‘The Chosen People’ and the ‘House of Many Mansions’:

Managing Deep Divisions in the Yishuv and Lebanon during the Mandate Period

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ABSTRACT

This dissertation asks why Israel, a deeply divided society facing the same difficulties as other post-colonial states, was able to establish a stable democratic regime upon independence whereas its neighbour, Lebanon, with similar characteristics, established an unstable democracy. The question has wider implications for deeply divided post-colonial societies elsewhere and has gained greater currency in an age of civil strife and democratic retreat. By carefully tracing the political process that stretched from the advent of colonial power in the Middle East through the 1950s, this dissertation helps to explain how these two states came to follow divergent regime trajectories.

The key argument here is that during the mandate period, the community which would become the core of the Israeli state (known as the Yishuv) was able to develop a dominant vision of the state that guided post-independence policy and deactivated potentially destabilizing deep divisions. It was transformed from a vertically divided society into a horizontally divided society, making its regime less inclusive yet more stable. This development was aided by institutional mechanisms put in place by the British mandatory. In Lebanon, on the contrary, the mandatory power deepened and entrenched deep divisions. The institutional mechanisms put in place led to the multiplication of the number of politically relevant divisions in an already vertically divided society thus precluding the emergence of a shared vision of the state. The Lebanese state embraced diversity and protected minorities but its political system suffered from instability soon after attaining independence.

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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

Concluding a review of the events which marked the Middle East in 2014, particularly the displacement of large population groups in Iraq and Syria at the hands of ISIS, Lebanese political commentator Hazem Sayegh posed an intriguing question to his readers: Why was Israel, whose population is composed of people from all over the world, who are divided into separate factions, able to avoid the violence which plagued its neighbours?[1] Interestingly, Sayegh's home country, Lebanon, had also averted such violence in the context of the Arab Spring – and quite surprisingly so in the light of the country's nature as the stage of regional and international power struggles as well as its history of internal strife and deep divisions.

In the north of Israel, overlooking the Mediterranean, the grottoes of Rosh Hanikra provide a glimpse into a distant past. At scarcely a kilometre from the visitor centre of this sea reserve, one can discern yellow buoys which apparently mark the boundary between the territorial waters of Israel and Lebanon. Military personnel guard the barrier placed just outside the tourist site, preventing visitors from venturing into Lebanon. Yet, the very same site exhibits a railroad bridge built by the British mandatory during World War II to better connect Haifa and Beirut, two cities just 128 kilometres apart. Thus, in the first half of the twentieth century, these countries were not as far apart from each other as they are today. Not only were they geographically linked: as provinces of the Ottoman Empire with large religious minorities, they presented many similarities after World War I, when Britain and

[1] Hazem Saghyeh, "2014-2015: Alwaqa' Akthar Khayalan," *Al-Hayat*, January 3, 2015, http://alhayat.com/Opinion/Hazem-Saghieh/6606192/2014---2015.

France took charge of the mandates with the purported aim of guiding both countries toward independence.

Both countries emerged from the mandate system in the 1940s, after a show of unity against the mandatory, with democratic systems of government. They have since become one of the few exceptions to the rule of autocracy and military government in the Middle East.[2] Just as Israel had to face the challenges of ethnic and socio-cultural diversity in the post-independence period, so the young Lebanese democracy had to maintain a delicate balance between the sects composing its consociational system of government. Economically, conditions in Lebanon were more favourable. While the Israeli government was handing out food stamps and imposing a regime of austerity which lasted for a decade, Lebanon turned into the Switzerland of the Middle East.[3] Indeed, Lebanon also stood out against its closest Arab neighbour. "In 1946, I took a train from Tel Aviv to Beirut", said Jonathan B., who had immigrated to Palestine from Berlin in 1938, adding humorously, "You can't do that anymore". "At the time, I took a day trip to Damascus and you could see clearly where the boundaries between Lebanon and Syria were. The Syrian side was poor and chaotic and on the Lebanese side, people were well dressed and everything was orderly."[4] However, Lebanon was not just a place of prosperity and modernity but also one of religious tolerance – an example of a place where power-sharing institutions had been able to get formerly warring parties to cooperate.[5]

[2] Turkey has also maintained a stable democratic system since independence, and just like Israel and Lebanon, is now often considered a flawed democracy.
[3] Sahar Al-Attar, "Que Reste-t-il de la <<Suisse du Moyen-Orient>>?," L'Orient Le Jour, April 14, 2015.
[4] Jonathan B., Interview with the author, 31/3/2016, Rishon Letzion

[5] Arend Lijphart, "Consociational Democracy," *World Politics* 21, no. 2 (January 1, 1969): 207–25; Arend Lijphart, "Typologies of Democratic Systems," *Comparative Political Studies* 1, no. 1 (1968): 3–44.

In short, both Israel and Lebanon were considered symbols of democracy, freedom and tolerance within their regional context upon independence.[6] Scholars of Israeli politics and society, however, often consider Israel's political regime to be a flawed democracy at best, if not an ethnic democracy or ethnocracy.[7] Exclusion and violent repression rather than democratic cooperation are increasingly seen as characteristic of Israel's political system.[8] Israel's democratic nature can be questioned on many grounds, including the rise of religious and right-wing populism, discrimination against minorities within Israel, and most visibly the treatment of Palestinians in the Occupied Territories. Nonetheless, despite the diversity of its Jewish population and the deep divisions which characterize this society, Israel's political system has proven to be remarkably durable and stable.

Israel's population increased from just over 800,000 in 1948 to 7.2 million in 2007, with immigration accounting for 38% of this growth. In the first decade of statehood, Israel's population grew more than in any other period, by 8.2% annually. 65% of this growth was due to immigration.[9] These immigrants were of Jewish descent, but they were drawn from all over the world, did not speak the same language and often did not come to Israel by choice. Yet, since the creation of the State of Israel, free and fair elections have been held regularly – at a minimum every four years, the political apparatus has been effective in responding to the needs of its growing population and it has been able to keep

[6] Their portrayal as such must be viewed within the historical context of the 1940s-1950s. It is undeniable that upon closer examination, they exhibited profound democratic deficits. None of them can be categorized as representative of the entire population. As this dissertation will discuss in further detail, Zionism was more concerned with building the state than with democratic rights. Arabs were placed under military rule and denied citizenship rights, for instance. By the same token, the Lebanese system was hardly inclusive; the Maronites had hegemony in the state apparatus despite their minority status.

[7] Sammy Smooha, "Ethnic Democracy: Israel as an Archetype," *Israel Studies* 2, no. 2 (1997): 198–241; Oren Yiftachel, *Ethnocracy: Land and Identity Politics in Israel/Palestine* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2006).

[8] Baruch Kimmerling, *Zionism and Territory: The Socio-Territorial Dimenstions of Zionist Politics* (Berkeley: Institute of International Studies, University of California, 1983); Lorenzo Veracini, *Israel and Settler Society* (Ann Arbor: Pluto Press, 2006); Jimmy Carter, *Palestine, Peace Not Apartheid* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2006).

[9] Central Bureau of Statistics, "Israel in Statistics, 1948-2007" (Jerusalem, 2009), 2.

centrifugal tendencies susceptible of destabilizing it in check. Lebanon's 1958 crisis and 1975-1989 civil war exposed the fragility of the Lebanese state and the consensus upon which it was built. While political cooperation between contending sects has since returned – and it must be noted here that also Lebanon has been able to avert the violence which in the past decade has shaken the region – Lebanon's democracy is no longer considered an example in support of power-sharing models in deeply divided societies (The model was also famously applied in Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1995, Northern Ireland in 1998 and Burundi in 2000.) Indeed, Lebanon has now become the epitome of failed consociational attempts.[10]

This dissertation investigates the roots of these different outcomes. How did Israel come to establish a stable democracy upon independence, albeit with strong elements of control and repression, whilst Lebanon established an inclusive democracy, yet placed on a path of instability? This thesis argues that part of the explanation lies in how divisions were managed during the mandate period. The way Britain and France managed deep divisions influenced not only the relative levels of stability and inclusiveness of their democratic systems upon independence but also the very nature of the political divisions which they had to continue to negotiate after independence. In other words, they did not just *manage* divisions with their institutional structures; they also *defined* them.

Britain supported a policy of centralization and control by one group over the rest within the Jewish community of Palestine. This policy entailed forceful integration and repression of divisions in order to control centrifugal tendencies and thus promote political stability. The resulting system was one of control and dominance of diversity rather than acceptance thereof. At the beginning of the mandate period, the Yishuv was a vertically

[10] Nancy Jabbra and Joseph Jabbra, "Consociational Democracy in Lebanon: A Flawed System of Governance," *Perspectives on Global Development and Technology*, 2001; Michael C. Hudson, "The Lebanese Crisis: The Limits of Consociational Democracy," *Journal of Palestine Studies* 5, no. 3/4 (1976): 109–22.

divided society, composed of multiple segments with similar levels of power. This thesis will show that the institutional mechanisms developed during the mandate period with the support of Britain turned the Yishuv into a horizontally divided society, in which a dominant group imposed its power, both physical and ideological. In such societies, the hold of the dominant society on power can lead to prolonged periods of political tranquillity compared to the 'tit for tat violence' which characterizes vertical societies.[11] In other words, it is more conducive to political stability. As a result of its control of the central levers of power, the dominant group in the Yishuv was able to 'act as an articulator of commitment'[12] by imposing a single, dominant vision of the state to guide post-independence policy. This reduced the centrifugal tendencies that the system had to deal with upon independence.

France, on the other hand, promoted division and power-sharing in Lebanon with the purpose of strengthening centrifugal tendencies (not, interestingly, with the purpose of reducing conflict in a divided society as in modern-day Bosnia, Iraq and Northern Ireland). By expanding the state's boundaries, it created a vertically divided society in which no group could impose itself physically or ideologically. The consociational mechanisms which it introduced to channel those divisions ensured religious tolerance and freedom of conscience, but they also entrenched distinct political identities and their visions of the state, which made cooperation more difficult and weakened the Lebanese state in the long run. Lebanon turned into a privileged place where all religious creeds could live in peace, but also one where the potential for internal strife could not be controlled by the state if voluntary cooperation broke down. As a result, France supported the development of Lebanon into a vertically divided society with the associated political instability.

[11] Adrian Guelke, *Politics in Deeply Divided Socities* (Cambridge: Polity, 2013), 10.
[12] Dan Horowitz, "Dual Authority Polities," *Comparative Politics* 14, no. 3 (1982): 335.

This does not mean that the political systems of today were pre-determined by colonial policy. There is no doubt that developments after independence have had a large impact on this outcome. So, for instance, had Israel chosen after 1967 to extend electoral rights to Palestinians in the Occupied Territories, the dominant group would have changed remarkably even whilst retaining electoral thresholds. In such a situation, Israel would quickly have turned into a vertically divided society again.[13] Moreover, without the Arab-Israeli conflict, cohesion within the Jewish community would likely be more fragile today: A common enemy has the potential to increase cohesion. So, for instance, Jewishness, re-conceptualized as a national identity, is increasingly important to engender a sense of unity vis-à-vis the Palestinians.[14] Lebanon, on the other hand, experienced a period of heightened national unity under Fouad Chehab, president of the country after the 1958 crisis.[15] Without the turmoil caused by Palestinian guerrillas in the country thereafter, the regional power dynamics that repeatedly tapped into existing divisions since independence and disappointments stemming from social inequalities, the Lebanese system might have proved stable. Indeed, historian of Lebanon Kamal Salibi argues that by the early 1970s, sectarian identities had been strongly attenuated.[16]

Likewise, the country could change if leaders chose to modify electoral system, create a single electoral district with proportional representation: it seems clear that it would

[13] See for instance the most recent work of Oren Barak, in which post-1967 Israel is compared with post-1920 Lebanon. Oren Barak, *State Expansion and Conflict in and between Israel/Palestine and Lebanon* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017).
[14] The Jewish State Law of 2018 is a case in point. "Jewish Nation State: Israel Approves Controversial Bill," *BBC*, 2018, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-44881554.
[15] Fouad Chehab, mindful of the need for greater national unity, introduced reforms to increase participation of Muslims in public administration and to correct the country's social inequality with a public works programme focussed on underprivileged regions as well more state intervention to control the free market economy. In this way, he hoped to increase Muslim loyalty towards Lebanon. Kamal Salibi, "Lebanon under Fuad Chehab 1958-1964," *Middle Eastern Studies* 2, no. 3 (1966): 211–26; Michael C. Hudson, *The Precarious Republic: Lebanon* (London: Westview, 1985), 313–25.
[16] Kamal Salibi, *A House of Many Mansions: The History of Lebanon Reconsidered* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990), 196.

turn into a horizontally divided society, dominated by the Shia element[17] – probably by Hezbollah, if the 2018 are of any indication. However, the history of these countries did not evolve according to those counterfactuals and this dissertation proposes that part of this result can be explained by a certain level of path dependence on colonial policies.[18]

What this dissertation contributes is not the assertion that the mandate day Jewish community of Palestine (and thus Israel in the first years of statehood) was based on political dominance whilst Lebanon was based on political division – this is evident to any scholar of the Middle East or interested observer. What it seeks to elucidate is how these two different systems developed. Why did Britain and France follow such different institutional strategies when setting up their respective political systems? What informed their decisions and what might have happened if alternative decisions had been made? The data presented in this dissertation offers an insight into colonial imperatives and political legacies.

Moreover, the institutional strategies followed represent two distinct ways of managing deep divisions in democracies. As a result, tracing their development can help us understand the merits and shortcomings of each of these strategies. What is the impact of developing institutions that bring the dominant group within a divided society to power? How does this compare with the application of consociational mechanisms, which emphasize cooperation rather than control of one segment over the rest? How do these institutional strategies shape political identities, and how can this influence political stability? The answers to these questions can deepen our understanding of democracy in

[17] Although no census has taken place since 1932, it is estimated that the Shia population of Lebanon now makes up between 35 and 45% of the total population. For instance, Muhammad A. Faour, "Religion, Demography, and Politics in Lebanon," *Middle Eastern Studies* 43, no. 6 (2007): 912.

[18] Looking into the impact of economic institutions created by colonial powers worldwide, Acemoglu et al. showed that past institutions alone determine 20% of the variation in current institutions. Thus, whilst colonial institutions are not the only determinant of current institutions, they do have a substantial impact on them. Daron Acemoglu, Simon Johnson, and James A. Robinson, "The Colonial Origins of Comparative Development: An Empirical Investigation," *The American Economic Review* 91, no. 5 (2001): 1383.

divided societies and the associated nation-building process. Furthermore, this thesis shows that institutional mechanisms not only *manage* divisions; they also crucially help *define* their nature.

The remainder of this chapter will discuss the central theoretical framework that this thesis draws on. A brief methodology section, outlining the research process and sources used will be followed by an outline of chapters which simultaneously serves as a synopsis of my findings.

Theoretical Framework

Democracy in Deeply Divided Societies

Many scholars of democratization theory, a well-established though contested body of work in comparative politics, have asserted that deep divisions have the potential to hurt democratic endurance or prevent the emergence of democracy altogether. The other side of the coin, the idea that a level of national cohesion is a precondition for lasting democracy also has a long history, which long preceded contemporary political science. In this dissertation the terms 'political stability' and 'democratic stability' will be used interchangeably as Israel and Lebanon are both procedurally democratic, and political stability implies stability of the democratic system.

Outlining the entire history of political thought pertaining to this subject is beyond the scope of this dissertation. Nonetheless, a review of these ideas in contemporary political science is helpful to situate this study in its theoretical context. In the aftermath of World War II, many political scientists dedicated their attention to the conditions under which democracies could retain stability against the backdrop of the breakdown of such systems in Germany, Italy and Spain. Germaine to the present debate about social divisions is Gabriel Almond's 1956 article, 'Comparative Political Systems'. Continental Europe was

characterized by what he called 'fragmented political cultures'. Instead of having one 'secular' political culture, like Anglo-American systems, in which the majority of the population shared a general set of values on public policy issues, fragmented cultures presented no such agreement. Indeed, in these political systems, 'the actors have not come to politics with specific bargainable differences but rather with conflicting and mutually exclusive designs for the political culture and the political system'[19].

He outlined three main subcultural components: a) a remnant of the historical Catholic segment of the population, b) the old middle classes, c) representatives of industrial society. New subcultures are incrementally added to this mosaic, resulting in further fragmentation which may be expressed in political parties but also appear in the form of movements or sects. This state of affairs, Almond argued, was conducive to totalitarianism as it created the context in which charismatic nationalist leaders could break through the 'immobilism' of a segmented political system and create homogeneity. By contrast, the 'secular' Anglo-American political culture ensured political stability.

Without laying an emphasis on social psychological factors, democratization scholar Seymour Martin Lipset similarly highlighted the impact of divisions on democratic stability. In discussing the requisites of political consensus in 1960, Lipset asserted: 'where a number of historic cleavages intermix *and create the basis for ideological politics, democracy will be unstable and weak.'*[20] Whilst cleavages existed in all societies, it was *politicized* cleavages which informed ideological views and were often based on more than one divisive factor which proved to be an obstacle to stable democracy.

Exactly ten years later, democratization scholar Dankwart Rustow argued that national solidarity is a precondition for transition to democracy. National unity, he argued,

[19] Gabriel Almond, "Comparative Political Systems," *The Journal of Politics* 18, no. 3 (1956): 406.
[20] Seymour Martin Lipset, *Political Man: The Social Bases of Politics* (New York: Doubleday, 1960), 85.

'must precede all the other phases of democratization'.[21] To him, national unity meant the following: 'the vast majority of citizens in a democracy-to-be must have no doubt […] as to which political community they belong to'.[22] In other words, Rustow did not consider it possible for democracy to flourish in a society so deeply divided that their loyalties might lie outside of the nation state. Robert Dahl, one of the twentieth century's most widely cited political theorists and author of the seminal book *Polyarchy*, wrote in 1989: 'Consensus among the persons whose interests are significantly affected will be higher than it would be with any other feasible boundaries'.[23] Consensus, in this context was associated with the physical boundaries of the state.

A few years before Dahl's words, scholar Frederick Whelan had laid out what he considered a great paradox of democracy, the 'boundary problem of democracy'. Boundary definition (and thus the creation of the state and therefore the *demos*) was always undemocratic. He considered a clear definition of these boundaries to be essential for the endurance of a democratic system. Hence the paradox: The very maintenance of a democratic system required an undemocratic prerequisite, for general dissatisfaction with these boundaries could compromise 'the viability of the established democracy'.[24]

Rustow, Dahl and Whelan were directly advocating a nationalist perspective by highlighting the importance of a coincidence between the boundaries of the nation and the state or the political unit. However, in essence, they were referring to the same principle as Almond and Lipset: There was an assumption that politicized social divisions were detrimental to stable democracy. None of these authors explicitly referred to ethnic

[21] Dankwart A Rustow, "Transitions to Democracy: Toward a Dynamic Model," *Comparative Politics* 2, no. 3 (1970): 351, http://www.jstor.org/stable/421307.
[22] Ibid., 350.
[23] Robert Dahl, *Democracy and Its Critics* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1989), 207–8.
[24] Frederik Whelan, "Prologue: Democratic Theory and the Boundary Problem," in *Nomos 25: Liberal Democracy*, ed. J.R. Pennock and J.W. Chapman (New York: New York University Press, 1983), 41.

divisions: it was a matter of 'agreement' on boundaries, values and political systems which happened to overlap with other social factors.

This assumption that such divisions per se inhibit democratic stability was challenged by Arend Lijphart. His point of departure was the work of Almond: The latter's continental systems were now called 'centrifugal democracies' and were considered to be prone to immobilism and political instability, whereas 'centripetal democracies' had a united political culture and were more likely to engender political stability. However, he found a category in the middle: these were called 'consociational democracies', characterized by a fragmented political culture, yet enjoying stability. Looking at what he viewed as the deeply divided societies of Austria, Switzerland, the Netherlands and Belgium, Lijphart argued that institutional mechanisms mediated between deep divisions and stable democracy.

Where leaders of different segments of society formed a coalition, whichever institutional form this might take, they could encourage the reduction of political conflict despite divisions. The most defining characteristic of what Lijphart called 'consociational democracies' was 'overarching cooperation at the elite level with the deliberate aim of counteracting disintegrative tendencies in the system'.[25] Not only did this category of divided yet stable democracies include the small European countries listed above; he also identified Lebanon as an example of such a polity.[26] In a later work elaborating on his typology of democracies, Israel was included as an example of a plural society with a 'consensus democracy', one including elements of consociationalism, as well.[27]

[25] Lijphart, "Typologies of Democratic Systems," 21.
[26] Lijphart, "Consociational Democracy"; Lijphart, "Typologies of Democratic Systems."
[27] Arend Lijphart, *Patterns of Democracy* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1999), 249. He considers Israel a combination between a consensus democracy (in which power is shared, dispersed and limited) and a majoritarian democracy (in which power political power is in the hands of the majority). Ibid., 2.

Lijphart's work was followed by Eric Nordlinger's widely cited study *Conflict Regulation in Divided Societies* in 1972. Nordlinger sought to solve the same puzzle as his predecessor. Political scientists had for decades assumed that deep divisions are antithetical with democracy, yet democracies were found in deeply divided societies where the homogeneity, crosscutting cleavages and consensus generally associated with stable democracy were not present. As a result, 'some other variables are presumably present which counteract the powerful centrifugal tendencies found in deeply divided societies'.[28] His answer was likewise that cooperation at the elite level could reduce the salience of deep divisions.

The concept of consociational democracy has been widely applied in international peace-building efforts, and the associated theory and practice have become a matter of controversy. A large proportion of the democratization literature, based on both qualitative and quantitative enquiries, has found evidence that diversity hinders democracy.[29] Of course, quantitative studies can only return average relationships and are inadequate to elucidate causal relationships or nuances between cases. Study results are often strongly dependent on how democracy and diversity are defined. Indeed, the concept of deeply divided societies is ill-defined in most of the literature. Many authors use it without specifying the meaning of the term.[30] The term has gained wide usage with regards to ethnic and linguistic fragmentation. Consequently, Canada, Switzerland, Belgium and Spain are

[28] Eric Nordlinger, *Conflict Regulation in Divided Societies* (Cambridge: Centre for International Affairs, Harvard University, 1972), 2–3.
[29] Donald Horowitz, "Democracy in Divided Societies," *Journal of Democracy* 4, no. 4 (1993); Donald L. Horowitz, "Ethnic Power Sharing: Three Big Problems," *Journal of Democracy* 25, no. 2 (2014): 5–20; Adam Przeworski et al., *Democracy and Development: Political Institutions and Well-Being in the World, 1950-1990* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 125; Alberto Alesina et al., "Fractionalization," *Journal of Economic Growth* 8 (2003): 173; Timothy Power and Mark Gasiorowski, "The Structural Determinants of Democratic Consolidation: Evidence from the Third World," *Comparative Political Studies* 31, no. 6 (1998): 755–56; Adam Przeworski et al., "What Makes Democracies Endure?," *Journal of Democracy* 7 (1996): 47.
[30] Guelke, *Politics in Deeply Divided Socities*, 2.

often considered to be divided societies. Often, the term 'deeply divided society' is equated with ethnically divided polities.[31]

In reality, deep divisions can result from any cleavage within a society: It can be class-based, religious, ethnic, linguistic, between natives and settlers, between landowners and peasants or any other cleavage that may lead to political conflict.[32] Yet, this does not exhaust the dimensions on which divisions can be based. Particularly germane to this dissertation is the concept of 'competing visions of the state', based on the work of political scientist Hannah Lerner. This involves disagreements about societal norms and matters of national identity, much like the concepts used in Almond's dichotomy between fragmented and secular cultures.[33] These are, in the words of Dan Horowitz, 'divergent political aspirations' which characterize what he calls 'dual authority polities', i.e. polities in which power is split between a central authority (that of the state) and subgroups.[34]

In both Israel and Lebanon, as we shall see in this dissertation, ethnic, linguistic and religious divisions overlap with such 'competing visions of the state'. Thus, both countries faced similar challenges and negotiated them differently, resulting in two different models of democracy. In this dissertation, I will extend these concepts by using the term 'dominant visions of the state' as the antithesis of 'competing visions of the state'. It denotes the existence of a vision that is successfully imposed on the rest of society through institutionalization. This thesis argues that in the Yishuv, institutional centralization ensured that one segment could rise to supreme power and turn its own vision into the dominant vision.

[31] Ibid., 27.
[32] Ibid., 13–33.
[33] Hanna Lerner, *Making Constitutions in Deeply Divided Societies* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 31.
[34] Horowitz, "Dual Authority Polities."

In the past decades, ethnonationalism took centre stage in the theory and practice of politics (e.g. the former Yugoslavia, Nigeria, Rwanda, Chechnya, Iraq, Syria). As a result, the subject of whether stability and democracy could be attained in plural societies has arisen again as an important matter of concern. Quantitative analyses finding a correlation between deep divisions and democracy have been contested by others whose data has falsified said hypothesis. Depending on the statistical model used, divisions are shown to be either detrimental or inconsequential to democracy.[35] A widely cited study on the impact of ethnic, linguistic and religious fractionalization on the quality of government illustrates this (see table 1 below). The regressions control for GNP for 1970-1995, the log of population in 1960 and legal origin dummies (Socialist, French, German and Scandinavian). The democracy index is composed of average democracy scores for 1970-1994, on a scale from 0 to 10, with lower values indicating a less democratic environment.[36]

Table 1: Alesina et al. Impact of Fractionalization on Democracy[37]:

	Independent variable		
Dependent variable	Ethnic fractionalization	Linguistic fractionalization	Religious fractionalization
Democracy index	-2.278*	-0.162	0.233

Notes: *Significant at the 10% level

**Significant at the 5% level

***Significant at the 1% level

[35] Horowitz, "Democracy in Divided Societies," 1993; Horowitz, "Ethnic Power Sharing: Three Big Problems"; Przeworski et al., "What Makes Democracies Endure?"; Przeworski et al., *Democracy and Development: Political Institutions and Well-Being in the World, 1950-1990*; Alesina et al., "Fractionalization"; Power and Gasiorowski, "The Structural Determinants of Democratic Consolidation: Evidence from the Third World"; M. Steven Fish and Robin S. Brooks, "Does Diversity Hurt Democracy?," *Journal of Democracy*, 2004.

[36] Alesina et al., "Fractionalization."

[37] Own table using data extracted from Ibid.

The results show that ethnic and linguistic fractionalization are negatively correlated with the democracy index used in the study. However, only ethnic fractionalization has a statistically significant impact, and only at the 10% level. Meanwhile, religious fractionalization is positively correlated with the index, suggesting that higher levels of religious fractionalization are associated with higher levels of democracy, though the relationship is not statistically significant. The authors posit that this positive correlation is due to the fact that societies with higher levels of religious fractionalization are also more tolerant societies.[38]

How inconclusive statistical studies are on this matter is further shown in a 2004 study that regresses the Freedom House democracy ratings on the same fractionalization indexes, controlling for economic development, Islam as the majority religion, former British colony status and OPEC membership (to control for the 'oil curse'). The results presented in table 2 show a positive correlation (as opposed to the negative relationship shown in Alesina et al.) between ethnic and linguistic fractionalization and the Freedom House score, and a negative correlation between religious fractionalization and this score, exactly the inverse of Alesina's regressions. In this case, all of the correlations are statistically non-significant:

Table 2: Fish and Brooks Impact of Fractionalization on Democracy[39]:

	Independent variable		
Dependent variable	Ethnic fractionalization	Linguistic fractionalization	Religious fractionalization
FH score	0.11	0.05	-0.48

[38] Ibid., 175.
[39] Own table using data extracted from Fish and Brooks, "Does Diversity Hurt Democracy?"

Thus, statistically determining a universal effect of deep divisions on democracy has proven elusive.

Often, results depended on the way deep divisions or fragmentation was conceptualized. One 2004 study attempted to remedy this shortcoming by using several widely-used fragmentation indices to assess the impact of deep divisions on the Freedom House index. A simple bivariate analysis showed a statistically significant impact of such fragmentation on the democracy score. However, when controlling for other relevant variables, such as GDP per capita and British colonial heritage (assumed to be positively correlated with democracy), fragmentation appeared to have no impact on democracy scores.[40] The problem is thus that the data is inconclusive, and that some divided societies survive and prosper, while others fall apart.[41] In other words, it is not divisions themselves which stand in the way of democracy, but the way in which these divisions are managed and the context within which they are managed.

As Lijphart's article did in the 1960s, many now argue that institutional mechanisms have a great impact on the fate of a divided society. There is, however, no agreement on which institutional mechanism best channels divisions. The benefit of Lijphart's consociationalism is its inclusive character – all significant stakeholders receive a fair share in the system to represent their group's interests and voice their opinions. A variation of this system is suggested by centripetalists who propose to bolster moderates in each ethnic group to ensure the emergence of an interethnic central coalition of moderates.[42] Lebanon is often analysed as such a system, as the electoral system has historically compelled

[40] Ibid. Ibid.
[41] Ian O'Flynn, *Deliberative Democracy and Divided Societies* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2006), 34.
[42] Horowitz, "Ethnic Power Sharing: Three Big Problems," 5–6.

political leaders to draw on the support of an intercommunal electorate. Similar systems can be observed in Singapore and Indonesia.[43] Such 'centripetalism' prevents the creation of a parliament that is so polarized that cooperation is all but impossible.

While consociationalism focuses 'on the mutual cooperation of subnational elites […], a control approach would focus on the emergence and maintenance of a relationship in which the superior power of one segment is mobilized to enforce stability by constraining the political actions and opportunities of another segment or segments'.[44] The control system is thus 'the legal and administrative instrument of the superordinate segment.'[45] In the Yishuv, as will be shown in this thesis, establishing a control system required centralization of power for such a superior segment to arise. As a result, at times, this dissertation will use the terms 'control system' and 'centralization' interchangeably.

Opponents of consociationalism argue that the system strengthens deep divisions as it can prevent the emergence of a feeling of national belonging. In other words, it contributes to the creation of separate systems for each of Almond's subcultures or the development of Horowitz's dual polity systems thus strengthening a fragmented political culture which inhibits political stability. Moreover, they argue, it can lead to immobilism because each group can block the claims and demands of other groups. The resulting stalemate can lead to demands for a change of the system by the majority.[46] During times of peace, the consociational system is viewed as a guarantee of stability, but at times of

[43] Benjamin Reilly, *Democracy and Diversity: Political Engineering in the Asia-Pacific* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 85.
[44] Ian Lustick, "Stability in Deeply Divided Societies: Consociationalism versus Control," *World Politics*, 1979, 327–28.
[45] Ibid., 331.
[46] Horowitz, "Ethnic Power Sharing: Three Big Problems," 12; Horowitz, "Dual Authority Polities." In the case of Lebanon, the risk of groups whose democratic might has grown since the last census in 1932 (on which quotas are based) has prompted political leaders to avoid the celebration of a new census since. Faour, "Religion, Demography, and Politics in Lebanon," 910.

heightened conflict, it becomes the focus of all arguments and revindications.[47] Furthermore, it can render the system ineffective for dealing with everyday political demands.[48]

As a result, some have considered that it is preferable for a divided society to apply such a control system. Ian Lustick's seminal paper on control versus consociationalism is a case in point: 'In deeply divided societies where consociational techniques […] cannot be successfully employed', he argues, 'control may represent a model for the organization of intergroup relations that is substantially preferable to other conceivable solutions: civil war, extermination, or deportation'.[49] Following a similar logic, political scientists Alan Arian and Samuel Barnes recognized a link between Israel's dominant party system and political stability. Under difficult conditions, these scholars argue, a dominant party system provides significant advantages over a fragmented party system. The dominant party will reward allies and punish offenders, any opposition is minimal and can lead only to superficial political change. Even frequent changes of government will not destabilize the system as the dominant party is set to return, albeit with new coalition partners.[50]

While such institutional mechanisms may be better able to guarantee stability, they come at a price: there is no doubt that they restrict diversity and turn into an instrument of the majority. As a result, the quality of these democratic systems will invariably suffer. While they may not suffer from the governmental instability that can afflict a divided society ruled through a consociational system, they exclude large sections of the population. Political, economic and social inclusion of minorities through power-sharing

[47] Elizabeth Picard, *Liban État de Discorde. Des Fondations Aux Guerres Fracticides* (Paris: Flammarion, 1988), 92. [Lebanon, State of Discordance. The Foundations of Fracticidal Wars]
[48] Imad Salamey, "Failing Consocationalism in Lebanon and Integrative Options," *International Journal of Peace Studies* 14, no. 2 (2009): 84.
[49] Lustick, "Stability in Deeply Divided Societies: Consociationalism versus Control," 336.
[50] Alan Arian and Samuel H. Barnes, "The Dominant Party System : A Neglected Model of Democratic Stability," *The Journal of Politics* 36, no. 3 (1974): 593–98.

mechanisms, whether consociational or not, and decentralization of authority, are often considered to be more democratic courses of action in diverse societies. Under conditions of majority rule, underrepresented groups are often unable to voice their concerns. In his original formulation of the consociational model, political scientist Arend Lijphart described the consensus model of democracy as 'kinder' and 'gentler', a democracy of higher quality.[51] Even Donald Horowitz, a political scientist critical of Lijphart's consociational model, associates majority rule with minority exclusion and explains that in deeply divided societies it constitutes a problem for democratization.[52] Thus, control can result in the creation of an unrepresentative, flawed democracy, whilst consociationalism can create an unstable democracy.

This dissertation does not intend to provide a judgment on which institutional mechanism creates a better democratic outcome. As my conclusion to this dissertation reflects, there is no right or wrong way of managing deep divisions. Ultimately, it comes down to individual judgment: if stability is valued above individual freedoms and diversity, then control may at times be a more appropriate option. If, on the contrary, diversity is held in higher esteem, it may be worth sacrificing political stability. Chapter 8 of this dissertation will further elaborate on this point. I do not intend to argue that this conclusion applies to all divided societies – as some of the consociational systems applauded by the above mentioned scholars have been both stable and diverse. Any claims of generalizability would require deeper knowledge of a greater number of cases.

Instead of solving the puzzle regarding best practices in deeply divided democracies, what this project seeks to provide is a historical analysis of two of the few

[51] Lijphart, *Patterns of Democracy*, 293.
[52] Donald L. Horowitz, "Democracy in Divided Societies," *Journal of Democracy* 4, no. 4 (1993): 39–53; Donald Horowitz, "Constitutional Design: Proposal Versus Processes," in *The Architecture of Democracy: Constitutional Design, Conflict Management, and Democracy*, ed. Andrew Reynolds (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 15–36.

enduring democracies in the Middle East which reflect these two strategies. They created different types of democracy, each of them with its shortcomings and its virtues. Israel became a stable democracy upon independence, but it required repressing 'competing visions of the state' in the pre-state period. As this dissertation will show, this referred not only to the Arabs within Palestine but also alternative visions within the Jewish community. Lebanon, on the other hand, became an unstable democracy characterized by openness and diversity. Each community was able to develop within its own realm, thus maintaining the pluralism which Israel suppressed. At the same time, that system led to an entrenchment of conflicting identities and thus of a potential for conflict and instability. This dissertation helps to explain why different strategies were selected to manage diversity in these two countries during the mandate period and how they influenced national identities and political processes in the first years of statehood.

The Political Legacy of Colonialism

This dissertation traces and juxtaposes the paths followed by Britain in the Yishuv and France in Lebanon and shows that they were diametrically opposed to each other. If Britain emphasized centralization of power, thus helping a dominant group rise to power, France explicitly sought to prevent such an outcome and to create a vertically divided society with an unstable political system. But what was their reasoning? Did these different responses follow something that we might call "typical" French vs. British colonial traditions? Did they respond to strategies followed elsewhere in the world? Or were those policies developed *ad hoc*?

This dissertation will show the latter to be the case. I will show that colonial policy in Palestine was unplanned, ill-defined and made up on the spot. The same is true for France's policy in Lebanon. While it is often claimed that France's alliance with the

Maronites since the 19th century predisposed it to creating Greater Lebanon, it was not until other avenues were exhausted that Paris committed to this course of action. As a result, this thesis shows that colonial policy was not a matter of principle.

Political scientists have long discussed the political legacy of colonialism, including its effects on state-building and democracy. The institutional mechanisms applied by Britain and France in their former colonies, many argue, have had an impact on state structures, economic developments, regime types and national identities today. Large-N studies of democracy now commonly introduce a dummy variable for colonial status, and many differentiate by colonial power. Some statistical analyses have found a positive, statistically significant link between former British colony status and democracy.[53] In fact, some have found, almost every post-colonial state with an enduring democracy has been a British colony.[54] The suggested causal mechanism is that British colonialism created institutions and processes in newly independent countries that were more conducive to democracy.[55] This is particularly true for its legacy of military professionalism, a well-trained civil service and independent judiciary.[56]

Thus, the purported skills of Britain at creating more structured states are often associated with a hypothesized greater ability to support the development of democracy. Nonetheless, data from various studies does not unequivocally support this hypothesis. A quantitative study of democracy in Asia, for instance, has shown that former British colonies compare poorly to countries never colonized by Britain when democracy is

[53] John Charles. Lipset, Seymour Martin; Seong, Kyoung-Ryung; and Torres, "A Comparative Analysis of the Social Requisites of Democracy.," *International Social Science Journal* 45 (1993): 168; Pippa Norris, "Stable Democracy and Good Governance in Divided Societies : Do Powersharing Institutions Work ?," in *International Studies Association 46th Annual Convention*, 2005, 15, http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=722626.
[54] Myron Weiner, "Empirical Democratic Theory and the Transition from Authoritarianism to Democracy," *PS* 20, no. 4 (1987): 862.
[55] Ibid.
[56] Aurel Croissant, "From Transition to Defective Democracy: Mapping Asian Democratization," *Democratization*, 2004, 168.

measured in terms of political and civil rights. Furthermore, only three out of ten former British colonies in the region have established democratic regimes.[57] Other studies have shown that this variable has no effect at all on regime type.[58]

In trying to establish a more differentiated narrative, scholars like Matthew Lange and Mahmood Mamdani have concluded that no general effect can be attributed to a certain colonial heritage. Rather, they show that it was the *type of rule* that was instituted: Direct rule – where the colonial power supplanted existing power structures with a new political system – was more conducive to democracy and development than indirect rule – whereby the colonial power relied on existing local leadership to govern a territory.[59] The same arguments have been applied to state-building. In Africa, for instance, France did not trace administrative boundaries following ethnic boundaries, it spread the use of the French language thus promoting linguistic homogenization, and civil law supported the control of the central state. Britain, on the contrary, relied on tribal chiefs, traced administrative boundaries based on ethnicity and bolstered judicial independence through common law. This, in turn, is assumed to have weakened the African state.[60]

As individual case studies, the analyses in this dissertation cannot confirm or falsify any of the theories reproduced above. Rather, they show how contingent colonial policy was on the particular interest that each of the powers pursued in their respective realms and at different points in time. In this sense, it follows a strain of the literature which recognizes the heterogeneity of policy within each empire.[61] Rather than applying a pre-defined,

[57] Ibid., 168–69.
[58] For instance, Fish and Brooks, "Does Diversity Hurt Democracy?," 159.
[59] Matthew Lange, *Lineages of Despotism and Development. British Colonialism and State Power* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2009); Mahmood Mamdani, *Citizen and Subject* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996).
[60] Merima Ali et al., "Colonial Legacy, State-Building and the Salience of Ethnicity in Sub-Saharan Africa," *The Economic Journal*, 2019, 1–2.
[61] Alexander Lee and Kenneth A. Schultz, "Comparing British and French Colonial Legacies: A Discontinuity Analysis of Cameroon," *Quarterly Journal of Political Science* 7, no. 4 (2012): 6–7; Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson, "The Colonial Origins of Comparative Development: An Empirical

standardized policy to Palestine and Lebanon, the ultimate outcome was the result of agency, interest and unplanned reactions to the situation on the ground. In the Yishuv, Britain supported the centralization of power. However, this cannot be attributed to the causal mechanism which some of the large-N studies referred to above have proposed: Britain as the better state-builder. In fact, when they arrived in Palestine, they intended to build a binational state, possibly with a consociational system, just like France did in Lebanon. It was only the development of events on the ground (in particular, the refusal of Palestinian Arabs to participate in such a political arrangement) that led them to support development of the autonomous Yishuv. Furthermore, the mandatory did not initially intend to centralize power within the Yishuv either: it was only through strong lobbying on the part of the High Commissioner and the Zionist Executive that it resolved to create a single community. Initially, their plan was to turn the Jewish community into a vertically divided society with a consociational political system.

Discussions in France about the structure of Lebanon were equally vivid. Some elements of the French establishment – not least first High Commissioner, Henri Gouraud – clearly favoured the creation of Greater Lebanon with the annexation of Syrian land advocated by some Maronites. The majority, however, including commercial interest groups and Prime Minister Georges Clemenceau himself wished to explore the avenue of a smaller Lebanon and a Greater Syria. It was only when negotiations with Faisal, King of Syria, broke down that the French government left policy in the hands of the High Commissioner who promptly proceeded to creating the new state which would now harbour a vertically divided society. Only from then on did 'divide and rule' become the only option to defend colonial interests.

Investigation"; Ewout Frankema and Marlous Van Waijenburg, "Endogenous Colonial Institutions: Lesson from Fiscal Capacity Building in British and French Africa, 1880-1940," African Economic History Working Paper Series, 2013, https://www.ewoutfrankema.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/05/AEHN_WP_No.11.2013-1.pdf.

In other words, both colonial projects could have gone different ways: the Yishuv could have become a vertically divided society with no group gaining dominance. Lebanon, on the other hand, could have remained a small state with a Maronite majority, next to a Greater Syria. Alternatively, France could have promoted centralization and domination by one segment – however defined – within Greater Lebanon. Divergent regime trajectories were ultimately not due to any 'average effect' of Britain versus French colonial policy but to developments on the ground.

Similarly, this dissertation only finds limited support for the thesis that direct rule (i.e. the creation of a new, colonial administration) is more conducive to state strength, democracy and development. The systems established by Britain and France were mixed. France established a parliament with a modicum of power in Lebanon, but suspended it for most the mandate period. Nonetheless, elected Lebanese leaders (with elections often manipulated by France to ensure support for the mandatory) were consistently at the side of French officials. It is true that France formed a centralized administration and power was fully in the hands of the French High Commissioner. Contrary to the situation in Palestine, however, France created channels (albeit ineffective) for popular participation.

After the failed legislative council elections of 1923 in Palestine, Britain ruled Palestine solely through a committee composed of British officials. The institutions of the Yishuv and the various structures through which the Palestinian Arabs made themselves heard were little more than interest groups when it came to governing Palestine. In both the Yishuv and Lebanon the mandatory powers relied fully on local officials. As a result, both contained elements of direct and indirect rule. Once again, then, no 'average effect' of colonial strategies can be confirmed.

Development of the Project And Methodology

This project began with the puzzle of why Israel's divided society was able to establish a more stable democracy than Lebanon's. If divided societies had comparative disadvantages when it came to establishing democracy, then why was Israel more stable than Lebanon? Why did divisions lead to instability in Lebanon soon after independence whereas they were 'managed' or 'attenuated' in Israel?

