conception of the mind and the way we think we know of its 'contents', the second service rendered is, I propose, a gradual emergence of the conceptual dimension of what persons should be taken to

consist in. I would like to stress the gradual character of this type of inquiries because even if in the end a detailed picture of rule-following etc, is perhaps inconclusive,\(^1\) it is nevertheless valuable in that it directs our attention - via discussions of meaning - to a starting-point (the negative one) and to a route (the considerations about the practice of following rules) that should be traced in order to elucidate the idea of personhood. I would suggest that this second aspect or service not only affords us the possibility of engaging in a discourse about how to arrive at the public or social (as I try to do below), it also has a parallel as far as the concept of a person is involved in the Hegelian dialectical unfolding of the three stages of 'self' we are offered in the *Philosophy of Right*: Abstract Person/Abstract Right - Subject/Mortality - Concrete Person/Ethical Life.

The parallel can be seen in the method providing the steps whereby we move from the idea of the individual as in complete isolation from social relations towards the final stage at which the individual becomes 'true to himself' (keeping in mind Hegel's preoccupation with the individual's rationality and freedom), or more concretely, situated (and embodied); it is also instructive to note an early passage in which Hegel points to the form of the concept of moral and political laws which makes it possible for them to operate as laws and not as force only among those who give rise to and apply such a concept.\(^2,3\)

\(^1\) See, e.g. S.Blackburn, *Spreading the Word* (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1984), chap.3.


\(^3\) See also the illuminating study by K.-H. Ilting for the way in which the three stages develop from the point of Hegel's initial critique of Kant's ethical theory: 'The Structure of Hegel's Philosophy of Right' in Z.Pelczynski (ed.), *Hegel's Political Philosophy* (Cambridge, C.U.P., 1971), pp.90-110.
The most important conclusion, however, to which discussions about rule-following and privacy draw our attention is that searching for empirical 'facts' about the individual's use of language and our inability to find any that would involve only the individual's mental and behavioural life,¹ should make us realize that we are looking for the wrong facts. Whatever the merits of the various proposals with respect to what sort of facts appear to be relevant and ultimate (e.g. actual communal agreement, dispositional agreement, etc.²), it should be stressed that what is significant is the question itself (the tracing of the 'sceptical' paradox) which compels us to inquire about the kinds of 'facts' that make meaning possible. The question is not an epistemological one, it is not whether we can secure knowledge of the actual way in which a speaker means something by the use of words; it is rather that any (past or present) mental state or outward behaviour does not determine how a speaker ought to use a word, apply a concept.

In this sense it is as Kripke calls it a normative question ³ or, perhaps

1. The clearest and most convincing presentation of the sceptical case (the negative point) — whether the associated 'sceptical solution' is accepted or not — is Kripke's 'Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language: An Elementary Exposition' in I.Block (ed.), Perspectives on the Philosophy of Wittgenstein (Oxford, Blackwell, 1981), pp.238-312.


3. Kripke, op.cit., pp.249, 257-8, 272. For someone like Winch, however, it is clearly an epistemological question which plays an instrumental role in his strictures on the social-scientific practice of understanding: The Idea of a Social Science, chap.I.
better put, a metaphysical question concerning the limits of the
justifications of the employment of concepts. Perhaps a localized
view of such questions can be afforded to us in the form of T.Nagel's
paper 'What is it like to be a bat'?\(^1\) To many, both critics and
defenders of Wittgenstein, the failure to find any individualistic
facts (inner or outer), opens the way for a reassessment of the realist,
truth-conditional construal of semantics and along with it a recognition
that 'facts' can be of a variety of sorts not all describable as
*Tractarian* states of affairs.\(^2\) This anti-realist perspective replaces,
as is well known, truth-conditions by assertibility or justification
conditions of statements but what is significant is that by doing this
it brings into prominence the idea that the practice of using words
and asserting sentences has a utility\(^3\) in our lives (which of course
links up with the idea of language-games).

But before we reach the stage at which community enters we
must clarify the scope of this anti-realist perspective. In the
previous chapter I proposed a way in which we can see how concept-
possession and application coincide in the case of socio-cultural terms,
emphasizing the active rôle of the employment of (at least certain)
concepts in 'carving up' the relevant socio-political reality, i.e.
the extent to which the use of concepts is constitutive of the way
relations and practices in the (social) world are determined. However,
faced with one of Wittgenstein's familiar remarks about 'how to go
on' in an application of a concept and the resulting scepticism about

\(^1\) Repr. in *Mortal Questions* (Cambridge, C.U.P., 1979), pp.165-80,
esp. p.172, n.8.
\(^2\) E.g. Kripke (following Dummett), *op.cit.*, pp.274ff.
\(^3\) See Wittgenstein, *Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics*,
"the hardness of the logical must"¹ (i.e. the obligation to use a sign always in the same way as supposedly contained already within the meaning of the sign or in our possession of the concept), we come to realize that such remarks when generalized to cover all concepts whatsoever² purport to show that there is no advance determination of what is to count as a correct application of a concept in that there is no 'contract' binding externally understanding with meaning. If so, the active rôle I ascribed to some concepts in the previous chapter re-appears here, somewhat indirectly. For the anti-realist strand I am trying to clarify implies that we must not think of any contingent statements (cf. Chapter II above) as determinate with resepct to their truth-value irrespective of our ratification-conditions. This is not (or not always) because we may tend to regard the world as unspecifiably indeterminate, but rather, as C.Wright puts it, "the open character of our understanding ... does not predetermine what aspects of the world we shall count as showing such a statement to be true or false."³ I think, however, that this becomes even more radical when we consider concepts whose employment shapes continuously a particular region of psychological or social reality and, of course, also in the case of all those concepts which are non-condition governed, have 'open-texture' (in Waismann's terminology) or are 'essentially contestable' (in Gallie's terminology), and the like.⁴ If "the extension of [a] concept

2. As Kripke shows; op.cit., pp.267-8.
4. For a critical overview of this genus of concepts, see M.Weitz, The Opening Mind (Chicago, Chicago U.P., 1977), chap.2.
is not closed by a frontier" and if the negative point about the inadequacy of mental images, etc. is taken into account, then the 'gap' between a rule-following act (of word-use) and its interpretation cannot be closed from within the individual. But does appealing to 'communal understanding' or 'conformity within a social practice' provides the required standards by means of which the normativity of meaning and understanding or act and rule (i.e. what is to count as right or wrong) is ensured? Many commentators think that if the idiolectic individual is challenged by a sceptic, so is the community itself since there is no external standard on which the latter can fall back. This difficulty reveals that the criteria which must be adduced as necessary and sufficient for separating 'individual' from 'public' are not straightforward. I believe that it is the discussion of this difficulty about how 'publicity' is to be conceived that gives valuable insights about the corresponding notions of 'person' and 'social'. Below I propose a way (in the form of a dilemma) in which the discussion may proceed and see what can be extracted from it.

2. When the general question 'How is meaning possible?' is posited we must realize that we are thereby led to focus our attention initially on facts relevant to the individual rather than to facts about social reality. That is, the manner in which we enter the discussion engages us, in the first place, in questions about what kinds of facts should be selected as appropriate to the case of the individual user of a language. In this respect the general question


2. See, e.g., Wright, op.cit., p.220, who wants to solve this problem; and S.Blackburn, 'The Individual Strikes Back', Synthese, 58 (1984), 281-301, who thinks the problem is unanswered.
is, at the first stage, transformed into the more specific question: in virtue of what is an individual person able to mean something in particular by his use of certain words? In answering this we are eventually led to a second stage at which the familiar rule-following considerations and anti-private language argument purport to bring back facts about the social or the communal which were initially held at the background. It is instructive to keep in mind this structure or latent form of the argument as I have just sketched it. This is not of course, meant to be an exegetical point about the relevant texts which is obviously outside my concerns here. But it is, I believe, significant - in so far as our interest is about the boundaries of the individual and his emergence as a person - to stress this structure of the argument: by asking how it is possible for an individual to mean or refer to something or other by linguistic means, we clearly wish to know something about the individual only. This means that the very positing of this specific question (as a transformation of the general one) implies that matters of meaning have been divorced, at this stage, from issues concerning social matters. Although the upshot is of course a picture of social or communal practice, etc., although, that is, matters beyond those initially appropriate to the answer of the specific question are brought to bear upon what in the end is to count as the right answer, it is nevertheless correct to say that in the course of the argument there is a cleavage between the two stages, which I believe, is usually (if not always) lost sight of. This cleavage may be seen as the result of being preoccupied with the possibility of meaningful linguistic
behaviour as particularized to each case or occasion.\(^1\) It is in abstraction of certain presuppositions that it seems to make sense to ask in virtue of what is meaning manifested in each such case. But purged of these presuppositions the individual's mental life and corresponding linguistic activity results in being pictured as a "windowless monad". In the structure of the argument dealt with here, these requirements are brought into effect at the second stage but by this move they are not presuppositions any more but additional (missing) pieces of a picture. To see what would count as such a presupposition we may, following G.Baker and P.Hacker, take the communal agreement in the use of words as a framework condition for the existence of so-called language-games but not as constitutive of any such game.\(^2\) In this respect the issue about what is to count as correct or incorrect application of a concept-word, i.e. the puzzle as to the interpretation of a rule, arises only within a context where there is an established technique of application of a rule, a custom or practice. Pointing to this formulation of the presupposition furnishes the required connection between the two stages of the question we are dealing with here. This connection turns out to be an internal relation between the two stages which holds between the specific question about the possibility of meaning in the case of the individual and the answer by appealing to social facts. In this way we are better placed to appreciate the metatheoretical claim of holism that: the appeal to social facts (whatever their exact nature) is not meant to be an invitation to see them as causally responsible for the formation of each individual's

1. My point is not identical to the one Wittgenstein raises with respect to the possibility of obeying a rule for only one individual or only once in his life, *op.cit.*, §§199, 200, 205.

mental life, i.e. how he comes to exercise the concepts he possesses. This would be an individualist position whereby the relations between an individual and his social environment are external or contingent. If we construe the two stages of the hidden structure of the argument as being internally related, that is, if we see the first stage as only a moment to be completed (see Chapter I), then we once more see holism as requiring a non-causal individuation of the individual's mental states in relation to his environment. We have still however, to show how the 'social' enters the picture.

If we construe the rule-following considerations as being embedded within a more-or-less traditional context of paradigmatically epistemological issues then we must look upon Winch's classical formulation: "all meaningful behaviour must be social, since it can be meaningful only if governed by rules, and rules presuppose a social setting."¹ Within such a schema the crucial thing to note is, I suggest, the way in which the familiar account of following a rule is generalized with respect to its domain of application so that it can be employed to show how the definition of what is to count as social can be made equivalent to the most basic epistemic question (i.e. reliability of knowledge: see Chapter II above) of the method of investigation.² This suggestion of how to conceive the above formulation of rule-following brings out a claim that would have been missed if we read it as an injunction about the methodology of social inquiry only. It is

¹ Winch, op.cit., p.116.

² See, e.g., ibid., pp.108,110. In the text I do not purport to give an exegesis of Winch's own views but rather to use some of his ideas in order to bring out new aspects.
thooy fair to say that this aspect or interpretation of Wittgenstein's remarks on rules purports to provide the manner in which social matters are to be understood as social. If it is in this way a kind of 'definition' of the social realm that we are after then we must be clear as to whether the non-epistemological questions about the possibility of meaning and the attendant sceptical paradox and sceptical solution would be the starting-point towards the 'definition' of the social, or whether it is the other way round. The dilemma I want to stress may be clearly seen as involving two directions that we may find tempting to move along. On the one hand, a (Winchean) route would take us through a Kantian point about the necessary presuppositions for the possibility of the understanding of social reality and also through a Wittgensteinian point about the character of philosophical elucidation as being something "which stands above or below, but not beside the natural sciences". Here we are presented with a criterion about the limits of legitimacy of the practice of being philosophically engaged in ontological questions about the social world. But a 'radicalized' employment of rule-following considerations which would question even the meaning of 'the same as' or 'a rule for' will result in making the very subject-matter of the philosophical inquiry (i.e. in this case, the social world) as being itself the object of rule-following considerations.


2. As far as I know no one has applied the usual sceptical treatment specifically to the word 'rule' itself. Gellner comes close to this (but I think his point is weaker than the one about 'rule') when in criticising both Wittgenstein and Kripke he queries why the concept 'community' is left out of sceptical scrutiny: 'Concepts and Community' in *Relativism and the Social Sciences*, pp.167-86, at pp.177-8.
The step following from this is to admit that from the standpoint under examination (viz, that which combines the two aforementioned presuppositions) the nature of human society consists "in different and competing ways of life, each offering a different account of the intelligibility of things." Thus this horn of the dilemma leads us from the comprehensive applicability of what it is to follow a rule as covering not only cases of meaningful linguistic behaviour but also all kins of meaningful behaviour, towards a definition of the latter as social. This is effected in particular by taking the notion of principle or maxim of conduct and that of meaningful action as "interwoven in much the same way as Wittgenstein spoke of the notion of a rule and the notion of the 'the same' being interwoven". By attending to the rule-following considerations we arrive, via relativization of 'the same as' to context, to a conception of the social which is itself subject to rule-following, i.e. has a normative dimension already.

The alternative route would be to confine rule-following considerations to questions of meaning only, that is to questions about the possibility of communication by means of a public language. Here we arrive at the social via Kripke's idea of the sceptical paradox, and the sceptical solution offered brings into prominence (among the other issues I mentioned above) communal agreement in practice. Here we must notice that we are not so much concerned with how to define or characterize the 'social' (i.e. what lies beyond the 'inner' and 'outer' boundaries of the individual), but rather to allow a fairly

1. Winch, op.cit., p.103.
2. Ibid., p.63.
uncomplicated notion of community to solve the sceptical paradox. Such a pre-existing notion of a community\(^1\) embracing the individual and forcing him to abide by its rules is supposed to provide the required normative dimension in the application of concepts by each individual. The latter cannot follow the required rules in isolation from a 'like minded' community of others by introspecting his own 'private' states. This is a valid point for in the latter case an allegedly private linguist - as Wittgenstein showed - cannot compare his different states in accordance with a privately held original standard since the 'same as' itself has no meaning. Hence, I want to stress that what we get here is a case in which the personal identity of the individual is lost since each time the purported private comparison is attempted the previous history vanishes from the use of the term: we have simply atomic instances of episodic experience.

However, the further claim that this alternative makes with regard to the public character of communal practice, is questionable if it can only give us a picture of a plurality of individuals being accidentally in conformity, that is, as a matter of luck which goes on undetected.\(^2\) An optimistic line of argument would reject that there is any sceptical paradox to be found (in the texts of Wittgenstein) and therefore we do not need a sceptical solution which invites such

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a questionable idea of community. Rather what we need to hold on to is that rule-following behaviour is an initiation into a custom and not a causal explanation of the training in the use of words.¹ Since exegetical disputes are beyond my interests here, I want to round off this section by pointing to what we can extract from putting each alternative side by side.

I would like to suggest that although there is a real difference between the alternatives I have constructed here, they may nevertheless be taken as two complementary ways via which the nature of the social is elucidated. While the former approach gives us explicitly a characterization of the constitution of the social, rich in its normative dimension, the latter offers us a clear understanding of how Cartesian privacy as understood here cannot be sustained without the concept of person dropping out of the picture. Taken together the two alternative reconstructions of the considerations on rule-following and privacy are valuable in that they provide the manner in which the idea of the individual as a person and the idea of the social have to be discussed.

3. In trying to make human action intelligible by placing it within a 'context' in which it becomes meaningful, and then trying to reach the particular perspective of each agent, we tend to forget that even if we are successful we may in the end realize that sometimes that viewpoint itself does not afford us the possibility of employing the familiar categories of motives/intentions or reasons vs. causes in our

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attempt to explain action. It is important to emphasize cases
in which there is prior to explaining an action the issue of making
it intelligible, especially when the latter becomes impossible or
hard. A poignant example of such a case is presented to us by literature
in the form of Camus' novel The Stranger. I chose this particular
example not only for its intrinsic interest but mainly because the
difficulty of making intelligible rather than explaining the actions
of the protagonist reminds us that being preoccupied with the dispute
of causal explanation vs. interpretative understanding in the social
sciences resembles a tendency to subscribe to what L. Strauss spoke of
as the merciless laws of "logographic necessity". In our case this
can be understood as the demand that even when we are confronted with
instances of entirely unintelligible action (i.e. when it seems we
cannot avail ourselves of references to the 'social context' or
'traditional meanings' or 'customs' and the like), even if we are
confronted with what is indisputably a break with the 'traditional'
or the familiar we can still retain a thread which we can trace back
to the relevant context. The latter move resembles the interpretation
of texts in accordance with the imperatives of the logographic necessity
(which in the case of Machiavelli's action was the writing of his texts

1. See the illuminating and original study by S. Sutherland,
'Imagination in Literature and Philosophy: A Viewpoint on
2. Thoughts on Machiavelli (Glencoe: Ill., Free Press, 1958),
pp.120-21. Strauss is here concerned with something distinct
but related, viz., the interpretation of past texts of politics
and history; logographic necessity is also embedded within the
wider discussions about the ethical values of all kinds of
necessity.
in accordance with the canons of the art of noble rhetoric although he was breaking with the Great Tradition).

Similarly, we feel compelled to acknowledge that there must be a "thick description" available that enables us to understand how a behavioural 'outward' expression of an 'inner' feeling or emotion acquires its particular meaning. I want to suggest that the way we make sense of individual human action resembles the way in which we try to answer the question of 'how' is meaning possible. As I argued in the previous section rule-following considerations posit a first stage at which to conduct the inquiry with respect to each individual or occasion. This logical abstraction has its counterpart here when we ask a similar question about the possibility of individual action as meaningful. Here the principle of 'logographic necessity' impels us to evoke the 'social' in order to individuate the 'individual'. But by construing the individual agent as a person, i.e. as capable of purposeful action, rational deliberation, emotional motivation, etc. we ensure that his beliefs, intentions and desires are always related in some way to his actions. The former, i.e. beliefs, etc., can be translated into action and the latter becomes intelligible in virtue of the relevant socio-cultural context which gives rise to these two possibilities. By this we have ensured that our concept of person itself (construed as I have just indicated) guarantees the presence of the 'social context'. Put in a nutshell, this line of thought reveals

1. For an attempt to retain the culture-relative determination of behavioural (non-linguistic) expressions while making them intentionally identifiable, see R. Wollheim's 'Expression', in The Human Agent, Royal Institute of Philosophy Lectures, Vol.1 (London, Macmillan, 1968), pp. 227-44.
that the manner in which the concept of an individual as a person is employed facilitates our recognition of what the distinctive features of the social are: by identifying each human being as a person with forethoughts, emotional motivations, etc. we thereby clarify the domain of the social. When the relations that are commonly presupposed within the boundaries of the individual (e.g. the connections between his desires, beliefs, etc. and his actions) break down, what is emphasized is the way in which by being deprived of the concept of a person we are thus cut off from what we previously were able to designate as the social.

I want to suggest, therefore, that given the above, what the familiar rule-following considerations accomplish implicitly is a more perspicuous conception of how the idea of person that emerges thus carries within it both a repudiation of those 'inner' facts as private (in the Cartesian mode of indubitable and incommunicable) and as 'belonging' to the individual without recourse to the possibility of being individuated by reference to the social; and it also carries within it a repudiation of the 'outer' manifestations of those 'inner' states, (i.e., verbal and non-verbal behaviour) as again being individuated without recourse to the social. An individualist position would allow that both the 'inner' and 'outer' facts about an individual are identified irrespective of non-causal relations that such facts may stand to with the societal environment. This begs the question for it presupposes that it is meaningful to individuate 'facts' about the individual as already separated from 'facts' about what is to be regarded as lying beyond the boundaries of the individual. In this circular picture (cf. sct. 9 of Chapter I) the latter facts are allowed
to have only a causal influence on both the 'inner' and the 'outer' facts pertaining to the individual. But if we accept the general direction of the discussions on rules and privacy we are not allowed any more to hold on to anything 'private' whose constitution and subsequent individuation has been determined prior to any facts about the encompassing social reality - such as, for instance, linguistic practices or cultural norms or ways in which concept-possession and application determine socio-political practices as presented in the previous chapter. The crucial point I want to stress is that in attacking the distinction between the so-called 'inner' and the 'outer' as pertinent to the individual person, rule-following considerations and (the) anti-private language argument should not be seen as opening the way towards a linguistic account of how the (linguistic) communal environment operates causally on an individual's uses of words; rather its more fundamental accomplishment ought to be the logical possibility of making sense of an individual as a person whose so-called 'inner' and 'outer' features do not stand in a purely causal relation with independently identified social features. These latter features themselves should emerge as being embedded within hierarchical whole/moment relations. Otherwise - and this is more exaggerated in the case of the use of language - what we would be forced to include in an (individualist) picture as the 'social' would itself be in need of a 'cement' which would supposedly hold it together; in this case our attempt to characterize the 'social' (as whatever facts lie outside the individual) - since we need it as one of the relata in the purely causal relations we would allow - is not forthcoming. The 'social'-side itself will be only an aggregate of individuals.
If we turn to Camus' Meursault we see that the reader of the novel is presented with a certain individual, his deeds, and the world surrounding him, that is, a certain 'possibility' which nevertheless, the reader is unable to comprehend. It is an encounter with an unfamiliar situation which is not readily intelligible, not because it is an exception to a rule or something that simply flouts everyday conventions; but rather because we are given nothing by which to 'understand' Meursault. The problem is clearly summarized by Sartre when he posits the question at issue, "How were we to interpret this character?" and goes on to say that "The Stranger is not an explanatory book".  

If the difficulty in answering the question of how we are to account for the relationship between a man and his actions is further sharpened by our inability to offer any explanatory account, this we must remember is the upshot of a more basic problem: that our access to any set of descriptive practices is blocked by the fact that the text itself does not give us any conclusive starting-points for our descriptions. Hence the problem of intelligibility is carried backwards to a prior stage: from explaining to describing; from clarifying or establishing an illuminating pattern for the sequence of events to struggling with finding out what these events were.

If we accept a reading according to which in The Stranger we are presented with a genuine, non-moral (albeit inconsistent) total

1. Cited in Sutherland, op.cit., p.263.

nihilism, whereas in "Le Mythe de Sisyphe" the picture is that of a "moral rebellion in embryo", then there is clearly a tension between the two. And as a first approximation then, we may place Meursault's character within the first: a world of discrete, unconnected, episodic experience, where emotions (as distinct from sensations) are absent: 'absent' of course in the common everyday sense that we are accustomed to. In this respect, the world in which Meursault lives can be called solipsistic, though not as a result of conscious methodical scepticism. Had it been the latter, even in the form of an ultimate Cartesian doubt (which, by the way, is Camus' own metaphysical starting-point for his idea of the Absurd), then we could ascribe to Meursault the concept of a person.

By 'person' I am here thinking in particular of Strawson's account of the concept. The fundamental idea behind it is that of the primitiveness of the concept of a person, of its logical priority to that of an individual pure consciousness as a Cartesian ego. Strawson's contention amounts to showing that it is a necessary condition for one to be in a position of ascribing states of consciousness/experiences, etc. to oneself, in the way one does, that one should also ascribe them to others who are not oneself. The latter presupposes that one can identify others as the subjects of experience and as the subjects of states of consciousness as well, i.e. as 'persons'. For Strawson, the concept of a person refers to a 'certain' and 'unique' type of entity under which a set of single individuals fall,


such that both predicates ascribing states of consciousness and
predicates ascribing corporeal characteristics are equally
applicable to every single token/member of that type/set. The
motivation for such a claim is the need to avoid the impasse that
awaits us if we follow a different route. That is - granted that one
can be aware of himself as the subject of sensations/emotions, or
intentions etc. only if he can identify himself as a subject amongst
other subjects - if the 'things' one ascribes states of consciousness/
sensations/experiences to, in ascribing them to others, are
thought of as a set of strictly Cartesian egos to which only private
experience/'objects' can be attributed, then the problem is insoluble.
If we are working within this framework of fundamental privacy the
whole anti-solipsist enterprise collapses. For it is the concept
of a person which is primary and in terms of which that of pure
individual consciousness is formed; not the other way round.¹

Thus the idea of 'descriptive metaphysics' invites us to
acknowledge as basic that human beings are essentially constituted
by the most general features of the conceptual framework they are
situated in. A corollary of this outlook is that it rules out the
formation of the idea of a person unilaterally; i.e. the idea to
attribute predicates to one's own self only or to differentiate
logically the ascription of mental from that of corporeal characteristics.
In general the conceptual scheme we 'inhabit' would render inconceivable
the idea that one could be aware of himself as a person, while denying
the same possibility to other subjects of experience/states of
consciousness, since to be in such a position of conceptual awareness

¹. Ibid., pp.102-3.
and self-knowledge presupposes that one is able to identify, distinguish, individuate and reidentify individuals as persons - one of whom he would designate as his own self.

By the same token, for Strawson, Hampshire, Malcolm, et al., the solipsistic predicament never threatens to arise simply because the sceptic cannot at the same time posit his challenge against the conceptual framework and phrase it in virtue of it/within it. In particular, for Strawson, non-corporeal predicates have the same meaning in both first and third-person ascriptive uses, because it is in the nature of the case that their meaning does not shift in accordance with the subject upon which they are predicated. In order to be able to ascribe a predicate or use a concept in one's own case one must be able to use it with the same meaning and in exactly the same way in applying it to others' cases. "To refuse to accept this is to refuse to accept the structure of the language in which we talk ......"¹

Unfortunately such a statement raises more questions than the one it purports to answer (or rather than the one it tries to block). However, what is pertinent here is to emphasize the conceptual impossibility that arises with regard to a subset of concepts, namely, those non-corporeal ones. In a more general fashion one could claim that same considerations apply to some extent to all those concepts which are indispensable to the formation of a more-or-less comprehensive outlook that would provide us with a non-solipsistic frame of reference. The gist of the whole problematic is to indicate

¹ Ibid., p.109.
one way in virtue of which the conceptual construction of reality - via the sharing of a common 'logical space' effected by language-rules out, as contradictory, a situation in which the locus of states of consciousness is an entity built up autonomously. This, transposed to the empirical level, amounts to saying that for someone to come to exist as a social person one must exist within a state of affairs; and this presupposes the acknowledgement by each of the existence of other persons as well, likewise responsible for this state of affairs.

