On the Standing of States

Latin America in Nineteenth-Century International Society

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ABSTRACT

The present dissertation offers a critical examination of the place accorded to Latin American states in the English School account of the expansion of international society. It pursues two aims. First, the study contributes to understanding the nature and scope of international order, and its historical transformation over the course of the 'long nineteenth century'. Because of the profound impact that European colonization had on the region, the English School has conventionally treated the entry of Latin American states into international society as an unproblematic historical fact achieved with diplomatic recognition in the 1820s. The crucial cases of Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico, however, indicate that more attention needs to the paid to the hierarchical nature of the international order. The central argument of this historical-comparative study posits that the three Latin American states were recognized diplomatically, but they were not regarded as fully-fledged members of the community of 'civilized' states.

Second, the dissertation examines the implications of hierarchy in international politics. Building on a critique of the legal-formalist conception of 'standing' in English School theorizing, three ideal-typical dimensions of international stratification are identified: the distribution of material capabilities (stature), the function states perform in international society (role), and estimations of honour and prestige (status) among states. The interpretative framework sheds light on how agents understand international society, and the way in which they deal with its hierarchical nature. The study analyzes how Latin American elites perceived the standing of their state, and how these perceptions shaped politics through their corresponding 'logics of social action'. The study finds that nineteenth-century elites in Argentina, Mexico, and Brazil conceived of the standing of their states predominantly in terms of status, and demonstrates how these perceptions informed politics.

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CHAPTER 1

ON THE STANDING OF STATES: LATIN AMERICA IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY

1. Latin America and the English School of IR

In November 1807, French troops marched from Spain into Portugal after Prince Regent John VI refused to join Napoleon's continental blockade against Britain. Only a few months later, Napoleon turned against his Spanish ally, forcing the Bourbons to abdicate in favour of his brother, Joseph Bonaparte, whom Napoleon installed as King of Spain in June 1808. The French invasion of the Iberian Peninsula set in motion a chain of events that led to the creation of sixteen new states in the Americas.[1] By the mid-1820s, most of Latin America had won its independence from Europe and gained international recognition by the

[1] Brazil became independent from Portugal in 1822. Argentina, Bolivia and Paraguay emerged from the disintegration of the Viceroyalty of the River Plate. Control of the eastern bank of the River Plate was disputed between Argentina and Brazil, leading to creation of Uruguay as a buffer state in 1828 under British mediation. Chile won its independence from Spain in 1818, followed by Peru, which declared its independence in 1821 but remained under royalist control until 1824. Colombia, Ecuador and Venezuela formed part of Gran Colombia until the breakup of Bolívar's federation in 1830. Mexico became independent in 1821. The Central American provinces of the Captaincy-General of Guatemala were first annexed to Mexico, but seceded in 1823. The federation between today's Costa Rica, Nicaragua, Honduras, El Salvador, and Guatemala lasted until 1838. In addition to these 'traditional' Latin American states, the region furthermore comprises Haiti, whose independence in 1804 took place in the context of the Napoleonic Wars, but which predated the Iberian invasion. As a former French colony, Haiti's identity as a Latin American state remains contested, and the first black republic was isolated in the region until the 1860s. While the Haitian case is important, it is not treated as part of Latin America in the following pages. The Spanish part of the island of Hispaniola was occupied by Haiti until the founding of the Dominican Republic in 1844. Cuba remained under Spanish rule until the Spanish-American War of 1898. The United States was also instrumental in the creation of the last Latin American state when Panama seceded from Colombia in 1903.

preeminent powers of the time. However, despite being recognized diplomatically, Latin American states continued to occupy a liminal position within international society.

Conventionally, the 'admission' of Latin America into the family of 'civilized' states is treated as an unproblematic historical fact. Traditional diplomatic history focuses almost exclusively on the wars of independence and the events leading to diplomatic recognition, most importantly by Britain and the United States. More recently, the bicentenary of the struggles for independence sparked a new debate regarding the underlying causes of revolution in the Americas, and the question of whether independence was the inevitable consequence of an 'incipient nationalism' among the local population, or determined by exogenous forces.[2] As result, there is now a much better understanding of the path leading to independence in Latin America. The recent synthesis suggests that the Napoleonic Wars triggered widespread political crises within the Iberian empires, during which local discontent manifested itself, first, in calls for greater autonomy, which, after the metropoles sought to reinstate control over the colonies, escalated into all-out demands for independence. The international context also conditioned the recognition of the new states, as Britain, closely followed by the United States, used the normalization of diplomatic ties to consolidate their political and economic clout over the region.[3] A similar perspective on the emergence of Latin America has also guided the discipline of International Relations

[2] Quote from Adelman 2011, 156.Traditional Latin American historiography emphasizes the role of the creole elite as vanguard of independence, which is also central to Anderson's influential study on nationalism, 1983, 47-65. Notable examples of the more recent historiography include Guerra 1992; Rodríguez 1998; McFarlane 1999; Adelman 2006.

[3] Classic diplomatic historical accounts are Manchester 1933; Webster 1938; Whitaker 1941; Kaufmann 1967; Platt 1968. For a more recent, cultural historical perspective, see Paquette 2004; Racine 2010.

(IR).[4] Here, Latin America features chiefly as a 'sphere of influence' and region that has historically been subject to great power tutelage and domination. Because the region was of little geopolitical relevance and populated by militarily weak states, Latin America spent most of its independent history on the sidelines of great power politics. Great powers may have infringed frequently on their sovereignty as part of the 'organized hypocrisy' that characterizes international politics, [5] this view suggests, yet once recognized, the place of Latin American states within the international order is generally taken for granted.

The present study offers an alternative interpretation of the standing of Latin American states. It is guided by the assumption that the international insertion of Latin America need, first and foremost, be understood in the wider context that was the transformation of the international order of the 'long nineteenth century'.[6] The period under consideration begins with the revolutionary upheavals that sprung up across the Atlantic. It was marked by the rise of European economic, political and cultural global dominance that reached its zenith with the 'new imperialism' of the late nineteenth century, before its erosion epitomized by WWI. The history of European expansionism tends to be told from the perspective of Europeans. But it is *equally* important to consider how other, non-European political communities, dealt with this far-reaching transformation. Thus, secondly, through a case study approach that centres on Argentina, Mexico and Brazil, the inquiry also demonstrates the value of examining the international insertion of these states from the perspective of Latin Americans themselves. Making sense of the place of Latin American states in

[4] Throughout this dissertation, capital letters are used to distinguish the discipline of International Relations (IR) from international relations as subject matter.
[5] Krasner 1999, for a discussion on the independence of Latin America, see 176-180.
[6] Bayly 2004; Osterhammel 2014. The case for the nineteenth century as fundamental turning point in the history of world politics is made by Buzan and Lawson 2013. For critical receptions, see Musgrave and Nexon 2013; and, written from an English School perspective, Pella 2014, 91-95.

international society requires understanding both European 'core' and Latin American 'peripheral' perspectives. The 'core', or to be more precise, the 'apex' of nineteenth-century international society was dominated by colonial European great powers, most importantly Britain and France, and, increasingly, the United States, which emerged as a non-European power towards the end of the nineteenth century. The present study seeks to understand not only how Latin America was perceived in the European and North American metropoles, but also how Latin American elites conceived of that order, their place therein, and the range of possible 'social action' that was available to them at particular points in time.

The starting point of inquiry is *The Expansion of International Society,* developed by Hedley Bull, Adam Watson, and other theorists in the English School tradition of IR.[7] Despite its origins in international law, international society has become the 'signature concept' of the English School.[8] 'By an international society', Bull and Watson explain, 'we mean group of states (or, more generally, a group of independent political communities) which not merely form a system, in the sense that the behaviour of each is a necessary factor in the calculations of the others, but also have established by dialogue and consent common rules and institutions for the conduct of their relations, and recognized their common interest in maintaining these arrangements'.[9] The notion of international society, then, denotes a different ontological perspective that approaches international

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[7] Bull and Watson 1984b. The English School debate on the expansion of international society is reviewed in Chapter 2.

[8] Epp 2014, 30. Introductions to the English School are provided by Navari 2009b; Navari and Green 2014; Buzan 2014; Linklater and Suganami 2007. For an intellectual history, see Dunne 1998; Vigezzi 2005; Hall 2011.
Dunne 1998.

[9] Bull and Watson 1984a, 1.

politics not as the result of mechanistic forces that apply equally across time and place, but as social activity of human agents who are constrained by their environment but act purposefully towards others.

According to the English School orthodoxy, international society emerged first in Europe from the reorganization of Latin Christendom into sovereign and formally equal territorial states.[10] From seventeenth century Europe, it then spread to the rest of the world through colonialism and the breakup of European empires, starting with the independence of the United States in 1776. In this view, the expansion of international society was a gradual process. In order to qualify for membership, political communities had to comply with the basic principles of organizing international life, most importantly the consolidation of territorially bounded nation-states.[11] Inchoate and vague at first, by the end of the nineteenth century these demands were, arguably, formalized in an explicit 'standard of civilization', requiring non-Western countries to undergo profound political and social reform in order to gain membership.[12] States, in turn, achieved international standing through diplomatic recognition, i.e. the acknowledgement of their independence and formal equality by the existing members of international society. Thus, according to the conventional view, there was a distinction between 'insiders' of international society and those political communities without standing in the international order of the time. The 'admission' of the new states of the Americas marked the first step in the globalization of

[10] See, for instance, Hurrell 2007, 10-11, 29-36. Note that although authors have engaged with the question of hierarchy in international society, this is either approached in terms of hegemony, see Clark 1989, 2009, and 2011, and Dunne 2003, or, in terms of the differential treatment of insiders and outsiders, in particular Keene 2002.
[11] Bull 1984a, 120-122.
[12] Most importantly, Gong 1984. Note that the orthodox English School account defines the 'West' as including all European countries and the countries of predominantly European settlement, O'Hagan 2002, 115-116; and also, 2005, 209.

international society, a process which reached its apogee with the dismantling of European colonial empires in the wake of WWII. With the decolonization of Africa and Asia in the twentieth century, the transformation of an originally European international society into a global one was complete.

The English School account of the expansion of international society provides not only a historical account of the emergence of the contemporary global order, it also sheds light on the 'baggage' or path dependencies that this process entails. For Bull and Watson, this primarily concerns the question of order in an international society that expanded beyond its originally European core.[13] More recent scholarship, however, has criticized the orthodox narrative for its Eurocentric bias and the neglect of colonialism as a primordial institution of international society. As Suzuki maintains, by focusing on how non-Western societies accepted the more progressive elements of international society, such as diplomacy and international law, the orthodox account downplays the 'darker face' of international society.[14] The evolution of modern international society, these critics argue, was marked by the imposition of colonial rule, the exploitation of non-European peoples, and the negation of the rights of indigenous communities.[15] Pointing to this failure, Keene suggests that international society contained a 'dualistic mode': one based on the toleration of difference, the other following a totalizing logic, namely 'civilization'. As Keene puts it,

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[13] The question is also central to Bull's 2002 [1977] seminal *The Anarchical Society*, in which the author identifies a tension between order and justice in international society.
[14] Suzuki 2009, 7.
[15] Most importantly, Keal 2003; Keene 2002. The cases of China and Japan are re-examined by Zhang 1991; Suzuki 2005; 2009. For an overview of the debate, Buzan and Little 2009. Note that the debate is indebted to arguments from postcolonial studies and the attempt to 'provincialize Europe', for instance, Chakrabarty 2000. Also, a similar critique has been advanced by critical legal scholars, emphasizing the colonial origins of modern international law, see Benton 2002; Anghie 2005; and Becker-Lorca 2010 for a discussion of Latin America.

'[a]t the same time as the "Westphalian system" of equal and mutually independent territorially sovereign states was taking shape, quite different colonial and imperial systems were being established beyond Europe, predicated above all on the division of sovereign prerogatives across territorial boundaries and the assertion of the rights of individuals, especially property'.[16]

One important line of inquiry in the revised English School has been the agency of non-Western states.[17] Suzuki, for instance, provides an insightful account of how Chinese and Japanese elites responded differently to the 'coercive face' of international society that was Western imperialism. Conceiving of international society as external imposition, Chinese elites were reluctant to internalize its norms and values, opting instead to increase the country's military power through selectively appropriating Western technology. By contrast, elites in Japan were eager to be recognized as 'civilized', pursuing far-reaching 'Westernization', including the development of Japan's own civilizing mission, which, according to Suzuki, contributed to the rise of imperialism in Meiji Japan.[18] Another instructive example is Englehart, who demonstrates how the aristocracy in Siam responded to racial discrimination by emphasizing their social background and, therefore, represented Siam as 'civilized' in the eyes of Europe's ruling class.[19] The agency question is also explored by Roberson's analysis of 'legal borrowing' in late nineteenth- and early twentieth century Egypt. In order to abolish the much-resented capitulation system, Egypt embarked on a legal reform that sought the gradual extension of the jurisdiction of newly created

[16] Keene 2002, 97.
[17] See also, Acharya 2011; 2009.
[18] Suzuki 2009, 178-180.
[19] Englehart 2010, 433.

courts, thereby gradually abolishing the extraterritorial privileges of European powers.[20] What these account have in common is the view that non-Western states were not simple 'rule-takers' but were able to pursue different strategies in their dealings with Western-dominated international society. What furthermore emerges from the revised English School—but which needs to be made more explicit—is that these strategies were guided by particular elite perceptions of the nature of international society and the place that their states occupied within that order.

While the English School has provided a powerful analysis of civilizational encounters, Latin America has received only scant attention in this debate.[21] Considered as 'white settler societies' inhabited by the descendants of European colonization and guided by European ideas, the English School has conventionally treated Latin America as being part of the 'West', and therefore exempted from the unequal treatment experience by peoples in Asia, Africa, and the Middle East.[22] As an extension of Latin Christendom—the 'extreme West', in Alain Rouquié's words[23]—Latin American states would have entered international society with recognition in the early nineteenth century. The terms of the debate were set by Watson: 'What really and decisively made the settler states of the Americas consider themselves, and be considered, members of the European family was that they were all states on the European model, inhabited or dominated by people of

[20] Roberson 2009.
[21] The most developed account to date remains Watson's 1984 problematic contribution in *The Expansion of International Society*. Other recent English School accounts that discuss Latin America include Fabry's 2010 well-research study on the changing norms of recognition; Aching 2011 on the reluctance of Cuban elites to abandon slavery to promote their cause for independence; and, more broadly, Jones's 2013 account of inter-civilizational encounters during the colonial period. Reus-Smit 2013 discusses Latin American independence but takes a critical stance towards the English School, see 2013, 30-32. Haiti, which in this study is treated as a case apart, has received treatment from Shilliam 2006; Cantir 2013.
[22] O'Hagan 2002, 114.
[23] Rouquié 1987.

European culture and descent'. [24] Following this reasoning, Watson concludes that they were 'rather boorish and provincial members, perhaps, but that was no great matter'.[25]

Contrary to Watson's assertion, this thesis argues that, in fact, the 'boorishness' of Latin American states mattered a great deal. Latin America's purported 'Western' credentials—having a predominately Christian population led by the descendants of European conquest and settlement who modelled their institutions on a European template—did facilitate the diplomatic recognition of these states. But recognition did not easily translate into equal membership in international society. The standing of Latin American states illustrates the limits of treating international society as a 'club', whose members can be neatly distinguished from the more heterogeneous 'rest'. The central argument of this dissertation is that the distinction between 'insiders' and 'outsiders' fails to account for the stratified nature of nineteenth-century international society. This becomes particularly evident from the experience of Latin American states, marked by great power interventions, naval blockades, and foreign tutelage. As the proceeding analysis demonstrates, Latin American states were recognized but not regarded as fully-fledged members of the purported community of sovereign and equal states. Latin American elites were cognizant of their international marginalization. They closely followed and interpreted debates of their European and US counterparts and responded to their visions of global order. Furthermore, as the case studies illustrate, their aspiration of ascending within the international hierarchy influenced not only domestic politics but became an important objective in the foreign policy of these new states.

[24] Bull 1984a, 122; Bull and Watson 1984b, 18; quote from Watson 1992, 268.
[25] 1984b, 139.

Conceptually, understanding the place of Latin American states in nineteenth-century international society requires, first, a shift from treating standing as 'membership' to conceiving of standing as position in a complex order. This conceptual move builds upon and extends recent scholarship on 'hierarchy under anarchy',[26] as well as a revised English School that, drawing on earlier legal scholarship by Alexandrowicz and others, focuses on stratification, i.e. the hierarchical arrangements of states within international society.[27] For the purpose of this study, international society is regarded as 'heterarchical', in the sense that it comprises multiple and co-existing forms of stratification that are not reducible to a single ranked order.[28] In what follows, three ideal-typical *dimensions of stratification* are identified. The first arises from the uneven distribution of material capabilities among states. *Stature* is the most common form in which IR theorists have conceived of international stratification. But it is certainly not the only possible dimension. *Role* is the second dimension of stratification, which captures the distribution of tasks and functions among states. The third dimension is *status*. The status of a state depends on social estimations of honour and prestige. Accordingly, being regarded as 'civilized' is a form of status that is not necessarily determined by either stature or role. Moreover and importantly, each dimension of stratification is associated with a particular logic of 'social action'.[29]

[26] There has been a growing body on hierarchy in world politics, examples include but are not limited to Wendt and Friedheim 1995; Weber 1997; Donnelly 2006; Nexon and Wright 2007. Note that Lake's 2009 influential works treats anarchy and hierarchy as extreme points on a continuum of authority relations. The present study differs from Lake in that hierarchy can exist under anarchy.

[27] Alexandrowicz 1967; Fisch 2001; 1984.The distinction seems already implied in Keene 2002, but becomes more explicit in later studies of the same author as the 'standing' of colonies remains underexplored, see for instance, Keene 2007. See also, Albert, Buzan, and Zürn 2013.

[28] The concept of borrowed from Donnelly 2009, 63-66; and 2012, 153-157. See also, Buzan and Albert 2010, 318; Simpson 2004, 17, 56-61.

[29] The Weberian notion of 'social action' is discussed in Chapter 3.

Underlying this is a reflectivist (or constructivist) conception of international society.[30] First, it is assumed that agency in international society ultimately rests with individuals who act, either individually or collectively, on behalf of the state. Secondly, is it also assumed that the rules, norms and practices of international society derive their significance not from legal obligation or the threat of sanctions, but from 'the self-understandings of the participants in international life'.[31] From this it follows that, depending on whether individuals perceive of international society as either stratified on the basis of stature, role or status, elites adopt different strategies to position their state within international society.

To illustrate the argument, take the realist notion of the international realm as anarchic and characterized by the competition of states for survival, which corresponds to a stature conception of international stratification. In this case, the appropriate 'social action' for states is to balance against others, either by increasing their own military capabilities or by forming militarily alliances. It suggests that international society should not be conflated with 'zones of peace' or 'security communities'.[32] This becomes clear in Bull's treatment of war as an institutionalized practice among states.[33] In this view, geopolitical competition can be normatively sanctioned and regarded as 'appropriate' by state elites—provided that they perceive the international order to be guided by such logic.

By contrast, roles matter to elites because they unevenly distribute functions and tasks among states. Common expressions of role differentiation are the rights and responsibilities

[30] In particular, Dunne 1995; Epp 1998.
[31] Navari 2009a, 4.
[32] Adler and Barnett 1998; Deutsch 1957. This seems to be the case with Kacowicz's 2005 otherwise convincing account of Latin America as regional international society.
[33] Bull 2002 [1977], 178-193.

that are vested in great powers and recognized by others. To emphasize, the dimensions of stratification are ideal types. Great powerdom, for instance, is generally associated with great material capability, a prominent role in world politics, and a privileged status among states. Yet great powerdom does not automatically arise from stature, nor are status and role necessarily determined by it. As real world phenomena, these ideal-types tend to occur as mixed forms; analytically, however, they can be separated and treated as different according to the underlying logic of stratification. From the vantage point of Latin America's political and intellectual elites, international relations have always been characterized by rampant inequalities. Dependency theory, a critique of modernization theory that emerged in Latin America in the 1960s, is a reflection of this long-held sense of marginalization that, as the case studies below illustrate, predates the rise of the United States as regional hegemon. In the terminology of this study, dependency theory is underpinned by a role perception of international order that has been present in the region since the late eighteenth century, but which only became dominant in the twentieth century. Role thinking was furthermore important during independence, when the role of the colonies within the Spanish and Portuguese empires was put to the test.

Nor was stature thinking absent in Latin America. By the late nineteenth century, Argentina, Brazil, and Chile, in particular, engaged in an arms race, which, however, was ultimately resolved by diplomatic means.[34] Similarly, Mexican elites harboured a distinctive view of their state as predestined to great power and wealth, which explains the self-confidence with which they negotiated recognition with Britain and other major powers. Yet what emerges from the reconstruction of elite perception is that whereas

[34] See, for instance, Burr 1965; Child 1985; Kelly 1997; Mares 2001; Resende-Santos 2007.

stature and role perceptions of stratification were certainly important, it was predominately status, conceived in terms of membership in the community of 'civilized' states, that shaped the way in which nineteenth-century elites thought about the nature of international society and the position of Latin American states therein.

Ideas about culture and race were important to this civilizational identity and, accordingly, feature prominently in the ensuing case studies. Culture refers to the norms, practices and traditions that are intelligible to the members of a social group. This, then, is not to say that culture is determined by immutable attributes or traits, as the proponents of an essentialist conception like Huntington or Wiarda advocate,[35] but rather that culture is a social construct akin to what Anderson described as an 'imagined community'.[36] Social constructivism also informs the definition of race employed in this study. More commonly, race is understood as a 'label' employed to differentiate human populations based on phenotype. Yet race is not necessarily determined by biological differences. This is particularly true in Latin America, where colonial politics defined racial identities, but which, in practice, were more diffuse and malleable than the distinction between creoles, Indians, blacks, *caboclos* or *mestizos* might suggest.[37] Biological descent played an important role, but so did language, customs, and, importantly, the socio-economic standing of a person. Hence, for instance, Joaquim Nabuco's indignation when Machado de Assis, an Afro-Brazilian novelist and founding president of the distinguished Brazilian Academy of Letters, was described in the press as 'mulatto'; or take the example of Porfirio Díaz, who, for some, was 'an almost pure Mixtec [Indian]', while for others the

[35] Huntington 1996; Wiarda 2001.
[36] Anderson 1983.
[37] Graham et al. 1990.

Mexican leader passed as 'probably all white'.[38] Racial 'whitening' could consequently occur demographically, for instance, through the promotion of European immigration, or culturally, depending on a person's compliance with expectations of sociability and sophistication derived from social life at the 'core' of international society.

2. Latin America in Nineteenth-Century International Society

Latin America, as Alfonso Reyes stated in 1936, 'arrived late at the banquet of European civilization'.[39] The political emancipation of Latin America was the immediate result of the Napoleonic Wars in Europe. France's invasion of the Iberian Peninsula in 1807 and 1808 undermined the foundations of Spanish and Portuguese authority in the Americas. Thereafter, Spanish and Portuguese America took different paths to independent statehood. In Spain, Napoleon forced Ferdinand VII to abdicate, leading to the establishment of self-governing juntas throughout the Spanish realm. First loyal to the crown, the Bourbon restoration of 1814 sparked fierce resistance that eventually escalated into long and destructive wars of independence. Following the defeat of royalist forces and de facto independence, Argentina and Mexico were among the first Spanish American states to gain recognition from Britain and the United States in the early 1820s. However, although recognized internationally, civil war and rampant political instability soon raised questions about their membership in the family of 'civilized' states.[40]

[38] Skidmore 1990, 30; quotes from Knight 1990, 73.
[39] Cited in Altamirano 2008, 10, own translation.
[40] On state consolidation in nineteenth-century Latin America, see López-Alves 2001; Centeno 2002; Dunkerley 2002; Centeno and Ferraro 2013. In order to avoid a teleological conception of the 'state', which assumes that all political communities will be organized, in the long run, according to a Western European ideal, the term 'state consolidation', e.g. the establishment of political order within a territory, is preferred over 'state formation', which includes furthermore the ability of providing public goods.

From the perspective of the European powers, states had to guarantee the life and property of foreign nationals. Disputes over pecuniary claims led to numerous blockades in Spanish America,[41] including in Brazil, Mexico, and the River Plate. In addition, the difficulty of establishing order in the nascent states reinforced pre-existing cultural and racial stereotypes about the inability of Latin Americans to self-govern, which further intensified with the rise of scientific racism in the second half of the nineteenth century. The '[i]nevitable anarchy of Spanish American republics', Gustave Le Bon noted in 1894, was 'a consequence of the inferiority of the characteristics of the race'.[42] Similarly, in North America, the doctrine of manifest destiny of the mid-nineteenth century rationalized the westward expansion of the United States and the occupation of indigenous and Mexican territory in the name of civilization. That culturalist and racial thinking influenced foreign policy towards the region is well documented in the case of the United States.[43] Schoultz shows convincingly that prejudices against Hispanic culture and Catholicism, local customs, miscegenation, and widespread political violence has informed the thinking of US foreign policy elites: 'A belief in Latin American inferiority is the essential core of United States policy toward Latin America because it determined the precise steps the United States takes to protect its interests in the region'.[44] These prejudices drew mainly from two sources: For one, they can be traced back to anti-Spanish propaganda of the Dutch Revolt in the sixteenth century, the so-called 'Black legend', which, in Protestant countries like the

[41] Hogan 1908; Dunn 1932, 54. European interventions in Latin America as result of the violations of the 'minimum standard of treatment' as discussed by Lipson 1985; Finnemore 2003; Tomz 2007.
[42] Le Bon 1898 [1894], ix, 138. Note that Le Bon seem to have considered Brazil part of Spanish America, having 'to some extent escaped this decadence' due to the strong rule of the monarchy. However, with the proclamation of the republic in 1889, the country would face the same inevitable destiny, see 1898, 53, 149, 151.
[43] See, in particular, Pike 1992; Schoultz 1998; Johnson 1980. There is no comparable study that covers the cases of European states. Some aspects are elite perceptions in the German-speaking countries are discussed in König 1998.
[44] Schoultz 1998, xv; see also, Johnson 1980; Pike 1992.

United States, took on a distinctively anti-Catholic tone. The view is made succinctly clear by John Quincy Adams:

> They [Spanish Americans] have not the first elements of good and free government. Arbitrary power, military and ecclesiastical, was stamped upon their education, upon their habits, and upon all their institutions. Civil dissension was infused into all their seminal principals—War and mutual destruction was in every member of their organization, moral, political and physical.[45]

For another, prejudices about the inability of creoles to self-rule were influenced by the writings of eighteenth-century European naturalists, who described the flora, fauna, and, by extension, peoples of the New World as degenerated and effeminate.[46] As discussed below, it is curious that elites in the United States were able to shake off this stigma relatively early on. For Spanish Americans and, to some extent, elites in Brazil, the matter remained unsettling for much of the nineteenth century. What emerges from the case studies is the insight that these views not only influenced attitudes in the United States, but were more widely shared at the 'core' of international society. Latin Americans, in turn, reflected upon these views, and developed their own way of dealing with their subordinate status in the community of 'civilized' states.

Brazil's path to independence was less disruptive. Facing the threat of Napoleon's invasion, the Portuguese court was evacuated to Rio de Janeiro in 1807 under the protection of the British navy. John VI elevated the South American colony to the status of co-kingdom in 1815, and was crowned King of the United Kingdom of Portugal, Brazil and the Algarves in 1818. Upon the king's return to Europe, his son was left as regent until Peter yielded to

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[45] 4 March 1821, in Adams 1875, 325.
[46] Gerbi 2010 [1973]; Todorov 1984; Pagden 1990; 1995; Muldoon 1994.

local pressure and declared Brazil's independence in 1822. The continuation of Braganza rule facilitated the diplomatic recognition of Brazil, especially from the legitimist powers of the Holy Alliance and the Holy See. Domestically, it also provided the regime with sufficient military capabilities and political authority to prevent a similar fragmentation as Spanish America underwent in the first decades of independent statehood. But while the country's early consolidation provided its elites with a sense of superiority over their 'barbarous' neighbours in Spanish America,[47] Brazil, too, experienced the stratified nature of international society. British recognition led to the continuation of British pre-eminence, which was secured through unequal treaty relations, including a limited form of extraterritorial jurisdiction that was functionally similar to (but different in scope and duration than) the treaty port system imposed on China and Japan.[48] More importantly, the reliance on African slave labour pitted Brazilian economic interests against the British, which, after 1845, began to suppress the slave trade within Brazilian waters by force. Although the slave trade had ceased by the 1850s, within Brazil slavery became increasingly seen as an anachronistic institution that negated the empire its rightful place in the community of states.[49] For instance, abolitionists such as Joaquim Nabuco condemned slavery not only in humanitarian terms but argued that it would hold back the prospering of civilization in the country, among other things, by discouraging white immigration.[50] Race, as argued above, became intrinsically linked to international status. Analogous to events in Spanish America, by the late nineteenth century, Brazil's mainly black population and

[47] Preuss 2012, 97.
[48] The best account remains Manchester 1933.
[49] Schwarcz 1998; Preuss 2012, 99.
[50] Skidmore 1990, 8-9; Murilo de Carvalho 2012, 26.

racially mixed society was conceived in pejorative terms, purportedly relegating Brazil to a third-class status among nations.[51]

3. The Problem of Agency

Politics in nineteenth-century Latin America was dominated by a small group of men, whose wealth came from their families' control of land—a colonial legacy that significantly increased with the privatization of public property under the liberal reforms of the nineteenth century. Predominantly of European origin, the creole elite excluded women and those of mixed, indigenous, and black ancestry from public life.[52] The marginalization of the 'subaltern', however, was never complete. In Brazil, some mixed-raced *mulattos* were able to climb socially, a place that was generally occupied by white *mazombos* (in Portuguese, the term *crioulo* historically referred to a Brazilian-born black slave). Public figures such as John Maurício Wanderley, the Baron of Cotegipe, or André Rebouças, an engineer and advisor to Peter II, are notable exceptions. In contrast to Brazil's 'enlightened' court society, in Argentina and Mexico, mass mobilization and social upheavals put pressure on the governing elite and provided for limited social mobility. Take the example of Latin America's first indigenous president, Benito Juárez of Mexico, a Zapotec Indian lawyer from Oaxaca, who defeated the French occupation under Archduke Maximilian of Habsburg. Crucial for understanding nineteenth-century Latin American elites are the so-called Americas-born *letrados*, 'lettered men' typically trained in law, who occupied important positions of power, and who formed the political, commercial, and intellectual

[51] Skidmore 1990, 7. On the domestic 'civilizing mission' of Brazil's elites, see Needell 1999.
[52] See, for instance, Gargarella 2010; Simon 2012; for a contrasting interpretation that emphasizes the inclusiveness and syncretism in Latin American political thought, see von Vacano 2012.

elite in these states.[53] Characteristically, this 'lettered' elite moved easily between government and private enterprise. An illustrative example is Domingo Faustino Sarmiento, an influential politician in the liberal opposition to Manuel de Rosas who made a career as a soldier, journalist, and writer renown for his polemic *Facundo*,[54] a classic of Latin American literature, and who, in 1868, was elected president of Argentina while still abroad on his diplomatic posting as minister to the United States. Sarmiento's influence on Argentina's cultural, political, and foreign affairs is evident. It is not the intention here to repeat the 'great man' narrative that celebrates the achievement of this generation of elites while neglecting the contributions that the largely marginalized majority of the population made to the histories of these countries. However, their broad involvement in public affairs and prolific writings make nineteenth-century Latin American elites ideal subjects for studying 'official' thinking about the standing of these states, as it was largely they who authored these narratives.

The outward-orientation of the region's 'lettered' elite is well established. As the Mexican philosopher and historian Zea argues in *Latin America and the World*, the leaders of the newly independent countries were well aware of their confinement to the 'periphery of progress'.[55] Intellectual life in nineteenth-century Latin America would have been little more than a 'derivative' of European models and ideas.[56] Equally, Burns maintains that nineteenth-century Latin American history was marked by the imposition of theories that were alien to the socio-economic realities of the region as part of the elites' attempts 'to ape

[53] The classic study on Latin America's 'lettered elite' is Rama 1996.
[54] Sarmiento 2003 [1845].
[55] Zea 1969, 3; Mignolo 2005, 71.
[56] Cited in Palti 2009, 596.

Europe'.[57] By contrast, Whitehead maintains that the impact of Iberian colonization made a return to the pre-Colombian past unfeasible. The new states had to establish new links with the outside world, which included 'the outward and inner projection of new identities'.[58] Because of Latin America's colonial past, and because the region was geographically and politically remote from European great power politics, 'the rulers of Latin America were constrained to modernize rather than threatened by outright takeover'.[59] Yet the appropriation of foreign models from 'above and without' was only partial, and often exhausted before it could be fully implemented, making Latin America a 'mausoleum of modernity'.[60]

Whitehead's metaphor points to the fact that the particular arrangement of modernization projects makes the Latin American experience unique. Moreover, as Whitehead's treatment suggests, the view that the region's 'lettered men' were merely copying a European original, as Zea and Burns would have it, is misleading. The particular views adopted by Latin American elites were neither imposed from outside, nor were they the inevitable result of structural forces, such as geopolitical pressure or the spread of market capitalism to the region. As the case studies of this project illustrate, Latin American elites tended to selectively interpret and appropriate European ideas, applying these to the specific problems and concerns of the region.[61] Obregón's important work on Latin American international legal scholarship suggests a similar pattern. Nineteenth-century creoles in Spanish America regarded themselves as part of a European intellectual tradition, at the

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[57] Burns 1980, 13, see also 18, 18, and 48.
[58] Whitehead 2006, 30.
[59] Ibid., 32.
[60] Ibid., 23-68.
[61] Jaksic and Posada-Carbó 2013, 12.

same time as they were aware of their regional uniqueness, creating a particular 'creole legal consciousness'.[62] Underlying this was a particular cultural and racialized vision of international society in which Latin American societies occupied a marginal status due their civilizational backwardness. This status conception shaped the way in which Latin American elites sought to bolster the standing of Latin American states. As Loveman posits in a recent study on census politics in nineteenth-century Latin America:

> From Argentina to Mexico, many of the region's political leaders and intellectual elites dreamed of turning their respective *patrias* into card-holding members in the international community of 'civilized nations.' To increase their chances of acceptance as members of the club, Latin American state builders often took pains to make their states look like already recognized members. They sought to build states that did—and were seen doing—the things that modern states were expected to do. Thus, many early efforts at modernization in Latin America entailed the emulation and adaptation of institutional forms and practices from abroad.[63]

The misunderstanding of the use of European ideas seems to be the underlying problem of accounts that seek to categorize Latin American contributions as either 'Western' or 'non-Western' and 'postcolonial'.[64] Adam Watson's narrative of the entry of Latin America into international society is indicative of this flaw. As Fawcett makes clear, the idea that Latin America's 'Western' credentials were beyond question misunderstands the protracted relationship of local elites with their colonial past; it also neglects the extraordinary ethnic heterogeneity of the region.[65] In other words, Latin America was not composed of 'settler states', but elites in countries like Argentina developed a form of 'settler colonialism' in order to gain substantive international recognition.[66]

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[62] Obregón 2006a, 817.
[63] Loveman 2013, 331.
[64] See, for instance, Tickner 2003b, 305-306, 319-320.
[65] Fawcett 2012, 3.
[66] See, for instance, Gott 2007; Belich 2009, 518-547.

An important proposition advanced by this dissertation is that nineteenth-century debates in Latin America show a remarkable concern with the scope and nature of the international order. Because they were close observers of the ideas and developments of the 'core', their peripheral accounts provide important insights for understanding the multiple hierarchies at work in international society. Although stature and role were important at times, local elites perceived the standing of Latin American states primarily in terms of status, as defined by the European-core but interpreted and applied to local realities. It is impossible to capture the whole array of perceptions of international order that exist in a society. Nor did Latin American elites necessarily agree on a single 'vision of global order'.[67] These visions were constantly contested and formed part of domestic political conflict, in general, and the questions of how society should be organized and relate to others, in particular.[68] These views became particularly apparent during times of political crisis, which also tend to be the historical moments at which Latin American societies have attracted most attention from foreign observers. The hermeneutic method employed by this study attempts to identify particularly dominant perceptions through an analysis of official correspondence and public debates on international order, using the traditional sources of diplomatic history, but also alternative sources more commonly used by cultural histories such as essays and pamphlets that were not part of the regular diplomatic dispatches, but which

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[67] As Bell 2007 notes, the nineteenth century was the 'age of grand (and grandiose) theorising'. Even more so than the European elites studied by Bell and his contributors, Latin American 'lettered men' were 'intellectual generalists': Hence, '[i]t is very hard to separate 'the political' (or 'political theory') from other domains of nineteenth-century thought – it was embedded in, and shaped by, political economy, theology, jurisprudence, the emerging social sciences, especially anthropology, literature, and the writing of history', Bell 2007, 3. What is different, however, is their locus of enunciation. Latin American elites closely observed and, at times, took part in the intellectual debates of the 'core', but their views were markedly shaped by the marginal standing of their societies.

[68] Pratt 1992, 112.

were, nevertheless, important political interventions in public debates, and which need to be analyzed in their proper domestic and international historical context.[69] Given the long-term perspective and comparative nature of this study, secondary source material is of crucial importance, and care has been taken to adequately represent historiographical controversy in context.[70]

4. The Case for 'Latin America'

Broadly conceived, Latin America refers to all countries south of the United States that were under Spanish, Portuguese, or French colonial rule, and, consequently, inherited Romance languages. The precise origins of the idea remain disputed.[71] Some authors attribute the term to the French statesman Michel Chevalier, who asserted Frances's leadership ambitions over the Latin countries of Europe and the American continents;[72] others, most importantly, the intellectual historian Ardao, argued that even though the distinction between Anglo-Saxon and Latin races was proposed first in Europe, the term 'Latin America' was coined in Spanish America to refer to a separate cultural entity.[73] Yet authors agree that the idea emerged first in the mid nineteenth-century to separate *Latin* America from the Anglo-Saxon North.[74] There is also a consensus that the term was adopted as an expression of Spanish American unity and of the belief that the region had come under pressure from the rapidly expanding United State, as exemplified by Caicedo's

[69] This contextualization is commonly associated with the Skinner's Cambridge School, but is also characteristic for German *Ideengeschichte*, see Koselleck 2004 [1979]; Tully 1988; Skinner 2002. On the study of discourse and public rhetoric in IR, Milliken 1999; Neumann 2002; 2008a; Epstein 2008.
[70] On the use of secondary sources for comparative-historical research, see Goldthorpe 1991; Lustick 1996; Schroeder 1997; Thies 2002; Yetiv 2011.
[71] See McGuiness 2003; Bethell 2010a, 457-458.
[72] Such as Mignolo 2005.
[73] Ardao 1980, 23, 55.
[74] Dunkerley 2004, 28.

poem *The Two Americas* of 1856, written in the aftermath of the Mexican-American War (1846–1848), and the filibustering expeditions of William Walker.

It should be apparent that the idea of 'Latin America' is neither independent of a culturalist and racialized view of international order, nor of the question of Latin American marginalization.[75] Similarly, it is also important to note that its meaning did not remain constant over time. Until the late nineteenth century, contemporaries would use either geographic references, such as South and North America, or distinguished between Spanish America on the one hand, and other regions of the Americas that did not form part of the Spanish Empire, on the other. Thus, although the use of the term 'Latin America' represents an anachronism, it nevertheless captures some important features that are not reflected by either geographic reference, or by the separate treatment of Brazil from the wider region. Latin America is highly heterogeneous both between as well as within its respective national societies. The case is made succinctly clear by Dunkerley: 'any idea of a Latin American commonality should always be qualified with respect for the region's diversity'.[76] Yet as the case studies illustrate, despite its diversity, Latin America shares a common political history that is all the more apparent in its experience with international society. The cases of Argentina, Mexico, and Brazil may not be representative for the whole of Latin America, but they are crucial cases that allow for appreciating the differences and similarities that existed within the region. In other words, they represent variations of a common theme.

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[75] The central thesis of Mignolo 2005.
[76] Dunkerley 2004, 29; see also, 2000, 33; 2002, 8.

More recently, debates on the emergence of Brazil as a global power have reinforced the view of Brazil's exceptionalism, calling for an analytical separation between Brazil and Spanish America. As Bethell points out, nineteenth-century Brazilians did not identify with Latin America: they were conscious of the differences in their colonial history, culture, the economic basis of their prosperity, and, importantly, of the preservation of the Braganza monarchy. Nor would the European and Spanish American intellectuals who first used the term have included Brazil, either.[77] Yet the presumably neutral (and perhaps historically more accurate) alternative reference to South America has its downside, too, as the term was used by contemporaries to refer to the region that comprises essentially contemporary Latin America, rather than the South American continent. It was only in the twentieth century that the Isthmus of Panama became univocally regarded as the dividing line between North and South America.

Thus, in what follows, the focus lies on elite perceptions in Argentina, Brazil and Mexico: the three largest, most populous, and, arguably, most important countries in the region. For one thing, this has the advantage that they are the best-studied cases in Latin America, rendering the comparative study more feasible. In addition, these three states constitute 'hard cases' in the sense that, on the basis of their relative importance, they were more likely to gain full membership in international society. That is to say, although it is important to appreciate the heterogeneous nature of Latin America, it seems reasonable to assume that the problems that these 'big three' faced were also very likely to be the problems that other states in the region had to confront.

[77] Bethell 2010a, 460.

5. Overview

The remainder of this dissertation proceeds as follows: the first section offers a conceptual discussion in two steps. Chapter 2 revisits the English School account of the expansion of international society. In the first place, it calls into question the conventional view of international society as comprised of sovereign and formally equal states. Drawing on the revised English School and legal history, it makes the case for treating international society as potentially universal in scope, but highly stratified along multiple dimensions. Chapter 3 sets out the conceptual framework of this dissertation. It argues that international society is best understood as comprising three dimensions of stratification, namely stature, role and status, each of which is associated with a particular logic of social action. As the ensuing analysis suggests, not every dimension was equally influential. In the Latin America case, role and stature may have been important at different points in time. Yet it was status concerns that dominated the way in which elites thought about international society, and the policies needed to gain substantive recognition by its existing members.

Following the development of the interpretative framework of this dissertation, the second section contains the case study chapters of Argentina, Mexico, and Brazil. These cases are presented as analytical narratives that begin by tracing the colonial antecedents of independence, proceed with discussing the processes of emancipation and international recognition, followed by an analysis of the political situation around mid-century, and conclude by focusing on debates on the standing of these states towards the late-nineteenth and early twentieth century.

Chapter 4 focuses on the protracted experience of Argentina in international society. The Argentine case demonstrates how status considerations were central to the way local elites conceived of Argentina's standing in international society. Although prejudices about creoles' ability to self-govern existed in Europe and the United States prior to recognition, these were temporarily muted by the prospect of economic benefits and the geopolitical considerations of the early nineteenth century. Role, in other words, trumped status at the beginning of the nineteenth century. Political instability following independence, however, brought these culturalist prejudices back to the fore. Argentine elites, and in particular the Generation of 1837, reflected on the marginalization of their country, which was framed in terms of the opposition between civilization and barbarism. From the perspective of the country's exiled liberal elite, Argentina desperately needed European influences, most importantly in the form of immigration from northern Europe, in order to assert its rightful place in international society. After the fall of Rosas in 1852, it was the vision of the Generation of 1837 that transformed the country, based on the expansion of the agriculture frontier, the construction of railways and communication lines to advance the economic insertion of Argentina as an exporter of agricultural produce, and the promotion of large-scale European immigration. The late-nineteenth-century was marked by the increased geopolitical competition of Argentina with Brazil. Even though status concerns remained dominant, assumptions about the racial degeneration of Latin American countries remained prevalent. For one thing, this put Argentina above its Spanish American neighbours and, importantly, its long-time rival Brazil. For another, it also placed the country below (northern) Europe and the United States.

Chapter 5 discusses the case of Mexico. Like their Spanish American counterparts in Argentina, early nineteenth-century Mexican elites expected their country to play an important role in international affairs, a view that was confirmed and, to some extent, reinforced by the ostentatious descriptions provided by foreign travellers, most importantly Alexander von Humboldt, whose *Political Essay on the Kingdom of New Spain* remained a recurring point of reference throughout the nineteenth century. Similar to the *porteños* of the River Plate, the independence period was a moment when role thinking became salient, as Mexicans called into question the distribution of rights and privileges within the Spanish realm. However unlike the Argentine case, Mexico's creole elite soon lost control over the emancipation process, as a rural revolt sidelined their efforts to negotiate greater autonomy from Spain. Although Hidalgo's rebellion was defeated militarily, the fear of social revolution led influential creoles to side with royalist forces, leading to the declaration of independence from Spain as the Mexican Empire in 1821. However, unable to pacify the countryside, Mexico passed though decades of political instability and civil war. To make matters even worse, the new state became embroiled in a disastrous war against the United States (1846-1848), and, as a consequence, lost more than half of its territory to its northern neighbour. The difficulties that Mexico faced in its first decades of independent statehood seriously undermined the confidence that Mexican elites felt in the future of their state. As in Argentina, Mexico's unfulfilled promise was rationalized in civilizational terms, which also influenced the way in which local elites thought about the standing of their state. In order to bolster its international status, Mexico embarked on a policy of prestige that included not only the refurbishment of Mexico City according to the Parisian ideal, but also

a reframing of racial miscegenation as virtuous and 'cosmic',[78] a form of status assertion that gained strength in the aftermath of the Mexican Revolution in 1910.

The Brazilian case examined in Chapter 6 adds further weight to the argument that Latin American states were diplomatically recognized but not regarded as fully-fledged members of international society. The preservation of Braganza rule facilitated Brazil's recognition, but it also implied the subordination of the newly created empire under British tutelage. Paradoxically, the Brazilian Empire was the only case in early nineteenth-century Latin America where foreigners enjoyed a limited form of extraterritorial jurisdiction, which, according to the orthodox English School account, demarcates the exclusion of a state from international society. By the mid-nineteenth century, Brazil was sufficiently consolidated to renege on British demands, leading to the expiration of the Office of the Judge Conservator in 1844. Brazil confronted Britain on the slave trade question. However, following Britain's coercive stance under the Aberdeen Act, the imperial government had to back down, and, against domestic opposition, enforced its abolition. As argued below, British insistence had more to do with prejudices about the inability of Brazil to administer justice than the functional demands of the 'Imperialism of Free Trade'.[79] Brazilian elites, by contrast were conscious about the inferior status that extraterritoriality implied.

During much of the second half of the nineteenth-century, Brazilian foreign policy was bifurcated. On the one hand, Brazil asserted its stature regionally, leading to substantial territorial gains that were secured through bilateral treaties with its Spanish American

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[78] Vasconcelos 1997 [1925].
[79] Gallagher and Robinson 1953.

neighbours. One the other hand, Brazilian elites were aware of the negative view that foreigners at the 'core' of international society had about the country, trying to increase its prestige through measures that were remarkably similar to the policy pursued by Argentina and Mexico. Status concerns, then, also help to elucidate Brazil's seemingly contradictory policy with regard to international law: on the one hand, Brazil insisted on adhering to allegedly universal (European) rule of norms within the region, defending, for instance, the right of states to enforce pecuniary claims against the attempts of Spanish Americans to refine the legitimate use of force; on the other hand, internationally, Brazil made a strong case for substantive sovereign equality, against common practice among European states, at the Second Hague Conference in 1907.

Lastly, the conclusion revisits the principal insights gained from this study and discusses their wider implications for theorizing the emergence of contemporary international society. The cases of Argentina, Mexico and Brazil illustrate hierarchical nature of nineteenth-century international society. Hierarchy matters in international politics. The theoretical claim advanced in this study suggests that the way in which hierarchy influences international relations is through agents' perception of stratification. Latin Americans, it is suggested here, conceived of the standing of their states first and foremost in terms of an inferior status. Ultimately, it was this perception that informed their policies to be recognized as fully-fledged members of the international order.

CHAPTER 2

REVISITING THE 'EXPANSION OF INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY'

1. Introduction[1]

The historical evolution of international society is a central theme in the English School approach to international relations. The orthodox narrative finds its clearest expression in *The Expansion of International Society*, edited by Bull and Watson, but features in earlier accounts as well.[2] According to this account, the re-organization of Latin Christendom into numerous sovereign states led to the emergence of an anarchical international society in Europe, from whence it spread to encompass the entire globe due to the military and economic dominance of European powers. With decolonization following WWII, the process culminated in the transformation of an originally European into a global international society. European in its origin, international society bears the mark of its birth: it is 'founded upon the division of mankind and of the earth into separate states, their acceptance of one another's sovereignty, of the principles of law regulating their co-existence and co-operation, and the diplomatic conventions facilitating their intercourse'.[3]

Two central tenets emerge from the English School account of the expansion of international society. First, it follows from the mutual recognition of state sovereignty that

[1] This chapter draws partly on Schulz 2014.
[2] Hence, Vigenzzi regards Bull and Watson 1984, 'for all its patchiness, lacunae and tension' as the 'most complete achievement' of the British Committee on International Theory, Vigezzi 2005, 289.
[3] Bull and Watson 1984b, 2.

the members of international society are regarded as equals—at least in the formal, juridical sense.[4] The expansion of international society is presented as a gradual process, during which aspirant states were admitted into international society through the practice of diplomatic recognition.[5] Like all routinized forms of social action, diplomatic recognition is a practice governed by norms.[6] Norms are implicit or explicit standards of appropriateness that are shared by the members of particular group or society. Accordingly, existing studies examine how the members of international society have defined and policed norms of legitimate statehood.[7] Fabry, for instance, provides an insightful account of how the principle of dynastic legitimacy was gradually replaced by de facto statehood as a precondition for recognition, which the author attributes to a change in policy of Britain and the United States following the independence of Latin American states.[8]

At first glance, the advantage of this approach appears obvious: diplomatic recognition offers a discrete event, an identifiable point of transition at which outsiders become accepted members of international society. But recognition is not always straightforward. More recent examples, such as Palestine and Kosovo, serve as reminders that it is not always clear when and whether a state is recognized as a fully-fledged member of the

[4] Ibid., 23, 24; Brownlie 1984, 357; Bull 1984a, 124; Wight 1977, 23. See also, Bull 1977, 35, 67, note that for Bull, 'equality' implies 'equality before the law', 76.
[5] While long neglected, recognition has received increased attention lately. In IR the focus has been predominantly on recognition as foreign policy instrument, see for instance, Peterson 1982; Newnham 2000; Ringmar 2002. More recent studies drew on theories from social psychology and philosophy on the importance of social recognition for individuals' self-esteem, such as Taylor 1992; Honneth 1995; Nicolaidis 2007; Greenhill 2008; Lebow 2008; Wolf 2011; Agné et al. 2013. Scholars of international law have long debated the legal and political consequence of recognition, see Lauterpacht 1947; Grant 1999; Crawford 2006.
[6] On 'practices', see Neumann 2002, 630-631; 2011, 5.
[7] Most importantly Gong 1984. But also Reus-Smit 1999; Caplan 2005; Clark 2005.
[8] Fabry 2010, in particular, 49-78.

international community.[9] In the Latin American case, the United States recognized the first states through public declaration by President Monroe, even if, as the Mexican case below illustrates, this was not necessarily accepted as consummation of the fact. By contrast, recognition from European powers was generally extended through treaties of friendship, commerce, and navigation. The Brazilian case was an exception in this regard, as recognition took the form of an anti-slave trade agreement. Yet these treaties were often preceded by other, more ambiguous forms of recognition, for instance when Britain allowed vessels flying the flags of the Spanish American insurgents into its ports in 1822. Given these difficulties, it is not surprising that the English School has struggled with a number of exceptional but very important cases whose exact dates of 'admission' remain disputed.[10]

More importantly, the strong commitment to sovereign equality that came to characterize international society following WWII, and which became a foundational principle of the United Nations, should not divert from the fact that equality among states—both formal and substantive—was not the norm prior to the twentieth century. Although the principle of sovereign equality can be traced back to European intellectual and legal history since at least the eighteenth century, its wide acceptance in the twentieth century has to do not only with the diffusion of European norms and principles, as the English School would suggest,

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[9] The Correlates of War 2011 (COW) project deals with this problem in two ways: for the period of 1816 to 1920, a state is regarded as member if its population is exceeds 500,000, and if Britain and France established a diplomatic representation above the rank of chargé d'affaires.

[10] The case of the Ottoman Empire is instructive, as authors disagree on whether it acceded with the Treaty of Paris in 1856, see Naff 1984, 169; Stivachtis 1998, 87; or following the abolition of the capitulations in the Treaty of Lausanne of 1923, see Gong 1984, 31-32; Stivachtis 2014, 115. But does this mean that the Ottoman Empire was clearly 'outside' international society? As Yurdusev maintains, the Ottoman Empire 'pursued a conscious policy of balance vis-à-vis the European powers', concluded treaties with European princes, and although the first resident embassy was only establish in 1793, maintained regular diplomatic relations with European courts, Yurdusev 2009, 72, 74.

but was the result of the demands and political struggles of hitherto marginalized peoples. Japan's unsuccessful push for racial equality at the Paris Peace Conference is one example, as is the insistence of Latin American delegates on strict sovereign equality during the Second Hague Conference in 1907.[11] Lastly, even after the universalization of sovereign equality, remnants of legalized hierarchies still prevail in contemporary international society, most apparently in the distribution of voting rights in international organizations.[12]

This leads to the second tenet. The international order of the nineteenth-century was highly stratified. Yet the hierarchical nature of this order is not fully accounted for in the English School orthodoxy, premised on the gradual expansion of an originally European order, and the admittance of new states as sovereign equal members of international society. Hierarchy, in this view, only plays a role in the relationship between the insiders of international society and the more heterogeneous 'rest': those political communities outside the 'West' that were only progressively admitted into the 'club'. By the turn of the twentieth century, it is argued, this relationship was mediated by a 'standard of civilization', requiring 'non-Western' societies to accept 'Western' norms and institutions before they qualified for full membership. In this view, the evolution of modern international society was not only a process driven by European expansionism, but a confrontation between different standards of organizing international life.[13] Gong regards the 'standard of civilization' as the result of a transition from natural law to positivism, during which a vague civilizational ideal became moulded into an explicit legal doctrine

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[11] See Hicks 1908, 132-154; Finnemore 2003, 33; Finnemore and Jurkovich 2014, 363; Simpson 2004; Stirk 2012, 653-654.
[12] Kingsbury 1999, 79-80; Krisch 2003; Simpson 2004; Anghie 2005; Hurrell 2007, 207; Pitts 2013, 139.
[13] Gong 1984, 3, 97.

that defined the boundaries of international society.[14] A critical engagement with Gong's 'standard of civilization' is important not only because it highlights the limits of distinguishing between 'Western' insiders and the 'non-Western' outsiders, but also because it exposes the problems that stem from the legal-formalist conception of standing that underpins the English School account.

Because of the profound demographic and cultural impact that centuries of European colonization had on Latin American societies, and because local elites drew largely on European ideas and institutions in the creation of the new states, the conventional English School account considers Latin America as part of the 'West'.[15] This is why, once recognized, Latin American states were allegedly treated as members of international society. They would not have faced the same cultural barriers and racial prejudice that societies in Africa, Asia and the Middle East had to overcome. There is certainly some truth to the claim. The proximity between European and Latin American elites facilitated recognition, which was achieved in the first decades of independence. The difference becomes quite clear by comparing, in first instance, the relative ease with which the Brazilian Empire under Peter I gained international recognition, with the years of international isolation that Haiti experienced after its successful slave revolt led to independence in 1804.[16] Furthermore, unlike China, Japan or the Ottoman Empire, nineteenth century legal scholars did regard Latin America as part of international society. At the same time, however, European and North American statesmen and publicists were

[14] Ibid., 5, 240; 2002a, 78-80.
[15] Bull 1984a, 122; O'Hagan 2002, 114. The 'West' is an inherently problematic concept. In the conventional expansion narrative, the 'West' refers to European and their 'offshoots', including North and South America, and the settler societies in Australia, New Zealand and South Africa, Bull 1984b, 217.
[16] See Moya Pons 1985; Shilliam 2006; Cantir 2013.

ambiguous about the standing of Latin American states. Viewed from the 'apex' of international society, political instability in Spanish America and racial and cultural heterogeneity, more generally, raised doubts about the membership of these societies within the community of 'civilized' states.

In what follows, the chapter develops a critique of the legal-formalist conception of standing that underpins the orthodox English School account of the expansion of international society. The first section focuses on the principle of sovereign equality. Contrary to widespread belief, it argues that the principle was not instituted as part of the 'Westphalian settlement' of 1648; nor was it the norm (in the sense of being perceived as the 'normal' state of affairs) among European states in the eighteenth century, at the time when Emerich de Vattel developed the principle in his *Droit des gens*.[17] The emergence of sovereign equality in international society cannot be seen as independent from its historical evolution and, importantly, the contributions of agents outside Europe. Whereas the first section attempts to unsettle the image of a pluralist European international society of equal states (that is the norm 'within'), the second section takes issue with the 'standard of civilization' that allegedly defined the boundaries of nineteenth-century international society (the norm 'without'). The discussion concludes that rather than focusing on the gradual 'admission' of outsiders into the core of international society, the debate should be reoriented to questions of 'standing' and the political consequence of an international order that is characterized by multiple forms of differentiation.

[17] Vattel 1834 [1758].

2. Sovereign Equality Within

The view that the members of international society are formally equal seems widely accepted in IR in general, and in the English School in particular. Bull, for instance, considers the norms of sovereign equality and non-intervention as the two 'corollary principles' to the mutual recognition of sovereignty, as the 'basic rule of co-existence'.[18] 'Sovereignty', as Jackson argues, 'is a status, a legal standing, and thus a right to engage in relations and to make agreements with other sovereign states on a basis of formal equality'.[19] Given that the 'anarchical society' is composed of sovereign states, each claiming supreme authority within its respective territory,[20] it seems only logical that all members of international society are equal. The 'fundamental principles' of European international society, according to Watson, 'were that all members states were to be regarded as juridically equal and that their sovereignty was absolute'.[21] For Buzan, the mutual recognition of sovereign equality is the 'bottom line' that demarcates the members from the outsiders of international society, a criterion that is also adopted in Stivachtis' account of the entry of Greece into nineteenth-century international society.[22] Similarly, James maintains that, despite the vast and apparent disparities among states with regard to

[18] Bull 2002 [1977], 35.
[19] Jackson 2000, 110.
[20] Philpott 2001, 16. For similar conceptions of sovereignty, see also Hinsley 1986, 25-26; Ruggie 1993, 151; Jackson 2007, x. It is different from Bartelson's 1995 genealogical approach; it also differs from Krasner's 1999 conception of sovereignty based on a distinction between authority and control that leads the author to identify four separate meanings of sovereignty: 'international legal', 'Westphalian', 'domestic' and 'interdependence sovereignty'. Krasner's distinction is misleading, as the last two relate to sovereignty only as far as they concern the authority of states to exercise control within a territory and its borders, not the effective capacity of states to do so.
[21] Watson 1984a, 23.
[22] Buzan 1993, 349; Stivachtis 1998, 42-43, 47, 56-59, 188-189.

their size and strength, international society is a 'classless society'; its members may be distinguished in terms of their 'stature' but 'in point of status, they are all equal'.[23]

In this more conventional reading, the origins of sovereign equality are either traced back to the Peace of Westphalia in 1648, or, more aptly, to the writings of eighteenth-century legal theorist Emerich de Vattel. The treaties of Münster and Osnabrück, which ended the Thirty Years' War between Protestant princes and the Catholic forces of the Holy Roman Emperor, are often regarded as the foundational moment in the emergence of the sovereign-state system.[24] 'The Peace of Westphalia', Holsti asserts, 'represented a new diplomatic arrangement—an order created by states, for states—and replaced most of the legal vestiges of hierarchy, at the pinnacle of which were the Pope and the Holy Roman Emperor'.[25] The treaties of 1648 feature less prominently in the English School orthodoxy, which attributes the genesis of European international society to the practices of fifteenth-century Italian city-states, most importantly the institution of diplomacy conducted through resident embassies.[26] Yet the Peace of Westphalia is nevertheless regarded as a historical turning point in the transformation of Latin Christendom into a society of states. By ending the 'Habsburg pretensions to universal monarchy', Bull asserts, the Peace of Westphalia instituted an order among European princes that was 'anti-hegemonic' in character, and based on the mutual recognition of sovereignty, formal equality and independence of its

[23] James 1992, quotes on 383, similarly, 389; 1993, 287.
[24] For recent review of the debate, see Nexon and Reus-Smit, 69-72.
[25] Cited in Reus-Smit 1999, 87; Holsti 2004, 123; see also, Philpott 2001, 4, 77, 83. Art. V(1) of the Treaty of Osnabrück promulgates 'That there be an exact and reciprocal Equality amongst all the Electors, Princes and States of both Religions', Parry 1969, vol. 1, 214.
[26] Wight 1979, 30; Watson 1984a, 15; Bull 2002 [1977], 101. 'The master-institution of the modern Western states-system is the diplomatic network of resident embassies, reciprocally exchanged. This Italian invention seems to be unique, and found in no other civilization', Wight 1977, 53.

members.[27] In other words, it gave rise to the emergence of 'pluralist' international society (rather than a 'solidarist' order based on a universal moral community, according to English School terminology).

