

Mapping Knowledge

Cross-Pollination in Late Antiquity and the Middle Ages



Edited by

Charles Burnett & Pedro Mantas-España



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An Arsenal of Arguments

Arabic Philosophy at the Service of Christian Polemics in Ramón Martí's *Pugio fidei**

Ann Giletti
Rome

Since the inception of the Dominican Order, intellectual skill was put to use in the defence of Christian orthodoxy. It did so in the forms of missionizing and debate on several fronts. Dominicans were trained to preach to, and debate against, Christian heretics (such as Cathars), Jews and Muslims. On their own training ground, in their convents and at the University of Paris, they were involved in heated discussions over controversial philosophy which challenged the fundamentals of Christian faith. These two efforts, Christian missionizing and confronting threatening philosophy, are well represented in an intriguing work called *Pugio fidei* ('Dagger of Faith'), which contains polemics against both dangerous philosophy and Judaism. It was completed c. 1278 by a Catalan Dominican, Ramon Martí (c. 1220-c.1284/5). Martí lived in the Santa Catalina monastery in Barcelona, home at the same time to the great decretalist Ramon de Penyafort. He was an expert in the Hebrew and Arabic languages, Jewish and Muslim Scripture, and Arabic philosophy. He had direct contact with Jews, in Barcelona, and Muslims, particularly during trips he made to Tunis in 1250 and 1268. He originally went there with Ramon de Penyafort and a group of Dominicans to found a school for studying Arabic for missionary purposes. Martí was also very well read in philosophical texts written in Arabic, some of which were unknown to the rest of Europe, and he cited and quoted these in his work. In its section on philosophy, the *Pugio fidei* has citations to, and quotations from, the works of great thinkers such as al-Fārābī, Avicenna, al-Ghazālī, Averroes and Maimonides.¹ The abundant

* I wish to thank Charles Burnett, Claudia la Malfa and Paul Gwynne for their comments.

¹ For studies on Martí's use of Arabic sources, see: A. Cortabarría Beitia, 'L'étude des langues au moyen âge chez les dominicains: Espagne, Orient, Raymond Martin', *Mélanges de l'Institut dominicain d'études orientales* 10 (1970), pp. 189-248, at 226-228 and 233-238; id., 'Los textos árabes de Averroes en el *Pugio fidei* del dominico catalán Raimundo Martí', M.P. Torres and M. Marin (eds), *Actas del XII Congreso de la Unión Europea de Arabistas et d'Islamistas*, Madrid: Huertas, 1986, pp. 185-204; id., 'Fuentes árabes del *Pugio fidei* de Ramón Martí: Al-gazel (1058-1111)', *Ciencia Tomista* 112 (1985), pp. 581-596; C. Burnett, 'Encounters with Rāzī the Philosopher: Constantine the African, Petrus Alfonsi and Ramón Martí', in J.M. Soto

quotations from Arabic sources are all presented in Latin translations, some of which must have been made by Martí himself, as they had not previously been translated. For reasons which will be elaborated on below, with respect to the use of Arabic sources, the *Pugio fidei* is something of an enigma, in that it is not immediately clear who the target audience for this discussion was. It is this aspect, as well as the ultimate purpose of the discussion, which I wish to address. I would suggest that the audience envisioned in this anti-philosophical polemic was Arabic philosophers, and ultimately potential converts from Islam.

The *Pugio fidei* is extant in twelve manuscripts, including an autograph, and two early editions of 1651 and 1687; the later edition was reprinted in facsimile in 1967.² The work is, according to its introduction, intended for use by Christian missionaries,³ and it is divided into three parts, or books. Book I is the discussion about philosophy, in particular where it is in error against religion, while Books II and III are directed at Judaism, and aim to convince Jews of Christian doctrine. All we are told about the target of Book I is that it is concerned with ‘those without law’ (*qui non habent legem*), that is, without divine law, as opposed to those with law (*habentes legem*), who are Jews, Christians or Muslims (*aut sunt Judaei, aut sunt Christiani, aut Saraceni*); and Martí identifies those without law as various types of philosopher.⁴

One could suppose that the target of Book I was Christian philosophers potentially falling into error, perhaps at the University of Paris, which was experiencing turbulent controversy on this account. Friction over Aristotelian natural philosophy where it clashed with Christian doctrine – theories such as the eternity of the world and the unicity of the intellect – had progressed to formal condemnations of particular philosophical principles in 1270 and 1277.⁵ In this respect,

Rabanos (ed.), *Pensamiento Medieval Hispano* (Homenaje a Horacio Santiago-Otero), Madrid: Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas, 1998, pp. 973-992.

² Ramon Martí, *Pugio fidei adversus mauros et judeos*, Leipzig, 1687; reprinted Farnborough: Gregg Press, 1967. The autograph manuscript is in Paris: MS Bibliothèque de Sainte Geneviève 1405 (13th century). Citations below are to the edition. Biographical information about Ramon Martí is available in: A. Berthier, ‘Un maître orientaliste du XIII^e siècle: Raymond Martin O.P.’, *Archivum Fratrum Praedicatorum* 6 (1936), pp. 267-311.

³ *Pugio fidei*, Prooemium, III, p. 2: ‘praedicatoribus christianae fidei’.

⁴ *Pugio fidei* I, Ch. 1, I-III, p. 192.