My search for the answer in mandate day institutions was informed by two reasons. At first, this dissertation was set to trace the development of identity discourses and the creation of national identity following a modernist or constructivist approach within nationalism studies.[62] As I began my archival research, I found identity discourse mostly in government documents and published work written by government officials, and realized that the development of such discourse was intimately linked with institutional developments during the mandate period. Certain discourses came out ahead whilst others disappeared based on the power which the group espousing the discourse wielded through established institutions. The focus of my research thus shifted from the discourse itself to the conditions which made the emergence of certain dominant discourses or, as used in this dissertation, visions of the state (and the disappearance of subordinate discourses) possible.

A second, more practical reason for focussing on the development of government institutions rather than discourse (whether elite or popular) were limited human and financial resources to analyse other sources. First of all, the archives that I could access for both Israel and Lebanon were official archives – linked to the government, political parties or interest groups. The papers these institutions held were those of the political and social

[62] Hobsbawm, *The Invention of Tradition* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992); Benedict Richard O'Gorman Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism* (London: Verso, 1991); Ernest Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism* (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1998).

elite at the time rather than grassroots movements. Secondly, while I could cover German, French, English and, with some limitations, Arabic, I could not use Hebrew language sources which could have provided an insight into non-governmental developments. Hiring language assistants was out of the question given the time restrictions and financial resources at my disposal for this dissertation.

While I initially intended to analyse 3-4 cases to conduct a comparative study with greater generalizability, the nuanced and detailed analysis that was required to look into the development of each state dictated a small-N approach. I thus resolved to conduct process tracing to understand the detailed mechanisms that were behind the development of these deeply divided societies into states. For this purpose, I visited multiple archives in Israel (Central Zionist Archives, Ben-Gurion Archives, Jabotinsky Archive, Weizmann Archive), France (Archives Diplomatiques Nantes, Archives du Ministère des Affaires Étrangères, Service Historique de la Defense) and the United Kingdom (Middle East Center Archives at St. Antony's and The National Archives at Kew). I was able to gain access to the Maronite Archives in Lebanon, but could not find anything of use for this dissertation that was not already covered in French documents.

The wealth of material available for both countries as well as my desire to understand the development of these societies into states in detail meant that I had to choose a cut-off date for my research. This dissertation focusses on the development of these two divided societies into independent democracies and the impact that the management of their divisions had on the type of regime they established. As such, the bulk of my research stretches from 1918 to 1943 in Lebanon and 1948 in Israel. Moreover, I analysed instances of institutional development which I considered to be of great significance for the development of their respective visions of the state. I focussed on moments of political institution building and conflicts surrounding these institutions as well competing visions

of the state. To illustrate the impact of these developments on the functioning of both political systems, I provide a cursory analysis of politics in the first decade of independence in the last empirical chapter of this dissertation.[63] I very briefly touch upon the 1958 crisis in Lebanon, Chehabism and the onset of the 1975 civil war to illustrate the long-term effects of the system established during the mandate period.

Organization of this Dissertation

Chapter 2 will set the scene by showing in which way the Yishuv and Lebanon were deeply divided societies during the mandate period. Drawing on a wealth of published secondary sources, I show that both societies encountered deep religious divisions which overlapped with ideological divisions (which often related to different visions of the state). Religious cum ideological movements established separate political structures in both societies, thus fragmenting the political entities in the pre-state period and configuring vertically divided societies. In addition, the Yishuv contended with ethnic divisions amongst its Jewish immigrants – and Jewish natives – whilst in Lebanon, social class divisions played a part in structuring political life.

This chapter will furthermore outline the ways in which institutional mechanisms introduced by the mandate powers impacted the nature of these divisions. Institutional centralization in the Yishuv led to a progressive unification of the Yishuv's society; with the reduction of separate political identities, it was on the way to becoming a horizontally divided society – and thus more politically stable – by the time Israel became independent.

[63] There is no widely accepted definition of democratic consolidation, but there is some consensus regarding the likelihood of democratic survival after a certain period of democratic governance. Power et al. place the threshold at 12 years, Power and Gasiorowski, "The Structural Determinants of Democratic Consolidation: Evidence from the Third World." Svolik finds that the hazard ratio for authoritarian reversal declines after 10 years, Milan Svolik, "Authoritarian Reversals and Democratic Consolidation," *American Political Science Review* 102 (2008): 167.

The French mandatory, on the contrary, introduced mechanisms that not only entrenched existing social fragmentation but increased and deepened divisions. As a result, they perpetuated fragmentation and ensured that Lebanon would continue to be a vertically divided society, struggling to attain political stability.

Chapter 3 connects with the discussion about colonial imperatives and policies to illustrate the rationale that each mandatory followed in their respective territories. A first section traces the discussion about Palestine policy in London to show that the British government had no pre-defined plan for its mandate. Rather, its policy consisted in navigating its promise to Jews – contained in the Balfour Declaration – and to the Arabs – contained in the McMahon-Hussein correspondence – with on-the-spot decisions adjusted to the situation on the ground. This ultimately resulted in the creation of autonomous Yishuv institutions and thus the basis for the creation of the State of Israel. These findings are based on a combination of published secondary work, newspaper articles published at the time, debates in the House of Commons and House of Lords (obtained through Hansard[64]) and Cabinet Papers[65].

The following section shows that France did not have a pre-defined policy in Lebanon either. The creation of Greater Lebanon with protective mechanisms for the Maronites was not – as is often assumed – set in stone when France took over the mandate. Rather, it was the result of a break-down of their agreement with Faisal, King of Syria. France was in the region to perpetuate its influence there and to impede the success of Arab nationalism – only keeping the Maronites dependent on them and the breakup of Greater Syria could accomplish it. I draw extensively on the military archives of the Service Historique de la Défense in Paris, the foreign ministry archives at the Centre des Archives

[64] Available at https://api.parliament.uk/historic-hansard/index.html
[65] Available at http://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/cabinetpapers/

Diplomatique in Nantes, parliamentary debates and contemporary newspaper articles. The analysis is complemented with a wealth of published secondary and primary sources.

Chapters 4 to 6 present a selection of institutional mechanisms applied in the Yishuv and Lebanon during the mandate period, which I consider to be instrumental for the management of divisions within both societies. Chapter 4 begins with tracing the boundaries of each political community, showing how the Yishuv and Greater Lebanon came into being and why. I draw extensively on published primary and secondary sources in both cases. For the Yishuv, I found much of my data in the Israeli State Archives in Jerusalem, the Weizmann Archives in Rohovot, and Hansard.

These documents show that the British mandatory did not define the demos or political entity that would become the basis of the State of Israel at the beginning of its mandate. Rather, its definition was accidental, following the failure of an attempt at creating a binational entity in 1923. The shelving (though never abandonment) of the binational project opened up an opportunity for the Yishuv to develop politically and reduced the level of fragmentation in its democratic institutions. Greater Lebanon, on the other hand, followed a logic that was diametrically opposed to that of the Yishuv: France deliberately sought to increase fragmentation within Lebanon to make sure that it remained a vertically divided society in need of France's continued support. Primary sources used in the section on Lebanon include the UK foreign office archives at the National Archives in Kew and Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States (available online[66]) as well as the above mentioned military archive in Paris and diplomatic archive in Nantes.

[66] Available at https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments

Chapter 5 looks closer into the management of divisions once boundaries had been drawn. In the Yishuv, the opportunity to create autonomous institutions to manage the affairs of the Jewish community and represent its interests vis-à-vis the mandatory triggered a debate, particularly with the ultraorthodox Agudat Israel, as to whether centralization should be pursued or whether a consociational system composed of semi-autonomous entities was the better course of action. The Zionist Organization and local British officials vigorously campaigned for the former, fearing that fragmentation could result in political instability and disunity. When the British government resolved to follow this advice, they put the Yishuv firmly on a path to becoming a horizontally divided society. Once again, the chapter draws extensively on published primary and secondary sources, as well unpublished archival material from the Israeli State Archives, the Central Zionist Archives (Jerusalem) and the Weizmann Archives.

In Lebanon, far from seeking further centralization, the mandatory chose to institute a quota system, whereby each religious community sent a fixed number of representatives to parliament. The same system was mirrored in the state's administration. District size, electoral formula and quota system led to an increased politicization of religious communities. This structure continues to be in place and has made the system unrepresentative and inflexible. Much of the primary documents that I perused for this section of the dissertation came from the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs Archives in Paris as well as the above mentioned archives at Nantes. To illustrate the impact of the electoral system and sectarian political structure from a contemporary perspective, I conducted interviews and gathered documents from electoral advocacy groups in Lebanon, in 2017.

Chapter 6 considers how identity politics were managed within those institutions and the visions of the state that they made possible (or prevented from emerging). The

Yishuv case study that I chose for this section refers to managing incompatible visions of the state espoused by the Revisionists, a right-wing grouping which advocated the immediate definition of the final goal of Zionism as being the creation of a Jewish majority in Palestine. Since this was incompatible with the Labour and General Zionist view – the two groups that held most of the power positions within the organization – centralization of power was promoted from within by excluding the Revisionists. This contributed to reducing fragmentation within the Zionist Organization and the Yishuv and opened up an opportunity for a dominant vision of the state to emerge ahead of independence. I draw on published sources as well the Revisionists' own Jabotinsky Archives in Tel Aviv, the already mentioned Central Zionist and Weizmann Archives, and interviews that I conducted in Israel in 2016.

As the following section shows, in Lebanon, competing visions of the state – particularly pro-Western (generally Maronite) and pro-Arab (mostly Sunni and Greek Orthodox) tendencies continued to exist. It traces moments of unity to explain how they came about in order to show that a consensus on the state of Lebanon was the result of contingency (notably a lack of support for reunion with Syria) rather than a real endorsement of the state project. The large majority that denied the legitimacy of Greater Lebanon was irremediably incorporated into the state, and embracing consociationalism and fragmentation was the best way to secure representation. To trace this process, I rely not only on published primary and secondary resources, but also on the diplomatic archives in Nantes and the League of Nations archives (available online).

Chapter 7 constitutes a cursory overview of how these outcomes of the mandate period impacted politics during the first decade of independence in both countries. It relies predominantly on secondary literature, taking advantage of the wealth of historical studies that are available on both countries. With the creation of centralized institutions as

discussed in chapter 5 and the elimination of incompatible visions of the state, the statist ideology of Mamlakhtiyut, advocated by Labour Zionism, attained dominance over all other visions. This contributed to reducing fragmentation, thus turning Israel into a horizontally divided society in which one political segment could impose a vision of the state. The ideology provided clear guidance for effective and stable policy-making in the first years of statehood and allowed the state to monopolize power. At the same time, it reduced the state's tolerance of diversity.

In Lebanon, on the other hand, the vision of the state could not be other than an embrace of diversity. With incompatible visions of the state thus institutionalized, governments could not follow a clear line in their policy-making. The state was unable to monopolize power – physical and ideological power continued to lie with confessional groups. This has contributed to recurrent political crises, for instance in 1958 and 1975-1989. The chapter briefly reviews attempts made at creating greater unity by President Fouad Chehab to illustrate conditions under which stability might have been attained.

The conclusion of this dissertation in chapter 8 outlines contributions made to our understanding of democracy in divided societies as well as the impact that colonial policies had on the management of divisions in such societies. First of all, this dissertation concludes that based on the cases studies, no judgment can be made as to whether consociationalism or control are better ways to manage deep divisions in a democratic system. If political stability is more highly valued than tolerance and diversity, the control system may be the correct answer. If, on the other hand, diversity is more highly valued, then consociationalism may be a better strategy. Even this limited statement, it must be noted, may not apply beyond the cases studied. After all, there are stable consociational systems that provide both stability and diversity.

My conclusion furthermore highlights counterfactuals for both countries had divisions been managed differently to show that alternative outcomes have their own merits and shortcomings. A lack of centralization in the Yishuv might have bred fragmentation which in turn could have prevented the emergence of the State of Israel or encouraged cooperation with the Palestinians to create a binational state. There would have been no expulsion of the Palestinians from Israel in 1948 and no Arab-Israeli conflict, but there would also have been no state for the Jewish people to emigrate to when under persecution. Lebanon, on the other hand, would probably not exist without the consociational structures introduced by the French. If not absorbed into Syria, it would probably now be dominated by the Shia, perhaps with a theocratic regime dominated by Hezballah, and the openness and diversity of the country would have suffered.

Moreover, I conclude, institutions created during the mandate period not only *managed* divisions, they *altered* their nature. If the Yishuv went from being a vertically divided society to being a horizontally divided society, Lebanon's vertical divisions were strengthened with the quota system introduced by the French. Institutions only contributed to this outcome (in Israel, Ashkenazi ethnic dominance contributed to reducing fragmentation; in Lebanon, religious communities were a pre-existing fact), but without them, these societies might have developed differently.

Secondly, the dissertation shows that any differences in regime trajectories upon independence cannot be attributed to 'typical' French or British colonial policies. Both led 'on-the-spot' policies and their considerations were hardly driven by principle. In fact, in both cases, policy was made by men on the ground rather than the metropolis. France was more led by its colonial interest than Britain, but only because Britain did not have a clearly defined interest in Palestine. It chose a divide-and-rule strategy only after other avenues had been exhausted rather than due to an intrinsically French colonial directive. A cursory

overview of the examples of India, Nigeria and Iraq will show how the lessons from this dissertation may apply to other case studies. They illustrate similar effects of different institutional mechanisms to manage divisions and how colonial policies followed contingency and colonial interest rather than principle. Avenues for further research will likewise be outlined.

CHAPTER 2: ISRAEL AND LEBANON AS DEEPLY DIVIDED SOCIETIES

This dissertation analyses Israel and Lebanon as two deeply divided societies with enduring democratic system. As will be discussed below, in Israel, deep divisions were managed and shaped by placing political power in the hands of the dominant group whereas in Lebanon, they were managed by applying a consociational system. Before delving into how the cases match the theoretical framework outlined above, a brief discussion as to why I believe that the Yishuv and Lebanon were both 'deeply divided societies' in the period under consideration is in order. The section will focus on discussing the former as divisions within the Yishuv are less well known and more highly disputed than in Lebanon[1], the archetype of a deeply divided society in some political science literature.

Cleavages and divisions in the Yishuv and Lebanon

As discussed above, the divisions within society that are most susceptible to posing an obstacle to democracy are divisions that become politicized. All societies, Eric Nordlinger reminds us, are divided in some way, but divisions do not result in self-aware and politically relevant subgroups everywhere. Only when shared characteristics between people are valued by individuals in such a way that they are used to create an ingroup and an outgroup,

[1] For work emphasizing the divisions within the Yishuv, see Yair Wallach, "Rethinking the Yishuv : Late-Ottoman Palestine's Jewish Communities Revisited," *Journal of Modern Jewish Studies* 16, no. 2 (2017): 275–94; Uri Ram, *Changing Agenda of Israeli Sociology* (New York: State University of New York Press, 1995); Zeev Sternhell, *The Founding Myths of Israel: Nationalism, Socialism and the Making of the Jewish State* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998); Gur Alroey, *An Unpromising Land: Jewish Migration to Palestine in the Early Twentieth Century* (Stanford: California University Press, 2014). This stands in sharp contrast with the vision of unity that early Zionist historiography sought to convey, S.N. Eisenstadt, "Israeli Identity: Problems in the Development of the Collective Identity of an Ideological Society," in *Integration and Development in Israel*, ed. S.N. Eisenstadt, Rivkah Bar Yosef, and Chaim Adler (Jerusalem: Israel Universities Press, 1970), 673–83; Dan Horowitz, "Before the State: Communal Politics in Palestine Under the Mandate," in *Israeli State and Society: Boundaries and Frontiers*, ed. Baruch Kimmerling (New York: State University of New York Press, 1988).

thus defining relationships with others that do not share those characteristics, do they form social segments. If these segments, in turn, take on high political significance, they form conflict groups.[2] Another article which fundamentally impacted the study of democracy in deeply divided societies likewise highlights the importance of 'political salience' to define such societies. Political scientist Ian Lustick considers a society to be deeply divided 'if ascriptive ties generate an antagonistic segmentation of society, based on terminal identities with high political salience, sustained over a substantial period of time and a wide variety of issues'.[3] In these societies, 'there is a tendency […] for all political issues to be viewed through the prism of their impact on the society's principal fault line [which] undercuts the operation of the cross-cutting cleavages that moderate conflict in most societies'.[4] Such divisions, then, are politicized, pervasive and lasting – and susceptible to standing in the way of the peaceful cooperation which characterizes stable democracy.

There is no doubt that both Israel and Lebanon are deeply divided societies today. In Israel, not just the highly visible ethnic cleavage between Arabs and Jews creates politically defined segments. The settler-native divide is also visible – albeit in a different manner – between Ashkenazim and Mizrachim. Aside from a small number of Oriental Jews that had already settled in Palestine before the large-scale arrival of European Jews in the first decades of the 20th century, both were settlers. However, as this thesis shall touch upon, the Ashkenazim came to form the dominant political and social class whereas the Mizrachim have traditionally fallen behind. The deep divisions between secular and religious Jews continue to impact politics in Israel today, overlapping with the ideological divide between the left and right.

[2] Nordlinger, *Conflict Regulation in Divided Societies*, 6–7.
[3] Lustick, "Stability in Deeply Divided Societies: Consociationalism versus Control," 325.
[4] Guelke, *Politics in Deeply Divided Socities*, 29.

Adrian Guelke distinguishes between horizontally divided societies, in which a subordinate group is pitted against a dominant group, and vertically divided societies, in which several groups of similar status vie for power.[5] Given the description of divisions in Israel provided above, I would argue that Israel is horizontally divided, but instead of a conflict between one subordinate group and the dominant group, several subordinate groups are pitted against the latter. As this dissertation will show, institutional mechanisms introduced by Great Britain influenced this outcome. The Yishuv started out as a vertically divided society; by 1948 it had begun to transform into a horizontally divided society.

Lebanon, on the other hand, is clearly a vertically divided society. The country currently recognizes 18 religious sects.[6] Lebanon, as we shall see, has always harboured a large number of different religious communities and their relatively peaceful coexistence for centuries has set it apart from its neighbouring countries where dominant groups have established authoritarian regimes and kept subordinate groups out of power. In places like Syria, Iraq and even Israel, a dominant group took over power, repressing diversity, whereas Lebanon turned into a vertically divided society, i.e. one composed of several groups with similar levels of power. The main segments in conflict, however, have changed markedly over time. As this dissertation will discuss, the colonial powers had a strong hand in changing the balance of power between communities. In the 19th century, Maronite and Druzes formed the main politically defined segments. With the Maronites supported by France and the Druzes supported by Britain, their relative levels of power were impacted by great power intervention. After the creation of Greater Lebanon, the conflict revolved more around 'competing visions of the state' than around religion (though these overlapped). The creation of the new state increased the demographic power of Sunnis and

[5] Ibid., 1;10.
[6] Faour, "Religion, Demography, and Politics in Lebanon."

Shias vis-à-vis Mount Lebanon whilst decreasing that of Druzes. The main political segments thus became the Western-oriented Maronites against the Arab-oriented Sunnis and Greek Orthodox, whilst the Druzes lost much of their previous power. With little political awareness, the Shia did not become a politically relevant power until much later. Today, the political conflict between Shias and Sunnis is the most salient political divide in Lebanese politics.

It is clear, then, that the nature of divisions differs between these two countries. This dissertation will show how these divisions became politicized during the mandate period, how they were managed and why, and how this influenced the regime types that both countries established upon independence.

The Yishuv as a Divided Society

Ethnic divisions

As is the case today, the nature of divisions in the Yishuv differed from those in mandate period Lebanon, but both political systems had to grapple with deep, potentially destabilizing divisions from the outset.[7] Both societies were ethnically and religiously divided – cleavages which overlapped with social and linguistic ones. In 1934, an observer of the Yishuv explained:

> Palestine presents a most unusual melting-pot of Jewry. Jews from all parts of the world, with different outlooks on life, varying backgrounds, dissimilar traditions and languages, coming from communities regulated by systems of public law unlike one another, meet together in Palestine to build a new community.[8]

[7] Contrary to a recent publication which argues that Israel only became a deeply divided society with the expansion of the state in 1967. Barak, *State Expansion and Conflict in and between Israel/Palestine and Lebanon,* 58.

[8] Moshe Burstein, *Self-Government of the Jews in Palestine since 1900* (London: W.&G. Foyle, Ltd., 1934), 1.

If the Sephardim made up the majority of the Yishuv's population in the 19th century, this author estimated that by the beginning of the 20th century, the 60,000 Jews of Palestine were evenly split between what was often generically called 'Sephardim' (which included all Jews of oriental origin) and Ashkenazi Jews from Eastern and Central Europe. By 1936, the Yishuv's population had grown by almost 700%. Most of this growth came from European immigration. As a result, by the end of the mandate period, when the State of Israel was created, only 22% of the population was categorized as non-Ashkenazi.[9] A process of ethnic homogenization had thus taken place. This did not eliminate separate ethnic differences among these immigrants – cultures, traditions and languages continued to differ.[10] Furthermore, the main fault lines of political conflict at independence were, as in Lebanon, mostly related to 'competing visions of the state', overlapping with ideological and religious divisions. Contrary to what happened in Lebanon, however, institutional mechanisms developed during the mandate period led to an attenuation of the potentially destabilizing effects of these divisions.

Religious divisions

Not only did immigration to the Yishuv increase ethnic diversity within the community, it also resulted in a deepening of the religious cleavage between secular and orthodox Jews. On the one hand, secular Jews quickly outgrew the small orthodox community which had hitherto formed the majority of the Jewish community of Palestine. On the other hand, many of the new immigrants came with Zionist ideals which were diametrically opposed to orthodox Judaism. The leaders of the settlement project which took centre stage during

[9] Abigail Jacobson and Moshe Naor, *Oriental Neighbors: Middle Eastern Jews and Arabs in Mandatory Palestine* (Waltham: Brandeis University Press, 2017), 6–7.
[10] For more on the linguistic aspect, see Liora Halperin, *Babel in Zion: Jews, Nationalism, and Language Diversity in Palestine, 1920-1948* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2015). Ethnicity would become the chief political, social and economic cleavage in the 1950s. See Avi Bareli, "Mapai and the Oriental Jewish Question in the Early Years of the State," *Jewish Social Studies* 16, no. 1 (2009): 54–84.

the early Zionist movement were staunchly anti-religious. These same leaders would become the core group of the Yishuv, the Jewish Agency and the State of Israel. At the same time, however, Zionism's *raison d'être* was intimately linked with the Jewish religion – it was a return of the Jewish people to the land of their forefathers.

During the mandate period, two clear strands of Jewish orthodox politics took centre stage. The Mizrachi party was the more moderate representative, in that it did not advocate theocracy in Palestine. Its conflict with the mainstream General Zionists and Mapai (and its precursors) – both in the *Yishuv* and abroad – referred primarily to the public institution of the Sabbath and Kashrut in Palestine. In principle, however, the Mizrachi sought cooperation and agreement with the recognized institutions.[11] As early as 1918 it was reported that "the Mizrachi attempts to reconcile on the common platform of Jewish Nationalism the traditional religious spirit of the past with the modern intellectual spirit of the Zionist movement." To secular Zionists, the importance of this attempt could not be overstated, for "it unites in the Jewish National Programme practically the whole of world Jewry."[12] Even though Zionism was a predominantly secular movement, its legitimation was based on the Jewish religion and it required for its success the support of both secular and religious Jews. The ultraorthodox Agudat Israel was much more difficult to co-opt. Chapter 5 of this dissertation will show how this division was managed to relegate this group to subordinate status and to ensure that centrifugal tendencies emanating from it would not derail the Zionist project.

Class divisions

[11] The chief rabbinate, for instance, was quick to show his opposition to the ultra-orthodox resistance to the formation of single community institutions, assuring that "Orthodox Jewry […] strives to complete organisation in communal in communal and religious life in Palestine Jewry, without any dissensions which are likely to undermine every public order." S.A. Weber, "Weber to High Commissioner," October 23, 1925 ISA, CS, 5016/28-M.

[12] Chaim Weizmann, "Chaim Weizmann to Reginald Wingate," May 22, 1918. WA 16-426.

Social class has long been a factor of political conflict in Lebanon. Particularly because social class differences overlap with communal divisions: Not only were the Shia of Lebanon long relegated to a subordinate political position despite their growing demographic strength; they continue to inhabit the least developed regions of the country and constitute the poorest of the country's communities. Because of their strong commercial and cultural ties with France since the 19th century, the Maronites – and, to an extent, other Christian communities of Lebanon – have traditionally enjoyed an unrivalled social position in the country. In addition, the political system of Lebanon continues to exhibit semi-feudal characteristics stemming from the maintenance of traditional power by only a handful of families.[13] As we shall see, the political system created by France during the mandate period entrenched these semi-feudal tendencies: the power of leading families was strengthened by an electoral system which put an elite cartel in power.

The Yishuv, on the contrary, benefitted from the absence of an existing social order. In theory, every immigrant came to the country as an individual, not a member of a social class. Immigration certificates were granted to workers in whichever sector they were needed. Often this meant that middle class professionals would have to retrain to become agricultural or factory workers. Furthermore, there were no large landowning elites among the Jews of Palestine. Even though there were 'capitalist' immigration certificates, as one immigrant whose parents had come from Germany on such a certificate said, 'you did not have to be much a of a capitalist at all to qualify for them.'[14] In fact, a family only needed to prove availability of 1,000 Pounds in order to be eligible. Thus, a priori, the state in the making did not have to grapple with competing social power centres as it did in Lebanon.

[13] A comprehensive anthropological study of the power of large landholding families in Lebanon is Michael Gilsenan, *Lords of the Lebanese Marches: Violence and Narrative in an Arab Society* (London: I.B. Tauris, 1996).
[14] Jonathan B., Interview with the author, 31/3/2016, Rishon Letzion

At least in theory, this would prevent the creation of class-based cleavages, which often increase conflicts in democratic societies. Nonetheless, many of these 'capitalist' immigrants came from liberal professions or had been owners of large businesses in Europe. They often settled in the cities, seeking to recreate their European way of life. This was in sharp contrast with that of the agricultural settlements, reflecting the Zionist spirit which sought to create a new Jewish man, removed from the realities of the diaspora.

The picture of the Yishuv as an egalitarian society is heavily biased toward the image that the pioneering ideology (*Chalutziut*) sought to convey. Even though economic inequality was minimal, the rhetoric of class struggle was pervasive and class cleavages were important in structuring the party system. So, for instance, did the Histadrut (trade union) reject an agreement for cooperation with the rival Revisionist party in 1934 over differences regarding the use of strikes instead of arbitration to solve labour disputes. This debate over the use of means of class struggle even led to violent clashes between Labour groups and the Revisionist youth group, Betar.[15] Much of the hostility between these two political movements was rooted in Labour's insistence on class struggle and the Revisionists' resistance to it. As chapter 6 will explain, the Revisionists withdrew from both Knesset Israel and the Zionist Organization in the mid-1930s. This development coincided with the formulation of a new labour Zionist principle by Ben-Gurion, 'from class to nation', by which class struggle was disavowed in favour of a comprehensive state building project. It was only partly the result of agency, i.e. the political leaders' willingness to find a consensus as the consociational model describes. It was also the result of an elimination of the Revisionist objection to Labour Zionism's vision of the state. The levers

[15] In general, strikes often turned violent and labour disputes were of great concern to the Palestine administration. For example, Ormsby-Gore to Henderson, 5/10/1925, in Eran Kaplan and Derek Penslar, *Origins of Israel, 1882-1948: A Documentary History* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2011), 116–18.

of power that were put in the hands of the dominant group were instrumental in achieving this.

Political divisions

Eliminating alternative power centres was thus essential to the creation of a horizontally divided society in the Yishuv. In reference to its high degree of particularism (the existence of political units whose rules apply only to a subgroup), sociologist Amitai Etzioni described the Yishuv as a neo-feudal system. In such a system, there are no citizens, but only vassals who provide the baron with votes in exchange for services offered.[16] Even though the Yishuv, as a new society, did not posess large landowners or urban notables, the strong 'from cradle to grave' parties of the Yishuv acted as a powerful social organizations to create a similar outcome. Those who entered Palestine on labour immigration certificates had often been associated with a political party of the Yishuv before their arrival. Once in Palestine, it was the party which helped them find employment, provided healthcare services, schooled their children and provided security. The concept 'from the cradle to the grave' was taken to a completely new level; the party, not the Jewish community organisations, carried out state-like tasks.

Therefore, prospects of loyalty and political support for a centralized quasi-state were dim at best. Zionist leader Chaim Weizmann, reflecting on this fragmentation, illustrated this point powerfully when in 1934 he said: 'Turn the Jewish community into a State? Internal strife would soon finish it off!'[17] At the time, tensions between the labour

[16] Amitai Etzioni, "The Decline of Neo-Feudalism: The Case of Israel," in *Papers in Comparative Public Administration*, ed. Ferrel Heady and Sybil Stokes (Ann Arbor: Institute of Public Administration, University of Michigan, 1962), 231–32.
[17] Monty Penkower, *Palestine in Turmoil, Volume I: The Struggle for Sovereignty, 1933-1939* (New York: Tauro Press, 2014), 94.

party and the Revisionists were at an all-time high, following the assassination of labour leader Chaim Arlosoroff, for which several Revisionists were placed on trial. Then, and again with the Altalena Affair of 1948, when Menahem Begin's Irgun challenged the authority of the new state's military, a Jewish civil war did not seem implausible.[18] It is not within the purview of this chapter to discuss why civil war was repeatedly averted, but the centralization of power in the hands of the new government by 1948 is certainly part of the explanation.

Control and consociationalism: Two distinct strategies to manage divisions

As this research will show, Israel represents both the merits and shortcomings of the control theory. The Jewish community of Palestine (henceforce, Yishuv) was a vertically divided society during the mandate period. Far from being a self-selected group of immigrants embarked on a joint nation-building process, the Yishuv encountered various and severe centrifugal tendencies on its quest to statehood. The Holocaust and the war with the Palestinians was certainly an important factor in creating a sense of national unity over the long haul. Nonetheless, as will be shown in this dissertation, this was not sufficient to eliminate potentially destabilizing deep divisions. Institutional control exercised by a select group of political leaders and supported by the mandate power set the basic pattern of politics in Israel for decades to come and turned Israel into a horizontally divided society. To a certain extent, this institutional platform allowed these leaders to gain dominance, impose a new national identity, exact the population's loyalty and create a share vision or

[18] It is difficult to ascertain to what extent British diplomatic cables and media reports highlighting dangers of civil war accurately reflect the intensity of the internal Jewish conflict. The majority of interviewees for this project recalled strong tension between these militias, but were hesitant to categorize this tension as strong enough to cause a civil war. Previous to the Altalena affair, the spectre of civil war seemed real, when the revisionists fought against the British and labour helped the latter to stop the Irgun. For example, Colin Shindler, *The Rise of the Israeli Right: From Odessa to Hebron* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2015), 214.

general political agreement which many theorists have associated with stable democracies. At the same time, however, this has meant that opposing political identities had to be given up – those who wanted to participate in the new state's enterprise had to abide by the rules set by the dominant centre.

Some scholars categorize Israel as a consociational system on account of the role that orthodox Judaism plays in the country. With the status quo agreement, the dominant party entered a compromise which would tie its hands in the future and ensure orthodox interests were protected. This in itself implies consensus and power-sharing. However, as chapter 7 will discuss, this agreement was made from a position of dominance of mainstream Zionism. Lijphart's previously mentioned characterization of Israel's political system as a model that combines 'majoritarian' and 'consensus' democracy is thus more appropriate to describe Israel upon independence. Power, both ideological and physical, was monopolized by the dominant group. Even though the country maintained a formally democratic system and constituted a place of relative freedom and tolerance in the Middle East (at least for non-Arabs), it was also a place where consensus was often artificially engineered and imposed by the state. At the same time, the emergence of a dominant centre made the creation of Israel, and its survival during the first years of statehood and beyond, possible.

Lebanon, on the other hand represents both the merits and the shortcomings of the consociational system. Mount Lebanon had its experience with power-sharing under the Mutasarrifya, when it became an autonomous province of the Ottoman empire. After a civil war in 1860[19], the international community intervened to establish what would from today's perspective be considered a consociational system. Every sect sent representatives to the

[19] For more on the war, see Laila Tarazi Fawaz, *An Occasion for War: Civil Conflict in Lebanon and Damascus in 1860* (London: I.B. Tauris, 1994).

administrative council where its interests would be represented. This system was remarkably successful, not just because the system had achieved peaceful coexistence but it had led to the development of a sense of unity between these groups.[20] As comparativist Abdo Baaklini explained in his reference work on legislative development in Lebanon, under the *Mutasarrifiyah*, a political culture emerged 'that refused to sacrifice cultural, religious, and economic pluralism for the sake of national integration.'[21] It was a democratic system based on tolerance and cooperation. At the same time, a community of purpose had developed to defend the political prerogatives which all the inhabitants of Mount Lebanon shared as an autonomous province of the Ottoman empire.

When the French arrived in Lebanon in 1918, however, they embarked on a completely new state-building enterprise, as this dissertation will show. The question was no longer how to manage divisions between groups that despite going through periods of violence had cooperated with each other for centuries. The question became how to trace completely new boundaries of the demos and thus manage new divisions. A new consociational system was devised. In this system, no group was allowed to rise to dominance, not even if over time it came to represent the majority of the population. As a result, divisions were not only managed, but they were also newly defined and perpetuated: a vertically divided society was created. The French introduced a centripetal mechanism in that electoral candidates had to appeal to voters outside of their own sect, thus encouraging political moderation. As will be shown, however, this did result in a moderation of political discourse by the elites and in the formation of strong elite coalitions. Nonetheless, by

[20] Wilhelm Kewenig, *Die Koexistenz Der Religionsgemeinschaften Im Libanon* (Cologne: Walter de Gruyter & Co, 1965), 62; Engin Deniz Akarli, *The Long Peace: Ottoman Lebanon, 1861-1920* (London: I.B. Tauris, 1993), 30.
[21] Abdo I. Baaklini, *Legislative and Political Development: Lebanon, 1842-1972* (Durham: Duke University Press, 1976), 55.

introducing sectarian quotas and promoting separate political identities in other ways, the system entrenched separate political identities and encouraged immobilism.

Once again, this dissertation does not intend to explain politics in Lebanon today. It is one of the most complex polities of our day, shaped as much by internal politics as by international and regional power dynamics. The political system created at the beginning of the last century has not determined Lebanon's modern-day political reality. What it intends to do is to explain the *roots* of the system and of patterns of government which continue to exist today in light of the above discussion of control versus consociationalism in deeply divided societies. In doing so, it argues that these roots have exerted an influence on subsequent developments; they have created a certain level of path dependence. Lebanon's system continues to be unrepresentative: the consociational system established by the French has only been modified slightly – and after a brutal civil war. Although there is consensus that the system has deepened divisions, encouraged patrimonialism and reduced governmental effectiveness, reform could reopen conflicts which have been effectively silenced through a currently accepted distribution of stakes in government.[22] At the same time, for most of its history, Lebanon has been at peace. Indeed, though tensions erupted periodically, it was at peace between 1861 and 1975.[23] It is conceivable that without the consociational system, the state of Lebanon would have ceased to exist long ago. Alternatively, a religious majority might have taken over, possibly resulting in the repression of religious minorities. The unique character of Lebanon as 'the Switzerland of the Middle East' might have been lost.

[22] Brenda M. Seaver, "The Regional Sources of Power-Sharing Failure: The Case of Lebanon," *Political Science Quarterly* 115, no. 2 (2000): 252–53; Jabbra and Jabbra, "Consociational Democracy in Lebanon: A Flawed System of Governance," 77–80; Michael C. Hudson, "The Lebanese Crisis: The Limits of Consociational Democracy," 113–14.
[23] Fawaz, *An Occasion for War: Civil Conflict in Lebanon and Damascus in 1860*, 218.

CHAPTER 3:
COLONIAL IMPERATIVES AND STATE-BUILDING UNDER THE MANDATE SYSTEM

The 1920 Treaty of San Remo accorded the tutelage of Iraq and Palestine to Britain and that of Syria and Lebanon to France, closely mirroring the distribution of former Ottoman provinces which the two powers had envisioned in the secret Sykes-Picot Agreement of 1916. The so-called mandate system was a new legal instrument which changed the rules of the game for these two imperial powers. In the context of Wilson's Fourteen Points and their emphasis on the self-determination of national groups, imperial ambitions needed to be presented in a new light. Instead of being able to openly exercise unlimited and permanent rule over overseas territories, the great powers were now required to help their new colonial possessions become independent states. Thus, Britain and France had to build states that would protect their regional interests even after their official tutelage ended.

As the introduction to this dissertation explained, political scientists have often posited that British colonial policy was somehow more conducive to building stable states, economies and democracies than that of France. Such an inherent qualitative difference cannot be observed in the Middle East during the mandate period. In Lebanon, France introduced democratic mechanisms early on, setting up parliament with relatively extensive powers, whereas Britain ruled Palestine directly without the aid of a local parliament until 1947. Even after Iraq had attained formal independence in 1932, Britain continued to exercise extensive influence. Thus, the mechanisms employed by both powers varied according to territory, and no particular British or French patterns can be recognized. It cannot be said that Britain was inherently more prone to building stable democratic states than France or vice-versa, as both were deeply interested in institutionalizing long-term

colonial control in the new context of the mandate system. What differed were the precise motifs of their presence in each state, and these colonial imperatives conditioned the institutional mechanisms at the mandatory powers' disposal.

Britain's policy in Palestine was improvised, vague and vacillating. It had made promises to both the Arab and the Jewish people, it sought to honour both and had little in the way of a strategy to reconcile the political contradictions that it had created. This gave Britain a flexibility in managing local politics that France did not have – Britain was not wedded to a specific political strategy; it could adjust course in search for governmental effectiveness, stability and feasibility. While France's policy was initially as ill-defined as Britain's, once Greater Lebanon had been established, it pursued a clear objective: It was in the region to perpetuate its clout, and the only way of achieving it was to make itself indispensable to the Lebanese Maronites and to prevent Arab unity. Its political strategy was guided by this concern, regardless of the implications for the future state of Lebanon. The following sections will discuss the imperial interests in the Middle East which guided mandatory policy in Palestine and Lebanon.

Great Britain and the Creation of a Middle Eastern Ulster

The Bases of British Palestine policy: The Balfour Declaration and the McMahon Correspondence

There is nothing that determined British policy in Palestine more than the Balfour Declaration. It was issued by Lord Balfour in the name of the British government in November 1917 and read that

> His Majesty's Government views with favour the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people and will use their

> best endeavours to facilitate the achievement of this object, it being clearly understood that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine.

This declaration was understood by Arab political leadership in particular to contradict promises made in 1915 by Sir Henry McMahon, high commissioner in Egypt, to the Sharif of Mecca, Hussein Ibn Ali. In their correspondence between 1915 and 1916, McMahon indicated Britain's support for an Arab state after the fall of the Ottoman Empire that would be aided by the Arab revolt which the Sharif of Mecca vowed to bring about. Britain's wording was deliberately vague, and the correspondence remained outside of the public purview for years.

McMahon had acceded to Arab independence in the Arab provinces of the empire, excluding Mersina and Alexandretta as well as portions of Syria lying west of the districts of Damascus, Homs, Hama and Aleppo. In addition, the correspondence pointed to the need of respecting French interests in the region. Hussein, however, had ample reason to believe that his territorial claims – including that which he laid on Palestine – would be met if he launched a revolt.[1] For successive British governments, it was all a big misunderstanding, the crux of which was a passage of the letters which described the territories to be included and excluded from the promise of Arab sovereignty. According to a 1923 memorandum of the Colonial Office, the excluded territories 'lying west of the district of Damascus' included Palestine.[2]

Critics of the Balfour Declaration assumed this to mean Lebanon and parts of Syria – excluded and under French rule. It is very likely that part of the misunderstanding was

[1] Ali Alllawi, *Faisal I of Iraq* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2014), 62.
[2] Colonial Office, "Palestine Memorandum by the Secretary of State for the Colonies," February 1923. CAB 24-159-49

based on a language barrier, for McMahon's letter was translated for Hussein, and the term 'districts' could have been interpreted in different ways in the Arabic language.[3] But when Sir Henry McMahon himself was asked to clarify the meaning years later, he stated that it had been his full intention to exclude Palestine, and that he had no reason to believe that the Sharif of Mecca understood the letters otherwise. Furthermore, Emir Hussein had not raised any complaints about the Balfour Declaration; resistance had come specifically from the Palestinian Arabs, who had not fought on the British side.[4] In conclusion, official government policy was that Palestine had been excluded from the territories promised in the McMahon-Hussein correspondence, and thus only one promise had to be considered when formulating policy in Palestine: The Balfour Declaration.

It was clear, then, that Palestine would not be included in any future Arab state and that a 'Jewish national home' was to be 'viewed with favour' without prejudice to the rights of native inhabitants of Palestine. These words, however, were subject to at least as much interpretation as the McMahon-Hussein correspondence. Historian Malcolm Yapp could not have put it more clearly: The terms were so vague that 'British honour might have been satisfied by sponsoring a Jewish cultural centre in Palestine.'[5] Only a few days after the Balfour Declaration was issued, Foreign Secretary Arthur Balfour was questioned in the House of Commons about its practical consequences. One member of parliament wanted to know from Balfour whether a Jewish National Home entailed the establishment of an independent state, an autonomous rule in the Empire or another type of constitution. The

[3] Jonathan Schneer, *The Balfour Declaration: The Origins of the Arab-Israeli Conflict* (New York: Random House, 2010), 66.
[4] Office, "Palestine Memorandum by the Secretary of State for the Colonies," February 1923. King Hussein had been contacted after the Balfour Declaration was issued. While objecting to the idea of the establishment of a Jewish State, he readily assented to Jewish settlement in Palestine, and appreciated "the financial advantage of Arab co-operation with the Jews." Colonial Office, "Palestine Memorandum by the Secretary of State for the Colonies," March 13, 1923 CAB 24-159-49.
[5] Malcolm Yapp, "The Making of the Palestine Mandate," in *Dayan Centre Middle East Lectures* (Tel Aviv, 1995), 9.

future constitution of Palestine, the Foreign Secretary replied, could not be forecasted at that point in time.[6]

Even though the text of the mandate turned the Balfour Declaration into a legally binding international promise, the content remained vague. How much Jewish immigration Britain allowed, whether it encouraged development of a Jewish political entity and what relationship with the native Palestinian Arabs it promoted was up to Whitehall's definition. As long as it continued to favour the development of an ill-defined Jewish national home and respected weakly defined native Arab rights, it was not in breach of its international obligations.