I discussed in the previous chapter the issue of systematic and recurrent inconsistency (Gellner's argument). This is of fundamental importance when one realizes that the 'signification functions' of concepts do not render themselves open to any rigorous and unambiguous procedure of specification and re-identification, yet they are the grounds for constituting - in general - the holistic reality of man as a social person. The latter notion, 'person', may be logically primitive in Strawson's aforementioned sense. But we may also think of 'person' as susceptible to the familiar sceptical challenge concerning its application to novel cases; from which it follows that 'person' itself should not be used equivocally in a study of "primitive mentality" or "abnormal (psychopathic) mentality". Consequently, the representational and formative power of all the other concepts their significance of which derives from that of 'person' should shift analogously. In this sense the notion of person may be seen as primitive relative to certain other concepts within a cultural order. Thus the outright discrepancy between concepts and reality that Gellner points to should make us look for such hierarchies of concepts. The diagnosis that there may be an essential connection rather than a discrepancy between the
hierarchy of concepts and their application in social praxis involves claims about interpretation: that the latter should
(or should not) be the only faithful and literal construal of what the speakers say. The issue becomes even more complicated when we turn to consider the case of concepts/beliefs that are related not to publicly observable material (physical) things (objects), but to the speakers' own attitudes and desires concerning prima facie inaccessible 'private' states such as sensations or emotions; that is, a set of problematic assertions of which the subject matter is either in dispute, e.g. there is no private object, or based on in principle unavailable appropriate evidence. 1 An instance of a problematic case (one which is not usually - if ever - considered to be so, but one which I personally think is more interesting and intriguing) is the class of statements purporting to report/express propositions that describe, interpret, or evaluate objects of art. In this case we are confronted with an observable material thing of a rather special sort since our relation to it is of a different kind.

4. The uniqueness of any talk about art seems to me to be the simultaneous engagement with more than one question from the field

1. Before going on it is instructive to note that as Bruno Snell showed the rise of the individual in Greek antiquity is placed within a broad historical process (encompassing changes in the political (e.g. Solon) and religious spheres) culminating in the 'innovation' of the individual's soul as the locus of the origin of emotion both as opposed to the body and as autonomous. For this we are indebted to the lyric poets - Antilochous, Sappho, Anacreon - who were the first to picture emotions as truly personal. Love, for instance, is a passion welling up from within and not a gift of Aphrodite as their contemporary worldview supposed: The Discovery of the Mind in Greek Philosophy and Literature, Engl.Transl., 1953 (N.York, Dover, 1982), chap.3.
of the philosophy of mind. Unlike puzzles about perception etc.
of a singular kind, when one places oneself in aesthetic discourse,
one is immediately confronted with a host of problems of different
kinds. One of the starting points in the case of aesthetic
understanding is primarily the fact that persons are engaged in
perception, of a sort fundamentally distinct from ordinary ones.
The object of art does not only exist as content of statements of
perception, but it also acquires a life of its own as the subject
matter of description, interpretation and evaluation by a person.
These activities are essential in the sense that it is them which (in
a way) constitute a particular 'thing' as an artistic object for a
person. Initially, what the distinctness I mentioned amounts to
is that: whereas in talking about feelings or emotions one can
legitimately enquire whether it is conceptually correct to say that a per-
son may experience a certain emotion without being able to
articulate in words this state of his/hers or without having the
word in his/her vocabulary or without having appropriately grasped
the meaning of the concept available to express this state; in any
discussion about art however, one is faced with an object which
is not private in the sense that a feeling of depression may be
(if we allow for the moment that such privacy and the accompanying
pre-requisite of an onnicompetent mental paradigm, independent of
shared linguistic practice, exist). Whatever the case may be, one
should emphasize this distinction. An important aspect of it is
that in the case of perceiving a particular physical object as a whole
arrangement thereof that constitutes the content of our visual field
at a certain point in time, we normally see it as something we
consciously or not go on to make an inference that is a necessary but not always sufficient presupposition of our subsequent activities ('you do something with it'). Whereas, when we look or listen at an object or performance of art we are never supposed to "do" anything with it in the above sense - but we are expected to accomplish at least what can be taken to be an elementary form of aesthetic understanding or enjoyment.

According to one view, this aesthetic understanding should be philosophically approached as an instance of what has been called 'categorial aspection'.¹ This latter is to be construed on this view as one of two equally objective modes of perception. But whereas the subject observes the qualities of a thing so that it becomes a physical object in physical space, in the case of art the subject "apprehends" the aspects of the thing that animate it into an aesthetic object in aesthetic space (a basic simple perception of things is presupposed in the latter case). Thus, so-called categorial aspection is, in this way of looking at aesthetics, the sine qua non prehending activity in which the observing subject is engaged in any basic aesthetic understanding. It is fundamentally a special kind of predicative activity which involves the application of a set of concepts in such a way that a particular object acquires its particular aesthetic value (or general character). Now categorial aspection is closely linked to the two other major issues in the realm of art: first, the distinction between expression and representation; and two, the logic of talk about art. Concentrating on the last one, practitioners of the analytical persuasion have

¹ See e.g. V. Aldrich, Philosophy of Art, (Engelwood Cliffs: N. Jersey, Prentice-Hall, 1963).
painstakingly tried (albeit so unsuccessfully that in the end they partially abandoned the project) to outline an intelligible and all-encompassing conceptual distinction between 'aesthetic' and 'non-aesthetic' qualities and properties, and the relationship thereof.¹

By and large, aesthetic properties are predicated of a work of art as (tertiary) qualities of (secondary) qualities; but some proponents of this view deny that what is at issue here are two mutually distinct ways of perceiving (aesthetic vs. physical).² However, it seems that there was an agreement that aesthetic concepts employed even at the level of description should not be taken as descriptive terms³ (and therefore suffer from 'open-texture' problems as empirical terms do), since this would result in the so-called 'essential fallacy'; it is, rather, that critical language should be able to absorb and re-enact the (whatever) 'expressive portrayal' that a work of art betrays. This last point raises questions concerning problems of meaning and interpretation with regard to the idea that art should be seen as an instrument of a special sort of communication: either as a kind of 'language' of sensations and emotions - or as a means to knowledge through poetic meaning and truth.⁴


². Aldrich is in favour of two modes of perception (though inter-related), whereas I.C. Hungerland in her 'Once Again, Aesthetic and Non-Aesthetic' argues against such a view which she herself used to hold (along with Sibley, et al.): in H. Osborne (ed.), Aesthetics (Oxford, O.U.P., 1972), pp. 106-20.


On the other hand, phenomenologically inspired writers have attempted to stress the point that though invoking aesthetic properties is a legitimate way of talking, one should nevertheless bear in mind that there is a crucial difference between these and the corresponding artistic qualities, as well as between a work of art and an aesthetic object: such a distinction plays the central rôle in their idea that aesthetic experience is fundamentally a cognitive one. The direction towards which such an approach points is basically a re-examination (under a different spotlight) of the question of what makes an object a work of art by cutting across such attempts as the ones I briefly mentioned in the previous paragraph, i.e. it supplants any argument in which clear-cut, determinate binary oppositions figure, such as for example, aesthetic vs. non-aesthetic.

Ingarden, for instance, not only did not obliterate any talk about perception, but, what is more, he formed his conception of an aesthetic object as a "concretion" that emerges out of an independent existing work of art, when the latter presents its value-giving qualities for an aesthetic reconstruction by a competent observer (of course, this does not at all mean that to every work of art corresponds an unlimited number of possible aesthetic views - on the contrary). The essential factor in such acts of 'concretion' is that primarily an aesthetic experience must be achieved before the aesthetic object of apprehension comes into being. For this the competent observer must be able to 'notice' the aesthetically relevant properties of the work. And this is why, I think, phenomenological aesthetics of this sort comes closer to various

1. The pioneering work for this school of thought has been R. Ingarden's work; see in connection with my text his 'Artistic and Aesthetic Values', repr. in Osborne (ed.), op.cit., pp.39-54.
theories of empathy, rather than to any analytical treatment of terms and relationships. What is relevant to both is what some versions of Expression Theory have tried to pinpoint.

Reconstructing (and somewhat altering) the argument, I would like to point to the importance of a conceptual distinction between the emotional, etc. qualities of the secondary qualities (sound, colour, shape, etc.) that can be apprehended by a reflective practice on the one hand, and on the other the expression of an emotion (or complex thereof) by the work as an organic unity which can only be felt in an act of empathetic experience; in fact the distinction is a kind of relationship since the latter presupposes the former. Now such an approach raises, I believe, a question, especially in view of the fact that some proponents of an Expression Theory advocate the belief that we can experience an emotion through imaginative assumptions and empathetic understanding of a work of art so that this particular emotion can be both present in us but not predictable of our psychological state at that time (e.g. you can feel the sadness of a piece of music but it would be incorrect for one to say that you are sad). This is in itself a very complex point, but stated in this simplistic way seems to me to be either wrong or nonsense. Instead my question is whether we should distinguish (even remaining within the same framework) between on the one hand the experience of the expression of an emotion (the latter being

somehow already 'contained' or 'present' in the work of art itself),
and on the other the experience of the emotion itself (which is
expressed). If the latter, then the above dichotomy does not, I
think, hold. But if we concentrate on the former then we should rather
speak not of experiencing, but of conceptualizing, since it involves
reflection (thinking), i.e. active involvement.

What is more important is that the rejection of a simplistic
account of the perception of emotional qualities in works of art is
informed not so much by specific empirical studies on the psychology
of aesthetic understanding as it is by the recognition of a too crude
adoption of the concept of emotion itself. Responding to the need for
conceptual clarification, some studies in the 1960s purported to show
that to invoke the concept of emotion is not to admit the existence
of the 'essentially inner' or 'private', or incommunicable subjective
psychological states. Briefly put, the main idea is to give prominence
to the fact that the logic of discourse structured around emotion-
concepts brings in (necessarily so in the case of some particular
emotions such as 'remorse', 'indignation', etc.) interpretations
of a situation, a state of affairs which is not only non-equivalent
with 'inner' feelings/psychological states, but it logically goes
beyond the mere recording or ascribing the occurrence of such
(relevant) feelings to the person in question at any particular
moment. Furthermore, (at a second remove) statements of emotions
do not simply depict a certain kind of behaviour believed to be
somehow associated with the "existing" inner state - as logical
behaviourists or (Central State Identity) materialists would try
to do by 'isomorphic correlation' techniques, etc. (and perhaps
relinquishing the 'inner' altogether). Rather, as Bedford put it,
"(s)tatements about emotions cannot be said to describe behaviour; they interpret it",¹ since emotion concepts presuppose socio-cultural relations and institutions.

Crucial to this line of thought is the belief that we must distinguish between 'having feelings' on the one hand, and 'experiencing emotions' on the other. The former is usually taken to imply the possession of bodily sensations and perceptual experiences (or the upshot thereof). Regarded as basic or non-reducible to anything other than perhaps statements of neurophysiological description or of causal explanation, feelings are taken to connote the presence of an element of 'passivity' on the part of the subject. In contrast to this, it would be at least inappropriate, if not contradictory, for us to simply assert that a certain person is under the experience of an emotion tout court. The reason is that the statements we are making systematically entail and presuppose a set of further propositions to the effect that states of emotions (when ascribed to a person) are intimately related to propositional attitudes entertained by that person.² Unlike feelings of sensations, 'affectations', or sometimes moods, which may be properly approached through a phenomenological perspective, emotions unavoidably correlate with their respective 'formal objects' that necessarily demand specific descriptive accounts (often more than one). The latter are in turn incorporated in the formation of relevant beliefs.


2. We may say of emotions what Heracleitus said of Delphic oracles: "neither do they speak nor do they hide but they signify". (Frag.B.93).
desires or volitions. They thus imply—most of the time but not necessarily always—the existence of intentional states in persons. In fact such states—irrespective of whether they are or can possibly be translated into any kind of effective or ineffective action undertaken—may be taken to constitute the further grounds for the concept of the social person as introduced above.

The problem arising in consequence to this view, is whether emotions are non-contingently or not connected with their formal objects.\(^1\) A further question I would like to raise is whether it is plausible to maintain that a specific description of a person's emotional state does not just exhaust all possible alternatives, but it further points towards equally reasonable but quite different interpretations (that may or may not be compatible). This is further connected I think with the problem of how we are to establish the relation between the linguistic expression of an emotion (both first and second-person singular statements) and the sentences purporting to describe it and hence explain it (why and how it happened, etc.). What complicates matters is the additional problem concerning the difficulties that one faces in an attempt to clarify the conception of intention itself. Sometimes, I think, this concept is invoked all too often to solve all sorts of problems regardless of whether it can properly do so. Thus it is unquestionably supposed that whatever diverse things human beings express (emotions, beliefs,

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desires, etc.), there is always a common core in them, and that is that they are all intentional states. But I think that not all the sets of beliefs that we come to form can properly said to be made up of propositions the content of which entails the occurrence of intentional tendencies - where the latter are specifically understood as drives or motives of or inducements to any kind of actions. Besides, even volitions do not always issue in action. On the other hand, we must be careful to admit that even moods imply or presuppose a certain minimum awareness or reflective ability on the part of an agent, if he/she is to qualify as a person. The reason is, as I have said, that elementary bodily sensations apart, even moods and 'passive' feelings should be understood as 'active' in the sense that they have to rest on judgements which involve language. That is equivalent to the employment of concepts in a certain manner that seems appropriate to the person in question (even if no further action is then taken or decisions made). For instance, one major problematic area that should make us cautious in our use of the notion of intention is what Freud has dubbed "unconscious intentions", especially in the cases of 'lapsus linguae' and 'lapsus calami'. Self-deception or motivated irrationality is another. And there is sometimes a continuum between them.

1. An interesting proposal to deal with this apparent oxymoron (and rather neglected topic) see F.A. Siegler, 'Unconscious Intentions', Inquiry, 10 (1967), 251-67.
5. The discussion of the previous section was intended to throw some light on the, by now familiar, idea that we should first get rid of the misconception that an emotion-word names a referent, a private/inner entity, and we would then be in a position to appreciate the full cognitive import (and the 'social dimension') of statements employing such words. To be sure, my discussion is not meant to be exhaustive of all the relevant issues, but my specific interest (given the considerations of sect.3) was to see to what extent this familiar idea can be more interesting and significant than is usually made to be in the literature. I believe that by focusing at the complex of artistic apprehension, a considerable moment of which is the experience and expression of emotions, we may begin to form such a more interesting and significant picture about the 'privacy of the mental, that is, an approach different from the usual one in terms of sensations and pain-behaviour and the like.

What makes the aesthetic case distinctive is that the experience involved in appreciating a work of art do not issue in outward behaviour or action in the same way that other aspects of an individual's mental life may or have to do. In this sense we are afforded a view of something 'inner' or a 'fact' about the individual. This is a starting-point, I believe, towards an account of the non-causal relations that should be specified as taking place between the mental and the social or, properly speaking, between the individual's mental life and what is supposed to be his extracranial environment enveloping him.

The case I chose makes more difficult to appreciate the force of the idea that an emotion-word does not function as a name picking out an
inner item, defined by private ostension. Even if this last point about
ostension is abandoned as an impossibility (as we saw rule-following
considerations were successful at least as far as their negative
point goes), it still remains to be shown how we can safeguard
subjectivity and first-person authority other than by adducing
a (sometimes simplistic) concatenation of empirical examples of word-
usage. If the individuation of human beings as persons is to be carried
out so that the mental and the social can stand in non-causal relations
it must be ensured that the moment of subjectivity is not completely
capitulated to actual behaviour expression or linguistic facts. This
is ensured if we take more seriously the complexity and difficulty
involved in the idea of the 'social' the constitution of which should
not be taken for granted or simply exhausted by that of 'custom' or
'practice'. The special case developed in the previous chapter and
the discussion of the first two sections of the present one were meant
to underline this complexity and difficulty. The case of aesthetic
experience adds weight to this by showing simultaneously that
expressing emotions (in this case) involves not simply linguistic
examples but rather issues pertaining to the constitution of artistic
and cultural objects as such, some of which I brought forth above.
Furthermore, the picture gets more complicated if we reflect that
central to those issues is the fact that cultural and artistic
creations themselves can be seen to have emotional or cognitive
elements or, more strongly, that they employ a (quasi-) language
and hence can be "embodied truths". In this case we have clearly
moved a long way from the usual preoccupation with tickles and pains
and we can begin to appreciate the importance of further dimensions
of experience constitutive of personhood; we also avoid a one-sided
view which lays emphasis primarily on explaining actions at the expense of other kinds of questions that would reveal interesting aspects of the 'subjective' moment.

The choice of Camus' novel was motivated by the fact already elaborated that its form itself provides an access to the problem of the origin and limits of our practice of making what is human intelligible. The text illuminated what intelligibility consists in by rendering the latter impossible. But at the same time it provides a standpoint from which to inspect the concepts of person and privacy. Intelligibility turns out to be more significant when we face not questions of explaining actions but when we encounter the absence or presence of emotions, especially when the latter do not issue to any kind of actions (as aesthetic appreciation shows). Even in Meursault's world etiolated existence does not imply privacy of meanings.

The aim of the first two sections of this chapter, on the other hand, was to inquire to what extent, given the negative point concerning privacy of meanings that rule-following considerations establish, we can safeguard the character of the social inherent in the question of 'how is meaning possible'. The two alternatives that I constructed in the form of a dilemma offer us different pictures of the social or communal. Even if the whole discussion about rule-following is inconclusive and controversial, I believe that both these alternatives are valuable in that they open up routes for exploring the anti-individualist character of the mental. Some issues pertaining to one route which I consider fruitful are discussed in the next chapter.
CONCLUSION

First: I put forward the thesis that the question of how meaning is possible is the philosophical locus involving the category of the social. We can thus appreciate why the theory of holism shows that, from the formal point of view, the 'social' and the 'individual' are not two independently circumscribed realities. In the previous chapter I explained how this is true in the case of the meaningful employment of political-cultural concepts. Here this idea was advanced with respect to all kinds of concepts, especially those which purport to express the 'privacy of the inner'. Thus the difficulty with the notion of 'public' I detected (end of sect. 1) led me to the two alternative (but ultimately complementary) ways of how the 'social' enters the picture. I concluded that the one route arrives at a conception of the 'social' as normative (i.e. itself subject to rule-following issues), while the other leads us to the ideas of community and custom (sect. 2). Of the latter I claimed that its only significant contribution is that it shows how Cartesian privacy cannot be sustained without the concept of person dropping out of the picture.

Second: I argued that the cluster of such considerations point to both (1) the repudiation of any 'inner facts' as 'private' and as 'belonging' to the individual without recourse to the necessity of being individuated by reference to the 'social', i.e. in the specific sense required by the analysis of the meaning-question; and (2) the repudiation of the 'outer' manifestations (verbal or not) of those 'inner' states as again being individuated without recourse to the social in the same sense.
Thus the subjective moment does not imply privacy of meanings in the sense of 'being prior to public'. The basic idea to which my inquiries converge is that such 'priority' cannot be philosophically tenable since the segmentation it presupposes (inner/outer or private/public) does not hold in the first place. The more comprehensive dichotomy of individual/social is dissolved within the notion of social person being formulated in this Part. However, I should make clear once more that the issue of expressing emotions in aesthetic contemplation plays an important role in elucidating the subjective moment because of the uniqueness of this case. This, prima facie, may be regarded as the epitome of 'privacy' since (a) no action accompanies the emotions, (b) no bodily sensation is involved and (c) no linguistic custom to be shared. This showed how issues pertaining to the constitution of artistic and cultural objects as such (and, thus, not mere linguistic practice) should be included in an account towards the anti-individualist conception of the mental: which is further elaborated in the following chapter. If emotions are par excellence 'items' true of the individual, then the discussion of the art case helps us realize that they are not to be construed as "belonging" to the individual.

The upshot of my discussion was that holism should not be assimilated to linguistic naturalism in order to exorcise the 'privacy of the mental'. On the other hand, the proposed analysis safeguards one of the most crucial properties of Leibnizian individuals, namely, their non-repeatability which has been acknowledged by this theory of holism (see Chapter I, sect. 8).
Chapter VI

INTENTIONALITY, INDIVIDUALISM AND THE MENTAL
INTRODUCTION

I conclude this Part's theme by investigating the last of the three entelechial attributes in virtue of which Leibnizian individuals are in conceptual communication. As I have stated, this is the property of the intentionality of propositional attitudes. This mental feature betokens the special relationality between a public object and the thought directly about it. My discussion incorporates the main results of the two previous chapters. So far, to put it in a schematic manner, I have been concerned with the active employment of a certain type of concepts in determining social practices and beliefs (Chapter IV); and, further, with the broader question of the possibility of meaning and the repudiation of the doctrine of 'privacy as the mark of the mental' (Chapter V). Thus the present chapter brings to completion my inquiries into the notion of social person by throwing more light at the thesis under investigation: namely, that the identification of the individual as a person within the social world involves non-causal relations.

In what follows, I wish to demonstrate that a study of intentionality shows that in ascriptions of so-called mental contents to persons, terms of social entities and properties (a) appear meaningfully and (b) function referentially.
In section 1 I make some historical remarks and clarifications about the phenomenological notion of intentionality, while in section 2 I dwell on the relationship of intentionality to intensionality relevant to my argument. Then in section 3 I spell out the two fundamental theses or principles of intentional experience. I start analyzing the first thesis which states that: in an intentional relation between a person and an object the latter is necessarily conceived in a particular manner. I try to show how such conception-dependence conditions the relationality between mental acts of representing/judging and the objects thereof. This will be the first approach to claims (a) and (b) above.

Then in section 4 I consider the other thesis of intentionality: that the intentional relations between persons and objects are independent of the existence of the objects intended. For the rest of this chapter I will be engaged with this issue for it poses a threat to holism: namely, that judgments about the social world may contain concepts under which no real instantiations fall. My strategy in refuting this will be a three-step reply. I take into account the results of section 3 and then proceed in section 5 to examine some recent views against what is known as 'methodological solipsism' in the philosophy of mind.

Thus an analysis of intentionality is shown to contribute to the anti-individualist conception of the mental according to which mental states are not semantically autonomous. This is the second approach to claims (a) and (b) above.
1. In the course of the previous chapters I tried to show first how concept-possession and application coincide in the course of an active cognitive and social engagement with the socio-cultural order on the part of the individual; and second, how the notion of 'person' could gradually emerge in its relation to the notion of the social via considerations that repudiate Cartesian privacy as the distinguishing mark of the mental. In this chapter I propose to discuss an additional feature constitutive of the individual as a person which I consider indispensable: namely, that of the intentionality of propositional attitudes. Coming to grips with certain issues pertaining to this aspect of an individual's mental life will also throw more light on the holist thesis that the identification of the individual as a person within social wholes involves non-causal relations.

By intentionality I mean only that special characteristic property of 'directedness' or 'aboutness' mental acts exhibit, as adumbrated by Brentano, who first revived the medieval notion, by the phenomenological movement. I must stress, however, that my own concerns here are not exegetical and in what follows I stay clear of textual disputes and only use some core ideas for my purposes.

It is customarily thought that phenomenology being by definition purely egological cannot offer us any account of the place of the individual

within a non-solipsistic world. This is true to the extent that what we focus on is the theme of the phenomenological reduction of the pure ego and so forth. But apart from Schutz's work (which falls outside the contours of this chapter), one could cite in reply two instances, one unsuccessful and one instructive, in which phenomenological considerations purport to move away from the solipsistic or egological standpoint. The first attempt is Husserl's *Cartesian Meditations* which present the idea of a "community of monads", i.e. how the 'I' and 'other' are related and how it is *a priori* or apodeictically given that "my ego... can be a world-experiencing ego only by being in communion with others like himself." But according to a cogent interpretation of Husserl's project the positing of an "objective world" is still strictly egological since in the end it is only within my own experience that I can distinguish between what is directly given to me and what is such to the other.  

The second example I like to point to briefly brings out a more hopeful dimension within phenomenological reduction because it emphasizes that such an analysis of consciousness (after 'bracketing') is genuinely hermeneutic, i.e. reflective and evaluative, insofar as it intends something (the world) which always exists. This is to be found in Husserl's 1931 lecture entitled 'Phenomenology and Anthropology'  

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1. This is in particular Kolakowski's claim that it is hopeless in Husserl's system of subjectivity to restore the common world: *Husserl And The Search For Certitude* (N.Haven, Yale U.P., 1975), p.79.
3. See the scholarly study by D.Carr, 'The "Fifth Meditation" and Husserl's Cartesianism', *Philos. & Phen.Res.*, 34 (1973/74), 14-35.
in which he places his system against Dilthey's Lebensphilosophie.

In 'epoche' the world is not lost but rather a richer way of looking at this world is open to us since new questions are asked about the world: namely questions about consciousness itself which by means of intentionality constitutes itself within that world. In this respect Husserl defends his method as being one which does not posit the initial dichotomy (as Dilthey is alleged to have done), between human or embodied subjectivity and pure ego, as an unbridgeable gap.

Having made these historical remarks and qualifications, I now turn to address specifically certain issues about intentionality relevant to my thesis.

2. I would like to broach the subject with two quotations from Husserl:

"...(A) quite fixed content (Gestalt) in each noema is delimited. Each consciousness has its What and each means (intends) "its" objective something; it is evident that, in case of each (act of) consciousness, we must essentially speaking, be able to make such a noematic description of "its" objective something, "precisely as it is meant"; we acquire by explication and conceptual comprehension a closed set of ... "predicates" and these in their modified signification determine that "content" ("Inhalt") of the object-core of the noema which is spoken of." (1)

"... the general indeterminateness has a field of free variability; what falls within it is in the same way implicitly included but still not motivated, not positively prescribed (vorgezeichnet). It is a member of an unbounded

field of more precise determinations which can be accommodated to this framework but which, beyond this, are completely uncertain." (1)

These two quotations, of which the second is an elaboration of the idea featuring in the first, contain one of the most fundamental themes of a transcendental project of phenomenological reflection at its inception. This cluster of themes falling within the key area of 'Intentionality' (in the technical sense of the term) has recently come to attract the attention of contemporary practitioners of both philosophical and scientific (e.g., cognitive science) research. The main focus is the relationship between 'intentionality' and 'intensionality' in an attempt to elucidate the logical properties involved in an analysis of what it is for a person (or conscious being) to entertain propositional attitudes; or alternatively what it is that can be said to be an essential characteristic feature or distinguishing criterion of an essentially intentional state of mind that a subject is said to be in or a mental activity in which he/she is consciously engaged in.

