Inventing the Veteran, Imagining the State:
Post-Conflict Reintegration and State Consolidation in Timor-Leste, 1999-2012

Thesis submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for
the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Politics
at the University of Oxford

by

Kate C. Roll

10 October 2014
Trinity Term

GREEN TEMPLETON COLLEGE
DEPARTMENT OF POLITICS & INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
MANOR ROAD BUILDING
UNIVERSITY OF OXFORD
Table of Contents

Acknowledgements ........................................................................................................iv
Glossary of Acronyms ..................................................................................................v
Abstract ...........................................................................................................................viii

Chapter I: Introduction
1 INTRODUCTION........................................................................................................ 1
   1.1 SITUATING THE CASE: REAPPRAISING REINTEGRATION ................................... 3
2 CASE SELECTION & METHODOLOGY .................................................................... 7
3 THE STUDY OF REINTEGRATION ........................................................................... 10
   3.1 CRITICAL APPROACHES TO DDR ................................................................. 12
4 CHAPTER OUTLINE .................................................................................................... 16
5 CONCLUSION .............................................................................................................. 19

Chapter II: Inventing the Veteran, Imagining the State
1 INTRODUCTION .......................................................................................................... 21
2 STATE-BUILDING AND THE STATE .......................................................................... 24
3 REINTEGRATION AS STATE-BUILDING ..................................................................... 28
   3.1 DATA VERIFICATION AS PERFORMANCE ...................................................... 31
   3.2 THE ANTI-POLITUICS OF REGISTRATION .................................................. 34
   3.3 DEMOBILISATION CEREMONIES AND EXCLUSION ..................................... 36
   3.4 REGISTRATION AND KNOWLEDGE-POWER ............................................. 39
4 IMAGINING THE NATION ............................................................................................ 46
   4.1 NATION-BUILDING AS POLITICS ................................................................... 48
5 CONCLUSION .............................................................................................................. 52

Chapter III: Historical Background - Resistance & Independence
1 INTRODUCTION .......................................................................................................... 55
2 PORTUGUESE COLONIAL ERA ........................................................................... 58
   2.1 COLONIAL LEGACIES ..................................................................................... 59
3 THE RESISTANCE ...................................................................................................... 62
   3.1 PORTUGUESE COLLAPSE AND INDONESIAN INVASION (1974-1975) .............. 63
   3.2 MASS MOBILISATION AND PACIFICATION (1975-1979) ............................ 65
   3.4 THE 1999 REFERENDUM AND INDONESIAN WITHDRAWAL .................... 72
4 THE RESISTANCE UNDER THE UN INTERREGNUM (1999-2002) ......................... 74
   4.1 CANTONMENT, DEMOBILISATION, AND ESTABLISHING THE F-FDTL ........... 74
   4.2 FALINTIL REINSERTION ASSISTANCE PROGRAMME (2001-2002) ............... 78
5 CONCLUSION .............................................................................................................. 84

Chapter IV: The Evolution of State-led Reintegration Programmes
1 INTRODUCTION .......................................................................................................... 87
   1.1 THE VALORISATION APPROACH ................................................................. 89
2 REGISTRATION: PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSIONS .................................................. 91
   2.1 FALINTIL REGISTRATION: CAVF AND CAAC ........................................... 92
   2.2 CAQR AND VERIFICATION COMMISSIONS: CVD, CCD AND CHSRR ......... 94
3 LEGAL FRAMEWORK ............................................................................................... 97
Acknowledgements

This work is dedicated to the madres of Timor-Leste. They have built oases of calm and safety; they looked after me. I will not forget their openhearted support.

Hau dedika tesis ida ne’e ba madre sira Timor-Leste nian. Sira hari’i uma kalma no seguru, no sira tau matan ba hau. Hau leble haluha oinsa sira fo apoiu ba hau ho laran luak.

***

My gratitude also extends to those with whom I spoke. They welcomed me into their homes, entertained my questions, and gave me their trust. The staff of Belun merit special mention for their support while I was in Dili, particularly their patience in helping the test early versions of the survey. A special thanks goes to my malae friends, too, particularly the incomparable Tracey Morgan and Wayne Lovell.

I also appreciate the help of those in Oxford. My supervisor, Professor Richard Caplan, has encouraged and supported this work since its inception as an MPhil project. Dr John Gledhill and Professor Nancy Bermeo provided inspiration at the confirmation stage, and Professor Nancy Bermeo and Professor Oliver Richmond offered their insights in the viva voce. Green Templeton College has provided me both with generous scholarship support and a community – both in the GCR and GTBC – for which I am grateful.

Finally, I thank my family – welcome Althea! – and friends, particularly the Thunderettes. The former for their love, forbearance, and trust; the latter for getting me outside, feeding me well, and making this time at the University of Oxford such a wonderful ride.

Thank you, thank you.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AFC ‘75</td>
<td>Association of Former Combatants of 1975</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APODETI</td>
<td>Timorese Popular Democratic Association (Associação Popular Democrática Timorense)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASDT</td>
<td>Timorese Social Democratic Association (Associação Social Democrática Timorense)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAAC</td>
<td>Commission for Former Combatants’ Affairs (Comissão para os Assuntos dos Antigos Combatentes)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAQR</td>
<td>Commission for Cadres of the Resistance’s Affairs (Comissão para os Assuntos dos Quadros da Resistencia)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAVF</td>
<td>Commission for FALINTIL Veterans’ Affairs (Comissão para os Assuntos dos Veteranos das FALINTIL)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAVR</td>
<td>Commission for Reception, Truth, and Reconciliation (Comissão de Acolhimento, Verdade e Reconciliação)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCD</td>
<td>Data Consolidation Commission (Comissão de Consolidisaun de Dados)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHSRR</td>
<td>Commission for Homage, Supervision of Registration, and Appeals (Comissão de Homenagem, Supervisão do Registo e Recursos)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CLN</td>
<td>National Liberation Combatant (Combatente Libertasaun Nasional); pension classification for individuals with less than four years of exclusive dedication</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CNRM</td>
<td>National Council of Maubere Resistance (Conselho Nacional da Resistência Maubere)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CNRT</td>
<td>National Council of Timorese Resistance (Conselho Nacional da Resistência Timorense); resistance organisation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CNRT</td>
<td>National Council for the Reconstruction of Timor-Leste (Conselho Nacional de Reconstrução do Timor); political party.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CPD-RDTL</td>
<td>Popular Council for the Defence of the Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste (Conselho Popular pela Defesa da República Democrática de Timor-Leste)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CRRN</td>
<td>Revolutionary Council of National Resistance (Conselho Revolucionária da Resistência Timorense)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CVD</td>
<td>Data Validation Commission (Comissão de Validação de Dados)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DDR</td>
<td>Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ETAN</td>
<td>East Timor Action Network</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Full Name</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>-----------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ETDF</td>
<td>East Timor Defence Force, precursor to F-FDTL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FALINTIL</td>
<td>Armed Forces for the National Liberation of Timor-Leste (Forças Armadas de Liberatação National de Timor-Leste)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F-FDTL</td>
<td>FALINTIL Defence Force of Timor-Leste (FALINTIL-Força Defesa de Timor-Leste)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FRAP</td>
<td>FALINTIL Reinsertion Assistance Program</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FRETILIN</td>
<td>Revolutionary Front for an Independent Timor-Leste (Frente Revolucionária de Timor-Leste Independente)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IMPETTU</td>
<td>The East Timorese Students and Youth Association (Ikatan Mahasiswa, Pemuda, dan Pelajar Timor Timur)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NUREP</td>
<td>Focal Points for the Popular Resistance (Núcleos de Resistência Popular)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-governmental Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OJECTIL</td>
<td>Organisation of Timorese Catholic Youth and Students (Organização de Juventude e Estudante Católica de Timor-Leste)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OPMT</td>
<td>Popular Organization for Timorese Women (Organização Popular da Mulher de Timor)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PERD</td>
<td>Special Retirement Pension with Distinction (Pensão Especial de Reforma ho Distinction); pension category for individuals with special distinction, e.g. former top leaders</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PER1</td>
<td>Special Retirement Pension 1 (Pensão Especial de Reforma 1); pension category for individuals with 20-24 years of exclusive dedication</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PER2</td>
<td>Special Retirement Pension 2 (Pensão Especial de Reforma 2); pension category for individuals with 15-19 years of exclusive dedication</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PMLF</td>
<td>Marxist-Leninist FRETILIN Party (Partido Marxista-Leninista FRETILIN)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PNTL</td>
<td>National Police of Timor-Leste (Polícia Nacional Timor-Leste)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSId</td>
<td>Special Subsistence Pension (Pensão Especial Subsistência); pension category for individuals with 8-14 years of exclusive dedication</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSInc</td>
<td>Special Subsistence Pension (Pensão Especial Subsistência – Incapasidade); pension category for individuals disabled as a direct result of the conflict</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSv</td>
<td>Survivors’ Pension (Pensão Sobrevivência); pension category for survivors of those killed as a direct result of the conflict</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Description</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSvD</td>
<td>Survivors’ Pension with Distinction (<em>Pensão Sobrevivência ho Distinction</em>); pension category for those killed as a direct result of the conflict, special distinction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PPU</td>
<td>Single Pecuniary Payment (<em>Prestação Pecuniária Única</em>); single payment made to individuals with 4-7 years of exclusive dedication</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RDTL</td>
<td>Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RENETIL</td>
<td>National Resistance of Timorese Students (<em>Resistencia Nacional dos Estudantes de Timor Leste</em>)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RESPECT</td>
<td>Recovery, Employment and Stability Program for Ex-Combatants and Communities in Timor-Leste</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UDT</td>
<td>Timorese Democratic Union (<em>União Democrática Timorense</em>)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>United Nations Development Program</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNTAET</td>
<td>United Nations Transitional Administration for East Timor</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Abstract

Conventional post-conflict state-building models approach disarmament, demobilisation, and reintegation (DDR) programmes as a means for state actors to delegitimise non-state sources of power and centralise control over coercive power with the state. The programmes carry the promise of new lives for conflict actors and a new, modern and technocratic approach to the exercise of force; they are thus central to post-conflict transformation. However, this thesis calls into question the naturalisation of ‘state’ and ‘conflict’ actors in DDR models. Instead, it finds that DDR programmes create these categories and, in doing so, serve to mask and facilitate continuities in elite power.

This thesis examines the case of Timor-Leste. In Timor-Leste, the country’s new leaders – resistance actors cum state actors – have centralised legitimate power, while, at the same time, incorporated non-state, resistance-era networks and identities upon which their authority depends. The key technology through which this order has been established is a suite of reintegration programmes. In registering over a quarter of a million people and dispersing significant funds, this programme has emerged as a tool of governance. Again challenging the idea of a ‘state’ acting upon ‘veterans’, this thesis finds that these programmes constitute these identities. The act of defining non-state conflict actors who may no longer legitimately wield force also necessarily defines the category of state actors who may wield force.

In asking what these programmes ‘do,’ this thesis rejects conventional readings of reintegration practices as security-driven or processes like registration as purely administrative challenges. As such, this study introduces a critical, new perspective on the political economy of post-conflict reintegration programmes. It supports its findings through a mixed methods approach, combining a robust, representative survey of over 220 former resistance members with ethnographic observation and 90 semi-structured elite interviews. This thesis is thus of relevance to those interested in DDR, conflict networks, and state-building.
Chapter I: Introduction

1 INTRODUCTION

In 1999, Indonesia withdrew the forces and administrators that had occupied the territory of Timor-Leste since 1975. This withdrawal marked both the beginning of the process of building a new, independent Timorese state, as well as the putative end of the dynamic resistance movement that had fought the occupation for a quarter-century. Due to the comprehensive devastation of the Indonesian withdrawal and the deleterious impacts of the occupation, the challenges of building a liberal, democratic state were considerable: physical infrastructure was destroyed, skilled jurists and intellectuals had fled, and the population was strikingly poor. United Nations (UN) administrators and nascent Timorese institutions were confronted with the tasks of meeting the pressing needs of the populace and establishing stability. In the dominant view of international state-builders, it was time for former resistance members\(^1\) to transform back to productive civilians and for the new state and security architecture to be built de novo.

Yet in 1999 the country was not a blank slate primed to be inscribed from above with new institutions. Instead, the complex and politically engaged resistance movement remained a potent source of authority and political legitimacy, as well as of personal identity, social capital, and welfare support to its members. Where the nascent Timorese state, first administered by the United Nations (1999-2002), lacked territorial reach and displayed weak institutions, resistance networks maintained their relevance. Indeed, almost all emergent Timorese leaders have grounded their claims

\(^1\) The term 'former resistance member,' while ungainly, provides the most encompassing and accurate descriptor of those who participated in the 24-year resistance movement. This includes members of the armed, clandestine and diplomatic fronts. The term 'veteran' (veteranu) is avoided as it has a narrow legal definition in Timor-Leste, although Timorese often use it more colloquially.
to political power in their roles as resistance leaders and both drawn upon and supported their resistance-era networks accordingly. The state-building challenge, then, has been for these leaders – resistance actors *cum* state actors – to retain and maintain these networks, while, at the same time, consolidating and centralising this power with the state. State-building in Timor-Leste has thus involved both the exclusion of ‘old’ resistance-era institutions and their deliberate incorporation.

In examining the development of the state in Timor-Leste by tracing this relationship, this thesis takes as its object of study reintegration programmes implemented by the Timorese government since independence. Pension benefits form the centrepiece of the reintegration programme, and their development has involved both new legislation and a nation-wide registration and data-verification process for recipients. Such initiatives may appear purely administrative or technocratic, yet under critical examination they emerge as powerful mechanisms for state governance and knowledge-power. In registering and classifying former resistance members, these programmes define the identities of resistance actors, create an official record of service, and distribute resources accordingly. In controlling the distribution of both financial resources and political capital, these programmes are also the basis of new political economies and patronage politics, which, in turn, have helped to sustain these conflict networks well into the post-conflict period.

In critically examining these programmes, this thesis pursues a deceptively simple question: What reintegration programmes in Timor-Leste do? What ‘problem’ posed

---

2 Reintegration programmes are defined broadly to include demobilisation ceremonies, pensions, and special benefits such as scholarships, housing, and construction contracts. These programmes are discussed in depth in Chapter IV.

3 This research question purposefully echoes that posed by Ferguson, who examines development programmes ‘not for what they don’t do or might do, but for what they do’ (1990: 13).
by former resistance members to the nascent state do these programmes resolve? This thesis argues that former resistance members occupy a complex and problematic position in relation to state power; their authority is both the basis of and a challenge to that of political leaders. These programmes thus work to resolve this tension by seeking to consolidate this authority with the state, both by drawing boundaries between state and non-state authorities – delegitimising their power – as well as by incorporating non-state authorities into the state. Crucially, delimiting non-state power and consolidating state power are two sides of one coin; just as ex-combatants are created by these programmes, so too is the modern state. Indeed, I find these processes to be mutually constitutive: in defining the ‘veteran,’ these programmes define the state.

1.1 Situating the Case: Reappraising Reintegration

Even a quick glance at reintegration pensions scheme in Timor-Leste suggests that conventional analyses of these programmes would fail to fully explain their political drivers and capture their more profound role in post-conflict state-building. For example, the investment and participation in these programmes appears wildly disproportionate to the size of the historical resistance and the current security threat its members pose. As of May 2012, between 200,000 and 250,000 Timorese registered as former resistance members, the first step in becoming eligible for a pension. This is an extraordinary figure. In relation to the young country as a whole, it represents approximately one sixth of the entire population or the equivalent of 60 per cent of the population over 30 years old, far outstripping historical estimates of participation (CAVR, Part 5, 2005: 39). And while few have received benefits, direct

---

4 Or those 17 years old and above at the end of the conflict, based on 2010 population statistics. Those under 17 years old were also involved, so this figure is used to give a rough impression of the scope of registration.
transfer payments to registered individuals now consume five per cent of the Timorese national budget – almost twice the entire Ministry of Health’s share.

Conventional, security-based analyses of reintegration benefits focus on the need to control spoilers: in this model, as threats diminish, so too the need for such action. Yet in the case of Timor-Leste, the security concerns posed by former resistance members have continued to decline while expenditures and number of registrants continue to rise and show no sign of tapering. Such an interpretation thus has limited utility. Furthermore, the role of former resistance members in security has been dynamic. Echoing Staniland, it is wrong to assume that state actors are engaged in a ‘straightforward struggle for a monopoly of violence’ (2012: 243). Instead, the post-conflict political order has involved both the incorporation and rejection of former resistance actors in security roles, as well as both substantive clashes and threats as political theatre. As such, this thesis reframes security challenges as epiphenomena of more profound negotiations over the legitimate sites of authority and coercive force.

Similarly, attributing these programmes’ growth to opportunism or corruption remains too simplistic and a-political. Analyses of these programmes that focus on their technical components – getting registration ‘right,’ for example – fail to explore the impacts of nation-wide registration or how conflict-era relationships play out in the programmes. Evaluating disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration programmes as administrative successes or failures thus avoids key questions concerning how policy ‘failures’ – such as the registration of ineligible individuals as in Timor-Leste – serve particular interests (Kriger, 2003: 15). This line of analysis follows critiques by Ferguson, who encourages attention to what interventions and their discourses do – their ‘instrument effect’ – and how programmes shape both institutions and ideas (1994: 256). Accordingly, this thesis does not pursue questions regarding efficacy
and seeks to step free from what Kriger terms the ‘evaluative straightjacket’ (2003a: 15).

A reappraisal of state-led reintegration programmes and their role in post-conflict state-building is important in light of the rise in disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) programmes across the globe. Since the mid-1990s, DDR programmes have emerged as de rigueur elements of post-conflict peace building (Kingma, 2000). To date, over 40 DDR processes have gone forward in states as diverse as Kosovo, Tajikistan, Haiti and Iraq (Berdal and Ucko, 2009: 2; Knight, 2008: 26). Understanding how these programmes function on the ground, and how both recipients and administrators understand these programmes, offers the potential to challenge assumptions and improve practice. For example, this thesis provides an in-depth look at how local state actors conceptualise reintegration, particularly their emphasis on valorisation, which brings attention to the rift between local and international views of reintegration goals.

More broadly, this study encourages a new perspective on reintegration as a key part of post-conflict state-building. To ground this analysis, I engage a view of the state rooted in the anthropological literature. This brings attention to everyday experiences of governance and everyday encounters with the state. I argue that these programmes are keenly involved in the extension of the state apparatus and engendering what Ferguson and Gupta (2002) describe as the perception of a ‘vertical,’ ‘encompassing’ state, capturing the idea that the state exists both above and around individuals. Going further, registration efforts provide a mechanism for ‘knowing’ former conflict actors, and these programmes mark off and fix the identities of former resistance members. State power is thus also exercised through identification and enumeration, bureaucratic surveillance, and the distribution of resources or execution of interventions based on these regulatory identities. Rather
than viewing ‘veteran’ status as natural or self-evident, I problematise the categories of ‘veteran,’ ‘national liberation combatant,’ ‘civilian’ and ‘collaborator.’ I approach these identities as constructed by the programme, and highly political.

This new approach facilitates important findings regarding post-conflict political orders and the way authority and power work in post-conflict states, particularly in relation to non-state power. While the establishment of the reintegration programme for former resistance members has expanded the state’s reach, as described above, the result has not been a Weberian state, monopolising power from the technocratic centre. In the Timorese case, the extension of the state’s reach through reintegration programmes has been achieved through the incorporation of non-state, resistance-era networks. Indeed, as Richmond argues, the ‘new authority associated with the liberal state has not displaced the customary authority and legitimacy, but in fact has highlighted its significance’ (2001: 121). While the incorporation of these alternative sources of legitimate authority extend state power, it does so through hybridisation. Reintegration programmes thus should not be viewed as straightforward mechanisms for state building in the ideal type. To the contrary, in Timor-Leste, the result of these reintegration programmes is state hybridity or neopatrimonialism, rather than state consolidation and autonomy.

Reappraising reintegration programme in Timor-Leste in terms of state building and political authority up-ends standard expectations for what reintegration programmes ‘do.’ The story of reintegration programmes in Timor-Leste since independence is not one of the diminution of resistance-era identities and relationships. It is not one of socially disembedded ex-fighters returning to their communities and receiving assistance to turn swords into ploughshares. Instead, see these programmes as mechanisms through which the relationship between the state and non-state authority is negotiated and, more profoundly, technologies by which these very
objects are defined. I observe the creation of ‘veteran’ status and its use for the inclusion and exclusion of various actors. And I document the conservation and continuation of resistance-era power relations; reintegration programmes have become a means through which non-state, resistance-era actors continue to extract resources and exert power. These programmes build the state, yet this process is political and the results complex.

2 CASE SELECTION & METHODOLOGY

This thesis specifically examines the development and functioning of reintegration and pension benefit programmes for former members of the Timorese resistance movement against Indonesian occupation. I focus on the 2003-2012 period, a timespan beginning with the closure of the United Nations-led (UN) demobilisation and reinsertion programme, FRAP. This period is bookended by the 2012 Presidential and Parliamentary elections and closure of the UN Mission in Timor-Leste (UNMIT). While FRAP concerned the initial cantonment and reinsertion of active resistance members during the 1999 vote and Indonesian withdrawal, my focus is on the growth of the more expansive and long-term state-led reintegration programmes. It is during this 2003-2012 period that state-led reintegration efforts have taken shape and implementation has begun.

In regards to the study of reintegration and state-building, Timor-Leste provides an interesting case. Firstly, in Timor-Leste, the former combatants were part of a national liberation movement rather than parties in a civil war, and the conflict ended with the withdrawal of Indonesian forces. This allows for a more isolated focus on

---

5 Then FALINTIL Reinsertion Assistance Programme (FRAP). FRAP involved the cantonment of the resistance movement’s armed wing, FALINTIL, in anticipation of and immediately following the 1999 referendum on independence.

6 This does require some qualification. As will be discussed in Chapter III, the unity and cohesion of the resistance movement should not be over-stated. In addition, as is also
the political content of these programmes when compared to reintegration efforts following civil conflict in which reconciliation is an additional concern and the risk of return to conflict is higher. Secondly, Timor-Leste has consistently been studied as a ‘test case’ for post-conflict recovery and state-building. As Sahin notes, for international actors ‘[i]t was important to show whether it was possible to build a viable democratic state with well-functioning institutions and transfer required capacities to territories that have recently emerged from large-scale conflict’ (2007: 256). This work shares the over-arching concern with understanding state-building in Timor-Leste, and expands this literature accordingly.

In selecting a case that defies dominant explanations of programmatic growth, for example, I have chosen what Levy describes as a ‘deviant’ case. My research focus is thus on ‘refining or replacing an existing theory or hypothesis’ (2008: 3).

Furthermore, the objective of the thesis is not to make evaluative or causal claims, but, following George and Bennett (2005), to establish a new theoretical perspective on these programmes. I argue that critical analysis of how there programmes affect state authority and the legitimate exercise of power, for example, provides greater explanatory leverage than theoretical perspectives that focus on realist concerns with security threats and institutional hardness.

Regarding methodology, I have taken a mixed methods approach, combining a randomised cluster survey of 224 registered former resistance members, 90 semi-structured elite interviews, ethnographic observation, and analysis of primary and secondary source material. I conducted this research over the course of nine months discussed, some Timorese collaborated with Indonesian forces or took part in anti-independence, Indonesian-backed militias (see Drexler, 2013).

Accordingly, there has been sustained academic attention to security sector reform and other aspects of the country’s post-conflict transition (see Burton, 2005; Funaki, 2009; Hood, 2006; Peake, 2009; Rees, 2002; Simonsen, 2009).
of fieldwork in 2010 and 2012. Interview subjects include high-level policy-makers, former resistance and clandestine leaders, activists, and administrators, as well as lower-level former resistance members who were not picked up in the survey instrument. Concerning the survey, I utilised a stratified, population-proportional, randomised cluster sample. The survey included both qualitative, open-ended items and quantitative measures of social, political, and economic integration. While the sample size is smaller than some large-scale studies of reintegration such as Humphreys and Weinstein (2004), it is one of fewer than a half-dozen studies to generate representative data on former fighters and clandestine actors – important but difficult to access populations.

Taken together, these data streams have proved complementary, providing a portrait of life after conflict that has both breadth and depth. This bricolage approach has also allowed for the investigation of the ‘micro-politics’ and ‘micro-mechanics’ at work (Widder, 2004: 423) as well as highlighted, and opened avenues for the exploration of, contradictions or tensions between quantitative and qualitative findings. In regards to research design, this thesis marks the most comprehensive and rigorous study of former resistance members in Timor-Leste to date as well as an important contribution to the study of former combatants and reintegration more globally. A more detailed description my methodology, including discussion of the sampling designs, sources of bias and a reflection of my positionality as a researcher, is included in Appendix A. Appendix B contains an English language version of the survey instrument.

Questions included on the survey were explicitly designed to mirror those asked by Humphreys and Weinstein (2004), Pugel (2007) and Porto et al. (2007) in their similarly broad-based surveys of former combatants, as well as items from the 2009 Timorese census, allowing for some comparisons to be drawn.
3 THE STUDY OF REINTEGRATION

As academic attention has caught up with the proliferation of DDR programmes over the last two decades, the literature on DDR processes has grown. Excellent studies now address a wide range of issues, including the role of the international community (Alden, 2002), the participation of ex-combatants in post-conflict electoral politics (Christensen and Utas, 2008; Söderström, 2010 and 2011), ways to make reintegration processes more sensitive and responsive to local contexts (Jennings, 2007; Kingma, 2000), and technical aspects of DDR such as the merits of cash transfer payments (Isima, 2004; Willibald, 2006). Building on the path-breaking work of Humphreys and Weinstein (2004, 2007), there are now an increasing number of studies using large-n quantitative analysis to address questions about the effectiveness of DDR and the economic lives of former combatants (see Ayalew et al., 2000; Bøås and Hatløy, 2008; Gilligan et al., 2010; Porto et al., 2007; Pugel, 2007). Providing a useful summary, Gilligan et al. identify four dominant streams in the literature: programme reports or grey literature, examination of practical challenges, critical studies, and those focused on ‘beneficiaries’ perspectives’ (2010: 5).

Despite the literature’s florescence, both gaps and weaknesses remain. Firstly, in regards to gaps, few studies of DDR actually fully consider reintegration programmes; reintegration remains the least studied element of DDR (Pugel, 2008: 79; Jennings, 2008: 5; Spear, 2006: 176). As Specker summarises: ‘[w]hile the term “reintegration” has commonly been used to cover all activities after demobilization, in practice R-phase programmes have generally been limited to the provision of resettlement or reinsertion assistance only’ (2008: 4). Secondly, state-led, rather than internationally-led, programmes receive even less attention. Reflecting donor priorities and the difficulties of studying former combatants once they have left
cantonments, the majority of the literature focuses on shorter-term internationally-led programmes and policy support (see Torjensen and McFarlane, 2007, for an exception). An examination of the literature thus finds little consideration or assessment of programmes such as employment initiatives, direct transfer payments, and pensions schemes. Missing, too, is information on what these programmes mean to policy makers and recipients alike.

Looking more broadly, the literature on DDR remains dominated by what Jennings terms ‘grey literature,’ which is ‘weighted towards technical guides, identification of general trends, and “lessons learned”’ (2008: 13). This literature draws its information from programme design documents, evaluations, and interviews with policy-makers, resulting in little generation of new information on the lived experiences of former combatants or the politics that provide the context for key decisions around benefits, eligibility, and other forms of symbolic recognition. Due to the costs and challenges of carrying out such work, there is also a dearth of data on ex-combatants social networks and post-conflict relationships to other former combatants and leaders, despite the focus on dissolving these relationships as a pathway to social reintegration. While there may be a healthy debate over how best to demobilise former fighters, there is much less attention to what that transition means in terms of identity, relationships, and support structures.

The dominant focus on programme evaluation and practical improvements also leads to the under-theorisation of these programmes and a failure to connect the work done by these programmes to broader processes of state-building. Too often, studies fail to situate their analysis of initiatives in the context of larger contests around power, history, authority, and political economy. Instead, DDR is approached as a technically complex, though ultimately administrative, challenge. Reviews of the ‘relationship of DDR to political context and processes tends to be perfunctory’
(Berdal and Ucko, 2009: 2). As Jennings points out, while DDR’s place is secure in post-conflict transitional strategies, surprisingly little is known about ‘how DDR plays out on-the-ground’ (2008: 5). As will be discussed in Chapter VII, in Timor-Leste the ways in which eligibility for benefits is awarded ‘on-the-ground’ differs radically – and consistently – from the process and criteria set out in the pensions law; the politics, in this case, eclipses the policy.

Finally, the gaps and weaknesses described above are evident in regards to the scholarly examination of reintegration in Timor-Leste. While Peake (2009) explores the concerns of Timorese former resistance members and the limitations of reintegration programmes, his scope is limited to the FALINTIL Reinsertion Assistance Programme (FRAP, 2000-2002), rather than subsequent state-led programmes; the survey data also may reflect gatekeeper bias in its selection of focus group and survey participants. Sousa Santos (2010) provides a sensitive portrait of the ‘last resistance generation,’ yet presents limited data to support his claims. Studies by Leach (2002) and Wallis (2013) on conflict and national identity in the Timorese Constitution, and Rimmer (2007) on the political discourse surrounding conflict orphans, capture important aspects of post-conflict dynamics, but are narrowly focused. Finally, the World Bank’s 2008 report ‘Defining Heroes’ describes the Bank’s contribution to policy formation, but it focuses on discussing programmatic successes and does not cover implementation. This thesis thus marks the first in-depth examination of the reintegration programme and representative survey of registrants in Timor-Leste.

3.1 Critical Approaches to DDR

As a reaction to positivistic accounts of DDR and the grey literature, critical approaches have lent new insights to the study of reintegration, often re-approaching
these programmes as ‘strange’ (Li, 2007: 2-3). Such perspectives challenge the naturalisation of certain ideas about war, combatant identities and networks, and post-conflict societies in programme design. This body of literature is identified as ‘critical,’ both as it interrogates key assumptions that underpin reintegration practice as well as reflects, in many cases, the broader critical studies movement and discursive turn in the social sciences. Of particular importance are concepts of power and attention to ‘explosion of numerous and diverse techniques for achieving the subjugations of bodies and the control of populations’ (Foucault, 2003: 140). Attention is paid to semiotics and the use of language, including the consequences of labelling and discursive framings. Critical approaches to reintegration have, accordingly, looked to the politics of reintegration and the power relationships that are embedded and reproduced through these seemingly straightforward, technocratic endeavours. This thesis is situated within this literature.

As a starting point, critical authors point out that reintegration programmes serve as ‘technologies’ for profoundly re-imagining societies. Marking a clear departure from evaluative or policy frameworks, they advocate viewing reintegration programmes as tools for social engineering and the reconstruction of a new citizenry, redesigned for the needs of the new state. Muggah points out that reintegration ‘amounts to social engineering – from re-housing, resettling and integrating former soldiers and their families in areas that may be hostile to them – is ambitious in the extreme’ (Muggah, 2009: 14; see Paris on peace-building as social engineering, 1997: 56), capturing the scope of these programmes. In this light, reintegration programmes become mirrors reflecting policy makers’ ideas about the future as well as specific anxieties and concerns about who these combatants were in the past.

Writing about reintegration programmes in Kosovo and the imagining of new economy through the re-training of former combatants, Pozhidaev and Andzhelich
push us to see reintegration as a ‘complex process of socialisation par excellence’ (2005: 1). Reintegration has been used to facilitate a new system of land allocation in Sierra Leone (Humphreys and Weinstein, 2009) and produce hundreds of trained ‘professionals,’ waiting to enter a new economy in Kosovo (Pozhidaev and Andzhelich, 2007). In a more grounded approach, yet similarly tied to the connection between reintegration and the state (re)formation, Metsola (2006, 2010) uses an anthropological analysis of the state to look at the effects of reintegration as a bureaucratic practice. Examining the intensive registration and data collection process in Namibia, which was a precondition of reintegration, he argues that these programmes are deeply implicated in biopolitics - the classifying and reforming of subjects – as well as the rapid extension of state power. A deeper examination of theories of the state and state building is provided in the next chapter.

Critical political economy also draws attention to the construction and negotiation of actors’ interests (Jessop and Oosterlynck, 2008: 1156) and encourages the analysis of how programmes embody and advance the priorities of implementing actors and shape resource distribution. Applying this framework and locating DDR in the context of contests over state power, Muggah argues that internationally-led DDR does ‘not emerge spontaneously “from below” but is part of a broader (Weberian) project of securing the legitimate control of force from above’ (Muggah, 2009: 2). Muggah argues that DDR programmes are vehicles for advancing particular ideas around security and development. He states: ‘DDR embodies the strategic and bureaucratic priorities of the security and development sectors’ and it therefore ‘perpetuates the discourse and policy priorities of international donors and power-holding local elites’ (Muggah, 2009: 2). Such analysis establishes DDR programmes as a portal through which to pinpoint and understanding these important priorities; however, such frameworks have not been applied to state-led initiatives.
Delving into the micro-politics of DDR, other scholars have brought domestic political and historical dynamics to the fore. Kriger’s (2003, 2005, 2006) path-breaking work on veterans’ programmes in Zimbabwe provides one example. Entirely uninterested in evaluating the success or failure of these programmes to reintegrate combatants, Kriger looks at reintegration programmes as the sites of contestation over material and symbolic resources. Focusing on discourses, Kriger argues that claims to be forgotten and neglected, for example, emerge as ‘an important symbolic resource and a strategy to seek privileged access to state resources’ (Kriger, 2003a: 1). Such discussions provide a counterpoint to explanations of the extension of pension benefits focus exclusively on vote-seeking or patronage, with little attention paid to the role of political mobilisation and normative argumentation.

Finally, critical approaches to DDR have addressed recent efforts to standardise DDR practice (see the IDDRS, 2006; Stockholm Institute for DDR guidelines, 2006). These ‘best practices’ documents have further reinforced what Berdal and Ucko describe as the ‘DDR orthodoxy’ (2009: 4). Refusing to accept this ‘orthodoxy’ as a-political or a-historical, Torjesen and McFarlane view it as rooted in a ‘liberal democratic script’ (2007: 329) that carries with it specific, contingent notions of the individual, society, and the state. This critical analysis leads to basic questions, such as what does ‘economic reintegration’ mean in a state without a functioning economy? Or more broadly, if ‘a discrete cluster of programmes can ever genuinely reintegrate people in the long-term’ (Peake, 2009: 165)? In regards to the case of Timor-Leste, these largely unstated orthodoxies and international norms prove an uneasy pairing with Timorese concepts of reintegration and benefits.
4 CHAPTER OUTLINE

The next seven chapters delve into the case of reintegration in Timor-Leste and present the data gathered during the two research periods (2010, 2012). The next chapter, Chapter II, examines the relationship between theories of the state and state-building processes. Here I begin to make arguments connecting reintegration programmes and state-building, arguments that are elaborated upon in later chapters. As above, I argue that reintegration programmes are best understood as tools for resolving issues faced by the nascent state, primarily a lack of institutional reach and multiple sites of political authority. This analysis, however, requires moving away from the largely institutionalist conceptualisation of state-building. As an alternative, I introduce the anthropological analysis of state power and the performance of the state. I then use examples from the case to illustrate the argument. These themes and theories are returned to throughout the thesis.

Chapter III looks at the conflict period extending from the withdrawal of Portuguese colonial administrators from 1974 to the 1999 referendum and full independence in 2002. Rather than emphasising points of ruptures and change, I focus on continuities in the exercise of power, thereby connecting systems of authority and informal governance from the Portuguese era through independence. The chapter ends with a discussion of the UN-led reinsertion programme, FRAP. Chapter IV picks up from this point to discuss the evolution of state-led reintegration policy in Timor-Leste and how Timorese actors have understood and sought to resolve issues around exclusion that first emerged under the UN initiative. This chapter gives a systematic overview of Timorese programmes. I also identify an overarching trend towards the expansion of these reintegration benefits yet the maintenance of boundaries delimiting what types of service merit recognition. I also consider the provision of benefits through non-formalised channels, including the awarding of government
contracts to former combatants. This chapter, in laying out the scope of reintegration programmes in Timor-Leste, provides a foundation for further analysis.

Moving from a discussion of policy to examination of the lives of former resistance members, Chapter V examines the post-conflict era and provides analysis of the survey data. I present new data on registrants’ social integration, including community involvement and engagement in family and resistance-era networks; economic integration, including their levels of employment and education, and housing conditions; and political integration, including their voting behaviour, party involvement, and trust in state institutions. I find that while by many metrics these individuals are remarkably well integrated and participate in the state, a large minority has also maintained strong links to resistance-era networks and view the resistance as ‘still on-going’ – a finding consistent with the long-term perspective on authority and symbolic power established in Chapter III.

Next, Chapters VI explores political manoeuvring by politically mobilised former resistance members and their efforts to shape reintegration policy. In particular, I identify key discourses that have been mobilised to define which actors deserve benefits. These discourses shed light on Timorese political values and gain traction by being rooted in cultural norms and expectations. While this pressure ‘from below’ has shaped policy, so too has policy been ‘created’ at the level of implementation. In Chapter VII, using the notion of street-level bureaucrats, I explore corruption and the systematic use of alternate criteria for registration. This thesis finds that state actors seek to control and distribute access to the registration process, as ‘veteran’ identity unlocks significant political and financial capital. This capital both legitimates state governance and, conversely, fuels resistance-era patronage networks. Furthermore, the inclusion of ineligible registrants has become part of the political economy of post-conflict Timor-Leste. I argue that the involvement of former resistance leaders in
the registration process has allowed them to take control of state resources. This, crucially, leads towards neopatrimonialism.

In Chapter VIII I conclude, reviewing the arguments made in preceding chapters and summarising the key empirical findings and theoretical contribution. This final chapter also explores the implications of the study for DDR policy and makes recommendations for improving reintegration practices in post-conflict contexts akin to Timor-Leste. Regarding recommendations, I focus on the need to separate the recognition and valorisation of those who served from the provision of welfare benefits. I also argue that the complexity of the programme has allowed for both the high levels of fraud and unsustainable pension costs; reducing programme complexity, for example simplifying registration criteria, would help to address these significant issues.

Finally, what is not included in this study merits mention. This is not primarily a study about the effectiveness of reintegration programmes in Timor-Leste; rather, it is about their effects. The focus is on discovering what these programmes ‘do’ rather than ‘fixing’ them to align with reintegration orthodoxies. The focus is also firmly on the perceptions and actions of Timorese administrators and programme recipients; international perspectives on reintegration are not considered in depth. In addition to this distinct focus, there are a number of aspects of this subject that are not addressed at length by this thesis. Firstly, the research concerns the development of these benefits programmes, including the registration and verification processes; due to government delays, assessing the impact of payments to the majority of approved beneficiaries was not possible. Secondly, this thesis does not probe the social and, particularly, psychological impacts of conflict on those who participated and their communities. Thirdly, while discourses around victimisation and victimhood are
discussed at length, separate victims’ reparations processes and their effects are beyond the scope of this work.

5 CONCLUSION

Disarmament, demobilisation, and reintegration (DDR) processes have been embraced as a means of preventing ex-combatants from entering neighbouring conflicts, acting as spoilers, and engaging in organised crime (Muggah, 2009: 2; Alden, 2002: 342). Through a sequence of ‘guns, camps and cash’ these programmes are expected to address material conflict factors as well as respond to the complex needs of conflict-actors (Knight and Özerdem, 2004). The term reintegration itself holds the promise of a return to a less fissured society. This study, however, in examining how reintegration programmes in Timor-Leste have played out on the ground, suggests that the narrow conceptualisation of these programmes is misplaced. Indeed, the case of Timor-Leste suggests that these programmes are doing something different altogether.

As an alternative, I explore reintegration programmes as mechanisms or technologies by which state actors have sought to consolidate and extend state authority – a concept that goes beyond concerns with spoilers. Far from being a-political, administrative undertakings, these programmes are used by interested actors to redefine state-society relations. It is through reintegration programmes that state actors take an initial stab at consolidating and transferring authority from conflict-era actors and shaping the conflict’s legacy in the emergent state. And it is around these programmes that conflict-era actors, too, stake their claims, draw boundaries, make and break rules, and seek advantage. Resistance-era actors have, indeed, gained control over significant state resources under the umbrella of DDR, a result that shapes the very nature of governance in Timor-Leste.
These programmes are thus foundational for the development of the state, in terms of institutions, resources distribution, and its day-to-day performance. They constitute a crucial site of state formation. And in taking a critical approach, this study challenges the very starting assumption that states act upon former fighters, instead viewing these bodies as mutually constituted through the programmes. This reconceptualization of what these programmes do marks a significant departure from the conventional literature on reintegration benefits.

As the review of the extant literature demonstrates, much of the academic and policy discussions of reintegration programmes and practice fail to capture these functions and their mechanisms as well as what ‘problems’ state actors seek to resolve through these sweeping interventions. More fundamentally, the evaluative literature in particular misses the ways in which reintegration programmes, structure, produce, and regulate the relationships between the state and ex-combatants or former resistance actors. In addition to the limited application of a critical theoretical lens, there remains an overall lack of attention to and detailed examination of how reintegration programmes simply play out on the ground. Asking these questions and taking this more critical stance has the potential to yield more cogent and accurate analysis of both nationally and internationally-led reintegration programmes, as well as draw the attention of policy-makers and implementers to the symbolic and political contests embedded in these undertakings.
1 INTRODUCTION

While the independent Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste has been internationally recognised since 2002, the process of building the state has been on-going. Building a state requires a transition from the old to a new political order. Not sewn from whole cloth, the new state depends upon artefacts of the pre-existing order. It is also defined, however, in opposition to what came before. In Timor-Leste, the state-building challenge has revolved around negotiating the relationship between the new state and the resistance, which until independence served as the legitimate site of authority and coercive force. In the context of pervasive state weakness, defined as a limited institutional reach and ability to govern, this process has been a complex dance of incorporation and ‘grafting’ as well as exclusion and de-legitimisation. As this relationship is central, a key means of establishing the new state has been defining ‘veterans;’ surprisingly, these processes emerge as mutually constitutive.

The tensions between preserving the resistance-era political order and the establishment of new, statist order can be seen in a lack of resolution across a range of basic issues. Still alive on newspaper columns, blog posts, and in civic debate are questions such as: Why should heroic resistance members give up their weapons and cede control to young police officers? Why should efficient ‘jungle justice’ be replaced by lengthy court processes? Why should memorials to the dead be designed in Dili and built in the sub-districts? Why should Xavier do Amaral’s remains be buried in the National Cemetery in Metinaro rather than in his birthplace?

---

9 Xavier do Amaral is one of Timor-Leste’s ‘founding fathers’ and was an early member of the political wing of the Timorese resistance movement, FRETILIN (Revolutionary Front for an Independent Timor-Leste, Frente Revolucionária de Timor-Leste Independente). He also was designated Timor-Leste’s first President in 1975 when it made a unilateral declaration of independence; full independence was not achieved until 2002.
How can state administrators tell former resistance members that they do not qualify for a pension? These are questions of where legitimate domination resides. These are questions about justifying a new regime.

In this chapter I make the expansive argument that reintegration and pension benefits programmes and, in particular, the attendant registration process, should be viewed as key mechanisms for resolving these questions. These programmes do so both firstly by instilling an *idea* of the state that legitimises governance or domination. Secondly, they exert disciplinary power through the registration and classification of this important cohort. While many state programmes may be analysed in these terms, reintegration and benefits programmes provide a particularly rich example as they engage classic definitional issues around the state, such as who may legitimately wield force. Indeed, I find the goal of reintegration programmes to be the relocation of centres of authority from conflict-era institutions to the inchoate state. This analysis runs counter the dominant literature. I find these programmes ‘do’ much more than stabilise a state.

Such an argument, however, rest on a particular conceptualisation of state-building, and of the state itself. I apply theoretical approaches to the state as constructed or imagined; this view, common in anthropology, diverges significantly from the dominant approach in the post-conflict state-building literature focusing on institutional development. The state-building literature generally adheres to statist perspectives and approaches the divisions between the state and society as clear and natural. As an alternative, I follow the calls to ‘focus on the multiple sites in which state processes and practices are recognized through their effects’ (Trouillot, 2001: 126) and plumb the quotidian practices of governance and state performance that become the ‘central domain for the production and reproduction of the state’ (Navaro-Yashin, 2002: 135). Applying anthropological, critical, and post-structuralist
theories of the state to the analysis of state-building offers a fresh, de-centred perspective.

In particular, this new approach focuses on the mechanisms that engender the idea of the state, shifting emphasis from institutional development as an end-in-itself to a means of establishing the state-as-idea. Instead of approaching the state as a ‘thing,’ for example, like a court, I analyse it as a powerful concept reified through interactions, more akin to rule-of-law. As Aretxaga argues: ‘[T]he state as phenomenological reality is produced through discourses and practices of power, produced in local encounters at the everyday level’ (2003: 398). Accordingly, I approach state-building as concerning questions that go beyond institution-building, including: How does a collection of new institutions become a ‘state’? What processes transform these entities into something more than the sum of their institutional parts? Fundamentally, how does the state emerge as a ‘common ideological and cultural construct’ (Mitchell, 1991: 81)?

In this chapter, I first address these theoretical debates. In the following section, section three, I delve into this alternative literature on the state and use it to analyse examples from the Timorese case. I argue that reintegration programmes provide an excellent example of Aretxaga’s ‘local encounters’ that communicate the presence of the state in people’s lives and shape their actions accordingly. I specifically examine registration, data collection, and demobilisation ceremonies through this lens. As such, reintegration provides cogent examples of post-conflict state-building, as reconceptualised around the imaginaire of the state and extension of disciplinary power. At the end of this chapter I briefly discuss the concept of nation-building before concluding.
While the questions ‘what is a state?’ and ‘how is a state built?’ appear inseparable, there remains scant engagement with or correspondence between the state-building literature and theoretical discussions of the state. Critiques of the state that have so dominated political theory and political anthropology appear to have had little impact on the state-building literature. The perverse absence of a discussion of the state in state-building marks a weakness in the literature. What results is that the definition of the state is implied through the definition of state-building, or, if it is defined, the definition of the state is left unexamined.

The lack of explicit theoretical engagement does not mean that conventional approaches to state-building analysis do not stake out theoretical ground. For example, Fukuyama identifies state-building as the ‘creation of governmental institutions’ (2004: 17). This implicitly defines the state as merely a governing body. Such definitions thus raise the questions of whether or not this is an accurate or adequate approach to the state. Fukuyama’s definition also recalls Radcliffe-Brown’s

10 Since the end of the Cold War, there has been a florescence of writing on post-conflict state-building, reflecting the rise in such endeavours and the increased roles of the international community therein. Accordingly, the growing state-building literature has primarily focused on interventions by international actors (see Call and Wyeth, 2008; Caplan, 2005; Chesterman, 2004), and excellent work has examined issues ranging from establishing rule of law (see Snyder and Vinjamuri, 2003/4) to democratisation (see Bermeo, 2003). Largely policy-focused, the literature emphasises institutional design, strategies for strengthening judicial systems, establishing democratic governance, and reforming security sectors. It is fundamentally about ‘problem solving’ (Lindén, Mac Ginty, and Oliver, 2009: 592).

11 The most cogent analysis in this vein actually comes from work on state failure (see Boege et al., 2008). Hameiri (2007), for example, has critically examined how approaches to state failure rest upon flawed notions of the state and its functionings. He attributes the ‘patchy success record of state building interventions’ to the focus on ‘build[ing] institutional capacity as if this is a separate issue to power and interests’ (2007: 144).

12 There is an emergent critical literature on state-building that details how large-scale international interventions in practice engage with cultural or political values. These include questions around universal suffrage, ethnic integration, and gender (see Caplan, 2004: 53). Others highlight the normative and neo-colonial aspects of international endeavours (see Paris, 2002; Mallaby, 2002; Knaus and Martin, 2003).
critique that ‘[t]he state is neither something out there nor a necessary concept. Each and every time we use the word, words such as “government” would do the conceptual job, and they would do it better’ (in Trouillot, 2001: 126). While I disagree with the argument that the state is not a ‘necessary concept’ – indeed, I find the idea vital in the legitimisation of governance – this critique challenges us to define the ways that ‘the state’ transcends ‘governmental institutions.’ When Fukuyama’s treatment of the state is examined in relation to the broader theoretical literature, such a narrow, institutional model appears inadequate and limiting.

In looking at the state-building literature, I argue that it generally displays three particular theoretical weaknesses. Firstly, as above, it advances a normative, institutional, ‘statist’ conception of the state, locating the state at the ‘center of solutions to the problem of order’ (Evans, 1995: 3). Secondly, it treats the state as autonomous and the relationship between the ‘state’ and ‘society’ as both well defined, natural, and adversarial. Thirdly, as will be discussed in the next section, it neglects to examine the idea of the state as well as the exercise of disciplinary power, concepts key to the post-structuralist approach to the state. Taken together, the state-building literature centres on the creation of a ‘Weberian’ state, and marks regimes that do not meet this ideal as flawed or failed. This perspective contrasts with the alternate view of state-building put forward in this chapter, which examines the idea of the state, the ways in which this idea is established, and the ways in which this idea facilitates governance.

Concerning the first critique of the dominant model as normative, much of the state-building literature is neo-statist and rooted in Weber’s 1922 encyclopaedic work on social phenomena, *Economy and Society*. Here Weber establishes an ideal type – a tool used to benchmark and measure difference – of the state as ‘a compulsory political organization with continuous operations’ in which ‘its administrative staff
successfully upholds the claim to the *monopoly of the legitimate* use of physical force in the enforcement of its order within a territory (Weber 1968, 54; emphasis original). Formulaically, this places considerable focus on coercive institutions and territorial control, passing over post-structuralist theories of how modern state power is exercised, extended, and legitimised. This perspective on the state reinforces the importance of building autonomous state institutions and consolidating coercive power in post-conflict contexts.

In this dominant model, the bureaucracy is rational, and the development of modern state structures holds the key for resolving social, economic, and other ills. Works by Huntington (1968) and Fukuyama (2004), as well as many in development studies, exemplify this focus on the modern, liberal state institutions as the antidote for social disorder. Accordingly, this ideal type has been widely adopted as a shorthand, state-building formula. For example, Ignatieff claims: ‘the chief prerequisite for the creation of a basic rights regime’ is the rebuilding of ‘a state with a classic Weberian monopoly on the legitimate means of force’ (2002: 3). Similarly, Call and Cousens, while acknowledging the ‘conceptual abstraction of the state,’ advocate assessing state-building in relation to the extent the state ‘exercises a monopoly over the legitimate use of coercion in the territory,’ as well as measures of institutional proficiency such as collecting, tracking, and spending state revenues (2008: 15).

This Weberian model, however, imagines a very *specific* state, and the functionalist focus results in what Chowdhury describes as an ‘astonishingly simplistic portrayal of

---

This use of Weber, as well as those connecting ‘Weberianess’ and outcomes (see Rauch and Evans, 1999), often fails to acknowledge the complexity of his work. Rather, I argue that Weber in fact presents a two-pronged view of the modern state in *Economy and Society*: first, as dependent on individual beliefs and habit which orient social action toward the state, and, second, as composed of bureaucratic structures. Weber’s dual-level analysis approaches the state on both normative-theoretical and descriptive-empirical levels (Jayal, 2001; Sharma and Gupta, 2006). The ideal type, from which the definition of the state is so often drawn, is, instead, a static yardstick or analytic tool, not a model. On Weber’s use of ideal types see also Watkins (1952: 26).
state intentions and purposes’ (1999: 1097). Institutions in this model are mono-dimensional and a-political. However, this normative vision of the state has become integral to discussions of state-building. Assumptions that function follows form (i.e. ‘good’ outcomes will flow from ‘good’ institutions), sit well with a top-down perspective on state-building. This focus on ‘good’ institutions also concords with a technocratic or managerialist perspective regarding the role of international actors in state-building itself. Such ‘simplistic portrayals,’ do not so much ignore issues of corruption or illiberalism, but subsume these issues under the rubric of problems that are resolved through the building of this ideal, autonomous state. Little room is given toward the examination of state-building outside of this rubric.

Moving to the second critique, this view of the state as the ‘solution’ to social disorder positions the state as both insulated from and antagonistic towards social forces, reifying the boundaries between state and society. The view of the state as autonomous, ‘obscures the characteristics of modern forms of political power’ (Rose and Miller, 1992: 176), and, analytically, this makes ‘trac[ing] how wider social differences reproduce themselves within the processes of the state’ more difficult (Mitchell, 1991: 90). As will be discussed in the next section, an alternate view of state power is that it operates through webs of state and non-state actors and institutions. Rather than being overtly coercive, power is disciplinary and embedded in mundane practices and routines. As Jessop (2001) observes,14 the lines between the state and non-state authority, and between state and non-state apparatuses, are often ambiguous; drawing these lines becomes part of the state-building endeavour.

In sum, a nuanced, dynamic theory of the state is necessary for better understanding state-building. While the Weberian ideal type may serve as a benchmark for the

14 Neo-Weberians, such as Seabrooke (2002), have responded to many of these criticisms, incorporating more complex social relations and concepts of change.
development of certain institutions, it prefigures state-society relations and advances a top-down view of power. It does not provide a means of analysing how the state develops, what social forces are involved, or explain deviations from the ideal. It also remains vulnerable to the critiques that the state as an imagined entity rather than an 'empirical object.' In this view, the state is a discursive pall lain over a wide range of institutions that gives the impression of a unified, autonomous actor. What is needed is attention to the development of the post-conflict institutions – repressive or unresponsive, violent or magnanimous, Weberian or not – and how they become viewed as a cohesive entity that has the legitimate authority to shape citizens' actions. In the next section, I introduce an alternative perspective on the state, focusing on discipline and governance, and draw attention to the relationship between ideas and institutions of the state.