Britain's (Dis)interest in Palestine

It follows that the definition of mandatory policy was subject to everyday policy- making, albeit constrained by the text of the mandate, which turned the Balfour Declaration into international law. This also meant that this policy was in permanent flux, depending on the circumstances and dominant political forces. Indeed, the Balfour Declaration itself had been as much the result of particular political circumstances that arose during World War I as the McMahon-Hussein correspondence. In the context of the new paradigm of self-determination inaugurated by Woodrow Wilson, the British needed to disguise their imperial policies as support for Jewish self-determination in Palestine.[7] But there is ample scholarly consensus that British political interests rather than Zionist leader Chaim Weizmann's statesmanship, sympathy for the plight of the Jewish people or the principle

[6] Mr. King and Mr. Balfour, "Palestine (Jews' National Home), HC Deb 14 November 1917 vol 99 cc382-3
[7] Danny Gutwein, "The Politics of the Balfour Declaration: Nationalism, Imperialism and the Limits of Zionist-British Cooperation," *Journal of Israeli History* 35, no. 2 (2016): 119, https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/13531042.2016.1244100.

of self-determination motivated the declaration.[8] Documents of the Colonial Office show that in internal conversations, the war effort was also cited as the explicit motif for the declaration.[9] In the words of historian Jonathan Schneer, the Balfour Declaration 'was the highly contingent product of a tortuous process characterized as much by deceit and chance as by vision and diplomacy.'[10] As will be shown below, this was an important element in determining the state-building process in Palestine and is therefore germane to the discussion contained in this thesis

Despite this overall consensus, however, authors differ as to the precise political motivations behind it. On the one hand, an entente victory in the Great War was contingent upon Jewish support – British officials were convinced of the Jewish peoples' overwhelming international power, a conviction fuelled by myth and the Zionists' skilful propaganda efforts.[11] Britain was particularly concerned to win over Jewish support in the USA, and after the Russian revolution.[12] On the other hand, a domestic political struggle in Britain, between radicals and reformists, might have been decisive for the issuing of the Balfour Declaration.[13] It is beyond the scope of this dissertation to closely analyse the motivations behind the Balfour Declaration, as they expired with the end of the war and are thus of little consequence to Britain's long-term policy in Palestine. Once the war was over,

[8] Schneer, *Balfour Declar. Orig. Arab. Confl.*; Mayir Verete, "The Balfour Declaration and Its Makers," *Middle Eastern Studies* 6, no. 1 (1970): 48–76; Gutwein, "The Politics of the Balfour Declaration: Nationalism, Imperialism and the Limits of Zionist-British Cooperation," 2016; Leonard Stein, *The Balfour Declaration*, London (Vallentine-Mitchell, 1961).
[9] Colonial Office, "Palestine and the Balfour Declaration," January 1923.
[10] Schneer, *Balfour Declar. Orig. Arab. Confl.*, 370.
[11] Jonathan Schneer, "Forging the British-Zionist Connection," in *The Balfour Declaration: The Origins of the Arab-Israeli Conflict* (New York: Random House, 2010), 165–77.
[12] James Renton, *The Zionist Masquerade* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007).
[13] Danny Gutwein, "The Politics of the Balfour Declaration: Nationalism, Imperialism and the Limits of Zionist-British Cooperation," *Journal of Israeli History* 35, no. 2 (2016): 117–52, https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/13531042.2016.1244100.

the aims of Britain's Palestine policy – now enshrined in international law – needed reinterpretation.

Those who supported the Jewish national home policy insisted on its strategic value for securing the valuable Suez Canal.[14] An analysis of the military chiefs, however, dismissed the territory's importance in a 1923 report.[15] The strategic value of the Jewish national home policy was thus controversial. An argument which was much more successful in silencing opposition to British presence in the country was the defence of some vague 'international' or 'religious' interest. Clear examples of the ambiguity of governmental discourse in these regards can be found in parliamentary inquiries.[16] The British foreign policy elite became adept at dodging any inquiries into its motivations in the Holy Land. Ormsby-Gore referred generically to the existence of 'other reasons' for Britain's presence in Palestine aside from building a home for the Jews.[17] Because of its vagueness, and the unwillingness of HMG to provide a clear description of its interests, the policy was unassailable. Who, after all, could deny the existence of an undefined interest?

[14] There is considerable debate as to the extent to which strategic considerations drove British policy in Palestine. Christopher Sykes, *Cross Roads to Israel* (London: Colins, 1965), 19–22. Lord Lamington and Earl Curzon of Kedleston, "Palestine", HL Deb 29 June 1920 vol 40 cc1005-38. A further explanation can be found in Bernard Wasserstein, "The British Mandate in Palestine: Myths and Realities," in *Moshe Dayan Centre Conference Files* (Tel Aviv, 1991). The same author provides a brief historical overview of British interests in the Canal in Bernard Wasserstein, *The British in Palestine. The Mandatory Government and the Arab-Jewish Conflict 1917-1929* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1991), 6 ftn.Colonel Wedgwood, "Middle Eastern Services", HC Deb 09 March 1922 vol 151 cc1535-604. B.R. Hoffman, "Jewish Terrorist Activities and the British Government in Palestine, 1939-1947" (University of Oxford, 1985), 33–34. Cabinet, "French Intentions Regarding Syria, Memorandum by the Secretary of State for War," June 8, 1920 CAB 24-107-49.
[15] Yehoshua Porath, *The Emergence of the Palestinian-Arab National Movement, 1918-1929* (London: Frank Cass, 1974), 168. Later on, after World War II had confirmed the territory's importance, the British Chiefs of Staff opposed withdrawal from it on the basis of its centrality to the Commonwealth defence strategy. Naomi Shepherd, *Ploughing Sand* (London: John Murray, 1999), 7.
[16] For instance, Mr. King and Lord Cecil, "Turkish Empire", HC Deb 21 February 1918 vol 103 cc887-8; Mr. King and Lord Cecil, "Palestine Campaign", HC Deb 04 July 1918 vol 107 cc1818-9; Mr. Ormsby-Gore, "Arabs (Status)", HC Deb 15 March 1923 vol 161 cc1781-2; Earl Curzon of Kedleston, "Palestine", HL Deb 29 June 1920 vol 40 cc1005-38
[17] Mr. Ormsby-Gore, "Jewish Immigration", HC Deb 09 July 1923 vol 166 c900

Once the Mandate had been approved by the League of Nations, the basis for Britain's commitment to the Jewish national home policy became an international legal obligation. 'We are simply in Palestine for the purpose of carrying out the functions imposed upon us by the League of Nations', the Duke of Devonshire said in a House of Lords debate, in 1923.[18] This statement is particularly interesting if one considers that just a few years earlier, the government insisted on receiving the mandate in order to carry out the promise contained in the Balfour Declaration. That is to say, it pleaded with the international community to receive the mandate, and later justified the same mandate by stating that they were bound by an international obligation which had been imposed upon Britain. In the absence of an explicit definition of Britain's interests in Palestine, historian Yehoshua Porath advances a plausible claim:

> It appears that what won out in the end was the convenience of continuing a policy which had already been formulated and the recognition that the Balfour Declaration was an explicit commitment which had received international approval, and which could not be abandoned without risking a loss to Britain's prestige and status as a world power.[19]

Thus, as Porath concluded, no matter what considerations were brought to bear on Britain's Palestine policy in the aftermath of the war, it was a commitment that had been set in stone and that would now have to be abided by.

[18] The Duke of Devonshire, "Strategical Value of Palestine", HL Deb 27 March 1923 vol 53 cc669-70

[19] Porath, *The Emergence of the Palestinian-Arab National Movement, 1918-1929*, 168–69. This is confirmed in parliamentary debates at the time. For instance, Lord Sydenham, "Palestine", HL Deb 29 June 1920 vol 40 cc1005-38; Lord Lamington, "Mandate for Palestine", HL Deb 15 June 1921 vol 45 cc559-63; Ormsby-Gore, "Middle Eastern Services", HC Deb 14 June 1921 vol 143 cc265-334; Mr. Ormsby-Gore, "Colonial Office", HC Deb 04 July 1922 vol 156 cc221-343. See also, Mr. Asquith, "Middle Eastern Services", HC Deb 09 March 1922 vol 151 cc1535-604; Office, "Palestine Memorandum by the Secretary of State for the Colonies," February 1923 CAB 24-159-6.

Britain's policy in Palestine: Vagueness and Flexibility

In the absence of clearly defined interests and goals, there was simply no pre-defined policy to implement in Palestine. France had clearly defined interests and explicitly declared its need to remain in Lebanon over the long haul. As a result, even though its precise policy was not set in stone at the beginning of the mandate period, it was clear that its institution-building strategy had to ensure continued French influence. Britain, on the other hand, was much more flexible. Its interests were ill-defined, it had no 'natural' ally in the region, and there was no consensus as to the importance of Palestine to Britain. When it came to define how to implement the Balfour Declaration, then, Britain had no pre-defined guidelines.

How haphazard government policy towards Palestine was is illustrated by an account of MP Eustace Percy in 1922. At Christmas 1917 – after the Balfour Declaration had been issued and the occupation of Palestine was on its way – this Member of Parliament wished to 'enquire into the exact position in regard to matters in Palestine'. Instead of finding a representative at the Foreign Office, he was sent to Mark Sykes at Whitehall Gardens, for he was the one 'managing the whole policy of the Government in Palestine, and was responsible to no Minister at all.'[20] Far from having a well-staffed unit at the Foreign Office working around the clock to devise a plan for this very difficult political project which lay ahead, the responsibility continued to lie with the man who, in 1916, had signed the agreement through which Britain and France split up responsibility over the territories of the Turkish Empire.

In situ, Palestine was to be ruled by a military administration until the mandate was legally adjudicated to Britain by the Entente and the League of Nations. As such, the country was treated as occupied enemy territory; the military administration strove to

[20] Lord Eustace Percy, "Class II", HC Deb 13 June 1922 vol 155 cc213-87

maintain the status quo inherited from the Turkish Empire. It was only with the advent of civil government, in 1920, that the political history of the Palestine mandate began. In February 1920, political veteran Sir Herbert Samuel was sent on a visit to Palestine, albeit without clear instructions. Prime Minister Lloyd George echoed the press in declaring that Herbert Samuel had been invited by Lord Allenby 'with a view to advising on questions of administration and finance in the development of that country.'[21] Other sources, however, reported that the purpose was 'assisting the Jewish in that land.'[22]

Just like Britain's role in Palestine was ill-defined, it was unclear what type of constitutional arrangement would be introduced in the state which the mandate sought to create. When Lord Balfour, whose name the Declaration carried, was asked in 1918 what the political results of the successful British campaigns in Palestine were, he replied that 'only an historian of the future could satisfactorily answer' this question.[23] This vagueness is in apparent contradiction with Lloyd George's own assertions about British policy. He defined the political meaning of the term 'Jewish national Home' rather unequivocally:

> The idea was that the Jewish State was not to be set up immediately by the Peace Treaty without reference to the wishes of the majority of the inhabitants. On the other hand, it was contemplated that when the time arrived for according representative institutions to Palestine, if the Jews had meanwhile responded to the opportunity afforded to them and had become a definite majority of the inhabitants, then Palestine would thus become a Jewish Commonwealth.[24]

This was exactly how many of the policy's critics interpreted the term. As early as 1920, Lord Lamington charged that 'a 'Jewish home' is too narrow a term to convey any other

[21] The Prime Minister, "Palestine (Mr. H. Samuel's Mission)", HC Deb 19 February 1920 vol 125 cc1026-7; "Mr. Samuel's Mission to Palestine," *The Times*, January 12, 1920.
[22] "Imperial and Foreign News Items," *The Times*, January 3, 1920; "Herbert Samuel Leaves for Palestine," *The Sentinel*, February 6, 1920.
[23] Mr. Balfour, "Eastern Campaign", HC Deb 19 November 1918 vol 110 c3326
[24] Quoted by Malcolm MacDonald, "Palestine", HC Deb 22 May 1939 vol 347 cc1937-1940

meaning' than Jewish control over Palestine.[25] Other British parliamentarians also noted that Zionist propaganda was 'inconsistent with a mere 'place-in-the-sun-claim'.'[26]

These conceptions, however, which were largely informed by purported Zionist expectations, did not coincide with official government policy. According to Colonial Secretary Winston Churchill, Arab worries that they may soon 'be swamped by thousands of immigrants from Central Europe, who will […] eventually gain absolute control of its institutions and destinies' was illusory. The Zionists, he added, needed to use such lofty prospects as a motto to rally support and gather resources for Jewish settlement in Palestine. Nevertheless, immigration was carefully monitored, and adjusted to the economic capacity of both the country and the immigrants.[27] Churchill also endorsed High Commissioner Herbert Samuel's public declaration of 1921 that:

> These words (national home) mean that the Jews, who are a people scattered throughout the world but whose hearts are always turned to Palestine should be enabled to found here their home, and that some amongst them, within the limits fixed by numbers and the interests of the present population, should come to Palestine in order to help by their resources and efforts to develop the country to the advantage of all its inhabitants.[28]

Thus, there were clear limitations to Jewish immigration, which was to be contingent on the economic and social context in Palestine. Moreover, successive governments declared that there was no provision for establishing a system in which the Jewish minority would

[25] Lord Lamington, "Palestine", HL Deb 29 June 1920 vol 40 cc1005-38
[26] Lord Sheffield, "Palestine", HL Deb 29 June 1920 vol 40 cc1005-38; Mr. Churchill, Middle Eastern Services, HC Deb 14 June 1921 vol 143 cc265-334
[27] Winston Churchill, "Middle Eastern Services", HC Deb 14 June 1921 vol 143 cc265-334
[28] Colonial Office, "Letter to the Arab Delegation," 1922. ISA, AE, 4/1-M

exercise authority over the non-Jewish majority.[29] A colonial office memorandum of 1923 even declared: 'The idea of a 'Jewish State' in Palestine has been definitely ruled out.'[30]

Despite the apparent contradiction between these statements and Lloyd George's words about the Balfour Declaration quoted above, these were in perfect harmony with each other. Britain had been charged by the text of the mandate with the development of representative institutions. As long as the Jews were a minority, they would not be able to dominate these institutions. If, however, they were able to fund large-scale immigration and the native population could benefit from it, they might, in time, become the majority. Alas, this result was considered implausible. As chapter 4 will show, Britain's implicit foreign policy objective was the establishment of a binational state, with a consociational system, in Palestine. It was only with the 1936 Arab riots that the mandatory began to cautiously consider (albeit never fully embrace) partition into separate ethnic states – and Jewish domination in one of them – as the sole solution for Palestine.

It seems clear then that the outcome – a Jewish majority state in Palestine – was an accident rather than the result of a grand strategy. Contrary to French actions in Lebanon, where clear foreign policy priorities crystallized even before the mandate was approved and determined the institutional structures of the new state, Britain's policy in Palestine was reactive. Britain entered the mandate with scant knowledge of the country and its inhabitants, attempting to carry out its promises to Arab and Jewish nationalists alike. In Herbert Samuel's words, the country had been derelict and 'needed to be redeemed by brains and money […] Where could that be found, except among the Jews scattered throughout the world?'[31] Palestine had been neglected during the Turkish Empire, British

[29] Earl Curzon of Kedleston, "Palestine", HL Deb 29 June 1920 vol 40 cc1005-38
[30] Office, "Palestine Memorandum by the Secretary of State for the Colonies," February 1923 CAB 24-159-6.
[31] "Right Hon. Herbert Samuel Call for an End of Words and Beginning of Work," *The Sentinel*, January 9, 1920.

officials reckoned. Remedying this lamentable state of affairs was in the interest of all the inhabitants of the country.

As a result, Jewish immigration of the kind capable of creating better conditions for everyone was highly desirable. Two birds killed with one stone: Given their purportedly ample financial resources, so the mandatory thought, the Jewish people would have an opportunity to build an undefined 'Jewish national home'. Native Arabs would continue living in their country, enjoying an autonomy and prosperity which they never had under the Turkish Empire. The role of the British Administration was simply to 'promote the harmony and development of all races and creeds in Palestine, and to prevent the domination of any one over any other.'[32]

Given the great potential for ethnic strife from the outset, it is quite surprising that most of the British political establishment did not foresee how difficult the establishment of a binational democracy would be. Having the benefit of hindsight, we know that the administration of the mandate turned out to be much more complicated than any of these officials suspected. Recurring riots against Jewish immigration in 1921, 1929 and 1936 led to the conviction that a binational arrangement was not an option. White papers that defined British policy were issued after each of these riots (1922, 1930, 1939), redefining the meaning of the 'Jewish national home' and restricting immigration in the hope of restoring social peace. Zionist propaganda predicting Jewish dominance and simultaneous development of state-like institutions for themselves could not but frighten the native population.[33] Riled up by their own leaders, they resisted politically and militarily. The establishment of a binational state based on the rights enshrined in the Balfour Declaration was out of the question for Palestinian Arabs. Any other institutional arrangement, which

[32] Mr. Ormsby-Gore, "British Policy", HC Deb 02 July 1923 vol 166 cc14-5
[33] Winston Churchill, "Middle Eastern Services", HC Deb 15 June 1921 vol 143 cc265-334

would allow the Arabs to control immigration into the country, was unacceptable from the Jewish standpoint. In reality, then, there were unsurmountable incompatibilities which condemned Britain's project to failure.

For two decades, Britain attempted to find a middle ground where there was none in an attempt to fulfil its international obligations in Palestine to both Arabs and Jews. This is not the place for a lengthy discussion of political developments during the mandate period, about which ample material has been published.[34] Suffice it to say that a lack of knowledge and planning by the Palestine government led to a hands-off, reactive approach to government. Perhaps a description given in the House of Lords captures it best: It was 'a zig-zag policy.'[35] Once the binational plan had clearly failed, in the late 1930s, partition became the only viable solution. But it was much earlier, after the failure of the legislative council project in 1923, that the bases for partition, and therefore the Israeli state, began to be laid, as chapter 4 shows.

Lebanon: France's Little Daughter

Two years after the creation of Greater Lebanon, its first High Commissioner Henri Gouraud proclaimed a speech which encapsulated French attitudes toward Syria and Lebanon:

[34] Wasserstein, "The British Mandate in Palestine: Myths and Realities"; Albert Hyamson, *Palestine under the Mandate, 1929-1948* (London: Methuen & Co. Ltd., 1950); Jacob Metzer, *The Divided Economy of Mandatory Palestine* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998); Esco Foundation for Palestine, ed., *Palestine. A Study of Jewish, Arab and British Policies. Volume I* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1947); Esco Foundation for Palestine, ed., *Palestine. A Study of Jewish, Arab and British Policies. Volume II* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1947); Frederick Kisch, *Palestine Diary* (London: Victor Gollancz, 1938); Doreen Ingrams, *Palestine Papers 1917-1922: Seeds of Conflict*, ed. John Murray (London, 1972); Barbara Smith, *The Roots of Separatism in Palestine: British Economic Policy, 1920-1929* (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1993).

[35] Several speakers, "Palestine", HL Deb 27 June 1923 vol 54 cc654-82

> It appears that I can compare Syria with a little daughter which France had after the war, whereas it already had numerous children, even though it did not see it coming with particular joy. But nowadays, seeing that the child is beautiful, well-behaved, intelligent, budding, she takes her resolutely by the hand to guide her towards her destiny.[36]

The tone of the message is clearly civilizational: France had reluctantly taken it upon itself to take care of the Syrian political orphan. A few years later, this orphan had become a successful young person of which its adoptive parent could be proud. France had civilized Syria. Similar descriptions of France's presence in the region can be found in diplomatic correspondence of the time: It had liberated the Arabs from their oppressors in the name of national self-determination and now took it upon itself to guide the country to independence.[37] What Gouraud presented as a snapshot decision of post-war period, however, was in reality a new reading of a long history of French interests in Syria and Lebanon. A more fitting analogy would have been that of a great granddaughter, for France had already assumed tutelage of Lebanon in the mid-19th century. The interests that it built during that century ultimately determined its policy in 20th century Lebanon and left little room for any solution aside from the creation of Lebanon as a state of minorities and its internal ethnic fragmentation, as chapters 4 and 5 will show. The remainder of this chapter will discuss French interests and broad policy objectives in Lebanon, focusing on the attitudes with the greatest impact on managing deep divisions.

[36] Philippe Gouraud, *Le General Henri Gouraud Au Liban et En Syrie, 1919-1923* (Paris: L'Harmattan, 1993), 149 [French, own translation]. Original text: Il me semble que je pourrais comparer la Syrie a une petite fille qu'aurait eue la France après la guerre alors qu'elle avait déjà de nombreux enfants, si bien qu'elle ne l'a peut-être pas vue venir avec une joie particulière, mais aujourd'hui, voyant que l'enfant est jolie, bien portante, intelligente, pleine d'avenir, elle la prend résolument par la main pour la conduire vers sa destinée.
[37] For instance, "Diplomatie Paris to General Commandant En Chef A.L.," May 28, 1920 SHD, GR 1 K 247 15 ; "Diplomatie Paris to General Commandant En Chef A.L.," April 25, 1920 SHD, GR 1 K 247 14 .

An historical interest

France's political ties with Lebanon and its role as the protector of the Maronites (the Catholic majority group in historical Lebanon), which it often emphasized when formulating its Middle East policy, originate in the second half of the nineteenth century. It was during the 1860 civil war in Mount Lebanon, which pitted Maronites and Druses against each other, that France's sponsorship of the Maronites began in earnest. Before this date, the alliance was sporadic and shifting. In 1840, the French and the Maronites had even been on opposite sides of a Lebanese conflict. When news of the 1860 conflict reached Europe, it provoked such popular indignation that the French demanded governmental intervention. Eventually, the massacre of 5,500 Christians at the hands of the Muslims of Damascus prompted France to send their ships to the coast.[38] Since then, France presented itself as protector and representative of Maronite interests in the new autonomous Mutasarrifiyah of Mount Lebanon.

It was in the context of the Mutasarrifiyah that the Maronites began to exist as a political grouping, as the struggle for the restoration of the Maronite Shehabi dynasty brought the community together. France actively encouraged them to promote this political aim and in doing so was instrumental in promoting this nascent ethno-political identity. Other European powers championed the causes of other religious groups in the Mountain, Britain in particular became the protector of the Druses of Lebanon. As historian Ussama Makdisi explained, it was the European image of the Middle East as inherently divided along religious lines that shaped political identities in Lebanon, as the 'deployment of religion-based politics by the elites inadvertently opened the possibility of popular

[38] Kamal Salibi, *The Modern History of Lebanon* (New York: Praeger, 1965), 109.

mobilization along communal lines.'[39] It was thus that the political alliance with the Lebanese Maronites was fostered.

But France's political tie with the Maronites was only part of the equation which conditioned policy-making in the 20th century. France's strengthened political presence in Lebanon motivated the development of economic and cultural ties, once again primarily with Lebanese Christians. In 1840, the first French spinning mills were established in Mount Lebanon taking advantage of Syria's growing silk production and the strong French administrative presence in the region. However, it was only after 1861, with the imposition of a new order in Mount Lebanon, that the situation turned in favour of French silk merchants and France's Maronite allies. The silk trade grew exponentially over the latter half of the nineteenth century, and merchants from Marseille and Lyon invest heavily in the region. As a result, the chambers of commerce of both cities turned into powerful interest groups, pressuring the French government to perpetuate its political control over Syria.

Indeed, during World War I, both chambers of commerce joined efforts to claim Syria for France. Concerned about the pan-Arab movement, they meet with Prime Minister Georges Clemenceau in October 1919, and left the meeting reassured that French troops would occupy the Syrian coast. Shortly after Henri Gouraud's appointment as high commissioner of Syria and Lebanon, the general assured the chamber of Lyon that he would do everything in his power to facilitate Lyonnaise commerce. As a result of their pressure, they received similar reassurances from Prime Minister Alexandre Millerand later on. When debates arose in France about leaving Syria, the chambers publicly pleaded for

[39] Ussama Makdisi, "Reconstructing the Nation-State : The Modernity of Sectarianism in Lebanon," *Middle East Report*, no. 200 (1996): 24; Ussama Makdisi, *The Culture of Sectarianism, Community, History and Violence in Nineteenth-Century Ottoman Lebanon* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000).

France to remain. Constant communication between the government and the commercial groups of these cities shows how concerned the former was to allay the latter's concerns. In sum, commercial interests in Syria, exemplified by the Lyonnaise and Marseillaise silk trade, were an important factor influencing French policy in the Middle East.[40]

In addition to these commercial interests, on the eve of the first world war, French financiers controlled 62.9% of Ottoman Public debt. The imperial Ottoman bank was entirely owned by French and British capital, and this bank controlled the tobacco monopoly, several utilities, as well as railway and industrial assets, among other businesses. French financial enterprises furthermore had interests in docks and warehouses in the Mediterranean, and French businesses held concessions for port construction in Tripoli and Beirut. Because Beirut and Mount Lebanon had the best access to France, these investments primarily strengthened France's link with the Maronite Christians.[41] To strengthen its control of Syria and to define its economic sphere of influence, France hammered out an agreement with Germany and the Ottoman government in the first two decades of the 20th century that gave it a concession to build an extensive railroad network in Syria. France thus had a monopoly on transit in the country and, with it, great political power.[42]

Not unrelated was the development of France's cultural influence. Public financing for French schools in the Middle East was increased after the defeat of Mehmet Ali, supported by the French, at the hands of Britain, in 1840. The Egyptian ruler had intervened

[40] Dominique Chevallier, "Lyon et La Syrie En 1919, Les Bases d'une Intervention," *Revue Historique* 224, no. 84 (1960): 275–320, http://gallica.bnf.fr/ark:/12148/bpt6k18398g/f3.r=alain+derville+%22revue+historique%22+280+assolement+triennal.langFR; D K Fieldhouse, "Syria and the French, 1918-1946," in *Western Imperialism in the Middle East, 1914-1958*, 2010, 245; Philip Shukry Khoury, *Syria and the French Mandate* (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1987), 38.
[41] Khoury, *Syria and the French Mandate*, 30–32.
[42] William I Shorrock, "The Origin of the French Mandate in Syria and Lebanon: The Railroad Question, 1901–1914," *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 1, no. 02 (1970): 152–53.

to help his ally, Bashir II, quell a Lebanese revolt whose protagonists were backed by Britain.[43] The latter half of the nineteenth century brought further and more onerous defeats for the French, notably, the Franco-Prussian war of 1870-1. In the face of British and German economic and military advances, France sought to strengthen its standing in an area where its superiority was uncontested: Culture.[44] Not having been able to spread the revolution successfully in Europe, the idea of establishing a Mediterranean empire gained popularity among French colonial agents. [45]

This coincided with a time during which catholic missionaries sought new avenues for expansion. Middle Eastern Christians were considered a target group that could easily be proselytized, particularly if benefits such as schooling and healthcare could be offered. A symbiosis between missionary movements and France's 'mission civilisatrice' ensued. The schools created by private organisations, and supported by the French state, were in turn attended by the children of the Lebanese businessmen who worked in the French dominated silk trade.[46] Indeed, in the early 1900s, the University of Lyon associated with the University of St. Joseph in Lebanon (a Francophile Jesuit institution) and asked for support from the Lyonnaise chamber of commerce with the argument that it will help the education of commercial agents on site.[47] The result of France's mission to spread its language and culture was that by 1914, 10% of all students had been educated in the French

[43] Kamal S. Salibi, "The End of the Emirate: 1840-1842," in *The Modern History of Lebanon* (New York: Praeger, 1965).
[44] Mathew Burrows, "'Mission Civilisatrice': French Cultural Policy in the Middle East, 1860–1914," *The Historical Journal* 29, no. 1 (1986): 135; Fieldhouse, "Syria and the French, 1918-1946," 246.
[45] Asher Kaufman, "Phoenicianism: The Formation of an Identity in Lebanon in 1920," *Middle Eastern Studies* 37, no. 1 (2001): 176, http://www.jstor.org/stable/4284144%5Cnhttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp.
[46] Burrows, "'Mission Civilisatrice': French Cultural Policy in the Middle East, 1860–1914."
[47] Chevallier, "Lyon et La Syrie En 1919, Les Bases d'une Intervention," 304.

schools.[48] This educational system, however, benefitted primarily Syria's Uniate Communities, particularly the Maronites concentrated in Mount Lebanon and Beirut.[49]

Of course, the spread of French culture was not entertained for its own sake, nor was it a caritative undertaking. It would eventually have tangible economic and political benefits for France. Robert de Caix, one of the main policy-makers of the early mandate period, explained that if the Lebanese's commercial abilities were 'educated and corrected', they could become 'a means of expansion for our industry and the general influence of our country.' It was thus in France's best interest to 'Frenchify' the greatest possible proportion of this Christian population.[50] As chapter 4 will discuss, the added benefit of this was to separate this population culturally from their Arab speaking, eastward-looking compatriots, thus ensuring their isolation and continued dependence on France. In a similar vein, Premier Millerand explained that the Frenchification of the Christians would prevent them from looking inward and assimilating, which would deprive France of its most valuable power base in Lebanon.[51] Such a 'politique de races' had successfully been applied by Louis-Hubert Lyautey, first Resident General of Morocco, where ethnic differences between the Berber and Arab communities had been highlighted to improve French control. This policy – which was dubbed 'the Moroccan formula' by historian Philip Khoury – strongly influenced the forces that arrived in Beirut in 1918, including General Gouraud, the first high commissioner of Lebanon.[52]

Lastly, France's strategic interest in the Levant mirror that of Britain. If Britain's struggle for a strong enclave in Palestine was motivated by its need to secure the route to

[48] Burrows, "'Mission Civilisatrice': French Cultural Policy in the Middle East, 1860–1914," 110.
[49] Khoury, *Syria and the French Mandate*, 27.
[50] Gérard Khoury, *Une Tutelle Coloniale : Le Mandat Français En Syrie et Au Liban : Écrits Politiques de Robert de Caix* (Paris: Belin, 2006), 256.
[51] "Millerand to Gouraud," August 6, 1920 [French] SHD, GR 1 K 247 15.
[52] Asher Kaufman, *Reviving Phoenicia: The Search for Idenity in Lebanon* (London: I.B. Tauris, 2014), 14–15; Khoury, *Syria and the French Mandate*, 54–75.

India, France strove for presence in the Levant to guard its possessions in North Africa. 75% of French imperial trade was with North Africa, and investments in that region expanded considerably after the war. A secure outpost in the Mediterranean was required to guarantee continued control of the area, complementing France's substantial military presence in North Africa. Furthermore, as will be discussed in more detail in chapter 4, Arab nationalism was viewed as a threat to France not only in Syria, but also in its more valuable colonial enclaves of North Africa. Control over Syria would stem the tide of pan-Arabism and prevent it from reaching the shores or Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia.[53]

It follows that France had multiple, intertwined interest in Syria, and particularly, in Mount Lebanon. In an attempt to counteract British and German power and to recover French national pride, France embarked on an expansionist policy in the Levant in the second half of the nineteenth century. Its attempts accelerated particularly after 1860, when it intervened as the protector of the Lebanese Maronites and established itself as their political champion thereafter. The new order established in Lebanon was propitious for the economic and cultural development of the country. Investments, particularly in the silk trade, increased exponentially, and missionary organisations in search for new avenues for proselytization began to establish schools and other public institutions. These developments benefitted the Maronites of Lebanon disproportionately and fostered a strong tie between this group and France. The combination of French historical interests in the region and British competition for domination of the ailing Ottoman empire made the Middle East an absolute priority for France's small colonial party.[54]

[53] Khoury, *Syria and the French Mandate*, 42–43.
[54] C.M. Andrew and Kanya-Forstner, "The French Colonial Party and French Colonial War Aims, 1914-1918," *The Historical Journal* 17, no. 1 (1974): 80–81.

The Bases of France's Policy in Lebanon: From Syrian Unity to Fragmentation

France's historical ties between France and Mount Lebanon did not result in a clear line of policy from the beginning. What its interests determined was the need for continued French presence in the region and a good economic and cultural basis to do so. Prime Minister Millerand described France's objectives in the following manner: By claiming the mandate of Syria, France had not been in search of a new colony. Rather, it sought to 'maintain its century-long basis in the Mediterranean region and to assure its influence under the most liberal conditions with a minimum of intervention.'[55] Just like Britain's policy, however, it was far from clear how it might best achieve this objective. Like the British government, the French executive was confronted with substantial questioning by a Parliament puzzled by an ill-defined foreign policy.

In June 1919, just 14 months before the creation of Greater Lebanon, a member of the French chamber inquired what France's political directives in Syria were. The response he received from the Minister of Foreign Affairs was very similar to the default British response: 'The French government strives in the strongest and most energetic way to safeguard the *traditional interests of France*.'[56] A similar inquiry had been launched by another member of parliament three months before, when he contended that the weakness of French policy in Syria was its lack of a defined policy.[57] Just like British parliamentarians were left in the dark as to Herbert Samuel's first invitation to Palestine –

[55] "Millerand to Gouraud," August 7, 1920 [French, own translation] SHD, GR 1 K 247 15. Original text: […] maintenir une situation séculaire nécessaire à son assiette dans Méditerranée; elle désire y assurer son influence dans les conditions les plus libéraux avec un minimum d'intervention.
[56] "1re Séance de 24 Juin 1919," *Journal Officiel de La République Française. Débats Parlementaires. Chambre Des Députés*, 1919, 2875 [French, own translation]. Original text: le Gouvernement français a le souci de sauvegarder de la façon la plus ferme et la plus énergique les droits traditionnels de la France.
[57] "Chambre Des Députes, 2° Séance Du 26 Mars 1919," *Journal Officiel de La République Française*, March 26, 1919, 1485.

which was variably explained as a mission to assist plans for economic development, or to assist the development of the Jewish national home – so French deputies unsuccessfully inquired of the government what Gouraud's mission in Syria was.[58] In a letter to General Gouraud himself, Premier Clemenceau described his mission broadly as follows: 'Your mission consists […] in establishing in the Mediterranean a centre of French emanation.'[59] Thus, at the end of the war, France had not yet formulated a clear policy for its state-building projects in Syria and Lebanon.

As will be shown in chapter 4, the administrative council of Mount Lebanon swiftly initiated a campaign to achieve the expansion of its territory under French tutelage by sending representations to both the Paris Peace Conference and the French government. Between January 1919 and the creation of Greater Lebanon in 1920, three delegations were sent to France.[60] As representatives of the council, they represented the wishes of Mount Lebanon but were in no position to speak for Syria or the Syrian territories that they sought to attach to the Mountain.[61] At the beginning of the mandate period, the French – just like the British – sought to follow a middle course between their ally, the Maronite majority of Mount Lebanon, and Syria, where Syrian nationalism was progressively gaining strength. Not committing to any future policy, Clemenceau issued declarations to both the Maronite patriarch and the Syrian population.

To the first, he vowed to assure the survival of Lebanon's traditions and the development of its independent political and administrative institutions. While the

[58] "Séance Du 5 Février 1920," *Journal Officiel de La République Française. Débats Parlementaires. Chambre Des Députés*, 1920.
[59] Gouraud, *Le General Henri Gouraud Au Liban et En Syrie, 1919-1923*, 34 [French, own translation]. Original text : Votre mission consiste […] à établir au fond de la Méditerranée un centre de rayonnement français.
[60] "Note," n.d. CADN, Syrie-Levant, 363.
[61] "Dans Le Levant, Déclarations Du Patriarche Maronite," *Le Temps*, August 31, 1919; "Declarations Du Patriarche Maronite," *Correspondance D'Orient* 12, no. 221 (1919): 129.

territorial limits of Lebanon could not be determined before the mandate was approved, France would 'take into account the need to reserve the territories of the plain and access to the sea that are indispensable for its prosperity.'[62] It is clear that the French government sought to reassure Mount Lebanon's administrative council of France's support and consideration. At the same time, however, it was unwilling to commit to a specific future vision for Lebanon. To the Syrians, the Prime Minister explained Gouraud's mission as follows: He had been appointed to inform Paris about the needs of the population, to maintain the trust that has been established between 'the Arabs and their allies during the war of liberation' that had been 'waged together.'[63] Therefore, France was keeping its options open, as it had done during the preceding decades, when it promoted both Syrian and Lebanese nationalism against the Ottomans.[64] When Gouraud arrived in Beirut in November 1919, French policy remained undefined. The general himself declared that he would make up his mind about his programme 'on the spot.'[65]

Reports received in Paris about the 'the needs of the population' were initially contradictory. An early review of the situation in Syria under King Faisal, who had been installed as Syria's ruler by the British two months prior to Gouraud's arrival, explained that the majority of the population is 'indifferent to the idea of the Arab homeland that is really quite recent' and that the notion of a threatened Islam brandished by the anti-French government 'barely moves them'.[66] This seems to confirm an even more optimistic assessment of local conditions by Minister of Foreign Affairs Stephen Pinchon, who

[62] Gouraud, *Le General Henri Gouraud Au Liban et En Syrie, 1919-1923*, 36.
[63] Ibid., 37.
[64] Eyal Zisser, "The Mediterranean Idea in Syria and Lebanon: Between Territorial Nationalism and Pan-Arabism," *Mediterranean Historical Review* 18, no. 1 (2003): 80–81; Khoury, *Syria and the French Mandate*, 28–30.
[65] "General Gouraud and the Emir. A Hopeful Silence.," *The Times*, November 10, 1919.
[66] "Mornet to French Foreign Ministry," December 15, 1919 [French, own translation] CADN, Syrie-Levant, 363. Original text: La plus grande partie de la population […] est indifférente a l'idée vraiment trop récente de la patrie arabe. Même le spectre de « l'Islam en danger » que brandissent devant elle les meneurs du mouvement anti-français, n'arrive que difficilement à les émouvoir.

declared that 'everyone knows that [the Syrians] are perfectly devoted to France.'[67] Another report of the same period, however, indicated quite the contrary: The Christian population had received General Gouraud very well, but what he categorized as the Muslim attitude was described as one of hostile isolation. The Mutawalis – as the Shiites were called at the time – were obviously not considered part of the Muslim population, for the author categorized them separately from the Sunnis and explained that they were getting closer to France and cooperating with the mandatory.[68] Despite these mixed reports, public discourse remained that France was received exceedingly well in Syria and that the anti-French movement was negligible. There is no doubt, however, that France was well aware of the difficulties that it would encounter in Syria and Lebanon on account of the meagre public support for its mandate. The disorders that broke out in Syria at the end of 1919 left no doubt about it.[69]

Syrian hostility, however, was not the only factor conditioning the development of French policy in the Middle East. Shortly after the King-Crane Commission had been appointed by the Paris Peace Conference to ascertain the wishes of the Syrian population, with a view to assigning the Middle East mandates, Times journalist Wickham Steed organised a dinner to advance French-British rapprochement. He described the members of the commission as 'arabomaniacs' and alerted the French government to the dangers that this commission poses to French and British plans in the region. To defuse the situation, the French government decided to initiate talks with Faisal.[70] Clemenceau himself explained the decision thus: Britain had accepted Faisal as the Arab representative at the

[67] "Chambre Des Députes, 2° Séance Du 26 Mars 1919," 1485.
[68] "Rapport Sur La Situation Politique En Syrie-Cilicie, Période 20.11.-10.12.1919," n.d. CADN, Syrie-Levant, 363.
[69] For example, "French and Arabs in Conflict. Fight at Baalbek. Heavy Casualties.," *The Times*, December 23, 1919.
[70] Khoury, *Une Tutelle Coloniale : Le Mandat Français En Syrie et Au Liban : Écrits Politiques de Robert de Caix*, 32–46.

Peace Conference, and safeguarding British support for a French mandate in Syria and Lebanon now required an understanding with the Arab nationalist leader.

It seems clear that some French officials advocated the immediate occupation of the Bekaa valley for annexation to Lebanon – the territories of the plain that Clemenceau had mentioned in his letter to Maronite patriarch Hoyek – after Britain evacuated the area in December 1919. Faisal, however, considered the Bekaa valley an integral part of Arab Syria. In view of Britain's insistence that negotiations be initiated with the King[71], Clemenceau demanded an interruption of these plans. Dismissing the recommendations of the Chief of the French Army in the Levant to occupy the Bekaa despite Faisal's opposition, Clemenceau explains that 'our visions in Syria cannot be completely realised', because British approval of France's presence in the Middle East is dependent on Britain's agreement with King Hussein.

If no accord with Faisal was struck, an Arab attack on France's position in the Middle East was to be expected. If France was to respond to these attacks, they would have to confront British criticism. By entering into negotiations with Faisal, Clemenceau reckoned, 'the British are rendered conciliatory through the negotiations which I pursue in Paris, and the Arabs are deprived of direction due to the absence of their leader with whom I am speaking.'[72] To calm the disturbances in Syria, however, the leader was sent back quite soon.[73] He was promised support for Syrian independence, Syrian unity and non-occupation of the Bekaa valley in exchange for his acquiescence to French presence in the region and the independence of Mount Lebanon.[74] Thus, while the expansion of Mount

[71] Stephen Pinchon, "Pinchon to Gouraud," December 19, 1919 SHD, GR 1 K 247 14.
[72] Georges Clemenceau, "Clemenceau to A.F.L. Commander in Chief," November 30, 1919 [French, own translation] CADN, Syrie-Liban, 363.
[73] "La France En Presence de l'Emir Faysal En Syrie," n.d. CADN, Syrie-Levant, 363; Pinchon, "Pinchon to Gouraud" SDH, GR 1 K 247 14.
[74] "Millerand to General Commandant En Chef A.L.," May 5, 1920 SDH, GR 1 K 247 19.

Lebanon to the Bekaa might have been a widely-held preference, Clemenceau was willing to compromise on this vision for the sake of Faisal's and Britain's support. Contrary to a common view that Clemenceau was uninterested in the Middle East, he seems to have been a pragmatists who was aware of the limitations to French power in the region. [75]

General Gouraud considered the accords with Faisal a retreat and a sign of French weakness.[76] Just before the Faisal-Clemenceau accord was signed in January 1920, Gouraud alerted the Ministry of Foreign Affairs that such an accord would be detrimental to French interests in the region. In particular, Faisal's insistence on the attachment of Tripoli to Arab Syria and his hope that Lebanon would of its own accord end up demanding attachment to Syria seemed to be at odds with Gouraud's vision of the Middle East. Such an accord with Faisal would 'render the organisation of Syria in accordance with [French] interests impossible.' He explained that, motivated by the anarchy which Faisal's rule had brought about, notables of different villages had approached him demanding direct negotiations with the French and rejecting Faisal as an intermediary. Particularism, Gouraud explained, was used by these notables to justify their right for direct negotiations.

He considered these divisions to be helpful for France to organise Syria 'in a way that is favourable to our authority.' 'It would be deplorable', the high commissioner concluded, 'to eliminate them for the sake of the unity of Sheriffian authority which embodies […] hostility against us and which views the entente with us as a temporary means.'[77] In other words, the accord with Faisal would mean an extension of his authority

[75] Andrew and Kanya-Forstner, "The French Colonial Party and French Colonial War Aims, 1914-1918," 96; Khoury, *Syria and the French Mandate*, 36.
[76] Gouraud, *Le General Henri Gouraud Au Liban et En Syrie, 1919-1923*, 55.
[77] "Gouraud to Diplomatie Paris," December 29, 1919 [French, own translation] SHD, GR 1 K 247 15 . Original text: […] rendrait impossible l'organisation syrienne conforme à notre intérêt […] Les divisions de la Syrie doivent nous aider à l'organiser d'une manière pratique et favorable à notre autorité, nous sont déjà fort utiles pour contenir le mouvement organise contre nous. Il serait déplorable, pour le présent et l'avenir, de les effacer dans l'unité d'une autorité chérifienne qui incarne aux yeux des populations, l'hostilité contre nous et qui ne voit elle-même dans une entente avec nous qu'un moyen temporaire.

over all of Syria, possibly even Lebanon. As a movement hostile to France, the triumph of Arab nationalism would be directly opposed to French interests. Gouraud emphasized repeatedly that tendencies of Arab unity should be resisted vigorously. Any plans for a confederation between the newly created states had to be loose enough to prevent the triumph of these tendencies.[78]

As for Lebanon, Gouraud viewed its reestablishment as an independent state within its pre-1840 boundaries, which included large parts of Syria, as a matter of course.[79] He pushed vigorously for a strengthening of the French-Maronite link, and urged the government to continue reassuring the Maronite church and the Lebanese administrative council of France's commitment to Lebanese independence.[80] But his views did not immediately result in a well-defined mandatory policy. His secretary Robert de Caix – who, as chapter 4 will show, may be credited with defining French policy in the Levant – spoke of his superior's 'absence of programme', adding that any plan that Gouraud will implement in the Middle East will not be a product of local government but rather 'improvised in Paris out of need.'[81]

He was right that a clear policy would only be formulated out of need, but wrong in that it was ultimately formulated in Beirut rather than Paris. In June 1920, it became clear that Faisal was not as well-disposed toward France as negotiations with him had indicated. Prime Minister Alexandre Millerand alerted General Gouraud of the importance to 'actively prepare the policy which will be imposed on the day on which the incompatibility between the French mandate and the continuation of the government of Damascus is definitely demonstrated.' The wording suggests that there was no alternative, set-in-stone

[78] "Gouraud to Diplomatie Paris," August 19, 1920 [French] SHD, GR 1 K 247 15.
[79] Gouraud, *Le General Henri Gouraud Au Liban et En Syrie, 1919-1923*, 76.
[80] "Gouraud to Diplomatie Paris," March 12, 1920 [French] SHD, GR 1 K 247 15.
[81] Robert De Caix, "De Caix to Berthelot," *Gérard Khoury, Une Tutelle Coloniale : Le Mandat Français En Syrie et Au Liban : Écrits Politiques de Robert de Caix*, November 16, 1920, 297–98 [French, own translation]
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policy for Syria before this point. The approval of the mandate and the attitude of the government of Damascus, he concluded, 'obligates us to come out of our shell.' France had been reactive, and it was now time for it to take an active interest in the future of Syria, as its short-lived plan with Faisal was about to fall apart.[82] Furthermore, Millerand explained, he would only be able to provide the general with limited directives and requested information about the best way forward.