1. Experience and Judgement, §21c; 'general indeterminateness' is his concept of "open possibility". Transposed to the social world this implies, as Schutz elaborates (Collected Papers (The Hague, Nijhoff, 1973), i, 79-82) that the world taken for granted is a general frame of open possibilities none of which has any relative weight. A selected set of such possibilities is transformed into problematic ones by each individual in his biographically determined situation, by means of choice and projected action.

Given this it is natural to inquire into the relation between the intentional character of the agents' propositional attitudes and the social world that confronts them and in which they exist. It is in this sense that one may draw plausible connections between recent ideas in the philosophy of mind and social holism as I try to do below.

Following Brentano and his tradition (especially the writings of Twardowski) we can construe Intentionality as the necessary and/or sufficient mark of the mental or of a limited subclass of mental phenomena. In a parallel fashion we can view intensionality as a logical feature that applies to certain linguistic constructions. It thus appears that a dialectical relationship may tie together the metaphysical or ontological aspects of Intentionality (as developed in the Husserlian project) on the one hand and the logico-semantic one of intensionality on the other.

This would connect the idea of a person or conscious being the mental acts of whose instantiate tokens of intentional states with the idea of linguistic meanings as studied by semantics. Such a connection takes place at a key point which Husserl himself recognized as the one at which the "noematic Sinn"-component of the intentional character of a mental act is identical (more precisely, it is equivalent in the logical sense) with the "Bedeutung" of the linguistic expression which is used to express and communicate the act's meaning (noema).

Closely linked to this is the further idea that every "noematic Sinn" is expressible (in principle) as a linguistic meaning. This is
in effect the claim that although "Sinn" is always present in an act of consciousness directed at an object — since it is precisely the exact structural composition of this "Sinn" which gives an act its intentional character (i.e. this structure is logically presupposed) — it is not necessary (at least in Husserl's opinion) that a corresponding linguistic expression does in fact exist or that it should capture the full intentional meaning of the mental act.

This may be mistakenly taken as the source for the existence of an irreducible, non-paraphrasable, non-expressible and hence non-communicable individualistic element of experience. This would seem to be a sort of last resort of a limited segment of 'privacy': viz., an inalienable, essentially private, component of the phenomenological quality of an intentional act. This unavoidable remainder poses no problem to a holistic project, bearing in mind the considerations of the previous chapter, and is congruent with the formal character of Leibnizian monads advanced in Chapter I. But in particular, I want to stress that the main thrust of the holistic interpretative inquiry outlined so far is not jeopardized even if we accept that there exists such a basic and non-eliminable element of experience.

1. For this, see the detailed monograph of D. Woodruff Smith and R. McIntyre, *Husserl and Intentionality* (Dordrecht, Reidel, 1982), pp. 170ff.


3. My claim here is not to be confused with something like Simmel's idea that each individual has a non-societary component in his personality, as reported in H. Bershady, *Ideology and Social Knowledge*, p. 75.
This is because this element refers to those phenomenological "qualia" of an act's resulting experience that are irrelevant to the meaning-giving ("Sinn-gebung") character of the act's "noema". And in fact this is all that is claimed as far as the philosophical inquiry into the social sciences is concerned.

Since the dimension of holistic understanding discussed here operates only at the level of effective linguistic communication and intersubjective exchange of "noemata" then nothing turns upon the presumed fact that a person-qua-conscious individual ego enjoys a certain element or 'quantum' of experience that is not expressible or captured (necessarily) by the corresponding linguistic meaning of the system of speech acts correlated with the intentional ones.

3. In discussion of intentionality there have traditionally been two approaches with regard to its metaphysical character: one stresses the importance of 'intentional objects' as a special kind of objects with which acts of consciousness are ordinarily related (Brentano, Meinong); the other emphasizes the intentionality of the content of an act directed towards ordinary objects (Husserl).

Whatever account of intentionality one adopts one should distinguish provisionally, between intentional acts which are object-directed or definitely individuated (de re) on the one hand; and acts directed towards propositional contents (indefinite or de dicto) on the other. In both of these types of intentional directedness one encounters the two fundamental theses of the theory of intentional experience: (1) that of existence-independence; and (2) that of conception-dependence. The first principle says that all kinds of
intentional relations between persons and objects are independent of the existence of the objects intended. In particular, propositional acts or attitudes may exhibit an intentional relation with either the object (de re) or the state of affairs (de dicto) towards which they are directed without the object being actual or the states of affairs in fact instantiated; in the latter case we may distinguish between: the individual of which the propositional act ascribes a property does not exist; or the individual is actual but the ascribed property is not instantiated and hence the act is not directed to an actual state of affairs. According to the second principle of conception-dependence an intentional relation between a person and an object holds only to the extent that the object is intended or conceived in a particular way by the subject of the act. Two tokens of propositional attitudes may be directed at the same (external) existing object and yet be different in that they conceive of it in diverse ways. Both these two principles are significant for my present concerns. The relevance of the second principle becomes evident when we consider the theoretical requirements of explaining and understanding an agent's propositional attitudes directed specifically at the social and political reality in which s/he is active. Thus I consider first thesis (2) and then in the next section go on to deal with the problem that thesis (1) poses with respect to social holism.

1. Conception-dependence arises, under a different garb, in the familiar analytical debate about the causal vs. non-contingent connection between mental states and action, motives as causes or reasons, etc., alluded to in my previous chapter: see F.M.Stoutland, The Logical Connection Argument, Am.Phil.Q.Monogr. no.4 (1970), 117-30. An interesting recent account of intentional causation and social hermeneutics can be found in J.Searle, 'Intentionality and its Place in Nature', Dialectica, 38 (1984), 87-99.
One subclass of the so-called 'intentional objects' is that of mental images. The recent debate in this area from within the analytical tradition is summarily captured by the two opposite views concerning the character of mental representation: 'pictorial' theories are contrasted to 'descriptional' ones (the latter mapped on an analogy with linguistic representation). I propose that the bone of contention is the issue concerning the nature of the mental process of 'conceiving/thinking of'. This I take to be connected with thesis (2).

One issue in the dispute between pictorial and descriptional accounts of mental representations concerns the extent to which the former is accused of giving us a 'photographic' model of representing. Whether such a view is really held by anyone or not, it is instructive to note that given conception-dependence no intentional object can be a photographic picture by means of which an act of consciousness represents that towards which it is directed. Both (non-photographic) pictorial and descriptional means of representing must be taken to involve, essentially, modes of presentation the diversity of which is responsible for the phenomenon of conception-dependence (see the second quotation at the start of the previous section). Specifically, thinking, judging etc. of an object involves conceiving of it as falling under certain concepts or descriptions. This point, so banal for our modern post-Cartesian era (it wouldn't be so straightforward for Aristotle), conceals an important claim accommodated more effectively within a descriptional account of mental representation: that ascribing a property to an object (or refraining from doing so), or representing

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a predicate as being instantiated by or in an object, involves the question of concept-possession and schematism (as presented in Chapter IV) in conjunction with rule-following considerations. Representing an object or a state of affairs in accordance with a certain mode of presentation implies, in addition, that in a non-photographic type of intentional judging the subject of the propositional attitude can and does remain inexplicitly non-committal with respect to whatever it is that the employed mode of presentation excludes. However, this important possibility, once granted, must be seen as depending on what the content of the subject's intentional act commits him to (inexplicit noncommittal is reminiscent of Meinongian "incomplete" or "incompletely determined" objects: i.e. an object which, for some property \( F \), neither possesses \( F \) nor possesses non-\( F \)).

These considerations suggest that the subject as a social and political person in order to be successful in representing or in being aware of social and political states of affairs, his intentional acts must possess a (Husserlian) "noematic Sinn" such that it refers or 'mirrors' essentially social properties. In cases of propositional attitudes about what I have called Parmenidean particulars, if reference is to be successful (satisfied), then conception-dependence must be constrained by the meanings of the predicates denoting the social powers or properties constitutive of each such particular. From the simplest case, e.g. being aware of \( x \) as a mayor, to the most complex, the intended object cannot be taken as an 'incomplete object' (in the above sense). For

\[1\] I use this, conjunctive phrase in view of Arendt's thesis about the social and the political: see end of Chapter IV above.
if the intentional act is to be directed at the P-particular as such
(and not at the human being), then the intended object should incorporate
all the relevant social predicates. Of course, this is a **condition**
for the possibility of successful intentional representations and does
not imply that in every actual act of intending something about a P-
particular one must be aware of all the relevant social powers.
However, this condition enables us to appreciate two points. One
follows from this: since the concept of a P-particular is itself
uniquely identified by the social powers involved, in subsuming an
individual under such a concept we have what Frege called a "fundamental
union", i.e. the unsaturatedness of the concept (as in his familiar
terminology) is responsible that the particular (person), "in effecting
the saturation, engages immediately with the concept, without need of
any special cement."¹ This poses the condition upon the concepts
entering the "noematic Sinn" of the intentional act in that the
subject must be aware of a P-particular as such in the above mode.
That is, the intending should reflect the peculiarity involved
in P-particulars. Given this, the second point or corollary to
be appreciated is that conception-dependence being thus conditioned
(at least in this case) sheds light on our central issue concerning
the place of the mental within social holism. In particular it
further supports my thesis in favour of a non-causal relation
between the 'facts' about the individual's mental life and his so-
called extracranial (social) environment. We can generalize this
conclusion beyond P-particulars to cover the cases of essentially

¹. G.Frege, Posthumous Writings, Engl.Ed. & Transl. (Oxford, Blackwell,
contested political and other non-condition governed concepts. In this case, far from having a complete, in advance, specification of the meanings of the relevant concept-words we encounter conceptual (evaluative and descriptive) dispute which provides the limiting context within which the relevant propositional attitudes of the participants are individuated. That is, here the limiting condition on conception-dependence has its source in the existence of the discourse of contestedness.

This picture of the intentionality of propositional attitudes can also serve to highlight an additional important feature of the relationality involved in such acts of representing and what they are representations of. The conditional manner in which conception-dependence enters the content or structure of each intentional act makes clear that it is not by itself that each singular act can be the vehicle of representing; it does not stand on its own since, even if we provisionally accept that its noema/sense determines the reference, we must sooner or later acknowledge that there is a whole complex network of noematic structures within which each singular sense is embedded and in virtue of which it can be successfully individuated. Such structures can be taken as a historically derived tradition of meanings belonging to institutionalized conventions of communicative discourse.1 Alternatively, from the semantic point of view, it can be seen to involve the acceptance of something like the well-known Fregean 'context-principle' whereby words have meanings only in the context of sentences; in this case the noematic component

of an intentional act is not conditional merely upon the meanings of concept-words as it might be the case with essentially contested and open-texture words (I write "it might" since I do not believe that even in this case the relevant words stand on their own, independently of complex propositional contexts; nevertheless it may be thought that with such concepts we have a minimum employment of the context-principle, only in the sense that in the course of a conceptual dispute there is a constant process of 're-definition' which issues in the production of new sentential contexts). The significance of the context-principle lies further in that the noematic component of an intentional act is conditional upon the 'organic unity' of the underlying language (see Chapter II) and in this respect the correlated senses involved correspond with those of whole sentences rather than with 'isolated' words or expressions. Hence the noematic component is to be specified and individuated with respect to sentential complexes; even if it is the meaning of a term that enters the noema and which we are interested in specifying, the outcome involves reference to the subject's knowledge (partial or contested) of whole sentences. Of course, the context-principle does not rule out that words or phrases do have senses on their own, it rather prescribes that there must be a condition if they can be said to have meaning at all: viz., that they must occur in some context.\(^1\) This qualification allows for the incorporation of the other Fregean principle of 'compositionality' whereby the sense and reference of a sentence depends on the sense and reference of its constituents (in transparent

contexts) which I tacitly invoked above in connection with the subsumption of an object under a concept being immediate. In this way, it also disallows a monolithic 'organic' or 'holist' theory of language which would result in rendering the noematic component of each intentional act as compeltely determined in advance; this would imply, among other things, that the individual person loses his/her singularity or uniqueness which social holism (as explored in this thesis) was to preserve.¹

All these considerations pertaining to thesis (2) of conception-dependence must be seen as contributing towards an account of the a priori status of certain features essential to the intentionality of mental acts. They should not be taken as merely conditional necessities the modal property of which is dependent upon the particular conceptual framework we decide (conventionally) to accept. It is not, that is, a certain such scheme the adoption of which necessitates the acceptance of the conditions I adduced above as constitutive of intentionality (with special reference to the social realm). The reason is not that we cannot conceive of diverse frameworks in which different conditional necessities would hold, i.e. considerations different from the above would be needed.

¹ For how this can be defended by means of traditional phenomenological notions, see J. Mohanty, 'Intentionality, Causality and Holism', Synthese, 61 (1984), 17-33, at pp.29-31.
in order to show what the special features of intentional acts are. Rather, the reason is, I believe, that the considerations I analysed, and no doubt others, are constitutive of the 'framework', i.e. presupposed by it. There is no 'framework' beyond the complex cluster of features that bestow the mark of intentionality upon the content of mental acts. On the other hand, such necessities are not derived (directly) from definitions of concepts alone such as those of 'intentional' and those denoting social properties or social particulars that were prominent in my discussion above. This is because these concepts do not function, as Kant argued, in the manner of mathematical concepts that allow a complete definition which admits of purely a priori construction. Apart from the fact that some of the social concepts are essentially open-textured or contested, which as I argued above has important repercussions for the relational feature of intentional acts, these concepts and that of 'intentionality' do not enter into analytic statements (true by definition of the terms involved), they are not self-evident; they resemble Kant's syntehstic a priori truths since they are presupposed in the kind of experience (social cognition and action: see Chapter IV) part of which they make possible. This formulation agrees with the results of Chapter II.

4. Having elaborated the details of the principle of conception - dependence and their status with respect of questions of 'necessity', I want now to turn to thesis (1) of existence-independence. I propose that the latter principle should not be divorced from the one already

discussed; this is why I chose to deal first with conception-dependence.

Thesis (I) above, of existence-independence, puts forward a principle (pertaining both to the metaphysics and the semantics of intentionality) which is considered fundamental in the phenomenological tradition but which has been disputed or amended in recent analytical discussion. However, the question that concerns me at this point is whether and if so to what extent the consequences of this principle (or criterion) of intentionality vitiates any efforts to establish a legitimate ontological status for social entities in general and social properties in particular. If for instance the latter are construed as merely 'intentional objects' that cannot guarantee the existence of underlying real entities it follows that: entertaining whatever propositional attitudes with regard to such social properties is a non-extensional or intensional context. Granted this we cannot then conclude that such properties exist in reality (i.e. in empirical space and time). This means that for example beliefs or judgments about the social world or about political affairs may contain concepts under which no real token-instantiations fall. Would it then be plausible to assume that a holistic project, which rests on the idea of a non-causal relation between social context and the content of propositional attitudes, is vitiated?

The first step towards a reply would be to say that individualism does not prevail because: in accordance with certain views of intentionality (Husserl's content-theory) it is appropriate to say that the whole complex of "Sinn" prescribes or is directed toward an
object-as-if-it-existed. And hence it appears that in our case the category of social wholes has to be taken into account in determining the reference/directedness of the agent's mental acts. The point made here is that even if an act has no object it has nevertheless a "Sinn" that prescribes an object as if it existed and hence makes the act intentionally directed toward this (non-existent or non-actual) "object". Thus the focus of our attention is driven toward the act's meaning which necessarily refers to or prescribes such an "object". Hence in order to understand the act's meaning (and a fortiori for it to arise in the first place) we must make due allowance for the referent of this noema. However, critics have claimed that in such a case the act fails to be directed at all, that is, fails to intend anything. So we need a stronger reply.

I believe that in order to overcome this difficult we should first establish the public character (via an anti-psychologistic account) of these noemata (Sinne) as expressed in language. Here the problem turns upon two major approaches.

(a) One may proceed toward Husserl's and Frege's Platonistic theories (in the tradition of Bolzano) but this would hardly be relevant or helpful in the area of social inquiry.

(b) Alternatively and more fruitfully, we should turn to recent discussions in the philosophy of mind emphasizing anti-individualist accounts of the mental and specifically of the contents of propositional attitudes. Further research into this area will do much to illuminate the required non-causal relationship between social context and propositional content.
Before going fully into this I propose an intermediary (second) step towards a comprehensive reply.

The structure of the "noematic Sinn" (the theme of the first quotation from Husserl) in conjunction with the aggregate of its predicate-senses must be taken into account. With regard to perceptual acquaintance for instance the traditional phenomenological analysis thereof focuses on what is known as "general indeterminateness", partial view, etc. This is an alternative perspective from which the issue of thesis (2) above can be seen. But more importantly it is a case in which 'successful reference' (i.e. non-empty) can be ascribed to mental representations or propositional attitudes; this, however, can only be effected on the basis of a more comprehensive framework of acquaintance and information-flow (Cf. the second quotation at the start).

If the object of perception "transcends" its sensibly appearing properties and the subject is always able to ascribe more properties and other classificatory features to the material thing perceived then this is beyond doubt due to the fact that a perceiver is never acquainted with what s/he is confronted with in vacuum. But if this is the case with perceptual knowledge it should be a fortiori so in other areas of conscious life. In particular this holds true in the case of social cognition and action. This latter point should be emphasized since one of the most prominent and influential developments of the phenomenological movement was towards the interpretative understanding of the social world. This necessitated the replacing of perception by the category of 'action' as the focal point of investigation (as in Schutz).
In the case of judgments or beliefs concerning the social world it would be rather absurd to claim that the subject experiences tightly separated and unrelated segments of information. But even if sometimes (if not all the time) a particular social phenomenon is never (or perhaps only gradually) unfolded in its entirety in front of one's "eyes" it is still the case that: the subject's experience during an intentional act (in the technical sense) should contain a meaning-component that enables the subject to acquire a fuller description of the situation. The subject, as it were, 'adds' more features to what s/he perceives (in the case of perception) and more interpretative aspects to what s/he understands, judges and acts upon (in the case of social life). We should however keep in mind that the reverse is equally important, viz. when the subject systematically refuses to add any more features.

1. This kind of 'synecdochic' perception is what methodological individualists missed as, e.g. Hayek does in The Counter-Revolution of Science (London, Free Press, 1955), pp.36-38, when he distinguishes sharply between beliefs about the phenomena vs. what is 'constitutive' of beliefs: the former if they refer to social wholes suffer from what in this chapter is the thesis of existence-independence. For 'synecdochic perception' as crucial to agency and holism, see L.W. Beck, The Actor and the Spectator (N.Haven, Yale U.P.), pp.61-62 and 86.

The next step in an attempt to deal with the problem of existence-independence should be to take into account contemporary developments in the philosophy of mind. In the past decade or so, these have successfully exposed the untenability of what is regarded as the dominant tradition in which discourse about the mental is individualistic in the specific sense that: it explicitly obliterates or tacitly neglects the significance of the 'extracranial environment' in the process of identifying individuals' mental states. In the relevant literature this environment is taken to be either the physical or the social one, or both. Putnam, who was the first to argue that psychological facts are not circumscribed within the individual, stressed the importance of the physical environment, while more recent attempts are more radical in that they include both. Around his celebrated catchphrase 'meanings just ain't in the head!' and his well known thesis about the 'social division of linguistic labour', Putnam argued for a reconsideration of the classical (Fregean) notion of meaning - as intension determining extension; this notion (if accepted as adequate) cannot be compatible with the thesis that knowing the meaning of a term is just a matter of being in a certain psychological state. The upshot of his argument was a new proposal about semantics but what interests me here is that part of the argument attacks what is known as the thesis of 'methodological solipsism': this thesis assumes that no psychological state, 'properly so-called', presupposes the existence of any individual person, thing, event, etc. other than the subject to whom the state is ascribed.


If this thesis is accepted then we may distinguish between: 'narrow' psychological states which have a purely 'notional' content (Quine's term about de dicto beliefs) in that in ascribing such states to an individual we only characterize the 'internal' layout of his mind that is existence-independent; and 'wide' psychological states the ascription of which entails the existence of those things or persons to which the propositional attitude refers. Methodological solipsism, if true, would hold that 'narrow' states must be admitted as causally significant for explanatory purposes\(^1\) even though the intrinsic features or nature of these internal brain states fail to determine the required semantic content of the beliefs to which the supposed internal representation (in a 'language of thought') corresponds; i.e. even if they do not determine on their own the truth conditions of the expressed beliefs.\(^2\)

However, what the recent developments I have mentioned made clear was that even if a (representational) picture of the mind as a computational device operating with 'internal sentences' is not solipsistic, it is nevertheless in line with an individualist approach to the study of the mind. Putnam inaugurated the, by now, familiar and standardised genre of Doppelgänger thought experiments in order to show how misconceived the notion of 'narrow' state or attitude is. I do not intend to rehearse this type of experiment since they are reiterated constantly in the relevant literature and so I assume that their point is clear: that in at least the case of belief-contexts involving reference to proper names, natural

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kind terms and indexicals, what the speaker or thinker believes, judges etc., is specified by reference to the physical environment and linguistic community.

This idea has been shown to be easily generalized by taking the environment to include social reality. In a number of influential articles T. Burge has emphasized this more radical view again by means of a thought-experiment. Briefly summarized the experiment runs as follows. We are first asked to envisage someone who has a number of beliefs and other attitudes with a certain content in which a particular term or expression appears. We wish to make attributions of such attitudes to him of the form 'He believes that \( p \)', that is, we wish to gain some knowledge about him and hence we must take care that our attributions are accurate. If so, then we must find out the person's own way of describing and conceptualizing the things he uses the term to refer to. But we can then imagine that, respecting this requirement, we find out that the person has what we consider false beliefs because he applies the term wrongly, i.e. he extends his word-usage to things he, mistakenly believes fall under the relevant concept. This, of course, works with terms like Burge's own 'arthritis', i.e. terms the meaning of which is given scientifically and hence a layman can be mistaken about its exact application. Next, however, we are asked to imagine this same person with exactly the same physical and non-intentional mental histories in a counterfactual situation in which the extension of the term is specified by the counterfactual scientific community.

as covering also those cases which in the original situation were not.

In this counterfactual case the same content of beliefs would render them true, not false, because we specify this content in accordance with the new meaning of the term. I elaborate a bit on this thought experiment because I have found that some of its numerous expositions in the literature miss its point. The point is, in my reconstruction, that in both situations the person can be unaware of the correct meaning of the term he employs in thinking and speaking. The fact that exactly the same content of beliefs has different truth values in the two situations when the linguistic conventions of the two communities are altered, reflects a peculiarity of the way in which the thought experiment is formulated and as far as I know it has got unnoticed.

I want to propose two possible, alternative, interpretations.

In the first possibility we envisage that what the person intends to mean by using the relevant term available remains the same both in the ordinary and in the counterfactual situation. What differs here is the extension of the term as designated by the respective scientific or wider social communities in which he is situated accordingly. So we ascribe to him the same concept but from the point of view of the diverse communal practices he happens to have wrong beliefs in the ordinary situation and correct ones in the counterfactual. He himself is unaware of these facts in the respective situations (although, of course, in practice he is bound to be corrected by an expert, especially in such a simple case as that of 'arthritis' in Burge's example). It should be noted, however, that the fact that he is wrong in one community and right in the other is as a property of the contents of his beliefs not a 'Cambridge property' (Geach's term), a familiar
expression used to refer to an 'exotic' variety of properties which are idle constructions playing no causal rôle in the world. So in the first case the beliefs the subject has in the two possible worlds respectively have different truth values although their content is constant.

In the second, alternative interpretation we ascribe to him different concepts in accordance with the established conclusions of the usual Doppelgänger examples like that of Putnam's original and Burge's own. Here we make use of this conclusion, i.e. we accept that a difference in scientific and social circumstances (concerning the term and its extension) is a sufficient reason to make us attribute a difference in the contents of his relevant-propositional attitudes.

We do not allow the content of the subject's belief that is specified in the original, ordinary society to move freely, as it were, retaining its identity, to the counterfactual community of language speakers. The content (and its key concept) does not survive its transworld movement. In this case, it follows that the respective beliefs have the same truth value because, simply, they are different beliefs altogether. This is the exact opposite of the first alternative.

I am making this elaborate point because I think it is significant to realize the exact import of thought experiments like this before we draw the desired conclusion (central to this part of my thesis): namely, that from an anti-individualist standpoint facts about an individual such as what she believes or hopes for and the like are non-causally related to social facts or that they are susceptible to 'social change' but not causally so. As I have already indicated throughout these chapters
it is not a sufficient condition for social holism to maintain
that 'society exerts a causal influence upon its members'. This is
an empirical claim which may not be as trivial as it sounds but it
contrasts with a project based on formal requirements, as I showed
at the start of Chapter I. In fact, this very distinction itself (between
formal and empirical questions) reflects an important difference between
the philosophical presuppositions of individualism and holism. I want
to stress that such a distinction is not available to individualism and
that this is one of its characteristic marks: only empirical questions
about causal interactions between entities are admitted in dealing with
ontological commitments; while any other approach that distinguishes
between causal and non-causal relations is repudiated. With special
reference to the case I am examining here (i.e. the implications of
the thought experiment) an individualist position about the mental would
be one that admits that psychological states proper can be in causal
interaction with other states or things and events external to them,
i.e. independently identified. To the extent that the psychological
states of an individual are allowed to be susceptible to changes of
his environment, an individualist position would construe such
states as psychological proper only as long as they bear the causal
imprint of such changes. From this standpoint non-causal relations
between social context and propositional content are deemed illegitimate. In
this way anything we may wish to claim as a fact about an individual's mind must
be something which can, in principle, be discovered as within the
individual mind; any other truths which are about facts transcending
each person's mind (as the latter is understood by individualism) are
taken into account only if they refer to causal interactions.
The way in which I drew the two alternative descriptions or interpretations above helps us also appreciate the limits of an approach proposed by some authors according to whom we must distinguish between 'conceptual rôle' and 'semantic rôle'. Only the first alternative allows such a distinction but is vulnerable to the claims of the original thought experiment. What is more important for my own purposes in discussing the more interesting case of social and cultural matters (rather than simplified examples of 'water' and 'arthritis') is the emphasis on the point of view of us, the ascribers of belief-contents; and in particular the manner in which, in the course of such thought experiments, it is not just the individual subject who is being situated by us in different environments but rather our occupying different points of view we are able to appreciate how the 'extracranial' environment is not contingently external or simply touching the psychological subject at his bodily or brain perimeter.

This is important in view of the general result reached at in the final stage of Chapter III above and could be seen as an application of that. To the extent that we can move away from a simple causal model of interaction between the social and the psychological (however this may be conceived in individualist terms) then we place our discourse on holism in the philosophy of the social sciences at a level at which questions of formal ontology with respect to the 'social' and the 'individual' must be intertwined.