3 REINTEGRATION AS STATE-BUILDING

The above analysis suggests that the dominant construction of the state in the state-building literature appears at odds with critical, post-structuralist and anthropological readings of the state. In emphasising the 'modern state as a military, political, and economic accomplishment,' neo-statist theories 'obscure the fact that the modern state is also, and essentially, a symbolic accomplishment' (Loveman, 2005: 1652; emphasis original). This section, and indeed chapter, is interested in these 'techniques and practices' and how this 'symbolic accomplishment' comes to be. In contrast to the questions that dominate the state-building literature (e.g. 'what institutions are necessary for establishing rule of law?'), 'how' questions 'lead us to problems of the techniques and practices, rationalities and forms of knowledge, and identities and agencies by which governing operates' (Dean, 1999: 29). This section applies theories that relocate the site of state building to the on-the-ground practices that reify the state and legitimate its sweeping powers.
Firstly, of particular influence is Abrams, who argues for the separate analysis of the state-system – the constellation of government bodies, actors and institutions – and the state-as-idea. The state idea is that the state ‘constitutes the “illusory common interest” of a society’ (1988: 64). It is about how the whole – the state – becomes more than the sum of its parts and taken for granted as a body, above its subjects.\textsuperscript{15} Put in Weberian terms, it is not just about the institutional \textit{monopoly} of the use of force, but asserting the \textit{legitimacy} of that arrangement. Applying this framework to this case, reintegration programmes may be analysed as expanding the state’s institutional apparatus – more cars, more databases, more ministry offices; they also should be analysed in terms of how this engenders the \textit{idea} of the state. State-building in post-conflict contexts thus is not just about institutional growth, but also about spreading the idea of a modern state. In Timor-Leste, the concept of the state itself legitimises bureaucratic expansion and the centralisation of authority. It also depoliticises the ascension of former resistance actors into power, recasting familiar, fractious players as neutral ‘state actors.’

Abram’s focus on agencies communicating the idea of an overarching state is enhanced by an examination of how state power is expressed. Again, attention to how people experience state power in everyday encounters shifts the object of study

\textsuperscript{15} Theorists have described this effect in different ways: Easton uses the term ‘transcendental’ (in Mitchell, 1991: 81), while Abrams describes the state-as-idea (1988: 58). Mitchell focuses on the state as a ‘structural effect … not as an actual structure, but as the powerful, metaphysical effect of practices that make such structures appear to exist’ (1991: 94). The anthropological literature also emphasises the state’s cultural production. As Ferguson and Gupta argue, ‘states are not simply functional bureaucratic apparatuses, but … are themselves always culturally represented and understood in particular ways’ (2002: 981). The authors argue that states – not just nations – are ‘imagined;’ they are ‘constructed entities that are conceptualized and made socially effective through particular imaginative and symbolic devices’ (Ibid; see also Scott, 1998; Anderson, 1991). Regardless of the terminology and some differences, these theories share an emphasis on the \textit{imagination of the state} as a key to understanding its form and power.
from institutions to their effects. Here, Foucaultian theories of power are particularly useful. As Jessop writes:

Foucault created a space for exploring [the state’s] ‘polymorphous crystallization’ in and through interrelated changes in technologies of power, objects of governance, governmental projects, and modes of political calculation (2007: 36).

Attention to how the state takes form or crystallizes as a ‘social object’ through technologies of power, projects, and modes of calculation bring a new perspective to the study of post-conflict state-building. Through this lens one can explore the political content of seemingly mundane practices like reintegration.

Applying Abrams’s framework to the case, on the most basic level, the initiation of Timor-Leste’s benefits and reintegration programme has driven institutional growth – the extension of the state-system.16 For example, the government has established new bodies, including a series of Presidential Commissions and the Secretary of State’s Office for the Ex-Combatants of National Liberations’ Affairs. Within the latter, of particular importance are the registration and data verification teams. These teams, based in the capital, Dili, go forth to record and check bio-data in all sub-districts, collecting data and resolving disputes; crucially, these teams extend the reach of the state to the local level. While the growth of this new state apparatus to address the ‘veterans problem’ is notable, I approach this institutional growth as actually secondary to the consideration of its effects. What matters are institutional practices and the ideas of the state that they communicate.

16 Of note, the institutional development was not only within the traditional state sector. Financially, the provision of direct benefit payments to certain sets of registered former resistance members marks the Timorese state’s largest single investment in national welfare. Indeed, the investment in benefits eclipses the government’s financial commitment to the health or justice sectors. In the absence of a state banking system, managing these financial flows has facilitated the extension of the private sector. In particular, automated teller machines (ATM) have been introduced outside of Dili and Baucau, the two largest population centres, marking the extension of centralised, formal banking systems for the first time. This form of hybridisation echoes work by Hallinan (2001) and others on the changing nature of state power and the privatisation of ‘core’ state functions.
Here Abrams’s question of how the state-as-idea is established becomes relevant. Below I take on demobilisation and registration process – processes that at first glance are seemingly narrow in scope, technocratic, and mundane – and explore how they serve as technologies through which the state-as-idea is articulated. I begin by first looking at how reintegration programmes enact a particular theatre of ‘stateness’ – a show of technical aptitude, centralisation, and supercilious state control over complex data. This performance is part of the process of legitimating state power and, more controversially, masks the continuation of pre-existing power relations through ‘state’ practice. In the second sub-section, I identify this ‘masking’ as a form of anti-politics (see Ferguson, 1994). Next, I use the example of demobilisation ceremonies to describe how the state actors mark former resistance members as non-state, and thus unable to wield legitimate force. In the final sub-section I examine the registration process, particularly the enumeration and classification of former resistance members, as a form of disciplinary state power. There I consider the importance of mundane practices in the governance of citizens and their identities. In this light, seemingly ‘neutral’ administrative undertakings merit reappraisal as constitutive of political identities.

### 3.1 Data Verification as Performance

In the case of state-building in Timor-Leste, reconceptualised as the establishment of both the state-system and state-as-idea, the processes of naturalising authority is particularly important. Here the concept of the performance and the analysis of bureaucratic practices as ‘theatre’ are relevant. Practices from military parades to the architecture of ministries, from the design of police uniforms to new currency (Dorman, 2006: 1088), tell a story to the public about the state and their role therein. Post-modern performance theory has been applied to the nation-state by authors such as C. Weber (1998), and the idea of statehood being a parody or impersonation
is drawn from Butler’s work on gender and performativity (1990). The parodic nature
of state performance in Timor-Leste can be seen, unsettlingly, in the ways in which
the new state mimics Indonesian and Portuguese statecraft.

This theatre takes place during quotidian encounters between individuals and the
state, encounters that become more frequent as the state extends its reach,
understood simply as the increased likelihood that an individual would encounter the
state apparatus. Because of the importance of resolving questions of state and non-
state authority, the new reach of the state is particularly apparent in regards to the
resistance: matching memorials and ossuaries are under construction in each of the
country’s sub-districts, and demobilisation ceremonies have been held in the capital.
These performances draw upon a language of authority and communicate the
modernity and centrality of the state. For example, demobilisation ceremonies
including the mixing of traditional, resistance-era, and highly formal, Western military
dress; these will be discussed in greater detail below.

Another area in which the performance modern, bureaucratic statehood can be seen
is in the process of registering and verifying the data of former resistance members.
Here, the theatre of this process must be considered independently of its efficacy as
a tool of enumeration and authentication. As Appadurai discusses in the context of
colonial India, the use of numerical tools such as censuses ‘rather than being a
passive instrument of data-gathering…became an important part of the illusion of
bureaucratic control’ (Appadurai, 1993: 316-317; my emphasis). Even if the forms
and folios were lost, what matters in this instance is the impression or ‘illusion’ of
modern statehood that the registration and data verification process itself makes on
the participants. In Timor-Leste, the audience is considerable, with approximately
250,000 individuals having registered and thousands having participated in data
verification.
In the case of data verification, the Commission for Homage, Supervision of Registration, and Appeals, observed in 2010, arrived from the capital in a large government vehicle with a driver. The members stayed with local leaders, were fed first, and held their audiences from a table set up with in a commandeered school building. The Team’s Commissioners, many of whom were former resistance leaders, wielded all the tools of officialdom. They pulled reams of forms in and out of plastic sleeves, displayed identification cards on patriotic lanyards, and had mobile phones clipped onto their belts; they thumped down rubber stamps with percussive authority. They also trafficked in the currency of the formal state, rewarding the production of official documentation, including birth records and voter identification cards, and looking askance at those who had none. In the wake of these visits state-authored registries issued from the capital were publically displayed, advertising the new, singular and official record of the resistance.

The authority and modern rationality of the Homage Commission, and thus the state from which it emanated, was communicated in everything from the organization of the room to the use of formal documents. It painted the picture of a strong, modern, and opaque central state and marked off boundaries between state actors (Commissioners) and subjects (registrants). The hierarchies established by the Data Verification Team recall Ferguson and Gupta’s description of how states are performed as vertical – above civil society and other social groups – and encompassing. They argue that through this ‘spatialization’ state actors ‘help to secure their legitimacy, to naturalize their authority, and to represent themselves as superior to, and encompassing of, other institutions and centers of power’ (2002: 982). This recalls Abrams’s focus on the idea of the state, or, more accurately, on the imagination of the state, as critical for legitimising the exercise of state power.
3.2 The Anti-politics of Registration

In discussing the state, some theorists look to measures of ‘state hardness’ and ‘structural autonomy, whereby state institutions, leaders, and officials effectively remove themselves from the influence of societal actors and influences’ to compare various regimes (Forrest, 1988: 423). Upon inspection, however, the idea of state autonomy emerges more as an ideal type than a reflection on how institutions and politics function; it ‘obscures the characteristics of modern forms of political power’ (see Rose and Miller, 1992: 176). As an alternative, I am interested in the mythology of this hypothetical removal and what is gained through the positioning of state as individual-like, a unitary, ‘free-standing object or actor’ (Mitchell, 1991: 90). Here, too, I find that the construction of a certain idea of the state lends it greater legitimacy and thus normalises the exercise of state power – dynamics at the heart of post-conflict state-building.

In the case of Timor-Leste, this mythology of an a-political state has served to mask continuities in conflict-era power relations and the political content of the reintegration programme. This dynamic is most evident in the widespread appropriation of reintegration resources for patronage, as is documented in Chapters V, VI and VII. The registry includes a breath-taking number of ineligible registrants – a full 60 per cent of my sample. This fraud is made possible through the transformation of former resistance leaders into Commissioners, the bureaucratic actors working on behalf of the state. The transformation, achieved in part through the theatre of state authority described above, however, is illusory or partial (reflecting, in part, the very fiction of the autonomous technocrat). While their transformation into ‘Commissioners’ may appear to be a victory for state consolidation, it obscures how non-state actors and institutions that pre-date the new state gain access to resources. As such, it is a form of anti-politics.
While these actors ‘act’ on behalf of the state, many have used their positions to advance their interests and the resistance-era networks that they support and that maintain their status. Wearing ‘two hats,’ non-state actors – whether as traditional authorities, through patronage networks, or via ex-combatant groups – embody state institutions as well as retain authority in both state and non-state spheres. Crucially this result is not entirely unforeseeable. Indeed, the Commissions tasked with gathering and verifying former resistance members’ registration data were chosen from the resistance leadership precisely because of their authority within those networks, as well as their knowledge of the area and those who had participated in the resistance. This dual source of authority adds to their perceived omniscience, again evoking the vertical, encompassing state. The expansion of the state-system through the registration programme has, ironically, depended upon engaging resistance-era authority and legitimising it by dressing up former leaders.

Here state actors have increased the impression of the encompassing, omniscient state by incorporating former resistance leaders and their networks – bodies still associated with coercive force and active surveillance. As Dorman argues, the institutions and styles of leadership that define the conflict era carry forward in post-conflict styles of politics and governance (2006: 1086), to which I add that the structures and networks themselves carry over as well. Here we are reminded that even as the state enacts these boundaries, marking itself as distinct and autonomous from civil society and non-state resistance-era networks, these lines are both strategic and illusory. Rather, the exercise and currency of power remain rooted in relationships and narratives that extend through the state apparatus, and the perception of the state as unitary and autonomous is produced through specific practices.
Finally, as will be discussed at greater length in Chapter VII, the result of this exchange is hybridity or neopatrimonialism – a situation in which ‘relationships of loyalty and dependence pervade a formal political and administrative system’ (Bratton and Walle, 1994: 458). Returning to the metaphor of theatre and performance, in this arrangement, the ‘state is no more than a … façade masking the realities of deeply personalised political relations’ (Chabal and Daloz, 1999: 16). Failing to ‘unmask’ the state and accepting the Commissioners’ transformations, reifies state/non-state boundaries and forecloses examination of state/non-state collusion or collaboration. This idea of defining state/non-state boundaries as a form of state-building is discussed further in the next section.

3.3 Demobilisation Ceremonies and Exclusion

While the extension of the state’s reach is made possible through the transformation of former resistance leaders into ‘Commissioners,’ the imagination of the state is also achieved through the exclusion of certain non-state actors. Indeed, a key element of the performance of statehood is the articulation of lines separating the state from society. It is via these boundaries that the state takes form and is attributed with autonomy. As Mitchell argues, ‘[t]he state should be addressed as an effect of detailed processes … which create the appearance of a world fundamentally divided into state and society’ (1991: 95; my emphasis). Of particular relevance to this discussion is the use of demobilisation ceremonies to re-articulate lines of authority and re-classify former resistance actors as ‘non-state’ and thus illegitimate authors of coercive force.

To study this boundary, Mitchell suggests looking at the ‘detailed political processes through which the uncertain yet powerful distinction between state and society is

17 See also Boege et al., 2008; Hofmann, 2009; Ekman, 2009; see also Pozhidaev, 2006 on Chechnya.
produced’ and ‘through which a certain social and political order is maintained’ (1991: 78, 90; see also Torpey, 1998). In this reconceptualisation, a key element of state-building is how and where the line defining state and society is drawn. Who can act on behalf of the state? Who is a subject of the state? More broadly, I contend that key to the modern state’s performance and the idea of state autonomy depends on the creation of standard, mutually exclusive roles. These include citizen/bureaucrat, politician/technocrat, veteran/soldier, and rebel/soldier, amongst others. The assignment of such roles as a form of disciplinary state power is discussed in the next section.

One of the best examples of the redrawing of lines of authority is the demobilisation of armed resistance members, the FALINTIL. In 2006, 2011, and 2013 the Timorese government demobilised 205, 236, and 219 high-level former resistance members, respectively.\(^\text{18}\) These ceremonies included the awarding of medals, presentation of new uniforms, and martial displays by the new generation of the Timorese military, the F-FDTL.\(^\text{19}\) The theatrical ceremonies communicated a passing of the torch – a shift in authority from former fighters (the FALINTIL resistance) to the new state actors (the F-FDTL). The new uniforms, for example, made clear the separation of and distinction between the active troops and those now ‘demobilised.’

The comments by the Japanese Ambassador highlight the underlying narrative of

\(^{18}\) A further 30,000 diplomas were distributed to former resistance members with shorter terms of recognised service (2012 figure). The absurdity of this ‘demobilisation’ is evident when considering the conflict’s history and the cessation of mass, armed conflict by approximately 1980. From the perspective of armed action, these men and women have been effectively demobilised for decades. Many are infirm. Few have access to weapons. Furthermore, this shuttering of FALINTIL was supposed to have been accomplished a decade before in the cantonments of Aileu (see Rees, 2004: 47). The protracted and iterative nature of this ‘demobilisation,’ however, points to the fact that it is tremendously difficult to reshape the relationship between a resistance movement and a ‘new’ state army.

\(^{19}\) F-FDTL stands for FALINTIL - Defence Force of Timor-Leste (FALINTIL-Força Defesa de Timor-Leste). FALINTIL is an acronym for the Armed Forces for the National Liberation of Timor-Leste (Forças Armadas de Liberatação National de Timor-Leste).
these ceremonies, as well as underscore the fundamental challenge of such a proposition. He stated: 'We are entering to a new era. Until now, there were F-FDTL soldiers who were also members of the FALINTIL. But from now on, the F-FDTL will be organized only by F-FDTL soldiers.' Yet can such a line distinguishing the two identities be so clearly drawn? The point seems to have been lost that the name FALINTIL remains as the first ‘F’ in F-FDTL. This, indeed, this ambiguity or overlapping of the FALINTIL and F-DTL authority was deliberately incorporated in the name. The military was first formed in 2001 as the East Timor Defence Force through the recruitment of 650 cantoned FALINTIL members; under public pressure to acknowledge the FALINTIL resistance, it was renamed the F-FDTL in 2002 (see ICG, 2011: 4). The FALINTIL’s authority remains, as does its symbolic power; as an institution, it is difficult to raze.

For those being ‘honoured,’ demobilisation has served as a form of exclusion. These ceremonies confer an official status on the demobilised, symbolised through their medals and uniforms, but, concomitantly, they delegitimise these individuals’ roles in the active state security apparatus. Even the bowing of each veteran’s head to receive his or her medal signalled, too, a submission to the supremacy of the new state. Accordingly, some refused to participate, viewing the ceremonies as a way to mark the resolution of their claims to government assistance. This displacement and delegitimisation of non-state, resistance-era actors extends beyond demobilisation; the centralisation of information, for example the determination of the years and types of service recognised in the demobilisation ceremonies, reproduces these lines of official (state) and unofficial knowledge (non-state), only one of which ‘counts.’

---

20 Comments by the Honorable Iwao Kitahara, Ambassador of Japan to Timor-Leste, on 23 August 2011. Comments available online: [http://www.timor-este.emb-japan.go.jp/newera_e.htm](http://www.timor-este.emb-japan.go.jp/newera_e.htm)
These processes result in the alienation of these fighters and clandestinos from their histories.

The drawing of state and non-state boundaries and lines of authority is particularly complicated in post-conflict states. As Mitchell argues, ‘the edges of the state are uncertain; societal elements seem to penetrate it on all sides, and the resulting boundary between state and society is difficult to determine’ (1991: 88). Many resistance-era actors have parlayed their authority into positions within the state. This is evident for both political leaders, who have drawn upon their conflict-era status to both legitimise their claims and mobilise former followers politically, as well as ‘Brown Shirt’ security guards, who reportedly are often former resistance members who have received their positions through patronage networks. Even in the registration process, as discussed above, the incorporation of former resistance members as Commissioners merged and blurred the authority of resistance-era leaders and state actors. In such a fluid environment, activities that the draw line of state and non-state are particularly powerful.

3.4 Registration and Knowledge-Power

Finally, moving away from the performance of the state – the instilling and articulation of the state-as-idea and the practices that define the boundaries of the ‘state’ in contrast to ‘society’ – I am interested in the extension and exercise of state power through the creation of knowledge about subjects. As discussed above, the conventional literature on state-building focuses on institutions and the exercise of coercive power, usually the monopolisation of force. However, Mitchell calls for scholars to move ‘beyond the image of power as essentially a system of authoritative commands or policies backed by force’ (Mitchell, 1991: 92). Instead, he argues, it is more useful to look to disciplinary power. In the case of reintegration in Timor-Leste,
the identification and classification of individuals through registration can be viewed as such. Once classified, groups such as ‘veterans’ are naturalised and become ‘problems’ for the state and thus the objects of intervention and regulation.

In Ferguson’s evocative summary, the growth of state disciplinary power can be understood as when ‘more power relations are referred through state channels – most immediately, that more people must stand in line and await rubber stamps to get what they want’ (Ferguson, 1994: 274). Similarly, Loveman describes the extension of disciplinary state power through ‘infrastructural penetration and administrative “ordering” of everyday life’ (2005: 1679). These authors capture the progressive penetration of the state into individuals’ lives and how these practices reorder social relations to facilitate governance. Aspects of education, work, welfare, life, death, and marriage all become more tied to the state through regulations, which require centralised systems of identification, monitoring, and policing. Put more succinctly, ‘[d]isciplinarity fixed individuals within institutions’ (Hardt and Negri, quoted in Widder, 2004: 414). The creation of the benefits programme, and the huge registration effort, are usefully analysed as examples of the exercise of such power.

The channelling of relations through institutions does not just direct individual action, but also serves to constitute the individuals as part of a particular administrative group or identity. As Mitchell argues, disciplinary power ‘works not from the outside but from within, not at the level of an entire society but at the level of detail, and not by constraining individuals and their actions but by producing them’ (1991: 93). Rose

---

21 On a larger scale, Scott uses the examples of *ujamaa* villigization in Tanzania and the resettlement of Meratus in Indonesia to illustrate how these programmes made it possible for state actors ‘to make the terrain, its products, and its workforce more legible – and hence manipulable – from above and from the center’ (Scott, 1998: 2).

22 On the level of disciplinary power, this ‘modern form of political power’ is also brought to bear through the ‘expertise’ of non-state actors such as the United Nations, international stabilisation forces, and bilateral donors.
and Miller make a similar point, calling for the reconceptualisation of modern political power: '[p]ower is not so much a matter of imposing constraints upon citizens as of “making up” citizens capable of bearing a kind of regulated freedom' (1992: 174). Making the disciplinary and constitutive practices of the state the object of study opens up new avenues of analysis, including drawing attention to how reintegration and benefits programmes provide an avenue through which the state governs former combatants.

In terms of practice, disciplinary power has been identified in the use of registration processes, actions that facilitate state intervention and knowledge. State actors first actively define the population subject to the intervention by producing knowledge on the cohort. This expert ‘knowledge’ becomes the source of power (‘knowledge/power’), as it justifies and facilitates differential treatment and intervention (see MacKinnon’s excellent summary, 2000: 296). Technologies for creating these identities include enumeration, classification, and mapping. These practices engender standardisation, radical simplification and institutionalisation, and make state surveillance and control possible (see Anderson, 1991; Bernal, 1997). The legal development of identity categories in Timor-Leste used for administering pension benefits, as will be argued in subsequent chapters, provide an example of this knowledge/power nexus.

The creation of these identity categories allows for a range of disciplinary action, particularly through the exercise of ‘biopower’ – the control of bodies and populations – and the creation of docile bodies (see O’Neill’s analysis, 1986: 43). As Ferguson argues, government services extend disciplinary state power into the realm of how people live and control their bodies. He writes:

23 As Metsola argues, “'[r]eintegration” combines regimenting biopolitics with governmental techniques that aim at reforming and civilising subjects’ (2006: 1125).
‘Government services’ are never simply ‘services;’ instead of conceiving this phrase as a reference simply to a ‘government’ whose purpose is to serve, it may be at least as appropriate to think of ‘services’ which serve to govern (1994: 253).

The view of the state as instrumentalised through the extension of disciplinary power is of particular relevance to this thesis; here, government services, including benefits programmes, are a means of regulating identities and bodies, reframing reintegration programmes as a form of disciplinary biopolitics. In this light, the introduction of state controls or programmes (e.g. permits, forms, taxes, identification, services) marks the extension of state power and thus a form of state-building.

In regards to the Timorese case, while the encounters and bureaucratic practice listed above are performative, the registration process is also disciplinary and constitutive. The registration scheme in particular has been the tool by which the new state has come to not only know these subjects, but, in doing so, also to create, problematise, and control the cohort. This dynamic is important for consideration in post-conflict state-building, as these developments mark the displacement of some non-state systems and challenge the exercise of state-like authority by those not incorporated into the (hybrid) state system. Power, indeed, lies with the gatekeepers who determine who is on – or off – the list, who, quite literally, counts. As Prime Minister Gusmão acknowledged, registration is important as ‘once there is oversight, we’ll know who’s who’ (Timor Post, 19 July 2010).\(^24\) Control over the lists, means control over identity and resources.

\(^{24}\) Quoted in ‘PM Xanana husu veteranus hakmatek’ [“PM Xanana asks for calm from veterans”], Timor Post, 19 July 2010. My translation differs slightly from that offered by Nolan (ICG, 2011: 12).
In Timor-Leste, the development of comprehensive registries began with non-state veterans’ associations. Of the new groups, the Association of Resistance Veterans (AVR) by 2002 boasted over 18,000 members (McCarthy, 2002: 91), many of whom would have had extremely limited fighting experience. The Association of Former Combatants (AAC) also registered putative former fighters, ‘demanding cash payments from those who registered in return for an ID card’ (World Bank, 2008: 9). The engagement of these associations in state-like functions (e.g. issuing identity papers or promising benefits) increased the state’s need to establish its own registration programme and reassert control over who would take part in these programmes. As one Member of Parliament summarised: ‘[Resistance members] served the state, now it is the state’s obligation. They could organise themselves… this would be a problem!’ (INT59).

Accordingly, Timorese programmes have focused on creating authoritative data, ‘official’ records that control who is offered benefits and who is not. More broadly, these data drives helped the Timorese state account for its populace. Prior to the registration drive, most Timorese registrants had no formal ‘identity’ in relation to the state apparatus. But registration has done more than just put individuals on the state’s radar: the resulting identity categories set the lens through which the state approaches subjects. Here the summation of disciplinarity as fixing individuals within institutions is again apt (Hardt and Negri, quoted in Widder, 2004: 414). These discursive processes – the categorisation of individuals – fundamentally augment the

25 These included the FALINTIL Veterans’ Foundation (FVF), the Ex-Combatants Foundation (AAC), and Association of Resistance Veterans (AVR), established by Gusmão, in addition to resistance-era groups including RENETIL and CPD-RDTL that remained active.

26 It is worth noting that he imagines the state as in existence during the occupation, with the resistance, even at that point, subordinated. A full, anonymised list of interview participants is available in Appendix C.

27 This changed somewhat with the introduction of national voter ID cards. However, prior to these cards, many struggled to produce documentation, including birth certificates, owing to the destruction of records in the Indonesian withdrawal or a general the lack of recordkeeping.
state’s ‘control over the production unification, codification and dissemination of knowledge’ (Loveman, 2005: 1660).

In Timor-Leste, the registration programmes identify subjects meriting special attention and interventions, including recognition and payments, using categories and criteria relevant to state purposes. Legal instruments draw the lines defining and excluding civilians and collaborators, and separate high-status ‘veterans’ from ‘former national liberation combatants.’ These determinations centre on questions around types of service, with particular emphasis on use of weaponry; the criteria favour the politically powerful – older men – over the less so (women, young people). The title of ‘veteran,’ which has a distinct legal meaning, establishes subjects’ relationships to the state. The categorisation is double-edged, however. As discussed in regards to demobilisation, such an assignation both honours the subject and marginalises him or her, both underscoring the subject’s heroism and marking it as from a bygone era.

The emergence of the state in making these determinations marks a very specific extension of state power. Nationwide registration establishes the state as the maker and keeper of official – and thus consequential – histories, identities and knowledge. Here state actors draw black and white distinctions in a conflict marked by shades of grey, resolving thorny questions around identity and service. This power to resolve ambiguities is, somewhat ironically, highlighted by the state’s complicity in ‘laundering’ fraudulent or inflated service claims. Survey data suggests that a majority of newly minted ‘veterans’ and ‘former combatants’ fail to meet basic registration criteria, yet these individuals have been registered and treated accordingly. As Scott notes, ‘fictitious facts-on-paper’ matter as they ‘can often be made eventually to prevail on the ground, because it is on behalf of such pieces of paper that police and army are deployed’ (1998: 83). The state renders these
classifications ‘true’ by deploying the state apparatus and conferring special treatment on fraudulent registrants. As discussed above, the state’s ability to remove people from the list marks a similar expression of this power.

In addition to simply determining who gets benefits (who ‘counts’), registration renders subjects visible – countable, measurable – to the state. This allows for the treatment of registered individuals as a coherent group and facilitates monitoring as well as control through targeted benefits distribution. For example, the provision of financial benefits to identified individuals can be used to disperse – the ‘pay and scatter’ DDR approach (Alden, 2002: 345) – or concentrate problematic populations.\(^{28}\) In Timor-Leste, benefits payments are disbursed in the subject’s sub-district of birth, requiring regular pilgrimages back to areas in which the subject is ‘known.’ Veterans’ benefits programmes have also, for both surveillance and cultural reasons, often focused on housing, placing residences near the road for ease of state visits or envisaging ‘veterans’ villages’ in which former fighters are concentrated. In this manner, data gathering and analysis is disciplinary and key to the extension and effectiveness of the state apparatus.

Finally, the classification of ‘veterans’ also makes possible the articulation of a ‘veterans problem.’ This problematisation sets the stage for and justifies intervention. In interviews, state officials depict former resistance members as infirm and doddering or hot-blooded and not modern – of a different era. This contrasts with state actors who, despite often having been in the resistance themselves, now

---

\(^{28}\) Metsola, in his examination of the reintegration of former combatants in Namibia, provides a good example of a service that governs; he argues that jobs training programmes ‘leaned … towards containing ex-combatant agency’ (2006: 1125). This focus on pacification echoes Foucault’s work on state power as biopower, and the creation of docile bodies through disciplinary practices (see O’Neill’s analysis, 1986: 43). As Metsola argues, “[r]eintegration” combines regimenting biopolitics with governmental techniques that aim at reforming and civilising subjects’ (2006: 1125).
identify with the state and the hybrid organisations like Gusmão's CNRT party. This idea of former resistance members as being anachronistic has emerged as the heart of this ‘problem,’ the clash between the old ways of doing things and the ‘new’ state. The focus of policy makers has thus been on excluding these actors from driving the political process – finding more ‘appropriate,’ state-run venues in which they could express themselves, most notably the yet-to-be-established National Veterans’ Council. Settling or solving the ‘veterans problem’ in this perspective thus revolves around redefining their relationship to the state, and under cutting or co-opting these forms of authority.

4 IMAGINING THE NATION

Thus far this chapter has focused on state-building; it now briefly turns to a discussion of nation-building, the establishment of a common identification – the “we” to which individual citizens feel they belong’ (Cohen, 1999: 264f).

Nation-building is commonly contrasted with state-building, with distinctions drawn between fostering a national identity (nation-building) and constructing effective government institutions (state-building) (Call and Cousens, 2008: 4). As outlined above, however, I view state-building as a process and set of practices, including institutional development, that engender the idea of a common, overarching state. Thus, while the processes of state- and nation-building remain distinct, here both state- and nation-building centre an *imaginaire* – the ‘state’ is not unlike the ‘we’ referenced above. Unlike the state-building literature, the concept of the imagination and construction of a nation through political action increasingly lies in the analytical mainstream.

---

29 Rich scholarly debate exists around the emergence of nations and nationalism (see Gellner, 1983; Hobsbawm, 1990; Hastings, 1997), and increasing attention has been paid to the processes of nation-building either in the wake of colonial rule (see Chipkin, 2004) or after conflict (see Simonsen, 2004).
While the state and nation are conceptually distinct, state- and nation-building processes are strongly inter-related and often reinforcing. Their dichotomisation, particularly once institutional development is underway, downplays the interaction between these processes. Firstly, initiatives that increase the perception of the state as vertical and encompassing in post-conflict states advance nation-building: the perception of being centrally governed – the periphery tied to a single core – becomes a point of mutual identification. As such, the growth of the state’s institutional reach, as with the registration of former resistance members, for example, and the concomitant displacement or appropriation of non-state systems of governance and authority, reinforces the common identification as ‘governed’ and thus of a shared nationality. As Hastings writes: ‘a nation may precede or follow a state of its own but it is certainly assisted by it to a greater self-consciousness’ (1997: 3). The state apparatus educates citizens both in their subordination to the state, but also their collective identity as its subjects.

Secondly, the relationship between state- and nation-building processes may function in the opposite direction as well: strengthening a common national identity also strengthens the state apparatus. For example, a nation-building exercise such as the creation of schooling in a common language drives territory-wide institutional development. This extends state bureaucratic power and reinforces the state-as-idea – the state as omnipresent and encompassing, unified and rational. A sense of national unity may also reinforce perceptions of state authority and improve state actors’ ability to govern; this improved governance may further enhance the ‘pragmatic’ legitimacy of the state (i.e. its claims to legitimacy based upon competent performance, see Suchman, 1995: 578). In this manner, the mechanisms and practices for state- and nation-building are interknit and often mutually reinforcing:
the imagination\textsuperscript{30} of the state and the nation (and exclusion from both) go hand in hand.

4.1 Nation-building as Politics

As with the focus on the ‘how’ of state-building introduced above, I am particularly interested in the mechanisms of post-conflict nation-building. Anderson (1991) has identified the critical role of a common language, print media, and compulsory education. Other scholars have focused on the mobilisation of a ‘usable past’ to describe threads of commonality connecting diverse peoples (Ingimundarson, 2007: 96). As Aretxaga emphasises, ‘[states] have actively engaged in the production of national fantasies of communitas’ including through the ‘monumentalization of heroism aimed at creating collective memory and myth’ (2003: 396). These attempts at forging a national identity are intensely political. Politics drive this machinery, and jockeying occurs around defining narratives, as it is these narratives that help to legitimate and naturalise claims to state power. Political actors’ seek to influence these narratives as well as advance their interests and positions through this national discourse. Accordingly, I approach ‘nation-building as a form of politics’ (Brubaker, 1996: 412; my emphasis).

Beyond these instrumental dynamics, the normative legitimacy of the state itself lies in the concordance of the nation and state. The nation-state has been naturalised as the dominant form of modern political organisation. As Anderson reflects, ‘nation-ness is the most universally legitimate value in the political life of our time’ (1991: 3). The ‘symbolic power’ or taken-for-granted quality of state institutions and even political leadership is rooted in narratives about the natural or inevitable conformity of

\textsuperscript{30} The use of ‘imagine’ follows Anderson (1991) who defines nations as imagined communities for the simple reason that an individual feel a sense of connection to a group containing many more people that he or she will ever develop relationships with.
state and nation; discussions of statehood presuppose the existence of political communities.  

For example, claims for Timorese ‘self determination’ hinged on the positioning of Indonesia as a foreign occupier of a coherent, unified ‘nation without a state’ (Bogerdoft, 2006: 102). As A. Marx describes, in an concept reaching back to Rousseau, ‘[t]he nation is that group viewed as the legitimate owner of the state; the collective sentiment of such ownership (that is, nationalism) is what gives the state legitimacy’ (2002: 104). Discourses and practices that knit together the state and the nation are thus key to establishing state legitimacy and the political legitimacy of those who govern.

Reflecting the emphasis on the nation-state unit, the state-building literature has approached the establishment of unifying or integrative nationalism as stabilising. Scholars argue that national identities, which are forged through discourses around common experiences, ethnicity, origin, or culture, engender trust and increase social consensus and cohesion (see Simonsen, 2004). Prior to Timorese independence, Anderson (1993) argued that national unity could form around resistance to Indonesian rule. In particular, the Catholic church, introduced through Portuguese missionaries, gained importance during the Indonesian occupation as ‘the only protection from persecution by the Indonesian military’ and ‘the “umbrella” for East Timorese identity,’ as well as a vehicle for the popularisation of Tetum as a national language (Borgerhoff, 2006: 108).

---

31 With a view to the political content of nationalism and nation-building, Gellner goes further to argue that ‘[i]t is nationalism which engenders nations’ (1983: 55). He suggests that political actors drive the creation of uniting narratives that then define a polity and demand a state in the case that one does not exist.
Scholars also sought to identify unifying, national characteristics or histories following the 2006 Crisis in Timor-Leste, which saw the excitement of east/west tensions. Local and international scholars sought to identify indigenous practices that could symbolise a common Timorese culture and nationhood and mend East/West divisions. Trinidade and Castro (2007) advocate for the use of ‘traditional Timorese’ dispute resolution practices. Wallis, while identifying the issues regarding the instrumentalisation of resistance histories, advises leaders to mine their ‘common heritage’ and ‘draw upon memories that can support a unifying national narrative, rather than those that remind people of their divisive past’ (2012: 149, 152).

What these authors do not fully acknowledge or problematise, however, is the fiction of a united past and united resistance. Narratives that gloss over divisions, both within the resistance and historically between clans, reify a single, traditional, ‘Timor,’ existing before colonial intervention. By contrast, Timor-Leste remains remarkably diverse – there are over 19 distinct, autochthonous living languages (Taylor-Leech, 2009: 12) – with a history of inter-kingdom animosity and conflict. While the resistance and, for example the spread of Tetum during the occupation (CAVR, Ch. 3, 2005: 99), increased mutual identification across Timorese ethnicities, individuals still strongly identify with their linguistic group and clan. Even the symbolic Timorese ‘traditional house,’ presented as a symbol of ‘primordial elements of collective life’ (Itzigsohn and vom Hau, 2006: 195), reflects only one regional style, rather than a territory-wide architectural style and set of cultural practices. These nations pre-dated both the state and any conceptualisation of a single nationality.

32 The 2006 Crisis refers to a period of political violence that took place in April-May 2006. It led to the deaths of approximately thirty people and the internal displacement of over 125,000 Timorese, primarily in the capital Dili. Evidencing severe institutional weaknesses, the fighting broke out between elements of the Timorese military (F-FDTL) and the Police (PNTL). The conflict also took on regional, East/West dimensions, which reflect the specific political and geographical histories of the F-FDTL and PNTL. See ICG, 2006; COI Report, 2006; and Gledhill, 2014.
Secondly, national myth-making has political consequences as these narratives describe boundaries around who belongs in the nation and who does not, who is legitimate to govern or not. Somewhat ironically, the exclusionary nature of national discourses is key to their integrative function – the definition of the in-group through the marking of the out-group. For example, reflecting on the construction of post-conflict national identity in Zimbabwe, Kriger notes that the ‘brand of official nationalism celebrates the military dimensions of the liberation war and side-lines non-violent political struggles’ (2006: 1151), thus reducing these groups’ claims to power. This is a dynamic political space, however, and ‘social movements and excluded elites [also] advance contending national narratives that challenge established ideas about national membership’ (Itzigsohn and vom Hau, 2006: 194). Accordingly, these national discourses are contested.

In the case of Timor-Leste, resistance histories are key to the ‘brand of official nationalism’ advanced by political elites, yet also contested by those who fall outside of these narratives.33 Here the processes of state- and nation-building again converge, as political leaders have sought to codify or embed these national narratives in both state symbols and administrative programmes. For example, FRETILIN colours and the image of a gun were incorporated into the state seal in 2006. Similarly, the official date marking the beginning of the conflict carries political symbolism, as it is tied to early political contests (see Wallis, 2013: 136).

Memorialisation also communicates ideas about the conflict, nation, and leadership.

33 Politics in Timor-Leste are dominated by reference to three main sources of political power: the resistance, as discussed above; traditional power structures and indigenousness; and the Catholic Church. In political rallies, political elites draw upon these symbols of cultural and political authority, including wearing traditional dress (e.g. tais textiles, kaibauk headdress) and appearing with former resistance leaders. As these leaders age, the question of generational shifts in leadership arise. This new generation includes many members of the clandestine movement, which defined the latter part of the conflict, raising the question of how these grounds for national political power will be refashioned to suit their needs. On generational succession, see ICG, 2011: 17.

51
Through such practices actors entrench specific, political and historical narratives, reflecting efforts by resistance leaders to conserve and entrench their claims to political legitimacy. Through both their repeated use and codification through state practices, specific symbols of authority and histories gain currency as dominant constructions of national identity.

5 CONCLUSION

This chapter began with the observation that there has been little dialogue between the literature exploring the nature of the state and the literature on post-conflict state-building, despite the insights the former provides in terms of how states function and how, crucially, the idea of the encompassing state is spread. In drawing upon anthropological and post-structural concepts of the state, this chapter has sought to shed new light on state-building and the role of reintegration and benefits programmes therein. This new theoretical lens shifts attention from what is being built (the state as an object or assemblage of institutions), to what effect these processes have (the idea of the state, the drawing of boundaries). This new approach calls to mind Heraclitus’s aphorism that ‘the sun is new everyday;’ in many ways, so too the state. Analytically, this places focus on ‘how the state is performed and experienced in the everyday encounters of state agencies and functionaries with the citizenry or population’ (Metsola, 2006: 1119).

The re-identification of the state thusly reanimates the study of post-conflict reintegration and benefits programmes in Timor-Leste, transforming our perspective on seemingly mundane practices such as queuing for registration or classifying former combatants by their type of service. This framework, in complicating notions around state autonomy and agency, exposes the complexity around sites of authority, with state and non-state actors appearing both in competition, but then also
often highly integrated with some former resistance leaders ‘wearing two hats.’ The idea of the state, expectations of state action, and the legitimacy acting on behalf of the state imparts, remains highly relevant – the state maintains this ‘meta-capital’ – even in a situation like Timor-Leste where state institutions are weak and the reach of the state apparatus, such as through policing, is limited. Again, this provides new ways of thinking about post-conflict transitions.

In his discussion of state development in Timor-Leste, Richmond argues that ‘East Timor appears increasingly to be a hollow liberal state: the state structure certainly exists, but its liberal substance is virtual and has even been described as a “Hollywood film set”’ (Richmond and Franks, 2008: 196). This chapter, with its focus on the performance of the state and engendering the state-as-idea largely concurs. In 2012, the Timorese state remained institutionally weak, with a limited ability to govern outside of the capital. However, with the rollout of the old age pensions the state has gained more substance; the pensions programme, if amended as discussed in the concluding chapter, could play a similar role. Welfare programmes have the potential to ground a state’s legitimacy in benefits to its citizens and this engages ideas about the foundation of state power in the social contract. This analysis, indeed, follows Richmond’s own observation that the development of the welfare system since the 2006 Crisis has marked a shift away from the neoliberal mode towards social justice and a ‘post-liberal synthesis’ of the local and state (Richmond, 2011: 124).

In preparation for a deeper exploration of the case, the next chapter shifts away from these theoretical discussions to look at the history of the resistance and the Indonesian occupation of Timor-Leste. Particular attention is paid to continuities and discontinuities in power structures and the changing internal dynamics and strategies of the resistance movement.
1 INTRODUCTION

Sergio de Mello, the United Nations’ Transitional Administrator and Special Representative to the Secretary General (SRSG, 1999-2002), described Timor-Leste as a ‘pretty perfect petri-dish’ in which the UN could put theories of state building to the test (Power, 2008: 303). His metaphor suggests a territory both diminutive and sterile, a slate wiped clean through decades of oppression and out-migration and autoclaved in the heat of intense, post-referendum violence. Such images of post-conflict Timor-Leste as an ‘empty shell’ and ‘laboratory’ for external experimentation have been repeated in both policy and scholarly analysis (Traub, 2000: 74). The impression is of a place defeated and burnt down to its political and social foundations, a place ripe to be rebuilt de novo from the ground up. But was this really the case? What were the legacies of the colonial and resistance eras? Is Timor-Leste best understood as a ‘clean slate’ at the beginning of the UN period?

As Chopra notes, ‘[t]here is a profound difference between anarchy defined as the absence of a national executive, legislature and judiciary, and the actual breakdown of indigenous social structures’ (2002: 981). Periods of war, violence, and oppression destroy some social arrangements but strengthen or create others. As Hoffman writes: ‘[S]ociality is not something that can be present or absent. Social relationships may be reconfigured profoundly in wartime but they do not simply deteriorate or break’ (2007: 651). Social arrangements, including patronage, clandestine networks, and systems of elitism and power, are remarkably robust, surviving, in the case of Timor-Leste, through the Portuguese colonial era (16th century-1975), Indonesian

34 During this transitional period, Timor-Leste was technically recognised as a non-self-governing territory under United Nations administration. During the conflict, only Australia recognised Jakarta’s claim, and other states regarded it as a de jure Portuguese territory (see Chopra, 2002: 984).

This chapter is grounded in the viewpoint that the study of Timor-Leste’s post-conflict politics, and the politics of reintegration programmes in particular, necessitates the examination of these social structures and the history of the resistance movement. This is the case for four key reasons. The first is that it is difficult to understand what these programmes are doing – or not doing – without reference to the conflict histories of those who served in various capacities. As will be discussed, historical analysis immediately flags the approval of approximately 10,000 Timorese for pensions recognising extended armed service as wildly out of step with conflict-era estimates of participation; a few hundred armed individuals are thought to have been mobilised during the final years of the conflict (Moore, 2001: 12). So too, does historical analysis help to highlight the various needs of those who participated. For many, the majority of the conflict was spent participating in covert action from their homes, drawing on familial networks. Here, in this historical context, ‘reintegration’ takes on a much different meaning.

Secondly, reintegration and pension benefits programmes do not treat all who participated the same. They provide support based on performance in the conflict-era, including types of service (e.g. armed versus clandestine), conflict-era hierarchies, and years served. However, while seemingly straightforward, the study of the 24-year Timorese conflict exposes how difficult these distinctions or determinations are to make based on the historical record. As will be discussed, there are no rolls, resistance structures evolved, and, in some cases, documentation that outlines clear hierarchies were more symbolic or propagandistic than reflections
of reality. It is from these shades of grey that reintegration programmes have been used to draw black and white distinctions. To understand these transformations and the complexity inherent in any reintegration programme that seeks to standardise service across a diverse, guerrilla movement, an appreciation of the conflict history is key.

Thirdly, by looking for continuities with colonial and conflict-era dynamics, post-conflict divisions, alliances, tensions, and policy decisions can better be understood. For example, the current leadership of independent Timor-Leste reflects resistance-era hierarchies, which, in turn, are rooted in systems of ethnic and nepotistic elitism established by the Portuguese. In the independence period, these leaders have continued to carry obligations to their conflict-era networks, networks that in many cases have become the basis for political parties and continue to be supported through patronage. Reintegration programmes have provided one avenue for sustaining these networks. Even leadership styles and former resistance members’ expectations for the state are rooted in conflict era structures and management (see Kingsbury, 2012: 17).

Finally, Timorese political actors have used resistance histories to gain political capital, as association with the resistance has become a key ground for claims to legitimate leadership. Accordingly, the documentation and representation of conflict history has become increasingly important.35 Some political actors have emphasised armed action, particularly the contribution of the armed wing, FALINTIL, to advance their claims or marginalise those of others. Such emphasis excludes those who served later in the clandestine front, which rose to prominence in the 1980s. As will

35 While I consider the historicisation of the resistance in legislation, the presentation of resistance histories in other arenas, such as memorials, museums, or school textbooks (see vom Hau, 2008), is beyond the scope of this study.
be discussed further in Chapter VI, the ‘very centrality of the resistance to East Timorese nationalism,’ Leach argues, has driven ‘considerable political conflict over the symbolic ownership of that history: over who is included, excluded, recognised and acknowledged in the central narrative of funu [war]’ (2010: 125). The benefits of inclusion in these narratives are more than symbolic. The examination of these narratives is only possible when contrasted with scholarly accounts.

This chapter begins with the end of the Portuguese colonial era and then addresses the Indonesian invasion, occupation, and ultimate withdrawal in 1999. The chapter concludes with an account of UN-led demobilisation efforts, specifically the FALINTIL Reinsertion Assistance Programme (FRAP). In order to avoid analysis of the resistance movement coloured by the ultimate achievement of independence, a form of confirmation bias, this chapter takes particular interest in pre-independence scholarly work and Indonesian accounts.

2 PORTUGUESE COLONIAL ERA

On the eve of the Indonesian invasion in December 1975, Portuguese Timor had little by way of health facilities or schools, and illiteracy rates exceeded 90 per cent (Taylor, 1991: 34). A mere 20-30 kilometres of paved roads, first sealed the decade before, extended through the capital Dili and stopped abruptly at the colonial governor’s door (Cottle and Masterman-Smith, 2002: 3; Nicol, 2002: 39). As McDonald reflects:

Beyond the towns and administrative villages lived more than eighty per cent of the population in the hundreds of tiny hamlets in conditions that had endured with little change since the beginning of Portuguese colonisation (in Budiardjo and Liong, 1984: 4).

---

36 The process of presenting a historical account is fundamentally challenging. Histories are both simplifications and political – the summarisations of complex events and multiple perspectives – and recognition of these dynamics both complicates the presentation of a conflict’s history and implicates the author. No history is ‘disinterested’ or ‘a-political.’
Despite having come to the island as sandalwood traders and missionaries in the 16th century, and establishing an administrative base on the island in 1702, the Portuguese maintained a colonial bureaucracy with minimal reach. As Gunn argues, in the Portuguese era, Timor remained ‘a paradigm of underdevelopment, an exemplar of a backward dependent colonial periphery’ (2001: 11). There was negligible Portuguese investment in the cultural and economic lives of the Timorese; direct colonial penetration into the life-worlds of most Timorese was minimal.

2.1 Colonial Legacies

However, this lack of direct colonial presence should not be confused with a lack of influence. The Portuguese approach to governance left important legacies and the colonial era influenced both patterns of resistance to the Indonesian occupation and political dynamics in the post-conflict period. Firstly, the Portuguese administrators’ dependence on the indigenous system of kingdoms to control populations left these structures largely intact. These indigenous networks provided a basis for the resistance. Secondly, the Portuguese class system, concentrated power amongst a small, largely mestico elite. This educated elite emerged as the leaders of key resistance groups, which now as political parties dominate the political arena. These continuities in the distribution of power from the colonial era through independence are often neglected.

37 Colonial intervention did increase in the late 19th century. In the 1880s, the use of forced labour to build roads to coffee plantations sparked the Manufahi uprising (1896-1912) under liurai (king) Dom Boaventura (Taylor, 1991: 11). After Boaventura’s defeat, the colonial administration relocated to Dili from Macao, and sought to consolidate power and increase agricultural exports through the increased use of tariffs and forced labour. Following the Second World War and Japanese occupation, the colonial state again extended its reach, this time under international pressure to bring ‘indigenous inhabitants [into] closer contact with local government’ (Weatherbee, 1966: 686). The 1960s thus brought sweeping changes to the relationship between East Timor’s inhabitants to the Portuguese state, including universal Portuguese citizenship, voting rights, and compulsory schooling.

38 While not considered here, recent scholarship has also connected patterns of political and urban violence since independence with Portuguese-era uprisings (Muggah, 2010: 21). In addition, both Anderson (1993) and Traube (1995) argue that colonial domination and resistance created a sense of Timorese national identity.
Concerning the first legacy, the Portuguese colonial power depended upon the co-option and incorporation of local rulers, most notably Timorese liurai or kings. Through this relationship, these Timorese kingdoms both projected Portuguese colonial power and insulated Timorese from direct colonial control. By strategically alternating allegiances between colonial (both Dutch and Portuguese) and indigenous powers, these kingdoms negotiated colonial domination and maintained significant autonomy (Sowash, 1948: 231). In the post-conflict period, the strength of these structures is still evident. As Cummins and Leach note: ‘those with liurai (political authority) or lia-na’in (ritual authority) heritage have proven more effective in modern local government roles and have greater “speaking power” than those…without local traditional legitimacy’ (2012: 91).

These clan-based kingdoms were the building blocks for the resistance to both colonial rule and Indonesian occupation. Underscoring the importance of family alliances, an 1882 Portuguese assessment states that ‘marital exchange is our government’s major enemy because it produces… an infinity of kin relations which comprise leagues of reaction against the orders of the governors and the dominion of our laws’ (Taylor, 1995: 25, 30). Following the Indonesian invasion, it was again these networks and clan-based kingdoms that provided armed and clandestine groups with the sinews of the resistance (Taylor, 1995: 33). As discussed in later chapters, while Timorese historical narratives emphasise a rational, bureaucratic resistance, pre-existing family alliances and kinship emerge more prominently as the

---

39 The engagement of liurai to project colonial power can be seen in efforts to increase the production of cash exports, particularly coffee, through plantation agriculture, forced labour, and systems of tribute (Weatherbee, 1966: 686). Into the 1920s, the Portuguese forced the creation of ‘communal plantations,’ redubbed ‘plantations of the government’ by the Timorese (Clarence-Smith, 1992: 17). Somewhat paradoxically, in this period coffee exports stagnated. By contrast, coffee exports had skyrocketed in the second half of the 19th century under freehold production and in concert with Chinese and other non-Timorese traders; this boom was due ‘little to Portuguese measures,’ which they were poorly situated to enforce regardless (Clarence-Smith, 1992: 15, 17).
basis of resistance networks.

In the early 20th century, the Portuguese increasingly exerted control through the replacement of ‘disloyal’ liurai with those who were more sympathetic, in some cases disrupting the hereditary system (Ospina, 2006: 15). More broadly, the Portuguese governed through cultivating a small, ruling elite. These elites, often related to liurai, gained access to education, employment, land, and political power, advantages passed through families across generations. This power was highly concentrated, and the 1950 census identified only 2,022 ‘mesticos’ and 1,541 ‘civilised’ indigenous Timorese amongst 434,907 ‘uncivilised’ indigenous Timorese (Weatherbee, 1966: 648). These elites – representing less than 1 per cent of the 1950 population – were defined both racially and culturally, particularly through their Catholicism and the use of the Portuguese language.

These Portuguese-era class structures are significant as it is from this educated elite that the majority of resistance leaders emerged. Today, many leaders come from the families of liurai (assimilados) or are mestico descendants of Portuguese deportados (Shoesmith, 2003: 236). Accordingly, as Jolliffe notes, ‘the curriculum vitae of many of the leaders are strikingly similar’ (1978: 69). The leadership of the resistance’s political wing, FRETILIN, now a political party, came from similar backgrounds and had ‘all been educated in Portuguese-language high schools and/or Catholic seminaries’ (Carey, 1995: 3). Rifts within the resistance and post-resistance periods can thus often be traced to disputes that emerged in the 1970s and divides between the first political parties. Similarly, despite the appearance of hostilities, these leaders’ common origin and formative education is cited as an example of why

---

40 The census also included categories for ‘Chinese’ (3,122) and ‘Other non-indigenous’ (212). Such instruments were critical in establishing and reifying these category-identities, and sit, as Loveman describes, at the nexus of colonial efforts to extend administrative reach, gain ‘scientific’ knowledge of populations, and construct national identity (2009: 436-7).
political contests are kept under control by leaders; conflicts like the 2006 Crisis are cited as failures of the leadership – who reportedly remain ‘best friends’ – to control the ‘lower ranks’ (INT65).41

These elite origins of the resistance leadership sit somewhat uncomfortably with the populist discourse of *mauberismo* (Timorese peasant culture) and early revolutionary political rhetoric, which was influenced by Latin American socialism, liberation theology, and African anti-colonial struggles. These elite origins complicate a vision of the Timorese resistance emerging from the grassroots. Concern over how to preserve and embody authentic, autochthonous Timorese identity continues to be expressed in proxy battles over language education, for example, as well as on the national political stage. Questions over the ‘Timorese-ness’ of mestico and highly cosmopolitan leaders such as Ramos-Horta arose during the 2012 Presidential elections, with Taur Matan Ruak (the *nom de guerre* of José Maria Vasconcelos) highlighting his humbler origins and presence in Timor-Leste during the occupation.