Now that Syrian independence under Faisal with limited French control ceased to be an option, the government was open to Gouraud's suggestions. He picked up where he had left off with his plans for the fragmentation of Syria. The new structure, however, was not to result in an endless multiplication of states, for French control of these small entities would be too costly and it could motivate small autonomous states to resist the partial unification of Syria that France would endeavour. Rather, a moderate number of states was to be created: A Christian majority Greater Lebanon, and the Muslim majority states of Damascus and Aleppo. His reasoning: It would 'allow the High Commissioner to balance out the rivalries that can be exploited to the greatest benefit of his authority and, consequently, that of France.'[83] Furthermore, if Syria was split up into too many states, maybe eight or nine (as Millerand had previously suggested)[84] it may 'serve the idea of [Arab] unity rather than destroy it by creating groups that are too small to ensure their own existence, thus encouraging solidarity and inciting them to rapprochement based on shared

[82] "Millerand to Gouraud," June 14, 1920 [French, own translation] SHD, GR 1 K 247 15 . Original text: Il importe de préparer activement la politique qui s'imposerait le jour (ou) serait définitivement démontrée l'incompatibilité entre le mandat français et le maintien du Gouvernement de Damas […] L'octroi du mandate sur la Syrie en même temps que l'attitude du Gouvernement de Damas nous obligent à sortir de notre réserve.
[83] "Gouraud to Diplomatie Paris," August 6, 1920 [French, own translation] SHD, GR 1 K 247 15 . Original text: […] doit permettre au Haut-Commissaire de mettre en balance des rivalités pouvant être exploitées au plus grand profit de son autorité et, par conséquent, de la France.
[84] "Millerand to Gouraud," August 6, 1920 [French] SHD, GR 1 K 247 15.

interests.' It would be easy to create a balance of power between three or four larger states that are large enough to be autonomous but that need to oppose the rest. [85]

What had to be avoided at all costs was the creation of a unified state with a ruler capable of opposing France.[86] Parliamentary democracy was also out of the question for Syria, as French leaders believed that Syria's political culture was inadequate for it. Republicanism, on the other hand, was as unthinkable, as the French believed that Muslims were naturally disposed towards strong leaders. Thus, a limited amount of popular government through notables would have to be combined with a strong mandatory power. It is debatable whether France really believed that the Syrians were not 'ready for democracy'; concerns about an overwhelming popular resistance were probably much more instrumental in determining French policy towards institution building in Syria. France's concern about Muslim opposition was pervasive; even the choice of a capital for a potential Syrian Federation was affected by it.[87] Furthermore, if the Syrians were unprepared for democracy, then logic would dictate that the Muslims of Greater Lebanon were no different. Yet, Lebanon received something akin to parliamentary government in 1926. Here, however, the Maronites were placed in a position that would allow France to govern indirectly whilst guaranteeing the defence of their interests. Chapter 4 will show how a divisive logic geared at preventing opposition to French power was applied to the creation of Greater Lebanon.

[85] "Gouraud to Diplomatie Paris," August 19, 1920 [French, own translation] SHD, GR 1 K 247 15. Original text: En ce qui concerne cette dernière, morcellement en 8 ou 9 groupements présente inconvénients sérieux. Au point de vue politique, cette mesure risque de servir l'idée d'unité au lieu de la détruire en créant des groupes trop réduits pour pouvoir assurer eux-mêmes leur existence, sont rendus solidaires et incites à se rapprocher par une communauté d'intérêts.
[86] "Gouraud to Diplomatie Paris," August 3, 1920 [French] SHD, GR 1 K 247 15.
[87] "Millerand to Gouraud," August 6, 1920 [French] SHD, GR 1 K 247 15.

Correspondence perused for this research shows that Gouraud and his successors received little in the way of political guidance from Paris.[88] In the above cited letter, Millerand explicitly requested ideas from Gouraud for the formulation of French policy, because he would not be able to offer anything other than broad directives. Moreover, if discussion about the budget of the High Commission are any indication, the French government did not regard the Middle East as a priority. In a letter to Gouraud, Minister of Foreign Affairs Poincare explained that France's financial effort had to be commensurate with the country's interest in the region.[89] Instead of investing heavily in stable future allies, Paris repeatedly rejected requests for a higher budget that might support the administrative changes that the high commissioner sought to introduce. The formula of a mandate was new territory; it was not a colony and it would eventually lead to independence. As a result, it became 'a territory which French officials and investors eventually preferred to neglect.'[90] Policy-making in Lebanon was thus up to the high commissioners.

As chapters 4 and 5 show, when it came to institution building, they were consistently inspired by a divide and rule logic. There were frequent changes in French policy toward Syria over the years of the mandate, and each high commissioner left his imprint on the region. So, for instance, Lebanese governor Léon Cayla and High Commissioner Henri de Jouvenel sought to counter the tendency toward fragmentation. Both championed greater homogenization within Lebanon by seeking to overturn the sectarian electoral system which the 'Moroccan formula' dictated. In the end, however, the policy initiated by the likes of Millerand, Gouraud, and de Caix had become firmly anchored and continued to be followed until the end of the mandate. No matter who was in

[88] This was the typical pattern of French colonial politics. See, for instance, Tony Chafer and Amanda Sackur, eds., *Promoting the Colonial Idea: Propaganda and Visions of Empire in France* (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2002), 2.
[89] "Poincare to Gouraud," May 5, 1922 SHD, GR 1 K 147 19 .
[90] Khoury, *Syria and the French Mandate*, 45.

government, the French considered the preservation and expansion of their strategic and economic investments to be of vital importance.[91] Dividing the population against itself continued to be France's preferred policy tool.

Conclusion

At the end of the Great War, the British and French positions vis-à-vis de Middle East were comparable in many respects. First, they had entered into an agreement with each other regarding the distribution of the territories amongst themselves. As a result, any policy they pursued had to respect the agreement with their European partner. Secondly, their rule of the Middle East had to be conducted under the provisions of the unfamiliar mandate system, which changed the rules of the imperial game, forcing them to defend their interests despite having to help these countries achieve independence. Thirdly, having to rely on the support of the population rather than force, Britain and France tried to follow a middle course between a sure ally, the Zionists in the case of Britain and the Maronites in France, and the majority of the population, Muslim Arabs in both cases. Lastly, they entered the relationship with their new possessions without a predefined policy for the new state-building venture.

This, however, is where the similarities end. France had clear historical interests in Lebanon. It had built strong political, economic and cultural ties with majority Maronite Mount Lebanon. Aside from considerable commercial and financial interests in Syria itself, control of the Levant was considered necessary to safeguard more important interests in North Africa. The Muslim population was overwhelmingly anti-French and the Maronites were by no means powerful enough to overcome this hostility. France thus had to rely on

[91] Ibid., 47.

other means to break the power of the majority: Political fragmentation. Britain, on the other hand, had a vague and controversial interest in Palestine. It could only ambiguously refer to religious and cultural interests, and there were no commercial or financial assets that needed protection. Even the strategic value for the protection of the Suez Canal was put in question by the highest military command. Britain had, however, concluded a double promise to establish a national home for the Jewish people and to protect Arab rights in Palestine in the process. These promises were enshrined in international law and ultimately provided the basis for British policy in Palestine until 1948. The vagueness of these promises, however, gave Britain flexibility to adjust to the situation on the ground, which would prove vital to the Israeli state-building process. Chapter 4 will trace how these divergent policy objectives impacted the definition of the boundaries of the demos in the Yishuv and Lebanon. It will then become clearer that no 'typical' French or British colonial strategy can be identified in these two cases as this chapter has contributed to showing.

CHAPTER 4
CREATING THE FRAMEWORK CONDITIONS: THE MANDATORY AND THE BOUNDARIES OF THE POLITICAL SYSTEM

France and Britain had a clear mandate: The progressive development of these countries into independent democratic states. The boundaries of the territories were to be negotiated between these two powers, and each was free to determine the administrative division within their assigned territories. In other words, within the territories that had been assigned to them, France and Britain decided the boundaries of the *demos*.[1] France chose to extend Lebanon's borders, thus creating a vertically divided society.[2] Britain reduced the heterogeneity of the political system by shelving binationalism, thus allowing separate Jewish community institutions to develop.[3] Nonetheless, this was only the first step in defining the nature of divisions in both countries and how they would be managed, as chapter 5 will show. The present chapter will review the considerations which went into this crucial first step of the state-building process in the Yishuv and in Lebanon. It will show that from the beginning, Britain was deeply concerned about government effectiveness and stability whilst France purposely sought to sow disorder through fragmentation.

As the introductory chapter to this dissertation discussed, political scientists have long grappled with the impact of social heterogeneity versus homogeneity on the

[1] On the importance of the coincidence of territorial boundaries with national boundaries for the purposes of establishing democratic rule see Whelan, "Prologue: Democratic Theory and the Boundary Problem."
[2] Kais M. Firro, *Inventing Lebanon : Nationalism and the State under the Mandate*, ed. I.B. Taurus (London, 2003), 101. On horizontally and vertically divided societies, see the introduction to this dissertation as well as Guelke, *Politics in Deeply Divided Socities*.
[3] Joel Migdal, *Through the Lens of Israel* (New York: State University of New York Press, 2001), 58.

establishment of democratic regimes. As numerous scholars since Lijphart and Nordlinger have shown, deep divisions are not in themselves an obstacle to democracy. Rather, in many cases, institutional mechanisms can contribute to managing otherwise destabilizing centrifugal tendencies. Though it may seem trivial to highlight this: Before such institutional divisions can manage divisions, these divisions come about when the boundaries of political systems are set. So, for instance, is it obvious that the Austrian-Hungarian Empire was a much more diverse society than modern-day Austria; Yugoslavia and the Ottoman Empire more diverse than their successor states. Thus, administrative boundaries determine which divisions have to be institutionally managed. The reason for highlighting such a theoretically trivial point at this stage is that in the cases of the Yishuv and Lebanon, as the following chapter will show, it was pivotal to the development of both successor states. Their boundaries were drawn by the mandatory powers and the considerations which went into this process shed light on the nature of divisions within both societies as well as colonial policy.

In Palestine and Lebanon, multiple versions of the *demos* competed to gain the upper hand. In Palestine, binationalism was trumped by de facto partition thus reducing diversity, whereas in Lebanon, the *demos* was diversified by expanding the territory to include a large Muslim population. The next section will analyse how the boundaries were drawn for the Yishuv in the British Mandate of Palestine; the following section will trace how Greater Lebanon was carved out of the territory of Syria. By defining the *demos*, the mandatory powers constrained the subsequent institutional choices (chapter 5) and the visions of the state which could find institutional expression (chapter 6).

The End of Binationalism in Palestine

The most relevant debate to the definition of the *demos* in Palestine, and particularly the Jewish community, was not about geographical boundaries but about demographic limits. Should the new polity encompass all inhabitants of the territory irrespective of religious adherence? Was it to be a 'binational' state with power-sharing arrangements between Jews and Arabs? An Arab state with a Jewish minority? Or – and this option was not contemplated until much later on – two separate, ethnically defined states? The text of the mandate had enshrined in international law the obligation of the British to promote a Jewish National Home in Palestine, a promise previously made through the Balfour Declaration of 1917. Just like the Zionist movement had no coherent definition of what such a home entailed, so the British were ambivalent about its meaning. What seems clear from the official documents of the period is that the mandatory certainly had no intention of creating a Jewish state (refer to chapter 3).[4]

What can be said with certainty is that the government's Palestine policy was ill-defined. It was clear that Jews were to be allowed to immigrate to Palestine to an extent that was beneficial for the country and its inhabitants. A symbiotic relationship was to develop between the communities residing in Palestine where Jews received a 'national home' and Arabs a flourishing economy. Despite its commitment to institutionalizing this binational vision, however, the British mandatory ended up laying the basis for partition and, eventually, a state dominated by the Jewish population. As will be shown below, the absence of a clear political vision of the mandatory power coupled with an insistence on

[4] A minority of British officials disagreed with the official policy. Sir Herbert Samuel, first High Commissioner for Palestine, did harbour such hopes. A Jew himself, he sympathized with Zionism, and considered the gradual creation of a 'Commonwealth with a Jewish majority' as the ultimate aim. It was only when the 1921 riots revealed the difficulty of this course of action that he reassessed this policy. Evyatar Friesel, "Herbert Samuel's Reassessment of Zionism in 1921," *Studies in Zionism* 5, no. 2 (1984): 213–37.

government effectiveness promoted institutional separation between Jews and Arabs. The design of Jewish community institutions would have been very different had the binational project triumphed in 1923, i.e. had the boundaries of the *demos* been traced differently. Legislation engendered through a mixed Arab-Jewish council would almost certainly have precluded the political development of the Jewish community.

The legislative council proposal

When General Allenby entered into Jerusalem on December 11th, 1917 to establish a British military administration, the political institutions of Palestine were those of the Ottoman Empire. As has been mentioned in chapter 2, parts of what would become Mandatory Palestine were under the authority of the Ottoman province of Beirut while others formed a separate administrative unit, which included the autonomous province of Jerusalem. Palestinian Muslims were under a local religious authority which answered to the Grand Mufti of Istanbul, while non-Muslim communities managed their own religious affairs, as *millets*. Politically, however, they were all subject to the Sublime Porte.[5] To administer their internal political affairs, the Jews of Palestine had been planning for self-governing institutions since the beginning of the 20th century. By 1920, they had engendered an advanced political structure, Knesset Israel, composed not only of local decision-making bodies, but of an elected community-wide parliament (*Asefat Ha-Nivcharim*) and an executive chosen by it (*Vaad Leumi*).[6] Even though the party structure was still

[5] For a succinct description of this system view Esco Foundation for Palestine, *Palestine. A Study of Jewish, Arab and British Policies. Volume I*; Porath, *The Emergence of the Palestinian-Arab National Movement, 1918-1929*; Bichara Khader, *The Sons of Agenor. Europe and Palestine, from the Crusades until the 21st Century* (Barcelona: Bellaterra, 1998).For an overview of the administrative divisions of the late Ottoman Empire see Gideon Biger, *The Boundaries of Modern Palestine, 1840-1947* (London: Routledge, 2004), 13–41.

[6] The first impetus for organizing the Jewish community in Palestine came from prominent Zionist leaders Ahad Ha'am and Menahem Ussishkin who in 1903 sent a delegation to Palestine to set up an overarching institution (*Knessiah*) for the Palestine Jews. After Ussishkin had fallen from grace, this institution was replaced by a similarly fashioned Council with the aim of 'coordinating the work of the Zionist agencies in

underdeveloped, based on economic and ethnic cleavages with little in the way of ideologies or programmes, these bodies mirrored those of advanced European democracies.

By contrast, the Arab community presented no institutional structure to channel their feedback to the mandatory power. Fearing that the advanced institutionalization of the Jewish community presaged a future Jewish state, the Palestinian Arabs announced the creation of the Muslim-Christian-Association (hereinafter: MCA) in November 1918.[7] The latter, however, was not an elected body like Knesset Israel, but a federation of local political clubs. Over time, it became the Palestinian Arabs' opinion leader and de facto political representative, but it never received a mandate from the Palestinian electorate. Thus, the institutional landscape that the British civil administration found at its inauguration in 1920 was more conducive to consociational mechanisms, or ethnically-based partition, than to the creation of a binational majoritarian democracy.

However, Britain seems to have been unconcerned about the fact that Arabs and Jews were two distinct, autonomous and potentially conflicting communities. Parliamentary debates suggest that part of the British political leadership was unaware of the great potential for ethnic conflict that their Jewish National Home policy entailed. Rather than expecting a Jewish-Arab conflict, pro-Zionist MP Colonel Wedgwood even voiced a concern that Jews and Arabs might combine 'in hostility to the British Empire'.[8] Others felt that by December 1920, the time had come for British military forces to withdraw from Palestine, suggesting that no further difficulties were expected.[9] Similarly,

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Palestine according to a definite programme leading to the general Zionist goal.' Also this council broke down to be replaced by several unsuccessful constitutive assemblies until the war effort called for unity and the establishment of permanent institutions. After the war, a census of all Jewish voters was fashioned and elections held in April, 1920. For a survey of early *Yishuv* institutions see Burstein, *Self-Government of the Jews in Palestine since 1900*, 68–73.

[7] Porath, *The Emergence of the Palestinian-Arab National Movement, 1918-1929*, 28–32.

[8] Colonel Wedgwood, "Turks and Constantinople", HC Deb 26 February 1920 vol 125 cc1949-2060

[9] Sir H. Brittain, "Palestine", HC Deb 09 December 1920 vol 135 c2405

foreign Secretary George Curzon disputed the idea that Zionism was in antagonism to the Arab population of Palestine, painting a picture of close friendships between village sheikhs and heads of Jewish colonies.[10] With these impressions prevailing, binationalism seemed to be a feasible option.

Not only was there a widespread ignorance in Westminster regarding the potential for ethnic conflict; there is ample evidence that the mandatory put scant thought into the domestic politics of Palestine in the first years. An advisory council composed of appointed British and local officials assisted the high commissioner in taking administrative decisions, and for the time being, there was no need to engage in more weighty discussions about the country's political future. Indicative of this relative lack of concern is how rarely Palestine was discussed in Westminster. Of over 800 entries marked with the term 'Palestine' in a search of historical parliamentary debates in Britain between 1920 and 1922, only 10 address the domestic political situation. In the same period, only 17 cabinet papers on Palestine were produced, half of which relate to the discussion of the text of the mandate by the League of Nations. Britain had no authority to take non-administrative decisions in Palestine until this text was approved in 1922, but the adjudication of Palestine to Britain was certain enough for its political future to have been discussed in advance. Silence of the matter can thus reasonably be interpreted as either ignorance or lack of interest. At the very least, it shows that Britain was not committed to a specific future vision for Palestine.

The impulse for political reorganisation came when the advisory council was called upon to take political decisions of greater consequence for the future of the country, such

[10] Earl Curzon of Kendleston, "Palestine", HL Deb 29 June 1920 vol 40 cc1005-38

as municipal voting rights and raising a long-term loan.[11] Arab representatives in the council joined the chorus of the MCA in asking for immediate legislative council elections. For this, the Colonial Office reckoned, Palestine was not yet prepared: Full self-government in Palestine was antithetical with British promises toward the Jewish people.[12] If full self-government meant majoritarian mechanisms or proportional representation, the 84,000 Jews would undeniably be eclipsed by the 664,000 Arabs, thus reducing the Jewish National Home to a slogan. Explaining the situation to the Arab delegation that had travelled to London to overturn government policy, the Colonial office wrote,

> if your delegation really represents the present attitude of the Arab population in Palestine, it is quite clear that the creation at this stage of a national government would preclude the fulfilment of the pledge made by the British Government to the Jewish people[13]

At the same time, however, the mandatory was opposed to creating the conditions for future partition by legalizing the ethnically-defined institutions of the former millet system.

Its plan to create a binational Palestine commenced with the proposal to create a legislative council, with the 1922 Palestine-Order-in-Council. This constitution provided for an elected Arab majority which could be overruled by an alliance between two minorities composed of appointed British officials and the elected Jews. In other words, the consociational power-sharing model was to be corrected by a quota which ensured the control of an artificial majority of mandatory power and Jews. The objective of these institutional mechanisms was to placate criticism of the mandatory by combining ‘a large measure of popular representation with the necessary degree of control to ensure that the

[11] Records of advisory council meetings during the early days of the mandate can be found in Government of Palestine, “Advisory Council Meetings,” 1922 ISA, HC, 4753/1-M.
[12] Cabinet, “League of Nations,” February 17, 1921 CAB 24-120-4.
[13] Colonial Office, “Letter to the Arab Delegation,” March 1922 ISA, AE, 4/1-M.

policy of the government is not thereby stultified.'[14] In other words, the government had to be able to effectively implement its policy. A similar point was emphasized by High Commissioner Herbert Samuel who explained that an Arab majority 'might be very likely to lead to a deadlock between the legislature and the executive.'[15] Thus, government effectiveness was, from the beginning, a key consideration by the British mandatory in its state-building efforts. It had a goal to accomplish and it knew that an Arab majority would make it difficult if not impossible to reach that goal. Any institutional design had to guarantee strong support for mandatory policy, and this consideration took precedence over the principle of democratic representativeness.

The run-up to the 1923 elections provided a taste of how difficult it would be to bring Jews and Arabs on board with this scheme. It became clear that expectations that the two communities would enter a symbiotic relationship administered by power-sharing institutions had been far too optimistic. Immigration, the most important political issue of the day, proved intractable. While the Arabs insisted that it be within the purview of the council, the Jews argued that it should be placed under the authority of the not yet officially recognised Jewish community institutions.[16] The corollary of this demand was that the latter had to gain legal standing. As the Arabs were expected to veto the establishment of Jewish community institutions in the new legislative council, the Jewish delegation demanded that their institutions be approved before the elections. Initially, they vowed to withhold Jewish participation in the elections pending the government's endorsement. High Commissioner Herbert Samuel, however, convinced them otherwise; their boycott of the

[14] Ibid. ISA, AE, 4/1-M.
[15] Herbert Samuel, "Memorandum," February 11, 1923 ISA, CS, 6/18-M.
[16] The Muslim-Christian Association, "Letter to the Chief Secretary," November 13, 1922 ISA, CS, 6/18-M. Palestine Zionist Executive, "Telegram to London Zionist Executive," June 16, 1922 WA, 731A-30.

election risked turning public opinion in Britain against the entire Jewish National Home project. [17]

With much greater influence than the Jewish minority, the Arab Executive led a vigorous and successful campaign to induce the Palestinian population to boycott the elections. Participation in the elections, the executive reckoned, would mean acceptance of the mandate and its pro-Zionist policy. The organisation's head, Moussa Kazem Al-Husseini, explained that Palestinians would prefer death itself to recognizing the Jewish National Home.[18] Samuel tried in vain to convince the representatives of the wisdom of participating in the vote; abstention would remove them from all channels of influence on legislation and administration. Further, their concerns that the power of the high commissioner would be excessive in view of the number of members which he appointed were overstated. He reassured the representatives that the government was unlikely to decide against the explicit wishes of the majority of the population.[19]

Despite its commitment to power-sharing, the Palestine government vowed not to force the population to vote nor would it prevent promotion of the boycott as long as no physical force was employed to prevent people from voting.[20] The government's handling of the boycott provides an insight into the underlying principles of British rule in Palestine: It knew that forcing participation would not yield a stable political arrangement if the majority of the population was opposed to it and likely to resist it. As will be seen in chapter 5, this stands in clear contrast to French policy in Lebanon, where the Sunni boycott of the

[17] "Minutes of a Meeting between Vaad Leumi Delegation and High Commissioner, February 16th, 1923," in *Political Diaries of the Arab World, 1920-1923* (Archive Editions, 2001), 473–79.
[18] "Letter to the Minister of Foreign Affairs," February 12, 1921 ISA, CS, 15/7-M.
[19] Interestingly, the exact same arguments were used to persuade the Arabs to participate in a much later but practically identical legislative council project, in 1933-1935. A decision taken by an elected Arab delegation could not as easily be ignored in London.
[20] "Minutes of Meeting Executive Committee of the Arab Congress and High Comissioner," February 6, 1923 ISA, AE, 4/2-M.

elections to a constitutional council was prohibited. Participation in the multi-ethnic democratic arrangements was mandatory even though the majority of the population did not consider them as legitimate.

The Palestine government's campaign to counteract the boycott paled in comparison to the strings pulled by the Arab Executive. The Arab boycott was almost complete. After the electoral period, there could be no doubt about the barriers to cooperation between Jews and Arabs in Palestine – no matter which institutional design was adopted, there was no common ground.

Choosing government effectiveness and stability

Initially, the Colonial Office remained committed to its binational vision by insisting that the Palestine government attempt to create a full legislative council despite the appointment of only 82 out of 722 Arab secondary electors.[21] These 82 could have elected all members of the council, even for places like Samaria or Jaffa, where the boycott had almost been complete. In its instructions to the Palestine government, the Colonial Office assured that the existing constitution allowed for such a solution.[22] Thus, had the government been fully committed to a binational legislative in 1923, and disregarded the dangers to long-term political effectiveness, the legislative council could have been created.

However, having much greater local insight, High Commissioner Samuel and the District Governors strongly argued against London's recommendation. Just as they had done with the boycott, they discouraged the creation of unrepresentative institutions that would be viewed as illegitimate by the population. All alternatives that were discussed did not satisfy the Colonial Office's stability requirements; the last thing it wanted to do was

[21] Esco Foundation for Palestine, *Palestine. A Study of Jewish, Arab and British Policies. Volume I*, 288.
[22] Colonial Office, "Letter to Sir H. Samuel," March 29, 1923 ISA, CS, 6/18-M.

to issue new orders-in-council every time an arrangement failed.[23] Instead, a new Order-in-Council was to 'cover all contingencies', enabling Samuel to carry out the administration of the country without a legislative council, if necessary.[24] After failing to reconstitute the advisory council, the country began to be administered by Samuel with the assistance of an executive council composed of appointed British officials only.[25]

The above discussion of the 1923 legislative council elections clearly shows that initial plan of the mandatory was to establish a binational legislative council. In other words, it was to trace the boundaries of the Palestinian *demos* in binational terms. Its strong preference for this plan is apparent in that the mandatory was willing to go to great lengths to ensure the participation of both Jews and Arabs in the process, and even sought possibilities to achieve the establishment of the binational legislative body despite the Arab boycott. However, because Britain was not committed to a particular future vision for Palestine, it remained flexible to change course when the project failed. The mandatory's concern for government effectiveness and stability ultimately trumped its dedication for this project. The considerations surrounding the mechanisms of the council as well as the discussions that followed the failure of the 1923 elections clearly show how important these concerns were in shaping mandatory policy. When faced with the choice of establishing an unstable legislative council or none at all, Britain chose the latter.

[23] Devonshire, "Telegram to the High Commisioner for Palestine," March 14, 1923 ISA, CS, 6/18-M. In a meeting held by the Arab Executive Committee on March 6, 1923, celebrations on the occasion of the failure of the elections was discussed. Herbert Samuel, "Report on the Political Situation in Palestine and Trans-Jordan for the Month of March 1923," in *Political Diaries of the Arab World, 1920-1923*, ed. Robert L. Jarman (London: Archive Editions, 2001), 484. Thus, the mandatory had to avoid declaring 'failure' for as long as it could. Lest its weakness vis-à-vis the Arab majority be laid bare.

[24] Office, "Letter to Sir H. Samuel"; Colonial Office, "Palestine: The Recent Elections," March 28, 1923; Devonshire, "Telegram to the High Commisioner for Palestine"; High Commissioner for Palestine, "Telegram to the Colonial Office," March 12, 1923; High Commissioner for Palestine, "Telegram to the Colonial Office," March 10, 1923. ISA, CS, 6/18-M.

[25] Executive Committee of the Arab Palestine Congress, "Declaration to the Nation by the Executive Committee," in *Political Diaries of the Arab World, 1920-1923*, ed. Robert L. Jarman (London: Archive Editions, 2001), 598.

The expansion of multiethnicity in Lebanon

Once the binational idea had been defeated in Palestine, a window of opportunity opened up for the definition of a Jewish Palestinian *demos*, as will be shown in the next chapter. Laying the bases for partition was therefore an essential step on the road to creating a horizontally divided society in the future state of Israel. In Lebanon, the process was the opposite: By expanding the boundaries of the *demos* through the creation of Greater Lebanon, France created a deeply divided society, thus reducing the likelihood of stateness. As historian Meir Zamir – an expert on the creation of Lebanon –put it:

> If there was one single act which, more than any other, determined the character and development of the Lebanese state, it was undoubtedly the establishment of Greater Lebanon on 1 September 1920 […] This act, which totally violated Muslim aspirations, had far-reaching consequences for the development of Lebanon, whose subsequent history has been dominated by political, social, cultural and economic conflicts between Christians and Muslims. […] It can thus be claimed, that in the very creation of Greater Lebanon were sown the seeds of destruction of the independent Christian entity it was designed to guarantee.[26]

From Mount Lebanon to Greater Lebanon – Territorial and Demographic Changes

It is a mistake to think of today's political arrangement in Lebanon simply as the inevitable result or continuation of the arrangements of the autonomous Mutasarrifiyah of Mount Lebanon. This would remove all responsibility from the mandatory who would merely have retained an existing, then well-functioning system. While it is true that this system, established in 1860, was similarly based on institutionalized ethnic and religious differences, it also presented a clear Maronite majority and, in the decades preceding the

[26] Meir Zamir, "Preface," in *The Formation of Modern Lebanon* (London: Croom Helm, 1985). Philip Khoury also explains that while the economic viability of Lebanon was improved, its political viability was put in danger. Khoury, *Syria and the French Mandate*, 57.

establishment of the mandate, a certain feeling of national belonging common to all inhabitants had developed.[27] The autonomy of Mount Lebanon was a privilege for all, regardless of religious belonging, and they strove to maintain the unique status quo of this quasi-independent entity. When in 1909 a new Ottoman parliament was formed, and the Lebanese were invited to send a representative, a large-scale petition movement revealed how strongly the Lebanese guarded their autonomy. The Lebanese were opposed to any participation in that parliament, viewing it as an encroachment on their collective – almost national – rights.[28]

As table 3 below shows, Mount Lebanon and Greater Lebanon were two completely different entities in terms of their demographic profile. In the province of Mount Lebanon, Maronites made up a majority of the population. When Greater Lebanon was created in 1920, large areas to the East, South and North of Mount Lebanon were annexed to it, including Beirut. The new population distribution had little in common with that of Mount Lebanon. Now the only population group that had supported the creation of the new state, the Maronites, came to form less than a third of the total.

[27] Akarli, *The Long Peace: Ottoman Lebanon, 1861-1920*, 1; Kewenig, *Die Koexistenz Der Religionsgemeinschaften Im Libanon*, 62.
[28] Carol Hakim, *The Origins of the Lebanese National Idea: 1840-1920* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2013), 214.

Table 3: Demography of Mount Lebanon and Greater Lebanon:[29]

Community	Mount Lebanon	Greater Lebanon
Maronites	58.3%	28.7%
Druses	11.3%	6.7%
Greek Orthodox	12.5%	9.7%
Sunnis	3.6%	22.5%
Shias	5.8%	19.5%
Total population	415,000	782,000

Taken together with other Christian minorities (e.g. Armenians) not included in the table, this brought the total percentage of Christians to 50%. However, in terms of how this impacted the nature of deep divisions within the country, this proved inconsequential as the Greek Orthodox did not share the Maronite vision of the state. Rather, they tended to support the Pan-Arabist or Syrianist vision.[30]

A disruptive change was effected to the *demos*: It was no longer a mixture of religious groups with a shared proto-national identity and with an interest in cooperating for the sake of autonomy cum independence. Rather, it became a conglomeration of competing visions of the state striving to achieve incompatible political objectives. A comparison of the two maps below shows how disruptive the change was.

[29] Youssef Courbage, "La Terrible Famine Du Mont-Liban," *L'Histoire* 66 (2016); Rania Maktabi, "The Lebanese Census of 1932 Revisited. Who Are the Lebanese?," *British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies* 26, no. 2 (1999): 219–41.
[30] Maktabi, "The Lebanese Census of 1932 Revisited. Who Are the Lebanese?"

Map 1: Administrative divisions of the Ottoman Empire[31]



[31] R. Huber, "Empire Ottoman. Division Administrative 1/1 500 000 Dressé d'après Le Salnamé de 1899/1317" (Bibliothèque nationale de France, 1899).

Map 2: Greater Lebanon used in 1920[32]



[32] L.A. Blondel, "Carte Du Liban : D'après Les Reconnaissances de La Brigade Topographique Du Corps Expéditionnaire de Syrie En 1860-1861" (Huntington Digital Library, 1862).

Map 1 shows the administrative divisions of the Ottoman Empire, with Mount Lebanon highlighted with orange coloured lines. This is the only territory in which the Maronites formed the majority of the population. The city of Beirut is a separate sanjak, belonging to the vilayet of Beirut, marked with yellow-coloured lines, and includes territories to the north and to the south of Mount Lebanon. The territories to the East of the Mount belong to the vilayet of Damascus.[33] Map 2 was drawn up in 1860-1861 by a French military expedition to Lebanon, but did not find expression in the political arrangement set up at that time. It was used by the Lebanese delegation to the Paris Peace Conference to argue its case and formed the basis of the proclamation of Greater Lebanon in 1920. Mount Lebanon is drawn in red lines on this map. The territories surrounding it, which were annexed in 1920, coincide with the former vilayets of Beirut and Damascus.

When General Gouraud proclaimed Greater Lebanon on September 1st, 1920, he explained that 'before determining the boundaries [of Lebanon], I consulted the populations and can say that […] I have only satisfied the freely expressed wishes of the populations and served their legitimate interests.'[34] This declaration echoed earlier assertions that when he toured parts of the country to be attached, 'the enthusiasm was generalized.'[35] These overall impressions – which likely served to bolster French public support for the creation of Greater Lebanon – ignored the fact that only the inhabitants of Mount Lebanon proper had issued petitions in support of an independent Lebanon. By the time a census was taken in 1932, the population of Greater Lebanon was almost twice as large as that of Mount Lebanon: As table 1 showed, instead of 415,000 inhabitants, it now had 782,000.[36]

[33] R. Huber, "Empire Ottoman. Division Administrative 1/1 500 000 Dressé d'après Le Salnamé de 1899/1317."
[34] Benjamin Beede et al., *Independence Documents of the World* (Leiden: Oceana, 1977), 418 [French, own translation].
[35] "Dépêche Du General Gouraud à M Chekri Ganem," *Correspondance D'Orient* 13, no. 249–250 (1920): 316. [French]
[36] Meir Zamir, *The Formation of Modern Lebanon* (London: Croom Helm, 1985), 98.

According to the King-Crane commission's conclusions, the bulk of the population that had now been added opposed the creation of the state they were now forced to be part of.[37]

Despite rhetoric to the contrary, there is no doubt that the French authorities knew the dangers inherent in extending Mount Lebanon to include such a large number of Muslims with strong ties to Syria. By creating a new state with such a level of diversity and competing visions of the state, France built in a factor that could not but destabilize the state from the outset. The remainder of this chapter will analyse why the French authorities made this choice instead of creating a smaller, more homogenous Lebanon.

Promoting fragmentation and instability

Of course, Greater Lebanon was not only France's brainchild. As early as 1919, long before Gouraud proclaimed Greater Lebanon, a delegation of the Administrative Council of Mount Lebanon demanded the extension of Lebanon's territory to its 'historical and geographic limits and in conformity with its economic needs'.[38] The very same formula was supported by the Comité Libanais de Paris, an influential pressure group, in January 1919.[39] The scholarly consensus traces this formula back to Henri Lammens, a Jesuit priest of Beirut, who in 1902 published an article in which he analysed solutions to the economic problems of Mount Lebanon. The population growth of Mount Lebanon, he reckoned, needed to be accompanied by an expansion of its territory. According to Lammens, the country's natural boundaries included Beirut, Saida and Tripoli, parts of the Bekaa valley, and the Akkar district.[40]

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[37] "Summarized Statement of Significant Conclusions from the Petitions," 1919, Donald M Brodie Miscellaneous Papers, Box 1, O.C.A.

[38] "La Délégation Libanaise," *Correspondance D'Orient* 206, no. 12 (1919): 85–87 [French, own translation]. For the full text of an Administrative Council decision of July 1920 summing up its demands, see "Un Document Historique," *L'Asie Arabe*, August 30, 1920.

[39] Khairallah Khairallah, *Le Problème Du Levant. Les Régions Arabes Libérées, Syrie – Irak – Liban. Lettre Ouverte à La Société de Nations* (Paris: Editions Ernest Leroux, 1919).

[40] Hakim, *The Origins of the Lebanese National Idea: 1840-1920*, 184.

These revindications of Lammens resurfaced in the more prominent work of M. Jouplain, which was published in 1908, and which prefaced the demands of the 1919 Lebanese Administrative Council delegation. In the conclusion of his sweeping review of the history of Lebanon, Jouplain explains that the most urgently needed solution to Mount Lebanon's problems is the expansion of its territory to include 'Beirut and the fertile Bekaa, then the Bilad-Bishara, Akkar, Houleh and Marjayoun.'[41] Note that this would have included regions, such as the Houleh, which are in modern Syria – thus going beyond the borders of the Greater Lebanon that was eventually established by France. Emboldened by these intellectual productions as well as a map produced by France in 1860 (Map 2 above), when a first attempt at expanding Mount Lebanon's borders failed, the Administrative Council sent its representation to the Paris Peace Conference.[42]

This view, however official, was by no means that of the majority. Or at least, it had not yet been ascertained whether a majority of the people inhabiting the areas that were proposed for annexation were on board with the plan. Daniel Bliss, director of the Syrian Protestant College (now the American University of Beirut), thus demanded the launch of a commission of inquiry, saying

> I did hear more or less of a list of names that was being made up attached to various petitions in favour of this or that programme, but although in a position to hear of any official or thorough or systematic general plan to ascertain the wishes of the people, no such report came to my knowledge.[43]

[41] M. Jouplain, *La Question Du Liban. Étude d'Histoire Diplomatique et de Droit International* (Paris: S.N., 1961), 545 [French, own translation].
[42] Further information about the delegation's demands has been provided in previous chapters. Report of the delegation and its demands can be found in "Dans Le Levant, Déclarations Du Patriarche Maronite"; "Les Revendications Libanaises," *Le Temps*, October 8, 1919.
[43] Paris Peace Conference, "Secretary's Notes of a Conversation Held in M. Pinchon's Room at the Quai d'Orsay, Paris," *Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, Paris Peace Conference, Vol III*, February 19, 1919 Paris , Peace Conference, 180.03101/38.

From the context in which his demand was made, it is clear that his intervention was a reaction to the debate between Lebanism and Syrianism in the Council of Ten of the Paris Peace Conference, motivated by the potential difficulties of uniting a large number of different religious groups in a single political entity. When Lebanon came up for discussion in the Council of Ten of the Paris Peace Conference, Syrian nationalists, represented by King Faisal, were opposed as the alternative to the fragmentation of the Levant, with no indication as to which option would be more viable. The issue of Greater Lebanon was thus in flux during the Paris Peace Conference and was not the inevitable response to a popular movement or the continuation of a path-dependent phase inaugurated in 1860.

As different options were being weighed, analysts and politicians from all sides expressed concerns about the creation of a Greater Lebanon. Writing on the bottom of a telegram from the Foreign Office about a letter from the pressure group Alliance Libanaise of Cairo to Lloyd George, historian Arnold Toynbee commented:

> The proposal to create an economically self-sufficient Lebanon with enlarged frontiers is not feasible. The adjacent territories are solidly Moslem, and would either refuse to be included, or, if included by force, would outnumber the Christian Lebanese and vote the union of Lebanon with Syria.[44]

The very resolution of the Lebanese Administrative Council demanding an enlarged independent Lebanon, was, according to Toynbee,

> Another example of French propaganda […] in order to return to the boundaries […] which the powers [ignored] owing to alleged Turkish intrigue in setting up the autonomous Lebanon in 1861.[45]

[44] Arnold J. Toynbee, "Comment, Telegram from Foreign Office, 'Future of Lebanon,'" February 3, 1919, FO 608/96/4.
[45] Arnold J. Toynbee, "Comment, Telegram from Administrative Council of Lebanon," January 24, 1919 , FO 608/96/4.

For the British, then, the French were determined to create the Greater Lebanon that they had not been allowed to establish sixty years prior. Propaganda in the French press for the Maronite version of Greater Lebanon that the Administrative Council represented seemed to provide ample evidence for this view.[46]

This version of events, however, ignored the ambivalence which prevailed in French media and politics surrounding the future of Lebanon. As historian Meir Zamir explained, at the time of the Sykes-Picot-Accord of 1916, which split the Middle East into British and French areas of influence, 'French decision makers had not necessarily envisaged the creation of an independent Christian Greater Lebanon.'[47] Around the same time as Arnold Toynbee wrote his scathing criticism of French policy in Lebanon, a member of the French Chamber of Deputies launched an attack on the French Minister of Foreign Affairs, Stephen Pinchon:

> This is the misfortune, that we don't know [the policy]. This is the weakness of your policy. What! You are speaking in the name of France? But which thesis do you support? Which policy do you follow […] when it comes to Syria?[48]

The French government, it turned out, had no definite plan for the territory's political future. Indeed, at the outbreak of the First World War, the colonial party – a series of pressure groups interested in French colonial expansion – envisioned dominating rather than partitioning the territories of the Ottoman Empire. Later on, its preference was for 'la Syrie intégrale', i.e. a united Syria. [49]

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[46] Articles in the French newspaper *Le Temps,* for instance, were strongly biased towards Lebanism in 1919 and 1920.
[47] Zamir, *Form. Mod. Lebanon*, 41.
[48] "2° Séance Du 26 Mars 1919," *Journal Officiel de La République Française. Débats Parlementaires. Chambre Des Députés*, 1919 [French, own translation]. Original text: C'est là le malheur, que nous ne la connaissions pas. C'est la faiblesse de votre politique. Quoi ! Vous allez parler au nom de la France ? Mais quelle thèse soutenez-vous ? Quelle politique suivez-vous […] sur la question de la Syrie.
[49] Andrew and Kanya-Forstner, "The French Colonial Party and French Colonial War Aims, 1914-1918," 80; 83; Khoury, *Syria and the French Mandate*, 38.