⁵ On the Condemnations of 1270 and 1277 at the University of Paris, see: J.F. Wippel, ‘The Parisian Condemnations of 1270 and 1277’, in J.J.E. Gracia and T.B. Noone (eds.), *A Companion to Philosophy in the Middle Ages*, Malden, MA – Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2003, pp. 63-73; id., ‘The Condemnations of 1270 and 1277 at Paris’, *The Journal of Medieval and Renaissance Studies* 7 (1977), pp. 169-201; and F. Van Steenberghen, *Maître Siger de Brabant*, Louvain – Paris: Publications Universitaires, 1977, pp. 74-79 and 139-158. For the text of the condemnations, see H. Denifle and E. Chatelain, *Chartularium universitatis Parisiensis*, 4 vols, Paris: Delalain, 1889-1897; reprinted Brussels: Culture et Civilisation, 1964, I, pp. 486-487

we should take into account a distinct feature of the *Pugio fidei*: large portions of Book I are almost verbatim reproductions of passages in the *Summa contra gentiles* of Thomas Aquinas, as well as several from his *Summa theologica*. Nowhere does Martí cite Thomas or credit him for the material reproduced. This substantial borrowing, traced in detail in studies by Laureano Robles,⁶ can perhaps help us identify the target audience of the *Pugio fidei*. If one takes the view that the *Summa contra gentiles* was directed at the errors of Greek and Arabic philosophy as it was received in Christian Europe,⁷ then Martí's borrowings from it might indicate that his intended audience was Christian, Latin-reading philosophers of the milieu of Thomas Aquinas (the University of Paris), and other European centres of scholastic philosophy. Yet, if this were the case, one would expect that such a polemic against the dangers of philosophy would focus on those errors repeatedly identified, written against, and formally condemned at the University of Paris in the 1270s. This would include the Latin Averroist theories of the eternity of the world and the unicity of the intellect, which were included in the Paris condemnations of 1270 and 1277, and addressed by Thomas Aquinas in the *Summa contra gentiles*, as well as in treatises he devoted to the problems, his *De aeternitate mundi* and *De unitate intellectus*. In several series of chapters, Book I of the *Pugio fidei*, takes up the problems of the eternity of the world (13 chapters), God's knowledge of particulars (11 chapters), and the future resurrection of the dead (one chapter). The unicity of the intellect, however, only makes a relatively brief appearance as a side problem, in a discussion of rebuttals to the theory of the world's eternity.⁸

Alternatively, one can take the view that the *Summa contra gentiles* was meant to provide material for disputing with pagans and Muslims by means of philoso-

and 543-555; see also R. Hissette, *Enquête sur les 219 articles condamnés à Paris le 7 mars 1277*, Louvain – Paris: Publications Universitaires, 1977.

⁶ L. Robles, *Tomás de Aquino*, Salamanca: Ediciones Universidad de Salamanca, 1992, pp. 121-139; id. 'En torno a una vieja polémica: el *Pugio fidei* y Tomás de Aquino', *Revista Española de Teología* 34 (1974), pp. 321-350, and 35 (1975), pp. 21-41, in vol. 34, pp. 324-336; id. 'Escritores dominicos de la Corona de Aragón (siglos XIII-XV)', *Repertorio de Historia de las Ciencias Eclesiásticas en España* 3 (1971), pp. 11-177, at 62-65.

⁷ See, e.g., M.M. Gorce, 'La lutte *contra gentiles* a Paris au XIII siècle', in *Mélanges Mandonnet*, 2 vols, Paris: Librairie Philosophique J. Vrin, 1930, I, pp. 223-243; A.C. Pegis 'Qu'est-ce que la *Summa contra Gentiles*?' *Théologie* 57 (1964), published as *L'homme devant Dieu. Mélanges offerts au Père Henri de Lubac*, 2 vols, Paris: Aubier, 1964, II, pp. 169-182, at 182. See also an opposing view in M.D. Chenu, *Introduction à l'étude de saint Thomas d'Aquin*, Montreal: Institut d'Études Médiévales; Paris: Librairie Philosophique J. Vrin, 1984, pp. 247-251.

⁸ *Pugio fidei* I, Ch. 12, XI-XIII, pp. 226-228. See also the reference to this theory in Chapter 5, IX, p. 211. Martí had ample material for a series of chapters on the unicity of the intellect in the *Summa contra gentiles*, especially in its Book II, Chapters 73 and 75.

phy.⁹ In an often-quoted passage there, Thomas Aquinas said that, while Christians could debate with Jews by using the Old Testament as common ground, and with Christian heretics by referring to the New Testament, with Muslims and pagans there was no Scripture in common, so one had to resort to ‘natural reason’, or philosophy, in order to convince them.¹⁰ Muslims were certainly an urgent concern of Martí, and of Dominican missionaries in general. However, if we consider this approach in relation to the *Pugio fidei*, we come up against the fact that Ramon Martí was familiar with Muslim Scripture and had enough knowledge of it to be able to address works to Muslims in which he cited the Koran and *hadith*, as he did in two treatises not long after his first trip to Tunis in 1250. His *De seta machometi* (perhaps dated 1257) sets out to prove that Mohammed was not a true prophet, and tries to persuade Muslims to accept the authority of the Old and New Testaments.¹¹ His *Explanatio symboli Apostolorum* (dated 1256 or 1257) includes almost identical text on the authority of the Old and New Testaments, and tries to convince Muslims of the tenets of Christianity.¹² Evidently, at that time Martí felt he had a means of converting Muslims by using Muslim and Christian Scripture, combined with good arguments. Thus, if the *Pugio fidei* was intended for Muslims, it marks a change in approach.