3 THE RESISTANCE

The history of the Timorese resistance may be divided into distinct phases, marked by important organisational and strategic shifts. This section first considers the precipitous Portuguese withdrawal and the period of intra-party violence that followed. This brief conflagration, fanned by Indonesian state actors, justified the Indonesian invasion in 1975. The next five years were marked by Timorese armed resistance and the brutal military pacification of Timor-Leste by the Indonesian forces, including the massacre of civilians. With the resistance routed and the support bases pacified, the leaders of the resistance charted a new course, including incorporating the agile clandestine networks that emerged both in Timor-Leste and

---

41 A full list of interviewees is included in Appendix C. Due to the sensitivity of this subject, all interviews have been anonymised.
abroad in the mid-1980s. In the late 1990s, the confluence of increased international scrutiny, the Asian financial crisis, and the subsequent democratisation of Indonesia, created the necessary political conditions for a referendum on independence, ending the occupation.

3.1 Portuguese Collapse and Indonesian Invasion (1974-1975)

The Portuguese era came to a close in 1975. The overthrow of Portugal’s fascist Caetano regime in April 1974 precipitated a swift shift in policy towards decolonisation, and the new Portuguese government dedicated few resources to resolving the Timorese territory’s status. Within only sixteen months of the Carnation Revolution, the last Portuguese governor fled Dili for Atauro Island, leaving a capital in political tumult. The political system up-ended, a power vacuum developed and questions as to the ultimate status of the territory came to the fore. With this new political space opened up, Timorese parties formed and began vying for power.

Presenting different visions of the future, elites formed political parties, advocating for options ranging from integration with Indonesia (APODETI), Marxist self-determination (FRETILIN, originally named ASDT), or a more gradualist, pro-Portugal path to independence (UDT). FRETILIN, drawing from a core of elite student advocates, many of whom were active in the diocesan political publication Seara, soon aligned itself with a new vision for an independent, social-democratic Timor-Leste. Inspired by Marxism-Leninism, African national liberation movements,

---

42 Caetano came to power after Salazar’s death in 1968; Salazar served as the Portuguese Prime Minister from 1932-1968.

43 ASDT was renamed Revolutionary Front for an Independent Timor-Leste (FRETILIN) on 11 September 1974.

44 The depth of this understanding and the commitment to these principles merits examination. As one leader reflects, during these early days: ‘What is a communist? We didn’t know; we were following Cuba, Russia. People needed to learn about self-rule’ (INT27). This comment suggests that the adoption of revolutionary rhetoric and principles may, in fact,
and the work of Paolo Freire, FRETILIN began establishing rural cooperatives and organised social campaigns as early as November 1974. In August 1975, FRETILIN established the Armed Forces for the National Liberation of Timor-Leste (FALINTIL) as the party’s armed wing. The defection of 3,000 Timorese from the Portuguese armed forces in August 1975 swelled FALINTIL’s ranks.

Tensions between Timorese parties rose, however. In the context of increasing popular support for FRETILIN, and exacerbated by the sustained efforts of Indonesian intelligence, the loose alliance that had preserved the peace between UDT and FRETILIN collapsed. UDT staged a coup on 11 August 1975 targeting the ‘communist elements’ within FRETILIN (Muggah, 2010: 23; CAVR, 2005: Ch. 5, 2). The conflict between UDT and FRETILIN’s FALINTIL wing lasted fewer than three weeks yet caused the deaths of 1,500-3,000 people, the execution of hundreds of political prisoners, and the displacement of 40,000-50,000 civilians into West Timor (CAVR, 2005: Ch. 1, 43). In the end, FRETILIN prevailed, and on 28 November 1975 the party issued a unilateral declaration of independence.

This period of independence proved short-lived. On 7 December 1975, Indonesia launched a full-scale invasion, a marked escalation from earlier border incursions that had already put it in de facto control of large areas of the territory. Hundreds of Indonesian troops entered by sea, land, and air, overwhelming FRETILIN forces. The invading Indonesian troops quickly took Dili, despite the presence of 2,500 regular forces and 7,500 irregular Timorese resistance forces, and forced FALINTIL into the hills to pre-established bases (Taylor, 1999: 70). Indonesian troops targeted civilians and employed counter-insurgency tactics, including moving rural populations into

have been more strategic or aspirational than substantive. The state that has formed since independence, which largely follows neoliberal economic policies, raises further highlights a ideological shift within the leadership as well as the influence of international development actors.
strategic hamlets and deploying chemical weapons (Taylor, 1999: 71). Amidst the violence, both Australia and the United States of America (USA) refused to intervene; the USA provided arms and military equipment to Indonesia while maintaining a ‘policy of silence’ (Simons, 2000: 189; see also Simpson, 2005). The Indonesian occupation, to last 24 years, had begun.

3.2 Mass Mobilisation and Pacification (1975-1979)

While the Indonesian forces succeeded in quickly taking the larger population centres, efforts to control territory inland were initially frustrated or slowed by Portuguese-trained FALINTIL troops ensconced in isolated support bases (base de apoio). Reflecting the strategy of fighting a protracted people’s war, throughout this period FRETILIN encouraged civilian families to relocate to these bases, which became ‘the basis of the popular war of resistance against the Indonesian invasion’ (Cottle and Masterman-Smith, 2002: 5). There residents received revolutionary education in the areas of health, agriculture, and FRETILIN’s political programme. Cultural education programmes also sought to increase understanding across different Timorese ethno-linguistic groups and thus encourage a sense of national pride and common identity (CAVR, 2005: Ch. 5, 15).

In 1977-1978 the Indonesian army began a new military offensive focused on taking control of FALINTIL strongholds in the eastern highlands. The tactics included not only the use of ground forces, but intensive

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 3.1: Estimated Total Deaths by Hunger/Illness, 1972-2003</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Source: Retrospective Mortality Survey; CAVR, Annex II</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total estimated deaths by hunger/illness, 1972–2003: 161,098 (+/- 10,662)
Total estimated deaths by hunger/illness, 1975–1999: 135,917 (+/- 10,291)
Deaths in excess of estimated baseline, 1975–1999: 86,538 (+/- 10,291)
bombing and strafing campaigns. The Indonesian army was able to encircle the
FALINTIL support bases, causing mass starvation and casualties. In these first years
of combat, an estimated 80,000-100,000 people perished – over 10 per cent of the
population – mainly due to hunger and illness (Taylor, 1999: 71; see Table 3.1).\textsuperscript{45}
With deaths from starvation taken into account, more than half the entire 24-year
conflict’s causalities took place in this devastating five-year period. FRETILIN’s focus
on isolated support bases compounded these problems. Walsh described the
Indonesian offensive as bringing about the ‘virtual, though temporary, annihilation of
the Resistance’ (CAVR, 2005: Ch. 3, 82).

Following the collapse of the bases, some FALINTIL forces broke into small cells of
four or five fighters and scattered. The majority of residents of the support bases
were sent back to by the remaining leadership to their communities of origin. Survey
subjects describe receiving orders from their commanders to surrender and return.
For many of the 300,000 people who left the support bases (CAVR, 2005: Ch. 3, 94),
reintegration was difficult; those who survived the Indonesian transit camps found
their communities altered and their lives now under constant Indonesian surveillance
(INT121, INT134). In the face of such destruction, the majority stopped their
involvement in the resistance. Others resumed their involvement later in the conflict,
with some Easterners re-joining in the 1983 ‘uprising’ or as part of the clandestine
movements. Overall, the loss of the bases and dramatic loss of life marked the end
of the original strategy of a protracted people’s war supported by remote enclaves as
well as the abandonment of FRETILIN’s ambitious social programmes (CAVR, 2005:
Ch. 5, 26). In March 1979, just four years after invading, Indonesia proclaimed Timor-
Leste fully pacified (Fernandes, 2008: 29).

\[\text{\textsuperscript{45} Over the entire conflict period (1975-1999), the CAVR estimates 102,800 (+/– 12,000) deaths, of which an estimated 84,200 (+/– 11,000) were the result of hunger and illness (CAVR, 2005: ES, 44). The CAVR’s top estimate is 183,000 lives lost (2005: ES, 73).}\]
Organisationally, in this initial conflict period, FRETILIN and FALINTIL leadership was in flux. Firstly, formal structures were not established until mid-1976 with the creation of official positions in each region and liberation zone (CAVR, 2005: Ch. 5, 4). Once formed, under sustained pressure and in the face of casualties, changes to command structures and territorial units continued on a yearly basis. These changes in leadership were at times violent, with the use of arrests, torture, and executions to bring ‘cadres into line’ and even discipline high-level members, including Francisco Xavier do Amaral (CAVR, 2005: Ch. 3, 75, 77). In 1979, following the collapse of the bases, the committee was in disarray, with leaders killed, captured, scattered, and in hiding – disconnected. Only three members of the FRETILIN Central Committee survived. While post-conflict narratives describe a rational, coherent resistance, historical evidence suggests a volatile, fractured movement during this period.

3.3 Reorganisation and the Rise of the Clandestine Front (1979-1999)

With the destruction of the strategy of support bases and liberated zones, and reflecting Indonesia’s overwhelming military dominance, at the close of the 1970s the Timorese resistance underwent both tactical and structural changes. Under the leadership of Xanana Gusmão, the several hundred remaining FALINTIL troops – a number greatly diminished from the 10,000 fighters who defended Dili only a few years before – shifted from mass-mobilised, armed resistance to dispersed, guerrilla activities, shedding military uniforms and shifting to the East (CAVR, 2005: Ch. 3, 96). Politically, the movement’s centre moved away from FRETILIN, which had led the Marxist-inspired campaigns in the support bases, and a series of putatively non-

---

46 Despite the presence of Portuguese-trained fighters, FALINTIL resistance cadres generally arose around existing administrative structures at the hamlet (aldeia), village (suku) and regional levels.
partisan, broad-based councils were introduced. Strategically, as the conflict wore on and guerrilla numbers declined, the armed resistance became largely symbolic. The centre of gravity thus shifted to the diplomatic and clandestine fronts, the latter that emerged largely independently of the central leadership. At the same time, demonstrations and other political action became increasingly important for gaining international support for independence. These changes define this next conflict phase.

With civilians moved back into Indonesian-controlled areas, the Indonesian occupation emphasised the militarisation and Javanisation\(^47\) of Timorese society. As an example of their comprehensive control, in the early 1980s, the Indonesian military employed a ‘Fence of Legs’ strategy. Indonesian forces forcibly recruited 60,000 to 120,000 Timorese civilians to sweep the jungles for remaining FALINTIL fighters. These massive operations involved men, women, the elderly and very young; many died of starvation, sickness and ill treatment (CAVR, 2003: Ch. 5, 89). Those who resisted or were suspected of clandestine activities were tortured or ‘disappeared.’ Those testifying before the CAVR describe the psychological toll of living in fear (CAVR, 2005: Ch. 3, 7). Such strategies have led to high levels of post-conflict trauma (see Field, 2004: 13; Strohmeyer, 2000: 267; Sousa Santos, 2011). As Muggah notes: ‘Virtually no Timorese were left untouched by these developments’ (2010: 26).

In this context, collaboration became more common. The Indonesian military intensified surveillance by both increasing their presence at the village level, and soldiers employed locals to monitor the activities of their neighbours. Some

\(^{47}\)This ranged from the rapid expansion of the Indonesian education system and use of \textit{Bahasa Indonesia}, to the spread of a rice-based diet (Guttal, 2008: 1).
collaborated or joined militias under duress, while others set ‘their own course on the basis of historical experience, political context, and personal desire’ (Robinson et al., 1999: 277). Timorese were victims, perpetrators and resistance members – sometimes all three (Pinto and Jardine, 1997: 100). As one long-time observer described:

There was a comprehensive defeat, and people were swallowed up in the [Indonesian] social system. People were absorbed into the Indonesian state; it had full penetration. Veterans thus joined the enemy’s system, signed up and collaborated (INT18).

He concludes: ‘If you were not in the jungle, you were collaborating’ (INT18). This assertion is purposefully provocative: such discussions of collaboration (a word rarely listed in the indices of Timorese histories) go against the narrative of unified national resistance and complicate the hero/collaborator dichotomy advanced in the post-conflict period. However, in the context of survival, such high levels of collaboration are plausible.

Seeking to regroup, in 1981 the surviving leaders of the resistance movement met and charted a new strategy of guerrilla resistance. Organisationally, the leaders divided the territory into new zones and established a new body, the Revolutionary Council of National Resistance (CRRN), to lead the broader struggle, displacing FRETILIN. Gusmão retained the leadership of the CRRN, FRETILIN (PMLF), and FALINTIL, rendering moot many of the new structures’ distinctions. Despite the intricacy of the new arrangements, testimony suggests that the new structures were as much symbolic as operational:

The CRRN structure at the time was operating only at top level or in the forest, while there was no structure or base in the towns. It was just a kind of tactic to signal that an armed front [of the] Resistance, which wanted to continue the struggle, still existed. The

---

48 While the leadership structures may have been symbolic, as suggested in the testimony, the 1981 Conference marked the establishment of NUREP (Núcleos de Resistência Popular), small, village-based units that became the building blocks of the clandestine movement. According to my research, were NUREP cells were highly active and remain relevant.
structure only existed at the level of the FALINTIL command... We ourselves did not know exactly what the structure was (CAVR, 2005: Ch. 3, 28).

This informant highlights the use of symbolic organisational structures tactically – an approach obscured in the post-independence privileging of these structures. The production of such structures, documents, and titles was a key part of the resistance’s propaganda machine. Of note, in the post-conflict period those involved in the pensions registration process have treated this organisational fantasy as real, finding recipients to populate many of these fictive positions (INT78).

The mid-1980s saw the emergence of small, dispersed clandestine cells. These cells provided food and intelligence to the remaining FALINTIL fighters, fed information to activists inside and outside the territory, and organised demonstrations. Initially, these cells ‘worked discreetly and separately’ from each other as well as from the CRRN (Pinto and Jardine, 1997: 95). Under the leadership of Constancio Pinto, coordination between cells increased, including the creation of a more comprehensive network, Orgaun Oitu (Organ Eight). While some groups grew out of student networks both inside and outside Timor-Leste (e.g. 007, OJECTIL, IMPETTU, and RENETIL), others were based in sectarian or church ties. Groups such as Sagrada Familia, established in 1989 under the charismatic leadership of Cornélia Gama (L7 – Elle Sette), incorporated religious and mystical beliefs. Overall, however, Trinidade and Castro attribute the strength of these clandestine structures to their links to traditional house (uma lulik) kinship networks and alliances (2007:

49 This informant, a well-respected former clandestine actor, described the issue as follows: ‘I had three titles, but I was only allowed to register one. Who has them now? Before it was difficult to fill the structures, now everyone has a position. If you ask, they will become angry’ (INT78).

50 Orgaun Oitu, an intelligence network, remains active in some parts of Timor-Leste. See discussion on blog Radio Aton Lifau (tetum): http://radioatonilifau-radioatonilifau.blogspot.co.uk/2010/07/ocrn-liberta-veteranus.html. In discussions some former resistance members advocated ‘reactivating’ the network.
my fieldwork, too, found family units to be the building blocks of the resistance in this later period.

In 1987, reflecting these changes, Gusmão established the National Council of Maubere Resistance (CNRM), replacing the CRRN. Gusmão took the presidency of CNRM. As with the CRRN, the CNRM served as an umbrella organisation. It sought to create a single, non-partisan body under which to unify FRETILIN, UDT, FALINTIL, and new clandestine organisations, many of which were politically independent of FRETILIN (Pinto and Jardine, 1997: 122; Shoesmith, 2003: 241; Fernandes, 2008: 30). While post-conflict narratives describe the ‘clandestine front’ as one arm of the resistance, Pinto’s account suggests the CRRN and CNRM had to play ‘catch up’ to understand and control these complex, proliferating networks. The balance of power shifted significantly; for example, Pinto unilaterally decided that the new Executive Committee of the CNRM for the Clandestine Front (Comité Executivo, est. 1990), originally envisioned to coordinate clandestine groups under FRETILIN, would be best placed directly under CNRM (Pinto and Jardine, 1997: 123). By the early 1990’s clandestine groups were at the heart of the resistance. FALINTIL had been reduced significantly, and Indonesian intelligence reports filed in 1995 estimated that as few as 210 fighters held 98 guns (Moore, 2001: 12).

In the context of increased clandestine activity and advocacy, a major turning point in the conflict came in 1991 with the Santa Cruz massacre of 271 individuals, including an activist from New Zealand. Internally, the massacre ‘cemented the national unity basis of the resistance and hastened the rise of the civilian clandestine movement’ (COI, 2006: 17). The more sweeping impact, however, was international. A film of the

---

51 Some resistance leaders resented the further subordination of FRETILIN and FALINTIL under CNRM; as described in the 2006 Commission of Inquiry report ‘the resulting tensions between Xanana Gusmão and much of the FRETILIN leadership still reverberate within Timor-Leste today’ (COI, 2006: 17).
Santa Cruz massacre, taken by British journalists Christopher Wenner (a.k.a. Max Stahl), brought new international attention focus to Timor-Leste’s plight. Ironically, the 1992 jailing of Gusmão in Jakarta also redoubled press attention and improved access to the resistance leader. Further scrutiny came with the awarding of the 1996 Nobel Peace Prize to Timorese activists José Ramos-Horta and Bishop Carlo Filipe Ximenes Belo. Activity within the United Nations also increased, as well as in other international forums. Recognising the need for a single, legitimate voice to represent the resistance to the international community, in April 1998 Gusmão, still imprisoned, transformed the CNRM into the National Council of Timorese Resistance (CNRT). While CNRT played this role, scholars have noted the tenuousness of its actual control over the multi-faceted movement (Beauvais, 2001: 1123; Hohe, 2002: 71).

3.4 The 1999 Referendum and Indonesian Withdrawal

The rise of the clandestine networks and increased international pressure coincided with the Asian Financial Crisis and the subsequent political turmoil in Indonesia, which brought Suharto’s 31 years as president to a close (Alatas, 2006: 133). Faced with financial and political pressure from both the international community and inside Indonesia, in January 1999 the new Indonesian president, B. J. Habibie, consented to a popular consultation, offering a choice between Timorese independence and autonomy within the Indonesian Republic. In line with the 5 May Agreement, the United Nations Security Council adopted Resolution 1246, establishing the United

---

52 José Ramos-Horta received the prize for leading the diplomatic efforts outside of Timor-Leste to raise awareness of the independence movement. Bishop Belo, the head of the Timorese Catholic church from 1983-2002, emerged as a vocal critic of the occupation from within the country and he used his office to communicate with the United Nations and Vatican.

53 Moore, quoting Indonesian government documents, describes how: ‘the government had been initially optimistic that “autonomy would be the people’s choice” since the “pro-integration groups” (meaning the militias) had, in the early months of 1999, been able to “reverse the situation” of the previous year’ (2001: 33). This assessment suggests either ignorance of the situation in the occupied territory or pressure to downplay Timorese antipathy towards Indonesian rule.
Nations Mission in East Timor (UNAMET) to oversee the voting process. On 30 August 1999, 78.5 per cent of participating Timorese voters expressed their wish for independence from Indonesia. It was a resounding victory for the resistance movement and CNRT.

Despite international scrutiny and undisputable electoral results, the plebiscite was met with violence. Indonesian-backed Timorese militias attacked civilian populations; the Indonesian police, tasked with providing security, were ‘unable or unwilling’ to stem the violence (CAVR, 2005: Ch. 3, 137). Taking a scorched earth approach, these militias destroyed over 70 per cent of infrastructure, displaced thousands into West Timor, and took the lives of over 1,500 people, of which 900 were slain after ballots were cast (COI, 2006: 18). This potential had been foreseen, but security arrangement for the cantonment of Indonesian military and Indonesian-backed militias had been dropped during international negotiations due to concern over endangering the entire agreement (CAVR, 2005: Ch. 3, 132). As discussed in the next section, FALINTIL fighters had voluntarily entered cantonments prior to the voting, a strategy that sought to pre-empt any claim that the anti-independence forces were provoked or acted in self-defence and, in impeding retaliation, may have also prevented an escalation of violence.

On 12 September 1999, under international pressure, Habibie consented to the presence of an international force, effectively ending the military’s 24-year reign of terror. The Australia-led International Force for East Timor (INTERFET) arrived a week later and stabilised the situation. In October, United Nations Security Resolution 1272 established the United Nations Transitional Administration for East Timor (UNTAET), which replaced UNAMET, and was tasked with administering the territory during its transition to full independence (20 May 2002). Three more UN missions followed UNTAET, the last of which, UNMIT, ceased operations in
4 THE RESISTANCE UNDER THE UN INTERREGNUM (1999-2002)

The entry of the United Nations mission marked the end of the conflict, but it was not the end of the resistance. Despite reaching its political goal, the resistance’s composite social structures, political networks, and economic relationships remained. As is discussed in the next chapter, these networks have continued to evolve in the post-conflict period. How to ‘manage’ the resistance and consolidate authority in the post-conflict period came to define the ‘veterans problem’ for the UN. More immediately, however, thousands of resistance members had relocated to cantonments prior to the voting. As conditions declined and the number of cantoned individuals climbed, tensions rose. The following sections first discuss the cantonment and then detail UNAMET’s and UNTAET’s early efforts at closing the cantonments and community reintegration. In particular, I focus on the FALINTIL Reinsertion Assistance Programme (FRAP, 2001-2002).

4.1 Cantonment, Demobilisation, and Establishing the F-FDTL

The process of demobilising resistance actors began even before the Indonesian withdrawal and the popular consultation. By mid-August 1999, 670 FALINTIL and other resistance members voluntarily entered four cantonments. Displaying shrewd restraint, FALINTIL leaders refused to allow fighters to re-engage with the Indonesian military or Indonesian-backed militias, fearing that it would undermine international support for self-determination (World Bank, 2008: 6). Following the arrival of INTERFET forces in September 1999, the FALINTIL command agreed to consolidate resistance members in a single cantonment outside of the town of Aileu, south of the

54 The CAVR writes: ‘According to FALINTIL’s information to UNAMET, 187 guerrillas were placed in Aiassa, 153 in Poetete, 260 in Uaimori, and 70 in Atelari, making a total of 670 people’ (CAVR, 2005: Ch. 5, 41).
capital. In Aileu, the number of cantoned individuals doubled to over 1,300 – a figure indicating inclusion of individuals who were not part of the armed resistance for extended periods of time – if at all.55

As these men and women waited for benefits or assistance, conditions in the camps deteriorated. Both housing and food were inadequate, and as members of the resistance languished in the camps, tensions rose between cantoned groups. These antagonisms belie the rhetoric of a coordinated and united resistance advanced in the post-conflict period. As Rees notes:

Aileu was the first time that many FALINTIL had to cohabitate with each other, and it created a situation where long standing differences of opinion and political rivalries became raw and exposed (2004: 47).

In one instance in May 2000, 30 members of the clandestine group Sagrada Familia seized weapons and entered a standoff with UNTAET administrators. The group’s leader, Cornelio Gama (L7 or Elle Sette), eventually withdrew his men and re-established his power base in the East, but only after being “‘bought off’ and offered an honorary position in government in Baucau’ (Huang and Gunn, 2004: 28). The resistance’s united front proved fragile if not a fiction in the first place.

UNTAET was slow to respond. Ambiguities around the mission’s mandate and overly restrictive and ‘inflexible’ rules prohibited the UN and aid organisations from providing services to ex-combatants (Hood, 2006: 70; Rees, 2004: 46-47). Compounding these problems with the mandate, UNTAET projected a lack of respect for FALINTIL and other resistance actors (ICG, 2006: 5). UN actors reportedly approached resistance members as threatening and problematic – much

55 Rees cites 1,200 cantoned individuals; Moore suggests 1,500 individuals were cantoned, with 900 long-term resistance members and 600 new recruits that had joined after 1998 (Moore, 2001: 13). FRAP reports place the figure at 1,900 individuals (McCarthy, 2002: 2). These figures should be contrasted with Indonesian intelligence estimates of as few as 500 active fighters in 1999 (Moore, 2001: 12).
like the ex-combatants described in the dominant DDR literature. As commander Taur Matan Ruak, who subsequently became the head of the Timorese armed forces (F-FDTL) and won the presidency in 2012, states, ‘we were treated like dogs’ (ICG, 2006: 5) rather than as the widely venerated national liberators (World Bank, 2008: 8; Rees, 2004: 46). Overall, Chopra identifies an attitude of ‘malevolence’ and ‘colonial-style behaviour’ amongst the very international officials who had been brought in to facilitate self-determination (2002: 981).

Chopra connects this stance towards the Timorese resistance to these international practitioners’ experiences in other post-conflict states; many UNTAET personnel, for instance, had come with De Mello, the SRSG, from UNMIK in Kosovo (2002: 981). In Kosovo, the disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration of the Kosovo Liberation Army has been challenging, with issues around criminality and remobilisation in neighbouring conflicts (see Nilsson, 2005: 18; King’s College, 2003: 40). Reaching further back, in his analysis of international approaches to DDR, McMullin argues that the remobilisation and return to civil war in Angola in 1992 set the framework for subsequent generations of DDR programmes – what he terms ‘Angola Anxiety’ (2004: 626). In this model, emphasis is placed on security and thus immediate interventions to disrupt networks. Beauvais argues that these legacies led to the inappropriate application of a ““peacekeeping” approach to what [was] essentially a “decolonization” situation’ (2001: 1168-69).

With some individuals already cantoned for over a year and under pressure to resolve these issues, in September 2000 the East Timor Transitional Cabinet accepted ‘Option Three’ from a King’s College London study concerning the

56 While ostensibly independent of UNTAET, according to the watchdog group La’o Hamutuk, the Transitional Cabinet had ‘little legitimacy, because the process of its establishment – through UNTAET regulations – was non-democratic and, as is evident from the case of the F-FDTL’s establishment, served frequently to rubber-stamp UNTAET decrees’ (2005: 3).
formation of a national military, mandating the creation a 3,000-member, non-conscripted force. The cantonments would be partially emptied through the integration of resistance members into the new military. Under the supervision of Taur Matan Ruak, 650 individuals were chosen to from FALINTIL ranks join the East Timor Defence Force (ETDF, the precursor to the FALINTIL-Defence Force of Timor-Leste (F-FDTL). However, the recruitment of fewer than half of the cantoned resistance members into the ETDF came as a surprise to many. Numerous cantoned individuals thought their future positions in the new armed forces were secure. They did not anticipate that the recruitment of the rest of the force would follow strict literacy and age requirements; did their service, sacrifice, and tactical experience count for nothing? This upset created new pressure to then resolve the status of those not brought into the military.

Partisanship also compounded concerns with the justness of the recruitment process. Those chosen for the ETDF overwhelmingly represented both Gusmão loyalists and easterners. These rifts reflect longstanding personal alliances, the increased divide between Gusmão and FRETILIN, and the resistance movement's concentration in eastern districts during the second phase of the conflict. One analyst characterises the programme as ‘a political demobilisation. Xanana’s friends got in and his enemies were left out. They are very much Xanana’s boys’ (quoted in Dodd, 2002: 20). Their selection, Shoesmith argues, ‘represent[ed] the culmination of the policy Gusmão launched in 1987: the separation of the armed forces from FRETILIN control’ (Shoesmith, 2003: 248). As Kingsbury writes: ‘the F-FDTL [sic] was created largely to satisfy former FALINTIL guerrilla commanders and members’ (2007: 24).

This process fuelled tensions amongst groups within the resistance movement, politicised the military, and accentuated regional differences within the army and between the nascent defence and police forces. Politically, some FRETILIN leaders,
particularly Rogerio Lobato, saw these disgruntled members as a political opportunity. Deepening divisions between Gusmão and FRETIILN, these individuals were ‘wooed by FRETIILN in 2001’ (Rees, 2003: 2) and promised that FRETIILN would offer a ‘new concept’ for the F-FDTL. Lobato also established a veterans’ organisation, the Association of Ex-Combatants 1975 (AC75), which mobilised young men and had ties to security groups (Radin, 2012: 11). These issues have been identified as key drivers of the 2006 Crisis (see ICG, 2006: 5-6).

4.2 FALINTIL Reinsertion Assistance Programme (2001-2002)

The recruitment of the EDTL did not resolve the problem of the cantonments. The status of the remaining resistance members – many cantoned since August 1999 – remained unaddressed by UNTAET until February 2001. While these men and woman may have been capable of securing transportation to their communities, remaining in the cantonments offered the promise of recognition and reintegration support – an attractive proposition in the context of Timor-Leste’s shattered economy. To close the cantonments, UNTAET created the FALINTIL Reinsertion Assistance Programme (FRAP). FRAP was run by the International Organisation on Migration (IOM) and supported by the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), and Japan. One thousand three hundred and eight (1,308) beneficiaries were identified to participate.

Concerning its activities, the programme had four major components: ‘registration; discharge from cantonment; initial reinsertion grant disbursement; and reintegration’ (Kent, 2006: 9). Following the provision of identification cards and transportation

57 Unemployment was rampant; Simonsen cites reports of over 6,000 ‘FALINTIL veterans’ applying for positions with the new police force (2009: 580). It is unlikely that all 6,000 individuals contributed to the armed front as part of FALINTIL, suggesting the emergence of veteran identity as a symbolic currency.
assistance out of Aileu, beneficiaries received a 500 USD transitional safety net payment, meted out in 100 USD instalments. In addition to these payments, FRAP provided reintegration packages or training up to the value of 560 USD (McCarthy, 2002: 51). These packages, administered from the eight regional offices, generally involved providing financial support or materials, including tools, special equipment and even buffalo, allowing beneficiaries to establish micro-enterprises, open kiosks, or begin farming.

FRAP, as a reinsertion programme, was meant to serve members of FALINTIL residing in the cantonment. However, as McCarthy notes, ‘there were no explicit criteria per se’ and benefits were provided to those included on the FALINTIL High Command’s ‘master list’ (2002: 28). This list included some of those identified in an earlier survey of 1,700 former FALINTIL across the territory. These criteria, however, largely excluded clandestine actors, including those who were cantoned, and thus engaged with only a small proportion of resistance members (Kent, 2006: 9). In practice, the composition of the ‘master list’ reflected the abilities of individuals to exploit their personal connections to the High Command and key clandestine players such as Cornelio Gama (L7). These lists were highly political and negotiated rather than clear-cut. This was made possible by the ambiguities over who, in fact, took part in the FALINTIL. As discussed above, rather than being rigid and hierarchical, as the conflict wore on, FALINTIL numbers declined and the organisation became increasingly decentralised. As McCarthy notes: ‘Understandably there were no definitive lists or records detailing membership in the guerrilla force’ (2002: 38). In addition, other, non-FALINTIL actors also took part in armed action or assumed the FALINTIL mantle at the end of the conflict.

Because of these dynamics, the ‘master list’ both included those who did not meet the basic FRAP criteria as well as excluded those who did. Accordingly, one of the
programme’s legacies was the formation of groups who did not participate in FRAP. These groups called themselves the ‘Excluded’ and the ‘Forgotten.’ The ‘Excluded’ include clandestine, armed, and other actors who were cantoned yet were found ineligible for FRAP. The ‘Forgotten’ include individuals who did not enter the cantonment or who left the cantonment before FRAP began, those who participated earlier in the conflict, and FALINTIL who were not recognised on the FALINTIL ‘master list.’ FRAP thus not only established a precedent for the types and level of assistance offered to former resistance members, but also patterns of what types of service would count. The programme both legitimised some individuals’ identities as FALINTIL, while ostracising others, and articulated a hierarchal relationship between armed and clandestine actors.

Unsurprisingly, external evaluations of FRAP have been mixed. McCarthy (2002), while recognising the limitations of both time and available resources, hails the programme as a success. He argues that FRAP facilitated community reintegration and provided the resources necessary for recipients to undertake economic activities. Peake’s useful reappraisal of FRAP, published seven years later, acknowledges these short-term benefits yet finds that programme participants perceived minimal long-term impacts. The responses gathered by Peake capture former resistance members’ unmet expectations and their broad dissatisfaction with living conditions in the post-conflict era. Peake documents, for example, how a lack of vocational skills, land and assets, families, and professional identity – forgone or compromised during years of service – proved humiliating for those ex-combatants.

58 This evaluation is open to a number of criticisms. Firstly, McCarthy’s conclusion was reached mere months following the programme’s closure, limiting the author’s ability to assess longer-term impacts and the longevity of microenterprises, for example. In addition, while survey data was collected at both the beginning and the end of the programme, the methodologies varied and no control groups were included, raising questions concerning the validity of comparisons and the ability to make claims about causation. See, for example, McCarthy’s finding that FRAP ‘facilitated’ marriages amongst younger beneficiaries (2002: 74).
returning to civilian life. Both Peake and McCarthy observe that the programme did not adequately ‘compensate participants for their service, suffering, and contributions’ (McCarthy, 2002: 102). As Peake argues, FRAP was poorly equipped to address these broader challenges and ‘existential concerns’ – a shortcoming endemic to reintegration initiatives (2008: 21).

Little attention has been paid, however, to the appropriateness of the reinsertion model in this context. A closer examination of FRAP recipient data and the status of guerrilla forces at the end of the conflict suggest that many beneficiaries had, in fact, very recently lived in communities prior to cantonment. Many cantoned fighters were young and had been involved in the conflict for a relatively short period of time: over 40 per cent of recipients reported serving in FALINTIL for fewer than three years and almost 60 per cent had joined in 1995 or later (see Table 3.2, next page). Fifty six per cent of FRAP beneficiaries were under 30 years old (McCarthy, 2002: 74). This is consistent with organisational shifts in the resistance described above. Reinforcing this point, commanders admitted that despite the approximately 1,300-1,900 cantoned individuals, fewer than 500 guerrilla fighters were active during the final years of the conflict (McCarthy, 2002: 92). Depending on which individuals were recruited into the ETDF, as many as three-quarters of FRAP beneficiaries could have entered cantonments from the clandestine front, and thus settled life, rather than the jungle.

The comments of the recipients interviewed in the FRAP evaluation also draw attention to the question of to what extent recipients needed, in fact, to be reinserted

59 Current government registries indicate fewer than 500 individuals served for more than 15 years – a figure that is most likely inflated when viewed in light of Gusmão’s CAVR testimony that identifies fewer than 100 individuals active in the armed resistance between the early 1980s and early 1990s (CAVR, Part 5, 2005: 39). The first round of registration, encompassing 37,000 individuals, determined only 1,300 had served for more than five years (Bowles, 2005: 3).
into communities. For example, a common complaint from beneficiaries centred around the inadequacy of benefits to meet their heavy, on-going social responsibilities as parents and heads of households – indications of social integration and community presence. These FRAP beneficiaries thus do not fit the ex-combatant profile of socially dis-embedded and de-socialised ‘lifers;’ such individuals require a different reinsertion and reintegration approach. And here, too, emerges the irony: for many FRAP beneficiaries, reintegration was made necessary by the 19 months spent in cantonments, a period that may also have exceeded their length of service in FALINTIL or armed groups at the end of the conflict. In these cases, and in the context of constant movement in and out of the cantonments, FRAP’s efforts to facilitate reintegration and reinsertion appear, as John Beven, UNTAET’s district administrator in Aileu, stated in a UN memorandum, ‘ostensibly unnecessary.’

Table 3.2: Breakdown of FRAP Beneficiaries by Length of Service

![Graph showing the breakdown of FRAP beneficiaries by years of service.]

What Beven’s assessment does not recognise, however, is the political importance of the programmes. As one anonymous official explained: ‘[FRAP was a] political process with a political aim - to prevent FALINTIL from becoming problematic’

---

It was necessary to manage the anger and dissatisfaction of those who were not chosen to join the ETDF, and valid concern over the growth of non-state, militarised groups, including CPD-RDTL and AFC’75, drove political support for FRAP as a state-based alternative. Rather than viewing the programme as concerning reinsertion and reintegration of atomised fighters, FRAP may more usefully be understood as a short-term mechanism for dispersing and placating groups of individuals who viewed themselves as entitled to care from the state and their conflict-era leaders. These individuals, far from being homogenous or the paradigmatic fighters re-emerging from the isolated front, represented a complex range of conflict experiences, expectations, social responsibilities, and needs. It is their identification by FRAP that creates a coherent group – state beneficiaries – which further contextualises the concern of those not recognised, recorded, and served similarly.

Ultimately, while FRAP provided an immediate resolution of the issue of the congregation and stubborn presence of FALINTIL forces and clandestine actors in the cantonments, their very presence in the cantonments reflected (and foreshadowed) greater, unresolved ambiguities over the status of those not brought into the ETDF in relation to the emergent Timorese state. Who benefits? Who counts? FRAP also left issues of valorisation unresolved, and in focusing on armed actors in the cantonments, did not address those who participated earlier in the conflict, were not registered, or left the cantonment (the ‘Forgotten’) or the demands of clandestine and other conflict actors who were ineligible for FRAP (the ‘Excluded’). Thus political questions around authority, recognition, and status, rather than

---

61 Scambury identified unmet expectations stemming from these early demobilisation processes as a cause of later institutional tensions and motivation for membership in dissident (in)security groups during the 2006 Crisis (2006: 14).
concerns over social reintegration (as in narratives of return), drove FRAP and subsequent state-led programmes.62

From a programmatic perspective, the conclusion of FRAP in 2002 marked the end of major international reinsertion assistance efforts. Some international assistance did continue: a reintegration initiative, the Recovery, Employability, and Stability for Ex-combatants and Communities in Timor-Leste (RESPECT, 2003-2005) programme followed, and bilateral and UN support through technical assistance and the provision of international advisors has been on-going. These programmes, however, are relatively minor when compared to the state-based initiatives, the focus of this thesis. Internal political dynamics, rather than international programmes and orthodoxies, primarily drive reintegration programmes in Timor-Leste. As with the challenge of selecting beneficiaries for FRAP, however, deciding who was part of the resistance – and who gets to make that determination – emerged as a major political and technical challenge. Again, an appreciation of the conflict underscores the historical complexity underlying determinations of veteran status or decisions regarding collaboration.

5 CONCLUSION

The history of the Timorese occupation and independence is often outlined as the triumph of a hardscrabble, united liberation movement. However, as this chapter describes, the story is more complex. The resistance evolved over more than two decades. It was often fractured, strategies changed, and organisational structures and their membership were rarely clear-cut. And, at the end of the conflict, far from being a sterile ‘petri dish’ or ‘blank slate’ the territory hosted complex political

62 FRAP also anticipated key tensions that re-emerge in the pensions and benefits programmes, including issues around false claimants, generational divisions, and the role of former resistance members in performing state-like functions.
organisations and dense networks of clandestine groups. Through these groups, the emergent leadership now shares a long history of both collaboration and antagonism. In Timor-Leste, the Indonesian withdrawal did not mark the end of the resistance; the identities, behavioural patterns, political relations, and economic relationships that sustain social groups remain.

As noted in this chapter’s introduction, taking this more in-depth view of the conflict lays a foundation for analysis in subsequent chapters. Of particular importance is the recognition of how the conflict’s length and complexity makes determinations of participation difficult. This issue is compounded as claiming membership in the armed resistance, particularly FALINTIL, opens up access to financial support. Ownership of – and membership in – this complicated resistance history has also become central to political party identity and access to political legitimacy. As ‘veterans’ legislation has come online, recognition in officialised resistance-era histories now legitimates access to both financial and symbolic capital, the latter becoming even more valuable as others are excluded. Fundamentally, the reproduction and control over – the ‘ownership’ of – a dominant historical narrative serves as a source of power. Consideration of the conflict’s history is crucial for assessing these claims; too often these post-conflict identities have been accepted without critical evaluation.

The next chapter moves to an examination of the development and implementation of Timorese-led programmes that followed the end of FRAP. The chapter focuses in particular on the challenge of resolving the call for recognition and care by those found ineligible for state assistance – problems that had already emerged under UNTAET control and that remain tremendously difficult to solve through policy tools.
Chapter IV: The Evolution of State-led Reintegration Programmes

1 INTRODUCTION

While internationally-led efforts to politically neutralise and resolve the status of former resistance members in Timor-Leste ended with the closure of FRAP in 2002, the issues of recognition and state support for those who fought against the Indonesian occupation were far from resolved. Into this vacuum came the Timorese government, proffering a series of commissions to register former resistance members, legislation to determine their rights to pensions and other benefits, and eventually an additional set of \textit{ad hoc} benefits ranging from lucrative government contracts to medical care. However, despite these increasingly Byzantine efforts, the questions of \textit{who} deserves benefits and \textit{how} to identify these actors have proved difficult to settle. These programmes, in their complexity, reflect the potentially unresolvable challenge of fully representing a complex history in administrative categories as well as countervailing pressures to increase inclusivity yet also valorise those with special status.

A good starting place for understanding the Timorese government’s approach to the benefits programmes for former resistance members is the 2002 Constitution. The Constitution lays down a broad mandate for the state to value and ‘protect all those who participated in the resistance against the foreign occupation’ (Section 11, articles 1-4). It states:

\begin{quote}
The Democratic Republic of East Timor acknowledges and values the historical resistance of the Maubere People against foreign domination and the contribution of all those who fought for national independence… The State shall ensure special protection to the war-disabled, orphans and other dependents of those who dedicated their lives to the struggle for independence and national sovereignty, and shall protect all those who participated in the resistance against the foreign occupation.
\end{quote}

The focus on autochthonous resistance evokes a common, national identity, forged through opposition to the foreign ‘other’ (Sousa da Cunha, 2009: 10).
The term Maubere is evocative of rural, indigenous, as opposed to mestizo or elite, and thus 'authentic,' Timorese life.\(^{63}\) By identifying resistance actors with Mauberism, the Constitution suggests a grassroots national resistance and broadly defines those who contributed. The document does not specify or elevate organisations or draw distinctions between armed, clandestine, and diplomatic fronts; indeed, disabled ex-combatants and orphans are identified as deserving the protection, if not the same protection. In its open embrace of broad-based suffering, Leach argues that this clause provides the ‘symbolic heart’ of the document; ‘[the] constitution recognises and sacralises the resistance as the core tradition of the independent state’ (Leach, 2002: 43). Overall, the constitutional call to honour and protect those who contributed and suffered is inclusive.

The challenge set to policy makers in Timor-Leste has been to fulfil the Constitutional mandate to honour resistance actors while also determining who shall receive recognition and financial benefits. In a 2002 interview, Taur Matan Ruak distilled the issue at the heart of what makes the design of benefits programmes in Timor-Leste so difficult:

If we were to recognize all those who supported our struggle, we would have to extend this recognition to most of the population, as all have, at some point in time and in their own way, participated in the liberation of our nation (in Meden, 2002: 3).

What he alludes to is the challenge of transforming the Constitution into policy and thus defining a cut-off point: if the state will not recognise all who supported the struggle, where does it draw that line? And, in making these determinations, which categories, identities, and benefits are relevant?

\(^{63}\) Resistance leaders constructed Mauberism as the basis of a liberation ideology, and it has furnished a ‘radical foundation myth validating the struggle for independence’ (Shoesmith, 2003: 238). Ramos-Horta, who takes credit for its coinage, describes Mauberism as an essential ‘symbol of a cultural identity, of pride, of belonging’ (as quoted in Niner, 2000: 3, n1; Silva, 2009: 67).
This chapter examines the evolution of these programmes. In doing so, it creates a foundation for subsequent analysis and, for the first time, presents a detailed, integrated record of these policies. The next section outlines the mechanisms used to define and register beneficiaries, beginning with the establishment of Presidential Commissions. I then examine the evolution of the legislation that codified and expanded the instruments developed by these Commissions as well as the eventual implementation of the transfer payment scheme. The subsequent section considers non-transfer-based benefits, including special ad hoc or informal assistance. This chapter traces the trend towards continually increasing the scope of the programme and size of the awards; in the final section, I look at the potential impacts of such budgetary commitments on economic development. I argue that this prodigious growth is also significant in regards to the long-term institutional and economic development of the country and merits consideration as such. However, before moving forward, in the next sub-section I discuss the concept of valorisation in greater detail, as it defines the Timorese perspective on how these programmes and processes should operate.

1.1 The Valorisation Approach

While these programmes have evolved from this constitutional mandate, the focus on valorisation has remained. I define a valorisation approach\(^64\) as focused on rewarding individuals based on the perceived significance of their service. This orientation defines the Timorese approach to reintegration policy. Reintegration programmes publicly demonstrate state attention and mark the special status of

\(^{64}\) Across various contexts, it should not be taken for granted that significant service during the war shall be viewed as honourable and as a sign of status in the post-conflict period. In Liberia, for example, having fought in the war is viewed negatively and often hidden (Leena Kotilainen, pers. comm.). The approach to reintegration programmes in such political environments would be significantly different.
beneficiaries, particularly those with long service records and ties to formal resistance structures. Indeed, in the resultant policies, the higher an individual’s recognised status in a resistance organisation, the greater his or her pension. Those at the top are honoured by being among the few to receive special benefits, as with five individuals who currently receive 750 USD/month in pensions.

The creation of these distinctions and hierarchies is not, however, a programmatic blunder or an unintended consequence. There is a fundamental link between valorisation and exclusion, particularly in the processes of differentiation between civilians and non-civilians and between elite and non-elite resistance actors. Concepts such as ‘exclusive dedication,’ which policy makers have developed to calculate entitlements, hinge on metrics that promote and reproduce elite political biases and nationalistic histories. These distinctions are, in fact, integral to the Timorese approach to reintegration. This is thus a story of defending continuities in resistance-era status, not their disruption. Discussing the mind-set of many former resistance members, a high-ranking government official explained: ‘[Resistance actors] want to be on top, not below’ (INT03). Through valorisation, these programmes contribute to post-conflict transitions not by removing differences but by accentuating them – placing resistance members back ‘on top.’

This focus on valorisation contravenes conventional understandings of reintegration, which emphasise assimilationist goals and the subsumption of combatant identity in favour of a unitary national identity (see Özerdem, 2002: 962). More specifically, it also stands in contrast to approaches to reintegration focused on basic needs, which may involve means testing and thus not provide financial awards to well-off elites; programmes oriented towards speeding assimilation, which may use tactics like ‘pay and scatter’ and disallow the use of military attributes (uniforms, medals, etc.; see McMullin, 2004: 628); and community-based reintegration programmes (see Kingma,
1997: 62). The IDDRS Operational Guide, for example, emphasises the importance of community-based reintegration and the importance of recognising the ‘needs of ex-combatants without transforming them into a privileged group within the community’ (2010: 159). By contrast, in Timor-Leste the exclusionary, rather than community-based, distribution of these benefits reinforces this group identity, privilege, and power.

2 REGISTRATION: PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSIONS

Faced with the unrest following the end of FRAP, the Timorese government needed to take action towards addressing the needs of former resistance members. Indeed, demonstrations by ‘fringe FRETILIN veterans’ groups’ in the capital raised the stakes (Rees, 2004: 53) and tensions were increasing ‘surrounding activities by groups purporting to represent veterans’ (Bowles, 2005: 2). In this difficult environment, on 9 September 2002, President Gusmão announced the establishment of two presidential commissions to respond to these pressures and bring the situation under government control. Reflecting the discussion of knowledge-power in Chapter II, the primary activity of these and subsequent committees has been the registration of former resistance members. Here we see the act of registration as pacifying, with the mere collection of bio-data serving as form of government acknowledgement and (potential) promise of further benefits.

This section outlines the history of the Presidential Commissions that have been at the forefront of registering former resistance members and verifying this data (see Table 4.1 for an overview). The complexity of this programme evidences, I argue, the difficulty of the task and its resistance to resolution. The first commissions, the

---

65 Additional demonstrations were held in November and December 2002, underscoring that the announcement of the Commissions did not fully address these groups’ grievances; such demonstrations also need to be understood as political theatre and part of Rogerio Lobato’s efforts to engender a dissident, ‘veterans’ movement, uncoupled from particular demands.
Commission for Former Combatants’ Affairs (CAAC) and the Committee for FALINTIL Veterans’ Affairs (CAVF), established eligibility criteria and, for the first time, registered ex-FALINTIL members across the country. Reflecting renewed political pressure, later commissions expanded this focus, with the Commission for Matters of Cadres of the Resistance (CAQR) registering members of the clandestine movement. Following the completion of these registration rounds, additional commissions were formed to consolidate and verify the data.

Table 4.1: Overview of Commissions (World Bank, 2008: 12)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Commission</th>
<th>Start Date</th>
<th>End Date</th>
<th>Mandate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Commission for Matters of Cadres of the Resistance (CAQR)</td>
<td>Sept. 2004</td>
<td>Jan. 2006</td>
<td>Register former members of the civilian resistance and/or clandestine front.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Data Validation Commission (CVD)</td>
<td>Nov. 2004</td>
<td>April 2006</td>
<td>Verify those registered by CAAC, CAVF and CAQR.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Data Consolidation Commission (CCD)</td>
<td>Jan. 2006</td>
<td>May 2007</td>
<td>Consolidate the databases of CAAC, CAVF and CAQR.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commission for Homage, Supervision of Registration, and Appeals (CHSRR)</td>
<td>Sept. 2006</td>
<td>On-going</td>
<td>Supervise registration and hear appeals relating to registration</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2.1 FALINTIL Registration: CAVF and CAAC

As noted above, created with some urgency, the first two Presidential Commissions, the CAAC and CAVF, responded to calls for recognition by the ‘Forgotten’ and ‘Excluded,’ and sought to acknowledge ex-resistance members who were not cantoned, did not benefit from FRAP, nor joined the ETDF (F-FDTL). Tasked with creating the first comprehensive state register of former FALINTIL, the first two presidential commissions registered resistance members from the 1975-1979 and 1980-1999 periods, respectively.66 This chronological division reflects the tactical

66 The work of CAAC-CAVF was funded with a 500,000 USD grant from the World Bank Post Conflict Fund and additional support from UNDP, USAID, Development Cooperation Ireland, and DFID. Later commissions received additional support from Norway and Sweden; the
shift in the movement away from guerrilla fighting towards a clandestine resistance following the collapse of the support bases.

Together these two commissions recorded the names of approximately 38,000 individuals, of whom 22,000 were still living. The twenty Commissioners were drawn from government, military, and civil society, and included former resistance leaders. Reflecting on this composition, Kent notes that the CAVF and CAAC were successful in gaining the participation of non-state veterans’ groups (2006: 10). While Cutter et al. found the CAVF and CAAC ‘helpful in reducing some of the veterans’ frustrations’ they note that ‘many unemployed former combatants who have grown increasingly disillusioned since the celebration of independence’ remained (2004: 24). Indeed, interviewees suggested that at times tensions from the resistance era carried over in their work on the commissions (INT33, INT35).

Of note, the work of the CAVF and CAAC registering former resistance members preceded national legislation codifying this identity and its associated entitlements. These commissions first developed their own questionnaires, and then subsequently used this data to inform decisions around eligibility criteria for registration; this sequencing introduced additional complexities to the process. For example, the lack of legislative guidance resulted in an everything-but-the-kitchen-sink approach to data collection, necessitating a hugely complex 25-page questionnaire. However,

World Bank estimates the total cost of the commissions between September 2002 and May 2007 to exceed 2.7 million USD (2008: 12).

67 The quality of the data is open to question; a 2007 World Bank report suggested that over 10,000 cases were pending or incomplete and over 800 cases were disputed (2007: 66).

68 While the World Bank in its 2008 report Defining Heroes describes the decision to register individuals through the commissions prior to Parliament determining eligibility criteria as ‘strategic’ and lists it as an important innovation under ‘Lessons Learned,’ other evaluations have not been positive (World Bank, 2008: 33). An external evaluation of the CAQR found the availability of eligibility criteria prior to the registration process marked a ‘significant methodological improvement’ over the initial CAAC-CAVF registration process, which gathered data before deciding what criteria would be relevant for inclusion (Kent, 2006: 17).
regardless of whether or not criteria were pre-determined, in the absence of a legal framework, the commissions could not guarantee that registrants would later be recognised or receive government benefits. This has been particularly problematic as participation in registration processes set expectations for payments. Many registrants continue to have difficulty differentiating inclusion in the database and eligibility for benefits, which has created confusion and anger when those who registered have found themselves ineligible for transfers.

Ultimately reflecting the composition of the Commissions and targeting former FALINTIL, the registration questionnaires largely focused on identifying military-like attributes, specifically an individual’s ‘unit, region, rank, names of commanders, and type of weapon used’ (World Bank, 2008: 13). In practice, at the crux of the FALINTIL registration process was thus the question: did you carry a gun? As one former clandestine member summarises: ‘If you didn’t carry a gun, you don’t get money’ (INT43). This focus privileged masculine armed service and reflected the experiences of political elites and the Commissioners, many of whom were drawn from the leadership of FRETILIN, FALINTIL and CNRT.

2.2 CAQR and Verification Commissions: CVD, CCD and CHSRR

With this focus on armed service came the neglect or exclusion of un-armed service. This result is not unexpected; as noted in this chapter’s introduction, the value of the identity lies in part in its exclusivity and the devaluation of a complementary identity, in this case unarmed and clandestine service. Reflecting political elites’ own backgrounds, women and younger resistance members were largely excluded. Viewed by default as civilians rather than combatants, not a single woman was
included amongst the 38,000 successful registrants (Ospina, 2006: 24). The exclusion from this initial registration process of women, clandestine actors, student activists, and those not incorporated into formal resistance organisations produced tensions. As a result, the CAAC-CAVF’s final report ‘recommended that, to aid stability and to avoid presumptions of injustice and discrimination, members of the civilian cadre and clandestine resistance be given equal opportunity to be registered and to be recognized by the state’ (Kent, 2006: 10). With the extension of this privilege of state recognition – registration – comes the dilution of this form of exclusive power.