At the same time as the Lebanese Delegation to the Peace Conference and its head, Maronite Patriarch Hoyek, were pressing for Lebanese expansion and independence, King Faisal's Syrian nationalism was gaining traction. In May 1919, Faisal received full powers from a host of Syrian notables at a gathering in which he advocated an Arab union with separate governments for Syria, Iraq and the Hedjaz. This gave him no new official standing, but it was proof of his popularity at the time.[50] French Premier George Clemenceau was reluctant to put the alliance with Britain in jeopardy solely to satisfy minority demands for a Greater Lebanon. In a letter co-signed by Clemenceau himself, Minister of Foreign Affairs Pinchon explains the rationale of entering into negotiations with Faisal:

> The English have accepted Faisal as the qualified representative of the Arabs for the Peace Conference, and have demanded that we instantly negotiate with him. Could we either remove him or play our cards under his cover? The latter solution protects us against all accusations from our allies; this is the one that I choose.[51]

Premier Minister Clemenceau responded in a similar vein to a military commander who had urged him to ignore the accords which he had negotiated with King Faisal and occupy the Bekaa Valley immediately, stating that the commander's views were excessively focused on local politics and left the big picture out of sight. Only the accord with the British guaranteed France 'an incontestable right in Syria', and this accord in turn depended on a British promise to King Hussein and his son Faisal.[52]

[50] "Cornwallis to Clayton," *Eastern Affairs. Further Correspondence. Part II*, May 16, 1919, 107.
[51] Pinchon, "Pinchon to Gouraud" üFrench, own translation] SDH, GR 1 K 247 14. Original text: « Les Anglais ont fait accepter Faysal par la Conférence de la paix comme le représentant qualifie des Arabes, et nous ont demandé instamment de nous entendre avec lui. Pourrions-nous soit l'écarter, soit jouer la partie sous son couvert ? Cette dernière solution nous assurerait contre toute contestation de nos allies ; c'est celle que je choisis. »
[52] Clemenceau, "Clemenceau to A.F.L. Commander in Chief" CADN, Syrie-Liban, 363. [French].

Maronite demands could simply not be met under these circumstances. The accord had guarded the promise of Lebanese independence which had been publicly confirmed by a letter from Clemenceau to Maronite patriarch Hoyek[53], but it envisioned a much more limited territorial entity. The Bekaa Valley, in particular, which had been part of all plans for the expansion of Mount Lebanon due to its fertile agricultural land, was removed from French influence in the Faisal-Clemenceau-Agreement in return for Faisal's support of French influence in Syria and Lebanon. From the viewpoint of Paris, then, the idea of Greater Lebanon was by no means set in stone. Considering the creation of Greater Lebanon a natural result of the French-Maronite alliance, as if 'the High Commision had become an appendix of the Patriarch'[54], is thus misleading. Rather, there were several possible outcomes, with Greater Lebanon being only one of them.

If neither the majority of the people nor the mandatory was committed to Greater Lebanon, why was this minority vision implemented? Perhaps the two most important figures in deciding the fate of Lebanon were General Gouraud, High Commissioner of Syria and Lebanon between 1919 and 1923, and Robert de Caix, advisor to the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs and secretary general of the High Commissioner during the same period.[55] Robert de Caix was strongly opposed to Gouraud's decision to overextend Lebanon's territory, and decried what he called 'Lebanese megalomania'.[56] He was not,

[53] Clemenceau promised in his letter from November 1919, that the Lebanese will have independence in a territory that will be determined after the mandate of Syria is attributed to France, and that the latter will take care that the Mountain receives the necessary territories to access to the territories of the Bekaa and the sea in order to ensure its prosperity. "Constitution Libanaise. Historique.," n.d. CADN, Syrie-Liban, 452 [French].

[54] Unknown, "Notes Sur La Syrie," n.d. CADN, Syrie-Liban, 363. [French, own translation]. Original text: "Le Haut Commisariat etait devenu une annexe du patriarche"

[55] De Caix was subsequently nominated as the French delegate to the permanent mandates commission of the League of Nations between 1924 and 1939.

[56] Zamir, *Form. Mod. Lebanon*, 76–77. An example of a writing of De Caix expressing his regrets over the overextension of Lebanese territory is, Robert De Caix, "L'Organisation Donnée a La Syrie et Au Liban. De 1920 à 1923 et La Crise Actuelle," *Gérard Khoury, Une Tutelle Coloniale : Le Mandat Français En Syrie et Au Liban : Écrits Politiques de Robert de Caix*, n.d., 334–441 [French].

however, able to override the High Commissioner, whom he considered to be a man of little imagination, lost in the detail and unable to understand the big political picture.[57] Even though his concrete plans for Syria and Lebanon were never implemented, his advice on the region sheds light on the prevailing rationale in French foreign policy circles and thus on the decision-making process in the Middle East during the mandate period.

According to historian Gérard Khoury, who had access to De Caix's papers, his philosophy regarding the Middle East was that, contrary to the Maghreb, these countries were not to be administered directly nor through majority rule. Government here was to be based on minorities in order to fortify French influence, particularly through extended use of the French language.[58] In his notes about French policy towards Faisal, of which he was put in charge in April 1919, De Caix explains the result for his country in vivid words:

> Thus organised, Syria will […] become like a stained-glass window whose lead is French. We should strive to implement this compartmentalised organisation: 1. Because it responds to the nature of a country […] which is better suited for cantonal frameworks than for a large state; 2. Because a Syria organised like a series of Swiss cantons is an excellent filter against indigenous nationalism […] which puts into jeopardy the work of European powers everywhere; 3. Because […] it is from an African vantage point that we have to consider all our policy in the East.[59]

[57] Caix, "De Caix to Berthelot," 297 [French].
[58] Khoury, *Une Tutelle Coloniale : Le Mandat Français En Syrie et Au Liban : Écrits Politiques de Robert de Caix*, 29.
[59] Robert De Caix, "Note Sur La Politique de l'Accord Avec Faysal," *Gérard Khoury, Une Tutelle Coloniale : Le Mandat Français En Syrie et Au Liban : Écrits Politiques de Robert de Caix*, January 26, 1920, 201–2 [French, own translation]. Original Text : Ainsi organisée la Syrie devait, pensant un certain nombre d'annees au moins, être comme un vitrail dont le plomb serait francais. Nous devions tendre à lui donner cette organisation compartimentée : 1. Parce qu'elle répondait aux dispositions d'un pays qui n'a aucune education civique et politique et qui peut beaucoup mieux se former dans une série de cadres cantonaux que dans le cadre d'un grand Etat. 2. Parce que cette Syrie organisee comme une série de cantons suisses, ferait un filtre excellent contre ce nationalisme indigène, qui tend à se constituer partout et à compromettre l'œuvre des puissances européennes dans tous les pays d'outre-mer. 3. Parce que par la même ce pays oriental de langue arabe (manque quelques mots) … de l'Afrique du Nord, région qui présente pour nous un intérêt si capital que c'est pour ainsi dire à travers un verre africain que nous devons considérer toute notre politique en Orient.

Thus, his reasoning for partitioning Syria was entirely self-serving and independent of the French-Maronite alliance. France needed to ensure its influence in Syria and North Africa. King Faisal's Syrian nationalism was a threat to its position in both arenas, and its defeat could best be guaranteed by emboldening local nationalisms, and Lebanism was one of them. In the quote reproduced above, De Caix paid lip service to 'the nature of the country', but elsewhere he explained that

> In this country without political traditions […] Sheriffianism is *as artificial as the diverse autonomies that we are hoping to create*. The difference between the former and the latter is that the former is ill-suited to maintaining our influence in the Levant.[60]

And he explained it perhaps even more clearly in a letter written shortly after the creation of Greater Lebanon:

> There are two courses of action in Syria: The first is trying to create a Syrian nation which doesn't yet exist, and which renders it as homogenous as possible in that it strives to roll over the lines of cleavage as much as possible […]. The second consists of getting the country up and running as much as possible but taking care to cultivate and maintain all the reasons for arbitration which these divisions allow the mandatory power. I have to tell you that I am only interested in the latter.[61]

[60] Robert De Caix, "De Caix to Kammerer," *Gérard Khoury, Une Tutelle Coloniale : Le Mandat Français En Syrie et Au Liban : Écrits Politiques de Robert de Caix*, April 11, 1920, 232 [French, own translation. Own emphasis]. Original text: Dans ce pays sans traditions politiques, sans union et sans opinion publique réelle, le chérifianisme est tout aussi artificiel que les diverses autonomies que nous voulons constituer. La différence entre lui et elles, c'est qu'il s'accommode fort mal du maintien de notre influence dans le Levant, et même de la paix dans toutes ces régions.

[61] Robert De Caix, "De Caix to Kammerer," *Gérard Khoury, Une Tutelle Coloniale : Le Mandat Français En Syrie et Au Liban : Écrits Politiques de Robert de Caix*, February 28, 1921, 315 [French, own translation]. Original text : Il y a deux manières de considérer notre action en Syrie: la première consiste à chercher à construire une nation syrienne qui n'existe pas encore et que l'on rendrait aussi homogène que possible en s'efforçant de passer le rouleau sur les lignes de clivage qui la divisent encore. La seconde consiste à mettre debout ce pays aussi bien que possible, mais en ayant soin d'y cultiver et d'y maintenir toutes les raisons d'arbitrage que ses divisions donnent à la puissance mandataire. Je dois vous dire que seule la seconde m'intéresse.

It becomes clear that he insisted on a division of these territories into multiple states, which he emphasized was no more natural than Faysal's Arabism. Once this mosaic had been created, only France would hold it together; it would be 'the lead in the stained-glass window'. Far from trying to create stable, long-lasting states in the Middle East, France knew that it was creating an unstable mosaic of states that would not be able to hold without its assistance. That he considered Syrian national unity an equally plausible outcome is clear from his warning that the inclusion of Lebanon in a Syrian federation would ultimately result in an assimilation of the Christians into the dominant culture, which in turn would leave the French without an ally.[62] Thus, the French did not discount or overlook affinities which could encourage collective action[63]; they knew of their existence and actively sought to prevent them from flourishing.

In harmony with the picture of a stained-glass window, Robert de Caix wanted each section of that window to be of a single colour, as far as possible. That is, he recommended external heterogeneity but internal homogeneity. As a result, he advocated for a Lebanon with as much of a Christian majority as possible, or a horizontally divided society. Pointing out that the Maronite clergy itself was opposed to the incorporation of areas with large Muslim elements that could counter Maronite majority, he recommended the annexation of regions with large Christian majorities. The exception was the Bekaa valley whose annexation he recommended despite its Muslim majority as he did not expect this population to resist annexation.

Moreover, its annexation to Lebanon would facilitate the dismemberment of the Sheriffian state. As for Tripoli, Beirut and Saida, De Caix discouraged their incorporation

[62] Ibid., 316 [French].
[63] Khoury, *Syria and the French Mandate*.

on the grounds that the population would resist such annexation sooner or later.[64] General Gouraud, the engineer of Greater Lebanon, followed De Caix's recommendation of division and instability over unity and stability. What Gouraud did not follow, was the recommendation to retain as much of an internal homogeneity as possible, and as much of a Christian predominance in Lebanon as possible.[65] Unfortunately, scholarly literature on the creation of modern Lebanon and the main biographical works of the French leadership involved in its creation are moot on the reasoning behind the expansion of Lebanon's borders against all odds.

From the above, it seems clear that the choice of creating an independent Lebanon, separate from Syria, was motivated by a combination of factors. First of all, France needed to prevent the triumph of Arab nationalism through the creation of an all-encompassing Greater Syria. Secondly, a Lebanon dominated by Christians who owed the very existence of the state to France would be perpetually indebted to France.[66] Thirdly, Mount Lebanon was not economically viable; it needed access to the sea and fertile agricultural land.

Why Greater Lebanon was created with its current borders despite overwhelming arguments against it from French and Lebanese leaders alike is a much more difficult question to answer. A review of government documents, newspaper articles and biographical documentation points at personal agency, as if Gouraud had taken this

[64] Robert De Caix, "Esquisse de l'Organisation de La Syrie Sous Le Mandat Français. Note de M de Caix Du 17 Juliet 1920," *Gérard Khoury, Une Tutelle Coloniale : Le Mandat Français En Syrie et Au Liban : Écrits Politiques de Robert de Caix*, July 17, 1920, 256–61 [French].

[65] It should be noted that even though De Caix did not favour the expansion of Lebanon that was effected in 1920, he saw an advantage in it later on, inasmuch as the dilution of the Christian majority would sooner or later provoke a Christian reaction, pushing them to Westernize further and strive to increasingly adopt French culture. Caix, "De Caix to Kammerer," February 28, 1921, 315 [French].

[66] In a letter to Maronite patriarch Hoyek in response to the latter's complaint that France is betraying the Lebanese cause by attempting to establish an economic federation with Syria, Gouraud provided an example of these arguments: How could they doubt French benevolence? After all, they had been able to double their territory without shedding a drop of non-French blood. Gouraud, *Le General Henri Gouraud Au Liban et En Syrie, 1919-1923*, 128 [French, own translation]. Original text: Par une chance inespérée, votre territoire est double sans qu'une goutte de sang n'ait été verse si ce n'est le sang français.

decision by himself. At the same time, however, there seems to have been a clear shift in French policy: Just a few days before Gouraud announced the creation of Greater Lebanon, Prime Minister Alexandre Millerand issued a letter to the president of the Lebanese delegation to the Peace Conference, Abdallah Khoury, promising French support for the 'natural borders of Greater Lebanon'.[67] This was an adoption of a version of Lammens' and Jouplain's romantic national narrative.

It clearly contrasted with the more moderate promise made by Millerand's predecessor, Clemenceau, in November 1919. According to the latter, Lebanon would receive independence, and France would make sure that the Mountain has access to the territories of the plain (Bekaa) and full access to the sea as needed for its prosperity.[68] One newspaper report also took pains to deny that Gouraud had gone it alone. The general, the report insisted, had taken his decisions in full accord with the government.[69] As chapter 3 explained, once the accord with Faisal had failed, Millerand turned to Gouraud for advice, citing his inability to provide major guidance on the matter of Syria. Shortly after his request, Gouraud provided suggestions for the partition of Syria that would maximize French authority by balancing out existing rivalries. If the attachment of the first territories to Mount Lebanon are any indication, Gouraud had broad freedoms in formulating policy in Syria: He announced the attachment the day after he had first suggested this move to Paris.[70]

Moreover, just two weeks before proclaiming Greater Lebanon, Gouraud asked for the government's authority to proclaim the state, including the annexation of Tripoli and

[67] "Une Lettre de M Millerand Au Président de La Délégation Libanaise," *Le Temps*, September 2, 1920 [French].
[68] Gouraud, *Le General Henri Gouraud Au Liban et En Syrie, 1919-1923*, 36 [French].
[69] "L'Organisation Civile de La Syrie," *Le Temps*, December 24, 1920 [French].
[70] "Gouraud to Diplomatie Paris," August 5, 1920 SHD, GR 1 K 247 15 .

Beirut. The government had initially suggested that these two cities be created as independent municipalities, like De Caix had urged. Gouraud, on the other hand, reasoned that Tripoli and Beirut would be vulnerable to the religious and political attraction of the Syrian interior if they were not attached to Lebanon.[71] Maintaining a strong French foothold by denying the triumph of Arab nationalism was essential. Clearly, then, Gouraud's vision of the Middle East and his goal of dividing the population to maximize French control was indeed instrumental in determining French policy as regards the creation of Greater Lebanon. In any case, Millerand was a staunch nationalist and more positively inclined toward the French colonial party than his predecessor. Gouraud's views thus found an open ear with the new government in Paris.[72]

Some scholars believe that Maronite pressure played a decisive role.[73] It is true that shortly before Lebanon was created, the administrative council of Lebanon and the Maronite church exercised considerable pressure on the French government. Shortly before the fall of Faisal's government in Damascus, the Lebanese delegation in Paris announced that it was not leaving before the Lebanese boundaries were determined.[74] During the summer of 1920, there was a flurry of activity in Mount Lebanon, with letters reaching General Gouraud that proclaimed Lebanese attachment to France and request for the country's independence.[75] Just a few weeks after this exchange of letters, Gouraud announced the attachment of Baalbek, the Bekaa, Rechaya and Hesbaya to Mount Lebanon.

[71] "Gouraud to Diplomatie Paris," August 12, 1920 SHD, GR 1 K 247 15 .
[72] Khoury, *Syria and the French Mandate*, 39.
[73] Meir Zamir, "Smaller and Greater Lebanon - The Squaring of a Circle?," *Jerusalem Quarterly*, no. 23 (1982): 37; Kaufman, *Reviving Phoenicia: The Search for Idenity in Lebanon*, 15.
[74] "Gouraud to Diplomatie Paris," May 1, 1920 SHD, GR 1 K 247 15 .
[75] "Gouraud to Diplomatie Paris," July 12, 1920; "Gouraud to Diplomatie Paris," July 13, 1920; "Gouraud to Diplomatie Paris," July 14, 1920 SHD, GR 1 K 247 15 .

It would thus seem as if Maronite pressure was the immediate cause of this decision and, by extension, the creation of Greater Lebanon.

This explanation ignores the fact that the Maronite leadership itself opposed the annexation of large Muslim majority areas, the Shiite south in particular.[76] Moreover, it does not provide a satisfactory justification as to why neither the French nor the Maronites took the risks inherent in such a move seriously. Moreover, it fails to explain why the French were prepared to sacrifice Maronite support when Clemenceau negotiated with Faysal. A more plausible explanation is that the breakdown of the accord with Faysal highlighted how fickle Muslim Arab support was and how much France needed Maronite support in the region. Thus, rather than creating Greater Lebanon in response to Maronite pressure, it seems plausible that the factors which determined the dismemberment of Syria also determined the fate of Lebanon.

By the time the state of Greater Lebanon was proclaimed, Faysal had been deposed and a French backed government had been established in Damascus. Syrianism, however, was larger than Faysal. By annexing territories to Lebanon that were claimed by Syria, the French could pose a further obstacle to Syrian nationalism. Moreover, if the Christians felt permanently threatened by the spectre of Muslim domination, they would turn westward. As Lebanese commentator George Samné wrote shortly after the creation of the state: 'Greater Lebanon is submerged in complete confusion. In practice, the sole authority that can be imposed is that of the High Commissioner'.[77] Moreover, the Christians would need to turn to the French language and culture to survive as an ethnic group, thus reproducing French influence in the region, as De Caix had predicted. Even though Millerand's and Gouraud's reasons for the creation of Greater Lebanon with its current borders cannot be

[76] "Millerand to Gouraud," August 6, 1920 [French] SHD, GR 1 K 247 15.
[77] George Samne, "L'Orient Terre d'Islam," *Correspondance D'Orient* 14, no. 263–264 (1921): 485.

ascertained for certain, the overall process points to the objective of fragmenting the country to sow the seeds of perpetual instability. In sum, French policy was tantamount to 'arranging disorder'.[78]

By redefining the Lebanese *demos,* the French had upset a communal balance that had existed since 1860 and beyond. The time of the Mutasarrifiyah had been, as historian Engin Akarli dubbed it, 'the long peace'.[79] It follows that problems stemming from deep divisions experienced in modern Lebanon cannot solely be blamed on age-old hatreds that preceded the mandate period and had been institutionalized during the Ottoman Empire. Indeed, the territory of Mount Lebanon had been at peace for most of its history, despite its diversity, with the sole exception of short civil wars in 1840 and 1860.[80] The Lebanese of 'small Lebanon' had established a stable system and had begun fostering a dominant vision of the state. It was only with the expansion of this territory that the system lost its balance.

Conclusion

The first steps in defining the deep divisions that the political systems of the Yishuv and Lebanon had to manage were taken in 1923 and 1920, respectively. By choosing to abandon the binational project, Britain opened a window of opportunity for the political development of the Yishuv. France created a vertically divided society which likewise constrained the institutional mechanisms at its disposal. Colonial imperatives were crucial for this outcome. Britain was not committed to a specific policy in Palestine, aside from its unconditional support for the creation of an ill-defined Jewish National Home. While it expressed a preference for a binational arrangement, it was uncommitted and able to change course when it became clear that such an arrangement would lead to governmental

[78] "Liban et Syrie," *Le Temps*, February 1, 1919.
[79] Akarli, *The Long Peace: Ottoman Lebanon, 1861-1920*.
[80] Fawaz, *An Occasion for War: Civil Conflict in Lebanon and Damascus in 1860*, 218.

ineffectiveness and instability. Although it similarly lacked an established political strategy for the region, France had strong pre-defined interests in Syria, as chapter 3 of this dissertation showed. It was in the region to perpetuate its long-term influence and given the majority's hostility to French influence, it had to disempower the majority. Its rule would be based on supporting minorities who, constantly threatened by the majority, would resort to France's protection. The next chapter will show how the definition of the *demos* and the colonial imperatives discussed in this chapter impacted subsequent institutional designs.

CHAPTER 5
INSTITUTIONALIZING IDENTITY: CONTROL VERSUS CONSOCIATIONALISM IN THE YISHUV AND LEBANON

Once the boundaries of the political entities within which the mandates were to develop had been decided, the mandatory powers could begin with the internal state-building process. While both powers retained a large contingent of colonial agents – and Britain even ruled Palestine directly until the end of the mandate – they also developed the democratic decision-making bodies that were to form the bases of both countries' modern parliamentary systems. As chapter 2 showed, both the Yishuv and Lebanese society were deeply divided along ethnic, religious and social lines. Thus, both mandatory powers were confronted with similar nation-building questions during the process of institutional design.

This chapter will analyse the institutionalization of identity in the Yishuv and in Greater Lebanon. Just as the British discussion about a binational legislative council was dominated by a concern for viability, so were its considerations regarding the internal development of the Yishuv. France, on the other hand, was once again driven by its concern to perpetuate its presence in Lebanon through its Maronite ally, now in the minority. To illustrate these policies, the first section of this chapter will discuss how the mandatory laid the basis for a control system to manage diversity, and thus a horizontally divided society, by creating a single Jewish political entity in Palestine. The second section will discuss how the French contributed to the development of a vertically divided society through their electoral system in Lebanon. Both decisions were instrumental in determining the impact of ethnic diversity on the political system of Israel and Lebanon in the long term.

Laying the Foundations for Partition: The Creation of a Single Jewish Community Organisation

Contrary to assertions that the State of Israel was the result of a deliberate British effort at building a Jewish state in Palestine, the emergence of a strong Jewish proto-state entity in mandate Palestine was an unintended consequence of what has been called a 'wait-and-see' policy elsewhere in this thesis. Indeed, far from seeking to establish a strong, monoethnic Jewish state, the mandatory never let go of its misplaced faith in the binational idea. On several occasions, the British government uttered proposals for a new constitution, with a legislative body akin to that proposed by Churchill in 1922 (chapter 4). Despite clear evidence to the contrary, and a stiffening of both the Arab and the Jewish positions, the mandatory dropped one proposal just to replace it with the next. Even the Peel Commission Report of 1937 did nothing to shake the British faith in a binational Palestine[1], and after the United Nations approved its 1947 Partition Plan, the mandatory continued to favour a federated binational state.[2] Yet, even though partition – and thus the creation of the State of Israel – was not the result of British grand strategy, it was the indirect result of mandatory policy. Following 1923, the British led a policy of Jewish unity and in providing the framework conditions for the development of Jewish institutions, their policies were instrumental in reducing centrifugal tendencies within the Yishuv.[3] The first step that

[1] For a history of the British plans for the partition of Palestine, see Penny Sinanoglou, "British Plans for the Partition of Palestine, 1929-1938," *The Historical Journal* 52, no. 1 (2009): 131–52.
[2] Ilan Pappé, *The Making of the Arab-Israeli Conflict 1947-1951* (London: I.B. Tauris, 2006), 32–33.
[3] Tim Sontheimer, "Bringing the British Back in: Sephardim, Ashkenazi Anti-Zionist Orthodox and the Policy of Jewish Unity," *Middle Eastern Studies* 52, no. 2 (2016): 165–81, http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/00263206.2015.1084295; Joel Migdal, "Laying the Basis for a Strong State: The British and Zionists in Palestine," in *Through the Lens of Israel: Explorations in State and Society* (New York: State University of New York Press, 2001).

favoured the emergence of a strong Jewish entity was shelving bi-nationalism *sine die*; the second step was the unification of the Jewish community.

Had the mandatory enforced the 1922 constitution despite the failed elections – whether by preventing the boycott, by encouraging participation more forcefully or by establishing a legislative council single-handedly on the basis of some of the alternatives discussed in the previous chapter – the country would have had a binational institutional structure. While we will never know what the political consequences would have been, it is unlikely that Jewish community institutions would have developed in the same manner under these conditions. The most likely outcome would have been a council unable to effectively govern due to the effective communal veto institutionalized by the 1922 constitution. The High Commissioner and his appointees would have held the key to breaking the veto. However, given the need to pacify the country and assuage Arab fears, Arab opposition to the development of the Jewish community would probably have overridden any concessions in this regard. Successive British White Papers limiting Jewish immigration make such a conclusion plausible. As a result, the decision to shelve the legislative council proposal in 1923 – as discussed in chapter 4 – was truly a critical juncture for the development of the Yishuv and the State of Israel. The following section is dedicated to the analysis of the next critical juncture, the centralization of power within the Jewish community.

An opportunity opens up for the Yishuv's self-governing institutions

Not only was the ultimate political form that Palestine would take an undecided matter for the mandatory. The representatives of the Zionist Organisation and those of the Yishuv had no clearer a vision of Palestine's future: Arab domination was to be avoided, and opportunities for the immigration of larger numbers of Jews into Palestine had to be created,

but there was no agreement on the ultimate political form the Jewish community of Palestine would take. What was clear, however, is that the failure of the legislative council elections opened a window of opportunity for the development of the Jewish community of Palestine.

Despite vigorous Jewish participation in the 1923 elections, the community considered the project's failure at the hands of the Arab boycott a resounding success. They knew that their only chance of furthering Zionism lay either in British tutelage or national self-government with a sizeable Jewish population. They did not support democracy for its own sake and believed that the time had not yet come to establish a Palestine-wide democratic system. In the words of the Palestinian commissioner for migration, Albert Hyamson, 'the Zionists […] were never enamoured of any sort of democratic government unless they were in an assured majority.'[4] At the same time, Jewish domination over Arabs in Palestine was not widely advocated in international Zionist circles and, indeed, as we shall see in chapter 6, the very concept of it split the Zionist movement in the 1930s. Whether only in rhetoric or out of conviction, also the most prominent Zionist leaders expressed hopes for a binational arrangement at the beginning of the civil administration in Palestine.[5]

The local Palestinian leaders of the new Yishuv, however, whose participation was required to bring about such cooperation, saw matters differently. As early as 1918, they had postulated a Jewish Palestine with nothing more than symbolic Arab representation.[6] Ben Gurion biographer Shabtai Teveth describes the predominant view among the Jewish labour leaders as follows:

[4] Hyamson, *Palestine under the Mandate, 1929-1948*, 101.
[5] Herbert Samuel, "Political Report for the Month of January 1921," in *Political Diaries of the Arab World, 1920-1923* (Archive Editions, 2001), 56.
[6] Neil Caplan, *Palestine Jewry and the Arab Question* (London: Frank Cass, 1978), 151.

> The Arab role would be the passive one of continuing to live as they always had […] Since the founders of Ahdut Ha'avodah anticipated a Jewish state, the Arab rights they sought to preserve were civil rather than political, and could best be protected through the absolute segregation of the country's inhabitants into two national communities.[7]

Thus, even though the establishment of a Jewish state or Jewish domination in a binational state was not the initial plan, some groups within the Zionist movement did not contemplate a unitary binational arrangement either. Segregation was a given. Once the development of the legislative council, which so clearly contradicted these preferences, had come to a halt, they picked up the struggle for their own representative institutions once more.[8]

It was time for Knesset Israel to either be legalized or disbanded, some argued.[9] Its power paled in comparison to that of the Zionist Organisation, which regarded itself as fully entitled to represent the Jewish constituencies in Palestine and abroad. Indeed, the Zionist Organisation considered decisions regarding the institutional structure of the Yishuv to be within its purview.[10] It was clear to all parties that the Jewish Agency would remain the key consultant of the British government in Jewish national home affairs. In other words, the Jewish Agency would be a ministry of foreign affairs of sorts. But Knesset Israel hoped to administer local affairs, such as healthcare, education and policing. For effective communal government, voluntary contributions were insufficient; the community needed

[7] Shabtai Teveth, *Ben-Gurion and the Palestinian Arabs* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1985), 66–68.
[8] Itamar Ben Avi, "Doar Hayom, Jerusalem, 14/6/23," in *Political Diaries of the Arab World, 1920-1923*, ed. Robert L. Jarman (London: Archive Editions, 2001), 634–35; Itamar Ben Avi, "Doar Hayom, Jerusalem, 20/6/23," in *Political Diaries of the Arab World, 1920-1923*, ed. Robert L. Jarman (London: Archive Editions, 2001), 637; Dr. M. Glickson, "Haaretz, Tel Aviv, 19/6/23," in *Political Diaries of the Arab World, 1920-1923*, ed. Robert L. Jarman (London: Archive Editions, 2001), 635–36; Dr. M. Glickson, "Haaretz, Tel Aviv, 20/6/23," in *Political Diaries of the Arab World, 1920-1923*, ed. Robert L. Jarman (London: Archive Editions, 2001), 637.
[9] Robert L. Jarman, ed., "Haaretz, Tel Aviv, 6/11/23," in *Political Diaries of the Arab World, 1920-1923* (London: Archive Editions, 2001), 739. A similarly worded earlier letter condemned the Vaad Leumi sharply for attempting to gain the upper hand in negotiations regarding the communities' ordinance, explaining that it was a misapprehension to consider this a purely local matter. Organisation Department of the World Zionist Organisation, "Letter to Palestine Zionist Executive," July 8, 1925 CZA, Z4-42611.
[10] "Organization Department to Executive," June 3, 1925 (German) CZA, Z4-42611.

to be able to levy taxes on its members. This had been their status under Ottoman law, and they now demanded that the mandatory grant them the same privilege.[11]

Internal opposition to Knesset Israel

From the earliest attempts at creating Jewish community institutions all the way up to the Declaration of Independence in 1948, the heterogeneity of the Jewish community in Palestine endangered the success of this project of political autonomy.[12] It was, as explained in chapter 2, a vertically divided society in which no group was in a dominant position. In terms of political organisation, the starkest contrast was – and continues to be – that between secular and ultra-orthodox Jewry. Indeed, the initial British resistance to sanctioning the political institutions which had been elected before their arrival in the country was due to objections from some ultraorthodox quarters. Because they had refused to participate in the 1920 elections to the Jewish legislative assembly, Asefat Ha-Nivcharim, the British government could not regard the institutions as representative of the entire Yishuv.[13] Given such powerful centrifugal tendencies, the ultimate creation of a single political representative of the Palestine Jewry – and with it of a strong basis for the future State of Israel – was by no means unproblematic. A strong commitment to centralization by both the mandatory[14] and the Zionist Organisation were key drivers of this outcome.

[11] Dr. Hugo Bergman, "Palestine Jewry Organizing," *The Sentinel*, April 22, 1921.
[12] Burstein, *Self-Government of the Jews in Palestine since 1900*, 1.
[13] For a summary of orthodox objections to the 1920 national assembly see Bergman, "Palestine Jewry Organizing"; "Minutes of a Meeting between Vaad Leumi Delegation and High Commissioner, February 16th, 1923."
[14] A recent article refers to a similar phenomenon of British Jewish unity policy with regards to the Sephardim and the anti-Zionist Ashkenazi orthodox, arguing that this policy 'involved the tacit approval of the internal domination of immigrant Ashkenazi Zionists'. Tim Sontheimer, "Bringing the British Back in: Sephardim, Ashkenazi Anti-Zionist Orthodox and the Policy of Jewish Unity," *Middle Eastern Studies* 52, no. 2 (2016): 166.

Before tracing the process by which centralization was accomplished, a short reminder of the religious divisions within the Yishuv is in order. As outlined in the introduction to this dissertation, not all orthodox Jews were opposed to Zionism. For instance, the Mizrachi party sought the public institutionalization of Sabbath and Kashrut in Palestine. In principle, however, they sought cooperation and agreement with the recognized institutions.[15] As early as 1918, it was reported that 'the Mizrachi attempts to reconcile on the common platform of Jewish Nationalism the traditional religious spirit of the past with the modern intellectual spirit of the Zionist movement.' To secular Zionists, the importance of this attempt could not be overstated, for 'it unites in the Jewish National Programme practically the whole of world Jewry.'[16] Even though Zionism was a predominantly secular movement, its legitimation was based on the Jewish religion and it required for its success the support of both secular and religious Jews. Contrary to their more intractable cousin, Agudat Israel, the Mizrachi could be absorbed into the Zionist movement without altering its overall goals. Bolstering them was thus a bulwark against growing popularity of the Agudah.[17]

But this did not mean that the ZO could ignore extreme ultra-orthodoxy altogether. Just as Albert Hyamson quoted above had said with regards to the legislative council, this was not due to an idealistic commitment to the democratic principle: As chapter 6 of this dissertation will show, Zionist leaders had no qualms about excluding large parts of Jewish

[15] The chief rabbinate, for instance, was quick to show his opposition to the ultra-orthodox resistance to the formation of single community institutions, assuring that "Orthodox Jewry […] strives to complete organisation in communal in communal and religious life in Palestine Jewry, without any dissensions which are likely to undermine every public order." Weber, "Weber to High Commissioner" ISA, CS, 5016/28-M.
[16] Weizmann, "Chaim Weizmann to Reginald Wingate." WA 16-426.
[17] Organisation Department of the World Zionist Organisation, "Zionist Executive to German Zionist Federation," April 17, 1921 (German) CZA, Z4-41319. For more on the relationship between the ZO, the Mizrachi and Agudat Israel see Daniel Mahla, "No Trinity: The Tripartite Relations between Agudat Israel, the Mizrachi Movement. and the Zionist Organisation," *Journal of Israeli History* 34, no. 2 (2015): 117–40. His doctoral dissertation pioneers the research into the role of the orthodox communities in the Zionist project. Daniel Mahla, "Orthodoxy in the Age of Nationalism: Agudat Yisrael and the Mizrahi Movement in Germany, Poland and Palestine 1912-1948" (Columbia, 2014).

public opinion if it threatened the stability of their administration. When it came to their religious opposition, however, accommodation was a necessary evil. Agudat Israel was demanding from Britain and the League of Nations a role analogous to that of the Jewish Agency. With over a quarter of a million paying members worldwide, the organisation was a sizeable opponent.[18]

The German language periodical – and organ of the German Zionist Federation – *Jüdische Rundschau* described this threat thus: 'The Agudah has been capable of creating an organism to pursue political-cultural goals, which harbours *significant* socio-dynamic force, out of the muffled, amorphous orthodox masses.'[19] In a letter to Zionist Executive member Richard Lichtheim, fellow member of the Executive Arthur Hantke stressed the importance of taking the Agudah seriously. Lichtheim was involved in negotiations with the organisation, and Hantke urged him 'under all circumstances to avoid the impression that [the Executive] was delaying the matter.' Such treatment of the Agudah could taint their image considerably.[20] Contrary to the Revisionists, which in the late 1920s and early 1930s posed a similar threat to the Zionist establishment (see Chapter 6), the Agudah encountered sympathy in both London and Geneva. Not only was the ZO interested in support from all strands of Judaism, it had to guard its international image to ensure consistent diplomatic support for an unpopular project.

By 1925, negotiations about the future political organisation of Palestine's Jewish communities were in full swing. Three clear points emerged out of this flurry of activity:

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[18] "Stolar to Zionist Executive," February 8, 1921 CZA, Z4-41319.

[19] Nathan Melzer, "Zionismus Und Orthodoxie. Eine Kritische Betrachtung," *Jüdische Rundschau*, March 2, 1926 [Zionism and Orthodoxy. A Critical Commentary]. Original Text: Die Agudah hat es verstanden, aus der dumpfen, amorphen, orthodoxen Masse einen bestimmte politisch-kulturelle Ziele verfolgenden Organismus, dem eine bedeutende sozialdynamische Kraft innewohnt, zu formen. [Own emphasis]

[20] "Hantke to Lichtheim," April 8, 1921 CZA Z4-41319 [German]. Original text: Ich möchte Ihnen [aber] dringend raten, unter allen Umständen den Anschein zu vermeiden, als ob Sie die Sache dilatorisch behandelten. Den Eindruck, dass die Exekutive die Angelegenheit dilatorisch behandelt, hat die Agudath Israel sicher bereits seit einem Jahr und nicht mit Unrecht. Sie erinnern sich an den von der Agudath Israel veröffentlichten Briefwechsel mit Sokolow und der Exekutive. Dieser Briefwechsel hat einen für uns sehr schlechten Eindruck hinterlassen. Dieser Eindruck muss unbedingt verwischt werden.

Autonomous institutions were necessary to continue building the Jewish national home, the Jewish community's heterogeneity made the creation of a single representative organism difficult, and whichever regulations were formulated had to be flexible enough to accommodate the needs of the large variety of cultural and religious groups in Palestine. To accomplish the latter, the Palestine government suggested that provision be made 'for the exercise of this autonomy in accordance with the needs of each religious community.'[21] In other words, initially, the mandatory contemplated consociational mechanisms for the internal administration of the Jewish community. In addition, any regulations were to 'provide for the imposition of contributions upon members of the community.'[22] Since all other political competencies were exercised by the mandatory, taxation turned into a marker of political power, of quasi-sovereignty.

Secular Jewish community leaders were well aware of how high the stakes were in these regards and opposed the government's proposals. In a memorandum of June 1925, the Palestine Zionist Executive laid out its position regarding the proposed communities' ordinance. In European cities where Jews were a sizeable minority, such as Warsaw or Vienna, they had set up analogous communal institutions with the right to levy taxes to pay for their own administration. Every Jew who was born into a community was automatically subject to its authority, and could only exit it through conversion to another religion. According to the Palestine Executive's letter, there was no alternative opt-out and no opportunity to create additional communities with legal standing.[23] The authors further

[21] Norman Bentwich and Stuart Spencer Davis, "Davis to Colonial Office," September 9, 1925 ISA, CS, 5016/25-M.
[22] "Draft Religious Communities Organisation Ordinance, 1925," 1925 ISA, CS, 5016/25-M.
[23] This was incorrect. The Prussian Parliament had passed the Jewish *Austrittsgesetz* (law of secession) in 1876. It not only allowed Jews to secede from the community without converting to another religion but also allowed them to create separate communities. See Max Birnbaum, *Staat Und Synagoge, 1918-1938 : Eine Geschichte Des Preussischen Landesverbandes Jüdischer Gemeinden* (Tübingen: Mohr, 1981), 8–9 [English: State and Synagogue, 1918-1938: A History of the Federation of Jewish Communities in Prussia].

explained that 'the chief condition for the success of the national home was that immigrants of all types, coming from the various countries of the world should become *one homogenous national unit*.'[24]

The Zionist Actions Committee in London expressed a very similar attitude toward the communities' ordinance later that year: The key requirement for endorsing continued negotiations with Agudat Israel was that 'the closed national unity of the Jewish community in Palestine would not be broken.'[25] If each group was to be allowed to set up their own separate community instead of contributing to a single Jewish entity, this objective could not be achieved. Special cultural rights and needs should be protected – and the Va'ad Leumi had approved its own resolution to these effects – but the authority to levy taxes should be the prerogative only of one set of officially recognized community institutions.[26]

Alas, such religious and cultural rights were an insufficient concession for the ultra-orthodox. While they supported the return of the Jews to Palestine, the creation of a political entity or a state was not part of their plans. The Agudah reasoned that it would be an infringement on their religious freedom to compel members of this community to pay taxes for secular purposes which they did not support.[27] But their demands were not simply negative, postulating exclusion from the community. On the contrary, the Agudah – and by extension any group 'who for their own reasons find it proper' – should be allowed to constitute a separate community, with its own services and powers of taxation. The demand was for no less than 'complete independence.'[28] Local institutions were to be set up in

[24] Frederick Kisch, "Kisch to Chief Secretary," June 14, 1925 ISA, CS, 5016/28-M. [Own emphasis]
[25] "Zionist Executive to Actions Committee, Re: Negotiations with Agudas Israel," October 16, 1925, CZA, Z4-42611 [German]. Original text: Das A.C. beauftragt die Exekutive, die Verhandlungen mit der Agudas Israel fortzusetzen, jedoch nur unter der Voraussetzung, dass die geschlossene nationale Einheit der juedischen Gemeinschaft in Palaestina nicht durchbrochen wird.
[26] Kisch, "Kisch to Chief Secretary" ISA, CS, 5016/28-M.
[27] Council of the Ashkenazic Jewish Community, "Memorandum of the Orthodox Jews," April 24, 1925 ISA, CS, 5016/28-M.
[28] Ibid. ISA, CS, 5016/28-M.

which all communities – including that represented by the Va'ad Leumi and their own – would sit in shared committees for the administration of all 'matters of public interest'. At the same time, each of these communities reserved the right to completely sever itself from the consociational system thus established.[29] The initial draft of the ordinance allowing for maximum flexibility was thus in the spirit of the Agudah's demands.

Given that the Va'ad Leumi's powers would not have extended beyond social services either, the demands of both political camps were almost identical.[30] Thus, had both lobbying efforts been successful, the government would effectively have split the Yishuv into two political centres with almost identical competencies. As the Palestine Zionist Executive had explained in a different context, the Zionist institutions' 'authority [was] largely based on [their] exclusive status as the sole officially recognised ones.'[31] If they ceased to have this monopoly, its authority would be weakened significantly. However, once again conscious of political stability and efficacy, the Palestine government chose to establish a single Jewish community organisation and to reject the Agudah's demands for autonomy.

Students of the mandate period will be aware of how negligible a minority the ultra-orthodox were at the time. The Agudist Council of Ashkenazic Jews of Jerusalem claimed variably to represent between 1450 and 1600 heads of family. While no data had been collected on their relative strength in the Palestinian population, Herbert Samuel regarded even this modest claim as 'grossly exaggerated.'[32] One could thus be tempted to conclude

[29] "Zionist Executive to Actions Committee, Re: Negotiations with Agudas Israel", CZA, Z4-42205 [German].
[30] Norman Bentwich, "Bentwich to Chief Secretary," June 18, 1925 ISA, CS, 5016/28-M.
[31] Palestine Zionist Executive, "Telegram to London Zionist Executive," April 29, 1925 CZA, Z4-42205.
[32] Rubin Jungreis, "Jungreis to Colonial Secretary," December 9, 1924 ISA, CS, 5016/28-M; Herbert Samuel, "Samuel to Amery," December 22, 1924 ISA, CS, 5016/28-M. In an interview with the Jewish Telegraphic Agency in 1926, a leader of the Agudat even claimed that his organisation represented 7,000 heads of family corresponding to a population of 35,000. "The Agudat Israel and Zionism," *J.T.A. Bulletin*, June 17, 1926; Leonard Stein, "Letter to Mr Rosenblueth," November 24, 1926.

that the dispute discussed in these paragraphs was of no consequence to the final institutional foundations of the Jewish state. After all, had the mandatory granted the Agudah its wishes to have its own community, or indeed ignored the group altogether, the outcome might have been the exact same.[33] In 1948, Knesset Israel would have represented the large majority of Jews in Palestine and would have built the State of Israel all the same. But such a conclusion does not take into account the symbolic character of the struggle between the Va'ad Leumi and Agudat Israel. If the Agudah was allowed to set up its own institutions with political power over its own community, this could have provided a precedent for other groups to follow suit.