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An argument rather too commonly invoked by individualist inspired
writers in the philosophy of the social sciences is that although concepts
about social entities and properties enter the specification of an
individual's propositional attitudes, these attitude contexts being
clearly opaque or intensional entail no commitment to such social entities.
As I formulated the existence-independence thesis above, this argument
accepts that there are relevant social concepts possessed by people
but that they may lack any real instantiations. This argument is used
to serve many purposes and it is thus ambiguous.

For instance, one version of the argument claims that a patriot's
state of mind is partly constituted by his possession of the concept
of a particular kind of social object "but that does not imply the
irreducibility of that concept."\(^1\) In reply to this one could follow
the line of argument convincingly presented by Ruben and attack the
part of the individualist argument corresponding to the reducibility
claim.\(^2\) I am not going to rehearse this kind of response here, with
which I concur. Alternatively, however, one may question the non
sequitur character of Quinton's formulation. It is, I think, a
confusion of two different orders, that of the ascription of beliefs,
etc. to an individual, and that of what social-scientific theory may
(or may not for that matter) decide as to the reducibility-
relations between the theoretical terms and statements employed in
its ontological commitments.

1. A. Quinton, 'Social Objects' repr. in his Thoughts and Thinkers
   (London, Duckworth, 1982), pp. 75-93, at 91; cf. Mellor,
   'The Reduction of Society', op. cit.

2. See the (augmented version) of two arguments in D.-H. Rubens',
   The Metaphysics of the Social World (London, RKP, 1985), pp. 31-44
   (121-7).
Thirdly, and more importantly, however, one may wonder as to what kind of theory (or metaphysical conviction?) this is about the 'nature' or 'function' of concepts. If it implies a separation of everyday social concepts (of 'folk sociology') from social-scientific ones (as pointed out at the end of the previous paragraph)\(^1\) then it must be clarified which particular concepts we are talking about. Thus we must distinguish between those that refer to 'perceptually salient' entities, e.g. groups, in which case Rubens' arguments apply; and those concepts, e.g. 'alienation', which may not be part of people's everyday vocabulary;\(^2\) in which case reducibility is totally irrelevant and in fact unwanted. If the argument does not imply such a separation and refers only to the concepts possessed and used by people in social intercourse then it is false to claim that the threat of non-existence arises. That these concepts may be empty is an impossibility if what I argued for in the whole of Chapter IV is valid. In addition, as I indicated above, one can support this by bringing into attention all the detailed considerations about the nature of conception-dependence I spelt out previously.

In fact, it is important to stress the parallel between on the one hand, the methodological solipsist picture of the mental as having a totally inner component which can be conceived to function on its own,

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1. E.g. Hayek, op.cit., 36-38; 53-63; 214 n.48.
2. Although, as I have already mentioned in Chapter I, it is interesting to note studies like Moscovici's which analyze the way in which psychoanalytic terms enter people's vocabulary and the importance of their social status or party-political membership in the way the assimilation is effected.
that is, it can be seen to have a proper function in isolation to another (semantic) component which attached, somehow, to the former is supposed to yield the possibility of the non-solipsistic placement of the psychological within a non-psychological world.\footnote{See further Evans, op.cit., pp.200-4; and the most penetrating paper J. McDowell 'Singular Thought and the Extent of Inner Space' in Pettit and McDowell (eds.), op.cit., pp.137-68, esp. 88.} And on the other hand, parallelly, a picture of the individual whose employment of social concepts is philosophically conceived (and, for some, institutionalized) to be a 'non-social' fact.
CONCLUSION

This chapter's argument proceeded thus:

I. By taking into account the results of the two previous chapters and certain Fregean ideas, the discussion of the 'conception-dependence' of intentional thought established the following: First, there must be a necessary condition ensuring the possibility of successful intentional representation; it states that intentional mental acts about socio-political states of affairs must exhibit a specific structure in which social predicates appear ineliminably. Second, this condition further supports my thesis in favour of the non-causal relations between the mental and the social. Third, that each singular act cannot be on its own the vehicle of representing entails that each act's meaning is a moment of an embedding complex noematic structure. Fourth, these considerations are to be understood as synthetic a priori truths. These were, consecutively, the points of section 3 (the argument's first stage).

II. The discussion of the 'existence-independence' problem made clear that: First, the subject does not experience reality as a series of episodic segments. This 'synecdochic perception' (a point individualism missed) implies - in conjunction with all the above - that: the objection with regard to the disputed instantiations of certain social concepts loses its point once we acknowledge that the mental act's meaning (which prescribes 'objects' to social concepts) must not be construed as an autonomous or inert psychological feature of the individual mind, and nothing more (section 4). This point was further elaborated thus:
Second, we have seen throughout this Part why meanings are not enclosed within the mind; so by reconstructing and extending the thought-experiments I showed in what way the content of a belief is related to its truth value. It follows that given the analysis of intentionality the distinction between the 'conceptual role' and the 'semantic role' of the mental acts' content (i.e. briefly speaking, the distinction between meaning and referring of propositional attitudes) has no role to play; and hence that the mental content is not a feature of solipsistic "narrow psychological states" - as individualism has to say in order to claim (against holism) that concepts of social entities and properties may appear in propositional attitudes but cannot refer to anything real (section 5).

So the gist of the analysis of intentionality is that mental representation is an active positing of the world - which takes us back (as intended) to this Part's first chapter. On the whole, I must emphasize that what the analyses of the three entelechial factors (moments of the conceptual communication) showed is that, as I stated in the beginning of this Part, for holism: [A] the mind is not a res extensa independently identified and [B] society is not what "touches upon the perimeter" of what is considered as "psychological" and hence non-social.

In the universe of discourse of formal ontology the 'individual' and the 'social' are not represented as sets of entities. Rather, given our initial question of how it is possible for persons to think, it is proposed that: the 'social' itself is the expression of the possibility of the conceptual correlation of Leibnizian individuals-qua-social persons in the precise sense I advocated in this Part.
PART THREE
Chapter VII

EVENTS AND HOLISM (I)
The theory of holism pursued in this dissertation reaches its final stage in this Part by addressing the notion of events which will be shown to characterize the form of social states of affairs. It should be stressed that despite this terminology of 'states' the idea of events ensures, ultimately, that our basic question of the constitution of the social world as a unified totality is not posited from a static point of view. Rather, it involves the dynamic or temporal cohesiveness of social reality.

Part One opened with the formal requirement that social states of affairs are possible by virtue of certain kinds of relations exhibited necessarily by the elements of our ontological domain. The distinctive mark of the formal approach was that it replaced the fallacious extensional/mechanical model of social reality. It followed that human beings cannot be individuated and identified as atomic "societal members" but that they should be constituted as social persons in the precise sense argued for in the previous Part. The crucial idea that the elements of our ontological domain (and in particular the individual's cognitive make-up) combine to form complex states of affairs without the need of extraneous links entails that such a non-atomic (and its counterpart the non-extensional) social ontology must incorporate a theoretical discourse on the reality of events. That is, it should convey a certain event-structure of social states of affairs that ensures their irreducibility to individuals or social groups, etc, that participate
in them. Thus events must be seen as a manifestation of the relations true of the formally unified social ontology. In this respect, I shall argue that predicates of social properties have a crucial role to play.

This is, then, the theme of this Part and its bearing on the previous two. I should add that the general idea of events has been encountered at various points already, as well as the concomitant idea of change or transition that the language of events brings forth (e.g. in the case of cultural-words change: Chap. IV, sect. 4). Another point to be stressed is that in dealing with the identity-conditions of social events (as my topic requires) I will gradually be able to extract how they differ from other kinds of events. In addition, although we speak in terms of "events" in a general fashion, my examination will lead us to admit a richer typology needed for our purposes.

The present Chapter contains a cluster of considerations with respect to the semantics of event-language. My aim at this stage is to arrive at the most appropriate notion of events suitable for our holist theory by raising a problem crucial to the characterization of events. Then, based on the relevant results, the next chapter will carry on with the bulk of my claims about the ontological status of social events.

Section 1 introduces a theory which construes events as concrete particulars and its opposite which recognizes only agents. Although the former may be initially registered as supporting holism,
I intend to show that it is fruitful as far as certain semantic points are concerned but that it is in the end inadequate for my purposes. In order to see this I present the crucial problem mentioned above: this is the well-known 'variable polyadicity' of verbs of action. This problem raises the issue of specifying the context necessary for the meaningfulness of social event-sentences. My proposal is to look at the semantics of adverbial modification valid for singular action-sentences (this will be enriched in the next chapter). This proposal of mine is made precise in section 2. There I adopt some semantic principles relevant to descriptions of social events. These points aim at discarding the idea that we are allowed to speak only in terms of agents.

Having thus cleared the ground, I carry on with this problem in section 3 which contains the main argumentation of this chapter. I discuss Ramsey's view that events are particulars because they are asserted by a 'fact-that' clause. My criticisms, confined to social events, reach the conclusion that such a view is limited in its informativeness which is needed in dealing with our problem of 'context'. Then I press on by widening the issue so as to include the question of the indeterminacy of truth-values together with that of polyadicity. Thus I arrive at the Conclusion of this chapter: it expresses the inadequacy of the theory of 'events as bare particulars on a par with material bodies' (penultimate page of section 3). In addition, to the criticisms of that section, I should stress that such a view could not be in
harmony with the already argued holist thesis that the social world is not modeled on a theory of bodies (vid. end of sct. 6 of Chap. I above).

These negative points are followed by the proposal (on the last page of section 3) that the most useful notion of an event for our purposes is that of a social state of affairs specified as: the exemplification of a social property by a subject (being one or more agents, or social group(s), etc) at a time. This notion must be made more precise so that we can investigate the specific ontological status and typology of social events as indispensable to this theory of holism. This is the task of the next chapter.

Before going into that, the present chapter ends with section 4 supplemented by an Appendix at the end of the dissertation. Together they discuss the issue that social theory cannot accept that social events are 'simple uninterpreted data' of social reality. This issue - stemming from the claims of Chapters II and III above - is taken up in the last section of the next chapter.

It should be noted, finally, that the above-mentioned results of this chapter are put together with the arguments of the next chapter in the overall CONCLUSION at the end of this Part.
1. In recent discussions of 'events' the two most basic issues about which contrasting positions have been offered are the following:

The first issue arises in the debate over the ontological status of the entities denoted by the terms 'action' and 'event'. With reference to the latter which is my particular concern here, we have on the one hand the thesis (originally Davidson's) that events are individuals or concrete particulars on a par with ordinary objects such as material things or organisms; on the other hand, events are considered to be abstract entities such as propositions or sets of possible worlds. There is also the view (found in the writings of J.Kim and others) of events as concrete exemplifications of properties and/or relations by one or more particulars. My interest in what follows is confined to theories which construe events as concrete particulars alongside individual persons and things since only this is relevant to social holism.

The second pair of contrasting positions avoids the issue of abstractness/concreteness and focusses on the semantic issue of the adverbial modification of linguistic expressions for events. The two most prominent theses here may be conveniently dubbed as "Adverbial"

1. R.Chisholm appears to be an advocate of such a view; see his debate with Davidson in Nous, IV (1970) and V (1971).

2. Here views diverge: e.g. R.M.Adams proposes reduction of talk about possible worlds to talk about sets of propositions in his 'Theories of Actuality', Nous, VIII (1974), at 225 while R.Stalnaker thinks that propositions must be reduced to sets of possible worlds: 'Possible Worlds', Nous, X (1976), 65-75.

and "Event and Relative Clause Theory" respectively. The former (chiefly held by Strawson) is perhaps the most traditional view and in Strawson's version it originated as a reaction to the latter. According to the Adverbial Theory the comprehension and use of, say, action-sentences adorned with adverbial modifications do not need anything more than the surface structure as it appears in ordinary language. The extraneous apparatus brought to bear upon surface in order to reveal the 'deep' structure of such sentences - which is claimed as necessary by the rival theory of "Events and Relative Clauses" - is the formal-theoretic one of first-order predicate calculus. The latter ensures the characteristic of generality displayed in such sentences, it explains their logical relations and above all it brings into light such hidden concrete entities as events. In opposition to all this the Adverbial Theory imposes ontological parsimony by recognizing only agents as the sole items involved in the context surrounding the uniform predicational rôle that adverbs play with respect to verbs and adjectives.

In what follows I am going to be engaged with only a selection of some problematic points and their particular implications arising within the 'Event Theory'.

Before going into this however it would be quite instructive to register the relationship between individualism and the agent-thesis on the one hand and that between social holism and the event-thesis (whereby events are taken as concrete particulars) on the other.

For consider that by quantifying over events in accordance with
the latter thesis, we are forced to admit the ontological significance
of a reality 'lying' beyond the individual agents as such. By "reality"
we may have in mind here an ensemble consisting of a plurality of action-
and event-tokens together with their properties - the latter being, e.g.,
either causal, temporal/spatial, or logical.

But consider, for instance, that if we could countenance any
talk about a particular event or action of voting enacted by a particular
individual at a particular time, any sentence purporting to express
the occurrence of this event would be if not entirely unintelligible
at least devoid of any theoretical or practical significance (i.e.,
devoid of informativeness - see below, section 3) unless we specified
the political context within which it took place. This may sound like
a hackneyed truism or, to the same effect, so sweepingly general as to
be vague. As in the case of the well-known problem of the 'variable
polyadicity' of verbs put forward by A.Kenny, once a verb-form like,
for example, 'kissed', is construed as a polyadic predicate we cannot
determinately decide how many argument places it has:

"If we cast our net widely enough, we can make 'Brutus
kissed Caesar' into a sentence which describes, with a
certain lack of specification, the whole history of the
world." (1)

This charge can be seen to be akin to the age-old criticism
against extreme forms of collectivism or 'organicism' (N.B. not holism).

P.Ricoeur refers to this point in the course of discussing the
relationship between the structure of action and that of
locutionary acts, in 'The model of the text: meaningful action
considered as a text' rept. in his Hermeneutics and the Human
But it could be directed both against the empirical version of the 'social-construction-of-reality' thesis, and against 'situational-logic' individualism. Here the problem is not confined to issues of methodology but in its generalized form it appears every time we have to specify the identity or boundaries of an event; it is thus crucial to whole/moments formal relations. I want to claim that in order to avoid any charge related with the problem of polyadicity in the field of social-theoretical discourse we must take recourse to the logical structure (and the properties thereof) underlying action-sentences expressing events. By doing so in a careful manner we can then strictly circumscribe the exact relationship between context and individual that we find revealed by an analysis of ordinary action-sentences adverbially modified. In this sense we do not impose on our semantic analysis prior empirical convictions independently held by us. We rather bring the resulting ontological commitments of the former to bear upon the logic of the latter.

Although in the next chapter I will move on to issues pertaining to macro-relations between social events, the point I am stressing here is still valid in the case of singular actions performed by given individuals (who do not have to be 'historical personalities' or political office-holders): if we find this semantic proposal fruitful in that case we would have managed to show that a certain version of individualism is untenable. We would have also shown how complicated it is to specify (i.e. on what basis we can plausibly identify) what is a fact about an individual agent which — though instantiated within a clearly socio-cultural or strictly political context — cannot be properly said to be a social fact.
Thus in the case of political discourse an adverb (or a coherent set of adverbs)-qua-predicate modification (i.e. not as a simple sentential operator) within an action sentence about voting corresponds to - and thus displays - the relevant political context; this latter is necessarily restricted so as to envelop the particular action and thus avoid the problem of polyadicity. I will presently consider how we can make this claim more precise.

2. Of events in general we could initially say that they are, intuitively, states of affairs which have obtained or recurrently occur. For the purposes of social holism we should not take events as the instantaneous beginnings (or ends) of processes, the latter being the only entitites which have temporal duration.¹ For some authors² there is, confusingly, an identification between these 'states of affairs' that obtain and facts; in this sense 'events' are best thought of as a species of such facts. In my discussion immediately following I will eventually distinguish between these three kinds of entities in accordance with their logical properties as well as with respect to the thesis of social holism. In particular I will be concerned with the issues of spatial location, of a special feature of the temporality accrued in historical narrative and its relation to causation; i.e. the two main areas will be location-in-space (movement) and location-in-time.

¹. This extreme position is advocated by R. Ingarden for whom events have no temporal duration but are temporally determined: *Time and Modes of Being*, Engl. Transl. (Springfield: Ill., C. Thomas, 1964), pp.102-6.
Two well-known theses are associated with the ordinary linguistic mechanism by which states of affairs are represented in a narrative sequence. We must note however, that there is a famous counterpart of the way I use the term 'sequence' here in formal logic, viz. Tarski's 'satisfaction theory' of truth. In contrast to our concern with the meanings of predicates and their interrelationships in ordinary and social-scientific discourse this theory works on the presupposition that one already understands the meaning of the predicates. The two semantic theses are:

(a) (negative): mere co-extensiveness of the contained predicates is insufficient to guarantee that, e.g., 'X is cordate' and 'X is renate' describe the same state of affairs (where 'X' is the name of the same individual in both occurrences).

(b) (positive): co-intensiveness or synonymy of the contained predicates does guarantee the uniqueness of the descriptum of such pairs of sentences.

As far as the species of events is concerned the required sentential descriptions are typically formed (in English and in other languages) by nominalizations of quasi-sentential verbal expressions: a nominalization transforms an expression or a sentence into a noun phrase which can then be inserted into another sentence. This takes place either by outright gerund forms of the verb, or by idiomatic alternatives to the gerund in cases where the existing vocabulary happens to supply them: i.e. nouns as lexical (single) items and not as noun-


2. Ibid., pp. 40-1.
phrases (i.e. complexes, e.g., descriptions). An exception would be the case when the only nouns that exist as action - or event-descriptions are those without any correlate (i.e. cognate) verbs: e.g. 'funeral' or 'suicide' in English (but not in Greek). From an empirical standpoint intra- or inter-language historical discontinuities and differences significantly reflect the underlying socio-cultural reality and the dominance of each distinct mode of conceptualizing about such phenomena as suicide.

Here it is relevant that every speaker of a natural language is assumed to be aware that with regard to co-extensive singular terms, which are intersubstitutable within such nominalizations there is no damage to the denotation of the whole. However, we readily deny that nominalizations are found to be co-designative merely on the grounds that they embed co-extensive predicate terms.

Matters can get complicated, however, and we should not treat all adverbial forms as of a single kind. For, as D.Wiggins shows there is a "large and theoretically quite heterogeneous class [of adverbs] comprising 'scarcely', 'definitely', 'almost' ..." which can be prima facie contrasted to other adverbs modifying action-descriptions proper so that the former class appears to be quite amenable to a treatment according to the Adverbial Theory. Recall that this implies that such adverbs apply to agents per se while those of the latter kind make sense only if applied to events - qua-particulars. Now if such is the case and this preliminary distinction is quite in order we should like

1. For an innovative scholarly study of this theme see D.Daube, 'The Linguistics of Suicide', Phil. & Pub. Aff., 1 (1972), 387-437.

to inquire into what it is in particular that qualifies certain action-verbs as candidates for the alternative 'Relative Clause' theoretical treatment.

Wiggins' correct identification of this special problem rests on the observation that if action-verbs like, e.g., 'walk' did not introduce event-particulars such as 'a walk' or 'walking' on which adverbs apply (as opposed to the agents involved in performing them), then "we would be hard to explain why their intersubstitutivity salva veritate was as strictly circumscribed as it seems to be."¹ But the crucial point is to realize (as Wiggins indicates) that for two such verbs V and V' to be thus interchangeable, it is not sufficient that everything that is found to V should also V' and vice versa:

"What seems to be required is that all V-ings be V'-ings and all V'-ings be V-ings. Certainly it is not enough to require that the class of ordered pairs of entities that V and the times at which they V coincide with the class of ordered pairs of entities that V' and the times at which they V'. If 'breaths' and 'lives' satisfied that condition, it would scarcely suffice for their salva veritate inter-substitutivity. He who breaths deeply would not in virtue of this kind of coextensiveness live deeply. Surely the important condition failed by 'lives' and 'breathes' concerns not times but events." (2)

3. Given this last point, I would like to round off this part of my discussion by bringing in another observation which is directly relevant to the problem of context-boundaries and polyadicity that I introduced above. What I have in mind is the claim (first made by Davidson) that a simple action sentence like, e.g. 'Brutus kissed Caesar' is both determinate with respect to its truth-value but quite indeterminate with

¹. Wiggins, op.cit., xi.
². Ibid., xii.
respect to any time or occasion. That is, it "does not, by virtue of its meaning alone, describe a single act."¹

The problem here appears to be that the sentence of our example has a specific truth-value, 'true', say, in this case, but if embedded within a larger sentence which specifies an occasion that does not, or did not in the past obtain, the whole sentence becomes false (for instance in an act of utterance). Now the explanation given here by the Event and Relative Clause Theory is that, as I simply hinted in the beginning, if the context of the utterance does not determine a particular occasion upon which the truth-value constitutively depends, then the sentence implicitly or covertly quantifies over occasions.

Davidson who proposed this first² borrowed the idea from Ramsey who maintained that "'That Caesar died' is really an existential proposition, asserting the existence of an event of a certain sort";³ in particular, Ramsey's thesis was premised on the plausible idea that a phrase beginning 'the fact that' is neither a name or a description of an event (the latter clearly on the grounds of the intentionality of belief contexts). For instance, the connection between the event which was the death (or dying)⁴ of Caesar and the fact that Caesar died resembles, according to him, the relation between 'That Italy has a King' and a man of a certain sort.

4. This is one of the reasons why we must allow events to have duration.
To be sure, these two kinds of sentences merely resemble each other for the one asserts the existence of a particular individual while the other asserts the existence of a political event in history. Following up this suggestion we find that in the former case, the individual (in this example a human being) is asserted as being of a certain sort: i.e. the predicate of his royal role in relation to the country of Italy (a property of this person) is attributed to him; the latter ascription in turn (by inversion) implies the fact that this country has a person in the royal position (i.e. a king). Thus I propose we have: on the one hand, the proposition which is 'named' by that-clause and made true by the corresponding fact, viz. that Italy has a monarchical régime; and on the other, the proposition about the existence of a certain person (individuated by his royal name or the appropriate definite description) who fulfills this kind of rôle. These two propositions are related as just shown but are by no means identical for the following reasons:

First, obviously, a political personality is not identical to a political fact. Second, one can entertain certain beliefs about a country's political regime which are different but related to (i.e. distinct from) other beliefs about political officials (this relation further depends on the truth of the set of beliefs from which other beliefs are deduced). Third, beliefs and judgments about a country's monarchical rule are not automatically affected by the accretion of additional pieces of information about personalities, such as, that the King has just died (though for instance, knowing what the relevant constitutional laws of succession prescribe and having appropriate information one can deduce further beliefs).
There is an additional complication which arises with respect to the individuation of persons vs officials, going back to the idea of Parmenidean-particulars of Chapter I above. Consider the following example by Monroe Beardsley:

(1) The local Justice of the Peace and the local tax collector are the same person.

but

(2) The local Justice of the Peace and the local tax collector are not the same official.

There is here an easily detectable underlying ambiguity whereby affirming the conjunction of (1) and (2) makes sense though it has, as Beardsley says, an air of zeugma. If by 'official' we mean a person who may legally occupy more than one official positions then (2) is false. But if the terms 'Justice of the Peace' and 'tax collector' are meant to designate official posts then (2) is true. Now (1) may be thought of as false since neither position is a person (Beardsley's view) but I would say that it is not well-formed and it is thus unintelligible since even if we prefix a negation operator to (1) it still does not make sense. (see below).

So in the first case we have a relation between the obtaining of a fact (i.e. that Italy has a King) and the existence (modulo my point above about the moment of the King's death) of a person of a certain sort. In the second case, however, we have a relation between the fact that Caesar died and the existence of an event of that sort which is the death of Caesar. As in the former case it would be nonsense to identify the fact with the particular person (for the reasons I gave

1. 'Actions and Events: The Problem of Individuation', Am.Phil.Q., 12 (1975), 236-76.
above), similarly in the latter we should not confuse the fact that [...] with the event.

We need however a more precise characterization of what I have here called a 'relation'. Briefly, whereas in the former case we can affirm both the existence of a person of a certain sort from the fact-that clause and the converse, in the latter case we can only say that the fact-that clause implies the existence of an event of a certain sort. But we could not deduce any further characteristics of the fact from our mere knowledge (or assertion) of the event. In the former case we can move back and forth because our knowledge - however rudimentary - of what is implied in a characterization such as "monarchical régime" is adequate for the required deduction in our everyday communication. But in the latter case the singular term naming the event is not enough for us to entertain further beliefs about the relevant facts. Thus when we say, with Ramsey, that 'That Caesar died' is an existential proposition (Ramsey's inaccurate term) asserting the existence of an event 'of a certain sort', this latter phrase proves to be limited in its informativeness.

This, however, poses an obstacle to our initial answer with respect to the question of the determinacy of truth values. Recall that the problem I started with in relation to holism was that of context-boundaries and polyadicity. An action sentence that is determinate as to its truth-value may be indeterminate as far as the relevant time or occasion are involved. Then I cited the answer that the Event Theory would favour and whose origin has been traced back to Ramsey's paper. But my discussion so far has revealed a certain limitation.
In order to appreciate this difficulty let us take into account a valuable idea that von Wright has introduced in the course of a discussion on the nature of propositions. He puts forward a distinction between "generic" and "individual" propositions: whereas the individual proposition has a determinate truth-value (i.e. the Axiom of Bivalence holds), the generic proposition has, by itself, no truth-value; it 'acquires' a truth-value "when coupled with an occasion for its truth or falsehood; that is, when it becomes 'instantiated' in an individual proposition."¹

Such a distinction is not to be confused with that between singular and universal/general propositions. Von Wright's division is to be applied only to singular propositions. How are we then to detect such a distinction? According to him, since both kinds are singular ones, the differentiating feature is the logical nature of the concepts (or universals as he calls them) involved respectively. Thus, that Brutus killed Caesar is an individual whilst that Brutus kissed Caesar is a generic proposition, is obviously because a person can be killed only once whereas a person can be kissed on more than one occasion.

Davidson retorts to this by claiming that a generic proposition has a uniquely determined truth-value in the same sense that an individual one has. For him the only difference is that - as quoted above - a generic proposition cannot be said to describe a single act by virtue of its meaning alone.² I think such a reply misses the point of the proposal.