If looking at the primary material for the *Pugio fidei* can help determine the audience and purpose of Book I, we would do well to consider a striking feature to do with its structure. Here we find Martí indebted to another author, whom he treats as an ally, though this great philosopher and theologian was not generally considered a friend to Christians in matters of philosophy. For the structure of Book I, Martí takes al-Ghazālī as his model, and makes it explicit that he is doing

⁹ See, e.g., F. Van Steenberghen, *La Philosophie au XIIIe siècle*, Louvain: Publications Universitaires, 1966, p. 323; A. Patfoort, ‘La Somme contre les Gentils, école de présentation aux infidèles de la foi chrétienne’, in *Saint Thomas d’Aquin. Les clefs d’une théologie*, Paris: FAC-Éditions, 1983, pp. 103-130, p. 105.

¹⁰ Thomas Aquinas, *Summa contra gentiles* I, Ch. 2, *Opera Omnia* 13, Rome: Commissio Leonina, 1918, p. 6: ‘[Q]uia quidam eorum, ut Mahumetistae et Pagani, non conveniunt nobiscum in auctoritate alicuius Scripturae, per quam possint convinci, sicut contra Iudaeos disputare possumus per Vetus Testamentum, contra haereticos per Novum. Hi vero neutrum recipiunt. Unde necesse est ad naturalem rationem recurrere, cui omnes assentire coguntur. Quae tamen in rebus divinis deficiens est.’

¹¹ The work has been edited in: J. Hernando i Delgado, ‘Ramon Martí, *De seta machometi o De origine, progressu et fine machometi et quadruplici reprobatione prophetiae eius*’, *Acta Historica et Archaeologica Mediaevalia* 4 (1983), pp. 9-63. For examples of Martí’s citations of Muslim scripture, see the references to the Koran on pp. 454-455 and 462; and to *hadith* on p. 487.

¹² The work has been edited in: S.J. March, ‘En Ramón Martí y a seva *Explanatio Symboli Apostolorum*’, *Anuari de l’Institut d’Estudis Catalans* (1908), pp. 443-496. For examples of Martí’s citations of Muslim scripture, see the references to the Koran on pp. 24-38, 42-46 and 54-56; and to *hadith* on pp. 20-22, 28-38, 44-46 and 50-52.

so.¹³ He relies on al-Ghazālī's *Al-munqidh min al-dalāl* ('The Deliverer from Error') and his *Tahāfut al-falāsifa* ('The Incoherence of the Philosophers'). In *The Deliverer from Error*, al-Ghazālī identifies several groups of philosophers and theories they hold which are contrary to Muslim doctrine.¹⁴ When he discusses the group which includes Aristotle and his followers (he names al-Fārābī and Avicenna), he says they promoted three errors: the eternity of the world; denial of God's knowledge of particulars; and denial of the future resurrections of bodies.¹⁵ These are the three issues to which Martí devotes the main part of *Pugio fidei*, Book I. Al-Ghazālī regards these as the most dangerous theories in Arabic philosophical circles, and, calling them heresies, says in *The Deliverer from Error* that he had argued against them in his *Incoherence of the Philosophers*.¹⁶ Martí quotes from both works at length in the *Pugio fidei*.¹⁷ Even before treating the Aristotelian errors, he addresses the other errors against faith which al-Ghazālī had identified in *The Deliverer from Error* in discussing various groups of philosophers. Al-Ghazālī spoke of the Materialists, who he said denied the existence of God and believed in the eternity of the world.¹⁸ Martí calls them Epicureans as well as *Temporales* and *Carnales*, and accuses them of holding that the supreme good consists of sensual pleasure;¹⁹ he demonstrates the existence of God in his Chapter 2,²⁰ and goes on to condemn the idea that sensual pleasure is the supreme good in Chapter 3.²¹ Al-Ghazālī also identified what he called Naturalists, who did believe God existed, but denied the immortality of the soul.²² Martí calls them 'naturales',²³ and defeats

¹³ He quotes al-Ghazālī substantially in Chapter 1, which is essentially an introduction setting out the topics for discussion in Book I. He also refers to al-Ghazālī's view of the worst errors of the philosophers when he opens his discussion of God's knowledge of particulars in Chapter 15, after having completed his treatment of the eternity of the world: *Pugio fidei* I, Ch. 15, I, p. 234.

¹⁴ Al-Ghazālī, *Deliverer from Error*, ed. and trans. by M. Abūlaylah and N.A.-R. Rif'at, *Deliverance from Error and Mystical Union with the Almighty/Al-munqidh min al-dalāl*, Washington, DC: The Council for Research in Values and Philosophy, 2001, pp. 74-75.

¹⁵ Al-Ghazālī, *Deliverer from Error*, pp. 78-79.

¹⁶ Al-Ghazālī, *Deliverer from Error*, p. 78.