Despite its centrality to IR narratives about the origins of international society, the significance of the Peace of Westphalia remains disputed in the literature. Numerous accounts have challenged the conventional view of 1648 as starting point of modern international relations.[28] This literature clearly demonstrates that, first, the modern territorial state emerged only gradually: a process which had neither begun nor was completed by the seventeenth century;[29] furthermore, and more importantly, neither the conflict nor the treaties that ended the war were concerned with equality as principle for organizing the political relations of European princes. As Croxton points out, questions over precedent loomed large at Westphalia, as France objected to Sweden's bid to be recognized as equal,[30] an observation that is further supported by Ringmar's analysis of Sweden's entry into the war as means to assert its status.[31] Osiander offers a particularly trenchant critique of the 'Westphalian myth':[32] he traces the idea that the peace treaties laid the foundation of the modern political and legal order back to Protestant wartime propaganda, which, according to Osiander, was later resuscitated by nineteenth-century German historians to account for their country's thwarted development of a unified nation-state. Twentieth-century political scientists, starting with Leo Gross, would have accepted

[27] Bull 2002 [1977], 31.
[28] Such as Keene 2002; Teschke 2003; Nexon 2009.
[29] This ties into the wider, and hotly contested, debate on state formation. Prominent proponents of this long-term perspective include Tilly 1990; Spruyt 1994.
[30] Croxton 1999, 582; Reus-Smit 1999, 102-103.
[31] Ringmar 1996a.
[32] Osiander 2001.

this interpretation of the Peace of Westphalia at face value without questioning their historical origins.[33] For Osiander, the prevailing notion of order in seventeenth-century Europe remained hierarchical, where the 'senior royal title in Christendom' continued to command 'immense prestige'.[34] In short, the basis of international differentiation was tradition and precedent, or, in the terminology of this study, status, and not the possession of raw material power (that is, stature, as argued in Chapter 3).

The Thirty Years' War was a conflict over the constitution of the Holy Roman Empire that erupted due to the religious schism that divided post-Reformation Europe. As such, it was a religious conflict rather than the first in a series of European wars fought to prevent the supremacy of one state over the others.[35] From this it also follows that the distinction between pre- and post-Westphalian orders is highly misleading, not only because its sets a dubious benchmark for assessing change in international relations, but, more central to the scope of this study, because the notion misrepresents the relations that existed within Europe and, crucially, between Europeans and non-European political communities. This is the main argument of Keene's important critique of the English School orthodoxy, which, for the author, portrays the unequal relations between Europeans and the extra-European world as 'anomalies' in an otherwise 'pluralist' international society.[36] The Peace of Westphalia did not institute a pluralist international society based on the principles of territorial integrity and sovereign equality. Rather, as Reus-Smit rightly points out, the 'Westphalian settlement' was one stepping-stone in a transformation of the international

[33] Ibid., 246; Keene 2002, 14-22; see also, Stirk 2012, 642.
[34] Osiander 2001, 262-263.
[35] In particular, Nexon 2009; Reus-Smit 2013. For a historiographical overview, see Wilson 2005.
[36] Keene 2002, 3; Fisch 1984; 2001.

order that was only completed in the twentieth century, and whose evolution cannot be adequately understood through the agency of Europeans alone.[37]

The second purported origin of the principle of sovereign equality is eighteenth-century Europe. The classic formulation of the principle of sovereign equality can be found in Vattel's *Droit des gens* of 1758:

> Since men are naturally equal, and a perfect equality prevails in their rights and obligations, as equally proceeding from nature—Nations composed of men, and considered as many free persons living together in the state of nature, are naturally equal, and inherit from nature the same obligations and rights. Power or weakness does not in this respect produce any difference. A dwarf is as much a man as a giant; a small republic is no less a sovereign state than the most powerful kingdom.[38]

What this reference suggests is that sovereign equality, as an abstract principle, did indeed emerge in Europe. Vattel wrote his treatise under the influence of the Seven Years War, with the intention to provide an accessible and practical guide for the 'conductors of states' to equip them with 'the compass by which to steer their course'.[39] Vattel's *The Law of Nations* was strongly influenced by Christian Wolff. However, unlike the latter's work, Vattel published in French, the language of European diplomacy at the time, placing particular emphasis on the rights of states as the ultimate representatives of people's interests.

Sovereign equality, independence, and non-interference were consequently hallmarks of Vattel's legal theory. This is why some commentators have attributed to him the

[37] Reus-Smit 2013, 102; see also 1999.
[38] Vattel 1834 [1758], lxii, see also 148-154.
[39] Ibid., xvi-xvii.

'externalization of sovereignty', in the sense that states would possess the ultimate authority over territory and people, and by fleshing out some of the implications that this entails for the conduct of international affairs.[40] Accordingly, the English School orthodoxy discussed him as an early exponent of the pluralist stance that places order and peaceful co-existence among states over the attainment of substantive justice.[41] However, since the prerogatives of states derive from a social contract, Vattel also acknowledges the right of peoples to revolt against oppression and tyranny—and, concomitantly, the moral duty of others to assist them in their need[42]— which may explain the popularity that his work acquired on the American continents. 'It was no coincidence', as Armitage argues, 'that the conception of statehood as independence found in the [US] Declaration of Independence resembled Vattel's so closely'.[43] Throughout Latin America, the treatise was invoked during the wars of independence, and remained a standard reference thereafter.[44] Its influence is also apparent in Andrés Bello's work. Bello is a central figure in understanding the way Latin American elite sought to bolster the standing of their states. Not only was he directly involved in the negotiation of British recognition of the new states; he also made important contributions to early state formation, and exerted a remarkable influence on later generations of Latin American diplomats and jurists.[45] Like Vattel's attempt to speak to European statesmen, Bello's *Principios de derecho de gentes* [Principles of the Law of Peoples] of 1832 was explicitly directed towards the foreign policy elite of the new Spanish

[40] Beaulac 2003, 241-242.
[41] Hurrell 1999, 233.
[42] Ibid.
[43] Armitage 2007, 40-41. Another reason for Vattel's popularity in the Americas may have been his justification of the expropriation of nomadic peoples, see Epp 2001, 309; Pitts 2013, 142, 147.
[44] Chiaramonte 2000, 65.
[45] On the importance of Bello, see Jaksic 2001; Obregón 2010; Fawcett 2012.As will become clear below, Bello played also a key role in popularizing European civilizational discourse in the region, particularly through his polemic with José Victorino Lastarria over the civilizational merits of the Spanish conquest and civilization of the American continents.

American states. By applying and thereby reinterpreting European sources to the political and legal situation of Spanish America, Bello defended the rights of new states, irrespective of their colonial past and form of government. In a clear reference to Vattel, he notes that: 'Since people are naturally *equal*, so are groups of people who form a universal society. Even the weakest Republic enjoys the same rights and is subject to the same obligations as the most powerful empire'.[46] Yet Bello was also aware of the political realities of his time. In a footnote that Bello included in the third and last edition of 1864, he critically notes that Wheaton's chapter on 'Rights of Equality' in *Elements of International Law* should be more aptly termed 'Rights of Inequality' given that 'in terms of ceremony, there is nothing but differences and privileges'; he also lamented Britain's treatment of Brazil during the Christie affair of 1863. The incident, which led to a six-day blockade of Rio de Janeiro, demonstrated that 'in the affairs between the powerful and the weak, the powerful are at the same time judge and jury', and, in fact, executioner.[47]

To be sure, Vattel noted similar discrepancies between legal doctrine and political reality. However, while arguing that no state could 'naturally lay claim to any superior prerogatives', including 'precedency [sic] and pre-eminence of rank', tradition and consent would justify deviations from the rule.[48] For Vattel, then, equality requires the equal application of the law, but not substantive equality among states. His reservations, however, are also indicative that although the principle of sovereign equality may have originated in

[46] Bello 1954 [1864], 31, own translation, emphasis in original.
[47] Ibid., 32, own translation; see also Obregón 2010, 81.
[48] Vattel 1834 [1758], 148-149.

Europe, states within Europe were not necessarily equal.[49] As Stirk maintains, neither was sovereign equality established at Westphalia, nor was it the norm in the eighteenth century as the international order was still perceived as hierarchical.[50] This is why, according to the author, Vattel's arguments must be understood as historical counterfactual: 'It was counterfactual not just in the sense that Vattel noted, namely that this normative equality stood in contrast to inequalities of power or nature. It was counterfactual in that it did not accord with widespread perceptions and practices in his own day'.[51] Pitts concurs: sovereign equality in the eighteenth century, was an 'aspiration rather than a plausible description of his world'.[52]

These inequalities within Europe are not sufficiently explored in the English School account due to its legal-formalist conception of standing, Wight being the exception, as his discussion of the 'grading of powers' illustrates.[53] In his view, the eighteenth century saw the gradual decline of the 'old order of precedence among sovereigns, based on the antiquity of their titles' in Europe, and its replacement with a differentiation of states based on material capabilities.[54] The Regulation of Vienna (1815) and the subsequent Protocol of Aix-de-Chapelle (1818) clarified the precedence order among states and their diplomatic

[49] As Wight comments: ''From the fourteenth to the eighteenth centuries it was assumed that the states of Western Christendom fell into hierarchy. Feudal society was hierarchical; the society of princes, though each claimed to acknowledge no superior, likewise 'observed degree, priority, and place, office and custom, in all line of order'. Hence the rules of the papal curia, with their tables of the relative dignity of the monarchs and republics of Christendom. Hence the recurrent disputes between powers about precedence', 1977, 135.
[50] Stirk 2012, 646-647, 650.
[51] Stirk, 648.
[52] Pitts 2013, 140.
[53] See Wight 1977, 136; 1979, 63, 295-301; Simpson 2004, 69; Keene 2013a; Reus-Smit 2013, 108.
[54] Wight 1979, 41.

representation abroad.[55] Yet, as Wight maintains, '[i]t is ironical that the same Congress that introduced this rational and egalitarian system first also formally recognized the grading of states according to their power'.[56] Similar ideas have been expressed by Simpson's notion of a 'legalized hierarchy' that would have been put in place by the Congress of Vienna. For Simpson, the legal prerogatives vested in great powers, and the right denied to what he calls 'outlaw states' goes beyond mere 'political inequalities' that may emerge from the unequal distribution of power and wealth among states.[57] This discussion of the Peace of Westphalia and the principle of sovereignty equality casts doubt on the assertion that the members of international society were formally equal, while the absence of sovereign equality demarcated the boundaries of nineteenth-century international society.

3. Standard of Civilization Without

The English School account of the expansion of international society has been strongly influenced by legal scholarship of the late nineteenth and early twentieth century. Central here is the identification of international law with the 'public law of Europe' (*Droit public de l'Europe*), often associated with the displacement of natural law with legal positivism.[58] Whereas natural law is based on notions of a universal human community whose laws can be deduced through reason, legal positivism posits that law consists of humanly enacted

[55] First, the regulations distinguished between four categories of diplomatic missions: (1) ambassadors, legates and papal nuncios; (2) envoys and ministers accredited to head of states; (3) ministers resident accredited to foreign ministers; and (4) chargés d'affaires. Second, they introduced a precedence order among diplomatic representatives based on seniority of accreditation; and thirdly, they established the convention by which signatories would be listed alphabetically on treaties, see also Singer and Small, 1966, 1973; Satow, chapter 11.
[56] Wight 1977, 136.
[57] Simpson 2004, 73.
[58] For instance, Schmitt 1950; Grewe 2000, 466; Anghie 2005, 33, 40-48.

rules. International law, then, is premised on state sovereignty, in the sense that it is limited to the customs and conventions agreed to between states. Historically, the contraposition between natural and positive law is problematic.[59] Naturalist arguments never fully disappeared from legal thought—not even during the height of legal positivism at the turn of the nineteenth century. Nor did earlier generations of legal theorists regard the international order as 'flat'. The distinction between Christians and infidels, for instance, played an important role in the colonization of the Americas and in the development of international law more generally.[60] Yet, from a natural law perspective, individuals and, by extension, political entities such as states, are naturally bound to certain normative obligations. They can neither opt out nor be excluded from the overarching *civitas gentium maxima*:[61] a notion nowadays enshrined in the international human rights regime.

This legacy is apparent in Bull's scepticism about the existence of a universalist notion of international community before the early twentieth century.[62] According to Buzan, the English School orthodoxy adopts a 'vanguardist' account of the evolution of international society that places Europe and the West at the centre of the expansion narrative.[63] This can be contrasted with a 'syncretist' perspective, which understands contemporary international society as 'a globally generated phenomenon'.[64] In more recent years, this view is advocated by global historians who study the emergence of modernity in terms of global encounters and connections, with particular emphasis on the nineteenth century as crucial

[59] Koskenniemi 2001, 4.
[60] See Muldoon 1979; Pagden 1995; Benton 2002.
[61] Kingsbury 1999, 72.
[62] Bull 1984a, 125.
[63] Buzan 2004, 222; 2010, 2-3.
[64] Ibid. 2010, 13.

transformative period.[65] In the history of international law, a seminal study that substantiates the 'syncretist' view has been Alexandrowicz's history of legal relations between Europeans and non-European rulers.[66] Before the 'narrowing' of the law of nations into a regional, European order, a mutual interest in trade between European and Southeast Asian rulers led to widespread treaty-making and diplomacy, often reflecting local customs and traditions—and this despite religious doctrines on both sides that prohibited the establishment of legal relations with 'infidels'.[67] It would therefore be misleading to characterize international law as an outgrowth of European civilization: 'For to consider the European nucleus of States as the founder group of the family of nations to the exclusion of Asian Sovereigns in the East Indies was to view the origin and development of that family in the light of positivist conceptions which were only born at the turn of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries'.[68]

Bull acknowledges that Europeans traded, entered into military alliances, and, at times, concluded reciprocal agreements with non-European polities.[69] 'But they were not united by a perception of common interests, nor by a structure of generally agreed rules setting out their rights and duties in relations to one another, nor did they co-operate in the working of common international institutions'.[70] In this view, universalist notions of international society were purely theoretical, with little political relevance and 'no foundation in the will

[65] Exemplary are Pomeranz 2000; Bayly 2004; Osterhammel 2014. On the debate in IR, see Buzan and Lawson 2013; and the critical response by Musgrave and Nexon 2013.
[66] Alexandrowicz 1967; 1973.
[67] Ibid. 1967, 89, 94.
[68] Ibid., 11; for a critical rebuttal, see Grewe 2000, 466.
[69] This aspect of the international order is explored in Alexandrowicz 1967.
[70] Bull 1984a, 117.

or consent of political communities throughout the world'.[71] International society may have evolved as it spread in the process of European expansion. But, in the end, it was the European powers who defined the 'rules of the game': 'It was in fact their conception of an international society of juridically equally sovereign states that came to be accepted by independent political communities everywhere as the basis of their relations'.[72] This is why, according to the English School, the boundaries of international society were defined in civilizational terms.[73] This applies not only to the historical 'European international society'; international orders elsewhere were founded upon a 'common culture or civilization', defined by 'a common language, a common epistemology and understanding of the universe, a common religion, a common ethical code, a common aesthetic or artistic tradition'.[74] This is why, prior to European expansionism, there was no global international society, but only a number of regional orders 'each with its own distinctive rules and institutions, reflecting a dominant regional culture'.[75]

The 'Standard of Civilization'

Because the boundaries of the originally European international society were defined in civilizational terms, non-Western states had to comply with a certain standard of

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[71] Ibid., 120; Keene 2002, 26-27. Bull's rejection of Alexandrowicz's thesis is particularly apparent in his polemic with Donelan, see *Times Literary Supplement,* 26 May 1978. See also, Bull's and Holbraad's editorial note in Wight 1979, 13. Although he also emphasizes the Western origins, once more, Wight seems to differ from the English School orthodoxy: in his view, 'Alexandrowicz's thesis deserves careful and sympathetic scrutiny'; he would have overstated his claim to 'correct an interpretation of the history of the state system that was exaggerated (as well as being today politically unfashionable)'; summarizing his own position, Wight concludes: 'I believe that a proper view of the nascent states-system will be stereoscopic, seeing in the states-system a dual nature, two concentric circles, European and universal', 1977, 118. 'A diplomatic formulation for a states-system that had a European core and a non-European penumbra' , ibid., 151-152. The divergence of Wight's account of the evolution of international society is noted by Epp 2001.
[72] Bull 1984a, 124.
[73] For a discussion, see, for instance, O'Hagan 2002; 2005; Buzan 2010, 339-340; Hobson 2012.
[74] Bull 2002 [1977], 15.
[75] Bull and Watson 1984b, 1.

appropriateness before qualifying for recognition. In the English School orthodoxy, this is commonly referred to as the 'standard of civilization'.[76] In Gong's view, the historical evolution of international society was not only about European economic and military dominance, but a 'confrontation between civilizations and their respective culture systems'.[77] Based at first on vague civilizational ideals of Enlightenment Europe, Gong posits that in the course of the nineteenth century the standard developed into an explicit legal doctrine based on the tripartite classification of humanity into 'civilized', 'barbarous' and 'savage' peoples—whereas only the first enjoyed the full rights and obligations of international law.[78] This also implies that membership was made on a certain degree of homogenization, which is why non-Western polities had to undergo profound domestic reform, and, crucially, to accept the rules and principle of international society as defined by the West.[79]

The so-called standard of civilization has received considerable attention in recent years, with a plethora of scholars arguing for the continuing relevance of civilizational standards in world politics, ranging from the principles of liberal market economics, the democratic governance, to the protection of human rights.[80] Despite this renewed interest, Gong's interpretation of the nineteenth-century 'standard' as legal principle has attracted relatively little scrutiny.[81]

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[76] 1984.
[77] Ibid., 3, 44, 97; quote in Gong 2002b, 78.
[78] 1984, 4, 240.
[79] Bull 1984a, 120-122.
[80] Donnelly 1998; Jackson 2000, 290; Keene 2002, 120-144; Paris 2002; Mazlish 2004, 104; Simpson 2004, 246; Mazower 2008; Bowden 2009; Hobson 2012, 310.
[81] Rare exceptions from the perspective of IR include Bowden 2009, 105; Phillips 2012, 10-11., and the contributions to the Millennium Special Issue 42(3)

Gong's main concern is the difficult experience of China, Japan and, to a lesser extent, Siam (today's Thailand) with the expansion of international society. In these cases, the 'standard of civilization' is helpful for understanding the unequal treatment that these political communities received from European powers and the United States. After refusing to engage in foreign trade and diplomacy, China was forced to open its ports following the First Opium War through the Treaty of Nanking in 1842. Paradoxically, while China had to abandon its long-standing Sinocentric worldview that placed the Middle Kingdom at the heart of a network of tributary relations with its neighbours, this 'unequal treaty' granted British subjects extraterritorial rights, a legal privilege that was subsequently extended to other powers.[82] The United States, then, was instrumental in the opening of Japan under Commodore Perry in the 1850s, leading to a similar system of legal exemptions, which were subsequently also imposed on Siam. Because these long-established Asian states were regarded as 'barbarous' entities, they were treated as inferior, but nevertheless as legitimate states that were not open for outright colonial annexation. In response to this unequal treatment, China and Japan underwent a process of political and social reform to comply with the 'standard of civilization'—although, as Suzuki points out, they were far from being passive recipients, appropriating foreign ideas and institutions selectively.[83] Chinese elites were reluctant to promote domestic reform and did not accept Western norms, opting instead for increasing Chinese power and wealth through the use of Western technology. Japanese elites, by contrast, were eager to be recognized as 'civilized' states, which not only included far-reaching domestic Westernization, but also the development of its own

[82] Gong 1984; Zhang 1991; Suzuki 2009.
[83] Ibid. 2009.

civilizing mission, contributing eventually to the rise of imperialism in Meiji Japan.[84] Hence, the socialization of these states was not just about the adoption of social norms:[85] '[w]hat is important here is that the novice is capable of *convincing* her peers that she has attained the attributes necessary to qualify for membership'.[86] In both cases, the crucial question was how elites responded to their perceived marginalization within international society, which is why Suzuki's contribution raises important questions about agency in the expansion of international society more generally, and the role of local elites in particular.

The agency question is also explored by Roberson's analysis of 'legal borrowing' in late-nineteenth and early-twentieth century Egypt. Roberson argues that Egyptian elites introduced elements of European law selectively to renegotiate its relations with the European colonial powers. Local elites embarked on legal reforms that sought the gradual extension of the jurisdiction of newly created courts, thereby abolishing the extraterritorial privileges of European powers: 'the key to a successful judicial reform, so it was thought, was not only to make Egypt look more 'European' legally speaking but also to persuade the Europeans to be bound by the new law'.[87] Although these reforms did not achieve their immediate aim, Roberson concludes, the introduction of a legalist approach was instrumental in gaining independence from Britain in 1922 and the abolition of the capitulations in the 1930s.[88]

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[84] Ibid., 178-180.
[85] On socialization as internationalization of external social norms, see Hurd 1999, 388; Checkel 2005, 804; Johnston 2008, 20-23.
[86] Ibid., 2009, 30, emphasis in original.
[87] Roberson 2009, 192.
[88] Ibid., 204.

The agency of states outside the European core is underestimated by the conventional account of the expansion story.[89] Furthermore, because Gong's account is premised on a confrontation between Western and Asian civilizations, he misses the ubiquity of civilizational rhetoric in the nineteenth century. Phillips, for instance, emphasizes the ambiguous nature of the 'standard of civilization' in rationalizing imperial expansionism. 'Throughout the 19th century, and even under the lengthening shadow of European imperialism', he writes, '"civilization" contained multiple meanings, some of which served to aid and abet imperial violence, while others worked to arrest—or at least temporarily inhibit and frustrate—imperial enterprises'.[90]

As the subsequent case studies illustrate, despite the deep cultural, political, and demographic imprint that European colonization left on Latin America, the civilizational standing of these states was far from being taken for granted—neither in Europe and the United States, nor within Latin Americans countries themselves. The ideal of civilization does not provide a clear demarcation line between 'insiders' and 'outsiders' of international society. Even within Europe, the colonization of predominately white and Catholic Ireland was rationalized by the very same civilizational standards that were also invoked to justify British rule over India.[91] The same can be said about Portugal, long regarded as Britain's 'subservient satellite', where British subjects enjoyed extensive extraterritorial rights long before the imposition of treaty ports in Asia and the Ottoman Empire. [92]

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[89] See also, Englehart 2010; Pella 2014.
[90] Phillips 2012, 10; see also Towns 2009.
[91] Sullivan 1983, 605-606, 610; Bell 2006, 283.
[92] Boxer 1969, 184.

A central problem with the orthodox expansion narrative is its legal-formalism, which it inherited from nineteenth and early twentieth century legal scholarship. Gong, as has been pointed out, considers the 'standard of civilization' the product of the replacement of natural law by legal positivism in the nineteenth century. While it is true that civilizational standards rationalized Western imperialism, as evidenced by the partition of Africa under the Berlin Act of 1885, there was considerable ambiguity in international law, because publicists did not universally recognize the 'standard of civilization' as 'an explicit legal principle'.[93] As Koskenniemi explains:

> No stable standard of civilization emerged to govern entry into the "community of international law" [...] The existence of a "standard" was a myth in the sense that there was never anything to gain. Every concession was a matter of negotiation, every status dependent on agreement, *quid pro quo*. But the existence of a *language of a standard* still gave appearance of fair treatment and regular administration to what was simply a conjectural policy.[94]

Gong's account draws heavily on Lorimer's *The Institutes of the Law of Nations*, in which the author divided humanity into 'three concentric zones or spheres'.[95] Only 'civilized' peoples, including Europe and its extensions in overseas, were entitled to 'plenary recognition' and, therefore, to full international legal personality with all the rights, duties and protections this entailed. Thus conceived, international society was, in its inception, region-specific and delimited by the boundaries of what would nowadays be regarded as Western civilization. As Henry Wheaton put it, international law derived from the customs and conventions of European peoples, it was, in the first place, the 'law of the civilized,

[93] Gong 2002a, 80.
[94] Ibid. 2001, 134-135, emphasis in original; see also, Obregón 2012, 935-936.
[95] Lorimer 1883, 101.

[C]hristian nations of Europe and America'.[96] Yet Lorimer did not regard of himself as positivist, nor was he interested in 'empirical jurisprudence' based on the accumulation of 'lifeless facts', which is why he is sometimes regarded as late proponent of natural law.[97] In practice, however, even so-called legal positivists found it difficult to draw the boundaries of international society along civilizational lines. Oppenheim's writings are illustrative in this regard. In what can be regarded as an early account of the expansion story, Oppenheim identified the different stages in which the international community expanded: from Europe, to the Americas, over the inclusion of the Ottoman Empire, to the acceptance of the ancient powers of East Asia.[98] But Oppenheim also alludes to the difficulties of making a final judgement about the place of Persia, Siam, China, Korea and Abyssinia: 'These are certainly civilised States, and Abyssinia is even a Christian State', yet he maintains that 'their civilisation has not yet reached that condition which is necessary to enable their Government and their population in every respect to understand and to carry out the command of the rules of International Law'.[99]

What emerges from this account is the discretionary nature according to which states were recognized as being part of the family of 'civilized' nature. As Westlake observed, 'Our international society exercises the right of admitting outside states to parts of its international law without necessarily admitting them to the whole of it'.[100] More importantly, Oppenheim's comments on Abyssinia and other seemingly 'civilized' states suggests that a wholly different logic than 'civilization' was at work here: namely, racial

[96] Wheaton 1836, 51.
[97] Lorimer 1883, 19-22.
[98] 1905, 30-34.
[99] Ibid., 33.
[100] Cited in Simpson 2004, 238.

prejudice. As Bell explains, the dichotomy between civilization and barbarism was but one possible conception of global order, and one that was riddled with contradictions and ambiguities:

> The binaries were complemented, supplanted, and occasionally undermined by other attempts to classify and order the world. This often resulted from the difficulties faced incorporating liminal societies, those that fell awkwardly between the categories of civilized and barbarian. China, Japan, Russia, the Ottoman empire, *the newly independent republics of Latin America*, even the countries of southern Europe—all presented difficulties and generated debate.[101]

This suggests that the ideal of civilization was employed to rationalize inequalities in nineteenth-century international society. But this does not mean that an explicit 'standard of civilization' existed that permitted the clear separation of the members of international society from the 'rest'. More accepted among legal scholars was the so-called 'minimum standard of treatment'. This is the principle to which Schwarzenberger referred when he first described the 'standard of civilization' in 1955.[102] The recognition of a political community, according to Schwarzenberger, depended on 'whether its government was sufficiently stable to undertake binding commitments under international law and whether it was able and willing to protect adequately the life, liberty and property of foreigners'.[103] Contrary to Gong's interpretation of a civilizational conflict, it is important to note that the 'minimum standard of treatment' was invoked to justified the imposition of unequal treaties in East Asia, just as it was used to rationalize 'diplomatic impositions' and 'pacific blockades' against smaller states within the 'West' itself. Although the first 'pacific

[101] Bell 2006, 283, emphasis added.
[102] Schwarzenberger 1955.
[103] Ibid., 220.

blockade' was imposed against Greece in 1827,[104] the instrument was primarily used by European naval powers against Latin American states, starting with the French blockade of Mexico during the Pastry War of 1838 and lasting until the Venezuela Crisis of 1902-3, all of which were 'justified' by the inability or unwillingness of local governments to protect the life and property of foreign nationals.[105] Scholars may have disagreed on the legality of blockading the ports of a foreign country without a formal declaration of war, but, as Fisch maintains, they generally recognized the responsibility of states to protect 'civilized life'.[106] This is not to deny the role of international law in European colonialism and the unequal treatment of non-European peoples. However, rather than conceiving of international society as an originally European order that expanded across the globe, the picture that emerges from this discussion is one of an hierarchical international order whose underlying logic of stratification shifted over time. As Fisch elaborates: 'It was a distinctive feature of European expansion that, along actual legal relations, multifaceted claims to rights were merely that—claims that were often only later enforced, if at all'.[107] It was not that the 'standard of civilization' offered a way to become a member of international society. But the 'standard' was part of a redefinition of earlier legal relations during a time of unprecedented European economic and military power.

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[104] Oppenheim 1914, 577; Verzijl 1976, 45.
[105] The implications of the 'minimum standard of treatment' for Latin American states are discussed in Lipson 1985, 16-19; Finnemore 2003, 25; Tomz 2007.
[106] Fisch 2001, 247-248.
[107] Ibid. 1984, 17.

4. Conclusion

Latin American states occupied a limbo-like position within nineteenth-century international society. The supposedly 'Western' credentials of these societies—having a predominately Christianized population led by local elites who were often the direct descendants of European conquistadores and colonizers, and who drew on European ideas and institutions in the creation of the new states—certainly facilitated diplomatic recognition by the European powers and the United States. In theory, the European ancestry of Latin American states ensured that they inherited their place in the family of 'civilized' nations. In practice, however, there was considerable ambiguity regarding their credentials as 'civilized' states. The results were twofold. First, although the independence of Latin American states was not seriously questioned after it had been won as a matter of fact, great power tutelage and foreign interventions were frequent and rationalized in similar terms to those in 'semi-civilized' and 'barbarous' countries outside the 'West'. Secondly, within Latin America, elites were acutely aware of their international marginalization, pursuing a dual-strategy of international insertion that aimed at 'completing civilization' at home,[108] while, projecting an image of orderly societies abroad.

The English School orthodoxy fails to fully capture the stratified nature of international society, both within Europe, as elaborated in section one, as well as with regard to the supposed 'outsider', the subject of section two. This chapter has suggested that the underlying problem is a legal-formalist conception of standing in terms if membership, whereby states are either categorized as 'insiders' (and therefore formally equal), or as 'outsiders' who were gradually admitted through diplomatic recognition. This view is not

[108] The expression goes back to Andrés Bello, see Obregón 2006b, 253.

limited to the English School. Waltz, for instance, famously argues that states are functionally undifferentiated 'like units',[109] an assumption that is rooted in a similar formalism that has also informed the conventional account of the expansion of international society. In fact, IR theorists have long struggled to come to terms with the prevalence of hierarchies in an international order composed of formally sovereign and equal states. Yet despite recurring references to the principle of sovereign equality, international society has always been a thoroughly hierarchical international order. Although diplomatic recognition did play a role, the crucial question is not whether or not a state was a member, but what 'standing' it had in that order. As the following chapter will elaborate, standing can be achieved on more than one dimension, which, perhaps, is best described as 'heterarchy' or 'multiply ranked order'.[110]

[109] Waltz 1979, 93-97; for a critique of Waltz's 'formal-legal theory', see Lake 2009, 24-28.
[110] Donnelly 2009, 69.

CHAPTER 3

‘STANDING’ IN AN HETERARCHICAL INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY

1. Introduction

The previous chapter advanced a critique of the legal-formalist conception of ‘standing’ in the conventional English School account of the expansion of international society. According to this orthodoxy, the members of international society are characterized by the mutual recognition of sovereign equality, whereas the boundaries of international society are defined by norms of legitimate statehood, most notably the nineteenth-century ‘standard of civilization’. The result being that the ‘expansion’ of international society has been conceptualized in terms of a successive admission of states through diplomatic recognition. Drawing on more recent revisionist scholarship, the review concluded that rather than conceiving of international society in egalitarian terms—as being composed of formally sovereign states—international society is best understood as heterarchy, in the sense that it is comprised of multiple dimensions of stratification. This heterarchy reflects the fact that both formal and substantive inequalities existed among the members of nineteenth-century international society.

Based on this critique, the present chapter develops a ‘reflectivist’ conception of standing in international society. Contrary to the legal-formalist definition of standing as membership, in what follows, standing is conceptualized as the position or rank that a state occupies

within an international order that is potentially global in scope.[1] It is true that nineteenth- and early twentieth-century jurists did not regard international society as universal. But the fact that Europeans treated some political communities as 'outsiders' of international society does not mean that they did not maintain diplomatic and legal relations with these communities, nor that these practices were not governed by social norms and expectations.[2] This necessarily shifts the question of 'admission' to one about the position a political community occupied within the international order.

This chapter argues that standing can be achieved on different dimensions that are non-reducible to a single rank order. This means that there is no single hierarchy along which states can readily be ordered, for instance, by their possession of material capabilities, such as the strength or their armed forces and wealth. As discussed in the previous chapter, this is what Donnelly described as 'heterarchy'.[3] In what follows, three ideal-typical dimensions are identified: stature, role, and status. Stature refers to a rank order based on the distribution of material capabilities; role to the distribution of functions in international society; and status to estimations of honour and prestige among states.

[1] Following Bull, a social order is a formal or informal arrangement that sustains core aims of a society. An international order, therefore, refers to a 'purposive pattern' among states, Bull 2002 [1977], 8; see also, Hurrell 2007, quote on 2, 32.
[2] Alexandrowicz 1967; Fisch 1984; 2001; Benton 2002.
[3] Donnelly 2009, 63-66.

Table 1: Three Dimensions of Standing in International Society

	Dimension of Stratification	*Logic of Social Action*
Stature	Material Capabilities	Balance of Power
Role	Functional Differentiation	Role Enactment
Status	Esteem, Honour and Prestige	Status Management

The three dimensions of standing represent ideal types. The argument is made that most forms of international differentiation are captured by one of the three ideal types. Ideal types are not approximations of reality, but conceptual abstractions that highlight analytically crucial aspects of real world phenomenon.[4] This means that, in reality, ideal types only appear in mixed forms. This is best illustrated with the notion of great powers. A common view holds that great powers command great material strength. But great powerdom also reflects a 'functional differentiation' among states because it often entails certain special rights and responsibilities that are recognized by other states. Lastly, great powerdom is also a form of status that is inextricably tied to estimations of honour and prestige, which, for some, are deemed desirable on their own. Great powerdom entails components of all three dimensions of stratification. Empirically they may be interrelated; analytically, however, it is useful to distinguish between them.

[4] Goertz 2006, 83. For a discussion of ideal-type conceptualization in the English School tradition, see Keene 2009, 107.

More generally, then, the tripartite conception of standing sheds light on two important aspects of the stratification of states: In the first place, conceiving of standing this way takes into consideration the multiple dimensions on which states can be ranked. States with great material capabilities may often be dominant on other dimensions, but states with great material capabilities are not always those with the highest prestige in international society. Conversely, relatively small states may enjoy high prestige, but their status is not necessarily based on military prowess or economic wealth. Nor does their role automatically follow from either status or stature. The case studies examined in the following chapters reveal the significance of this analytical differentiation. Nineteenth-century Latin American states were weakly consolidated and lacked military prowess (stature). Yet, as the analysis of elite perceptions illustrates, the marginalization of these states was largely attributed, in both European and North America 'core' and Latin American 'periphery', to their civilization backwardness, which is best understood as an 'underprivileged' position on a status order. That is not to suggest that stature and role were unimportant. At particular points in time, elite discourse demonstrates a heightened preoccupation with military competition (albeit largely regionally confined), as, for instance, during the Southern Cone arms race at the end of the nineteenth century. Similarly, role was seen as crucial during the struggles for independence, as well as during the attempts of Latin American elites to push for the institutionalization of substantive equality among states.

Secondly, while this tripartite conception provides an account of international stratification, its analytical purchase lies in linking ideal-typical *dimensions of stratification* to particular

logics of social action. The notion of 'social action' goes back to Weber's interpretative sociology:

> We shall speak of "action" insofar as the acting individual attaches a subjective meaning to his behavior—be it overt or covert, omission or acquiescence. Action is "social" insofar as its subjective meaning takes account of the behavior of others and is thereby oriented in its course.[5]

A central claim of this study is that nineteenth-century elites in Latin America perceived international society, and their standing therein, primarily in terms of status. Ideal-typically, international society is perceived as being ordered according to either stature, role, or status. Which dimension of stratification is salient depends on external influences and forms part of the shared belief system in a society. But this does not imply that conceptions of order are shared by all of its members. Quite the contrary, notions of how societies should be ordered and relate to each other are politically contentious, and often formed part of domestic political conflict. At the same time, however, ideas do shape the way in which political actors understand the world. As Weber put it, interests may 'govern immediately the conduct of human beings [but] the "worldviews" which have been created by "ideas" have very often, like switchmen, determined the lines on which the dynamic of interests has moved conduct'.[6]

In the present study, conceptions of the ordering of states constitute Weber's proverbial 'switchmen'. More specifically, the interpretative framework builds on a 'reflectivist' or

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[5] Weber 1968, 4. Because social action is purposive and directed at other agents, 'adequate explanation' requires understanding an actor's goals and values. See also, Neumann 2002; Adler and Pouliot 2011, 5.
[6] Weber 1947 [1922-1923], 252, own translation.

constructivist perspective of international relations,[7] which argues that shared meanings form the basis of human action. As Wendt put it, 'people act toward objects, including other actors, on the basis of the meaning those objects have for them'.[8] These meanings are socially constructed; they arise from social interactions that are culturally embedded and historically contingent. This constructivist perspective is compatible with English School theorizing. While constructivist accounts centre on the causal effects of individual norms, they have also described the overarching normative framework that guides the relations between states as 'international society'.[9] English School theorists, in turn, point to the importance of intersubjective understandings for the social constitution of international society. International society, as Wight put it, 'presuppose[s] an international social consciousness'.[10]

The members of international society are states. The sovereign state is the principal actor in international society. States may possess 'legal personality' in international law, but they are only persons in the metaphorical sense. Agency, the ability to act purposively upon a social environment, ultimately resides in individual human beings. 'Individuals', as Wight

[7] Keohane 1988; Goldstein and Keohane 1993, 5.
[8] Wendt 1999, 329-330, paraphrasing Blumer 1969
[9] See, Onuf 1994, 15; Wendt 1999, 21, 195, 292, 355. Finnemore criticizes the English School for not providing the evidentiary basis of 'international society', Finnemore 2001, 509. Yet the same author also uses the concept in her own work, see ibid. 2003, 1. More recently, constructivists have questioned the distinction between system and society that underpins many English School account. For instance, for Reus-Smit, all international systems are inherently social, Reus-Smit 2013, 18. The argument is consistent with Dunne 1995 in that international society exists only intersubjectively as the result of the self-understanding of actors. See furthermore, Epp 1998, who links this approach to hermeneutics; and Jackson 2000, 113-116; Navari 2009a, 4; 2009c, 46.
[10] Wight 1966, 97; Epp 1998, 55-56. As Bull noted in his 1978 review of Donelan's *The Reason of States* the authors of Diplomatic Investigations, 'saw theories of international politics not as "models" or "conceptual frameworks" of their own to be tested against "data" but as theories or doctrines in which men in international history have actually believed'. Similarly, Hurrell notes that Bull, 'was deeply committed [...] to the notion that [international] society is constituted through diverse political practices built around shared, inter-subjective understandings', Bull 2002 [1977], xii; see also, Hurrell 2007 for the author's own 'broadly constructivist approach', 17; Epp 1998, 55-56.

maintains 'are also the ultimate constituents of international society'.[11] Civil servants, diplomats, and politicians represent and act on behalf of the state. People can share meanings and understandings, they can have identities, but states cannot.[12] The point is that collectively shared belief systems shape the range of possibilities that are conceivable to individuals at particular points in time.[13] This is why it is important to study the 'worldviews' or 'cognitive priors' that elites hold in a society to understand how states relate to one another and international society more generally.[14]

The remainder of this chapter substantiates the argument theoretically that perceptions of order have guided Latin American attempts to bolster their international standing. It argues, first, that each dimension is best understood as an independent dimension of stratification; secondly, it also identifies the logic of social action that underpins each ideal-typical dimension. The discussion begins with stature. Stature orders are associated with balancing strategies that seek to either increase a states' material capabilities or to bolster a states' position through the formation of alliances. Although (or perhaps because) Latin American states were militarily weak, stature concerns were only of secondary importance. Alternatively, roles are based on the distribution of functions among states. Rights and duties of states are the most significant aspects of role differentiation. These concerns became salient in the early nineteenth century, when Latin American elites challenged their relationship with the European metropoles; they also became salient later in the attempts of Latin American elites to advocate for the equal rights of states. The most important

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[11] Wight 1979, 106; James 1992, 390; Jackson 2000, 111; Callahan 2004, 318.
[12] *Pace* Wendt 2004.
[13] Koselleck 1982.
[14] Goldstein and Keohane 1993, 8-9; Acharya 2004, 21-23.

concerns among Latin American elites, however, related to status, which was a recurring and overarching theme in elite discourse throughout the entire period. Elites in each case pursued different strategies to 'manage' their status, for instance, by complying with social expectations, or by challenging or supplementing underlying norms. The reframing of Spanish America's Iberian heritage (Argentina) and cultural and racial miscegenation (Argentina, Brazil and Mexico) as virtuous at the turn of the nineteenth century can be seen in this light.

2. Stature as Dimension of Standing

Stature refers to the position that a state occupies within an international rank order based on the distribution of material capabilities, especially military strength and wealth. There is little doubt that stature—sometimes misleadingly referred to as 'material power'—is the most common way IR theorists have thought about and conceptualized the standing of states. This is particularly true for neorealists, who assume that international phenomena are best explained in terms of systemic pressures and constraints. According to Waltz, the intellectual founding father of neorealism, the structure of the 'international system' comprises of three elements: its ordering principle, the differentiation of its 'units', and the distribution of capabilities among its constituting parts. In domestic societies, '[t]he units—institutions and agencies—stand vis-à-vis each other in relations of super- and subordination [...given that] political actors are formally differentiated according to the degree of their authority, and their distinct functions are specified'.[15] But whereas domestic political systems are hierarchically organized, the international realm would be defined by

[15] Waltz 1979, 81.

anarchy: the absence of an overarching authority above the state. Because each state is an autonomous political entity in a sovereign states system, states should be treated as 'functionally undifferentiated', or 'like units' that perform similar functions irrespective of apparent differences in 'size, wealth, power, and form'.[16] Waltz's distinction between hierarchical (domestic) political systems on the one hand, and anarchical international systems, on the other, is often taken as evidence of his failure to conceptualize hierarchy in world politics.[17] But Waltz does not call into question the existence of an international pecking order *per se*. Rather, what he rejects is the importance of role and status differentiation in international politics. The neorealist conception of international differentiation is one-dimensional and based on stature, defined in terms of the military capabilities of states.[18]

Stature depends on tangible assets. The stature of a state should not be confounded with its power.[19] Power is the ability to shape political outcomes. Thus defined, power depends not only on material resources, but on a myriad of tangible, intangible, and situational factors.[20]

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[16] Quotes from ibid., 95, 96, 97.
[17] Hobson and Sharman 2005, 69; Lake 2009.
[18] Note that for Waltz, the distribution of capabilities is an attribute of the system not of individual units, on which Wendt's treatment of roles as systemic features is based. The case is discussed below.
[19] For example, Mearsheimer 2001, 55.
[20] See, Wight 1979, 26; Barnett and Duvall 2005; Baldwin 2013. The 'intangible' aspect of power is highlighted by Nye's 2004 concept of 'soft power'. See also, Berenskoetter and Williams 2007; Guzzini 2013. In a highly intriguing argument, McNeill suggests that the acquired resistance of the local population to yellow fever and malaria significantly influenced imperial rivalries in the Caribbean, and, more generally, assisted revolutionaries in the Americas to fend off European expeditionary forces during the wars of independence, McNeill 2010, 235.

In theory, material capabilities can be measured and combined into a single composite score. Following this logic, Waltz argues that material capabilities in different domains, such as economy and defence, cannot be treated as separate from one another, given that states will mobilize all of their assets to ensure their survival.[21] 'States are not placed in the top rank because they excel in one way or another. Their rank depends on how they score on all of the following items: size of population and territory, resource endowment, economic capability, military strength, political stability and competence'.[22] This approach is also taken by the Correlates of War (COW) project, which compiles demographic, industrial and military indicators into the Composite Index of National Capability (CINC).[23] However, even this widely used and seemingly straightforward conception of material capabilities is not without problems. Technological advances and differential access to technology, such as nuclear weapons, substantially alter how military spending translates into actual capabilities.

Most debates, however, are less concerned with how to conceptualize and measure material capabilities than with the consequences of its distribution. After all, the balance of power has been a defining concept in international thought in general and IR theory in particular.[24] 'If there is any distinctively political theory of international politics' Waltz asserts, 'balance-of-power theory it is'.[25] Yet despite its long legacy—for some it dates back to Thucydides' history of the Peloponnesian War—there is strikingly little consensus on the

[21] *Pace* Keohane and Nye 1977.
[22] Waltz 1979, 131.
[23] See Singer, Bremer, and Stuckey 1972.
[24] The balance of power, according to Levy, 'is one of the oldest and most fundamental concepts in the study of international relations', 2004, 29.
[25] Waltz 1979, 117.

matter.[26] To start, the balance of power can refer to a process or a particular outcome. With regard to the latter, a common view holds that the Congress of Vienna re-established the balance of power in Europe that was unsettled by Napoleon's grasp for the domination of Europe.[27] In this context, the balance of power is an outcome, understood as the absence of a preponderant state or,[28] alternatively, as a condition of approximate parity among great powers.[29]

As a process, the balance of power (or the absence thereof) is often invoked as a crucial explanation for international phenomena, especially major war. But there is also considerable disagreement here. For some, most notably Waltz, the balance of power materializes with law-like regularity because of the unintended consequences of states seeking their survival in a self-help system.[30] For others, it is a conscious policy of statecraft that requires prudence and diplomatic skill. The balance of power, as Butterfield, argues 'is not a thing bestowed upon by nature, but is a matter of refined thought, careful contrivance and elaborate artifice'.[31] Accordingly, Bull, distinguishes between 'fortuitous' and 'contrived' balances, but argues against any automatic mechanism: 'The problem of maintaining a balance of power is not merely one of ensuring that a military balance exists, it is also a problem of ensuring that there exists belief in it'.[32] Walt's theory of alliance formation builds on a similar assumption. While framed as an extension to Waltz's neorealism, Walt suggests that balancing occurs not in response to the distribution of

[26] Sheehan 1996, 1-23; Holsti 2004; Levy 2004, 29; Paul 2004, 5; Little 2007, 11; Wohlforth, Kaufman, and Little 2007, 1.
[27] For instance, Kissinger 1957; Gulick 1955.
[28] Bull 2002 [1977], 97.
[29] Paul 2004, , for instances, uses both, 2 and 5.
[30] Waltz 1979, 128.
[31] Butterfield 1966, 147.
[32] Bull 2002 [1977], 99.

material capabilities but against the perception of threats. 'Aggregate power' is an important factor in this perception, as are geographic proximity, offensive capabilities and, crucially, the nature of an opponent's intentions.[33] That the perception of an actor's intentions influence decision-making has been recognized by Jervis' path-breaking *Perception and Misperception in International Politics.*[34] Misperceptions, as Jervis demonstrates, frequently result in a 'security dilemma', in which the efforts of one state to increase its own security are interpreted as threatening by another. In much the same vein, Van Evera argues that Social Darwinism and the erroneous belief in the superiority of offensive warfare exacerbated the political crisis that led to the outbreak of WWI.[35] Further support of the reflectivist interpretation is provided by Levy. Challenging the claim that the current lack of counterbalancing against US preponderance would undermine the validity of the theory's core proposition, Levy contends that the scope conditions for the balance of power have not been met. This is because the balance of power, as theory, is based on an exclusively European experience. In Europe, however, the balance of power was a deliberate policy, not a consequence of structural forces.[36] It comes as no surprise, then, that historical surveys of the balance of power outside its modern European context find little evidence that systems of independent polities are inherently anti-hegemonial.[37] In short, the position adopted here is that the balance of power is a conscious policy and not an automatic process, which depends on actor's perceptions of the international environment as stature ordered.

[33] Walt 1987, 22-26; see also, Schweller 2006.
[34] Jervis 1976.
[35] Snyder 1984; Van Evera 1984.
[36] Levy 2004, 39-44; see also Sheehan 1996, 97; Haslam 2002, 95; Williams 2005, 195; Little 2007, 5-7; Wohlforth, Kaufman, and Little 2007, 5.
[37] Kaufman, Little, and Wohlforth 2007; Kang 2010.

'Balance of Power' as Logic of Social Action

Balance of power theories provide little definitive guidance on state conduct, but they do suggest some strategies that states have adopted vis-à-vis preponderant states. In the first place, this includes the formation of counterbalancing alliances by secondary states. This 'external balancing' does not directly contribute to a state's stature. Indirectly, however, it influences military capabilities of states, as in the case of NATO's nuclear sharing policy, which provides non-nuclear members with access to nuclear weapons. States can also bolster their stature through enhancing their material capabilities domestically, for instance, by promoting economic growth or an expansion of the domestic arms industry: what Waltz termed 'internal balancing'. By contrast, failing to balance leads to alliances with the preponderant state or group of states: so-called 'bandwagoning'; or it may also lead to 'buck-passing', where the costs of counterbalancing are passed on to third states. Schweller, for instance, argues that Argentina and Brazil failed to check Paraguay's expansionist ambitions, leading to the War of the Triple Alliance.[38]

Balancing behaviour has been particularly attributed to the relations of South American states. Schweller's interpretation of the causes of the War of the Triple Alliance is one example. Other authors have focused on the arms race between Argentina, Brazil and Chile that took place at the end of the nineteenth century.[39] This period saw a heightened geopolitical tension between these countries. However, it would be misleading to interpret the arms race as the result of shifts in the distribution of material capabilities among South

[38] Schweller 2006, 85-102. Alternatively, other authors have suggested that states may also 'soft balance' through diplomacy and the strengthening of institutional constraints, for instance, for instance, Paul 2004; Pape 2005. 'Soft balancing', however is not a form of balancing in the strictest sense, as argued by Lieber and Alexander 2005, 3; Kaufman, Little, and Wohlforth 2007.

[39] Burr 1965; Child 1985; Kelly 1997.

American states.[40] Rather, these shifts were the result of a changing perception among elites of the international, and, in particular, the regional international order as guided by stature concerns. The case studies on Argentina and Brazil demonstrate this change in perception that can be clearly identified in elite discourse in these countries, for instance, in the writings of Argentina's foreign minister Estanislao Zeballos, and José Maria da Silva Paranhos, better-known as the Baron of Rio Branco. Second, although the origins of the arms are often traced back to Chile's 'Prussianization' under Colonel Körner, in fact there is also considerable historical evidence that suggests that the impact of the German military mission had less to do with an increase in Chile's actual military capabilities and more with the indoctrination of the country's elites, particularly its officer corps.[41] Lastly, it is not only important to note that an arms race took place in the Southern Cone, but also to acknowledge how it was resolved. Unlike Europe, where geopolitical tension exploded into WWI, the Southern Cone equivalent was by and large decided through diplomatic means and international law.[42] Tensions between Argentina and Chile dissipated notably after the Treaty of Arbitration of 1902; the triple frontier between Bolivia, Chile and Peru, 'South

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[40] Such an interpretation is offered by Resende-Santos 1996; 2007. Drawing on Waltz's 1979 concept of 'emulation' as a form of internal balancing, he argues that Chile's emulation of German military organization and doctrine in the aftermath of the War of the Pacific (1879–1883) triggered an arms race in the Southern Cone until economic hardship in the early twentieth century rendered this strategy no longer feasible. Facing external threats, secondary states would selectively emulate particular traits of the most militarily competitive great power in the system. Following the Franco-Prussian War (1870-1871), this was Germany, whose military missions were to be found throughout South America by the late nineteenth century. However, like in Walt's 1987 case, neither threat perceptions nor the 'conscious, purposeful imitation' of foreign institutions and practices are, strictly speaking, systemic factors and therefore consistent with Waltzian neorealism.

[41] Hence, the title of a study on the 'Prussianization' of Chile: *The Grand Illusion*, Sater and Herwig 1999. On the impact of the German military missions on the Chilean army and its perceived 'civilizing mission', see Nunn 1983. More recent comparative studies include Centeno 2002; Thies 2005.

[42]While contentious to this day, Bolivia recognized the transfer of the Atacama desert in 1904; the Tacna-Arica dispute between Chile and Peru was settled under US mediation in 1929; The arms race between Argentina and Chile was effectively over with the Treaty of Arbitration of 1902; Brazil drastically expanded its territory under Baron Rio Branco at the expenses of its neighbours, none of which involved the actual use of force.

America's version of Europe's Alsace-Loraine' as one neorealist author quipped,[43] was settled by treaty between 1904 and 1929; and Brazil's territorial expansion under Rio Branco was ultimately achieved through a combination of military pressure and negotiation. Balancing behaviour in Latin America was not caused by real changes in military capabilities, but rather the result of changing elite perceptions about the stature of their states.

As the Brazilian case study in Chapter 6 illustrates, status and prestige (and not stature) was the central concern of Brazilian elites in their relations with international society more broadly conceived. In sum, whether states pursue balance of power strategies depends on the perception of international society by elites as stature order. Stature thinking has been important in Latin America in particular points in time. However, it should also be noted that this was not the norm among elites in nineteenth-century Argentina, Brazil and Mexico, which were predominately concerned with the status of their states, and, to a lesser extent, the role they played internationally.

3. Role as Dimension of Standing

Role differentiation refers to the distribution of tasks and functions among states in international society. In stark contrast to the Waltzian view of states as 'like units', role, as the second dimension of standing, assumes that states are indeed 'functionally

[43] Resende-Santos 1996, 230.

differentiated'.[44] Viewed in historical perspective, empires and other forms of international hierarchy have been more common than international orders comprised of sovereign and formally equal states.[45] Nor did the Westphalian Peace in 1648 mark the end of 'hierarchical authority relations'.[46] In Europe, the Holy Roman Empire continued to exist until 1806, while European colonialism and imperial rule did not abate until well into the twentieth century.[47] Culminating in the second half of the twentieth century, decolonization has led the globalization of sovereignty as principle of organizing international life, but it did not end role differentiation among states.[48] The absence of an overarching authority above the state 'profoundly reduces the number of roles', as Goddard and Nexon explain, but 'it does not follow that this eliminates *all* structural variations in available roles'.[49] This is not to deny the historical transformation that decolonization entailed—even at the height of US preponderance, there has been no return to empire, as some commentators claim.[50] Rather, what this suggests here is that the range of roles that states 'enact' in international society has varied over time.

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[44] Waltz 1979, 97. At the same time, Waltz argues that the vast differences in material capabilities among states give way to 'something of a division of labor', 1979, 105. Note that in social theory, functional differentiation does not necessarily entail rank orders. A prominent example being Weber's treatment of social class as defined by market relations, see Chan and Goldthorpe 2007, 514. Accordingly, drawing on Luhmann's systems theory , Albert, Buzan and Zürn distinguish between segmentary, stratificatory and functional differentiation. However, the differentiation of roles in international society generally leads to forms of stratification, as the distinction between great, minor and small powers illustrates, 2013.
[45] See, Wight 1977; Watson 1992; Buzan and Little 2000; Kaufman, Little, and Wohlforth 2007.
[46] As Waltz identifies with domestic political systems, see 1979, 88. The point is made by Osiander 2001; Hobson and Sharman 2005, 69.
[47] Benton 2002; 2008; Keene 2002.
[48] Hurrell 2007, 266.
[49] Goddard and Nexon 2005, 39, emphasis in original.
[50] The debate abated in recent years but is set against the background of US preponderance, see Hardt and Negri 2000; Ferguson 2004; Cox 2007. For a critical discussions, Hurrell 2007, 262-283; Nexon and Wright 2007.

Role differentiation has been conceptualized from different theoretical angles. A prominent example is the distinction between core and periphery that lies at the heart of dependency and world system theories.[51] Core-periphery thinking builds on the assumption of a differentiated capitalist world economy that is shaped and defined by the division of labour between the industrialized 'core' and the 'periphery' in the underdeveloped world. Although the distinction goes back to Lenin's theory of imperialism, it was first fully articulated by Latin American structuralism, out of which dependency theory eventually emerged.[52]

That the perception of a particular role can motivate state action is illustrated by the political legacy of dependency thinking. During the 1960s and 1970s, dependency theory exercised a remarkable influence on the economic policies of the Third World, calling for social-economic change and the strengthening of the state in promoting development. Core-periphery thinking reached its apogee on a global level in the demand for a New International Economic Order (NIEO), while dependency theory, in particular, was promoted by intellectuals and practitioners in the Third World, 'as the first genuine peripheral approach to development and international insertion'; and as part of their struggles for 'international recognition, dignity and equality'.[53] Despite having lost much of

[51] Frank 1967; Cardoso and Faletto 1979 [1969]; Wallerstein 1974; Frank and Gills 1993; Quijano 2000; Chase-Dunn and Gills 2003. Other historical materialist approaches, such as 'uneven and combined development' emphasizes the interdependence of societal structures that is also characteristic of Latin American structuralism, see Teschke 2003; Rosenberg 2006.

[52] Conventionally, the origins of core-periphery analyses are traced back to the work of Argentine economist Raúl Prebisch, and what became known as the Prebisch-Singer thesis of the declining terms of trade, Valenzuela and Valenzuela 1981; Love 1990; 2005; Packenham 1992; Bielschowsky 1998; Bernal-Meza 2005. It is beyond doubt that Prebisch was influenced by Latin America's experience with commodity booms and busts. What is less appreciated, however, is that by the time Prebisch formulated his thesis, some of the arguments had been rehearsed in Argentina since, at least, the turn of the eighteenth century.

[53] Quote on Tickner 2003a, 327; Slater 2004, 130.

its initial appeal since the 1980s, dependency thinking continues to be politically relevant, for instance, in the form of Brazil's 'national developmentalism', premised on the idea that the working of international society is rigged against the interests of developing states.[54] A similar notion also informs what Tickner identifies as the Latin American 'hybrid' approach to international politics, a blend of core-periphery analysis with 'Morgenthauian realism' that centres on the problem of state autonomy.[55] Lastly, core-periphery thinking also influenced postcolonial approaches to world politics—even if postcolonial scholars reject the uncritical view of the state and 'Western' notions of progress that are implied in dependency theory.[56]

That perception of differentiated roles in international relations shaped foreign policies is apparent in the example of dependency theory. Another prominent example is the special rights and responsibilities that have been vested in great powers since the formation of the Concert of Europe in 1815.[57] Following WWII, this variant of role differentiation was consecrated in the veto power of the permanent members of the UN Security Council, in recognition of their special responsibilities for the maintenance of international peace and order.[58] Thus conceived, the institution of great power management denotes a difference in function rather than mere difference in the distribution of material capabilities.[59] Take the example of France, which, for historical reasons, performs the role of a great power in the

[54] Hirst 2005, 98; Hurrell 2010, 135; see also Burges 2009, 4; Gomes Saraiva 2011, 54.
[55] Tickner 2003a, 331; 2008, quote on 742. Prominent examples include Jaguaribe 1979; Puig 1980; Escudé 1997; Russell and Tokatlian 2003; Bernal-Meza 2005.
[56] See Blaney 1996; Slater 2004; Acharya and Buzan 2007, 308; Blaney and Inayatullah 2008, 667.
[57] Wight 1979, 41; Simpson 2004, 91-115; Bukovansky et al. 2012, 26-27.
[58] Kingsbury 1999.
[59] For a different view, see Waltz 1979, 198-199; Holbraad 1984, 74-75.

Security Council, even though it no longer corresponds with its stature, defined in material terms.