Cognizant of these brewing problems, in September 2004 President Gusmão established the Commission on the Cadres of the Resistance (CAQR). Slightly larger than the CAAC and CACF, the CAQR had 32 Commissioners, including representatives from each district as well as a ‘group of 10 advisors made up of prominent resistance figures’ (World Bank, 2008: 12). The CAQR registered 36,606 individuals, including 9,796 women or 27 per cent of registrants (World Bank, 2010; World Bank, 2008: 15). Taken together, the CAAC, CAVF and CAQR registered a total of 75,143 members of the armed and clandestine fronts, including over 18,000 deceased individuals (Fundasaun Mahein, 2011: 8). The work of the CAQR thus almost doubled the number of individuals registered with the state.

Managing and verifying this large, complex dataset necessitated the creation of another body, the Data Validation Commission (CVD), later replaced by the Data Consolidation Commission (CCD). These commissions reconciled the data collected by the CAAC, CAVF, and CAQR, which hitherto had been stored in incompatible

---

69 Women were completely excluded from the final CAAC and CAVF lists despite the efforts of 13 women to register (Kent, 2006: 10). Niner’s discussion of female participation in DDR and the framing of women’s service by male political and resistance leaders, which is situated in work by Enloe (2004), merits mention (2011: 424-426).
databases (see Kent, 2006: 25). The CCD and CVD also conducted further verification rounds, consisting of the public display of registration lists, and held community meetings for complaints regarding errors or the improper inclusion of individuals. The use of these open forums reflects the lack of a centralised personal identification database and wartime service records against which to check claims. Without such authoritative state records, verifying information and identity has proved challenging. The introduction of voter cards for the 2007 elections has now provided a form of widely held identification, partially addressing this problem.

When the CVD and CDC concluded their work in 2006 and 2007, respectively, a new registering body, the Commission for Homage, Supervision of Registration, and Appeals (CHSRR), took up the mantel. Established in 2006, the CHSRR was tasked with continuing the work of the other commissions, and under the CHSRR over 12,000 individuals received medals. To continue the community-level data verification meetings, the CHSRR organised 65 councils composed of local resistance-era leaders. These Commissioners were selected based on their seniority in resistance structures, specifically popular resistance cells (NUREP) and the CNRT (CAVR, Ch. 3, 2003: 97; World Bank, 2008: 16). This composition addressed earlier concerns that those involved in the registration process were naïve outsiders, with

---

70 Database management continues to be a problem; because of issues with inadequate processing power, for example, data from separate registration rounds are stored separately rather than in a single, unified database (INT84). This increases the difficulty of detecting fraud and duplicate claims.

71 On-going problems with these data reflect errors in collection, entry, and false or duplicate claims, yet they also evince Timor-Leste’s – and other post-conflict states’ – crippled information infrastructure, the socio-technical assemblages that organise data within a society. In the example of birth records, during the occupation period, the church held these documents for many. However, these records were also deliberately destroyed, forged or manipulated and resistance members often registered with code names for which no previous register existed. As will be discussed, the creation of this database contributes to the rebuilding of this information infrastructure and the associated power that it imparts.

72 The CHSRR is composed of ten members, appointed by Parliament (3), Government (3), the President (3), and F-FDTL (1), respectively.
little knowledge of local participation. However, in incorporating powerful, well-connected individuals, it introduced new issues with falsification and the appropriation of state resources for patronage networks (SUR79; these dynamics are the focus of Chapter VII).

Following the CNRT’s ascension in the 2007 elections, Gusmão promised to reopen registration and the CHSRR carried out a second registration round in 2009-2010. A flood of over 125,000 self-identified former resistance members participated, bringing the number of registered individuals to a staggering 200,000-250,000 individuals; this dataset has yet to be verified. Overall, the complexity and importance of the task laid out for the commissions, problems with opportunism, widespread perceptions of entitlement to government assistance, and the political costs of denying self-identified ‘veterans’ this help have made concluding registration and verification processes extremely difficult. Looking forward, government officials hope to transfer the complicated tasks of registration, verification, and database management to the National Veterans’ Council, a body that has yet to be fully established.

3 LEGAL FRAMEWORK

While the development of the Presidential Commissions allowed for the registration of former resistance members, this initially took place without a law laying out the contours of the benefits programme. The creation of the Law on Status of National Liberation Combatants (hereafter referred to as the 2006 Law) and the Pensions Law codified registrants’ identities, rights and benefits, formalising and bureaucratising hitherto personalistic or ad hoc system of payments. As with the registration criteria, the legal benefits criteria have come embedded with certain biases and nationalistic,

73 This is equivalent to the state having registered and collected data on over 60 per cent of the population over 30 years old, based on 2010 population statistics. A recent media report now places the figure even higher, 250,000 individuals (Lista Veteranus 2009 Sai ba 250,000, Diario, 2013). The article included a call to create a new verification commission.
elite, and gendered visions of resistance history. This section details the content and evolution of these two key laws and then examines their implementation.


The 2006 Law marks the first attempt by the Timorese government to codify the work done by the Presidential Commissions. Influenced by the CAAC-CAVF process, the law categorises resistance members and establishes their associated rights to benefits and transfer payments. While the detailed discussion of these legal categories may seem unnecessary, in fact, these categories and the associated calculation of service proved a major source of concern amongst surveyed resistance members. As respondents recognised, these classifications produce what type of service and in what organisations, quite literally, counts.

To identify beneficiaries, the 2006 Law applies three basic criteria: Timorese citizenship, ‘campaigning’ within the conflict period, and membership in a resistance organisation. Length of service is then used to classify former resistance members as different combatant types. Five main identity categories74 are established; please see Table 4.2: Identity Categories Established in 2006 Law for a detailed summary. For each category the law outlines benefits, including rights to special identification cards and certificate of service, as well as the use of the assigned title and corresponding uniform. The 2006 Law also establishes that those with longer service shall receive undefined financial payments; these benefits and transfers are discussed at greater length below.

74 These are: non-National Liberation Combatants (<3 years), National Liberation Combatants (≥3 to <15 years), National Liberation Veterans (≥15), National Liberation Martyrs (deceased), and National Liberation Movement Founders (those with special, early service). It is worth noting that the term veteran has a specific, legal meaning, and thus should be used with appropriate precision in the context of Timor-Leste.
Table 4.2: Identity Categories Established in 2006 Law

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Criteria</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>National Liberation Martyr</td>
<td>▪ Participation between 15.08.75 and 25.10.99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>▪ Member of resistance structures/organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>▪ Killed due to participation in the conflict</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Founding Fighter of National Liberation</td>
<td>▪ Participation between 15.08.75 and 31.05.76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>▪ Senior leader of resistance structures/organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Liberation Veteran, ≥15 to 24 years</td>
<td>▪ Participation between 20.08.75 and 25.10.99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>▪ Part of resistance structures/organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>▪ ≥15 years of campaigning</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Liberation Veteran, deceased (1b)</td>
<td>▪ Participation between 20.08.75 and 25.10.99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>▪ Senior leader of resistance structures/organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>▪ &lt;15 years of campaigning</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>▪ Killed due to participation in the conflict</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Liberation Combatant, ≥3 to &lt;15 years</td>
<td>▪ Participation between 20.08.75 and 25.10.99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>▪ Part of resistance structures/organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>▪ ≥3 years of campaigning</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Liberation Combatant (1a)</td>
<td>▪ Participation between 20.08.75 and 25.10.99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>▪ Part of resistance structures/organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>▪ ≥3 years of supporting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Liberation Combatant (1b)</td>
<td>▪ Participation between 20.08.75 and 25.10.99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>▪ Part of resistance structures/organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>▪ Killed due to participation in the conflict</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Liberation Combatant (2a)</td>
<td>▪ Participation between 20.08.75 and 25.10.99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>▪ Not part of resistance structures/organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>▪ ≥3 years of providing support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Liberation Combatant (2b)</td>
<td>▪ Participation between 31.12.78 and 25.10.99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>▪ Participated in resistance cells</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>▪ ≥3 years of support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Liberation Combatant (2c)</td>
<td>▪ Participation between 20.08.75 and 25.10.99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>▪ Part of resistance structures/organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>▪ ≥3 years of campaigning</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>▪ Left resistance before 25 October 1999</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>▪ Did not collaborate with the enemy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-National Liberation Combatant</td>
<td>▪ Participation between 20.08.75 and 25.10.99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>▪ Part of resistance structures/organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>▪ &lt;3 years of campaigning</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The 2006 Law’s key innovation centres on determining what types of service should merit benefits – a complex task in light of the transformation of resistance groups and strategies during the 24-year occupation and in light of the, at times, broad-based
mobilisation of Timorese. To address this issue, the Law establishes two standards for calculating service: the first, less stringent standard, included in Article 10, recognises time spent while incarcerated and/or in ‘the different fronts of the struggle,’ thereby including time spent in the diplomatic and clandestine fronts. This standard is used to calculate length of service for the five identity categories noted above. In Article 23, however, the Law introduces the concept of ‘exclusive dedication,’ defined as full-time service within a resistance organisation and/or incarceration. Critically, it is this second standard that is used for calculating financial benefits.

The creation of two standards for calculating service has caused considerable confusion. As a high-level government official explained: ‘Many people are unhappy: they don’t understand that duration is not the same as dedication’ (INT67). This issue arose repeatedly in interviews with registered former resistance members. Forty nine per cent (49 %) of respondents reported that their registration level had decreased, presumably reflecting the downward adjustment of years of service, as initially registered, to years of ‘exclusive dedication.’ Some individuals who had thought that they were entitled to significant pensions thus found themselves ‘denied’ support that they considered to be their right. This experience provides one lesson regarding what policy makers should avoid when designing registration processes; here, the existence of these two standards and complex systems of accounting has resulted in confusion, unmet expectations, and disappointment.

75 These standards were expanded and refined in the first revision of the 2006 Law, Law No. 9/2009. This revision clarifies this division and expands the criteria for ‘exclusive dedication’ to include not only time spent within the armed resistance, but also time in preventative and prolonged detention. In practice, the Commissions also recognise time spent in the support bases (bases de apoiu, 1975-1979), as well as time in forced work programmes and under restrictive custody – the most difficult to document. Restrictive custody includes house arrest, in which the individual lives in his or her residence yet must report to the authorities on a regular basis or when undertaking travel.
Mirroring the dynamics of exclusion seen in the Presidential Commissions, the use of ‘exclusive dedication’ shapes the gender and generational composition of registered former resistance members. For example, these criteria again disfavour women, who, because of family and agricultural responsibilities, are less likely to have participated in the resistance on a full-time, armed basis (INT30); women thus also often do not meet the requirement of exclusivity. These exclusionary dynamics are controversial, as they rewrite the history of who contributed to the resistance. The idea that these laws carry a historical narrative is not simply academic; Timorese respondents frequently discussed improvements to eligibility criteria in relation to their perceptions of how the conflict unfolded. For example, one high level former resistance leader and bureaucrat stated: ‘My suggestion is to get rid of exclusive dedication, to use the differences: armed front, clandestine front, and diplomatic front. The war in Timor-Leste was a popular war. It was not won with a gun’ (INT73). Implied is that the current law over-emphasises a history of armed combat.

As he notes, these criteria also privilege armed service and focus on patterns of combat and displacement present in the earlier stages of the conflict, in particular armed action emanating from the support bases. This focus disadvantages village-based clandestine actors and student activists who participated later in the conflict – a period characterised by clandestine activity. In the same vein, the 2006 Law also introduces an institutional component, and defines resistance organizations to which eligible registrants must be members, namely FRETILIN, FALINTIL, CRRN, CNRM and CNRT. The privileging of these five groups also constructs a cluster of ‘true’ or ‘core’ resistance organizations, and accordingly marginalises armed FALINTIL splinter groups, such as Sagrada Familia; clandestine groups, such as National Resistance of Timorese Students (RENETIL); and informal networks. Under

76 The emphasis on masculine military power in the conflict’s historicisation has also sidelined women, a phenomenon also observed in post-conflict Kosovo (Ingimundarson, 2007: 117).
pressure, in 2009 the Parliament amended the law to expand this list to allow for membership in other organizations recognized by the leadership of these five keystone groups.

The combination of the requirements of exclusive dedication and recognition by a major resistance organisation means that many individuals – if not the majority – registered through the CAQR are unlikely to qualify for significant enough periods of dedicated service to receive financial benefits. This exclusion reinforces a lower or marginal status for these actors when compared to those involved in the armed front and early in the conflict. Expressing frustration, a high-level resistance leader and a founding member of Sagrada Familia described these criteria as too narrow and as a ‘road block’ to the full recognition of those who participated in the struggle (INT06).

Despite some adjustments, the exclusion of clandestine actors remains; as UNMIT Political Affairs official stated: ‘[exclusive dedication] could generate conflict. There are expectations that remain unmet’ (INT63).

These exclusionary dynamics and the privileging of certain narratives reflect political party competition and the use of these laws to advance sympathetic histories. According to one high-level Timorese political advisor and former resistance leader, exclusive dedication caused political tensions between the FRETILIN parliamentary leadership and then-President Gusmão, who later established his own rival political party. As he notes:

> There was a big dispute about the law. It was written based on the legislation from other countries. It was given from Alkatiri to Anna Pesoa without review by Gusmão. Gusmão was very angry – he had issues with exclusive dedication (INT73).

Indeed, as noted above, the criteria recognise the contributions of FRETILIN and FALINTIL members, de-emphasising the contributions of those who came later in the conflict and worked with Gusmão in the CNRT. Moreover, the view that ‘exclusive
‘dedication’ is partisan threatens the legitimacy of the law. As one high-level former resistance leader involved in the registration process stated: ‘There is a problem with the law – the exclusive dedication. The law is Parliament’s, it is not Gusmão’s will’ (INT77). Unsurprisingly, this respondent, who identified heavily with resistance hierarchies, found little issue in reinterpreting the eligibility criteria.

The 2006 Law has been revised twice. The first revision (Law No. 9/2009), introduced substantive changes, most notably establishing the Single Instalment Payment (Prestação Pecuniária Única, PPU) for those with ≥4 to <8 years of exclusive dedication. This marks a major expansion of the number of individuals eligible for payments; at the time of fieldwork, this change has made over 15,500 individuals eligible for a single windfall payment of 1,380 USD – a figure equal to approximately three and a half times the average, per capita non-oil income in Timor-Leste. This expansion of the law was passed just three months before the October 2009 Village Council elections, a move that as a means of courting voters displayed the governing coalition’s support for former resistance members and, more saliently, their ability to mobilise resources. The second set of changes focused on the establishment of the National Liberation Combatants’ Council.

---

77 Other important changes included: expansion of rights to scholarships and medical treatment; more attention to the survivors of the deceased; and clarification on the relationship of benefits to minimum civil service salaries.

78 This replaced the Special Subvention Payment to those with ≥3 to <8 years of exclusive dedication established in the 2006 Law. The Subvention payment was to be calculated through the multiplication of a fixed amount by the number of years served. While undefined in the legislation, the World Bank’s Economic and Social Development Brief placed this figure at 200 USD (2007: 67); the World Bank had advocated for the amount to be fixed at 300 USD/year served to better reflect per capita GDP. It appears that this benefit was never paid. The payment of the PPU is regulated by Decree Law 6/2012.

79 The second, less comprehensive revision (Law No. 2/2011), amplifies the role of the National Liberation Combatants’ Council, marking it as the ‘single body representing the interests of all National Liberation Combatants’ (my emphasis, Article 35.1-2). This shift was predicated by concern over the fragmentation of veterans’ groups and a national consultative process that suggested that the National Liberation Combatants’ Council be expanded to include representation at the sub-district level.
Overall, in contrast to the 2002 Constitution yet consistent with the work of the CAAC and CAVF, the 2006 Law reflects a narrowing of the narrative concerning who participated during the occupation period – again, a circumscription of who counts and thus who to count. The resistance itself is portrayed in a different light: broad mentions of Mauberism as in the Constitution are replaced by references to membership in hierarchical, formal structures. While the operationalisation of principles such as those limned in the Constitutions requires the creation of exclusionary categories, it is important to recognise that these categories, including that of ‘veteran,’ are constructed and, ultimately, political. These seemingly banal categories and criteria merit examination as they open access to significant political and financial capital and, as the basis for state interventions or benefits, become naturalised, reproduced, and reinforced.

3.2 Pensions Law (15/2008) and Revisions

While the 2006 Veterans’ Law created legal classifications identifying different levels of service as well as basic guidelines for benefits, it was not until the 2008 Law on Pensions for Combatants and Martyrs of National Liberation (Pensions Law, Decree Law 16/2008) that specific benefits levels were established. This law has gone through five sets of revisions, specifically 25/2008, 35/2009, 25/2010 42/2011, and 6/2012. This law replaced longstanding, ad hoc transfer programmes that arose following the referendum.80 While the benefits structure generally reflects the 2006 Law, the 2008 Law added further complexity by dividing these categories by grade (Grau), corresponding to seniority in civilian and military posts. The benefits levels

---

80 Such ad hoc efforts included the distribution of medals as well as significant, one-off or regular payments to high-level former combatants.
established in the 6/2012 revisions are outlined in Table 4.3: Summary of Transfer Payment Scheme.

Since the law’s passage, Parliament has regularly amended the legislation to increase the value of benefits payments. While in the initial regime payments ranged from 85 USD to 550 USD per month, over the last four years the lowest benefit levels have, on average, more than tripled; the base level of benefit for a living former resistance member currently stands at 276 USD/month. In addition to expanding the value of the benefits, the revisions have pegged pension amounts to civil service salaries – a move that draws equivalency between service in the resistance and service to the state, an uneasy pairing that has been challenged, for example, in protests over Parliamentary pensions (Pensão Mensal Vitalícia, Law 1/2007). Parliament has also expanded the number of eligible beneficiaries, for example through lifting the requirement that recipients must be over the age of 55 to receive a Special Subsistence Pension.

Finally, it is instructive to consider the value of pensions and transfer payments in the context of chronic poverty: 41 per cent of Timorese live below the poverty line (RDTL Budget, 2011: 20). At its current level, the lowest level of monthly pension is over eight times greater than the average monthly earnings of Timorese citizens based on non-oil GDP (391 USD per year; RDTL Budget, 2011). At the top of the chart, fifteen individuals recognized for their prominent roles in national liberation are entitled to 750 USD/month – a staggering sum, more than double average yearly income. As will be discussed in Chapter V, this benefit level can increase social jealousy and inequalities within communities, as well as put stress on the beneficiary to provide for extended networks of family and associates.
Table 4.3: Summary of Transfer Payment Scheme*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Years of Exclusive Dedication</th>
<th>Transfer Type</th>
<th>Grade</th>
<th>Formula</th>
<th>Monthly Payment (USD)</th>
<th>Yearly Benefit (USD)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>National Liberation Veterans</td>
<td>Special Distinction</td>
<td>Special Retirement Pension, Distinction (PERD)</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>750.00</td>
<td>9,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Liberation Veterans</td>
<td>≥20, &gt;24</td>
<td>Special Retirement Pension, Tier 1 (PER1)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5 x VM</td>
<td>575.00</td>
<td>6,900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4.5 x VM</td>
<td>517.50</td>
<td>6,210</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4 x VM</td>
<td>460.00</td>
<td>5,520</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Liberation Veterans</td>
<td>≥15, &gt;20</td>
<td>Special Retirement Pension, Tier 2 (PER2)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4 x VM</td>
<td>460.00</td>
<td>5,520</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3.5 x VM</td>
<td>402.50</td>
<td>4,830</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3 x VM</td>
<td>345.00</td>
<td>4,140</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Liberation Combatants OR Disabled</td>
<td>≥8, &lt;15</td>
<td>Special Subsistence Pension (PSId), Special Subsistence Pension for Disabilities (PInc)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>60% x (5 x VM)</td>
<td>345.00</td>
<td>4,140</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
<td>60% x (4.5 x VM)</td>
<td>310.50</td>
<td>3,726</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
<td>60% x (4 x VM)</td>
<td>276.00</td>
<td>3,312</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Liberation Combatants</td>
<td>≥4, &lt;8</td>
<td>Single Instalment Payment (PPU)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>12 x VM; 1,380 USD</td>
<td>None.</td>
<td>None.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-National Liberation Combatants</td>
<td>&lt;4</td>
<td>None.</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>None.</td>
<td>None.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Liberation Martyrs</td>
<td>Deceased</td>
<td>Survivors’ Pension (PSv)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>50% x (5 x VM)</td>
<td>287.50</td>
<td>3,450</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
<td>50% x (4.5 x VM)</td>
<td>258.75</td>
<td>3,105</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
<td>50% x (4 x VM)</td>
<td>230.00</td>
<td>2,760</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* VM – *Vencimento mínimo*; this figure is equal to the minimum monthly civil service salary
3.3 Data Verification and Programme Implementation

While legislation has been in place for over half a decade and programmes have been running since the first Commissions in 2002, implementation of the actual payments has lagged. Based on government data, I find that fewer than a third of all registrants have had their data verified; of those whose data are verified, only 30 per cent of verified eligible registrants have received benefits. The slow rollout of these programmes, however, highlights how priorities have been set. The data verification and payment processes reflect political dynamics – for example the 2012 election – as well as ideas about which groups should be prioritised for verification and payment. See Table 4.4: Number of Verified Individuals by Pension/Payment Type below.

As shown in Table 4.5: Beneficiaries Receiving Payments, the rollout of payments has been highly stratified by payment type. For instance, 94 per cent of beneficiaries are survivors of those killed in the conflict. This also means that only a minority of approved living former resistance members (as opposed to those receiving survivors’ benefits) has received pension benefits, approximately 3 per cent of those eligible. Reflecting their socio-political prominence, these beneficiaries have been those with ‘Distinction’ – reflecting leadership roles – and longer exclusive dedication. Put in another way, while registration has become more broad-based, to date programme implementation – the payment of benefits

---

81 Reported figures have varied widely; in 2010, one UN advisor estimated that the individuals to actually be receiving their pensions to be drastically lower, between 3,400 and 3,600 individuals (INT24). Complementing the figures from the database team, the government provided a yearly breakdown of pension recipients, as follows: 2,011 (2008), 3,400 (2009), 9,644 (2010), 11,146 (2011), and 22,202 (2012) (‘Goodbye Conflict, Welcome Development’ 2012: 98).

82 Verified registration data has been released in three ‘editals’ or editions (2008, November 2010, and December 2011), lists consisting of registrants’ names and basic demographic information. Each round has taken a different focus; for example, the March 2011 Edition focused exclusively on survivors whereas the December 2012 Edition also encompassed resistance members eligible for single payments (PPU).
### Table 4.4: Number of Verified Individuals by Pension/Payment Type

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Pension Type</th>
<th>Approved, 2008 Ed.</th>
<th>Approved, 03-2011 Ed.</th>
<th>Approved, 12-2011 Ed.</th>
<th>Sub-Totals</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Special Retirement Pension, Distinction (PERD)</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Special Retirement Pension (PER1)</td>
<td>147</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>194</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Special Retirement Pension (PER2)</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>449</td>
<td>531</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Special Subsistence Pension (PSld)</td>
<td>277</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>7,019</td>
<td>7,296</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Special Subsistence Pension, Disability (PSInc)</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>178</td>
<td>392</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Survivors’ Pension (PSv)</td>
<td>11,896</td>
<td>1,753</td>
<td>130</td>
<td>13,779</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Survivors’ Pension, Distinction (PSvD)</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Single Instalment Payment (PPU)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>15,502</td>
<td>15,502</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sub-Totals</td>
<td>12,537</td>
<td>1,847</td>
<td>23,325</td>
<td>37,709</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No Payment, &lt;4 years</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>27,927</td>
<td>27,927</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No Payment, rejected</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2,261</td>
<td>2,261</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sub-Totals</td>
<td>12,537</td>
<td>1,847</td>
<td>53,513</td>
<td>67,897</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grand total</td>
<td>67,897</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Table 4.5: Beneficiaries Receiving Payments

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Pension Type</th>
<th>Paid, 2008 Edition</th>
<th>Paid, 2011 Edition</th>
<th>Sub-Total</th>
<th>Total Approved</th>
<th>Payment Rate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Special Retirement Pension, Distinction (PERD)</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Special Retirement Pension (PER1)</td>
<td>169**</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>169</td>
<td>194</td>
<td>87%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Special Retirement Pension (PER2)</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>531</td>
<td>13%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Special Subsistence Pension and Disability (PSld &amp; PInc)</td>
<td>223</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>302</td>
<td>7,688</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Survivors’ Pension (PSv)</td>
<td>9,197</td>
<td>1,290</td>
<td>10,487</td>
<td>13,779</td>
<td>78%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Survivors’ Pension, Distinction (PSvD)</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>90%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Single Instalment Payment (PPU)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>15,502</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals</td>
<td>9,670</td>
<td>1,369</td>
<td>11,039</td>
<td>37,709</td>
<td>30%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

83 While registration efforts can be broken into two distinct rounds: 2003-2005 and 2009-2012, in processing the data the GoTL database team has produced three, distinct (non-cumulative) editions (editals) of verified data, April 2008, March 2011, and December, 2011, focusing on specific groups that reflect political priorities in dispersing benefits. These data are drawn from these documents.

84 The fact that the listed number of paid beneficiaries exceeds that of approved beneficiaries exemplifies some of the inconsistencies that plague governments data in Timor-Leste. These figures are taken directly from government databases, as provided by the database team.
has been concentrated amongst a small, living elite (n=546) receiving the very highest payment levels.

It is also worth noting that the timing of these payments has in one case corresponded with electoral contests. This was noted by the European Union Observer Mission on the 2012 Parliamentary elections:

On 6 June, the day after the campaign began, Secretary of State for Veterans Affairs Marito Reis announced that the government would begin paying the pensions due to more than 27,000 veterans of the resistance and their families on 15 June. The decision suggests that the government may have been using the advantages of incumbency to win over to CNRT a constituency which had been identified as crucial to the success of the party’s campaign (2012: 17).

Here we see the mobilisation of a politically relevant cohort through the appropriation of state resources. This political use of state resources provides another key impetus for the lack of opposition to the continued expansion of these programmes. As more individuals are approved and more payments are rolled out, this type of manipulation may reoccur.

4 OTHER BENEFITS: MEDICINES, MEDALS AND CONTRACTS

While the direct transfer programmes detailed above account for the focal point of the government’s official commitment to former resistance members, additional programmes have emerged to provide benefits and recognition. These measures have provided recognition over the decade-long policy development period, supplemented regular transfer benefits, and make up for perceived failures in the legal framework to sufficiently recognise the contributions of certain individuals or groups. They also have been used to ‘reward’ mobilised former resistance members and support patronage networks, reflecting a system of ‘buying the peace’ that has

85 The spike in payments in prior to the 2012 election can be clearly seen in graphs of monthly payment expenditures compiled by the watchdog group Lao Hamutuk: www.laohamutuk.org/econ/pension/VetPension6Mar2013en.pps. However, the other clear spike, in November 2010 does not correspond with an election.
been endemic in Timor-Leste as well as other conflict zones, such as Aceh (see Myrttinen, 2012: 240).

These benefits are officially clustered around four main areas of focus, including scholarships, medical treatment, housing, and recognition of service (INT03). In practice, however, initiatives range from the ceremonial and commemorative, such as demobilisation, medal-granting services, and the construction of memorials, to the more immediate and material, specifically housing and preferential treatment in awarding development contracts. Of these measures, the majority are *ad hoc* and thus poorly documented. Even more formalised or ‘official’ programmes, such as scholarships, have lacked transparency in regards to allocation. These thus raise particular concern with regards to nepotism and manipulation, including the use of government resources to reward or control conflict-era actors or to bolster or benefit leaders’ patronage networks. Significantly, in contrast to broad-based transfer payments, these are targetable methods of support, allowing for *quid pro quo* arrangements.

While it is difficult to compare the costs of these supplementary programmes to direct transfers, particularly as preferential contracting involves programme delivery, their dollar value rivals the financial magnitude of the transfer programme and merits serious consideration. Investigations of reintegration and benefits programmes that do not take into account these grey areas risk missing a major component of how reintegration – in particular the resolution of contests over competing sites of state and conflict-era authority – is done.
4.1 Scholarships and Medical Treatment

The government has offered scholarships and medical treatment to some former resistance members. As of May 2012, 266 individuals had received government scholarships (‘Goodbye Conflict, Welcome Development,’ 2012: 99). This number remains small in the context of the greater demand. According to one member of parliament and prominent former resistance member, a quarter of ex-FALINTIL members have requested scholarships for their children and half of the families of martyred fighters have requested scholarship support for orphaned children – a figure easily in the thousands (INT31). Some competition has emerged between two of these groups, with each claiming that the other has benefited disproportionally (INT32, INT15).

In terms of medical assistance, in 2009, the government expanded its provision of free local treatment to include all ex-resistance members with at least three years of exclusive dedication (National Liberation Combatants), as well as their spouses and children. In addition, specialist, overseas treatment has been provided to some individuals. One UN official described the programme as 'ad hoc,' with selection for costly treatments dependent on personal connections (INT33). Discussions of this programme focused on former fighters who still carried pieces of shrapnel or bullets within their bodies; resolving these wounds was presented as important on both a physical and symbolic level.

4.2 Housing

Another way in which the Timorese government has sought to valorise and demonstrate care for former resistance members is through the provision of housing. From an outside perspective, the decision to provide housing may appear misplaced; one UN informant noted that healthcare presents a more pressing need than shelter
for most former fighters and clandestinos. While this assessment may be correct within a basic needs and community-based approach frameworks, it lacks attention to both the social significance of housing in Timor-Leste and the primacy of valorisation in the government's overall approach. This focus on housing also reflects the special cultural significance of homes in Timor-Leste as a means of binding together families and signaling social status. There is a rich literature on the cultural significance of houses in Timor-Leste, particularly in regards to the uma lulik or sacred houses. For similar reasons, houses are often the targets of violence. In sum, these structures have a ‘central symbolic value… in East Timorese society and culture’ (McWilliam, 2005: 28).

In contrast to the UN view, Timorese interviewees consistently expressed concern that former combatants lack homes commensurate with their status, particularly masculine status as heads of households (INT10; INT13). As one prominent resistance and F-FDTL leader stated: ‘You can never live in another’s home’ (INT48). Another argued: ‘Each person needs a house. It is part of one’s identity. If you don’t have a house, you are the same as an animal. You can be rich, but a house comes first!’ (INT48). Discourses concerning the degradation experienced by resistance members both during and after the conflict also often focus on the absence of adequate shelter; one resistance leader describes living ‘like animals and sleeping on the ground’ in the jungle during the resistance (INT06). For these individuals, housing is fundamental because it is symbolic.

Reflecting this cultural significance, in 2005, the FRETILIN government committed to build 100 houses in ten districts for vulnerable former resistance members. The

---

86 Others have focused on the centrality of the destruction and reconstruction of houses in the Timorese history of occupation, repertoires of violence and post-conflict recovery (Zetter, 2005: 155; Traub, 2000: 80; Acciaioli, 1985).
project was estimated to cost 1 million USD, originally to be financed through Chinese donors (World Bank, 2005: 1; INT18; INT11). This initiative failed; as a contest over authority, politically mobilised resistance actors deftly reframed the highly visible housing programme to decry the government’s efforts as inadequate. The houses were rejected, and in the case of Viqueque, destroyed. This maneuvering, despite its political impact, likely denied vulnerable ex-resistance members improved shelter.

This cultural and symbolic significance, as well as the prominent placement, made the FRETILIN government’s housing programme a focal point. While the homes were still under construction, former resistance leaders expressed their dissatisfaction.\(^8^7\) The houses’ size drew particular anger.\(^8^8\) As a senior bureaucrat explained, echoing the discourse of re-victimisation: ‘Veterans said “before we were in the jungle without a chair, now we have independence and the houses are the size of a chair!”’ (INT03; INT43). Another former resistance leader, and current MP, scathingly likened the houses to changing rooms for foreigner tourists on the beach (INT27). Here, the symbolic value of the programme also made it a particularly salient target, as the failure to meet expectations carried cultural significance.

The failed housing programme also illustrates a second aspect of the valorisation approach: the process of differentiation. Discussing his vision of state housing for former combatants, a Timorese NGO worker stated: ‘People should be able to tell the difference between a veteran’s and a civilian’s house. Their houses need to be

\(^8^7\) Complaints included the houses’ proximity to each other, distance from agricultural land, and design. Others felt excluded from the entire process and thus disrespected (INT09), and they noted that more houses were constructed in the East than the West (INT11).

\(^8^8\) The size was the result of budgetary constraints; those involved in the design and construction process were aware of – and concerned about – the reaction of ex-resistance members to the size of the homes throughout the design and construction process (INT46). House size is linked to social status, for example the ability to house extended family or to conspicuously host visitors.
unique because they fought to make this one nation’ (INT02; also INT03). Central to valorisation is the provision of visual, discursive, or material markers of status and difference – in this case signals to those who pass through town that a hero resides here. Just as with the payments, this programme was designed to augment and reproduce differences between civilians and resistance actors and among resistance actors themselves. As will be discussed in Chapter V, such inequalities raise concerns regarding social jealousy, a conflict factor in Timor-Leste.

Following the refusal to accept the original houses, resistance actors secured a pledge from Gusmão’s AMP government for the construction of larger, more prominent homes. In at least one case, the government has also provided funds for the purchase and renovation of the personal residence of a former resistance leader, specifically André da Costa (L4 or Elle Quatro), the former deputy leader of Sagrada Família (INT63). The government has also forwarded plans for ‘veterans’ villages’ – replete with dedicated clinics and other services – and earmarked 7.1 million USD for veterans’ housing in its Strategic Development Plan (GOTL, 2010: 4-161). Such ‘villagisation’ recalls analysis by Scott on the use of such strategic resettlement by the state to control and monitor groups (1998). Whether these larger houses or ‘villages’ are ultimately constructed remains to be seen; however, the focus on housing suggests the symbolic importance – and concomitant sensitivity – of such initiatives.

4.3 Medals, Demobilisation, & Memorialisation

Regarding individual recognition, while eligibility for payment benefits has been narrowly drawn, all successfully registered former resistance members are eligible to receive certificates. Those with over eight years of exclusive dedication or who
served in the support bases may also receive medals; over 30,000 individuals have now received medals. The bulk of these – 12,002 medals – were awarded between December 2006 and August 2007; of these, 11,367 went to the families of martyrs (World Bank, 2007: 65). Setting aside the condition for armed service, in November 2011 the government gave medals to a further 900 individuals who had been involved in the Santa Cruz massacre. Concomitantly, the number of types of medals has grown; as one World Bank official involved in the system’s initial creation reportedly quipped, there are now enough grades, decorations, and devices for each individual to receive a unique medal (INT30).

Concerning demobilisation, as discussed in Chapter II, the government carried out demobilisation ceremonies in 2006 and 2011, involving 205 and 236 high-level individuals respectively. These ceremonies have included the awarding of medals and uniforms, speeches by functionaries, and martial displays by the new generation of F-FDTL. While few of these subjects may be described as ‘mobilised’ at the time of their ‘demobilisation,’ the utility of these public ceremonies lies in the attempted resolution of their status in relation to the state and state security architecture. Accordingly, the 2011 event was met with ‘nervousness and suspicion’ due to the perception that participation in such a public resolution to this question ‘might be used to move away from the idea that veterans deserved special treatment and announce that the matter of their welfare was resolved’ (ICG, 2011: 13).

89 The types and number of decorations award are as follows: Boaventura - 64; Nicolau Lobato - 13,934; Guerrilla - 398; FALINTIL - 6,643; Funu Nain - 7,275; D. Martinho - 5; and Lorico Aswain- 1,911 (‘Goodbye Conflict, Welcome Development,’ 2012: 98).

90 At times, the granting of medals has been incorporated with demobilisation ceremonies and payments; for example, in December 2007, the government awarded an additional 205 medals to ex-resistance members with over 15 years of service along with 9,600 USD.

A less explicit form of demobilisation has occurred through the incorporation of resistance-era leaders into state institutions – what Torjesen, in the context of Tajikistan, characterises as a ‘partial’ demobilisation (2006: 11). Many key leaders assumed the top leadership positions in the F-FDTL. Others have used their social networks and symbolic capital to establish political parties; notable examples include Xanana Gusmão (CNRT), Francisco ‘Lu Olo’ Gutteres (FRETILIN), Fernando ‘Lasama’ Araujo (PD), and Cornelio ‘L7’ Gama (UNDERTIM). Through these parties, key ministerial positions have further been awarded to those within these networks. This dynamic is also present with lower-profile actors; for example, Civil Security personnel (‘brown shirts’) have been recruited almost exclusively from resistance-era networks (INT24).

Government positions have also been used to control potential spoilers and bring former resistance actors under state control. In one example, as noted in Chapter III, L7 was awarded a district government position following his armed mobilisation of former resistance members in Aileu during the cantonment period (INT30). In another notable example, Rogério Lobato received the post of Interior Minister in May 2002 following threats of large-scale protests by his followers, many claiming to be ‘veterans’ (Rees, 2004: 52).

Finally, the government has prioritised the construction of memorials and mausoleums, as well as the establishment of a museum to the resistance in the capital, Dili; another museum of the resistance was inaugurated in 2012 in Samalari, Baucau district. By 2011, 20 monuments had been completed in sub-district capitals and a further twelve mausoleums, in addition to the existing mausoleum in Metinaro,

---

92 Primary examples include: Major General Taur Matan Ruak (elected President in 2012), Brigadier General Lere Anan Timor, Colonel Cornélio ‘Maunana’ Ximenes, and Lieutenant Colonel Sabica Besi Kulit.
Dili district. These projects respond to the persistent calls from families of the missing for a place to honour the dead, as well as provide a public recognition of the resistance and a means of educating future generations. State actors have also viewed these erections as unifying; the designs are uniform and their distribution hews to political boundaries – sub-district centres – rather than being tied to historic events in the conflict. This decision reflects a nationalising of the conflict, and, as such, deemphasises the different ways the conflict was experienced and fought in the East and West.

4.4 Contracting

Finally, similar to the use of ‘partial’ demobilisation as described above, the Gusmão government has sought to deal with spoilers and provide financial benefits to former resistance members through an acknowledged yet informal system of awarding government contracts to companies owned or controlled by former resistance members (see comments by the Secretary of State for Electricity in ‘National Parliament Receives Complaints,’ Jornal Independente, 2013). These range from small-scale construction projects to multi-million dollar rice importation contracts. This has emerged as a significant avenue for state actors to provide benefits to former resistance members. More cynically, this practice has also been a key avenue for state officials to provide lucrative benefits to their supporters and patronage networks.

The practice of awarding preferential or single-bid construction contracts has been made possible through the use of emergency funds, for which the normal scrutiny and tender processes are not required. This is the case for the government’s 500

---

93 The design of these monuments was initially highly contested by former resistance members; as a strategy to find consensus, the individual in charge of the design asked Gusmão to sign the architectural drawing, after which, when displayed to dissenters, no problems were identified.
million USD rural electrification project, for which many sub-contractors have been used to erect power poles. In an example of rent seeking, contracts are awarded to a shell company registered in the names of former resistance members. These individuals then sub-contract to another firm, taking a cut; the sub-contractor, generally Indonesian, supplies the labour, expertise, and equipment (INT63). As one widow described: ‘People are always asking for projects. And they have asked me for my husband’s martyr’s documents to use for entering a tender’ (SUR62; see also ‘National Parliament Receives Complaints,’ *Jornal Independente*, 2013).

Here veteran identity is directly linked to access to capital. With the rise of these contracting practices has come a new market in which former resistance members ‘sell their names.’ As documented throughout this chapter, as these identities have become more valuable, players have greater stakes in managing access. For example, L-7 expressed concern with contracts being awarded to ‘fake’ veterans and looked to the government to verify their status. He argued: ‘The government is giving contracts to “veterans” but it is not clear where these “veterans” come from; we need an organ to clear up and organize this’ (INT27). Due to its relevance in terms of political and financial capital, this process of clarifying and organising this identity continues to be called for and its results disputed.

A handful of well-connected former resistance members have benefited from these contracts: the Timorese watch-dog NGO La’o Hamutuk has documented the awarding of at least 123 emergency project contracts to companies fronted by former resistance members between 2010 and 2012 (partial). Together these contracts have an average value 0.63 million USD and a total value of 78 million USD (*La’o Hamutuk*, 2013). The group has also specifically raised concerns that the 27 million USD of the 80 million USD 2012 budget rectification has been used to pay for ‘political party promises,’ most likely through the awarding of these contracts (Ibid.).
While such contracts cannot be equated with direct transfer payments, this figure does mark another significant resource stream flowing from the state to former resistance members.

The distribution of these contracts appears to be highly personalised and rooted in resistance-era networks and hierarchies. As the ICG notes, the newspaper *Tempo Semanal* ‘reported the prime minister had ordered that veteran-owned companies be granted the contracts and delivered a list of 30 such companies to the tourism and industry minister’ (ICG, 2011: 14). Here Xanana Gusmão, has been able to hand pick contract beneficiaries. This importance of ‘who you know’ was echoed again and again by survey respondents: ‘People that know Xanana or the Minister for Electricity, they get it. This is not right’ (SUR42). Beyond nepotism and patronage, the ascension of former resistance leaders into government power has deepened the issue with conflict of interest. In 2010, one well-placed informant suggested that the company Veteran’s General Supply, a subsidiary of FALINTIL Veterans’ Foundation (FVF), had secured a 4 million USD rice importation contract (INT18). This company has also been involved in importing ammunition, uniforms, and other material, raising questions about collusion and conflicts of interest, as key members of the F-FDTL remain involved in the company’s parent organisation, FVF.

Political leaders have also used contracts strategically to control potentially problematic actors and avoid insecurity. Contracts have been employed to incorporate potential spoilers, while allowing these individuals to keep their networks intact. A senior UN political analyst listed a series of former leaders, known by their *noms de guerre*, brought into the fold through such mechanisms. These include Dudu, a formal FALINTIL regional commander, and Rai Los, also ex-FALINTIL, known for attacking police headquarters in the 2006 Crisis with arms supplied illegally by Rogério Lobato (INT33). In addition, according to another UN official, ‘L7,
Renan Selak, 5-5, 12-12 – they were brought back into the commissions,’ again evidencing the granting of discretion over state resources to potentially destabilising former resistance and clandestine leaders (INT63). In this same vein, in 2011 the ICG noted that a former FALINTIL member involved in the 2008 attacks on the President and Prime Minister has also received lucrative contracts in Manufahi (ICG, 2011: 15).

In another example, just as contracts have been used to control insecurity, they have also been used strategically to *mobilise* violence. According to one UN analyst, Gusmão held a meeting with former resistance members in November 2011 regarding the government’s rural electrification programme, at which he asked for their support:

> Veterans were to make sure that no claims would arise from local communities, and no compensation would be paid to the people [for land taken to install infrastructure]. It was about status and intimidation. There was also a *quid pro quo* – Gusmão gave them the simple contracts (INT63).

This mobilisation of former resistance members in non-state, security-like functions yet at the behest of state actors is highly problematic. This is an excellent example of how political relations have shaped resource allocation, and, more profoundly, of the mobilisation of non-state networks to perform state-like functions in exchange for resources. Here the state is both extended and undermined.

Finally, the preferential, non-competitive awarding of government contracts to former resistance members has opened the floodgates to the use of government resources to fuel personal power networks. While this misappropriation of funds is in and of itself a concern, there are also knock-on effects for the quality of the projects. Here, those living without access to good roads or electrical infrastructure lose out. As one Timorese political advisor to the President noted: ‘[Former resistance actors] demanded money – $2,000 – from EDTL as technical advisors – $500-800 per
advisor... But the community also demands services’ (INT65). The lack of competitive bidding prevents the introduction of market forces that would encourage lower costs or higher quality. It is also more difficult to enforce contracts with international sub-contractors or require them to amend shoddy work. The high status of the former resistance members who hold the contracts has also made it politically disadvantageous to criticise project implementation. Taken together, preferential contracting has produced projects that are often both costly and poorly executed.

5 FINANCIAL LIABILITY AND DEVELOPMENT

The concern with the poor quality of infrastructure projects is just the tip of the iceberg in regards to the impact of reintegration benefits programmes and practices on the country’s development. Taken together, these programmes represent a significant financial commitment on behalf of the Timorese state – and introduce the associated opportunity cost. Indeed, due to their high costs, these transfer payment programmes should be viewed as a central feature of Timor-Leste’s approach to development, not just in terms of reintegration and security. The level and duration of the associated financial commitment merit this re-evaluation. These programmes should be central to the conversation on Timor-Leste’s economic development.

These commitments to former resistance members have and will continue to have a significant impact on the government’s overall approach to development and the use of national resources. These are long-term financial commitments, with internal government documents projecting the continuation of payments to the offspring of high-level resistance members until 2122 – well beyond the projected lifespan of Timor-Leste’s oil and gas fields (La’o Hamutuk, 2013). The transfer programme currently pays out significant, regular financial benefits to just over 1 per cent of the
Timorese population – a figure that is due to more than triple as those already approved to receive pensions and Single Instalment Payments (PPU) are paid.\textsuperscript{94} Further increases will occur when beneficiaries from the second registration round are identified, verified and receive payment.

Over the last five years, the budget allocation has increased steadily. Approximately 5 per cent of the national budget is currently dedicated to these direct transfer payments, and this financial commitment, set to increase, is already high relative to other post-conflict countries (World Bank, 2008: 27). In 2012, the budget for direct transfer payments to former resistance members came to 106.7 million USD, following a rectification that increased the allocation by 26.9 million USD to account for back payments. The projected 2013 budget drops to 92.1 million, although it remains to be seen as to whether this figure will also be rectified. These figures are also significant, upward revisions from previous budgets, suggesting that these costs have been poorly anticipated. For example, the 2012 figure marks a 74 per cent increase in the projected 2013 expenditures in the 2011 budget. Budget projections from the 2013 budget and previous expenditures are shown in Table 4.6 and Chart 4.7. It is important to note that these figure do not include the costs of preferential contracts awarded to former resistance members.

Table 4.6: Projected Budget for Personal Benefits Payments (in millions, USD)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>28.1</td>
<td>47.9</td>
<td>44.3</td>
<td>106.7</td>
<td>92.1</td>
<td>95.8</td>
<td>99.6</td>
<td>103.6</td>
<td>107.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: RDTL Budget, FY2011, FY2013.

\textsuperscript{94} Since the conclusion of my fieldwork in June 2012, the government has begun transfers of 3,800 USD, the Single Instalment Payment (PPU), to those with $\geq 4$ to $< 8$ years of exclusive dedication.
It is worth noting that these budget projections do not indicate a tapering off of this commitment, and, considering the addition of tens of thousands of newly eligible registrants, any levelling off of the financial commitment indicated in these projections would likely be in error. While data regarding the 2009-2010 registration and verification process have not been released, as noted earlier, the total number of registered former resistance members is expected to increase by approximately 125,000-175,000 individuals. Of these individuals, one government official estimated a 40-70\textsuperscript{95} per cent payment eligibility rate for pensions or one-off payments (INT28). However, even at a more modest 15 per cent eligibility rate for pensions, the number of eligible individuals would more than double, increasing the financial liability accordingly.

At issue is whether these expanding programmes crowd out other important initiatives, a particularly cogent concern if the national budget is approached as zero-

\textsuperscript{95} A number of factors affect this rate. Pushing it upwards, age requirements have been removed and there is the possibility of a broader interpretation of the rights of members of the clandestine front. Pushing it downwards, this later pool may include more ambiguous or fraudulent cases, assuming that the clear cases - the ‘low hanging fruit’ – were captured in the earlier registration rounds.
In understanding this calculus, comparisons can be instructive. For example, the 2011 transfer programme had a budget roughly equal to that of the Ministry of Justice, Ministry of Health, Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries, and Ministry of Economy and Development combined (RDTL, 2011: Annex 2A, 1-5). And while these programmes’ budgets have continued to increase, this growth has been outstripped by that of the transfer programme (La’o Hamutuk, 2013). Other transfer payment programmes, including payments to the elderly and to vulnerable women, which reach 89,000 and 15,000 beneficiaries respectively, have budgets that are each less than a third of that for transfers to former resistance members, despite serving, in the case of the former, over eight times the number of beneficiaries. Even the lowest-level pension is over nine times the old-age pension (30 USD per month), as instituted in 2008 (GOTL, 2011: 46).

These comparisons raise the question of whether the money invested in elite-level pensions, which are costly both in terms of payment amount and the duration of financial liability, as transfers carry over to offspring, may have a more significant welfare impact invested more broadly. In a 2008 review, the World Bank takes this position, noting:

…these commitments to veterans have impeded the government’s ability to address other social issues [and] should Timor-Leste’s revenues from its oil reserves dramatically decline these high pension payments may be fiscally unsustainable in the long-term (World Bank, 2008: 27).

However, I argue that the government has structured its programme to valorise former resistance members, and, as such, the programme is expressly not designed to broadly satisfy basic needs or welfare gains. These figures – and the trade-offs inherent in investing in these programmes – underscore the magnitude of this

This perspective comes with some caveats or drawbacks; budgeting, for example, may not be a good indicator of expenditure. Timor-Leste, like many other developing countries has struggled to spend its allocated budget. In part because of the challenges inherent in other initiatives, direct transfer programmes have attracted increasing interests as tools for poverty alleviation (see Hanlon, 2004; Willibald on transfers and DDR, 2006).
investment and add urgency to the question of what social and political factors explain this approach to reintegration.

These decisions about how to structure and allocate welfare payments also have institutional legacies. The expansion of these programmes has necessitated the growth of the state apparatus – cars, officials, offices, and databases. This marks the beginning of the social welfare state in Timor-Leste, and while these processes are not entirely path-dependent, it sets the precedent for pensions and other programmes. Here Skocpol’s (1993) work on the influence of the expansion of US Civil War veterans’ benefits in the creation of the US welfare system is relevant. She suggests that such programmes had a ‘pioneering effect’ for the development of welfare systems more broadly (Skocpol, 1993: 116). This dynamic can already be seen in Timor-Leste in the comparison of reintegration benefits to old age benefits, government pensions, and even payments to internally displaced persons in the 2006 crisis. Their very form – direct transfer payments – also reflects the groundwork laid by programmes for former resistance members.

6 CONCLUSION

The creation of a pensions and reintegration benefits programme in Timor-Leste has been difficult. Issues have stemmed from both challenging starting conditions, including a lack of pre-existing data on potential participants and intense pressure to provide benefits, as well as problems with coordination and sequencing. The result has been a programme marked by changing standards, acute complexity, and non-transparent stopgap measures. These characteristics have led to confusion, disillusionment, and a sense of alienation amongst potential beneficiaries, as well as potentially unsustainable long-term financial commitments. While these problems may be approached as technical (e.g. long surveys, incompatible databases), this
chapter finds that this complexity and the continual rounds of revisions and registration is ultimately better understood as reflecting the challenges inherent in deciding ‘who is who’ and ‘who deserves what.’

Legislative development has been marked by the regular expansion of both the pool of potential beneficiaries as well as the value of their entitlements. Approximately 250,000 individuals have been registered, tens of thousands have received medals, and tens of millions of dollars have been spent on transfer payments – a figure set to increase and be sustained in the future. More growth has occurred in the creation of sizable non-pension benefits programmes, namely preferential contracting. These practices have provided an important avenue for former resistance leaders, now in positions of political power, to reward a small coterie of former fighters and their patronage networks. This expensive, expansive and Gordian system is a far cry from the one conceived by one international evaluator, who envisaged a 140 – rather than tens of thousands of – potential beneficiaries (McCarthy, 2002: 120).

However, in pursuing the constitutional mandate to ‘acknowledge and value’ those who served, reintegration and pensions programmes have necessarily delimited the scope of eligibility and reward. In making such designations, these regulations, practices, and laws also write a history of the conflict. They answer questions about whose contributions count, who deserves recognition, and what types of service, by contrast, do not merit attention from the state. As noted in the chapter, programmes have focused in particular on masculine armed service and an elite, institutional perspective on the conflict. Under-recognised have been the contributions of women, young people, and other clandestine actors. As these determinations are official (e.g. recorded in certificates) and become the basis for the distribution of political and financial resources, resources that ultimately entrench and accentuate these hierarchies. In this manner, these programmes are both exclusionary and political.
Moving forward, the next chapter shifts focus from a discussion of policy to an examination of the post-conflict lives of those who are set to benefit. Drawing upon representative survey data from individuals registered with four or more years of exclusive dedication, Chapter V examines their levels of political, social, and economic integration, and, in doing so, explores these concepts. It finds strong evidence of the continued role of resistance networks and identities in their lives, even a decade after the cessation of conflict.
Chapter V: The Resistance After Independence

1 INTRODUCTION

Reintegration programmes are widely conceived to focus on enabling former fighters to shed the trappings of their former lives and re-emerging as full, post-war citizens. The case of Timor-Leste, due to the slow roll out of benefits programmes, provides opportunity to look at the post-conflict trajectories of former fighters and clandestinos in the absence of the broad-based reintegration assistance. Accordingly, in this chapter I ask: how well (re)integrated are former resistance members in Timor-Leste? What problems persist? How have these individuals coped, particularly with little direct assistance? In light of the concerns that motivate much of the DDR literature, I look in particular at measures of social, political, and economic integration. These factors are broadly defined as the identification of former fighters with non-combatant communities, their engagement with democratic political processes, and their participation in the licit economy – perhaps even newly trained by the state and armed with skills for the imagined post-war economy.

