Doubt, dogmatism, and the Dunamis antithetikē: sextus empiricus on sceptical inquiry

Thesis

Sextus Empiricus’ account of Pyrrhonian Scepticism has been judged harshly in the history of philosophy. Since the verdict of Hume 1748 (12.128), Pyrrhonism has often been thought to be neither a worthwhile way of inquiring, nor a worthwhile way of life. This verdict is, I think, mistaken. My goal in this thesis is therefore to show that Sextus’ vision of Sceptical inquiry is more serious, sophisticated, and fruitful than it may seem, and thus can be the basis for a worthwhile life. I seek...

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Authors: Sykes, S

• Type of award: Mst taught course
• Level of award: Masters
• Awarding institution: University of Oxford
• Language: English
• Subjects: Philosophy, Ancient; Skepticism; Philosophy