

## Making a Hero for Lombok: The Shifting Category of *Pahlawan Nasional*

**Abstract:** Indonesia's category of 'national hero' or *pahlawan nasional* has evolved since it first emerged with Indonesian independence. This title went from a popular term for veterans, to a designated national category, to a centrepiece of New Order civil religion. This article chronicles further changes in the post-Suharto era both by a quantitative analysis of the entire pantheon of 179 *pahlawan* and by the case study of the first national hero for West Nusa Tenggara Province: TGKH M. Zainuddin Abdul Madjid, also known as Tuan Guru Pancor, from the island of Lombok. The category of *pahlawan nasional* has become both more diverse and more political in the last two decades.

**Keywords:** national hero, Lombok, West Nusa Tenggara, Muhammad Zainuddin Abdul Madjid, *pahlawan nasional*

### Introduction

National heroes are a common trapping of modern nationalism around the world (Eriksonas 2004). Whether enshrined in a special tomb as in France (Parienté 2013), embalmed in state as in China (Wakeman 1985), or heralded in proclamations and government propaganda as in Vietnam (Tréglodé 2012), states often carefully present their ideal 'heroes' in national life so as to inculcate desired values or to curate the narrative of national history.

In the Indonesian case, the idea of 'national heroes' is not only particularly formalized, but also particularly bureaucratized. Indonesia's state designation for national hero (in Indonesian, *pahlawan nasional*) has been in existence for 60 years. Under the Sukarno and Suharto governments, this category was used to frame and curate national history. The president inducted new *pahlawan* to convey a message about the nature of the state, its collective history, and the characteristics and contributions that the state valued. This process can be termed the 'curation of history' because, as with curation in a museum or exhibition, the state chooses what merits inclusion and why. The Indonesian state in different eras has chosen which historical figures to highlight through elevation to special status so as to communicate with its people. Messages strengthened in this way included how Indonesian

identity was forged in opposition to colonialism, the primacy of military struggle, and the integration of all islands into a single, cohesive political unit. Over the years, the process of selecting and inaugurating new national heroes – individuals subject to such veneration that their elevation can be termed ‘canonization’ – and the process of celebrating the heroes already on the official list have been governed by an increasing number of regulations and ritual practices.

Both the regulatory and the ritual aspects have been studied by previous authors. This includes the pre-colonial discussions of heroism in Indonesia (Reid 1979), state manipulation of local heroes and their historiography (Hoskins 1987), the use of *pahlawan nasional* in the national education curriculum (Leigh 1994), the nature of female heroism (Taylor 1989; Rutherford 1993), and the veneration of designated heroes (Cunningham 1989). In particular, Schreiner (1995, 1997) has articulated the central place of *pahlawan nasional* in Indonesian civil religion: the rituals and practices (especially during Suharto’s New Order) that inculcated and enforced patriotism and loyalty to the state and its officers. Although civil religion and the kind of Pancasila worship of the authoritarian Suharto regime have both changed and receded since 1998, there still exist key national ceremonies and collective practices of patriotism – and *pahlawan nasional* are still placed at the centre of many of these activities.

One particularly fraught aspect of the national pantheon of heroes in Indonesia, given the regional and ethnic diversity of the archipelago, is the need to represent the full geographic spectrum of the country. Thus, the inauguration of a first *pahlawan nasional* from a particular province is telling (Barnard 1997), especially in recent decades when only a minority of provinces have remained without any national hero. First, this reflects the struggle by that region to prove that its history and people are no less ‘heroic’ than other regions. Second, the province must find an individual to align the popular aspirations of local

society and the regional government with national interests and narratives. Third, although varying across different eras, the new hero must be woven into the national narrative curated by the Indonesian government in its official understanding of the country's history.

Previous studies of the Indonesian category of national hero are now over twenty years old, meaning that none of the transformations of Indonesia's post-democratization era (Reformasi) have been considered. Of the 179 officially designated *pahlawan nasional*, 75 come from this period, providing plenty of scope for major changes in the nature of the category in modern Indonesian life. This article uses a historical survey of the canonization process, close analysis of the pantheon officially designated *pahlawan nasional*, and field observations of a recent canonization to argue that the category of *pahlawan nasional* – which was previously a tool for the regime to curate national history – has now become a tool for electoral politics and strategic alignments. This reflects new political realities in an era of decentralized democracy, in which a wider range of understandings of nationalism and national history are permitted by the state (i.e., curation is less centralized) and where power is spread among many different competing ideologies and regional interests.

### **Emergence of *Pahlawan Nasional* as an Aspect of Civil Religion**

The category that is today *pahlawan nasional*, or 'national hero', evolved over a number of decades in 20th century Indonesia. The term *pahlawan* as a Persian-derived word for hero was already in general circulation in Malay (the basis of the modern Indonesian language) well before the 20th century, but without a specific nationalist meaning (Klinkert 1902: 635). As modern nationalist movements grew, though, they began to appropriate the term for their cause. In the 1930s, Sukarno had already identified three key exemplars of Indonesian resistance against the Dutch (conveniently also from three different major ethnic communities: Javanese, Minangkabau, and Acehnese) and grouped them together – despite

no evidence that their struggles were connected – as *pahlawan tiga sekawan*, ‘three hero friends’ (Reid 1979: 294). There is also a vague recognition in the Indonesian Constitution of 1945 (chapter 3, article 15) that ‘The President shall give titles, decorations, and other honours as designated under law’, but no specific title of *pahlawan* is introduced.

The term took on a new and more distinct meaning with the Indonesian revolution of 1945-49. The first great battle of this war of independence, November 1945 in Surabaya, produced a tremendous outburst of popular resistance to the Allied reoccupation of the city, and the fighting of ordinary Indonesian youth on 10 November was deemed ‘heroic’. Before the revolution even concluded, this gave rise to a national holiday on the Indonesian calendar, ‘Heroes Day’ (*Hari Pahlawan*) annually on 10 November, in recognition of the fighters who sacrificed in the fight against recolonization.<sup>1</sup> Initially, the holiday celebrated the normal, everyday people of Indonesia who undertook historic resistance in the revolution. Vice-President Hatta’s comments for Heroes Day in 1952 (when a monument to the Surabaya fighters was unveiled) speaks of the ‘Heroes [*pahlawan*] who died fighting in Surabaya, many of whose names we do not know,’ while still asserting that they unambiguously fought not just for their own children and grandchildren but for the whole ‘nation and country’ (Hatta 2002: 133). At this point, the category of *pahlawan* functioned more like veteran (Hatta also spoke of the many heroes who had become handicapped from their fighting) than a special category of exceptional individual.<sup>2</sup> Still, the sanctification of 10 November began the process that has led subsequently to the creation of a special category of *pahlawan nasional*.