Based upon representative quantitative and qualitative data gathered for this thesis, I argue that despite a lack of direct assistance, most former resistance members are, in some significant ways, very similar to the overall population. They are politically

---

97 Only 12 per cent of my sample had received pension payments, a figure including both those for service and the death of a spouse or family member (‘martyr’s payments’). However, this is not to say respondents have not received other benefits: FRAP provides one example and, as I argue in Chapter II, the very encounter with state actors and the process of registration and data verification communicate important messages about the relationship of the former resistance member to the state and new centres of power.

98 A randomised cluster sample was used to select the 224 respondents over a six-month period in 2012 across eight of Timor-Leste’s thirteen districts; a 60 per cent response rate was achieved. The survey provides the first representative data on this cohort in Timor-Leste; the margin of error is approximately 6.5 per cent at a 95 per cent confidence level. In previous analysis of social protection programmes by the World Bank, for example, former resistance members represent too small a proportion of the overall sample to conduct in depth analysis; other survey instruments, such as the census, do not include information on armed or
active, embedded in their communities with established families, and perhaps better off financially than most Timorese. These results, I argue, are consistent with the conflict’s history: for many, ‘reintegration’ happened decades ago following the collapse of the support bases, not in 1999. Yet these results are not clear-cut; resistance members also remain remarkably invested in conflict-era networks, networks that have morphed and largely define post-conflict politics. The majority of surveyed individuals continue to maintain and rely upon conflict-era networks for a variety of needs. Many see a role for conflict-era institutions in the post-war period, including in the provision of security. And 44 per cent view the resistance as ‘still going.’

Taken together, I conclude that more than a decade after the conflict’s cessation, the relevance and potency of these networks and identities remain.

These results paint a complex, even contradictory, portrait of the social, political, and economic integration of former resistance members in Timor-Leste. The findings that individuals may actively participate in political life and express trust in state institutions yet also believe that former resistance members have the right to re-arm, suggests that it cannot be assumed that the growing authority of the state necessarily, prima facie, marks the replacement or delegitimization of conflict-era authorities. This marks an important challenge to current thinking. As the Timorese case exemplifies, state and non-state institutions are tightly interwoven. Votes for a political party both display a belief in democracy as well as allegiance to conflict-era hierarchies. These results challenge the way we conceptualize and measure reintegration, and raise important questions about the value of these networks and identities to a range of actors in the post-conflict period. If patterns in the Timorese clandestine service. The survey design and sampling methodology are discussed in depth in Appendix A: Methodology.

99 See Appendix B for an English translation of the full survey instrument.
case hold across other conflicts, former comrades may be more connected and for longer than previously assumed.

The chapter is divided into three main sections addressing political, social, and economic integration. While these categories are common in the literature and provide interesting lenses, it becomes clear that these categories are interlocked and overlapping. As such, an attempt is made to note intersections and complementarities, rather than to reify the divisions between a former combatant’s social and economic life, for instance, and the role of resistance networks therein.

2 POLITICAL INTEGRATION

The concept of political reintegration refers to the commitment or ‘at the very least, willingness to participate in the democratic process’ by former conflict actors (Porto et al., 2007: 120). Democratic political institutions are now a defining element of post-conflict state-building programmes, in part because they offer an avenue for resolving disputes and political contests through the ballot box rather than the gun. For democratic processes to be legitimate and effective, buy-in from interested parties and potential spoilers is critical. Furthermore, Porto et al. also describe political participation as a proxy for the formation of social capital and a ‘sign of rehabilitation and trust’ (2007: 120). Reflecting the multifaceted nature of the concept, political reintegration has been measured through a range of indicators, including voting rates, democratic values, and participation in local decision-making.

Reflecting this thesis’s particular interest in the state, I have further conceptualised political integration as the degree to which former resistance members locate authority in state security institutions (e.g. the police) and state-based processes (e.g. elections) and look to these institutions and processes as the legitimate means
of resolving disputes and distributing resources. The survey measured participation in elections; participation in political parties; trust in leaders and security institutions; and perceptions of the resistance in the post-conflict period. Another aspect of political integration is political mobilisation. Accordingly, I document the importance of ‘veterans’ groups’ – a diverse set of organisations that in some cases reinforce ‘the rules’ of the democratic ‘game’ and in others undermine the nascent political system. These groups point to the on-going, and perhaps even increasing, symbolic capital of resistance identities in the political sphere, calling into question the ability of state-based programmes to disrupt these bonds.

Overall, while I found high levels of political participation, including voting, I also found that individuals continued to trust resistance-era leaders and many saw a place for themselves as security actors. Crucially, my data suggest that a quarter to a third of former resistance members perceive an active, extra-legal role for former resistance members in armed defence. These individuals also place more trust in resistance-era leadership than in elected local officials or traditional leaders. This finding suggests that these relationships and beliefs are deeply entrenched; over a decade after the cessation of conflict and a series of successful plebiscites, these men and women still view state institutions with circumspection and place their political trust in non-state actors. This marks a failure of reintegration, as defined above. These former armed and clandestine actors have not transferred their trust to state institutions; were problems to arise, they would look to non-state actors. For these actors, the state does not hold a monopoly on legitimate force.

This section on political integration is divided into three parts. In the first sub-section I discuss participation in the formal political process, including voting, as well as data on trust in leaders. In the second sub-section I turn to questions around security and the role of former resistance actors in that sector. The final section looks at the
political mobilisation of former resistance members – or those purporting to be – in ‘veterans’ groups.’ Membership in these groups also cannot be linked to political integration in a straightforward manner: while some groups participate in political advocacy others specifically mobilise former resistance members against state institutions.

2.1 Elections and Political Leadership

Concerning voting behaviour, participation in elections is generally viewed as an indicator of belief in the efficacy of democratic means for securing economic and political goods, as well the belief in the legitimacy of the system itself. In this light, it is an encouraging and positive indicator of political integration that over 97 per cent of respondents reported voting in the 2007 Parliamentary and Presidential elections. The same percentage anticipated voting in the then upcoming Presidential elections. While this figure is most likely also positively skewed due to social desirability bias, I regard this bias as itself indicative of respondents’ understanding of democratic participation as a positive or normative political value. In Timor-Leste there are strong community norms towards participating in elections and participation in national elections is high. Indeed, rather than observing apathy or disengagement, almost all homes that I visited displayed political propaganda posters, often of multiple parties, featuring brightly rendered photos of key leaders.

100 Social desirability bias is when respondents answer questions so as to portray themselves in a more favourable light; positively regarded behaviours such as voting may thus attract false reports. It is also worth noting that the data set, in sampling from the government registry, under-represents anti-state actors. Such groups, namely CPD-RDTL, have made an express point of disengaging with the state, often refusing to participate in elections or register for benefits (although some have).

101 Average voter turn out in the 2007 Parliamentary and Presidential Elections (two rounds) was 81%. In 2012 participation dropped slightly, with average turn out for the 2012 Parliamentary and Presidential Elections (two rounds) at 75%. See http://www.electionguide.org/countries/id/63/.
In addition to voting in elections, 24 per cent of respondents reported being members of political party structures, roles that range from standing in elections to working as neighbourhood coordinators. Of these respondents, the highest percentage supported FRETILIN (37%), followed by CNRT (25%), PD (11%), ASDT (11%), and other assorted parties (16%). These numbers broadly correspond with the 2007 and 2012 parliamentary results, suggesting that registered former combatants and clandestine actors are not disproportionately involved in particular parties specifically describing themselves as veterans’ parties, such as L7’s UNERTIM organisation. Rather, reflecting geography, the importance of clan links, and the regionalism of the resistance movement, party affiliation appeared to be regional. For example, in Aileu district, respondents to a high and significant degree support ASDT, reflecting the dominance of that party in the district. While the relationships were not as strong as found in Aileu, there was also a high correlation between involvements in the FRETILIN party and birth in Baucau district. In the post-conflict period, former resistance members appear to work within local political structures rather than as a voting block. The preference for regional parties rather than national, ‘veterans’ parties’ is consistent with the localised and cellular nature of the resistance.

While participation in plebiscites appears encouraging as an indicator of positive views on democratic processes, this relationship is actually more complex. Firstly, the strong connections between political parties in resistance-era groups and networks complicate how data on voting patterns should be interpreted. Party membership and voting remains strongly linked to pre-existing ties; Hohe describes

102 The 2012 Parliamentary elections results: CNRT 37%, FRETILIN 30%, PD 10%, and ASDT 2%. The 2007 Parliamentary elections results: CNRT 24%, FRETILIN 29%, PD 11%, and ASDT/PSD 16%. The slightly higher levels of support found in my sample for FRETILIN may both reflect allegiance to the party based on resistance-era participation as well as the skew in the sample towards the East, where FRETILIN dominates.

103 Forty seven per cent (47%) of Aileu’s votes in 2012 parliamentary election went to ASDT.
the pressure in 2001 to ‘dismantle’ resistance-era structures to form parties as ‘difficult to accept’ and notes that individuals joined parties due to ‘personal relationships or historical connections’ not political ideologies (2002: 71, 73; see also Richmond, 2011: 119). Accordingly, as will be discussed in greater length in Chapter VII, voting patterns correspond with patronage and clientalistic relationships. As one respondent outlined: ‘[i]t is still very traditional; people follow who the leaders tell them to vote for’ (SUR55). As such, voting may not provide a particularly good indicator of belief in the efficacy of democratic processes or of political engagement. This provides an example of hybridity in post-conflict political institutions.

The importance of resistance-era leadership in the post-conflict period was captured in a question concerning which leaders respondents trust the most in, for example, the resolution of a minor dispute (the example provided in the survey). Local leaders include elected officials such as Village Chiefs (Xefe Suku), whereas traditional leaders would include authorities without elected office such as Liurai, Datos, and Lian Nain. As shown in Chart 5.1, of those that listed a single authority, resistance leaders were considered the most trusted, followed by traditional, and local leaders. While the item was intended to focus on local elected officials, respondents could plausibility understand local leaders to include non-state authorities at the local level include church leaders and leaders of civic groups.

Understanding the source of political authority in Timor-Leste is made more complex due to reinforcing patterns of overlapping authority. Local elected leaders are often
selected for their pre-existing authority in the community; for example, village chiefs also may be hereditary leaders (e.g. Lian Nain) or have served prominently in the resistance. As Gusmao documents in his study of local governance, there is ‘no clear dividing lines between these categories [of authority], however, with many villages having a mixture of two or more features’ (2012: 182). Similarly, on the national stage, top leaders have been drawn from the armed, clandestine, and diplomatic fronts. Those without this experience are disparaged; as one respondent describes: ‘Parliament members - there are people who are smart, but their mind-sets are not the same as those who were in the jungle’ (SUR46). These results suggest that in political contests, experience in the resistance may be particularly important.

In lights of this hybridity and multiple sites of authority, it becomes less evident that participation in elections marks a change in the basis of political legitimacy in Timor-Leste rather than the continuation of the status quo. This finding calls into question the use of electoral participation as a proxy measure for the embrace of democratic politics, such as the use of elections to regulate (reward or punish) officials’ performance and popular mobilisation around class interests. In addition, participation in elections and the rise of democratic governance may not necessarily be a good proxy measure for signalling the displacement of non-state authorities and networks. Complicating conclusions about the political integration of former resistance members, the on-going political legitimacy of former resistance leaders amongst respondents relates to a much broader belief amongst a large minority (44%) that the resistance is still continuing (Tetum: ‘sei lao nafatin’).

This view that the resistance is ‘still going’ carries a range of meanings. Firstly, many respondents described the idea of the resistance in the post-conflict period as a united effort to improve the nation, ‘fighting’ hunger, poverty, and corruption. For example, as one respondent explained: ‘[t]he war is already over, but it is about
national development. This is our struggle, this is my intention: to liberate the land, the people’ (SUR58). Others focused in particular on care for ex-resistance members. As one respondent explained: ‘we still reinforce [the government] - some still have not received their pensions. As long as this is not resolved, it will keep going’ (SUR259). The idea of a lack of resolution – whether promises of social justice and welfare or of pensions and valorisation – came through strongly.

Secondly, another interpretation of the continuation of the resistance is in terms of political parties and the incorporation of resistance-era networks into party structures. Indeed, political parties including FRETILIN, CNRT, PD and UNDERTIM all have strong connections to resistance-era structures and leadership. Those who viewed the resistance as ‘still going’ were more that twice as likely to trust resistance leaders over the other authorities. These political organisations have benefited both from the political capital and prestige associated with their resistance-era precursors. The ongoing use of resistance-era symbols and nomenclature deliberately clouds the distinction between non-partisan national resistance organs and parties. As one respondent stated: ‘[t]he resistance is about parties like FRETILIN. They still are in charge of the government. Their resistance is now this’ (SUR52). He positions the work of the resistance as now political, but the structures and leadership are the same.

In terms of mobilising voters for elections, the vitality of resistance-era networks is also important. Leaders have transformed the robust and complex resistance-era networks criss-crossing the country into the basis for their political organisations. Parties benefit from and utilise resistance infrastructure. One informant noted that the current president, Taur Matan Ruak, engaged resistance structures to mobilise

---

104 Small parties such at KOTA, ASDT, and Trabalista also trace their roots to the 1974-75 period.
votes: ‘TMR us[ed] keixas to organise his campaign’ (INT66). Here, again, the assumed relationship between voting and the diminution of non-state authority (and political integration) is complicated or even reversed. Similarly, FRETILIN drew strongly upon its pre-existing networks to mobilise voters in the 2001 Constituent Assembly elections (see Hohe, 2002: 71). In this context, voter participation may actually be a reflection of the persistence and new relevance of resistance-era structures and leadership, rather than the opposite.

As scholars, understanding the tenacity of these organisations and hierarchies, so long after the end of conflict, requires consideration of their social value not just their stated political agendas. Insights from organisational theory suggest that organisational longevity, rather than the achievement of an expressed goal, drives organisations. In some regard, it does not matter if these networks are re-animated as political bodies or as development organisations as long as they continue. In his classic study of inter-organisational relationships, van de Ven et al. state: ‘there is a tendency within organizations to adopt new goals, solve new problems, and market new products when previous goals have been attained, old problems solved, and old product lines terminated’ (1976: 34). Activities in the spheres of development, social welfare, and party politics appear to be the new ‘products’ associated with resistance groups and networks, providing the justificatory rhetoric for their on-going presence. These ‘missions’ also help maintain the relevance of resistance identities that are so important to former combatants and clandestinos yet are so rarely discussed in the DDR literature.

2.2 Security Institutions and the Resistance

In addition to attention to political participation and voting behaviour, political reintegration reflects former combatants’ perceptions of state security institutions.
This includes their belief in concepts of state power, notably the state’s monopoly on the use of legitimate force – and thus the deligitimisation of the use of non-state force. The view that state security institutions, namely the police (PNTL) and military (FFDTL), are capable of resolving disputes marks trust in these institutions and the transfer of authority from non-state networks to the state and its laws. My research finds, however, that many respondents view the resistance as a necessary watchdog and protector of the nation, and still needed to pursue unfinished elements of the revolution: social protection, the valorisation of resistance actors, and stability. In Timor-Leste, as predicted by the large minority of respondents who viewed the resistance as ‘still going,’ views on state institutions and the state’s monopolisation of violence are complex.

In order to gauge respondents’ views, I asked a series of questions on security institutions and their roles in and relationships to them. Firstly, I asked respondents about which security institutions they trusted the most. Rather than directly asking whether or not an individual trusted the police, for example, respondents could choose to name a single institution or a combination of institutions. The omission of an institution indicated mistrust or a lack of identification. I also asked a series of ‘true/false’ questions – a form of question that translates well and is used frequently for rhetorical emphasis in colloquial Tetum (lo’os ka lae?). These items included questions about whether or not former resistance members were always required to follow the law, needed to seek permission from the government to be armed, and should remobilise for national security. Each touches on the perceived subordination of resistance actors to state power, a relevant gauge of political integration.
Concerning security institutions, as shown in Chart 5.2, approximately 60 per cent of respondents answered that they trusted the FFDTL and PNTL equally (excluding mention of foreign forces) or trusted all these security actors the same. This is an uncontroversial answer, and as such may reflect social desirability bias. Regarding the military, 23 per cent placed their primary trust in the FFDTL; in the minority, 13 per cent reported placing their primary trust the PNTL. The preference for the FFDTL over the PNTL suggests an on-going affiliation to the military amongst former resistance actors, rooted in the FFDTL’s foundations in the FALINTIL forces. Interestingly, there is a statistically significant relationship between primary trust in the FFDTL and Lautem or Baucau as district of birth (a correspondingly lower levels of trust in the PNTL). This correlation points to the on-going salience of East/West divisions in terms of security institutions. These divisions and antagonisms were mobilised in the devastating 2006 Crisis.

Of particular concern for post-conflict stability, a sizable minority envisaged an active role for former resistance members in providing security. Removing non-responses, a quarter of respondents believed that former resistance members do not need government permission to carry guns. Thirty seven per cent and 40 per cent of respondents believed former resistance members had a role in guaranteeing state security and sometimes did not need to follow the laws, respectively. There is a strong, significant relationship between the finding that the law does not apply and a

---

105 The p-values for all statistical tests and findings described in this chapter are included in Appendix D. All statistics cited herein are significant to the 95 per cent level.
belief that former resistance members have a role in guaranteeing security. There is also a significant correlation between the belief that sometimes the laws need not apply to veterans and those who trusted resistance leaders over local or traditional leaders.

Taken together, these results suggest that in times of strife, a large minority of former resistance actors believe that the resistance groups should remobilise to ‘right’ the nation, retaking the reins. This marks a lack of belief in the state’s monopolisation of force. Unfortunately, such a dynamic is not hypothetical. During the 2006 Crisis, the ex-FALINTIL member, Oan Kiak, and his men created an armed roadblock in Mercado Lama, Dili; they killed one man and injured two others (COI, 2006: 38). The subsequent 2010 Appeals Court decision justified this use of force and found that the FFDTL ‘may, in emergency situations, include former members of FALINTIL in order to provide support to the FDTL, for it was through just such a contribution that the nation of RDTL was born.’ As such, many resistance members see the arrangement hierarchically, with any authority that state actors now hold as granted by the resistance.

The finding that a significant minority of respondents conceive themselves as part of a largely autonomous security group (or groups) is of particular concern both because this group includes people for whom violent and clandestine action was once their ‘vocation,’ as well as because of the political complexities involved in challenging such a role. The concept of political integration becomes more complicated if the resistance-era roots of political organisations and political authority are taken into account. Efforts to delegitimise resistance actors’ claims to autonomous action are made more difficult by the fact that the legitimacy of the new institutions (e.g. the FFDTL) is based in the legitimacy of these actors to wield force historically. When conceptualising integration, political institutions cannot be modeled
as novel institutions that former conflict actors accept or reject. Rather, the new institution is build atop the old; the process of integration and institutional reform is actually one of carefully removing the old foundation brick by brick without disturbing the new edifice.

2.3 ‘Veterans’ Groups

Finally, the emergence of groups representing former resistance members in the post-conflict period merits discussion in relation to political integration. While participation in associational life may be viewed as a form of social integration, and the participation in political advocacy as a form of political integration, these groups are diverse and their influence is mixed. Namely, it is through these bodies that many former combatants (and those claiming that identity) have become politically mobilised and legitimise the use or threat of coercive force. These ‘veterans’ groups’ include remobilised resistance-era groups; veterans’ associations formed since independence; political security groups with resistance-focused identities; and more loosely organised networks. Benefits of group membership include validation, political expression, social protection, and often access to resources – functions that the government reintegration and pension programmes have promised but are yet to offer.

Of the 149 respondents who reported being part of a community-based group or organisation (of 224 total respondents), 31 reported being part of a clandestine or veterans’ group. This marks 20 per cent of respondents who were active in civic life, as will be discussed below, and approximately 9 per cent of the total sample. This figure, however, is most likely low, due to both missing responses (i.e. individuals who did not answer the question) and under-reporting in the case of secretive or anti-state groups. Even so, an approximately 9 per cent participation rate by registered
former resistance members is notable, as this cohort constitutes a large and politically significant aspect of the population; extrapolating from this rate, more than 20,000 individuals may be involved in these groups nationally. Such figures have not been published previously.

In some case, these groups facilitate political integration, namely participation in the democratic process and adherence to the ‘rules of the game.’ These resistance-era organisations have sought new, advocacy and development roles in independent Timor-Leste. For example, RENETIL, a student clandestine organisation, has sought to reinvent itself. As a former leader of RENETIL explains:

[RENETIL] is a historic name, you can’t just toss it away. Our mission and vision have simply moved. We have the feelings of the resistance – we are still resisting poverty, anarchy, corruption, negative things (INT47).

Riding the wave of international programme funding, RENTIL has reinvented itself along the model of a local NGO. Interestingly, another member described how the persistence of RENETIL networks has aided post-conflict stability: ‘Before we struggled together; we are now all in parties but have maintained connections, so that if something goes wrong, we can call them up. It is easy to speak together, sit together’ (INT44). However, suggesting the difficulties of this transition, the group has added only four new members since independence (INT43).

Of more concern, however, is the remobilisation or formation of groups in the post-conflict period that challenge or threaten the state (see footnote for examples). 106

106 Such groups with resistance-era ties or identities include Rogerio Lobato’s group AC ’75; the Association of National Liberation Combatants and FALINTIL Veterans (ACLNVF); Colimau 2000; Forcas FALINTIL SF-75; the National Front for Justice and Peace (FNJP); and the National Union of Ex-Squadrons and Members of the Timorese Resistance (UNAQMERTIL) (see Scambary, 2006). The latter two petitioned the government in 2008 and 2004, respectively, although their composition remains undocumented. Moreover, criminal groups have used language evoking resistance roots. In 2011, the group Xefe Estadu Maior Baze de Apoiu 1975 (Major Head of State Support Base 1975), founded by ‘Commander Lakon Mosu’ was accused of extorting money from residents in Manatutu and Manufahi districts (Timor Post, 23 February 2011).
Rather than encouraging political engagement and advocacy, these groups have retained their martial character and, in some cases, explicitly sought to delegitimise state structures while also retaining links to political actors. Many appear relatively unstable, waxing and waning in both importance and membership. For example, resistance-era organisations like Fitun and KRM have recently re-emerged from obscurity over a decade after the end of the conflict. In the case of Fitun, memberships now appears to be composed of a new generation that came of age since independence (INT63). Groups that briefly dominate the political stage also often slip into obscurity, suggesting their instrumental use by political actors (see, for example, the National Movement for Unity and Justice; Scambury, 2009: 273). Such fluidity and volatility makes an accurate accounting of their influence and membership and activities difficult.

In some important cases, these groups formed in response to perceived failures in government policy. As noted in Chapter III, a first round of advocacy groups were established in 2001, following the decision that only one-third of the cantoned resistance forces would be integrated into the military. The groups took on state-like functions, performing military drills and registering members (Kent, 2006: 9). In some cases, the formation of these groups was driven by ‘the frustration of younger male veterans, especially former clandestinos, at the perceived lack of proper acknowledgement and of social and economic benefits’ (Myrttinen, 2012: 231). These groups organised around charismatic former resistance-era leaders, drawing upon or reproducing resistance-era structures of command or loyalty.

These early organisations include both the large veterans’ associations, the Association of Resistance Veterans (AVR) and FALINTIL Veterans Foundation (FVF). Pre-dating the formation of the CNRT political party, Gusmão established the
AVR in July 2001 to bring together former CNRT members, participants in the clandestine movement, and other resistance actors. At one point the AVR claimed over 18,000 members, although Rees finds this figure ‘grossly inflated’ (2004: 49). The FVF, led by Taur Matan Ruak and Lere Anan Timor, continues to play an active role in Timorese politics. Veterans General Supply, a for-profit subsidiary of the FALINTIL Veterans’ Foundation (FVF), reportedly received large contracts for supplying military equipment, raising conflict-of-interest concerns (INT18). The FVF headquarters housed Taur Matan Ruak’s campaign offices in 2012.

Of particular concern, however, are violence-prone pressure groups, including Sagrada Familia and the Popular Council for the Defence of the Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste (CPD-RDTL). CPD-RDTL, for example, explicitly rejects the ‘rules of the game’ in the post-conflict period. CPD-RDTL views all legislative developments made since the transformation of CNRM to CNRT in 1998 as illegitimate, questioning the basis of the new state and its institutions. Accordingly, it discourages members from voting, registering for benefits, or participating in the census (Simonsen, 2006: 593). This and other behaviour has led to a series of clashes with state authorities. Furthermore, both Sagrada Familia and CPD-RDTL ‘have formed links to gangs and martial arts groups as well as to political parties’ (Myrttinen, 2012: 231).

The politics and intricacies of these diverse, evolving organisations is beyond the scope of this thesis; however, simply cataloguing these groups underscores how they remain significant players of Timor-Leste’s post-conflict political and security environment. In light of their importance and broad membership, reducing their membership appears challenging. Worthy of note, the problematic nature of these groups has provided the sub-text for the creation of the National Veterans’ Council (CNV), a state-based consultative and representative body for former resistance members. As noted in Chapter II, establishing the CNV under the leadership of
Xanana Gusmão is widely seen by high-level policy-makers as an important step for reinig in these groups and delegitimising those that oppose the state or employ violence and intimidation.

3 SOCIAL INTEGRATION & NETWORKS

Social integration is defined as the embedded-ness of former fighters in their home communities, following the cessation of conflict. It is about sharing ‘common norms, beliefs, and goals that are structured and enforced through social institutions and a common dialogue’ (Hazen, 2007: 1) and identifying as part of civilian communities. As such, indicators include participation in community groups such as churches, agricultural collectives, and community meetings. A lack of social integration, on the other hand, can be measured in both non-participation as well as on-going links to resistance-era groups, including participation in ‘veterans’ groups, as discussed above. As Hazen emphasises, ‘civil war is not purely the disintegration of society,’ instead, it marks ‘the disintegration of the broad social community, and the social integration of certain members of the community into a new social fabric: the war family’ (2007: 1). Reintegration, in this formulation, is the dissolution of the ‘war family’ and the re-establishment of the broader, ‘social community.’

As with political integration, the data from Timor-Leste is mixed and, similarly, these data challenge the facile dichotomisation of social integration and the maintenance of resistance bonds. I find former fighters to be well integrated in communities according to key metrics, specifically in regards to participation in associational life and the maintenance of family bonds. However, looking to their participation in the ‘war family’ over a decade after the conflict, I find a significant proportion to have maintained contact with both former leaders and comrades. These relationships appear close, with the majority of respondents maintaining frequent contact. The on-
going vitality of these bonds may reflect the intermeshing of familial and resistance ties. As one informant explained: ‘There were two ways to send help: institutionally or individually. You could also send help through networks such as friends and family – it was not just formal structures.’ (INT44). This fits within Hoffman’s model of ‘militarized social networks’ (2007: 660). These bonds may also be sustained through participation in associations or political parties, as described above.

3.1 Family and Associational Life

In Timor-Leste after 1980, the majority of conflict actors were embedded in communities, rather than isolated in the jungle. According to basic life histories taken as part of the survey interviews, the majority of respondents mobilised following the invasion; almost three quarters of my sample reported moving to the support bases in the late 1970s. However, upon the destruction of the bases, individuals were ordered to return to their home villages. Back in villages, some respondents reported issues with hostility from neighbours as well as extra scrutiny and abuse from occupying forces. Despite these issues, the majority of respondents were able to establish families, obtain land, and rebuild their lives. Some re-joined the resistance in later years, however primarily as part of the village-based clandestine movement. As noted in Chapter III, this descent from the hills marks a key, and perhaps the most significant, demobilisation and reintegration event of the conflict for most registered former resistance members.

107 As discussed in Chapter III, by the early 1980s, the initial mass-mobilisation strategy was replaced with guerrilla resistance and clandestine action. A broad network of clandestine actors supported a small number of armed fighters: in the Maoist trope, ‘fish’ moving through ‘water.’ A small band of fighters did remain in the jungles throughout the conflict; these men did not enjoy the privilege of raising families or experiencing civilian life. Only five men have been recognised for 25 years of service, while 195 have been recognised for 20-24 years and 531 for 15-19 years. Approximately 1,700 individuals were registered in FRAP, although this may provide a slightly inflated estimate of the number of active, armed fighters at the end of hostilities. These numbers are dwarfed in comparison to the approximately 250,000 individuals who have sought benefits.
Most respondents reported high levels of participation in community life. For example, while noting the possible influence of social desirability bias, 87 per cent of respondents reported sometimes or always attending community meetings, and 67 per cent reported being part of a community-based group (including veterans’ organisations, as described above, and political parties). This suggests that they have established social bonds within their communities and have built social capital. Social capital, the product of social relations, trust, and shared norms, is viewed as important for economic and social well-being (see Putnam, 1993). Such community involvement also connects to political integration, as discussed above, as associational life may be considered as the ‘learning schools for Democracy’ (Rothstein and Stolle, 2002: 5).

In addition, particularly amongst those who re-established their civilian lives in the 1980s, respondents describe rich family lives. Firstly, over 90 per cent of respondents live in the same village in which at least one relative also maintains a household; the majority of respondents reside in their villages of birth. Of importance for assessing social integration, the respondents hold positions of responsibility in their families: a large majority, 84 per cent, identify themselves as heads of households, with 80 per cent of respondents living in household of four or more people (39 per cent in households of seven or more). As one indication of former resistance members’ longstanding social integration, common concerns voiced by respondents included meeting tuition payments for their teenage children’s education or the need to make repairs to their homes.

These are the quotidian concerns of former-combatants and civilians alike; these are the concerns of people who have established lives within communities, far different from the needs of atomised former fighters who must be ‘reinserted’ into civilian life. The IDDRS Operation Guide do recognise the importance of context for reintegration
programmes, noting that ‘[r]erintegration is … in some cases the wrong word to use’ (2010: 157). However, this observation is in regards to those who mobilised during wartime and are unfamiliar with peacetime society. In Timor-Leste, and potentially in other, largely clandestine conflicts or conflicts of decolonisation or national liberation, the status quo may be social integration but in a wartime context. The diversity of these configurations, the meaning of reintegration in various contexts, and the relationship of reintegration and community development thus merit further consideration in the creation of policy guidelines.

3.2 Contact with Resistance-era Commanders and Comrades

Despite enjoying these established roles in their communities, the situation in terms of the breaking of resistance-era bonds is more complex. To measure this dynamic, I look at the frequency of contact with former resistance comrades and leaders, as well as the functions that these relationships serve. While the necessity and feasibility of disrupting these bonds may be debated, their presence provides interesting insights into their social lives. Of particular note is the co-existence of ‘civilian’ social bonds and on-going relationships with and trust in conflict-era commanders and comrades. While conventional models of integration would predict an inverse relationship between community participation and the maintenance of conflict-era bonds, this study found no statistically significant relationship between participation in a community organisation and on-going contact with a previous commander.
Firstly, 82 per cent of respondents reported maintaining contact with former comrades from the resistance; a further 66 per cent reported maintaining contact with former commanders. Of those who reported on the frequency of the contact (there was a lower response rate on this item), most respondents met with their comrades at least monthly (66%), while fewer than half of respondents met with their commanders that frequently (47%); see Chart 5.3. The most commonly given reason for losing contact with comrades and commanders was the cessation of the conflict and that he or she is deceased, respectively (closely followed by the cessation of conflict). Of particular interest, those who kept in contact with their comrades were also statistically significantly more likely to maintain contact with their commanders. Put in terms of an odds ratio, those who maintained contact with their comrades were almost seven times more likely to maintain contact with their former commanders.

The nature of these relationships is more challenging to capture. Half of the respondents described the primary function as information sharing. The process of ‘telling stories’ from the past was also listed as an important activity. As one explained: ‘[we] share our views, organise ourselves. If we hear bad rumours we can look for information. We also drink coffee together and share ideas’ (SUR271). Other examples included information from former commanders about registration and benefits programmes and ‘who was approved, things like that’ (SUR95). As a researcher, my presence in communities was spread through these relationships, often leading to people I was looking for actually seeking me out – in one alarming case being pulled over on the side of the road and queried (see Roll, 2014).
These casual connections should be taken seriously: these networks continue to play intelligence-like functions. One respondent described how he monitored INTERFET and UN actors until 2002, passing on information to resistance leaders and FALINTIL (SUR 270). A high level political leader (INT75) also described such connections, noting that he continues to share information with former comrades and then passes it on to Lere, the current head of the military and high-level former resistance leader. A Timorese security specialist emphasised that while most resistance members are not formally organised, they ‘continue to have an emotional organisation; they are tied together’ (INT43). Another notes: ‘They still direct each other. Those who before were in the resistance together still follow their commanders’ (INT54).

As will be considered more fully in the next section, these bonds also have economic significance; the majority of respondents who maintained contact with their former comrades report providing or receiving material support from them. In one case, the respondent stated that the former commander sends phone credit in order to maintain contact (SUR247). Another stated that his former commander provides seedlings, draft animals, and other agricultural assistance to his former followers (SUR291). Concerning hiring, a UN security specialist noted that many of the Civil Security members or ‘brown shirts,’ security guards that protect government buildings, were drawn almost exclusively from resistance-era networks (INT24). In an extreme example, the anti-state group CPD-RDTL claimed purportedly abandoned land in Manufahi District and sought to establish a large-scale agricultural cooperative, involving a reported 11,000 members.\footnote{More than 11,000 CPD-RDTL members remain in Fatuberliu,’ Radio Timor-Leste, November 23, 2012. The high number of participants, while potentially over-reported, also reflects the ability of groups identified with the resistance to expand their membership beyond those who served.} This precipitated a tense political showdown between the organisation and the Prime Minister.
Returning to the survey data, respondents reported high levels of cooperation. Amongst those who maintain contact with former comrades, 66 per cent reported helping each other, for example by sharing goods. Assistance may take a wide range of forms, including assistance with registering to receive financial benefits, employment opportunities, or direct financial assistance. For those who maintained contact with former commanders, the figure was 45 per cent. Reflecting the complexities and hierarchies of this relationship, a smaller percentage (30%), of valid respondents stated that they could directly ask their former commander for help, such as employment or other necessities. Ironically, the registration and benefits programme has reinforced the importance of these connections. In discussions of problems with the registration process, respondents frequently described getting help from former commanders to resolve issues and increase awards. As will be discussed in Chapter VII, these relationships cut both ways; superiors, acting as government commissioners, have extracted rents for rendering such services.

4 ECONOMIC INTEGRATION

Economic reintegration is broadly defined as the establishment of independent economic livelihoods by former fighters in the post-conflict period. In particular, the achievement of economic reintegration involves participation in the licit economy and marks the reduction of former combatants’ financial vulnerability. By contrast, as noted above, economic co-dependence between former comrades deepens and perpetuates linkages. Accordingly, financial benefits packages or employment trainings are thus viewed as means of supplanting the role of non-state groups in the economic lives of former conflict actors. Economic reintegration is considered the linchpin on which social and political reintegration processes depend (Porto et al.,
In this framework, little can be done by way of political and social reintegration until the economic livelihoods of former combatants have been addressed. Accordingly, in most DDR programmes economic reintegration comes first, even if political reintegration is the ‘ultimate goal’ (Gilligan et al., 2010: 7).

In Timor-Leste, economic benefits, including direct transfer payments and government contracts, have been at the centre of reintegration efforts. However, at the time of the survey, the majority of respondents had not received financial benefits; this offers an opportunity to examine the financial status of this cohort prior to the broader rollout of the payments. These data suggest the economic polarisation of the population, and, despite this split, the on average the cohort may be slightly better off than the average Timorese person. I also discuss the complicated ways in which the decision to reward service through payments threatens to deepen economic and social divisions amongst former resistance members and between former resistance members and those who did not serve.

4.1 Measuring and Interpreting Relative Inequalities

Despite the focus on the economic lives of former resistance members, this survey is the first in Timor-Leste to specifically target this cohort. Looking to employment, I found that 68 per cent of respondents identify as being farmers, and a full third of respondents also reported having at least 1-2 other people in the household who contribute to family income. A further 35 per cent reported receiving another source

\footnote{This emphasis reflects the view that (re)mobilisation is driven by ‘greed’ or economic hardship (see Collier, 1994). In this theory, economic stability is the key for preventing the criminalisation of former fighters and their remobilisation as criminal enterprises.}

\footnote{This is particularly interesting as economic strife and neglect are key discourses used by politically mobilised resistance actors to demand political support for the expansion of reintegration payment programmes. Former resistance members have shrewdly measured their pensions against payments to Parliamentarians and the reintegration packages paid to petitioners and internally displaced persons (IDPs) following the 2006 Crisis, arguing that their needs are both more significant and worthy.}
of income, most commonly the monthly old-age pension. In order to understand their financial status, I also gathered data on housing materials to use as proxy indicators for asset wealth and even income (see Montgomery et al. 2000; McKenzie, 2005).

Concerning the main findings, I firstly found the cohort to be polarised into two main groups. As shown in Chart 5.4, approximately half of the respondents are clustered to the left, possessing more robust dwellings and likely higher asset wealth, while the other half is clustered to the right, in more vulnerable conditions. While the presence of former resistance members who have flourished financially in the post-conflict period is not surprising, the high number of these individuals relative to those who have lower asset wealth is unexpected. Political discourse suggests that all former resistance members continue to suffer and have suffered more or less equally; these data paint a much different picture.

111 Housing materials are good proxy indicators of an individual’s asset wealth, as the choice of materials reflects an individual’s access to financial recourses, and can provide a basis of comparison. Indicating higher levels of wealth were ‘robust’ housing conditions, featuring concrete wall and concrete or tiled floors. By ‘vulnerable’ housing conditions suggest lower levels of wealth; such conditions include clay floors and bamboo or palm frond walls. As would be expected, I found strong and significant correlations between flooring and wall materials; for example, houses with tiled floors were three times more likely to have concrete wall than those with clay or bamboo floors. Houses are also a key way of communicating social status.

112 Key: con = concrete slab or blocks, bam = bamboo, metal = corrugated metal panels.
In exploring who these individuals are with higher projected levels of wealth, I found that wealth and the receipt of pension payments (either old age or veterans’),\textsuperscript{113} for example, are not significantly correlated. Nor are projected asset wealth and the maintenance of contact with former commanders. Both these findings suggest that their sources of financial security come, at least in part, from sources other than those associated with resistance networks or benefit payments or, alternately, that the survey was unable to capture key dimensions of these relationships. There was, however, a strong and statistically significant correlation between robust housing conditions and living in urban environments. This connection makes sense, as poverty is concentrated in rural areas, as are livelihoods based on subsistence agriculture. As would be predicted, there was a strong, statistically significant correlation between high projected asset wealth and non-agricultural employment, as well as between non-agricultural employment and urban location.

What emerges is a portrait of a population divided between the rural, agriculturalist poor and a better off, non-agriculturalist, well-connected urban cohort. Respondents that now hold government positions in district capitals or Dili exemplify the latter. These inequalities are expressed across a wide range of factors. Those in urban centres with robust housing conditions enjoy better access to important goods such as transportation, education, medical treatment, and even communications. To wit, I found that those with tiled floors – a proxy for high asset wealth – were 18 times more likely to have mobile phones. These types of inequalities, as will be discussed in the next section, are potential sources of conflict and tension amongst former combatants and clandestinos themselves, with those in more isolated areas

\textsuperscript{113}Old age pensions, available to all Timorese over the age of 60, provide my lower levels of benefit than veterans’ pensions. It is less likely that these old age pensions would make a significant enough difference in household income to allow for the upgrading of housing infrastructure. By contrast, veterans’ pensions are significant enough to be used as such and housing upgrades are consistently identified as a priority once payments are made. These two types of pensions are unfortunately not distinguished in the data.
concerned that they have not benefited in the post-conflict period to the extent of their peers in urban areas.

Secondly, when comparing the data on housing materials to that gathered in the national census, I found that my sample appeared to be better off on the whole than the general population. Respondents were approximately twice as likely to have tiled floors than census figures and half as likely to have clay or dirt floors than the average Timorese person, both proxy indicators of asset wealth. This relative economic advantage may reflect a number of dynamics. The sample is older and more male than the wider Timorese population. This suggests a higher status in households and communities and thus access to greater social and economic capital. This cannot be attributed to a bias in my sample towards urban respondents; in fact, the contrary is true, with my cohort more rural than the general population.¹¹⁴

Finally, the relative economic security of the cohort is particularly interesting as it contravenes dominant narratives of former resistance members being universally disadvantaged in relation to those who did not participate in the resistance. These narratives came through in the interviews, with respondents much more likely to identify themselves as worse off than better off than their peers (Chart 5.5). These claims are also key to political discourses calling for the further expansion of programmes; these political scripts are the main focus of the next chapter. The introduction of objective measures of wealth, in this case

¹¹⁴ Significant at the 95 per cent level; p=0.016.
housing materials, allows for these discourses to be re-evaluated and provides an empirical basis for social policy.

4.2 Benefits Payments, Integration & Social Jealousy

While economic integration, is defined by the reduction of economic differences amongst former combatants and between former resistance members and civilians, the current benefits programme in Timor-Leste is designed to accentuate these disparities. Higher levels of payment are awarded to those with the greatest contributions, rather than using a means-tested or needs-based approach. As a result, while some individuals who are currently in vulnerable financial positions will be served with generous monthly pensions, the majority of those who have registered will receive no financial assistance or a one-off payment. This will deepen, rather than lessen, the polarisation of the population as well as the split between civilians and those recognised with payments. Indeed, I find the creation of these distinctions and their reification through direct transfer payments to be a primary objective of the programme. These distinctions ‘valorise’ those who served; exclusion is key to this process.

Respondents had a complex relationship with questions concerning the balance between honouring former resistance members with payments and taking a more broad-based approach. The belief, for example, that a commander should receive benefits was also accompanied by the expectation that he distribute them widely. In some instances, respondents supported the diminution of economic differences between those who served and those who did not. A slight majority, 54 per cent of respondents, felt that former resistance members should enjoy the same standard of living as civilians. This reflects Timorese cultural norms around equality and redistribution (Kingsbury, 2010: 142; Traube, 1989: 322; Hohe, 2002: 69). However, when the issue of social status was introduced, a formidable 71 per cent of
respondents felt that former resistance members should enjoy a higher social status. As social status is intimately tied to access to resources, and, in this case, marked through transfer payments, these responses are complex. Capturing this tension, one interviewee stated: ‘We must create equality, but also keep a little apart for the veterans’ (INT02).

In Timor-Leste, scholars have documented a wide range of similar cases in which differential resource allocation, often as a result of post-conflict transitions, has increased community-level tensions. Of concern, the focus of the transfer payment programme on armed actors has inspired charges of discrimination from those who served in the clandestine front. One Timorese conflict prevention specialist pointed out: ‘There is social jealousy. Who fought? It was everyone! People died but they did not become veterans’ (INT04). Perhaps reflecting their own histories of service, almost two thirds of respondents agreed that the government had yet to fully valorise those in the clandestine front. Here, benefits programmes, while addressing the need for recognition, will frustrate economic integration and augment horizontal inequalities and social jealousy, constituting a conflict risk factor.

In describing disappointment with the post-conflict period, respondents revealed their underlying expectations for recognition and an improvement in their financial position and support from the networks to which they had contributed during the conflict. As former resistance members, they envisioned being at heart, rather than the margins, of the new, post-conflict nation. In some ways, their disappointment points towards

---

115 These include: augmented tensions over the control of lucrative rental of properties and the awarding of UN temporary use agreements (Harrington, 2006: 13, 16); unequal access to employment (Stratton, 2008: 61; Cutter et. al., 2004: 20); community level international aid distribution and contracting (Cutter et. al., 2004: 6, 15); expansion of Sino-Timorese economic power (Muggah, et al., 2010: 52); the on-going influence of families favoured during the Portuguese and Indonesian eras (Molner, 2006: 348); social benefits awarded to returning internally displaced persons (ICG, 2008: 5; Dolan, 2004: 37); and unequal benefits from petroleum and natural gas projects (Nicalau and Scheiner, 2005). Harrington has also used the concept of horizontal inequalities to discuss East-West disputes (2006).
their successful integration; this marginality, sadly, is the norm. However, it is also a
world turned upside-down, with key hierarchies and cultural norms upended and
inverted through the awarding of payments to those more junior. As one respondent
states: ‘The commission gave me nine years, but then I only got four to seven. There
are children who did not do anything that have gotten more than us. It is from the
national level that they have done this. They understand how to read, write. We
don’t.’ (SUR258). While they are part of society, it is a society to which they
decreasingly relate and recognise. In this regard, and in their view, social
reintegration remains incomplete.

A final way that these programmes exacerbate community tensions is through
pressure on those who have received payments, generally for high levels of service
or the death of a close relative (‘martyrs’ payments). The interconnectedness of the
resistance and family networks means these individuals may experience intense
pressure to redistribute the money. One respondent, who received a one-off payment
in excess of $9,000 in addition to a monthly pension, described still facing financial
hardship: ‘The money is not enough for a house. I do not have enough food… There
is the major obligation to divide it according to the culture’ (SUR42). In particular, he
noted that his new obligations to provide large contributions for dowries and bride
prices. ‘Some protest, some don’t protest’ (SUR42). Another respondent expressed
anger at being put under pressure. He stated: ‘Some are angry at me because I gave
help while we were in the jungles but now I don’t give it to them. But I am not a big
brother! This is a problem - some people talk like this, I am ashamed’ (SUR47). He
blamed the government for failing to provide for other former resistance members,
causing them to turn to him for patronage (‘big brother’). Here, the unequal
distribution of benefits emerges as a source of strife.
5 CONCLUSION

This chapter draws a complicated picture of the social, political, and economic integration of former resistance members. Respondents report high levels of participation in political, family, and associational life, as well as economic conditions that are comparable to, if not more fortunate than, the general population. However, a large minority of these respondents, approximately 30-40 per cent, report on-going political, social, and economic interactions with former resistance commanders and comrades. These networks provide economic support, sources of information, as well as a sense of identity and belonging. Crystallised in associations, groups purportedly representing resistance actors continue to thrive and play a significant role in Timor-Leste’s post-conflict political and security environment.

This complex picture suggests the shortcomings of conventional criteria for measuring reintegration. The resistance is interwoven in the political, economic, and social lives of Timorese. The same command structures that can mobilise armed actors are those used to mobilise voters. Institutions are built upon foundations in the resistance, placing the drive to reduce or disrupt these identities (‘integration’) at odds with mainstream concepts of political legitimacy: patriotism, sacrifice, and valour. The hybridity of state authority makes the conventional focus on ‘breaking the command structures operating over rebel fighters’ implausible and perhaps even undesirable (Annan et. al., 2011: 5-6). The securitisation of bonds to resistance-era networks ignores the ways in which these ties may be positive and protective, or, more simply, have become part of the fabric of post-conflict politics and governance.

In addition, these findings also challenge and complicate sanguine claims about the emergence of a liberal, democratic, modernist state. This chapter suggests that resistance networks remain strong, and that some processes, such as elections, may
signal less substantive political changes than initially thought. Indeed, one theme that emerges in this chapter is a lack of social transformation and the perpetuation or deepening of inequalities despite expectations that independence would significantly improve the lives of those who fought. The next chapter picks up on this thread, and it discusses the political mobilisation of former resistance members and the normative language that they have used to articulate their grievances and advocate for additional state support.
Chapter VI: Arguing for Care

Oh may we n’er them ungrateful prove!
But bless the impulse that their spirits rous’d,
And bless the patriots who our cause espous’d.

(Humphreys, 1783; in Purcell, 2002: 55)

When national memories are concerned, griefs are of more value than triumphs, as they impose duties, and require a common effort.

(Renan, 2011: 83)

1 INTRODUCTION

In her work on the unprecedented explosion of Civil War veterans’ benefits in the United States, Skocpol makes the argument that this growth cannot be explained alone through macro-economic factors or a straightforward ‘pressure group thesis’ (1992: 97). Instead, she argues they reflect the confluence of driving factors. Emerging from the bloody brutality of the Civil War, veterans’ organisations presented a morally grounded, nationalist argument, placing pressure on legislators. And political party politics were competitive and patronage-based, with parties using these programmes to both curry favour and siphon benefits off to supporters. While Skocpol’s work describes a very different time and place to twenty-first century Timor-Leste, her argument outlines an alternative, conflict-specific pathway for the evolution of the social welfare state. She moves analysis from ‘socioeconomically determinist theories toward … a “polity-centered” approach’ (Skocpol, 1992: 88). Such polities and parallel, competitive dynamics in Timor-Leste are the subjects of this chapter.

More specifically, this chapter delves into the machinations and drivers behind the legislative growth of these programmes – the liberalisation of codified eligibility criteria as detailed in the previous chapter (programme expansion at the site of
implementation is the subject of Chapter VII). Here I ask why have these programmes grown so large? Or, put otherwise, what does their growth ‘do’ for the political actors and policy-makers who support it? Just as the ‘pressure group thesis’ was wanting in the US case, I find a singular focus on spoilers or vote-seeking in the Timorese case to be similarly incomplete and under-developed. To remedy this issue, I detail a perfect storm of competition between political parties, the dominance of patronage systems, and pressure from politically mobilised groups employing culturally significant arguments for increased care. I argue that these factors result in an escalatory game amongst legislators, in which players have much to gain from expanding and manipulating these programmes and much to lose – politically and financially – in their opposition.

While intimidation has played a part in the expansion of these programmes – the example of L7’s threats in the cantonment period and the response to such threats in the provision of contracts and government positions were noted in previous chapters – so too do rhetoric and appeals to cultural norms and values, a dynamic that has received much less scholarly attention. Ideas matter, and as Skocpol found with the case of the Civil War veterans, public appeals to duty, sacrifice, and the nation strengthen advocates’ positions. These narratives and normative discourses make claims concerning the relationship between former fighters and the state. They gain traction and moral weight by being grounded in Timorese culture. At the same time, they can be exclusionary and contradictory. Despite these complications, they imagine particular histories and use sacrifice and the experience of suffering as ‘credentials to legitimate… access to power and resources’ (Kriger, 2006: 1167). Of note, similar narratives are used in Namibia, Liberia, and other post-conflict contexts, although they have not been well documented (Metsola, pers. com., 2012).

---

116 Norms are defined herein as standards of ‘appropriate behaviour for actors with a given identity’ (Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998: 891).
The first section of this chapter focuses on the dynamics that drive support for the continued expansion of these programmes amongst policy makers. The subsequent section looks to the political mobilisation of former resistance actors – and those adopting that mantle – and focuses specifically on the discourses that they use to make claims on state resources. Taken together, this chapter provides an account for pressures and motivations for programme liberalisation at the site of legislative policy making.

2 POLITICAL SUPPORT, POLITICAL COMPETITION

The growth of reintegration programmes in Timor-Leste through the legislative process should be understood in the context of political party competition. Since the establishment of electoral politics in Timor-Leste, the field has become more contested and robust. While Hohe characterises voting in the 2002 Presidential contest as a ‘totem poll,’ in which ‘indigenous values of unitary and hierarchical political authority reinfor[ed] a one-party state’ (2002: 69), subsequent contests have resulted in multi-party competition, dominated by FRETILIN and CNRT. 117 Reintegration and benefits programmes have come to play a part in this competition, although not necessarily though straightforward vote seeking.

In this section, I look to three main dynamics. Firstly, despite the competitive nature of the emergent multi-party system, party loyalties remain strongly linked to regional identity and associated patronage networks rather than party platforms or class

117 Of note, while Timor-Leste has not become a one-party state, voting patterns do, however, hew closely to regional and family lines, as discussed in Chapter V. Concerning parties, the 2012 Parliament also includes two smaller parties: PD (8 seats) and FRETILIN Mudança (2 seats). This marks a significant reduction in small parties; the 2007 Parliament featured CNRT, FRETILIN, PD and six other smaller parties, four of which were joined in two-party coalitions in order to achieve the threshold number of votes for a seat. The d'Hondt system for seat allocation, as used in Timor-Leste, specifically favours larger parties, hastening this development.
mobilisation (INT15; INT33). Reintegration benefits programmes provide an avenue for distributive politics by which political leaders are able to manipulate the timing and scope of the programmes to benefit their constituents. Secondly, association with the resistance is key to political legitimacy in Timor-Leste and opposition to support for fighters – though notably not for victims – amounts to a political ‘third rail.’ Political parties use support for these programmes to compete for this form of political capital. Finally, these programmes help to control spoilers – an issue that I reframe in the context of political competition.

In the context of policy making, these three drivers combine to incentivise the expansion of these programmes and disincentivise their opposition. The competitive nature of Timorese politics creates escalatory dynamics. Furthermore, in game theoretical terms, the situation may also be viewed as a sort of arms race or even prisoners’ dilemma. While policy makers may recognise that higher and higher levels of spending come with significant costs, and there may be benefits to parties agreeing not to push for further expansion, the potential political windfall to the party that breaks such a pact and pushes for further liberalisation results in all sides pushing for expansion, matching or escalating rivals’ proposals.

2.1 Programme Expansion and Patronage

Patronage dynamics can be seen in the direct awarding of preferential contracts and individual programme administrators inflating the service record of a former follower during the registration process – a phenomenon discussed at length in Chapter VII. However, in regards to pensions legislation it is more difficult to identify these dynamics. Indeed, part of what distinguishes these welfare programmes is their comprehensive nature: potential beneficiaries have been registered across the country, spanning the strongholds of both major parties. As Skocpol notes, an ‘ideal
“distributive” policy’ or one lending itself to patronage ‘is one in which benefits are given to many particular recipients and politicians have some discretionary control over the timing and the targeting of those benefits. Civil War pensions may not seem to fit this profile very well’ (Skocpol, 1992: 121).