Recall from the preceding chapter that the conventional English School conception of international society distinguishes between formally equal member states, on the one hand, and the more heterogeneous group of polities without membership (and hence without 'standing' according to the formal-legal definition), on the other. Hierarchy, in this sense, is only deemed relevant in the relations of members with polities outside international society, which are mediated through the 'standard of civilization'. Yet member states are not equal in terms of the role they perform internationally.

For Bull, great power management is one of the five institutions of international society, along with the balance of power, international law, diplomacy, and war as fundamental 'rules of order or coexistence'.[60] Great powers, thus conceived, provide order in international society by either (horizontally) managing relations amongst each other, or (vertically) by managing their relations with other, subordinate states, for instance, by settling disputes between third parties, the 'unilateral exercise of local preponderance', and the establishment of 'spheres of influence', among other things.[61] Bull further distinguishes between different degrees of preponderance, ranging from primacy based on consent, over hegemony, in which superordinate states recognize the rights of the subordinate, to domination. The latter is characterized 'by the habitual use of force by a great power against the lesser states comprising its hinterland, and by habitual disregard of the universal

[60] Bull 2002 [1977], xxxiv. Buzan furthermore distinguishes between primary and secondary institutions, 2004, 161-204; see also Schouenborg 2011.
[61] Bull 2002 [1977], 207-218.

norms of interstate behaviour that confer rights of sovereignty, equality and independence upon these states'.[62] The relationship between the United States and the states of the Caribbean Basin, for instance, would have passed from one of dominance to hegemony by the 1930s.[63]

What emerges from Bull's treatment and English School debates on great power management, more generally, is a functionalist theory of stratification, according to which inequality is a prerequisite for any social order to emerge and be sustained.[64] 'The members of international society, as Dunne posits, 'generally accept that order has to be managed'.[65] This is why the managerial role of great powers cannot be based on preponderance alone. In Bull's view, great powerdom first requires the existence of a group of states joined together in a 'club with a rule of membership'.[66] Bull furthermore agrees with Ranke that great powers have to possess great military strength and the ability to act independently from allies.[67] But he further adds the requirement of social recognition: 'States which, like Napoleonic France or Nazi Germany, are military powers of the front rank, but are not regarded by their own leaders or others as having these rights and responsibilities, are not properly speaking great powers'.[68] Other scholars have followed Bull on this point: 'A state can claim great power status', Hurrell asserts, 'but membership of the club of great powers is a social category that depends on recognition by others: by your peers in the club, but also by smaller and weaker states willing to accept the legitimacy and authority of those at

[62] Ibid., 207.
[63] Ibid., 207, 210.
[64] As Davis and Moore argued in the seminar article, 'no society is "classless"', 1945, 242.
[65] Dunne 2003, 307; Jackson 2000, 139-140.
[66] Bull 2002 [1977], 194; Watson 1984a, 24. Hence, the 'anti-hegemonial' tendency of international society identified by Dunne 2003; and disputed by Clark 2011.
[67] Bull 2002 [1977], 195-196.
[68] Ibid., 196.

the top of the international hierarchy'.[69] Approaching the question from a constructivist perspective, Bukovansky et al. suggest that the privileged position of great powers derives only in part from material inequalities, while an important aspect of special rights and responsibilities would be their 'social allocation'.[70]

A particularly strong case for the possible misalignment of stature and role is made by Simpson. As noted in the previous chapter, Simpson maintains that the international order after 1815 contained two forms of legal inequality. The first is the 'anti-pluralism' that is captured by English School debates on the 'standard of civilization'—although Simpson insists that 'outlaw' states are nevertheless part of the international legal order. The second form is 'legalised hegemony', which is defined as 'the constitutional recognition of a Great Power concert within the system combined with a recognition of a form of sovereign equality within the coalition itself'.[71] This point is insightful because great powers are not necessarily those states that possess the greatest material capabilities. Prussia, for instance, was recognized as great power by the Congress of Vienna, and this despite the fact that its military capabilities lagged significantly behind those of Britain or Russia, while the still formidable Ottoman Empire was not. 'The great power category is a 'juridical idea [...] presented as a material fact'.[72]

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[69] Hurrell 2006, 4.
[70] Bukovansky et al. 2012, 6.
[71] Simpson 2004, 76.
[72] Ibid., 69; Schroeder 1992, 686.

'Role Enactment' as Logic of Social Action

The constructivist understanding of role differentiation is not limited to great power management.[73] 'Role differentiation', a term employed in Wendt's seminal *Social Theory of International Politics*, is central to his call for 'a rethinking of Waltz's definition of structure'.[74] In Wendt's view, neorealist accounts of structure can explain the range of possibilities that states have for pursuing their goals, but they cannot explain why a particular policy is ultimately realized.[75] This is because only shared ideas give meaning to material facts: 'Five hundred British nuclear weapons', Wendt exemplifies, 'are less threatening to the US than five North Korean ones'.[76] Shared ideas about appropriate behaviour constitute roles ('friend', 'rival' and 'enemy', according to Wendt) through which states interact with their social environment. The argument builds on 'role theory' developed in sociology and social psychology, which treats roles as structural features of society.[77] Accordingly, individuals receive cues from their social environment (role expectations), which they then interpret and internalize ('role conceptions', or, in Wendt's framework, 'role identities'): 'Role-identities are subjective self-understandings; roles are the objective, collectively constituted positions that give meaning to those understandings'.[78]

[73] Barnett 1993; Bukovansky 1997.
[74] Wendt 1999, 255.
[75] See also Katzenstein 1996.
[76] Wendt 1999, 255.
[77] Also known as 'identity theory', which is different from 'social identity theory', see ibid., 327; on the difference, see Stets 2006, 89-90.
[78] Wendt 1999, 259.

Wendt's constructivism assumes that states have 'corporate identities' which allows the attribution of humanlike characteristics, such as emotions and intentions.[79] This extreme anthropomorphism has not passed without criticism, and it seems analytically more fruitful to follow the more conventional metaphorical use here.[80] It is common for state leaders to act as if states have roles and identities, but this does not mean that states become reified and ontologically real. Understood in this way, role identity has also been applied to foreign policy analysis. Holsti, for instance, argues that policy-makers conceived of multiple roles, including their 'own definitions of the general kinds of decisions, commitments, rules and actions suitable to their state, and of the functions, if any, their state should perform [...] It is their "image" of the appropriate orientations or functions of their state toward, or in, the external environment'.[81] While state leaders may hold various role conceptions, their relative saliency is context specific. Holsti's (now dated) analysis suggests that a preoccupation with the distribution of capabilities during the Cold War was characteristic of major powers, 'but from the point of view of many governments, international regional issues and roles are most salient'.[82] Third World countries (or in the current terminology the 'Global South'), in particular, were more concerned with non-alignment leadership, autonomy, and economic development, which is evidence of the influence of core-periphery thinking during that historical period. In a more recent adaptation, Thies consequently distinguishes states according to their level of maturity, 'whereby new members of the international system learn their appropriate roles in response to cues and

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[79] See, Kratochwil 2000, 82-83; Wendt 2004.
[80] See contributions to the forum on Wendt's *State as a Person* in *Review of International Studies* 30(2). I follow Ringmar's 1996 pragmatic suggestion that a metaphorical use is analytically more helpful than settling the ontological question.
[81] Holsti 1970, 234.
[82] Ibid., 291.

demands from the audience of member states'.[83] Importantly, the distribution of roles does not necessarily follow from the stature of states. Role differentiation is an analytically distinct dimension of the standing of a state. Role conceptions are not about 'what you have' (stature) or 'who you are' (status), but 'what part you play' in international society.

Role differentiation matters because of the distributional consequences it entails. This is the underlying argument that is shared by both core-periphery and English School accounts—although for different reasons. Dependency theory argues that the relationship between core and periphery is inherently exploitative in nature. Because the core develops at the expense of the periphery, underdeveloped countries will either have to overthrow the capitalist world economy (Gunder Frank), or seek protection, either domestically (Import Substitution Industrialization (ISI)) or through the formation of commodity cartels (NEIO).

From an English School perspective, social roles, such as that of a great power, allocate rights and responsibilities in international society. One the one hand, great power management is conceived of as a means of overcoming coordination problems in international society. On the other hand, it also entrenches power inequalities because it allows powerful states to set and enforce the 'rules of the game'.[84] Because these privileges are 'socially allocated'—that is, they need to be generally accepted to be legitimate—the special rights and responsibilities of great powers are constantly contested by the members

[83] Thies 2012, 27; see also Checkel 2005, 810-812; Breuning 2011; Thies and Breuning 2012.
[84] See Hurrell and Woods 1999; Krisch 2003; Hurrell 2006.

of international society, either because a particular role differentiation is perceived as unjust, or because it is deemed ineffective to achieve the purported goal.[85]

The distributional effects of role differentiation become particularly apparent in the literature on hierarchy and 'relational contracting'.[86] Hierarchy, according to Lake, is defined by 'the extent of the authority exercised by the ruler over the ruled'.[87] By treating sovereignty as divisible, Lake conceives of hierarchy as the outcome of a negotiated settlement, in which states trade in some of their sovereign prerogatives in exchange for certain 'goods', such as security or economics benefits from trade. This conception of hierarchy differs from aforementioned accounts in two aspects.

First, Lake considers hierarchy a dyadic relationship between two states rather than an attribute of international order.[88] Hierarchy is not necessarily derived from material capabilities, but from the distribution of 'residual rights'[89]: the authority of one contracting partner to decide over those affairs that were not explicitly settled in the initial compact. 'The greater the number of private actions unregulated by the political authority, the less hierarchical the relationship. Conversely, the greater the number of policy areas that are legitimately controlled by the political authority, the more hierarchical the relationship'.[90] Lake's conception of hierarchy is based on a differentiation of roles (differentially allocated rights), and not on status or material capabilities. For instance, in his view, US relations with Western Europe and Latin America are more hierarchical than its relationships with

[85] Bukovansky et al. 2012, 16-17.
[86] Weber 1997; Cooley 2005; Cooley and Spruyt 2009; Nexon and Wright 2007; Lake 2009.
[87] 2009, 9.
[88] Ibid., 61.
[89] Cooley and Spruyt 2009, 10, 27-30.
[90] Lake 2009, 51.

most of Africa and the Middle East;[91] likewise, while US relative material capabilities skyrocketed in the 1990s, its authority over security matters remained largely constant: 'Perhaps more than any other fact, this divergence highlights that hierarchy and coercive capabilities are different and independent theoretical constructs'.[92]

Second, states enter into hierarchical relations voluntarily. It is the result of a cost-benefit calculation on behalf of states. In this view, then, the viability of hierarchical relationships does not depend on the equitable distribution of entitlements, nor on perceptions of fairness, but simply on the fact that states are 'marginally better off under hierarchy than in the anarchic state of nature'.[93]

Lake's rationalist account of hierarchy formation provides one possible reasons why states enter into relations that distribute rights and responsibilities unequally. However, it is questionable whether Lake effectively conceptualizes hierarchy or the military and economic alliance that was created under US hegemony following WWII, the 'liberal world order' that Ikenberry describes in his work.[94] There is also good reason to doubt that states tend to enter and maintain unequal authority relationship voluntarily. Lake's account is lopsided from the perspective of the superordinate (hence its similarities with the 'imperialism of free trade' thesis).[95] He furthermore underestimates the importance of the use of force and coercive means, and neglects the historical role of 'subaltern' resistance. People have resisted colonial domination even when economic and security consequences

[91] Ibid., 10.
[92] Ibid., 83, see also 92.
[93] Ibid., 34. Note that Lake, following Waltz 1979, considers anarchy and hierarchy as the extreme points of a continuum.
[94] Ikenberry 2011; 2001.
[95] Gallagher and Robinson 1953.

of independence were unclear.[96] The rationalist literature explains well the distributional effects of hierarchy, but it is less convincing in its account of the motives and responses to inequality and subordination, which have been important themes in Latin American history.

By contrast, constructivist accounts centre on 'role enactment'. Individuals are socialized into certain roles, which prescribe norms of appropriate behaviour. By enacting a social role, individuals follow what they think is expected and appropriate given a particular self-understanding that actors have of themselves. States cannot perceive of roles. But individuals act through states. It therefore seems reasonable to assume that collectively shared role perceptions of individuals have an influence on state conduct. In line with role theory in foreign policy analysis, constructivists argue that individuals hold multiple role perceptions whose salience changes over time and contexts.[97] From this it also follows that the distribution of roles in international society, and the importance of those roles, varies.

Although generally secondary to status concerns, role perceptions have been important in Latin American history, particularly during the struggles for independence. As the case studies on Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico exemplify, independence was the result of a challenge to the role that the colonies occupied within the Spanish and Portuguese Empires. In the course of the eighteenth century, demands for political and economic autonomy grew steadily, but crucially these were not accompanied by claims for a severance of the constitutional ties with Europe. The Napoleonic Wars then interrupted colonial relations, and temporarily led to self-governance. However, once Ferdinand VII of Spain and the

[96] Crawford 2002.
[97] March and Olsen 2008, 689.

Portuguese Cortes attempted to re-establish colonial subordination, demands for autonomy changed into the enactment of new roles, as independent states of Latin America. Thereafter, role concerns appear to play a comparatively minor part in the thinking of nineteenth-century elites. Contrary to the advocates of dependency theory, the export of agricultural produce and minerals was not regarded as a problematic and 'inferior' role.

4. Status as Dimension of Standing

Status is a socially constructed dimension of stratification based on social evaluations of esteem, honour and prestige.[98] There is now a large and expanding body of literature that deals with the role of status and related questions of prestige and recognition in international politics. Prestige, in particular, has attracted the attention of scholars interested in the intersubjective aspects of great power competition.[99] Accordingly, prestige has been primarily associated with high-status groups in international politics, as the 'reputation for power'[100] and the 'public recognition of eminence;[101] in other words, what Weber identified as *Machtprestige*: the 'glory of power over other communities'.[102] Yet material preponderance, or stature, is not the only source of status in international relations; as with role, there is also a subjective component to status. Status depends on the perceptions of an actor's rank or social position by others; it is intrinsically linked to what is valued and regarded as desirable in a society. As noted above, great powerdom includes notions of role differentiation (in terms of the function that great powers are expected to perform), and in

[98] Weber 1968, 305, 932; Barbalet 1980; Chan and Goldthorpe 2007, 514; Ridgeway 2014, 2.
[99] Mercer 1995; Taliaferro 2004; Wohlforth 2009; Larson and Shevchenko 2010. For an overview of the debate, see, Volgy et al. 2011; Paul, Larson, and Wohlforth 2014.
[100] Morgenthau 1954, 70-73; Wight 1979, 98; Gilpin 1981, 31.
[101] Markey 1999, 126, 158; see also, Wolf 2011, 115.
[102] Weber 1968, 911; see also, Lebow 2008, 20; an exception is Donelan 2007.

terms of status, given that a great power needs to be recognized by others as such. More broadly conceived, however, status does not necessarily imply that states are expected to perform different roles.

This intersubjective understanding of status is also reflected in Singer and Small's definition that informs the COW project:

> [Status] is a rank or reputation attributed to an individual or a group by others in the same social system. Though it may correlate with certain inherent and objective properties, capabilities, or skills of the actor in question, it need not. The major element in the classification is usually a *perceptual* one; moreover, it is *perceptual in the collective sense*. That is, members of the community are constantly engaged in a vague and ill-defined process of reputation making for themselves and for others; the shifting consensus regarding any one member's strengths and weaknesses, or virtues and vices, at any particular point in time describes that member's status in the community.[103]

Recast in constructivist terms, the conferral of status depends on social norms, which, as indicated above, are specific to time and context. During the height of absolutism, for example, status among European princes was primarily a question of lineage and tradition. The result was an international order based on precedence, in which the Pope and Holy Roman Emperor occupied the top ranks of a hierarchy that reflected the wide range of sovereign titles in Europe. It was only towards the eighteenth-century that the precedence order was gradually supplanted by the idea of a 'grading of powers', which, as Wight posits, introduced notions of state size and strength into international legal and political thought.[104] However, even thereafter, material capabilities have never been the only criterion for achieving status in international society as the English School notion of an

[103] Singer and Small 1966, 238, emphasis added.
[104] Wight 1977, 136; 1979, 63, 295-301; see also Simpson 2004, 69; Keene 2013a, 10.

historical ‘standard of civilization’ and more recent debates on democratic governance and state legitimacy illustrate.[105]

From a realist perspective, status is either epiphenomenal to the distribution of material capabilities, and therefore analytically irrelevant, as Waltz would have it,[106] or part of the struggle among states for power and security. The latter view is adopted by Morgenthau: ‘in the struggle for existence and power—which is, as it were, the raw material of the social world—what others think about us is as important as what we actually are’.[107] At the same time, however, Morgenthau argues that the ‘prestige’ of a state has to correspond, at least on the long run, to its material capabilities.[108] A ‘policy of bluff’ could only be credibly maintained temporarily before it will be put to test by other powers; the same would apply to a ‘negative policy of prestige’ where states misleadingly appear to be satisfied with a status inferior to their actual material power.[109]

The argument that ‘status inconsistencies’ lead to international conflict is made explicit in hegemonic transition theory. Because the international order reflects the interests of the most powerful state or group of states, emerging powers have an incentive to challenge the status quo, which can potentially escalate into major war.[110] Within this framework, the ‘hierarchy of prestige’ plays an auxiliary role to the distribution of material capabilities by legitimizing the predominance of the hegemon. Yet, as Gilpin asserts, status ultimately depends on the distribution of material capabilities: ‘Prestige is the reputation for power,

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[105] Gong 1984.
[106] Waltz 1979.
[107] Morgenthau 1954, 68.
[108] Ibid., 78.
[109] Ibid.; see also, Volgy et al. 2011.
[110] For instance Carr 2001 [1939]; Organski 1958; Gilpin 1981.

and military power in particular'.[111] The Morgenthauian conception seems at odds with a common understanding of prestige, according to which prestige derives from an actor's qualities that deserve admiration. Greenhill, for instance, makes the point that Germany in 1942 certainly had a reputation for power, but the notion that Nazi Germany was prestigious in the eyes of the United States seems questionable at best.[112] The point had already been made by Nicolson in his lecture on the meaning of prestige on the eve of WWII, in which he criticized Germany for failing to understand prestige confers power but that power alone does not imply status.[113]

More importantly, the very notion of 'status inconsistencies' suggests that status cannot be treated as a mere derivative of the distribution of material capabilities—otherwise it is hard to conceive how misalignments between power and status occur in the first place.[114] The point is well illustrated by Russia's ambiguous status as a European great power. Russia emerged from the Great Northern War (1700-1721) as a formidable continental power, but, as Neumann suggests, Russia 'lacked the social mores required to be fully recognized' as such by its European peers.[115] Even thereafter, Russia continued to lag behind social expectations, which arguably accounts for its uncertain status as great power that persists until today.[116] As elaborated below, a similar case can be made for Argentina, Mexico, and Brazil that, despite their respectable size and potential (although not actual material capabilities), did not fully live up to the expectation placed upon them.

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[111] Ibid. 1981, 31.
[112] Greenhill 2008, 115.
[113] Nicolson 1937, 9..
[114] Gilpin, for instance, simply notes that status would tend to lag behind material capabilities, 1981, 33.
[115] Neumann 2008, 26; see also 1998; 2008b. Similarly, Wohlforth 2009, 46: Russia provoked the Crimean War because its demands on the Ottoman Empire implied status demands which Britain and France deemed 'unwarranted by any increase in its capabilities'.
[116] Ringmar 2002; Wohlforth 2009; Larson and Shevchenko 2010.

The domestic analogy is helpful for disentangling material capabilities (stature) from status conceptually. For instance, Weber proposes a distinction between class and status situations. In this view, a social class is defined by similar life chances on the market, which depend on property ownership and the possibility to generate income from the labour market. Status, in turn, 'is determined by a specific, positive or negative, social estimation of *honor*'.[117] 'With some over-simplification, one might thus say that classes are stratified according to their relations to the production and acquisition of goods; whereas status groups are stratified according to the principles of their consumption of goods as represented by special styles of life'.[118] Although Weber is sceptical about the possibility of placing social classes in a rank order,[119] by way of analogy, his conception of a 'class situation' corresponds roughly to the position that a state occupies in the stature order.[120] Importantly, while Weber argues that class (corresponding to stature) is determined by the distribution of property (material capabilities), property is not necessarily a status quality; in fact, quite often, status stands 'in sharp opposition to the pretensions of sheer property'.[121] This means that, for instance, in domestic societies, the pauperized aristocracy can belong to a high-status group from which the *nouveau riche* are excluded; while graduate students may share a similar income with welfare recipients even if they do not necessarily enjoy the same degree of social esteem.[122] Following this argumentation, Keene

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[117] Weber 1968, 932, emphasis in original.
[118] Ibid., 937.
[119] Chan and Goldthorpe 2007, 514.
[120] Weber 1968, 911.
[121] Ibid., 932.
[122] Note that Bourdieu 1989 makes a similar point about how social boundaries are created through the cultivation of manners and lifestyles. Bourdieu, however, departs from Weber in that status is part of the symbolic power of privileged social classes, even though it cannot be reduced to economic power alone. For an accessible introduction to Bourdieu as applied to IR, see Pouliot and Merand 2013.

adopts a neo-Weberian approach in explaining the 'normative power' of Europe that focuses on processes of 'social closure' through which high-status groups create social boundaries to exclude others from privileges and scarce resources, for instance through credentialism.[123]

'Status Management' as Logic of Social Action

Status matters to states. Before the Vienna Congress of 1815 clarified questions of precedence, disputes over diplomatic ceremony were common among European sovereigns. For example, *Satow's Guide to Diplomatic Practice* recounts the row between the French and Spanish ambassadors over the right of way during a public procession in London in 1661, which almost escalated into war as Louis XIV demanded the recognition of France's precedence at all foreign courts.[124] Status also played a role in the relations between Europeans and non-European rulers. The refusal of Lord Macartney to *kowtow* to the Chinese emperor in 1793 is well known. It is no coincidence that the episode also appears on the dust jacket of the *Expansion of International Society*. For Gong, the incident symbolized the civilizational clash that resulted from Western expansionism into China.[125] European sovereign equality was simply incompatible with Chinese imperial pretensions. But it also seems plausible to interpret Macartney's conduct as a case of status assertion by

[123] Keene 2013b. Parkin 1979 suggests that 'social closure' on behalf of high-status group can be challenged by what Weber termed 'usurpation'. 'Usurpation' is a direct response to exclusionary closure, which involves the 'use of power in an upward direction' by 'negatively privileged status groups'.
[124] Gore-Booth and Pakenham 1994, 22; Sofer 2013, 42.
[125] Gong 1984, 174.

Britain, which emerged from the conquest of Bengal and the Seven Years' War as the foremost naval power in Asia.[126]

However, even if the argument is accepted that status does matter in world politics, it still begs the question of why this is the case. One the one hand, for Morgenthau and his realist disciples, the pursuit of status is largely motivated by instrumental reasons: states seek to enhance their prestige as part of the competition for power among states. [127] A more recent variation on this instrumentalist theme has been proposed by institutionalists, who maintain that the reputation of a state contributes to overcoming coordination problems. Tomz, for instance, maintains that, historically, states did not repay their sovereign debt because they feared coercive sanctions, such as naval blockades, but because of the reputational effect this had on international capital markets.[128] A similar logic also underpins publicity campaigns that portray a country in a particularly positive light in order to attract, for instance, foreign investment. As shown below, the participation of Argentina, Mexico, and Brazil at world fairs was thought, in part, to attract foreign capital and people.

One the other hand, status can also be an end in itself. Ringmar purports that Sweden's entry into the Thirty Years War in 1630 was not motivated by military or strategic objectives, but by the aspiration of relatively backward Sweden and its king, Gustav Adolf,

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[126] The argument is supported by Zhang's observation that other European envoys conformed with the Chinese ceremonial protocol, 2013, 70. Kang purports that the East Asian tribute system was generated by a shared Confucian worldview that placed China at the top of a culturally-defined rank order. He also notes that kowtowing was recognition of Chinese cultural superiority, but did not confer rights to the emperor, Kang 2010, 603-604. In this author's view, the East Asian order was formally unequal for informally equal: 'the tribute system emphasized formal hierarchy among nations while allowing considerable informal equality', ibid., 602.
[127] Markey 1999, 129.
[128] Tomz 2007.

for respect and recognition as a 'legitimate member of the community of European states'.[129] In much the same vein, Schweller maintains that the War of the Triple Alliance (1865-1870), a war of attrition fought between Paraguay and an alliance formed by Argentina, Brazil, and Uruguay that led to the annihilation of large parts of Paraguay's male population, was caused by Francisco Solano López's 'voracious appetite for power and prestige'.[130]

The argument that status-seeking is an innate human predisposition is also central to Lebow's *A Cultural Theory of International Relations*, which builds on insights from ancient Greece to identify three universal drivers of human conduct. The first human driver identified by Lebow is 'appetite', which refers to the need for well-being through the satisfaction of basic physical need. 'Spirit', the second human driver, pertains to the pursuit of self-esteem, which is attained through honour and standing. The latter is defined as 'the position an actor occupies in a hierarchy' and is largely treated as synonymous with status by Lebow.[131] Lastly, 'reason' restrains 'spirit' and 'appetite', which, if dominant in a society, would lead to inherently unstable political orders. This dilemma would most likely to arise in ideal-typical 'spirit-based worlds' because of the 'relational nature' of honour and standing.[132]

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[129] It is debatable whether the modern concept of nation and national identity can be projected back to the seventeenth century. Likewise, for an identity-centred explanation, Ringmar has surprisingly little to say about religion and its influence on Gustav Adolf's decision to enter the war, See, for instance, Ringmar 1996a, 20-21. Despite these criticism, Ringmar's account rightly points at the importance of status concerns in international politics.
[130] Schweller 2006, 86. The author assumes that Paraguay was a coherent and revisionist state that confront internally divided adversaries. While this is true for the case of Argentina and Uruguay, this was hardly the case for Brazil, see Abente 1987; Doratioto 2002; Whigham 2002.
[131] Lebow 2008, 65. According to the author, honour refers to the recognition of achievement by others.
[132] Ibid., 82.

The premise that actors are intrinsically motivated by status-concerns is also shared by social identity theory (SIT). First developed in social psychology by Henri Tajfel in the 1970s, the theory posits that people act towards others on the basis of their self-perception as members of social groups.[133] Group identities assist people in making complex social situations intelligible, and are formed through evaluative intergroup comparisons, in which the 'in-group' tends to be seen in a more positive light than 'out-groups'. Because group identities are part of people's self-esteem, individuals will try to maintain a positive group distinction, and therefore employ different strategies of status protection and enhancement.[134] To some extent, the argument bears resemblance to the idea of 'Othering', suggested by poststructuralist and postcolonial authors—most notably in Said's *Orientalism*—in which negative representations of the 'Other' are taken to be constitutive of the 'self', that is individual and collective identities.[135] A similar notion also informs a constructivist understanding of identity formation, the difference being that, according to constructivism, social interaction determines whether conceptions of the 'Other' have positive, negative or neutral connotations.[136]

In IR, arguments from SIT have been primarily employed to explain status competition among major powers.[137] An early application was proposed by Mercer, who suggested that

[133] Tajfel and Turner 1979, 35; Brown 2000; Hogg 2006, 122.
[134] Tajfel and Turner 1979, 43-46; Hogg 2006, 123; for an application to IR, see Larson and Shevchenko 2010, 70-76.
[135] Said 1991 [1978]. Similar arguments have been made with regard to Latin America, in particular in the context of the 'discovery' of the Americas and the impact it had in the self-perception of Europeans, see O'Gorman 1961; Todorov 1984. Said's critique has also informed postcolonial studies on Latin America, see Coronil 2004; Mignolo 2005.
[136] Wendt 1992, 401; 1999, 316; 2003, 511. Somewhere between poststructuralism and constructivism lies Neumann's 1999 study on the Eastern 'Other' in the identity formation of Europe; see also Neumann and Welsh 1991.
[137] Mercer 1995; Larson and Shevchenko 2010; Volgy et al. 2011; Onea 2014; Paul, Larson, and Wohlforth 2014.

the need for positive group identities supports realist assumptions about the perpetual self-help nature of international politics. However, contrary to Waltzian neo-realism, SIT suggests that competition among states is not a result of anarchy, but due to primordial social psychological processes.[138] Human nature features heavily in the classical realist accounts of Hans Morgenthau, George Kennan, and others.[139] It is therefore no surprise that neo-classical realists haven taken up SIT in their research. While cautious of applying insights derived from experimental social psychology directly to world politics,[140] Wohlforth suggests that state leaders tend to identify with their respective state, which is why they also have a motive to advance its status internationally. Echoing Lebow, Wohlforth understands status as a 'positional good', where the status advances for one signify the loss of status for others.[141] As a consequence, major powers may act against their 'material interests' when questions of status are at stake. For Wohlforth the question of status competition is linked to polarity: in cases where high-status groups are also materially dominant, status competition is less likely than under more ambiguous status hierarchies, such as multipolar orders, that are prone to 'status inconsistencies' and, therefore, major power war.[142]

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[138] Mercer 1995, 246-247. This effectively shifts the level of analysis back to what Waltz disregarded as 'first-image' explanations, which centre on the human nature, including peoples' 'psychic-social behavior', Waltz 2001 [1959], 18. Mercer errs in arguing that Waltz would have limited his critique to individual psychological processes alone, cf. Mercer 1995, 237.

[139] Shimko 1992, 282.

[140] Wohlforth 2009, 36. The author argues that, first, SIT was developed in domestic settings which are more complex than the 'social realm' of international politics; and second, that SIT assumes equal distribution of resources which does not apply to the highly unequal distribution of material capabilities among states. While the second point seems valid, it is important to keep in mind that SIT was first developed and tested in experimental settings, in which individuals had only minimal interaction with other participants. In fact, the 'social realm' of international politics where state leaders interact both with other state leaders and the wider public is more rather than less complex.

[141] Hirsch 1976; Schweller 2006, 27; Wohlforth 2009, 30; Larson and Shevchenko 2010, 69.

[142] Wohlforth 2009, 39.

By contrast, Larson and Shevchenko suggest that status concerns of great powers can also lead to more cooperation.[143] Crucial here are the different 'status management strategies' developed in SIT. 'A group that wants to improve its standing may try to pass into a higher-status group, compete with the dominant group, or achieve preeminence in a different domain'.[144] The first strategy, *social mobility*, is adopted as a strategy when a given rank order is perceived as permeable. In this case, status is pursued through the emulation of higher-status groups. The English School orthodoxy provides a good example of *social mobility* as a way of entering international society through the 'socialization' of non-Western, most importantly by adopting European-style diplomacy and international law.[145] This understanding also underpins Gong's ambiguity towards the 'standard of civilization' which discriminated alleged 'outsiders' while at the same time providing point of entry into international society.[146] Second, *status competition*, the focus of Wohlforth's account, is adopted when a status order is either perceived as closed to social *parvenus* or regarded as illegitimate and unstable. In international politics, status competition can be difficult to discern from balance-of-power policies, as Wolforth's example of arms build-ups illustrate.[147] Lastly, if the social hierarchy is perceived as closed but stable, 'group members may seek positive distinctiveness for the in-group by redefining or altering the elements of the comparative situation'.[148] Hence, *social creativity* is the third status management strategy, which aims at either reframing previously negatively charged traits in positive terms; at shifting comparison to an alternative trait; or at changing the group against with

[143] Larson and Shevchenko 2010.
[144] Ibid., 70-71.
[145] Similarly, Suzuki 2009 points at the 'socialization' of China and Japan into international society by conforming to the expectation of its existing members—although Suzuki rightly emphasizes that this was not a one-sided process.
[146] Bull and Watson 1984b; Gong 1984; Grewe 2000.
[147] See, for instance, Wohlforth 2009, 32; Larson and Shevchenko 2010, 72.
[148] Tajfel and Turner 1979, 43.

the 'in-group' is compared altogether.[149] Although Larson and Shevshenko focus on great power status and therefore neglect the last possibility, they suggests that China engaged in 'status creativity' in redefining Confucianism as source of Chinese 'soft power', which, under Mao Zedong had been disregarded as part of the country's 'feudal' past.[150]

Latin American history knows analogous cases of 'status creativity'. *Arielismo* was an influential intellectual movement at the end of the nineteenth century, based on the contrast between Latin America's spiritual superiority and the cold materialism of the United States. Similar ideas had surfaced throughout the region, at least since the Mexican-American War, that were essentially an inversion of longstanding stereotypes about Hispanic culture and societies. In Argentina, it became officially endorsed with the revaluation of the country's Spanish heritage (see Argentina chapter). Similarly, in early-twentieth century Brazil and Mexico, racial miscegenation was reframed as virtuous, thus informing state ideologies, such as *indigenismo* in post-revolutionary Mexico and 'racial democracy' in Brazil.

'Negatively Privileged States Groups' and Status-Seeking

The status of a state is not determined by material capabilities alone. Yet debates on status in world politics revolve almost exclusively around recognizing great powers. While these accounts illuminate the role that status plays in international politics, the focus on the top ranks of the international pecking order obscures the extent to which status and status concerns are inherent to all members of international society.

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[149] Ibid.
[150] Larson and Shevchenko 2010, 73.

A particularly drastic example of great power myopia is Lebow, who suggests that only social elites aspire to prestige and honour:

‘In the realm of international relations, leaders—and often peoples—of powerful states are likely to feel anger of the Aristotelian kind when they are denied entry into the system, recognition as a great power or treated in a manner demeaning to their understanding of their status. They will look for some way of asserting their claims and seeking revenge. *Subordinate states lack this power and their leaders and populations learn to live with their lower status and more limited autonomy*’.[151]

While this assertion may well have been true of ancient Greece, it is hardly defensible in light of the international history of the past centuries. Reus-Smit makes the case that the struggle against unequal entitlements has been a driving force in the evolution of international politics since the seventeenth century.[152] Importantly, this includes the efforts of Latin Americans to institute sovereign equality and non-intervention internationally; and, more generally, what Bull termed the Revolt against the ‘West’.[153] The argument that subordinate states would ‘learn to live’ with their marginalization flies in the face of twentieth-century decolonization. The widespread neglect of minor powers by social identity approaches is similarly striking. While Larson and Shevchenko equate status with great powers, nothing in the original formulation suggests that its applicability would be limited to social elites; quite the contrary, SIT seems particularly interested in explaining the formation of social stereotypes and stigmata, and the way in which marginalized groups

[151] Lebow 2008, 69, emphasis added.
[152] Reus-Smit 2013.
[153] Bull 1984b; see also, Krasner 1985.

respond to their subordinate social status.[154] Tajfel, for instance, recognizes that subordinate groups may engage in self-derogation and therefore accept their inferior social rank, as Lebow suggests, but he contends that this is only in cases where the status hierarchy would be perceived as legitimate and stable.[155] Nor does the assumption that status is a 'positional good' necessarily follow from SIT. Because there is not only one dimension on which status groups compare themselves, status protection and advancement is not necessarily a zero-sum game. Furthermore, as Ornea posits, there is an important difference between dominant power and great power categories. While there can be only one dominant power in a regional or international order, recognition as great power is more appropriately described as 'club good', whose 'consumption' is excludable but non-rivalrous and therefore not a zero-sum game.[156]

It is important to note that, contrary to more recent accounts, Morgenthau's conception of prestige was not limited to great powers. As he illustrates by quoting an article from *Fortune* (1952) magazine:

> Because the Latin Americans throw the biggest and most expensive parties in Washington, and appear to profit the least thereby, there is a tendency to write them off as mere playboys. That is a mistake. What the Latinos are striving for, above all, is prestige, a place of equality in the family of American nations.[157]

Once more following Morgenthau, Wohlforth seems more aware of the fact that subordinate states do not lack agency. 'More certain of their relative rank, subordinate actors are less likely to face the ambiguity that drives status competition [...] Given limited

[154] On stigmatization, Zarakol 2011.
[155] Tajfel and Turner 1979, 37-38; Hogg 2006, 120-121.
[156] Onea 2014, 152.
[157] Morgenthau 1954, 71.

material wherewithal, either acquiescence or strategies of social creativity are more plausible responses, neither of which leads to military conflict'.[158]

In sum, status is a third and distinct dimension of the standing of states in international society that is independent from the distribution of material capabilities (stature) and functions (role). This also implies that status concerns can be a motive for social action on their own. The point is captured by the notion of status management, which suggests that agents pursue strategies geared toward bolstering the status of their state. Status concerns were paramount in Latin American history. The marginalization of these states was rationalized, both locally and in Europe and North America, less in terms of inferior military capabilities or the function these states performed internationally, but rather in terms of the civilizational backwardness of Latin American states. Almost paradoxically, political instability, economic hardship, and military inferiority were conceptualized as consequences rather than the cause of this inferior status as members of the family of 'civilized' states.

5. Conclusion

The proposed interpretative framework is helpful for understanding the position that Latin American states occupied within international society. As will become clear in the case study chapters, there was a widespread sense among nineteenth-century elites, both in the European and North American 'core' and the Latin Americam 'periphery', that the states that emerged from the disintegration of the Spanish and Portuguese empires were not fully

[158] Wohlforth 2009, 39.

part of the family of 'civilized' states—and this despite having achieved diplomatic recognition from the 1820s onwards. What this suggests is the need to think of standing not in terms of membership that is acquired by means of international recognition, but as a more complex phenomenon. Rather than existing along a single dimension (membership/non-membership) this chapter has identified three distinct ideal-typical dimensions that each account for the standing of states.

Realists point to stature, the concrete material capabilities of a state, as the overriding factor that determines the position a state occupies internationally. Accordingly, increasing a states' stature requires either internal or external balancing. While some authors have identify balancing behaviour in Latin America, balance-of-power politics was the exception rather than the rule. Furthermore, stature concerns did not feature prominently in elite discourse for most of the period under consideration. Even during times of heightened geopolitical competition, other considerations remained prominent. This indicates that stature is an important but in itself insufficient dimension of the standing of states.

This chapter suggested that two further important dimensions of standing are role and status. Role refers to the distribution of functions among states. Roles are enacted in the sense that elites either act in accordance with a particular role or challenge their perceived position in the international order. In nineteenth-century Latin America, role concerns dominated during the struggle for independence. They are also evident in the attempts of Latin American elites to change the distribution of rights and duties among states, most importantly by strongly advocating substantive sovereign equality, which reached its apogee at the Second Hague Conference of 1907.

Yet, as Rui Barbosa's activism suggests, for Brazil it was also part of a policy of prestige pursued toward European powers. This point to the third and last dimension of standing: status. The preceding chapters will demonstrate that nineteenth-century Latin American elites predominantly perceived of international society as a status order, where concerns of honour and prestige were paramount. Hence they pursued different strategies of 'status management' by either complying with social expectations, or by challenging and supplanting underpinning norms. Throughout the period under consideration, Europe, and in particular France and Britain, remained the principal referent for Latin American elites, who were strongly influenced by the civilizational discourse emanating from the 'core'. Elites in Europe and the United States, in turn, were ambiguous about the standing of Latin American states. On the one hand, diplomatic recognition and the purportedly Western identity of these states implied that they were part of 'civilized' humanity. On the other hand, and particularly during times of political crisis, they questioned the civilizational credentials of Latin America. Dealing with this perceived civilizational inadequacy was a particular concern for elite in Argentina, Brazil and Mexico.

The three dimensions of standing developed in this chapter are ideal-types. Standing, as a real-world phenomenon, reflects some combination of all three dimensions. As such, stature, role, and status are often interlinked and do not occur in isolation in their empirical manifestations. However, the purpose of this chapter was not to theorize about the complex relationships between these dimensions. Rather, it was suggested here that treating each dimension as analytically distinct allows understanding how elites in the European and

North America 'core' and in Latin America perceived of the standing of these states, and how perceptions shaped policies through their corresponding 'logics of social action'.

The standing of a state depends on perceptions, both in terms of how a state is seen by others, and, importantly, how local elites perceive of the standing of their state within international society. Take the discussion on Russia's great power aspirations, for example. What makes the status of Russia historically relevant is not its 'objective' rank, but how the country was perceived internationally and domestically. Russian leaders since the Great Northern War, it was suggested here, have acted on behalf of perceptions of order and the standing of Russia therein. The same can be said about Imperial Germany or Meiji Japan. There is little doubt that Germany perceived of international society first and foremost as stature order in which material preponderance loomed large. Status concerns may have also factored in Germany's drive for 'a place in the sun', but the predominant dimension was certainly stature. This does not mean that the naval build-up and imperial expansionism under Wilhelm II were caused by stature aspirations. Prominent explanations of German *Weltpolitik* focus on the 'primacy of domestic politics'.[159] Yet even if the hypothesis is accepted that German foreign policy was primarily driven by domestic concerns, these authors do not deny the balance-power-power dominated worldview of the time. The Japanese case is more protracted. As Suzuki illustrates, Japanese elites internalized European norms of international conduct, which both included ideas about what role Japan should play in international society more generally and how it should relate to its neighbours in particular. But Suzuki's account also suggests that norm compliance was taken as a means to bolster Japan's status internationally. In this sense, Japan's

[159] In particular, Fischer 1961; Wehler 1973.

'Westernization' and turn to imperialism can be understood as manifestations of 'status management'. The difference between stature and status becomes even more apparent when Japan's 'deep' socialization is contrasted with the more selective strategy pursued by Chinese elites, whose principal goal of engaging international society, so Suzuki, was the 'attainment of military power'.[160]

Stature, role, and status are important for understanding Latin America's place in nineteenth-century international society. As the arms race between Argentina, Brazil, and Chile illustrates, stature concerns have not been absent from the region. Burr's study on balance of power politics in the Southern Cone clearly demonstrates that elites accepted the 'axioms and techniques of European power politics. They used its jargon, and did not hesitate to employ its form of coercion in dealing with problems of intra-South American relations'.[161] Similarly, Child argues that geopolitical thinking has been especially popular among South Americans, and remained so even after geopolitics became hugely discredited due to its association with German *Lebensraumpolitik* following WWII.[162] The same authors also find that, although early accounts were largely derivative of European theories, Latin American writers developed an independent tradition of geopolitical thought that stresses, among other things, the importance of boundaries and the need to occupy 'empty lands'.[163] In this context, however, it should also be noted that, contrary to the importance of territory in European geopolitical thought, in South America, the vast expanses of uncultivated land were often regarded as liability rather than strategic asset, as exemplified

[160] Suzuki 2009, 92.
[161] Burr 1965, 6.
[162] Child 1985. See also, Parodi 2002; Herz 2010.
[163] Child 1985, 23, 172, 176. See also Calvert 1994, 71-74; Kelly 1997; Hurrell 1998, 531-537; Atkins 1999, 45; Dodds 2000; Hepple 2004; Escudé 1988.

by Alberdi's dictum that, for Argentina and the region more generally, 'to govern is to populate'.[164]

Geopolitics in the Southern Cone also ties into the larger question of the 'anomalous' pattern of peace and conflict among Latin American states.[165] A small but growing body of literature has emerged that discusses the absence of major war in the region in the twentieth century, which is contrasted with the more conflict-prone nineteenth century, marked by the wars of independence, territorial secession and border disputes, and international war, most notably, the Mexican-American War (1846-1848), the War of the Triple Alliance (1864-1870), and the War of the Pacific (1879–1883). Three different strands of explanation have been advanced thus far. The first focuses broadly on the geopolitical location of Latin American states, and the role that great power hegemony played in isolating the region from systemic pressures. Consequently, particular emphasis is placed on Britain's role as 'boundary setter' between Latin America and European great power politics in the nineteenth century,[166] followed by the exclusion of extra-hemispheric powers by the United States under the Monroe Doctrine in the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries. The second strand centres on the nexus between state level phenomena and war-making.[167] Paradigmatic in this regard is Centeno's *Blood and Debt*, which argues that wars in the region were 'limited' because Latin American states lacked the organizational bases to wage major war. The third strand identifies Latin America as 'zone of negative peace' where threats are common but rarely escalate into military confrontations because of the

[164] Alberdi 1915 [1852], 217.
[165] See Holsti 1996, 150-182; Buzan and Wæver 2003, 304.
[166] For instance, Atkins 1999, 37, 45; Domínguez 2007, 88.
[167] Mares 2001; Centeno 2002; Thies 2005; Thies 2006.

regional norms and conflict resolution mechanisms in place.[168] The debate clearly demonstrates that Latin American elites were no utopian idealists. However, as the case studies will demonstrate, for the most part, war and territorial acquisition were not regarded as appropriate by Latin American elites for advancing their standing in international society. This stands in sharp contrast to the dominant view in Europe that saw territorial acquisition as means to increase a state's 'material power'. It seems likely that the increased rivalry among European states at the end of the nineteenth-century influenced Latin American conceptions of international order, leading to a temporary salience of stature perceptions in the region, which would explain the adoption of balance-of-power politics in all three cases towards the turn of the twentieth century.

Role thinking, by contrast, was particularly influential in the transition period leading to independence in the early nineteenth century. Traditional Latin American historiography interpreted independence as the outcome of an incipient nationalism and heroism of the enlightened few.[169] More recently, however, historians have stressed that independence in Latin America was the result of a constitutional crises that erupted with Napoleon's invasion of the Iberian Peninsula in 1807. As Adelman demonstrates, it involved a 'revision of the colonial pact' that did not seek the break with the metropolis but was driven by the demand of local political and economic elites for more autonomy (which would have involved a redistribution of rights and obligations, and which would have had concrete distributional effects both in terms of economic policy and access of creoles to higher

[168] Buzan and Wæver 2003; Kacowicz 2005.
[169] For an historiographical overview, see Adelman 2011.

administrative positions).[170] It was only after Ferdinand VII refused to meet these demands for autonomy that the situation escalated into civil war followed by wars of independence. Similarly, in Brazil, independence was proclaimed in 1822 after the Portuguese Cortes demanded the return of the king and the re-subordination of Brazil to Portugal.

Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico were recognized diplomatically, but they came to occupy a subordinate position within international society. Viewed from the perspective of the core of international society, but, more importantly, from within the region itself, the relative marginalization of Latin American states was first and foremost attributed to the region's civilizational backwardness. It was not a matter of stature, nor of role, which dominated twentieth-century debates on peripheral role of Latin America in the world economy. The perception of international society as status order also informed concrete politics in the region. Domestically, it led to the promotion of modernization oriented toward a European civilizational ideal, which was closely tied to questions of culture and race. By the end of the nineteenth century, the Eurocentric point of reference became gradually challenged, and was severely undermined by the carnage of WWI. The late nineteenth century saw increased geopolitical rivalry, particularly among Southern Cone states, but it was also accompanied by the belief that (Latin) America had developed a more progressive basis for the conduct of 'civilized' international relations based on regional institutions and the promotion of international law.

[170] In particular, Rodríguez 1998; Adelman 2006, 124.

CHAPTER 4

CIVILIZATION OR BARBARISM: ARGENTINA IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY

1. Introduction

This chapter examines Argentina's protracted history in nineteenth-century international society. It does so in two steps. The first section adopts the more conventional view of the diplomatic history of Argentine recognition, focusing in particular on the policies of Britain and the United States. This section places the recognition of Argentina in the wider context of the 'Western Question' that emerged from the collapse of Spanish authority in the Americas, and which is also highly relevant for understanding the Mexican case discussed in the following chapter.[1] Although Spanish rule had been strained before the outbreak of the Napoleonic Wars, it was war in Europe that drove the events in Spanish America. For one thing, Britain was primarily interested in securing, if not expanding, its commercial position in the nascent states. For another, the war against Napoleon, its alliance with Spain after 1808, and the problem of maintaining the peace thereafter, constrained Britain's response to the Spanish American insurgency. The situation of the United States was remarkably similar, even though it acted from a relatively weak position. Furthermore, its scope for action was limited by European politics, in general, and Spanish intransigence, in particular. The debates surrounding the Congress of Tucumán, during which the

[1] See, Blaufarb 2007.

independence of Argentina was declared in 1816, illustrate the awareness of the creole elite of these power political constraints. They also exemplify the way in which creole elites envisaged their entry into the community of independent states, that is, as Europeans born in the Americas. As a result, from their perspective, achieving standing in the international order was primarily a military question. They did not fundamentally question their entitlement to a place within the community of 'civilized' and Christian states. In the end, however, the situation of interlocked interest impeded the recognition of the United Provinces until the early 1820s. What the first section thus demonstrates is how stature concerns temporarily muted pre-existing stereotypes about the ability of Spanish Americans to self-rule. However, rampant political instability following independence and, importantly after recognition, had been granted by Britain and the United States, brought these back to the fore.

The second section, then, is about Argentina's 'promise unfulfilled'.[2] The dramatic rise and decline of Argentina as a wealthy exporter of agricultural produce has captured the interest of historians and political scientists alike. As Salvatore points out, the question of Argentina's modernization is intrinsically linked to its place in the wider world: 'The Europeanized elites who governed the country during the golden age and controlled its most important cultural and educational institutions were unambiguous about the location of Argentina in the concert of nations. Argentina was a country of European descent, struggling to modernize'.[3] The section traces the evolution of Argentine perceptions about the nature and scope of international society. Civil war, the absence of constitutional order,

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[2] The expression is borrowed from the dust jacket of Bulmer-Thomas 2003, see also, 5.
[3] Salvatore 2008, 760.

and, in particular, the regime of Juan Manuel de Rosas, a provincial *caudillo*, whose rule was portrayed as a conflict between civilization and barbarism, made Argentine elites highly sceptical about the country's place within the hierarchical international order of their time. The analysis of Argentine international thought reveals the extent to which the international order was conceived in culturalist terms, in which civilizational prestige determined the standing of states.

The chapter highlights the concerns of Argentine elites for the status of their state, framed in terms of the opposition between European civilization and American barbarism. In particular, the Generation of 1837, a group of liberal intellectuals united in their opposition against Rosas, blamed the harsh physical and social environment of the pampas, Spanish colonization, and racial miscegenation for Argentina's backwardness. On the one hand, the country's relatively small indigenous and black population placed Argentina in a privileged position vis-à-vis other countries, including Brazil and Mexico. On the other hand, however, Argentina urgently required European ideas, commerce and, in particular, peoples to overcome the country's barbarism. Rosas' advocates, by contrast, stylized the 'Restorer of the Laws' as a champion of (Latin) American independence, who successfully defended the country against Britain and France, and against the influence of Europeanizing 'sell-outs'. In the end, however, it was the vision of the Generation of 1837 that shaped Argentina's political trajectory. From 1861 onwards, Argentina underwent a profound transformation of its economy and society based on the expansion of the agricultural frontier, infrastructural works, and large-scale immigration from Southern Europe. The Argentine 'miracle' gained momentum at the end of the nineteenth century but ended abruptly with the collapse of the world economy following WWI. The late nineteenth-

century was also the heyday of racial thought, closely related to the ‘social question’ that emerged from these deep economic, social and demographic dislocations, concerns that also arose in Mexico and Brazil at the time.[4] Although debates were still framed in civilizational terms, under the influence of Social Darwinism, its standing in international society was thought to be determined by Argentina’s ‘whitening’ race, thus placing the country below North-west Europe and the United States, but above its more racially-heterogeneous neighbours in Latin America. At the same time, however, the combination of immigration from southern Europe and US expansionism at the end of nineteenth century led to a reappraisal of Argentina’s Spanish heritage. This reorientation became manifest in Argentina’s defence of Spanish American solidarity within the context of the Washington-led Pan-American movement.

In sum, the chapter argues that, from the perspective of Argentina’s Eurocentric elites, diplomatic recognition was a necessary but insufficient step in becoming a fully-fledged member of international society. The international order was perceived as highly hierarchical, in which status, conceived in cultural and increasingly racial terms, determined the ability of states to fulfil the expectations of international life. The chapter also demonstrates how these perceptions about the nature and scope of international society, and the place that Argentina occupied therein, shaped the way in which elites sought to modernize the country and bolster their standing among the family of ‘civilized’ states.

[4] Zimmermann 1992; 1995; Rodríguez 2006; Novoa and Levine 2010.

2. Independence and Recognition

Geopolitics and economic interests loomed large in the country's early history. Located along the southeastern edge of the South American continent, contemporary Argentina resulted from the disintegration of the Viceroyalty of the River Plate. Founded only in 1776, the creation of the viceroyalty was part of the Bourbon reforms that sought to reorganize the Spanish empire and to forestall further Portuguese expansion in the region. Buenos Aires—until then a colonial backwater at the mouth of the River Plate that served as a centre of contraband trade—was quickly transformed into a viceregal capital and an important *entrepôt* in the Atlantic trade, especially in silver.[5] With the Bourbon reforms came also the corpus of Enlightenment thought. Liberal economic doctrines, such as Physiocratic teachings on agricultural wealth and free trade, found fertile ground in Buenos Aires, whose creole elites increasingly resented the privileges of the *peninsulares* and who had long been exposed to foreign influences as a consequence of the contraband trade.[6] Political liberalism, however, was slower to take root. Ideas of popular sovereignty and representative government did not spark revolution in the River Plate. Spanish authority was undermined by the Napoleonic Wars, the consequences of which were felt throughout the Americas. Following the forced abdication of Ferdinand VII in 1808 and the fall of Seville two years later, the first self-governing body was formed in Caracas, Venezuela, in early 1810. Buenos Aires soon followed suit with the establishment of the *Primera Junta* on 25 May 1810, which, similar to the new authorities in Caracas, continued to pledge allegiance to the absentee king.[7]

[5] Rock 1987, 39-79; Adelman 1999b, 20.
[6] Romero 1963, 48-50; Adelman 1999b, 71; Terán 2008, 16-18.
[7] See Rodríguez 1998, 110-111.

The issue of legitimacy was not an easy question to settle. The seizure of power by the juntas in Spain and Spanish America was couched in terms of a 'retroversion of sovereignty', which stated that in the absence of a legitimate king on the Spanish throne, power should revert back to the 'peoples'—the peninsular kingdoms, cities and provinces that constitute the Spanish realm.[8] Unlike in the Mexican case where creoles sided with royalists in the face of a popular insurgency, in the River Plate, the emancipation movement was led from Buenos Aires, whose protagonists claimed authority over the interior as the continuation of viceregal prerogatives.[9] Although resisted by Montevideo and the provinces of the littoral, the independence of the United Provinces was declared on 9 July 1816. The 'hegemonic presumption' of the creoles in Buenos Aires sparked a virulent backlash within the former viceroyalty, provoking the secession of Paraguay, Upper Peru (Bolivia) and the Banda Oriental (Uruguay). The conflict also plunged nascent Argentina into decades of civil strife that only ended with the military victory of Buenos Aires in 1861, but which was not fully resolved until its federalization in 1880.[10] Political instability, in turn, undermined the standing of Argentina among the family of 'civilized' states.

British Recognition

Despite the political volatility of the post-independence period, the United Provinces of the River Plate was among the first countries in Spanish American to receive international recognition, most importantly from Britain and the United States. Recognition, however, was granted amidst significant concerns about the stability of the new state. This, in turn,

[8] Ibid., 75; Chiaramonte 2000, 59; Goldman 2008.
[9] Two centuries later, this presumption still forms the basis of Argentina's claim to the Falkland Islands/Malvinas. On Argentina's 'territorial nationalism', see Escudé 1988.
[10] See Oszlak 1982; Schweller 2006, 96-97; Halperín Donghi 2007.

had important ramifications for Argentina's standing in international society. Britain, in particular, took a keen interest in trade with the River Plate.[11] British trading interests had increased substantially since the *Asiento* (the right to trade slaves with the Spanish American colonies) was granted to Britain by the Treaty of Utrecht in 1713.[12] Napoleon's continental blockade in 1806 then forced British merchants to find new markets outside Europe. Britain's naval supremacy following the battle at Trafalgar provided an opportunity for British naval commander Sir Home Popham to temporarily seize control over Buenos Aires. With the Spanish forces unable to fend off the foreign intrusion, the residents of Buenos Aires organized a local militia, inflicting two humiliating defeats on the British between 1806 and 1807. The British invasion triggered an institutional crisis within the Viceroyalty. Perhaps more importantly, the defeat of the British increased the self-confidence of the *porteño* elite, contributing to the sense that, as Rodríguez puts it, 'the people of Buenos Aires possessed not only the right but also the ability to function as full-fledged citizens of the Spanish Monarchy'.[13] The failed invasion further strengthened the belief that Britain should not become politically entangled in the affairs of the region. Military conquest, the British Foreign Secretary, Castlereagh, argued, was a 'hopeless task'.[14] Fostering Spanish American independence would only lead to revolution: 'in endeavouring to promote and combine the happiness of the people with the extension of our own commerce, we might, in destroying a bad government, leave them without any government at all'.[15] International standing, in this view, was simply a matter of stature.

[11] On British recognition, see Webster 1938, vol. 1; Kaufmann 1967; on Argentina in particular Adelman 1999b; Gallo 2001; and more generally Ferns 1960; Miller 1993.
[12] Adelman 1999b, 22-31.
[13] Quote from Rodríguez 1998, 57; see also Bushnell 1987, 96; Chasteen 2008, 41.
[14] Castlereagh Memorandum to Cabinet, 1 May 1807, in Castlereagh and Londonderry 1851, 319.
[15] Ibid., 320; see also Ferns 1960, 48; Kaufmann 1967, 38.

Although the failed invasion put an end to the idea of British rule in the River Plate, Britain did gain control over parts of the former Spanish empire in the Americas—British Guiana, the Mosquito Coast and, most controversially from the Argentine perspective, the Falkland Islands/Malvinas, which were seized from the United Provinces in 1833. However, after 1807, Britain's official policy was largely driven by commercial interests, which could be secured through other, more informal means, which is why Argentina is often referred to as part of Britain's 'informal Empire' or 'Sixth Dominion'.[16] As Belich points out, from the perspective of Argentina's landholding class, the relationship was both beneficial and unforced.[17] The latter point is important because it emphasizes the consensual nature of this relationship, at least viewed from the perspective of the port's creole elite.

The Napoleonic Wars weakened imperial links with Spain and caused economic hardship in the River Plate. The crisis further emboldened the creole fraction, which demanded an end to the Spanish trade monopoly. The calls for free trade, controlled political change, and the abolition of the slave trade struck a chord with the British public. Creoles, in other words, called for a renegotiation of their role within the Spanish realm. For Mariano Moreno, the celebrated ideologue of the May Revolution, trade with Britain was an economic necessity and moral imperative due to the 'perfect equality that should exist between the peoples that comprise essentially a single Kingdom'.[18] The quote stems from Moreno's response to the representative of Cadiz, Miguel Fernández de Agüero, who had warned that free trade would wreak havoc on local manufacturing while subjugating the

[16] Gallagher and Robinson 1953; Platt 1968; Hennessy and King 1992; Hopkins 1994; Brown 2008b.
[17] Belich 2009, 536.
[18] Moreno and Piñero 1915, 149; see also Jacobsen 2005, 117-122.

River Plate to British interest.[19] Interestingly, the debate bears resemblance to the arguments of twentieth-century *dependentistas*, who criticized Argentina's subordination under British economic interests. It is furthermore important to point out that Moreno's intervention reverberated in the region, including, as discussed in Chapter 6, by Brazilian elites, who generally maintained little contact with their Spanish American counterparts. Although commercial in its origins, the trade issue was highly political, ultimately turning into a question of the colony's place within the imperial order. Drawing eclectically from a number of European sources, in particular the Spanish political economist Gaspar de Jovellanos,[20] Moreno argued that neither Spain nor Spanish America could compete with British producers, which is why mercantilism would only lead to contraband trade and economic backwardness. Thus, he concluded, the key to reverting economic and political decline was specialization in agriculture and free trade with Britain: 'justice of our times demands that we enjoy the same commerce as all the other peoples that constitute the Spanish monarchy of which we form a part of'.[21] As will become more apparent in the case studies on Mexico and Brazil, ideas about the role that the provinces should play within the Spanish realm was crucial for understanding creole discontent that developed from demands for greater autonomy to outright declarations of independence.