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² See p. 264 n. 1, above.
As I interpret von Wright one can legitimately be a semantic realist (in the standard version of it) with respect to the truth of an individual singular statement. But in the case of generic propositions it is not clear to me how one can defend the adoption of the same stance. For even before entertaining any ideas in favour or against semantic realism with regard to generic propositions we have to ascertain what is the distinctive logical feature of such propositions. In this connection it would be instructive to ponder on the relation between those features of the 'occasions' (which bestow upon them their truth-value as we saw) and the particular individuals (constituents) which figure in the statements. An example of von Wright's would make my point clear; the statement that Paris is bigger than New York is false now, but was true two hundred years ago. Here one can clearly be a realist. But if we consider the following example: 'Smith voted for the Communist Party', where a generic proposition is involved, we have to specify at least one particular occasion before we could warrantly assert its truth or falsehood.

Going back to what I said above, we can now appreciate the difference between these two examples. Whereas the former is both determinate with respect to its truth-value and the time or occasion at the same time; the latter is either - depending on whether one is disposed towards realism or not - determinate with respect to its truth-value but indeterminate as far as its truth conditions are concerned (I would say that this would be a move favourable to a semantic realist). Or, it is indeterminate with respect to its truth-value as long as its truth conditions are also indeterminate (anti-realism).
In this sense a reply such as Davidson's misses the point of von Wright's distinction. It is not correct to say that a generic proposition has a uniquely determined truth-value "in the same sense" that an individual one has.

Thus we arrive at the point where we can clearly see the trouble which I claim a proposal such as Ramsey's runs up against. In an attempt to solve this problem of (in)determinacy the Event Theory postulates the existence of covert occasions qua events as particulars over which quantification is exercised. But if we put together the conclusions drawn from the sections 2 and 3 of my discussion above we see that: on the one hand, in the case of historical examples a fact-that clause implies only the existence of an event about which I have shown we can only know that it is of a certain sort; but this latter characterization is, I found, too limited in its informativeness for us to solve the initial problem of context-boundaries and variable polyadicity. On the other hand when dealing with generic propositions we necessarily have to specify particular occasions which make them true (and this holds irrespective of which semantic construal we adopt, i.e. realist or not, as it is clear from my thesis above). But all the Event Theory offers us is the vague notion of a covert or implicit event as a concrete particular. The latter however is found to be inadequate - for lack of informativeness - in its rôle of determining the truth-value of the relevant statements.

I conclude therefore that in order to solve the problem of variable polyadicity and its counterpart that of determinacy, and thus advance towards social holism, we cannot rest content with the rather limited
suggestions of the Event Theory. It is thus indispensable that a notion richer in its logical implications and epistemological value should be put forward. I consider such a notion to be that of 'states of affairs' (originally proposed by J. Kim and A. Goldman) which in addition to its general logical usefulness is also promising in the more specific area of social inquiry and its attendant problematic. The basic idea behind this alternative is that the identity of each event is specified in terms of the exemplification of a property by an object at a time. The three essential constituents or moments (in my terminology) of each event are its constitutive subject, its constitutive property, and the time of occurrence (of course, in complex events more than one subjects and non-monadic properties appear). Two events are identical as long as the descriptions employed refer, in both of them, to the same constitutive subject, property and time.

This idea I submit avoids both the pitfalls of an outright individualism which results from the Adverbial Theory (see beginning of this chapter) and also the limitations of adopting an ontology of events as the Event theory suggests. A proponent of social holism should thus adopt this idea.

4. The debate over the identity conditions of events vs. facts is still in progress. In this chapter I have dwelt only on a restricted number of issues that must be taken into account in so far as social holism countenances the existence of social events as social entities. I put forward some claims as to how this should be done. In the next chapter I move further into these areas by looking at some additional issues.

Before closing this chapter, however, I would like to indicate briefly another issue which, although not within my concerns here, links up with the second half of the next chapter. This has to do with the familiar problem of historical interpretation and objectivity. Here, with respect to the distinction between facts vs. events, I only want to say what is nowadays generally agreed: that the mistaken idea that historical facts were to be 'found' or 'discovered' in the documents was responsible for what J. Lucas has dubbed "the squirrel theory of history".\(^1\) Contrary to the latter it is important to realize the extent to which facts, in the social and historical sciences, can be seen as theoretical constructions while events as elements of the objective reality. Historical facts may then be taken to arise out of retrospective interpretations of occurrences of events. But even this is somehow a minimum claim if it implies that events are mere happenings in the world, specified without recourse to (tensed) descriptions in the course of interpretative practices. In an Appendix to this chapter I take up this issue and focus in particular on an epistemic paradox that I have detected and I try to show how it arises.

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Chapter VIII

EVENTS AND HOLISM (II)
INTRODUCTION

This chapter completes my inquiries into the logic of the identity conditions of social events by examining two issues. These are: the spatial location of events and the temporal interconnection thereof. Discussing these issues will make precise the ontological status of social events and, consequently, we will extract important requirements for our thesis on the possibility of the unified constitution of social reality. In this way we will be introducing the idea of the dynamic cohesiveness of the social world.

Section 1 poses the issues and explains that they should be dealt in this order: my discussion will show that the spatial issue progressively leads to the temporal one. The question of whether events can be said to move serves in arguing not only that social wholes are not mereological wholes (seen in Chap. I, too) but, mainly, that events are irreducible to their constituent subjects.

The next two sections concentrate on the semantics of an event-expression as a prerequisite of our inquiry into the question of the 'movement of events'. Thus in section 2 I argue that focusing on adverbial modification enables us to distinguish between the agents' actions and the event-as-a-whole which they comprise. For this, I adduce semantic and logical arguments. This line of thought is carried on in section 3 which points out, among other things, that what may be called 'external' event-predication (i.e. a signifying characterization of an event) is not itself a mereological piece of the relevant event.
Taken together these two sections underline the mistake of atomically construing events; in which case we would only have compound but not complex events. But the latter will be shown to be indispensable.

Having made these necessary points, I confront in section 4 the question of whether events can move. I propose, contrary to the usual practice, that this should be seen as leading us to the issues of the spatial location and temporal interconnection of events. This alternative approach enables us to distinguish between events and individual agents or other social substances as subjects of events. The starting point of my investigations is this: it is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for the possibility of event-movement to assert that events are "in" space. Hence, that they cannot move will be demonstrated by means of a detailed logical syllogism unfolded in that section. The stages of my argumentation will give me the opportunity to extract important features of kinds of events. One result will be that social phenomena, which resemble social institutions, should not be construed as aggregates of single events. The other point of interest is that we should distinguish between types of events. Before proposing such a typology I shall explain briefly that (1) social events are not like extensional wholes which may be said to have spatial parts (dimensions); (2) such events cannot have the spatial properties of material or compound things; and (3) they are irreducible to their constituent subjects.

My inquiries lead to a classification of types of events which sets the stage for the introduction of the second major issue, that of the temporal modality of social events.
I should repeat that according to my analysis the one major issue leads to the other. The typology I submit is not meant to be exhaustive but (a) it must be presupposed by any such study and (b) it bears directly upon the problem of the placement of events in historical time: this is what concerns me here. Thus section 5 contains the proposal with regard to the typology, its purpose and the main theses entailed on the status of social events.

I propose the distinction between on the one hand macro-events which are just a class of tokens extensionally grouped together, and on the other, event-types based on an intensional definition by the generic social property exemplified by each token. The purpose of this move is that it is the starting point towards the ineliminability of social properties constitutive of events. Furthermore, this typology is incorporated into a more comprehensive framework which I put forward. This latter is an adaptation of the linguistics model of 'syntagma vs. paradigm'. Thus this formal ontological model gives us a syntagmatic combination of events as a series in time inviting the idea of the causal interconnection of events; while the paradigmatic classification gives us clusters of events in terms of generic social properties.

This analysis entails the following theses discussed in detail in the rest of this chapter: (I) The manner in which theory classifies events along the paradigmatic axis brings into the forefront their intensional features; and this is what determines the way in which social events enter into a causal ordering in historical time.
(II) This ordering should be understood as an inter-action of events; this is in accordance with Danto's theory of "historical narratives" and "past-referring concepts"; I try to explain and expand this view. Thus (III) the relevant "narrative sentences" do not represent events simply in terms of descriptions that would leave out formal and substantive properties of events, that is, properties which are acquired in the course of historical change: so each event logically refers to others (which is in harmony with the basic principles of formal ontology expounded in Chapter I above).

The upshot is that the temporal modality of an event's constitution is conditioned by the relations (cf. paradigmatic axis) among the relevant generic social properties. In the specific case under study, this means that for holism event-descriptions are formed in terms of ineliminable social or historical predicates.

However, in order to defend such a view according to which causal interaction in historical discourse is conveyed by intensional links between properties, I must establish that contrary to received opinion the philosophical theory of causation can show that causal language is not extensional. This is the task of the closing section 6. My strategy will be to offer a line of detailed arguments to the effect that causal contexts (of events) are intensional because they do not refer to an allegedly extra-theoretic reality (which is in congruence with the considerations of Part One above).
1. In this chapter I put forward some ideas concerning the question as to time, space and movement of events. Since I propose to deal with the first aspect, viz., time in the specific sense of temporal connections between events (historical narratives) in relation to causation and extensionality later on I will start my discussion with the problem of event location and movement.

It is generally agreed by both those who regard events as concrete particulars (basic or not) and those who view them as propositions that facts, unlike events, if they exist at all, are abstract entities in which case it is absurd to claim that facts can be found anywhere in physical space. A linguistically informed picture, put forward by Z. Vendler, also suggests not only that facts are not in space but that they are not in time either. This means moreover that any talk about change, transformation or simple movement with respect to facts is nonsensical.

Events, by contrast, are more controversial and it is hard to draw sharp lines of demarcation as to their spatial and temporal features. A customary but misleading approach is to try and answer the questions about space and about time separately and then try and deduce an account with respect to movement or change somehow independently. Doing justice to the subject-matter at hand would require us to start the other way round and deal with the problem of movement first.

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Now it is a commonplace to assert that events, whatever their specific ontological character, are intimately linked with change or that they denote, or are about, or signify alterations, transfigurations or modifications or what not. In fact the underlying general idea is that an event refers to a process of change predicated upon a state of affairs. We might perhaps convey the same idea by saying in accordance with the previous chapter that an event is but a succession of two states of affairs (that obtain). This is too vague though. A better suggestion would be an analysis according to which a state of affairs adequately specified for the purposes of a certain research context is described as having changed; or that the "patient"/constituent—subject of such a state is said to have undergone a change and has thus passed on to another state. Of course besides the description what is further required is explanation of 'how'? and 'why'? In fact a statement of description is merely followed by an explanatory attempt only in such cases where the event comprises observationally salient constituents and when it is more-or-less uncontroversial to initially pronounce empirically verifiable statements of descriptive adequacy designating the (publicly accessible) change involved (or non-change for that matter). However this is not always the case and moreover what I want to claim is that both in the natural sciences and in the human sciences the most interesting changes occur at a level which is far beyond any such possibility of public observation and ease of identification. Thus in these cases which are after all the principal subject matter of social scientific theorizing, descriptive statements are intimately connected with explanatory aims (see Chapter III above).

Thus to come back to the initial intuitive suggestion we may say
that an event is (or is about - see below pp. 232-5) a kind of (described) change in need of explanation. I want to stress that my claim is that we cannot profit much unless we deal with the question of change/movement first and regard the problems of space- and time-locating as posterior. This claim is in addition motivated by the underlying theme of this Part: the distinction between social events as holistic entities and individual agents as social persons. So a natural question that is usually insufficiently attended to is: do events move as individual persons undoubtedly do? - or, if they do move, is it in the same manner as persons? To this the generally accepted answer is No: events cannot really move. Below I offer an alternative route to this conclusion.

The usual answer - that it is only a façon de parler when we say that an event moved from one place to another - is similar to the one given by individualists about the existence of social substances or events. Usually when opponents of holism are ready to concede that certain properties applying to social wholes are fundamentally different from those predicated upon individual human beings, they conclude that at most this is a difference which is easily shown to be eliminable by means

1. D. Mellor, in Real Time (Cambridge, C.U.P., 1981), chap. 7, claims that change must be defined as some kind of event and not vice versa. This follows from his assumption that a change is always in a thing's properties. But as it will appear later in this chapter we must allow changes definable as in an event's properties (i.e. constitutive property of a state of affairs) when we deal with 'past-entailing' concepts in history (Danto's term).

of reductionist strategies.

So I propose to pause and deal seriously with the issue of movement as applied to events and inquire not only as to whether it demonstrates that social wholes are not identical to mereological wholes (which I dealt with) of atom/members; but also as to whether social events can be found to possess sui generis properties, whether they enter into relations with one another or with individual agents in such a way that it would be logically impossible to reduce them to their individual constituent (subjects).

Taking our cue from an all too often used historical example we can say that the 'collapse' of the German army is a fact but was an event. Notice that relative to a time-specification we cannot now utter that "the collapse of the German army was a fact and is an event"; but we can sensibly assert that it was a fact just after it happened (i.e. it was completed and undisputed). And we could also intelligibly say at the time it was occurring that "it is an event". Z.Vendler claims that this event is not located, nor can it be found anywhere. But it is meaningful to say that it took place both in the Vaterland and in occupied Europe.

"Yet to continue by saying that the collapse of the Germans was 2,000 miles long would be absurd. Yes, the collapse may have occurred all along a 2,000 mile front, but this precisely shows the indirect relation that events have to space. (2)

In discussing and criticizing arguments for criteria of individuation of events Davidson finds the proposed condition of place-identity puzzling on some occasions. But in certain cases like, say, an

explosion, "we find no difficulty in assigning a location, although
again we may be baffled at a request to describe the total area."¹
This comes pretty close (or is identical) to Vendler's claim.

2. Fred Dretske in a pioneering and illuminating article, 'Can Events
Move?'² puts forward a suggestion which I believe to be the most
plausible one. After meticulously examining the linguistic background
of event-talk and of event-attributes he succeeds in presenting a picture
of the problem purged of any irrelevant conclusions. Dretske starts by
making the term 'event' more precise by calling it an "event expression"
which is any expression "that generates a meaningful question when
inserted in the question form: "When did ______ occur (happen, take
place?)"³ (incorporating suitable tense-modifications with respect
to context). This squares with my general suggestion above about
events-qua-changes. But the important point Dretske makes is that
his proposed wording of the question form above "was purposely designed
to prohibit the insertion of a sentence or any comparable grammatical
unit."⁴

What is significant for my argument here is the fact that Dretske
takes issue with one particular characterization of events, in relation
to movement, proposed by J.J.C. Smart.⁵ The latter's contention is that

¹ 'The Individuation of Events' in Rescher, et al. (eds.), op.cit., p.229.
³ Ibid., p.481.
⁴ Ibid., p.481.
⁵ 'The River of Time'; the quotations are cited from Dretske's paper.
event expressions are those which exhibit the "logical property of not ordinarily being able to be used in conjunction with the verb 'to change'." Thus according to Smart's too restrictive sense of the term we can say that victories, arrivals, battles or even beginnings, endings, reachings, hittings, touchings, etc., can be dated, but they cannot be clocked. And so the phrase "the battle" is an event expression when used in "The battle occurred on October 14, 1066" but not when used in "The battle became fiercer". For in the latter case, in order for our referring to be successful, we have to be able to specify temporal instants or rather successive spatio-temporal slices of an entity (adorned with adverbial/adjunctival modifications which reveal the intended change). Hence in this latter case a noun phrase does not denote the whole of an event. It appears that for Smart it is only appropriate segments or portions of events that are subject to change or movement while it is nonsense to refer to the whole of the event as being the subject of such precise, minute modifications ('clockings').

It seems to me that Smart's suggestion if followed would unavoidably lead us into construing (large-scale) social, political or historical events as comprising the actions of the individuals involved in them only. It is only one step from this to invite an anti-holistic schema of ontological reductionism. For consider what I suggested if an adverbial modification - not of a sentential mode but of a mode-adverb - in the context of an action sentence applies only to the actions undertaken by the agents, then in order to comprehend any kind of change (modification) related to the event in question we have to specify that such a change is not intelligible unless predicated upon these individual
actions. Even if this is correct (and we shall presently examine this) it by no means follows that any "external" type of event predication or its analogue 'sentence-adverbs' is either redundant or reducible to the atomic action predicates.

For if it were redundant we could not speak of the widespread historical consequences, say, of a specific battle nor would we be allowed to differentiate between "qualified" results, unintended outcomes and consequences of a complex of actions-quasi-state of affairs. But this is not only absurd (for we do indeed manage perfectly well to make such distinctions); it is also unduly restrictive since the most interesting topics of social investigations are thus entirely repudiated. The mere information that a battle became fiercer or a revolution bloodier simply does not advance our social understanding, whilst bringing out the implication of an event obviously does.

But now even if our opponent concedes to us this point of scientific or explanatory significance s/he might argue that the ontological-reducibility claim is still unaffected. I consider this to be misleading since the burden of the argument rests with the advocate of the "inescapable" reduction. Such a proponent of the thesis that specific predications upon particular atomic actions are more basic than the "external" event predications, is asked to provide an adequate account of the relationship between the two required to sustain any reducibility thesis. I must stress here that I am not discussing actions as a succession of particular spatio-temporal slices existing in the external world; I am rather talking about what one can and does say about them when one tries to specify and explain change by the use of adjectives and adverbs. That is I am
here interested in how we go about interpreting such occurrences.

In this sense our opponent has to have a thesis displaying clearly how a mode-adverb of an action-token as particular (or even one of an individual agent if we adopt the Adverbial Theory) generates a related sentence-adverb applied to the whole of the event. If no identity between social wholes and mereological wholes is forthcoming our opponent cannot resort to an argument that purports to show, on logical or conceptual grounds, that a set or collection of action-adverbs and the 'subjects' thereof entails (i.e. is equivalent to) the single or overall event-adjective(s). A fierce fighting is perhaps a fierce battle on the whole (if it stayed fierce all the time): but it does not imply a battle with fierce political consequences (absurdity). On logical grounds the entailment does not go through; and on conceptual grounds the meanings are not preserved.

3. There is in addition an alternative line of thought, put forward by B. Mayo, which could be seen to be in harmony with my argument just presented. In his article 'Events and Language', Mayo suggests that as far as simple (i.e. without adverbs) action sentences are concerned we ought to distinguish between two kinds of functions exemplified by them: on the one hand, if common sense is right, we are allowed to hold that such a sentence, e.g., 'This stone was laid by King George V' is indeed about an event; on the other, however, there is a strict technical sense revealed by logical analysis according to which such a sentence does not assert anything of an event but it simply records an event. In this latter sense the 'recording' features can be

equivalent or rather identical to the 'time-indicating/specifying' features. Now what makes this distinction of particular significance here is Mayo's further contention to the effect that time-honoured techniques of traditional logic have failed to appreciate this difference when it comes to sentences bearing adverbial modification. As I mentioned in the beginning of the previous chapter translating the surface structure of such action sentences into first-order predicate calculus is the quintessence of the Davidsonian programme but Mayo thinks that such a construal of action sentences on a par with simple subject-predicate ones is clearly a mistake.

These two kinds of sentences may be formally or grammatically exactly analogous but "they are not logically analogous."\(^1\) The reason for this is, I think, that a typical action sentence of the form 'C struck P violently' does not refer to an event-qua-object on which, further, the property of 'violently' is then predicated. It is not as if the event's occurrence was the first to be asserted and then its description. Rather what happens here is that an event is simply recorded, namely, the event: C striking P violently. This means that any other 'recording' of the same event mentioning striking but not violence would be either a misleading one - depending on context) or an inadequate or incomplete record. But it would not be false as it would have been had the alternative accounts of events been espoused. This way of looking at the issue establishes that the Verb-Adverb link (in a phrase) is much tighter than the Noun-Adjective one.

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1. Ibid., p.178.
However, I think the weakness of this approach lies in the fact that it confines the function of action sentences and adverbs within an entirely pragmatic framework. This is immediately revealed by the rationale behind the acceptance of the link above: what we are in effect asked to consider by the use of examples is a certain characteristic of communicative contexts of utterance, a characteristic feature of linguistic reportage in which – in order to pass on information about a specific event (or constellations thereof) successfully or receive information adequately – the hearer is assumed not to have any prior knowledge of the event at all. This is unfortunately a very restrictive picture of events and the function of their descriptions, it is one of the reasons why this framework cannot provide an adequate semantic (as opposed to pragmatic) theory of adverbs or of ontological commitments with respect to social events as real holistic items.

However, it is correct to say that in everyday social contexts what really matters is a (more-or-less) successful exchange of information-content by the use of event-sentences. But it must be noted that the human sciences are concerned both with what happens in actual (practical) social situations and with how to report them in the course of interpretative discourse – as it happens for instance in the field of the history of ideas.

There is however a further confirmation of the view Mayo adopts, that is, that it would be a mistake to treat action sentences in accordance with Russell's theory of definite descriptions. Whereas the latter is applicable to the analysis of phrases of the form 'the-so-and-so' it is not so with expressions of events. Whereas 'The Prime Minister of Spain is a Socialist' can be readily paraphrased...
with the help of the usual technique - since being the PM of Spain and being a Socialist are both (strictly political) properties of a subject and hence 'the PM of Spain' refers only to a property (and not to a subject) asserted by implication: (see Chapter VII). In 'The death of the PM of Spain was sudden', however, 'the death of the PM of Spain' does refer to an event and not merely to a 'property' supposedly asserted of an event. To ask "Of which event?" shows immediately the absurdity of the latter.

This whole approach is again applicable to sentence-adverbs and thus it further strengthens my previous argument against Smart's restrictive condition as to the dating vs. the clocking of events. The adverb 'suddenly' however can also be a mode-adverb and then again we would have the problem of clocking or atomically constructing events (i.e. only compound and not complex events would be admitted). If on the other hand it is only taken as a sentence-adverb then 'suddenly' does not refer to an extra property which modifies the event in question (overall) but is itself a proper constituent of the event - i.e. of what actually happened.

An adverbial modification of the form 'had political consequences ______' where the blank would be suitably filled with specified information of an historico-political kind in which case value terms characterize the desired interpretation - is, as I have said, an "external" kind of event-predication. From this it follows that whatever property it is that the predicate (expressed by the sentence(s) within the single quotes) denotes it is not one that belongs, as a mereological piece (as opposed to moment) to the event in question. In this case breaking the event down into atomic constituents either of
single action-tokens or of spatio-temporal slices (if it is a
single action-token itself) does not in any way warrant the inference
that these tokens had such properties (i.e. the historical consequences)
in the manner of 'C struck P violently'.

So here is a second weakness of Mayo's position. In fact it can
better be said to be applicable only to specific cases of "internal"
event-predication. However after these two points have been brought
to our attention we can still, I believe, maintain that his suggestion
is instructive where it properly applies. It is instructive in the
following way: since we are interested in whether it makes sense to
suppose that events move we must be careful in making clear what should
properly count as an event expression. As Dretske\(^1\) correctly points
out a sentence such as 'Johnny is graduating' cannot be said
without absurdity to be related to an event-movement. Only if "perfect
nominals" (in Vendler's sense of the term\(^2\)) are placed in such contexts
does it make sense to ask so.

4. I began this chapter by noting that the intuitive idea we have
of events as changes or non-changes of states of affairs, (i.e. as
processes through space-time intervals as well as the problem of
their peculiar 'location' in space), could more profitably be investigated
if we first studied the notion of an event's 'movement'. This suggestion
of mine is in fact in direct contrast with the various approaches to the
same general topic usually found in the relevant literature. There
the focus is on the problem of how to derive identity conditions for
events (where the latter are construed, as I have mentioned, either as
concrete particulars or as propositions) in order to solve a number of

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2. Op.cit., Chap.5: a 'perfect nominal' is one in which the verb
has been completely transformed into a noun.
further problems of a different kind - e.g. the relationship between the deep structure of action sentences and the linguistic competence exhibited by natural speakers; the mind/brain identity controversy; the logical status of causal or generally scientific explanation; the problem of 'the same action under different descriptions', etc.

My own concern here however, should be clearly distanced from these related areas. For, to repeat, I do not intend to solve these problematic issues by making use of any prior theory of event-ontology. My purpose rather is to explore reasons for taking social events as distinct from individuals or social substances when the latter appear as constituent subjects.

More specifically my contention is that by inquiring into the meaningfulness of the idea of event-movement we will be able to further illuminate the aforementioned puzzling areas. In contrast to this one could start by affirming or denying that it is all meaningful to assert of events that exist in space (i.e. occupy space). I do not find this approach particularly fruitful both for my present concern with holism, and for whatever other purpose in general, for the following reason. It would be wrong to assume that the best line of attack against the idea of the possibility of movement is that which argues to the effect that the sense of 'in' in which events can be said to be in space lacks some of the defining properties of the familiar spatial relation (i.e. of concrete, physical things proper as opposed to events): i.e. transitivity, asymmetry and irreflexivity. It can easily be seen that such a view would be indeed mistaken for if, say, a political meeting (caucus) can take place in a building (e.g. party headquarters) and the building can be in a certain city, then, to be
sure, the political meeting is (takes place) in that city (transitivity); the same holds for a political demonstration. Obviously the political gathering was not in itself (irreflexivity); nor was the building within the meeting (asymmetry). Thus any alleged difference in the meaning of 'in' as applied to the case of material thing-location, as opposed to event-location, cannot in itself provide an adequate basis on which to erect any kind of theoretical edifice about events. Events, unlike material things, organisms or social substances, have temporal parts (moments or phases) but no spatial dimensions.

Furthermore - and I consider this to be the most important issue - I want to argue that even if we can successfully show that a view such as the above is logically flawed (as the example clearly does), it is by no means enough to rely on the refutation of this view in order to advance our investigations into the nature of events. For it is not a sufficient condition to have demonstrated that an event such as the one constructed out of my example above can pass the 'relations-test' and thus be said to be in space. That is, it is not sufficient in order to show that events can move - as we shall see. Moreover, it is not a necessary condition either. An inference would be required in order to guarantee the desired link between spatial location and movement as displayed in the following inference schema I put forward.

Let 'p' denote the proposition 'event e is in space'. And let 'q' denote the proposition 'event e moves'. Then:

\[ \neg p \Rightarrow \neg q \quad (A) \]

and \[ q \Rightarrow p \quad (B) \]

\[ \therefore \text{ Ergo } p \Rightarrow q \quad (C) \]

1. This can be modelled, for instance, on the traditional idea of causal link: whenever p is a necessary condition for q, q is a sufficient condition for p (and conversely). Formally: \[ \neg p \Rightarrow \neg q = q \Rightarrow p. \]
Thus in the above schema (A) is the necessary condition and (B) the sufficient one. Conclusion (C) states that if an event is in space then we are entitled to assert that such an event may also have the property of mobility. (C) follows from the equivalence of (A), which states that if an event is not in space then it does not (cannot) move, with (B), which states that if an event moves then it is in space.