To resolve this conundrum, Skocpol notes that the increasing complexity of the American pension programmes allowed for more and more discretion and targeting by policy makers on behalf of their party machines. In Timor-Leste, too, the escalating complexity of the programmes – the divisions not only by years of service but by ‘grade,’ for example – has allowed for more negotiation regarding individual status, often through direct appeals to policy makers who then instruct bureaucrats to make changes. Discretion for policy makers in directing payments has also been introduced in terms of the timing of payments – again the EU Observers’ Mission’s comments about the spike in the disbursal of payments prior to the 2012 election comes to mind. Policy makers are also influential in terms of what groups are eligible for payment. As a leader of the CNRT, for example, Xanana Gusmão has ‘promised to open up eligibility for “the Fronts [of the Resistance] which were not recognised under the relevant law”, referring primarily to the clandestine front’ (ICG, 2011: 7). Such a move would mark a further expansion of payments to those with fewer than four years of exclusive dedication.

The ability to require a vote or action in return for a benefit is a defining feature of clientalistic and patronage systems. Here, however, the relationship is slightly more indirect and resembles other forms of currying favour, such as supplying club goods (see Hicken, 2011: 295). A strict vote-buying argument assumes that material benefits are sufficient to draw voters from one party to another or, at the very least, motivate a voter to participate or, conversely, to stay home. This, however, downplays the historical and regional dynamics around party allegiance, including
the deep rifts that emerged during the resistance period and have now been carried forward in party politics. As one established journalist described: ‘That they are self-interested and seeking votes is nonsense. It is not about this. You don’t vote [for a party] because you want a garden fence’ (INT34). In this manner, I argue that the patronage element of competitive party politics is more about demonstrating care and the ability to provide for potential supporters rather than more mechanistic, targeted initiatives that characterise classic clientalism and ‘vote buying.’

2.2 Nationalism and Political Legitimacy

While the use of reintegration resources for patronage and political mobilisation accounts for one aspect of why policy makers have consistently supported the liberalisation of pensions eligibility, the other dynamic revolves around political values and legitimacy. Support for former resistance members through the expansion of these programmes can be viewed as a form of symbolic behaviour that is a ‘strategic element in political competition’ (March and Olsen, 1984: 744). There are both incentives for expressing support and disincentives for questioning programmatic expansion. As one observer summarised: ‘all parties agree on the importance of rewarding veterans… Gusmão and Ramos Horta arrived with a clear understanding of service delivery. It was an untouchable item’ (INT 34). Crucially, however, opposition by political actors becomes not only politically imprudent but, more fundamentally, unthinkable. Benefits programmes are not ‘off’ the negotiating table, as they would never be considered to be ‘on the table’ in the first place.

These programmes have emerged as ‘untouchable’ because the locus of political legitimacy lies in the resistance (see Hohe, 2002). Connections to this history have emerged as the key – though not exclusive – ‘currency’ of post-occupation political
life.\textsuperscript{118} As Holthouse writes, political actors ‘make claims to political legitimacy through the prism of the nation… the degree of sacrifice during the independence struggle becomes the primary determinant of one’s closeness to the nation’ (2006: 48). As is discussed in other chapters, this narrative also proves exclusionary to those less involved in the armed resistance, particularly women and youth, which raises questions for transitions and representation in Timorese leadership.

The political currency of the resistance is demonstrated again and again through the political theatre of campaigns, for example local resistance leaders appearing on stage with politicians. In another example, prior to the 2012 elections both Taur Matan Ruak and Xanana Gusmão appeared in military uniforms on their campaign posters, prompting rival political leader and former \textit{clandestino} Fernando ‘Lasama’ de Araujo to quip: ‘You don’t need to show off in pamphlets that way, everyone knows that Taur is a former General who was together with Xanana a high ranking former commander’ (‘Renan Selak: A lot of our people felt threatened during election because of military uniforms,’ \textit{Jornal Independente}, 2012). The uniforms, however, recalled their service – a form of ‘bloody shirt’ politics that draws contrast with those who did not participate in the armed fight. By underscoring these continuities, political parties and leaders assert both their nationalist credentials as well as the appropriateness of their on-going positions of power.

The need to establish these connections with symbols of the national resistance through the support of these programmes may be particularly important for political leaders that did not serve in the same manner as Gusmão and Taur. Some key

\textsuperscript{118} Veteran identity thus is a source of \textit{symbolic capital}. Symbolic capital ‘defines what forms and uses of capital are recognised as legitimate bases of social positions in a given society’ (Sisiläinen, 2000: 12). Bourdieu suggests symbolic capital legitimates claims to other types of capital and those with symbolic capital can affect perceptions of what groups should gain similar access (Bourdieu, 1989: 23).
leaders have emerged from the Timorese diaspora; these include José Ramos-Horta, who lobbied international organisations from New York and other locales, and Mari Alkatiri and the ‘Maputu Group,’ located in Mozambique. Both these leaders make claims based on their experience in the Diplomatic Front, while also deferring to the sacrifices of those who remained. Ramos-Horta, in particular, also draws on other sources of symbolic legitimacy, including the use of traditional, high-status Timorese dress (e.g. *kaibauk, tais*) in political rallies and his association with the Catholic Church. Other leaders, particularly appointed Ministers, that prospered during the Indonesian administration have been particularly vulnerable to political attacks for being ‘autonomists’ and thus have additional incentive to demonstrate their support (INT11, INT17).

The on-going power of these symbols, particularly for parties like CNRT, FRETILIN and PD that trace their roots to the resistance, motivates the preservation and elevation of these identities in policy. This is a very different set of motivations than those that shape reintegration programmes that seek to remove the marker distinguishing ‘fighters’ and ‘civilians.’ Taken together, the importance of these identities drives both support for the programmes and effort to preserve and these political identities in the party’s image.

119 In addition, Alkatiri, for example, also sought to discredit Taur Matan Ruak in the 2012 presidential elections by claiming that he received support from ‘autonomists’ and former pro-Indonesia militia members. Typical of the political discourse in Timor-Leste, his statement both praises and damns his rival by association: “People came and threatened us starting from the first round of election saying that if Ruak would not win then crisis will appear again in Timor.” “It is a lie, because Taur himself is not a person who will create crisis. Those people who made intimidation were those who were autonomists,” Alkatiri said (‘Autonomists back Ruak: Alkatiri.’ *Independente*, 2 April 2012).
2.3 Controlling Spoilers and ‘Kabuki’

While the strategic, individual award of preferential contracts, housing, and jobs by state actors to control potential spoilers has been discussed in Chapter IV, broad-based programmes may also be understood as a means of pacifying potentially problematic former resistance actors. Here, however the mechanism differs. As discussed in Chapter II, the extension of the pensions registration programme provides a means of the state to ‘know’ those who have registered, a form of disciplinary power. The provision of payments further connects former resistance actors to the state, as well as creates mechanisms for state actors to control and monitor the movements of recipients, namely through decisions about how, where, and when payments are dispersed.

The growth of these programmes to control spoilers can also be analysed in light of political competition. Here competition is both between state actors and non-state actors for authority – stand-over tactics are negotiations for resources in exchange for ‘playing ball’ with the new regime – as well as between parties to harness the energy of these politically mobilised and volatile groups. Overemphasis on the violent or coercive power of resistance groups and their leaders misses this element of negotiation and political theatre inherent in clashes between state and non-state actors, many of whom previously were comrades in arms. As one experienced journalist noted, public confrontations between ex-resistance members, as seen, for example, between Sagrada Familia founder Cornelio Gama (L7) and the police in 2010, suggest ‘kabuki’ – a scripted sequence of demands, sabre-rattling and resolution that result in gains for both sets of actors (INT34). This recalls Chabal and Daloz’s examination of ‘disorder as a political instrument’ (1999).
Analysts such as Rees (2003, 2004), Timorese informants, and scholars such as Muggah (2010) and Nilsson (2008) emphasise the nuanced ways in which state actors use state resources and broad-based reintegration benefits strategically to achieve a range of short-term goals, including ‘buying’ political spoilers. As former resistance members themselves have pointed out to bolster their claim to benefits, cash payments have frequently been used to resolve impasses in negotiations, including with the Petitioners\textsuperscript{120} and internally displaced persons following the 2006 Crisis (ICG, 2006, 2011). Pension and benefits programmes writ large provide an avenue for appeasing potentially problematic mobilised groups, even if simply by discouraging them from withdrawing their endorsements.

These welfare programmes are effective in keeping state resources flowing, and political leaders may experience pressure from dissident groups to continue to provide this source of potential rents. While these explanations are incomplete, the need to ‘buy the peace’ and maintain political advantages over rival parties marks another reason for political actors to support programmatic growth.

Finally, this focus on political competition helps to avoid blunt portraits of former combatants as criminal and lawless,\textsuperscript{121} and places needed emphasis on ‘spoiler’ activities as organised and rational negotiations for resources. Indeed, concern with the violent remobilisation of former combatants and clandestinos in Timor-Leste ignores the political and intelligence orientation of resistance-era structures at the

\textsuperscript{120} During the 2006 Crisis, the soldiers who left their military barracks to protest allegedly discriminatory behaviour within the F-FDTL were known as the ‘Petitioners.’ Under the leadership of Major Alfredo Alves Reinado, these men participated in violent protests and clashes with the F-FDTL.

\textsuperscript{121} Concerns with return to civil conflict or the remobilisation of ex-combatants on behalf of criminal organisations or on a mercenary basis are certainly not unfounded in particular contexts and conflicts (for examples, see Debos, 2008). However, Torjesen and McFarlane’s (2007) work on DDR in Tajikistan supports the view questioning the connection between reintegration orthodoxy and stabilisation.
end of the conflict. Recall, for example, that FRAP largely engaged populations that had only limited fighting experience and had remained embedded in communities during their service. Again, reintegration benefits in Timor-Leste may be better understood as efforts to assert control over this politically and culturally significant cohort. Reinforcing this view, none of the elite informants interviewed for this thesis supported the notion that reintegration programmes in Timor-Leste were primarily focused on addressing short-run security concerns.

3 ARGUING FOR CARE

This chapter thus far has focused on highlighting how competition between political parties has helped to drive the legislative liberalisation of benefits eligibility. What has been missing from this discussion so far, however, is the agency of resistance era actors and organisations, particularly their efforts to exert pressure on policy makers. Skocpol’s Civil War veterans ‘were ideologically well positioned to make claims as “saviours of the Republic” and they ‘enjoyed considerable access and leverage;’ these groups’ tactics and discourses played into party competition and partisan concerns with appearing ‘ungenerous’ and unpatriotic (1993: 88, 103). So too in Timor-Leste. Advocacy has been embraced as a new purpose of the resistance movement, a view that crucially conceptualises the resistance as on-going rather than concluded (SUR92).

Far from being passive, resistance actors have actively asserted their rights to benefits. Demands for compensation and resources by ex-resistance groups have been made publicly, through the media and petitions, as well as privately, using resistance-era connections as backchannels for accessing high-level political

---

122 I take an actor-oriented approach and consider social actors ‘active participants who process information and strategize their dealings,’ while also recognising that these actors and their subjectivities are also the products of beliefs, norms, and experiences (Long, 2001: 4, 13; Wendt, 1987: 355; Giddens, 1984).
leaders. While the literature on post-conflict transitions has often focused on coercive action, including public demonstrations and threats, in Timor-Leste these actions have been relatively limited. Instead, in this section, I draw attention to ‘the issues, social identities, [and] styles of politics’ that successfully facilitate access to state reintegration resources (Skocpol, 1993: x), and argue the deployment of certain narratives, images, or discourses by these actors has been the key to making political opposition to benefits programmes untenable.

In Timor-Leste, these public discourses are complex, and establish images of the resistance and its members that encompass a series of dualities and tensions. Former fighters are limned as both national standard bearers and decrepit; they are the protectors of the nation but also a threat;\(^\text{123}\) elite leaders are fathers and protectors as well as neglectful, forgetting since independence those with who supported them whilst in the jungle. Similar complexity can be found in the images of ‘veteranhood’ that were mobilised and evolved following the US Revolutionary War; while these veterans were celebrated as heroes and exemplars of national character, this framing was accompanied by the image of ‘aging veterans’ deprivation, poverty, infirmity, and despair,’ which became ‘badges of honor, valor and rectitude’ (Resch, 1999: 91). On-going suffering and the possibility of re-victimisation at the hands of the state has been interwoven with narratives positioning former resistance members as mythical, untouchable.

\(^\text{123}\) Sousa-Santos (2010), for example, highlights the potential threat posed by former resistance members who view themselves as neglected by the state. As he quotes one former leader: ‘Are we forgotten heroes or bandidos? And if they continue to call us bandidos, we will show them bandidos’ (Sousa Santos, 2010: 67). I view this as a primarily discursive move – the imagining of former FALINTIL and clandestine figures as powerful and volatile – rather than as reflection of their demonisation or marginalisation; put in another way, such ‘reactionary’ statements reinforce the idea that this putative group has been treated poorly, whether or not that is objectively the case.
In Timor-Leste, policy makers have been both particularly responsive to claims by resistance actors and motivated to liberalise access to benefits because of the importance of having these groups ‘on side’ for maintaining political legitimacy. However, as is discussed below in the first sub-section, grounding resistance groups’ argument for special access to state resources in Timorese cultural norms enhances their potency. In particular, these arguments have coalesced around five key narratives: national fatherhood, national treasures, sacrifice, and re-victimisation and unmet expectations of social transformation; these are discussed in the subsequent sub-sections. Despite the lack of cohesion amongst former resistance members, the discourses used by these politically mobilised actors have been remarkably consistent.

3.1 Normative Foundations

Schmidt argues that ‘discourse itself, as a representation and as well as a process, needs to be evaluated as to why it succeeds or fails in promoting ideas’ (2008: 309). Drawing upon the work of Finnemore and Sikkink, I argue that discourses deployed by former resistance members to argue for access to resources are particularly authoritative or compelling based on their links to norms and ‘scripts to which [people] conform’ (1998: 912) – a concept akin to Schmidt’s ‘resonance’ (2008: 311). Through connecting their arguments to these norms and associated narratives, resistance groups have imbued assistance to ex-resistance members with a ‘quality of “oughtness”’ (Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998: 891).

Discourses of national sacrifice, for example, engage with normative beliefs around reciprocity, which foreground arguments for a state’s obligation of care to those who

---

124 Although I use the language of norms here, historians such as Resch (2010: 6) have turned to the writings of Hume and Smith to understand the persuasiveness of moral arguments; Purcell, in her discussion of national gratitude, draws upon Plato and Cicero and their writings on the ability of gratitude to unify nations (2002: 54).
fought. Engagement with such norms is well documented across conflicts. Resch notes the active role US Revolutionary War veterans played in 'arousing sentiments of gratitude' and efforts to 'present themselves to the public as suffering soldiers... which became a more powerful rhetorical device' after the passage of the 1818 Pensions Act (2010: 8). Kriger observes that politically mobilised ex-combatants in Zimbabwe have claimed to be forgotten and neglected by the state (2003). In each case, these 'political sentiments seek to bind the nation together around patriotic memories' and change the terrain of policy debate (Purcell, 2002: 53).

The grounding of these narratives in cultural norms is, at least in part, strategic. As Elster notes, 'rational actors often deploy norms to achieve their ends' (Elster, 1989: 99). As Kriger notes, these narratives of neglect serve as 'an important symbolic resource and a strategy to seek privileged access to state resources' (Kriger, 2003: 1). Her argument parallels that of Humphreys and Valverde in the context of victims' mobilisation in Argentina. There, the narratives used by the victims 'constructs a moral and political relationship between the individual and the state,' one in which the state has an obligation to respond to these groups’ demands (Humphreys and Valverde, 2007: 181). As Renan states, discourses of grief, for example, can be used to 'impose duties' (2011: 83).

The argument, however, that these discourses are used strategically has some limitations. As Bourdieu argues, 'legitimation of the social world is not, as some believe, the product of a deliberate and purposive action of propaganda or symbolic imposition;' instead, he argues, it results 'from the fact that agents apply to the objective structures of the social world structures of perception... which tend to picture the world as evident' (1989: 21). Former resistance members fundamentally see themselves as the proper and legitimate recipients of state care. By identifying as ‘heroes,’ ‘founding fathers’ or ‘veterans’ (i.e. ‘applying structures of perception’),
they assume the position of the *obvious* or *natural* recipients of scarce state resources. Such discourses popularise these conceptions and reproduce patterns of labelling or identification that, again, naturalise certain individuals’ claims to benefits. Rather than being a ‘put on’ or a strategic move, these discourses reflect deep, culturally reinforced, perceptions of the resistance experience and the state’s reciprocal obligations; as such, these discourses further reinforce the ‘taken-for-grantedness’ of resistance members’ claims.

### 3.2 Founding Fathers

In the case of Timor-Leste, the most dominant discourse deployed to assert the state’s obligation of care is the role of resistance members as the ‘fathers of the nation’ (INT14), a script that invokes an existential debt – the nation would not *exist* without *us* – and also draws parallels to family structures. This imagining of Timor-Leste as a family, with elite ex-resistance members as the father, both recalls the associated authority that fathers have over children as well as the obligations of care that children eventually assume for their fathers – a complex dynamic.

Demonstrating the former, Lieutenant Colonel Sabika, a prominent resistance leader, stated: ‘It is important for the Government to pay attention to the future of the veterans, because the country will never exist without having veterans and probably the Indonesians would still occupy us’ (‘No Veteran, No Nation,’ *Diario Nacional*, 25 November 2010). A high-level clandestine leader echoed this sentiment: ‘Without veterans there would be no government!’ (INT06). Both comments suggest a debt; the state itself is a product of their service: ‘Our obligation has already been met: we fought. Now they have their [obligation] to fulfil’ (INT06).
In regards to the positioning of former resistance members as father figures, it is important to recognise that Timorese society is predominantly patriarchal and hierarchical, aspects reinforced by the dominant Catholic Church (Rimmer, 2007: 339; Hohe, 2002: 80). There exist strong familiar norms of deference towards both male heads of households and male traditional leaders, and power is often exercised through familial networks. These social structures, Hohe argues, have translated into ‘indigenous values of unitary and hierarchical political authority’ (Hohe, 2002: 69). Expanding from this observation, I argue that these norms of familial and filial piety have been mobilised in this narrative of national fatherhood. By identifying as ‘fathers’ former resistance members become natural subjects of deference and authority – these discourses further model the relationship between the resistance and the government as between fathers and sons.125

Resistance actors have also used this framing to position lower level resistance members or civilians as the younger brothers of high-level resistance leaders who have benefitted in the post-independence period; Gusmão’s popular epithet, Big Brother (Maun Boot), fits within this framework. This familial, yet subordinate status suggests an obligation for those in power to ‘look after’ the rest (INT25). Adopting this language of family one resistance leader, who currently holds a high-level position in the F-FDTL, states: ‘[former commanders and resistance members] consider each other as older and younger brothers... they still call me Commander’ (INT12). He considered it his on-going obligation to support his former soldiers; such perceptions may encourage the continuation and even formalisation of patronage relationships.

125 This may also help to contextualise the exclusion of women in the valorisation of resistance members – women simply do not fit easily within the model of male, filial power (INT30).
The familial and inter-generational aspect of this discourse is also illustrated through narratives concerning its violation and disrespect of former resistance members. One Timorese NGO member described how ‘young people beat them’ (INT11). Another lamented that young people gesture to ‘old men’ and ask “‘who is that?’... there is no respect anymore’ (SUR79). Whether or not former fighters have been victimised by youths, these comments suggest a perceived imbalance in the post-conflict period in the relationship between ex-resistance members and civilians, particularly the failure of (young) people to recognise their ex-resistance members’ authority. This concern also reflects the aging of resistance leaders – how can these ‘founding fathers’ maintain their dignity? What happens when men who were once believed to be bulletproof are now vulnerable to be mugged by teens? This anxiety drives calls to reinforce resistance actors’ authority and material well-being.

### 3.3 Sacred, National Treasures

A slightly different discourse centres on former resistance members as valuable or sacred objects. Members of the resistance are ‘heroes, nation-builders, they are this country’s treasures’ (INT06). In interviews, former resistance members described both people, particularly Gusmão (INT19), and institutions like FALINTIL as sacred (INT48). As a Timorese security analyst suggested: ‘The name [of veterans] is sacred [lulik]’ (INT14). As Wilson summarises: ‘Veterans are accorded great, almost religious, status in Timorese political culture’ (2010: 145). This sacredness forms part of the national mythology, and contributes to the construction of Timorese history around the near-miraculous triumph of a determined, ‘righteous’ resistance against a much larger, occupying state.
As a result of status, interactions with former resistance members and the valorisation of the resistance may have not only political, but also cosmological consequences. Commentary by Trinidade and Castro is worth quoting at length:

[Interviewees] suggested that the East Timorese people, through the government, have forgotten the martyrs (Matebian/War Heroes) who sacrificed their lives during the resistance. These martyrs or fighters are part of the spiritual world at the moment. When they are upset, the spiritual world is out of order, resulting in conflict in the real world… East Timorese described this phenomenon as Malisan husi Matebian sira [curse from the martyrs] or Matebian Babeur [disturbances from the spirit world to the real world by the martyrs] (2007: 18).

The linking of the spiritual and terrestrial world makes the valorisation of former resistance members particularly important. Their neglect raises concerns about the loss of spiritual equilibrium, and preventing this disequilibrium may reinforce state actors’ interest in valorising ex-resistance members through benefits schemes.

This sacred status suggests not only a relationship of deference, as with the narrative around ‘founding fathers,’ but places former resistance fighters on a higher plane – above the state and its laws. As one NGO worker and former clandestine member stated: ‘They think that they’re free from justice. [They say] “I’m God, you cannot bother me! If I am wrong, I will not go to jail.” It is not equal, just look at Lobato – he’s a veteran’ (INT04). Accordingly, tensions have emerged around the conceptualisation of resistance members and their relationship to state institutions. One Timorese security analyst described a culture of impunity: ‘The state has always protected them… It’s like the mafia – untouchables – they cannot be arrested, it can’t be done’ (INT01). As the NGO worker queried facetiously: ‘We need to valorise them, but is God still higher?’ (INT04). The imputed ‘sacred’ status of former resistance members, a non-state source of authority, undermines and conflicts with the realisation of a vertical state – one that stands above or over all citizens (Ferguson and Gupta, 2002: 981).
The duality of former resistance members as both fallible and human or infallible and godly or sacred can be seen even in a single individual. Regarding the confrontation between resistance leader and parliamentarian Cornelio Gama (L7) and the police, one informant explained the difference: ‘an individual is wrong, a veteran cannot be... L7 and Cornelio Gama are not the same’ (INT43; my emphasis). For this interviewee, these two levels exist within one man. For the informant, while Gama should be investigated for illegal dealings, any comment against veterans or ex-resistance members is inappropriate. Another informant expressed genuine concern that criminal activity ‘decreases their value, and sullies them a bit. Like the L7 case – it is a lot of little cases that add up’ (INT14). Because of the importance of a heroic resistance mythology in Timorese nationalism, the dirtying or profaning of the resistance name becomes of profound concern.

3.4 Sacrifice & Suffering

Another prominent discourse centres on the sacrifices made by the resistance members, and it bases their claim to compensation in the losses that they suffered during the conflict – what Raftopoulos has termed the ‘ideology of sacrifice’ (in Kriger, 2006: 1165). The sacrifice for the state creates a reciprocal obligation of the state; as Lere argued: ‘Our colleague of struggle, we suffered together in the jungle; therefore [the] solution to the [problem of collecting and reburying] skeletons [of those who died in the resistance] is the state’s responsibility’ (‘Conis Santana’s family meets with Commander Lere.’ RTTL, 2012). However, as discussed below, this discourse has also been used to define and broaden the group of individuals seen as legitimate recipients of state benefits.

This discourse of sacrifice and suffering has been deployed to establish a dichotomous hierarchy between ex-resistance members and civilians. As one
prominent veteran explains: ‘There is tension: the veterans have suffered, they have already built this nation, and now they can see politicians,’ and those in the Diaspora who did not sacrifice as much, prospering (INT09). As one ex-resistance member stated provocatively: ‘Doctors and engineers! Those are the enemies: those who schooled outside of Timor-Leste’ (INT37). As those that gave the most, to benefit from the peace dividend or ‘independence pay off’ is the veterans’ right (INT33).

Comparative suffering is explicitly used as grounds for payment; as one clandestine actor agues: ‘I should get [a payment] each month. I suffered worse that the people who carried guns’ (SUR66).

Implicit in these discourses of suffering are hierarchies of sacrifice; suffering is used to define those ‘most deserving’ of reintegration assistance rather than proximity to formal structures or position within organisational hierarchies, as in the legal regime. Those who were in the jungle for the entire occupation are positioned at the apex, with members of the clandestine front who were able to maintain domestic lives or overseas education on a lower rung, though still higher than those in the diplomatic front who enjoyed life in New York, Lisbon, Maputo or Melbourne. Civilian non-combatants and victims of Indonesian violence are implicitly excluded as having suffered or sacrificed less. These hierarchies can be exclusionary. As Gledhill argues: ‘The effects of these hierarchies of harm can become evident in on-going struggles for redress, in which citizens who cannot successfully appropriate the identity of “victim” or, in this case, veteran, ‘but who might be considered equally disadvantaged, are unable to invoke the same kind of rights claim’ (Gledhill, 2003: 211 in Kent, 2010: 191). In this manner, these hierarchies are used to define certain categories or groups as more deserving than others.

Invocations of the sacrifices made by resistance members have been key when arguing that compensation for former resistance members should be comparable to
– if not exceed – that provided to anti-state actors following the 2006 Crisis.\textsuperscript{126} The concepts of neglect, and re-victimisation were used to mobilise support for the expansion of the benefits programme. Emphasising the insult of not receiving benefits while these anti-state actors did, resistance actors put pressure on government actors. As one respondent stated: ‘I worked for the Timorese land, but why did they give [payments] to the petitioners? If no one had gotten it, it wouldn’t be a problem’ (SUR63). As one former member of the student resistance recounted: ‘When the government gave money to the gang leaders, the petitioners, we asked: why not the veterans?’ (INT11). Such arguments, drawing upon the state’s obligation of care, influenced the subsequent passage of the 2008 Pension Law.

In another example, former resistance members have contrasted their service records and suffering with that of government officials as a basis for pension benefits. More specifically, a 2008 petition from a group representing former resistance members demands the alignment of pensions for ex-resistance members to those of Members of Parliament, the Pensaun Vitalisia, suggesting that, in light of their suffering, they are also entitled to comprehensive pensions (2008: 9). More forcefully put, one respondent stated: ‘Those of us that had been in the armed front, we gave everything, 24/7 just waiting to die. And then there is the Pensaun Vitalisia!’ (SUR42). Another individual questioned why Parliamentarians deserved generous pensions for ‘sitting in a chair’ for five years when his decades of suffering and sacrifices in the jungle merited only a single payment (SUR41).

These discourses of sacrifice have also been used to universalise the experience of suffering and find commonalities between different groups. In Timor-Leste, the

\textsuperscript{126} Following the 2006 Crisis, the Timorese government provided significant cash payments to the Petitioners as well as some internally displaced persons residing in camps in Dili and Metinaro. This response can be seen as part of a ‘larger government strategy of buying groups off’ (INT33).
discourse of sacrifice has been appropriated to expand access to resources, with the success of one group’s claims on these grounds paving the way for other groups. For example, as former long-term resistance member and *Sagrada Familia* leader argued: ‘The law needs to recognise everyone, including people who were not jailed. It needs to pay everyone because they lost their lives;¹²⁷ it is too narrow’ (INT06). He appeals to the common experience of suffering as the basis for compensation, not membership within a formal institution. Similarly, in an address to the FOK-FALINTIL convention, FRETILIN leader Mari Alkatiri argued that widows and orphans from both the clandestine and armed fronts deserve government support due to their equal sacrifice (RTTL, 2012).

Overall, the political currency of this discourse, married with the widespread experience of suffering, has allowed for the adoption of this narrative by clandestine members and victims groups, for example, and has provided the basis of their claims to state resources and special status (Kent, 2010: 190; ICTJ, 2010: 8). Looking forward, some high-level actors anticipate the further growth of pension benefits to clandestine actors and even conflict victims, driven by these discourses based on the experience of the conflict rather than an individual’s particular rank (INT21, INT31).

### 3.5 Re-victimisation & Unmet Expectations

Finally, closely linked to sacrifice is the narrative of re-victimisation by the government and unmet expectations for social and economic transformation in the post-conflict period. This discourse suggests the injustice and irony of the on-going suffering and vulnerability of former resistance members, despite their previous

¹²⁷ This phrase should be understood not in the English idiom meaning death, but more broadly to signify the loss of a full social and cultural life – the opportunity to have a house, a family, and a position in the community. L4 emphasised the dehumanising experience of ‘living like an animal’ in the jungle: poorly clothed and underfed, sleeping outside and without a fire (INT06).
sacrifices and the material benefits that independence has brought to others. Following their suffering and victimisation by the Indonesians in the jungle or prisons, a lack of benefits and/or recognition is described as re-victimisation, with the government uncomfortably and unflatteringly grouped with the oppressive colonial occupiers of Timor-Leste’s past. This discourse has been widely adopted, and the Timorese press, for example, have described the state’s failure to care for ex-resistance members as shameful.

In one clear example of the argument, a Timorese NGO worker described the lack of government progress on providing housing and employment in these terms:

> Many [former resistance members] still are becoming victims – they are still sitting in the same houses... Some veterans have not received good employment, even though they made an important contribution; [the conflict] ruined them. They have already become victims once (INT43).

Similarly, in one dramatic exchange, a man being removed from the veterans’ registration list described the failures of the administrative process through the lens of victimisation: ‘Again you are accusing the people who are suffering! We are becoming victims again’ (INT50). In another example, in October 2010, the government was criticised for failing to assist former fighters in their efforts to recover the bones of those killed during the resistance, evidencing that the government had ‘not paid maximal attention to the national heroes’ (‘Govt Should Pay Attention,’ *Timor Post*, 27 October 2010).

These narratives are suffused with a sense of helplessness and subordination to an unfeeling state. As one registered resistance member stated: ‘I am just angry because of the law. We have to submit to the law - there is frustration, you can't do anything. The government has said to just wait. I am again waiting for the state’ (SUR81). Similarly, again noting the power of the state, another averred: ‘Now those who did not fight have the opportunity to erase the rights of those who participated
before... why have some not been considered?’ (SUR245). From a rhetorical perspective, taking this submissive stance accentuates the state’s failing to meet its duty of care and the state’s unique position to provide such assistance.

Closely related to the narratives of re-victimisation, are discourses concerning unmet expectations for social and economic transformation, perhaps derived from the revolutionary ideology explored in the early part of the conflict. As one respondent summarised: ‘I was involved for 24 years. My life is the same. Those who are small, are still small. Those who were rich, they are still rich. There has been no result’ (SUR78). The variations on this refrain – ‘we are poor, and still poor. The rich? They are still rich’ – was oft repeated (SUR79). While these comments are focused on a general lack of socio-economic change, others viewed this issue in more personal terms, noting that many former commanders, often drawn from the educated elite or the Portuguese military, had benefited in the post conflict period, but had done little to support those who fought under them or supported them through clandestine action. Rather than prospering together, in solidarity, low-level combatants have seen themselves as left behind. This sense of neglect is compounded by the fact that high-level former resistance members were first to receive their benefits.

Invoking Mao’s iconic description of guerilla warfare, one respondent stated: ‘There is now discrimination between the armed and clandestine fronts. Before it was the fish swimming through water, but now the fish don’t need the water! It is dry!’ (SUR267). While his complaint centres on his commander’s failure to secure or redistribute financial benefit, at its heart it speaks to a loss of brotherhood or solidarity in the new social world. Making a similar argument, another respondent stated:

They are separating themselves - their lives are already good. They live in the village. The Company Commander is still alive, but he does not provide help. They have cast me aside
already. [My commander] is still alive, but he hasn't even given a card or a cigarette! I am still looking for a livelihood. Before we helped each other, day and night. Clothes, pens, chairs (SUR86).

Here the speaker describes the erosion of his relationship with the Commander, who, now prospering, refuses to provide help despite their earlier brotherhood. These narratives of abandonment became particularly powerful following unmet expectations for integration into F-FDTL and FRAP (Rees, 2003: 1).

Finally, these feelings of powerlessness are further animated by the perception that those who have been undeserving have received benefits. These include internally displaced persons (IDPs), the 2006 Petitioners, and Parliament Members, whom receive a generous pension. As one respondent describes: ‘As in 2006, we are crying again. Those of us in the rural areas just sit silently. The dislocated received money – millions were given to [IDPs], and we are just listening to this from the mountains. Just watching money get spent' (SUR 69).

4 CONCLUSION

In looking at both political competition and the normative aspect of political pressure from mobilised former resistance actors, this chapter provides a refinement of under-specified models that attribute such growth to simple, instrumental vote buying or the response to threats. Such explanations fail to acknowledge how social welfare programmes are a blunt instrument for addressing such issues, and that an intermediate factor – competition – is needed. Indeed, in Timor-Leste, this growth cannot be fully understood outside the context of competitive, patronage-driven party politics. In this competitive context, ideas, norms, and identities matter, making political mobilisation and political discourse another important piece of the puzzle. And support for former resistance members is a ‘highly emotive’ – rather than a purely strategic – issue (INT34). This marks an alternative approach to address what drives policy makers to pursue reintegration programmes on this scale.
Accordingly, this chapter has mapped out the competitive dynamics between political parties, focusing on patronage dynamics and claims of political legitimacy, and reframed ‘spoiler’ activity as a negotiation between non-state competitors, while also noting that courting spoilers can also be used competitively. I also examined the ways in which resistance actors, in turn, have used specific images and narratives to assert and normalise the state’s obligation of care and valorisation in the post-conflict period. In particular, these discourses establish images of former resistance members – as founding fathers, for example, or victims – and, crucially, these images also describe the relationship of former fighters to the state – as helpless and needing care, for example, or as objects of reverence.

As Tilley reminds us, discourses are ‘not documents to be interpreted which will finally reveal their inner meaning, but monuments to be described’ (1990: 296). The discourses themselves must be analysed in regards to what makes them effective, what obligations they create, what assumptions they rest upon, and what dynamics they serve to obscure. The discourses of re-victimisation and suffering have tended to obscure the ways in which the post-conflict period has been a boon for some ex-resistance members, for example. This period has been fraught with inequities, and post-independence processes of ‘marginalisation and disenfranchisement’ have run parallel the blossoming wealth and political power of former resistance leaders (see Sousa Santos, 2010: 1).

More subtly, despite their diversity, these discourses share the assumption that the state is the appropriate provider of this assistance. As such, these arguments are not just about why the state should provide care; they further entrench an answer to the question: who should care for those who fought? Focusing on the state rather than
resistance networks marks an important shift. Even if the state is seen as failing in its duty, it is notable that this duty of care has been located thusly.

The next chapter looks at this same question of what has driven programme growth, but instead of focusing on policy makers in Dili, I look to the implementation of the programmes. While eligibility legislation has been liberalised, this does not account for the widespread – and widely accepted – reinterpretation or disregard of this legislation at the level of registration and data verification. While thousands have been added to the rolls through opening up new eligibility categories, thousands more have been added through the rolls through ignoring these eligibility criteria.
Chapter VII: Implementation from the Veranda and the Hybrid State

*Don’t look to the law; look for stability.*

(SUR69)

*Veterans and politics are like milk in coffee: impossible to separate at this point.*

(INT78)

1  INTRODUCTION

This is a chapter about the veranda and the business of governance that takes place there. While embedded with the Data Verification Team in 2010 in Laileia, Baucau district, our morning routine was to walk to the meeting hall, stopping on prominent community members’ wide porches for sweet black coffee. We would sit on the veranda with our host, his wife and daughters invariably hanging back in the doorway, and observe people go by carrying goods or ferrying uniformed children to school on the backs of motorbikes. The team's leader, Alin Laek, a prominent resistance figure, would enquire after family members and exchange gossip and pleasantries before moving onwards. These encounters were warm and enjoyable; I started to see Alin Laek as a 'local boy made good' or, in the North American mode, the charismatic captain of the high school football team, back from the big city for the homecoming game, reliving moments of glory.

Yet these relaxed exchanges were also much more significant. These conversations and the meetings that followed, wherein disputes concerning the registry were summarily resolved, constitute the leading edge of state power. In Timor-Leste, power is exercised in both the 'le climatiser et la veranda' ('the air-conditioning and

---

128 Data verification has been carried out across Timor-Leste by teams representing the Commission for Tribute, Supervision of Registration and Appeals (CHSRR); the CHSRR was designed to operate through five-person councils in each of the country’s 65 sub-districts. These teams were to be composed on the 'former CNRT sub-district level official, the Nurep ... local level former members of the clandestine front, and a member of the CHSRR' (World Bank, 2008: 16). These team members are referred to as ‘Commissioners’ throughout this chapter, reflecting the common usage by respondents.
the veranda,’ Terray, 1986). As Berman explains, ‘[t]he first is the face of modern state power, bureaucratic omnipotence and technical expertise the avatar of modernity; the second is the scene of the real business of government [through] patronage’ (Berman, 1998: 335). What I observed on the veranda was the maintenance of personal power networks – networks often pre-dating the resistance – and their reinforcement through the careful distribution of state resources. Far from the tiled offices of Chinese-built ministries of the capital, Dili, it is on such verandas that reintegration programmes take shape and life. There, through the micro-level interactions between Alin Laek’s team and registrants, eligibility criteria and thus the programmes more broadly were reimagined to reflect both actors’ understandings of service and sacrifice, obligations and ambitions.

The distance between the air-conditioned ministries and the verandas of Timor-Leste and the transformation of policy that takes place in-between should not be underestimated. Over 60 per cent of surveyed individuals did not meet the codified eligibility criteria for their registration level, specifically four or more years of ‘exclusive dedication’129 (see Chart 7.1 below). While some degree of fraud may be expected in any benefits programme,130 in Timor-Leste, I found deviation from the legal criteria – the expectations set by technocrats and their external advisors – to be the norm. Furthermore, such levels of deviation are not possible without the widespread participation of officials. Legal criteria are being disregarded and

---

129 As discussed in Chapter IV, time spent in the armed service, in support bases, under preventative detention, and under incarceration count towards an individual’s service and thus pension level; un-armed service and clandestine activity do not. My sample was drawn exclusively from those registered with four or more years of recognised service. While the majority of respondents did not meet the specific eligibility criteria, the vast majority had participated in the resistance to some degree, often residing in the support bases or taking part in the clandestine front.

systematically reinterpreted on the ground by commissioners drawn from the resistance leadership and the enumerators working under them. Following Walker and Gibson, I view this ‘gap between objectives and outcomes’ as a ‘demonstration of how policy is recreated through the process of implementation, rather than an implementation failure’ (2004: 1251; my emphasis). Fraudulent claims are not the results of incompetence or negligence; they are the realisation of a new policy. This on-the-ground perspective is critical for understanding reintegration.

In focusing on the interactions on the veranda, this chapter is rooted in anthropological work on the interactions between citizens and state actors or ‘street-level bureaucrats.’ Based on their studies of educational policy reforms, Weatherly and Lipsky argue that ‘[i]n a significant sense … street-level bureaucrats are the policymakers in their respective work arenas’ (1977: 172). Accordingly, policy has to be studied both in its conceptualisation at the centre as well as its implementation at the periphery as the ‘meaning of policy cannot be known until it is worked out in practice at the street level’ (Ibid: 173). This street-level perspective is missing from most of the ‘top-down’ best practices DDR literature. Reflecting the difficulty of
studying this cohort, little is known about how such policies are (re)interpreted and ‘[play] out on-the-ground’ (Jennings, 2008: 5). Addressing this gap, I move from the air-conditioned capital and legislative negotiations as discussed in Chapter IV to look at policy formation on the ground.

This chapter analyses the work done on the veranda on two levels. Firstly, it looks at the registration of ineligible individuals, distinguishing at the micro-level between cases that follow patterns of graft or nepotism (‘corruption’) and those that mark the systematic application of alternate eligibility criteria (‘correctives’), providing evidence of both dynamics. In the second section, I take a meso-level, structural view. From this perspective, the distinction between ‘corruption’ and ‘correctives’ becomes less important; instead, the position of former leaders cum commissioners as gatekeepers and power brokers is key. I identify commissioners’ allocation of years of service as part of the post-conflict political economy. Here, commissioners use their control over inclusion in the veterans’ registry to support their own patronage networks. This marks the continuation of patronage politics along resistance-era lines and the conservation of these power networks in the post-conflict period.

In the second section I explore what these structural arrangements – that commissioners wear ‘two hats’ – mean for state-building and state formation. The Timorese government has used non-state power networks to extend its reach and establish the credibility of the registration and verification process, choosing a strategy of incorporating and co-opting non-state sources of symbolic power (Loveman, 2005: 1661). However, in co-opting these networks, state resources now support these networks. The commissioners, selected specifically for their prominence in the resistance-era networks, extend the state’s reach, but, in doing so at their discretion, also harness state resources to further reinforce their patronage networks. The result is a situation of state hybridity or neopatrimonialism, an
overlapping of state and non-state modes of power. Here reintegration programmes incorporate rather than disrupt non-state power. This complicates the conceptualisation of state-building as the displacement of non-state networks with bureaucratic state power. In Timor-Leste, reintegration programmes appear much more like a Trojan horse, through which non-state institutions are able to interpenetrate state institutions.

2 ON THE GROUND: CORRUPTION, CORRECTIVES AND COMMISSIONERS

In this section I explore deviation from selection criteria and provide examples of how, on the micro-level, commissioners have used their discretion to both sell access to reintegration benefits (‘corruption’) as well as introduce alternative criteria for registering individuals (‘correction’).131 Corrupt practices include nepotism and rent-seeking behaviour (e.g. providing access to benefits for payment). By contrast, in what I dub ‘corrective’ behaviour, commissioners systematically deviate from the legal criteria based on alternative notions of who deserves to be included. In this case, the commissioners reject the policy or legislation and, in its place, follow norms or values derived from other systems of values and authority. Together, proximately, these practices begin to account for the high numbers of ineligible individuals on the registry.

This distinction between corrupt and corrective practices is made with the recognition that these categories are not mutually exclusive or uncomplicated. Our ‘street-level bureaucrats’ – the commissioners – wear multiple hats, have personal relationships with prospective registrants, and face a range of pressures and incentives.

131 Much of the literature on street-level bureaucrats, for example, focuses on how implementers change policies to respond to the practical, environmental constraints that they face, particularly around time, funding, and capacity; while these additional factors may also be evident, they are not considered herein.
Commissioners may register an individual for multiple reasons, such as both family connections and a belief in the need to register former clandestine members, or use values-based discourses to mask or justify transactional arrangements. However, by highlighting the two dynamics separately, I underscore the prominence of justificatory discourses and the openness with which the use of alternate criteria, across commissions, is discussed. In the case of ‘correctives,’ rather than this reinterpretation happening surreptitiously, commissioners openly view themselves as authorities and authors. Furthermore, while authors such as Hoffman (2003) have discussed corruption in DDR practice, the normative content that distinguishes ‘correctives’ has not been explored. Nor have other authors discussed how making adjustments to fit community norms may also serve as a conflict mitigation strategy and stem problems with social jealousy arising from differential treatment; ironically, violating the legislative framework may aid integration.

2.1 Corruption: Rent-Seeking and Nepotism

As noted above, the hijacking of reintegration benefits for personal enrichment and the maintenance of non-state networks has been documented in a number of contexts (see Jennings, 2007: 209-10, on Liberia). Hoffman paints a vivid picture of how former rebel leaders exact rents by controlling access to reintegration benefits in Sierra Leone. He gives the example of ex-commanders charging former fighters for physical access to the stadium in which international organisations provided benefits:

A third or a half of the newly minted ex-combatant's pay packet seemed a fair trade for the opportunity to pass through disarmament and train for a job in post-war Sierra Leone. The upshot was that only those who had made the necessary bargains with their commanders had any hope of passing through the locked gate to the inside of the stadium (Hoffman, 2003: 297).

Here commanders act as gatekeepers – literally and figuratively – and the access to reintegration benefits is negotiated. Those who can pay are included, even if ineligible, and those who cannot are excluded. The result is the diversion of
resources from their intended beneficiaries and their exploitation for the benefit of 'big men.'

In Timor-Leste, such bribes as well as nepotism constitute a major concern for respondents, even amongst those who were ineligible themselves. Respondents described how commissioners use their positions as gatekeepers to either extract rents, as above, or to include ineligible individuals due to pre-existing, family ties. The most commonly cited issues included the registration of ineligible associates or family members; the inflation of associates’ or family members’ service records; the exclusion of individuals or reduction of their service records due to personal disputes; and demands of payments to be registered. Less extreme examples were also consistently cited, including the use of personal connections to those in power to fast-track payments or resolve issues with registration. Concerning government project contracts, multiple informants discussed issues ranging from poor service delivery to pressure from non-resistance members to use their names as veterans to register companies.

In regards to bribery, respondents in both survey and elite interviews consistently identified such corrupt practices. Parallel to Hoffman’s example, some must pay to be included in the programme. As one survey participant described:

I am concerned with corruption. People have paid in order to receive longer durations. The latest list did not include my name… my son went and checked. There was no explanation. If you speak with the Commission, they will ask for money, more than just $5, $100-200, for example. People give mobile phones, cigarettes (SUR125).

A former commission member confirmed this pattern of bribery, noting that some commissioners have demanded 50 per cent of the registrant’s payment (INT78). While upset by this corruption, the survey respondent quoted above pragmatically suggested that the issue with his registration could only be resolved through recourse to personal ties: ‘I need to go to Aileu; I know someone on the Commission’
Due to strong redistributive norms, even when kickbacks are not explicitly demanded, there might be an expectation that recipients share their payments.

Nepotism also emerged as a key concern. As one village chief underscored: ‘There are people in the clandestine front with more years than those in the armed front. The Commission has looked to its family members’ (INT68). The registration of family members was, according to one former commissioner and resistance actor, de rigueur. As he notes: ‘I refused to put my wife and mother on the registry, like other commission members. Everyone asked me: why not?’ (INT78). The inclusion of family members of prominent actors, not just commissioners, also appeared widespread. A former clandestine leader notes: ‘The zone secretary registered his family, gave them really big benefits … they all got 8-14 years’ (INT87). Similarly, as one District Administrator explained: ‘[t]here are some who were just in the village and worked as functionaries – they got 15 years! If the woman is the man’s wife, she’ll get it’ (INT71). This raises additional concerns regarding the eligibility of women included on the pensions registry.

Vulnerability to nepotism reflects the very design of the registration programme as well as the structure of the resistance itself. As Vries and Wiegink note:

> DDR practitioners may purposefully work through combatant associations, which help set priorities and select candidates for the programme in a confused melee of competing individuals … [this] provides plenty of opportunities for nepotism (2011: 43).

The strength, cultural importance, and density of kinship networks in Timor-Leste make issues with nepotism particularly difficult to combat. In the case that an individual’s registration has been challenged, the registrant may use family connections to secure a person in authority to come testify and support their claims.

Controversially, this may partially account for the absence of mutual recognition I encountered by women registered putatively part of the resistance-era women’s organisations within a sub-district or even village (see Roll, 2014).

132
As one informant described: ‘[i]f one Nurep,’ a leader of a clandestine cell, ‘won’t testify on their behalf then they will find another who will from their family. There has been so much intermarriage now’ (INT78). As very few records of participation exist, and resistance networks were rebuilt along family lines, such counter-claims from family members are difficult to refute.

2.2 Correctives: Renegotiating the Criteria

While no respondents defended the corrupt practices listed above, the commissioners openly discussed other ways in which they modified eligibility requirements. As one stated confidently: ‘We have flexibility’ (SUR272). As street-level bureaucrats, commissioners have established alternate criteria, resulting in a ‘folk law’ or lex non scripta that expands the scope of eligibility to meet community expectations. In particular, the criteria have been expanded to recognise special service and incorporate members of the clandestine front. These modifications reflect a range of pressures on commissioners as well as their own views. These considerations include the need to reconcile criteria with local concepts of merit, status, special service, and rights; concerns with social jealousy; and the political mobilisation and lobbying of interested parties. Away from the policy-making arena, these actors are renegotiating and recreating the policy.

The use of an alternative system for calculating service appears to be both consistent and widespread; this marks a systematic reimagining of the policy. One commissioner explained the system:

Those who contributed directly can receive 4-7 years. Those who contributed indirectly, just a little, there are not criteria for them to receive payments. What does a direct contribution mean? To give money, clothes, food; to carry water. For this you can give 4-7 years, 8-14. All the commissions use a system like this (SUR272; my emphasis).

The commissioner describes a coherent and logical heuristic for allocating benefits; it is neither highly personalised nor ad hoc, and it continues to enforce certain limits
that centre on an individual's contribution (i.e. 'indirect' support is not recognised). It is a simple to understand and rooted in folk conceptions of service. In this manner, it is in some ways more legitimate than the system developed by Timorese technocrats and international advisors. However, despite its advantages, the distinction between 'direct' and 'indirect' contributions is completely novel – these criteria are not derived from the law.

Deviating from the policy and using the concept of 'direct' and 'indirect' contributions appears legitimate as it grounded in widespread normative beliefs. Communities have ‘unmet expectations’ (INT63) concerning the need to recognise service. In particular, both respondents and commissioners identified payments as a transcendent right of individuals who served, justifying the registration of clandestine actors in particular even though their service is not recognised under Timorese law. As one Nurep deeply involved with the registration process stated:

> The regulations] don't work... If you do it according [to the law] they will still be victims. Youth that were just born could not have carried guns, but according to human rights. It is according to a principle (INT89).

He viewed ignoring the legal criteria as essential to realising the rights of clandestine actors,133 regarding the law as unequipped to recognise their service. Similarly, one commissioner and key leader stated: '[t]hose with more than three years. All of them should get money; the law cannot obliterate their rights' (INT77). Here he positions the law as hostile to rights, while, critically, still looking to apply a rule or framework (e.g. 'more than three years’). This idea of a right to compensation, independent of the law, was frequently echoed.

---

133 The choice of a rights framework is interesting. Just as Kent found in terms of victims’ mobilisation, by using a rights framework commissioners have appropriated and reproduced "official" discourses of justice and nationbuilding’ (Kent, 2011: 436).
In addition to calculating benefits based on the concepts of ‘direct’ and ‘indirect’ service, commissioners also appear to take into account the importance of individual contributions, rewarding special contributions or participation in significant historical events. In this case, ‘years of service’ were allocated as awards to mark significant service and do not relate to time served. ‘Years’ emerge as the currency of the commissions, rather than a marker of time; this distorts the historical record created by the registry. As one prominent respondent who worked as a medic described: ‘I first received 4-7 years, but I have received support from Lere, Alin Laek and others to increase my dedication to 8-14 years to recognise my contribution and nursing’ (INT22). Here his particular skill set and critical access to needed medications was rewarded with a monthly pension; his on-going connections to those in power facilitated this adjustment. In another example, in the case of the Nain Feto sub-district, Dili district, I interviewed five individuals who were also allocated 8-14 years of service. None claimed to have served in the armed front or to have been jailed; only one individual spent time in the support bases. However, each had participated in the 12 November demonstrations. These demonstrations culminated in the Santa Cruz Massacre, a major turning point in the conflict. Their high number of ‘years’ exclusively reflected their participation in this key event.

The decision by commissioners to expand these criteria should be contextualised by looking at both community expectations and the broader political dynamics. Commissioners experience pressure from politically powerful mobilised groups demanding inclusion, as described in the preceding chapter. For example, the high levels of benefits awarded to the Santa Cruz massacre survivors reflects the political mobilisation of protest participants in the 12 November Committee. Established in 2010 by Gregorio Saldanha, the 12 November Committee represents over two thousand survivors, the majority of whom are urban unemployed (ICG, 2011: 8, n64).
The 12 November Committee has used its clout and participant lists\(^\text{134}\) to pressure commissioners to include participants in the massacre on the grounds of special service. One key government official involved in the pension programme characterised the 12 November Committee as feeling ‘marginalised,’ pointing out that it ‘thinks we should recognise special service’ (INT67). While recognising survivors’ ineligibility, he appeared disinclined to remove those who were registered or instruct commissioners to exclude such actors.\(^\text{135}\)

Modifications to eligibility criteria and registration practices also resolve tensions between the capital and the veranda, between state actors (the commissioners) and the ex-resistance members at the grassroots level. As one Timorese political advisor explained: ‘[c]riteria, these created tensions. They pitted the Homage Commission against the veterans’ (INT65). The main point of contention has been the exclusion of clandestine actors, particularly those who made special contributions. Accordingly, the modifications described above have resulted in the systematic inclusion of higher numbers of clandestine actors on the registry, thereby partially addressing this tension between the commissioners, the law, and resistance actors. This reflects the pressures on commissioners as well as the related concern that the strict application of the legal criteria, and thus the broad exclusion of clandestine actors, would result in higher community-level tensions.

Concern with violence or social jealousy stemming from the strict application of legal criteria is not unfounded. As one UN Political Affairs Officer noted, the lack of

\(^{134}\) Similarly the resistance-era clandestine groups RENETIL and Sagrada Familia have produced their own registries. According to a UN source, the Sagrada Familia list has been ‘accepted as valid data for the commissions’ list [and] manipulated accordingly’ (INT63).

\(^{135}\) Whether or not supervisors agree with policy is, as May and Winter (2007) have found, a key factor in determining whether or not street-level implementers implement policies with which they disagree. Here buy-in throughout an organisation emerges as critical for the delivery of a programme in line with drafters’ intentions.
recognition is a potential flash-point: ‘[a]ll people are concerned about exclusion of the clandestine front because of exclusive dedication. This could generate conflict. There are expectations that remain unmet’ (INT63; my emphasis). By registering members of the clandestine front, such as those who provided ‘direct support,’ commissioners address these expectations extra-legally and realign the programme with local conceptualisations of fairness, merit, and seniority. As one respondent put it succinctly, in regards to understanding registration patterns, ‘[d]on’t look to the law, look for stability’ (SUR69). Ironically, while reintegration benefits are conceptualised as a means of improving post-conflict stability, in Timor-Leste, the violation of eligibility criteria and the decision to recognise ‘direct’ support by clandestine actors has become important for reducing tensions – a dynamic that should be taken seriously in post-conflict contexts.