In 1809, the port of Buenos Aires was opened to British trade, and, particularly following the May Revolution of 1810, British merchants lobbied intensively for the support of the

[19] Levene 1939, 715-717; Halperín Donghi 1975, 111-124; Adelman 2006, 205.
[20] See, for instance, Moreno and Piñero 1915, 134-135; it is likely that Moreno was introduced to British political economy through Spanish liberal authors who were often Anglophiles, see Racine 2010, 431.
[21] Moreno and Piñero 1915, 132, own translation. *Pueblo* refers to cities and provinces rather than nations, see Chiaramonte 2007.

rebellious colonies and the recognition of Buenos Aires.[22] Likewise, public opinion in Britain largely favoured Spanish American emancipation, advocated by important publicists such as Jeremy Bentham and James Mill, who were in close contact with revolutionary leaders based in London. As Paquette argues, the insurgencies were widely perceived as 'as counter-revolutionary, restorative and purifying struggles', not unlike the revolt of the Greeks against the decaying Ottoman Empire.[23] Seen in this light, the events in Spanish America were the legitimate response to Spanish decadence and despotism–a theme which, as argued above, had persisted in Protestant countries since the sixteenth century.[24] However, despite strong domestic pressure, the British government shied away from openly aiding the insurgents after Britain entered into an alliance with Spain against Napoleon. Even after Napoleon's defeat and the restoration of Ferdinand VII to the Spanish throne, Britain pursued an ambiguous policy of openly supporting Spain while simultaneously undermining its political and commercial position in the Americas.[25] For the British government, maintaining peace in Europe was more important than promoting trade with the creoles of the River Plate.

By 1822, Britain gradually moved towards *de facto* recognition by admitting ships flying the flags of the new Spanish American states into its ports.[26] However, whereas commercial interests and public opinion pushed in one direction, the political realities in Europe

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[22] Waddell 1987b, 206-207.
[23] Paquette 2004, 76; see also Racine 2010.
[24] As Parish put it: 'Oppressed, misgoverned, [and misguided] as they long have been, it was not to be expected that [in this enlightened and liberal age] they could much longer continue in the state of [degraded and odious] subjection in which they had been hitherto held' in Parish to Canning, FO6/4, 25 June 1824, in Humphreys 1940, 2. Note that words in squared brackets were pencilled through. On the controversy surrounding British 'neutrality' and the Foreign Enlistment Act, see Sir James Mackintosh, HC Deb Deb, 10 June 1819, Vol 40 cc1084-116; see also, Waddell 1987a, 15; Gallo 2001, 125.
[25] Ferns 1960, 88; Kaufmann 1967; Waddell discounts the importance of commercial interests, 1987b, 204.
[26] Ferns 1960, 106; Waddell 1987b, 208.

constrained Britain's policy towards the River Plate. This was the case until the early 1820s, when Britain began to take a more distanced stance towards the European Concert, following the interventions of the Holy Alliance in Italy and Spain.[27] After the United States extended recognition in early 1822, Britain felt increasingly compelled to follow suit:[28] In October 1823, Canning obtained a guarantee from France not to assist Spain in regaining its lost colonies, and appointed Woodbine Parish as Consul-General to the River Plate.[29] A year later, the authorities in Buenos Aires took up a loan of £1,000,000 from Baring Brothers in London, which put further pressure on the British government to formalize its relations with the South Americans.[30] British recognition seemed imminent at that time, although Canning was sceptical about the political stability of the new regime and its control over the provinces.[31] The issue of religious toleration was a further obstacle, although far less consequential than in the Mexican case. During the 'Happy Experience' (1821-1824), Bernadino Rivadavia, the Benthamite minister of the Rodriguez government, pursued a number of far-reaching reforms that included the lease of public land, the promotion of European immigration, and the attempt to curb the power of the Catholic Church, but which caused considerable backlash amongst religious conservatives.[32] As Rivadavia described it, immigration was a necessity and 'the most effective and perhaps only means to destroy the offending Spanish habits and the fatal gradation of the castes' that characterized colonial society.[33]

[27] Kaufmann 1967, 148; Schroeder 1992, 685; Gallo 2001, 137.
[28] FO 72/266, 15 Nov 1822, in Webster 1938, vol. 2, 393-398.
[29] Ferns 1960, 113; Gallo 2001, 140-141.
[30] See Platt 1968, 34-35, 313.
[31] Gallo 2001, 151-152.
[32] Ibid., 154; 2012, 80-84.
[33] Cited in Halperín Donghi 1987, 196.

The issue of religious toleration did not pass unnoticed by the British government, given its importance to the safety and civil rights of Protestant residents in the River Plate.[34] Overall, reports from the merchant community seemed more sceptical about the situation in the River Plate than the official dispatches of Parish.[35] 'Nature has done her utmost in climate and situation', Parish informed Canning, 'and it only remains for civilized man in these regions to make the most of those inestimable blessings which Providence, on the one hand, has bestowed upon him, and a paternal Government, on the other, is anxious by all possible means to improve'.[36] After the defeat of the Spanish forces at Ayacucho in December 1824, the concerns were finally alleviated.[37] In early 1825, Buenos Aires was given authority to represent the provinces vis-à-vis foreign powers, which finally opened the way for British recognition.[38] Thus, although largely self-governed since 1808 and effectively independent since the May Revolution of 1810,[39] the United Provinces of the River Plate were recognized by Britain through the 'Treaty of Amity, Commerce and Navigation', signed on 2 February 1825.[40] Britain, in Canning's words, was left no other choice but to recognize the new states, 'thus to bring them within the pale of those rights and duties, which civilized nations are bound mutually to respect and are entitled reciprocally to claim from each other'.[41] At least formally, Argentina was recognized by Britain as member of the community of 'civilized' states.

[34] Ferns 1960, 126, 129-130.
[35] Ibid., 118; Gallo 2001, 143.
[36] FO6/4, 26 June 1824, in Humphreys 1940, 25; see also Gregory 1992, 6.
[37] Rock 1987, 100; Gallo 2001, 157.
[38] Ferns 1960, 128-129; Cisneros and Escudé 1998, vol. 2, 216.
[39] Ferns 1960, 110.
[40] Reprinted in Parry 1969, vol. 75, 75-84.
[41] FO 72/309, 25 March 1825, in Webster 1938, vol. 2, 438; see also Gallo 2001, 151; Fabry 2010, 63.

The treaty recognized the sovereignty of the United Provinces of the River Plate and established formal reciprocity in the relations between the two states. The agreement also contained a number of commercial stipulations that granted most favoured nation status (article VII), and guaranteed basic civil liberties, including the exemption from military service and freedom of religion (XII). There is no doubt that Britain benefitted disproportionally from this arrangement—as John Murray Forbes, who replaced Rodney as the US envoy to the River Plate pointedly remarked, its 'supposed reciprocity is a cruel mockery of the absolute lack of resources in the provinces'.[42] This factual inequality has led to the charge that Britain imposed the treaty on its South American counterpart, thereby establishing the foundations of its informal dominion over Argentina.[43] However, as Ferns highlights, 'Canning's policy, as it eventually took shape in the Anglo-Argentine Treaty of 1825, was to establish a complete legal and political equality between the British and Argentine states'; the underlying 'liberal principles' were strikingly different from the policy pursued towards Brazil based on the pursuit of commercial and, importantly, legal privileges, which Ferns overlooks. It is also noteworthy that the River Plate did not attempt to play-off foreign powers to the same extent as Mexico, which, despite the often-remarked self-consciousness of the *porteño* elite following the expulsion of the British expeditions, suggests an overall more cautious stature approach towards international society.

Finally, despite the early warnings of the Spanish merchant community, free trade and the international insertion of Argentina as provider of agricultural produce was not regarded as

[42] Shumway 1991, 99; see also Peterson 1964, 85-87.
[43] This view has been represented by the revisionist school of historiography in Argentina; in the English literature, the notion goes back to Gallagher and Robinson 1953, 9; for a recent restatement, see Becker Lorca 2010, 520.

demeaning by the new state's elite. The distribution of different roles in the international division of labour, in other words, did not relegate Argentina to an inferior standing. Quite the contrary, from the perspective of the *porteño* elite (although not necessarily from the perspective of the interior provinces), trade with Britain was a necessary means to political independence. Britain may have exercised political pressure, but the removal of trade barriers had long been demanded by the creole elite, and, after 1808, became inextricably linked to the question of self-determination and autonomy from Spain.

Dynastic Legitimacy and the Search for a New Link

The European powers at the Congress of Vienna sought to restore the international order that had been profoundly disrupted by the events of the French Revolution. Peace in Europe, as Schroeder makes clear, was thought to depend on a political settlement underpinned by great power management and the 'restoration of the rule of law, beginning with its foundation, the security and legitimacy of all thrones'.[44] Tsar Alexander I proposed a 'Holy Alliance' of Christian monarchs to uphold peace and international legitimacy, which bound together the conservative powers of Austria, Prussia, and Russia. Sceptical of the initiative from its inception—Castlereagh famously regarded the proposal as a 'piece of sublime mysticism and nonsense'[45]—Britain never acceded to the alliance. Yet even the treaties of Vienna bore frequent reference to the 'Powers of Christendom' as a theological-political formula that only declined during subsequent decades. In the early nineteenth century, monarchism and Christianity were still regarded as foundations of the international political order, at least on the European continent. But whereas there was little doubt about

[44] Schroeder 1992, 696; 1994, 580.
[45] Castlereagh to Liverpool, 28 Sep 1815, in Webster 1938, vol. 2, 383.

the Christian credentials of the new states in Spanish America, the regime question remained unresolved as republicans haggled with monarchists over the new constitutional order.[46]

Between 1808 and 1826, the establishment of a constitutional monarchy, the preferred choice from the British point of view, was seriously considered by creoles in Buenos Aires. The issue arose first with the arrival of the Portuguese Court in Rio de Janeiro. Carlota Joaquina, the sister of Ferdinand VII and wife of the Portuguese King John VI, proposed that she rule over Spanish America from Buenos Aires in her brother's name. Although the idea failed to attract widespread support—neither Spain nor Britain supported the initiative—*carlotism* found some prominent advocates amongst the creole elite, including Manuel Belgrano and Mariano Moreno.[47] Following the May Revolution, Buenos Aires dispatched several diplomatic missions to gather foreign support, which included the search for a suitable monarch. In 1814, Belgrano and Rivadavia were secretly instructed that if Spain refused to grant, at the very least, autonomy to the River Plate, the envoys should approach Britain and other European courts, 'to find an advantageous party that ensures the civil liberty of these Provinces, without stopping short of allowing political and commercial treaties that could stimulate her attention, because the objective is to obtain the respectable protection of some Power of the first order, against the oppressive attempts of Spain'.[48] Although Britain supported the establishment of independent monarchies in South America

[46] Drake 2009, 58.
[47] Bushnell 1987, 96-97; Rock 1987, 87; Cisneros and Escudé 1998, vol. 2, 67-73; Gallo 2001, 90-94.
[48] For the instructions, see Belgrano 1947, 419; Mitre 1887, 292; Cisneros and Escudé 1998, vol. 2, 98; Gallo 2012, 24-27.

in principle,[49] the scheme was encouraged by France, where the Abbé de Pradt argued for the creation of Bourbon monarchies in order to check Britain's influence in the region.[50] In 1819, the French government proposed the Duke of Lucca, a nephew of Ferdinand VII of the House of the Bourbon; however, he was not considered sufficiently respectable by the South Americans, and his candidacy lacked the support of either Spain or the Holy Alliance.[51] The episode exemplifies the confidence that elites placed in the future of their new states, as elite from the River Plate, like their Mexican counterparts would not simply accept any European prince. Status mattered.

Lastly, there was also the possibility of choosing a monarch from among the descendants of the Inca dynasty, introduced by Belgrano at the Congress of Tucumán in 1816. Although the 'Inca Plan' seemed preposterous to later generations of Argentines, in fact, the delegates at Tucumán were willing to consider the proposal, including leading military figures like José de San Martín and Martín Miguel Güemes.[52] Yet the idea provoked considerable domestic opposition, in particular from republican circles in Buenos Aires, who strongly opposed the monarchical designs of Belgrano, questioning whether an Inca dynasty would even be regarded as legitimate in Europe.[53] For the deputy of Buenos Aires, Tomás Manuel de Anchorena, a 'monarch of the chocolate caste' was unacceptable.[54] Similarly, the editor of *La Crónica Argentina,* Vicente Pazos Silva, was surprised that the Incas were not simply invoked 'as a political metaphor to designate the Argentine empire';

[49] Castlereagh Memorandum to Cabinet, 1 May 1807, in Castlereagh and Londonderry 1851, 321-323; Kaufmann 1967, 38.
[50] See Bornholdt 1944; Paquette 2004, 80-81; Blaufarb 2007, 747-749.
[51] Robertson 1939, 129-177; Cisneros and Escudé 1998, vol. 2, 247-248.
[52] Mitre 1887, 426-430; Ingenieros 1956, 32; see also Pratt 1992, 144.
[53] Mitre 1887, 422; the British considered the proposal 'curious' and a 'stalking-horse to cover other plans', FO63/195, Chamberlain to Castlereagh, 29 August 1816, reprinted in Webster 1938, vol. 2, 178.
[54] Anchorena to Rosas, 4 Dec 1846, cited in Caballero 2008, 11; Ingenieros 1956, 30.

the Incas had ‘no right to reign over the Americas, having ceased to exist as a House of Princes 300 years ago, but not without bequeathing to posterity bastard offsprings without consideration in the world’.[55] An Incan monarch, he further argued, would be the ‘king of mockery, deed of thoughtlessness and caprice, taken from a hut or the centre of the plebe [...who would] establish the divisory line between the indigenous race and the creole race, presenting as threat the example of the preponderance of the black race in Santo Domingo’.[56] Following staunch public opposition, the initiative was finally dropped,[57] although the monarchical question was not resolved until the promulgation of a republican constitution in 1826.[58]

The ‘Inca Plan’ represents a prime example of what Earle termed ‘indianesque nationalism’. As the author explains, with the onset of emancipation, ‘advocates of independence across Spanish America began to describe the new nations they sought to create as continuations of the pre-Colombian civilizations destroyed as result of the Spanish conquest’.[59] Rather than expressions of a ‘synthetic paradigm of race’, as von Vacano claims,[60] the evocation of the pre-Colombian past was a rhetorical move to delegitimize Spanish colonialism while asserting the rights of the ruling America-born elite as the metaphorical sons of ancient emperors and kings. All three cases under study developed some form of Indianism, even though in the Brazilian case, the foundational myth was built around the image of the ‘noble savage’ rather than the prestige of pre-Colombian empires. Contrary to Earle’s observations, Indianism in Mexico was politically far more

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[55] Mitre 1887, 441, own translation.
[56] Ibid., 441-442, own translation.
[57] Ibid., 447.
[58] Rock 1987, 101.
[59] Earle 2007, 3.
[60] von Vacano 2012.

consequential than in the River Plate, where creole elites came to accept the Aztec empire as Mexico's own classical antiquity.[61] Although references to the Incas can still be found in the national anthem and coat of arms of Argentina, Incaism fell rapidly out of favour, and, by mid-nineteenth century, it was rejected outright as a foundational myth across the political spectrum and, unlike the Mexican case, not resuscitated again.

The Inca Plan exemplifies how creoles' conceptions of the international order were framed in culturalist and racial terms and the contradictions this created for the entry of Argentina into international society. Independence leaders justified their right to rule by distancing themselves from Spanish despotism while simultaneously advancing their Spanish heritage as grounds for admission into international society. More broadly, monarchism was seen as a way to gain recognition from the European powers. Yet the initiatives to crown a European monarch in Buenos Aires failed because of domestic opposition and European and Spanish politics, in particular, which effectively blocked the monarchical designs of France and the creoles in the River Plate. Even if monarchism had won out, 'premature recognition' would still have undermined the rights of the Spanish monarchy. This is because the principle of dynastic legitimacy requires the consent of the 'parent' sovereign for a territorial change or secession to be legitimate.[62] However, with the Bourbon restoration in 1814, Ferdinand VII sought a return to absolutism, abolishing Spain's liberal constitution of 1812 and attempting to reassert his control over Spanish America by force. The Spanish position changed little over time, effectively postponing its recognition of Argentina until 1859.

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[61] See Brading 1985; 1991.
[62] See Crawford 2006; Fabry 2010.

Recognition from the United States

Spain's intransigence further influenced the policy of the United States, which, despite the reservations of influential sceptics such as John Quincy Adams, was inclined to recognize the new states but refrained from doing so until after the transfer of Florida from Spain was secured in 1821.[63] Like the British position, the policy of United States was influenced by geopolitical interests and the prospect of commerce—although its trade lagged considerably behind Britain's position in the River Plate.[64] But whereas British neutrality stemmed from its concern for the preservation of peace in Europe, the government in Washington feared Spanish retaliation, as Ferdinand VII postponed the ratification of the Adams-Onís Treaty of 1819. The United States also worried that the revolutionary upheavals in South America could provoke European interventions and the extension of monarchical rule to the Americas. The conservative powers of Europe had agreed at Troppau to suppress revolutionary upheavals, and the interventions in Italy and Spain seemingly demonstrated their determination. With the War of 1812 fresh in their minds, the possibility of a foreign presence that could destabilize the Union seemed a real threat, eventually leading to the promulgation of the Monroe Doctrine in December 1823.[65] From the perspective of the United States, recognition was desirable because it would stabilize the new regimes. Recognition was therefore not only declaratory, it was also thought to have a constitutive

[63] Cisneros and Escudé 1998, vol. 2, 235-236; Schoultz 1998, 9; on US recognition, see Robertson 1918a; Manning 1925a, vol. 2; Whitaker 1941.
[64] Peterson 1964, 84-85.
[65] On the Monroe Doctrine see Perkins 1927; Dunkerley 1999, 8-13; Gilderhus 2006; Sexton 2011; Scarfi 2014. Note that Monroe's message was received in favourable terms in Argentina. In fact, Rivadavia appealed to the doctrine during Argentina's conflict with Brazil over the Banda Oriental. Clay, however, made clear that president's message was a personal statement and implied no obligations for the United States, Stewart 1930, 29-32.

effect on the nascent state. Yet since the outbreak of the wars of independence, the policy of the United States was to maintain its declared neutrality with Spain while closely following developments in Spanish America as to whether independence had been achieved as a matter of fact.[66]

Following the end of the Napoleonic Wars in Europe, royalist forces were able to temporarily subdue some of the rebellions in Spanish America. By 1816, the River Plate was the last stronghold of rebellion in Spanish America, paving the way for the formal declaration of independence of the 'United Provinces of South America' at the Congress of Tucumán at that year. Yet the fragmentation of the former viceroyalty reached a point where Buenos Aires had lost control over Paraguay and Upper Peru, and was facing considerable opposition from José Gervasio Artigas in the Banda Oriental. The Luso-Brazilian invasion eventually aborted Artigas's 'barbarian democracy', but his defeat did not end the conflict between centralist and federalist forces.

In 1817, the Monroe administration dispatched a commission to Buenos Aires to inquire about the state of affairs in the River Plate and to protest against Argentine privateering along the coast of the United States.[67] The reports varied considerably in their outlook, with all but Rodney opposing immediate recognition. But the commissioners also pointed to the advances made since the end of Spanish rule—although Bland lamented the 'inertia of the Spanish habits' and in particular the 'hebetating [sic] political and ecclesiastical institutions

[66] Robertson 1918a, 245; Peterson 1964, 28.
[67] Adams to Rodney, Graham, and Bland, 21 Nov 1817, in Manning 1925a, vol. 1, 47-49.

of the countryside.[68] For their secretary, Henry Brackenridge, who held a patronizing yet favourable view of Buenos Aires, the country was simply too 'far removed from the civilized world'.[69] Even more sceptical was the report issued by the former 'special agent' to Buenos Aires, Joel Roberts Poinsett, who warned of the potential European reaction, calling into question the 'moral effect' that recognition would have on the people of the River Plate, who had treated the United States as a 'Secondary power' thus far.[70] As will become clear in Chapter 5, Poinsett passed similar judgement on Mexico, where he became deeply involved in domestic partisan conflict. The episode demonstrates how negative stereotypes about Spanish Americans influenced Washington's foreign policy towards the newly created states. Much in the same line, Adams concluded that the inhabitants of the River Plate were unable to self-rule. 'They have not the first elements of good and free government. Arbitrary power, military and ecclesiastical, was stamped upon their education, upon their habits, and upon all their institution. Civil dissension was infused into all their seminal principles. War and mutual destruction was in every member of their organization, moral, political, and physical.'[71]

Ultimately, Rodney's views seem to have carried more weight with Monroe.[72] Furthermore, the situation in the River Plate improved by 1820 with the election of Rodríguez. On 8 March 1822, Monroe announced the recognition of the first South American republics, including the United Provinces of the River Plate, Colombia, Chile, and Mexico.[73] Adams replied to the protesting Spanish minister that it was 'the moral obligation of civilized and

[68] Bland to Adams, 2 Nov 1818, in ibid.; see also Peterson 1964, 38-41; Schoultz 1998, 7-8.
[69] Whitaker 1941, 179; Gregory 1992, 9.
[70] Poinsett to Adams, 4 Nov 1818, Manning 1925a, vol. 1, 442.
[71] John Quincy Adams, 9 March 1821, in Adams 1875, 325; Schoultz 1998, 4.
[72] Peterson 1964, 71; Whitaker 1941, 389-390.
[73] Monroe to the United States House of Representatives, March 8, 1822, Manning 1925a, vol. 1, 148.

Christian nations to entertain reciprocally with one another'.[74] Colombia and Mexico—a monarchy headed by Agustín de Iturbide since May 1822—were the first Latin American nations to receive de facto recognition by the United States. Doubts concerning the stability and authority over the viceregal provinces postponed the recognition of the River Plate.[75] On 27 January 1823, Caesar Augustus Rodney was appointed the first minister of the United States to the new state. [76] Yet despite recognition, Buenos Aires remained a focus of concern. In his instructions to Rodney, Adams stated that Buenos Aires had 'undergone many changes of Government, violent usurpations of authority, and forcible dispossessions from it; without having so far as we know to this day settled down into any lawful establishment of power by the only mode in which it could be effected—a constitution formed and sanctioned by the voice of the people.'[77] Furthermore, he warned about the many 'European foreign intrigues' and the 'hankering after Monarchy' of 'all the successive governing authorities in Buenos Ayres'.[78]

As Schoultz argues, prejudices about Spanish culture and Catholicism certainly informed the official position of the United States.[79] But when it came to recognition, these considerations were overridden by Washington's concern for the integrity and security of the Union. Security concerns also took precedence over questions of regime type and stability. As the Mexican case illustrates, the United States was willing to recognize a monarchy in Latin America, even if in this case the establishment of monarchical rule

[74] Adams to Andagua, April 6, 1822, in ibid., I, 157; see also Robertson 1939, 254; Fabry 2010, 59.
[75] 'Indeed, I think this Republic, if it ever merited that name, is now in the most utter darkness of despair and without any ray of hope', Forbes to Adams, 1 April 1821, Manning 1925a, vol. 1, 573.
[76] See Whitaker 1941, 248-250; Peterson 1964, 74; Fabry 2010, 57.
[77] Adams to Rodney, 17 May 1823, in Manning 1925a, vol. 1, 187; Schoultz 1998, 10.
[78] Adams to Rodney, 17 May 1823, in Manning 1925a, vol. 1, 187; Schoultz 1998, 9.
[79] Ibid. 1998.

would not strengthen the position of a European power in the Western Hemisphere. These observations explain why the United States anticipated British recognition and declined to coordinate its efforts with Britain. Lastly, they also raise questions about Fabry's argument that Britain and the United States would have regarded the admission into international society as a 'natural right' of de facto states.[80] While it is certainly the case that both countries defended their decision to recognize the United Provinces as mere acknowledgement of established facts, Fabry's argument concerning the emerging norms of de facto recognition downplays the importance of economic and, in particular, geopolitical considerations.

To briefly summarize what has been said so far, the recognition of the United Provinces was largely driven by power political and economic considerations. In the context of the Napoleonic Wars and the post-Vienna settlement, these interests muted the culturalist concerns. However, as will become clear below, political instability following independence soon brought cultural and racial considerations back to the fore, undermining the status of Argentina as fully-fledged member of the community of 'civilized' states. Argentina was recognized diplomatically, but not admitted into the inner-circle of international society.

3. Mid-Nineteenth-Century Argentina

The previous section demonstrated how political considerations and economic interests muted concerns about the viability of the new state in the River Plate. The British public, in

[80] Fabry 2010, 56-70.

particular, was enthusiastic about the prospects for political development and commerce after the yoke of Spanish rule was lifted. The United States, too, expected to benefit economically from recognizing the Spanish American republics. Although in both cases recognition was justified in de facto terms, there was also considerable concern as to whether stability had been achieved. Political instability, in turn, was seen as an outgrowth of Spanish culture and the inability of creoles to self-rule in particular.

It did not take long for the precarious post-revolutionary order to break down again. In 1826, a new constitution was enacted that organized Argentina into a republic, but whose strong centralizing tendencies were fervently opposed by the *caudillos* in the provinces and cattle ranchers of Buenos Aires, who resented the separation of the port from the province. The constitutional congress elected Rivadavia as the first president of Argentina, but his government enjoyed little support at home and came under considerable pressure from abroad. The unresolved territorial dispute with Brazil over the east bank of the River Plate boiled over into war in 1825. The Brazilian blockade of Buenos Aires severely disrupted overseas trade and severed the government's principal source of revenue. The ensuing economic crisis harmed financial and mercantile interests in Buenos Aires, and forced Argentina to default on the Baring loan of 1824. In Europe, the crisis added to the more negative outlook regarding the future of Spanish America, as the investment boom of the early 1820s met a sudden end. According to Ferns, contemporary observers succumbed to the 'temptation' of attributing the political and economic chaos 'to the barbaric propensities of the Spanish and Indian races'.[81] Upon his return to Britain after his colony had been sacked by provincial strongmen, James Beaumont warned his countrymen against

[81] Ferns 1960, 143.

venturing into the River Plate: ‘They have driven away their Spanish masters, but have retained their suspiciousness and jealousy of strangers [...] They have dismissed their monks and friars, but there remains with them the hypocrisy of both orders. They have broken their own chains of slavery, but the vices of slaves, dissimulation and treachery, continue rooted in their habits’.[82]

With his political support rapidly eroding, Rivadavia resigned in 1827. Rivadavia’s fall ended the Unitarian experiment and set into motion the rise of Juan Manuel de Rosas, who came to dominate Argentine politics between 1832 and 1852. The war with Brazil ended in 1828 leading to the creation of an independent Uruguay as a buffer state under British mediation. However, the veteran forces led by General Juan Lavalle turned against the Federalist Manuel Dorrego, who had become Governor of Buenos Aires after the dissolution of the central government in 1827. Dorrego’s imprisonment and summary execution by the Unitarian forces sparked renewed civil war, during which the provincial *caudillos*, above all Rosas, mobilized subaltern groups including the rural poor, gauchos, black, and indigenous peoples.[83] To the foreign observer, the breakdown of political order was further evidence of Spanish Americans’ inability to self-govern. As the *Times* editorial from 21 March 1829 explained: ‘The events which have occurred on the La Plata, so similar in character to the late excesses in Mexico, furnish another proof of the difficulty of establishing civil subordination and political order in a state of society like that of Spanish America, where extensive provinces, too imperfectly civilized for self-government, though

[82] Beaumont 1828, 245-246. By 1828, of the newly independent states of Latin American, only Brazil was not in default.
[83] Lynch 1981, 39-40; Rock 1987, 105; for a more detailed discussion, see Andrews 1980, 96-101.

too powerful for foreign restraint, have, by the force of circumstances, been raised into independent commonwealth'.[84]

Strong enough to prevent reconquest but not sufficiently consolidated to be regarded as 'civilized', by the mid-nineteenth century Spanish America fell short of full membership in international society. While stature confirmed rather than undermined Argentina's international standing—after all, the country was able to militarily defeat European powers—Argentina's alleged civilizational deficiency became increasingly seen as problematic, and emerged as a central trope in how Argentine elites thought and wrote about the standing of their state.

Argentina, under the rule of Juan Manuel de Rosas, exemplifies the dilemma between sufficient international stature and insufficient status. Rosas assumed the governorship of Buenos Aires endowed with dictatorial powers, which he used extensively over two decades, with only a short interruption between 1832 and 1835.[85] To this day, Rosas remains one of the most controversial figures in Argentine history. For some, including the revisionist school of historiography of the twentieth century,[86] Rosas represented the popular elements of Argentine society, defending the nation's honour and sovereignty against the encroaching foreign powers of Britain and France.[87] This interpretation relies on two key points: First, Rosas, in control of the custom revenues, implemented protectionist policies that increased tariffs on imported goods and closed the River Paraná,

[84] Times, 21 March 1829, 2; see also Dawson 1990, 175-176.
[85] Lynch 1981, 157.
[86] See, for instance, Halperín Donghi 2005, 16-17; Goebel 2011, 23-64.
[87] See, Rosas's address to the Legislature, 16 August 1845, AMREC, AH/0007/3. The Day of National Sovereignty, a public holiday in Argentina, commemorates Rosas's resistance against the Anglo-French blockade at the Battle of Vuelta de Obligado.

and therefore the interior provinces, to foreign trade. Secondly, Rosas successfully defied two naval blockades: the first imposed by France between 1838 and 1840, and the second by an Anglo-French fleet between 1845 and 1848.

By the late 1830s, France adopted a more assertive stance internationally, including towards Spanish America, where it seized the port of Vera Cruz in 1838. Similar to the events in Mexico, the French blockade of Buenos Aires resulted from disputes over indemnity claims and the treatment of French subjects.[88] France recognized the independence of Argentina in 1830,[89] but because recognition was declared rather than negotiated, the French community did not enjoy the legal protection that was granted to the British in 1825, exempting the latter from forced loans and impressment into military service.[90] Relations between the two countries further deteriorated as France tacitly supported the opposition in Uruguay, provoking the expulsion of the French consul from Buenos Aires. From the French perspective, Rosas's disregard for the nation's honour required a civilizing force against the 'degenerate children of the Spanish heroes of the conquest'.[91] In the course of the blockade, France openly sided with Rivera in Uruguay, but, ultimately, was forced to abandon its ally and to settle with Rosas in the Arana-Mackau treaty of 1840, widely perceived as a humiliating defeat of the Europeans as it only granted 'qualified' most favoured nation status to France.[92]

[88] Rock 1987, 109.
[89] Robertson 1939, 553.
[90] Cady 1929, 27-31; Ferns 1960, 240.
[91] Mignet 1838, cited in Cady 1929, 36.
[92] Unlike Britain, France would be excluded from the privileges granted to other Latin American states, see ibid., 87, 90-91.

Rosas's use of state terror against his political opponents reached a highpoint in the early 1840s, provoking renewed complaints by France. In an intriguing example of how great powers can come to an arrangement with dictators if they serve their interests, Britain established a working relationship with Rosas—Rosas made important concessions during the French blockade concerning the slave trade and even considered exchanging Argentina's claims over the Falkland Islands for a cancellation of the Baring loan of 1824.[93] This situation changed with the defeat of Rivera and the siege of Montevideo, which drew Britain into the conflict as guarantor of Uruguayan independence. In their joint declaration, Ouseley and Deffaudis condemned the regime's cruelties, which had 'excited the indignation of the civilized world'.[94] After the blockade was declared on 18 September 1845, they furthermore specified that the action was targeting the 'barbarous decree' that closed the River Paraná and the 'savage acts' committed against foreign nationals, a 'continued violation of the great principles of civilization and humanity'.[95] The fact that the rationale for the 'pacific blockade' was explicitly couched in civilizational terms does not mean that France's main concern was to 'civilize' the River Plate. But it does show how the civilizational rhetoric was employed to construct an international hierarchy based on status differentials, on which the River Plate ranked relatively low.

In November 1845, an Anglo-French expedition defeated the Confederation at the Battle of Vuelta de Obligado, forcing Rosas to temporarily open the River Paraná to foreign ships. Yet despite the military victory, the blockade was controversial in Britain, as the merchant community in Buenos Aires sided with Rosas, and criticism mounted over what was

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[93] Ibid., 63; Ferns 1960, 240-280; Lynch 1981, 54, 266-267.
[94] Ouseley and Deffaudis to Arana, 18 Sep 1845, AMREC, AH/0007/03.
[95] 21 Dec 1845, AMREC, AH/0007/3

perceived as a sacrifice of British trading interests.[96] Rosas in turn, tried to influence public opinion in Europe by spreading his own counter-narrative in newspapers and pamphlets in which his advocates sought to undermine the credibility of the Unitarian opposition while portraying Rosas as defender of 'American' interests. In many respects, Rosas's *americanismo* resembled the 'Western Hemisphere idea' propagated in the United States.[97] Accordingly, the Americas were part of a political system that, by virtue of geography and values, was separate from Europe. American affairs, therefore, were only of the concern of Americans. It differed, however, in its political aim, as Rosas's apologists—most importantly the Italian Pedro de Angelis, whose *Archivo Americano* was distributed in Spanish, English and French—argued that only the present regime was suitable for a social environment that was inherently alien to European political ideas and theories.[98] The Europhile opposition, not Rosas's methods, were to blame for the political chaos in the River Plate, betraying American independence and seeking the re-establishment of colonial ties.[99] In the end, the Anglo-French blockade reinforced Rosas's image as defender of American independence, as Britain, followed by France, withdrew from the blockade and acknowledged Argentina's sovereignty over the River Paraná.[100] In Britain, the view prevailed that Rosas was a necessary evil in the unruly South American republic,[101] whereas his resilience gained him the highest praises from the liberator, San Martín, himself, who, in a highly symbolic gesture, handed over his saber, with which he fought the

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[96] Ferns 1960, 274-276; Lynch 1981, 285-286.
[97] The United States envoy supported Rosas, see Brent to Rosas, 22 September 1845, and 24 July 1846, AMREC, AH/0007/3.
[98] Myers 1995, 46-72.
[99] Ibid., 65.
[100] Cady 1929, 244-265; Lynch 1981, 290-291.
[101] Ferns 1960, 214; Lynch 1981, 288; Rock 1987, 104.

Spanish, to Rosas.[102] As Andrés Bello remarked: Rosas's 'conduct in the great American question places him in my opinion in the leading ranks of the great men of America'.[103] If Argentina was not part of the inner-circle of international society, it was not because of military defeat.

For the Unitarian opposition, however, Rosas was a brutal dictator, embodying the worst elements of Spanish colonialism whose reign of terror represented the worst form of Spanish American barbarism. The latter view was propagated by his liberal opponents who, following the defeat of Rosas in 1852, interpreted the history of Argentina in terms of the struggle of a small, enlightened elite for civilization and progress. The views represented by the so-called Generation of 1837 are particularly relevant: founded by Esteban Echeverría as a literary circle inspired by European romanticism and Saint-Simonion ideals, the group surrounding Juan Bautista Alberdi, Domingo Faustino Sarmiento and, by association, Bartolomé Mitre shaped the political and cultural life of nineteenth-century Argentina.

Despite heated disagreements in their later years, the Generation of 1837 were united in their opposition to Rosas. They supported the Unitarian party but were critical of Rivadavia's liberal reforms, which they regarded as utopian and out of touch with the history and social reality of the country, ultimately provoking the interior to rise up against civilization, which Sarmiento, in particular, identified with the city of Buenos Aires. Seen in this light, independence was a promise unfulfilled. Underlying their critique of Rosas was the belief that the emancipation of Argentina was incomplete and required a 'moral

[102] See also de de Angelis and Ruggeri 2009, 345-350.
[103] Cited in Lynch 1981, 294.

regeneration' in order to break with 'American' backwardness and the legacy of Spanish colonialism.[104] A strong centralized government was essential to this transformation, as was their role as intellectual avant-garde, promoting Northern European ideas and immigration to the River Plate. Although major advocates of public education and institutional reform, the Generation of 1837 had a negative view of the country's rural and indigenous populations that led to a political programme that was markedly elitist and racist in nature, and which dominated Argentine politics following the fall of Rosas.

The contributions of Sarmiento are exemplary in this regard. Born in 1811 in the province of San Juan, Sarmiento embarked upon a distinguished career as a writer, reformer and statesman, culminating in his presidency in 1868-1874. Sarmiento was exiled in Chile, from where he produced his most important literary contribution, *Facundo,* a thinly veiled polemic against Rosas told through the life of the caudillo Juan Facundo Quiroga.[105] The work is regarded as a classic, if politically controversial, masterpiece of Latin American literature.[106] Sarmiento deliberately set out to apply Tocqueville's famous cultural analysis of American democracy to Argentina,[107] describing the political situation in the River Plate as a reflection of a society in its infancy, shaped by the physical environment of the pampas and history of Spanish colonization.[108] The result was two societies: 'One, civilized, constitutional, European; the other, barbarous, arbitrary, American'.[109] The rise of Rosas, in Sarmiento's view, marked the defeat of the city by the countryside, which introduced 'the

[104] Botana 1984, 263-266; Myers 1995, 400; Katra 1996, 87.
[105] Sarmiento 2003 [1845].
[106] Kirkpatrick and Masiello 1994, 2; on its contemporary reception, see Katra 1996, 96-101; Sorensen 1996.
[107] Sarmiento 2003 [1845], 32; see also González Echevarría 1994, 235-236; Katra 1994, 84-86.
[108] Sarmiento 2003 [1845], 141.
[109] Ibid., 127.

regime of the cattle ranch' into the republic.[110] *Facundo* is riddled with orientalist images that equate the *gaucho*, the mix-blood inhabitants of Argentina's vast plains, with the nomads of the Asian steppe.[111] But whereas the 'American Bedouins'[112] commanded at least some respect and admiration, the indigenous population was treated as inferior and only in possession of some basic rights, 'for although savages, they were, in the end, men'.[113] Hence, although *Facundo* is generally interpreted through the more obvious binary between civilization and barbarism, it actually contains the tripartite distinction that the English School also identified in nineteenth-century international law, namely 'civilized', 'barbarous', and 'savage' humanity.

Nor were Sarmiento's aims purely domestic. It is true that he sought to delegitimize the federalist cause domestically, but, writing from his Chilean exile, he also appealed to a European audience for support. For the author, the French blockade revealed 'the crass ignorance in which Europe exists regarding European interests in America'.[114] Rosas would resent all that is European, taking advantage of the blockade to stir hatred against foreigners and to style himself as the defender of 'American independence':[115]

> The French blockade was the public channel by which the feeling properly called Americanism came to manifest itself without disguise. Everything barbarous about us, everything that separates us from cultured Europe, has emerged since then in the Argentine Republic, organized into a system and ready to make us an entity apart from peoples of European ancestry.[116]

[110] Ibid., 220.
[111] Altamirano 1994; see also Cicerchia 2004, 676; Bergel 2006, 100-101.
[112] Sarmiento 2003 [1845], 50.
[113] Ibid., 213, similarly: 'The Africans are known by all travelers as a warlike race, full of imagination and fire, and although fierce when they are excited, docile, loyal, and attached to the master or the one who employs them', 222.
[114] Ibid., 222.
[115] Ibid., 225.
[116] Ibid., 226.

Sarmiento, thus, defends the Unitarian support for France, arguing that, in fact, European action did not go far enough. In a direct appeal to Guizot, then Foreign Minister of France, Sarmiento protested that France stood idly by 'while a system of government that destroys all guaranteed rights of civilized societies—and abjures all the traditions, doctrines, and principles that tie that country to the great European family—is built and consolidated'.[117] The importance of the French minister was not only of a practical nature. The Generation of 1837 was deeply influenced by Guizot's *History of Civilization in Europe* of 1828,[118] which narrates the rise of a superior civilization in Europe after the barbarian invasion of Rome. Although Sarmiento was highly critical of Argentine society, he shared Guizot's belief in the inevitable march of history towards progress, which made him confident about Argentina's future: 'The day will finally come when they will solve that riddle, and the Argentine Sphinx, half cowardly woman, half bloodthirsty tiger, will die at their feet, giving the Thebes of the Plata the high rank it deserves among the nations of the New World'.[119]

Using the linguistic code of nineteenth-century European politics, Sarmiento talked (although subtly) about international society and Argentina's place therein. There is little doubt about the ubiquity of civilizational discourse in nineteenth-century international thought. Yet as argued in Chapter 2, 'civilization' could also be appropriated and invoked to criticize the European ideal. As Echeverría asked his fellow countrymen:

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[117] Ibid., 224-225.
[118] Botana 1984, 266-284; Katra 1996, 98-99; Myers 2005, 419; Terán 2008, 71.
[119] Sarmiento 2003 [1845], 32.

> How important to us are the political and philosophical solutions reached in Europe when they have an objective entirely different from that which we seek? Do we, by any chance, live in that world? Would Guizot make a good minister if he were ensconced in the fortress of Buenos Aires?[120]

Echeverría makes the connection between Guizot, France's imperial politics, and Sarmiento's false belief in a European template explicit. Another example is Lucio Mansilla's travel memoir of his diplomatic exploit during his visit to the Ranquel Indians, where he was sent by Sarmiento to convince the sceptical tribes about the merits of a the recently concluded peace treaty.[121] Published more than two decades after Echeverría's remarks, the account is noteworthy not only because it is a testimony of frontier life at the onset of the 'desert campaigns' against Argentina's indigenous population, but because it was also a cleverly written critique of the ruling *porteño* elite and their obsession with achieving 'civilization without compassion'.[122]

It should be notated that Sarmiento's idealized view of Europe was revised after the publication of *Facundo*. Between 1845 and 1847, Sarmiento was sent overseas by the Chilean government to study the educational systems in Europe and the United States. While in France, Sarmiento lobbied— with little success—in favour of the Anglo-French blockade and used the opportunity to propagate his views among Parisian society. *Facundo*, Charles de Mazade wrote in the *Revue des Deux Mondes* in 1846, offered testimony of the 'moral infirmity' of Spanish Americans and the need to bring them

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[120] Cited in Dunkerley 2000, 139.
[121] Their intuition proved them right as the treaty was signed by the President Sarmiento but not ratified by Congress, Mansilla 1997 [1870], xxxiv.
[122] Ibid., 383.

civilization, not unlike the English brought it to India and French to Africa.[123] The reflections on his journey clearly show his disillusionment with Europe, and his turn towards the United States as model to follow, where he served as Argentine minister between 1865 and his presidential election in 1868. Sarmiento's later writings also took a more reconciliatory tone towards Argentina's Spanish heritage.[124] However, his views on race and the superiority of peoples of European descent became more entrenched. Sarmiento defended the French 'civilizing mission' in North Africa,[125] and, while sceptical of its expansionist ambitions, accepted the claim of superiority of the United States.[126] In his later life, Sarmiento fully subscribed to scientific racism, as elaborated in his last book, *Conflictos y armonía de las razas en América* [Conflict and Harmony of the Races in America], published in 1883, in which he attributed the success of the United States to the reluctance of the white settler population to mix with the 'servile races'.[127] Race, in short, became intrinsically tied to status in international society by the late nineteenth century.

For the Generation of 1837, North European immigration was at the heart of civilizing the River Plate. 'Argentina's speedy entrance into the select circle of civilized nations', Katra resumes, 'was dependent on the containment or even erasure of Indian and *mestizo* influences and their replacement with white immigrant settlers'.[128] Although substantially smaller, the same can also be said about Afro-Argentine community, whose support for Rosas' regime aroused suspicion among the Unitarians.[129] Argentina, it was argued,

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[123] de Mazade 1846, 633, own translation; see also Sorensen 1996, 96-98.
[124] Halperín Donghi 1987, 199.
[125] Sarmiento 1886 [1847], 213-214; see also Cicerchia 2004.
[126] Rockland 1993, 45; Katra 1994, 78.
[127] Andrews 1980, 103; Burns 1980, 23; Shumway 1991, 140-141; Novoa and Levine 2010, 85-88.
[128] Katra 1996, 33, and also 113, 207, 285.
[129] Andrews 1980, 101.

urgently needed European immigration. Nowhere is this belief better expressed than in Alberdi's dictum 'to govern is to populate', although, as the subsequent case studies illustrate, similar ideas were also propagated in Mexico and Brazil.[130] Alberdi's *Bases*, written at the fall of Rosas in 1852 from his exile in Chile, became the foundation of the liberal political order created by the Constitution of 1853. For Alberdi, civilization does not blossom in the cities, as opposed to the barbarism of the countryside, but in those parts that were opened up to the influences of Europe. Argentina, however, was a 'desert' that lacked a suitable population and, therefore, civilization in the eyes of the world. 'Which constitution is best suited to the desert? It is the one which makes it disappear; the one that serves to make the desert cease to be a desert in the shortest time possible, and converts it into a populous land'.[131] Unlike Sarmiento, then, for Alberdi civilization was primarily a question of material progress.[132] At the same time, however, he agrees with Sarmiento on the origins of civilization in Europe: 'I know of no distinguished person in our societies', Alberdi wrote in the context of the Anglo-French blockade, 'whose surname is Pehuenche or Araucano'.[133] 'The republics of South America are the product and living testimony of Europe's deeds in America. What we call independent America is nothing but Europe established in America. All that is civilization on our soil is European'[134] Spanish colonialism, in particular, prevented the population of the continent's vast interior with industrious immigrants from Europe, a problem that was further exacerbated by the emphasis of the revolutionary generation on cutting ties with Europe.[135] The result was a people incapable of self-government, who would not require new laws but a change in the

[130] Alberdi 1915 [1852], 217.
[131] Ibid., 218.
[132] Ibid., 20-21, 79, 89.
[133] 1886 [1847], 82.
[134] 1915 [1852], 79-80; 1886 [1847]-a, 80.
[135] 1915 [1852], 45.

very composition of its race, especially of Anglo-Saxon origin.[136] 'The plant of civilization does not sprout from the seed', as Alberdi put it, '[i]t is like a vine, it grows from the branch'.[137]

Like Sarmiento, Alberdi supported the annexation of Mexican territory by the United States on civilizational grounds.[138] 'Everything was solitary and neglected under the republican system of Spanish America, until the neighbouring civilization, provoked by such uncivilized and unjust exclusions, took possession of the rich soil, and established on it its laws of true liberty and franchise'. Within four years, the United States had established 'a country which for three centuries had not left the obscurity of a miserable village'.[139] What emerges from Alberdi's critique of the current state of affairs is a sense of Argentine exceptionality, which places the country below Europe but still above its Spanish American sister republics. Despite suffering from the same afflictions, Argentina was poised to overcome its backwardness due to its proximity to Europe 'for which she [Argentina] will receive more rapidly the influx of her [Europe] progressive ideas, which were put in place by the Revolution of 1810'.[140] Rosas was more (in)famous than Bolívar and Washington; his name having appeared in the European press on a daily basis. He stood up against the Anglo-French blockade, but even before him, Argentina had ejected Spain and the English occupiers.[141]

[136] Ibid., 214-216.
[137] Ibid., 90.
[138] Ibid., 69.
[139] Ibid.
[140] 1886 [1847]-b, 233; see also Terán 2008, 105-106.
[141] Alberdi 1886 [1847]-b, 223-225.

While asserting Argentina's claim to regional leadership, Alberdi also advocated international law and Spanish American solidarity. In *Memory on the Convenience and Objects of a General American Congress* published in 1844, Alberdi emphasized the need for economic cooperation over political alliances.[142] Unlike in Europe, the abundance of territory rendered military conquest pointless, while the lack of population and geographic distance from the Old World provided sufficient protection against military threats.[143] Outstanding disputes could be settled by consensus rather than force, placing the Americas in a privileged position internationally. Drawing on Andrés Bello's earlier work, Alberdi called for the creation of an 'international American law', based on equality, plurality and, importantly, mutual intervention: 'America, one and indivisible in her political and social elements, in the evils that afflict her, in the means that can save her, will always be a less intimate body than the North American union, if you will, but a thousand times closer and more united than the one formed by the European peoples'.[144]At same time, he emphasized the need for Spanish America to engage constructively with Europe, and not to abuse her power of 'passive resistance' by 'excommunicating' herself from international society.[145] The international order that Alberdi envisioned was distinct but not separated from international society at large.

By the mid-nineteenth century, Argentina was neither a fully-fledged member nor a clear outsider of international society. Rosas withstood two foreign blockades imposed on Buenos Aires by European powers. But whereas the country was militarily powerful

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[142] 1886 [1844], 395.
[143] Ibid., 396, 401.
[144] Ibid., 402.
[145] Ibid., 403.

enough to reassert its sovereignty over the River Paraná, political instability and the nature of Rosas's regime called into question the country's standing within the community of 'civilized' states, a notion that was fully exploited by his opponents. Foreign observers and the Generation of 1837 concurred: Argentina's peripheral place in international society was not due to power political (stature) or economic consideration (role) but a function of its culture and racial composition (status).

4. Argentina in the Late Nineteenth Century

The second half of the nineteenth century was a period of increasing state consolidation and economic growth. Although nominally a federalist and provincial *caudillo*, Rosas united the country politically under the hegemony of the port. In 1851, the governor of the province of Entre Rios, Justo José Urquiza, led a revolt against Rosas over the closure of the River Paraná. Brazil, Uruguay, and the province of Corrientes joined Entre Rios, whose combined forces defeated Rosas at the Battle of Caseros in 1852. However, the fall of Rosas and his exile to Britain did not immediately precipitate the pacification of Argentina. Buenos Aires opposed the San Nicolás agreement, which stipulated equal representation for each province, and rejected the liberal Constitution of 1853, framed on Alberdi's *Bases*. The consequence was two Argentine governments that coexisted for nearly a decade. Although Alberdi, who acted as Urquiza's representative in Europe, secured Spanish recognition, the Argentine Confederation could not outmatch Buenos Aires's economic and financial strength.[146] Urquiza attempted to subdue Buenos Aires by force, but, in 1861,

[146] See Cisneros and Escudé 1998, vol. 5; Quattrocchi-Woisson 2012.

retreated and left the field to Bartolomé Mitre, who was elected president of a unified Argentina the following year.

The presidencies of Mitre (1962-1868) and Sarmiento (1868-1874) cemented the supremacy of Buenos Aires, inaugurating the profound political, economic, and social changes that Argentina underwent in the second half of the nineteenth century. Even though revolts continued to erupt until 1880, as Ozlak maintains, after 1861, there were no contenders left to seriously challenge Buenos Aires domestically.[147] Born in 1821, Mitre not only unified the country, but is also regarded as the founding father of the country's historiography, given his monumental biographies of San Martín and Belgrano. Mitre institutionalized the liberal narrative and 'official history', according to which the emancipation of Argentina was the work of an enlightened urban elite that fought against barbarism.[148] Mitre is a prime example of how Latin America's elite instrumentalized history for partisan politics: a phenomenon that can also be found in Mexico and Brazil. As a politician, Mitre strengthened the authority of the centralized state, implementing important legal and administrative reforms and opening the country for foreign investment. British banks invested heavily in the financial sector and public works, in particular in the construction of railways that connected remote agricultural regions with the port, but which remained mainly under British control well into the twentieth century. The combination of infrastructural improvements, immigration, and the appropriation of indigenous lands spurred an economic boom that reached its heyday in the 1880s but which came under strain with the Baring crisis of 1890.

[147] Oszlak 1982, 92-93.
[148] Burns 1980, 45-46; Shumway 1991, 188, 193, 208; Palti 2000; Goebel 2011, 29.

Before the crisis, Argentina's focus remained firmly on its relations with Europe, while presenting itself as defender of Latin American interests in the context of Washington's Pan-Americanism. Within the region, the most important international involvement was Argentina's role in the War of the Triple Alliance (1864-1870), after Paraguay's Francisco Solano López crossed into the province of Corrientes in 1865. Paraguay sided with the Blanco government in Montevideo, which was taken as a pretext by Brazil to invade Uruguay in support of the Colorado insurgence. López declared war against the Brazilian Empire, which, in turn, formed an alliance with Argentina and Uruguay, governed at this point by the victorious Colorado Venancio Flores. The Colorado party had supported the Unitarians during the Argentine civil war, now Mitre seized the opportunity to impose the new order upon the remaining *caudillos* in the interior. The war of the Triple Alliance was one of the bloodiest conflicts in Latin American history, during which Paraguay lost a substantial part of its territory and male population.[149] Although primarily a land-grab war, Argentina and, as argued in Chapter 6, Brazil, framed their involvement as a 'civilizing mission' against 'barbarian' Paraguay, where López ruled over an autarkic and mainly indigenous society.[150] This view was shared by Britain, whose ministers lamented the 'savagery' of the Paraguayan dictator, at the same time as, Ferns argues, 'Argentina was being transformed into something more acceptable to European ideas of civilization'.[151] Even more so than in Brazil, the costly war proved hugely unpopular. It contributed to the election of Sarmiento as president in 1868.

[149] Abente 1987, 49; Centeno 2002, 55-56; Schweller 2006, 87.
[150] Burns 1980, 130; Abente 1987, 47; Katra 1996, 274; Doratioto 2009.
[151] Ferns 1960, 324.

Despite his prejudices against Paraguay, Alberdi severely criticized Argentina's alliance with Brazil and the alleged 'civilizational crusade' against barbarism.[152] The most developed expression of Alberdi's international thought is found in his essay *The Crime of War*, in which he draws a domestic analogy to argue that war was the abnegation of civilization, irrespective of whether it was waged against 'civilized' or 'savage' peoples. Because the 'society of nations' would not recognize any authority above the state, the latter was at the same time plaintiff and defendant, judge and executioner, hence the need for world opinion and an impartial international adjudicating body to pass judgement.[153] Alberdi then employed the civilizational ideal to defend Spanish American against European incursions. The essence of international society, thus understood, was the recognition of international law: 'Only Asia, Africa and indigenous America, that is, only savage peoples are excluded from that rule of civilized and Christian peoples'.[154] If corporal punishment for debtors, 'the barbarism of other times', was abolished domestically, then the coercive collection of national debt was wrong by the same principle of civilization: naval blockades, 'the wars for debts, are pure barbarism'.[155] A similar line of thought was shared by Carlos Calvo, whose *International Law of Europe and America in Theory and Practice* appeared in 1868, in which the author outlined what became known as the Calvo Doctrine.[156] Citing the long history of blockades and foreign interventions in Latin America—the most recent ended in Mexico with the execution of Maximillian in 1867—Calvo rejected the legality of the forcible collection of pecuniary claims by foreign

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[152] Paraguay, Alberdi argued, maintained 'the gates of progress hermetically short', with its Guaraní population 'inept for industry and liberty' while at the same time demonstrated the typical Jesuit 'docility and discipline', see Alberdi 1915 [1852], 64-65; on his opposition to the War of the Triple Alliance, see Cisneros and Escudé 1998, vol. 6.

[153] Alberdi 1915 [1870?], 52, 64-65, 71, 207, 215, 232.

[154] 1915 [1852], 117, and also 143, 188.

[155] 1915 [1870?], 64-65.

[156] See Hershley 1907; Obregón 2006b, 256-257; Esquirol 2012, 567-568.

powers.[157] Neither the 'absolute ignorance in Europe of our state of civilization and progress',[158] nor the region's colonial past would justify the unequal treatment of Latin American states from a legal point of view: foreigners had no right to be treated differently from the citizens of the host country. Although sceptical of the idea of a separate (Latin) American international law, in fact, Calvo was one of the first Spanish American publicists to use the term 'Latin America'.[159] His Argentine contemporaries still preferred 'South America' to refer to the region south of the United States.

Sarmiento's presidency saw the continuation of the modernization programme initiated by Mitre. Sarmiento improved the quality of public education and connected the country with Chile and Europe via telegraph lines. Similarly, the promotion of European immigration continued unabated for the colonization of the newly 'pacified' lands. Military expeditions against the indigenous communities in the South had been fought since independence. The war against Paraguay brought a temporary halt to these campaigns. However, just as in Chile following the War of the Pacific (1979-1883), the end of the Paraguayan war freed Argentine troops, which were then deployed in an aggressive campaign of territorial expansion, culminating in the 'Conquest of the Desert' led by Julio Roca, Avellaneda's Minster of War and two-time president of Argentina. Avellaneda also crushed an uprising against the federalization of Buenos Aires, which took effect in 1880, thus completing the consolidation of the centralized state.[160] Yet, during the 'conservative order', the country continued to be ruled by a small elite that dominated the political process until the

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[157] Calvo 1868, 185-188.
[158] Cited in Obregón 2006c, 990.
[159] 2006b, 257; 2006c, 990; Bethell 2010a, 459.
[160] Oszlak 1982; Halperín Donghi 2007, 155.

expansion of the franchise in 1912. Although the campaign in the South served economic and geopolitical purposes by making the land accessible for agriculture and foreclosing Chilean colonization of Patagonia—the defeat and extermination of the indigenous communities made manifest the internalization of the civilizational ideal by the Argentine elite.

Immigration, however, did not unfold as envisaged by Sarmiento and his generation. Attracted by government programmes and the agricultural boom that the country underwent in the late nineteenth century, Argentina received almost 6 million immigrants in the period between 1871 and the outbreak of WWI.[161] The vast majority of the newcomers came from Italy and Spain, rather than Northern Europe, and either settled in Buenos Aires or returned to their country of origin after a few years.[162] Furthermore, access to land was monopolized by large estates, limiting settler colonization and leading to a rapid urbanization. As a consequence, Buenos Aires grew to become the largest city in Latin America, and, by 1895, the year of the second national census, more than half of its population was foreign-born.[163] As one government publication summarized the results, Argentina was about to be transformed into a country 'where soon the population will be completely unified, forming a new and beautiful race which is the product of all the European nations made fruitful on American soil'.[164] As in Mexico and Brazil, Argentineans developed their own version of 'racial whitening'. The demographic and economic transformation of the frontier led to the disappearance of the *gaucho*, and was often accompanied by violent clashes between locals

[161] Rock 1987, 141.
[162] See Halperín Donghi 1987; Moya 1998.
[163] Gallo 1983, 203; Rock 1987, 141-144.
[164] Andrews 1980, 106.

and newcomers, as exemplified by the killing of thirty-six foreigners in the town of Tandil in 1872.[165] These episodes caused much indignation in Europe, provoking the British government to protest against the situation that was 'wholly incompatible with what might reasonably expected from a civilized government'.[166] But intervention was no longer deemed feasible, and the government and the Argentine public criticized the intrusion into the nation's domestic affairs, accusing the British of interpreting international law in a self-serving way when 'applying its principles to weaker nations.[167]

European immigration, therefore, did not bring the desired effect.[168] Although liberal elites courted Northern Europeans based on the faulty belief that their superior race and work ethic made them better suited for civilizing the 'desert' that was independent Argentina, in fact a vast majority of those who settled in the country were of Southern European origin. Large-scale immigration and the sense of being overwhelmed by foreign influences triggered xenophobic reactions in both the population and the intellectual elite, as expressed by Miguel Cané's metaphor of an invasive 'tidal wave' that had flooded the country.[169] Once upheld as a bastion of civilization, the urban centre came to be seen as a focal point of social crisis.[170] Rapid urbanization and population growth raised the so-called 'social question', which encompassed concerns over public health, crime, and the increasing militancy of the labour force.[171] These social problems became particularly acute in the

[165] On the tension between 'natives' and newcomers', see Gallo 1983, 40, 279-320; Halperín Donghi 1987, 209; on the Tandil incident, see Lynch 1998; Salvatore 2008, 765.
[166] Lynch 1998, 140.
[167] Héctor Varela, May 1872, cited in ibid., 142.
[168] See, also Belich 2009, 529-547.
[169] See Terán 2008, 119, 126.
[170] Ramos Mejía 1994 [1899]; see also Shumway 1991, 166-167.
[171] Halperín Donghi 1987, 211; Zimmermann 1992; 1995.

aftermath of the Baring crisis of 1890.[172] Notions of the superiority of Europeans and, in particular, Anglo-Saxons had been widespread in Argentina since at least the mid-nineteenth century. By the late nineteenth century, social Darwinism, and especially the social psychological variant of Gustave Le Bon, enjoyed considerable 'scientific prestige' and found a fertile ground in the River Plate.[173] As Zimmerman elaborates, the appeal of racial ideas cut across ideological boundaries, with liberals tending towards biological and conservatives to cultural and historicist conceptions of race.