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<sup>1</sup> This was already a designated national holiday by 1948. See Arsip Propinsi Aceh, Koleksi Kecamatan Lhok’Nga, #88 where letters from the Ministry of Religion lay out the holidays for the upcoming year, including setting the dates for all religious holidays and national holidays.

<sup>2</sup> This is the meaning still in use in the term *Taman Makam Pahlawan*, or Heroes’ Cemeteries, which are found throughout the provinces of Indonesia for veterans of the revolution.

Over the course of the 1950s, public debate and presidential action slowly transformed the category of *pahlawan* from a general designation for veterans to a special designation for exceptional individuals. For example, Kartini was broadly accepted as the paragon of Indonesian womanhood, and her heroism was commemorated annually on 18 April (although not with a formal national holiday). This prompted pushback from Islamic political parties, who put forward alternatives, such as journalist and activist Rohana Kudus, as alternative heroines who accomplished more in their nationalist work (Djaja 1956).<sup>3</sup> Many different party activities actually showed that the idea of a special class of national heroes was already circulating in popular discourse, like when the Partai Sarekat Islam Indonesia claimed to be the heir of *pahlawan* including Sultan Agung and Prince Diponegoro (Partai Sjarikat Islam Indonesia 1953: 33-35). This was not limited to political parties, though. When renaming streets to replace Dutch with Indonesian place names, heroes' names were commonly used, generating an informal pantheon of appropriately important nationalist figures (Reid 1979: 297). In 1957, Sukarno formalized the celebrations of Heroes' Day annually on 10 November by setting guidelines in a presidential decree, although this did not yet go so far as naming specific individuals as heroes.<sup>4</sup> The idea that specific individuals should be granted a special title – the title initially used by the government was *Pahlawan Kemerdekaan Nasional* or 'National Independence Hero' – was first codified in 1958, when Sukarno gave himself the power (under his constitutional mandate) to grant this title in a presidential decree.<sup>5</sup>

The key development in the creation of the category as used today came in 1959, when Sukarno for the first time assigned a title to an individual. The recipient, Abdoel Moeis, was a famous literary author but also a key leader of the Sarekat Islam movement in the early

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<sup>3</sup> Notably, this debate took place using the term *srikandi* (an explicitly female heroine), as opposed to the gender-neutral *pahlawan*.

<sup>4</sup> Keputusan Presiden Republik Indonesia no. 217 tahun 1957, as found in Schreiner 1995: 268-73.

<sup>5</sup> Keputusan Presiden Republik Indonesia no. 241 tahun 1958, as found in Schreiner 1995: 274-77.

decades of the twentieth century. When he passed in 1959, Sukarno designated him *perintis kemerdekaan*, or trailblazer of independence.<sup>6</sup> Sukarno was struck at the contributions of this prominent figure, whom he had known from activist days under Cokroaminoto in the 1910s,<sup>7</sup> and also concerned that the younger generation did not appreciate what he had done for the development of modern (and independent) Indonesia. Thus, with a decree to honour Abdoel Moeis, there emerged clearly the modern category of *pahlawan* as a designation for exceptional individuals in Indonesian history.

Once one hero was designated, the canonization of heroes scaled up rather quickly. Sukarno named two more later in 1959, followed by one more in 1960, eight in 1961, three in 1962, five in 1963, a whopping 14 in 1964 and 12 in 1965.<sup>8</sup> The category of *pahlawan* was re-regulated by a presidential decree in 1963 (overriding the 1958 decree) and a presidential regulation in 1964 (expanding and regulating the types of honours for military matters, with some incidental reframing of *pahlawan* status) (Schreiner 1995: 278-91). The hero-making of the Sukarno era was disproportionately focused on those who had been crucial during the nationalist movement and the Indonesian Revolution and had just passed away. This was epitomized in the last individual canonized by Sukarno: Sutan Sjahrir, Indonesia's first Prime Minister, who died in 1966 while still technically under house arrest (on orders issued by

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<sup>6</sup> Surat Keputusan Presiden no. 218 tahun 1959, as discussed in Abdullah 2017: 10. Note that in 2019, the category of *perintis kemerdekaan* carries a different meaning: not an individual of exceptional contribution in the history of the country, but rather one of the individuals who actively fought in the 1945-49 revolution – thus, the meaning that had been initially ascribed to *pahlawan* in the 1950s. See Kementerian Sosial Republik Indonesia 2018a.

<sup>7</sup> Oral History with Harsono Tjokroaminoto, interviewed by Wardiningsih Surjohardjo, ANRI Koleksi Sejarah Lisan, 1982 #60 tape 8.

<sup>8</sup> See Figure 1 below for full numbers. Throughout this section and the next, individual data points and collective statistics are based on a spreadsheet compiled from the information on the website of the Kementerian Sosial, particularly the Pahlawan Center, and supplemented for recent years by news reports in the respected national daily *Kompas*. This data has been checked against Schreiner 1997 for those canonized before 1993. The author has made the spreadsheet available to the public at <https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1tNfIXZL5yphc3GG9MncdKeCvqQ:95lsG2HkZi3E2pPk/edit?usp=sharing> and welcomes feedback, questions, or corrections.

Sukarno, no less) and yet within days of his passing got *pahlawan nasional* designation and a state burial in the national ‘heroes’ cemetery’ in Kalibata, Jakarta (Mrázek 1994: 491-94).

The category and the process changed somewhat under the New Order of President (cum General) Suharto. His regime strongly controlled the category of *pahlawan nasional* as part of its history-making project. As Barbara Leigh has noted, in this period heroism was built on ‘the origins of the modern Indonesian state in the war-making acts of men’ (Leigh 1994: 32). Disproportionately, heroes designated in this period were not only male, they were connected to the military, and particularly to the crucial moments of the Indonesian Revolution and the 1965 supposed Communist coup attempt (which sparked the army counter-coup that brought the New Order to power). This began with the most obvious candidates, the army leaders assassinated that night in September 1965, who were quickly canonized the following month with the special category *pahlawan revolusi* (Heroes of the Revolution), even before Suharto became president (Schreiner 1997: 266-67).<sup>9</sup> It continued through the three decades of his rule, with 10 of the 56 heroes designated from 1967 to 1998 holding military rank, and many others famous for their armed struggle against the Dutch (during the Revolution or before). The militarization of national heroes was par for the course of the New Order’s recasting of history to highlight the army (McGregor 2007; Steedly 2013), and is similar to other military-backed regimes in the region (Khin Mar Mar Kyi 2012; Curaming 2003).