I wish to make clear that my intention here is to deny that (C) holds and hence I need to block both (A) and (B). More precisely, as I have indicated above, I believe that it is wrong to adopt an approach that would establish the primacy of the category of event-location over that of event-movement; it would be mistaken, that is, to consider solving the question of the former prior to that of the latter. So let us deal with (A) and (B) in turn:

Is (A) plausible? Accepting the negation of $p$ implies that we must deny that events can be meaningfully said to be in space. But we have seen that this is not so since a simple example like the one above about a political event clearly shows that events are in space or, more precisely, occur in space; that is events as such do not fill or occupy space. But conceding the general point, was that in fact conclusive, i.e. was our example a representative one such that it encompasses all other socio-political cases? One may plausibly claim that that battles, suicides, elections, weddings, judicial proceedings, primitive exchanges of goods, funerals, cashing of cheques, strikes, psycho-analytical sessions, seminars, etc., cannot but occur in space. The prominent features of such short- or long-term and small- or large-scale events can be
readily seen to be associated with the execution of concrete actions involving
the use or manipulation, etc. of things: i.e. they exemplify the property
of empirical observability or salience in public space. Thus we should
not regard phenomena or 'states' in general, such as capital accumulation,
political persecution, social mobility, the development of manners,
alienation, as constituting events proper, that is, in the same sense
as of those above. Such phenomena or 'states' are closer in this respect
to social institutions such as those of prison, church, school, etc.¹
I believe the distinguishing characteristic is that a social phenomenon
- within its historical-narrative context (i.e. within historical time) -
is not only distinct from a single event (obviously) but also it would
be wrong to identify a phenomenon with an aggregate of events. Here
of course we need a more precise and detailed empirical study of
individual cases in order to construct a helpful taxonomy since some
phenomena (e.g. material capital accumulation or political persecutions)
may be taken as extensional entities in that they are made out of
individual tokens. However, my concern here is to deal with concrete
events which are after all the pre-eminent candidates for spatial
location.

So we see that in order to discuss whether the negation of \( \neg p \)
holds - i.e. events cannot occupy space - we have to take into
account different kinds of examples. That is, we have to select our
case studies from various categories of social entities such as single
or collective actions, phenomena, institutions, and so on. But

¹ A typical picture of what I allude to here can be found, for instance,
in N. Elias' analysis of the phenomenon of the modern 'socialized'
or 'institutionalized' nature of the constraints imposed upon the
by making this move, viz., allowing first $not-p$ to be meaningful, we prejudge the issue simply because we make use of this as a defining criterion of identity of events. However the whole purpose of the present exercise has been precisely to investigate into the nature of events by studying a number of problems associated with them - among which I consider that of movement to be most prominent in connection with an inquiry into the formal ontology of social holism. Hence we arrive at a circularity or deadlock: we cannot answer the question of comprehensiveness (i.e. the appropriateness of our examples) until we have an adequate idea of what events are; and we cannot get an idea of the latter until we are clear about, among other things, their spatial location.

This supports my argument that the whole approach which starts by accepting the logical priority of the question of space occupancy over that of movement is doomed to failure. Let us then inquire into the plausibility of the converse method.

This brings us to (B) which states that if we can show that $q$ holds, viz., that events move then we can say that they are or occur in space. This is closer to what I consider to be the correct way of going about these things but some difficulties arise with regard to the plausibility of $q$ itself as well as with the inference from $q$ to $p$.

To start with it is apparent that we need a classification of events or chains of events which would facilitate our inquiry. Distinguishing among types of events in accordance with the requirement of movement (N.B. not between single events and phenomena) - however incomplete and to a certain extent flexible distinction - would reveal more fine
Grained differentia than we would have detected by the simple
criterion of spatial location. The simple criterion or received answer
I mentioned would merely state that no event simpliciter can fill
or occupy space and so no event has any spatial parts (dimensions)
in the way material things, or a musical group in performance, do.
In this sense an event as such cannot have all the properties that
mereological essentialism would ascribe to material things as wholes
proper. For instance, a glance at our list above would convince us that
it is rather odd if not completely absurd to say that an event like a suicide
moves. Hence, if we generalize we may take this as a negation of q,
i.e. say that no event whatsoever can really move. From this it follows
that we cannot avail ourselves of the sufficient condition (B).
Therefore combining our results so far, that is, the unavailability
of (A) and the blocking of (B), we may deny (C). This, apart from
establishing in a wholesale fashion the correctness of the received
opinion, would give additional support to the idea that
events are to be distinguished from the things or persons that participate
in them, and that therefore events are not reducible to their constituent-subjects.

However, it would appear contradictory to hold both that events do
not occupy space and that events are real particulars over and beyond
their constituent-subjects. I think no such contradiction arises as
long as we bear in mind that the reality and particularity of events
is not modelled on that of solid things or human beings. One of the most
crucial differences between them is that events are not impenetrable.
Two events can happen in the same place at the same time. This is initially obvious but it needs refining conditions the most significant of which is that two such events must be logically unconnected: this is commonly known as the 'Humean principle' that distinct existences must be logically independent. This means that the distinction of the two events is established by the logical possibility whereby two 'possible worlds' are indistinguishable with respect to one of the events but discernible as to the other (and vice-versa). This helps us appreciate a further minimal criterion of event identity according to which two events are identical if and only if they necessarily have exactly the same spatio-temporal specification, i.e. the same in all possible worlds in which they could be said to occur.

5. As I have already indicated my discussion is not meant to provide definite solutions to the problems surrounding the ontology of events, but rather to raise some questions and give some answers which can be helpful to further research. From this perspective, enquiring into the issue of movement, etc. in the way I have suggested leads us to a point at which (as I said a few pages back) we must pay attention to different types of events. Such a classification can be, in the end, supplied by social-scientific research which could give us a picture richer than any logical or linguistic considerations can do so. I would like, however, to suggest here one aspect of such a typology which links

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1. This has been proposed by M.Brandt with additional assumptions; for a critical exposition see L.Lombard, Events (London, RKP, 1986), pp.63-72.
up with the second half of this chapter.

We may distinguish between event-types on the basis of a difference in a characteristic property involved. On the one hand, there is an extensional feature exhibited by an event-type whereby the latter is nothing over and beyond the aggregate of concrete event- or action-tokens. These last do not exemplify any higher-order which would serve as a criterion of individuation and classification.

On the other hand this is precisely the characteristic feature of the second category of event-types: in this case we cannot plausibly maintain that a particular event is nothing more than a temporal series of atomic or more basic events. A simple array of temporal happenings (changes) or actions in concreto will not transform such a 'bundle' into a unique event of a certain kind. What is needed in this second case of event-types is an intentional definition of the property which every concrete constituent of event exemplifies. And it is precisely this specific-to-each-case property which gives the non-basic or complex event its unique defining character.

Near the end of the previous section I pointed out how an approach to events' spatial location can yield the irreducibility of events to their constituent-subjects. The distinction just adumbrated can be a useful starting-point towards the irreducibility of events to their constitutive properties, i.e. the property exemplified by the subject of the event or the agent of an action. This can emerge from a number of viewpoints but here I will concentrate on the issue of the temporal dimension of events via the idea of 'historical narrative association'.
We can, I think, incorporate the above distinction into a more comprehensive framework that takes account of phenomena (as above) and institutions, etc. i.e. enlarge the too restrictive picture of simple events. A fruitful model which clarifies the formal features involved could be one borrowed and adapted from the field of structural linguistics. This is only a proposal I would like to put forward. What I have in mind, in particular, is the well-known dichotomy between 'syntagma' and 'paradigm' and the associated relationships.

According to this standard definitions a syntagma is an assertion or combination of several successive or simultaneous (linguistic) units of the same level. A paradigm is any class of (linguistic) elements constructed with a specified principle of grouping. Paradigmatic relationships holding between any two or more elements within a given class is such that renders them intersubstitutable within syntagmatic contexts, without of course preserving, always, the descriptions of the initial syntagma (I am here simplifying considerably). A classic application of the model I am proposing is that of R.Jakobson's in the field of mental disturbances with respect to language use (and he also mentions Talcott Parsons and R.F.Bales' application of the dichotomy in a study on child development). 1

Now, the model would give us two axes along which each event may be classified (in historical time). A certain syntagmatic combination may be taken as an event series while a certain paradigmatic selection would cluster events into types of phenomena or 'generic events' as they are sometimes called. By participating in the former relationship events

are seen as causally interconnected; whereas in the latter they are
structured in accordance with the specification of the 'generic
property' under which each event's constitutive-property falls.

My interest in putting forward this model is that it makes perspicuous
a claim of mine which I want to pursue in the remainder of this
chapter. First of all, of course, I must stress that what I have to
say is intended to apply to social and historical events, and although
one could argue that the approach can be generalized to cover all sorts
of events this is outside my own concerns here.

Now, the proposed model is helpful because, availing ourselves of
the underlying analogy from linguistics, we can see that issues arising
about the nature of causation and the manner in which we describe
it are affected by the fact that: from the point of view of historical
knowledge, the way in which theory classifies events into paradigmatic
typologies (as above) brings into the forefront the intensional
features of events and this is precisely what affects the way in which
events enter into causal interactions. I speak of interaction because
I espouse A. Danto's thesis about the distinctive nature of historical
narratives and the importance of what he calls "past-referring"
concepts.¹ Among the latter are instances of social predicates such
as 'priest', 'U.S. Senator', etc.; a past-referring term is a predicate
or descriptive expression the correct application of which to a present
object or event, logically involves reference to some earlier object or
event; the relevant pair may be an instance of causal relation or not
but what interests me here is the causal case. Such terms are irreducible

¹. A. Danto, Narration and Knowledge (N.York, Columbia U.P., 1985),
chaps. V, VII and XV.
to tenseless concepts and although they refer to the past, they are not merely about the past. They rather enter into statements about the present in the light of the past. They thus enter into 'narrative stories', i.e. a series of events in time-relations and causal interaction captured by the narrative associations constructed by theories of history. Social predicates as past-entailing terms connote what may be called "narrative existents" (e.g. 'queen') as opposed to natural things ('woman' predicate).¹ Every event in the narrative is essentially dependent on other events. The crucial feature that Danto's "narrative sentences" (employed by the historian) exhibit is that "the content of the knowledge they express contains temporal information which cannot be assimilated simply to the apparatus of tense".² This implies that events of the past acquire additional properties from the point of view of their future. At least one such second-order property important for my purposes here is that: if in history a cause-event has been the necessary condition of a later effect-event, the former acquires, after the time of its occurrence, the complex property: 'the occurrence of the effect-event is a necessary condition for the first event being the cause of the latter'. In addition to this formal property, the earlier event may acquire a number of other substantive properties in the course of future historical and social developments as, for example, when its constitutive-subject itself evolves by obtaining more properties. In this sense the specification of the initial event is transformed accordingly.

¹. See D.Livingston, Hume's Philosophy of Common Life (Chicago, U. of Chicago P., 1984), p.146 (and pp.130-1; 136-7; 145-9). Livingston ascribes the idea of such words to Hume's philosophy of language and in particular to his idea about the structure of the "world of common life".

². Danto, ibid., p.347.
The basic idea behind all this is that a mere chronicle of happenings is not, of course, significant history proper and as such this idea hardly needs any mentioning. However, what I am interested in here is to point out something more controversial with respect to the language of causality in the light of all the above. To the extent that the individuation and identification of a historical event or action is effected in accordance with the predicates appropriate for denoting the event's constitutive-property, then historical narrative (unlike a chronicle of totally independent occurrences) must pay attention to the internal structure of the events that enter into a specified syntagmatic causal interaction. This, however, has an important consequence. If both the temporal phases of an event and its historical relations are determined by the 'internal structure' of an event, and if the latter depends on the properties exemplified, then in order to make sense of historical relations we must presuppose the identification of kinds of properties. Analysis of the latter and their interrelationships requires - given the above considerations about historical narratives - that we must acknowledge so-called 'intensional links' between properties of distinct events. A discourse which purports to capture the identity of an event within its syntagmatic unit must be faithful to such links. This implies that the language by means of which we 'gain access' to the temporal and historical modalities of an event's structure is

1. That historical consciousness coincides with the emergence of Christianity, and in particular that the first philosophy of history is presented in Augustine's De Civitate Dei, has been disputed by Arendt in her 'The Concept of History: Ancient and Modern' in Between Past and Future (London, Faber and Faber, 1961), pp.41-90, at 65ff.
conditioned by intensionality - which, in our case, means that event-descriptions incorporate ineliminable historical and social predicates.

Recently, however, there has appeared in the relevant literature a thesis to the effect that causal contexts must be considered as extensional. This thesis' origin lies in semantic considerations but it purports to be, ultimately, a thesis about the ontological status of events as particulars (as the one with which the previous chapter started). The trouble, initially, with this position is that it is not quite clear what its proponents wish to do with it - apart from the purposes I have just mentioned. First we are offered a particular argument which is based on a well-known rigorous logical proof, (incorporating a set-theoretic step) to show that: any linguistic context which is extensional must also be truth-functional. By such contexts it is commonly meant sentential connectives or sentence-forming operators like, e.g. '... because ___', or '...after___'; etc. The criteria of extensionality are usually two: one, substitution of co-referring singular terms, and/or, two, logically equivalent sentences, \textit{salva veritate}. On the other hand, a context is truth-functional if the embedded sentences are materially equivalent, as e.g. '...iff__'. It is clear that the former examples are non-truth functional and hence they are non-extensional. Transposed to the case of causality the argument purports to rule out a particular causal-connective which accepts facts and not events. I am not so sure as to the fruitfulness of this idea but what interests me is the conviction

1. See Davidson, 'Causal Relations', \textit{J.of Phil.}, LXIV (1967), 691-703.
2. I am not reproducing the proof here since it can be easily found in almost all the writings in the relevant literature. It has many versions and applications and goes back to Frege, Quine, et al.
3. The problem of such substitution into causal context was first expounded by D.Prellesdal, 'Quantification Into Causal Contexts' repr. in L.Linsky (ed.), \textit{Reference and Modality} (Oxford, OUP, 1977) pp.52-62.
that the causal connective must be extensional, which is the rationale behind the employment of the logical proof. The debate about the whole thesis is endless but it seems to me that some criticisms against it by means of examples (usually of political events) have shown cogently that it is the event-descriptions filling the blanks of causal contexts which are opaque. And this supports my claim above with respect to the behaviour of social predicates in event-descriptions.

The issue of event-description, i.e. examining the internal structure of an event or action, must not be sidestepped by logical arguments since it is important from the point of view taken above with respect to the meaning of a "historical narrative sentence", and congruent with my claims in the previous chapter about how to construe events from the point of view of social holism. It is also important as far as explanation is concerned. I am not here concerned with semantic disputes, since they are irrelevant to my present theme but I would like to offer a number of detailed arguments in the rest of this chapter. My intention is to try and explore, in this way, the ontological significance of the structure of social and political events (generally) when the latter are the subject of a historical narrative. Both from this last point of view and from the standpoint of the participants involved it is, I think, relevant to examine some crucial issues connected with causal contexts.


3. See Kim, 'Events and their Descriptions...', loc.cit.; for a critique of Kim's views see F.R.Bohl, Jr., 'On Sentences Referring', Logique et Analyse, ns., 63-64 (1973), 345-57.
6. In what follows I propose to concentrate on the motivations behind the theses pro and con extensionality in causal contexts. This is a useful way to arrive at an understanding of the basic contested issues and also at providing compelling reasons for demonstrating the untenability of the thesis that construes such contexts as purely extensional. Exposing the rationale behind that thesis will also specify, in a parallel fashion, the plausibility of my general claim advanced in Chapter II concerning the interrelation between questions of ontology and questions of epistemology.

My starting point is the question of why we are intuitively predisposed to accept—despite what the extensionalist position tries to prove to the contrary—that causal relations characteristically exhibit intensional features. The most promising way to get to grips with this is to try and bring to bear upon this question the issue of mind-dependency as initially a straightforward epistemic notion. This enables us to appreciate the connection we are trying to investigate. One can easily substantiate the observation that in the relevant literature it is not seldom that recent attempts to provide accounts of causal analysis have failed (in different degrees) to pay sufficient attention to the related problem of the analysis of explanatory relations. Whatever attention has been given it is sometimes very cursory.¹ On the other hand only writers explicitly

¹ As, I think, Davidson does in 'Causal Relations', loc. cit., p.703.
involved with problems arising in the philosophy of natural sciences and with scientific explanation in particular have rightly emphasized the (striking, for some of them) similarities between causal and explanatory contexts. These authors have voiced a plea for a discourse that would do justice to the interrelation between the two contexts but their respective methodological recommendations vary (sometimes considerably or only apparently) according to whether their general scientific-explanatory outlook pulls them away or pushes them towards a more or less typical Humean account. To bear witness to my contention we can turn to Hempel's account of the relation between causal explanation and subsumptive explanation of the D-N type.¹ According to him all causal explanation is D-N, but not vice-versa. As von Wright attests, "the covering law model was originally thought of as a generalization of ideas associated with causal explanation"² the result being that issues specific to causation lost their urgency. From a non-positivist point of view Hanson stressed the functional rôle that causation plays in explanation: "The primary reason for referring to the cause of x is to explain x."³ However, from an explicitly pragmatic stance Scriven has urged the reconsideration of intertwining causation and explanatory relations.⁴ It must be noted nevertheless

³ N.R.Hanson, Patterns of Discovery (Cambridge, C.U.P., 1958), p.54.
⁴ M.Scriven, 'Causation and Explanation', Nous, 9 (1975), 3-16; P.Achinstein's work contains similar ideas.
that causal explanation which respects both items does not necessarily collapse one to the other; for instance, von Wright, concerned with an "actionist" scheme of causation, wants to preserve the distinction between causal analysis and causal explanation.\(^1\)

He has further proposed to analyze causality by employing the tools which condition-concepts provide as prior to any other such concepts. In his theory every causal relation is a conditionship relation "of some sort of other", but "every conditionship relation is certainly not a causal relation."\(^2\) An explicit allusion to the importance of the issue of the extensionality of causal contexts of actions and events to certain areas of social theory has been made by M. Beardsley.\(^3\)

Finally the most explicit (and to my mind cogent) attack against the traditional Humean view of causation (and its modern reaffirmations) has been put forward by Harré and Madden.\(^4\) They appeal to its replacement so that we should construe the ontological presuppositions of our conceptual schemes about causation as a basis for a naturalistic (realist) metaphysics.

From this background we may appreciate the significance of the 'mind-dependency' as a starting point in any discussion concerning the unification (bringing together) of the ontological issues from within the analysis of causation on the one hand and the epistemological ones arising with respect to explanations on the other. I propose to

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1. von Wright, ibid., p.55.
approach the question of mind-dependency from two angles both
of which focus on the problem of extensionality and causal explanation.
In this way I will be able to substantiate the claims about
philosophical anthropology adumbrated in Chapter II, while showing
in what way causation exhibits intensional characteristics refuting
extensionalist analysis. The first route goes directly to the logical
issue while the second builds in a number of pragmatic or context-
relevant considerations.

(1) In his model of contiguity and succession of observed 'like
objects' having 'like relations' Hume allowed "that the operations
of nature are independent of our thought and reasoning"¹ but since
the mind can never observe any power of necessary connexion as existing
in the objects he was quick in mocking the "contrary biass" which
would exclaim:

"As if causes did not operate entirely independent of
the mind, and wou'd not continue their operation, even
tho' there was no mind existent to contemplate them,
or reason concerning them." (2)

The picture Hume derides depicts causal relations in nature as part
of the fabric of the universe but what is more - and it is here the real
disagreement with Hume lies - the exact nature of such relations is
represented as independent of the contingent fact that the actual
universe is not a mindless one. The crucial thing to note however,
is that such independence is asserted irrespective of what we may

construe the structure of the mind to be. This familiar Kantian gloss on both items (i.e. on the nature of the relations and the structure of the mind) makes the formulation quoted sound vacuous. What is important for my present purposes however is that the reformulation supplies the ground on which causation and explanation meet. Such a reconstructed picture would not accept a proposal that, for instance, takes lawfulness (as distinct from law-like-ness) as based on the epistemically warranted key-principles of 'imputation' and 'mind-dependence'.¹ The former would provide the 'law-ful-like' features of nomic necessity and hypothetical counterfactual reasoning. The latter is based on this kind of reasoning (hypothetical) whereby it is we who entertain these counterfactuals (e.g. in discussing dispositional properties in nature). So according to this proposal "lawfulness is not something that one can meaningfully postulate objectively of a mindless world; it is a mode of 'appearing to a mind'".²

Furthermore explanatory statements can be seen to be mind-dependent in a different but related sense: ascription of truth or falsity to them is a function of the beliefs held together with the most reliable descriptions provided of the items (things/persons and properties and relations) appearing in these statements - this is especially pronounced in the case of theoretical terms as we saw in Chapter III. Given these two aspects of mind-dependence with respect to two of the most central regions of the explanatory enterprise, that of the nature of lawfulness and that of the reference of theoretical

¹. For this see, N.Rescher, Scientific Explanation (N.Y., Collier-Macmillan, 1970), pp.113-21;(105-12).

². Ibid., p.116.
terms, it may appear that an analysis of the logic of causal contexts could be purged of such aspects. This means that the extensionality of such contexts results from the application of any or all of the criteria outlined above because such criteria enable us to place ourselves in a "Cosmic Exile" (Quine's well-known phrase). From that perspective — if possible — causal contexts are 'seen' to preserve their truth-functionality since what they express is independent of at least both the requirements of lawfulness and of the reference of theoretical terms. This, however, is disputed. But in addition I mentioned a few pages back the growing awareness of the similarities between concerns about causality and concerns about explanation; in particular, powerful similarities (for some people) in form and function between causal and explanatory statements. For both these reasons, then, it can be held that causality exhibits intensional features, like explanation, and that the alleged extensionality of the causal relations between events is a myth that represents such relations as linking transparent events. If this holds in the realm of nature it a fortiori holds in the realm of social events whose 'internal structure' is not thus transparent.

Now, in order to show that despite all these reasons causal relations are indeed extensional we should try to detect a sufficient differentiating feature between the language of causation and that of explanation that would warrant the ascription of extensionality to the former idiom but not to the latter. One proposal tries to do this by focusing on the issue of co-extensive predicates — unlike


what we have been considering so far. Accordingly, Rosenberg
and Martin divide sentential contexts and their arguments into
two types: when the context is "... causes..." the arguments
inserted are as previously singular terms that refer to events,
states or conditions; when the context is "... because..." the
arguments are sentences in their own right. If we can agree that the
problems of substitution of singular terms do not arise we cannot
so agree as far as the substitution of co-extensive predicates
within the sentential arguments of the second type of contexts are
concerned. Rosenberg and Martin then put forward a new test for
extensionality which they dub "Nominal Extensionality"; it goes
as follows: their criterion demands not that the truth-value of
the whole sentences remain unchanged after substitution of co-extensive
predicates in them, "but that a sentence-taking context is extensional
if the references of the gerundive nominalization of the contained
sentences remain the same." This does in effect enable them to
demonstrate that 'because'-type contexts do not fail to be truth-
preserving (and, hence, are extensional) since their device (new
criterion) allows them to assimilate predicate-expressions to singular
terms. In fact, however, they fail to notice that the former are
properly speaking definite descriptions. Their move collapses
'because'-contexts into 'cause'-contexts and since it is agreed that
there is no intensionality exhibited by the latter there can be no
such problem with the former either. This seems to me to be a suspect
move and it looks as if we have in fact no 'new' criterion at all.

1. Ibid., p.404.
2. Ibid., p.406: their italics.
The first strategy seems to leave matters unchanged since the logical considerations adduced above do not appear to me to be essentially different. For if we consider that aspect of the whole issue that is insufficiently attended to by Rosenberg and Martin, viz., definite descriptions, we end up with the same query as before. Definite descriptions, of course, can have either large or small scope and accordingly earlier problems and suggestions for a solution (as, e.g., those by Mackie and Anscombe) resurface here, too. What is more important for my present concerns however is to note the motivation behind this type of strategy, i.e. Rosenberg and Martin's. This points to the centrality of the issue of mind-dependency as outlined above and the first strategy, after all, focused on this as the differentiating feature between causal and explanatory discourse. However, this is not the only route and the alternative I mentioned above would be to bypass the issue of mind-dependency and try to account for causality and explanation from a pragmatic standpoint that builds in 'features of events' as essential to causation. Such an alternative route has been proposed by F.Dretske, in a cogent formulation. But before going into this thesis in particular I must further clarify the issue of mind-dependence itself — which should not be avoided by sleight of hand (as the one just presented).

In what follows I am using a particular proposal as reference for my discussion. This denies that mind-dependence is the correct starting

1. 'Referring to Events' in French, et al. (eds.), Contemporary Perspectives in the Philosophy of Language, pp.369-78.
2. This is L.Lombard's in his reply to Rosenberg and Martin, ibid., 409-15.
point for the matters concerned here. The particular proposal I am using purports to lead us eventually to the 'pragmatic' standpoint but the argumentation is, I find, muddled. In the first place, to deny tout court that explanatory contexts are intensional because mind-dependent (whereby the latter notion can be analysed in a variety of ways) is I believe wrong. In order to make sense of a particular outcome of states of affairs that is intimately linked (causally) to an agent's beliefs about his own actions we cannot in fact avoid mind-dependency in at least this minimal sense: that beliefs cannot be eliminated from the picture. Here I do not have in mind the traditional (Weberian) point about meaningful action-under-description nor the stronger (Schutzian) claim in favour of the primacy of the agents' authority in self-avowals of their intentions. I rather want to stress that this minimal non-eliminability is due to the fact that in at least a specific type of cases the agent's own beliefs are causally efficacious. For example, Oedipus's belief (or his coming to believe) that he has married his mother - whether true or false - was causally efficacious for his subsequent state of madness.