¹⁷ In citing al-Ghazālī's *Al-munqidh min al-dalāl*, Martí renders the title *Almonkid min Adalel* or calls it *Liber qui eripit ab errore*. He quotes this work in *Pugio fidei* I, Ch. I, pp. 192-194; and Ch. V, pp. 208-210. In citing al-Ghazālī's *Tahāfut al-falāsifa*, Martí calls it *Liber de ruina philosophorum* or *Liber praecipitii*. He cites or quotes/paraphrases this work in *Pugio fidei* I, Ch. 1, VIII-IX, p. 194; Ch. 5, V-VIII, pp. 209-210; Ch. 9, VI, p. 221; Ch. 12, XI, p. 226; Ch. 14, III, p. 231; and Ch. 26, VIII, p. 254.

¹⁸ Al-Ghazālī, *Deliverer from Error*, p. 74.

¹⁹ *Pugio fidei* I, Ch. 1, II and IV, p. 192.

²⁰ *Pugio fidei* I, Ch. 2, pp. 194-196.

²¹ *Pugio fidei* I, Ch. 3, pp. 196-199.

²² Al-Ghazālī, *Deliverer from Error*, p. 74.

²³ *Pugio fidei* I, Ch. 1, II and V, pp. 192-193.

their position on the soul in his Chapter 4.²⁴ The third group al-Ghazālī named was the Theists,²⁵ whom Martí calls ‘*philosophi*’,²⁶ intending ‘natural philosophers’.²⁷ It is they who are guilty of the three errors of the eternity of the world, denial of God’s knowledge of particulars, and denial of the future resurrection of the dead,²⁸ the topics of the rest of Book I of the *Pugio fidei*. In sum, the whole structure of Book I follows an outline provided by al-Ghazālī’s remarks in *The Deliverer from Error*; and a good part of Martí’s Chapter 1, which serves as an introduction to Book I, is taken up with quotations of the Muslim theologian’s identification of the groups of philosophers and their errors.²⁹

While al-Ghazālī’s writings provide the skeleton for the entire structure of Book I, the arguments and approach of Thomas Aquinas’ *Summa contra gentiles*, along with a wealth of quotations from various Arabic philosophers, provides much of the content. Thus Martí is heavily indebted to both the work of his *cofrater* and that of a Muslim theologian. These characteristics make it difficult to determine who the target audience of Book I of the *Pugio fidei* was meant to be, and yet they seem to point outside the ambit of Christian philosophers. The *Pugio fidei* gives every indication of being directed at philosophers – but which philosophers, if not to Christian scholastics, and to what purpose? The use of the works of Thomas Aquinas and al-Ghazālī seems to be more than a matter of appropriation of helpful ideas and material. On the one hand, Martí appears to be implementing something of the aims of the *Summa contra gentiles*; on the other hand, he appears to be implementing the aims of al-Ghazālī’s *Incoherence of the Philosophers* and part of his *Deliverer from Error*. It would seem, then, that to understand the audience and purpose of the *Pugio fidei*, we need to compare Martí’s efforts with what we can see in these sources in terms of their purpose, approach, method and audience.

The *Summa contra gentiles* was meant to be a collection of the best philosophical arguments that could be used to defend Christianity. According to the *Chronicle* of the Dominican Petrus Marsilius, completed in Barcelona in 1313, Thomas Aquinas wrote it at the request of Ramon de Penyafort, the Master General of the Dominican Order, who lived in retirement in the Barcelona monastery with

²⁴ *Pugio fidei* I, Ch. 4, pp. 199–207.

²⁵ Al-Ghazālī, *Deliverer from Error*, p. 75.

²⁶ *Pugio fidei* I, Ch. 1, II and VIII, pp. 192 and 194.

²⁷ Martí (paraphrasing al-Ghazālī) names Socrates, Plato and Aristotle, as well as al-Fārābī and Avicenna, see *Pugio fidei* I, Ch. 1, VIII–IX, p. 194.

²⁸ *Pugio fidei* I, Ch. 1, VIII–IX, p. 194.

²⁹ For a thorough analysis of the use of al-Ghazālī in the *Pugio fidei*, see the recent PhD thesis by D. Travelletti, *Front commun. Raymond Martin, al-Ghazālī et les philosophes. Analyse de la structure et des sources du premier livre du Pugio Fidei*, <http://ethesis.unifr.ch/theses/TravellettiD.pdf?file=TravellettiD.pdf> (last visited 1 March 2013).

Ramon Martí from 1241 until his death in 1275.³⁰ Thomas does not mention the origin of the work, but says in the *Contra gentiles* that its purpose is to provide truth, and to do so by organising wisdom. By ‘truth’ he means divine truth. Any falsehood against divine truth he regards as impiety.³¹ For his approach, he says he would ideally cover every possible error against Christian faith. Yet, he tells us, this would be impractical, as he could not possibly know them all, unlike the early Christian theologians who were familiar with the errors of the ‘gentiles’, either because they had been gentiles themselves, or because they lived among them.³² For this reason, his point of departure is Christian doctrine, and he argues against theories which challenge it. His method of demonstration is strictly to defeat errors against Christian doctrine, not to subject doctrine to philosophical proof,³³ apart from his well-known demonstration of the existence of God.³⁴ Instead, divine truth must be accepted on the authority of Scripture, as confirmed through miracles.³⁵