Even those heroes whose legacy was not strictly military were reimagined in exclusively martial terms. For example, Prince Diponegoro, who was a traditional noble, a religious leader, and a leader in anti-Dutch resistance in the 1820s and 1830s, had been discussed as a hero as far back as Sukarno’s 1930s ‘three heroic friends’. He was designated

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<sup>9</sup> These heroes also got special attention as a special category in public remembrances of 1 October (*Hari Kesaktian Pancasila*, or Sanctity of Pancasila Day)—separate and distinct from the Heroes’ Day celebrations in November—and in public monuments. See Schreiner 2005.

an official national hero in 1973 (Kementerian Sosial Republik Indonesia 2018b). From that time, though, according to his leading biographer,

Diponegoro was seen – especially in his guise as a modern-day Indonesian *pahlawan nasional* (national hero) – as principally a military leader. Nearly all the statues in Indonesian cities depict him astride his charger, Kyai Gitayu, his horse rearing up, its front hooves pawing the air while the prince’s *jubah* [robes] and turban flutter in the wind as he urges his forces forward against the Dutch. ... with Suharto’s army-supported New Order (1966-98) in full control, Diponegoro’s image had been seemingly hijacked by the Indonesian army. (Carey 2008: 9)

Similar militarization (and the application of a national framework to their struggles)

happened even for local folk heroes who did not get canonized into the national pantheon (e.g., the reimagining of Wona Kaka of Sumba; Hoskins 1987).

The process of designating national heroes under the New Order was heavily personalized, too. Basuki Rachmat, who assisted Suharto in his takeover by pushing President Sukarno to sign away his power, was canonized on the very day of his death (Schreiner 1997: 266). Even after additional bureaucratic layers were implemented, such as the requirement that nominees be designated first by districts and then by provinces before receiving national consideration, Suharto still pushed through personal candidates quickly. His beloved wife, popularly known as Ibu Tien, passed away on 28 April 1996; all of lower level nomination bureaucracy raced to process her file such that Suharto issued a presidential decree to name her a *pahlawan nasional* a month later, on 30 May 1996—an incredibly quick turnaround especially for a hero whose main qualification was devotion to her husband (although official accounts gave much more lofty credentials; Kementerian Sosial Republik Indonesia 2018c).

Even while the pantheon became more militarized and personally inflected under Suharto, it also became increasingly national and formalized. More and more provinces were represented by at least one official national hero, and the process for nominating and designating these heroes became steeped in classic New Order bureaucracy (Barnard 1997; Cunningham 1989). The government also fuelled the cult of national heroes by publishing

authorized biographies (written to strongly support the official history narrative of the New Order) aimed at children – a classic example of the state curating history (Schreiner 1997: 273-75). The celebration of Heroes' Day on 10 November definitively shifted away from remembering the veterans of Surabaya and towards the celebration of the designated pantheon of national heroes. Under Suharto the ceremonies were strictly formulaic, with what one observer called 'elements of state worship', like the roll-call of honours, reburials of veterans and designated *pahlawan* into state-run Heroes Cemeteries (*Taman Makam Pahlawan*), and speeches to honour the fallen heroes (Schreiner 1997: 276). The special status for national heroes was reinforced by the aggressive use of their names almost as regional patron saints. For example, in Padang, the city's parade ground, the main street in town, the provincial State Islamic Institute, and numerous other geographic and institutional features were named after West Sumatra's leading *pahlawan*, Imam Bonjol.<sup>10</sup>

Thus, in the first 50 years of Indonesia's independence, the category of *pahlawan* shifted from being a loose popular term, to a government designation for those prominent individuals who led the independence effort, to practically a para-religious status with extensive ritual trappings. Those canonized were strictly figures who had some 'national' importance, either to the president himself or to the narrative cultivated of a non-sectarian, military-led, patriarchal, development state.

### **How have national heroes changed in the last two decades?**

Since Reformasi in 1998, Indonesian hero-making has changed yet again. Although the central idea – that *pahlawan nasional* is a status for exceptional individuals of the past – remains true today, the designation of new heroes is becoming less tied to the personality of the president and more connected to questions of political patronage for the heirs (familial

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<sup>10</sup> Author's observations.

and ideological) and home districts of the honourees. The process of canonization is also more regularized.

The legal context for canonization was revised with Law 20 of 2009, on Titles, Decorations and Honours (Undang-undang Republik Indonesia nomor 20 tahun 2009 tentang Gelar, Tanda Jasa, dan Tanda Kehormatan). This law presents itself as consolidating the regulations on official titles, which were up until then spread throughout many different legal instruments – most of which were legally outdated and ‘already did not conform with the requirements of *reformasi*’, according to the legislative history (Undang-undang Republik Indonesia nomor 20 tahun 2009 tentang Gelar, Tanda Jasa, dan Tanda Kehormatan: penjelasan p. 2). The law defines *pahlawan nasional* as ‘a title given to Indonesian citizens or someone who fought against colonialism in the territory that is now part of the Republic of Indonesia who died defending the nation and country, or who during his life undertook heroic actions or produced extraordinary deeds or works for the development and advancement of the nation and country of the Republic of Indonesia’ (article 1, clause 4). The law also creates a Council (*Dewan*) made up of two academics, two military figures, and three decorated civilians to oversee titles, decorations and honours; this council replaces two previous bodies (one on decorations and honours; another on *pahlawan*) and advises the president on nominations. The law is complemented by regulations from the president (Peraturan Pemerintah nomor 35 tahun 2010) and the Minister of Social Affairs (Peraturan Menteri Sosial nomor 15 tahun 2012) to bring it into force. These require, among other things, committees at the district and provincial level to nominate any potential *pahlawan nasional* (limited to 13 people, representing ‘practitioners, academics, experts, historians, and related institutions’) and a seminar to publicize the results of research on the potential hero (Peraturan Menteri Sosial Republic Indonesia nomor 15 tahun 2012, Bab II pasal 8, pasal 10).

(The latter was already commonplace but was not previously mandated under law [Barnard 1997: 518-20].)

This 2009 law (with its associated regulations) is not the only one touching on heroes; for example, the 2011 law on currency formalized the practice (in place since 2000) whereby Indonesia has used the images of designated *pahlawan nasional* on its currency (Undang-Undang nomor 7 tahun 2011 tentang Mata Uang, pasal 7; Setiawan 2016). Additionally, not all changes since the start of Reformasi have been driven by new laws; many preceded the 2009 legislation, and other important developments have resulted from how the presidents have chosen to use their authority.