Finally, these decisions to modify eligibility criteria are also part of the machinery of post-conflict history making. Those on the veranda are keenly involved in directing processes of official remembering and forgetting through the inclusion and exclusion of individual on the registry; these processes may restore normalcy for some but leave wounds open for others. The most pointed example comes from the treatment of collaboration by the commissions. While the legislation explicitly excludes those who collaborated from being included on the registry and receiving benefits, it appears that this prohibition has been observed only selectively. Discussions of collaboration, more widespread than is publically acknowledged (see Chapter II),

136 A similar observation about the counter-intuitive, short- to mid-term benefits to stability of disregarding legal guidelines has been documented regarding contracting in post-conflict Timor-Leste and Aceh (Myrttinen, 2012: 239) and DDR programmes in Tajikistan (Torjesen and MacFarlane, 2007: 322).

137 Reflecting the power of those involved in the legislative drafting, involvement in the law allows those with elite roles in the Indonesian occupying government or armed forces to be eligible. The World Bank describes this as a ‘pragmatic choice given that many in the resistance movement, including some very prominent figures, were at certain times members of the Indonesian administration or army, and who would often use their position to support the resistance’ (2008: 21). There is no explanation of why such double agency would not also have been present at lower levels.
remain taboo (Drexler, 2013: 75; INT18). As one senior UN Political Affairs officer notes: ‘If you lived here, you collaborated’ (INT33). Due to the length and complexity of the conflict, many of these same men and women who fought or contributed to the resistance in substantive ways also collaborated.

Now, in the post-conflict period, the registration process is ill equipped to address this complexity. As one senior UN Political Affairs officer notes: ‘Nothing is clear! … There is no black and white; it is all a matter of degrees. The process is not recognizing shades of grey’ (INT33). Without a mechanism for recognising these ‘shades of grey,’ commissioners decide whether to valorise individuals or pursue their exclusion. If fully enforced, many individuals would be excluded. And the processes of investigation and verification would be deeply unsettling for many who adhere to ‘histories of innocence,’ seeing wartime behaviour as exceptional (see Theidon, 2010). More importantly, these exclusions and investigations would challenge the nation mythology of a united, apolitical resistance. These narratives crucially ‘obscur[e] the more troubling knowledge of the collaboration that pervaded the conflict over decades’ (Drexler, 2013: 89). The non-enforcement of these prohibitions protects this mythology. Commissioners, working on the veranda, have systematically wiped away these ambiguities; through this ‘corrective’ they create a registry of flawless blacks and whites.

3 THE HYBRID STATE

While reintegration programmes are but one, though sizable, component of the Timorese government’s social policy, they provide an insight into the influence of resistance-era power networks and patronage on state resource distribution. The political economy perspective, which is adopted in this section, focuses on how
politics and social relations dictate such access. Engaging the discussion of state-building in Chapter II, this approach emphasises that the ‘interactions between institutions, politics and economic interests and incentives [are] the primary influences on the nature of governance’ (Anten et al., 2012: 11). Accordingly, in this section, I examine of the distribution of reintegration resources to explore the nature of governance and the nascent state in Timor-Leste. I argue that the devolution of power over the distribution of reintegration resources to quasi-state actors – former resistance leaders cum commissioners – serves to extend the state’s reach, yet also contributes to the hollowing of the state. Paradoxically, governance is carried out by those with obligations to networks that transcend the state.

Returning to the scene of coffee on the veranda that opened this chapter, resistance actors such as Alin Laek are key to making registration processes both practicable and legitimate. Without their participation, the gathering and verification of data by government bureaucrats would have been more difficult if not impossible. In the absence of written records, former resistance leaders offer both a key source of information on participation; they are also respected authorities. Early attempts to carry out registration with trained teams from the capital were rejected by prospective registrants and former leaders. Many argued that outsiders from the capital were ‘too young’ and did not know who had been involved locally or to what extent. One former resistance member contrasted former leaders’ knowledge of resistance organisations with that of bureaucrats, who he identified as lowering his registration level: ‘Those at the top need to know people through the structures… [Bureaucrats] do not trust the structure! I deserve 8-14 years, but I got 4-7. It is not right’ (SUR122). Such

138 This moves away from the above micro-level analysis. This framework has already come into play through the discussions of nepotism and family networks as well as the political mobilisation of advocacy groups such as the 12 November Committee.
arrangements also denied leaders control over pension eligibility and the associated rents.

Former resistance leaders have been selected as commissioners precisely because they wear two hats. On one hand, they represent the growing, authoritative state: they collect data on inscrutable official forms, ride in ministry vehicles, sport shiny identification cards on patriotic lanyards, and report to the capital. On the other hand, their authority rests in their reputation and pre-existing, hierarchical relationships. Their service provides the legitimacy to make key determinations and reflects a continuation of conflict-era governance. They know people in the communities; they have history and connections – the opposite of the autonomous technocrat envisioned by Weber. It is through the reintegration programme that these formal and informal spheres are layered and ‘permeate each other’ (Erdmann and Engel, 2006: 18). The programmes are able to go forward because of this very state/non-state hybridity. Yet as has been discussed above, this hybridity allows for the subversion of the programme. This trade off is an under-acknowledged feature of reintegration efforts that depend on former leaders for their implementation.

As Boege et al. caution, this hybridity or interpenetration of state and non-state authority ‘leads to the deviation of state institutions from the ideal type of “proper” state institutions’ (2008: 7). The 60 per cent ineligibility rate found in the sample provides strong evidence of this dynamic in Timor-Leste; many of the projects awarded through these preferential contracts have had poor outcomes.¹³⁹ Former leaders’ new roles as commissioners have satisfied their need to support and shape their networks through the distribution of benefits and extraction of rents. Control

¹³⁹ Performance, indeed, remains a significant issue in this approach. Former resistance actors often lack the skills and strong connections to the Indonesian firms that generally supply the necessary labour and equipment. Preferential contracting may, ultimately, ‘hamper the quality of development just as the country is trying to invest heavily in superior infrastructure’ (ICG, 2011: 18).
over these networks has been parlayed for political access and on-going access to state resources, including lucrative contracts. Accordingly, I argue that the implementation of these programmes evidences key elements of neopatrimonialism: the distribution of state resources by non-state or quasi-state actors in exchange for support and deference (Bratton and van de Walle, 1994: 458). While acting as commissioners, these leaders also carry obligations towards their non-state networks, explaining the high levels of ineligible individuals included on the veterans’ registry.

Neopatrimonial states are defined by the exercise of state power through a combination of non-state institutions and power networks (whether clan-based, religious, or para-military) and bureaucratic state institutions. Neopatrimonialism is defined with reference to Weber as ‘regimes in which the customs and patterns of patrimonialism co-exist with, and suffuse, rational-legal institutions’ (Bratton and van de Walle 1997: 62). Furthermore, as Boege et al describe, in such a system, “the state’s “outposts” are mediated by “informal” indigenous societal institutions which follow their own logic and rules within the (incomplete) state structures’ (2008: 7). This is certainly the case in Timor-Leste. Reintegration benefits programmes provide a prime example of the interweaving of formal, techno-bureaucratic and patronage-based governance mechanisms. The rational-legal institutions of the climatiseur are subverted, and, critically, also sustained or made possible by the patrimonial politics of the veranda.

While the above sections have described the ways in which commissioners act as ‘street level bureaucrats’ and informal policy makers through the reinterpretation of reintegration assistance eligibility criteria, this section expands this analysis to look at how these quasi-state actors wield other forms of state authority. I first broaden my analysis to look at the ways in which state resources, from reintegration benefits to
contracts, have become a key part of patronage politics. Secondly, I look at the ways in which former resistance leaders have used their roles in the reintegration programmes to retain and exercise other forms of state-like authority, notably semi-judicial roles. Commissioners now adjudicate claims of collaboration in scenes reminiscent of the ‘jungle justice’ of the conflict period. The commissioners are thus situated at these ‘outposts’ or leading edge of the state, yet govern in ways that reinforce their authority separate from or in opposition to the state. This study thus provides an example of state hybridity and the ways in which the extension of state power through co-opting non-state networks can also come at the cost of ‘hollowing out’ or decentring the state.

3.1 Contracting and Patronage Politics

Former leaders, now commissioners, have become key brokers of state resources, from benefits packages to scholarships to building contracts. While the negotiations over access to such benefits are dyadic, taking a broader view, the classic, pyramidal structure of patron-client relationships emerges. Those at the baze (base or grassroots) are dependent upon commissioners for access to resources, a dynamic accentuated in the context of poverty (see Khan, 2005: 705). In exchange for access to resources, the commissioners bolster their own networks, generally based on a combination of kinship and resistance-era ties. Once former leaders have received contracts, they are able to service their patronage networks. As Myrttinen describes, ‘secur[ing] both financial benefits and “jobs for the boys”’ (2012: 235) are important for maintaining these networks in the post-conflict period.

140 These programmes do not meet the strict definition of clientelism and patronage laid out by Hicken (2011), as the benefits are widely distributed and non-contingent. Individuals across the political spectrum will benefit from access reintegration benefits. However, commissioners have used state resources to bolster their own networks, an example of iterated, and contingent patron-client relations; this lest strict usage is common in the literature.
These networks channel information, provide social support and economic assistance, and can be mobilised politically. Viewed structurally, at the top of the pyramid, political actors gain access to brokers’ networks – in this case those of former resistance leaders. Brokers, in turn, increase the resources that they can distribute to their networks, and networked individuals who may otherwise have been excluded gain access to resources. Those outside these networks may find themselves marginalised and vulnerable. Timorese politics, indeed, may best be characterised through the mobilisation of personal networks rather than distinct political visions and mass mobilisation by class, for example, as in many industrialised democracies (Khan, 2005: 705). As one interviewee cautioned ‘veterans and politics are like milk in coffee: impossible to separate at this point’ (INT78). Taking this admonition seriously, I recognise the meshing of state and non-state authority, most notably embodied in political elites like Xanana Gusmão who also crucially served as top commanders.

In particular, the awarding of lucrative government contracts, as discussed in Chapter V, appears to be linked to supporting political leaders’ networks. As one report notes, ‘many of the most senior veterans in the country have recently been awarded significant contracts’ (Fundasaun Mahein, 2011: 13). This appears highly discretionary. As one political blogger explains: ‘nowadays an MP can tell the Prime Minister to give government contracts to individuals of their own choosing’ (Tilman, 2012). The European Union Election Observation Mission forcefully made this

\[141\] Survey respondents often expressed frustration with this exclusivity, their inability to access start-up capital, and their lack of connection to Indonesian companies able to carry out the work. As one interviewee stated: ‘People who know Gusmão or the Minister for Electricity – they get it! This is not right’ (SUR 40). At the same time, respondents also sought to take advantage of their connections and express frustration that they have not similarly benefited (SUR212, SUR26).

\[142\] This preferential treatment has been acknowledged openly, and Cornélto ‘L-7’ Gama has publically discussed securing a contract for a party member and former resistance member and his frustration with the result (see ‘Contracts are distributed among friends without results...’ Timor Post, 2012).
point, noting the convergence of state, party, and resistance structures and the role of state resources therein:

[The CNRT political party’s] campaign relied heavily on ... veterans’ structures, some of which appear to overlap with the state agencies handling veterans’ affairs, including their pensions, and are run by individual veterans who have benefited from government contracts (2012: 17).

Here government officials, generally elite former resistance leaders, award pensions or government contracts to former resistance leaders and deputies who, in exchange, mobilise their networks in support of political parties and candidates. Furthermore, the lines between parties, government agencies, and state and non-state actors are blurred.

While the political economy perspective underscores the rational and transactional element of patronage politics, the distribution of resources via patronage also models a close, familial relationship and reinforces ties of affection. On this point, Berman is worth quoting at length:

Patronage networks not only distribute material benefits, but also are expected to sustain an intimacy of relations between rulers and ruled, a semblance of the personal ties of the traditional *gemeinschaft* rather than the impersonal relations of the capitalist *gessellschaft*. Distribution of patronage by the wealthy and powerful both displays their status and subordinates to them those who accept their largesse (1998: 337).

This ‘patrimonial’ aspect can be seen in the close, personal relations of the veranda. Alin Laek’s casual discussions with community leaders help to maintain a sense of closeness and affinity. The incorporation of patronage networks into governance structures allows for the continuation of a sense of the state and top leaders as intimate with their people and engages the legitimacy and authority already enjoyed by these leaders. The language of power in Timor-Leste continues to revolve around

143 Here Bakyoni and Stuvøy’s critique of Reno’s concept of the ‘shadow state’ and the economic model of conflict is highly relevant. They underscore that attention to patrimonialism ‘expresses in essence the necessity to examine how political, economic and symbolic aspects interact’ (Bakyoni and Stuvøy, 2005: 362).
the family with many former resistance members in particular expecting personal relationships with Maun Boot, big brother Xanana Gusmão.

Finally, resource distribution can be used politically to both include or mobilise and exclude or marginalise individuals. This power to deny access to important resources has a chilling effect on individuals who may otherwise raise concerns with contracting practices or the inclusion of ineligible registrants. As resources are tied to patronage networks, which reflect party, family, and resistance-era alliances, and resources are scarce for those living in poverty, exclusion becomes a risk most are unwilling to take. A former Nurep who resigned from the commission explained: ‘The problem is that of the former leaders, people are afraid of them. They cannot speak against them… the commissions didn't accept other opinions. They spoke insultingly to Nurep, threatened us. It is better if you are idiots and just sit silently’ (INT88). As another summarised: ‘People are not making complaints because of the party politics; those in power will get angry again’ (INT71).

3.2 Exercise of State Power: Transitional Justice on the Veranda

The incorporation of these networks and conflict-era authorities in the registration and data-verification processes marks a rational strategy for extending the state. One survey respondent highlighted, however, their role as both part of and separate to the government: ‘These are separate from local government, and can help with governance. The laws have yet to reach the base, there is not yet the force to occupy the whole nation’ (SUR272). Notably, he uses the idea of coverage or reach: these networks patch up and extend the state into areas that it lacks the capacity and infrastructure to reach. This is consonant with models of state hybridity. As described by Boege et al., in some contexts ‘the only way to make state institutions work is
through utilising kin-based and other traditional networks’ (2008: 7). This sub-section explores the ways in which non-state, resistance-based patronage networks have come to play state roles.

In this section I look particular at their roles in quintessentially state-like functions, namely justice and security. Concerning extra-judicial roles, the commissioners on the data verification teams are tasked with hearing and resolving complaints of fraudulent registration brought by community members. As noted in the introduction, during the course of my fieldwork I observed the data verification process in in Laileia, Baucau district. During one session, a middle-aged man accused a registered individual of complicity in a massacre of civilians in 1983. Offended, the object of the complaint lunged toward the accuser and a short, dramatic scuffle ensued. After separating and calming the men, Alin Laek spoke about the merits of the charges and, after conferring with the other council members, decided to uphold an earlier commission’s decision barring the accused individual’s application for reintegration assistance. The commission appeared comfortable in this role, which marked a continuation of the popular justice system created by FALINTIL organisations during the resistance (CAVR, 2003: Ch. 5, 12).

Such decisions may appear administrative – *does the individual meet the determined criteria?* – but in practice these community forums have emerged as proxy courts, playing an unofficial role in transitional justice. Critically, it is the commissioners who sit as justices. As one respondent described, the commissioners have not only the power to include individuals on the registry, but ‘they can [also] exclude those who

---

144 According to Loveman’s analysis, this hybridisation is a key strategy by which state actors increase both their reach and symbolic power or legitimacy. State actors may seek to consolidate state power through innovation or the usurpation, imitation, or the merging or over-laying of state institutions and non-state networks (‘co-option,’ 2005: 1661). I find the latter, co-option, to be most evident in Timor-Leste.
have done wrong’ (INT67). In this case, the council determined the ‘truth’ about past events and individual culpability. By publically removing the accused from the registry, the council provides an extra-judicial avenue for official acknowledgement and remembrance of past wrongs; ‘justice’ is served by denying an alleged perpetrator access to reintegration benefits as well as through public condemnation. In making decisions concerning individual’s rightful place on the lists, government representatives have engaged in a public process of disambiguation and historicisation, including to authoritative judgments on contested identities and official recognition of alleged wrongs.

This process facilitates the creation and legitimation of an official history, codified in the lists and the identities (e.g. hero, civilian, collaborated) embedded within. The registration and verification processes are highly public, with registration lists posted in village centres and complaints processes held in public forums. While justified in World Bank documents as a means of preventing dissembling and ‘reducing community concerns’ (2008: 15; Kent, 2006: 3), the process has also served as mechanism for the public creation of collective memory and the legitimisation of a dominant historical narrative. In the context of such high levels of ineligible registrants, the public exclusion of some individuals appears purgative. As Drexler notes, ‘trials do not address the complicity of bystanders or those who participate in looting and other “non-serious” crimes … individualized guilt may contribute to a myth of collective innocence’ (Drexler, 2013: 82).

The dramatic scene of former leaders returning to remove ‘collaborators’ from the roles reinforces their power and the ‘collective innocence’ of others in the community. Indeed, the identification of collaborators becomes necessary for the recognition of those who did not; heroism and veteran-ghost are animated and given meaning through the identification of their opposite. This dramatic purging of the registry
evokes the idea of the ‘familiar stranger’ (see Aretxaga, 2003: 397): ‘violence’ against such individuals defines the in-group and establishes state actors as the protectors of those who truly belong. While those crossed off the rolls do not lose their citizenship, their exclusion from benefits marks an exile of sorts. It is an alienation from their state and identification with the historic enemy, Indonesia. Somewhat ironically, the state may be articulated or performed most clearly in it such treatment of its own people.

The relationship between these public, emotive tribunals, evocative of ‘jungle justice’ meted out during the resistance, sits at odds with the conceptualisation of ‘modern’ state justice. Again we see the contrast between the ‘le climatiseur et la veranda’ (Terray, 1986). One member of the early presidential commissions described his concern with this practice: ‘It is unclear who has this right [to remove a name from the registry]. We are not an organ of justice!’ (INT25). Similarly a young government official alluded to the problems of popular justice. He contrasts the re-emergence of resistance-era systems in data verification processes with the enclosed bureaucratic space of le climatiseur: ‘I want it to take place confidentially, in an office behind closed doors; this is not popular justice with the elders as judges. This [process] creates new problems and opens up new wounds’ (INT07). For this respondent, the continuation of these extra-judicial processes undermines formal state systems, embodied or performed through confidential and technical administrative practice.

4 CONCLUSION

In exploring the business conducted on the veranda and the performance of the state at the margins, this chapter looks at drivers for why the programmes have grown so large and in doing so explore what these programmes ‘do.’ I find that reintegration ‘goods’ are used to sustain non-state patronage networks. The use of non-state
authorities to administer these programmes makes them possible, yet this also facilitates the privatisation and personalisation of state resources (see Ménard in Erdmann and Engel, 2006: 14). These programmes are key to the political economy of resistance-era networks in the post-conflict period. This finding reinforces the contention of this thesis that reintegration programmes should not be viewed simply through the lens of security but also in relation to bureaucratic state power and authority. The use of state resources to control potential spoilers and draw their networks into the state sphere has consequences for state consolidation and governance. The story does not end with paying off spoilers. These ‘solutions’ to security issues shape the new state.

In Timor-Leste, resistance leaders *cum* commissioners tasked with registering individuals and verifying their data, stand at the nexus of state, resistance, political party, and kinship networks. From a policy perspective, attention to these networks, patronage, and patrimonialism avoids incomplete analysis that focuses simply on corrupt practices. Indeed, one weakness in the technical DDR literature is a lack of attention to implementation and the role of networks and loyalties therein. For example, the UN Development Programme and UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations’ recommendations on eligibility and registration simply suggest that commanders ‘deliver’ their subordinates to be registered by UN personnel (IDDRS, 2010: 44). As discussed, in cases in which implementers are chosen because of their pre-existing relationships to conflict actors, this process of delivering or identifying registrants is complex and important. Comprehensive and apparently legitimate alternative criteria are currently in use. Furthermore, the combination of state and non-state authority makes such arrangements highly resilient and difficult to challenge (Ilkhamov, 2007: 80). How to manage these trade-offs is discussed in the concluding chapter.
More pointedly, the use of reintegration resources to strengthening or extending resistance-era patronage networks appears perverse in light of the emphasis in the DDR literature on dismantling such connections. A key question is whether or not reintegration programmes in Timor-Leste strengthen state power and, concomitantly, reduce reliance on resistance-era networks. Hypothetically, as the state gains strength and takes form by entering citizens’ lives, the need for non-state networks to provide state-like functions such as welfare support, dispute resolution, and even authoritative records or identification documents is reduced. Furthermore, as these functions decline, the relevance of the networks and identities also falls away. However, as described in this chapter, I have found that resistance actors have instead flourished through the use of state resources. They have used their power as gatekeepers and ‘their new position to reinforce their authority’ (Boege et al, 2008: 8). This simultaneous extension and hollowing out of the state through these programmes complicates conventional state-building models that position state and non-state authorities as substitutes. The Timorese state cannot be understood without attention to both le climatiser et la veranda.
Chapter VIII: Conclusion

1 INTRODUCTION

In 2008, a World Bank report on the status of former resistance members and its work on the pensions benefits programmes trumpeted: ‘Veterans [sic] issues in Timor-Leste have arguably moved from being one of the most important sources of potential instability in 2002 to an administrative challenge’ (World Bank, 2008: iii). In this telling, the ‘problem’ posed by ‘veterans’ concerns security and their potential role as political spoilers. With the establishment of reintegration programmes, this problem was transformed into a matter of regulation: databases and rubber stamps, the right legislation, and sending registration teams into the districts. In this narrative, success is achieved with the movement of benefits claims from the contentious political realm into the technical, and unthreatening, sphere of administration, firmly located within both the state apparatus and the ken of international organisations. In making this claim, the World Bank authors assert that the hard work has been done: the security threat has been addressed; now it is just the details.

But, as always, the devil lies in the details. Fundamental questions of identity, history, and legitimate power continue to be negotiated in seemingly colourless realm of registration processes and benefits criteria. In its processes and effects, administration is far from basic. In this thesis, rather than ending the story with this transformation of ‘veterans’ issues’ into an ‘administrative challenge,’ I have looked to the work done through administration. I have examined how these seemingly straightforward benefits programmes and associated registration processes draw boundaries, distribute resources, and actively mould the new relationship between state and non-state authorities. These outputs are not primarily related to security. Indeed, programmes and processes address the ‘problems’ identified by their
authors. Accordingly, Timorese state actors and ‘street level bureaucrats’ define the ‘veterans’ issues’ differently than the World Bank; the work these programmes do reflects a particular *problematique*.

Former resistance members present a particular challenge for state leaders in Timor-Leste as the liberation movement both legitimises the power of new state and remains a rival site of political authority. The ‘veterans’ issue’ for these actors thus is how to affirm and preserve former resistance members’ status while defanging their ability to challenge the state. Crucially, these state actors are largely former resistance leaders that now hold office in the government and military – recalling Torjesen’s definition of ‘partial demobilisation’ (2006: 11). Consolidating their power within (or through) the state apparatus, and even articulating the boundaries of the state itself, has involved delegitimising former comrades in arms. Such boundary lines are drawn through reintegration programmes, for example, the demobilisation of old fighters and plans to consolidate resistance groups within a state-run body, the National Veterans’ Council. Significantly, however, this process of consolidating state authority has also required the co-option and incorporation of resistance-era networks. Here we see neopatrimonialism and the use of resistance-era networks for intelligence and voter mobilisation. Here the spheres of state and non-state intermesh.

Stepping back, more than simply about the evolution and design of reintegration and pension programmes, this thesis is about the lives of former resistance members and the negotiation over their place in the post-conflict political order. Former resistance members have transitioned both successfully and unsuccessfully, some finding honour and new opportunities in the post-conflict period and others feeling forgotten and their expectations for the post-conflict transformation unmet. Beyond simply spoiling behaviour, former resistance members have navigated this change in a
range of ways. They have formed political parties, development-savvy local NGOs, informal networks, and anti-state groups, such as CPD-RDTL, which hold martial drills and run agricultural collectives. Each of these diverse configurations speaks to the robustness of resistance-era ties and mark diverse efforts to resolve issues around their political authority and status the post-conflict period.

To engage the issues laid out above, demonstrate their significance, and underscore how such analysis differs from dominant conceptualisations of reintegration practice, the thesis began with a simple question: What do these programmes do? In reappraising reintegration practices through the lens of political power and relationships, rather than security or programme evaluation, I have argued that they play an integral role in state-building, primarily as a technology for integrating and articulating state and resistance-era power networks. Accordingly, this thesis demonstrates that a seemingly mundane subject – the technocratic development and implementation of a registration scheme and benefits programme, the World Bank’s ‘administrative challenge’ – can unfurl to expose complex political negotiations that affect the very idea and exercise of the state.

These findings are grounded in extensive and innovative\textsuperscript{145} field research, involving observation, 90 semi-structured interviews with leaders, policy makers, activists, and scholars, and over 220 randomly sampled survey interviews with registered former resistance members. The focus on their views provides unique insights into reintegration and benefits programmes ‘from below.’ Additionally, this quantitative component constitutes not only the most comprehensive, representative study of former fighters in Timor-Leste, but also one of the half-dozen largest probabilistic studies of former combatants worldwide. This chapter provides an overview of this thesis, including the key empirical and theoretical findings that were generated

\textsuperscript{145} See Roll, 2014, on methodological innovations.
through this exploration of programmatic growth. I also discuss the theoretical contribution and the implications of this study’s findings for policy making and reintegration practice, focusing on international actors involved in programme design. In the concluding section, I explore the limitations of the study and pathways for further work.

2 KEY FINDINGS

This section explores the key empirical findings and theoretical contributions of this study that contribute to the larger portrait of the politics of reintegration practices drawn above. This section covers four main areas of interest: the lives of former resistance members, the drivers of programmatic growth, the impact of these programmes on state building and state hybridity, and this thesis’s theoretical contribution.

2.1 Former Resistance Members: Integrated yet Interconnected

Despite their political, economic and cultural importance, very little is known about former resistance members in Timor-Leste; even basic demographic and socio-economic data has not been made available by the government, and census data, for example, are not disaggregated. Similarly, while there are programme reports on various international initiatives such as FRAP, and there have been some studies of programme participants, these data are more narrowly focused and not representative. In producing a dataset on registered former resistance members, this project has taken a significant step towards being able to describe this group – age, geographic distribution, and employment status, for example – as well as to assess their relative social, economic, and political integration. In analysing these data, I focused on understanding how these men and women have coped while waiting for the roll out of the programmes. These data also allowed me to cross check
individuals’ registration levels, providing a rough estimate of the proportion of ineligible registrants slated to receive benefits; this is discussed in the next subsection.

With regard to measures of integration, I found that the majority of my sample enjoy standards of living at or above that of the average Timorese person, exhibit positive attitudes towards democratic institutions, and are active members of their communities. These results are positive and make sense in the context of a conflict during which the main ‘demobilisation’ event took place in the early 1980s. It is also surprising, as the first finding that runs counter to dominant narratives regarding the indigence of former fighters. The second set of results, however, complicated this rosy picture of seamless integration. A significant minority of my sample, approximately 30-40 per cent, maintain regular contact with former resistance leaders and comrades and depend on these connections for both information and material goods. A similar proportion viewed the resistance as being on-going rather than concluded (44 per cent). Many individuals, despite their embrace of democratic processes, for example, still envision a role for former resistance members in the legitimate armed defence of Timor-Leste.

What emerges is a portrait of a group for which the extension of the state and the introduction of bureaucratic state practices (e.g. identification, registration) has done little to disrupt individuals’ connections to former resistance leaders and the relevance of these bonds. Put in another way, the social capital and social networks established during the resistance are both durable and valued. These factors have keenly shaped former fighters and clandestinos economic, political, and social lives in the post-conflict period. Even a decade after the cessation of conflict and almost three decades after the end of mass mobilisation these relationships continue to be important, and informants described their value in terms of access to information and
resources. More subtlety, these networks and more formal veterans’ organisations have kept alive the history and provided these men and women with identity, status, and community.

The implications of this finding are three-fold. On one hand, it encourages a rethinking of these social bonds as protective – a grassroots form of social support and social security – that counters the dominant securitisation of these networks. This securitisation makes the destruction of such bonds appear necessary. On the other hand, however, their persistence underscores the challenge of establishing new networks of power and influence around democratic, issue- or class-based political mobilisation. As seen in Timor-Leste, party politics reflect cleavages in identity more acutely than those in policy. This calls into question the accuracy of conventional measures of political integration, for example. Finally, these networks and identities are also highly exclusionary, generally reproducing the masculine hierarchies of the resistance and following family lines. As will be discussed below, this perspective on these social networks should spur increased attention amongst policy practitioners concerning both how to foster and harness the protective aspects of these networks, while, at the same time, preventing the co-option of reintegration resources for patronage.

2.2 Drivers of Programme Growth

Moving from the lives of former combatants to the growth of reintegration and benefits programmes, this thesis explored the mechanics or structural drivers of this growth – how they got to be so large. I identify escalatory, liberalising pressures at the levels of both policy making and implementation. What unites these separate dynamics is the recognition that official resistance identity unlocks access to both political and financial capital. Growth is a result of both policy makers and
implementers manipulating who has access to this capital, and, by doing so, expanding and shaping the registry to reflect their interests and beliefs. In the context of a distributive or patronage-based political system, as in Timor-Leste, controlling these resources is vital.

Concerning the first site of expansion, discussed in Chapter VI, policy makers experience competitive pressures with rival parties, public pressure from mobilised former resistance actors, as well as competitive pressure from non-state authorities (‘spoilers’) for authoritative control over these resources. As ties to the resistance movement are the key currency of post-conflict political life, legislators demonstrate their political legitimacy through their support for benefits programmes. More subtly, such support is highly normative: opposition, for example, would be unthinkable. This normative aspect is also acutely present in the discourses used by politically mobilised groups, which draw upon cultural tropes such as the role of resistance members as ‘founding fathers’ to strengthen their claims for support. These factors result in escalatory dynamics, in which the incentives for opposing the continued growth of the programmes, as may be in the state’s fiscal interest, are outweighed by the potential political gains of increasing awards’ value and liberalising eligibility.

Secondly, at the site of implementation, ex-combatants cum commissioners have included ineligible individuals, bloating the rolls. I contend that this concerted action by ‘street level bureaucrats’ accounts for a large portion of the staggering 60 per cent of respondents found to be ineligible for their registration levels, another key finding of this study. While part of this inflation can be attributed to base corruption and nepotism – rent seeking behaviours by implementers – I also found that the inclusion of ineligible registrants also followed a coherent set of rules and adhered to reasoned concepts of merit and distributive norms. These alternate criteria are straightforward, inclusive, and, crucially, reflect a broadly legitimate lex non scripta or local
assumptions about who should be eligible for benefits. Commissioners openly discussed these deviations in eligibility criteria, viewing their actions as ‘corrective.’

The results of this growth and fraud are significant. Firstly, the huge number of registrants represents a significant outpouring of state resources, one that may be unsustainable in the long-term. The finding that the majority of these resources, based upon my sample, will be channelled to recipients other than those identified in the legislation, is cause for concern. Secondly, the embellished registry produces a skewed national history, obscuring the actually quite limited number of individuals who served in an armed capacity and reifying organisational structures that may have been symbolic during the conflict. Finally, and of most interest to policy makers, these findings suggest that the inclusion of ineligible registrants and the inflation of service records is not the result of technical failings or a lack of capacity, but, instead, is a key outcome of the programmes. These ‘correctives’ may even be protective. Reflecting patronage relations as well as the disciplinary effects of these programmes, such fraud is at least tacitly sanctioned by state actors. The strength of resistance-era networks in the post-conflict period, in terms of political connections, economic resources, and coercive power, makes it difficult for those who oppose the falsification or inflation of registration data to oppose such actions.

2.3 State Hybridity: Co-opting Resistance-era Networks

Building upon the two findings described above, this thesis finds that resistance-era leaders have used their knowledge and influence to become deeply involved in these programmes and to channel state resources to their patronage networks. These actors, however, have been deliberately incorporated into the state apparatus as a means of extending the bureaucratic state. The result is hybridity – the co-existence of state and non-state governance – and neopatrimonialism, the use of state office
and resources by state actors for private purposes. This finding complicates the expectations implicit in the policy literature that the extension of state power through these programmes precipitates the concomitant diminution of non-state power. I agree with the World Bank assessment that ‘registration elicit[s] recognition of the state itself’ (2008: i-ii), while also noting, that this recognition results from the grafting together state and non-state networks. As such, the rise of the state and financial investment in reintegration benefits programmes has also meant the preservation and even flourishing of some resistance-era patronage networks.

This finding is significant as it demonstrates that, despite being part of the post-conflict state-building orthodoxy, these programmes do not necessarily promote an autonomous, Weberian state. These programmes are about controlling resistance groups and identities, but the result is arrangements with resistance-era networks (hybridity), rather than their domination; this is not the monopolisation of legitimate force and symbolic authority. Furthermore, this recourse to resistance-era networks for authority and state reach does not necessarily mark the creation of a new, democratic state. This arrangement builds the state’s legitimacy on that of the resistance – not popular democracy or effective governance. This raises serious questions for state legitimacy and power transitions going forward, as resistance-era leaders pass on and new leaders seek to gain popular support. This may be read as a note of caution to those involved in post-conflict state building processes.

2.4 Theoretical Contribution

Concerning the theoretical contribution of this thesis, in looking particularly at the power relations embedded within these programmes, this thesis follows in the footsteps of scholars such as Kriger (2003), Hoffman (2007), and Torjesen and MacFarlane (2007) who have interrogated the political purposes that such
programmes serve in a range of conflicts. However, this paper also marks a theoretical contribution to the DDR literature by exploring these dynamics with regard to state formation, drawing upon the work of Anderson (1993) and Scott (1998), as well as Foucault’s work on disciplinary power and the state. More radically, I have applied critical anthropological critiques of the state to the study of state-building, looking in particular to Jessop (1977), Abrams (1988), and Ferguson and Gupta (2002). In drawing together theories of the state and analysis of state-building processes, and identifying reintegration programmes as one such process, this thesis contributes to both the conceptualisation of post-conflict state-building and reframes the role of DDR therein.

Rather than assuming that the ‘state’ exists and acts as an autonomous empirical object, this thesis re-approaches state consolidation as a process by which the idea of the state as a legitimate authority is articulated and popularised. This shift in perspective results in the finding that how states treat their warriors matters and that this process creates both the state and the warrior. Through defining identities (e.g. veteran, civilian, collaborator) and the distribution of political and financial capital, these programmes draw lines of authority, enacting the new relationship between the state and non-state powers. In reintegration practice, the ‘state’ does not return desocialised ‘combatants’ to communities; instead, it is as a mutually constitutive process by which both the state and the (ex)combatant are imagined and defined. The idea is to not reify the state versus non-state division, but instead to investigate its mechanisms and explore the ways that this transition is partial or contested.

In order to explore how these processes unfold, this thesis has employed post-structuralist theories of power. In particular, it brings new attention to mundane administrative reintegration practices as a form of state disciplinary power. As a mechanism of governance or disciplinary power, these officialised identities fix
former resistance members to state institutions, legitimise (or de-legitimise) claims to political and financial capital, and crowd out other alternative lists of who served, such as those proffered by non-state ‘veterans’ associations. The ability to regulate hinges on data; as the Secretary of State for Veteran Affairs, Marito dos Reis, stated: ‘Without data, we can’t secure people’s rights.’ This offers a new perspective on the effort to gather extensive data on former fighters.

Finally, this interest in the performance of the state also brings attention to the theatrical elements of reintegration – the uniforms, ceremonies, and memorials – as part of this process. This thesis finds analysis of reintegration and benefits programmes that omit these forms of power and performance to be incomplete. Understanding state building as a process of spreading the idea of legitimate state domination (and thus first requiring the imagination of a state), suggests re-reading Weber’s ideal type to emphasise the legitimacy of domination – and the types of power involved therein – rather than focusing on the monopolisation of coercive force, a very narrow type of power. Here we return to the basic question of how state actors acquire the legitimate authority to govern; in this case, reintegration programmes and the theatre of demobilisation, for example, are important mechanisms. How such a re-reading would affect state building practice merits further consideration.

3 IMPLICATIONS FOR POLICY AND PRACTICE

As a study of these programmes, this thesis has been explicitly non-normative and sought to wriggle out of the ‘evaluative straitjacket’ identified by Kriger (2003: 15). Instead, it has focused on understanding these mechanisms and rationalities. This thesis examines a ‘policy failure’ – seen, for example, in the high number of ineligible registrants included in the registry – as an outcome that serves certain interests and

227
has been widely tolerated if not embraced. As discussed, street level bureaucrats openly discuss some fraud and the use of extra-legal eligibility criteria as appropriate and ‘corrective.’ Here, again, understanding former resistance members and state actors’ the views of reintegration and relationships has been key.

This view of policy failures as not the result of incapacity or ignorance makes the task of changing these systems more difficult. Technical solutions, for example better databases that would improve systems of crosschecking registrants, are easier to implement than initiatives focused on adjusting the self-interested motivations of those who registered these individuals in the first place. Furthermore, I have noted the considerable interweaving of state and non-state power networks, which locates problems with these programmes beyond the technocratic sphere, as well as the normative and cultural values, such as an interest in valorisation, that have justified the programmes’ continued expansion. Recognising what has driven the evolution of these programmes fosters an appreciation of how difficult it would be to change direction.

Despite this caveat, this thesis does offer some insights into potential avenues for improving reintegration practice. Firstly, I suggest that international actors involved in programme design move away from ‘reintegration orthodoxy’ (Muggah, 2005: 5) and take seriously local perspectives on reintegration, historical context, the persistence of conflict-era networks, and even consider normalising extra-legal practices documented in this study. An appreciation of the work that these programmes do opens the question of how to conceptualise programmatic improvements. Secondly, and more idealistically, this thesis recommends a two-pronged approach to the reintegration and recognition of former combatants, separating the valorisation of service (e.g. medals, memorials) from financial assistance in an effort to reduce fraud.
and control programme costs. Such an approach would seek to understand and incorporate local goals, rather than sticking to the ‘reintegration orthodoxy.’

Returning to first principles, former conflict actors present a relevant class for recognition and social interventions that help them to create secure and productive lives. This is a positive conceptualisation of reintegration, rooted in Sen’s ideas of flourishing (1999). This differs from a negative view, which focuses, for example, on removing distinctions; negative definitions of reintegration become problematic in contexts where economic destitution and political marginality are the status quo. While often discussed in terms of security, reintegration programmes are also grounded in ideas of reciprocity, particularly in the case of national liberation movements and decolonisation struggles. In such contexts, governments widely recognise an obligation to both reward sacrifices and compensate for deficits, such as missed opportunities and injury due to their service, that disadvantage former fighters in relation to their peers. Such ends are served when policies are able to accurately and without discrimination recognise those who contributed. However well intentioned, legislation and policies that lead to poor implementation do little to advance these goals. These basic ideas provide a normative baseline for assessing policy and post-conflict benefits programmes.

3.1 Context Driven Policy: Conflict History and Values

The first broad recommendation that emerges from this study is that reintegration practices and goals should be context driven, in particular aligning with local conflict histories and conceptualisations of the purposes of such programmes. Externally conceived programmes that do not recognise local goals are less likely to be realised as intended, and programmes that use a one-size-fits-all model likely result in ineffective interventions. In taking account of context, programmes better reflect the
structures and progression of the conflict, which shape recipients needs. What ‘reintegration’ means depends on how long people were fighting, the nature of the fighting and patterns of movement and mobilisation, as well as their situations in the post-conflict period.

In Timor-Leste, for the vast majority of armed conflict actors, the conflict ceased almost two decades before the United Nations arrived in 1999 and the advent of independence in 2002. These individuals do not fit the mould of isolated combatants who need direct assistance to re-establish themselves in communities; as the survey results show, respondents enjoy standards of living in line with their civilian peers. Such a critique is particularly relevant to FRAP, and raises questions around the extended cantonment of individuals that had been mobilised for very short periods of time. Equally important is an appreciation of conflict structures, and, as this study has emphasised, the persistence of these networks to post-conflict life. Resistance actors’ desires to retain their identities and networks make sense, as these identities unlock social, political, financial and cultural capital. This thesis found these forms of capital to have protective functions; engaging these networks may provide new opportunities. This also suggests that the efforts to dismantle such networks may be both difficult and carry unintended consequences. Awareness of these networks also encourages engagement with issues around patronage and exclusion.

Secondly, in relation to context, policy makers should seek to understand local values and goals and align their programmes accordingly. The incorporation of local goals poses a challenge, however, as they may clash with the ‘reintegration orthodoxy.’ More specifically, the reintegration best practices literature focuses on three main principles, each conceptualised around addressing the security risks posed by former conflict actors. These principles include comprehensiveness – all ex-combatants should be fully demobilised, disarmed and reintegrated; atomisation –
ex-combatants are treated as individuals and should be separated from conflict-era networks to prevent remobilisation; and equality — distinctions amongst ex-combatants should be lessened and distinctions between ex-combatants and civilians should be removed. In line with these principles, recommendations focus on distributing benefits according to a basic needs or community-based approach.

By contrast, the Timorese programme operates on the principle of valorisation. For instance, in practice, the demobilisation of former fighters has been deliberately incomplete, and political actors have fostered and retained access to this non-state source of coercive force, as seen in the 2006 Crisis. Instead of removing the markers of combatant identity, in focusing on valorising former fighters and providing higher ranked individuals with substantial pensions, the programmes have explicitly created and articulated the differences not only between former resistance members, but also between ‘veterans’ and ‘civilians.’ This orientation promotes the development of programmes that reward elite service and reproduce rather than dismantle resistance-era hierarchies. Indeed, informants emphasised that programmes should reflect not only their needs but also their status. As one informant explained, ex-resistance members say: ‘How can I return? How can I accept this? I value myself, I can’t return to scratching the earth!’ (INT03). The importance of status is also identified by Alden, who describes the provisioning of ‘kits of hoes, seeds and a bucket’ to high-ranking leaders in Mozambique as ‘insulting at best’ (2002: 350).

Understanding these autochthonous goals illuminates barriers to why Timorese leaders have resisted adopting certain programmes as well as resistance to the faithful implementation of programmes based on the ‘reintegration orthodoxy.’ For example, as discussed, one UN practitioner’s interest in taking a needs-based approach and focusing on heath care (rather than supporting the highly visible housing benefits) failed to gain support because it runs counter to the Timorese
focus on valorisation and distinction. This has broader implications, specifically around the adoption of 'community based' approaches to reintegration (see Pugel, 2009: 71; Kingma, 1997: 62). While such community-based programmes advance the values of equity and atomisation, and may be important for reducing issues with social jealousy, this thesis suggests that such programmes may find little support. In the case of Timor-Leste, differentiation and the preservation of resistance-era hierarchies appear to be valued by political actors above potential risks of increased community tension. The challenge to international policy practitioners thus becomes how to honour indigenous values and the ‘facts on the ground’ while also advancing the liberal political values, such as non-discrimination, which opened this section.

3.2 Addressing Fraud: Decoupling Recognition and Payments

Moving from a general call for context sensitive programmes to specific policy issues, this thesis has identified three key and interrelated weaknesses in the Timorese reintegration programmes: high levels of fraud, unsustainable project costs, and risk for social conflict. I find that each issue can be traced, at least in part, to a broader problem with the extreme complexity of the system, stemming from the programmes’ development and the high payment levels, as measured in relation to other benefits programmes and non-oil per capita income.

As discussed in Chapter VII, I argue that the complexity of the system for determining eligibility, as well as the high value of payments made to those registered with certain types of service, creates the opportunity and incentives for embellishing claims. This problematic complexity in the registration system arises as legislators have tried to reflect diverse histories and contributions in payment rubrics. And the high payment levels reflect a desire by lawmakers to distinguish special service. Efforts to control costs and fraud in Timor-Leste have, to date, centred on
data verification. By contrast, this thesis suggests that addressing these problems in
Timor-Leste and other contexts requires limiting the complexity of the benefit scheme
and the magnitude of payments.

Limiting the benefit scheme’s complexity and the magnitude of payments in
reintegration programmes such as those in Timor-Leste requires de-linking special
recognition (e.g. within group distinctions) and financial support. This would allow for
the necessarily complex processes of understanding and recognising service to take
place independently of the distribution of benefits. As discussed, recognition includes
processes of differentiation, history-making, and identity formation. As Cole and
Barsalou emphasise, and has been demonstrated in this thesis, this is a highly
political and fraught exercise:

Few post-conflict societies are ready to accept an approach that promotes critical
thinking, since it is often perceived as flying in the face of traditions that respect expertise,
seniority, and authority and promote group honour as more important than any forensic
truth (2006: 10).

Decoupling recognition from benefits has the potential to allow these identification
processes to evolve over time and potentially incorporate a wider range of actors,
including those who are marginalised in conventional reintegration programmes.
Such complexity and inclusivity is largely precluded when such categories need to be
transformed into practicable payment levels.

In this de-coupled model, recognition and valorisation processes would develop
independently of a grossly simplified system of benefits payment. This system would
be much more akin to a class- or cohort-based social security system, as with Timor-
Leste’s old age pensions. While the complex and political act of drawing lines
between who merits benefits and who does not is unavoidable (unless benefits are
made universal), simplifying the system carries benefits. The reduction of payment
level and programme complexity would reduce incentives and opportunities for fraud
while still retaining the important focus on honouring and identifying those who fought. Such suggestions were made by a number of respondents, often calling for a simpler system dividing individuals by the three fronts – armed, clandestine and diplomatic – and offering compensation to each. The current system combines three factors: service type, seniority, and duration. Removing one or more of these variables would mark a significant simplification of the system while still honouring local values.

4 CONCLUSION

The functioning and growth of reintegration and pensions benefits programmes demand attention and careful analysis. Attention to reintegration practices has been lacking in the study of post-conflict transitions – a problem deepened by the relative lack of studies focusing on reintegration within even the DDR literature and the difficulties of generating representative data on former fighters. Furthermore, there has been little consideration of reintegration in relation to state-building, in part, I argue, reflecting rather narrow, institutional understandings of the subject.

In re-evaluating the work that reintegration programmes do, and situating this within a anthropological understanding of the state and state-building, this thesis comprises one step towards addressing this gap as well as extending the analysis done on the subject. This work matters: across conflicts, these programmes affect both economic and institutional development. They reshape the lives of those who fought and similarly define those who did not. In registering over 250,000 people, the programme has elicited the recognition of the state and pushed the expansion of the state apparatus in significant ways, with complex results. These programmes consume considerable state resources (in this case, 5 per cent of the national budget), necessitating their consideration in regards to post-conflict economic
development. At stake are access to political and financial capital and the legitimate exercise of force and authority, not simply security.

While marking a step forward, due to necessary constraints this thesis has a number of limitations. Firstly, while registration efforts may be drawing to a close at the time of fieldwork, very few of the eligible registrants had received their payments. This leaves open the question of how payments affect the relationship of former resistance members to each other, to their communities, as well as to state institutions. Social jealousy remains a conflict factor in Timor-Leste, and the impacts of reintegration benefits on community-level tensions remain to be seen and studied. Secondly, while this study is the most comprehensive to be conducted in Timor-Leste, constraints on time and resources limited the survey design and make finer grained comparisons amongst respondents as well as comparisons with non-registered individuals infeasible. Other relevant and illustrative aspects of reintegration politics in Timor-Leste have not been considered including memorialisation and the recent attempt to establish the National Veterans’ Council, a representative organ within the state.

These limitations and gaps, however, suggest avenues for further investigation and research. More broadly, while the specific outcomes that I document in Timor-Leste are context specific, the interpretive lens invites application across a range of conflicts as well as comparative analysis. Accordingly, one avenue for further research is the exploration of other reintegration programmes, in both the contexts of civil wars and national liberation conflicts. How do the needs of former fighters differ in these contexts? How does the ‘veterans problem,’ as conceptualised by state actors, differ? Further research is also merited in relation to the social networks of former conflict actors – both the critical analysis of their conceptualisation in reintegration policy as well as their functions in Timor-Leste and elsewhere. As noted
above, these networks play a wide range of functions and may have the potential to be harnessed to improve reintegration outcomes. Little has been done to map or understand these networks, which, as I found, appear to be tremendously important well after the cessation of conflict.

Looking forward, despite being in over their tenth year of development, in many ways these programmes remain in their infancy. Over 100,000 individuals still await data verification, and many more have yet to receive their payments. The full impact of these programmes on the nation’s budget, economic development, and security remain to be seen, as does the impact of generational change on how legitimate political power is conceived of and exercised. As these processes continue to unfold, so too shall the answer to what effects these programmes have and to what ends – what work these programmes actually do. Moreover, in observing these reintegration and benefits programmes as they continue to expand and evolve in Timor-Leste, it becomes even clearer that short term, security-driven analysis of such programmes is ill-equipped to capture their scope. As the node of contact, as it were, between former fighters and the state apparatus, attention too should be paid to the way in which these programmes renegotiate lines of authority.

These programmes, in the end, are not about returning men and women to the lives they once lived; those lives are gone. Nor is it about mending relations between former fighters and their communities, as these relationships have, in most cases, been long established. They are rather, about setting apart those who contributed in certain ways. Reintegration in Timor-Leste has been about the anxieties and structures that have worked to create such distance, thereby inventing the veteran. These programmes, recursively, have both reflected and facilitated the on-going importance of these identities so many years after the conflict ended. Such outcomes demonstrate a profound local ambivalence around dismantling conflict-era networks
an ambivalence made profoundly ironic as such an outcome is assumed to be the basis of reintegration.
Appendix A: Methodology

1 INTRODUCTION

This thesis takes a mixed-methods approach to studying the reintegration of former resistance members in Timor-Leste, collecting demographic data on this poorly understood population as well as soliciting narratives around how the process has affected individuals and altered their relationships to each other, their leaders, and the state. In an example of *bricolage*, the use of survey and interview data was supplemented by informal conversations, ethnographic observation, and media analysis. In all, 224 registered former resistance members were surveyed using a randomised cluster sample, maintaining a 60 per cent response rate, and 90 individuals were selected through a purposive sample and interviewed. The refusal rate was less than two per cent, making self-selection bias negligible.

The decision to expand upon previous, qualitative research and generate quantitative data was driven by four main factors. Firstly, despite the importance of the cohort, little basic demographic information is available; neither the government nor other researchers have addressed basic questions concerning age breakdown, economic conditions, or geographical distribution. Secondly, this lack of information on former resistance members makes cross-checking empirical claims, for example that former combatants were more economically disadvantaged than the general population, extremely difficult. Thirdly, quantitative data also allows for regression analysis of the relationships between marginalisation, trust in state institutions, and access benefits – analysis that advances broader arguments concerning the relationship of these programmes to state consolidation and which has not been previously possible.
Finally, the experience of carrying out qualitative research on this subject in 2010 underscored the difficulties of accessing lower level former resistance members. While elites proved accessible, those at the margins and less authority were more difficult to identify and interview; randomised sampling provided an avenue for bringing these voices into the study. Interestingly, randomisation also helped me to justify my choice of respondents to elite former resistance members who found low level former resistance members’ inputs ‘worthless.’ As will be discussed below, the complex process of locating individuals for the sample also emerged as an unexpected source of qualitative data on the relationships between former combatants, the organisation of resistance groups, and the robustness of the sampling frame.

Following a discussion of the overarching theoretical framework and mixed methodology as an epistemological approach, I lay out the research design and its major components, and then discuss the inevitable sources of bias that come with field work and how these issues have been addressed both in the data gathering and analysis phases.

2 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK: MIXING METHODS, MIXING PARADIGMS?

Qualitative and quantitative methodologies are rooted in distinct epistemic frameworks and produce different types of knowledge. Whereas, qualitative methods generate a ‘thick description’ (Geertz, 2003: 175) of experience and illuminate how knowledge is generated and to what end, often rather than engaging

---

146 A post-positivist theoretical framework entails ‘a relativist ontology (there are multiple realities), a subjectivist epistemology (knower and subject create understandings), and a naturalistic (in the natural world) set of methodological procedures’ (Denzin et al., 2000: 13-14). This contrasts with a positivist approach in which reality is viewed as fixed and discoverable with the correct tools.
with questions of which knowledge is ‘true,’\textsuperscript{147} quantitative methods are able to generate broad-based, representative data and allow for between group and within group comparisons. Denzin, tracing the theoretical debates over mixed-methodologies, notes a shift away from a view of these paradigms as incommensurable and growing ‘recognition, that all methods are hybrids, emergent, interactive productions’ (2010: 423), opening new, pragmatic, and less binary ways of understanding mixed-methods approaches (Morgan, 2007).

This thesis, however, takes an alternative perspective and views mixed methodologies as not a combination of two frameworks, but as representing a distinct perspective on the nature of knowledge and knowledge production – each a discrete \textit{research paradigm}. This study accords most fully with the research paradigm identified by Sommer Harrits as ‘praxeological knowledge’ (2011: 156). Following Bourdieu, this perspective emphasised the dialectic or even disjuncture between objective and subjective knowledge generated from the ‘outside,’ such as surveys, and from the ‘inside,’ using the words and reflections of subjects. For example, preliminary data suggesting that former resistance members experience a material standard of living comparable to the general population comes into conflict with distinct narratives about being forgotten and disadvantaged. These are both ‘truths’ for which their uneasy pairing is ultimately interesting and productive.\textsuperscript{148}

\textsuperscript{147} For an extended discussion of the objectivist-constructivist divide in qualitative research see Miller and Glassner, 1997.