As for its audience, the *Contra gentiles* provides a collection of arguments which could be addressed to either Christian scholastics handling Greek and Arabic philosophy, or to pagans and Muslims (or perhaps a broader range of ‘gentiles’), using philosophy as a means of dialogue. That Muslims (as opposed to Arabic philosophers) are indeed included in the target audience of the *Contra gentiles* is suggested by Thomas’ comment on the use of philosophy for dialogue with them;³⁶ and he includes them in Book I, Chapter 6, where he speaks of Islam as false, and criticizes it.³⁷ Thomas also recommended the approach of the *Contra gentiles* for missionizing to Muslims in his *De rationibus fidei*. He wrote this work for the Cantor of Antioch, who had (according to indications in *De rationibus fidei*) solicited help in providing strong arguments to Muslims in support of Catholic faith, since referring to Christian Scripture could not persuade them. The method presented in *De rationibus fidei* is identical to that of the *Contra gentiles*. Rational

³⁰ Quoted in Thomas Aquinas, *Opera Omnia* 13, Rome: Commissio Leonina, 1918, p. VI: ‘Conversionem etiam infidelium ardentius desiderans (S. Raymundus), rogavit eximium doctorem Sacrae Paginae, Magistrum in Theologia, Fratrem Thomam de Aquino, eiusdem Ordinis, qui inter omnes huius mundi clericos post Fratrem Albertum philosophum maximus habebatur, ut opus aliquod faceret contra infidelium errores, per quod et tenebrarum tolleretur caligo, et veri solis doctrina credere nolentibus panderetur. Fecit Magister ille quod tanti Patris humilis deprecatio requirebat, et Summam quae contra Gentiles intitulatur composuit, quae pro illa materia non habuisse parem creditur.’

³¹ *Summa contra gentiles* I, Ch. 1.

³² *Summa contra gentiles* I, Ch. 2.

³³ *Summa contra gentiles* I, Ch. 2.

³⁴ *Summa contra gentiles* I, Ch. 3 and 13; cfr. *Summa theologica* I, Q. 2.

³⁵ *Summa contra Gentiles* I, Ch. 9.

³⁶ See quotation in n. 10.

³⁷ *Summa contra Gentiles* I, Ch. 6.

(necessary) arguments should not be used to demonstrate articles of faith directly, as these truths are beyond the grasp of the human mind. Instead, these truths must, and can, be believed, because they are revealed by God. They can, nevertheless, withstand any attack by rational arguments, so the missionary's task is to defend faith by arguing against these attacks.³⁸ Thus, in confronting infidels, one needs to arm oneself with excellent arguments against their objections, and arguments are what Thomas provides. He also says that he has already written substantially elsewhere (*alibi*) on the material he is presenting, a reference generally believed to be to the *Summa contra gentiles*.³⁹

Al-Ghazālī, for his part, is clear about his audience, or the focus of his concern: it is Arabic philosophers and their followers.⁴⁰ His purpose is to defend Muslim orthodoxy against philosophical error. Unlike the *Contra gentiles*, his point of departure is not tenets of faith, but the errors themselves. His stated approach in *The Incoherence of the Philosophers* is to take up philosophers' theories and attack them, not to defend a set of ideas.⁴¹ His method is in accord with that of Thomas Aquinas. In *The Deliverer from Error*, he says that logic, or demonstration, can only go so far, in that it only produces necessary conclusions within its system because it sets its own conditions, and these conditions cannot be followed when treating the higher questions of religion.⁴² Al-Ghazālī does not reject philosophy altogether. He believes it can produce some useful truths which it would be a pity to lose if one discarded the science: his aim is to eliminate the errors against faith.⁴³ As for divine truth, since it is beyond the reach of intellection, he says we

³⁸ Thomas Aquinas, *De rationibus fidei ad Cantorem Antiochenum*, *Opera Omnia* 40 B-C, Rome: Sancta Sabina, 1968, Ch. 2, p. B58: 'De hoc tamen primo admonere te volo quod in disputationibus contra infideles de articulis fidei, non ad hoc conari debes ut fidem rationibus necessariis probes, hoc enim sublimitati fidei derogaret cuius veritas non solum humanas mentes sed etiam angelorum excedit; a nobis autem creduntur quasi ab ipso Deo revelata. Quia tamen quod a summa veritate procedit falsum esse non potest, nec aliquid necessaria ratione impugnari valet quod falsum non est, sicut fides nostra necessariis rationibus probari non potest quia humanam mentem excedit, ita improbari necessaria ratione non potest propter sui veritatem.'

³⁹ Thomas Aquinas, *De rationibus fidei*: '[S]uper praemissis tibi exponam, quae tamen alibi diffusius pertractavi.' See the edition's note for 'alibi', and the preface (p. B7) regarding this reference.

⁴⁰ Al-Ghazālī, *Tahāfut al-falāsifa*, translated by S.A. Kamali, *Al-Ghazali's Tahafut al-Falasifa (Incoherence of the Philosophers)*, Lahore: Pakistan Philosophical Congress, 1963, pp. 1-5 and 8. He reports on what he wrote here in *The Deliverer from Error*: see *Deliverer from Error*, pp. 78-79.

⁴¹ Al-Ghazālī, *Tahāfut al-falāsifa*, p. 8.