Choosing political centralization

In the face of a vigorous Agudist campaign for recognition, High Commissioner Herbert Samuel explained the Palestine government's opposition in a confidential memorandum to the British foreign office. It will be remembered that the first draft of the ordinance supported communal independence and that Agudat Israel found a sympathetic ear in London and Geneva. At the time of Samuel's writing, the Agudah was lobbying for a clause in the ordinance giving them autonomy in the ritual slaughtering of animals.[34] This issue, Herbert Samuel cautioned, was far from being a trivial matter of no political import. On the contrary, the matter

> raises points of principle which are hotly contested by powerful organizations. The parties concerned regard this as a test case and

[33] The ZO was advised by one of its legal aids to yield to the Agudat in the negotiation about the communities ordinance because he doubted that this would involve "serious risks to the integrity and authority of the official community." If left to segregate, the most likely outcome was for the Agudat to disappear in due course as an anachronistic organisation. Leonard Stein, "Confidential Memorandum for the Executive, Re: Jewish Community Ordinance, Agudah Israel," April 4, 1925 CZA, Z4-42205.

[34] The draft ordinance provided for the slaughtering of animals to be directed by the Chief Rabbinate, an institution in turn submitted to the lay institutions (the Vaad Leumi and the Asefat Hanivcharim).

> the decision […] may have consequences that will be far-reaching and enduring. [35]

From the outset, the mandatory had striven to 'promote unity and stability' in a country historically affected by sectarian strife. If the government was now to grant any rights exceeding those relating to personal status (notably, marriage and burial), it would lend encouragement to the 'spirit of disunion.' Herbert Samuel presaged:

> If the separation of one group is recognized now, the separation of another would be demanded later. The present claim is on behalf of the ultra-orthodoxy, but the next would probably be from the side of the anti-orthodox.

In his words, the 'unity of the Jewish community as a polity' was at stake.[36] The High Commissioner's concerns echoed those by Frederik Kisch, mentioned earlier in this section. Whereas Herbert Samuel was arguing on the basis of the Jewish community present in Palestine in the 1920s, Kisch thought ahead. If Agudat Israel was allowed to set up its own institutions, groups of immigrants might do the same in the future.[37] Considering that throughout the mandate period large 'national' communities of Jews immigrated to Palestine, it is reasonable to suggest that such an arrangement would have precluded the creation of strong pre-state institutions as a foundation of the future Jewish state. If communities of different strands of the Jewish religion, or indeed different national groups, had formed separate communities, the Jewish community would have been fragmented by the time the mandate ended, depriving it of the institutional bases which made the creation of Israel and its survival during the first years of statehood possible.

[35] Herbert Samuel, "Samuel to Amery," January 18, 1925 ISA, CS, 5016/28-M.
[36] Ibid. ISA, CS, 5016/28-M.
[37] Kisch, "Kisch to Chief Secretary" ISA, CS, 5016/28-M.

Not only that: Oriental Jews[38], who were in the majority during the early mandate period, might have chosen a similar course of action.[39] The beginning of the mandate period, with its support for the Balfour Declaration and thus the establishment of large numbers of European Jews in Palestine, marked an end to the autonomous political status which the Sephardim had enjoyed as a millet under the Ottoman Empire. With the advent of Ashkenazi hegemony in the Yishuv's institutions, they had to redefine their political role. Sephardic political organizations like the Association of the Pioneers of the East (founded in 1918 as an organization to promote Sephardic cultural revival and to act as a mediator between Jews and Arabs in Palestine) went to great lengths to deny accusations of anti-Zionism that were levelled against them by Zionist leaders. According to a recent work on Oriental Jews during the mandate period, this group represented the majority view among Sephardi and Oriental Jews at the beginning of the mandate period.[40] This suggests that the majority of the Sephardim sought integration with the Zionist establishment, even before the 1929 riots spelled an end to Jewish-Arab cooperation.[41]

While they advocated for Jewish-Arab rapprochement – thus opposing the prevailing Zionist policy – their main goal was to increase the involvement of their community in the institutions of the Yishuv. However, they sought to do so as representatives of their own community, rather than full integration with the increasingly hegemonic Ashkenazi political order. So, for instance, in the context of the 1931 elections to the Assembly of representatives, Sephardic leaders in Jerusalem demanded that seats be reserved for Sephardic representatives. In other words, they were asking for consociational

[38] See Jacobson and Naor, *Oriental Neighbors: Middle Eastern Jews and Arabs in Mandatory Palestine*, 6–7.
[39] For a discussion of Sephardi political attitudes toward the Zionist movement, see Sontheimer, "Bringing the British Back in: Sephardim, Ashkenazi Anti-Zionist Orthodox and the Policy of Jewish Unity," 2016.
[40] Jacobson and Naor, *Oriental Neighbors: Middle Eastern Jews and Arabs in Mandatory Palestine*, 29.
[41] Hillel Cohen, *Year Zero of the Arab-Israeli Conflict* (Waltham: Brandeis University Press, 2015); Menachem Klein, *Lives in Common: Arabs and Jews in Jerusalem, Jaffa and Hebron* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2014).

quotas. These were created, but the Zionist establishment quickly accused the community of acting in a divisive and sectarian manner. The pressure led Sephardi representatives to run as candidates affiliated with the main parties of the Yishuv instead. A campaign against their purported separatism was waged by the Labour movement, leading to an association of the Sephardim with the Old Yishuv, cultural backwardness and the political right-wing.[42] Between 1926 and 1928, the World Sephardic Organization sought to expand its activities to cater to the needs of the Sephardim in Palestine. For this purpose, it set up separate – and indeed, rival – institutions to those of the Zionist Organization, including a Sephardic-Mizrahi credit bank to assist the communities' settlements, and a mechanism to fund educational and cultural activities.

This development deeply concerned the Zionist Organization: Secretary Leo Lauterbach sent letters to Zionist leaders warning of the dangers of a separate Sephardic entity. He went on to successfully lobbying Sephardic Zionist leaders, to prevent them from endorsing the World Sephardic Federation. The efforts of the Zionist Organization to sabotage the growth of the community's political and economic institutions combined with the internalization of a feeling of inferiority on the part of the Sephardim and growing tensions between Jews and Arabs after 1929 to spell an end to the idea of Sephardic autonomy.[43] Nevertheless, it shows that there was a potential for separate ethnic political action, perhaps even consociational demands. Moreover, had such ethnic communities (and large European communities, such as the Germans or the Polish) been allowed to develop institutionally, they might have formed the basis of political parties in the early years of the State of Israel, with the associated instability that afflicts vertically divided societies

[42] Jacobson and Naor, *Oriental Neighbors: Middle Eastern Jews and Arabs in Mandatory Palestine*, 32.
[43] Yehuda Sharim, "The Arch of a Sephardic-Mizrahi Ethnic Autonomy in Palestine , 1926 to 1929," *UCLA Historical Journal* 24, no. 1 (2013): 29–43.

elsewhere. Britain and the Zionist Organisation anticipated this result and were determined to avert it.

After years of negotiations, the Jewish Community Regulations of 1927 were promulgated with a clear preference for the centralization of political power. As such, the first substantial article of the regulations states 'there shall be a recognised Community of the Jews in Palestine', composed of a rabbinical council, local rabbinical offices, an elected assembly, the Va'ad Leumi and a committee of local communities. By using the formula '*a* recognised community', the formation of other communities was precluded. Individuals who desired so could strike their names off the community register and thus be relieved of the payment of taxes, but with it, also of all rights accruing to members of the Jewish community. Even on a local basis, all those who removed their names from the register could hope for was some support of the recognized community in their free exercise of religious and cultural activities.[44] This solution allowed the mandatory to remain within the limits of legality regarding the protection of religious minorities, a matter which had by then reached the League of Nations. But it was also a solution which secured the 'unity and stability' that Herbert Samuel had pleaded for in his letter to Amery.

In fact, as a letter of protest of the Agudah against the Ordinance explains, the arrangement actually discouraged striking off one's name of the official list. After all, life would be very difficult for those who chose to do so. Once they were crossed off, they renounced the use of any public services whatsoever. This meant they would have no access to healthcare, education, and possibly employment opportunities.[45] Because other communities could not be formed, the alternatives a member of the community had were

[44] Government of Palestine, "Regulations for the Organisation of the Jewish Community," 1926 CZA, KH4-14453.
[45] The latter were often controlled by labour exchanges of the Histadrut or organisations associated with the Jewish Agency.

self-reliance or membership in the official Jewish community. The letter of protest thus concludes 'almost all the Jews will in course of time become members of the community.'[46] That the option to exclude oneself would have such an outcome had been clearly calculated by the ZO. A memorandum of April 1925 on the negotiations with the Agudah described this formula as 'a weapon in the hands of the Va'ad Leumi.' If excluding oneself from the community was inconsequential, there were bound to be free riders escaping the financial contributions needed to build strong institutions.[47] Thus, exclusion needed to be penalized. The system set up by the mandatory supported centralization and thus rule by a dominant power rather than power-sharing. In the end, this did not discourage the Agudah from seceding – and continuing to request separate legal standing until well into the 1930s – nor its followers from foregoing the benefits of affiliation with the recognized community. What it meant, however, was that establishing separate communities was rendered difficult enough to dissuade their proliferation.

Dealing with Diversity: The Entrenchment of Deep Divisions in Lebanon

If Britain chose centralization of the Jewish community of Palestine in order to foster a sense of national unity in what would become a country of immigrants, France decided to follow a policy that was diametrically opposed to such centralizing mechanisms. By creating a rigid power-sharing system, the mandatory institutionalized the political differences that had crystallized since the fall of the Ottoman Empire among the now Lebanese citizens. In addition, the electoral system that the French put in place fostered

[46] Council of the Ashkenazic Jewish Community, "The Proposed Communities Ordinance for the Jewish Yishuv in Palestine," 1925 (?) ISA, CS, 5016/28-M.
[47] Leonard Stein, "Confidential Memorandum for the Executive, Re: Jewish Community Ordinance, Agudah Israel," April 4, 1925 CZA, Z4-42205.

clientelism as it strengthened the traditional elite's grip on power, thus weakening the state's infrastructural power.[48] Certainly, many elements of the sectarian system built in the 1920s – such as the maintenance of personal status law and communal education systems – were taken over from the Mutasarrifiyah of the nineteenth century. Nonetheless, as will be discussed below, the mandatory could have chosen institutional mechanisms more conducive to reducing the salience of deep divisions. The following sections will discuss the impact of electoral systems on ethnic heterogeneity, the choices available to the mandatory and the process of institution-building ultimately followed in Lebanon.

The import of electoral systems in divided societies

France created and maintained many public institutions that perpetuated and strengthened divisions among the Lebanese. So, for instance, did the mandatory retain personal status law[49] – and even expanded it to the Shia community by institutionalizing the Jafari rite[50] - and maintained a communal education system. Why, then, does this chapter focus on the electoral system established by the mandatory as pivotal to perpetuating deep divisions among the Lebanese? First of all, because personal status law relates to the private sphere. Even in more homogenous countries, such regulations are put in place to allow for the free exercise of religion. Such measures do not necessarily have an effect on the politicization of divisions. In the case of the Yishuv, personal status and education remained in the hands of different Jewish denominations, but it did not fundamentally impact political institutions.

[48] The capacity of the state to actually penetrate civil society, and to implement logistically political decisions throughout the realm. Michael Mann, *States, War and Capitalism: Studies in Political Sociology* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1988), 5.

[49] For a description of personal status law in Lebanon see "Memorandum Respecting the Judician Organisation of the Lebanon and Alaouites," 1936, Eastern Affairs, Further Correspondence Parts XXXVIII and XXXIX, Confidential Print Middle East .

[50] Max Weiss, *In the Shadow of Sectarianism: Law, Shiism, and the Making of Modern Lebanon* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2010).

How identities are managed within the political system, however, affects the public representation of citizens, i.e. it shapes their relationship with the state. Whether citizens are directly represented in a state-wide political system or indirectly, through the mediation of a representative of their own creed, necessarily impacts how individuals relate with that state. In Gabriel Almond's words, mentioned in the introduction to this dissertation, it leads to the creation of separate political structures by subcultures, which can in turn breed instability.

Electoral systems are considered one of the main tool in a policy-maker's repertoire to manage ethnic conflict, as they mediate between the impact of social diversity and the stability and effectiveness of the political system.[51] At the same time, electoral systems cannot create social realities; formulas that increase heterogeneity in the political system only do so where social cleavages objectively exist. That is, only where a society is ethnically heterogenous can an electoral system support processes of political fragmentation.[52] As Maurice Duverger explained in his famous work on political parties, 'a particular electoral regime does not necessarily produce a party system; it merely exerts pressure in the direction of this system'.[53]

France, then, could not have produced ethnopolitical fragmentation through electoral rules had Lebanese society not been divided to begin with. At the same time, however, ethnic heterogeneity is not a sufficient condition to produce ethnopolitical fragmentation in the political system. Rather, where ethnic cleavages exist, electoral

[51] Robert G Moser, Ethan Scheiner, and Heather Stoll, "Social Diversity, Elections Rules, and the Party System," *Oxford Handbook of Electoral Systems*, no. October (2017): 3.
[52] Octavio Amorim Neto and Gary W. Cox, "Electoral Institutions , Cleavage Structures , and the Number of Parties," *Political Science* 41, no. 1 (1997): 149–74.
[53] Maurice Duverger, *Political Parties: Their Organization and Activity in the Modern State* (London: Methuen, 1959), 40.

systems significantly impact the likelihood of politicization of these cleavages.[54] As Lebanon expert Elizabeth Picard has put it, the electoral system created during the mandate period was 'the instrument for the institutionalization of clientelism *par excellence*.'[55] In setting an electoral threshold, the electoral system determines which ethnic groups – if any – become politicized as only those that meet the threshold can achieve representation. The higher the threshold, the lower the resulting political fragmentation. Low thresholds act as an incentive for groups to go it alone and create group-based movements. High thresholds, on the other hand, dissuade groups from mobilizing politically or encourage them to pool together with other groups to reach the threshold.[56] In new democracies – like the Yishuv and Lebanon in the 1920s – these effects are multiplied by a lack of popular knowledge about electoral institutions and their effects. This can bolster ethnopolitical groups and cleavages as they become an important source of information as voters rely on their group's own leadership to make sense of the new political setting.[57]

Lebanon's 1922 electoral system

The first Lebanese elections after the war were held in May 1922. They were ruled by decree 1307, which stipulated that the legislative council was to be composed of 30 members that were to be designated through indirect elections, and that the electoral district would be the *sandjak*. The attribution of seats would result by decree in proportion to the

[54] David Lublin, "Electoral Systems, Ethnic Heterogeneity and Party System Fragmentation," *British Journal of Political Science* 47, no. 02 (2017): 373–89.
[55] Picard, *Liban État de Discorde. Des Fondations Aux Guerres Fracticides*, 91. [Lebanon, State of Discordance. The Foundations of Fracticidal Wars] Original Text: L'instrument par excellence de l'institutionnalisation du clientélisme politique au Liban est la loi électorale.
[56] Lublin, "Electoral Systems, Ethnic Heterogeneity and Party System Fragmentation."
[57] Shaheen Mozaffar, James R Scarritt, and Glen Galaich, "Electoral Institutions, Ethnopolitical Cleavages, and Party Systems in Africa's Emerging Democracies," *American Political Science Review* 97, no. 3 (2003): 380; Peter C. Ordeshook and Olga V Shvetsova, "Ethnic Heterogeneity , District Magnitude , and the Number of Parties," *American Journal of Political Science* 38, no. 1 (1994): 100–123. Historian Elizabeth Picard has commented on this effect in 1920s Lebanon in Picard, *Liban État de Discorde. Des Fondations Aux Guerres Fracticides*, 90. [Lebanon, State of Discordance. The Foundations of Fracticidal Wars]

number of voters of each religious community.[58] This section will discuss the two key elements of the new electoral system: The electoral district and the electoral formula. As historian Meir Zamir has emphasised, the importance of this decree for the political history of Lebanon cannot be overstated, as it 'first established the confessional character of the electoral system, which […] still exists today'.[59] Throughout the history of modern Lebanon, political leaders and citizens have called for an abolition of the sectarian formula that was part of France's system, while at the same time agreeing that the time is not yet ripe for such a bold restructuring of Lebanese politics. The decree created institutional mechanisms which several civil wars have been unable to overturn.

One of the most substantial discussions contained in the documents perused for this dissertation surrounded the choice of the electoral district. France closely considered the *caza*, a smaller district including a city and its surrounding villages, and the *sandjak*, a larger region. As chapter 4 explained, Greater Lebanon was roughly composed of two provinces of the former Ottoman Empire, Mount Lebanon and Beirut. At the end of the 19th century, administratively, the former was a single *sandjak*, containing eight *cazas*; the latter contained six *sandjaks* (including Nablus in modern-day Palestine) and 21 *cazas*.[60] In the Mutasarrifiyah, however, neither of these administrative divisions had formed the basis for electoral districts. Voters elected village sheikhs who in turn selected the twelve members of the administrative council to represent districts larger than the *caza*, yet smaller than the *sandjak*. Mount Lebanon, a territory much smaller than Greater Lebanon, was divided into seven such districts under the Mutasarrifiyah, compared with a total of six districts in the

[58] "Arreté No 1307," *Bulletin Officiel Des Actes Administratifs Du Haut Commissariat*, March 8, 1922.
[59] Zamir, *Form. Mod. Lebanon*, 142.
[60] R. Huber, "Empire Ottoman. Division Administrative 1/1 500 000 Dressé d'après Le Salnamé de 1899/1317." [Ottoman Empire. Administrative Divion 1/ 1 500 000 produced according to the Salname of 1899/1317]

new state according to decree 1307.[61] Knowledge of this data alone shows that the mandatory engaged in substantial retracing of electoral boundaries, and indeed, gerrymandering.

Official French correspondence justified the choice of the *sandjak* by referring to its purportedly more representative character in comparison with the *caza*. In a letter to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Secretary of the High Commissioner Robert de Caix explained that if the larger district was adopted, 176,000 voters would be represented by members of their rite, compared to only 146,000 if the latter was chosen.[62] Paradoxically, this concern for equitable sectarian representation was coupled with a desire to reduce the salience of sectarianism in the electoral process: The smaller division of the *caza*, so the French argued, would have led to purely confessional campaigning as it would have provided for a small number of deputies per district – likely just one – and of only the rite that held the majority in the *caza.*[63] Choosing the *sandjak*

> was judged necessary in order to avoid a contestation of elections purely on confessional grounds – which could have had serious disadvantages – to allow every rite representation according to its numerical strength […] the mode of representation of the Lebanese *ancien regime* [the *sandjak*] would be satisfactory to everyone.[64]

[61] For a table of electoral districts in the Mutasarrifiyah see Baaklini, *Legislative and Political Development: Lebanon, 1842-1972*, 49.
[62] "De Caix to Ministry of Foreign Affairs," February 22, 1922, GR 1 K 247 15.
[63] "Conseil Representatif, Etat Du Liban, Analyse de l'Arrete No 1307 Du 10 Mars 1922 Concernant l'election Des Members Du Conseil Representatif Du Gran Liban," 1922, CADN 363. [Information Service, Study Section, The May 1922 Elections to the Representative Council of Greater Lebanon]
[64] "Service Des Renseignements, Section d'Etudes, Les Elections de Mai 1922 Au Conseil Représentatif Du Grand Liban," n.d., CADN 396. [Information Service, Study Section, The May 1922 Elections to the Representative Council of Greater Lebanon] Original text: Il a été juge, en effet, nécessaire pour éviter que des élections se fissent sur le terrain confessionnal, - ce qui aurait pu avoir des inconvénients grâces, de laisser à chaque rite la représentation a laquelle lui donne droit son importance numérique […] ce mode de représentation converse de l'ancien régime libanais ferait donner a tous satisfaction

But the choice of district not only followed a search for democratic representation – and purportedly, a weakening of sectarian identities – it also happened to be the best system to ensure the election of a pro-French government. In the *sandjak*, the French could prevent the election of a hostile candidate better than in the *caza*, where a strong local candidate would obtain a majority despite French opposition.[65] After all, in the villages, candidates would have a closer relationship with voters and thus much greater influence over the electoral process than in larger constituencies where personal contact was less intense.

Furthermore, French calculations showed that the adoption of the *sandjak* would ensure the election of Habib Pasha Saad, a pro-French candidate – to the presidency. Unfortunately, the document which discusses this advantage of the system is incomplete and the pages which explain the rationale for this conclusion are no longer available. Nor do the existing pages specify which presidency Robert de Caix was referring to (given that the governor of Lebanon continued to be French at the time). The bottom line, however, was that the Saad's victory would prevent the triumph of a candidate from the Sursock family[66], a Greek orthodox candidate with pro-Sunni tendencies who campaigned for reunification with Syria. De Caix recommended that the French governor arrange a meeting with Habib Pasha Saad. The latter was desirous to see the French select the *sandjak*, to secure his election. Before revealing to him the French decision, De Caix explained, the governor should extract concessions from the candidate. The choice of the *sandjak* could then be presented as a reward for his cooperation.[67] There is no doubt, then, that substantial political advantages accrued to the French as a consequence of the adoption of this electoral district.

[65] Zamir, *Form. Mod. Lebanon*, 143.
[66] A wealthy family of Beirut, with close ties to the Ottoman administration. The name of the candidate is illegible from the document.
[67] "De Caix to Ministry of Foreign Affairs," February 1922, SHD GR 1 K 247 15.

But not only the choice of district had an effect favourable to French power in Lebanon; the electoral formula produced a slight Christian overrepresentation while not ensuring an absolute majority for any one group. As explained in chapter 4, France was closely allied with the Maronites and consistently sought to empower this group to cement its influence in Lebanon. Nevertheless, the group's position had to continue to be insecure, to make sure that they would always have to rely on France.[68] This was achieved through the 1922 electoral system. Greater Lebanon was divided into six *sandjaks*: North Lebanon, Mount Lebanon, South Lebanon, Bekaa, Beirut, and Tripoli. In each of these districts, voters elected a number of secondary electors according to the numerical strength of their rite, based on the 1921 census. To illustrate: This meant that in the district of North Lebanon, for instance, out of a total of 89 secondary electors, 44 were to be Maronites, 24 Sunnis and 21 Greek Orthodox.[69]

To prevent sectarian campaigning, one of France's concerns in designing the system, electoral lists had to be multi-ethnic. Thus, using the example of the district of North Lebanon again, each list would have had Maronite, Sunni and Orthodox candidates and each voter would have had to select delegates of all three communities. Consequently, each candidate on the list had to appeal to voters of all communities to reach the electoral threshold. The French had institutionalized a contradiction in Lebanon's electoral system which persists until today[70]: Mixed lists encouraged competition within communities – between candidates of the same sect on competing lists – and moderation of the sectarian discourse as candidates had to appeal to a broad multi-ethnic electorate. At the same time,

[68] Charles Winslow, *Lebanon: War and Politics in a Fragmented Society* (London: Routledge, 1996), 69–70.
[69] "Service Des Renseignements, Section d'Etudes, Les Elections de Mai 1922 Au Conseil Représentatif Du Grand Liban", CADN 396. [Information Service, Study Section, The May 1922 Elections to the Representative Council of Greater Lebanon]
[70] For instance, the electoral reform of 2017 sought to increase intra-communitarian competition, purportedly to decrease the salience of inter-sectarian divisions, whilst retaining sectarian quotas.

however, sectarian quotas institutionalized ethnic differences and gave them political significance. The title of a Lebanese newspaper article on the May 1922 election results clearly shows how the electoral system impacted the representation of deep divisions in Lebanon's new political system. Instead of entitling the article *Majlis al-Nawa'ib* (House of Representatives), the author chose to call the new institution *Majlis al-Tawa'if* (House of Sects). The article went on to list the 'parties' within the new legislative: A Maronite party, a Sunni party, a Shia party, a Druze party and a Catholic party.[71]

Overall, the combination of district and electoral formula led to a slight – though sufficient for French purposes – overrepresentation of Christian communities. In the first round of the vote, all voters were represented equally, i.e. each secondary elector required the same number of votes to be elected. When it came to the conversion of secondary electors into parliamentary seats, however, the system was skewed towards the Christians, and particularly the Greek Orthodox. The following table 4 sums up the results for the five main blocs[72]:

Table 4: 1922 Lebanese elections, secondary electors, seats:

	Secondary Electors	Seats	**Secondary electors/seat**	**Primary voters/ seat**
Maronite	200	10	**20**	**19,918**
Greek Orthodox	77	5	**15.4**	**16,281**
Sunni	171	6	**28.5**	**20,797**
Shia	116	5	**23.2**	**20,989**
Druze	44	2	**22**	**21,816**

[71] "Majlis Al-Tawa'if," *Al-Maarid* 4, no. May-August (1922): 4. [House of Sects]
[72] Own production, data from "Service Des Renseignements, Section d'Etudes, Les Elections de Mai 1922 Au Conseil Représentatif Du Grand Liban." [Information Service, Study Section, The May 1922 Elections to the Representative Council of Greater Lebanon]

These differences may seem minimal, but when expressed in percentages, their significance for the creation of a solid pro-French majority becomes clear. Overall, Christians made up 51% of the population and received 53% of seats, Muslims made up 48% of population and received 43% of seats. At the same time, however, the Christians were politically divided among themselves. Maronites only received 33.3% of all seats and could thus not impose themselves on the rest. The Sunni to Shia ratio was likewise 6:5 and the political differences between them too stark to allow for any meaningful political alliance. By overrepresenting the Greek orthodox, France was co-opting a religious cum political grouping which might otherwise have allied with Sunni forces.[73]

Thus, the Lebanese legislative council could not but become a fragmented organ: Majority decisions within the legislative would be difficult to come by given competing visions of the state, and the inability of a single political community to impose itself on the rest. Deadlock was thus programmed into the system; it was a recipe for weak, ineffective governments. Not only that, the system was completely disconnected from the Lebanese electorate as the meagre voter turnout shows: Except in the *sandjak* of Lebanon North, turnout did not supersede 50% in any district. In the Sunni stronghold of Tripoli, it was as low as 17%.[74] If Britain chose to suspend the legislative council project on account of its unrepresentative character in 1923, France accepted this unrepresentative council, despite all the rhetoric about seeking a highly representative system. An ineffective, unrepresentative council was the best guarantee for a weak state and thus for the perpetuation of France's presence in Lebanon.

[73] The same logic informed the election of Charles Debbas, a Greek Orthodox, as the first president of Lebanon in 1926. Muhammad Kheir Hussein Alkhajar, *Al-Madlul Al-Ta'ifi Li-Nitham Al-Hukm Fi Lubnan, 1925-1943* (Beirut: Dār al-'Ulūm al-'Arabīyah lil-Ṭibā'ah wa-al-Nashr, 2002), 24 [The Sectarian Sense of the Lebanese Political System].
[74] "Delegate of High Commissioner to High Commissioner," July 6, 1925, CADN 396.

A political inheritance from the Mutasarrifiyah?

It is often assumed that the quota system that the French introduced was simply a continuation of the system installed in 1861[75], which entailed the establishment of fixed quotas for each of Mount Lebanon's religious groups. Indeed, the documentary record suggests that a sectarian electoral system was almost viewed as an inescapable reality in 1920s Lebanon: One document argued that the 1922 electoral system preserved the Lebanese ancient regime and satisfied all parties.[76] While it is true that the principle of consociationalism had become a political tradition in Mount Lebanon, the creation of the new state of Greater Lebanon had opened up a window of opportunity for change. It was a new state, with a completely different social composition, and the mandatory power had various options at its disposal, as will be discussed below. The following paragraphs will discuss the system of the Mutasarrifiyah and show that 1922 was a critical juncture.

After the 1860 civil war, suspicions between Mount Lebanon's sects ran high. An international commission of the five European powers that had vested interests in the mountain sat in Beirut to consider its political future. Given the deep divisions which plagued the mount, the parties debated its partition into mono-ethnic statelets. A first proposal to create three separate political entities – one Maronite, one Druse and one Greek Orthodox – was quickly defeated. First of all, many areas contained a mixed population whose transfer was difficult, if not impossible, to implement. Second, it was precisely the partition of Mount Lebanon into a Druze and a Christian Kaimakamate in 1845 which had caused the 1860 war in the first place. The French representative argued that, far from

[75] For instance, Kewenig, *Die Koexistenz Der Religionsgemeinschaften Im Libanon*, 66; Eyal Zisser, *Lebanon: The Challenge of Independence* (London: I.B. Tauris, 2000), 13. [The Co-existence of Religious Communities in Lebanon]
[76] "Service Des Renseignements. Section d'etudes," n.d., CADN 452. [Information Service, Study Section]

partition, the most stable system Lebanon had ever had was one in which one ruler exercised authority over the entire country.[77] Also this option was difficult to implement: When the Mutasarrifiyah was created in 1861, no single group could claim leadership of the mountain. The Maronite church was the only established institution, but its emphasis on sectarian identity and its reliance on France prevented it from claiming leadership of the country.[78] France's preference for a Mount Lebanon united under a single ruler was, of course, not entirely motivated by considerations of good governance. The Maronites had long advocated the reestablishment of pro-Christian empire under a ruler from the Shehabi family, like the one that had preceded the Double Kaimakamate of 1845. If a Maronite ally was to dominate the whole of Mount Lebanon once more, France would have a solid power base in this economically and strategically important territory.

Britain also opposed the triple Kaimakamate proposed in 1861, but for completely different reasons. The arguments are particularly interesting in the context of this dissertation: Lord Dufferin, Britain's envoy to the commission of inquiry in Beirut argued that pacification would not result from emphasizing differences between Mount Lebanon's sects. On the contrary, long-term pacification would result from a system that unified them and reduced the salience of religious cleavages in a population that shared all ethnic characteristics aside from religious affiliation. Historian of Lebanon Carol Hakim assesses Dufferin's view – and that of his French counterpart Becalard – in the following way:

> They believed that an improvement in living conditions under a strong and secular government […] would gradually and necessarily attenuate the current tensions and animosities and eventually ensure the emergence of a harmonious policy.[79]

[77] Adel Ismail, ed., "Procés-Verbal de La Vingt-Sixieme Séance de La Commission Internationale Tenue a Beyrouth, Le 21 Mars 1861," in *Documents Diplomatiques et Consulaires Relatifs A L'Histoire Du Liban* (Beyrouth: Editions des Oeuvres Politiques et Historiques, 1978), 39–60. [Minutes of the Twenty-Sixth Session of the International Commission held in Beirut, on 21 March 1861]
[78] Akarli, *The Long Peace: Ottoman Lebanon, 1861-1920*, 82.
[79] Hakim, *The Origins of the Lebanese National Idea: 1840-1920*, 90.

They believed precisely what Herbert Samuel and the representative of the Zionist Executive expressed when designing the Yishuv's political institutions: The institutionalization of divisions would hinder long-term political stability. The fact that different options were discussed in 1860-1 shows that political sectarianism was not set in stone at the time.

But Dufferin's warnings did not prevail. The project finally adopted for the government of the Mutasarrifiyah was a melange of both systems. A Christian governor – as advocated by the promoters of a Shehabi emirate – was to be nominated for the entire Mountain by the Sublime Porte, but this governor had to consult extensively with an administrative council composed of two representatives of each of the Mount's sects. In addition to these consociational mechanisms in the central government, the *Reglement* provided for consociational rule at the local level.[80] Thus, the basic electoral principles which the French extended to Greater Lebanon from the first elections in 1922 stretched back to this document, and it seems logical to conclude that the path-dependent process which fostered sectarianism in Lebanon's democracy was created not in the 1920s, but in the 1860s. However, as historian Meir Zamir explains,

> The Mutasarrifiya could have been viewed as one stage in the realisation of Maronite national aspirations; alternatively, it could have been seen as a new political arrangement for securing harmony and balance in a multi-confessional society. The outcome in the first case would have been a Christian Maronite state; in the second, it would have been a pluralistic state not necessarily dominated by the Maronites. In fact, the Mutasarrifiya provided the basis for both possibilities […] Whether the Christian or the inter-denominational aspect would prevail ultimately depended on how the borders of the state were drawn.[81]

[80] Adel Ismail, ed., "Reglement Fondamental Relatif A L'Administration Du Mont-Liban," in *Documents Diplomatiques et Consulaires Relatifs A L'Histoire Du Liban* (Beyrouth: Editions des Oeuvres Politiques et Historiques, 1978), 102–8. [Fundamental Decree Relating to the Administration of Mount Lebanon]
[81] Zamir, *Form. Mod. Lebanon*, 12.

To the importance of how the boundaries were drawn, which was extensively discussed in chapter 4, one must add the impact of the institutional design within these new boundaries. As mentioned before in this thesis, by the beginning of the nineteenth century, a sense of national unity had emerged in what was the longest period of peace the mountain had seen in its modern history. A sense of Lebaneseness had emerged based not on an intellectual construct but on over fifty years of political practice. Sure, religion continued to be an important marker of identity but it 'was subsumed to the political process in public life and reconciliation of the communities rather than their contraposition was to be the guiding principle.'[82] In the 1920s, the French had an opportunity to capitalize on the potential for unity or the potential for fragmentation.

Choosing political fragmentation

France had an opportunity to focus on the potential for unity – while properly accounting for Lebanon's religious diversity – by establishing proportional representation without sectarian quotas. Such a system would still have given the Maronites a majority based on the 1921 census. By setting a relatively low threshold, however, such a system could have guaranteed the representation of all of Lebanon's religious communities. Representativeness could have been balanced to avoid excessive fragmentation and encourage moderation and coalition building among communities by setting a moderately high threshold. To illustrate how such a system might have attenuated ethnopolitical fragmentation, consider the results of the 1921 census reproduced in the table 5 below[83].

[82] Akarli, *The Long Peace: Ottoman Lebanon, 1861-1920*, 186–87.
[83] Own production using data from "Service Des Renseignements, Section d'Etudes, Les Elections de Mai 1922 Au Conseil Représentatif Du Grand Liban", CADN 396. [Information Service, Study Section, The May 1922 Elections to the Representative Council of Greater Lebanon]

Table 5: Hypothetical allocation of seats in 1922 with proportional representation:

Community	Population	% Population	Seats in 30-member assembly
Maronite	199181	32.7	9.8
Greek-Catholic	42462	7	2.1
Greek-Orthodox	81409	13	3.9
Protestant	4215	0.7	0.21
Sunni	124786	20	6
Shia	104947	17	5.1
Druze	43633	7	2.1
Diverse	8436	1.4	0.42

Assuming voters cast a sectarian vote, the number of seats per community would have remained the same with a non-quota PR system. If, for instance, a threshold of 7% of the national vote had been set, every community except for the protestants and the broad category 'diverse' (including Armenians and other minorities) could in theory have reached representation on a national level, provided voters decided to cast a sectarian vote. In other words, if all Greek Catholics in Lebanon had cast a vote for a Greek Catholic candidate, they would be represented by two candidates of their own rite. However, without quotas, this would only be guaranteed *if* the electorate behaved in this manner. Even if a minority of the electorate chose a candidate on grounds other than religious identity, the outcome of the elections would be very different. Over time, this 'risk' could have encouraged the formation of inter-sectarian coalitions and issue-based parties. By establishing quotas, however, voters did not have to cast a conscious sectarian vote; the system did it for them.

In addition to turning parliamentary representatives into representatives of their sect, the choice of regional (rather than national) districts meant that tradition local *zaims* – or community leaders – would wield disproportionate power. Granted, they were less powerful than in the *cazas*, as explained above, but the districts were still small enough to preserve their influence. Since the 1920s, a handful of families (e.g. Edde, Gemayel, Frangiyeh, Jumblatt, Karami, Solh) dominated Lebanese politics and they have been more powerful in their 'fiefs' than the Lebanese state apparatus. Their traditional power was institutionalized and maintained because recruitment of political representatives occurred on a regional and communal basis. As historian David Gilmour has explained, the member of a certain Sunni family may have disproportionate power in Tripoli, but has no influence among the Sunnis of Beirut, who have their own leaders. The same is true all over the country.[84] Gilmour furnishes an illustrative example of how the political system bolstered the *zuama's* power. Take the district of Aley in the mountains east of Beirut, which in the 1960 elections would have returned two Maronite deputies, two Druzes and one Greek Orthodox. In this case, the local *zaim* was the Druze chieftain, Emir Arslan, so one seat would always be won by him. All other seats would then be filled with his Christian and Druze allies. As a result, if a politician hoped to be elected to one of the Aley seats, he had to enlist Emir Arslan's support.[85] There is thus no doubt that a nation-wide electoral district without sectarian quotas would have significantly eroded the power of these elites and incremented the state's ability to confront such neo-feudal tendencies.

A quota-free, proportional representation system – advocated by campaigners in Lebanon today as the best formula to eradicate sectarianism – was only seriously considered once in mandate Lebanon. In late 1925, a report by General Maurice Sarrail

[84] David Gilmour, *Lebanon: The Fractured Country* (Oxford: Martin Robertson, 1983), 35–36.
[85] Ibid., 40–41.

(High Commissioner of Syria and Lebanon in 1924-1925) explained the importance of fusing the political districts of the ancient Mount Lebanon with the newly attached districts. In other words, greater national integration had to be promoted. The administrative reform had to be followed by an electoral reform as the existing 1922 system based on proportional representation that distributed votes among different rites was 'being combatted by all parties and communities'.[86]

In line with Sarrail's assessment, French governor of Lebanon Leon Cayla proposed the creation of five large districts in which candidates would be elected according to proportional representation. In his project, the distribution according to rites was not taken into account.[87] The documentary evidence of the discussion surrounding Cayla's project is scarce, perhaps a reflection of how little importance Paris – and the Lebanese press – attributed to his ideas. A note of the general secretary mentioning Cayla's reform project, however, provides a glimpse into the reasoning of its opponents: The author poses the rhetorical question of what the benefits of a project like that of Cayla might be. He then proceeds to explain that the main advantage is that it breaks with confessional representation but regards this as unnecessary as the Lebanese already set up their own non-confessional lists in the existing system anyway. [88]

This was, of course, a very weak argument against the project; as noted above, these inter-sectarian electoral coalitions were prone to dissolving into communitarian parliamentary blocs as a result of the sectarian quotas used to distribute seats. Ignoring this outcome, the author notes that he was involved in elaborating the electoral law of 1922 and

[86] "Rapport Du General Sarrail, Document No. 6, La Situation Dans Les Pays Sous Mandat Pendant Les 10 Premiers Mois de 1925," 1925, CADN 363. [Report of General Sarrail, Document Nr. 6. The Situation in the Countries under the Mandate during the first 10 Months of 1925]
[87] "La Loi Electorale," *L'Orient Le Jour*, March 23, 1925. [The Electoral Law]
[88] "Note Pour Monsieur Le Secrétaire General. Reforme Électorale," February 2, 1925, CADN 452. [Note by Mr. Secretary General. Electoral Reform]

that at the time, 100 people were consulted who had no confessional bias and all of them approved the confessional distribution of seats. The system was thus satisfactory for the majority of Lebanese citizens. As always, however, his arguments reflect that the search for a representative system was coupled with a search for the system that promised greatest support for the French mandatory:

> Whether we want it or not, we have to recognize that our influence in Greater Lebanon is built on the population of a community which, always oppressed under the old regime, has turned towards us despite superficial criticisms [against us]. The rest of the population is either hostile or indifferent [toward us] […] The majority that is in our favour will be feeble.[89]

In addition, some members of this feeble minority would lose confidence in France and as a result, other seats would move away from pro-French forces.

He emphasizes that the existing system was well calculated, and that he 'would not want to taunt the little game of electoral prognostics.' [90] He further illustrates potential losses using the example of Tripoli, a Sunni stronghold in the north. Under the existing electoral system, the Maronite list would have *all* Maronite votes, and if the Muslims and the Greek Orthodox voted their own lists, then the Maronites will have a majority overall. However, if there was a shift of only 50 votes – which he considers quite plausible – from the Greek to the Muslim list, then Muslims and Maronites would have five seats each. [91] He feared exactly what the hypothetical system outlined above illustrated: Without

[89] Ibid. Original text: Qu'on le veuille ou non, nous devons bien reconnaitre que notre influence au Grand Liban s'appuie sur une population appartenant à une communauté qui, toujours opprimée sous l'ancien régime, s'est tournée vers nous malgré quelques critiques superficielles de sa part. le reste de la population est ou hostile ou indifférente [...] mais la majorité en notre faveur était faible.
[90] "Note Pour Monsieur Le Secrétaire General. Reforme Électorale," February 1925. Original text: Je ne voudrais pas tenter le petit jeu des pronostics électoraux
[91] Ibid.

sectarian quotas, voters were free to cast a non-sectarian vote and thus the pro-French communal balance would not be guaranteed.

> The proposed system is certainly more perfect than the old one, from a theoretical standpoint, but one might ask whether our role is to give the country political institutions that are a copy of ours from now on or if it is not above all to facilitate the accomplishment of our role as educators without trouble through a prudent policy.[92]

This French refusal to reform the electoral system must also be viewed against the backdrop of general political circumstances in the region. In 1925-6, France faced a formidable challenge at the hands of a Druze rebellion in Syria which also spilled over into parts of Lebanon. At the close of 1925, High Commissioner Henri de Jouvenel alerted the Foreign Ministry to the situation, expressing concerns that it was weakening France's situation also in Lebanon. It was thus necessary, he urged Paris, to consolidate the mandatory's position, particularly on the coast, where the territories most supportive of the mandate were located. It is in this context that the high commissioner announced to the Lebanese representative council that it could now begin to draft a constitution for Lebanon.[93] Under these circumstances, it comes as no surprise that successive French officials who considered electoral reforms rejected the abolition of the sectarian formula, which entrenched Maronite power, out of hand.

Once the decision-making body of the country had been sectarianized, reform from the inside became all but impossible. When writing Lebanon's Constitution, the French decided to leave matters of internal organization up to the Lebanese parliament while

[92] Ibid. Original text: Le système propose est certainement plus parfait que le système ancien du point de vue théorique, mais on peut se demander si notre rôle est bien de doter des maintenant le pays d'institutions politiques calquées sur les nôtres ou s'il n'est pas plutôt de nous ménager par une politique prudente la possibilité d'accomplir sans troubles et sans heurts notre mission d'éducateurs.
[93] "Jouvenel to Foreign Ministry," December 6, 1925, MAE, Syrie-Liban, Serie E, Carton 412, Dossier 1, 196, Situation Politique Interieur.

reserving matters of essential interest to France to the French legislative. When the Lebanese council discussed the foundational document, 216 representatives of commercial and professional groups, parties and religious leaders were consulted. Only 65% of questionnaires were returned; many representatives boycotted the constitutional process.[94] Out of the 132 responses received, only 11 expressed themselves against confessional quotas. All representatives condemned the system and hoped that it would be abolished in the future, but, they insisted, Lebanon's communities had different customs, mentalities and religious attitudes. Rejecting this system would break the balance between them and result in jealousy, resentment and maybe continuous trouble. Supporters of the quota system explained that:

> The parliamentary representation must reflect the physiognomy of the country and because it is divided into many communities, it is necessary that the communities are represented. Otherwise, the representation will not be fair […] the country is already imbibed with a confessional spirit; the moment has not come to sacrifice these prejudices and you cannot renounce a mentality that has existed for centuries in one day […] solidarity is not yet prepared to give predominance to patriotic solidarity over confessional solidarity.[95]

The argument against confessional representation was that it created 'an abnormal mentality in the different elements of the population'.[96] Just like Lord Dufferin had cautioned half a century earlier, they realized that the institutionalization of separate

[94] A meeting had taken place among Muslims in Beirut in which the decision was taken to collectively abstain from the constitutional process Hassan Hallaq, *Dirāsāt Fī Tārīkh Lubnān Al-Muʿāṣir, 1913-1943* (Beirut: Jamʿīyat Bayrūt al-Iṣlāḥīyah, 1985), 118.

