Journal article
Reasons-sensitivity and degrees of free will
- Abstract:
-
Some actions are free and others are not. But free will also comes in degrees. This paper offers a novel account of degrees of free will, taking as its starting point the idea that an action is free to the extent to which the agent was sensitive, in acting, to reasons for or against performing that action. Though lip service is often paid to the idea that reasons‐sensitivity comes in degrees, however, the details turn out to be harder to pin down than one might initially have thought. I criti...
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- Publication status:
- Published
- Peer review status:
- Peer reviewed
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Authors
Bibliographic Details
- Publisher:
- Wiley Publisher's website
- Journal:
- Philosophy and Phenomenological Research Journal website
- Volume:
- 103
- Issue:
- 3
- Pages:
- 687-709
- Publication date:
- 2020-11-17
- Acceptance date:
- 2020-09-05
- DOI:
- ISSN:
-
0031-8205
Item Description
- Language:
- English
- Keywords:
- Pubs id:
-
1135503
- Local pid:
- pubs:1135503
- Deposit date:
- 2020-09-29
Terms of use
- Copyright holder:
- Alex Kaiserman
- Copyright date:
- 2020
- Rights statement:
- © 2020 The Authors. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research published by Wiley Periodicals LLC on behalf of Philosophy and Phenonmenological Research Inc This is an open access article under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits use, distribution and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.
- Licence:
- CC Attribution (CC BY)
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