⁴² Al-Ghazālī, *Deliverer from Error*, pp. 77-78.

⁴³ Al-Ghazālī, *Deliverer from Error*, pp. 78 and 81; cfr. *Tahāfut al-falāsifa*, p. 6. See also Marti's comment on separating what is to be rejected in philosophy from what is commendable in it: 'Nos ergo exemplo ipsius Domini, quae in philosophis fuerint commendabilia, praemittamus,

must rely on what the prophets tell us, because they have had the truth revealed to them by God, as evidenced by the miracles they have performed.⁴⁴ Al-Ghazālī's position is thus in harmony with that of Thomas Aquinas, that we must accept divine truth as it has been revealed.

The elements of faith al-Ghazālī is concerned about in this discussion (Creation, God's knowledge of particulars, and the future resurrection of bodies) coincide with Christian doctrine. In this sense he is 'safe' for Martí to use. Yet Martí's use of al-Ghazālī is surprising if one considers that al-Ghazālī was not regarded in Christian scholastic circles to be 'on the same side'. Of all his works, Latin readers had only a translation of his *Maqāsid al-falāsifa* (Aims of the Philosophers), a book in which he explained Aristotelian theories according to the teachings of Avicenna and al-Fārābī, the Aristotelian philosophers whose theories he destroyed in *The Incoherence of the Philosophers* and objected to in *The Deliverer from Error*.⁴⁵ The scholastics mistook al-Ghazālī to be in agreement with Avicenna and al-Fārābī, particularly in their support of the theory of the eternity of the world.⁴⁶ As Martí does not provide an explanation for why he is following al-Ghazālī, or an explicit correction of his reputation among scholastics, it seems unlikely that he is aiming to convince a Christian scholastic audience, such as the University of Paris.

In comparing the purpose, approach, method and audience of the *Summa contra Gentiles* and al-Ghazālī, what we can immediately say they have in common is their position on the undemonstrability of divine truth, which is accessible only through revelation and must be held on faith. In the *Pugio fidei*, Martí makes much of al-Ghazālī's statements on the importance of prophets. He quotes at length on this topic from, or rather paraphrases, *The Deliverer from Error*. In Martí's rendering of al-Ghazālī's *Deliverer*, the Muslim theologian says that God has spoken through the prophets,⁴⁷ and that God reveals truth to prophets in a

quae vero digna vituperio, evaginato pugione, Deo juvante, jugulemus.' *Pugio fidei* I, Ch. 5, I, p. 207.

⁴⁴ Al-Ghazālī, *Deliverer from Error*, pp. 97-100; cfr. his *Tahāfut al-falāsifa*, p. 3.

⁴⁵ The *Maqāsid al-falāsifa* was translated into Latin in Toledo by Archdeacon Dominicus Gundisalvi (or Gundissalinus, d. after 1190) and a 'Magister Johannes' by the late twelfth century: see M.T. D'Alverny, 'Algazel dans l'Occident latin', in *Académie du royaume du Maroc, session de novembre 1985*, Rabat, 1986, pp. 3-24; reprinted in her, *La transmission des textes philosophiques et scientifiques au moyen âge*, Aldershot – Brookfield, VT: Variorum, 1994, Article VII, p. 5; and C. Burnett, 'Magister Iohannes Hispanus: Towards the Identity of a Toledan Translator', in *Comprendre et maîtriser la nature au moyen âge: Mélanges d'histoire des sciences offerts à Guy Beaujouan*, Geneva: Librairie Droz; Paris: Librairie Champion, 1994, pp. 425-436.

⁴⁶ See, e.g., Giles of Rome, *De erroribus philosophorum*, ed. J. Koch and English transl. J.O. Reidl, *Giles of Rome Erroribus Philosophorum*, Milwaukee, WI: Marquette University Press, 1944, pp. 38-39; and Thomas Aquinas, *Quaestiones disputatae e de veritate*, Q. 2, art. 10, contra.

⁴⁷ *Pugio fidei* I, Ch. 5, V, p. 209.

way which is beyond the faculties of the intellect.⁴⁸ The passage, as reproduced by Martí, comes to three pages in the seventeenth-century edition of the *Pugio fidei*. It is in a chapter entitled ‘De secta philosophorum’. The first part of the passage outlines the deficiencies of philosophy cited above in the context of al-Ghazālī’s method. It goes on to compare philosophers and prophets, and then to show the superiority of prophets over philosophers. Interestingly, in the autograph manuscript of the *Pugio fidei*, this chapter was marked for division into two parts, an intervention which was not picked up in the seventeenth-century edition. It was made after the first draft, and awkwardly and abruptly interrupts the passage of al-Ghazālī.⁴⁹ Martí had intended to break the chapter into two: presumably one chapter on philosophers, and one on prophets. Another intervention, perhaps at the same time as the chapter break edit, is a long insertion which takes the form of a complete bifolio added to the manuscript (f. 14r-v). It consists of a lengthy series of quotations which supplements citations Martí had used to conclude the presentation on prophets. These are largely from Augustine and other Christian sources on how only goodness and virtue can lead one to beatitude, how philosophy can produce false wisdom, and how it needs religion because it is imperfect.⁵⁰ This long string of added quotations is introduced with scathing words by Martí against believing philosophers over prophets and Aristotle over God.⁵¹

The discussion on prophecy is important in determining Martí’s audience. Martí had already written on prophecy in earlier work in relation to Islam. In his *De seta machometi*, he made the focus of his polemic against Islam a case that Mohammed was not a true prophet, putting forward standard – and insulting – arguments that Mohammed had not led a pure life, and that no miracles were associated with him.⁵² Martí offered in place of Mohammed the Old and New Testaments. In the *Pugio fidei*, frequently in his chapters, he adds after arguments against philosophical errors quotations from Old Testament prophets and the Psalms. The thrust of the book, as with the *Summa contra gentiles* and the discussion on philosophy in *The Deliverer from Error*, is that divine truth must be accepted on faith; and prophets, as Martí presents them according to al-Ghazālī’s teaching, are witnesses to that divine truth, in whom we should place our trust.