We encountered in Chapter VI above some difficulties associated with the basically intentional features that the content of propositional attitudes exhibits and I delineated a way (most pertinent to social contexts) of analyzing the special relation which holds between social context and propositional-attitude content. Irrespective of which particular ontological commitments about mental entities we wish


2. This qualification is meant to cover the *de re/de docto* intensional issue (see Chapter VI).
to espouse (internal language of thought or purely syntactic accounts of beliefs), this much is agreed upon: the causal efficacy between the two states of Oedipus must be instantiated in him without implying that it is strictly private. Of course - keeping an eye to social reality and its holistic features as given in Part Two above - it is not so easily agreed which particular form this efficacy should have when we focus on us, the audience so to speak, when we try to make sense of such a state of affairs.

Let us for the sake of argument grant that there exists a psychological theory (however rudimentary) which purports - by generalizations, etc. - to explain the connection between awareness of incestuous marriage and feelings of guilt and eventual madness. We may also assume that such a theory is accepted as reliable or true (on whatever grounds) by the audience, i.e. by us (perhaps as part of our 'folk' cosmology); for instance, the theory provides explanatory connections for otherwise disparate phenomena (intellectual economy). Now, Lombard claims that there merely being such a true theory is enough for the truth of 'Oedipus coming to believe that he had married his mother explains his subsequent madness'.¹ This, however, is for him a different matter from one's acceptance of the truth of the connection adduced in the example since acceptance may rest on one's belief that there exists such a theory. Therefore in the former case there is no mind-dependency while in the latter there is - albeit not necessarily. This seems to me to be a conflation of issues. That one accepts the example as a true singular explanation

¹ Ibid., p.411.
because one has previously accepted a general theory to which the example is properly subsumed is a trivialization of the notions of 'intensional' and 'mind-dependence'. But that the existence of a true theory (whether one knows of it or not) is a sufficient condition for the truth of the example runs foul to any conception of what 'to explain' means. On the one hand, we can argue against this by invoking the idea of 'lawfulness' introduced above as formulated by Rescher. On the other hand, without appealing to empirical generalizations or 'social laws' (which many find dubious), we should remain puzzled by any suggestion which purports to identify 'explains' with 'connects'. If there is to be any signification function that the connective 'explains' is supposed to have, then this should be different from the vague 'link' or 'connection'. Further, to merely say that the truth of a singular explanatory context depends on its being a genuine instance of a 'true' general law or on its being properly subsumed under one, does not remove the burden of clarifying what 'to explain' means. For even if we can 'blindly', so to speak, assign any singular explanatory statement that we come across to a corresponding 'true' lawlike or lawful generalization as an instance thereof we are still left with the same question unanswered; we can again ask what it is that the theory's nomic regularities are supposed to accomplish - if, that is, one is dissatisfied, on independent grounds, with the traditional Humean picture of "necessary connexion". If any mention of 'to explain' at this general level is eschewed then we are left with that Humean model of atomistic experience. That such a sort of experience and cognition is not the case as far as the holisitc world of social persons is
concerned is what I tried to show in Part Two above. So if we want the statements at the general level to be themselves 'explanatory' we need to clarify what we mean by this term.

So I conclude that in cases under discussion it is not "merely" the subsumption of our example's singular explanatory statement to a hypothetical true theory that mechanically, as it were, guarantees the truth of our example for the following reasons: (a) even if we relegate the question as to the meaning of 'explains' to the general (nomic) level of the hypothesized theory but refuse to accept a Humean model of regularities (especially in social theory) the question crops up again as we saw; and (b) if we do not choose to move to the level of theory we are still entitled to ask within the context of our singular statement what it is that distinguishes the form of that statement from any other different type of sentential context such as, for instance, '... after---' or '... precedes---'.

The lesson one should draw from conflating the issues as shown here is that mind-dependence is rather polysemous and may lead us to extreme interpretations of its meaning. But in order to avoid extreme trivialization we may fall into the opposite mistaken exaggeration and deny any meaning to this notion other than 'entertaining a belief' ascribed to an individual. This simplification is equally misleading in that it conflates logical or semantical problems associated with the intent/sionality of the mental with issues in scientific explanation. Behind this latter confusion one can detect how powerful still is the received Humean, positivistic, view of the mind.
II. Having clarified some issues concerning mind-dependence for my present concerns I want now to move on to a discussion which focuses on the second route I mentioned above. Here we are involved directly with the question of the intensionality of both causal and explanatory idioms and their interrelation. In what follows, I found it helpful to use the particular paper by Dretske, cited above, as a frame of reference for my discussion. A succinct formulation of the central thesis of the alternative approach may be this: when we furnish an explanation concerning events what gets explained is not the occurrence of an event that as a matter of contingent fact exhibits a certain feature, but rather, as is usually put, the fact that that event has these features. That is, in explaining an event we focus on that peculiar feature or special characteristic (of that event) which is the causally efficacious property of the event. This has led some people to think that such a separation of events as such from the fact that they exhibit some special features entitles them to conclude that the initial problem does not arise; i.e. that once we effect such a separation, then causality cannot be associated with intensionality. The latter arises only within epistemic contexts and since these can be separated from the causal ones - by availing ourselves of the distinction between events as such and the special facts - we can retain our initial conviction that causality is a purely extensional idiom. So the basic idea behind this way of looking at things is usually put as 'events explain other events only under a certain description'. Given this question-begging assumption about the separability I outlined, it is an easy step to conclude that explanation relates only the facts about
the special characteristics of events and it is thus dependent on our descriptions; while causation is a relation between events as they occur in the world, as extralinguistic. Hence intensionality is conceded only in so far as explanatory purposes are concerned whilst causation itself is placed outside language, descriptions or minds. This is obviously a return to the unreconstructed picture above which Hume mocked and it inherits all of its defects. This is so because the tacit, question-begging, assumption on which the present picture is based invites us to consider first the ontological separation of something which is an 'event' from a different something which are its 'features'. On this ground-level separation the next one is built by assigning causation to the one realm and explanation to the other. What is crucial to note here is that the first separation is a repetition of the traditional one between reality and language - a separation that has been discredited beyond doubt (see Chapter II above).

However, this is not the only possible move available to one who wishes to preserve the extensionality of causal contexts. An alternative, I propose, would be for one to accept that there is no such separation between an event and the special characteristics or features of it; but he would further deny that an event (with all its inherent and inextricable features) causing another (with its respective special features) depends on how we describe this whole causal nexus. We may say then initially that the usual criteria of extensionality apply as far as causation goes since it occurs within the extra-linguistic world, in rerum natura - or in the case of the social, the causation occurs in the extra-theoretic world. But here
it is crucial to note that this alternative formulation differs from the previous one in that the question-begging separation occurs at the next to the ground-level. Here the special features are causally efficacious independently of what we may say or think about them. These features are not put there by us, as it were, they exist on their own irrespective of how we choose to describe them. But it follows paradoxically that, given that the features are (admitted as) causally responsible in their own right, the criteria of extensionality in fact turn to be irrelevant in this domain. For such criteria are meant to check our descriptions of these events (and their admittedly inextricable features), i.e. they are the epistemic tests we impose on our explanatory enterprise. So this hypothetical alternative formulation would accept the causal significance of the special features of events, i.e. their causal power, but since they form a causal nexus which is represented as taking place independently of our language or cognition, then causation turns out to be a relation which is extensional 'by default' as it were. These entities, completely isolated from language or theory, are not properly speaking candidates for any criterion of extensionality whatsoever. It is crucial that this alternative is not equivalent to a metaphysical doctrine which distinguishes sharply between an 'inside' and an 'outside' view of reality (which is crudely put the starting point for the distinction between a 'hard' or 'global' realist and his anti-realist opponent). That is, the alternative possibility I am formulating cannot be collapsed to that doctrine which traditionally supplies the ground on which sceptical doubts about epistemic reliability arise (as I explained in Chapter II); and it is in this sense unconnected to
the further, different issue of solipsism. Rather, the alternative, I want to claim, either leads to a reductio ad absurdum or it is incoherent.

The former is seen from what I have just said above: if this alternative starts as a thesis purporting to justify our belief that causal contexts are extensional, then it ends up denying the applicability of the relevant criteria to causation as I showed. Since it sharply separates the realm of the causally efficacious elements from the semantical issues concerning the language of explanatory statements, these issues turned out to be clearly irrelevant to causation. But even if we relegate the issues to the semantic level, this alternative is also incoherent thus: it invites us to countenance the existence of causally efficacious items, their specific form and function, irrespective of our ability to form any judgments about them; but recall that this line of thought does not separate events from their features since what causes an event to occur it causes it to occur with all its features (and similarly for the cause-event). Hence the incoherence: on the one hand, events are not ontologically differentiated from their special features when they enter into cause-effect relations with one another; on the other, these features are asserted as the causally responsible elements, i.e. they bring about these causal relations between the events. So given that this view does not allow explanation to interfere with causation at the ground level - since the latter resides in a realm uncontaminated by judgement - it follows that at this level events occur both differentiated and undifferentiated from their specific, causally efficacious features.
We are led to conclude from this series of arguments that the questions of extensionality and emphasis on events' special features blocks the separation of causation from explanation. This will enable us to gain a clearer perspective from which to view the aims of the explanatory enterprise as interrelated with ontological beliefs both in the domains of natural science and of social theory. The implications in the former case can be briefly seen in the following manner. Getting our cue from an illuminating paper by G. Schurz, we may present the notion of explanation in two, rather heterogenous ways: either explanation has to be defined in the precise form of a rigorous logical argument which has to meet certain conditions of correctness (of a purely formal character); for instance, both historically and from within the logical positivist canon the D-N model is such a candidate. Or, explanation can be taken in an intuitive manner as a specific piece of knowledge/information-enhancing, which makes us understand why something is the case. Built into the rationale of the D-N model is the view of explanation/prediction symmetry. The latter is inevitable since once we acknowledge that, as M. Hollis has crisply described, Humean "(I)nduction is the only coin which buys knowledge beyond the scope of direct observation, (then) Prediction and Explanation have to be two sides of it." (Cf. Chapter III above). But as we have come to realize formally correct D-N arguments can figure only as possible predictions or scientific justifications, but not as explanations. Schurz diagnoses

that the failure so far to find a solution to this problem is due
to the fact that this explanation-prediction asymmetry "conceals two
different things: on the one hand the problem of causality (in a
physical sense), on the other hand the epistemic problems of understanding-
why." Schurz, following Stegmüller et al., asks for a separation of
the two problems for even if a satisfactory additional condition of
causal relevance is offered strengthening the D-N model, it can be
shown that this "will not cover the intuitive characterization of
explanation"¹ in the second sense above. It is in this latter sense
in which we wish to claim that offering an explanation of why two
states of affairs are connected we gain an understanding over and above
mere regularity. To be sure, the why-sense is not the only one available
for we can easily see that 'what' or 'how' questions similarly claim
the status of explanatory notions. In all these, related, intuitive
and general senses understanding involves essentially discriminating
and individuating epistemic routes towards what initially defies our
knowledge; to attain such knowledge we need to devise, among other things,
a selection procedure which would effectively isolate and place the
emphasis upon the special, causally responsible features of a
state of affairs. So given these requirements we must not conclude
that problems of causality are unconnected with those of understanding-
why, etc.; and moreover, difficulties pertaining to the formal
center of the correctness conditions that the D-N model has to
meet should lead us to a re-examination of the underlying ideas of mere
regularities and absence of necessary truths (see Chapter II above);
as well as that which distinguishes between the 'given' and the 'constructed'.

¹. Ibid., pp.322-3.
Returning to the domain of the social, one can appreciate the relevance of the issue of emphasis under discussion. In everyday life-situations we are familiar with the use of pragmatic factors and devices with which we try to achieve communication (e.g., stress, intonation, etc. in the use of language). In the paper I have mentioned, F.Dretske provides an extensive discussion of such semantic phenomena and attempts to account for their epistemological provenance that is my main concern here. He calls "propositional allomorphs" the variant forms a proposition can be given depending on which component of the respective sentence stress or emphasis is placed on. Analogously he calls "allomorphic sensitive contexts" any larger statement containing such allomorphic sentences and whose truth depends on them. Thus we are asked to reflect on what is their defining property or peculiarity that makes us characterize some contexts as sensitive to the embedded stresses (and select between them). Furthermore, we wish to find what if anything in the external world is that which a 'propositional allomorph' refers to.

The question of extensionality thus crops up. When we obtain the gerundive nominalizations of two allomorphs, are we to say that they refer to the same event, change in the state of affairs, or to different ones? Some contexts appear quite clearly to be extensional under the usual interpretation given in the previous section: for example, the temporal ones employing 'before' or 'at the same time as', etc., are unaffected by any other stress on the subject or action verb and the like. Other contexts, however, prominently legal ones, may appear controversial (as to Dretske) but I think they are not extensional unless one assimilates them to causal ones and then tacitly assumes the
latter to be extensional - which obviously begs the question.

Furthermore, such a move would be misleading since not every example of legal or moral responsibility is amenable to explanatory treatment of a single, unitary kind: the importance of emphasis reveals diversity in objects of explanation which is reflected by diversity in modes of explanation, i.e. by focusing on what exactly is being explained; this, incidentally, provides a further justification for taking events to be entities on which properties can be predicated - as I maintain throughout this Part.¹

Now, Dretske's thesis is that when a different "propositional allomorph" is inserted in an "allomorphic sensitive context" it makes a different causal claim.² Although he concedes that he cannot show that all "allomorphic sensitive contexts" are ultimately causal in character, he wants to suggest that "the most prominent ones appear to be causal."³ Thus directing his approach squarely within causal contexts and holding that the latter are extensional, Dretske advances the following thesis: different "propositional allomorphs" refer to quite different allomorphic events (i.e. their worldly counterparts) and that this difference "manifests itself when we begin to talk about the causal relatedness of these items."⁴ Disregarding his unquestioned insistence about the extensionality of causal contexts I want to pursue his other point by exploring some examples which I believe reveal the form in which causation and explanation

3. Ibid., p.377: his examples are epistemic, psychological, etc.
4. Ibid., p.376.
are interrelated, a reassessment of the view that causality must be extensional because not mind- or explanation-dependent, and finally, a further specification of the holistic thesis proposed here.

Consider the following political example. Suppose that a certain coalition government introduces a number of economic measures of austerity a few months just after the elections. Suppose also that the content and target of these measures were clearly at odds with both the spirit and the avowed declarations of the leading party in the coalition during its electoral campaign and that its implementing such a policy caused the minority party of the coalition to become openly dissatisfied and led it finally to withdraw its support and its own ministers from the government. We can assume, for instance, that the new measures were taken without the prior consent of the other party or in defiance of its explicitly contrary position on the matter, i.e., to the effect that the measures would have undesirable political consequences if taken so early on. Now, one could plausibly maintain that the following identity concerning the events just described (obtained in a nominalized form).

The government's imposition of the economic measures of austerity at t = The government's imposition of the economic measures of austerity (where 't' stands for 'just after the elections' and for brevity by government' I mean the leading party) can be legitimately held on the belief that the above two expressions refer to the same state of affairs; and that the second is only a truncated description omitting the time-parameter. But it becomes clear that once we take the whole political context into our view the specification of time makes a lot of difference. Given the assumption, in our example, it is precisely this time-element which
is causally responsible for the dissatisfaction and subsequent resignations. This much is, I believe, quite obvious.

By now consider the following reply offered by someone who takes causal contexts to be transparent, meeting the relevant criteria of extensionality, and is also persuaded that the above identity is valid. He might argue that we are here conflating two separate issues. The government's imposition of the measures \textit{caused} the resignations, \textit{simpliciter}. Whether this is a satisfactory explanation (which he would admit is not) is a different matter altogether. This reply allows us to separate the two contexts and have true causal attributions (i.e. the resignations, for instance, were not in fact caused by something else), without being able to answer questions of the 'explain-why' kind. I think this reply is wrong and my contention is based on the arguments I presented above in a general fashion with respect to all those positions which picture the extensinality of causal contexts as stemming from an illicit or question-begging dichotomy between language and extralinguistic reality.\footnote{On p.376 of his paper Dretske gives another rejoinder I do not agree with.} In the more specific case at hand, or any other similar in form, these positions could be translated as asserting the following analogous dichotomy: the event which functions as cause remains the same irrespective of the predications of time or place or manner (i.e. the special features), whilst its occurring with these features makes a difference to explanatory purposes - and similarly for the effect-event. But apart from the resulting general conceptual puzzles argued previously, this line of thought takes the occurrence of the effect-event in our example...
as the result of a certain cause-event (i.e. a certain \(e\) which passes the tests of extensionality since it remains the same once all kinds of predications on \(e\), its special features, are assumed not to affect its identity). At the same time this line of thought takes the occurrence of the same effect-event to be explained as the result of a different entity, that is, the special features of the cause-event.

Thus if the effect-event in our example was brought about by a certain change in the states of affairs in that the latter exhibited one or more crucial aspects as causally efficacious (e.g., timing, electoral pledges, etc.), it would then be contradictory to hold both that (a) these constitutive properties of the cause event were responsible for triggering off the ministers' resignations; and (b) the truth of the causal statement itself remains unaffected whether we construe these features of the cause-event as constitutive properties (as I maintain following Kim's terminology) or just as mere additional bits of information which would simply help one (the receiver, say, of our explanation) to correctly identify which particular event we are talking about. This is contradictory for the following reason. If it is no more than a matter of information in the latter sense, then we implicitly presuppose that the cause-event can be given a description such that - without any mention of these allegedly merely individuating characteristics - by this description, only what is on its own (i.e. independently of these characteristics) indispensable from the explanatory point of view is referred to. This means that if our imaginary audience already knows which event we are trying to explain, then the only requirement upon us would be to
procure a description of this cause-event, a description that would specify the actual configuration of the political circumstances. Such a description alone will do the explaining (understanding—why or —how). The description will be, ex hypothesi, a complete identification and hence 'true-to-the-facts'. But being complete implies that these descriptive sentences used are closed under causality; which means that the relevant causally efficacious elements are included in them as constituents and not as components. Hence the contradiction which the reply to my example above would lead us to.

If it is thought that the example used is somewhat artificial, it seems to me that the same kind of considerations can be applicable to real cases. For instance, I have found two examples discussed by G.W.Runciman, one of political history and one of political sociology, in which the reconstruction of the causal sequence of the events we are interested in, gives us an opportunity to assess the limitations of the extensionalist thesis. I cannot reproduce the examples here because it would take me too far afield.

The above considerations and general arguments of the present section were offered with the intention of blocking the thesis that causal contexts are extensional and thereby clarifying some further issues related to the ontology of events on the one hand, and on the other to strengthen the ideas I proposed with respect to the historical-narrative association of events.

Finally, a recent resurgence of the notion of supervenience applicable to events and properties must be mentioned but albeit briefly since having studied the relevant literature closely it does not seem to me that any profound insight in the philosophy of social sciences is to be gained. The notion of supervenience goes back, as is well known, to, at least, G.E. Moore and (more recently) R.M. Hare's theories of ethics; contemporary applications of it are to be found in discussions about the mind/body problem, the issue of aesthetic qualities, and even in some views about quantum mechanics. In the social sciences I know of only two cases of such an application, one rather cursory invocation of the notion by P. Pettit in almost all his writings (see bibliography), and one rather more detailed one put forward by G. Currie.  

Writings in the field of supervenience relations between events or properties - or more compactly of facts or truths about a particular segment of reality in relation to another - primarily focus on the non-reductive relation between the strictly material and the non-physical. In fact, the notion is designed to cover these cases. To the extent that individualists do not wish to claim that the social is to be reduced to the physical (e.g. brain states), it follows that there is no need for supervenience thesis to be employed as paving

2. A pivotal paper in this discussion stressing the two basic (distinct) theses of physical materialism ('physical determination' and 'physical exhaustion') is: G. Hellman and F. Thomson, 'Physicalism: Ontology, Determination and Reduction', J. of Phil., LXXII (1975), 551-64.
3. See the papers in T. Horgan (ed.), Supervenience, South J. Phil. Supp. Vol. XXII (1984). The general consensus is that a social property, e.g. a monetary one, is irreducible to its physical instantiations.
a middle course between eliminative reductionism and determination on the one hand, and outright 'independence' of social entities (substances, properties, events) from facts about the individual. Here we come to the crux of the matter since Currie, for instance, claims that although certain holist theses are retained, e.g., the irreducibility of social concepts to individualistic ones, the application of the former concepts is highly sensitive to that of the latter (and never vice-versa). That is, according to 'global supervenience', two possible worlds are indistinguishable with respect to social states of affairs (i.e. relations (in each one) between social institutions, how social concepts are applied, etc.), as long as these worlds are absolutely indistinguishable with respect to what individuals in them are doing, thinking, desiring, saying, etc.

I find this whole approach question-begging because it is assumed without argument that an individual's belief about social matters, employing social concepts, is to be clearly distinguished as a non-social fact. And since supervenience is supposed to be a metaphysical issue the above needs justification. I tried to show in Part Two that as a metaphysical issue these are not non-social 'facts about individuals'.

In addition, with respect to truths about Parmenidean-particulars' social properties, it is clear that such truths do not supervene on non-social ones. In fact, more generally, in the social, as well as in the aesthetic, ethical, etc. spheres, the relevant properties are relational and cannot supervene on non-relational. As I said in

Chapter I some inherent properties are, from the formal point of view, relational.¹ Finally social properties enter into a hierarchical nexus of relations with other social properties, that is, we can construe them as higher-order properties and in this respect supervenience cannot take us from the individual to the social level (even if the individual level is accepted for the sake of argument to be thus separable).

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¹ See for a similar claim in a different context: P. Teller, 'Relational Holism and Quantum Mechanics', Phil. of Sci., 37 (1986), 71-81. I thank Prof. Teller for sending me a draft of his work on inherent relations in physics. I also thank Prof. J. Levinson for kindly discussing my comments on a paper of his, which helped me to clarify some points on supervenience.
CONCLUSION

In concluding this Part I would like to start with a concise review of the main points of the closing chapter.

I should underline first what the two major issues showed: The discussion why events cannot move showed that the ontological status of events is irreducible to their constituent-subjects (individual agents or social groups, etc). The issue of temporality in "historical associations" (i.e. intensional causality) showed that the constituent-social properties of events cannot be eliminated or reduced to, or be supervenient upon supposed non-social ones. These two, then, are the major results.

A. The points involved in these results were: (1) First, in sections 2 and 3 I gave semantic reasons for holding that events are complex rather than compound states of affairs: this played a crucial role in the last section 6 in explaining how events connect with each other. This point about complexity was linked to the distinction between the agents' actions and the event as a whole; it also required that 'external' event-predication is not a mereological piece of events. (2) Second, in section 4 I proposed that social theory should recognize certain complex events as social phenomena (on a par with social institutions) which are not aggregates of single events. (3) Related to these points was the further confirmation that no event has spatial parts (dimensions) in the way material things or a musical group in performance do and hence events not only cannot be assimilated to material particulars (a view criticised in Chap. VII) but also events, having distinct properties from groups or individuals that participate in them, cannot be logically reduced to their constituent-subjects.
B. I then proposed the syntagma/paradigma model which introduced, in what I think was a most rewarding manner, the intensional aspect of the structure of events. I argued that this arises out of the temporal placement of social events in history. The main thesis I argued for was that: the intensional features of the structure of events, revealed by the relevant generic properties, determine the mode in which social events enter into the causal inter-actions conveyed by historical discourse. The latter, as far as our topic is concerned, has the logical form of "sentences of narrative associations" which depict social events with reference to other social entities and events from a diachronic point of view. When such "sentences" describe certain formal interrelations between events that I indicated, the modal condition of these "associations" points to the conceptual links between the properties of the events that are thus related. This required, as I tried to establish, that the causal interconnection we are concerned with be determined by these conceptual links and as such it cannot be construed as extensional. Thus in the last section I argued at length against the extensionalist view of causal language. My strategy was to approach the problem from two complementary angles; so I offered two clusters of arguments, designated as subsections (I) and (II) in the text. The basic idea put forward was that causality is related to explanation and the latter, in turn, is mind-dependent or theoretical language-dependent. The first subsection examined this from a logical point of view in two stages. The second subsection provided philosophical arguments, also in two stages. Finally, this defence of the main thesis, i.e. that the constituent social properties of events cannot be eliminable or
supervenient upon non-social ones ended with a brief discussion criticizing the applicability of the idea of supervenience to our case.

The extensionalist view of causal language, against which I defended my thesis, would rule out events as anything but extra-linguistic data or uninterpreted facts of so-called objective reality (cf. Chap. VII, sct. 4; and Appendix). But it is precisely such an extensionalist model of social ontology which is being replaced by holist formal ontology throughout this dissertation. With respect to social events, in particular, holism construes them as exemplifications of social properties. The conclusion reached was that: the analysis of the spatio-temporal identity conditions specifying social events showed that they are distinct from any non-social, singular action (or from an aggregate thereof); this led to the main thesis that relations between events in historical time are instantiations of a grid of intensional links between the properties exemplified by them: this is what the syntagma/paradigma model and the idea of historical narratives capture. In this respect it was crucial to realize that the so-called 'special features' of events are not ontologically separate.

All these points indicated a major difference between social and natural events: this is what can be called the "open-ended" characterization of social states of affairs. This was a direct consequence of the semantic proposals of mine together with the idea of past-entailing concepts: it was shown how the specification of a social event can alter through time as a result of certain acquired properties (sct. 5, last Chap.).
It follows that (1) the theory of events presented here provides the grounds for accepting the idea that from the temporal point of view the social world cannot be constituted as unified as long as states of affairs are construed as epeisodic segments. It follows further that (2) this Part's discussion serves as a supporting framework for the traditional holist claim in favour of the reality of social wholes and of their identity through change (cf. main Introduction). This is seen once we take such social entities to be constituent-subjects of events and go on to apply to this case the results with respect to the irreducibility of events to their subjects, the role of past-entailing concepts, as well as the thesis entailed by the intensional view of causality to the effect that the individuation and identification of a social event is possible only by means of its relatedness to others.

Finally, (3) this last point explicitly refers us back to the basic principles of the formal mode introduced at the start of Chapter I and pursued throughout. My analysis disclosed also (4) the applicability of the Moment/Whole foundation relations in the case of complex social events. Further, (5) as I indicated in the course of the discussion, the thrust of this Part's argument is in congruence with the ideas concerning the validity of theory-claims (Chapter II); it is also a manifestation of the requirement that the integration of the ontological statements about social entities, such as events, with those about the individual as a person must itself be an element of the holist theory (Chapter III).
APPENDIX

AN EPISTEMIC PARADOX

Consider the following statement made by R. Aron:

"It can no doubt be maintained, in the spirit of philosophical exactness, that every historical fact is a construct, and that it therefore implies selection and interpretation. But, when applied, these distinctions (facts vs. interpretations) preserve their full implications. It is either true or false that Trotsky played a considerable role in organizing the Red Army; it is either true or false that Zinoviev or Bukharin plotted the assassination of Stalin.... Every totalitarian state exaggerates, to the point of absurdity, the link between fact and interpretation."