Perhaps the most visible change from previous eras has been the calendrical regularization of the canonization process. Whereas before 1998, heroes could be designated at any time of year, since 2000 all new *pahlawan nasional* have been inaugurated in the week leading up to 10 November, Heroes Day. The canonization of new heroes has also become part of the ritual of civil religion, with a televised ceremony in which the president presents honours to the descendants (or, when necessary, appropriate representatives) of the new heroes. This ceremony in some ways replaces the common, local liturgies of Heroes Day performed during the New Order; in an environment with little living memory of the Indonesian Revolution and less glorification of the armed forces, the old performative remembrances may have seemed less pressing.

Since 1998, too, only one year has gone without at least one new hero. As a result, 75 of the 179 *pahlawan nasional* (41.9%) have been canonized since the fall of Suharto. This is not an entirely unprecedented rate, as Sukarno canonized at a faster pace during his seven years designating *pahlawan* (47 heroes or 26.25% of the current total), but the steady increase over the last two decades is notable. Although there have been complaints in academic circles since the 1970s about overly inflated numbers of national heroes (Schreiner 1995: 332), the

issue is undeniably more acute now. Partly, this is based on an extension of the ritual aspects of Heroes Day (as described above) such that there now exists an expectation that the president will induct new heroes into the pantheon each year. The only exception was 2012, when President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono used the ceremony to recognize Sukarno and Hatta, who had been named *pahlawan* in 1986 but had not received any special ceremony. (The induction ceremony also may have been intended to provide an opportunity for political reconciliation between Yudhoyono and Megawati Soekarnoputri; any attempt in this direction was decidedly unsuccessful [Liauw 2012].) Partly, the steady increase may be dictated by the desire of presidents to use *pahlawan* canonizations as political currency.

Number of Pahlawan Nasional by Year




Figure 1: Number of Pahlawan Nasional by year, with the new additions in a given year shown with bars (scale on the left) and the total numbers tracked with the line (scale on the right). Sources for these figures are from Kementerian Sosial webpages and news reports.

Observers can disagree as to whether the nomination and selection process has become more nakedly political since Reformasi. On the one hand, it was certainly a political exercise under both Sukarno and Suharto. On the other hand, some recent choices (including the case study presented in detail below) seem to be more in response to political interests than in previous, more authoritarian regimes, when the president did not need the same

efforts to ensure continued elite buy-in to the government's program. Additionally, there have been numerous public, political disputes about the nomination of controversial candidates for *pahlawan* status. Most notably, since the deaths of former presidents Suharto and Abdurrahman Wahid, national parties have engaged in grandstanding about whether these figures deserve canonization and who would support or oppose their canonization (e.g., Riani 2018).

Certainly, the New Order emphasis on regional representation has been widened, and more provinces are now represented. Even as the number of Indonesian provinces has continued to climb, the percentage of provinces with a national hero has also increased. The calculation of this data point year-by-year is complicated by the separation of Timor Leste from Indonesia and by the fact that two provinces, Banten and North Maluku, already had national heroes before they became provinces, but 21 of the 27 provinces (77.78%) that existed in 1998 had *pahlawan*, and 30 of the 34 provinces (88.24%) in 2018 did. Nine provinces have had their first national hero in the Reformasi era, including some longstanding provinces like Central Kalimantan and West Nusa Tenggara. As of December 2018, only four remain without a national hero: East Kalimantan, Central Sulawesi, West Papua, and North Kalimantan.<sup>11</sup> This reflects increased demand from the regions for canonization of their local heroes, in line with the regional autonomy environment. It also changes the strongly centralized commemoration of *pahlawan nasional* under the Suharto regime, which proactively focused attention on the national and relegated the location of individuals' heroism to secondary importance, although there was admittedly some effort to provide geographic diversity among those who had contributed to the national cause (Schreiner 1997: 283; Barnard 1997: 511).

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<sup>11</sup> East Kalimantan was established in 1956; Central Sulawesi was established in 1964; West Papua (as West Irian Jaya) was established in 2001; and North Kalimantan was established in 2012. Thus, the lack of a *pahlawan* from a province is not necessarily connected to a more recent establishment as a province.

### Pahlawan Nasional by Province

Year in parentheses is the year of the province's first pahlawan nasional




Figure 2: Number of Pahlawan Nasional by Province, presented in the order in which provinces had their first national hero. Sources for these figures are from Kementerian Sosial webpages and news reports.

The diversity is not only regional; there have also been specific concessions to minority ethnic communities. In 2009, John Lie (also known as Jahja Daniel Dharma or Lie Tjeng Tjoan) was canonized – the first (and thus far only) Indonesian of Chinese descent to receive this honour (Kementerian Sosial Republik Indonesia 2018d). His canonization was taken as a great victory for the Chinese Indonesian community, and prominent Chinese Indonesian had lobbied in favour of his nomination (Agmasari 2018). Perhaps John Lie was the most palatable to national leaders because he fit many of the old stereotypes of a *pahlawan nasional*: a naval commander during the Indonesian Revolution who reached the rank of rear admiral, he thus connected back to the Sukarno-era trope of classic nationalism and the Suharto-era trope of military status.

On the whole, though, heroes in the Reformasi era are less likely to have armed forces backgrounds. At a seminar on Lombok in 2010, a figure from the Ministry of Social Affairs (which houses the bureaucrats working on the hero canonization process) went to great lengths to stress that the Reformasi era has seen more civilian and fewer military heroes.<sup>12</sup> Even some of those martial figures who have been inducted since 1998 – like Bung Tomo, the famous leader of militia fighting against the Dutch in the Battle of Surabaya, canonized in 2007 – have been those who did not represent the centralized command structure of the Indonesian armed forces and thus were overlooked by the Suharto regime. Additionally, the categories of contribution for *pahlawan* have now been collapsed. Whereas previously individuals were nominated to specific categories, such as *pahlawan revolusi*, *pahlawan pergerakan nasional*, or even *pahlawan proklamator* for the two individuals who proclaimed Indonesia’s independence (Schreiner 1997: 266-67), now such designations have been elided. The online, Ministry of Social Affairs-curated Pahlawan Center does not differentiate between these categories for those canonized before 2009, despite the fact that were used differentially under Sukarno and Suharto.<sup>13</sup> Now, the generic category into which all new heroes are inducted is simply *pahlawan nasional*; the 2009 law (article 4, clause 1) gives this as the only title awarded nationally.