⁴⁸ *Pugio fidei* I, Ch. 5, VI, p. 209; cfr. *Deliverer from Error*, pp. 97-98 and 107-108.

⁴⁹ I thank Ayelet Even-Ezra for checking the manuscript in Paris for me.

⁵⁰ *Pugio fidei* I, Ch. 5, pp. 211-213.

⁵¹ *Pugio fidei* I, Ch. 5, IX, p. 211: ‘philosophiae nimium inhaerentes plus videntur credere philosophis quam prophetis, plus suo Aristoteli quam Creatori’.

⁵² For example, Martí cites his polygamy and refusal to perform miracles: *De seta Mahometi*, pp. 34-40. In *Explanatio symboli Apostolorum* (p. 481), Martí dismissed Mohammed’s miraculous ascension to heaven by saying that, as it occurred at night, no one witnessed the event, so there was no evidence that it actually happened.

If we rule out a Parisian scholastic audience, and take account of Martí's use of al-Ghazālī as the guide for his choice of philosophical issues, and as the voice on the primacy of prophets over philosophers, we have indications that Martí's intended audience may have been Arabic philosophers. Arabic philosophers would have recognized the value of citing al-Ghazālī. Confronted with al-Ghazālī, together with powerful arguments, they would have had to regard Christian combatants thus armed as worthy opponents – or so Martí could have hoped.

As to Martí's purpose in addressing this audience, there could be no reason for him to help purge philosophy in order to preserve Muslim orthodoxy, as al-Ghazālī had done. It would seem that, in the *Pugio fidei*, or *Pugio christianorum* as he also called his work, he was putting into practice the idea in the *Summa contra gentiles* that disputing with and converting Muslims to Christianity could take place by means of philosophy. That such an approach might not actually be effective does not disallow that Dominicans of the 1260s-1280s were experimenting with it. The use of philosophy in matters of religion was a controversial topic at the time, but more in terms of the way or degree to which it was used, than its use in the first place. In this respect, one has only to consider the attack on Thomas Aquinas after his death by William de la Mare, who criticised the limits he placed on demonstration of doctrine,⁵³ or even the later efforts of Ramon Llull with the logical approach in his *Art*, and his own disapproval of the Dominican limits on philosophy in missionizing.

With Llull we should pause to consider a story which he told about demonstration of Christian doctrine and which has a connection to Ramon Martí. Llull told the tale repeatedly, with variations in the characters, but substantially to the effect of the following. A missionary (a '*frater*') who found himself before a Saracen king, argued convincingly that the religion of Islam was false. The king was persuaded, and asked the missionary to prove to him that the religion of Christianity was true. To this the missionary replied that Christian tenets cannot be subjected to proof, but must be accepted on faith. The king was outraged, and told him: 'I would not willingly cast off one belief for another, but rather one belief for true understanding. You have thus done harm since I am now left without any faith, because you disproved the faith that I had, but then cannot prove

⁵³ See William de la Mare's discussion of demonstration of Creation/the beginning of the world in his *Correctorium fratris Thomae*, edited along with the response of Richard Knapwell in P. Glorieux (ed.), *Le Correctorium Corruptorii 'Quare'*, (Les Premières Polémiques Thomistes, I. Bibliothèque Thomiste, IX), Kain: Le Saulchoir, 1927, pp. 30-34 and 410-412. See also the analysis by M.J.F.M. Hoenen in his 'The Literary Reception of Thomas Aquinas' View on the Provability of the Eternity of the World in De La Mare's *Correctorium* (1278-9) and the *Correctoria Corruptorii* (1279-ca 1286)', in J.B.M. Wissink (ed.), *The Eternity of the world in the Thought of Thomas Aquinas and His Contemporaries*, in *Studien und Texte zur Geistesgeschichte des Mittelalters* 27 (1990), pp. 39-68.

yours to me with rational argument'.⁵⁴ In one version of the tale, the king adds: 'Now I am neither Christian, nor even Saracen, nor Jew!'⁵⁵

Until recently, modern scholars have tended to identify the *frater* as Ramon Martí, based on convincing connections which can be drawn between details in one version of the story and facts we know about Martí's activities.⁵⁶ Doubts have been expressed about this identification, however;⁵⁷ and I myself have reservations. The details of the story change in the different versions and do not, in fact, accurately describe Martí. The character is variously a Christian hermit, an expert in logic and Arabic, conversely inexpert in philosophy and theology, and elsewhere, contradicting this, a theologian capable of producing an exposition of the Creed.⁵⁸ Nevertheless, this striking account highlights the approach to philosophical demonstration and Christian doctrine promoted by the Dominicans, and the *frater* could very well stand for a Dominican 'character', to which Martí does correspond in a general sense. If a demand like the Saracen king's for demonstration of Christian dogma was ever put to Dominican missionaries, the *Pugio fidei* could provide a strong response, making clear that 'proof' can only take place within certain limits – those outlined by Thomas Aquinas – and that, moreover, this approach should be accepted by a Muslim audience, as their own al-Ghazālī taught the same thing.