We may paraphrase Aron's point as follows: in actual politics, when the truth-conditional element (truth or falsehood) that differentiates a fact from an interpretation is completely obliterated, then the upshot would be a situation in which force becomes the only way of carrying one's views. The paradoxical nature of this conclusion rests on the idea that, once facts collapse into nothing but interpretations and indeed to any one event there correspond more than one equally plausible interpretations, then it needs only one more step for those who wield political power to select and impose a single interpretation. This means that in order to understand the logic of this use of force we must first realize that it is precisely generated by the very idea which it purports to eliminate: namely, the idea that there is no distinction between a fact and its interpretation.

But then the ensuing plurality of voices and freedom of opinion is stifled on the grounds that a particular event is given only one interpretation. If facts did not need any understanding, that is, if

they were self-evident and transparent (i.e. when their inner constitution was in public space and in full view), force would be unnecessary. Thus a conception of facts which starts with this distinction ends up, in the political context of totalitarian ideology, by annihilating this distinction and thus being at odds with the initial conception.

This paradox which I am claiming lurks behind the logic (i.e. its rationale) of the use of such force at the political level can also be viewed from a different angle. The political manifestation of totalitarian suppression is underwritten by more basic and rather traditional epistemological issues. In particular, what Aron considers as the danger resulting from a refusal to accept the legitimation of rival accounts, etc., can also be seen as the upshot of a dogmatic strategy par excellence whereby a two-fold attitude ensures the political use of such force: on the one hand, only the holders of political power are entitled to make claims to knowledge in general; and on the other such knowledge claims are taken to imply strict incorrigibility.

It is significant to realize that the second of these two steps is the more important one since it is responsible for the generation of the same paradox, this time not on the political level, but on the epistemological one. From the logical point of view such an extremely strong constrain on the notion of knowledge that a dogmatist needs in order to justify the use of force stems from precisely his own opponent, that is the sceptic. It is the latter who both historically and logically has put forward the challenge in this particular form: namely, that genuine knowledge is unattainable because
knowledge presupposes incorrigibility; and the latter is always, in principle, impossible to guarantee.

Thus we arrive at the point at which Aron's fear that force would be used to impose only one interpretation acquires its analogue in the conviction of the total elimination of error. The two sides of the paradox are thus generated, respectively, by the logic of political force and of epistemic error.

To illustrate the latter one could use the following words of Dewey's (who was of course advancing a pragmatic solution to the total factual sceptic's problem):

"That which satisfactorily terminates inquiry is, by definition, knowledge; it is knowledge because it is the appropriate close of the inquiry." (1)

One of the arguments that the factual sceptic puts forward is the so called "No Correction" Argument, usually given as an instance of the following schema:

I. In order to claim that genuine knowledge has been attained every circumstance of a possibility of error must have been eliminated.

II. But the possibilities of error can never be eliminated totally and completely in the domain of factual claims.

Ergo: Genuine knowledge cannot be attained in the factual domain. 2

1. John Dewey, Logic: The Theory of Inquiry, N.York, 1938, p.8. quoted in Nicholas Rescher, Scepticism (Oxford, Blackwell, 1980), p.113; the following paragraph's sketch of this type of scepticism is taken from chap.III of this book where a comprehensive survey of the history of this issue can be found.

2. See Rescher, ibid., chap.VI, for those who current hold such a view.
Several kinds of refutations can and have been given to this argument; my concern however is different for I want to show that the rationale of the use of political force is intimately linked to this "No Correction" Argument.

Thus what the paradox amounts to can be seen if we concentrate on premiss I above. The totalitarian imposition of a single interpretation or account of a state of affairs is based on the conflation of facts with interpretations. This implies that the proffered account is tantamount to genuine knowledge because every circumstance of possible error has been - so it is claimed - eliminated. But the latter itself further implies that there might have been such a possibility of error. This, however, is equivalent to acknowledging the possibility of constructing alternative and thus false accounts. But this proves, contrary to the initial assumption or contention, that facts are not to be conflated with interpretations: reductio ad absurdum. ¹

Hence a dogmatic attitude, in order to justify its political upshot, must borrow premiss I above, from the sceptic (who is vying precisely against such a dogmatism). This means that a totalitarian as described by Aron has to make use of a very strong presupposition with respect to the definition of knowledge. Such a condition, however, undermines the prior assumption or independent result that states of affairs exist only qua interpretations. The additional step consists in,

¹ This may be viewed on a par with self-refuting positions that the reality of time or of evil is an illusion: cf. M. Dummett, 'A Defence of McTaggart's Proof of the 'Unreality of Time', in Truth and Other Enigmas, at p. 356.
as I mentioned above, the forceful imposition of this single interpretation. For if my argument is sound, the proffered conflation of states of affairs with their accounts (descriptions plus evaluations) entails the conclusion that: since a political event’s truth conditions (out there in the real world) are nothing over and above what is expressed by their linguistic descriptions (i.e. the referents thereof), then it follows that there can be only one interpretation or account.

The dogmatist, of course, being committed to absolute infallibility would require in addition that the evidential guarantee for such total certainty encompasses every reason to think that further evidence will never alter the interpretation given. That is to say, future developments will, in principle, never falsify it (which again leads to more forceful imposition). But it is quite interesting to examine again here the epistemological contention that tacitly underwrites it. Certainty at one level (generated by the stringent condition of premiss I with the attendant paradox I brought out) needs an additional condition of certainty at the second level: viz., that the dogmatic attitude I am here investigating has to satisfy the following thesis:

knowing entails knowing that one knows.

In symbols this thesis is commonly rendered as:

(K)  
\[ Kxp \rightarrow KxKxp \]

[where "Kxp" reads "x knows that p" and '→' is "entails"]

1. In Knowledge and Belief (Ithaca, Cornell U.P., 1962), chap.5, J. Hintikka argues that KK is virtually equivalent to K but he is there concerned with the semantics of 'to know' and not with the problem of justifiability of knowledge as an epistemic issue I am dealing with here.
Now the problem here is that this thesis (K) is shared by some opponents of a dogmatic definition of truth, that is, by those who espouse certain fallibilist accounts of factual knowledge. But such accounts can avoid the charge of having enmeshed our human knowledge claims in dogmatism in the following way.¹ A pragmatic or "effective" fallibilist does not hold that the person who maintains that there is adequate rational warrant for holding that p is known (for certain, etc.) thereby asserts that it is known to be known. The inference:

x has adequate rational warrant for accepting "I know that p"
(or "It is certain that p")

∴ x knows that "I know that p" (or "It is certain that p")
is not accepted as valid by someone for whom even an adequately warranted claim to knowledge may in the end have to be altogether withdrawn or partially altered. Such a fallibilistic position admits only that it is a sufficient and rational justification to hold KxKxp; it does not follow that KxKxp must be true.

Although this is a sound defence of a fallibilist thesis and although it further avoids the unwanted consequence of infinite regress,² it is I think unnecessary. For someone who construes knowledge claims on the basis of sufficient conditions of rational assertibility does not need to hold thesis (K) in addition. This is because only one kind of inference is needed in order to eschew dogmatism: namely, that one is aware of the conditions of assertibility for p. Due to such a characterization of knowledge claims, one asserts only that one is justified in believing p, that is, one is hereby

1. Taken from Rescher, op.cit., p.118.
2. See ibid., p.117, n.43.
presenting one's reasons for believing that \( p \). So within this framework the 'logic' of knowledge is already reflexive in character and thus thesis (K) is redundant. By construing the claims to knowledge in the manner of sufficient and rational warrants of assertibility we are focusing on the epistemic aspect (the reasons or justifications for our belief that \( p \)) and not on the truth of \( p \) as such. But such a construal or 'grammar' of the concept of knowledge precludes ab initio any question arising with respect to the dogmatism engendered by an absolutist reading of thesis (K). And therefore a fallibilistic position of this sort does not need to justify itself against such a possibility inherent in (K).

In contrast to this a position which cannot tolerate such a fallibilist framework is perforce in need of thesis (K). My criticism above with regard to one version of fallibilist knowledge (e.g., Rescher's) was meant to show that, if my argumentation is sound, the reflexivity trait that I pointed to above is by definition excluded from a non-fallibilist characterization of knowledge claims. For if one holds that premiss I of "No Correction" Argument as given above is required in order to attain knowledge, then one must also hold thesis (K). The latter is an additional requirement which provides the closure of knowledge claims under certainty.\(^1\) A totalitarian situation demands a justification for the imposed certainty of the first level. And such a justification must be obtained from without because, in contraposition to fallibilism as previously argued, in the totalitarian case we have a different 'logic' of the concept 'to know'. Because the

ground-level knowledge is supposed to be (i.e. is imposed as) incorrigible it might be argued that it necessarily follows from this that:

Strengthened Thesis (K') \[ Kxp \rightarrow \Box KxKxp \]

from which follows:

\[ \Box \neg KxKxp \rightarrow \neg Kxp \]

But the latter is an unacceptable conclusion for an incorrigibilist position such as the one we are exploring. For it subverts its very rationale.

Therefore to avoid this we need instead the form:

\[ \Box (Kxp \rightarrow KxKxp) \]

This is in fact what a non-fallibilistic position requires. It amounts to saying that the epistemological counterpart of a totalitarian state of affairs generates certainty at the next to the ground-level. In this case infinite regress is also avoided albeit at the political level of forceful imposition.

It would be a mistake, however, to think that in the real world of government only such a use of force guarantees success. My discussion of the epistemological side of this issue shows, I believe, that the requirement of thesis (K) is sufficient in itself in providing the legitimating basis for the belief in a single interpretation of an event. In fact I think that it is precisely when thesis (K) is neglected that Aron's fear is justified with respect to the rise of force. When, unlike a fallibilistic framework as above, one gives an absolute characterization of the conditions of knowledge one thereby claims, when asserting that p, that all possible errors have been eliminated: this is premiss I above.
But in order to avoid the sceptic's conclusion which would follow had premiss II been accepted as well, our non-fallibilist must rescue his position (conflation of facts with interpretations) by denying premiss II. And this is the move which brings us to the additional requirement conveyed by thesis (K).
CONCLUSION

I wish to commence the conclusion of this study by restating what I have emphasized in the Introduction as being the key idea through which the argument of the thesis should be interpreted and assessed. This is the claim that: the distinctive mark of the proposed novel conception of social holism is that it posits the metaphysical problem as to what kind of ontological domain the social world is possible to be. I have made clear that the precise formulation of this foundational question—that was my task to examine—was: how is it possible that the social world is constituted as a unified totality or complex whole? Thus I stressed that my inquiries were confined to demonstrating no more than that this re-orientation of the philosophy of holism can be meaningful as guaranteeing the phrasing of this primary question in terms of conditions of possibility.

Now, I explained at various points that putting the matter like this is a more or less classic expression of what is known as the transcendental turn. In our case I tried to show in particular that this thesis' attempt to present a holist discourse which can articulate this metaphysical problem (and lay down its conditions of legitimacy) was, equivalently, an attempt to offer an answer to our precise ontological question. This answer has been what I called formal ontology: that is, the kind of domain the social world is possible to be.
In this respect I made clear right from the outset that the object of holism is the "social world" the meaning of which is entailed by the essential property of 'being a unified totality or complex whole'. The latter, I pointed out, is not assumed but determined in the course of inquiring into the preconditions of formal ontology. And I argued for the precise manner in which such considerations involve the underlying Moment/Whole problematic.

I have tried to show how the formal mode establishes that the social world is not composed, or comes to existence, part by part. Furthermore, it was shown that such a whole does not exhibit what is known as "homoeomereity" which would have implied that any qualities true of the whole persist in any subdivision of the whole. I have argued against such a view of social reality both in the course of the formal considerations of the opening Chapter, and with respect to the individual as a person and the moment/whole features of social events.

In this connexion, we should remind ourselves of an important historical point Jaeger made: namely, that originally the notion of 'ordered whole' or 'cosmos' had as its proper domain of application the socio-political life; it was then projected to nature and subsequently brought (as if it were adopted) to bear upon socially organized existence. On the other hand, however, we should not confuse the aim of holism presented here with any conservative political connotations from which I kept a distance. But what is more, the transcendental point of view is in its anti-empiricist sense inherently critical. This was
explicitly stated in discussing the metatheoretical legitimation of holism in Chapters II and III, as well as in the conclusion of Chapter IV (i.e. section 7) where I registered the link with Habermas' view about the repudiation of the primacy of methodology which arises out of positivist presuppositions. As I had asserted at the very start of this study, a crucial condition demonstrated has been that our philosophical standpoint must make room for holist categories that are not trapped within an individualism/holism dichotomy already framed by individualist presuppositions.

Therefore, given this key idea about the aim of this thesis, the thrust of the argument has been as follows. According to holist formal ontology, the constitution of the social world as a unified totality or complex whole requires as conditions for its possibility:

(a) the specific formal principles and relations together with the metatheoretical framework, extracted in Part One;

(b) the category of the individual as an intellectually active social person in conceptual communication, formulated in Part Two; and

(c) the particular ontological status of social events put forward in Part Three.

In the Introduction I explained in detail how this threefold idea arises out of the motivating rationale of the thesis as consecutive steps of the argument pursued in this dissertation. I have also given at the end of each Chapter and Part a complete account of what was being accomplished at each stage and its bearing on the rest of the thesis.
Here I shall assume a spherical viewpoint and ascertain the results of the thesis I have been arguing for throughout.

The principal idea one should appreciate has been that in trying to represent the ontological constitution of a domain such as the social world, which exhibits 'part/whole' relations, the extensional model (in all its aspects) must be repudiated. This demanded that we should break away from the impression that the basic doctrines of individualism and holism, with reference to the part/whole problematic, are simply antithetical. This, in turn, involved both a radical reconsideration of the relevant part/whole relations and, in connection to this, the acceptance of a transcendental philosophical anthropology characteristic of the proposed holist categories. This was necessitated not only by the demand to criticize traditional individualist reductionist claims but, in addition, by the concern to avoid certain logical problems that were seen to threaten the viability of the holist enterprise (vid., the problem of impredicative totalities and the related antinomies). What is more, I showed why the one idea, viz. the recasting of the part/whole relations, involves the other, viz. the introduction of the idea of a priori necessity required by the transcendental validation of a holist theory of social reality.

In spelling out the formal mode I started with its two foundational principles of non-extensional individuation and non-causal identification: they required that certain kinds of relations be inherent to the ontological status of the basic types of the world's constituent elements.
This idea of relationality led, after a critical examination of further issues, to the conclusion that we should cease thinking of parts as pieces altogether and that we should adopt the theory of "moments". By stressing the notion of 'foundation relations' as logically prior to that of 'whole', this theory symbolizes the basic trend of my argument: namely, that the overthrow of the mereological model (together with its corresponding empiricist convictions about the reducibility of social wholes) requires that the meaning of the terms 'part-qua-moment' and 'whole' is entailed by the various formal relations discussed in this study as characteristic of a unified social ontology. In particular, I made clear that this theory of moments and the associated two principles are applicable to all those instances that exemplify the individual/social relation. That is, we encountered the idea of moment/whole relation both in the case of the ontological structure of events and in that of the individual's intellectual activity. In the former, I showed how the social subject (either as an individual or a social whole) of an event is not a piece but an integral moment of it. And further, I argued that events themselves must not be construed as autonomous mereological parts of a series thereof but as moments of "historical narrative associations". That was the one type of results concerning social events from the viewpoint of the recasting of the part/whole problematic. Before going into the other type of results about social events, I shall dwell on the second major instance of the re-interpretation of the problematic and, consequently, of the individual/social relation.
This other major instance exemplifying the moment/whole relation has been the analysis of the individual mind. The first idea to be stressed again is that within the non-extensional framework we should cease representing the individual as a mere "member of social sets" and argue, instead, that the individual should be posited (i.e. as a transcendental requirement) as an entelechial Leibnizian monad. What this notion serves to convey is that the individual is 'non-atomic' in the precise sense of being (a) non-repeatable within a non-mechanical nexus of relations, and (b) a non-solipsistic self in conceptual correlation with each other. This latter is what the idea of entelechy signifies. The three essential entelechial properties which constitute the formal L-monad as a social person ensure the breaking away from mechanical causation (between the so-called social environment and the human mind) and its replacement by teleological (entelechial) mental activity. And it may be remarked that my focusing on the mind's teleological action can be seen (as a subject for further research) in connexion with the much discussed topic of human action in general. These essential entelechial properties of the mind explain how we should understand that what I called the social field is not modeled on extensional divisibility into simple atoms - the latter being isolated individual mental contents.

Thus our metaphysical question which gives meaning to holism was at that stage formulated as: 'How is it possible for individuals to think at all?'. It should be noted that this was originally introduced by the initial formal principles and that it received full treatment in
Part Two. The notion of social person was my proposed access to it. I argued that the issue of how meaning is possible must be the pivotal point of this matter. It can be assessed that this proved to be the kernel of the idea of entelechy. It was thus discussed with respect to: first, the justification-conditions of social practices, beliefs, etc by means of special concepts; second, the repudiation of so-called mental 'private items'; and third, the relation between a thought and the public object or state of affairs intended (phenomenologically) by that thought. These corresponded, respectively, to the three entelechial factors at issue. The upshot of this discussion has been that meanings are not enclosed by boundaries within each individual mind: that is, that it is wrong to expect meanings to be 'placed' somewhere for that matter. In this particular sense, it was demonstrated that we must not assume so-called individual facts which are autonomous to social facts: this would beg the question in the first place. This is what I discussed in the Introduction and in the text as the untenable idea of a "cement".

Equivalently, social reality should not be construed as an empty space into which we place atomic individuals since the teleological/entelechial constitution of the mind ensures that human beings are actively engaged in producing and changing social reality. And it may be remarked that my discussion of the constitution of the individual as a social person in virtue of these mental-linguistic possibility-conditions can be included within the history of that philosophical trend which emphasized the importance of language in transposing men
into what is known as socialized existence - though I should repeat that my formal approach differs significantly from linguistic naturalism. Thus I tried to steer a different course (in Part Two) in order to show how it is possible that the individual mind purged from those views about the priority of 'mental private objects' can be in harmony with an interpersonal world of Leibnizian entelechies. The discussion at that stage proposed that the categories 'individual' and 'social' converge within the notion of social person. The result reached was that, from the point of view of the possibility of a formally unified social world, the 'social', far from being represented as a set of entities, was shown to be the expression of the possibility of the conceptual correlation of Leibnizian individuals-qua-social persons.

I have so far retraced what the thesis of this dissertation has accomplished by throwing into relief the basis of the formal approach and its recasting of the underlying part/whole problematic; I have then considered the latter's specific exemplification both in the case of social events, and with respect to its 'individual vs. social' expression. However, the discussion of the ontological status of social events proved to be an indispensable stage of the central thesis pursued by this study. So I shall now turn my concluding assessment to this.

The first thing I must draw attention to is that the theory of events provides our thesis on the unified constitution of the social world with a temporal point of view. That is, it offers the means by which holism can posit the dynamic cohesiveness or identity through
change of the social world. Now, my point of departure has been that the proposed non-atomic conception of our universe of discourse invites us to enrich our theory's semantics with the notion of social events. I have shown, in the first place, that social events are indispensable holistic entities which was wrong to neglect (as the debate in the past had done), and I have stated in detail (in Part Three) their moment/whole features. In this respect, I have argued that social events are not reducible either to their constituent-subjects or to any aggregate of singular actions that may comprise them. But, given these points, I showed that the most crucial service of the discussion was that it has been a fruitful access towards the introduction of social properties.

My inquiries furnished a considerable initial ground on which to pursue further the topic of social properties. For my purposes, I believe that the results reached at were sufficient. Putting the matter in simple terms, the main point here has been that: dealing with the identity-conditions of social events (in order to specify their reality) we arrive at the issue of their involvement in "historical narrative associations": this - enriched by the syntagma/paradigma model I proposed - brings forth the idea that the interconnection of social events is a realization of relations between the generic social properties exemplified by these events; thus we appreciate the sense in which properties are ineliminable. But I needed to demonstrate, further, that the causal contexts in which events enter must be conveyed by an intensional idiom since it has to capture these intensional links just mentioned. I argued that this is what my syntagma/paradigma model
signifies. Now, the defended intensional idiom was not only strongly supported by the epistemological outlook that has superseded positivism (and was thus in congruence with the metatheoretical validation of holism argued for in Part One); but it was, also, superior to the much favoured extensional idiom because it incorporates the role of properties in 'narrative sentences' into a more comprehensive framework which abolishes the untenable separation between events supposed to be extensional particulars and their so-called special features (examined at the end of Part Three). Of these latter I focused on that of the 'timing of events' which was crucial and most appropriate to my discussion of the temporal identity-conditions of events.

It may be succinctly stated that the examination of the issue of social events as an integral moment of holism has enabled us to move beyond the initial problem of the variable polyadicity of verbs of action and take considerable steps in reaching the idea of historical narratives. The special complex form of such events together with the relevant semantic points that are incorporated into the holist discourse make precise the sense in which an event-dense social ontology is an instance of the non-extensionally/non-atomically dissectable conception of it that is required for the possibility of its being a formally unified social world - this being the thesis pursued.

In conclusion, as I made clear right from the start, the task I set myself in this study has been to offer the preconditions of a novel conception of ontological holism. I have maintained in particular that
the thesis argued for in this dissertation must be recognized as the core of a general theory of social holism. In this sense, I tried to bring forth the significance of a certain philosophical problematic which in the past had been trapped within a methodological debate that is agreed to have reached an impasse. My conviction is that this and other closely related areas in the sciences of man should not be considered as marginal to philosophy. Reflecting on the mainstream analytical philosophical scene, one could say that some of its central developments, especially in philosophical semantics, the philosophy of mind and the theory of events, should and could be made more significant and richer if an active engagement with questions of social theory were not officially divorced from what is accepted as the 'proper' subject matter of philosophy. My intention is the present thesis to be a contribution towards such a reconsideration of attitudes.

Finally, besides what I have mentioned above, I suggest that further fields of research bearing upon the topic of this thesis are the problem of personal identity and a modern retrospection on the history of the idea of 'the political and the social'.

In conclusion, therefore, the unequivocal result of the specific thesis investigated is that: the proposed conception of holism as a metaphysics of the social world rests on expressing the possibility of the social world being constituted as a formally unified whole.
REVISED

I. The definitions of extensionality and truth-functionality on p.302 should be corrected as follows: "A linguistic context is extensional if it admits substitution of co-referring singular terms and co-extensive predicates salva veritate. A context is truth-functional if it allows substitution of materially equivalent sentences in it."

II. With regard to sect. 4 of the last Chapter, the following corrections and clarifications should be added (pp.289-96):

(1) First, due to an oversight, the so-called "inference schema" on p.291 is as such invalid. It should be presented as an equivalence (as it is, in fact, in the footnote to that page). This equivalence schema [which may be denoted as (C) for verbal economy] is about the two assertions $p$ (event 'e' is in space) and $q$ (event 'e' can move). This schema is a concise picture of the epistemic priority (under discussion) between $p$ and $q$; it is by no means one about entailment relations between propositions. Thus the symbol $\circ$ is in this case a shorthand for "direction of epistemic priority". (2) The specific role of this equivalence for the purposes of the entire sect.4 is this: having showed that $p$ cannot be a sufficient condition for $q$ (as shown by the example of a political meeting given on pp.290-1), I then wish to add that $p$ is neither a necessary condition for $q$. Now, the link, which is being questioned, between locatability ("in" space) and movability [i.e. the epistemic priority of $p$ to $q$] has as its model the traditional parallel idea of conditional priority (p.291,n.1); the latter is standardly given in the form of an equivalence of necessary and sufficient conditions. Therefore, the link in our case is required to follow the same equivalence (C): (A) $p \circ q = q \circ p$ (B).
Thus by means of this equivalence we make perspicuous what must be pre-supposed by the claim that if events are in space then we are entitled to assert that they may also have the property of movability: what is pre-supposed are the two sides of the equivalence. However, the subsequent discussion reveals that (C)-qua-equivalence does not hold because of the unavailability of (A) and the blocking of (B). So, even if one may wish to avoid any mention of an equivalence schema, the detailed analysis of (A) and (B) remains as it stands since the discussion of each of these brings to light the proposed typology of events and links up with the issue of the temporal modality of events in the rest of the Chapter.

Further, it should be made clear once again that the issue is about event-movability (in relation to their occurring in space), or as I put it "the meaningfulness of the idea of whether an event can be said to move". This issue of the possibility of event-movement falls squarely within a contemporary well-known philosophical literature dealing with this question for three decades [to repeat some of the pioneering work cited already in the text: vid. Smart, Dretske, Davidson, Hacker]. A lot of examples can be found there and are indeed discussed by me (e.g. battles); in addition I gave a series of my own (pp.292-3) which was after all crucial in showing the need for a typology. (5) Now, the general agreement is that events cannot move — and with this I concurred. However, since social holism should avoid a reductionist move usually made here (cf. p.280), my alternative approach supported this same point differently [i.e. via (C)]. Therefore, keeping in mind the issue of the ontological reality of social events, I wished to demonstrate that: for deciding the meaningfulness of event-movability it is neither a sufficient nor a necessary
condition to have asserted (or denied) independently that events are-in-space. Hence the need for a typology. (6) But as it is made explicit on pp.294ff the typologies differ according to whether our starting point is p or q. (7) As to a possible misunderstanding, events not only cannot be movable but, correspondingly, they do not occupy space: i.e., as I wrote, the general agreement is that they do not have spatial dimensions, they are not mereological wholes. Rather, they occur in space.

(8) Finally, it should be stressed again that the very idea of event-movability is inherent to the basic and intuitive notion that events are manifestations of "change of states of affairs" (cf. pp.278-280). And thus "movability" (and its denial) must serve as a starting point in helping us appreciate the sense of such a "change" both as a spatial and as a temporal modality. We are, thus, in a position to extract criteria for the identity and individuation of social events if we are to be clear about their ontological status for holism. In particular, the holistic results reached by means of discussing the problem of movement were, as explained, that: in general, social wholes are not mereological wholes; events are irreducible to their constituent subjects; social phenomena (which resemble social institutions) are not aggregates of single events; and of course the syntagma/paradigm framework (pp.298ff).
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