Although the current process has less of a preference for military leaders, it remains noticeably androcentric. Women make up a distinct minority of the national pantheon—14 of the current 179 heroes, or 7.82%. Among the 75 heroes canonized since the fall of Suharto, only four are women (5.33%), and one of those was former first lady H. Fatmawati Soekarno, canonized by her own daughter, President Megawati Soekarnoputri, in 2000. The others are

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<sup>12</sup> Author’s notes from Seminar Nasional Peran TGH. Muhammad Zainuddin Abdul Madjid dalam Pembangunan di Nusa Tenggara Barat, Universitas Mataram, 24 July 2010.

<sup>13</sup> Admittedly, the website is also imprecise or incorrect in other ways (e.g., misidentifying Haji Agus Salim as “Kyai Haji Agus Salim,” and thoroughly inconsistent spellings of heroes’ names), but the non-differentiation of categories seems to be intentional.

Opu Daeng Risaju (an Islamic activist and independence fighter from South Sulawesi, canonized in 2006), Malahayati (a sixteenth-century Acehnese admiral and the earliest historical figure in the pantheon, canonized in 2017) and Agung Hj. Andi Depu (a revolutionary leader in West Sulawesi, canonized in 2018).

While during the New Order, the participation of historians seen as ‘national’ (i.e., from major universities on Java) was an important element in the process of approval for potential *pahlawan nasional* (Barnard 1997: 518-20), this process has both widened and become more formalistic. For the canonization of several Islamic politicians of the 1950s who were involved in the PRRI rebellion and thus whose candidacies were opposed by the military, international historians were also strong supporters whose voices carried weight.<sup>14</sup> The investment of a ‘national’ or ‘international’ seminar or conference on the legacy of the proposed *pahlawan nasional* is now a regulatory requirement, not just de rigueur, before a province forwards a nomination to the Ministry of Social Affairs. Such a seminar, of course, must bring in leading academic figures to endorse the proposed candidate.

Many of the broad changes described above can be seen in the particular case study of the first *pahlawan nasional* from West Nusa Tenggara Province. The first hero canonized for that province was an Islamic cleric and social leader, Muhammad Zainuddin Abdul Madjid.

### **Muhammad Zainuddin Abdul Madjid, known as Tuan Guru Pancor**

Tuan Guru Kyai Haji Muhammad Zainuddin Abdul Madjid, more often known on Lombok as Tuan Guru Pancor (using a religious title ‘Tuan Guru’ and the village where he centred his

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<sup>14</sup> Interview with Achmad Fauzie Natsir, Cinere, Depok, West Java, 20 June 2009. He was particularly grateful for the support of Dr Audrey Kahin of Cornell, who (he believes) made the difference for the nomination of his late father, Mohammad Natsir, and another Masjumi politician, Sjafruddin Prawiranegara. Their nominations were rejected in 2007 at the stage of cabinet consultations due to opposition by the military, but were rescued by the president in 2008 amid strong public advocacy, including by Dr Kahin. The author of this article had a similar experience of being in high demand to consult and support a nomination; see below.

operations),<sup>15</sup> was born to a wealthy family of traders in East Lombok around the turn of the twentieth century. In 1923, he and his parents set out for Mecca on pilgrimage, but the son did not return to the Indies with his parents; instead, he stayed in Mecca and studied at the Madrasah Saulatiah, a respected institution for Islamic studies founded by a South Asian scholar in the nineteenth century.<sup>16</sup>

After his graduation in Mecca in 1933, he returned to his native East Lombok with the intention of setting up a school. Although his first attempt failed because the local population was wary of the formalized structure and new curriculum that Tuan Guru Pancor brought from his time abroad, the 1937 second attempt – a school for boys called Nahdlatul Wathan (Revival of the Nation) – was a tremendous success. Its system of seven grades, set curriculum, and high standards of Arabic fluency were all new in the Lombok context. In 1943, Tuan Guru Pancor opened a second school called Nahdlatul Banat (Renaissance of Daughters), specifically for girls, which was also an innovation in Islamic education locally.

The success of his schools and the resulting branch schools that alumni founded across the island led to the formal establishment of a mass organization in 1953, also with the name Nahdlatul Wathan, which is now the dominant Islamic group on Lombok and claims to be the third-largest Islamic organization in the country.<sup>17</sup> Tuan Guru Pancor led this group – not only as the spiritual head but also, for almost the rest of his life, as its day-to-day leadership – until he passed away in 1997. During this time, Nahdlatul Wathan (NW) brought about significant social change on Lombok and among the ethnic Sasak diaspora. This included the promotion of a new textual orthodoxy to replace traditional and syncretic beliefs

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<sup>15</sup> On the use of the title ‘Tuan Guru’ among Sasak Muslim leaders, see Fahrurrozi 2018.

<sup>16</sup> This information is agreed by all sources. Among the hagiographic biographies of Tuan Guru Pancor that one might consult, Nu’man 1999 was written by a son-in-law and former secretary of Tuan Guru Pancor. Hagiographies with more academic trappings include Masnun 2007 and Noor, Habib, and Zuhdi 2004.

<sup>17</sup> The organization’s claim to be the third largest after Nahdlatul Ulama and Muhammadiyah is much disputed and not grounded in serious study.

and practices among the Muslim community (Cederroth 1981; Baharuddin 2007) and social programs like support for government family planning initiatives.<sup>18</sup>

Tuan Guru Pancor was active not only in the religious field, but also in politics. In the 1950s, he was a member of the Constitutional Assembly for Masjumi, the largest Islamic political party (Hidayat and Fogg 2018). Although Masjumi was disbanded in 1960, this was not the end of his political career; in the 1970s, as a sign of appreciation to the Suharto regime for its elimination of the Communist Party (seen as a threat to Islam), Tuan Guru Pancor became a stalwart of Golkar. He both represented Golkar in the national parliament from 1972-1982 and enforced loyalty to Golkar among all of the cadres and leaders of NW.<sup>19</sup>

After Tuan Guru Pancor's passing in 1997, the organization Nahdlatul Wathan went through a painful schism. The organizational congress immediately after Tuan Guru Pancor's death chose the younger of his two daughters (by two different mothers), Siti Raehanun, as the new organizational leader. A faction arose in opposition to this selection, supported by the elder daughter (Siti Rauhun) but premised on the impermissibility of female leadership on religious matters, and this group chose Tuan Guru Pancor's grandson by Siti Rauhun, Muhammad Zainul Majdi – popularly known as Tuan Guru Bajang or the abbreviation TGB (“Young” Tuan Guru) – as a rival head of the organization. Bitter contention ensued at all levels of the organization, leading to two different factions of NW today, still under the same leaders as in 1998, who each claim to be the legitimate heirs of Tuan Guru Pancor's legacy and Islamic leadership (Hamdi 2011; Smith and Hamdi 2014).