[95] "Conseil Représentatif, Premier Séance Du 19 Mai 1926," 1926, CADN 452. [Representative Council, First Session of 19 May 1926]. Original text: La représentation parlementaire doit refléter la physionomie du pays et comme celui-ci est divisé en plusieurs communautés il est nécessaire que ces communautes soient représentées sinon la représentation ne serait plus fidèle […] Le pays est encore imbu de l'esprit confessionnel ; le moment n'est pas encore venu de sacrifier ces préjuges et on ne peut renoncer en un jour a une mentalité qui date depuis plusieurs siècles […] La solidarité n'est pas encore habitue à donner la prépondérance a la solidarité patriotique sur la solidarité confessionnelle.

[96] Ibid. Original text: L'esprit confessionnel est un foyer de maladies sociales et crée une mentalité anormale chez les différents éléments de la population.

communal identities could not foster peace. People would be encouraged to identify more strongly with their sect, thus making peaceful coexistence less likely. Maronite intellectual and political leader Michel Chiha – one of the key players on the constitutional committee – is often credited with devising Lebanon's consociational formula as a means to manage diversity.[97] Others, however, show that Chiha strongly opposed this system of government and that his opponents in the constitutional committee prevailed over him.[98] His view – shared by some respondent – remained that of a minority and did not prevail in the drafting process.

The tenacity of sectarian quotas

Almost a century later, the Lebanese discussion surrounding sectarian electoral formulas remains the same. Political leaders and citizens alike blame the country's maladies on political sectarianism and agree that the system needs to be reformed, that the most desirable alternative would be a nation-wide district with proportional representation.[99] Corruption, war and poverty, many argue, can all be traced back to a faulty electoral system as it has given disproportionate power to communitarian elites and acts as a mobilizing ideology which has driven the Lebanese into civil war repeatedly.[100] Small districts with quotas have put disproportionate power in the hands of a small elite and encouraged clientelism, which has further weakened the system's representativeness and

[97] Kais M Firro, "Lebanese Nationalism versus Arabism: From Bulus Nujaym to Michel Chiha," *Middle Eastern Studies* 40, no. 5 (2004): 1–27; Zisser, *Lebanon: The Challenge of Independence*, 32; Fawwāz Tarābulusī, *History of Modern Lebanon* (London: Pluto Press, 2007), 90.
[98] Fawwāz Tarābulusī, *Ṣilāt Bi-Lā Waṣl : Mīshāl Shīḥā Wa-Al-Aydiyūlūjiyā Al-Lubnānīyah* (Beirut: Riad El-Rayyes Books, 1999), 33 ftn. 9.
[99] For instance, "Al-Nitham Al-Intikhabi" (Beirut, n.d.), 3 [The Electoral System]; Haytham Mouzahem, "Al-Hukuma Al-Lubnaniyah Tuwajih Tahadi Iqrar Qanun Al-Intikhabat," *Al-Monitor*, December 2016 [The Lebanese Government Faces the Challenge of Deciding the Electoral Law].
[100] Informal interviews conducted for this thesis, Beirut, Lebanon, 29 October to 5 November 2017. See also Ali El Samad, "Le Découpage Électoral Au Liban: Une Lecture Géopolitique de La Loi de 2000," *L'Espace Politique* 3 (2007): 14 [The Electoral Division of Lebanon: A Geopolitical Reading of the 2000 Law]; Abdo Saad, "Le Système Electoral Majoritaire Freine l'avancée Démocratique," *Confluences Méditerranée* 1, no. 56 (2006): 109–14 [The Majoritarian Electoral System Stops Democratic Development].

responsiveness. Just like in 1926, however, the elites that hold the levers of power to reform the system are the very same that benefit from the system, thus making any large-scale reform unlikely.[101] Indeed, leaders have repeatedly averted the celebration of a new census due to the political risks associated with highlighting the inadequacies of the quota system established during the mandate period.[102] There is no doubt, then, that this system has had a lasting effect on the structure of the Lebanese political system.

A movement advocating electoral reform has been gaining pace in Lebanon in the past few years, and many of its suggestions (e.g. lowering the voting age, voting in the place of residence, voting rights for emigres) have now been adopted in the new electoral law of 2017. But the elimination of sectarian quotas, which their campaign also advocates, remains elusive. During the French mandate and thereafter, Lebanon's sectarian electoral system was repeatedly modified, with new districts being formed and others abolished, new electoral formulas and seat distributions being agreed. However, as one of the campaign's leaders explained in an interview for this dissertation, changes to the district size or the electoral formula have very little impact on the system as long as the sectarian quotas remain in place.[103] The central element of the French system, then, remains in place – it has been one of the main culprits of the Lebanese system's instability and one whose chances of reform are unlikely to improve in the near future. A national representative survey undertaken by the Lebanese Association for Democratic Elections in 2014 confirms how long-lasting the effect of this system has been. It shows how closely associated political

[101] Philippe Abi-Akl, "Pas de Nouvelle Loi Électorale sans Nouvel Équilibre Des Forces Dans La Région," *L'Orient Le Jour*, January 16, 2017 [No Electoral Law without a New Balance of Power in the Region]; Jeanine Jalkh, "Loi Électorale: L'Alternance, Bete Noir de La Classe Politique?," *L'Orient Le Jour*, January 16, 2017 [Electoral Law: Alternation, the Political Class' Pet Peeve?]; Salibi, *A House of Many Mansions: The History of Lebanon Reconsidered*, 196–97.
[102] Faour, "Religion, Demography, and Politics in Lebanon," 910.
[103] Interview with O.K. at the Lebanese Association for Democratic Elections, Beirut, Lebanon, 3 November 2017

participation and sectarian identity have become: Respondents who clearly identified with a sect were also the most engaged in politics.[104] As it is, there are no secular politics in Lebanon, and institutions and religious fragmentation have become mutually reinforcing.

Conclusion

As was the case with the definition of the boundaries of the Yishuv's and Lebanon's political systems, political principles and colonial objectives were instrumental in defining political identities within these entities. Britain once again prioritized governmental effectiveness over representativeness, this time by heeding the calls of the Zionist Organization and the Palestine administration to prevent the creation of several Jewish communities in Palestine. It rejected calls for the creation of a consociational system that were supported by the non-Zionist orthodox group Agudat Israel. Even though this chapter focussed on the discussion between the Zionist establishment and the latter, the importance of the issues discussed went far beyond this group. It was symbolic, for allowing political autonomy to one group could have led to the institutionalization of the Yishuv's neo-feudal structures, thus aiding the creation of a vertically divided society.[105] As the next two chapters will show, the creation of a strong political centre was a prerequisite for the emergence of a dominant vision of the state which in turn proved to be important for political stability in the first decade of statehood.

France, on the contrary, increased fragmentation in Lebanon by focusing on what divided the Lebanese rather than what united them. The electoral system forced sectarian representation, whether voters had a strong sectarian political identity or not. The mandatory had a choice to create an electoral system more conducive to national unity,

[104] Lebanese Association for Democratic Elections, "Opinion Poll on the Electoral Issues in Lebanon," 2014.
[105] Etzioni, "The Decline of Neo-Feudalism: The Case of Israel." See also chapter 1 of this dissertation.

notably an electoral system which distributed seats according to a proportional representation formula without considering sectarian quotas, as Leon Cayla attempted in 1926. However, to guard France's interest in Lebanon, such suggestions were dismissed out of hand. Once institutionalized, the system was all but impossible to change from the inside. In the next two chapters, we will discuss some of the consequences of this system, and of the sectarian principle in the Lebanese polity, on subsequent developments. It contributed to a strengthening of sectarian identities and made the political system incapable of dealing with the challenges of independence. The system's influence has extended long beyond the post-independence period, however, and is still blamed for many of Lebanon's political ills. The next chapter will show how the institutional logic and mechanisms discussed in this chapter translated into the rise of a dominant group to power within the Zionist Organization and the Yishuv. As a result, a dominant vision of the state could be imposed, thus reducing the salience of deep divisions and turning the Jewish Community of Palestine into a vertically divided society. It will further show how France's institutional strategy prevented such developments in Lebanon by institutionalizing a vertically divided society unable to engender a dominant vision of the state.

CHAPTER 6
THE ROAD TO A DOMINANT VISION OF THE STATE: ZIONIST EXCLUSION AND LEBANESE INTEGRATION OF THE INCOMPATIBLE

As chapter 4 has shown, the first half of the 1920s was a critical juncture in the political history of the Yishuv and Lebanon alike. Several institutional options were open to the mandatory powers. In the Yishuv, the mandatory could have opted for binational government with an Arab majority, binational government with consociational mechanisms, rule by an unrepresentative but popularly elected advisory council, and rule by British advisory council. Having failed to implement a legislative council with consociational mechanisms (quotas and minority veto), the mandatory chose to continue ruling through a British advisory council and to promote the self-government of each ethnic community separately until they could cooperate in a legislative council. It was this decision which allowed the Yishuv to develop the pre-state institutions which provided the basis for the State of Israel. By insisting on governability and the unity of the Yishuv, High Commissioner Herbert Samuel aided the community's transformation into a horizontally divided society.

But not all obstacles to the formation of a dominant vision of the state which would facilitate political stability in post-independence Israel had been removed. Within these institutions, a bitter fight for dominance was on the horizon, one that could have led to further fragmentation. If in the institutional design of *Knesset Israel* the role of the

mandatory had been instrumental, internal development was fully in the hands of Yishuv and Zionist leaders[1], and they continued the same tendency toward centralization:

> Being conscious of its responsibility for maintaining [this] unity, the leadership of the Zionist Organisation, which has no intention of suppressing deviant views within the organisation, feels obligated to raise its warning voice and to explain that the Zionist Organisation will counter destructive anarchy on an organisational and political level with all means at its disposal.[2]

Similarly, France had several options on the table. First, the decision was made that Greater Syria would be split up to safeguard France's interest through the isolation of its Maronite allies in Lebanon. Having split the countries into segments in 1920, it could have opted for a system that would gradually lead to the development of a dominant vision of the state among the Lebanese or, at the least, one flexible enough to accommodate the rise of new majorities as demographic realities evolved. Alas, once again to ensure the maintenance of its position in the Levant, it chose to retain and extend a consociational system which would result in a segmented social fabric rather than a more cohesive one. This decision set Lebanon on a definite path of communalism which would impact the country's political developments henceforth. Once this framework had been established, the communities – and thus their political visions – had an assigned stake within that framework. None of them was able to assert dominance, and therefore consensus could not be engineered, and incompatible visions were forced to coexist. As a result, the internal understanding could not be but one based on consociational formulas:

> Lebanon being made up of confessional minorities, there must be between them a permanent balance for a strong Lebanon. This

[1] One scholar has called this attitude on the part of the British mandatory 'policy of non-interference'. Sontheimer, "Bringing the British Back in: Sephardim, Ashkenazi Anti-Zionist Orthodox and the Policy of Jewish Unity," 2016, 169.
[2] The Executive of the Zionist Organisation, "Statement of the Zionist Executive Regarding the Resolutions of the World Union of Zionist Revisionists," December 7, 1931. [German]. CZA Z4-30234

> balance takes place within national representation, it is in the Chamber where it must be sought.[3]

These words, penned by Lebanese politician and intellectual Michel Chiha, would become a guiding principle of Lebanese politics. The country was viewed as inescapably fragmented; political fragmentation was thus a necessary consequence of the existing social fabric.

Internal Dissent and Discipline: The Elimination of the Incompatible Right

The words of the Zionist leadership reproduced above were penned against the organisation of the Zionist-Revisionists, whose leader, Vladimir Jabotinsky, is now considered one of the founding fathers of Israel[4] and whose followers are now credited with leading the Jewish revolt against the British in the 1940s. While this episode of the rewriting of the *Yishuv*'s history has not been met with wholesale acceptance – as liberals in Israel continue to hold negative views of the historical right – it is the flipside of the leftist myth of national unity in the pre-state period.[5] The documentary record shows that neither the myth of the left nor the myth of the right explain the emergence of a dominant vision of the state and

[3] Michel Chiha, "Liban 'Confessionnel,'" in *Politique Interieur* (Beirut: Fondation Michel Chiha, 1945), 45–46. Original text: Liban étant fait de minorités confessionnelles, il faut entre elles, pour que le Liban vive, un permanent équilibre. Cet équilibre c'est dans la représentation nationale, c'est dans la Chambre qu'il le faut chercher.

[4] His burial on Mountin Jerusalem, which serves as a memorial to the founding fathers, shows how much his role in Israeli historiography has changed. Jabotinsky died in the USA in 1940. After the establishment of the State of Israel, his colleague and friend Joseph Schechtmann asked Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion to allow the transfer of his body to Israel. The request was only granted in 1964, after Ben-Gurion had stepped down as Prime Minister, and when his successor, Levi Eshkol, pursued a policy of national reconciliation.

[5] For more on the Zionist narrative and Israeli national myths, see chapter 1 of this dissertation as well as Sternhell, *The Founding Myths of Israel: Nationalism, Socialism and the Making of the Jewish State*; Michael Feige, "Introduction: Rethinking Israeli Memory and Identity," *Israel Studies* 7, no. 2 (2002): v–xiv. Historiography reflected Mapai's dominance until the rise of Likud in the 1970s, see Eran Kaplan, *The Jewish Radical Right: Revisionist Zionism and Its Ideological Legacy* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2005), xi–xix.

thus a horizontally divided society. Rather, the documents point to the Zionist Organisation using all means at its disposal to thwart what it considered to be organisational and political anarchy. In other words, control by the dominant group rather than consensus led to a reduction of centrifugal tendencies. This chapter traces this critical organisational development within the Zionist Organization/Jewish Agency which aided the dominant group in attaining a monopoly over ideological power, turning it into an 'articulator of commitment' demanding loyalty from subordinate groups.[6] The remainder of the chapter discusses how visions of the state developed in Lebanon to show why no dominant vision came out ahead to reduce centrifugal tendencies.

Ha-Zohar: Revising the Zionist programme

When Vladimir Jabotinsky left the Zionist Executive in 1923 over what he viewed as the British government's anti-Zionist policies, he intended to retire from politics. Yet, within just one decade, he became the nemesis of the Zionist establishment, represented by its president Chaim Weizmann and the emerging leader of Mapai, David Ben-Gurion. By 1925, Berit Ha-Tzohar, the World Union of Zionist Revisionists, was constituted as a separate movement sending delegates to the Zionist Congress. One year later, the Revisionists counted branches in 18 countries and an executive with 14 members.[7] From the onset, Jabotinsky clearly formulated what separated him from his former colleagues at the Executive: He strove to create 'a Jewish majority in Palestine, West and East of the Jordan.' The idea was not revolutionary in itself: For many in the Zionist movement, historical Palestine extended beyond the Jordan River, and the need for a Jewish majority

[6] Horowitz, "Dual Authority Polities," 335.
[7] Colin Shindler, *The Triumph of Military Zionism* (London: I.B. Tauris, 2010), 91.

in Palestine was implicit in the very motivation of Zionism to end the state of exile of the Jewish people and to combat assimilation.

What Jabotinsky demanded now was for his formula to be endorsed as the officially stated goal of Zionism, regardless of the potential loss of non-Zionist Jewish support and of whatever little acquiescence there might have been on the Arab side. In his view, mainstream Zionism – embodied in both Labour and General Zionism – had sold its soul, the Herzlian ideal[8] of creating a Jewish home, to non-Zionist donors and rulers. Refusing to extend his blessings to such deviation, he insisted on a revision of the Zionist programme so as to return to this ideal.

Given the importance of keeping the definition of 'Jewish National Home' of the emerging mainstream ideology vague (see chapter 3, 4 and 5), it is not difficult to see how these ideas threatened the Zionist establishment and to what extent they were incompatible with its goals and strategies. Through successive Zionist congresses a vague definition of the Jewish National Home, behind which all parties to the state-building project could rally, had crystallized. The call for a Jewish majority – and possibly even a state – which the Revisionists initiated, clearly contradicted this hard-won consensus. Similarly, the Zionist establishment was very conscious of the need for British support, which was directly dependent on the extent to which Arab fears could be assuaged. Any pronunciation of goals that were clearly incompatible with Arab aspirations could have jeopardized the entire

[8] Even though Jabotinsky presented himself as the true heir to Herzlian Zionism, his interpretation thereof was as skewed toward his own goals and interest as that of other true heir to Herzlian Zionism, his interpretation thereof was as skewed toward his own goals and interest as that of other Zionist leaders. Jan Zouplna, "'State-Forming Zionism' and the Precedent for Leadership: T. Herzl, V. Jabotinsky and D. Ben-Gurion," *Asian and African Studies* 13, no. 1 (2004): 34.

project. Hence, despite sharing the goal of establishing a Jewish National Home in Palestine, the Revisionist programme was antithetical to the established consensus. [9]

Nevertheless, the struggle was not as much over ends as over means.[10] The Revisionists were well aware that they could not achieve much from the vantage point of an internal opposition, since there simply was no middle ground between their programme and the emerging Zionist consensus. Thus, from the very beginning, their plan was to conquer the Zionist Congress rather than to remain in perpetual opposition. Though at the end of the period which this chapter considers they established an independent power base, this was not their preferred outcome. All the power resources (e.g. funds, immigration certificates, access to the Mandatory and the League of Nations) were channelled through the Zionist Organization/Jewish Agency, and secession was political suicide – and both sides knew it. Thus, the Revisionists endeavoured to hang on to their connection with the Zionist Organization, in spite of their rhetoric to the contrary, whilst the latter was more than happy to assist a Revisionist suicide.

The Revisionist Threat

In the absence of a right-wing party within the Zionist movement,[11] support for the Revisionist Union grew rapidly both in the diaspora and in Palestine, as tables 6 and 7

[9] For a discussion of the ideological convictions which the revisionists shared with Labour, see Howard Isaac Rosenblum, "A Political History of Revisionist Zionism, 1925-1938" (Columbia University, 1986) PhD thesis.

[10] Yaacov Shavit, *Jabotinsky and the Revisionist Movement 1925-1948* (London: Frank Cass, 1988), 191.

[11] Within the ZO, the General Zionists could be described right-of-centre, but they lacked a comprehensive political programme. As it is, they were a varied group of Zionists who did not belong to either the workers' or the religious group. They were split into two factions, with faction A being liberal and centrist, and faction B being right of centre. In the Yishuv itself, the Sephardim and Yemenites were conservative but ethnically-based parties whereas the Farmers represented only their own sector. The revisionists filled this void even though, at least initially, their ideology was far from well defined. See Jan Zouplna, "Vladimir Jabotinsky and the Split within the Revisionist Union: From the Boulogne Agreement to the Katowice Putsch, 1931–33," *Journal of Israeli History* 24, no. 1 (2005): 35–63, http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/13531040500040065; Jan Zouplna, "Revisionist Zionism : Image , Reality and the Quest for Historical Narrative," *Middle Eastern Studies* 44, no. 1 (2008): 3–27.

below show. The ascent of the Revisionists developed similarly in both constituencies, with the limitation that the Jewish National Assembly (*Asefat Ha-Nivcharim*) elections took place only every 4-5 years and were suspended from 1931-1944. Moreover, after the assassination of Labour Zionist leader Chaim Arlosoroff (pinned on the Revisionists) in 1933[12]– and the resulting tensions between Mapai and the Palestine Revisionists – the latter left the Jewish community institutions in 1934 and remained outside of the system thereafter. As table 5 shows, the Revisionists started with 7.5% of the vote in Palestine (vs. 6-9% in Congress elections) in the 1920s and had doubled their electoral support by 1931 (14% in Palestine; 23% in the diaspora).[13] Meanwhile, the workers' movement registered losses. Ahdut Ha-Avoda and Ha-Poel Ha-Tza'ir merged into Mapai in 1930; while their combined strength was 41.9% in 1925, in 1931 it had fallen to 38%. Only by 1933 did the rise of Mapai become unstoppable. This chapter will show why.

[12] Chaim Arlosoroff was shot dead by the seaside in Tel Aviv on June 16th, 1933, in the presence of his wife. The murder was investigated as a political assassination from the very beginning, with the Revisionists being the prime suspects. A few days later three Palestinian Revisionists were in custody; one was sentenced to death for the murder. A subsequent investigation in 1985 showed that there was insufficient evidence to convict Avraham Stavsky while at the same time denying that it had been a conspiracy organised by Labour to besmirch the Revisionists. Shavit, *Jabotinsky and the Revisionist Movement 1925-1948*; David Ben-Gurion, *Letters to Paula* (London: Vallentine-Mitchell, 1968), 63–64. For a discussion of the effect which the Arlosoroff murder had on Yishuv politics and the standing of the Revisionists in the diaspora and the Yishuv see Pierre Atlas, "Defining the Fringe: Two Examples of the Marginalization of Revisionist Zionism in the 1930s," *Israel Studies Bulletin* 9, no. 2 (1994): 7–11; Lily Weissbrod, "Economic Factors and Political Strategies: The Defeat of the Revisionists in Mandatory Palestine," *Middle Eastern Studies* 19, no. 3 (1983): 337–39; Mitchell Cohen, *Zion and State: Nation, Class and the Shaping of Modern Israel* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1992), 158–59.

[13] When parties which allied with the Revisionists as an electoral bloc are considered, their electoral support rises to 21.5%. Weissbrod, "Economic Factors and Political Strategies: The Defeat of the Revisionists in Mandatory Palestine," 335. The same is true for the Zionist Congress where the Mizrachi and the General Zionist Group B was sympathetic to them; if there had been a formal alliance and voting discipline, this coalition could have formed absolute majority with their 146 out of 285 delegates.

Table 6: Revisionist union at Congress elections[14]

Zionist Congress year	**Revisionist Votes / Total**	**Revisionist Delegates/ Total**	**% votes**	**% delegates**
1927	**8,446**/123,729	**10**/281	**6.8**	**3.5**
1929	**18,000**/200,000	**21**/310	**9**	**6.7**
1931	**55,848**/233,730	**52**/285	**23.9**	**18.2**
1933	**99,729**/555,113	**45**/318	**17.9**	**14.1**

This impressive Revisionist performance caught mainstream Zionism unawares: Just one year before the 1931 Congress, a representative of the Zionist Executive to the Revisionist world conference in Prague dismissed Revisionist expectations that they might have up to fifty delegates as fantastic.[15] Table 1 shows that the Revisionists achieved 52 delegates at this Congress.

[14] "Minutes of the XV. Zionist Congress: Basel, August 30th until September 11th, 1927" (Basel: Zionist Organisation, 1927) [German]; "Minutes of the XVI. Zionisten Congress and the Foundational Session of the Council of the Jewish Agency for Palestine: Zürich, July 28th until August 14th, 1929" (Zürich: Zionist Organisation, 1929) [German]; "Minutes of the XVII. Zionist Congress and the Second Session of the Jewish Agency for Palestine: Basel, June 30th until July 17th, 1931" (Basel: Zionist Organisation, 1931) [German]; "Minutes of the XVIII. Zionist Congress and the Third Session of the Council of the Jewish Agency for Palestine: Prague, August 21st until September 4th, 1933" (Prague: Zionist Organisation, 1933). [German]. The discrepancy between the percentage of votes and the percentage of delegates derives from the fact that small constituencies and Erez Israel had a different conversion formula than the rest; each delegate cost more votes in some constituencies than in others.

[15] Unknown author, "Letter to Weizmann," August 15, 1930. WA 10-1409.

Table 7: Elections to the Jewish National Assembly, percentage of vote:[16]

	1920	**1925**	**1931**
Ahdut Ha-Avoda	**22,3%**	**26.9%**	**-----**
Sephardim	17.2%	0.5%	8.4%
Ha-Poel Ha-Zair	**13%**	**15%**	**----**
Mapai	**-----**	**-----**	**38%**
Farmers	5%	4.4%	-----
Revisionists	**----**	**7.5%**	**14%**
General Zionists	----	------	7%
Progressives	4.1%	------	----
Yemenites	3.8%	------	4.2%
Mizrachi	2.8%	8.5%	7%
Others	31.8%	37.2%	21.4%

No wonder, then, that the established workers' movement – which formed the first formal political parties in Palestine – and its ally in the diaspora, the General Zionists, grew concerned about the unexpected competition. As early as December 1926, a letter to Palestine Zionist Executive chairman Frederick Kisch advocated the start of an anti-Revisionist campaign with the Executive's support. Its author pointed out that some of Kisch's 'colleagues at the P.Z.E. are *also* interested in this question of fighting Revisionism'.[17] The timing of this correspondence comes as no surprise. Having just been

[16] Data from Burstein, *Self-Government of the Jews in Palestine since 1900*; "Results of Elections to Palestine National Assembly Announced," *The Sentinel*, December 18, 1925; "Final Election Results," *The Palestine Bulletin*, January 8, 1931.
[17] Unknown Author, "Letter to Kisch," December 30, 1926. CZA S25\696\4.

elected a member of the Yishuv's Executive[18], Jabotinsky had visited Palestine from the Revisionist headquarters in Paris in the autumn of 1926. The reaction to his arrival left no doubt about his impressive following:

> Mr. Jabotinsky was escorted by a crowd of friends from the SS 'Lotus' at the Jaffa Port to the Commercial Centre at Tel Aviv, where he was met by a procession of bicyclists and a number of automobiles with flags. At the level-crossing in Herzl Street, hundreds of people accorded him a rousing ovation. Further on, he was pelted with flowers. Hundreds of people joined the processions, until the way to Tel-Nordau, where his family residence was thronged with eager admirers of Jabotinsky. His house is now surrounded by a constant guard of honor of young men who change guards in true military style.[19]

One week later, the Revisionist leader gave a speech in front of 6,000 people in Jerusalem and a report to David Eder – member of the P.Z.E. – following this public appearance declared that around the person of Jabotinsky 'are collected the malcontents, and the spirit of grievance is [of course] fomented by hunger and disappointment.'[20] It was a time of economic depression in Palestine and the general population blamed the Zionist Executive for it.[21] Thus, the qualitative force of the movement was probably much larger than the electoral results above suggest. Even the President of the Zionist Organisation, Chaim Weizmann, feared that members of other parties also tended towards Revisionist views 'but do not have the courage to openly profess them.'[22] Overall, then, the Revisionists were clearly on the rise between 1925 and 1933, and the Zionist establishment sought to curtail this success.

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[18] "Resolutions of the Jewish National Assembly," *The Palestine Bulletin*, January 17, 1926.
[19] "Gala Welcome of Jabotinsky," *The Palestine Bulletin*, October 5, 1926.
[20] Unknown author, "Letter to Eder," October 21, 1926. CZA S25\696\4
[21] Report on a special meeting of the Jerusalem Zionist Executive, "To Ameliorate the Situation in Tel Aviv," *The Palestine Bulletin*, October 5, 1926.
[22] "The Interview of Dr. Weizmann with the ITA," 1931. Circulated by the Executive Committee of the WUZR to the delegates of the Zionist Congress. [German]. CZA, A123\107

The Zionist Push and the Revisionist Pull: From the Riots to Calais

On August 23rd, 1929, a year-long dispute over Jewish worship at the Wailing Wall erupted into unprecedented violence. Beginning in Jerusalem, it soon spread all over the mandated territory leaving 133 Jews dead, 67 of them in Hebron. Its repercussions, however, went far beyond its victims: The riots spelt an end to whatever possibility for Arab-Jewish collaboration there might have been hitherto,[23] they soured relations between the Zionist and the Mandatory[24] and they put the Revisionists on collision course with the Zionist establishment. The tension only abated when the Revisionists created the rival but largely unsuccessful New Zionist Organisation in 1935.

More often than not, the period between 1929 and 1935, which will be analysed in the remainder of this section, is described as the path to voluntary Revisionist secession.[25] This version of events is very much in line with the Zionist Organization's own. A 1940 pamphlet – whose explicit aim was to inform the public about the 'true nature' of Revisionism and to stop the movement's growth in the USA – states that 'their [the Revisionists'] consistent aim has been seizure of power' at all costs. 'When they could not

[23] Menachem Klein´s latest work on the interactions between the Jewish and Arab communities before 1948 even speaks of an emerging "Palestinian identity" between Jews and Arabs living in Palestine. After 1929, both nationalist movements became more fervent and exclusive, and segregation more pronounced. Klein, *Lives in Common: Arabs and Jews in Jerusalem, Jaffa and Hebron*. Also Hillel Cohen considers 1929 to be the most decisive year in the emergence of the Arab-Israeli conflict. For more on this argument and a detailed account of the riots by city, see Cohen, *Year Zero of the Arab-Israeli Conflict*.

[24] The Zionist Executive accused the Mandatory of neglect in the protection of Jews as well as failure to stem incitement and agitation in the months leading up to the riots. "Report of the Commission on the Palestine Disturbances of August, 1929", March, 1930. Aaron Klieman, *The Turn toward Violence, 1920-1929* (New York: Garland, 1987). In 1930, the Hope Simpson report recommended a slow-down in Jewish immigration which was integrated in to the Passfield White Paper, increasing the tension between Zionists and the Mandatory.

[25] For instance, Anita Shapira, *Israel: A History* (Waltham: Brandeis University Press, 2012); Avraham Avi-Hai, *Ben Gurion, State-Builder: Principles and Pragmatism, 1948-1963* (New York: Wiley, 1974); Yaacov Shavit and Joseph Schechtman, "Revisionists, Zionist," in *Encyclopedia Judaica*, ed. Michael Berenbaum and Fred Skolnik (Detroit: Macmillan Reference, 2007), 260–67.

persuade', the pamphlet adds, 'they seceded.'[26] While it is true that the Revisionists decided to set up a separate organisation instead of remaining within the Zionist Organization, they did so only after the latter had suspended their rights as a separate union (hereinafter, Sonderverband). Thus, this simplified portrayal of the Revisionists as a secessionist movement fails to explain the phenomenon and misses an opportunity to explain the rise of a state-building consensus within the Zionist movement.[27]

Contrary to the pamphlet's assertion that 'the disruptive and separatist activities of the Revisionists began at once', the majority within the World Union of Zionist-Revisionists (hereinafter, WUZR) endeavoured to delay separate action as much as possible. In fact, the Union's foundational document described the Revisionist Union as an 'integral part of the Zionist Organisation.' While in this same document the group reserved the right to lead independent political activities vis-à-vis the public, it also assured that it would safeguard 'the legitimate foreign policy prerogatives of the Zionist Executive.'[28] This was not merely a dead letter: The group showed itself highly cautious in its interactions with the League of Nations and the Mandatory. Revisionist Selig Soskin, for instance, had informal meetings with members of the Mandates Commission in 1929, but even in closed sessions, Revisionist leaders were adamant that these needed to be kept informal and personal.[29] As late as February 1930, Meir Grossman – a member of the WUZR Executive Committee – was quoted in a strongly confidential protocol of a plenary meeting of the

[26] *Revisionism a Destructive Force* (New York: Emergency Committee for Zionist Affairs, 1940).
[27] Secession was due to a combination of the Revisionists' own actions and those of the ZO. Jan Zouplna's account of the developments within the Revisionist movement in the early 1930s argues that internal Revisionist divisions were to blame for its demise. Zouplna, "Vladimir Jabotinsky and the Split within the Revisionist Union: From the Boulogne Agreement to the Katowice Putsch, 1931–33." Because this chapter is more interested in institutional developments within the ZO, the discussion will not delve on internal Revisionist divisions.
[28] World Union of Zionist Revisionists, "Principles of Revisionism," 1929. [German]. JA G1/1
[29] The role of Soskin in Geneva is discussed repeatedly in Executive Committee meetings over the course of 1929. JA G2/1-5

Executive as saying: 'the authority to refer ourselves directly to the Colonial Office is superfluous.' Adding that 'also in Geneva, our work should be carried on as usual, i.e. informatively and unofficially […] as a consequence of the prerogatives of the Zionist Executive.'[30] Members, to whom the copy of the minutes was directed, were urged not to directly approach the Mandates Commission.

In the aftermath of the 1929 riots – whose mismanagement the Revisionists blamed on the Zionist Executive as much as the mandatory – the organization demanded the convocation of an emergency congress and the establishment of an interim Zionist Executive which would reflect the electoral strength of all forces, including themselves. Both proposals were rejected by the supreme Zionist authority between congresses, the Zionist General Council. In explaining the decision, Chaim Weizmann stated that he could not cooperate with a group which remained outside of the Jewish Agency.[31] It was in this context that the Revisionist Executive Committee discussed the possibility of constituting a Sonderverband for the very first time.[32] It follows that the Revisionists were not initially a secessionist movement seeking independence from the Zionist movement. Rather, they reacted to a Zionist Organization seeking to rid itself of the Revisionists. Indeed, even despite the mounting tensions with the Zionist mainstream, the Revisionist rank-and-file rejected the proposal to form a Sonderverband in a 1929 referendum.[33] It was a provision which allowed groups with a following of at least 20,000 Shekel-payers (the membership fee) to exist within the Zionist Organization without the need to work within the framework

[30] Executive Committee of the World Union of Zionist Revisionists, "Minutes of the Plenary Meeting of the Executive Committee," February 1930. [German]. JA G2/1-5
[31] "Revisionists Declared Will Remain within Zionist Organisation but Will Continue Struggle against Leadership," *The Sentinel*, October 18, 1929. The Revisionists rejected cooperation with non-Zionists and had thus remained on the margins of the Jewish Agency, created in 1929, while remaining within the Zionist Organization.
[32] World Union of Zionist Revisionists, "Minutes of Meeting of Executive Committee," September 26, 1929. JA G2/1-5
[33] Executive Committee of the World Union of Zionist Revisionists, "Minutes of Plenary Meeting of Executive Committee," December 1929. [German]. JA G2/1-5

of the national Zionist federations. This would thus have been an opportunity for greater autonomy and disassociation from the Zionist Organisation. The wholesale rejection of the Sonderverband proposal serves to reject the thesis that the eventual split of WUZR from the Zionist Organization in 1935 was simply the result of a long-term campaign to secede.

In the meantime, however, the animosity caused by the purported Zionist blame for the riots was compounded by the mandatory's new policy. In May 1930, the Palestine government communicated to the Zionist Executive that previously approved immigration certificates were suspended, pending the release of the Hope Simpson report which investigated the cause of the riots.[34] In an attempt to allay British and Arab fears regarding Jewish immigration, Chaim Weizmann – with the support of the Zionist General Council – responded by declaring that 'the essence of Zionism is not so much the Jewish State as the creation of material conditions for the establishment of an autonomous productive community.'[35] To the statist Revisionists, now was the time to draw a clear line between the dominant Zionist narrative embodied by Weizmann and their own: The Zionist Organization had to be pushed to clearly defining its ultimate objective.[36]

At a preparatory meeting for the 17th Zionist Congress, at which these matters would come to a head, Vladimir Jabotinsky, who had for years advocated a fight to conquer the Zionist Congress, announced his intention to 'search for a different possibility' should his struggle over the next year fail to put the Executive in his hands. He realized that his conquering the Zionist Organization was unlikely given the inherent incompatibilities between his vision and that of the mainstream. Hence, Jabotinsky's ultimatum to the Zionist

[34] "Jewish Protest Meetings, Suspended Immigration," *The Manchester Guardian*, June 5, 1930; "Suspension of Jewish Immigration," *The Palestine Bulletin,* May 18, 1930.
[35] "Meeting of the Zionist General Council," *The New Judaea,* September 1930; Chaim Weizmann, *Trial and Error* (New York: Harper and Borthers, 1949), 332–33.
[36] Executive Committee of the World Union of Zionist Revisionists, "Circular Letter No.2/II," September 19, 1930. JA G2/2-1.

Organisation: 'Either a Revisionist programme […] or we leave the Zionist Organisation.'[37] In the ensuing debate, Jabotinsky was rebuked by his peers, with German Revisionist Richard Lichtheim – who would later emphatically oppose leaving the Zionist Organization – forecasting what was to come:

> It would be a big mistake if we left now, because the others are still too strong, and we are yet too weak. We would become isolated in the Jewish nation and we would be unable to achieve anything politically. The British government would view us as a wild mob. In that case, the apparatus of the Zionist Organisation could be strengthened.[38]

Thus, their predicament was the same as any group choosing to remain outside Knesset Israel. The levers of power and the financial opportunities were in the hands of the institutionalized political centre represented by the Zionist Organisation and the Jewish Agency. Remaining on the margins was a sure recipe for failure.

Their drive to conquer the 1931 Zionist Congress yielded impressive results. They had been able to capitalize on the public discontent following the riots and the 1930 White Paper, which limited Jewish immigration and land purchases in Palestine. The Revisionists attracted over 23% of the vote (see table 4 above), which translated into 52 delegates, 21% of the Congress. The workers' parties were still ahead, with 75 delegates, but neither of them could form a majority of their own. Those most inclined to support Mapai, the General Zionists A, mustered only 25 delegates. Between the General Zionists B, the Mizrachi party and themselves, the potential revisionist alliance numbered 146 out of 287 delegates. When Weizmann first announced that the Executive did not aspire to a Jewish majority in Palestine, the Mizrachi party had immediately withdrawn its delegates from the Executive.

[37] World Union of Zionist Revisionists, "Minutes of the Ninth (Closed) Session of the IV World Conference of the Zionist Revisionists, Our Relationship with the Zionist Organisation," August 13, 1930. [German]. JA G2/7-1-3.
[38] Ibid. [German]. JA G2/7-1-3

Like the Radicals and the Revisionists, this coalition emphatically demanded Weizmann's resignation. It was quite conceivable for some of these parties to vote in unison, maybe even to create a new (Revisionist-dominated) Executive.

It is thus not surprising that David Ben-Gurion would describe the 17th Congress as the most 'difficult, nerve-racking and critical' he had ever attended.[39] The call for the definition of Zionism's final aim dominated the agenda, and while the Mizrachi party and the General Zionists B grouped together against the majority on several actions, they did not lend their support to the Revisionist formulation of Zionism's objective as 'commonwealth with a Jewish majority.' After this resolution was voted down by all but the Revisionists, Jabotinsky famously ripped his delegate card into pieces clamouring 'this is not a Zionist Congress' and walked out with his followers.[40] Jabotinsky had failed in his proclaimed last attempt to conquer the Zionist Congress. But the conclusion drawn by the WUZR was a different one.

In another show of its eagerness to remain within the Zionist Organization, a post-congress circular to its members spoke of Revisionist success.[41] Of course, such reinterpretation of the results required a redefinition of the objectives with which the Union had participated in the Congress. In this new version of events, the Revisionist goal had been to 'elucidate' the aim of Zionism and to disavow Brit Shalom[42]; to remove Weizmann; and to adopt a new political course under the guidance of new men. The devil was in the details: What the Revisionists had really wanted was for the congress to unequivocally call

[39] Ben-Gurion, *Letters to Paula*, 57.
[40] "Minutes of the XVII. Zionist Congress and the Second Session of the Jewish Agency for Palestine: Basel, June 30th until July 17th, 1931," 398.
[41] On the different interpretations of the Congress by Jabotinsky and Grossman see Zouplna, "Vladimir Jabotinsky and the Split within the Revisionist Union: From the Boulogne Agreement to the Katowice Putsch, 1931–33," 45, 49.
[42] A small intellectual movement in mandatory Palestine advocating peaceful coexistence between Jews and Arabs and opposing the creation of a Jewish state.

for a Jewish majority in Palestine. Weizmann had been removed, but originally, the Revisionists had called for the replacement of the entire Zionist leadership. Nor was the political course changed: The MacDonald letter, which reinterpreted the White Paper in terms less detrimental to the Zionists, was endorsed as a basis for continued cooperation, just like Weizmann had recommended. Very little – if anything – had changed.

While confirming the continuation of its struggle for the complete implementation of the Revisionist programme by the Zionist Organisation, everything about the circular points to an attempt to show the Revisionist masses that the Union was on its way to conquering the Congress.[43] Only a minority within the WUZR – led by Jabotinsky – continued to feel uneasy about membership in the Zionist Organization, under the circumstances confirmed by the Congress.[44] In order to prevent their split from the Revisionist Union – more specifically, the loss of Jabotinsky – a series of resolutions were passed at a meeting of the Revisionist Executive in Calais, on September 28th-29th, 1931. Henceforth, the Union would include both Shekel-payers (voting members of the Zionist Organization) and non-Shekel payers, with the former being under the direction of the Shekel-paying members of the Revisionist Executive. As a result, in theory, non-Shekel-payers could not dictate policy for members of the Zionist Organisation. At the same time, however, all of them would be subjected to Revisionist discipline. In exchange for the majority compromise to accept the minority non-Shekel-payers among their ranks, the latter would refrain from mentioning the creation of a separate Zionist organisation.[45]

[43] Executive Committee of the World Union of Zionist Revisionists, "Circular Letter No. 13/2," August 1931. JA G2/2-1.
[44] For an account of the divisions within the Revisionist movement and their effect on the movement's overall success see Zouplna, "Vladimir Jabotinsky and the Split within the Revisionist Union: From the Boulogne Agreement to the Katowice Putsch, 1931–33."
[45] "Von Der Union Der Zionisten-Revisionisten," *Die Neue Welt*, October 2, 1931. [From the Union of Zionist-Revisionists]

As the next section shows, it was the struggle over these resolutions which ultimately led to the exclusion of the moderate Revisionists (who advocated remaining within the ZO) and the secession of the radical Revisionist (who refused to compromise) from the Zionist organisation. The Zionist Organization cited this Calais compromise as the reason for excluding the Revisionists from the Organization: They had established a discipline separate to that of the Zionist Executive, thus impinging upon its prerogatives. In reality, the idea of exclusion preceded the Calais compromise. Wittingly or unwittingly, the keynote speaker of the 1931 Congress had foretold future developments. While highlighting the freedom that groups within the Zionist movement enjoyed within the 'Herzlian framework', he argued that precisely because the Organisation was voluntary and defenceless against saboteurs, safeguarding discipline was all the more important. Whosoever besmirched the elected leadership, he concluded, 'excluded himself from the organisation.'[46]

The final stretch: Expulsion of the moderates and secession of the radicals

Following the invitation extended at Calais for local Revisionist chapters to make their decision, by mid-October the German Revisionist union resolved to leave the German Zionist Federation. Unilateral actions like these, the Zionist Executive explained, could only 'lead to anarchy'.[47] The German Zionist Federation drew immediate consequences: Individual membership in the Federation was rendered incompatible with membership in

[46] "Minutes of the XVII. Zionist Congress and the Second Session of the Jewish Agency for Palestine: Basel, June 30th until July 17th, 1931," 108–10. [German]
[47] The Executive of the Zionist Organisation, "Regarding the Withdrawal of the Revisionists from the Zionist Federation of Germany," November 1931. [German]. CZA Z4-30234

the Revisionist Union.[48] The Austrian Zionist Committee followed suit.[49] Two months later, the Zionist Executive issued its official response to the Calais compromise, explaining that the WUZR's resolutions were tantamount to a declaration of war on the whole Zionist Organisation. They paved the way for the Union to legitimize 'illegal' independent political activities which it had been performing all along.[50] It is now that the Executive uttered the words quoted in the introduction to this chapter: The threat of anarchy had to be averted by all means possible.