A further consideration is whether the intended audience of Book I could have included Jews. These would be Jews with sophisticated knowledge of philosophy and who took part in the scientific discourse of the Arabs, as Maimonides had done, composing his *Guide for the Perplexed* originally in Arabic.⁵⁹ This could explain why the introduction to the *Pugio fidei* speaks almost exclusively about ad-

⁵⁴ 'Ego non dimitterem credere pro credere, sed credere pro vere intelligere multum libens, et sic male fecisti, quia legem quam habebam reprobasti, postquam tuam mihi non potes cum rationibus probare, quoniam modo remanebo sine lege': Ramon Llull, *Liber de acquisitione Terrae Sanctae*, ed. E. Longpré, 'Le Liber de acquisitione Terrae Sanctae du bienheureux Raymond Lulle', *Criterion* 3 (1927), pp. 265-278, at 197-198.

⁵⁵ '[M]odo non sum Christianus, nec etiam Saracenus, nec Judaeus': Ramon Llull, *Liber de convenientia fidei et intellectus in objecto*, in *Raimundi Lulli Opera Omnia*, 8 vols, Ivo Salzinger (ed.), Mainz, 1721-1742; reprinted Frankfurt-am-Main: Minerva, 1965, IV, pp. 571-575, at p. 574.

⁵⁶ E. Longpré, 'Le B. Raymond Lulle et Raymond Martí O.P.', *Bolletí de la Societat Arqueològica Lul·liana* 24 (1933), pp. 269-271; reprinted in *Estudios Lulianos* 13 (1969), pp. 197-200.

⁵⁷ See Alexander Fidora's analysis in his 'Ramon Martí in Context: The Influence of the *Pugio fidei* on Ramon Llull, Arnau de Vilanova and Francesc Eiximenis', *Recherches de Théologie et Philosophie Médiévales* 79 (2012), pp. 373-397, pp. 376-381.

⁵⁸ I have discussed Llull's story and its inconsistencies with what we know about Martí, see A. Giletti, 'Aristotle in Medieval Spain: Writers of the Christian Kingdoms in Confrontation with the Eternity of the World', *The Journal of the Warburg and Courtauld Institutes* 67 (2004), pp. 23-47, at 45-46 and n. 113.

⁵⁹ I am grateful to David Niremberg, Ryan Szpiech and Reinhold Gleis for raising this question, and particularly for helpful discussion with Ryan Szpiech.

dressing Jews, without accounting for the purpose of Book I's attack on philosophy. I have reservations about this idea, because there was a good way to have discourse with Jews, based on Scripture, as Thomas Aquinas had recommended in the *Summa contra gentiles*, and as Books II and III of the *Pugio fidei* do in great detail. The method outlined in Book I on how far philosophy can be used in discussion of Christian doctrine would not appear to be necessary for the approach to Jews, and seems to have no relation to the Scripture-based method used in Books II and III. However, Book I evinces Dominican expertise in arguing philosophically at the highest and most informed level, and, if further credentials were needed in debating with Jews to pre-empt scorn in this regard, Book I could arguably have provided them. Also, many chapters of Book I contain quotations from the Psalms and Old Testament prophets, usually with the Hebrew provided, along with a Latin translation. To explore this question, one would have to analyse the use made of al-Ghazālī in thirteenth-century Jewish works to discern how well he was understood and whether he would have served as an accepted model. One would also have to determine whether the issues treated in Book I would have been regarded as the main faults of philosophy by contemporary Jews defending religion.

In Book I of the *Pugio fidei*, with his appropriation of sections of the *Summa contra gentiles*, Martí seems to be 'translating' or transmitting it ultimately for an Arabic audience, using the vehicle of the respected al-Ghazālī. That is, he seems to be providing a version of it to supply Christian disputants with material in their mission to Muslims. This is not to say that Martí would have regarded his book as a direct or immediate means for effecting conversions. Rather, it could have served as a way for creating a preliminary, common ground for discussion. That this common ground, philosophy, had its limitations, but that those limitations should be acceptable, was justified by the teaching of al-Ghazālī that divine truths cannot be subjected to demonstration. Since the philosophical theories Martí treated were chosen by al-Ghazālī, and his positions regarding them coincided with those of al-Ghazālī and all devout Muslims, the aim of Book I would not have been to persuade Muslims of the error of the theories, but to present a model of a method that both sides could agree on. Establishing agreement on the method could in turn make it possible for missionaries to present similar proofs against opposition to other Christian doctrines, perhaps using arguments from the *Summa contra gentiles* to do so. In sum, Martí appears to be putting into practice the method prescribed in the *Contra gentiles*, fine-tuning it for a Muslim audience, so that this 'dagger of faith' can be put into the hands of his fellow Dominicans in their concerted efforts to fight Islam.