\textsuperscript{148} These tensions also arose at the level of research design, requiring both the tacit acceptance of government-defined identity categories for the survey frame while at the same time recognising that these categories are political, contextual, and constructed. This level of meta-critique has tended to be absent from large-scale surveys, thus avoiding questions of knowledge production at the government level and by international implementing partners.
2.1 Reflexivity

In both navigating and deliberately highlighting this divide between insider and outsider knowledge, this thesis both presents the data generated through quantitative inquiry while also addressing its technical (e.g. bias, error) and theoretical limitations. As knowledge is viewed as situated, subjective, and manifold (Mullings, 1999: 337), I both note the partial nature of the knowledge produced through survey data as well as problematise survey instruments and demographic measures themselves. My own research is thus implicated, just as the thesis implicates administrative tools, in the productions of identity and dynamics of inclusion and exclusion, privileging and silencing.

This process of interrogation is central to the practice of reflexivity and the implication of the researcher, more specifically the researcher’s identity and disciplinary training (Carr, 1961), in accessing and producing knowledge. Fundamental to this discussion is the recognition that researchers are ‘not neutral spectators of the world, but participants in that world’ (Smith and Hodkinson, 2002: 292). As has been discussed comprehensively elsewhere (Fontana and Frey, 2000; Acker et al., 1983), asymmetrical power dynamics, based on race, affluence, language, age, and gender, are inherent in research and colour informants’ responses as well as the questions researchers ask and what they choose to privilege in ‘writing up.’ Furthermore, the production of knowledge is also not without consequences, and, in creating authoritative accounts, scholars become involved in on-going battles over representation and history-making (see Leach on Timorese history, 2010: 125).

Concerning my own positionality, my experience working in Timor-Leste (2006-2008) provide the background of this study – these questions emerged through observation – and was instrumental for establishing my credibility and connecting me to key
informants. It also provided the language skills that made interviewing in Tetum possible. However, this familiarity with the site and friendship with those who had taken part in the resistance at times also made establishing critical distance and questioning mythologies of the resistance more difficult. The research process thus demanded both empathetic exchanges and the utilisation of these pre-existing connections, as well as deliberate alienation – the uneasy distinction between ‘field’ and ‘desk’ discussed by Mosse (2006).

2.2 Interviewing in Post-Conflict Contexts

Research in conflict and post-conflict settings raises special ethical, interpretive and logistical issues, and, as Wood underscores, conditions of insecurity, traumatisation, and political polarisation raise the stakes on the imperative to ‘do no harm’ as a researcher entering others’ worlds (2006: 373). Of particular concern in this study were the ethical considerations around discussing potentially traumatic experiences and, secondly, questions concerning the interpretation of information concerning such experiences.

In relation to the first consideration, while this research focuses on post-conflict programmes, the subject is linked to individuals’ experiences of the resistance and transitional periods. Obtaining information on the respondent’s occupation-era service, focusing on his or her roles and geographic location, was also seen as necessary for crosschecking whether or not he or she met the benefits eligibility criteria. At times, the respondent used this section of the interview to describe suffering experienced by the individual, his or her family, and friends. In the field, my approach to such discussions mirrored Shafer’s; she writes: ‘My research ethic would not allow me to probe too deeply into stories of the war, since I was not equipped to deal with the psychological repercussions of painful memories’ (2001: 218). I
generally listened respectfully, but found probing to be unnecessary; while interviewees often shared stories of their lives during the occupation, such decisions were theirs.

While these narratives convey strong emotional information, scholars have noted the unreliability and inaccuracy of many conflict narratives and testimonies, calling into question the utility of such data. Recall bias becomes more problematic as time passes (Krosnick and Presser, 2010: 288), and it may also be particularly acute in the context of post-traumatic stress. However, recent work has also looked at the role of issues including rumour, invention, denial, evasion and silences, in oral histories of conflict and challenged researchers to view these issues as rich sources of metadata rather than errors in memory (Fujii, 2010). More broadly, White emphasises the importance of lies, deliberate misinformation, secrets and omissions as sources. She writes:

We might not see the truth distorted by a lie or the truth hidden by a secret, but we see the ideas and imaginings by which people disclose what should not be made public, and how they should carry out concealing one narrative with another (White, 2000: 11).

In this manner, reports that contradict observation or verifiable histories, for example, remain valuable as they indicate issues meriting the effort to rework the narrative and not disclosure.

Actors' discourses are thus more usefully approached not only as a means of triangulating 'reality,' but as 'imaginings' and valid objects of study. As Alexander and McGregor describe their work on Zimbabwean guerrilla narratives, the stories are not meant to be a 'complete account of guerrilla lives, and nor... taken as an accurate account of war;' instead, the authors use the narratives to explore 'the ways in which guerrillas ordered and publicly represented their memories of the war at a particular point in time' (2004: 84). The narratives put forward by former resistance members,
through semi-structured interviews, in the open items of the structured surveys, as well as through the media, are key to constantly producing a history of the conflict, one that, just as Alexander and McGregor note, is very much of the present and a reflection of contemporary political dynamics.

3 QUALITATIVE METHODS

While semi-structured interviews formed the backbone of the qualitative element of this study, a range of different methodologies were utilised, including ethnographic observation, media monitoring, a single focus group discussion, as well as more informal interactions with a range of informants. In addition, as is discussed below, the survey component also contained open-ended items, which, rather than being coded and quantified, were treated as additional sources of qualitative data.

3.1 Semi-Structured Interviews

This project built upon qualitative research conducted in 2010, and taken together, 90 elite, semi-structured interviews were conducted, seven of which were re-interviews of key respondents conducted two years later. Of the total interviews, 83 per cent of respondents were Timorese, and 28 per cent of interviews took place outside of the capital, Dili. Concerning gender, 19 per cent of interviewees were female, including eleven female members of the resistance – a group that has often been underrepresented in academic studies of former fighters and clandestine actors (Rimmer, 2007: 324). These interviews served to supplement the information gathered from female respondents captured in the randomised sample.

These interviews ranged from 30 minutes to two hours in length. Interviews focused on policy-makers and resistance-era leaders – individuals who were seen as ‘politically important’ and with special knowledge of the circumstances under which
the policies were formed, for example, or on-going leadership roles amongst former resistance members (see Patton, 1980). Respondents were selected through a combination of purposive\textsuperscript{149} and snow-ball sampling, the latter which involves relying upon interviewees to recommend other subjects. While many of these interviews were conducted one-on-one, in a single case five former resistance members were available to speak together, allowing for an impromptu focus group discussion.

Prior to beginning these interviews, I introduced myself as an independent researcher, discussed the purpose of the research, and explained the strict confidentiality of all material. I consider these verbal discussions around consent and confidentiality to be more effective than written forms, both because of low literacy levels as well as sensitivities concerning signing documents. In addition, rather than using an audio recorder, I took notes, hoping to minimise respondents’ anxiety or discomfort. Erring on the side of caution, unless consent to use the individual’s name was explicitly discussed, and all quotes have been made anonymous.

Finally, while compensation was not offered, I often stayed longer with the interviewee, answering questions about my research, life in Dili, Darwin and Oxford, and my father’s experience as a Vietnam War veteran. This openness allowed for a greater sense of mutual exchange, and ameliorated, to at least a small degree, the dynamic in which the researcher extracts information but does not reciprocate. I also gave all respondents my card, including mobile number, with the promise to call back (saving the caller phone credit) when rung. Many respondents did so, asking follow-up questions about the interview or for more information about the registration

\textsuperscript{149} As an alternative to randomised sampling, purposive sampling draws from stratified layers, realising the ‘rectangular’ sample that is considered ideal for qualitative research. An example of purposive sampling includes efforts to locate and speak with female former resistance members and leaders. This approach, however, presumes a prior knowledge of what categories are relevant and is difficult to utilise for quantitative analysis.
processes; while small, this provided one way of making the interview process more ‘two way’ and mutual.

3.2 Ethnographic observation, media monitoring, and the sampling process

In addition to the semi-structured interviews, qualitative data was gathered through a range of other methods, each contributing to a broader and more nuanced picture of the lives of former resistance members in Timor-Leste. This recourse reflects an increasing adoption of these techniques in sociology and political science, yet also responds to what Auyero terms a ‘double absence: of politics in ethnographic literature and of ethnography in studies of politics,’ which allow for the exploration of meaning in political life and generates important data on how state programmes function, and what functions they perform, in practice (2006: 258).

Concerning ethnography, I observed a number of events in order to better understand registration, verification, and valorisation or memorialisation processes and observe how individuals frame these issues away from the capital. Some observational periods were quite intensive: for example, I embedded myself with a government verification team over a multi-day period in Baucau, staying with the team and joining them for open meetings across a number of villages. I also attended special events, including the first congress of Widows and War Orphans Network (FFOK) and a meeting of the Timorese Women’s Popular Organisation (OPMT), a former resistance group that continues as a political and advocacy organisation.

However, most of the observations that inform this thesis come not from observing specific events, but through simply being in the field – a form of ethnography more akin to ‘deep hanging out’ (Rosaldo, quoted by Clifford, 1997: 188). Such everyday interactions included sharing coffees with neighbours and onlookers following survey
or semi-structured interviews, standing in line at the Veterans’ Directorate along with individuals seeking to amend their registration data, and waiting in individuals’ homes for interviewees to arrive – each an opportunity for informal interaction and less guarded discussions of issues. And in interviews, it was often only after the pen was put away and coffee brought out that informants began discussing the issues with greater candour. Casual conversations held during these periods complement the more formal, one-on-one survey interviews allowing for a more socially embedded impression of how people discuss and relate to these issues.

In addition to this type of observation, I conducted basic archival research and document analysis, focusing on primary sources and media reports in Tetum, English and Portuguese. In Dili, I was granted access to parliamentary archives and information on the development of veterans’ legislation; I was also provided with programme documents concerning the FALINTIL Reinsertion Assistance Programme (FRAP, 2000-2001) and the national commissions tasked with designing reintegration programmes. Media reports were monitored through the ETAN email listserve, which includes a daily news summary of reporting from Timorese newspapers. The media monitoring covers two periods, October 2010 to March 2011 and then October 2011 to December 2012.

In observing verification processes and memorialisation practices as well as reading media coverage and legal documents, particular attention was paid the discourses, discursive framings, and the types of imagery and symbols used. Discourses, as Tilley states, are ‘not documents to be interpreted which will finally reveal their inner meaning, but monuments to be described’ (Tilley in Long, 1992: 165). Accordingly, the object of such analysis has been primarily to understand how language and symbolic practices have been used to frame problems, define groups, and make historical claims, not primarily to ascertain factual information.
Finally, the process of locating former resistance members who were selected through the randomised sampling proved to be, in and of itself, an unexpected and useful source of qualitative data. Using available registration data to find individuals necessitated a process of learning how to ‘read’ the registry, which served as the sampling framework, and understand its accuracies and inaccuracies. The process also facilitated the identification of relationship patterns and deepened my understanding of individuals’ social networks and their role in the registration and verification process (see Roll, 2014). Furthermore, seeking out low-level or marginalised respondents required regularly defying the wishes of key resistance leaders – an at times uncomfortable process that none the less brought extant, resistance-era hierarchies into bright relief and confirmed their importance, even ten years after the cessation of conflict.

Such observations, taken together with the document analysis and ethnographic observation, serve to supplement and provide context for the semi-structured and structured interviews that provide the bulk of the data presented in this thesis.

4 QUANTITATIVE METHODS: SURVEY ADMINISTRATION AND DESIGN

In addition to the qualitative methods described above, this study collected survey data from 224\textsuperscript{150} individuals registered as former resistance members, with a final response rate of 60 per cent. As such, this study presents the first comprehensive, randomly sampled dataset on the lives of Timorese ex-resistance members, now allowing for the analysis and profiling of this complex, heterogeneous group. The study design mirrors that of Pugel (2007: 18), who similarly utilised cluster sampling

\textsuperscript{150} Overall, the resultant sample size reflects resource and time constraints; while the total sample was 274 individuals, there was sufficient concern over 50 surveys collected by one of two research assistance to be discarded, reducing the usable data to 224 surveys.
and the government register as a sampling framework to survey 590 former combatants in Liberia. Overall, the margin of error is approximately 6.5 per cent at a 95 per cent confidence level.

Figure A: Regional Stratification & Map of Selected Study Sites

In Timor-Leste, conducting a simple, random sample of former resistance members was not possible, particularly as telephonic surveying are infeasible and, in this case, inappropriate; as a result, I chose to use a multi-stage randomised, cluster sampling. Cluster sampling allows for the randomised selection of sub-groups, from which respondents are then sampled (see Babbie, 1997: 88). To select the clusters, the country was first stratified into Eastern, Central and Western regions; three sub-districts¹⁵¹ in each region were then randomly selected using population proportional sampling. See Figures A and B for a visual representation of the selected sub-districts. As regional identities and conflict histories are important factors in post-conflict Timorese politics, yet the Timorese population is concentrated in the capital

¹⁵¹ Sub-districts are composed of suku (villages), which range in area from 0.6 km² to 212 km²; each suku contains aldeia or sub-villages, which are often dominated by a few families. In the case of large suku, aldeia may be highly isolated.
and western districts, such stratification was considered necessary to sufficiently represent these groups. Finally, a random number generator was used to select 50 or 65 individuals in each site from the 2003-2009 government registries of former resistance members – the sampling framework.

The sampling framework was constructed through the compilation of six sets of registration data, which taken together produced a list of over 65,000 government-vetted individuals; while registration has continued, bringing the total number to almost 200,000 individuals, verification has yet to conclude making this dataset larger yet less accurate. Of the vetted list, 23,870 individuals – approximately 36 per cent of the total list – are living former resistance members (as opposed to the families of those killed, eligible for ‘martyrs’ benefits’) and eligible for at least one payment; the samples were drawn from this sub-group. The decision to exclude those registered with fewer than four years of ‘exclusive dedication’ from the survey population, and thus ineligible for government payments, reflects both a substantive research interest in the experiences of longer-serving individuals and a strategy to capture more individuals who had already received benefits, without introducing more complexity by further stratifying the sample.¹⁵² For a breakdown of the make-up of those included in the sampling framework by pension type, please see the Figures C, D, and E; these demonstrate how the framework purposefully over-samples living

¹⁵² The importance of this group, however, is recognised, particularly as important for understanding dynamics around inclusion and exclusion. Accordingly, additional semi-structured interviews were conducted with individuals who were registered with fewer than four years of service.
beneficiaries with more than four years of recognised service ('exclusive dedication').\textsuperscript{153}

\textbf{Figure C: Overview of All Registrants, 2003-2011}

\textbf{Figure D: Population Summary of Living Registrants}

\textbf{Figure E: Breakdown of Sampling Framework}

\textsuperscript{153} The pension levels are as follows:

- **PSv** – Survivors of those killed as a direct result of the conflict
- **PSvD** – Survivors of those killed as a direct result of the conflict, special distinction
- **CLN<4** – Individuals with less than four years of exclusive dedication
- **PPU** – Individuals with 4-7 years of exclusive dedication
- **PSId 8-14, ED** – Individuals with 8-14 years of exclusive dedication
- **PER2 15-19, ED** – Individuals with 15-19 years of exclusive dedication
- **PER1 20-24, ED** – Individuals with 20-24 years of exclusive dedication
- **PERD** – Individuals with special distinction, e.g. former top leaders
- **PSInc** – Individuals disabled as a direct result of the conflict
- **Excluded** – Individuals who registered but have been removed
- **Unresolved** – Pending cases
The survey itself, which includes 69 items (see Appendix B),\textsuperscript{154} was designed over a one-month period and is divided into four areas of focus: social, economic, and political reintegration, and participation in resistance-era social networks. To capture these variables, similar survey instruments were reviewed and drawn upon, including those used by Humphreys and Weinstein (2004), Porto et al. (2007) and the World Bank’s Aceh Livelihoods and Reintegration Survey (Tajima, 2010), reducing the need to ‘reinvent the wheel.’ Additional questions were pulled from the 2009 Census, allowing for comparisons to be made between this sub-population and the wider Timorese population. Both qualitative (open-ended, non-coded) and quantitative items (closed, coded) were included on the survey, adding another level of quantitative and qualitative ‘mixing’ to the study design.\textsuperscript{155} The questions were first vetted with the patient aid of Timorese colleagues at Belun, a local conflict-prevention non-governmental organisation (NGO), and then field-tested with a pilot of ten interviews in Baucau sub-district. Additional revisions were made over the course of research, including simplifying some word choices and eliminating some questions.

The survey was administered as a structured interview; while researcher-administered surveys have the disadvantage of higher rates of satisficing, for example, as compared to self-administered instruments, they have the distinct advantage of allowing for the interviewer to probe or provide clarification, reducing the number of ‘don’t know’ responses, and removing the need for the subject to be literate – an important consideration as over 44 per cent of respondents could not read or write in Tetum (see Babbie, 1997, chp. 10). The length of time needed to

\textsuperscript{154} The number of questions that each individual was asked, however, varied. The use of ‘skip patterns,’ a common survey technique, allowed for me to ‘skip’ over sections irrelevant to a particular respondent.

\textsuperscript{155} On Onwuegbuzie and Collins’s (2007) matrix of research approach by sampling scheme, the work may be classified as Type 2 and Type 1, respectively.
conduct the survey ranged greatly, from 15 minutes, in the cases that respondents declined to answer open-end questions, to 2 hours, in which case respondents discussed a wide array of issues and spoke at length concerning their personal experiences in both the conflict and post-conflict periods. I often spoke informally with respondents and any observers following the survey, allowing for less formal and more free-ranging discussions.

As discussed in the context of semi-structured interviews, I began each survey interview with a description of my research, my role as an independent researcher, and explained the strict confidentiality of all material. As with the semi-structured interviews, I consider these verbal discussions around consent and confidentiality to be more effective than written forms. The question, however, of informed consent is more complicated in the context of these survey interviews, primarily as the interviewer-interviewee power asymmetries were greater and, as most respondents had very limited education, interviewees had a more limited prior understanding of the concepts and feel more comfortable refusing to participate (see Mauthner et al., 2002 on gatekeepers).

Finally, when possible, the survey was conducted in Tetum. However, in Tutuala sub-district, Lautem district, for example, the high proportion of non-Tetum speakers necessitated the assistance of a paid interpreter; in other sites, the arrangement was more ad hoc, with family members or neighbours providing assistance if necessary.

---

156 Interviewees were highly sensitive to the recording of data; one individual expressed concern and queried why I was using a dark red pen to fill out his survey form rather than a black pen. This sensitivity may carry over from the Indonesian occupation under which state legitimacy and power were performed through complex and alienating bureaucratic practices, including extensive paper work and dependence on official stamps and seals.

157 Sixteen major languages are spoken throughout Timor-Leste, in addition to Portuguese and Indonesian (Fataluku Language Project, 2010). While most Timorese speak Tetum, not all understand the ‘high’ Portuguese-inflected Tetum that I speak. This creates regional and elite selection biases; in one case, to address this concern, I worked with an interpreter.
Interviews were usually conducted in the subject’s home, allowing for data to be gathered on housing materials – a proxy measure of poverty (see McKenzie, 2004) – and also minimising the inconvenience to respondents. As the primary researcher, I conducted 192 survey interviews and all 90 semi-structured interviews, with a trained research assistant independently completing an additional 32 survey interviews.

4.1 Locating Selected Respondents

While the survey interview began with a description of my work, the actual process of accessing the selected individual began well before and, as is discussed in the next section, proved to be the most challenging and time-consuming aspect of this research. For locating individuals I depended upon available registration information, which included the registrants’ names, code names (nom de guerre), birthdates, birth villages, resistance-era positions, resistance-era grades (1-3), and benefit levels.

With each site I learned how to better ‘read’ this data: on a practical level, this involved recognising which items were useful and accurate as well as identifying the cases in which ‘inaccurate’ data reliably represented other factors or dynamics. It also gave me a clearer view of how resistance era networks continue to function in the post-conflict period.

In order to locate individuals, I would first seek out the village chief (xefe suku) and share the complete list with him or her. In many cases, the village chief would be able to identify a number of sub-villages (aldeia) in which respondents lived. At the aldeia level, I would then locate the sub-village chief, again soliciting his or her assistance in locating the individual in question; often the sub-village chief offered to make the initial contacts, inviting me to return the next day to complete the interviews. This gatekeeper function is a key aspect of both roles, and village and sub-village chiefs serve as the key conduits between community insiders and
outsiders. When possible, I would make an effort to be seen publicly with these or other local figures, including priests and nuns, and former resistance leaders. Concerns about response bias based on being perceived as associated with government or other entities are discussed below.

5 SOURCES OF BIAS

All research survey research is subject to error and bias. In interviewer-administered surveys, these can include mistakes in transcription and data entry, as well as technical issues in the sampling or questionnaire design. The researcher also introduces biases through the way she or he asks or words questions, and the researcher’s identity also influence how respondents choose to answer, if at all. Errors can thus be introduced at the level of who is asked (or not asked) as well as in how the interviewee responds to questions. Researching former resistance and clandestine actors may accentuate some sources of bias: firstly, around locating and accessing respondents (achieving an unbiased, randomised sample), and, secondly, in receiving accurate information on a sensitive and politicised subject.

The interpretation of gathered data therefore depends on a sensitive understanding of these biases, and this subsection reviews the main sources of error and bias found in the study. I highlight four areas in particular, the first two looking at issues with sampling, specifically weaknesses in the sampling framework and the problem of physical inaccessibility, and second two around response biases, specifically non-response bias and the problem of obstructive identification.
5.1 Assessing the Sampling Framework

A starting key element of any survey is the sampling framework, the list containing the names of members of the survey population\(^{158}\) from which the sample is drawn. As the sample is drawn from this list, weaknesses or omissions in this dataset are translated into the sample and evidenced in the results (Babbie, 1997: 83). When considering the adequacy as a sampling framework, it is thus important to consider both the presence of ‘foreign elements,’ non-eligible individuals included on the list, as well as ‘missing elements,’ such as eligible individuals excluded from the list and eligible individuals who did not register, for example (see Kish, 1965). *Figure F: Description of Foreign and Missing Elements in Registry*, provides a summary of these elements in my sampling framework.

In the case of this thesis, I used a list of registered and vetted former combatants supplied by the Directorate of Veterans’ Affairs’ database team as the sampling framework.\(^{159}\) In Timor-Leste, due to the incentives to register and the barriers to removing ineligible registrants, the presence of foreign elements introduces the largest source of error, with missing elements less common. The presence of such foreign elements makes it important to specify that survey data portray thus those registered as former combatants, rather than presenting the data as portraying those

\(^{158}\) As discussed above, the survey population consists of former resistance members registered in the first round with greater than four years of exclusive dedication.

\(^{159}\) In Timor-Leste, the registration of former resistance members has taken place in two waves, first from 2003-2005 and more recently from 2009-2010, although modifications and additions appear to continue. Together these databases include almost 200,000 people – or over 60 per cent of adults who were 18 years old or older in 1999 at the cessation of the conflict – with approximately 76,000 individuals registered in the first round and 120,000 individuals registered in the second. As names from the second round have yet to be verified, only the first round of data was used as the sampling frame. It is possible to speculate concerning the differences in the two populations; those who registered in the second round may be more isolated, less trusting of state institutions, or have lower literacy levels – all barriers to registering in the initial round. State officials, however, also believe that the proportion of spurious and fraudulent claims is much higher in the second round, as non-eligible individuals saw benefits flowing from the first round of registration.
who objectively meet the legal criteria. Due to foreign elements, this registered survey population may be younger, for example, than the broadly theorised population – Timorese former combatants – that is the overarching focus of the study. Discordance between the registered population and former resistance members who meet the legal criteria is discussed at greater length in the thesis.

Figure F: Description of Foreign and Missing Elements in Registry

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Foreign Element</td>
<td>Interviews suggest that the presence of ineligible individuals – foreign elements – is the largest source of inaccuracy in the registry. Individuals are motivated to register and/or inflate their service in order to gain access to recognition and other benefits. The lack of comprehensive records against which to check these claims makes verification difficult. In addition, commission members involved in registration and verification processes have compounded this problem, both through corruption or nepotism, as well as through the discretionary listing of individuals who they view as having made important contributions even if they do not meet the legal criteria. Basic questions were asked in the survey concerning participation, allowing for a rough estimate of what percentage of registered individuals do not, in fact, meet the legal criteria. While the percentage of the sample that met eligibility criteria varied widely (0-71 per cent), the average percentage of respondents who met the legal criteria was only 34 per cent.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Missing Element I</td>
<td>This group includes eligible individuals who have been blocked or removed from the registry. Given the reluctance of commission members to remove individuals, this source of error may be quite small. Numerous interviewees, however, suggested that commission members have decreased some individuals' lengths of service because of political and family disputes.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Missing Element II</td>
<td>This group is composed of those unable or unwilling to register. Individuals may be unable for reasons such as disability or sickness, isolation or lack of transportation, and a lack of information. The size of this group is difficult to estimate. Others may be unwilling to do so for political or other reasons. In Timor-Leste, while anti-state groups such as CPD-RDTL initially discouraged members from registering, this stance appears to have softened and CPD-RDTL members were present in my sample.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Finally, while the weaknesses in the sampling framework are not trivial – as is discussed at length the number of ineligible registrants is extremely high – this framework still captures a very interesting population of beneficiaries. Indeed, one
question that arises from the thesis is why such large numbers of ineligible registrants have been included; here I have looked to their relationship to former resistance leaders now charged with the programme. And as noted above, the process of interrogating this framework and questioning the processes by which individuals are labelled, sorted and simplified is central to this research. Recognising – rather than seeking to downplay – the complexities of the utilised sampling framework and the work that it does in creating data about a defined class forms a key part of this research process.

5.2 Physical Inaccessibility

Achieving a high response rate is one of the key factors in generating representative data. However, even when a response rate is satisfactory, it is likely that non-respondents consistently differ from respondents in certain ways. In this study, the inability to contact individuals due to poor road conditions and community isolation was the largest factor influencing response rates. In one exemplary case, unseasonably heavy rains cut off the village of Hohorai from the main road, leaving 14 of the 65 individuals selected within Laclo sub-district inaccessible. This ‘bottleneck’ resulted in a bias in the dataset toward individuals living closer to paved or better-maintained roads, most likely thus biasing the sample away from the most isolated registered former combatants.

Over the course of the study, I sought to counteract this problem by investing time in accessing remote sites via motorbike and in two cases even walking into communities. Despite the problems introduced by seeking out individuals living in remote areas, randomised cluster sampling significantly improved upon evaluators’ common practice of staying within a day’s drive of metropolitan areas or asking respondents to gather in regional centres – what Chambers terms the ‘headquarters
or capital city trap’ (2006: 8-10). Reflecting these efforts, the majority of survey participants lived in rural areas (77 per cent) and most were involved in subsistence agriculture (63 per cent), including the cultivation of coffee. As noted above, hearteningly, amongst those who were located, the response rate exceeded 98 per cent, making self-selection bias negligible.\(^{160}\)

### 5.3 Non-Response Bias

While, once located, individuals overwhelmingly agreed to be interviewed, I did encounter issues with item non-response – the refusal or inability of subjects to answer certain questions. In some cases, there were issues with comprehension or mental illness while respondents found other items to be too controversial. Levels of education were, indeed, low – one third of respondents had received no formal education school and over 50 per cent self-identified as unable to speak, read, and write in Tetum. These illiteracy rates are almost ten-times those found by Porto et al. amongst UNITA ex-combatants (2007: 42). Even when a translator was present, comprehension at times still posed problems, suggesting that the dynamics of the encounter, more than linguistic issues, created challenges. This type of issue was often gendered, also suggesting much broader social factors at play.

Other individuals refused to answer questions that they perceived to be too political, and these judgements themselves, particularly when unanticipated, proved informative (see White, 2000). When meeting such resistance, probing questions were often used. For example, questions concerning ranking levels of trust in

\(^{160}\) The high response rate amongst located individuals reflects a number of factors: Firstly, approaching people in their homes engaged strong hospitality norms, allowing me the opportunity to introduce my research and myself. Secondly, many former resistance members, expressed feeling ignored or marginalised; my presence was thus generally embraced. Thirdly, as will be discussed in the next section, I began my process of locating individuals by speaking with the village chief and a prominent local ex-resistance member; these individuals vouched for me and at times sent other individuals to accompany me, what Shenton and Hayer describe as the 'known sponsor' approach to gaining access (2004: 224).
different security institutions were often met with the initial response of ‘I trust them all;’ however, after acknowledging that all institutions were important but again asking for which one is the ‘most important,’ preferences would often be expressed. In other cases, respondents deferred to community leaders and claimed to be ‘just a nobody’ (‘hau ema kiik’) and uneducated (‘hau ema beik’), despite later demonstrating adequate working knowledge of the programmes. This self-abnegation reflects cultural norms around unity and deference to leaders.

Taken together, these issues lowered response rates on some of the more complex and controversial items, potentially biasing the results for these items towards more literate and confident respondents. In addressing this issue, some compounding factors were difficult to mitigate; for example, due to interviewing in the home, it was also almost impossible to hold one-on-one interviews, a concern when discussing more controversial items. However, while recognising the limits to addressing these issues over the course of a single encounter, I did simplify the questionnaire and attempted to make the interview more conversational, using a consistent set of probes and strategies for re-asking items. Again, the use of an interviewer-administered survey was key for reducing non-response bias overall.

5.4 Access and ‘Obstructive Identification’

As discussed above, locating sampled individuals proved to be a central challenges of this research design. While a number of strategies were used, I consistently relied upon local government officials (sub-district administrator, village chiefs, and sub-village chiefs) as well as prominent local former resistance members recommended

161 The presence of other community or family members had a variety of effects. In some cases, local leaders sought to be very active, pushing answers to certain questions and dominating discussions, in which case, the items were flagged and considered separately from the subject’s responses. However, concerning truth telling, the presence of community members may have had a positive effect, preventing the subject from embellishing to a too great degree or assisting him or her recall key events.
to me through a key informant in the Directorate of Veterans’ Affairs (DCLAAN) to help me locate selected individuals. These associations, with individuals about whom I knew relatively little, were both expedient and culturally appropriate; however, they also made identifying myself as independent of these gatekeepers more difficult, potentially making some respondents more reticent to speak critically about government programmes or party activities.

As has discussed in this thesis, Timorese party politics have their roots in resistance-era organisations. As such, political power structures in the post-conflict period have tended to reproduce or preserve divisions from the conflict-era. In this context, accessing and building rapport with those who have been marginalised had the potential to be made more difficult through perceived associations with government officials. Known as ‘obstructive identifications,’ this issue arises when researchers are perceived as an extension of these ‘political sponsors within the setting despite… denials to the contrary’ (see Dalton, 1959, in Shenton and Hayter, 2004: 224). The survey was, indeed, carried out in the context of a programme in flux, with the final verification of registration data for pensions on-going and an increased number visits by DCLAAN officials to the districts, increasing the possibility for such ambiguities.

Of primary concern was that individuals would be reticent to be critical of government programmes or reluctant to offer information contradicting their testimony used for government registration. In addition, willingness to admit manipulating benefits programme is reduced through social-desirability bias – the predisposition of respondents to mirror the interviewers perceived values or community norms. However, the data suggest a surprisingly high level of candour: over 60 per cent of surveyed individuals provided information demonstrating that they did not meet the legal criteria for state benefits, suggesting a lack of concern that my association with state officials could change their benefits status. Obstructive identification may have
been more problematic in regards to respondents’ willingness to discuss the exploitation or manipulation of benefits programmes – often by the very ‘big man’ that directed me to his or her home in the first place.

In order to address this sources of bias, I was deliberate in how I identified myself, including providing a business card with contact information were more questions to arise, and reiterating my independent status throughout the interview. When possible, I also sought to interview individuals alone or, if not alone, than not in the presence of higher-level former combatants. Finally, while staying in field sites where rental accommodation was unavailable, I endeavoured to stay with parties that were not strongly associated with Timorese veterans’ politics, for example nuns (Tutuala and Baucau sub-district sites). Overall, however, one of the inherent limitations of such survey research is the fleeting nature of the interaction, which places basic limitations on the level of trust that can be established within a single interview and makes a degree of reticence on the part of respondents not only predictable but also reasonable. The use of longer, and often iterative, semi-structured interviews and other qualitative methods help to address this overarching limitation of survey research.

6 CONCLUSION

In taking a mixed-methods approach, this study marks the most in-depth look to date at former resistance members in Timor-Leste and joins a small group of quantitative studies of reintegration globally. This body of quantitative and qualitative data is important for more fully understanding the lives and needs of former fighters, as well as interrogating how DDR processes unfold. This appendix has sought to shed light on the innovations and challenges of this approach, including sources of bias, with

\[162\] In order to not place a financial burden on respondents, I made clear that I would respond to any missed calls, thus taking on the cost of the conversation.
the goal of assisting researchers in the future with their methodological choices. In particular, this section has emphasised the importance of approaching challenges in quantitative and qualitative research – for example weaknesses in the sampling framework or obstruction by authorities – as sources of data in and of themselves, providing more information on how power is exercised between individuals as well as through administrative tools of classification and regulation.
### Appendix B: Questionnaire

**Questionnaire for Resistance Members ENG V.5**

**Code: __ __  Date: / /**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>About the researcher and interview:</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A  Researcher's name</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C  Respondent’s name</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D  District and village of birth</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E  District and village of interview</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Housing materials:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>F  Wall</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G  Roof</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H  Floor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rural or urban?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I  Rural</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>After the interview:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>J  Were there any factors that negatively affected the interview?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>K  Was a translator engaged?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>L  Observations:</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**I. Place: To begin, I will ask you about where you live and who lives with you.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1</th>
<th>Do you live in this house (village)?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1. Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2. No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3. Don't know</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>2</th>
<th>How many people live with you?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1. 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2. 1-3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3. 4-6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4. 7-9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5. &gt;10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>6. Don't know</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>3</th>
<th>Currently who looks after the people who live together with you? (Xefe de familia)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1. I do</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2. Husband</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3. Other: __________________________</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4. Don't know</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>4</th>
<th>Do you have relatives that live close by in this village, but not in the same house as you?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1. Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2. No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3. Don’t know</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>5</th>
<th>Do you have a mobile phone?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1. Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2. No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3. Don’t know</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**II. Education & Economic Integration: Next, I'd like to ask you about your education and work.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>6</th>
<th>At what level did you complete your schooling?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1. I didn’t go to school</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2. Other: _________________________________</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3. Don’t know</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Have you received any additional training or attended other courses?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>What training, and from where?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Can you speak, write and read in…….?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>Right now, are you employed?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>What work do you do? [go to 16]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>How many additional people in your household contribute to the family income?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>Do you receive money or payments from any other sources?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>From where?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>Do you think that your living situation is better than, worse off than, or the same as your neighbours'?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>Please explain about any difficulties or challenges that you currently face.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### III. Participation in the Resistance

<p>| 21 | In total, how many years were you involved in the resistance? | 1. 0-3 | 2. 4-7 | 3. 8-14 | 4. 15-19 | 5. 20-24 | 6. Don’t know |
| 22 | Were you in the support bases? | 1. Yes | 2. No | 3. Don’t know |
| 24 | While you were active in the resistance, where did you live? Can you explain your contribution and activities? |
| 25 | What are your thoughts on the veterans’ policies? Do they have advantages or disadvantages? |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>26</td>
<td>Do you feel content with the process of registration and data-verification?</td>
<td>1. Content</td>
<td>2. Not content</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27</td>
<td>Have you had the problem that your registered period of service has been reduced?</td>
<td>1. Yes</td>
<td>2. No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28</td>
<td>Please explain your experience with the Commissions</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30</td>
<td>What is your view of when the government gives priority to veterans? For example with project tenders.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31</td>
<td>Do you know anyone who has already received a pension?</td>
<td>1. Yes, veterans’</td>
<td>2. Yes, martyrs’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>32</td>
<td>When someone in the community receives a pension or a project tender, and others do not, does this create problems like jealousy or not? Can you explain?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>33</td>
<td>Have you received a medal?</td>
<td>1. Received</td>
<td>2. Refused</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>34</td>
<td>Are you content with the medal?</td>
<td>1. Content</td>
<td>2. Not content</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35</td>
<td>Why?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

I will read eight statements, please let me know if you think that each one is true or false.

1. True, 2. False, 3. Don’t know

| 36 | The government has an obligation to look after veterans. |   |   |
| 37 | It is important that the government consults with veterans about governance. |   |   |
| 38 | The government has yet to valorise the clandestine front. |   |   |
| 39 | Sometimes veterans do not need to follow the law because they contributed to the nation. |   |   |
| 40 | It is important that former resistance members have a higher social status than those who did not participate. |   |   |
| 41 | It is important that former resistance members have a higher standard of living than those who did not participate. |   |   |
| 42 | Those who were part of the resistance may mobilise themselves to guarantee national security. |   |   |
| 43 | Those who participated in the resistance do not need permission from the government to carry arms in the case that problems arise. |   |   |

**IV. Political integration & security:** Next I am going to ask you questions about your political participation
and security.

<p>| | | | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>44</td>
<td>Did you vote in the 2007 elections?</td>
<td>1. Yes</td>
<td>2. No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45</td>
<td>Will you vote in the upcoming Parliamentary elections?</td>
<td>1. Yes</td>
<td>2. No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>46</td>
<td>Do you have a political party position?</td>
<td>1. Yes</td>
<td>2. No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>47</td>
<td>Which party?</td>
<td>1. Party:____________</td>
<td>2. Don’t know</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>48</td>
<td>Concerning leadership, who do you trust the most: local leaders, traditional leaders, or resistance leaders?</td>
<td>1. Local</td>
<td>2. Traditional</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>49</td>
<td>Concerning security, who do you trust the most: the PNTL, FFDTL, or foreign forces?</td>
<td>1. PNTL</td>
<td>2. FFDTL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50</td>
<td>In your view, is the resistance still going?</td>
<td>1. Yes</td>
<td>2. No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>51</td>
<td>Why?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

V. Integration & Social Networks: *This is the last section*

<p>| | | | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>52</td>
<td>Are you a member of a group or an association?</td>
<td>1. Yes [go to 53]</td>
<td>2. No [go to 55]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>54</td>
<td>Can you tell me about your group’s activities?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>56</td>
<td>Do you still maintain contact with your comrades from the resistance?</td>
<td>1. Yes [go to 58]</td>
<td>2. No [go to 57]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>57</td>
<td>If not…] Why? [go to 62]</td>
<td>1. War is over</td>
<td>2. Distance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

268
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Do you help each other, like giving or sharing goods?</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>60</td>
<td>1. Yes [go to 61]</td>
<td>2. No [go to 62]</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3. Don’t know [go to 62]</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

|61 | If yes, how do you help each other?                |   |   |
|   |                                                   |   |   |

|62 | Do you still maintain contact with your commander from the conflict period? |   |   |
|   | 1. Yes [go to 64]                                  |2. No [go to 63]                          |
|   | 3. Don’t know [go to 69]                           |   |   |

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>If not…] Why not?</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1. War is over</td>
<td>2. He is now a VIP</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3. Distance</td>
<td>4. Deceased</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5. Other</td>
<td>6. Don’t know</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Can you describe what you do in your relationship?</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1. Share info.</td>
<td>2. Tell stories</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3. Other</td>
<td>4. Don’t know</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Do you help each other, like giving or sharing goods?</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>66</td>
<td>1. Yes [go to 67]</td>
<td>2. No [go to 68]</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3. Don’t know [go to 68]</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

|67 | If yes, how do you help each other?                |   |   |
|   |                                                   |   |   |

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>68</th>
<th>Do you feel like you can ask your commander for help, such as employment or other necessities?</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1. Yes</td>
<td>2. No</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3. Don’t know</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

|69 | Do you have any recommendations? Final thoughts? |   |   |
|   |                                                   |   |   |
### Appendix C: Anonymised List of Interviewees

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Code</th>
<th>Sex</th>
<th>Timorese/ Non-Timorese</th>
<th>District</th>
<th>Descriptor</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>INT 01</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>Timorese</td>
<td>Dili</td>
<td>Analyst at security-focused local NGO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INT 02</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>Timorese</td>
<td>Dili</td>
<td>Staff member, peace-building local NGO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INT 03</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>Timorese</td>
<td>Dili</td>
<td>High-level administrator, DNACLN(^{163}); former resistance member</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INT 04</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>Timorese</td>
<td>Dili</td>
<td>Programme manager, peace-building local NGO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INT 05</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>Timorese</td>
<td>Dili</td>
<td>Programme manager, Data Verification Team</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INT 06</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>Timorese</td>
<td>Dili</td>
<td>High-level former resistance member</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INT 07</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>Timorese</td>
<td>Dili</td>
<td>Senior administrator, DNACLN; former clandestine member</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INT 08</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>Timorese</td>
<td>Baucau</td>
<td>Mid-level administrator, DNACLN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INT 09</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>Timorese</td>
<td>Dili</td>
<td>Mid-level former resistance member</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INT 10</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>Timorese</td>
<td>Dili</td>
<td>Analyst at security-focused local NGO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INT 11</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>Timorese</td>
<td>Dili</td>
<td>Senior manager, local NGO; former youth activist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INT 12</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>Timorese</td>
<td>Dili</td>
<td>High-level leader, F-FDTL; former high-level resistance leader</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INT 13</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>Timorese</td>
<td>Dili</td>
<td>Member of Parliament; former clandestine member</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INT 14</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>Timorese</td>
<td>Dili</td>
<td>Programme manager, democratization-focused international NGO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INT 15</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>Timorese</td>
<td>Dili</td>
<td>Member of Parliament</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INT 16</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>Timorese</td>
<td>Dili</td>
<td>Professor, National University of Timor-Leste</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INT 17</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>Non-Timorese</td>
<td>Dili</td>
<td>Government advisor and security sector analyst</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INT 18</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>Non-Timorese</td>
<td>Dili</td>
<td>Senior manager, international peace-building NGO; security sector analyst</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INT 19</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>Timorese</td>
<td>Manatutu</td>
<td>Mid-level former resistance member; involved in data verification</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INT 20</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>Timorese</td>
<td>Manatutu</td>
<td>Son of slain low-level former resistance member</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INT 21</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>Timorese</td>
<td>Manatutu</td>
<td>Mid-level former resistance member; involved in data verification</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INT 22</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>Timorese</td>
<td>Manatutu</td>
<td>Mid-level former clandestine member; involved in data verification</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INT 23</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>Timorese</td>
<td>Manatutu</td>
<td>Mid-level former resistance member; involved in data verification</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INT 24</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>Non-Timorese</td>
<td>Dili</td>
<td>United Nations political and security sector analyst</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INT 25</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>Timorese</td>
<td>Dili</td>
<td>Former clandestine leader, Commission member</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INT 26</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>Timorese</td>
<td>Dili</td>
<td>Technical advisor, DNACLN</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^{163}\) DNACLN - National Directorate for the Affairs of Former National Liberation Combatants (Direcção Nacional do Antigos Combatentes de Libertação Nacional), the government organ focused on veterans' issues.
| INT 28 | M | Timorese | Dili | Senior government official; involved in Commissions and data verification |
| INT 29 | M | Timorese | Dili | Senior administrator DNACLN |
| INT 30 | F | Non-Timorese | Dili | Scholar, focusing on resistance history |
| INT 31 | F | Timorese | Dili | Member of Parliament; former clandestine member |
| INT 32 | M | Timorese | Dili | Leader, clandestine organization |
| INT 33 | M | Non-Timorese | Dili | United Nations political and security sector analyst |
| INT 34 | M | Non-Timorese | Dili | Journalist |
| INT 35 | M | Timorese | Manatutu | Sub-district administrator |
| INT 36 | M | Timorese | Manatutu | Community member; restaurant manager |
| INT 37 | F | Timorese | Manatutu | Mid-level former resistance member |
| INT 38 | M | Timorese | Manatutu | Low-level former resistance member |
| INT 39 | F | Timorese | Manatutu | Community member; unemployed |
| INT 40 | F | Timorese | Baucau | OMPT activist |
| INT 41 | F | Timorese | Baucau | OMPT activist |
| INT 42 | M | Timorese | Baucau | Mid-level former resistance member |
| INT 43 | M | Timorese | Dili | Leader, resistance-era clandestine organization |
| INT 44 | M | Timorese | Dili | Leader, resistance-era clandestine organization |
| INT 45 | M | Timorese | Dili | Mid-level administrator, DNACLN |
| INT 46 | M | Timorese | Dili | Mid-level administrator, Department of Public Works |
| INT 47 | M | Timorese | Dili | Leader, resistance-era clandestine organization |
| INT 48 | M | Timorese | Dili | High-level leader, F-FDTL; former high-level resistance leader |
| INT 49 | M | Timorese | Dili | Low-level administrator, DNACLN |
| INT 50 | M | Timorese | Manatutu | Claimant seeking pension benefits |
| INT 51 | F | Non-Timorese | Dili | International development NGO worker |
| INT 52 | F | Non-Timorese | Dili | Business owner |
| INT 53 | M | Non-Timorese | Dili | Pro-Independence activist |
| INT 54 | M | Timorese | Dili | CNRT Party official |
| INT 55 | M | Timorese | Dili | Researcher, local NGO |
| INT 56 | M | Timorese | Dili | Member Homage Commission; high-level former FALINTIL |
| INT 57 | F | Timorese | Dili | Family member of resistance member |
| INT 58 | M | Timorese | Dili | High-level administrator, DNACLN; former resistance member |
| INT 59 | M | Timorese | Dili | CNRT Party official; Member of Parliament |
| INT 60 | M | Timorese | Dili | High-level former clandestine leader; leader of veterans’ association |
| INT 61 | M | Timorese | Dili | Son of martyred resistance member |
| INT 62 | M   | Timorese | Dili | High-level government actor; former leader of veterans’ association |
| INT 63 | F   | Non-Timorese | Dili | Member of UNMIT Political Affairs |
| INT 64 | M   | Timorese | Dili | Leader of organisation advocating for the rights of war widow and orphans |
| INT 65 | M   | Timorese | Dili | Campaign manager and former clandestine youth activist |
| INT 66 | M   | Non-Timorese | Dili | Area specialist, security analyst |
| INT 67 | M   | Timorese | Dili | Senior administrator DNACLN |
| INT 68 | F   | Timorese | Baucau | Female village council chief; former clandestine actor |
| INT 69 | F   | Timorese | Baucau | Female former clandestine actor |
| INT 70 | F   | Timorese | Dili | Female former clandestine actor |
| INT 71 | M   | Timorese | Baucau | District Administrator |
| INT 72 | M   | Non-Timorese | Baucau | NGO Project manager; formerly engaged with veterans’ employment scheme |
| INT 73 | M   | Timorese | Dili | Senior administrator, DNACLN; former resistance member |
| INT 74 | M   | Timorese | Dili | Aldeia (sub-village) chief |
| INT 75 | M   | Timorese | Dili | Political activist |
| INT 76 | M   | Non-Timorese | Dili | Researcher and lawyer; former political advisor to Gusmão |
| INT 77 | M   | Timorese | Aileu | High-level former resistance member; Homage Commission member |
| INT 78 | M   | Timorese | Aileu | Former high-level clandestine member |
| INT 79 | M   | Non-Timorese | Dili | UNMIT Official, Security Sector Reform Unit |
| INT 80 | M   | Timorese | Liquica | Village chief |
| INT 81 | M   | Timorese | Liquica | Keixa representative; clandestine actor |
| INT 82 | M   | Timorese | Liquica | Low-level former clandestine actor |
| INT 83 | M   | Timorese | Dili | High-level government administrator; former resistance actor; former post in Indonesian administration |
| INT 84 | M   | Non-Timorese | Dili | Technical advisor (databases and IT) to DNACLN |
| INT 85 | M   | Timorese | Dili | Programme manager, NGO; former clandestine youth activist |
| INT 86 | M   | Timorese | Dili | Assistant for the monument design process, DNACLN |
| INT 87 | M   | Timorese | Aileu | Former Nurep |
| INT 88 | M   | Timorese | Aileu | Former Nurep |
| INT 89 | M   | Timorese | Dili | Former Nurep |
| INT 90 | F   | Non-Timorese | Dili | NGO manager; legal specialist |
## Appendix D: Statistical Test Results

### Test I: Lautem as District of Birth x Most Trust in FFDTL

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chi-Square Tests</th>
<th>Value</th>
<th>df</th>
<th>Asymp. Sig. 2-sided</th>
<th>Exact Sig. 2-sided</th>
<th>Exact Sig. 1-sided</th>
<th>Point Probability</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pearson Chi-Square</td>
<td>17.485*</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Continuity Correction*</td>
<td>15.046</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Likelihood Ratio</td>
<td>14.709</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fisher's Exact Test</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Linear-by-Linear Association</td>
<td>17.353*</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N of Valid Cases 132

a. 1 cells (25.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 4.09.
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table
c. The standardized statistic is 4.166.

### Test II: Baucau as District of Birth x Most Trust in FFDTL

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chi-Square Tests</th>
<th>Value</th>
<th>df</th>
<th>Asymp. Sig. 2-sided</th>
<th>Exact Sig. 2-sided</th>
<th>Exact Sig. 1-sided</th>
<th>Point Probability</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pearson Chi-Square</td>
<td>21.959*</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Continuity Correction*</td>
<td>19.078</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Likelihood Ratio</td>
<td>18.168</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fisher's Exact Test</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Linear-by-Linear Association</td>
<td>21.792*</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N of Valid Cases 132

a. 1 cells (25.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 3.64.
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table
c. The standardized statistic is 4.668.
### Test III: Contact with Commanders x Contact with Comrades & odds ratio

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chi-Square Tests</th>
<th>Value</th>
<th>df</th>
<th>Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)</th>
<th>Exact Sig. (2-sided)</th>
<th>Exact Sig. (1-sided)</th>
<th>Point Probability</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pearson Chi-Square</td>
<td>30.794(^a)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Continuity Correction(b)</td>
<td>28.885</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Likelihood Ratio</td>
<td>30.025</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fisher's Exact Test</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Linear-by-Linear Association</td>
<td>30.655(^c)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N of Valid Cases</td>
<td>221</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

a. 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 16.13.
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table
c. The standardized statistic is 5.537.

### Risk Estimate

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Value</th>
<th>95% Confidence Interval</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Odds Ratio for Contact comrade or not (1.00 / 2.00)</td>
<td>6.966 / 1.00 / 2.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>For cohort Contact commander vs none = 1.00</td>
<td>2.652 / 1.623 / 4.333</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>For cohort Contact commander vs none = 2.00</td>
<td>.381 / .282 / .513</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N of Valid Cases</td>
<td>221</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Test IV: Urban x Robust Housing Materials

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chi-Square Tests</th>
<th>Value</th>
<th>df</th>
<th>Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)</th>
<th>Exact Sig. (2-sided)</th>
<th>Exact Sig. (1-sided)</th>
<th>Point Probability</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pearson Chi-Square</td>
<td>36.969(^a)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Continuity Correction(b)</td>
<td>34.749</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Likelihood Ratio</td>
<td>46.049</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fisher's Exact Test</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Linear-by-Linear Association</td>
<td>36.746(^c)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N of Valid Cases</td>
<td>166</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

a. 0 cells (0.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 17.40.
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table
c. The standardized statistic is -6.062.
## Test V: Robust Housing Materials x non-Agricultural Employment

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chi-Square Tests</th>
<th>Value</th>
<th>df</th>
<th>Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)</th>
<th>Exact Sig. (2-sided)</th>
<th>Exact Sig. (1-sided)</th>
<th>Point Probability</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pearson Chi-Square</td>
<td>26.135</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Continuity Correction</td>
<td>24.338</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Likelihood Ratio</td>
<td>28.230</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fisher's Exact Test</td>
<td>28.959</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Linear-by-Linear</td>
<td>25.959</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N of Valid Cases 199

- a. 2 cells (33.3%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .32.
- b. The standardized statistic is 8.280.

## Test VI: Urban x non-Agricultural Employment

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chi-Square Tests</th>
<th>Value</th>
<th>df</th>
<th>Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)</th>
<th>Exact Sig. (2-sided)</th>
<th>Exact Sig. (1-sided)</th>
<th>Point Probability</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pearson Chi-Square</td>
<td>79.568</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Likelihood Ratio</td>
<td>78.853</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fisher's Exact Test</td>
<td>77.375</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Linear-by-Linear</td>
<td>68.553</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N of Valid Cases 148

- a. 0 cells (0.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 21.28.
- b. Computed only for a 2x2 table
- c. The standardized statistic is -5.095.
Bibliography


Anten, Louise, Ivan Briscoe, and Marco Mezzera. 2012. ‘The Political Economy of State-Building in Situations of Fragility and Conflict: From Analysis to Strategy; A synthesis paper based on studies of Afghanistan, Democratic Republic of Congo, Guatemala, Kosovo and Pakistan Louise.’ Conflict Research Unit, Netherlands Institute of International Relations ‘Clingendael.’


‘Conis Santana's family meets with Commander Lere.’ 2012. Radio Television Timor-Leste, 1 October.


'Govt Should Pay Attention to Heroes' Skeletons.' 2010. Timor Post, 27 October.


Hanlon, J. 2004. 'It is possible to just give money to the poor.' Development and Change 32 (2): 375–383.


‘Lista Veteranus 2009 Sai ba 250,000 (The Veterans’ List Climbs to 250,000)’ 2013. *Diario*.


'More than 11,000 CPD-RDTL members remain in Fatuberliu,' Radio Timor-Leste, November 23, 2012.


‘PM Xanana asks for calm from veterans.’ Timor Post. 19 July 2010.

‘PNTL have not responded to the illegal group called "Xefe Estadu Maior Baze de Apoiu 1975.”’ Timor Post, 23 February 2011.


Pozhidaev, Dmitry. 2006. ‘Challenges of Traditional Violence in Peacebuilding.’ Available online: https://www.interdisciplinary.net/ptb/hhv/vcce/vcce1/Pozhidaev%20paper.pdf


Tilman, Alex. 2012. ‘How are government contracts awarded these days?’ Accessed online, 7 March 2013: [http://www.diakkalae.com/2012/01/how-are-government-contracts-awarded.html](http://www.diakkalae.com/2012/01/how-are-government-contracts-awarded.html)