The impact of scientific racism in Latin America is well documented.[174] As elsewhere in Latin America, the 'degenerative propensity' of its population, a view that combined stereotypes about Iberian decadence with pseudo-scientific reasoning on the inferiority of peoples of mixed indigenous and black ancestry, was employed to account for the region's backwardness, especially in comparison to the prosperous United Sates.[175] But if Spanish and Italian immigration strengthened the Latin element in Argentine society, it also rendered it more European, thus placing the country in a privileged position vis-à-vis other Latin American states.[176] Sarmiento's views on the subject have already been discussed above. Other exponents include Carlos Octavio Bunge, who, in his *Nuestra America* of 1903, pointed to the varieties of 'national psychology' among Latin American states, that differed according to their racial composition, but whose principal traits were 'idleness, sadness and arrogance', which he traced back to the mixed ancestry of their population.[177]

[172] Halperín Donghi 2007, 126-127; Terán 2008, 116.
[173] Andrews 1980, 106; Zimmermann 1992, 25, 38, 45.
[174] See, for instance, Hale 1985, 396-414; Novoa and Levine 2010.
[175] Lucas Ayarragaray, 1904, cited in Zimmermann 1992, 29; see also Rodríguez 2006; Novoa and Levine 2010; Coletta 2011.
[176] Salvatore 2008, 762.
[177] Bunge 1903, 30-34, 57-58.

José Ingenieros, an advocate of 'Argentina sociology' based on the premises of the Generation of 1837, compared Argentina to the inferior 'tropical' societies on the American continents, which he attributed to its increasingly 'whitening' race.[178] Similar views were also entertained by Estanislao Zeballos, a controversial statesman and three-time foreign minister of Argentina, who became known for his bellicose stance towards Chile and Brazil. Using combined geopolitical and racial reasoning, Zeballos argued in *The Argentine Supremacy in America* that, despite 'the moribund state of and difficult cure for Argentine society' the country was poised to become a continental power if it could achieve naval supremacy over its neighbours.[179] The late nineteenth century was a moment of heightened stature concerns for Latin American elites. The influence that Bismarckian *realpolitik* and the rise of 'new imperialism' had on the region's elites is apparent in Zeballos thought. From the European perspective, Africans were uncivilized which justified if not necessitated (according to the thesis of the 'white man's burden') colonial subjugation. Argentina's population, by contrast, was believed to 'whiten' as result of European immigration, which not only implied its rise into the ranks of 'civilized' states, but also its superiority within the region. As Zeballos reflected in the aftermath of the Venezuela Crisis, 'it is impossible to equate the state of our civilization to those of the tropical republics [...] The basis of Argentina's population is European or of superior mestizo races [*razas superiores de mestizos*], predisposed to evolve actively through their transformative work'.[180] As result, Zeballos concluded, Europe would hold Argentina in higher esteem than its semi-barbarous neighbours, such as Venezuela or Brazil, whom Europeans

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[178] Cited in Terán 2008, 151; Hale 1985, 406-408; Zimmermann 1992, 32.
[179] Zeballos 1902, 469, own translation.
[180] 1903, 435.435

regarded on par with China or Africa.[181] Argentina, however, was quasi-European: 'Europe classifies us as a minor European country, regardless of the defects of our political organization and government.[182] In sum, despite existing stereotypes about their ability to self-rule, the changing racial composition of Argentina would guarantee its standing within the community of 'civilized' states, at least in the long run.

While it is true that rapid economic growth provided for the material basis for adopting a more assertive stance towards Brazil and, importantly, the United States, with regard to Europe, Argentine elites continued to hold a civilizational inferiority complex. Status, in other words, remained crucial for understanding Argentina's standing in international society. The large scale remodelling of Buenos Aires according to the Parisian template is a case in point. Similarly, the Paris World Exhibition of 1889 was an ideal opportunity to showcase Argentina's agricultural wealth. While Argentina sought to attract immigrants and open outlet markets for its products in Europe, its pavilion was consciously designed to appeal to European sensibilities, refraining from the use of Indianist symbolism that characterized Mexico's and, to some extent, Brazil's display, explicitly presenting Argentina as essentially European.[183] Argentina, according to Fey, 'sought to impress foreign visitors that Argentina had all of the necessary features of modern, "civilized" nations and lacked those aspects associated with "barbarity", namely a tropical climate inhabited by a large indigenous, black, or mixed-race population'.[184] No expense was spared to present Argentina in the right light. Not only did Argentina refuse to share its

[181] Ibid., 433.433
[182] Ibid., 441.441.
[183] Fey 2000.
[184] Ibid., 63.

pavilions with other Latin American countries, it also spent more than all other Latin American states combined, even outspending the United States almost threefold.[185] Despite Argentina's stature, pretension within the region and attempts to arrogate itself the role of a Latin American leader, prestige remained an important part of making the case for Argentina's standing in international society.

Similar to late-nineteenth century Mexico and Brazil, Argentina developed its own form of status assertion based on the exaltation of cultural and racial miscegenation. Latin immigration, in particular, contributed to a revaluation of Argentina's Spanish heritage. In particular in the aftermath of the Spanish-American War of 1898, Argentine elites increasingly embraced their creole identity. This became apparent in the revaluation of the colonial past in the context of a cultural nationalism, represented by Manuel Gálvez, Ricardo Rojas and Leopoldo Lugones, which elevated the *gaucho* to a symbol of national identity, thereby conflating mestizos with creoles.[186] But not only was the *gaucho*'s mix-raced origins 'whitewashed'; indicative of *hispanismo* were the opening of the Teatro Colon [Colombus Theatre], the capital's neoclassical opera house in 1908, the participation of the members of the Spanish royal family during the centennial celebrations in 1910 and, the declaration of 12 October as declared 'Day of the Race' in 1917 in acknowledgement of the *patria madre* [motherland].[187] The period also saw the reinterpretation of Rosas as an heroic figure, who defended the true spirit of the country against the Europeanizing liberal elites in Buenos Aires.[188] The 'national regeneration' in Argentina thus had important

[185] Ibid., 66, 69.
[186] See, for instance, Romero 1963, 25-26; Terán 2008, 175; Goebel 2011, 36-37.
[187] Hale 1985, 405; Terán 2008, 164; Goebel 2011, 86.
[188] Burns 1980, 69; see also Halperín Donghi 2005.

points in common with *modernismo*, which contrasted the moral and spiritual virtue of Latin America with the materialism of the United States, and which became influential throughout Latin America at the turn of the twentieth century.

The cultural shift also influenced Argentina's relations with the wider region. The United Province of the River Plate stood aloof of Bolívar's Panama Congress of 1826, even if the leaders of Argentine independence adopted the language of Spanish American solidarity. Nor did Argentina attend the subsequent conferences at Lima (1847-1848, 1864-1865) and Santiago de Chile (1856). Argentina, as Whitaker testily remarked, was represented at the second Lima conference, but only 'informally and against its will', as Sarmiento attended without official sanction from the Mitre government, who opposed the idea of a league of American states set apart from Europe.[189] Argentina only began to take on a more active role after the United States promoted its own idea of Pan-Americanism. At the initiative of Secretary of State James Blaine, the United States hosted the first Inter-American Conference in 1889–1890. Although an Argentine delegation attended the meeting, Argentina was sceptical of the hemispheric initiative promoted and led by the United States. In part, this was due to the wariness of Latin Americans concerning Washington's growing influence and expansionism in the region. But it also reflected the self-confidence and leadership ambition of the post-1861 Argentine elite, and, to an important extent, the position that they envisioned for their country as being economically and culturally tied to Europe. Consequently, Roque Sáenz Peña raised concerns that the proposed custom union would jeopardize Argentina's relations with Europe. Blaine's Z*ollverein* would yield 'the war of one continent against another, eighteen sovereigns allied to exclude from the life of

[189] Whitaker 1954, 57.

commerce the same Europe which extends to us her hand, sends us her strong arms, and complements our economic existence, after having apportioned to us her civilization and culture, her sciences and her arts, industries and customs that have complemented our sociological evolution'.[190] The episode demonstrates that, similar to debates during the independence period, Argentina's elites did not regard the country's role as provider of staples and commodities as demeaning. More important was the question of prestige, explicitly framed in terms of Argentina's civilizational status.

In the following decades, and in particular following the Venezuela Crisis of 1902-1903, Argentina became a marked proponent of a regional arrangement that asserted formal sovereign equality and guarded the region against intervention from Europe and, increasingly, the United States. In response to the announcement of the Roosevelt Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine, in which the United States, as 'civilized nation' claimed an 'international police power' in the Western Hemisphere, the Argentine Minister of Foreign Affairs, Luis María Drago, sent a note to Washington in which he outlined the Argentine position in the conflict. Emphasizing the perfect juridical equality among states, Drago lamented that the blockade 'would establish a precedent dangerous to the security and the peace of the nations of this part of America'; further, he argued that, because the forcible collection of debts implies the occupation and suppression of a country's government, such a policy was at odds with the Monroe Doctrine 'sustained and defended with so much zeal on all occasions by the United States, a doctrine to which the Argentine Republic has heretofore solemnly adhered'.[191]

[190] Cited in Mecham 1961, 53.
[191] Drago 1907, 3.

Thus Drago provided a more limited interpretation of the Calvo Doctrine, which denies the applicability of the minimum standard of treatment, stipulating that foreign nationals enjoy the same legal protection as nationals of the host country, explicitly framed as an 'economic corollary' to the Monroe Doctrine.[192] The same position was adopted by Argentina at the Second Hague Conference, which marked the first time that Argentina took part at a major international conference. Argentine diplomats and jurists, then, drew on arguments first outlined by Andrés Bello in the early nineteenth-century and later developed in the context of Argentina's and Latin America's experiences with foreign blockades and interventions. Argentina adopted a different position from Brazil, which supported the United States on the question of the use of force to recover international debt. It did, however, support Brazil in its insistence on strict sovereign equality. Hence, although Argentina sought to protect its relations with Europe while taking an increasingly assertive stance in Hemispheric matters, its position at The Hague can only be understood in the light of the ruling elites' long-held concern about the standing of their state. As discussed further below, The Hague was a watershed-event, at which Latin American countries emphatically insisted on being placed on an equal footing with European states.

5. Conclusion

For much of the nineteenth-century, from the view of Argentina's liberal elites, the country fell short of full membership in the family of 'civilized' states. Recognition by Britain and the United States was a crucial step, but due to the inherently hierarchical nature of

[192] See Whitaker 1954, 86-107; Shea 1955, 14-15.

international order of the time, the mere act of diplomatic recognition was insufficient to achieve this aim. The independence and subsequent recognition of Argentina must be seen in the context of the 'Western Question': the collapse of Spanish authority in the Americas, which created a situation of conflictual interests in Europe and the United States. As result, the United Provinces were recognized in the 1820s, despite considerable reservations about the viability of the nascent state. Ultimately, political and economic interests trumped concerns about instability, which, importantly, were heavily influenced by pre-existing stereotypes about the inability of creoles to self-rule.

What can be learned about Argentina's international standing from the interpretative framework that distinguishes between stature, role, and status? First, role conceptions of international standing were important in the context of the free trade debates of the independence period, and creole demands for greater autonomy within the Spanish realm. The analysis focused largely on the *porteño* elite of Buenos Aires, Argentina's principal port and connection with the Atlantic world, who had an obvious interest in opposing monopoly trade. Yet it was ultimately the elite of the capital that emerged as dominant force. Furthermore, as argued above, the influence of Physiocratic economic theory, which held that agriculture was the ultimate source of a country's power and wealth, suggested that its role as provider of primary goods would not relegate Argentina to a subordinate position within the community of states. Role was furthermore important in the regional context as the *porteño* elite arrogated itself a leadership position, first, with the territories that historically constituted the Viceroyalty of the River Plate, then as helmsman of Latin American interests vis-á-vis the United States.

Secondly, Argentina successfully repelled two British invasions in the early nineteenth-century, and two blockades by European powers during the rule of Juan Manuel de Rosas. Its resilience was an important source of the emerging national pride. This leads to the third point: from the perspective of the creole elite, what Argentina was lacking was not military prowess or stature. Rosas personified all that was backward and barbaric in Spanish America. From the perspective of the United States and European powers, Rosas was a necessary evil, whose brutal regime provided order and stability in the River Plate. As Rosas's controversial rule illustrates, Argentina's difficulties in the post-independence period were framed in civilizational terms on both sides of the Atlantic. As the euphoria of independence waned, political and economic interests no longer muted the prejudicial—and increasingly racialized—concerns about creole competence to self-govern. The fall of Rosas in 1852 brought into power the Generation of 1837 who implemented a far-reaching modernization programme of agricultural expansion, the extermination of indigenous communities, and European immigration. As a result, Argentina underwent a dramatic economic, social and cultural transformation. The 'logic of social action' was the management of Argentina's status.

The 'Argentine miracle' is often discussed in terms of national consolidation and global economic integration. What this chapter demonstrates is that the reform programme itself also reflected Argentine elites' perceptions about the scope and nature of international society and their attempts to conform. In sum, in the early nineteenth century, international society was perceived as a community of 'civilized' states. As the Christian descendants of Europeans in the Americas, creoles believed themselves entitled to membership in that community. Following the calamities of the post-independence period, however, it became

apparent that these essentialist attributes were insufficient for full membership in international society. Ongoing political and economic instabilities raised questions about the state of civilization in the River Plate. By the end of the century, debates about the shortcomings of Spanish America were still framed in civilizational terms, although these were increasingly influenced by Social Darwinist ideas.

What the case study illustrates, then, is the hierarchical nature of nineteenth-century international society and the ambiguous position occupied by Latin American states. Despite Argentina's alleged 'Western' credentials, elites at the 'core' of international society were ambiguous about the standing of the new states. Their Argentine counterparts, in turn, reflected upon this international marginalization, largely perceived in terms of an insufficient status within the community of 'civilized' states.

CHAPTER 5

PROMISE AND DISILLUSION: MEXICO'S STANDING IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY

1. Introduction

More than any other county in Latin America, the history of Mexico in nineteenth-century international society is the story of a promise unfulfilled. Towards the end of the colonial period, elites in the vast Viceroyalty of New Spain were confident that their *patria* was destined to great power and wealth. The belief in the Viceroyalty's future greatness was seemingly confirmed by the Prussian naturalist, Alexander von Humboldt, whose descriptions of the viceroyalty's riches remained a recurrent point of reference in Mexican's thought about the standing of their state.[1] However, whereas Humboldt's account was an important source of pride in the early nineteenth century, by the mid-nineteenth century it had become a nagging reminder of what the country had failed to achieve. Civil strife, economic crises, war with the United States, and foreign incursions seriously undermined confidence in the standing of the new state.

Mexico's experience with international society provides further evidence that international recognition did not necessarily imply an equal standing in the family of 'civilized' states.

[1] Humboldt 1811.

The conceptual move that distinguishes between stature, role, and status as the three dimensions of international stratification is helpful for making sense of Mexico's place in international society, and the way in which perceptions of standing informed elites attempt's to bolster the standing of their state. As argued below, stature conceptions loomed large in the country's history. Early nineteenth century elites expected Mexico to achieve a position of formidable material strength—stature in the terminology of this study—which explains their self-confidence in negotiating recognition with foreign powers, most importantly Britain and the United States. The central position that New Spain occupied within the Spanish world also influenced how Mexican elites envisioned their country's role in the Americas. Already during the colonial period, *novohispanos* were protagonists in the 'Dispute of the New World', challenging European naturalists who called into question the ability of creoles to govern themselves. After independence, Mexican elites also sought (temporarily) to perform a leadership role within Bolívar's Panama Congress of 1826. Thereafter, however, Mexico's ambitions were suspended, until the late nineteenth century, exemplified by Mexico's role in negotiating the adherence of Latin American state to the Hague conventions.

The confidence of Mexico's creole elite eroded gradually with the political and economic problems of the post-independence period, but suffered a devastating blow with the military defeat in the Mexican-American War (1846-1848).[2] Even more so than in the River Plate, political instability and social unrest undermined Mexico's capacity to repay its external debt and led to claims by foreigners who suffered personal or material loss. France's

[2] Although the economic boom of the Bourbon period was exhausted by the turn of the nineteenth century, Mexico 'fell behind' the United States in economic terms: in 1800, Mexico's gross domestic product was half that of the United States, by 1860, it had fallen to only a seventh, Anna 1998, 75; see also Haber 1997.

bombardment and subsequent blockade of the port of Veracruz (1838-1839) was rationalized with the same civilizational rhetoric that was also employed to justify gunboat diplomacy in the River Plate. This rhetoric then took on a distinctively racist tinge during the war with the United States, as US propaganda represented the conflict as a standoff between civilization, on the one side, and Hispanic despotism and the decadence of a mixed-race people, on the other. Not unlike responses in Argentina, Mexican elites appropriated the civilizational ideal to reflect upon the status of their state.

Yet Mexico was different in many regards. First, Mexico shared a border with the thriving and expansionist United States. The geopolitical realities meant that Mexican elites never completely lost sight of power political considerations. Secondly, and importantly, Mexico had a far larger, ethnically more heterogeneous, and geographically more dispersed population. The mobilization of indigenous peoples and the rural poor (often difficult to distinguish), in turn, put pressure on Mexico's elites, who never gained control over domestic political processes to the same extent as their South American counterparts (in Argentina, and even more so in Brazil). This is true for Mexican independence, which was proclaimed only in 1821, as creoles, fearing a popular revolt, sided with royalist forces and elevated Agustín de Iturbide, an army-officer-turned-emperor, to the newly created Mexican throne. Another important effect of popular mobilization is the rise of politically influential figures such as Benito Juárez, Latin America's first indigenous president. Lastly, the ethnic and racial diversity, as well as the availability of a collective imaginary of a glorious pre-Colombian past, influenced the way in which Mexican elites responded to European racial ideas that relegated non-white peoples to a subordinate place within the international order. Hence, towards the end of the nineteenth century, elites turned to a

particular form of ‘social creativity’, reframing the previously negatively charged trait of racial miscegenation in positive terms. Although there were intellectual precedents in New Spain’s colonial past, the exaltation of the *mestizo* towards the late nineteenth century, which became an official *leitmotiv* of the Mexican Revolution following 1910, can be read as a strategy of status management. As the case study suggests, even during the *Pax Porfiriana*, during which Mexico was politically stabilized by the heavy-handed rule of Porfirio Díaz, status concerns and the attempt to be fully recognized as member of the family of ‘civilized’ states are central for understanding Mexico’s standing in international society.

2. Colonial Antecedents

New Spain underwent a sustained period of economic and demographic growth during the eighteenth century, transforming the vast viceroyalty into Spain’s most prosperous New World possession. The economic and cultural riches of the viceroyalty are meticulously described by Alexander von Humboldt, who travelled the ‘equinoctial regions’ of Spanish America from 1799 to 1804. In his *Political Essay on the Kingdom of New Spain*, Humboldt portrayed a colony that, given its climate, natural resources, and vast territory, was poised to prosper and thrive. Published at the onset of Spanish American emancipation (the English translation came out in 1811), the study attracted much attention on both sides of the Atlantic, raising expectations about the future prospects of New Spain.

Humboldt's *Political Essay*, as Florescano notes, 'came to sanction the Creole image of a great and vigorous Mexico'.[3] Humboldt had visited the country at the end of an economic boom that was the result of the Bourbon Reforms under Charles III. Following Spain's defeat in the Seven Years' War (1754-1763), the reforms were intended to increase the Crown's revenue and to defend its overseas possessions against foreign threats. New Spain, like the River Plate to the south, was a 'strategic frontier' of European competition.[4] At the heart of the reforms lay the strengthening of centralized control, which is why these reforms are often equated with a 'second conquest' of the Americas. In order to defend the sparsely populated Northern frontier, the interior provinces, encompassing much of the territory that was later lost to the United States, were placed directly under metropolitan control. The reforms furthermore attempted to undermine the privileges of corporate bodies, such as merchant guilds, that benefitted from the Spanish monopoly trade, and, importantly, the Catholic Church. The Crown asserted its jurisdiction over the clergy, expelling the Jesuit Order from the Spanish dominions in 1767. Many Jesuits were born in the Americas and the religious order played a pivotal role in educating the local elite. It was therefore no surprise that, as elsewhere in Spanish America, the measure was resented by the population, erupting into revolts that were fiercely suppressed by the Bourbon authorities of New Spain.[5] Although some creoles benefited from these measures, the reforms effectively put the relations between European and American Spaniards under strain.[6] Particularly problematic in this regard was the reorganization of the colonial administration, which deliberately attempted to limit the influence that creoles had gained

[3] Florescano 1994, 204; see also, Pereyra 1917; Miranda 1962, 205, 211-222.
[4] Weber 2005, 200; see also Adelman and Aron 1999, 816.
[5] Brading 1971, 27, 234-235; Rodríguez 1998, 28; Guedea 2000a, 280-281.
[6] On the colonial origins of the tensions between American and European Spaniards, see Brading 1985, 4-9; 1991; Florescano 1994, 186; Lomnitz 2001, 334.

in governing their own affairs. The consequence of this policy, as Humboldt pointedly noted, was a strengthened self-awareness of the local elite as '*Americans*' and, put in somewhat exaggerated terms, 'a jealous and perpetual hatred' between Europeans and creoles:[7] an effect that has already been noted in the case of the River Plate, and which, as result of similar reforms in the Portuguese empire, could also be observed in Brazil.[8]

In New Spain, the reforms gathered pace during the general visitation of José de Gálvez (1765-1771), who was responsible for implementing similar reforms throughout Spanish America, including the creation of the Viceroyalty of the River Plate. The disregard that Gálvez and his officers had for the local creole elite is well known.[9] The creoles protested against the presumption that they were irrational and unfit to self-govern, as exemplified in the famous Representation of 1771, in which the creole-dominated city council of Mexico (*ayuntamiento*) demanded that preference should be given to Spaniards born in the Americas in the appointment of public offices.[10] Creoles from New Spain also participated actively in what Gerbi described as the 'Dispute of the New World', which reached its most contentious point at the end of the eighteenth century.[11] At the heart of this polemic was the thesis, proposed by European Enlightenment thinkers, such as the Comte de Buffon, the Abbé Raynal, Cornelius de Pauw, and William Robertson, that the natural environment and the peoples of the New World would tend to degenerate. Although similar arguments about the alleged immaturity of indigenous peoples date back to the beginnings of European

[7] Humboldt 1811, vol. 1, 154.
[8] Note that this self-awareness does not imply the rise of a national consciousness, as Anderson 1983 famously suggests.
[9] Burkholder and Chandler 1977, 103. Brading suggests that Gálvez regarded creoles too involved locally in order 'to provide disinterested impartial government', 1971, 35; see also, Brading 1991, 467-468, 477-479.
[10] See Hernández y Dávalos 1968b, vol. 1, 427-455.
[11] Gerbi 2010 [1973], 183. See also, Pagden 1995; Cañizares-Esguerra 2001. For contributions from other Spanish American provinces, see Gerbi 2010 [1973], 289; Peralta Ruiz 2009.

colonization, most famously to the debate between Bartolomé de Las Casas and Juan Ginés de Sepúlveda at Valladolid, its association with leading European encyclopaedists gave the 'degeneration thesis' considerable scientific prestige.

What is more, the thesis was extended to Europeans born in the Americas, thus providing a pseudo-scientific rationale for excluding creoles from government. Whereas in the United States, as others have noted, the idea of America's inferiority attracted scientific curiosity and even ridicule from intellectuals such as Franklin and Jefferson, Spanish Americans engaged hotly in the debate.[12] A particularly important role in this regard was played by exiled Jesuits from New Spain. Writing from his Italian exile, Francisco Clavijero framed his influential *Ancient History of Mexico* as an explicit response to the 'incredible number of European writers' who had misrepresented the true 'state of civilization among Mexicans'.[13] Clavijero's account not only revised the history of the Aztec empire, but, by exalting its cultural achievements, he propagated the pre-Columbian past as Mexico's 'classical antiquity'.[14] Spanish conquest and colonization were to blame for the backwardness of indigenous peoples. After all, as he remarked, the Greeks under Ottoman rule had 'little resemblance of those who lived in the times of Plato and Pericles'.[15] Yet, importantly, the heirs to this rich heritage were not the biological descendants of the Aztecs but the creoles of New Spain. [16] According to Brading, the early appropriation of pre-Columbian history is characteristic of the 'creole patriotism' that emerged in Mexico during

[12] The best known response from the United States is Jefferson's *Notes on the State of Virginia*. It is said that Franklin embarrassed Raynal at a dinner party in Paris, asking the present guests to stand up in order to demonstrate that Americas-born Europeans would be taller than the French, see Gerbi 2010 [1973], 240-268.
[13] Clavi[j]ero 1787 [1780-1781], Preface (s/n), 79.
[14] Brading 1985; Pagden 1990, 92, 101.
[15] Clavi[j]ero 1787 [1780-1781], 82.
[16] Brading 1985, 22; Pagden 1990, 102.

the colonial period, based on ‘the exaltation of the Aztec past, the denigration of the Conquest, the xenophobic resentment against the *gachupines*, and the devotion to Our Lady of Guadalupe’, the religious patron of Mexico, who is believed to have appeared to an indigenous peasant in 1531.[17] ‘The invocation of historical and religious themes’ the author elaborates, not only acted as a bridge between elites and popular masses, but also ‘expressed the sentiments and interest of an upper class, denied its birthright, the governance of the country’.[18] It was, in other words, a form of status assertion that was very closely connected to the place that the creole elite envisaged for itself within the Spanish realm.

The use of the indigenous past to bolster their claims to autonomy was more pronounced in New Spain than elsewhere in Spanish America because of the ready availability of a pre-Colombian empire (unlike in the River Plate), the absence of an indigenous aristocracy (as in Peru, or New Grenada),[19] and because of the heightened sense of pride that creoles from the viceroyalty took in the economic prosperity and cultural achievements of their *patria* at the end of the turn of the nineteenth century. As we have seen in the preceding chapter, the trope is taken up by Creole elites in the River Plate and elsewhere in Spanish America during the wars of independence. But the Viceroyalty of New Spain was not a recently upgraded colonial backwater. From the perspective of its local elite, the viceroyalty was destined to greatness and did not rank below the Old World. Appreciating these colonial antecedents is important for understanding the way in which Mexican elites thought about the standing of their state in nineteenth-century international society in terms of their

[17] Brading 1985, 3.
[18] Ibid.
[19] Gerbi 2010 [1973], 233; Brading 1985, 22; Florescano 1994, 191.

stature ambitions, the role they envisioned for Mexico, as well as the status claims they would make.

3. From Colony to Independent Statehood

It would be misleading to read a demand for independence from Spain into these utterances. 'What the criollos really wanted', as Meyer et al. point out, 'was to be on an equal footing with the *peninsulares*, or, better, somehow to replace them altogether'.[20] It was, in other words, a claim for a redefined role within the Spanish realm. The move towards emancipation was triggered by the same events that also led to declarations of independence in Argentina and Brazil, even if these countries took markedly different paths. They all took place in the context of war in Europe, which strongly reverberated in the Atlantic world. As noted in the previous chapter, the French invasion of the Iberian Peninsula and the forced abdication of the Spanish Bourbons in 1808 plunged Spain into a political crisis that severely undermined the legitimacy of the empire.[21] The *Ayuntamiento* of Mexico first followed the example of the Spanish governing juntas, arguing that in absence of the legitimate king, sovereignty would revert back to the kingdoms and provinces that constitute the realm.[22] The attempt to convoke a governing junta for the entire Viceroyalty, however, was met with fierce resistance from the peninsular judges of the high court and the merchant guild of Mexico. The legitimacy crisis divided the local elite, precipitating the overthrow of viceroy Iturrigaray and the arrest of leading autonomists on 15 September 1808. Mexico's first coup effectively thwarted the possibility

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[20] Meyer, Sherman, and Deeds 2007, 244.
[21] See, Rodríguez 1998; Adelman 2006.
[22] See Hernández y Dávalos 1968b, vol. 1, 475-485; and also Lafuente Ferrari 1941, 383-390; on the 'retroversion of sovereignty' in Mexico, see Anna 1998, 49; Guedea 2000b, 117; Rodríguez 2012, 49-52.

of creole self-rule in the name of Ferdinand VII, the route taken by the creole of the River Plate. Resistance was largely organized among the colonial elite through secret societies,[23] until the outbreak of a popular insurgency in 1810 led to the political mobilization of the country's marginalized masses. Miguel Hidalgo's *Grito de Dolores* of 16 September is re-enacted annually to commemorate the onset of Mexican independence. Yet, at first, Hidalgo asserted his loyalty to the deposed king. There is considerable controversy surrounding the origins and objectives of Hidalgo's uprising. What is clear, however, is that the rebellion, which brought together the rural poor of Mexico's heartland under the banner of the Virgin of Guadalupe, became increasingly radicalized and directed against Europe-born Spaniards, who were branded as traitors ready to surrender the country to the 'godless French'.[24] The social revolutionary character of the insurgency clearly separates the Mexican war of independence from its South American counterparts. Social violence and the indiscriminate targeting of New Spain's white population, however, raised fears of a race war, hence alienating the creoles from the insurgency, which consequently shifted its support to the viceregal regime.[25] 'The desire to be rid of the peninsulares', as Hamill concludes, 'was not so strong that the criollos could contemplate the loss of their own social superiority and material wealth'.[26] With the capture and execution of Hidalgo in 1811, the leadership fell upon José Mario Morelos. A parish priest like Hidalgo, Morelos was more successful in organizing the insurgency military and in clarifying its political aims. In 1813, the insurgents proclaimed Mexico independent from Spain to 'have

[23] Guedea 2000b, 119.
[24] Guardino 1996, 61-62; Rodríguez 1998, 160-161; 2012, 121; Guedea 2000b, 199; Van Young 2001, 513.
[25] Note that military leadership of the insurgency was largely composed of creoles, Fowler 1998, 14.
[26] Hamill 1966, 219. Anna estimates that approximately 2,000 out of New Spain's 14,000 peninsulares fell victim to the insurgency, 1985, 64.

recovered the exercise of its usurped sovereignty',[27] representing the break with the European metropolis as re-vindication for three centuries of slavery and Spanish despotism.[28]

The ideologues of the Mexican insurgency, most importantly Servando Teresa de Mier and Carlos María de Bustamante, drew an analogy between the sixteenth-century conquest of the Aztec empire and the nineteenth-century insurgency to undermine Spain's authority. As in Argentina, the writing of history became an important ideological tool to propagate a particular view of Mexico's past illness and future remedy.[29] Having been expelled for questioning the traditional account of the sixteenth-century appearance of the Virgin of Guadalupe, Mier intervened through his writings in the debate on New Spain's colonial status from his exile in London. In 1813, he published *History of the Revolution of New Spain*, in which he defended the independence movement and reiterated the thesis of the pre-Hispanic origins of Christianity in the New World.[30] Mier distanced himself from the ideas of the French revolution, arguing instead that the coup of 1808 had broken the 'social compact' between the metropolis and the inhabitants of New Spain. Mexico was hence to assume a new role. Importantly, this 'magna carta' of the Americas consisted of two historical pacts: one between the conquistadores and the Spanish Crown, and another between the Crown and the conquered indigenous people.[31] New Spain was consequently

[27] See Galeana and Fernández Delgado 2013, 137-138, quote at 137.
[28] See ibid., 111-115, quote at 111; see also Villoro 1966, 206; Anna 1985, 67; Brading 1991, 580-581.
[29] See, Florescano 1994.
[30] Mier Noriega y Guerra 1813, vol. 2, 570-571.
[31] Ibid., 571; see also Villoro 1966, 189-199; Brading 1985, 46.

an integral and equal part of the Crown of Castile, with an equal right for its sovereignty to be respected.[32]

Mier's partisan account of the country's history should be read in the context of the constitutional debates surrounding the Cortes of Cadiz. The active participation of deputies from New Spain, the largest contingent from the New World, has been studied by Rodríguez.[33] Although Spain had formally recognized the equality of the overseas territories 1809 in an attempt mollify creole discontent, Spanish America was underrepresented both at the Central Junta and the ensuing Cortes. At the heart of the conflict was the refusal of the *peninsulares* to consider the non-white population of Spanish America for establishing the number of deputies to be sent to Spain. The dispute reached a critical point in September 1811 with the public reading of a representation issued by the merchant guild of Mexico City. Drawing on the arguments of de Pauw and his fellow Enlightenment thinkers,[34] the *Consulado* called into question the ability of the 'native' inhabitants of New Spain—Indians, mixed-race castas, and creoles—to possess the most basic abilities for self-government, let alone to partake in the government of Spain. New Spain was but a distant province that had been 'seduced by the sum of its population, and its wealth, swelled with pride by the abasement of the metropolis, pushed into anarchy by its corruption, stupidity, and imbecility'. The inhabitants of New Spain could not legitimately demand equality, given the 'right of conquest' and the 'absolute inequality of circumstances'; and further: 'the civilization of peoples, like the human nature, has its ages and epochs that cannot be violated, without offending the physical and political health, and

[32] Mier Noriega y Guerra 1813, vol. 2, 614.
[33] Rodríguez 1998, 82-92; 2012, 153-160; 1998; Reus-Smit 2013, 136-137.
[34] See Hernández y Dávalos 1968b, vol. 2, 450-466 and in particular, 457.

this is the most prickly point of the science of government'.[35] Prejudice about the inability of Spanish Americans was certainly not limited to the United States. The link between the 'degradation thesis' and the political disenfranchisement of creoles was made explicit in Mier's unsavoury remarks:

> Ever since the Prussian Pauw worked for nine or ten years, like a beetle concocting his pellet of dirt, collecting together everything bad their rulers had said about America and its inhabitants, the Spaniards have persisted in making merry with this putrefaction, and throwing it in our faces as if we were the *indios* of old.[36]

With the end of the Peninsular War in 1814, Ferdinand VII suspended the Constitution of Cadiz, seeking to re-establish metropolitan control. The Bourbon restoration also ended the option pursued by moderate creoles to secure autonomy within the Spanish realm. In the meantime, the insurgency in New Spain suffered a series of devastating military defeats. The death of Morelos in 1815 led to the fragmentation of the rebellion, which thereafter continued as a guerrilla war until 1821. Once more events in Europe set the pace. The Riego revolt of 1820 temporarily restored the liberal constitution of 1812 in Spain. Exhausted by the long internecine conflict, the royalist forces shifted their political allegiance towards supporting independence in an attempt to save the Bourbon monarchy in Mexico.[37] Agustín de Iturbide, a royalist officer who had spent the past decade fighting the insurgency, proposed the 'Plan de Iguala', according to which independence would be attained under the 'three guarantees': the establishment of a constitutional monarchy, headed by Ferdinand VII or a member of a reigning European dynasty; the protection of the Catholic Church to the exclusion of other religions; and the formal equality of all

[35] See ibid., 450-466, at 462, 464, 466.
[36] quoted in Gerbi 2010 [1973], 298, emphasis in original, see also 314-315; Mier Noriega y Guerra 1813, vol. 1, XV-XVI.
[37] Fowler 1998, 15; Archer 2000, 303; Guedea 2000b, 129.

inhabitants of New Spain. The compromise was soon accepted by the warring factions, and on 24 August 1821 Mexico's 'sovereignty and independence' was recognized by Viceroy Juan O'Donojú in the Treaties of Córdoba.

The Mexican path to independence was different than that of its Spanish American counterparts because of the political marginalization of the creoles during the legitimacy crisis, and because of the presence of a significant popular revolt. Yet the creole elite largely shared the role conception about the standing of their 'kingdom' within the Spanish world. The debates surrounding the autonomist claims were framed in terms of rights, in general, and free trade and political representation, in particular. Reus-Smit, who analyzes the independence of Spanish America as crucial 'wave' in the expansion of the 'international system', rightly asserts that creoles understood the legitimacy crisis largely in terms of their political rights, and fashioned their political responses accordingly.[38] At the same time, however, it was also a question of status: in particular, the status of creoles vis-à-vis *peninsulares*, and the assertion of the status of Europeans born in the New World versus their Enlightenment critics.

4. Recognition

The independence of the Mexican Empire was formally proclaimed on 28 September 1821. After Haiti, Mexico was the second independent monarchy of the new world, a year before

[38] Reus-Smit 2013, 107. Reus-Smit's argument is not without problems. For one, it is misleading to characterize creoles' claims as 'general' in the sense that 'everyone considered an integral moral being held them without distinction', as a substantive part of the population remained politically disenfranchised, ibid., 6. For another, these rights were not necessarily understood as individual rights but as privileges of corporate entities, as Villoro's 1966 discussion illustrates.

Brazil became independent under Peter I of the House of Braganza. Yet the 'Brazilian solution',[39] which provided the Brazilian monarchy with legitimacy at home and facilitated its recognition abroad, was barred to Mexico due to Ferdinand VII's reluctance to recognize the independence of the new state. Consequently, both monarchy and parliament renounced the Treaties of Córdoba. It was only after the death of Ferdinand VII that Spain extended recognition through a treaty of peace and friendship in 1836.[40] The Treaties of Cordoba largely followed the Plan of Iguala with one important modification: if no suitable monarch was to be found among the Bourbon princes, the Mexican Congress would be free to elevate another candidate to the throne. The search, however, proved unsuccessful, given Spain's conviction that it would eventually regain New Spain. Rumours of a Spanish expedition and the discovery of pro-Spanish conspiracies polarized the political class and led to the expulsion of the remaining *gachupines* (European Spaniards), causing a significant drain in the country's human and financial resources.[41] The need to prepare against a Spanish invasion also imposed a substantial burden on the national budget, which further complicated the already precarious state of Mexico's finances. Spain attempted to reconquer Mexico in 1829, but was defeated by Santa Anna at Tampico, converting him into a national hero and sparking his meteoric rise.[42] The search for a European prince finally ended when army officers staged public protests in favour of Iturbide, whom the intimidated Congress proclaimed emperor in May 1822. But the constitutional monarchy lasted less than a year. Iturbide soon cracked down on the opposition and dissolved

[39] Guardino 1996, 77.
[40] Robertson 1918b, 81.
[41] Sims 1990; Hamnett 2013, 40. Bazant 1985 estimates that public revenues dropped by one half from 1800-1809 to 1822, with debt rising from 20 million pesos in 1808 to 35 million in 1814 and 45 million pesos by 1822, 426.
[42] Fowler 2007, 124-125.

Congress, which provoked a series of military revolts that forced Iturbide to abdicate in February 1823.

Recognition from the United States

The unstable political order and the poor state of Mexico's public finances also hampered the establishment of regular diplomatic relations. As demonstrated in the case of Argentina, while Spanish Americans could count on the support of prominent politicians in the United States, most notably Henry Clay, there was also strong prejudice about Hispanic culture, Catholicism, and racial miscegenation in these societies. Furthermore, and this point is especially relevant in its relations with Mexico, the United States had territorial ambitions to expand into lands that were part of the Viceroyalty of New Spain, which, under the Doctrine of the 'Manifest Destiny', became increasingly justified by the purported inability of Spanish Americans to self-rule that was popularized towards the mid-nineteenth century. The United States remained formally neutral during the Mexican war of independence, a policy that only changed with the Spanish ratification of the Adams-Onís Treaty (1819) in 1821.[43] The treaty ceded all of Florida to the United States, recognized Washington's claim to the territory above the forty-second parallel, and settled the boundary of the Louisiana Purchase in return for the payment of claims that US citizens made against the Spanish government. Although the United States relinquished its claims to Texas west of the Sabine River (today's boundary between Louisiana and Texas), Spanish authorities were apprehensive of Washington's continued interest in Texas, which became increasingly

[43] Robertson 1918a, 251; Bosch García 1947, 14; Guedea and Rodríguez 1997, 28.

penetrated by Anglo-American settlers.[44] Following the treaty of 1819, Spain allowed Catholics from the United States to acquire land in Texas, a policy that continued under the Iturbide regime. As discussed below, the inflow of settlers from the United States proved controversial.[45] At the same time, however, Mexican elites regarded the colonization as necessary in order to defend the northern frontier against 'Indian raids' and to prevent future US expansion. The rationale given for its seemingly contradictory policy clearly shows the great power aspirations of newly-independent Mexico, as well as the stature concerns of its governing elite:

> [The United States] will fear having as a neighbour an Empire, which will be powerful because of its mineral, agricultural and industrial wealth, foreseeing that within a few years, its power will shift the balance in its favour, and will want to prevent this with war of by spreading discord through intrigue, or by other means available.[46]

The quote demonstrates that proximity to the United States led to balance of power thinking in Mexico, a 'logic of social action' that is also apparent in the way Mexican elites thought to negotiate international recognition.

President Monroe recommended the recognition of the first Spanish American states in his message to Congress of 8 March 1822.[47] In October of the same year, Monroe sent Poinsett to Mexico to report on the political situation in the country.[48] The imperial government, however, mistook the envoy as Washington's official representative, and responded by

[44] Onís to Venegas, 1 April 1812, cited in 1997, 21-22; see also Manning 1916, 279.
[45] Schoultz 1998, 17-18.
[46] See Azcárate 1932, 3-72, quote at 79-10.
[47] Monroe to the United States House of Representatives, March 8, 1822, in Manning 1925a, vol. 1, 148.
[48] Poinsett subsequently published some of his observations in *Notes on Mexico* of 1825.

appointing José Manuel Zozaya as minister plenipotentiary to the United States.[49] The Mexican diplomat was officially received by Monroe on 12 December 1822, which is frequently taken as the date of the recognition of the Mexican Empire.[50] It is paradoxical that despite being known for its strong commitment to republicanism and the 'American system', the Monroe government was among the first states to recognize the independence of Mexico. Yet it did not mark the beginning of cordial relations. As Zozaya reported disgruntledly: 'The arrogance of these republicans does not allow them to see us as equal but as inferiors'.[51] Reporting from Mexico, the staunchly republican Poinsett also expressed his concerns about the viability of the constitutional monarchy, recommending not 'to sanction and recognize as legitimate a government erected and supported by violence and oppression' by granting it full diplomatic recognition.[52] The question of establishing regular diplomatic relations with Mexico became further embroiled in the 1824 presidential elections, leading to the postponement of the appointment until the position was finally offered to Poinsett in 1825.[53] 'The abstract recognition and philanthropic declarations of the United States had interested Mexico for a time and had elicited admiration and gratitude', Manning argues, but its ambiguity towards Mexico, even after the fall of Iturbide, irritated the Mexican authorities, strengthening the belief that Britain was the more genuine advocate of the Spanish American cause.[54] When Poinsett was finally received by President Guadalupe Victoria on 1 June 1825, the event was deliberately scheduled to take place the day after the Mexican government had accepted the credentials of the British

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[49] Vázquez and Meyer 1995, 22; Guedea and Rodríguez 1997, 33.
[50] Robertson 1918a, 261; Manning 1916, 12; Whitaker 1941, 390; Pi-Suñer, Riguzzi, and Ruano 2011, 39-40.
[51] Zozaya to Herrera, 26 Dec 1822, in Santibáñez 1910-1913, vol. 1, 103.
[52] Poinsett to Monroe, January 1823, in Manning 1916, 34; Whitaker 1941, 391; Guedea and Rodríguez 1997, 34.
[53] Manning 1916, 44; Guedea and Rodríguez 1997, 35.
[54] Manning 1916, 49. See also, Racine 2010, 445.

chargé d'affaires, Henry George Ward.[55] While Mexico sought to balance Britain against the United States, the episode, which nowadays seems trivial, was well understood by contemporaries as a signal to the United States: with regard to status, Britain ranked clearly above the United States.

The creation of the first federal republic in 1824 inaugurated a short period of political stability—Guadalupe Victoria, who sought to diffuse political conflict by including representatives of different factions in his cabinet, would be the only Mexican president to complete his term in office until the 1860s. The 1820s also marked the beginning of what Fowler describes as a transition from period a 'hope' about Mexico's political future to disillusionment to a stage of 'profound despair' that set in with the loss of half of the country's territory to the United States.[56]

In the instructions to Poinsett, Clay reminded the envoy that Mexico would be 'entitled to high consideration', which, due to its history and wealth of resources, 'must be allowed to rank among the first powers of America'.[57] The note demonstrates how widely the view of Mexico's future stature was shared at the time. A first compromise was reached in 1826, but it took almost ten years to be ratified due to the outstanding territorial dispute between the two states (the treaty came only came into effect in 1832; the Mexican Congress only

[55] Manning 1916, 52; Vázquez and Meyer 1995, 26; see also Ward to Canning, FO50/13, 1 June 1825, in Webster 1938, vol. 2, 470-471.
[56] Fowler 1998.
[57] Clay to Poinsett, 26 March 1825, in Manning 1925a, vol. 1, 229-233, quote on 231.

accepted the final document with modifications on 20 April 1836, that is, after Texas had declared its independence).[58]

It did not help that Poinsett became heavily involved in the domestic conflict over the role of the Church and the treatment of the *peninsulares* in Mexico, which pitted radical and traditionalists, organized in two opposing Masonic lodges, against each other. In fact, Poinsett was instrumental in the creation of the York rite, which became the dominating political force towards the end of Guadalupe Victoria's term. Tensions escalated in the context of the 1828 elections, causing the breakdown of the constitutional order and renewed social unrest. Poinsett's intrusion into Mexican affairs led to open denunciations by state legislatures and the opposition, who blamed the Protestant US minister for the country's political turmoil's, ultimately forcing his recall in 1829.[59]

Poinsett publicly defended his role in the constitutional crisis in particularly patronizing terms that seem to have been taken directly from the writings of de Pauw. Given his importance to the recognition of both the River Plate and Mexico, the passage is worth quoting at length:

> The want of means of acquiring knowledge, the absence of all excitement to exertion, the facility of procuring the means of subsistence almost without labour, a mild and enervating climate and their constant intercourse with the aborigines, who were and still are degraded to the very lowest class of human beings, all contributed

[58] 1916, 250, 347-258; Vázquez and Meyer 1995, 28; Guedea and Rodríguez 1997, 38.
[59] Guerrero to Jackson 1 July 1829, in Manning 1916, 369-370.

> to render the Mexicans a more ignorant and debauched people than their ancestors had been.[60]

The episode had important international ramifications. First, Poinsett's machinations further poisoned early relations between Mexico and the United States, which were already strained over the question of Texas.[61] Secondly, Poinsett was instrumental in the ousting of the conservative Lucas Alamán, who, as minister of interior and exterior relations, played an important role in projecting Mexico's earlier leadership ambitions abroad. He was an influential proponent of (Spanish) American unity, who, among other things, played an important role in convincing Bolívar to invite Brazil and the United States to the Panama Congress.[62] It was also he who suggested the reconvening of the Congress at Tacubaya, located on the outskirts of Mexico City, after the initial summit had failed. With the removal of Alamán, Mexico's support for the Bolivarian project faltered, as opposing voices prevailed that were more concerned about the leadership ambitions of the Great Colombian than creating unity among American states.[63] Lastly, as elaborated below, the episode was also politically consequential as the breakdown of political order and the ensuing revolts led to the injury of French subjects, whose demands would provide the rationale for the French blockade during the so-called Pastry War (1838-1839).

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[60] Poinsett to Van Buren, 10 March 1829, in 1925b, 1673-1685, quote at 1676-1677. Manning justifies Poinsett's actions with the need to counter-balance British influence, and the fact that Poinsett acted upon his republican convictions, guided by his instructions to explain the working of a constitution to the Mexicans, 1916, 46-48, 203-204, 352. The episode is another example of how Washington calls into question the ability of Mexicans to self-rule.

[61] Vázquez and Meyer 1995, 29; Guedea and Rodríguez 1997, 36-37.

[62] Méndez Reyes 1996, 180-184. As this author also notes, Alamán believed that Mexico had a 'right to primacy' within Spanish America, ibid., 223. A similar observation is made by Vasconcelos, who was instrumental in establishing Alamán's reputation as champion of Spanish Americanism. As 'most powerful and cultured of the Hispanic family', Mexico was poised to lead which pitted Mexico against the United States, 1937, 12.

[63] On Alamán's hispanoamericanism, see 1996; Zoraida Vázquez 2003, 267; on Mexico's abandonment of Bolívar's project, Bosch García 1947; Davis 1977b, 71-74.

British Recognition

Britain emerged from the Napoleonic Wars as Europe's leading economic and maritime power, rendering British recognition essential for the new states of Latin America. Before Britain's alliance with Spain, plans were made for an expedition led by Arthur Wellesley, the future Duke of Wellington, to seize the silver mines of New Spain. With the onset of the Peninsular War (1808-1814), however, Britain officially refrained from further undermining Spanish rule, declaring itself neutral towards the Spanish American rebellions.[64] Despite its commercial interests, the government in London preferred to mediate in the dispute between the mother country and Spanish America—that is, until Spain's intransigence convinced the British government that recognition was not forthcoming.[65]

Although the recognition of Spanish America is generally attributed to George Canning, a policy shift had already taken place during Castlereagh's term in office when, in May 1822, Britain allowed Spanish American ships into its ports. According to Waddell, the change was a response to Monroe's address of March 1822, as well as a reaction to the threats made by Bolívar's envoy to Europe, Francisco Antonio Zea, that his government would exclude all countries from trade that refused to recognize Gran Colombia's independence.[66] Although often overlooked in the literature, the episode suggests that the Spanish Americans were not entirely victim to circumstances and great power politics. The move towards recognition gathered further pace when George Canning became foreign secretary

[64] Yet a large number of British subjects fought on the side of the Spanish Americans, and played an important role in organizing the armed resistance against Spain, see Waddell 1987a; Brown 2006.
[65] See Bosch García 1947; Kaufmann 1967; Platt 1968; Rodríguez 1975; Miller 1993, 34-48; for more recent accounts Paquette 2004; Blaufarb 2007; Fabry 2010; Racine 2010.
[66] Waddell 1987b, 208.

in September 1822.[67] A declared advocate of Spanish American independence, Canning sent Patrick Mackie to Mexico to inquire about the stability of the constitutional monarchy; Mackie, however, only arrived after Iturbide had already been overthrown. Although Mackie's task was to avoid the impression that he was on a political mission, the agent, like Poinsett before him, was regarded as an official representative by the Mexican authorities. The misunderstanding was not entirely Mexico's fault, since Mackie overstepped his authority by entering into negotiations with Victoria.[68] While negotiating with Prince Polignac over France's abstinence from aiding Spain in the recovery of its colonies,[69] Canning dispatched another commission to Mexico in October 1823, which was authorized to request the exchange of diplomatic agents under four conditions: first, that Mexico could demonstrate its determination to remain independent; second, that it controlled its territory and was able to fend off a possible European attack; third, that it was sufficiently stable and recognized as legitimate by its population; and fourth and lastly, that it had abolished the slave trade.[70] Once the formal recognition of Mexico had taken place, Hervey was to be appointed minister plenipotentiary. However, the envoy was later recalled for having given the government's backing for a loan to Mexico.[71] It consequently fell upon another member of the mission, Henry George Ward, to negotiate the treaty that would formally recognize the new state.

[67] See Temperley 1966.
[68] In addition, Mackie was to gather information about the intentions of the Mexican government with regard to British trade, its political ties with Spain, and whether Mexico would be willing to accept commercial agents and 'afford to British subjects generally all civil right [sic] and the unmolested exercise of their religious worship, etc'. Lastly, Mackie was to insist on the non-political nature of his mission, Canning to Mackie, FO 50/1, 21 December 1822, in Webster 1938, vol. 1, 431-432, at 431; Santibáñez 1910-1913, vol. 2, 109-114. Furthermore: Rodríguez 1975, 88; Pi-Suñer, Riguzzi, and Ruano 2011, 44. Bosch Garcia 1947 treats this erroneously as beginning of Anglo-Mexican diplomatic relations, 58-64.
[69] See Webster 1938, vol. 2, 115.
[70] Canning to Hervey, FO50/3, 10 Oct 1823, in ibid., vol. 1, 433-436.
[71] Canning to Hervey, FO50/3, 20 July 1824, in ibid., vol. 1, 455-457; see also, Tenenbaum 1979, 332.

In the early 1820s, as Rodriguez points out, there was still a widespread belief among Mexico's ruling class that the country was predestined to 'assume her place as an equal among the great powers of the earth'. Its 'fabled wealth', in particular, would provide Mexico with leverage to obtain recognition from European powers.[72] This optimism is also evident in President Victoria's inaugural speech. On the one hand, he warned his fellow citizens that, without political stability and the exact repayment of its foreign debt, Mexico would become the 'disgrace' of the Western Hemisphere in the eyes of the 'civilized' world.[73] On the other hand, he reassured his fellow countrymen of Mexico's bright future:

> The entire New World presents an existence full of life and great expectations in the face of the universe; but with Mexico's entering the list of states that became independent from Europe as matter of fact, it [Europe] seems to respect her [Mexico's] future opulence and her immense power that will carry her to the first ranks among all the free peoples.[74]

The statement leaves little doubt about the high stature expectation in early independent Mexico. The Victoria government not only attempted to balance Britain against the United States, but also pressured other European powers, including France and Prussia, into recognizing Mexico and the other Spanish American states, using the threat of trade sanctions initially proposed by Zea in 1822.[75] In response to the Hervey commission,

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[72] Rodríguez 1975, 91.
[73] Victoria 1824, VI.
[74] Ibid., VIII, own translation.
[75] The mix of inducements and threats seems to have had an effect on smaller mercantile powers, especially after Britain had formally recognized the republic. Mexico signed treaties with Denmark and Holland in 1827, with Prussia and Saxony in 1831, and with the Hanseatic cities in 1832, Rodríguez 1975, 143-159; Pi-Suñer, Riguzzi, and Ruano 2011, 45. France allowed Mexican ships into its ports since 1826, and in 1827, signed a declaration that de facto recognized Mexican independence, even if such an effect was denied by France, much to the irritation of the Mexican public, Robertson 1939, 397-398; 1944, 222. France only moved towards formal recognition following the July Revolution of 1830, but the ensuing Franco-Mexican treaty of 1831 was not ratified by Mexico, Waddell 1987b, 218; Serrano Ortega and Zoraida Vázquez 2010, 399.

Mexico appointed Mariano Michelena and Vicente Rocafuerte to obtain Britain's recognition.[76] To increase the credibility and strength of the threat, the Mexican delegation even suggested the creation of an alliance between Argentina, Brazil and Colombia that was initially supported by the envoys of the respective countries, but who would not commit to the proposal without explicit instruction from their governments at home.[77]

Mexican elites believed in the future greatness of their country, and acted according to these stature conceptions. These also implied certain leadership ambitions, as Mexico sought to use its weight to obtain the recognition of Spanish America more generally, and, in the 1830s, even attempted (unsuccessfully) to negotiate directly with Spain on behalf of the other Spanish American states.[78]

This confidence is also evident in the protracted negotiations leading up to the Treaty of Amity, Friendship and Commerce of 26 December 1826 (ratified on 19 July 1827).[79] In January 1825, Canning made public the intention to finally extend recognition to the de facto independent Spanish American states.[80] The first treaties were signed with the River Plate (2 Feb 1825), and Colombia (18 April 1825), the latter of which would serve as a template for the Anglo-Mexican treaty. Canning, however, rejected the first agreement signed in 1825 because it made concessions that Britain had not granted to any other country, and because it left the civil rights of British nationals residing in Mexico in

[76] The instructions to the Mexican delegation are reprinted in Santibáñez 1910-1913, vol. 2, 272-277.
[77] Nota del Agente Michelana, in 1912, 310-315; see also, Rodríguez 1975, 97-98.
[78] Davis 1977b, 74.
[79] Parry 1969, vol. 75.
[80] Temperley 1966, 151-152; Kaufmann 1967, 179. King George IV, who opposed recognition, avoided having to announce the measure to Parliament under the presence of being sick; the message was read out by Lord Eldon instead on 7 February 1825.

doubt.[81] For one, Mexico's constitution forbade religious toleration. Moreover, the Mexican delegation insisted that the reciprocity clause harmed Mexico's economy, while the requirement that a Mexican ship must be built in the country would prevent the establishment of a merchant fleet. Canning was seemingly irritated: Britain had already demonstrated its respect for Mexico by upgrading the British commissioner to the rank of chargé d'affaires, which, under normal circumstances, would be the result and not the starting point of the negotiation. Rejecting ratification of the treaty, as Canning wrote to Ward, 'may perhaps have a salutary effect in sobering, to a certain degree, that somewhat extravagant estimate of the importance of Mexico to Great Britain which appears to pervade the whole mass of the Mexican nation, and which may in all probability have stimulated the unreasonable pretensions of their Plenipotentiaries'.[82] In short, the Mexican delegation had arrogated themselves a position that did not correspond to their actual standing among states, and should consequently be put into their place. After another attempt to draft a satisfactory treaty in Mexico failed, the Mexican minister of foreign relations, Sebastián Camacho, was dispatched to London, where he was able to convince Canning to compromise. Although the treaty was later criticized by the Mexican Congress, as a matter of fact, Britain conceded in the crucial points: religious toleration in Mexico was circumscribed, and a ten-year moratorium was placed on what would count as a Mexican ship.[83]

[81] Canning to Ward, FO50/9, 9 September 1825, in Webster 1938, vol. 1, 475-476; see also Alamán 1849-1852, vol. 5, 817.
[82] Canning to Ward, FO 50/9, 9 September 1825, in Webster 1938, vol.1, 476-477.
[83] Rodríguez 1975, 134-135.

Although the inflow of cheaper British produce harmed Mexican manufacturing, the treaty of 1826 was clearly not a British *diktat*. In the first place, Mexico was able to secure important concessions from Britain that Argentina did not ask for and Brazil was unable to obtain. The episode illustrates how Mexican elites acted upon their perception of standing, and the agency of the new state, despite the actual difference in power and wealth, and despite an overall unfavourable international environment. The importance of limiting religious toleration becomes all the more evident considering that Britain went to great lengths in its negotiations with Brazil to ensure that the civil liberties of its citizens would be protected. The self-confidence with which Mexico negotiated reflects the belief that both Europeans and Mexicans held regarding the prospects of the new state, as well as the stature conception of Mexican elites. This is also apparent in the way the Victoria government employed the conclusion of the Anglo-Mexican treaty in its relations with the United States, and other European powers. Mexico was not satisfied with the extension of de facto recognition, but insisted on the regularization of its diplomatic relations. Fearing exclusion from a potentially lucrative market, even legitimist France and Prussia gave in—and all this years before Mexico was recognized by Spain.

The question, then, becomes whether Mexico was fully admitted into what was perceived in the early nineteenth century as a community of civilized and Christian states. There is little doubt that both local elites and the recognizing powers expected Mexico to play an important part in future commerce and international politics. There is good reason to belief that foreign governments were expecting the new states to take up a position in international society comparable to that occupied by minor European powers. However, as political order broke down once more, pre-existing stereotypes about the inability of

Spanish Americans came back to the fore. 'The adverse state of national finances, combined with the perception of political instability due to frequent changes of government by violent means, gave foreign observers the impression of an abject people incapable of running their own affairs as an independent state'.[84]

5. The Mid-Nineteenth Century: Into the Quagmire

Mexico's standing in international society received its first severe setback shortly after the signing of the Anglo-Mexican treaty. Following independence, Mexico had assumed all of the viceroyalty's debt, and in 1824 contracted two large loans with British banks totalling a face value of 32 million pesos. Although Mexico had sufficient credibility in London to allow its legation to underwrite an (unauthorized) interest-free loan to Gran Colombia in 1826, ongoing civil strife stifled the country's economy and strained its public finances.[85] The crisis finally caught up with the North American state, and in October 1827, Mexico announced the inability to service its foreign debt. The default of the largest country in the Western Hemisphere seriously undermined Mexico's reputation among European bondholders, and the British public in particular. While the *Morning Chronicle* had envisioned a Mexico that would 'rise into independence and greatness' in 1824,[86] the mood soured in the aftermath of the default, leading to public denunciation of Mexico in the

[84] Hamnett 2006, 148.
[85] Rodríguez 1975, 122; Bazant 1985, 39.
[86] 3 August 1824, cited in Costeloe 2011, 11.