### **Tuan Guru Pancor's Path to Become a National Hero**

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<sup>18</sup> Interview with Siti Rauhun and Siti Rohmi Djamilah, Pancor, Lombok Timur, Nusa Tenggara Barat, 22 September 2016; interview with Siti Raehanun, Mataram, Nusa Tenggara Barat, 30 March 2017.

<sup>19</sup> Interview with T.G. Taisir, Lombok Tengah, Nusa Tenggara Barat, 29 September 2016; interview with T.G.H. M. Yusuf Ma'mun, Pancor, Lombok Timur, Nusa Tenggara Barat, 4 October 2016.

Judging from the biography of Tuan Guru Pancor, he does not make an obvious case for *pahlawan nasional* status. His contributions were focused almost exclusively on Lombok, mostly in the religious sphere, and it is difficult to find ways in which he made a national impact or stood out on the national stage. Perhaps the most patriotic outward symbol of his career was the rather patriotic name for the Islamic organization he founded; Nahdlatul Wathan means ‘Revival of the Nation’ in Arabic, but even in this it is not historically clear whether ‘the nation’ aligned more closely with the Sasak ethnic group or the Indonesian state. Despite this, a combination of strong social support and acute political interests facilitated his canonization as a national hero in 2017. This case is informative about the nature of national hero-making in the present day.

Although Tuan Guru Pancor did not have a major national profile, his status on Lombok (which makes up some 70 per cent of the population of West Nusa Tenggara province) was unequalled (Cederroth 2004: 82; Ecklund 1979: 253; Wahid 1996). This popular authority was a great boon to his grandson who headed the NW-Pancor faction of the organization, TGB, to be elected governor of West Nusa Tenggara province in 2008 (the youngest governor in the country at the time, at age 36 [Prasongko 2018]), and it also meant that Tuan Guru Pancor’s name was already popularly revered as a local hero (although in an Islamic more than nationalist sense).<sup>20</sup> Thus, political and popular interests came together in 2010 to begin the formal discussion of nominating Tuan Guru Pancor as a *pahlawan nasional*, and the major state university of the province (Universitas Mataram) held a one-day seminar on Tuan Guru Pancor’s ‘role in development in West Nusa Tenggara’.<sup>21</sup>

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<sup>20</sup> This is, for example, the overwhelming tenor of the television programme produced about Tuan Guru Pancor by the local state-backed television channel, TVRI. “Figur Maulana Syeikh TGKH M. Zainuddin Abdul Madjid dalam Sejarah Perjalanan Nahdlatul Wathan,” from the TVRI series *Pigura*, accessed in Arsip Propinsi Nusa Tenggara Barat, Koleksi Media TVRI.

<sup>21</sup> The following notes come from the author’s observations while attending this seminar on 24 July 2010.

The seminar, with roughly one hundred people in attendance, was intended to initiate the bureaucratic processes that would lead to the eventual canonization.<sup>22</sup> To this end, speakers included a functionary invited from the Ministry of Social Affairs in Jakarta, to explain the process; the rector of Universitas Mataram, to voice the academic support for this candidate; the provincial secretary (Sekretaris Daerah), to add the government's support; and various former students and NW activists to speak to the virtues of Tuan Guru Pancor. The event was carefully balanced, with representatives of both rival factions of NW (at that time, on a reconciliation path [Fogg and Ending 2011]), and delegates from several different political parties – including a rather controversial speech by the provincial head of PDI-P, who tried to take on the mantle of Tuan Guru Pancor for his party (this was called out and shouted down by students in attendance). Although this seminar laid out clear steps for nominating a hero – starting with his home district of East Lombok and then the province of West Nusa Tenggara – no concrete outcomes seem to have eventuated from this gathering.

In fact, the idea of nominating Tuan Guru Pancor as a *pahlawan nasional* languished as nothing more than political rhetoric for four years, with no official action on the part of the district or provincial government. In 2014, the youth auxiliary of NW elected a new local head in East Lombok who made the nomination of Tuan Guru Pancor a priority, bringing the issue back to the fore and concentrating lobbying efforts on the bureaucrats who needed to initiate the process. The NW youth auxiliary and many allied groups demonstrated peacefully in front of the government of East Lombok in November 2014, and a district-level 'Regional Team to Study and Research Titles' was formed and funded within a few months (Effendi n.d.). This regional team, formally appointed in late 2014 and led by the district head's first deputy for governance (Asisten Satu Bidang Pemerintahan), worked for four months and

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<sup>22</sup> Interview with Dr H Fahrurrozi, IAIN-Mataram, Nusa Tenggara Barat, 30 July 2010.

reported its nomination to the province in mid-2015.<sup>23</sup> At this level, the bureaucratic work was carefully balanced between the two factions of NW and received strong moral support from the whole organization, and it was certainly facilitated by having TGB (head of the NW-Pancor faction) in the governor's mansion; he had been re-elected in 2013 by a wide margin (*Tempo* 2013).

After the report of the district committee, the West Nusa Tenggara government convened a provincial-level team along the same lines. Unfortunately, the initial nomination from the province to the national Ministry of Social Affairs was unsuccessful; it was found (by some accounts, multiple times) to have not fulfilled all the bureaucratic requirements to receive full consideration.<sup>24</sup> In order to overcome these challenges in a subsequent attempt, the governor appointed a new 'Team to Compile Documents for Putting Forward a Hero' on 10 March 2017 (Surat Keputusan Gubernur Nusa Tenggara Barat nomor 464-258 tahun 2017). The team was not the same type of provincial-level committee envisioned by national regulations; for example, its membership was 22 people across four working groups (well in excess of the legal limit of 13). It was instead to supplement and supersede the previous (unsatisfactory) work of the official 'Regional Team to Study and Research Titles'. The new effort was overseen mostly by academics at the local State Islamic Institute of Mataram (now State Islamic University) who made up seven of the 22 team members, with many of the others non-active (Surat Keputusan Gubernur Nusa Tenggara Barat nomor 464-258 tahun 2017, lampiran 1-4). As with previous committees, the overwhelming expertise among team members was in religion, rather than history, and the group was set up to include

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<sup>23</sup> Personal communication with Fahrurrozi, 28 November 2018. Dr Fahrurrozi served as a member of the East Lombok committee.