British press.[87] From the perspective of British investors, Humboldt was to blame for creating a false image of the Spanish American state.[88]

Similar to the situation in the River Plate, political instability and civil strife put the life and property of foreigners at risk, which implied that Mexico seemingly failed to comply with the 'minimal standard of treatment', too. The first serious incident involved the sacking of a French bakery during the social unrest in 1828, which gave the ensuing conflict its name: the 'Pastry War'. Mexico failed to ratify a treaty of friendship and commerce that would have provided some legal protection to French citizens residing in the politically volatile country. From the perspective of the French foreign minister, Prince Polignac, Mexico denied his countrymen the rights they could generally expect when living in a civilized country.[89] Mexicans, the French minister plenipotentiary wrote to Paris, would be 'as fickle and improvident as children. No European power has yet given them a lesson; and they conclude that they will never receive one'.[90] When the Mexican government refused to compensate the pastry chef for his loss, it was upon France to show the recalcitrant Mexicans their place. France issued an ultimatum on 21 March 1838, demanding the payment of 600,000 pesos, most-favourite-nation status for its citizens, and their exemptions from forced loans. The conditions were deemed unacceptable to the Mexican

[87] Rodríguez 1975, 126; Dawson 1990, 160, 172. See also, Salvucci 2009; Tenenbaum 1986; Marichal 1989.
[88] See Whitaker 1960, 322. British investors, for instance, complained that they were misled by the all-too-optimistic account of the 'Baron Humbug', Gregory 1992, 148. Henry Ward, by contrast, criticized British investors for having relied exclusively on Humboldt's outdated description without taking the effects of the long war of independence into consideration, 1829, 414-415. Alamán later recalled that Humboldt's *Essay* contributed to Mexican's 'exaggerated conception of the wealth of their country [patria]' and to the idea that 'once independent, it will become the most powerful nation of the universe', 1849-1852, vol. 1, 156.
[89] Polignac to Cochelot, 4 May 1830, cited in Robertson 1944, 223.
[90] Deffaudis to Achille, 3 February 1836, cited in Barker 1979, 65.

government, upon which France imposed a 'pacific blockade' against Mexican ports in April 1838, and seized San Juan de Ulúa in November of the same year.

Civilizational rhetoric became easily tinged with culturalist and racist stereotypes: as a naval officer remarked, the Spanish race in Mexico was 'a decadent, rotten race that flounders about in the two Americas incapable of emerging from disorder and misery despite all its chances for liberty and wealth'.[91] Little Latin solidarity could be found here. The French press, in turn, framed the conflict in terms of Europe's civilizing mission. France was acting to 'safeguard the interests of civilization' against the 'exorbitant pretentions' of a xenophobic and ill-intentioned Mexico: 'In effect, when the law of wrong-doing is injuring America, we introduce into those countries which are still barbarous a beginning and an example of social justice which will spread from foreigners to nationals'.[92] As in the River Plate, Mexican elites appropriated the civilizational rhetoric of Europeans. Following the shelling of Veracruz, President Bustamante criticized French hypocrisy accordingly:

> The world will behold with amazement that France, a nation which considers herself civilized, has started an unprovoked war; and that this very nation, desirous of compelling by force the celebration of treaties between two free should be binding upon both parties, has accused Mexico of lacking culture and of being ignorant of the rules of universal justice.[93]

In the end, Mexico declared war on France, but, under British mediation, conceded to France's terms in the peace treaty of 9 March 1839.

[91] Eugene Maissin, 1838-1839, cited in ibid., 67.
[92] Cited in Robertson 1944, 232.
[93]Cited in ibid., 243.

The inability to live up to the expectations of the ‘core’ of international society undermined the status of Mexico as part of the family of ‘civilized’ states. Its standing suffered yet another blow as a result of the unresolved territorial dispute with the United States. Washington regarded Texas to be part of the Louisiana Purchase of 1803 that left boundaries unspecified, but formally renounced its claim in the Adams-Onís Treaty with Spain. However, with the increase of Anglo-American colonization in Texas the issue came back to the fore. Since the opening of Texas to foreigners in the late eighteenth century, immigration was legally restricted to Catholics, who were required to recognize the authority of the Spanish Crown. The immigration policy caused frictions with Protestant newcomers, as did the fact that the colonists disregarded Mexican law, for instance, by introducing slaves from the southern US.[94]

Mexican historiography generally blames Antonio López de Santa Anna, a military strongman from Veracruz, for the dismemberment and humiliation of the country by the United States. Santa Anna was a central figure in Mexican politics during the first decades of independent statehood, whose *pronuncamientos* brought down Iturbide, and played an important part in ending the short period of constitutional order in the late 1820s.[95] As President, Santa Anna sought to strengthen the power of the central state, replacing the federalist constitution of 1824 with the ‘Seven Laws’ of 1836. The encroachment on state autonomy, however, was taken as a pretext by Anglo-American settlers to secede.

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[94] Schoultz 1998, 20-21; Zoraida Vázquez 2000, 342; Serrano Ortega and Zoraida Vázquez 2010, 421-422.
[95] See, in particular, Fowler 2007.

Accordingly, Texas proclaimed its independence on 2 March 1836, allegedly justified by Mexico's 'weak, corrupt, and tyrannical government' unable if not unwilling to 'protect the lives, liberty and property of the people'.[96] Santa Anna himself headed the expeditionary force to crush the Texan rebellion. To dissuade volunteers from the United States from supporting the Texans, the Mexican Congress furthermore passed a decree that called for the treatment of all foreign fighters as pirates.[97] Santa Anna would consequently take no prisoners. The execution of Anglo-Americans at the Alamo mission and the so-called 'Goliad massacre' of 1836 backfired as they galvanized resistance against government forces, and stirred up anti-Mexican resentment in the United States.[98] The cruelty of Santa Anna's troops, in turn, was taken as justification for the violence against Mexicans, especially by Texas Rangers, a volunteer force that was initially created to deal with the 'Indian problem' on the frontier, but which became notorious for extra-legal violence against Mexicans.[99]

The expedition, however, failed. Santa Anna was taken prisoner by the rebels and forced to accept Texan independence. Yet Mexico refused to recognize the new status quo, nor was it willing to accept a British proposal for the establishment of a buffer state between Mexico and the United States. As was to be expected, Texas sought annexation by the United States, which was achieved in March 1845. After Mexico also refused to negotiate what it regarded as an onerous offer made by the United States, President Polk ordered US troops

[96] The Texas Declaration of Independence 2 March 1836.
[97] Serrano Ortega and Zoraida Vázquez 2010, 424.
[98] See, for instance, Paredes 1977, 8-10; Costeloe 1988; Raat and Brescia 2010, 76-77.
[99] 2010, 86.

to move into the disputed territory and, following a short skirmish with Mexican forces, declared war on Mexico in May 1846.

To make things worse, regional rebellions further challenged the authorities of the central state and diverted government troops away from concentrating on the foreign invasion in the north. The most important uprising was the Mayan rebellion in the Yucatán, an ethnic conflict that became known as the Caste War (1847-1852).[100] The rebellion underscores the complexities of Mexico's place in nineteenth-century international society, and the way in which civilization was evoked to socially construct the status of the new state. Whereas foreign powers employed the civilizational ideal to call into question Mexico's international standing, creoles used similar language to delegitimize the resistance of autonomous indigenous communities in the name of 'order, humanity, and civilization'.[101] The situation turned desperate enough that the creole elite of the Yucatán offered 'domination and sovereignty' to the United States (and, in fact, to Britain and Spain) in exchange for protection.[102] As the Yucatecan commissioner to the United States wrote in his appeal:

> The white race, the civilized class of this State, is now attacked in an atrocious and barbarous manner by the aboriginal caste, which rising simultaneously, in insurrection, by an instinct of ferocity, is making a savage and exterminating war upon us.[103]

[100] On Mexican disunity during the war, see Santoni 1996; Levinson 2005. Henderson 2008 argues that Mexican elite adopted an increasingly bellicose position towards the United States rendering war a matter of national honour. On the Caste Wars, see Reed 1964; Rugeley 1996.
[101] Burns 1980, 112.
[102] Quoted in Reed 1964, 95. On the long and protected conflict, see also Mallon 1995; Rugeley 1996; Washbrook 2011.
[103] Justo Sierra O'Reilly to James Buchanan, 7 March 1848, in Levinson 2005, 92.

The argument made here is similar to Sarmiento's arguments about the savage nature of indigenous peoples, and also has its parallels to the Brazilian rhetoric during the Canudos rebellion at the end of the nineteenth century.

In the end, the poorly equipped Mexican army stood little chance against the United States. By September 1847, Mexico City was controlled by foreign troops, even if the occupying forces continued to face considerable resistance from the urban and rural populations, which engaged the United State in guerrilla warfare. In the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo of February 1848, Mexico had to accept the Rio Grande as the new boundary with Texas, and lost the vast territory comprising much of today's southwest of the United States.[104]

In addition to territorial loss, the Mexican American War had wider implications. First, the war entrenched stereotypes in the United States about the inability of Mexicans to self-rule. As Senator Calhoun noted during the debate on annexing Mexican territory:

> How can you make a free government in Mexico? [...] That is what she has been aiming at for twenty-odd years; but so utterly incompetent are her people for the work, that it has been a complete failure from beginning to end'.[105]

Calhoun's remarks reflect a long-lasting line of thought among Anglo-Saxon elites, who regarded Catholic Spanish America as degenerated and its populace as unfit to self-rule (that the 'degeneration thesis' also applied to Anglo-Saxons in the New World had already been forgotten). A result of the Mexican-American war, however, was that these elite views

[104] Comprising California, Nevada and Utah, most of Arizona and New Mexico (additional land was acquired by the Gadsden Purchase of 1853), as well as parts of Colorado and Wyoming.
[105] 'Speech on the war with Mexico',4 July 1848, in Wilson and Cook 1999, 54-74, quote on 61; see also, Schoultz 1998, 36. On the impact that the Mexican-American War had on US patriotism and the development of a sense of racial superiority over the 'mongrel Mexicans', see Johannsen 1985, 289-293. On dissident voices in the United States, Merk 1969.

became popularized and fused with stereotypes that emerged from life on the frontier. The latter case is made by Pike, who argues that the often violent encounters between Anglo-Saxon settlers, who pushed further west into Mexico's territories, and the Hispanic population of these areas, led to the emergence of a popular trope that equated Mexicans with savages. Like the indigenous inhabitants of the North American west, this view suggested, Mexicans lack legitimate title to their land.[106]

All this is not to argue that culturalist and racist stereotypes caused the westward expansion of the United States, or the Mexican-American War, for that matter, in a deterministic way. There were very concrete political and economic interests at stake. However, in line with constructivist thought, this argument suggests that these interests themselves were significantly shaped by ideas, such as such the belief that it was the 'Manifest Destiny' of the Anglo-Saxon people to expand across the North American continent.[107] After all, there are many different ways by which commercial benefits can be reaped from available land, and outright annexation is but one option that was regarded as appropriate by the United States at the time. The same argument, of course, applies to the treatment of indigenous communities by creole elites in Spanish American states. In this regard, the idea of civilization was important because establishing control over the national territory and its inhabitants was regarded as crucial not only for the formation of a consolidated nation-state, but also to signal its civilizational status to the world.

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[106] In particular, Pike 1992, 103-104; Schoultz 1998, 374-375; Raat and Brescia 2010, 6. Johnson concurs pointing furthermore at the gendered nature of anti-Hispanic prejudice in the United States, 12, 72-115.
[107] O'Sullivan 1845.

Second, the Mexican-American War also had implications for US-Latin American relations, more generally. War propaganda and the reasons given to justify the expansionist policy did not go unnoticed among Latin America's political and intellectual elite. For one, it revitalized attempts to forge a political union among Spanish American states. The Lima Conference, convoked following a Spanish attempt to regain control over Peru, was held in the shadow of the war. While Washington had been invited to Lima (but declined to attend), the next conference in Santiago was explicitly directed against the United States, which had reached a mutual understanding with Britain over its legitimate interest in the Isthmus of Central America in the Clayton Bulwer Treaty of 1850, and whose citizens, most prominently William Walker, were engaged in filibustering in the region.[108] In this regard, the war with the United States contributed to the strengthening of a Spanish American sense of identity, as elites began to embrace the notion of Latinity that had emerged in France in the 1830s. As mentioned in Chapter 3, identities are often formed in opposition to an 'outside' group. It is no coincidence, then, that the emergence of a self-consciously *Latin* American sense of belonging in mid-nineteenth century was closely related to the first wave of 'anti-American' sentiments in the region, explicitly framed in terms of a clash between the Anglo-Saxon race of the North encroaching on the Latin race of the South.[109] The writings of the Colombian José María Torres Caicedo are widely known in this regard. In Mexico, the theme was anticipated, for instance, by Cuevas's *Mexico's Future*, which builds on the contrast between virtuous Spanish America on the one hand, and the aggressive and materialistic United States, on the other, that was

[108] See Dunkerley 1988.
[109] Whitaker 1954, 47, 50, 59; Ardao 1986, 164; more recently, McGuiness 2003; Grandin 2006; Scarfi 2014.

popularized by Rodo's *arielismo* at the turn of the twentieth century.[110] As noted above, the very appeal of the idea of Latin America was intrinsically linked to the sense of international marginalization of the region's intellectual and political elite.

Third and finally, as Whitaker maintains, military defeat against the United States effectively ended the leadership ambitions that Mexico had in the region.[111] It not only ended Mexico's vision of its role in the Western Hemisphere, but also the stature conception that Mexican elite had harboured since the colonial period. As Zoraida Vázquez explains, 'Mexico's defeat marked the end of the grand dream that had encouraged the 18th-century prosperity of New Spain'.[112] The early optimism of the independence period and the self-assurance with which Mexico had negotiated its formal recognition was replaced by uncertainty and a search for the reasons for Mexico's failure.[113] Financially bankrupt, reprimanded by France, deeply humiliated by the United States, and challenged by agrarian and indigenous rebellions, the conception of Mexico's elite about the standing of their state, which drew heavily on the idea that Mexico was destined to greatness (e.g. stature), was shattered by the end of the 1840s.

What followed was a period of heated debate about the reasons for Mexico's disastrous defeat in 1847, what Fowler termed the 'final stage of despair'.[114] 'With the rapid subjection of the country and the loss of more than half its territory, the once proud and optimistic nation of Iturbide was left stunned', the consequence was, as Hale argues, that

[110] Cuevas 1954 [1851]; Torrés Caicedo 1865; see also Fowler 1998, 112.
[111] Whitaker 1954, 50.
[112] Zoraida Vázquez 2000, 339.
[113] Florescano 2006, 276.
[114] Fowler 1998, 3, 29.

the Mexican elite 'turned to bitter reflection upon its paralyzed condition and its flagrant display of weakness when faced by a small and not too efficient force of invaders'.[115] This 'great debate' reflected the taking shape of two clearly demarcated political proposals.[116] Liberals blamed the lack of patriotism, the impact of Spanish rule, and, in particular, the influence of the Church for Mexico's failure. A case in point is Mariano Otero, who, while serving as minister of foreign and interior affairs, anonymously published his *Considerations*, in which he criticized the lack of civic virtues in the deeply divided society. Whereas the indigenous majority lived in a 'semi-savage level of existence', the small 'productive' proportion had little incentive to sacrifice itself for the motherland, while their 'unproductive' counterparts, army officers, the clergy, and bureaucrats, were merely interested in their own enrichment. Some foreign observers would claim that the Mexicans were '*an effeminate people, and as a degenerate race, would neither know how to govern nor to defend itself*'.[117] But nothing could be further from the truth: the Mexican people were defeated because they lacked national unity. Otero thus concludes that 'far from deserving the depreciation and mockery of other nations', Mexico could expect if not assistance than at least the sympathy of the world.[118]

By contrast, conservatives highlighted the civilizational merits of Spanish colonization and criticized liberals and federalists for having imposed a political system upon Mexico that was foreign to its customs and traditions. The result of this ignorance was self-inflicted anarchy. Historiography became once more the instrument of ideological propagation.

[115] Hale 1957, 153; 1968, 11; Florescano 2006, 276-281.
[116] Hale 1957, 153; Fowler 1998, 30.
[117] reprinted in Otero 1967 [1847], 99, emphasis in original.
[118] Ibid., quote on 100.

Lucas Alamán's *History of Mexico*, published in five-volumes between 1849 and 1852, was central in this regard.[119] As native of Guanajuato who, according to his own account, only barely survived Hidalgo's attack on the city in 1810 (in his view 'an uprising of the proletarian class against property and civilization'),[120] he established himself as Mexico's foremost conservative thinker and politician of his time. Alamán, as noted previously, was an early advocate of Spanish American solidarity. In his *History* he emphasized the importance of Iturbide's conservative revolution in achieving independence,[121] and contrasted the order and prosperity of the Bourbon period with the political chaos that followed with the fall of Iturbide and the end of the 'Three Guarantees'.[122]

> There are no Mexicans in Mexico, and looking at the country which has collapsed into infamy and decrepitude without ever having enjoyed more than a glimpse of the lushness of being juvenile or having shown any signs of life other than violent commotion, it would seem that there is every reason to agree with the great Bolívar that independence has been bought at the cost of all the assets that America possessed before.[123]

Mexico, in short, has not delivered upon its promise. In the end, disillusionment led Alamán to increasingly move towards embracing monarchism. The message struck a chord with his contemporary conservatives.[124] Already in 1840, José María Gutiérrez Estrada had published a provocative pamphlet in which he called for the establishment of a constitutional monarchy headed by a European prince, which 'was more suited to the character, customs and traditions of a people who had been governed by a monarch since

[119] Alamán 1849-1852.
[120] Cited in Hale 1968, 20.
[121] Ibid. 1957, 168.
[122] Brading 1985, 77.
[123] Alamán 1849-1852, quoted in Dunkerley 2000, 33.
[124] Hale 1957, 170.

the foundation of their society'.[125] 'I cannot see any other way of saving our nationality which is imminently threatened by the Anglo-Saxon race, which having moved to this continent, is disposed to invade it all'.[126] The idea became increasingly palpable to Mexico's conservatives. As Hale concludes, the debate between liberals and conservatives shaped a new generation of leaders, 'causing them to reconsider the present and future status of Mexico, and sharpened their convictions which were to provide the basis for action in the Great Reform of 1857'.[127]

What lessons can be drawn about Mexico's standing in international society at mid-nineteenth century? Political instability, financial hardship and military defeat undermined the confidence that Mexico's elites placed in the standing of their state. While early nineteenth-century conceptions were guided by notions of Mexico's stature (and, to a lesser extent, role), the question became increasingly framed in terms of its insufficient status as member in the community of 'civilized' states. The appropriation of civilizational rhetoric was not merely a reflection of the intellectual appeal of a European ideal, but, in important ways, was a response to the relegation of Mexico to a subordinate position within international society.

6. The Politics of Prestige: Mexico in the Late Nineteenth Century

In 1853, Santa Anna regained the presidency for the last time. Invested with dictatorial powers, the *caudillo* exiled the opposition and curtailed the autonomy of the states, which,

[125] Fowler 1998, 25, 69-71, quote on 70.
[126] Ibid., 71.
[127] Hale 1957, 161.

as in the past, triggered a regional revolt, this time led by Juan Alvarez, who ultimately forced Santa Anna into exile in 1855.[128] The Revolution of Ayutla brought a group of secular-minded liberals into power, who initiated the period known as the Reform. As minister of justice, Benito Juárez, a Zapotec Indian from the state of Oaxaca, curtailed the legal privileges of the clergy and the military; whereas the minister of finance, Miguel Lerdo de Tejada, abolished the landownership of corporate bodies, including the church and indigenous communities. The Juárez and Lerdo laws formed the centrepiece of the reforms that sparked rural revolts and antagonized conservatives in the country. The tensions were further accentuated with the proclamation of a new constitution in 1856, which was strongly opposed by the Church and eventually declared null and void by Pope Pius IX.[129] The result was the most destructive internecine war since independence. The Reform War erupted over a military coup and the arrest of Juárez who, as Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, was the constitutional successor to the presidency. Juárez, however, managed to escape and was declared president by the liberal faction. The liberals ultimately won the upper hand in this bitterly contested conflict, followed by the victory of Juárez in the general elections of March 1861.

Once in power, the Juárez government expelled a number of foreign envoys, including the Papal nuncio and the representative of Spain, and declared a two-year moratorium on the payment of Mexico's foreign debt. Both liberals and conservatives had contracted foreign loans during the civil war and confiscated foreign property, including the seizure of 600,000 dollars deposited at the British legation by the conservative government. The

[128] Fowler 2007, 311.
[129] Meyer, Sherman, and Deeds 2007, 334.

default triggered an alliance between Britain, France and Spain, who, in the Convention of London, agreed to a joint blockade and to seize the customhouse of Veracruz. However, once it became known that Napoleon III had more ambitious aims,[130] Britain and Spain withdrew. In 1864, France, in consultation with Mexican monarchists, installed Archduke Maximilian of Austria as emperor on the Mexican throne. The invasion was part of Napoleon III's assertive foreign policy that sought to strengthen France's position in Europe, drawing his country into two wars in Europe (the Crimean War against Russia and the Austro-Piedmontese War against Austria), which led to the expansion of French colonial rule in Southeast Asia and North Africa. The French invasion highlights the ambiguous standing that Mexico occupied in international society. Mexico was not regarded as open for European (re-)colonization, but that did not mean that Mexicans were regarded as fit for self-rule. The case was explicitly made by Napoleon's advisor, Michel Chevalier. Chevalier is more commonly known for having coined the notion of a distinctively *Latin* America in 1836.[131] Three decades later, he justified the intervention on the grounds of France's civilizational mission abroad, bringing order and European immigrants to Mexico, both of which were necessary to stop further US expansionism and the 'degradation of the Latin race on the other side ocean'.[132] The episode also directly pertains to questions of the status and legitimacy of the monarchy. With a Habsburg Emperor married to the daughter of the Belgian King Leopold I, Mexico finally had a prince from a prestigious and influential European dynasty. Although it is often thought that the monarchy was a French 'puppet regime', Maximillian was supported by

[130] On Napoleon's 'Grand Design' to convert the Spanish American republics into monarchies, Hanna and Hanna 1971, 3-9.
[131] Ardao 1980; McGuiness 2003; Mignolo 2005.
[132] Hanna and Hanna 1971, 66-68, 199, quote on 167.

conservatives in Mexico. Furthermore, he also pursued an independent foreign policy, actively seeking recognition from foreign powers, which he largely achieved between 1864 and 1866—with the important exception of the United States, which, embroiled in its own civil war, continued to recognize Juárez as legitimate president of Mexico.

It is interesting to consider the counterfactual of what would have happened if a Habsburg prince had been brought to Spanish America immediately after independence. Iturbide, after all, lacked both international legitimacy and a foreign army that would back his rule. In the 1860s, however, Maximilian faced two sets of problems that eventually brought down Mexico's Second Empire. In the first place, and despite the large-scale presence of French troops in the country, Mexico continued to be politically volatile. The *Juaristas* were tacitly supported by the US government in the North, and engaged the French expeditionary force in a costly counter-insurgency campaign. Nor did the condescending attitude of the French officers towards Mexicans, and the brutality with which they dealt with the insurgency, help to win the hearts and minds of the local population. The issuing of the so-called Black Decree of 1865, which ordered the immediate execution of rebels caught bearing arms, added further fuel to the fire and was later cited as the reason for Maximilian's death sentence. As the French commander-in-chief exclaimed, suppressing resistance was a 'war to the death, a struggle to the finish between barbarism and civilization'.[133] Mexicans did participate prominently in the imperial government, which, importantly, also included moderate liberals.[134] Whereas conservatives, the natural ally of the monarchy, first supported the emperor, they became increasingly disenchanted with

[133] Vanderwood 2000, 388; see also, Meyer, Sherman, and Deeds 2007, 344.
[134] See O'Gorman 1969; Pani 2002.

Maximilian's liberal views, especially with regard to the Reform laws that dealt with the Church.

While the imperial regime's legitimacy was called into question within the country, the international context turned increasingly unfavourable toward the second half of the 1860s. In the United States, the Civil War ended with a victory of the Union over the Confederacy. The US government had only protested when the French invasion occurred and remained (officially) neutral thereafter—while allowing Juárez's troops to procure arms and ammunition in the country.[135] With the threat of an alliance between Maximillian and the South removed, the United States put increasing pressure on France to withdraw its troops.[136] In Europe, Napoleon III was criticized domestically for the expensive military engagement in Mexico at the same time as Prussia emerged strengthened from its war with Austria in 1866. Bismarck, in turn, showed little sympathy for the Mexican Empire, which he allegedly regarded as a French mistake. The fact that Prussia only recognized the imperial government in 1866 seemingly irritated the Habsburg emperor, who initially only addressed the Prussian envoy in Spanish (which Anton von Magnus did not speak).[137] With France's decision to withdraw its troops prematurely in 1867, the empire soon faltered. Maximilian was captured by Juárez at Querétaro after a two-months siege, tried for treason, and, despite many pleas for mercy from European diplomats, executed on 19 June 1867.

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[135] Vázquez and Meyer 1995, 69.
[136] See Hanna and Hanna 1971; Ridley 1993; Vázquez and Meyer 1995, 70-71.
[137] Weber 1966, 56.

The regicide caused strong commotions in Europe and the United States, leading to the rupture of diplomatic ties with the Old World.[138] Emboldened by the victory over the French invasion that, according to Juárez, left Mexico 'stronger in the interior and more respected abroad', he declared that all political ties would be broken with those powers that had recognized Maximilian, unless they agreed to renegotiate existing treaties based on 'just and convenient conditions', and to the national treatment of their citizens, also known as the 'Juárez Doctrine'.[139] While emphasizing that it had not defaulted on its foreign debt, the Mexican government renounced all international treaties, which particularly affected British interests, some of which were protected by a diplomatic convention and were therefore not considered merely a private interest by Britain.[140] The further requirement that foreign powers had to request the negotiation of a new treaty was clearly intended as a form of status assertion, which, in effect, protracted the normalization of Mexican relations with Europe.[141] The British government, for instance, insisted that Mexico had to make the first move, but then decided to withdraw its diplomatic mission and close all British consulates. The posture of the Mexican government, Lord Stanley concluded, 'renders it no longer

[138] Reactions to the execution of Maximilian were mixed. In the United States, the Johnson government officially called for clemency, but continued to support Juárez. A strongly worded response came from the New York Times. Accordingly, the 'savage leaders of the Mexican horde' had placed themselves 'outside of the pale of civilization', foreseeing that Juárez would soon recur to the 'indiscriminate slaughter of foreigners and wholesale confiscation', 4 July 1867. Although the British public called for a more resolute response, Lord Stanley simply responded to the Commons that 'great as are our power and our influence, we are the Parliament of the United Kingdom, and not the Parliament of the world', HC Deb 11 July 1867, Vol 188, 1393-5, for further reactions, see The Times, 4 and 6 July. Reactions in France were similarly divided, where the opposition blamed Napoleon III for Maximilian's faith. The German press condemned the 'Indian Juárez' for his violence and vengefulness, see Pi-Suñer, Riguzzi, and Ruano 2011, 183-186. By contrast, Ridley, in line with his central thesis, suggests that the European public and governments understood the events as a triumph of US foreign policy, Ridley 1993, 272-286.
[139] See González 1966, vol. 1, 491-494, quote on 493; see also Cosio Villegas 1962.
[140] See Tischendorf 1961, 4; the case seems to have escaped Platt 1968.
[141] Italy and the North German Confederation in 1869 (because they were 'new', and hence exempted from the policy); Spain, 1871, Belgium and Portugal, 1879; France, 1880; Britain, 1884; and Austria-Hungary 1901, Cosio Villegas 1962, 544; Pi-Suñer, Riguzzi, and Ruano 2011, 161-181, 197. According to Riguzzi, the agreement signed with the German Empire after unification was the first treaty signed by Mexico which provided for the principle of national treatment, prohibiting diplomatic interventions, 1992, 374.

compatible with the dignity of Her Majesty's Government to keep up in Mexico even the semblance of a Diplomatic Mission.'[142] As during the times of Canning, Mexico had once more stepped out of its proper place.

It was only in the 1880s, facilitated by negotiations between bondholders and the Mexican government, and in the context of increasing commercial competition from the United States, that the Foreign Office decided that it was necessary to 'put our pride in our pockets', and approached the Mexican government in order to conclude a new commercial agreement (negotiated under the Gónzalez government and signed in 1884).[143] Status, in this case, had to be subordinated to more pragmatic concerns. As noted by the *Times*, Mexico, which was 'formerly a byword for reproach among civilized States' has finally demonstrated a desire to leave its troubled past behind by meeting its international obligations.[144] In Mexico, in turn, the proposal for the conversion of foreign debt sparked a heated public debated that linked the issue to the nation's honour.[145] Yet, overall, the episode ended with a successful status assertion on the part of Mexico. The French invasion was rationalized with the same civilizational rhetoric that Europeans also employed to relegate political communities in Africa, Asia, and the Middle East to an inferior standing. Mexican elites were aware of their subordinate status within international society, and actively sought to bolster the status of their state.

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142 Stanley to Middleton, 25 October 1867 in House of Commons 1868, 4-5, quote at 4.
143 Lyons to Tenterden, 8 March 1881, cited in Tischendorf 1961, 15; see also, Riguzzi 1992, 367.
144 The Times, 20 September 1883.
145 Piccato 2010, 100-128, in particular 126.

Porfiriato

The restoration of the republic, Mexico's 'second independence', heralded a period of profound change. The reforms that began during the governments of Juárez and Sebastían Lerdo de Tejeda gathered pace during the three-decade rule of Porfirio Díaz, also known in Mexican history as the Porfiriato. Díaz was a mestizo from Oaxaca who rose through the ranks of the army during the Reform War, and who attained national fame for his role during the Battle of Puebla against the French. Vaulting himself into power through a coup in 1876, Díaz ruled until he was forced into exile by the Mexican Revolution in 1911, only to be interrupted by the short interregnum of Manuel González (1880-1884). Under the positivist banner of 'order and progress', the Díaz's regime introduced obligatory primary education, reorganized the country's finances, and promoted large-scale infrastructure works, such as the improvement of port facilities and, importantly, the expansion of Mexico's railroad network. Mexico underwent a prolonged period of rapid economic growth, especially in the first half of the Porfiriato, which opened the country to world markets and tied Mexico economically to the United States. The attraction of foreign investment was crucial. The inflow of US (and, to a lesser extent, British and German) capital led to the recovery of the mining sector and transformed Mexico into one of the world's largest oil producers by the turn of the century. The economic achievements were notable, and by 1894 government revenues outstripped public spending for the first time in Mexico's independent history.[146]

From the perspective of the governing elite, 'progress' was not possible without 'order'. While maintaining the appearance of constitutional rule, the relative stability of the *Pax*

[146] Meyer, Sherman, and Deeds 2007, 384.

Porfiriana was achieved through a mix of repression and intimidation and by co-opting regional elites into an expansive web of patronage, which rewarded loyalty with positions of power and economic opportunity. However, whereas the small elite and foreign investors benefited from the reforms, the costs of economic growth were borne by the largely indigenous peasantry, especially following the land reform laws of 1883 that led to an increasing concentration of land ownership and a further encroachment upon communal lands that began with the Reform laws. The Porfirian peace was heavy-handily imposed on the countryside by the *rurales*, a mounted police force, and by dispatching federal troops to subdue the rebellious Mayans and to 'pacify' of the northern frontier. A particularly ominous episode was the military campaign against the Yaquis of the state of Sonora, many of whom were deported to work as indentured labourers on the henequen plantations of the Yucatán.[147]

As in the Argentine case, the existence of autonomous indigenous communities became regarded as an obstacle to the formation of a consolidated nation-state by the late nineteenth century.[148] As a consequence, as Knight maintains, the 'large-scale Indian wars—integral parts of the Porfirian state-building project—were carried out with all the operational and ideological panoply of U.S. and Argentine frontier expansion'.[149] The ideological underpinnings of the Porfiriato have received much attention, especially with regard to the small group of technocratic advisors to Díaz, known as the *cientificos* who, inspired by European positivism and social Darwinism, engineered Mexico's economic, political, and

[147] The misery of the common people, Turner wrote in *Barbarous Mexico*, published at the onset of the Mexican Revolution, would 'provoke a raucous laugh at the solemn declarations of certain individuals that Mexico has a civilized government', 1969 [1911], 128.
[148] Mallon 2011, 289, 294.
[149] Knight 1990, 79.

social transformation.[150] Even Hale, who questions the influence of social Darwinism and biological determinism in particular, admits that late-nineteenth century Mexican elites perceived rural revolts as 'attacks upon property and the established social order by culturally segregated, racially distinct, and "uncivilized" peoples'.[151] There is little doubt, then, about their elitist view on Mexican society, and disregard for the indigenous population.

But whereas in the Southern Cone, the 'Indian question' was resolved through military conquest, the picture was more complex in Mexico.[152] The governing elite sought to integrate the majority of indigenous people through acculturation, partly based on European civilizational ideals (especially apparent in education), but also on the notion of *mestizaje*, which emphasized the positive aspects of racial and cultural miscegenation. The exaltation of racial-mixing became an official ideology of post-revolutionary Mexico, as advanced by Manuel Gamio, and epitomized by José Vasconcelos's *The Cosmic Race*.[153] Having important intellectual predecessors, such as Mier and Bustamente in the early nineteenth century, however, racial-mixing as a foundation of the Mexican nation had already become a dominant political narrative following the liberal victory in 1867.[154] During the Porfiriato, this integrationist view was officially sanctioned with the publication of Vicente Riva Palacio's monumental history of Mexico and, importantly, Justo Sierra's *The Political Evolution of the Mexican People.*[155] Sierra was a distinguished politician and Mexico's

[150] In particular, Zea 1944; Hale 1989; for a more recent survey, see, Lomnitz 2008.
[151] Hale 1989, 224-225.
[152] See, Mallon 2011.
[153] For recent discussion of Vasconcelos as proponent of the 'synthetic paradigm of race' in Latin American thought, see von Vacano 2012; for a more critical reading, see Knight 1990.
[154] Hale 1989.
[155] Riva Palacio 1884-1889; Sierra 1969 [1900-1902].

foremost intellectual of the Porfiriato. Drawing on Riva Palacio, Sierra developed an ideological justification of the regime, which he portrayed as an indispensable step in the evolutionary process of Mexico towards political maturation. The connection between overcoming political instability and improving Mexico's international standing is made explicit by Sierra: whereas independence from Spain gave Mexico 'national personality', the Reforma provided the country with 'social personality'; Díaz, however brought peace, 'which gave life to our international personality'.[156] Understood in these terms, it is a response to the 'degeneration thesis' and the relegation of Mexico to a subordinate place within the family of 'civilized' states. Although Sierra subscribed to the idea that the Mexican people were the result of a centuries-long mixing of two races, he shared the view of other *científicos* who regarded European immigration as necessary 'so as to obtain a cross with the indigenous race, for only European blood can keep the level of civilization [...] from sinking, which would mean regression, not evolution.'[157] As Loveman's survey of census politics in Latin America illustrates, *mestizaje* could also take the form of a statistical 'whitening' as in Argentine and Brazil during the same period, when official reports emphasized the change of the population to gradually become a 'whiter' race.[158] Hence, neither Sierra nor the post-revolutionary ideologues of miscegenation could fully escape the notion that same races were superior to others.[159] Mexico, however, attracted only a small number of immigrants from the Old World.[160] However, similar to Argentina, where the large-scale immigration from Southern Europe led to a revalorization of its

[156] 1969 [1900-1902], 365.
[157] Cited in Knight 1990, 78.
[158] Loveman 2013, 351.
[159] Knight 1990, 87-98.
[160] By the time the Mexican Revolution broke out, there only about 120,000 foreign-born residents in the country, Hale 1989, 237, far below the number of foreigners, especially Europeans that went to Argentina and Brazil; see also Yankelevich 2012.

Hispanic past, the reversal of racial stereotypes can be interpreted as a form of status management through 'social creativity' where negative traits are redefined in positive terms.[161] In other words, what Knight terms the 'cult of the mestizo' not only served as integrative political myth, but was also a way of dealing with racial theories that questioned the ability of Mexican to self-rule, and according to which Mexico was determined to occupy a lower rank in hierarchy of states.[162] It is important to keep the international intellectual context in mind. After all, this was the time when Lorimer developed his tripartite theory of recognition that relegated non-white peoples to a subordinate place in the world.

An important aspect of the Porfiriato was the projection of an image of Mexico abroad as orderly, progressive, and, to an important extent, 'civilized'. The politics of prestige, or status assertion, was therefore remarkably similar to the foreign policies pursued by Argentina and Brazil at the time—even if somewhat different in form. As part of this image campaign, Mexico City was remodelled on a Parisian template similar to the architectural changes that Buenos Aires and Rio de Janeiro also underwent during this time. The *Paseo de la Reforma*, the capital's principal thoroughfare that was originally built during Maximilian's empire as Mexico's *Champs-Élysées*, was completed by Díaz and transformed into a national pantheon dedicated to the country's Hispanic and indigenous past, the heroes of independence, and his comrade-in-arms of the Reforma. Similar syncretist accounts of the county were presented during the pompous centenary celebrations and at the Paris World Exhibition of 1889. According Tenorio-Trillo, the

[161] Tajfel and Turner 1979, 43.
[162] Knight 1990, 85.

Mexican pavilion, built in the style of an Aztec temple, was intended as a display of the country's recent civilizational achievements and to correct the reputation of Mexico as violent and inherently unruly, highlighting its glorious past and potential to attract European immigrants and capital.[163] 'Mexico's past thereby obtained a distinctively Mexican coherence and logic, but with a modern, progressive, and evolutionist structure that was easily recognized and understood by modern European standards'.[164] Mexico, as Tenorio-Trillo concludes, 'sought to join modern civilized times in a twofold manner: by catching up with European concerns and prejudices; and by conducting an intricate explanation—made possible by the constant catching up—of their own potential and fitness for joining previous civilization'.[165] The message of this form of status management was clear: Mexico should finally be regarded as member of the family of 'civilized' states.

The assertion of Mexico's status also played a role in the country's foreign relations. The adherence to the 'Juárez Doctrine' implied that Mexico was diplomatically isolated from Europe throughout the 1870s, and, in the case of Mexico's relations with Britain, until the mid-1880s.[166] Cut off from the financial markets in London and Paris, the Mexican government strengthened its ties with the United States, while relations with South America remained secondary at best. The highpoint of this 'liberal understanding' was reached in 1898 when the Mexican legation in Washington was upgraded to the rank of an embassy (the first for a Latin American state), while its few envoys in Europe remained at the ranks

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[163] Tenorio-Trillo 1996, 36.
[164] Ibid.
[165] Ibid., 95.
[166] Riguzzi; on the rivalry between Britain, Germany and the United States, see also, Tischendorf 1961; Katz 1981.

of minister plenipotentiary and minister resident.[167] Mexico did, however, participate at the First Hague Peace Conference of 1899, as the only representative from Latin America after Brazil had refused to attend.[168] Furthermore, on the suggestion of the United States, and following a vote by the Latin American envoys accredited at Washington, Mexico was chosen to host the Second Inter-American Conference. For Mecham, the decision was a clear 'recognition of the lofty status that Mexico had attained in international opinion'.[169] At the conference, it was decided to incorporate the Hague conventions into 'American international law', and to authorize the United States and Mexico to negotiate with the mostly European signatories the adherence of Latin American states to the Convention for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes. [170] Finnemore and others have rightly emphasized the importance of the Hague Conferences in the evolution of international society, both in terms of normatively sanctioning the use of force,[171] and breaking down the stark hierarchies of the European-dominated international order of the late nineteenth century.[172] Mexico acted in close coordination with the United States as intermediary, using its newly increased standing to facilitate the accession of Latin America to the Second Hague Conference.[173] In other words, it projected a certain role abroad.

[167] Riguzzi 1992, 406; Vázquez and Meyer 1995, 84.
[168] Consequently, research on Latin America at the Hague concentrate on the second conferences, see Lapradelle and Stowell 1908; Scott 1920-1921; Finnemore 2003, 24-51; Finnemore and Jurkovich 2014.
[169] Mecham 1961, 58.
[170] Álvarez 1909, 331; Wilgus 1931; Mecham 1961, 60; Boyle 1999, 109-110.
[171] Finnemore 2003.
[172] Finnemore and Jurkovich 2014.
[173] The intermediary role becomes even more apparent in the context of the Second Hague Conference. On the one hand, Mexico, in line with its aim of attracting foreign investment, opposed the Drago Doctrine in favour of the US proposal (the 'Porter Convention). On the other hand, it joined Brazil's Ruy Barbosa in insisting on the equality of states, Hull 1908, 425; Lapradelle and Stowell 1908, 275; Simpson 2004, 136-147.

Given the degree of economic dependence on the US market established during this period, critics of the regime tend to portray Díaz and his advisors as Washington's lackeys, who sold out the country for the benefit of the few. Yet Díaz's foreign policy was more complicated than this suggests. Towards the end of the nineteenth-century, the United States took an increasingly interventionist stance towards Latin American affairs, particularly in its immediate vicinity, successively extending the meaning of the Monroe Doctrine.[174] A turning point was reached in 1895-1896, when the United States forced Britain to submit a territorial dispute with Venezuela to arbitration, which is generally regarded as Britain's tacit acquiescence to a US sphere of influence in the 'Circum-Caribbean', a further step after the conclusion of the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty of 1850.[175] As Secretary of State Richard Olney famously declared: 'the United States is practically sovereign on this continent, and its fiat is law upon the subjects to which it confines its interposition'.[176] Yet Díaz's posture towards the United States was rather ambiguous and by no means submissive.[177] Although Mexico would avoid open confrontation with the northern hegemon, for instance by enforcing strict neutrality during the Spanish-American War,[178] the regime was concerned about the increasing penetration of Mexico by US interests. The response was twofold. First, following the rapprochement with Europe, Mexico attempted to diversify its relations by signing treaties of friendship and commerce with European powers, and including Japan. Díaz sought to multilateralize the Monroe Doctrine as part of the public law of the Americas, even though he did not promote the idea

[174] See Perkins 1927; Gilderhus 2006; Sexton 2011; Scarfi 2014.
[175] Smith 1996, 32-34; Schoultz 1998, 119-120; Atkins 1999, 150.
[176] Olney to Bayard, 20 July 1895, cited in Schoultz 1998, 115.
[177] Garner 2001, 142-145.
[178] See Gilmore 1963.

as vigorously as his South American counterparts in Argentina.[179] The regime also projected its leadership across Central America, a group of states that ceded from Mexico in 1823 and which Mexican elites regarded as 'backward but culturally similar'.[180] Like the *porteño* elite in the River Plate, Mexico's ruling class regarded the independent states that were formally part of larger viceroyalty as renegade provinces. Despite the vast difference in material capabilities, the Díaz regime, particularly with Ignacio Mariscal as foreign minister (who was also foreign minister during negotiation of British treaty), pursued an independent foreign policy. It is furthermore noteworthy that the period of Mexico balance-of-power politics coincides with a similar moment of *realpolitik* in Argentina and Brazil. While the Southern Cone arms race of the late-nineteenth century, in particular, has been explained by the existence of geopolitical pressures and the influence of European military missions,[181] the fact that similar considerations guided policy-making in Mexico (which did not receive European military missions) demonstrates that this was not unique to the South American 'subsystem',[182] but a more general feature of the late nineteenth-century. Mexico's relations with the United States did not turn sour because Mexico was searching for a counter-weight against Washington's influence, but relations became strained because Mexico was balancing off the United States. Balance-of-power politics is not necessarily the result of material forces, but, importantly, depends on agents' perceptions of such conduct as 'normal' and appropriate.

[179] See González 1966, vol. 2, 461-472, at 463; see also, Riguzzi 1992, 413; Buchenau 1996, 42-43.
[180] On Mexico's Central American policy under Díaz see, Cosío Villegas 1960; Mares 1988, 89-94; Buchenau 1996.
[181] For instance, Resende-Santos 1996; 2007.
[182] Atkins, in fact, treats Mexico as its own subsystem detached from the processes of the larger hemispheric system due to its size and proximity to the United States, 1999, 33.

Second, although counterbalancing the United States became an important goal of Mexican foreign policy during the second half of the Porfiriato, status concerns were by no means muted. Furthermore, starting with a treaty with the German Empire in 1880,[183] the commercial treaties that Mexico signed during this period were explicitly based on strict equality and, following Juárez's policy and in line with Argentina's Calvo Doctrine, the principle of national treatment. Although the policy is generally attributed to the post-revolutionary Carranza government,[184] this indicates that the promotion of sovereign equality and non-intervention had already begun during Diaz's rule. The relevance of these treaties for negotiating Mexico's standing in international society becomes particularly apparent in the treaty signed with Japan. The Treaty of Commerce, Friendship, and Navigation of 1888 was the first agreement concluded by Japan with a non-Asian power based on the recognition of equality, and which permitted Mexican nationals to live, work, and travel freely in the country, a privilege that Japan did not grant to any of the treaty port powers. For Japan, then, the treaty was regarded as a stepping stone for revising the 'unequal treaties' with Europe and the United States.[185] For Mexico it was not only a means of diversifying its commercial relations, but a way of asserting its status among states.

7. Conclusion

Mexico's experience with nineteenth-century international society suggests that 'membership' was not limited to the question of whether a state was recognized diplomatically or not. In fact, the negotiations leading to the recognition of Mexico indicate

[183] Riguzzi 1992, 374.
[184] See Gilderhus 1977.
[185] Kunimoto 2009, 92.

that actors had considerable disagreement about which acts produced particular effects and the extent of those effects. Some of this ambiguity was deliberate, as in the case of Britain's policy in the early 1820s, which attempted to address the concerns of its domestic constituency, while avoiding an open break with Spain and the legitimist powers of the Holy Alliance. By contrast, the United States extended recognition, at first, through a presidential declaration in Congress, which, from the perspective of the Mexican government, was insufficient. Hence, even a seemingly discreet act, such as the diplomatic recognition of a state, presents some problems for identifying the precise moment at which a state was regarded as recognized and, by extension, an unquestionable member of international society.

More importantly, the Mexican case demonstrates the inadequacy of understanding the historical evolution of international society in terms of a gradual 'expansion', during which new members were admitted through diplomatic recognition. The recognition of a state matters in the sense that it normalizes its relations with other states, thereby opening channels of communication and regularizing the conduct of state agents under the rules and norms of international society. In this sense, it clearly mattered to Mexico and the other actors involved. The important point, however, is that the question of the standing of states does not end here. The lesson that can be drawn from the Mexican case study is that recognition should be considered as the beginning of an inquiry into the standing of states. International society was a hierarchical international order. Whereas expectations about the future prospect where high at the onset of independence, by the mid-nineteenth century foreign observers called into question the status of Mexico as fully-fledged member in the community of 'civilized' states.

It has been suggested that the political relevance of international hierarchy not only depends on how a state is perceived from the outside (for instance, on what rank it is ascribed by other states), but from within the state itself. To make sense of these perceptions, the approach adopted here distinguishes between three ideal types: stature, role, and status. Stature perception played an important role in the first half of Mexico's independent statehood, rooted in the expectation that Mexico would become a wealthy and powerful state. The result, as has been shown, was a self-confident position vis-á-vis established states, including the principal powers of the time. Mexican elites were balancing the powers off each other because they perceived the standing of their state as largely determined by its stature. Role is the more difficult conception of standing, referring to the differentiation of functions among states. Although at that point not an independence state, in the Mexican case, role conceptions can be clearly identified during the negotiation with Spain over greater autonomy from the European metropolis. Unlike in the case of the River Plate, however, the denial of the creole bid for self-rule did not provoked the creole elite of New Spain to proclaim independence until the 'conservative revolution' of 1821. Ideas about the role that Mexico should play in international politics became further important in the regional context, as Mexican elites, most importantly Lucas Alamán, attempted to assume to role of a Spanish American leader.

However, the political instability that brought with it bankruptcy and foreign interventions, including the loss of a substantive part of the nation's territory, shattered the stature conception that was widespread among Mexican elite until the mid-nineteenth century. They also ended Mexico's leadership ambitions, which suggests, that, at least in the

Mexican case, role was indeed related to stature. It is important to keep in mind that the three dimensions of international stratification are ideal-types that, as real world phenomena, tend to occur as mixed forms. However, the point warrants closer examination in future.

What the case study does suggest is that the intellectual crisis following the Mexican-American War led to a conceptual shift in the understanding of the inherent defects of the country and, as a consequence, of its standing among states. Status became the dominant conception that guided the way in which Mexican elites thought about and dealt with the place of Mexico within the society of 'civilized' states. Status management as 'logic of social action' is apparent in Juaréz's denunciation of international treaties and the suspension of diplomatic relations with state that had recognized the Maximilian I as Mexican Emperor. It was also evident in the politics of prestige during the Díaz regime, which co-existed with balance of power concerns, explicitly framed in order to be recognized as member of the family of civilized states. Lastly, the argument was made that the exaltation of *mestizaje* can be interpreted as form of status assertion. Mexican elites, in sum, were concerned about the standing of their state and acted accordingly in order to bolster the position of their country within international society.

CHAPTER 6

ORDER AND PROGRESS: BRAZIL'S STANDING IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY

1. Introduction

The following chapter examines the standing of Brazil in nineteenth-century international society. At first glance, the 'South American giant' stands apart from its Spanish American neighbours. Portuguese colonialism set present-day Brazil on a different trajectory in terms of its language, culture, and political and social institutions. For some, these differences imply that Brazil not only stands apart from its neighbours, but is altogether separate from Latin America. Bethell, for instance, points out that Brazilian elites have had relatively few relations with their Spanish American counterparts: unlike the creole elites of Spanish America, who closely interacted among each other, entertained common political projects, and engaged in intellectual exchanges, Brazilians generally did not identify themselves as part of the same culture-area, and, quite often, tended to regard their country as superior to the Spanish American *republiquetas*.[1] This difference in terms the country's self-perceived status has historically been complemented by a particular understanding of Brazil's stature and role in the region. Already during the independence period, but particularly in the late-nineteenth century, Brazil attempted to achieve regional supremacy, especially with regard

[1] Bethell 2010a.

to the Amazon and River Plate basins. Stature concerns became manifest in a policy of territorial expansion, and in balance-of-power politics towards Argentina, which emerged as the more dynamic and prosperous rival at the end of the nineteenth century. Role thinking, which features prominently in twentieth century Brazilian international thought—in terms of Brazil's position within the international division of labour, and in terms of Brazil's ambitions as a leader of the 'Global South'—however, was subordinate to concerns about the country's prestige and power during much of the time under considerations.

The contrast between Brazil and its Spanish American neighbours should not conceal the fact that Spanish America itself is a highly heterogeneous group of states, whose elites tended to pursue different political aims, despite the recurrent appeals to Spanish American unity—a common practice that has remained remarkably resilient over time.

In fact, although Brazil differs in many aspects from Argentina and Mexico, there are also important commonalities, and Brazilians quite often responded to the same external events and influences in similar ways. With regard to Brazil's standing in nineteenth-century international society, it is noteworthy that, despite being a monarchy headed by a European dynasty, and despite the relative stability of nineteenth-century Brazil, Europeans often had negative views about the country. Brazilian elites, in turn, were aware of these ambiguities, which explains their concern for gaining substantive recognition in the community of 'civilized' states. Hence, rather than thinking of Brazil as a case apart, Brazil's international standing is best understood as a variation of a common theme: the new states of Latin

America were recognized diplomatically, but were not immediately accepted as fully-fledged members of nineteenth-century international society.

The preservation of Braganza rule facilitated diplomatic recognition from European powers and provided the new regime with legitimacy that the Spanish American republics often lacked in the eyes of foreign observers and domestic contenders. As a result, Brazil avoided the territorial fragmentation and protracted internecine wars that Spanish America underwent in the first decades of independence. Political stability, in turn, allowed the young empire to meet its international obligations—first and foremost the protection of the life and property of foreign nationals, and the serving of its sovereign debt—which bolstered its international status and the self-perception of Brazil's elites that the country stood aloof of its anarchic and 'barbarous' Spanish American neighbours.

At the same time, however, the continuity that marked Brazilian emancipation from Portugal led to the preservation of 'British pre-eminence'.[2] In contrast to the Spanish American cases discussed above, early relations between Brazil and Britain were indeed defined by an 'unequal treaty' that granted a preferential tariff to the Europeans and recognized the institution of a conservational court of cases involving British citizens. The effects of the treaty of 1827 were not limited to Anglo-Brazilian relations, as other powers laid claim to similar privileges that exempted their nationals from Brazilian jurisdiction. Paradoxically, then, Brazil was the only Latin American country that became independent

[2] Manchester 1933.

in the early nineteenth century[3] in which a foreign power enjoyed limited territorial jurisdiction, which, according to the orthodox English School account, was an international stigmata: an attribute of those states that formally preserved their independence, but were not regarded as members of international society, such as of the Ottoman Empire and the ancient Asian states of China, Japan, and Siam.

The case study demonstrates that elites were conscious about this 'anomaly' and its implications for Brazil's 'standing' in the community of 'civilized' states. Although pursuing a balance of power within the region, the policy of the Brazilian empire towards international society was dominated by concerns about their ambiguous status. Hence, the attempts during Peter II's rule to construct an image of the Brazilian empire as a 'Tropical Versailles' that brought (European) civilization to the (American) tropics—and this despite its dependence on African slaves.[4]

After the Civil War in the United States and the abolition of slavery in Cuba in 1886, Brazil was the last country of the Western Hemisphere where the institution remained legal. Slavery had far-reaching implications for Brazil's international standing. For one, the continuation of the slave trade pitted the South American empire against Britain's Royal Navy, which began to suppress the slave trade within Brazilian waters after 1845, leaving the imperial government little choice but to end the 'abominable trade'. Brazil emerged as a consolidated state by the mid-nineteenth century. Yet the country's elite continued to ponder the 'standing' of their state. Opponents to slavery had long criticized the forced

[3] Note that the United States acquired special privileges as a result of Cuba's (1898) and Panama's (1903) independence.
[4] The notion goes back to Oliveira Lima, see Schultz 2001, 1.

importation of Africans and the impact this would have for Brazil's reputation abroad, as well as its prospects for attracting European immigrations. These views are most clearly expressed in the work of Joaquim Nabuco, one of Brazil's most important intellectual and political leaders, who was appointed ambassador to the United States in 1905. Similar to the Argentine and Mexican cases, with the rise of Social Darwinism and race science in the second half of the nineteenth century, the debate was increasingly framed in racial terms, as elites were concerned that the significant African element in Brazil's society would undermine its status as 'civilized' state. The issue also arose during the bloody war against Paraguay, which Brazilian elites—in tune with their Argentine counterparts—presented in terms of a clash between civilization and barbarism. As elaborated below, the war acted as catalyst for change in Brazil, contributing to the end of slavery in 1888 and the downfall of the Empire a year later.

The proclamation of the first republic was accompanied by a reorientation of Brazilian foreign policy towards the region. Republican Brazil became more actively involved in hemispheric affairs and, as Burns maintains, Brazil entered into an 'unwritten alliance' with the United States.[5] Balance-of-power concerns dominated Brazil's approach towards Spanish America, whereas its support for Roosevelt's 'police power' in the Western Hemisphere clearly alludes to a role conception, as a partner in a US-Brazilian condominium to ensure that Latin Americans would meet their international obligations. Yet status remains crucial for understanding how Brazilian elites thought about the country's position vis-á-vis Europe and, consequently, international society more broadly. This interpretation also sheds light on Brazil's insistence on strict sovereign equality at the

[5] Burns 1966.

Second Hague Conference, a landmark event in the evolution of international society, as Latin American states participated for the first time in a European conference. Brazil, once again, is yet another case that illustrates the difficulties that Latin Americans encountered after officially entering the community of states: they were formally regarded as members, but not necessarily treated as such by the 'core' of international society.

2. Colonial Antecedents

Portugal played a central role in the first stages of European overseas expansion, starting with the capture of Ceuta in 1415. Closely following Spain, and only two years after Vasco da Gama discovered the sea route to India for the Europeans, Pedro Álvares Cabral reached the shores of South America, marking the beginning of Portuguese colonization of the New World. In order to mediate between competing Spanish and Portuguese claims, Pope Alexander VI issued the *inter ceatera*: a papal bull that divided the non-Christian world between the two crowns. An imaginary line was drawn at 100 leagues (about 500km) west of the Azores and Cape Verde Islands, awarding all newly discovered land west of that meridian to Spain.[6] In the treaty of Tordesillas (1494), the two Crowns then agreed to a new demarcation line that was more favourable to the Portuguese. While unaware of the true extension of the continent, the treaty granted the eastern tip of South America to Portugal, from the mouth of the Amazon River to a point close to present-day São Paulo. In the following centuries, Portuguese adventurers, in search of gold, diamonds, and slaves, continuously pushed the frontier deeper into the interior and far beyond the Tordesillas line.

[6] Protestant Europe did not recognize the validity of the accord. The French were expelled from southern Brazil, leading to the establishment of Rio de Janeiro in 1565. The Dutch took advantage of the weakened position of Portugal during the Iberian Union and occupied Brazil's sugar producing region in the northeast from 1630 to 1654.

The new situation was recognized in the treaties of Madrid (1750) and San Ildefonso (1777), which legitimized Portugal's possessions in the Amazon and Spain's control over the east bank of the River Plate.

Luso-Brazilian expansion continued in the nineteenth-century, putting independent Brazil at odds with its Spanish American neighbours, who based their claims on the principle of *uti possidetis juris* rather than the right of occupation.[7] A focal point was the Banda Oriental (or Cisplatine province as it is known in Brazil), which was under Luso-Brazilian occupation between 1815 and 1822, and which became independent Uruguay in 1828. The consolidation of Brazil's boundaries to encompass almost half of South America was the highpoint of the career of the Baron of Rio Branco, the celebrated founding father of Brazilian diplomacy. However, the fact that Brazil would eventually emerge as a South American giant was not a foregone conclusion.

In its beginnings, the colony played only a minor role within the Portuguese empire of forts and trading posts. Luso-America was a source of brazilwood, a highly valued source of red dye that gave Brazil its name, which only grew in importance with the rise of sugar cane cultivation in the northeast. The effects that the sugar plantations had on Brazilian history cannot be underestimated. Following the collapse and dispersion of the indigenous population, Portugal began large-scale importation of slaves from Africa—more than any other European colony in the New World.[8] Although the profitability of Brazilian sugar

[7] Note that only *uti possidetis de facto* was derived from Roman law. By contrast, *uti possidentis juris* was a Spanish American legal innovation. On the contrasting interpretations between Spanish Americans and Brazilians, see Parodi 2002, 5-8; Kacowicz 2005, 77.
[8] Schwartz 1985, 436-441; Skidmore 1999, 17.

declined in the seventeenth century due to competition from the Caribbean, the slave trade continued until the 1850s. Slavery also created a highly hierarchal and racially stratified colonial society. Unlike in the United States, where the codification of the 'one drop rule' has historically inhibited racial miscegenation, racial boundaries in Brazil (as in Spanish America) were less absolute. This led to a substantive population of free people black people, while the socially constructed nature of 'race' allowed for a limited degree of social mobility for mixed-raced *mulattos.* Yet slavery in Brazil was not as 'humane' as the proponents of 'racial democracy' would have it.[9] Low reproduction and high mortality on the plantations meant that Brazil relied on the trafficking of humans throughout the colonial period and well into the nineteenth-century.

The discovery of diamonds and gold in the late seventeenth century led to a mining boom, which shifted power within the colony from the sugar-producing northeast to the south, with Rio de Janeiro becoming the capital of the Viceroyalty of Brazil in 1763, a change that was further entrenched with the growth of coffee cultivation from the mid-nineteenth century. The inflow of bullion from Brazil added substantially to the temporary restoration of Portugal's standing among European powers, and allowed the metropolis to finance its trade deficit with England.[10]

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[9] The most important being Freyre 1946 [1933].
[10] Boxer 1969, 457-458.

Portugal's 'unequal treaties'

The special relations between England and Portugal are important for understanding Britain's pre-eminence in nineteenth-century Brazil.[11] Threatened by its larger Iberian neighbour, the Portuguese Crown ceded commercial privileges to the 'English factory' in a series of bilateral treaties. The best-known examples are the Methuen treaties of 1703, which provided for preferential access of English (after 1707 'British') textiles to the Portuguese market, and of Portuguese wine to Britain.[12] While these treaties were principally concerned with establishing a strategic and commercial alliance against Spain, they also created and, in fact continuously strengthened, the legal exemptions that were granted to British subjects residing in Portugal, and this at the time when similar arrangements were increasingly abolished elsewhere in the relations between European sovereigns (but, as the English School explains, not in the relations between European and non-European rulers).

Particularly obnoxious for the Portuguese was the Office of the Judge Conservator: a limited form of extraterritorial jurisdiction that exempted English subjects from Portuguese laws, which was officially sanctioned in 1654—arguably the 'most pernicious [treaty] that had ever been made with a crowned head'—and later established to Brazil in the treaties of

[11] Manchester 1933.
[12] English merchants enjoyed a special legal status in Portugal since the fourteenth century, with the first special judge appointed in 1367, Shaw 1998, 6, 82. According to Walford 1940, 43-44, the last payment to the judge conservator was made by the factory of Lisbon in 1848. In addition to the treaties of 1703, this includes the treaties of 1642, 1654, and the marriage treaty of John's daughter, Catherine, and Charles II of 1661, which transferred Bombay and Tangiers as dowry to the English. Other powers follows suit: A Dutch judge conservator was sanctioned in 1661, and subsequently extended to France with reference to the English and Dutch treaties in 1667, see Parry 1969, vol. 10, 15.

1810 (with Portugal) and 1827 (with Brazil).[13] As Manchester contends, the treaties of the seventeenth century converted Portugal into a 'commercial vassal' of Britain, and laid the foundation of the latter's pre-eminence in nineteenth-century Brazil. Boxer concurs: the treaties 'gave British subjects in Portugal a privileged position, legally, financially and commercially, in many ways analogous to that enjoyed by Westerners in the Treaty Ports of China between 1840 and 1940'.[14] Indeed, the treaty provisions are remarkably similar to those of the 'unequal treaties', including restrictions on tariff autonomy, the recognition of extraterritorial jurisdiction, and the most favoured nation principle—even if the similarity is one of kind rather than scope. Hence, at a time when European princes allegedly instituted sovereign equality as a pillar of European international society, Portugal was obliged to conclude 'unequal treaties' with England. Sovereign equality was a principle but not a practice of (European) international society.

As in Bourbon Spain, the Portuguese Crown embarked on 'enlightened reforms' that sought to strengthen the country's position in Europe through far-reaching administrative and fiscal reforms. Because Portugal's economic revitalization relied overwhelmingly on the re-export of Brazilian produce, the metropolis became economically tied to Britain and

[13] Marquis d'Abrantes, cited in Boxer 1969, 335. Although the practice of a special court for English merchants had long existed in Portugal, the treaty of 1654, established the right of the English citizens to a conservator, 'for the judging [of] causes relating to the people of the republic' (art. VII), see Lodge 1933, 215; Parry 1969, vol. 3, 281-302. Not being a member of the English resident community, the conservator was a Portuguese judge paid by the factory. He acted as a first instance for all causes and disputes concerning English citizens, regardless of whether they were part of the factory or not. Moreover, the treaty stipulated that no English subject could be apprehended without the written permission of the judge conservator, except in cases when caught *in flagrante delicto* (art. IX).
[14] Academia das Ciências de Lisboa. 1979, 9.

effectively dependent on its American colony.[15] Consequently, one aim of the 'enlightened reforms' under Pombal was the circumvention of Portugal's treaty obligations, which was partly achieved through the expansion of Crown monopolies and the creation of trading companies with their own courts whose rulings took precedence over the decisions of foreign magistrates.[16] The transfer of the Portuguese court during the Napoleonic Wars provided Britain with the opportunity to restore the *status quo ante*, which is how extraterritoriality came to Brazil. The discussion of extraterritoriality in Brazil is important because it is a powerful illustration of the hierarchical nature of nineteenth-century international society. Far from being equal, Portugal and, as a consequence, Brazil were subordinate states: a difference that was the result of unequal treaty relations between presumably 'Western' states.

3. The Transfer of the Portuguese Crown

Fearing a French invasion and under pressure from the British, the Portuguese court was evacuated to Rio de Janeiro in late 1807. Taking account of the new situation, Brazil was declared a co-equal part of the United Kingdom of Portugal, Brazil, and the Algarves, and placed on an equal footing with Portugal in 1815. However, when the Portuguese *Côrtes* attempted to revert its status back to that of a colony, the Brazilians opted for preserving self-rule, declaring independence in 1822. As in Spanish America, the Napoleonic Wars undermined the colonial pact. Yet the South Americans did not radically break with their

[15] Skidmore 1999, 31. Although Portugal did not attempt to exclude Luso-Brazilians from government as systematically as its Spanish counterpart, the reforms and the spread of Enlightenment ideas provoked similar political discontent, evidenced by the number of conspiracies and local revolts, most importantly in Minas Gerais in 1789, and Pernambuco in 1817. As da Costa maintains, Pombal's reforms made elites in the colony aware of the diverging interest with the metropolis. Yet, similar to the case of Spanish America, the Brazilian sense of belonging was local rather than national, 2000, 4.
[16] Boxer 1969, 181; Shaw 1998, 91-92.

past. The constitutional ties with Portugal were cut, but the rule of the House of Braganza was preserved with the proclamation of Peter I as Emperor of Brazil.

The conventional English School view discussed in Chapter 2 suggests that the particular circumstances of Brazilian independence facilitated its incorporation into international society as an equal member. Watson, for instance, posits that dynastic legitimacy and Peter I's marriage to a Habsburg princess ensured that independence was obtained 'by the general consent of the Concert of Europe'.[17] In a more recent assessment, Fabry argues along similar lines: although the Brazilian case followed other American revolutions in invoking the principle of popular sovereignty, 'Brazil belonged to a class distinct from its republican neighbors', which even the legitimist powers of Europe regarded 'far more favorably than other claimants in the Americas'.[18]

It is not disputed here that the establishment of a monarchy headed by a European prince facilitated independence and cleared the way for recognition, particularly from the legitimist powers of the Holy Alliance, who insisted that recognition required the prior consent of the 'parent' state. However, the question raised in this section is whether diplomatic recognition necessarily implied the acceptance of Brazil as an equal member of international society, for continuity brought with it the preservation of the legal privileges that foreigners had enjoyed in Portugal, and, as a consequence, the imposition of an inferior standing vis-à-vis the core of international society, most importantly, Britain.

[17] Watson 1984b, 130; see alsoWebster 1938, vol. 1, 59; Temperley 1966, 214.
[18] Fabry 2010, 64.

'Tropical Versailles'

Portugal remained neutral in the Napoleonic Wars until 1807, when French pressure to complete the continental blockade confronted Portugal with a difficult dilemma: either the Crown would declare war on Britain and thereby risk losing its overseas possessions, or preserve dynastic rule by transferring the court to Brazil.[19] Portugal ultimately succumbed to Britain's demands, and in late 1807 the entire Portuguese court, an entourage of between 8,000 and 15,000 courtiers, was transferred to Rio de Janeiro.[20] The event was unprecedented in European history: 'Never before had a European ruler visited, let alone taken up residence in, a colony'.[21] Plans for the evacuation of the royal family had existed for some time, but only under these desperate circumstances did Prince Regent John accept leaving Europe under the protection of the British navy.[22] There should be no doubt that Britain expected to be rewarded for its services. As Strangford self-confidently made clear in his letter to Canning: 'I have entitled England to establish with the Brazils the Relation of Sovereign and Subject and to require Obedience to be paid as the Price of Protection'.[23] The result, as Manchester argues, was the establishment of British 'preeminence' over Brazil.[24]

In 1808 Prince Regent John issued a royal decree allowing all friendly nations to trade directly with Brazil, which, as Europe was still at war, largely implied Britain.[25] From the outset, it seems obvious that the measure was a British imposition. Yet this was only partly

[19] Manchester 1933, 59-68; Bethell 1985, 168; Alexandre 1993, 147-164.
[20] Manchester 1933, 67.
[21] Schultz 2001, 1.
[22] Bethell 1985, 169.
[23] Strangford to Canning, FO 63/56, quoted in Manchester 1933, 67.
[24] Ibid.
[25] Adelman 2006, 234.

the case, given that influential Luso-Brazilians also demanded the end of the monopoly trade. As an admirer of Adam Smith (the 'new father of civilized people'), [26] José da Silva Lisboa, the future Viscount of Carú, is believed to have convinced the Prince Regent of the necessity of free trade to generate revenue for the Crown.[27] Lisboa was a staunch defender of gradual abolition and commercial liberalism, who, among other things, penned a polemic pamphlet in support of trade with Britain and translated Moreno's *Representation* into Portuguese in 1810 in a rare act of intellectual cross-fertilization.[28] Commerce, Lisboa believed, was crucial for realizing civilization, which was best achieved by emulating 'the *nações letradas* [cultured nations]', most importantly, Britain.[29]

Similar to debates in Buenos Aires, the question of free trade was intrinsically linked to the nature of the colonial pact and the place that Brazil would occupy therein. As Needell explains, Brazil's colonial elite gained its wealth through the export of agricultural produce, which is why they opposed protectionism.[30] While the division of labour between metropolis and colony corresponds to a role differentiation, with the arrival of the royal family in Brazil, it also became as question of status. The events led to a reversal of the relationship between European metropolis and South American colony, making Brazil the 'New World center of an Old World empire'.[31] According to Schultz, the tension that this created threatened to destabilize the Portuguese monarchy, making a return to absolutism unthinkable in Brazil.[32] In the end, the embarrassment of Portugal's 'colonial' situation was

[26] da Silva Lisboa 1804, iv.
[27] Schultz 2001, 198.
[28] See Levene 1939; Mendonça 2013, 135.
[29] Cited in Paquette 2009, 375, emphasis in original.
[30] Needell 2013, 85-86.
[31] Bethell 1985, 171; Adelman 2006, 228.
[32] Schultz 2001.

avoided by elevating Brazil to a co-equal kingdom in 1815, as first suggested by France's Talleyrand at the Congress of Vienna.[33] The upgrade of the former colony was, according to Lisboa,

> the most expedient and decisive Consolidation of the Greatness and Stability of the Lusitanian Monarchy, and of the place that it deserves in the Order of the Powers who most influence the progress of civilization in both Hemispheres.[34]

The transfer of the Portuguese court changed the role that Brazil played in the Portuguese world, and brought with it a considerable increase of its status that the Brazilians were keen to preserve.

'British preeminence'

While the Portuguese Crown regarded the opening of Brazilian ports as a necessary wartime measure, Britain capitalized on the opportunity in order obtain concessions.[35] One important demand was the abolition of the slave trade. Britain had outlawed the 'abominable trade' in 1807, now it used its preponderance in Europe and command of the seas to bring others to follow suit. As the largest market for African slaves in the Americas, Luso-Brazilian compliance was crucial. However, because Brazil's economy relied heavily on the continuation of the slave trade, the issue was highly contentious domestically, and remained a source of friction with Britain until the mid-nineteenth century.

[33] Webster 1938, vol. 1, 55; Schultz 2001, 190; Mendonça 2013, 121.
[34] Cited in Schultz 2001, 195.
[35] Manchester 1933.

The importance of the slave trade for Brazil's standing is all the more apparent when taking into consideration that abolition was framed as a hallmark of 'civilized' states by the early nineteenth century. As Keene elaborates, Britain achieved a 'broad moral condemnation' at the Congress of Vienna, and committed others to abolition through a network of anti-slave trade agreements.[36] Keene's main point is that the resulting treaty system demonstrates the social construction of hierarchy in international society, as the accords can be grouped into three broad categories, depending on whether the contracting partner was regarded as being part of 'civilized', 'barbarous', or 'savage' humanity by the British. Characteristic of the first category was the establishment of reciprocity in the enforcement of treaty provisions. Hence, Portugal and Spain agreed to the mutual right of detaining and searching vessels suspected of carrying out the trade, and to participate in mixed commissions to adjudicate cases. Most European powers, however, followed the French precedent in reserving the right to domestic jurisdiction. Latin American countries, by contrast, implemented the approach of Portugal and Spain, but generally refrained from making use of their right to nominate commissioners. Keene contends that power differentials could not explain why Portugal and Brazil received a 'comparatively generous treatment' from Britain despite their reluctance to enforce the treaties, which, according to Keene, is due to the fact that Britain considered them, as well as the new states of Spanish America, members of the 'family of civilized states'.[37] Yet the case is far from obvious. As the previous chapters illustrate, there was considerable ambiguity at the 'core' of international society about Latin America's civilizational credentials. Cultural and racial prejudices played an important role in this regard, as did the perceived inability of creoles to self-rule. Latin American states

[36] Keene 2007, 315.
[37] Ibid. 2002, 314, see also 334.

were formally treated as fully-fledged members of international society, but their social prestige—their (socially constructed) status in international society—was far from certain. Brazil is a case in point.

Brazil emerged as a monarchy and did not undergo the long and destructive wars of its Spanish American neighbours. But Spanish Americans were quick to abolish the slave trade and had few objections to including abolition of the slave trade in their treaties with Britain, which contrasts with Brazil's resistance on the matter.[38] Furthermore, slavery and the continuation of the slave trade not only influenced perceptions of Brazil abroad, but also shaped debates about the standing of the new state in Brazil itself. As others have noted, Lisboa was not only an influential advocate of free trade, he was also an early proponent of racial 'whitening' through European immigration, which would end Brazil's reliance on the slave trade.[39] The composition of its population would account for the stature and status of states: 'Without doubt the dignity of a king rests on the multitude his people, and the population makes the power of states. However, these rules apply to a population that is natural, prudent [*cordata*] and legitimate, and not foreign, barbarous and abusive, like that of the Africans [in Brazil]'.[40] Similar views were also expressed by José Bonifácio de Andrada e Silva, the celebrated 'patriarch of independence' and prominent member of the country's Coimbra-trained 'enlightened' elite. As he argued in his representation to the constituent assembly (which, however, was dissolved by the Emperor before Bonifácio could present his case), not only was slavery against natural law, but

[38] See King 1944, 388-389, 392.
[39] Paquette 2009, 385.
[40] da Silva Lisboa 1818, 163-164; see also Schultz 2001, 2208.

African slaves would 'contaminate' the white population with their 'immorality, and all their vices'.[41] Abolition was imperative to protect the masters from their slaves.

The slave trade question had already been raised in the commercial treaty of 1810, which committed Portugal to adopt 'the most efficacious means for bringing about the gradual abolition of the Slave Trade' (art. X).[42] The treaty, following Manchester's thesis, also transferred the commercial and legal privileges of the 'English factory' to Brazil. Canning dispatched Lord Strangford to Rio de Janeiro, in his now famous words, 'to induce the British merchant to make the Brazils an Emporium for the British Manufacturers destined for the consumption of the whole of South America'.[43] Contrary to denunciation of commercial British imperialism, it is clear from the instructions that Canning was willing to renounce the English factory. What he was not ready to give up were the 'Privileges and Immunities' of the British in Brazil.[44] As he made unmistakably clear: 'The Establishment of the separate Jurisdiction of the Judge Conservator is that which alone cannot be compensated by any analogous establishment in this country [...] It is apoint [sic] which must on no account be abandoned'.[45] Canning's instructions demonstrate that the Foreign Office did not expect Brazil to administer justice in a way that would live up to the expectations of 'civilized' life, which, in particular, required the protection of the lives and property of (British) subjects.

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[41] Bonifácio de Andrada e Silva 1825, 12; da Costa 2000, 42; Schwarcz 2008, 370.
[42] Parry 1969, vol. 61, 41-101.
[43] Canning to Strangford, 17 April 1808, FO 63/59, Inc. No.1; see also, Kaufmann 1967, 55.
[44] Canning to Strangford, 17 April 1808, FO 63/59, Inc. No. 4.
[45] Ibid.

The negotiations concluded with a treaty of friendship and alliance, and a treaty of commerce. The latter was supposed to establish 'perfect reciprocity' between the two countries, but, in fact, was an 'unequal treaty' in the sense that it established non-reciprocal commercial and legal privileges for the British in Brazil, that would expire 15 years after the date of ratification. The treaty guaranteed commercial liberties, including a preferential tariff of 15 per cent on British imports.[46] Following Canning's instructions, article X established the Office of a Judge Conservator in Brazil, granting British residents the right to elect magistrates in those cities and ports where the Portuguese Crown had established courts of justice to try their civil and criminal cases. Again, this concession was in fact non-reciprocal, as Portuguese subjects did not receive the right of a conservational court in Britain in exchange, due, as the treaty states, to the 'acknowledged equity of British jurisprudence, and the singular excellence of the British Constitution'.[47] Without doubt, the establishment of extraterritoriality violated the notion of sovereign equality. The inequality was not merely one in terms of power, but in fact denoted as role differentiation (different rights), and, to some extent, a subordinate status that was inherited by Brazil following independence in 1822.

4. Independence and Recognition

With the declaration of independence in 1822, and the expulsion of the last Portuguese forces from the northeast a year later, Brazil had severed its ties with Portugal as a matter of

[46] The tariff was even below the rate imposed on Portuguese merchandise, Canning would later claim that the 'odious and impolitic' provision was imposed on him by the Board of Trade, which is taken as evidence of Canning's commercial liberalism, see Stapleton 1859, 509; Temperley 1966, 184-185; Platt 1968, 315. This does not explain, however, why he insisted on the preservation of the Judge Conservator, nor why Canning accepted the renewal of commercial privileges after Brazilian independence.
[47] Parry 1969, vol. 61, 80.

fact.[48] The imperial government agreed to adhere to the Anglo-Portuguese treaty, which was about to expire at the same time as Brazil negotiated its recognition by Portugal. This was important for the new regime in two ways: internationally, it was supposed to avert attempts by Portugal to recover the former colony by force; furthermore, recognition would strengthen the legitimacy of the new political order domestically, thus decreasing the likelihood of upheavals in those provinces where regionalism remained strong.[49]

The experience of home rule had an important impact on the self-consciousness of the Brazilian elite.[50] Yet with the exception of regional uprisings in the northeast, as in Pernambuco in 1817, Brazilian independence was not driven by republicanism but by self-determination. Although there was a radical faction that called for the establishment of a republic, the group lost influence once it became apparent that Peter would side with those who insisted on preserving Brazil's autonomy.[51] Nor was there a clear dividing line that neatly separated Portuguese born in the Americans from their European counterparts. Colonial policy and practices whereby the local elite was trained in Portugal, as there were no universities or even printing presses in Brazil, meant that Brazilian elites had much stronger ties to the European metropolis than Spanish Americans. Political stability was not only fomented by the continuation of Braganza rule, but the new regime benefitted from these colonial ties. Adding to this was the fear that social mobilization would lead to racial violence and upheavals of the country's large population of slaves and freed black people. As Francisco de Sierra y Mariscal adverted in 1823, the political calamities that

[48] Bethell 1985, 187; Mosher 2008, 56-57.
[49] See, Chamberlain to Canning, 15 May 1824, FO 63/277, cited in Webster 1938, vol. 1, 240.
[50] Bethell 1985, 174-175.
[51] da Costa 2000, 34; Needell 2013, 80.

independence brought to Bahia would lead, within a few years, to the annihilation of its white population its disappearance from the 'civilized world'.[52]

Relations grew increasingly strained following the liberation of Portugal from France. In 1816, the Prince Regent ascended to the throne as John VI. Whereas the Portuguese Crown sought to transform Rio de Janeiro into a 'tropical Versailles' with the construction of a lavish palace, royal parks, and theatres, Portugal was governed by a regency headed by the British field-marshal Viscount Beresford (who had previously commanded the British troops in Popham's unsuccessful invasion of Buenos Aires). In fact, the Napoleonic Wars had inverted the relationship between colony and metropolis. Discontent over the dire economic situation and the de facto subordination of Portugal erupted in a revolt that spread from Oporto in 1820, demanding a liberal constitution similar to charter adopted by Spain, and, importantly, the return of the king to Europe. First resisting the pressure of the *Côrtes*, the Portuguese king finally relented in 1821, leaving his eldest son Peter in Brazil. This, however, would not suffice, as the newly convened assembly in Lisbon pushed for the restoration of Brazil's colonial status. As in the Spanish American case, Brazilians were strikingly underrepresented at the assembly. Initially aiming for the preservation of self-rule within a dual monarchy, the openly anti-Brazilian stance of the *Côrtes* alienated the Brazilians. Adding insult to injury, they faced personal attacks from the Portuguese delegates, such as Manoel Fernandes Thomaz, for whom Brazil was nothing but a 'land of monkeys, small black men caught on the African coast, and of bananas'.[53] The decision to place the provinces directly under the control of the metropolis, and to recall the Prince

[52] de Sierra y Mariscal 1931, 65.
[53] Cited in Bethell 1985, 183, own translation.

Regent, then provoked Brazil to declare their independence on 7 September 1822.[54] In order to preserve Braganza rule in Brazil, Peter, on the advice of Bonifácio, decided to remain in Rio de Janeiro, and was proclaimed Emperor of Brazil in October of the same year.

Recognition from the United States

Paradoxically, the first country to recognize the Brazilian Empire was the United States. This fact is often taken as evidence of an early 'unwritten alliance' between the two countries.[55] However, as Hilton maintains, bilateral relations were far from cordial. Frictions, for instance, arose from the treatment of North Americans in Brazil and Portugal's failure to enforce neutrality during the War of 1812, allowing Britain to attack North American ships in Brazilians waters. The United States for its part did not suppress Uruguayan privateers at the expenses of Brazilian trade. As Hilton furthermore notes, the 'deeply ingrained prejudice towards Latin and Catholic societies and scepticism about the capacity and worthiness of the Latin American' were not limited to Spanish Americans, but also influenced US attitudes towards Brazil.[56] Adding to this was the aversion of the United States against monarchism, especially when this implied the continued involvement of European powers in the region.[57] Such views were certainly present when US consul Henry Hill explained to Adams 'what ridiculous people these Brazilians are [...] wholly incapable of self Government'.[58] Writing shortly before independence, Hill was certain about the corrupt and decadent nature of the monarchy. Public opinion in the United States and the

[54] da Costa 1975, 72-73; 2000, 36.
[55] Burns 1966.
[56] Hilton 1975, 112.
[57] 'Portugal is neither American nor independent. So long as Portugal shall recognize the House of Braganza for her sovereign, so long the House of Braganza will be European, and not American—a satellite, and not a primary planet', Adams 1875, 176.
[58] Hill to Adams, May 1821, in Webster 1938, vol. 2, 713; Hilton 1975, 113; Gregory 1992, 207.

government in Washington were also confident that Brazil, too, would throw off the shackles of the *ancien régime*. While unwilling to recognize the insurgents at Pernambuco, for instance, President Monroe was sympathetic to their cause, which seemingly confirmed the profoundly republican nature of the Western Hemisphere, a bias that did not escape the Brazilian authorities. Lastly, it is noteworthy that Brazil's relations with Europe were guided by status concerns: the imperial government was considerably more assertive and convinced of its stature of New World power in its relations with United States. As the instructions to Rebelo illustrate, the Brazilian envoy was not to make any concessions in order to obtain recognition. Quite the contrary, the diplomat should leave no doubt that if the United States would not promptly extend recognition, Brazil would seek an alliance with a European power to the detriment of its trade.[59] Rebelo was officially received by Monroe on 26 May 1824.[60]

British recognition

Overall, Britain's role in the recognition of Brazil was more immediate and arguably more consequential than in the Spanish American cases. As the Brazilian envoy to London, Felisberto Caldeira Brant Pontes wrote in 1823:

> with England's friendship, we can snap our fingers at the rest of the world […] it will not be necessary to go begging for recognition from any other power, for all will wish our friendship in order to participate in the advantages of commerce, which will be exclusively for our friends.[61]

[59] Carvalho e Melo to Rebelo, 31 January 1824, in Fundação Alexandre de Gusmão 2008, 48-54. Rebello [sic] to Adams, 20 April 1824, in Manning 1925a, vol. 2, 779-790, esp. 780.
[60] Mendonça 2013, 143.
[61] 23 July 1823, quoted in Manchester 1933, 193.

The quote illustrates that Brazil, like Mexico, sought to use British recognition and the prospect of trade as means to pressure others into recognizing the new state.[62] But while British recognition was crucial, its demands were also more difficult to reconcile.

Among the conflicting interests, the abolition of the slave trade was the most contentious one. Again, it would be misleading to attribute the outcomes of the negotiations purely to British pressure, as the imperial government was in favour of gradual abolition.[63] Britain, however, insisted on the immediate termination of the slave trade as a precondition for recognition, which was unacceptable to the Brazilians for obvious domestic reasons.[64]

Furthermore, although Brazil became a monarchy, the proclamation of an Empire was not necessarily welcomed in London. Canning supported early recognition but faced resistance from cabinet members and George IV, who allegedly resented Peter's secessionist act and the 'Napoleonic overtones' of Peter's coronation.[65] The assumption of the imperial title was also an unmistakable signal that Brazil would claim superiority over Portugal, even though John VI insisted on an order of precedence that recognized his seniority.[66] Unilateral recognition would have converted the dispute into an international conflict, while Britain was still formally committed to defending its historical ally, and to 'protect all Conquests or

[62] See, for instance, correspondence of the Austrian envoy to Brazil of 17 May 1822, in Figueira de Mello 1916, 61-67.
[63] Bushnell and MacAulay 1988, 151, 157; Skidmore 1999, 29-64; Bethell 1970.
[64] Cabinet Memorandum, 15 Nov 1822, FO 72/266, cited in Webster 1938, vol. 2, 393; Freyre 1948, 325-326; Bethell 1970, 27-61.
[65] 1985, 192. The Holy Alliance was internally divided: Austria supported Britain's mediation efforts (due to Peter's marriage to a Habsburg princess), but officially upheld legitimism. Tsar Alexander, condemned Brazilian independence, regarding Peter as a 'rebel and a Parricide', Manchester 1933, 192; see also,Temperley 1966, 211-225. France's position was rather ambiguous: on the one hand, its envoy in Rio de Janeiro promised recognition in exchange commercial privileges; on the other hand, France encouraged Portugal to delay recognition, Webster 1938, vol. 1, 60-61.
[66] Ibid, 59.

Colonies belonging to the Crown of Portugal'. Britain offered to mediate, but because the commercial treaty of 1810 was about to expire, the British threatened to negotiate directly with the South Americans if Portuguese recognition was not achieved promptly. Portugal eventually agreed that Stuart, the British ambassador to Paris, would be sent to Rio de Janeiro in order to conclude a treaty of recognition in Portugal's name. The treaty was achieved in August 1825.[67] Portugal recognized the independence of Brazil in exchange of an indemnity payment of 2 million pounds. The status question was resolved by symbolically bestowing the imperial title upon John VI, who then conferred it upon his son.[68]

Formal recognition by Portugal opened the way for the newly independent state to establish diplomatic relations with other European powers. Between December 1825 and March 1826, Brazil was recognized by Austria, France, the Holy See, Sweden, the Hanseatic States, the Netherlands, and Prussia, among others.[69] In contrast to the situation in Spanish America where the reluctance of the Holy See to recognize the new states seriously undermined their legitimacy domestically, Leo XII recognized the Brazilian Empire in January 1826.

Britain recognized Brazil *de facto* with the official reception of Manoel Rodrigues Gameiro Pessoa as minister plenipotentiary in January 1826.[70] Formal recognition was achieved by

[67] Canning to À Court, 17 Jan 1825, FO 63/294; see also Manchester 1933, 196; Temperley 1966, 220; Bethell 1985, 193-194.
[68] Webster 1938, vol. 1, 63.
[69] Davis 1977a, 48; Mendonça 2013, 241-244.
[70] Some sources erroneously refer to the commercial and slave-trade treaties negotiated by Stuart in October 1825 as date of recognition (for instance, Skidmore 1999, 42; Mendoça 2013, 241), but these were rejected by the British government.

the treaty of 23 November 1826, in which Brazil agreed to abolish the slave trade within a period of three years after ratification. The agreement recognized the validity of the treaties signed with the Portuguese Crown in 1815 and 1817, which declared the trading of slaves an act of piracy, therefore granting the British navy a form of international police power in its suppression. The treaty was ratified by the Brazilian Emperor, but attracted fierce criticism at home. The majority of the Chamber of Deputies rejected the accord, arguing that the prospective date for the abolition was premature, and that the treaty itself was a British *diktat*. According to Deputy Cunha Matos, Brazil had been

> forced by threats of hostilities in case of opposition on our side […] forced, obliged, necessitated, subjected and compelled by the British government to conclude an onerous and degrading Convention upon affairs which are internal, domestic and purely national, and exclusively the competence of the free and sovereign legislative body and of the august head of the Brazilian nation.[71]

Domestic opposition also explains why the imperial government would not enforce the treaty effectively until 1850.

The second agreement was a commercial treaty signed in 1827. Negotiations leading to this agreement failed twice because of Canning's insistence on the preservation of the Office of the Judge Conservator.[72] The resulting accord confirmed the provisions of the 1810 treaty. In particular, it provided for reciprocal most favoured nation status; reasserted the preferential customs duty of 15 per cent on British imports; and continued the protection of the West Indian sugar trade from Brazilian competition. Hence, whereas Britain obtained preferential access to the Brazilian market, Brazil's principal commodity was excluded

[71] Bethell 1970, 65.
[72] See, Canning to Stuart, 19 April 1826, FO 13/17; see also Manchester 1933, 205; Webster 1938, vol. 1, 64.

from British markets through protectionist tariffs: ‘Having gained independence from Portugal, Brazil fell under the tutelage of Great Britain’.[73]

However, whereas the local elites were divided over the question of trade, they opposed ‘premature’ abolition of the slave trade, and resented the ‘pretense of privilege and impunity’ that came with the preservation of extraterritorial rights of the British in Brazil.[74] The Brazilian constitution of 1824 had abolished all special rights of foreigners under Brazilian law, but the Treaty of Amity and Commerce introduced an exception to the jurisdiction of Brazil’s courts. According to the treaty, extraterritoriality would ‘subsist only until some satisfactory jurisdiction shall be established, capable of providing, in an equal degree, for the protection of the Persons and property of His Majesty’s Subjects’.[75] As had been the case in Portugal, no comparable office was recognized for Brazilian citizens in Britain. Moreover, the arrangement was clearly interpreted differently by the contracting parties. This is because an important question remained unaddressed: who would determine whether the provision’s conditions were met? From the perspective of the Foreign Office, this decision was the prerogative of the British government alone. Brazil, however, repeatedly demanded the abolition of the court following the reform of its Code of Criminal Procedure in 1832. The records show that such demands were rejected based on the reforms being insufficient ‘for the protection of the Persons and Property of British

[73] da Costa 1975, 86.
[74] Schultz 2001, 213; Guenther 2004, 11. Freyre makes an important argument in this regard: ‘It was not uncommon’, he maintains, ‘that British consuls spoke out against the Brazilian authorities, not in pure imperial arrogance, but in defence of what seemed to them as sacred as the very life of a man: the rights of a British subject’, Freyre 1948, 306, own translation.
[75] Parry 1969, vol. 77, 380-381.

Residents in Brazil as they are entitled to expect'.[76] Although generally glossed over in the English-speaking literature as minor nuisance, the treaty has been critically discussed by Brazilian historians. The legal privileges, as Carvalho put it, were 'singularly vexatious', and an insult to Brazil's sovereignty and status as independent nation. [77] In Freyre's words: 'being a form of extraterritorial jurisdiction of Britain with colonial characteristics, it could have caused nothing else but rejection from the Brazilians, proud of their new *status*: a politically independent Nation'.[78] It is important to note that extraterritoriality did not deny Brazilian sovereignty. After all, the conservational court was established with the acquiescence of the Brazilian government, which consequently maintained the integrity of its authority. What the provision did, however, was to construct a hierarchy among formally equal states, denoting a difference in terms of rights (role differentiation) and, in fact, status (recognizing Britain as more 'civilized').

Brazil's 'entry' into international society represents a paradox. One the one hand, the preservation of Braganza rule facilitated diplomatic recognition from European powers. On the other hand, the high degree of continuity that characterized Brazilian dependence also led to the continuation of extraterritoriality, which, according to the conventional English School account, demarcates the exclusion of a state from international society. It is striking that despite the vast power differentials that existed between Britain and the Spanish American republics, no similar attempts were made to obtain special legal privileges for British subjects in either Argentina or Mexico. The fact that the institution was inherited

[76] See Ribeiro to Palmerstone, 16 June 1834, FO 13/115; Law Officers' Opinion, 30 Sep 1834, FO83/2237; and Palmerstone to Ribeiro, 13 Nov 1834, FO 13/115.
[77] Carvalho 1959, 160.
[78] Freyre 1948, 343, own translation, emphasis in original.

from Portugal, adds further strength to the argument the members of international society were not necessarily equal. By contrast, Britain did insist on religious toleration, which complicated the normalization of its diplomatic relations with Mexico at first, but it did not demand the creation of an exterritorial regime. While critics may discard the case as an historical 'anomaly', it nevertheless illustrates the variegated nature of hierarchy in international society, and the subordinate position that Latin American states came to occupy therein.

5. Regency and Mid-Nineteenth-Century

The continuation of Braganza rule meant that Brazil's emancipation was less disruptive, shorter, and overall more acceptable to European powers than the independence of the Spanish American republics, whose parent sovereign denied recognition, and who emerged from long and destructive wars of independence. This continuity also helped prevent the political fragmentation that Spanish America underwent. The preservation of Brazil's territorial integrity is remarkable considering that the country was subject to similar centrifugal forces as its Spanish American neighbours.[79] Since the colonial period, the Portuguese provinces in the Americas have been separated by vast distances and geographic barriers, and were in fact more connected to European ports than to each other. Furthermore, although there was a growing sense of self-awareness among the American-born elite of having different interests from their peninsular counterparts by the late eighteenth-century, political loyalties were first and foremost regional rather than Brazilian or 'proto-national'. In the absence of a shared national identity, Barman suggests, the

[79] Skidmore 1999, 45.

monarchy was an important stabilizing factor.[80] For one, it provided a source of political authority that gathered widespread support among the population. For another, the monarchy offered opportunities for patronage through the proliferation of offices and noble titles for the elite.[81]

This stability also facilitated the payment of Brazil's foreign debt, which, as demonstrated above, seriously undermined the international standing of Spanish America starting in the late 1820s. Here, too, the continuation of Braganza rule proved beneficial, as it provided a link to Rothschild's, Europe's most influential banking house. It was Rothschild's that brokered Brazil's first loans to pay off the Portuguese debt, and, in 1829, it was Rothschild's that kept the empire afloat after Peter I suspended payments to Portugal following Miguel's seizure of the throne in Lisboa.[82] In this regard, the Anglo-Brazilian treaty may have been a mixed blessing, given that, by limiting the country's tariff autonomy, it also contributed to stabilizing the government's revenue stream.[83] Even after the termination of the treaty, Brazil continued to service its obligations until the 1890s, which is why, by the mid-nineteenth century, its bonds traded at similar rates to those of 'seasoned' borrowers like Prussia or France, which indicates significant confidence in the new state among European investors.[84]

All this, however, should not conceal the fact that Brazil, too, faced considerable challenges during the first decades of independent statehood, and in some respects was unable to

[80] Barman 1988, 6.
[81] Graham 1990; de Carvalho 2006; Needell 2006.
[82] Dawson 1990, 181-182.
[83] Shaw 2005, 170.
[84] Dawson 1990, 93; Tomz 2007, 56-57.

improve its standing among states. The image of nineteenth-century Brazil as a haven of stability and order, surrounded by volatile and 'barbarous' republics, was carefully cultivated by Brazil's elite.[85] Shortly after the declaration of the centralist constitution of 1824, the Confederation of the Equator was proclaimed, which threatened to secede in the country's sugar-producing northeast. The empire also fought against the United Provinces of the River Plate over the territory, which, as a result of British pressure, eventually became independent Uruguay in 1828. Given that the conflict coincided with Bolívar's Panama Congress, it is possible that Brazil only formally accepted the invitation to attend to avoid a Spanish American counter-alliance.[86] In any event, neither Argentina nor Brazil ultimately sent a delegate to the conference, as both were wary of Bolívar's leadership ambitions, which demonstrates that even though there was the political will to include the Braganza empire in an American system, geopolitics and stature concerns were far from absent in the region.

Domestically, the costly and unsuccessful military campaign at Brazil's southern frontier accentuated the economic hardship of the post-independence period and contributed to the emperor's political isolation. Facing anti-Portuguese riots, and the threat of a military revolt, Peter I abdicated and returned to Europe in 1831, leaving his five-year-old son behind in Rio de Janeiro. The departure of Brazil's first emperor marked the beginning of the troublesome regency period that lasted for almost a decade until Peter II was prematurely declared of age in 1840. Uprisings broke out in Brazil's north and south that threatened to tear the country apart. The northern and northeastern provinces refused to

[85] Salgado Guimarães 1988, 13; Bethell 2010a, 461; Preuss 2011.
[86] Seckinger 1976, 252.

recognize the authority of the emperor at first, and remained a hotbed of revolt thereafter. Conventionally, these upheavals have been portrayed as nativist rebellions led by local elites who opposed subordination under Rio de Janeiro. There was certainly some truth to this, for while Brazil's elites shared a common social conservative outlook, especially with regard to slavery and the maintenance of social order, they disagreed on constitutional matters, including (and analogous to the situation in Spanish America) the question over the right balance between the capital and the periphery.[87] However, whereas many of these regional revolts were initially directed against the central government, they quickly escalated into social revolts, or, in the case of the Cabanagem (1835-1840), into outright race wars. The Cabanada in Pernambuco (1832-1835), the Sabinada in Bahia (1837-1840), and the Balaiada revolt in Maranhão (1838-1841) are further cases in point.

The social revolutionary character of the revolts ended the liberal experiments with decentralization under Diogo Antônio Feijó (1835-1837). The reactionary backlash, known in Brazilian history as the *Regresso,* then led to a significant concentration of power in the central state, which could draw upon a loyal bureaucracy composed of law graduates from Coimbra and, since 1820, Olinda. The fact that the social revolts of the regency period were primarily perceived as racial conflicts added further support to the imperial government. This view was also shared by foreign observers, who apparently distinguished between 'civilized' elites who have taken up arms, and the ruthless 'rabble' of Indians, *mestiços*, freedmen, and runaway slaves. Accounts of the Cabanagem and the Sabinada, for instance, indicate that during the elite-led initial period, insurgents were keen to protect the life and property of foreign residents (with the important exception of the Portuguese), with no such

[87] Needell 2013, 79-80.

care taken thereafter.[88] The lynching of the crew of a British brig even led Palmerstone to send British warships to Pará, against the protests of the Brazilian envoy in London.[89] Where in Spanish American cases, Britain blamed the inability of the elite to rule itself, from the British perspective, the problem with Brazil was the composition of its people. As the British minister to Rio de Janeiro wrote to Palmerston, as result of the upheaval of the lower classes the province of Pará may well be 'lost altogether to the civilised world'.[90]

The approach adopted in the north contrasts with the response to the Farroupilha War (1835-1845) in the southern province of Rio Grande do Sul. Economically integrated with Argentina's Litoral provinces and recently-created Uruguay, cattle-raising landowners proclaimed an independent republic in a conflict that was more akin to the Spanish American *caudillo* wars than to the social upheavals of Brazil's north. Although the revolt was crushed by imperial forces led by Luís Alves da Lima e Silva, the future Duke of Caxias, the rebels were subsequently pardoned and co-opted into supporting the central government, a model that Brazil then applied to deal with revolts elsewhere.[91] What this demonstrates is that Brazil was not inherently more peaceful in comparison to its republican neighbours, but that the imperial government was able to gain the upper hand over its domestic contenders at a time when Spanish America was struggling with the aftermath of independence. Political stability, in turn, had important ramifications for Brazil's status in international society. As Peter II triumphantly proclaimed on the occasion of the thirtieth anniversary of independence: 'Protected by our institutions, we have

[88] Kraay 1992, 507; Cleary 1998, 122.
[89] Ibid. 1998, 126.
[90] Fox to Palmerston, FO128/20, cited in ibid., 127. In this case, it seems that culturalist and racist prejudice varied with the subjects' social class and status, an observation that Cannadine 2001 made with regard to the views of British aristocrats the empire, and which Englehart 2010 noted in the case of Siam.
[91] Skidmore 1999, 46.

succeeded in enrolling ourselves among the independent and civilized peoples'.[92] The question, then, remains why Brazilian elites would doubt the civilizational status of their state in the first place, if the English School argument is valid that Latin America was, by default, a member of the community of 'civilized' states.

The premature declaration of age of Peter II in 1840 marked an important turning point in the consolidation of Brazil (he was only fourteen at the time). The 'triumph nation-state ideal' as Barman posits, also allowed the imperial government to adopt a more assertive stance towards Britain.[93] Although the commercial treaty of 1827 was bound to expire in 1842, the agreement remained in force until one contracting party declared the treaty to be terminated, in which case it would expire after two years. Thus, in effect, the treaty remained in force until 1844. When its renewal came up in the early 1840s, the Brazilian government refused to negotiate another treaty with Britain. To a large extent, this was a reaction to Britain's efforts to end the slave trade, but negotiations also failed due to Britain's insistence on the preservation of extraterritorial rights. This, however, was rejected with the argument that it would be an 'anomaly in the judicial system of Brazil', and furthermore, that public opinion would be strongly against it because, in the words of the Brazilian foreign minister, it was 'offending the national Dignity' of an independent and sovereign Brazil.[94] In response, the British Foreign Secretary Aberdeen sent Henry Ellis as special envoy to Rio de Janeiro in 1842. It remains unclear why Britain insisted on the Judge Conservator. The impression that emerges from the diplomatic correspondence

[92] Speech on 4 Sep. 1852, cited in Barman 1988, 235.
[93] Ibid., 217.
[94] Ellis to Aberdeen, 21 Jan 1843, Inlc. No 1, FO 131/12; and Honório Hermeto Carneiro Leão to Ellis, Translation in Ellis to Aberdeen, 30 Jan 1843, FO 131/12; the Board of Trade had a different opinion, see Board of Trade, 15 August, 1842, FO 131/12.

suggests that it was not to meet the demands of British merchants in Brazil, who, in fact, favoured its termination.[95] Rather, it seems that the authorities in London did not expect Brazil to administer justice, which stands in sharp contrast to Brazil's standing in financial matters and demonstrates the ambiguous position that the Latin American state occupied within nineteenth-century international society. On any account, the Brazilian government would not consider Britain's petition and Ellis had to return to Britain without a new treaty.[96] It is noteworthy that the commercial agreement with Britain expired in November 1842—the same year in which the Treaty of Nanking was imposed on China. Thus, unsurprisingly, Brazilian historians have pointed to the parallels between the 'unequal treaties' in Asia, and the case of Brazil.[97] For contemporaries, it was first and foremost an insult to Brazil's standing that was not in line with its status as member of the distinguished club of 'civilized' states. Without doubt, Brazil was a member of nineteenth-century international society, but it was not necessarily regarded as equal by the European powers.

The slave trade treaty was to expire a year after the commercial treaty. Because Brazil refused to renew the slave trade treaty, Britain passed the so-called Aberdeen Act of 1845, which authorized the Royal Navy to seize Brazilian ships suspected of trading slaves, including within Brazilian waters. Under the act, Britain seized over 400 Brazilian ships, whose crews were tried in British vice-admiralty courts.[98] As the British explorer Richard Burton remembers, the measure was 'one of the greatest insults which a strong ever offered

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[95] Ellis to Aberdeen, 10 Dec 1842, FO 131/12.
[96] The question of consular jurisdiction would remain unsettled until the early twentieth century, when the French consuls in Brazil finally lost the right to administer estates of French citizens dying intestate, see Manchester 1933, 299-306; Nazzari 1995.
[97] Lima Oliveira 1986 [1927], 181; see also João Dunshee de Abranches 1915 in Manchester 1933, 286-288.
[98] Bethell 1970, 283.

to a weak people'.[99] Unsurprisingly, the act caused strong anti-British sentiments among the Brazilian population, and was severely criticized by the imperial government as an infringement of Brazil's sovereignty. Ultimately, Britain left Brazil little choice. After Britain threatened to enforce the Aberdeen Act within Brazilian ports, Rio de Janeiro relented and began to suppress the slave trade despite domestic opposition, effectively ending the trafficking of human beings in the early 1850s.[100]

In the following years, both governments intended to settle outstanding disputes through a mixed commission: British subjects demanded compensation for their losses suffered in the war of independence, and during the Brazilian blockade of the River Plate in the late 1820s. The Brazilian government, in turn, insisted on compensation of losses that resulted from the seizures under the slave trade treaty and the Aberdeen Act. Bilateral relations reached a low point during the 'Christie affair', which led to a six-day blockade of Rio de Janeiro and the suspension of diplomatic relations in 1863.[101] The dispute revolved around two incidents: the first concerned the alleged negligence of local authorities in investigating the sacking of a British shipwreck; the second, the putative mistreatment of three British officers in Rio de Janeiro. In both cases, Britain demanded redress and an official apology. Although Brazil would have paid an indemnification (under protest) in the first case, it was unwilling to bend on the latter, which caused a British ultimatum and the blockade of the country's principal port. Belgian mediation decided in favour of Brazil, after which diplomatic relations resumed. In Britain, Christie, Britain's diplomatic representative to Brazil, was

[99] Cited in ibid., 266.
[100] See Palmerstone's declaration in Parliament, *Hansard*, 15 July 1856; Scarlett to Clarendon, 22 April 1857, 15 Jun 1857, and 25 Jun 1857, FO 97/79.
[101] Manchester 1933, 267-284; Graham 1962.

blamed for having overstepped his authority, although, as Graham argues, the diplomat acted according to instruction from his superiors in London. Hence, in this author's view, Britain deliberately escalated the dispute in order to demonstrate its power, and to possibly humiliate the imperial government after its refusal to renew the commercial treaty of 1827.[102] Christie defended his action later in Parliament with Brazil's alleged inability to administer justice: 'Let Brazil do right at home, and she will obtain reputation abroad'; the South Americans, he claimed, where no different from the 'barbarous' states of East Asia:

> The noble Lord would remember what had been done during the last twenty years to raise the reputation of this country, and to make the lives of its citizens sacred in any part of the world. In China, Japan, or Brazil, or wherever Englishmen or the English flag had been insulted, reparation had been demanded firmly and with success.[103]

The conclusion that can be drawn from the 'Christie affair' is that Britain, contrary to the 'imperialism of free trade' thesis, used coercive means not necessarily for commercial aims, but that gunboat diplomacy could also be employed against the interests of the British merchant community, who severely criticized the blockade. Christie left little doubt that he regarded Brazil as a 'semi-civilized' state that was on a similar footing as the ancient Asian states. Although Christie was ultimately sanctioned, the widespread characterization of Brazil as 'semi-civilized' provides good reason to believe that a similar view also informed decision-making in London. Stereotypes and prejudices not only influenced US foreign policy towards Latin America, as Schoultz and others have noted,[104] but ambiguity towards

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[102] 1962, 126.
[103] See Palmerston's declaration in Parliament, *Hansard*, 15 July 1856; Scarlett to Clarendon, 22 April 1857, 15 Jun 1857, and 25 Jun 1857, FO 97/79.
[104] Schoultz 1998; see also, Johnson 1980; Pike 1992.

the status of the Latin American states was widespread in nineteenth-century international society. Brazil shares an important similarity with Argentina and Mexico in this regard.

Brazil's refusal to renew the commercial treaty ended British tutelage, and could consequently be interpreted as renegotiation of Brazil's role in the international division of labour. Although Brazil did raise its tariffs in the aftermath, as Needell maintains, the aim was to increase government revenues rather than to promote manufacturing. Similar to the outlook in Argentina, Brazil's elites firmly assumed that Brazil would thrive on the export of agricultural produce, which was in line with their 'liberal perspective on the international division of labor'.[105] In this sense, the attribution of an inferior role to the export of primary goods is a twentieth-century phenomenon that was not widely shared by actors at the time. Prestige was a different matter altogether. As noted above, Brazilian elites were offended by the inferior standing that the Anglo-Brazilian treaties implied.

The concern for Brazil's status in international society is also apparent in what has been termed Peter II's 'politics of prestige'.[106] It is noteworthy that even diplomatic historians, such as Cervo and Bueno, who tend to follow the dependency school in interpreting Brazil's subordination as result of its integration into the capitalist world economy, highlight the will to create an image of a 'civilized' Brazil during the Second Reign.[107] Prestige mattered in international society, and the need to present Brazil in this light indicates that Brazilian elites were concerned about the civilizational status of their state.

[105] Needell 2013, 83.
[106] Cervo and Bueno 2011, 191.
[107] Ibid.

One way of achieving this aim was through patronizing the arts and sciences, for which Peter II became internationally known during his lifetime. Central in this regard was the creation of French-style academies, including the *Instituto Histórico e Geográfico Brasileiro* (IHGB), whose meetings the emperor regularly attended. Created in 1838, the entity was explicitly charged with developing a foundational fiction for the young nation based on the idea of a European civilization in the tropics.[108]As in Argentina and Mexico, and influenced by European romanticism, the development of historical narratives served an immediate and self-conscious nationalist aim, which, in Brazil, was closely tied to court society. A case in point is the essay competition on how to write the history of Brazil that the IHBG organized in 1844. The prize-winning entry, written by the Bavarian botanist Carl Friedrich Philipp von Martius is notable for its praise of racial miscegenation in Brazil, as a nation born from three races, 'the copper-coloured American, the white or Caucasian, and finally the black or Ethiopian'.[109] Although the case can be retrospectively read as an endorsement of 'racial democracy', as Guimarães contends,[110] what stands out is the *mission civilisatrice* that Martius attributes to the white population as the 'most powerful and essential motor' towards progress.[111] As the author put it: 'The Portuguese blood, like a mighty stream, should absorb the smaller tributaries that are the Indian and Ethiopian races'.[112] In contrast to the negligible role that blacks played in Brazilian society, Martius idealized the Indian as 'noble savage', a representation that must have struck a chord with the members of the institute. As Schwarcz explains, even though individual historians such as Francisco Adolfo Varnhagen rejected Indianism, Brazil's elites sought to construct an

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[108] Salgado Guimarães 1988, 8; see also, Schwarcz 1998.
[109] von Martius 1844, 382.
[110] Salgado Guimarães 1988, 17.
[111] von Martius 1844, 382; see also Needell 1999.
[112] Salgado Guimarães 1988, 383, own translation.

iconography around the country's native inhabitants and tropical environment.[113] 'Quite unlike the Black, whose presence was a constant reminder of the shameful situation of slavery, the Indian made it possible to evoke a mythical, unifying origin'.[114] It is true, as Bethell argues, that this expression of romanticism was unique to Brazil.[115] Brazilian Indianism exalted the unique features of the country, while simultaneously highlighting the civilizational achievements of Portuguese colonization, including the continuation of dynastic links to the Old World. By contrast, elites in Argentina and Mexico constructed particularistic 'antiquities' against the backdrop of pre-Colombian empires. However in all these cases, the objective was quite similar in that they sought to bolster the legitimacy of the new states, and the status of Latin Americans as being part of 'civilized' humanity. Indianism, in short, took different forms in these cases, but preformed a remarkably similar function.

While Brazilian intellectuals celebrated the 'native' elements of the country, since the arrival of the Portuguese court, and analogous to Argentina and Mexico, it was a declared aim of the authorities to attract Northern European immigration. But whereas the 'politics of prestige' was successful in gaining recognition for the empire's philanthropic endeavours, Northern Europeans did not succumb to Brazil's charms. For much of the nineteenth century, immigrants came primarily from Portugal, Italy and Spain. The only significant group of Northern Europeans emigrated from the German-speaking states, where the Brazilian government actively recruited colonists. With an estimated 200,000 individuals in the period between 1830 and 1930s, German immigration to Brazil was only

[113] Schwarcz 1998, 25, 30.
[114] Ibid., 35.
[115] Bethell 2010a, 461.

a tiny fraction of the approximately 6 million who chose to settle in the United States during the same period.[116] Slavery, the tropical climate, and the lack of accessible land kept Northern Europeans away, as did reports about the abhorrent working conditions on the coffee plantations, and the treatment of Protestants in the country. The ill-treatment of immigrants was taken up by the European press, creating a strikingly negative image of the country.[117] Brazilian planters were (rightly) accused of using sharecropping to force white immigrants into serfdom, following the end of the slave trade. Acting upon these reports, Prussia passed the so-called Heydt edict in 1859, prohibiting Brazil from recruiting colonists in its territory, which, following unification, was extended to the whole of Germany, and remained in place until 1895.[118] Other European countries imposed similar restrictions.

Nor did the search for an alternative source of labour prove fruitful. Brazilian elites had entertained plans for the importation of Chinese workers since the times of John VI. The scheme resurfaced once more after the suppression of the slave trade, but caused much controversy. For its opponents, Chinese immigration would contribute to the further degeneration of Brazil's population, which, in the view of Luís Peixoto de Lacerda Werneck, already suffered from the 'deformity of the indigenous and the African'.[119] Similarly, Brazil's foremost abolitionist, Joaquim Nabuco, objected to Chinese immigration on the grounds that it would unnecessarily prolong slavery and contribute to the 'pollution'

[116] Luebke 1990, 95.
[117] Lesser 2013, 44.
[118] Luebke 1987, 11; Luebke 1990, 98.
[119] Cited in Lesser 1999, 19; 2013, 47.

of Brazil's racial stock.[120] Apparently, the gradual 'whitening' of the population through cultural and sanitary policies, which was considered a possibility with regard to blacks and mulattos given the broadly Lamarckian interpretation of genetics that prevailed in Brazil, was not deemed applicable to Chinese 'coolies'. Nor were Chinese authorities particularly enthusiastic about the plan. China signed a commercial treaty with the Brazilian Empire in 1880, but would not allow immigration to Brazil. After a Chinese fact-finding mission in the early 1880s confirmed official concerns, the initiative met a dead end. Chinese immigrants, Peter II concluded, would only 'aggravate even further the heterogeneous aspects of our people'.[121] As Skidmore argues, elites were concerned that the racial composition of their country would relegate Brazil to a 'perpetual third-class status as a nation'.[122]

6. War of Triple Alliance, Slavery and End of Empire

If the war over the Banda Oriental had debilitated Peter I's position within Brazil in the 1820s, in the latter half of the nineteenth century the 'Uruguayan imbroglio' triggered yet another conflict that catalysed change.[123] The War of the Triple Alliance (1864-1870)—or Paraguayan War as the conflict is known in Brazil—was the bloodiest inter-state war in Latin American history and resulted in the dramatic decimation of Paraguay's population.[124] The war erupted over the control over the River Plate basin, although the immediate cause lay in Brazil's meddling in the Uruguayan civil war ('to protect the life,

[120] Nabuco 1950, 49-50; Skidmore 1974, 26; Lesser 1999, 28.
[121] Cited in 1999, 32; 2013, 50.
[122] Skidmore 1990, 7.
[123] Whigham 2002, 118.
[124] Centeno 2002, 55-56. Regarding the demographic impact of the war, see Kraay and Whigham 2004, 19.

honor, and property of the subjects of His Majesty the Emperor': a formula seemingly inspired by the justification of European powers' intrusion in Latin America).[125] After Brazil ignored Paraguay's warning not to intervene in support of the Colorado faction of Venancio Flores, the latter seized the *Marquês de Olinda*, a Brazilian steamer that carried the designated president of Mato Grosso to his new post in the interior. Flores was an ally of the Unitarians in Argentina, which is why the Mitre government refused Paraguay permission to pass through Argentina to intervene in Uruguay. In response, Paraguay's Francisco Solano López also declared war on Argentina, who, together with Brazil and Uruguay, formed the Triple Alliance on 1 May 1865.

Despite some initial military successes, the advantage soon shifted to the alliance. After Paraguayan troops were defeated and forced to surrender at Uruguaiana in 1865, López was on the defensive. Yet the Paraguayan population—women, children, and the elderly—mounted a fierce resistance, defending Asunción until 1869, and embroiling the invading forces in a costly guerrilla war that only ended with the killing of López by Brazilian forces in 1870.

The conflict was highly controversial then and has remained so ever since. Conventionally, historians in Argentina and Brazil have blamed López's megalomania and expansionist drive for the war.[126] A similar interpretation is advanced by Schweller, who argues that internal divisions in Argentina and Brazil caused the failure to counterbalance the

[125] Quoted in Box 1927, vol. 1, 213; see also, Abente 1987, 48; Whigham 2002, 118.
[126] By contrast, in Paraguay, the war is traditionally remembered for the patriotic sacrifice of the population and Lopez's heroism in the face of overwhelming odds. Historical revisionism in the 1860s then blamed British interests for orchestrating an imperialistic war against the peaceful and self-sufficient republic, although little evidence has been found to sustain the claim, see Bethell 1996; Doratioto 2009.

revisionist Paraguayan leader, who presided over a consolidated state with a highly militarized society.[127] Yet the argument is misleading. It was not the case that Argentina 'underbalanced' because it was internally divided. Argentina had an outstanding territorial claim against Paraguay, a country that the *porteño* elite continued to consider a renegade province of the former Viceroyalty of the River Plate. Ultimately, however, it was the fear that Paraguay may foment revolt in the provinces that led to Mitre's decision to go to war. Nor is it accurate to describe Brazil in the 1860s as a torn state. Important economic interests were at stake, as landowners from Rio Grande do Sul had invested heavily in land and livestock in Uruguay, and whose investment came under pressure from Uruguay's Blanco fraction. Peter II responded to the concerns of the *gaucho* elite, who only recently had been mollified into supporting the imperial government. Crucial, furthermore, was the question of freedom of navigation, as Brazilian ships had to pass through Paraguay in order to reach the interior. Brazil's insistence on keeping the waterways open, triggered fears in Paraguay about Brazilian intrusion, leading to the military build-up and the fortification of the River Paraguay. In short, the war was not the result of weak state consolidation, but rather Argentina and Brazil went to war to consolidate the power of the central state. Schweller has the direction of causality wrong.

As noted by Nabuco, the war was a watershed event in the history of the Brazilian empire, during which the monarchy reached its zenith while ultimately contributing to its own demise.[128] In Brazil, propaganda presented the conflict as a war between civilization and

[127] Schweller 2006.
[128] Nabuco 1897, 188-200; see also Bethell 1996, 11; Kraay and Whigham 2004, 17.

barbarism.[129] The view was also shared by the British, who tended to favour the Triple Alliance, even without actively supporting either side.[130] López, Nabuco argued, was a 'despot by birth, a semi-civilized, with the explosive instinct of an Indian' and 'the privileges of an Oriental sultan'.[131] The utilization of the Orientalist trope to condemn a 'barbarous' strongman has already been noted in the case of the Unitarian attacks against Rosas in Argentina, and it seems likely that the Brazilian rhetoric was influenced by their ally. Yet Brazilian elites had long developed their own sense of a civilizing mission. Although the conflict itself had more to do with stature concerns (the balance of power in the River Plate basin), the rhetoric about Brazil's civilizational status illustrates how elites thought about the standing of their state in the region (as superior), as well as how Brazil would fare within (European) international society more generally (as inferior and only incompletely civilized).

The War of the Triple alliance had far-reaching consequences, precipitating two of the most decisive events in nineteenth-century Brazilian history: the abolition of slavery and the fall of the monarchy. Peter II had committed Brazil to pursuing the war until López's removal from power. Following the defeat of the Paraguayan invasion, Argentina withdrew most of its troops, leaving Brazil to bear most of the cost in human lives and treasure, which made the war even more unpopular at home.[132] The result was an exacerbated financial crisis, an

[129] Burns 1980, 130; Abente 1987, 47; Bethell 1996, 5; Kraay and Whigham 2004, 16; Preuss 2011, 25.
[130] Bethell 1996, 25. See, for instance, condemnation of Paraguayan expansionism in The Times 1 August 1865. Graham-Yooll argues that the conflict attracted little interest in Europe as it was overshadowed by the end of the US Civil War, the French invasion in Mexico and growing tensions between France and Germany, 2002, 111.
[131] Nabuco 1897, 194, 198-199.
[132] See Beattie 2001; Kraay 2004.

emboldened republican opposition, and a highly politicized military, which eventually overthrew the monarchy in a coup in 1889.

The war also hastened the end of slavery, given that it brought a large number of Brazilians in close contact with Spanish America, where slavery had long been abolished, and given that Brazil's lack of military effectiveness was partly blamed on the recruitment of slaves. As Graham remarks, Brazilians 'frequently ridiculed the racial heritage of Paraguay and hinted at a concept of white supremacy'.[133] As the conflict dragged on, Brazilian elites became more openly concerned about the racial composition of their own society. 'Perhaps', Graham concludes, 'Brazilian politicians doubted the degree of their own "civilization" and feared disparaging comparisons with the European nations with which they so closely identified'.[134] Skidmore agrees: the conflict shook the self-confidence of the country's elite, who had long regarded Brazil as superior to its Spanish American neighbours due to its monarchical institutions and its (relative) political stability following independence.[135] In this sense, the effects of the Paraguayan War were not unlike the impact that the Rosas regime had on Argentina's liberal elite, and the 'soul-searching' that the war against the United States provoked in Mexico. Hence it is no coincidence that a first step towards abolition was taken immediately after the war in 1871 with the enactment of Law of the Free Womb, followed by the Sexagenarian Law of 1885. Although it was far from being the only cause—traditional historiography emphasizes the role of intellectuals and British pressure, while more recent scholarship highlights the influence of active slave

[133] Graham 1985, 787.
[134] Ibid.
[135] Skidmore 1999, 43; Preuss 2011, 25.

resistance and mass desertion—the war contributed to undermining slavery in Brazil.[136] Its abolition in 1888 then eroded the support base of the monarchy, which succumbed a year after the so-called Golden Law was passed.