<sup>24</sup> In the face of multiple unsuccessful applications for an individual to be canonized as a *pahlawan nasional*, the Minister for Social Affairs revised the regulations in 2018 to say that an individual can only be re-nominated by a province once, and that can happen no sooner than two years after the initial application. Peraturan Menteri Sosial RI nomor 13 tahun 2018. Information on the West Nusa Tenggara case from personal communication with Fahrurrozi, 28 November 2018, and Abdul Quddos, 27 November 2018. The latter served as a member of the provincial committee.

representatives from other Islamic organizations besides NW, but a plurality of members had some status as NW religious leaders and most of those leaned towards the governor's faction (NW-Pancor). Much of the initial drafting was outsourced to junior individuals, though; one lead (albeit uncredited) author of the official biography produced by this team held just an undergraduate degree in oceanography and took this role just because he was a devotee of NW with extra time on his hands.<sup>25</sup>

This provincial team met intensely for a month, carefully reviewing, recompiling, and framing Tuan Guru Pancor's life in the way that it believed would be most palatable to the national bureaucrats that would eventually determine canonization. For example, one point of particular concern was the fact that Tuan Guru Pancor had led the delegation from the State of East Indonesia (one of the regional states set up by the reconquering Dutch) on the pilgrimage to Mecca in 1947, during the Indonesian Revolution. This was problematic both because Islamic authorities on Java at the time (those not yet reconquered by the Dutch after the Japanese occupation) had decreed that going to Mecca at a time of war was not advised because it would take away able-bodied fighters from the war effort, and because leading the delegation meant Tuan Guru Pancor must have worked with the Dutch to facilitate arrangements.<sup>26</sup> The committee worked to show that the initiative for this delegation of pilgrims came from Indonesian society rather than the neo-colonial government and that coordination with the Dutch was minimal.

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<sup>25</sup> This comes from the author's observations, and from personal communication with Abdul Quddos, 28 March 2017.

<sup>26</sup> Author's observations of a meeting of the provincial committee, 28 March 2017. The author was invited to attend the committee's meeting on the night this point was being discussed, and was further requested to provide input to help shore up the application on this point. The author provided further historical references regarding the revolution that were pursued by the committee, but broader recommendations (e.g., that one of the few ways Tuan Guru Pancor stood out among national Islamic scholars was his early, vocal, and successful advocacy for family planning) were not taken up by the committee. However, despite not having contributions reflected in the final publication, the author was consistently invited to further events to promote canonization (most notably the national seminar discussed below) seemingly to lend international credibility to the team's work.

Perhaps in part to counterbalance this potentially unpatriotic episode, the committee went to great lengths to frame Tuan Guru Pancor as a military hero in the Indonesian revolution, in addition to his other contributions. This narrative of his military leadership during the Indonesian revolution runs contrary to the best historical evidence available, including the testimony of several of Tuan Guru Pancor's students from the 1940s who were still alive during the nomination process.<sup>27</sup> It was, however, a prominent narrative from the early stages of the nomination process, highlighting the sacrifices of his two younger brothers in the field of battle (though somewhat more vague about Tuan Guru Pancor's precise contribution) (Effendi n.d.). The members of the provincial committee thought it important to have a military contribution to the struggle for independence – probably out of long-running understandings of the *pahlawan nasional* category as preferring military bravery and revolutionary credentials.

The capstone moment for the province's (re-)application process was a seminar held at Universitas Negeri-Jakarta on 5 April 2017. With a headline speech by TGB and the Vice-President of Indonesia in attendance, the event's purpose was to demonstrate national support for Tuan Guru Pancor to be West Nusa Tenggara province's first *pahlawan nasional* (Prabowo 2017). The organizing committee, a collaboration between the State University of Jakarta and Universitas Hamzanwadi (the NW-Pancor university) with the financial support of the West Nusa Tenggara provincial government and the moral support of NW-Pancor, invited three preeminent Indonesian historians to speak to Tuan Guru Pancor's candidacy. Prof Dr Taufik Abdullah (a former head of the Indonesian Institute of the Sciences [LIPI] and a graduate of the famous Southeast Asia program at Cornell), Prof Dr Djoko Suryo

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<sup>27</sup> Interview with H. Jamiluddin Azhar, Mataram, West Nusa Tenggara, 27 July 2010; interview with Ummi Hj. Siti Hudusiyah, Kelayu, East Lombok, West Nusa Tenggara, 22 September 2016. Both of these former students (Jamiluddin Azhar born 1930 and studying at Nahdlatul Wathan from 1942; Hudusiyah born in 1937 and studying at Nahdlatul Banat from 1950) told the author that they were present in East Lombok to witness, and that Tuan Guru Pancor did not have a leading role in military efforts during the Indonesian Revolution, although other teachers at the Nahdlatul Wathan school in Pancor were deeply involved.

(Universitas Gadjah Mada), and Prof Dr Hariyono (Universitas Malang) all praised Tuan Guru Pancor as a major religious figure for Lombok and as a promoter of the appropriate national vision for Indonesia and development for the province of West Nusa Tenggara. Notably, though, none of them attempted to make a case that Tuan Guru Pancor had nation-wide influence or contributed especially to the fight against colonialism.<sup>28</sup> Taufik Abdullah was most explicit in this: he argued that the category of *pahlawan nasional* was no longer just for nation-wide impact or a major struggle against colonialism, but that it now represented the leading lights of Indonesian society from history, and that every province should be represented, thus Tuan Guru Pancor was an appropriate representative for a province without any heroes.<sup>29</sup>

Behind the scenes of the public nomination process, there were also political interests that facilitated the canonization of Tuan Guru Pancor as a *pahlawan nasional* at that particular moment. At the provincial level, the governor (TGB) of course supported the idea that his own grandfather would join the national pantheon, and the other elected and appointed officers around him recognized work on this project as a priority for the governor. At the level of national politics, TGB was frequently mentioned as a figure with potential for national office, and he likely saw the canonization of his grandfather as yet another strengthening of his resume for a possible promotion. For the incumbent president, Joko Widodo (commonly called Jokowi), who has suffered during his tenure from critiques and political attacks from Islamic groups, the canonization of Tuan Guru Pancor brought two benefits. Firstly, it opened the possibility of undercutting Islamic resistance in the province of West Nusa Tenggara. In connection with this, it is noteworthy that every year of his

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<sup>28</sup> Author's observations of Seminar Nasional 'Dari Nahdlatul Wathan untuk Indonesia: Jejak Perjuangan TGKH Muhammad Zainuddin Abdul Madjid', Universitas Negeri-Jakarta, 5 April 2017. I thank the organizing committee for an invitation to attend this seminar.

<sup>29</sup> This is articulated in writing in Abdullah 2017: 11, and was also emphasized in the seminar in response to a question from the author.

presidency Jokowi has elevated at least one major Islamic figure to *pahlawan nasional* status—a distinct uptick from previous administrations.<sup>30</sup> Secondly, it provided the opportunity to bring on-side the figure of TGB, who had previously supported the other candidate in the 2014 presidential elections (*Republika* 2014). The effort by Jokowi to win over TGB seems to have been successful. Amid long-term speculation that TGB was a potential vice-presidential pick for President Jokowi's re-election campaign in 2019 (Setiawan 2018), TGB withdrew from his party (Partai Demokrat of former President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono) and conspicuously endorsed Jokowi in July 2018 – eight months after Jokowi had elevated his grandfather to *pahlawan nasional* status. Publicly, all sides denied any deals between the two, including for future political collaboration or ministerial posts (*Kompas* 2018).

Tuan Guru Pancor was canonized as a *pahlawan nasional* on 9 November 2017 with Presidential Decree No. 115/TK/2017 (Kementerian Sosial Republik Indonesia 2017). He was one of four new heroes that year, but only one of the four brought representation to an additional province (Yogyakarta, Aceh, and the Riau Archipelago already had national heroes). As a small part of the on-going politics of the title-making process, both of his daughters came to Jakarta to receive the award together from President Joko Widodo, but popular hopes for a permanent reconciliation through this event came to naught (*Lombok Post* 2017).<sup>31</sup>

The politics did not stop with Tuan Guru Pancor's canonization as a *pahlawan nasional*. A leader of the provincial assembly criticized the canonization online in 2017, leading to fierce attacks on social media and expulsion from his political party (*Lombok Kita*

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<sup>30</sup> 2014: K.H. Abdul Wahab Hasbullah (NU); 2015: Ki Bagus Hadikusumo (Muhammadiyah); 2016: K.H. R. As'ad Syamsul Arifin (NU); 2017: TGKH Muhammad Zainuddin Abdul Madjid (NW); 2018: Mr. Kasman Singodimedjo (Muhammadiyah / Masjumi) and A.R. Baswedan (PAI and Masjumi).

<sup>31</sup> Hopes about reconciliation were rife on Facebook for the following month, but no breakthrough came. On the broader question of reconciliation in the organization, see Hamdi and Smith 2012.

2017; *JPNN* 2017). Further debate came in 2018 when the national and provincial governments moved to rename the Lombok airport after Muhammad Zainuddin Abdul Madjid, but this change was rejected by the district government of Central Lombok (whose district chief had been elected initially in 2010 over one of Tuan Guru Pancor's grandsons from the NW-Anjani faction) (Nursyamsyi and Subekti 2018; *Antara* 2010). Clearly, this particular canonization of a new *pahlawan nasional* was not just about curating history, but about regional representation and current politics.

### **Revisiting the category of national hero in Indonesia**

So where does the category of *pahlawan nasional* stand, almost 75 years after the founding of the Indonesian Republic? Firstly, it is important to note that *pahlawan nasional* is an official category used by the government to promote certain individuals and – ultimately – to curate ideas about who matters and what matters in Indonesian history. It is unavoidable that this category of *pahlawan* has changed since Indonesian independence, but the direction of evolution is interesting. It has gone from a popular term for everyday fighters in the Revolution, to a designation for exceptional individuals epitomizing the struggle against colonialism, to a representative pantheon of prominent figures from every corner of the country (but not necessarily connected to anti-colonialism). The current understanding represents a different direction in curation of Indonesian history than previous administrations. The trend to include numerous different visions, regional struggles, and demographic profiles in the national pantheon suggests a national narrative that is increasingly open to multivalent interpretations, or at least where no single community

(political, regional, ideological, or otherwise) has a stranglehold on the country's official history.<sup>32</sup>

Secondly, although the *pahlawan nasional* pantheon has opened slowly over time to a wider range of geographic and ideological representation, it is still far from egalitarian across class boundaries. The candidates canonized are disproportionately well-connected elites – not just because such figures are more likely to make a national impact, but also because they have more social and political capital to apply the necessary pressure to run the bureaucratic gauntlet until canonization. The dearth of women among the *pahlawan* can also be questioned in this light: is gender directly responsible for governments overlooking prominent figures such as Maria Ulfah Santoso, S.K. Trimurti, and Rohana Kudus, or has this happened in a more round-about way because these women were not connected to later generations of power-brokers so much as men were? On the other side of the spectrum, several candidates in recent years have been connected to prominent current politicians. This is not merely President Megawati canonizing her mother or the case study of Tuan Guru Pancor above, but the surprise *pahlawan* of 2018: A.R. Baswedan. Baswedan was a very prominent figure in the Arab-Indonesian community at independence and a voice of inter-ethnic solidarity in both the colonial and post-colonial eras, but news coverage of his appointment almost entirely framed his elevation in connection with his grandson, Anies Baswedan, the mayor of Jakarta and sometime thorn in the side of the current administration (Kuwado 2018; Sudjatmiko 2018; Firmansyah 2018). The category of *pahlawan nasional*, because it is granted after several layers of bureaucratic processing at different levels of

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<sup>32</sup> An interesting parallel can be drawn here to the debates in the 1950s about the nature of Indonesian culture: was it to be a new unifying culture produced from the collaboration of the citizens of the young country, or a rainbow of different cultures from the hundreds of local traditions across the archipelago. For a recent recapitulation of some of this debate, see Bogaerts 2012. Similarly, one can argue that the category of *pahlawan nasional* has gone from a category to bring together the best exemplars of a single, new vision for the country, to rather a holding space to recognize the best from a rainbow of different streams of political, social, and military activity.

government, is most accessible to families with strong material or political resources (what has been called the Indonesian oligarchy [Winters 2013]). Furthermore, because canonization comes with a government stipend for a surviving widow or children, it provides material benefits to families that are already powerful.

This connects with a third and final observation about the state of the category of *pahlawan nasional* after years of evolution. In addition to the curation of national history wrapped up in this process, the canonization process is now more of a political playing field than ever before. Although the Sukarno and Suharto administrations used the title for political purposes, they did not have the same need to shore up coalitional power as recent presidents. This has changed with democratization and regional autonomy. Since Reformasi, the title of *pahlawan nasional* has not only been political in that it is a prerogative used personally by the president, but also in the sense that presidents appear to have used canonization to try and win over political allies. Perhaps because the pantheon is now so large, the addition of new *pahlawan* for political reasons is easier to overlook amid the great crowd. Perhaps this reflects the general expansion of the political battlefield in Indonesian society. In any case, the trend of flagrant politicization weakens the function of curating the national narrative of history previously seen in the pantheon of *pahlawan nasional*.

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