Lastly, the War of the Triple Alliance also strained Brazil's international reputation. For one, the reliance on African slaves, both as labour on the coffee and sugar plantations and as soldiers in the war, stood in obvious contradiction to the claim that Brazil would bring liberty and civilization to Paraguay's people. The incongruity was taken up by Paraguayan propaganda in Europe, which presented the war as a fight for freedom against Brazil's 'slavocracy', frequently repeating racial stereotypes that portrayed Peter II and his soldiers as 'monkeys'.[137] The war therefore undermined the emperor's efforts to create the image of a European-like and enlightened monarchy in the tropics. Instead, as Schwarcz maintains, both in Brazil and abroad, the monarchy became increasingly associated with a despotic regime that, employing slave soldiers, fought a sanguinary campaign against Paraguay's civilian population.[138]

7. The 'Old Republic'

The first Brazilian republic was proclaimed in 1889 after a bloodless coup brought down the monarchy. The Republican Manifesto of 1870 declared that 'We are from America and we want to be Americans'.[139] Staying faithful to this motto, Brazil underwent a reorientation of its foreign policy towards a closer engagement with the region. Despite

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[136] Weinstein 2011, 217.
[137] Warren 1962; Schwarcz 1998, 313-314; Kraay 2004, 61; Doratioto 2009; Preuss 2011, 35.
[138] Schwarcz 1998, 313; 2008, 379.
[139] Hale 1985, 372; Skidmore 1999, 66; Bethell 2010b.

being the only monarchy in the Western Hemisphere, Brazil was invited to the First International Conference of American States held in Washington in 1889-1890. The conference was the brainchild of Secretary of State, James G. Blaine, who sought to establish a mechanism for the peaceful resolution of conflicts in the Western Hemisphere, and to tie Latin America commercially to the United States.[140] The collapse of the monarchy coincided with the Washington Conference, and one of the first measures taken by the republican government was to place Salvador de Mendonça, a renown admirer of the United States, at the head of its delegation in Washington, thus inaugurating the so-called 'Americanization' of Brazilian foreign policy.[141] Brazil did not support Blaine's *Zollverein*, but, in the ensuing Pan-American Conferences, broadly sided with the United States on the 'political questions' concerning the inviolability of sovereignty, and the right of states to enforce pecuniary claims.[142] Accordingly, Brazil did not support the Drago Doctrine proposed by Argentina, and, together with Chile, opposed compulsory arbitration. Furthermore and importantly, Brazilian jurists were sceptical about the proposal of Chile's Alejandro Álvarez to codify a separate (Latin) American international law.[143] As Manoel Álvaro de Souza Sá Vianna argued, the legal idiosyncrasies of the region would hardly justify their elevation to the status of international law. Latin America, he posited, had only recently been admitted to the community of 'civilized' nations, and such mischievous attempts would undermine their reputation in the eyes of European powers.[144]

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[140] See Whitaker 1954; Mecham 1961; Inman 1965; Sheinin 2000.
[141] For instance Topik 1996, 83-84.
[142] Mecham 1961, 49.
[143] Álvarez 1909.
[144] Sá Vianna 1912, 61-62; Obregón 2006c, 1004-1005; Esquirol 2012, 564-565.

The adherence to the (European) international law seems only superficially at odds with Brazil's activism during at the Second Hague Conference. Brazil chose not to attend the First Hague Conference of 1899, a fact that was lamented by the British minister in Rio de Janeiro ('Brazil has of late years unwisely allowed herself to drop out of international society').[145] The reasons for Brazil's abstinence remain unexplored in the literature. The official rationale cited the impact that the recent financial crisis had on its armed forces, and the fact that the conference dealt with purely European matters, which is why, 'in view of her great distance and her lack of influence in the political affairs of Europe', Brazil had no interest in attending.[146] It seems that, unlike Mexico, Brazil underestimated the importance of the conference: a mistake that Rio de Janeiro would not make when invited again in 1907.[147] As Smith points out, at the Second Hague Conference, the Brazilian delegation (seemingly) sided with the United States in endorsing the 'Porter Convention', a watered-down version of the Drago Doctrine, which, contrary to the Argentine proposals, allowed for the use of force in the recovery of 'contract debt' in cases where states refused to arbitrate or failed to comply with an award.[148] Paradoxically, and a fact that seems to have escaped the aforementioned author, Brazil did not sign the convention.[149] Nor did Porter's proposal meet the approval of the Spanish American delegates, who accounted for 16 of the

[145] Cited in Smith 1991, 28.
[146] Note from 27 January 1899, cited in Scott 1915, vi.
[147] For contemporary accounts of the Hague Conferences, see Higgins 1909; Hicks 1908; Lapradelle and Stowell 1908; for conference proceedings, Scott 1915; 1920-1921; and Finnemore 2003, 24-51; Finnemore and Jurkovich 2014; Simpson 2004, 132-164., for more recent treatments
[148] Smith 1991, 57-62; on the 'Porter Convention', see Hicks 1908, 542; Boyle 1999, 80-81; Lipson 1985, 74; Newcombe and Paradell 2009, 8-10.
[149] This can be explained by a careful study of Brazil's reading during the Ninth Plenary Meeting of 16 October. Brazil's 'endorsement' was a concealed support for the European practice of 'gunboat diplomacy': 'The formula presented by the delegation of the United States of America mentions frankly a possible appeal to force, and it should be praised for so doing', cited in Scott 1920-1921, I, 551.

44 states present in 1907.[150] It seems somewhat misleading, then, to argue that Latin American states managed to 'persuade creditor states to sign an international treaty at The Hague in 1907 barring the practice' [of the use of force for the collection of pecuniary claims].[151] It was certainly not perceived that way at the time. Finnemore, however, is right in arguing that Latin Americans were successful in 'reframing the sovereign default issue in terms of legal principles of sovereignty rather than *pacta sunt servanda*'.[152] A central role in this regard was played by Brazil's Rui Barbosa, an influential liberal politician and drafter of the republic constitution of 1891. Barbosa confronted Washington on the question of the composition of the Permanent Court of Arbitral Justice, a predecessor organization of the International Court of Justice (ICJ). The United States delegation proposed a formula, supported by Britain and Germany, according to which all member states would be represented at the court, but whose judges would serve different terms, according to a state's rank on a complex grading scale that discriminated between great powers and several subcategories.[153] Brazil was grouped together with Argentina, China, and minor European powers, a categorization that was vehemently opposed by the South Americans. However, rather than making the case for their regional preponderance, an argument that Brazilian politicians were not shy to make in the regional context, Barbosa presented the issue in universal terms, as a violation of the principle of sovereign equality:

> Brazil as a sovereign State and in that respect the equal of any other sovereign State, no matter what its importance be, aspires only to a place, in the arbitration court, equal to that of the greatest or of the humblest State in the world.[154]

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[150] In addition to Brazil, Ecuador, Nicaragua, Paraguay, and Venezuela refused to sign, only Chile, Cuba, Mexico, and Panama signed the convention without reservations, see
1915, 91-95; 1920-1921, I, 698.
[151] Finnemore 2003, 26.
[152] Ibid., 26, emphasis in original.
[153] Scott 1920-1921, II, 610, 612-613; see also Simpson 2004, 140; Becker Lorca 2011, 29-30.
[154] Scott 1920-1921, II, 646.

In fact, the proposal would bear evidence of the ignorance at the 'core' of international society about the civilizational status of Latin American states:

> If Europe and the United States itself were better acquainted with our continent, no attempt would be made to inflict this grave injustice upon nations with a future before them and already remarkable because of the progress they have achieved. They are not tributary States such as are met with in other parts of the world; they are not peoples that have come to the end of their development as some of the Old World ranked above us in this hierarchy: they are nations in the full exuberance of youth that have inherited something from every European civilization and not so far removed, as may be supposed, from the intellectual center of this continent, and that, now in the full bloom of a marvelously robust life, have already passed beyond many of those placed above us in that unhappy classification, and that will soon have outstripped many others.[155]

Barbosa was applauded in Spanish America and celebrated in Brazil as the 'Eagle of The Hague'.[156] As Nabuco wrote to Rio Branco about his personal friend: 'Rui made a great name for himself at The Hague, and raised Brazil's profile as much as possible; this impression of intellectualism and culture is what we must take away from the Conference'.[157] Status and not stature was the aim of Brazilian foreign policy towards international society. The 'core' states, however, were unwilling to institute sovereign equality. In Europe and the United States, Brazilian intransigence was blamed for the failure to create the permanent court. According to Simpson, the experience with The Hague convinced critics of the necessity to limit participation in international governance in the form of a 'legalised hierarchy', as implemented at the League of Nations a decade later.[158] As *The Times* concluded:

[155] Ibid.
[156] Magalhães Júnior 1964; Cardim 2007.
[157] Nabuco to Rio Branco, 20 Oct 1907, cited in Dennison 2006, 183.
[158] Finnemore 2003, 34; Finnemore and Jurkovich 2014, 367; Simpson 2004, 133.

> The conference was predestined to fail, because the convocation of such a body at all was based upon a gross violation of the "law of facts" […] Everybody knows that all sovereign states are not equal […] The suggestion that they should submit to such a doctrine is simply fatuous. Such submission would involve the subjugation of the higher civilization by the lower, and would inevitably condemn the more advanced peoples to moral and intellectual retrogression.[159]

In the short term, the South American standpoint may have been self-defeating. In the long term, however, as Finnemore and Jurkovich elaborate, their efforts contributed to creating the expectation of universal participation under the unanimity rule at international conferences. Sovereign equality may have its roots in European international thought, but it was first instituted as a practice in the Western Hemisphere in the context of the inter-American conferences, from whence it became universalized in the course of the twentieth century.[160]

The more confrontational stance towards the United States adopted by the Brazilian delegation at The Hague contrasts with *rapprochement* within the hemisphere. Whereas US-Argentine relations turned tense in the wake of the Spanish-American War (Mexico, as noted above, underwent its own *rapprochement* at that time), Brazil officially supported Washington's unilateral interpretation of the Monroe Doctrine. Its support even extended to the Roosevelt Corollary, which arrogated to the United States an 'international police power' in cases where the inability or unwillingness of a state to meet its international obligations 'results in a general loosening of the ties of civilized society, [which] may in

[159] 20 Oct 1907, in Nabuco 1949, 291; translation by Hicks 1908, 545, who attributed the quote to a letter from 519 Oct of the same year.
[160] See Finnemore and Jurkovich 2014.

America, as elsewhere, ultimately require intervention by some civilized nation'.[161] The Roosevelt Corollary was the 'Americanization' of what has been described as the 'standard of civilization' by the English School, based on the notion of a civilizational hierarchy within the Western Hemisphere. Brazil's approval therefore requires explanation. As Topik argues, the United States was interested in stabilizing the young republic, and in expanding its commercial presence in South America, leading to the Blaine-Mendonça treaty of 1891.[162] The reciprocity treaty was unpopular within Brazil, raising the spectre of North American domination, and foreign interference similar to the situation during British pre-eminence under the treaty of 1827.[163] The conclusion of the treaty contributed to the downfall of Deodoro da Fonseca, who, in 1889, had headed the military coup against the Emperor, and was forced to resign by a naval revolt in late 1891 in favour of the vice-president, Floriano Peixoto. Two years later, Peixoto, almost faced the same fate, as naval officers also demanded his resignation. Britain and the United States were drawn into the domestic quarrel, as the Peixoto government played up fears that Britain would back the rebels to restore the monarchy in Brazil. Although there is little evidence of such plans, US naval forces finally broke up the blockade to ensure free navigation.[164]

Why did Brazil support the United States if recent events demonstrated that the South Americans, too, could be the object of Washington's 'international police power'? For one, in Brazil's case, the intervention favoured the incumbent government, which successfully

[161] Cited in Bailey 1967, 184.
[162] Topik 1996.
[163] Smith 1991, 6.
[164] Graham 1968, 306-311; see also Smith 1991, 23; Topik 1996, 146-154; Cervo and Bueno 2011, 189.

played off Britain and the United States to its ends.[165] Commercial reasons were another factor, as Brazil was eager to find an outlet for its sugar and coffee industry. Yet the 'unwritten alliance' must be understood as part of the complexities of Brazilian foreign policy that took shape under José Maria da Silva Paranhos, the Baron of Rio Branco.[166] The son of a former prime minister rose to fame due to his role in a territorial dispute with Argentina that was submitted to US arbitration and awarded to Brazil in 1895. In 1902, Rio Branco was appointed Minister of Foreign Affairs, a position that he held until 1912. During his tenure, Brazil professionalized its foreign service, reorganized the armed forces, and worked vigorously to increase its international standing. Towards his South American neighbours, Rio Branco pursued a strategy of territorial expansion by legal means, even if at times under the threat of force, as in the case of Acre: a rubber-rich region that Bolivia ceded in the treaty of Petrópolis in exchange for 2 million pounds (1903). During his office, Rio Branco concluded boundary treaties with all of Brazil's neighbours, achieving substantial territorial gains roughly the size of France.[167] The period was also marked by heightened tensions with Argentina, Brazil's long-term rival. In a recent re-assessment, Preuss argues that the experience of the Paraguayan War led Brazil's elites to reconsider their historical disregard for Spanish America, and Argentina in particular. While considered as anarchic and backwards during much of the empire, Brazilian republicans in particular came to associate Argentina with progress and prosperity. Monarchists, by contrast, remained suspicious about Spanish Americans, and blamed republicanism for the

[165] This goes against the interpretation of Topik 1996, 153, according to which the United States used to incident to demonstrate its resolve to Britain. Note that this implies that the two powers were not merely competing over commerce, as British trade was equally affected by the treaty.
[166] Lafer 2000, 214-215.
[167] Mares 2001, 125.

political turmoil of the 1890s.[168] This may also explain Bethell's objection that Brazilians continued to see themselves as separate from Latin America during the period.[169] While loyal to the country, leading intellectuals and statesmen of the 'Old Republic', such as Manuel de Oliveira Lima and Joaquim Nabuco, did not abandon their monarchist convictions. As an abolitionist, Nabuco warned that European immigration to Argentina could permanently shift the balance of power in favour of Argentina.[170] As a diplomat for the Republic, he then became a self-proclaimed 'Monroeist' and staunch defender of Washington's Pan-American initiative in his later years. Yet Nabuco did not significantly revise his negative view about Brazil's Spanish-speaking neighbours.[171] Quite the contrary, the inability of Spanish Americans to govern effectively gave rise to the need for a powerful hegemon, e.g. the United States, to establish order in the region, a view that he shared with Rio Branco.[172] It is insightful, for instance, that Nabuco complained to Rio Branco that, as result of their 'historical failure', two Spanish American *republiquetas* would have the same voting rights as Brazil in the International Bureau of American Republics (renamed the Pan-American Union in 1910).[173] The position stands in contrast with Brazil's insistence on sovereign equality at the international level. 'It is one thing for Brazil', Nabuco reflected upon the bad publicity that Barbosa received in the British and US press, 'to use its best efforts to enter the inner circle [*círculo director*] of the civilized world, to which the simple fact of representation as justified by Rui contributes, […] but it is another thing to demand this for Haiti, Honduras, Panama, etc., in all the same

[168] Preuss 2011, 34; 2012.
[169] Bethell 2010a.
[170] Nabuco 1977 [1833], 3, 163.
[171] Bethell 2010b; on Nabuco's 'Monroesim', see Nabuco 1950, 312-313; Dennison 2006, 143-151.
[172] Bethell 2010b, 81; Dennison 2006, 150-151; Cervo and Bueno 2011, 196-197.
[173] Bethell 2010b, 86.

international standing that great powers have'.[174] Whereas at The Hague, 'sovereign equality' was to bolster Brazil's standing in international society, in the Western Hemisphere, the principle did not seem as absolute anymore.

The rivalry between Argentina and Brazil has been described in Burr's classic study on the balance-of-power-politics in South America.[175] In the early twentieth century, this animosity developed into an open naval arms race after Brazil commissioned three dreadnought battleships in Britain. Tensions between the two states extended beyond mere *raison d'état* as Rio Branco and his Argentine counterpart Estanislao Zeballos harboured a personal enmity that reached its highpoint when Zeballos claimed in 1908 to possess evidence (in the form of a falsified telegram allegedly send by Rio Branco to Brazil's Chile legation) that testified to Brazil's bellicose intentions towards Argentina. However, while stature concerns guided Brazilian foreign policy towards the River Plate, status remained crucial in its relations with Europe. As others have noted, one of Brazil's principal aims was to increase its international prestige. [176] Preuss, for instance, suggests that Rio Branco actively constructed an image of Brazil as peaceful and law-abiding power, with himself at the centre as part of a 'well-orchestrated propaganda campaign and a conscious exercise in personal and international image-building'.[177] Although the international reception at The Hague was mixed, overall the policy bore fruit with regard to the United States. After Mexico, Brazil was the second Latin American country to have its Washington legation upgraded to the status of an embassy. Nabuco became the first Brazilian ambassador in

[174] Nabuco to Aranha, 2 Sep 1907 in Nabuco 1949, 287-289, quote on 288.
[175] See, for instance, Burr 1965; Kelly 1997; Resende-Santos 2007.
[176] Burns 1966; Smith 1991, 52; Cervo and Bueno 2011, 191.
[177] Preuss 2011, 199.

1905, much to the annoyance of the Argentine minister. As Epifanio Portela reported in a confidential note, 'the distinction was not consistent with the importance of these countries that were artificially elevated to the rank of a great power', citing, among other things, the racial composition of these countries as argument against such standing ('For then, should not China occupy the highest rank among those who constitute the family of nations?').[178]

The leaders of the republican revolution were strongly influenced by Comtean positivism. In fact, Brazil's late-nineteenth century elite subscribed more fully to the French ideology than their peers in Argentina and Mexico, whose motto 'order and progress' still adorns the Brazilian flag to this day. The belief that all social life was subject to scientific laws, and could be engineered accordingly, also influenced race relations in the country. Although positivism and scientific racism are two separate intellectual currents, the former strengthened the conviction that human beings could be categorized and ranked hierarchically. One paradoxical result of the diffusion of scientific racism was, as George Reid Andrew demonstrates for the case of São Paulo, that informal discrimination against Afro-Brazilians actually increased after the abolition of slavery. Although Brazil never imposed legal racial segregation as existed in post-Civil War United States, the marginalization of blacks continued as employers preferred white Brazilians and Europeans, who immigrated to Brazil in larger numbers following abolition.[179] Similarly, although immigration from Asia was allowed in 1892, preference was given to Japanese,

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[178] 18 May 1906, AH0004, Serie 25.
[179] Andrews 1991.

who, according to Lesser, were perceived as 'whiter' than immigrants from other Asian nations.[180]

The popularity and scientific prestige of racist theories and eugenics in late-nineteenth and early-twentieth century Brazil received considerable scholarly attention.[181] One pioneering work in the English-speaking literature is Skidmore's study of racial 'whitening' in Brazil.[182] As in the Spanish American cases, Brazilian elites were observant of the racial theories that emanated from Europe, as well of the political consequences that the presence of a large non-white population implied. It is important to keep in mind that this is the intellectual context of Lorimer's tripartite distinction of humanity into 'civilized', barbarous' and 'savage' peoples, according to which only 'civilized' societies had the right to 'plenary political recognition'.[183] In this sense, discursively framing Brazil as uncivilized did not merely signify that it was backwards and lagging behind modernity, that its inferior status implied a subordinate standing within the community of states. The late nineteenth century was a time when European powers agreed to divide up the African continent at the Berlin Conference of 1884-1885, allegedly justified by the innate inability of Africans to govern themselves.[184] As noted above, as the offspring of European colonization, Latin America was formally regarded as part of 'civilized' humanity, even if in practice and discourse, Europeans (and elites in the United States) were more ambiguous about the civilizational merits of these states. 'New imperialism' at the core of international society also heightened fears that Europeans, and the United States would entertain expansionist

[180] Lesser 2013, 15-16.
[181] Skidmore 1974; 1990; Stepan 1991; Borges 1993; Schwarcz 1993.
[182] Skidmore 1974; see also 1990.
[183] Lorimer 1883.
[184] On Brazilian's receptions of the Berlin Conference, see Dennison 2006, 144; Bethell 2010b, 79; Cervo and Bueno 2011, 196.

designs for a 'scramble for the Amazon', a long-standing concern that continues to trouble Brazil's military in the twentieth-first century.[185]

However, Brazil's elite did not merely copy these European theories. As in Spanish America, they borrowed selectively and interpreted scientific racism in light of their own particular circumstances. In Brazil, as in Argentina and Mexico, eugenics was based on neo-Lamarckian ideas about the impact of environmental influences on human evolution, which, unlike biological determinism, allowed for the betterment of races, for instance through education and sanitary policies.[186] Vague ideas about racial 'whitening' had circulated in Brazil since at least the independence period but acquired scientific prestige under these conditions. As Skidmore argues, late-nineteenth century elites were concerned that the non-white elements in the country's population would condemn Brazil to backwardness. 'Brazilian thinkers worried about their past—they asked themselves whether heavy miscegenation and the resulting racially mixed population had predestined them to perpetual third-class status as a nation'.[187] Racial 'whitening' was a way of dealing with this concern. However, in Brazil the dominant interpretation held that miscegenation would eventually lead to a 'whiter' population, as the dominant race would prevail. Rather than causing degeneration, as the theories of Gobineau and Le Bon suggested,[188] racial-mixing would, in the long term, solve the 'racial question'. Hence, although Brazilian intellectuals

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[185] The Amazon River was only opened during the War of the Triple Alliance in 1867; as Nabuco de Araujo argued in the Council of State: Brazil could not deny others what it demanded from Paraguay, and, as civilized state, Brazil had to adhere to the principles of free navigation as laid down by the Congress of Vienna, see Martin 1918, 149, 161; Topik 1996, 53-54; Hirst 2005, 47.
[186] In particular, Stepan 1991.
[187] Skidmore 1990, 7.
[188] Gobineau 1967 [1853-1855]; Le Bon 1898 [1894]. Note that Gobineau was posted to Brazil as French consul from 1869 to 1870, where, despite his disregard for Brazilian society, which would evidence 'the saddest form of degeneration', he developed a friendship with Peter II, see Biddiss 1970, 202; see also Raeders 1938.

did not participate in the 'Dispute of the New World' of the eighteenth and early-nineteenth century, they responded quite creatively (but not less racistly) when the degeneration thesis was resuscitated by the proponents of scientific racism.[189]

Racial thought and the desire to fully join civilized humanity influenced the way in which Brazil's elite thought about the standing of their state within international society. Analogous to similar projects in Buenos Aires and Mexico City, parts of Rio de Janeiro were remodeled on Haussmann's Paris, including the construction of tree-lined boulevards and representative public buildings, such as the Municipal Theatre and the National Library, causing significant dislocation of the urban poor.[190] As the accounts of Skidmore and others illustrate, an important aim of these initiatives was to influence the opinion that foreigners had about the country.[191] Republican Brazil also continued to showcase the country at international fairs, an attempt to bolster its status along the lines defined by Peter II—although not necessarily as successfully as Argentina and Mexico, whose pavilions fared better in the eyes of the jury at the 1899 Paris exposition.[192] Lastly, perhaps the best illustration of the importance of appearing 'civilized' in the eyes of (European) international society was the policy of the Baron of Rio Branco to deploy only 'tall, well groomed, and personally attractive' diplomats to Europe's capitals, preferably married to wives who were 'white or near-white in appearance' and fluent in English and French.

[189] Borges 1993, 237.
[190] Needell 1987; Meade 1997.
[191] Skidmore 1999, 76-79.
[192] Pesavento 1997; Fey 2000, 79.

Even a formidable figure such as Rio Branco, Freyre concludes, 'allowed himself to be carried to Aryanist extremes'.[193]

Although dissident voices that opposed scientific racism, these were a minority prior to the outbreak of the First World War,[194] which, as elsewhere in Latin America, undermined Europe's status and led elites to question their own Eurocentrism. An illustrative example of the growing scepticism at the turn of the twentieth century is Euclides da Cunha's *Os Sertões*, a classic of Brazilian literature that, although published half a century later, is often compared to Sarmiento's *Facundo*.[195] Da Cunha's reflected on the military expedition against a rebellious millenarian community in Canudos, in the interior of Bahia, which the author had accompanied as a correspondent for a newspaper from São Paulo. Like Sarmiento, da Cunha traced the character of the people back to the harsh environment of the *sertão* or backlands of Brazil's Northeast. In this view, it was the mix-raced *caboclo*, and not the mulatto of the coastal regions, that was 'the backbone of our race'.[196] Like the Argentine writer-politician, he also explained the campaign in terms of the dichotomy between civilization and barbarism ('We are condemned to civilization. Either we shall progress or we shall perish').[197] Yet what da Cunha ultimately describes is how the supposedly civilized army slid back into barbarism itself in dealing with the rebellion. As in 'metropolitan' debates in Britain over the 'scorched earth' campaign against the Boers at

[193] Freyre 1986, 202.
[194] Skidmore 1990, 17.
[195] da Cunha 1957 [1902].
[196] Ibid., 464.
[197] Ibid., 54

that time, the ideal of civilization could also be turned against those acting in the name of progress.[198]

It was only after the fall of the Old Republic in the 1930s that Brazil's elites turned racial theories on their heads. Not unlike *hispanismo* in Argentina and analogous to the exaltation of *mestizaje* in Mexico, racial and cultural miscegenation became celebrated by the proponents of 'racial democracy', which became an officially-endorsed ideology during Getulio Vargas's 'New State'. At its core lies the belief that Brazil had always been a colour-blind society, where three races—blacks, Indians, and whites— lived together and intermingled free from race-based discrimination. In its modern form, this myth goes back to Gilberto Freyre's *The Masters and the Slaves*, in which the author, the descendant of a planter family from Recife, explains the country's social history as a result of the intimate life between slavers and slaves that revolved around the 'big house' (*casa grande*) of the plantation. Although 'racial democracy' continues to play an important role in Brazilian's self-understanding, it has been exposed as a historical myth, and Freyre charged with idealizing the plantation patriarchy and exploitation of African slaves.[199] At the same time, however, it should also be recognized that Freyre's account provided an integrative narrative for the revalorization of Afro-Brazilians and their contributions to Brazilian culture. 'Racial democracy' tends to be analyzed as an idiosyncrasy of the country's history, and contrasted with the United States, where race relations were defined by segregation until the 1950s. Yet 'racial democracy' should also be read in its regional and international context. It was but one manifestation of how Latin Americans dealt with their

[198] See, Thompson 2002, 314; a similar observation is made with regard to China by Phillips 2012.
[199] For a discussion, see Needdell 1995; da Costa 2000, 234-246.

supposed inferiority that stemmed from racial miscegenation: a view that became less and less acceptable to elites at the core of international society, at the same time as racist ideologies were on the rise at the heart of Europe. As such, 'racial democracy' was a form of status management. It is therefore not surprising that the 1930s saw manifestations of a growing self-confidence in the civilizational status of Brazil, as evidenced, for instance, by the founding of *Civilização Brasileira*, a publishing house that opened in 1932. The civilizational status of Brazil played an important role in how nineteenth-century elites thought about Brazil's standing in international society. The First World War marked a turning point in that its elites called into question the image that saw Brazil as falling short of the supposedly universal standard defined by Europe.

8. Conclusion

Brazil's history is illustrative of the ambiguities of nineteenth-century international society. The preservation of Braganza rule facilitated international recognition, but it did not necessarily signify that the South American state was regarded as an equal member of international society at the time. Brazilian elites, for their part, were aware of the liminal standard that was accorded to their state. Following the interpretative framework that distinguishes between stature, role, status conception of international stratification, the Brazilian case illustrates that, similar to their Spanish American counterparts, Brazilians elites largely conceived nineteenth-century international society as ordered by status. While regularly pursuing balance-of-power politics towards the region, internationally, they thought to increase Brazil civilizational prestige.

The establishment of an independent monarchy headed by a European prince provided the new state with a degree of legitimacy that many Spanish American states lacked in the first decades of independent statehood. The acceptance of Brazilian independence by the 'parent' sovereign then opened the way for recognition from the Holy Alliance and the Holy See, which bolstered the new regime against its domestic contenders. The fact that the principle of dynastic legitimacy was respected in Brazil explains the relatively short period between its declaration of independence in 1822 and diplomatic recognition by the major European powers. The preservation of the Braganza monarchy is furthermore important for understanding the relative political stability that Brazil achieved during the first decades of independent statehood. Political stability in turn allowed the empire to meet its international obligations, which is why, unlike its Spanish American neighbours, Brazil was not forced to default on its foreign debt in the late 1820s.

At the same time, however, the case also poses a challenge to the argument that 'unequal treaties' and extraterritoriality were legal institutions imposed only on non-Christian, non-European peoples. This implies that extraterritoriality was either less significant for determining the standing of a country within nineteenth-century international society than conventionally believed, or Gong's argument that the principal dividing line was civilizational is fundamentally flawed. This is even more striking when taking into account the fact that extraterritoriality in Brazil was not enforced on the new state *ex nihilo*, but as an institution inherited from Portugal, where foreign merchants—particularly the English factory—had enjoyed similar privileges for centuries. The Brazilian case is noteworthy because, at first glance, the circumstances of its emancipation suggest an unproblematic incorporation into international society. However, if extraterritoriality and the existence of

‘unequal treaties’ are taken as evidence for the inferior status or even exclusion of the Ottoman Empire, China and Japan, the treaty of 1827 raises serious doubts about Brazil’s standing during the first decade following independence; and this, despite the fact that Brazil became a constitutional monarchy headed by a European dynasty.

Hence, rather than thinking of international society in terms of an European order based on sovereign equality that gradually expanded to encompass the entire globe, it is more appropriate to conceive of international society in terms of a hierarchical order whose organizing principles underwent major transformation as non-European states engaged more closely with European powers and demanded their rights to be equally recognized and respected. Similar to their Spanish American counterparts, Brazilian elites were cognizant of these ambiguities. They resented the extraterritorial privileges that foreigners enjoyed in the country, and were quite aware that Brazil, despite its ‘Western credentials’, was regarded as exotic and somewhat unqualified to join the ‘core’ of international society. Stature thinking played an important role in how Brazilians thought about the place of their state within the region. Brazil used its weight to strong-arm its smaller neighbours into border agreements that were, generally, more favourable to the Brazilians, and it consciously engaged in an arms race with Argentina at the turn of the twentieth century. However, towards international society, it was first and foremost status that influenced the way in which Brazilian elites thought about the standing of their state. The same applies to role conceptions, ideas about Brazil’s place within the international division of labour were hotly contested during the independence period and resurfaced when the republic negotiated a commercial agreement with the United States, yet, for most of the time, the export of agricultural produce was not regarded as problematic. Nor did Brazilian elites

envision a similar leadership role as their Argentine and Mexican counterparts—the idea of a common condominium with the United States during the times of Roosevelt being an exception here. Similarly, while Barbosa's insistence on sovereign equality at the Second Hague Conference indicates an awareness of role differentiation, as states possessed different legal privileges and obligations, it was also perceived as contributing to Brazil's status within the community of 'civilized' states.

CHAPTER 7

CONCLUSION

1. Standing in International Society

Argentina, Mexico, and Brazil occupied a liminal position within nineteenth-century international society. The new states were recognized diplomatically in the 1820s by European powers and the United States, but they were not regarded as fully-fledged members of the community of 'civilized' states. A central insight of this dissertation is that Latin American states lacked sufficient status to enter the 'core' of nineteenth century international society—and this despite their purported 'Western' credentials of having a predominantly Christian population and an elite of European descent that drew on European ideas and institutions in the creation of the these new states.

Latin America's experience with nineteenth-century international society sheds light on the shortcomings of the English School account of the expansion of international society. According to the orthodox narrative, international society, understood as a community of states whose members share common expectations about the conduct of international relations, emerged first in Europe, from whence it spread to encompass the entire globe. In its origins, this view suggests, international society was limited to Europe and its offshoots overseas, 'white settler societies' that resulted from European colonization inhabited by peoples of European stock and culture. Political communities that fell outside the 'West' were initially excluded from this community of 'civilized'

states. Furthermore, the orthodox narrative posits that in order to become members of international society, non-Western peoples had to comply with the so-called 'standard of civilization', which required far-reaching social and political reforms. While the English School account is useful for understanding the obstacles that political communities in Africa, Asia, and the Middle East had to overcome in order to gain international recognition, the sharp distinction between equal members on the one side, and unequal non-members on the other, fails to take into consideration the stratified nature of international order. This becomes apparent when thinking about the standing of Latin American states in nineteenth-century international society. As the case studies illustrate, Argentina, Mexico, and Brazil were formally recognized as members of international society, but they did not stand on an equal footing with European powers, and, somewhat curiously, the United States.[1] Elites at the 'core' of international society regularly portrayed these cases as unruly an uncivilized, ultimately contributing to relegating these Latin American countries to a subordinate place within the community of states.

2. Dimensions of International Stratification

Building on a critique of the legal-formalism that underpins English School theorizing, this dissertation advanced an ideal-type conception of standing that distinguishes between the stature, role, and status, of a state. The underlying argument is that the international order comprises multiple dimensions of stratification. The political relevance of these dimensions stems from the fact that people act on the basis of the meaning that other people and objects have to them. As elaborated above, this is an

[1] The dissertation consequently departs from the treatment of the Western Hemisphere as single historical space in the tradition of Bolton's 'borderland thesis', such as Hennessy 1978, and more recently, Weber 1992; Adelman and Aron 1999; Dunkerley 2000; Jones 2007.

essentially Weberian understanding of 'social action' that also informs constructivist arguments about the relationship between ideas and human action in world politics. It follows from this reflectivist understanding that the way in which hierarchy influences international politics is through agents' perception of the logic of stratification and their particular place therein. This is not to deny the importance of material facts, such as military power and economic interests. What this suggests, however, is that people do not mechanically respond to external stimuli, but that ideas and perceptions matter to people's actions. To draw on Weber's arguments once more, ideas operate like 'switchmen' who condition the kind of conceivable action that actors might pursue.[2]

Stature

It is important at this point to summarize some of the findings of this study. According to the conceptualization of standing proposed in Chapter 3, it is possible to analytically distinguish three dimension of international stratification, identified as stature, role, and status. The first dimension is stature, which refers to the rank of a state based on its material capabilities. Stature is the most conventional way in which IR theorists have thought about international standing, based on considerations of the size of a state's territory, its population, economy, and military strength. This ordering principle matters most when foreign policy elites regard international society as primarily ordered by stature. The result—that is, the corresponding 'logic of social action'—is a policy that seeks to strengthen a state's stature, typically through balance-of-power politics, which can be achieved externally through the formation of alliances, or internally, for instance, by increasing the material capabilities of a state.

[2] Weber 1947 [1922-1923], 252; see also Chapter 2.

An illustrative example of stature thinking is late-nineteenth century European politics under the impact of Bismarck's *realpolitik*. Intended as a means to achieve German unification under Prussian leadership, the rise of Germany at the heart of Europe caused stature concerns in other countries. Influenced by the prevailing Social Darwinist ideas of the time, stature politics inaugurated an era of heightened geopolitical competition that ultimately escalated into WWI.[3] The example is a classic case of a 'security dilemma', in which the attempt of one state to achieve security by military means causes security concerns in others. Thusly understood, a 'security dilemma' does not automatically result from the distribution of material capabilities among states, but rather from agent's perceptions of others as a threat.[4] The implications of the argument for nineteenth-century Latin America are obvious, where, towards the late nineteenth century, geopolitical competition was regarded as the 'normal' state of affairs in international politics.

The three cases under study are large territorial states, but which were relatively sparsely populated, economically underdeveloped, and, compared to European powers, militarily weak, hence the common view that, once independent, Latin American states came under international tutelage, first by Britain as part of its 'informal empire', then by the United States, who long regarded the Western Hemisphere as its rightful and exclusive 'sphere of influence'. But does this interpretation fully account for the standing of Latin American states in nineteenth-century international society? The argument of this dissertation suggests that this is only partly the case. Understanding the place accorded to Latin American states requires an appreciation of how elites on both

[3] This is lies the heart of the so-called 'security dilemma' according to which, defensive means by one state are equivocally interpreted as offensive by another, see Jervis 1976. For a recent re-assessment of the causes of WWI that emphasizes the political and intellectual context under which decisions towards war were made, see MacMillan 2014.
[4] The term goes back to Herz 1950; see also Jervis 1976.

sides of the Atlantic thought about international politics and the nature of international order.

It is true that Mexico suffered a disastrous military defeat against the United States. Yet it should also be noted that, in other cases, Latin American states proved remarkably resilient in the face of external threats. The defeat of Popham's expedition to occupy the River Plate is a case in point, as is the defeat of the French invasion in Mexico that ended in the execution of the Habsburg prince Maximillian in 1867. The notion that the Monroe Doctrine and Washington's policy of 'strategic denial' prevented European intrusions in the region is misleading. For one, the United States did not have the military capabilities to close off the Western Hemisphere from European interference, especially given the lack of a naval force that could have confronted Britain for much of the nineteenth century. For another, Europeans simply did not regard Latin America as fit for colonization. Although diplomatic recognition did not signify an equal standing in international society, the difference that international recognition made is apparent towards the late nineteenth century. Europeans parcelled out Africa and parts of Asia and the Middle East amongst themselves, but they did not harbour such schemes for Latin America. Although elites in Europe and the United States often compared Latin American countries to 'semi-barbarous' societies, they did so to denote the inferior standing of these states within international society.

Stature concerns also played a role in the foreign relations of Latin American states. The case study on Mexico illustrates how expectations about the future power and wealth of their country led Mexican elites to adopt a strikingly self-confident position in their negotiations for recognition with European powers and the United States. Stature

thinking was also relevant in the relations between Latin Americans, as clearly evidenced in the competition between Argentina and Brazil over the control of the River Plate basin, leading to war in the 1820s, their continued involvement in Uruguayan politics thereafter, and, ultimately, to the War of the Triple Alliance against Paraguay. Towards the end of the nineteenth century, stature thinking also sparked an arms race between Argentina and Brazil (and, in fact, Chile) but which, importantly, did not lead to international war, thus demonstrating once more that balance-of-power politics do not follow a mechanical automatism. As elaborated above, these episodes of geopolitical competition were not the result of structural forces, as some analysts claim, but emerged during particular historical moments when elites consciously engaged in such politics. The question of what makes elites adopt stature thinking cannot be answered conclusively here. What the experiences of Argentina, Mexico and Brazil suggest, however, is that elite conceptions were significantly shaped by international influences and events. Hence, stature thinking among Mexican elites ended in the wake of the Mexican-American War, and only resurfaced towards the turn of the twentieth century. Similarly, European 'new imperialism' influenced politics in Argentina and Brazil, and are clearly reflected in the writings of Estinislao Zeballos and the Baron of Rio Branco. To put it differently, elites may adjust their perspective according to the concrete material capabilities of their state, but they also take cues about the appropriate 'logic of social action' at a particular point in time from international society itself.

However, although stature considerations were important at particular points in time, it was also suggested that its political relevance remained largely confined to the region. Latin American states recurrently balanced against each other, but they did not regard the increase of stature as viable means to gain full recognition in international society.

The point is not self-evident. At the turn of the twentieth century, Argentina ranked among the ten most prosperous countries in the world. Yet it did not opt for increasing its standing through an expansion its stature by military conquest, a strategy that Meiji Japan pursued, and which, at least temporally, placed Japan among the world's major powers following the defeat of China in 1895 and Russia in 1905. Why did Argentina not embark on a similar project of militarist expansionism? A possible answer to this puzzle may be that the stature concern of Latin American did not extend beyond the region because international society was first and foremost regarded as status ordered. With regard to European states, in particular, status was the more prominent concern for much of the nineteenth century. In other words, viewed from the Latin American perspective, what was needed to gain standing in the community of states was status, discussed below, not material power.

Role

Role was identified as the second dimension of stratification. Role refers to the differentiation of states according to the tasks and functions they perform in international society. As such, it is the most complicated dimension of standing and further research is needed to clarify the relationship between role and stature on the one hand, and role and status on the other. The conceptual difficulty was illustrated in Chapter 3 with reference to the category of 'great power', which contains notions of stature, role, and status. As a role conception, great powerdom implies certain rights and responsibility for the management of order in international society, a function that does not automatically derive from military power or great material wealth. Empirically, stature and role may often be related; logically, great stature is not a requirement for the enactment of a particular role. The position that France occupied after WWII is an

example of this discrepancy. Although France's material capabilities declined in relative terms, the country continued to occupy a central (institutionalized) position as great power, consecrated by its permanent seat in the United Nations Security Council. The immediate justification for this role was France's contribution to the Allied war effort, although its deeper historical roots are to be found in European diplomatic history. Brazil, by contrast, was denied such a role in the aftermath of WWI and at the San Francisco Conference in 1945, despite the continental proportions of the South American giant and despite of having sided with the Allied cause during the war. The failure of the international community to vest Brazil with a managerial role in international affairs has been a lasting source of discontent, leading to its withdrawal from the League of Nations in 1926, and, in more recent years, to Brazilian demands for a reform of the Security Council. Role, then, is related to status because it requires social recognition and implies an estimation of honour, e.g. of that enjoyed by France at the time when the United Nations was created, but which Brazil apparently lacked.

The case studies shed light on the long-standing sense of international marginalization among Latin American elites. What emerges from the cases of Argentina, Mexico and Brazil is the view that role conceptions were generally less important than considerations of either stature or status. They were also more variegated.

Aspects of role thinking were important during the independence period, as evidenced, for instance, in the calls for greater autonomy from the European metropoles and in the debates over free trade. The polemic between Mariano Moreno, writing on behalf of the landowning families of Buenos Aires, and Miguel Fernández de Agüero, the envoy of the Spanish monopoly merchants, is but one historical example. The debate

demonstrates how widespread these concerns were, as it is one of the few cases where elites in imperial Brazil discussed the political proposals advanced by their Spanish American counterparts. To some extent, it could also be argued that the debate foreshadows some of the arguments and claims made by Latin Americans in the twentieth century about the negative effects of free trade. From the perspective of dependence theory, the international economic integration of Latin American countries as exporter for primary goods (in other words, the particular role they played in the capitalist world economy), relegated them to a position at the 'periphery'. Although dependency theory was formulated against the backdrop of Latin America's experience with the economic disruption of two world wars and the Great Depression, there are nevertheless important intellectual predecessors that are easily overlooked. Viewing these antecedents in their proper nineteenth-century context, however, it should also be noted that the opponents of free trade were in the minority, especially in the port cities of Buenos Aires and Rio de Janeiro, and, although engaging in contested debates, ultimately lost out against elites who believed in the teachings of Adam Smith, and who were strongly influenced by Physiocratic theory that taught them that agriculture was the ultimate source of a nation's power and wealth.

Within the region, role was furthermore relevant with regard to the leadership ambitions of individual states. All three cases under study had a rather difficult relationship to Bolivar's vision of political unity among (Spanish) American states. Although Mexico's Lucas Alamán supported the Congress of Panama, and, after its eminent failure, sought to reconvene the delegates at Tacubaya, as in Argentina, Mexican elites were wary about Bolívar's leadership ambitions that were detriment to their own. Brazil, by contrast, was only invited after much hesitation, but did not regard its participation as a

priority, nor did the Brazilian government side with Spanish America in the ensuing Inter-American Conferences. Although uncertain about their status within the wider community of states, Latin American elites envisioned a leadership role for their own state within the region.

Ideas about renegotiating the role that Latin America plays in international society resurfaced in the context of the Hague Conferences of 1899 and 1907. Brazil and Mexico were the only Latin American states invited to attend the First Hague Conference, but only the latter chose to attend, thus taking the lead in obtaining the adherence of Latin American states to the Hague conventions. The situation was strikingly different at the Second Hague Conference in 1907, which marked the first time that Latin American states participated at a major international conference in Europe. In more recent years, scholars have highlighted the agency of Latin American states in redefining the legitimate purpose of the use of force, and in significantly contributing to the institution of sovereign equality as practice in international society.[5] Many states seized the opportunity to increase their international profile. Argentina made a strong case for sovereign equality and, importantly, the principle of strict non-intervention, as many states in the region had suffered from European 'gunboat diplomacy' to recover pecuniary claims. To an important extent, Argentina played the role of a regional leader, who defended the interest of Latin American states: a function that the Argentine government was also happy to perform in the context of the Inter-American Conferences. Mexico, in turn, took a similar position calling for 'national treatment' of foreigners and the general prohibition of the coercive recuperation of debt, but adopted a more reconciliatory stance towards the United States. Not all Spanish

[5] In particular, Finnemore 2003; Finnemore and Jurkovich 2014; see also Helleiner 2014.

American states pursued the same political aims, nor was the division between Spanish America on the one side, and Brazil, on other side, that clear cut. The fact that the diverging foreign relations of Argentina and Mexico stemmed to an important extent from different patterns of trade—Argentina remained tied to European markets, while Mexico became economically integrated with the United States—does not deny the fact that in both cases elites entertained a particular vision about the role that their county should enact in the region. However, as Brazil's intervention at The Hague illustrates, with regard to Europe, status remained crucial. Although Rui Barbosa's defence of sovereign equality in 1907 was applauded by the Spanish American delegations, for Brazilians like Rio Branco and Joaquim Nabuco, the conference was first and foremost understood as an opportunity to increase the country's prestige in Europe. With regard to European powers, role remained a secondary concern.

Status

What emerges from all three cases, then, is the predominant preoccupation of Latin American elites with the status of their state. Status is the third dimension of standing that refers to estimations of honour and prestige. As noted above, Latin America was formally regarded as a member of the family of 'civilized' states, but elites in Europe and the United States were ambiguous about the civilizational status of Latin America. In the Spanish American cases, political instability confirmed pre-existing racial and cultural stereotypes about the inability of creoles to self-rule. The importance of these pejorative views in US foreign policy towards Latin America has been recognized in the literature.[6] However, what it often presented as a culturalist and racist bias of protestant elites in North America was actually far more widespread at the 'core' of international

[6] Schoultz 1998.

society. Britain's policy towards nineteenth-century Latin America, for instance, tends to be read as a function of its commercial and financial interests in the region. British pragmatism, in this sense, is contrasted with the 'hegemonic presumption' of the United States.[7] However, although economic interests were vital in both Britain and the United States, it should be kept in mind that views about the inherently unruly nature of Latin American states were not an idiosyncrasy of US foreign policy. As the case studies have illustrated, such stereotypes were a common among European powers and the United States, significantly contributing to creating a hierarchical order that relegated Latin American states to a subordinate place within that order.

Furthermore, while Spanish Americans bore the brunt of culturalist and racist stereotypes, they were often extended to Brazil, as well. The preservation of Braganza rule stabilized the Brazilian Empire politically and facilitated its recognition by European powers. Recognition not only legitimized the new regime internationally, but also in the eyes of potential domestic contenders. To illustrate the point, recall that Spanish intransigence on the matter prevented the Holy See from recognizing Mexico. Without bishops to perform ordinations, non-recognition led to a shortage of priests in the staunchly Catholic country, with adverse effect for its domestic legitimacy.

In Brazil, a similar dilemma was avoided due to the early recognition from the 'parent' sovereign, which opened the way for its recognition by the legitimist powers of Europe, including the Holy See. Whereas Spanish America was embroiled in protracted and highly destructive internecine wars, the Brazilian Empire was not only able to swiftly expel the remaining Portuguese forces, but also to militarily subdue domestic opposition

[7] The notion goes back to Lowenthal 1976.

in the provinces. Although localized rebellions continued to challenge the authority of the central states until the mid-nineteenth century, the imperial government was successful in preventing Brazil from breaking apart. The relatively smooth transition into independent statehood and political stability of the post-independence period was an important source of pride for Brazil's elites. However, as Chapter 6 elaborates, the price of Brazilian independence was its subordination under Britain. For one, this concerns the abolition of the slave trade, a contentious issue until the Aberdeen Act of 1850 left Brazil little choice but to enforce its prohibition. For another, Brazil inherited the Office of the Judge Conservator, a limited form of extraterritorial jurisdiction that British the subject enjoyed in Brazil. As argued above, Brazilian elites were well aware of the international implications of such legal exemptions, which would have placed Brazil on a similar footing with the Ottoman Empire and seemingly 'barbarous' states like China and Japan. They consequently resented the Judge Conservator and continuously tried to undermine the institution. The fact that the British government in London insisted on its establishment and continuation although British merchants operating in Brazil called for its abolishment has less to do with 'informal imperialism' than with the belief among British policymakers that the Brazilian authorities were unable to properly administer justice in the tropics.

The Brazilian case offers particular insight into the hierarchical nature of international society. Following the English School understanding, the Western members of nineteenth-century international society were formally equally, which distinguishes the 'insiders' from 'outsiders': mostly non-Western polities, which were regarded as uncivilized and consequently excluded from that order. Yet the Office of the Judge Conservator was created in Brazil in the wake of the transfer of the Portuguese Court to

Rio de Janeiro. It was an institution that had existed in Portugal for centuries as part of the special relationship between Britain and the Iberian crown. In this relationship, Portugal did not stand on an equal footing with Britain, nor did independent Brazil thereafter. What this implies is that the 'standard of civilization' did not demarcate the boundaries of international society, but rather the notion of civilization was instrumental in the social construction of a status hierarchy that was somewhat independent from consideration of stature or role. Rather than neatly distinguishing between 'insider' and 'outsiders' of international society, civilizational rhetoric established an international pecking order. Take Lord Palmerston's remarks of 1850, for example, according to which, 'half-civilised governments, such as those in China, Portugal, [and] Spanish America, require a dressing-down every 8 or 10 years to keep them in order'.[8]

Little in this quote suggests that the presumed 'Western' identity of Latin American states (or Portugal for the matter) distinguished them from allegedly uncivilized China. What the Latin American cases demonstrate is that the 'standard of civilization' did not apply to non-Western states alone. Furthermore and importantly, it also puts into contention that, despite their Western attributes, Latin American states not necessarily regarded as members of the family of 'civilized' states. [9] Although nineteenth-century jurists categorized Argentina, Mexico and Brazil as part of 'civilized' humanity, in practice, however, there was considerable uncertainty about their civilizational status. In fact, it is the attempt of the region's elites to comply with an externally defined standard

[8] Cited in Brown 2008a, 19, emphasis in original.
[99] This also calls into question essentialist definitions of Latin America's identity, as suggested by the accounts of Huntington 1993; 1996; 2004; and Wiarda 2001. For a critique, see Dunkerley 2000, 28; 2004, 107.

of 'modernity', Whitehead suggests, that has historically defined Latin America as a region.[10]

The uncertainty of Latin American elites about the civilizational status of their states underlines the futility of categorizing Latin America as either 'Western' or 'non-Western'.[11] The point pertains directly to the question of agency raised in the introduction of this study. It has become fashionable to ridicule the outward orientation of nineteenth-century elites as out of touch with the realities of their countries. It is difficult to deny the elitism of their projects. But the present analysis also warrants caution not to forget the limitations under which they envisioned their countries' future (what Alberdi aptly described as the discrepancy between 'possible' and 'true republic' in his constitutional outline).[12] There was an expectation among European powers that states had to comply with the requirements of 'civilized' life, and the failure to live up to these expectations had very concrete consequences. In this sense, elites in Argentina, Mexico, and Brazil were not simply 'aping' European ideas, but reflected on the very cues that they received from international society at the time.

The case studies provided ample evidence that Latin American elites were aware of the ambiguity about the standing of their states at the 'core' of international society. Latin American elites appropriated the civilizational ideal propagated by Europeans, and employed it domestically as a benchmark to criticize the shortcomings of their own societies. That European ideals guided nineteenth-century elites in their attempts to transform Latin American societies is widely understood. What is easily missed, however, is the relationship between civilizational rhetoric, as epitomized by

[10] Whitehead 2006, 16.
[11] Fawcett 2012.
[12] Alberdi 1915 [1852], 72.

Sarmiento's *Facundo*, and the stratified nature of nineteenth-century international society. Civilization was not only about achieving European modernity, but about bolstering the standing of their states. Elites in Argentina, Mexico, and Brazil were concerned that racial miscegenation would not only confine their societies to perennial backwardness, but, especially towards the late nineteenth century, that it would relegate their status to a subordinate position within international society and eventually undermine the formation of viable nation-states in the region. Polities that sought to promote European immigration and the 'whitening' of Latin America's racially mixed societies were, in this sense, part of the same politics of prestige as the attempts to remodel their capitals according to the Parisian ideal.

The carnage and barbarism of WWI seriously undermined the civilizational prestige of Europe in the eyes of Latin America's elites. It is no surprise that they increasingly turned to the United States for orientation, creating the mixture of admiration and contempt that defines US-Latin American relations to this day. Growing disillusionment with the European ideal also accounts for the particular kind of status management through which elites refined Latin America's cultural and racial traits in more positive terms were increasingly employed by elites. The exaltation of *mestizaje* in post-revolutionary Mexico is a case in point, as is the promotion of 'racial democracy' in Brazil as state ideology of Vargas' *Estado Novo*. Argentina underwent a similar process with *hispanismo* and the glorification (and romanticization) of the *gaucho* as embodiment of the Argentine nation. The revaluation of racial miscegenation in each case was not independent from international events. As exemplified in the case studies above, the recasting of Latin American's cultural and racial traits in a positive light

began already to take root during the late nineteenth-century. However, it was in the aftermath of WWI that this form of status assertion flourished.

3. Further Directions for Research

A revised English School approach provides a useful framework for moving the research on the standing of states in new directions. First, it needs to be recognized that Latin America is a large and highly heterogeneous world region. The experiences of Argentina, Brazil and Mexico with international society neither constitute representative cases, nor do they encompass the full spectrum of diversity that exists in the region. With this caveat in mind, the three cases were selected because they are crucial cases for appreciating the differences and similarities that exist within the region. Their relative importance means that these cases have received the bulk of scholarly attention, making a comparative historical analysis over the timespan of a century more feasible.

More importantly, however, they are crucial cases because, due their importance, it seems reasonable to assume that they were more likely to be accepted into 'core' of international society than other, more marginal, cases. The case studies, however, have revealed that this was not necessarily the case. Even formidable republics and a vast empire headed by a European monarch found it difficult to become fully accepted as equal in the community of 'civilized' states. Further research should therefore explore the experience of smaller states to investigate how far they shared the protracted history with international society. It is quite likely that Chile, located at the extreme end of the South American continent, bounded by the Andes and the Pacific Ocean, had a very different experience than the smaller Central American republics, which were far more exposed internationally (and closer to the United States), and politically less

consolidated than the Southern cone state. Deeper insights could also be gained from comparing countries with large indigenous populations, such as Bolivia, Ecuador, Guatemala, Mexico, and Peru, with cases where indigenous peoples have historically constituted only a small minority to examine whether these states were treated differently in international society. The findings of the present study suggest that this was not necessarily the case, as knowledge about 'peripheral' societies was limited at the 'core' and stereotypes about 'Natives' were easily transposed to other groups as the 'Dispute of the New World' illustrates. Hence the complaints of Argentine elites about the ignorance of Europeans regarding the true state of civilization in their country, and their insistence that Argentina was different from their tropical neighbours, most importantly Brazil. The Mexican case, however, does indicate that the presence of large indigenous communities influenced the way elites appropriated foreign ideas, which is most apparent in the case of nineteenth-century racial theories.

Secondly, the analysis should also be taken further to include a projection of the experience of Latin American states with international society in the twentieth and twentieth-first centuries. In more recent years, the view prevailed that Latin America is internationally on the rise, ending, to paraphrase the title of García Márquez' Nobel Prize-winning novel, two hundred years of solitude.[13] This begs the question of the historical legacies of perception of international marginalization,[14] and the strategies adopted by Latin American elites to increase the standing of their state today.

The scope of this dissertation was limited to the crucial 'long nineteenth-century' that encompasses the onset of independence in the wake of the Napoleonic Wars to the

[13] For instance Reid 2007.
[14] An example of such legacy is the 'national developmentalism' of Brazil's foreign ministry, Itamaraty, discussed in Chapter 3. On the problem of historical legacies in Latin American history, Adelman 1999a.

participation of Latin American states at the Second Hague Conference before the outbreak of WWI. This is by no means to suggest that Latin America's standing in international society can be taken for granted thereafter. Latin Americans participated more actively internationally, but perceptions of marginalization continued to be politically relevant, as evidenced by the complicated relations of Latin American states with the League of Nations during the interwar period, US hegemony and interventionism during the Cold War, and the attempts, in alliance with the 'Third World', to transform the international economic order in the 1970s. Importantly, this also includes the question of how Latin America ultimately contributed to transforming international society itself; how, for instance, ideas that were first developed in the region have reverberated in those post-colonial countries that, following WWII, were recognized diplomatically under right of peoples to self-determination, but whose place in the community of states has been called into question since then. Similarly, it also raises the question of how Latin American states shaped the institutions of international society themselves, for instance, by insisting on strict sovereign equality and universal participation in international organizations. They were not simple 'ruler takers'. An important implication of this study, then, is the need to take the agency of non-European peoples into account in revising the historical evolution of international society. The view that marginalized agents and 'subaltern' groups exercise agency in global affairs has gained consideration traction within history as a discipline leading, for instance, to the emergence of global history as a subfield.[15] Much of this literature has focused on societies outside the 'West', especially on China and the Indian subcontinent.[16] But there is no a priori reason to follow these predefined civilizational boundaries. As this study has emphasized, international society has historically been marked by many forms

[15] See, for instance, Acharya 2009; Acharya and Buzan 2010; Suzuki, Zhang, and Quirk 2013.
[16] Paradigmatic in this regard has been Bayly 2004.

of hierarchical relations that have only recently begun to be appreciated. With regard to Latin America, a fruitful area of research in this regard has been Cold War history, where more recent scholarship emphasizes the 'agency' of Latin Americans despite the vast power differentials that existed in comparison to the United States.[17] IR, by contrast, has considerably lagged behind this more recent trend due to its conventional emphasis on great powers as principal drivers of change.[18] However, as suggested above, even if international politics is characterized by hierarchy, this does not imply that subordinate actors lack agency. Rather, what is needed is a perspective that takes into consideration how liminal actors deal with inequality and how their initiatives ultimately fed back internationally and thereby contribute to transforming international society.

Thirdly, a particularly fruitful direction for further English School research is the comparison of Latin America with the experience of those states that occupied a similar liminal standing international society. The case of Meiji Japan has already been alluded to. Another interesting case is Tsarist Russia, which, like the Latin American states, 'lacked the social norms' to be admitted into the 'core' of international society,[19] and whose elites attempted to modernize the country domestically while projecting the image of civilization abroad. Brading, for instance, mentions in passing the similarities between Mexico's nineteenth-century liberals and conservatives on the one hand, and Russia's 'Westernizers' and 'Slavophiles' during the reign of Nicolas I, on the other.[20] Perhaps a similar comparison can be drawn between Argentina's Generation of 1837 and the conservative distractors. Further comparison could involve, for instance, a

[17] Harmer 2011; Darnton 2012; McPherson 2014.
[18] Exceptions include Shaw 2003 on cooperation in the Organization of American States (OAS); Laffey and Weldes 2008 on Cuban agency during the Missile Crisis of 1962.
[19] Neumann 2008b, 26.
[20] Brading 1985, 88-90.

contrast between the Ottoman Empire and the Braganza Empire in Brazil. There are a host of examples in which states were formally regarded as members of the international order yet failed to live up to the expectations formulated at the 'core' of international society. Contrasting their experiences and the way in which elites responded to the hierarchical international order with Latin American histories promises to provide further insights into the historical evolution of international society.

There is much to be learnt about the relative standing of states in intentional society. The present dissertation has made a contribution to understanding the multiple forms of hierarchy in international politics, and the place accorded to Latin American states therein.

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