In a secret meeting of its Zionist Actions Committee in July 1932, the Zionist Organisation now defined concrete actions to deal with the situation created at the Revisionist Calais Conference of the previous year. A discipline clause was introduced which explicitly bound all members to the decisions of the Zionist bodies and banned independent political activity.[51] Under the proviso that the Revisionists would follow Zionist discipline, however, they would be allowed to form a Sonderverband. Much to the Zionists' dismay, the Revisionists endorsed their own discipline clause in unanimity just one month later at their world conference in Vienna.[52] In practice, this meant that

[48] Geschäftsführender Ausschuss der Zionistischen Vereinigung für Deutschland, "Membership in the Revisionist Country Federation in Germany Is Incompatible with Membership in the Zionist Federation of Germany," n.d. [German]. CZA Z4-30234

[49] Zionistisches Landeskommittee Wien, "Letter to the Zionist Executive," November 19, 1931. [German]. CZA Z4-30234

[50] The Executive of the Zionist Organisation, "Statement of the Zionist Executive Regarding the Resolutions of the World Union of Zionist Revisionists," December 7, 1931. [German]. CZA Z4-30234

[51] Most parties present at the Congress had emerged within the organisation and membership overlapped. The labour party Mapai had a varied membership in Palestine, but numbers of their electorate in both constituencies suggest that members of the party were also Shekel payers. Furthermore, their constitutive documents declared that decisions had to be made in line with the Zionist Executive. David Ben-Gurion et al., "The Platform and Agreement of Unity of Ahdut Haadova with Hapoel Hazair," *1929*, n.d. [Hebrew]. LPA 2-21-1929-10.

[52] Executive Committee of the World Union of Zionist Revisionists, "Final Session, Vienna Conference of the World Union of Zionist Revisionists" (Vienna, 1932). [German]. JA G2/7-4-3

Revisionist dictates would be prioritized over those of the Zionist Organization. The matter was now referred to the Zionist court of honour[53], whose attorney interpreted the case thus:

> These are cases where mildness is uncalled for. We are dealing with a struggle for the survival of the Zionist Organisation [which] cannot be carried through with compromises […] An example has to be made of this separate union. We cannot work with individual Revisionists […] unless the organisation […] is broken as such.[54]

These words bear striking resemblance to the concerns voiced by High Commissioner Samuel and P.Z.E. chairman Kisch during debates about the right to establish separate Jewish communities in Palestine (see chapter 5). An example had to be made to discourage others with a similar spirit of independence. Following the attorney's entreaty, the court resolved to suspend the rights of the Revisionist Sonderverband for six months, recommending that the Executive of the Zionist Organisation dissolve it *sine die*. Jabotinsky was not going to wait for that definite decision. When in March 1933 the moderate Revisionists in the WUZR Executive voted down his proposal for the establishment of a separate Zionist Organisation at its meeting in Kattowicz, he responded to the call for authoritarian leadership which had been voiced by the Palestine Revisionists a year earlier. He dissolved his executive unilaterally and, with the support of the Betar youth organisation, appointed himself as the sole leader of the Revisionist movement. In the meantime, the now dismissed members of the Revisionist Executive pledged to

[53] The Executive of the Zionist Organisation, "Minutes of Meeting of Zionist Executive," November 2, 1932. WA 2-507L; The Executive of the Zionist Organisation, "Minutes of the 32nd Meeting of the Zionist Executive," October 6, 1932. WA 6-507L; The Executive of the Zionist Organisation, "Minutes of the 31st Meeting of the Zionist Executive," September 29, 1932. WA 7-507L. The Zionist Court of Honour was charged with handling internal Zionist affairs.

[54] Court of Honour of the Zionist Organisation, "Minutes of the Session of the Court of Honour of the Zionist Organisation," January 5, 1933. [German]. CZA L14-193. During the XVIII. Zionist Congress, Berl Locker spoke of the discipline question with a similar sense of urgency as meaning the difference between the 'existence or non-existence of the Zionist Organisation as an organisation with a unitary political will.' "Minutes of the XVIII. Zionist Congress and the Third Session of the Council of the Jewish Agency for Palestine: Prague, August 21st until September 4th, 1933," 154. [German].

constitute their own Sonderverband by the name of 'Jewish State Party'. The court of honour had thus succeeded in breaking the organization.

The Zionist Organisation showed little sympathy for the revisionist moderates who wished to form a Sonderverband. In a letter explaining his absence from the 1933 congress, Chaim Weizmann emphasized the need to keep as far away as possible from the Revisionists. Nonetheless, he refused to comment publicly on a rumour that he requested that the Revisionists be excluded from the organisation for him to participate in the congress.[55] To judge from what was going on behind the scenes, however, the rumour is credible: Around the same time, the organisation department consulted with its attorney as to whether there was a legal basis for denying Jabotinsky's candidature to the Congress.[56] No such basis could be found, but it shows to what lengths the Zionist Executive was willing to go to preclude Revisionist presence at the congress. The followers of Jabotinsky thus participated in the congress grouped into a bloc of 45 delegates by the name of 'Union of Zionist-Revisionists', whereas the moderate group only mustered 7 delegates, by the name of 'Jewish State Party'. The latter declared its loyalty to the Zionist Organisation and disavowed the Calais resolutions.[57]

At the 1933 Zionist Congress, a resolution to strengthen the power of the Executive and the court of honour against breaches of Zionist discipline was adopted by a sweeping majority.[58] Aside from petty bickering between party leaders, the Revisionists were side-lined; their programme was simply not on the table anymore. This time around, the general debate revolved around the things to come: The rise of labour, its monopolization of the Congress and the Yishuv, and the threat that this posed to other currents of thought and

[55] Chaim Weizmann, "Telegram to Berl Locker," August 24, 1933. WA 14-1658
[56] A. Barth, "Letter to the Organisation Department," August 1, 1933. [German]. CZA Z4-30232
[57] "Minutes of the XVIII. Zionist Congress and the Third Session of the Council of the Jewish Agency for Palestine: Prague, August 21st until September 4th, 1933," 240. [German].
[58] Ibid., 134–37.

activity within the Zionist world. The Congress' centre of attention had shifted away from diaspora politics to Palestine, to the economic structure of the Yishuv, to the importance of the worker and his pioneering efforts. In other words, the future dominant ideology was the main point of discussion. The labour-General Zionist coalition which formed the Executive after the 18th Congress is the best reflection of this rising ideological consensus.[59] Ben-Gurion had sought and found a broad consensus – with everyone apart from the Revisionists.[60] By 1935, Jabotinsky's faction of the Revisionist movement had seceded and created the New Zionist Organisation. With much of its manpower gone – and its Sonderverband dissolved by the Executive[61] – the moderate Revisionists remained a rather insignificant force, unable to pose a serious challenge to the dominant party, Mapai. In other words, 'the threat from the right had been crushed.'[62]

A similar process of exclusion and secession of the Revisionists occurred in the Yishuv itself. Due to the superior importance of the Zionist Organization/Jewish Agency in the effort of centralization that this dissertation seeks to explain, this process will not be discussed in as much detail. However, a few words are in order to paint a picture of the local situation. The Revisionists lacked a worldwide structure, and communication with national Revisionist groups was deficient. As a result, policies and activities in Palestine did not always reflect official WUZR policy. This resulted in continuous conflict with the mother party, which pursued a more centrist and diplomatic policy than the Palestinian representatives.[63] The Palestinian Revisionists walked out of sessions of Yishuv institutions

[59] Selig Brodetsky (GZ), David Ben-Gurion (W), Jitzchak Grünbaum (GZ), Avigdor Jacobson (GZ), Berl Locker (W), Louis Lipsky (GZ), Elieser Kaplan (W), Moshe Shertok (W), Arthur Ruppin (GZ).
[60] Ben-Gurion, *Letters to Paula*, 67.
[61] The Executive of the Zionist Organisation, "Report of the Activities of the Organisation Department of the Executive, September 1933 - February 1934," 1934. [German]. CZA Z4-30237
[62] Avi-Hai, *Ben Gurion, State-Builder: Principles and Pragmatism, 1948-1963*, 30.
[63] For examples of such conflicts see Executive Committee of the World Union of Zionist Revisionists, "Report about the Session of the Executive Commitee," November 10, 1930. [German] JA G2/1-5. Executive Committee of the World Union of Zionist Revisionists, "Minutes of the Meeting of the Executive Committee

on several occasions without consulting with the Revisionist executive in London, something which the latter deeply resented. It was probably due to independent actions of this sort that a Revisionist discipline clause was introduced at Calais. At the same time, Palestinian Revisionism cannot be viewed as a homogenous movement; at one stage, a group attempted to secede from the recognized Palestinian Revisionist group and gain recognition from London as a separate local chapter.[64] Nonetheless, due to the prominence of its leaders, Abba Ahimeir and Uri Zvi Greenberg, Palestinian Revisionism on the whole became associated with the extreme right-wing fringe of the movement.[65]

In a letter to the 1932 Vienna Conference – at which he was attacked as a traitor to the Revisionist cause by this Palestinian faction – Richard Lichtheim described them as a group whose politics were 'a combination between nihilism and romantic putschism.'[66] Interviews conducted for this dissertation show that this perception was wide-spread. One account described them as 'narrow-minded, secretive, extreme, 'anti', and always aggressive'.[67] Another account used similar words to describe Palestinian Revisionism: 'They were narrow-minded: Whereas the left discussed different ideas, […] the right had one way and one way only.' When asked whether one might have friends on both sides, a

of the WUZR," February 1931. [German]. JA G2/1-5. Executive Committee of the World Union of Zionist Revisionists, "Minutes of the Meeting of the Executive Committee," September 9, 1931. [German] JA G2/1-5. For information about the internal conflict between the World Union and the Palestinian 'maximalists' see Shindler, *The Triumph of Military Zionism*. Especially Chapter 10.

[64] Revisionists, "Minutes of the Meeting of the Executive Committee."

[65] For an insight into their rhetoric and attitudes see World Union of Zionist Revisionists, "Minutes of the General Debate, Vienna Conference of the World Union of Zionist Revisionists" (Vienna, 1932). [German]. JA G2/7-4-3. For an overview of the Brit Habiryonim movement which Ahimeir and Greenberg led refer to Yonathan Shapiro, *The Road to Power, Herut Party in Israel* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1991), 43–49; Shindler, *The Triumph of Military Zionism*, 160–62.

[66] Richard Lichtheim, "Letter to the World Conference of Zionist-Revisionists," August 25, 1932. [German]. JA G2/7-4-2.

[67] Zaha Kheir, "Interview with Shoshana L.," April 28, 2016. Shoshana was born in the United States, in 1928, to a Palestinian Jewish mother whose family were Sephardic Jews settled in Jerusalem for generations. At age 7, she returned to Jerusalem where she lived for most of her life.

deep mutual distrust was described.[68] They were also described as outsiders, as pariahs who caused much damage in the Yishuv.[69]

The arrest and trial of a handful of Revisionists – including leader Abba Ahimeir – for the murder of labour leader Chaim Arlosoroff in 1933 thus came as no surprise. The campaign waged against the Revisionists thereafter lead the Palestine Revisionists to leave the organized Yishuv. Their most prominent political activity thereafter was their armed resistance against the British in the 1940s, about which much has been written and which is not germane to this dissertation. What matters is that they remained outside of the Yishuv's political institutions, which as chapter 5 explained, were the sole channel for political representation, immigration and social services. With it, the way to the rise to power of the dominant group and its vision of the state was paved.

Including the ideologically incompatible: Sunnis and Christians in Lebanon

The above has shown serious disagreements regarding the ultimate goal of Zionism – i.e. the vision of the state. In Lebanon, the disagreements outlined in chapters 4 and 5 were of similar tenor. In the case of the Zionist movement, the lack of mandatory involvement in its internal affairs made it possible for deep divisions within this institution to be resolved internally, through the exclusion of a large incompatible movement. It was thus that the path for the emergence of a dominant vision of the state was made possible. In Lebanon, steps previously taken by France made a similar solution impossible. Faced with irreconcilable differences regarding the identity of Lebanon, the Lebanese equivalent of Revisionist exclusion from the Zionist Organisation would have been a reduction of

[68] Zaha Kheir, "Interview with Bracha S.," April 6, 2016. Bracha was born in Palestine, in 1928, and was part of the Palmach, a left-leaning paramilitary group.
[69] Zaha Kheir, "Interview with Chanan I.," April 18, 2016. Chanan was born in Germany, in 1933, and came to Palestine in 1938. He did not participate in any political activities after his arrival.

Lebanon's territory, i.e. a return to Mount Lebanon. In Greater Lebanon, excluding the separatists from the decision-making process could only have meant the physical separation of Muslim majority areas from Lebanon altogether. As this section will show, both Sunnis and – to a certain extent, Maronites – might have been willing to accept such a solution. Indeed, the Sunni's willingness to reach a compromise vision of the state was the result not of a genuine acceptance of the political entity, but of a closing of options by the mandatory. The opportunity structures[70] that the mandatory created were such that it forced the emergence of a weak compromise, expressed the vague mutual acceptance of incompatible visions of the state (Chapter 7).

This section will start by considering the divisions which continued to persist between pro-Lebanese and pro-Arab forces after the promulgation of the 1926 constitution, a process that was briefly discussed in the preceding chapter. It will then discuss the obstacles which prevented the exclusion of the demographically dominant yet politically isolated Sunni population. Finally, it will show how these deep divisions became consequently the basis of the Lebanese system which was definitively entrenched when Lebanon declared its independence, in 1943 (chapter 7).

Separatist tendencies versus cooperation, 1926-1936

During the 1930s, the separatist Sunni community of Lebanon moved slowly towards acceptance of Greater Lebanon, providing an opportunity for the emergence of a dominant vision of the state. As the previous chapter showed, the 1920 creation of Greater Lebanon

[70] The term 'political opportunity structure' has been applied widely in social movement literature to designate the conditions which enable and/or constrain the actions of political actors. A useful way of defining the concept is by focusing on its dimensions: the relative openness or closure of the institutionalized political system; the stability or instability of that broad set of elite alignments that typically undergird a polity; the presence of absence of elite allies; the state's capacity and propensity for repression. Doug McAdam, "Conceptual Origins, Current Problems, Future Directions," in *Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements: Political Opportunities, Mobilizing Structures, and Cultural Framings*, ed. Doug McAdam, John D. McCarthy, and Mayer N Zald (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 27.

had done nothing to change the opposition of the now 'Lebanese citizens' who had been integrated into the new state against their will. In her seminal 1973 work on the attitude of Lebanese Sunnis towards the state of Lebanon, Najla Atiyeh goes as far as asserting that even at the time of her writing, this attitude continued to be 'the major problem of the state of Lebanon'.[71] Far from shelving their opposition, they demonstrated it by boycotting the elections to the first legislative council, in 1922, and by refusing to participate in the consultations conducted apropos the drafting of the 1926 constitution.[72] Shia opposition was deactivated much more easily. This group had been considered a heretical sect under Sunni empires and had thus never enjoyed self-government. By approving the Jafari rite as the basis of the new, legalized community, France ensured itself the support of the second largest Muslim group in the country. Notwithstanding Sunni resistance, the very approval of the constitution and the celebration of elections on a national basis were undeniable signs that the Lebanese entity had become a fait accompli.[73]

In theory, however, the state was not to be dominated by any one group and its dominant vision of the state. On the contrary, as chapter 5 showed, the system was to be characterized by consociational mechanisms. Michel Chiha had emphasized the virtues of Lebanon's multinational past and argued that for the country to survive, there had to be a balance between the communities, as quoted above. The version of Lebanese nationalism which triumphed in the constitution was the Lebanon of minorities, a country defined by diversity. Instead of asserting Lebanon's Phoenician origins, as Maronite thinkers had done in the past[74], Chiha emphasized that the history of Lebanon belonged to many races,

[71] Najla Wadih Atiyah, "The Attitude of the Lebanese Sunnis towards the State of Lebanon" (University of London, 1973), 2 Phd thesis.
[72] Pierre Rondot, "Lebanese Institutions and Arab Nationalism," *Journal of Contemporary History* 3, no. 3 (1968): 41–42.
[73] Huda Razq, *Lubnān Bayna Al-Waḥdah Wa-Al-Infiṣāl, 1919-1927* (Beirut: Beisan Lilnashar w'Attawziya'a, 1998), 125.
[74] For instance Henry Lammens, M.Jouplain/Paul Noujaim, and patriarch Elias Hoyek. See Kaufman, "Phoenicianism: The Formation of an Identity in Lebanon in 1920."

creating a unique melting pot in which no one element dominated. Once again, this version ensured the survival of the multicultural heritage which Lebanon stood for, but it also made cooperation more difficult given a lack of shared political goals in the new state.

Sunni opposition to the state of Lebanon changed between 1920 and 1943, through a process by which this community – or rather, their political and commercial elites – ceased to emphasize identification with the worldwide (and particularly Syrian) Sunni community and began to view themselves as members of a specifically Lebanese Muslim community.[75] As historian Patrick Seale describes it in his extensive work on Riad Al-Solh's life, the Sunnis of Saida, Tripoli and Beirut felt equally at home on the coast and in the Syrian interior. As a matter of fact, they had strong family and business ties with the rest of Syria and strongly identified with the Sunnis of the interior.[76] However, the shift that would occur did not eliminate identification with their Syrian brothers, and the emphasis in the compound term 'Sunni-Lebanese' would continue to be on the former rather than the latter. This, as will be discussed in Chapter 7, continued to be a factor weakening the Lebanese system well into the 20th century.

During the first years of Lebanon's existence, France was only able to co-opt a limited number of Muslim leaders for the cause of pro-French Greater Lebanon. Tracing the tone in Muslim political periodicals, Najla Atiyah shows that the Muslim attitude followed French policy rather than ideological preferences. The inauguration of a new, more liberal policy towards the Sunnis initiated by General Sarrail upon the request of French Prime Minister Édouard Herriot ushered in a period of goodwill toward the mandatory and tacit acceptance of the Lebanese entity. [77] Sarrail dissolved parliament and

[75] Atiyah, "The Attitude of the Lebanese Sunnis towards the State of Lebanon," 105.
[76] Patrick Seale, *The Struggle for Arab Independence: Riad El-Solh and the Makers of the Modern Middle East* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 319.
[77] Atiyah, "The Attitude of the Lebanese Sunnis towards the State of Lebanon," 117–20.

called new elections to give Muslims an opportunity to improve their representation in parliament.[78] Nonetheless, this temporary cooperation stopped under Sarrail's successor, Henri de Jouvenel. When he called upon the Lebanese parliament to begin drafting the country's constitution, matters became too serious to ignore. Participating in that process would have implied acceptance of the Lebanese entity – just like Arab participation in the 1923 elections in Palestine would have meant acceptance of the Jewish national home policy – and the Sunnis were not prepared to grant it.

In the years following the issuing of the constitution, however, moderation rather than rejection dominated Lebanese Sunni politics. A shift in attitude begins to crystallize after a conference in 1928, which brought together delegates from the disputed districts (Tripoli, Beirut, the Bekaa and the South) in the context of the drawing up of the Syrian constitution. Under the leadership of Riad al-Solh, a first step was made to express Muslim support for the status quo: Just like his co-religionaries, al-Solh sought Arab unity, but he advocated for Lebanese independence within this unity.[79] In the early 1930s, Muslim participation in Lebanon's political life increased steadily, culminating in the candidacy of Sunni leader of Tripoli Sheikh Mohammed Al-Jisr to the presidency, in 1932. As chairman of the council of ministers, Al-Jisr had pushed for the celebration of a new census in 1932, prior to the elections, in the hope that it would reveal a Muslim majority – which it did not.[80] The move was very popular, and wide-spread participation in the headcount as well as general interest in the elections were signs that Lebanese Sunnis were moving away from their previous alienation from the Lebanese state.

[78] Razq, *Lubnān Bayna Al-Waḥdah Wa-Al-Infiṣāl, 1919-1927*, 122.
[79] Atiyah, "The Attitude of the Lebanese Sunnis towards the State of Lebanon," 131.
[80] Ibid., 138.

In continuing with the trend of Sunni exclusion from power, however, the French suspended the Lebanese constitution to avoid the rise of Al-Jisr and his Sunni community to dominance. Of course, the official French justification for this decision was different: Lebanon was undergoing severe economic hardships that required political stability, the political system was in need of reform and the electoral campaign created polarization and instability.[81] In what seems to be an internal French note, however, the author confirmed in passing that High Commissioner Ponsot also intended to prevent the election of a 'président de combat'.[82] In another confidential communiqué from the High Commissioner to various French ambassadors in the region, he cautioned that

> The indications […] are meant for your personal information. What matters for the sense of the commentaries is to avoid referring to the confessional issue, and to make it look like it is only due to a need for urgent reforms demanded by [public] opinion.[83]

Of course, the response of the Patriarch at Bkerké came without delay: The patriarch considered France's response to be proof of the mandatory's commitment towards Lebanon.[84] For the Maronite elites, the presidency should – from the very beginning – have been in their hands[85], not in those of Charles Debbas, the compromise Greek Orthodox candidate elected in 1926. The Maronite attitude toward politics in the 1920s and early 1930s strongly alienated other communities and made it possible for Al-Jisr to rally not only various Muslim groups, but also the Greek Orthodox community behind him.[86] The suspension of the constitution, which looked suspiciously like the mandatory doing the

[81] "Expose de La Situation En Syrie et Au Liban Fair a La Commission Permanente Des Mandats a Geneve," December 2, 1932, CADN 364.
[82] "Note Liban," February 8, 1936, CADN 364.
[83] "Haut Commissaire à Ambafrance," May 9, 1932, CADN 454. Original text; Les indications […] sont destinées à votre information personnelle. Il importe, dans l'orientation des commentaires, d'éviter toute référence à la question confessionnelle, et de faire apparaitre seulement l'urgente nécessité des réformes réclamées par l'opinion.
[84] "Visite Du Patriarche," May 10, 1932, CADN 454.
[85] "Note," May 6, 1932, CADN 454.
[86] Ibid., CADN 454.

Maronites' bidding, put a break on the rapprochement of the Sunni community toward the Lebanese state.

Over the next years, all communities grew increasingly impatient with France's heavy hand[87], leading to the emergence (albeit temporary) of what might be considered a national Lebanese consensus. When, in 1935, the French attempted to assert their monopoly over the tobacco trade[88], Maronite patriarch Antoine Arida protested vigorously. This protest, however, was only the 'straw that broke the camel's back', in the words of a French report. The Patriarch had presented numerous other demands to the High Commissioner.[89] It seemed as if the French were no longer the Maronites' natural allies.[90] In a scathing assessment of Arida's political activities, High Commissioner de Martel wrote:

> I have told him that we haven't been tricked by his Palestinian intrigues, adding that Bkerké is quite naive if it imagines that between one high commissioner and another, we will fall prey to these petty manoeuvres. I have underlined the difference between the attitude of dignity which the office of the high commissioner adopts vis-a-vis the Maronite patriarch and the malicious means for polemicizing which Bkerké uses against me.[91]

Little was left of the words of praise that the French had for the patriarchate and vice-versa. Arida now emerged as the defender of Lebanese, perhaps even Arab, sovereignty against the mandatory power. Indeed, when nationalist agitation arose in Tripoli and the Bekaa valley in March 1936, a French report informed that the name of 'The Great Arab Patriarch'

[87] "Information No 113/S," March 1, 1935, CADN 942. Various documents demanding the reestablishment of the constitution and an extension of the legislative council's powers vis-à-vis the mandatory, CADN 942.
[88] For more information, see "Note Liban", CADN 364.
[89] "Information No 113/S", CADN 942.
[90] "Note Liban", CADN 364.
[91] "De Martel à Ministre Des Affaires Etrangeres," June 7, 1935, CADN 364. Original text: Je lui ai déclaré que nous n'avions pas été dupes de ses intrigues palestiniennes, en ajoutant qu'on était bien naïf à Bkerké pour s'imaginer que de haut-commissaire à haut-commissaire, on allait se prêter à ces petites manœuvres. J'ai souligné la différence entre l'attitude pleine de dignité adoptée par le haut-commissariat à l'égard du patriarcat maronite, et les moyens de polémiques malveillantes mis en œuvre par Bkerké à mon égard :

was being invoked in the mosques.[92] Around the same date, an extract of the journal '*Al-Bilad*' quoted Sheikh Ahmed Aref el-Zein – Shia cleric of South Lebanon – as saying that ever since the Patriarch had declared himself to be on their side, they had come to love Lebanon.[93]

In April of the same year, following an incident of violent repression of nationalist agitation in the south of Lebanon, the inhabitants of this tobacco producing region resorted once again to Arida's power. The patriarch received petitions from the region protesting tobacco regulations unfavourable to the South – the Lebanese government sought to limit the surface of cultivable land, and there were some voices in the region that viewed reattachment to Syria as a plausible solution to the tobacco conflict. By sending a report to Paris outlining the events which had taken place previously and confirming his anti-monopoly stance, Arida demonstrated his solidarity with the region's inhabitants despite the pro-Syrian context in which these demands had been formulated.[94] At the same time, by resorting to the Patriarch as an intermediary, the demonstrators were implicitly recognizing the legitimacy of the Lebanese entity as defined by the Maronite church.

Arida's 1935 move had thus initiated an era of rapprochement between the Maronite community and Syrian nationalists, which slowly became common currency thereafter.[95] The Maronite church's moderation had begun a year before, during a presidential campaign which pitted moderate Maronite Bishara Al-Khoury against hard-liner Emile Eddé. At the

[92] "République Libanaise, No. 318," March 1936, CADN 943. Original text: le Grand Patriarche arabe.
[93] "Extrait Du Journal 'Al Bilad' Du 12 Mars 1936," March 12, 1936, CADN 943.
[94] "Renseignement. Incidents de Beint-Djebeil," April 6, 1936, CADN 411. According to French sources, the events had started as a result of nationalist agitation – this had justified the intervention of the police, the death of several demonstrators and the arrest of its instigators. Lebanese petitions and media commentaries, however, disputed this version of events stating that the demonstration had been in opposition to the tobacco monopoly only. The violent repression to which the police had resorted was thus unjustified. "Les Incidents Du Liban-Sud," April 1936, CADN 411.
[95] Firro, *Inventing Lebanon : Nationalism and the State under the Mandate*, 137.

time, the archbishop of Beirut, Mgr. Mubarak, had expressed his support for Al-Khoury and planned to get Arida behind him.[96] His argument for supporting the moderate candidate was that Eddé would alienate the Muslims of Lebanon.[97] Such moderate tendencies were not confined to the Church. In fact, the Maronite journal '*Le Jour*' published an article series entitled 'Muslim Tolerance', which celebrated the new political era built upon the principle of 'Muslim-Christian fraternity'.[98] A shared understanding of Lebanon as an Arab yet sovereign country could have emerged.

Negotiating away Syro-Lebanese identity

Just as the Maronite-Sunni rapprochement had followed French policy, so the ultimate transition toward Sunni acceptance of Greater Lebanon – and therefore, the compromise vision of the state that would be formulated in 1943 – was a response to opportunity structures modified by the mandatory. In March 1936, French High Commissioner Damien de Martel responded to unrest in Syria by offering negotiations about the country's independence from France. This move was also prompted by rising tensions in Europe, the threat of Italian territorial expansion and the spectre of an Anglo-Egyptian treaty.[99] As soon as the news emerged, Patriarch Arida set into motion the wheels for Lebanese independence: The Lebanese should receive the same privilege as their Syrian counterpart. This was a critical juncture for the role of Lebanese Sunnis in the new state. After all, their identity was about to be negotiated away irreversibly.

[96] Surete Generale, "Information No 4096," December 8, 1934, CADN 943.
[97] Cabinet Politique, "Information No. 181," September 29, 1936, CADN 943.
[98] "République Libanaise, No. 318", CADN 943.
[99] Seale, *The Struggle for Arab Independence: Riad El-Solh and the Makers of the Modern Middle East*, 325; Robert De Caix, "General Statement by the Accredited Representative," in *Syria and Lebanon: Examination of the Annual Report of 1935* (Geneva: League of Nations Secretariat Archives, 1936), 93, LoN C-259-M-153-1936-VI.

The Patriarch had thus put an end to any doubts about his pro-Syrian leanings. Greek Orthodox Journal '*L'Orient*' reported on 17 March 1936 that Arida had addressed the Syrian nationalists in a public speech confirming his support for the 'independence and territorial integrity of Lebanon' and declaring that irredentist movements could not but harm the Syrians' effort at attaining independence from France.[100] These statements put Arida back in line with the strong Maronite camp that continued to oppose equality of their Muslim counterparts.[101] Archbishop Mubarak of Beirut had also already sent a request to Paris demanding guarantees for the territorial integrity of Lebanon.[102] Arida was informed, however, that France could not grant his call for an independent Lebanon within its 1920 borders as the patriarch was not authorized to speak for the country. He thus set out to enlist the support of the legislative assembly, whom the mandatory had designated as the sole legitimate negotiating partner.

But not only the Maronite, and more generally, state-supported branch reneged on the cooperative tendency that was developing in the early 1930s. A British report at the time described the reaction to France's willingness to negotiate Lebanese independence thus:

> A movement was at once started in the towns of Greater Lebanon which had been detached from pre-war Syria, and added to Greater Lebanon, clamouring for their return to their original states, or, alternatively, the union of all Lebanon with the new Syrian Federation. The majority of the Maronites of Lebanon, now the privileged ruling class, will oppose this movement – but all the Mohametans for racial, religious and political reasons will continue to agitate for reunion with Syria. With them are now ranged most of the non-Maronite Christians and the commercial classes of all creeds, who foresee a dark future economically and financially, for this small state if not amalgamated in the future Syrian state.[103]

[100] "Pour Un Liban... Libanais," *L'Orient*, March 17, 1936.
[101] Seale, *The Struggle for Arab Independence: Riad El-Solh and the Makers of the Modern Middle East*, 327.
[102] Ibid., 340.
[103] "Havard to Eden," March 10, 1936, Confidential Print Middle East, Eastern correspondence XXXVIII and XXXIX.

This British assessment contrasted strongly with assertions by Robert De Caix, now the French representative to the League of Nations, who as late as June 1936 downplayed the strength of pan-Arab sentiment by saying that 'there were supporters of Syrian unity in Tripoli and a few among the Shiites'.[104] Documents from the French ministry of foreign affairs underscore De Caix's assessment; there is scarcely any mention of nationalist agitation outside of North Lebanon, with isolated petitions from youth movements in the South.[105]

Whatever the truth of these competing assessments, faced with treaty negotiations with both Syria and Lebanon, which were certain to endorse the final borders of both countries, the Sunni elites set out to determine their stance vis-à-vis the latest developments. Tripolitan nationalists began a vigorous campaign to lobby their Damascene counterparts, the French government and the Patriarchate.[106] Moreover, nationalist from all over Lebanon gathered at the so-called 'Conference of the Coast' to determine their stance vis-à-vis the negotiations. While Kazem Al-Solh (representing his cousin Riad) argued that the wisest response to the current situation would be moderation to avoid offending the inhabitants of Mount Lebanon, Abdul Hamid Karamé vigorously advocated for immediate Syrian unity. When the congress attempted to pass a resolution based on Karamé's stance, participants were split. The resolution was only approved when an amendment proposed by Al-Solh was introduced explaining that their resolution did not go against the memorandum sent by the deputies of the legislative assembly upon Arida's request.[107]

[104] "Petitions, (Ninety-Eight in Number, in Six Categories), Relating to Syrian Unity," in *Syria and Lebanon: Examination of the Annual Report of 1935* (League of Nations Secretariat Archives, 1936), 123, LoN C-259-M-153-1936-VI.
[105] Various documents, CADN 411.
[106] Surete Generale, "Information 816," March 7, 1936, CADN 411; Surete Generale, "Information 842," March 9, 1936, CADN 411.
[107] "Extrait Du Journal 'Al Bilad' Du 12 Mars 1936", CADn 943.

Al-Solh had signalled this new attitude toward Lebanon and its Christian communities through an article that he distributed to the Lebanese press during the conference, entitled 'the Problem of Unification and Separation in Lebanon' by insisting that the resolution be addressed to the Christians of Lebanon rather than the French.[108] The patriarch's goodwill toward the National Bloc in the previous year showed that there were grounds for cooperation. If the Muslims acted likewise, he reasoned, the Christians would over time be won over to the cause of Arab unity. Conversely, if the Christian areas of Lebanon were forced to form part of Greater Syria, they would oppose it in dissatisfaction.[109] Similarly, if the four districts were to secede from Greater Lebanon, small Lebanon was likely to withdraw in isolation and demand foreign protection – a move that would contradict the goal of Arab unity.[110] As a result, the new Muslim attitude toward the state of Lebanon did not follow from a genuine change in Syro-Lebanese nationalist narrative but from practical considerations or opportunity structures. The consensus in the making was not one which might have provided the Lebanese state with a dominant vision of the state allowing for cooperation and stability.

Rather, the Sunnis were left without a choice. On the one hand, the French were obviously committed to the idea of Lebanese integrity. On the other, the Syrian nationalists were distancing themselves from agitating for a return of the four districts to Syria. Two of the leading Lebanese Sunni politicians, Riad Al-Solh and Salim Ali Salam, thus began to focus on their community's position within Greater Lebanon.[111] This coincided with a flurry of activity in 1936, when several other communities increased their efforts to obtain a fairer share of the power within the Lebanese system. This is particularly true for the Shia

[108] Ahmed Beydhoun, *Riad Al-Solh Fi Zamanhu* (Beirut: Dar Annahar Lilnashar, 2011), 150.
[109] Atiyah, "The Attitude of the Lebanese Sunnis towards the State of Lebanon," 143–44.
[110] Beydhoun, *Riad Al-Solh Fi Zamanhu*, 147.
[111] Firro, *Inventing Lebanon : Nationalism and the State under the Mandate*, 148.

community, which had been co-opted by the French around the time the constitution was discussed. The fact that Shia majority territories, like the port city of Saida, actively sent petitions to the French government asking for reunification with Syria in 1926 – petitions from the Bekaa reach until 1934[112] – but were all but absent in the discussion surrounding the treaty in 1936 shows how successful French efforts at co-opting them (and violently repressing unitarian tendencies among them[113]) had been. In fact, the Shiite Mufti of Saida even sent a letter to the High Commissioner in March 1936 proclaiming the Shia community's firm attachment to France and announcing that the territory that he represented formed 'an integral part of Lebanon'.[114] Similar letters were sent by other representatives of the Shia community[115] and meetings were held to confirm the loyalty of the South to the Lebanese entity.[116] Commenting on a minority movement among the Shiites to return their territories to Syria in 1934, a French official explained that overall, the community was uninterested in 'abstract politics' and that it was only concerned about an equal distribution of privileges within the state of Lebanon.[117]

Slowly but surely, the Sunni community was coming to a similar conclusion. For Sunni leader Riad Al-Solh, and his cousin Kazem – who provided the ideological justification for Riad's new politics – alliance and unity with the surrounding Arab states was still considered key to defending Lebanon's independence in the long run, but this

[112] Various petitions, 1926, CADN 411.
[113] In April 1936, a pro-Syrian demonstration in Bint Jebeil, South Lebanon, was violently repressed by the gendarmerie triggering widespread discontent. This was based on the 'instructions of the Lebanese government to repress any separatist activity'. "Delegue Géneral à de Martel," April 7, 1936, CADN 411. A month before this incident, the Lebanese government had publicly announced its intention to suspend any journals publishing nationalist propaganda and to pursue those responsible. "Le Gouvernement Libanais Sévira Contre Les Menées Separatistes. Un Communiqué Officiel.," *L'Orient*, March 15, 1936.
[114] "Sadek to de Martel," March 14, 1936, CADN 411.
[115] "Requête Addressée à Son Excellence Le Haut-Commissaire de La R. Fr.," July 21, 1936,CADN 411.
[116] "Rapport Du Caimacam de Merdjayoun Sur La Réunion de Taybé Le 12/4/1936," April 14, 1936, CADN 411.
[117] "Ligarde to Miniter of Foreign Affairs," September 21, 1934, CADN 411.

unity could be obtained without full-blown unification.[118] What Riad Al-Solh advocated, however, was not Sunni acceptance of Lebanese nationalism. On the contrary, he pressed for a compromise solution:

> Would you [the Christians] and we [the Muslims] take steps to meet in the middle of the road? Would you yield somewhat regarding your Lebanon as we would [regarding Syrian unity]? Can [you and we] reach an understanding on a kind of union which would not harm your desire for separation?[119]

This uneasy compromise would finally form the basis of the independent state of Lebanon, as will be discussed in chapter 7. Instead of a dominant vision of the state, communities agreed to disagree. For the time being, the Solhs' new approach remained that of a minority. As late as July 1936, the Mufti of Tripoli and nationalist leader Abdul Hamid Karamé was calling on the population of his town to agitate against the separation of the port city from Syria.[120] But Al-Solh's vision coincided with a trend among the Lebanese population. The Christian and Muslim middle classes had come to recognize the benefits of working together, and cooperation, even intermarriage, had become more common. At the same time, both Syrian negotiators and Al-Solh recognized that it was not the right time to put French goodwill in jeopardy by uttering territorial demands that were unlikely to be met.[121]

Thus, even though the Sunni leadership was moving closer to tacit acceptance of Greater Lebanon, their long-term vision remained incompatible with that of the *Kiyanists* (supporters of the Lebanese entity).[122] This camp was led by Emile Eddé, who had long promoted a Christian Lebanon. The French elections of June 1936 brought to power a left-wing government under Leon Blum that was more sympathetic to the demands of Arab

[118] Zisser, *Lebanon: The Challenge of Independence*, 16.
[119] Firro, *Inventing Lebanon : Nationalism and the State under the Mandate*, 148.
[120] "Meyrier to Minister of Foreign Affairs," July 24, 1936, CADN 411.
[121] Seale, *The Struggle for Arab Independence: Riad El-Solh and the Makers of the Modern Middle East*, 334–36.
[122] Beydhoun, *Riad Al-Solh Fi Zamanhu*, 151.

nationalists. On the French side, treaty negotiations were to be led by under-secretary of state for foreign affairs Pierre Vienot, who sought to disencumber France of Syria whilst retaining support in Lebanon, which was to become the basis of continued French presence in the region.[123] Because of Vienot's more conciliatory attitude toward Syrian aspirations, his appointment to the talks prompted an immediate response from *Kiyanist* President Emile Eddé to obtain guarantees regarding Lebanon's 1920 borders.

Eddé had thus moved away from his promotion of *little Lebanon* as a bulwark against Muslim domination.[124] In 1932, within the context of the census – which had confirmed that Christians were only a narrow majority among the Lebanese population – and the near success of Mohammed al-Jisr's presidential bid, Emile Eddé had requested the reduction of Lebanon's territory from the Quai d'Orsay. He suggested that only ridding Lebanon of its Muslim-majority cities would result in the country's consolidation and justified the move by referring to France's vital interest in Lebanon.[125] Greater Lebanon, with its narrow Christian majority would not be able to fend for itself. Thus, he suggested turning Tripoli into a free city under French administration, whereby Muslim inhabitants would receive Syrian nationality and Christian inhabitants Lebanese citizenship. South Lebanon was to receive an autonomous status akin to that of the Alawite state.[126]

Within the same context, the Christian daily '*L'Orient*' – a big supporter of Eddé's politics – had uttered a similar opinion: A Lebanon in which 45 per cent of the population rejected Lebanese identity, the daily reckoned, was not a viable entity.[127] The same journal

[123] Cyril Buffet, "Le Traité Franco-Libanais de 1936," *Cahiers de La Méditeranée* 44 (1992): 57; Itamar Fry, Michael G.; Rabinovich, ed., "MacKereth to Eden, 10 February 1936," in *Despatches from Damascus: Gilbreth MacKereth and British Policy in the Levant, 1933-1939* (Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies, 1985), 120.
[124] "République Libanaise, No. 278," March 20, 1936, CADN 943; Meir Zamir, "Emile Eddé and the Territorial Integrity of Lebanon," *Middle Eastern Studies* 14, no. 2 (1978): 232–35.
[125] Zamir, "Emile Eddé and the Territorial Integrity of Lebanon," 232–33.
[126] Tarābulusī, *History of Modern Lebanon*, 91.
[127] Quoted in Rondot, "Lebanese Institutions and Arab Nationalism," 45.

reiterated this view shortly before the Franco-Syrian treaty negotiations began, emphasizing that Lebanese nationalism necessarily had to be anti-Arab.[128] Nonetheless, Eddé's – and *L'Orient*'s – short romance with the idea of *little Lebanon* was clearly a minority position among the *Kiyanists*. As historian Meir Zamir explains, Eddé never expressed these ideas publicly, and merely prodded France secretly, in the hope that it would push forward this idea on its own accord.[129] It soon became clear, however, that the Quai d'Orsay was in no mood to revise the scheme which it had devised in the 1920s and whose rationale chapter 4 discussed in detail.

On the other side of France's negotiating table, revisions to Lebanon's borders also began to look less likely. While Syrian nationalists still hoped for the return of the four districts– and reserved the right to discuss the matter in the future – independence was more important than irredentism.[130] Discussions between the president of the National Bloc, Hashem Bey Atassi, and De Martel, in March 1936, had resulted in the conclusion that only the State of the Alawites and Jabal Druze were to become integral parts of Syria. Lebanon, on the other hand, would be excluded from the agreement.[131] Tripolitan nationalists sent petitions to Atassi to defend their reattachment to Syria, but to no avail.[132] It is unclear to what extent Lebanese Syrian nationalists were aware of Lebanon's exclusion from the treaty negotiations at the time. French documents of the period suggest that the Tripolitan nationalists continued to work under the assumption that the National Bloc was on board with turning the city into Syria's port.[133]

When the passivity of the Syrian delegation became clear, and after Vienot had addressed Eddé guaranteeing Lebanon's territorial integrity, massive strikes and

[128] Ibid.
[129] Zamir, "Emile Eddé and the Territorial Integrity of Lebanon."
[130] Seale, *The Struggle for Arab Independence: Riad El-Solh and the Makers of the Modern Middle East*, 342.
[131] "Labaki to de Martel," March 2, 1936, CADN 943.
[132] Surete Generale, "Information 1030," March 23, 1936, CADN 411.
[133] Surete Generale, "Information No 852," March 10, 1936, CADN 411.

demonstrations broke out in Tripoli. A few days before the final text of the Franco-Syrian treaty was published, Emile Eddé visited the port city. He had his eye on a future Franco-Lebanese treaty and wished to gain recognition as the representative of the entire country, including Sunni Muslims. His was one of the first visits of a Lebanese president to the areas attached to Lebanon in 1920 – hitherto the attached populations had been considered strangers in a country dominated by old Mount Lebanon.[134] Indeed, nationalist leaders Abdul Hamid Karamé and Abdul Latif Bissar of Tripoli explained that the support of their city for their reattachment to Syria was based on economic grievances: The Lebanese government had completely neglected the region and reattachment to Syria could only benefit them.[135] Eddé's attempts failed in the face of his established reputation as the representative of the *Kiyanists* who had hitherto advocated a purely Christian Lebanon.[136]

The final text of the Franco-Syrian treaty did not mention the districts attached to Greater Lebanon in 1920. The borders of Lebanon were now definitely a fait accompli, if they had not been since 1920. As a result, both the *Kiyanists* and the Sunni elite had to redefine their political strategies. Lebanon would not be a Christian political entity closely allied with France in perpetuity, nor would it be an autonomous region of Muslim Syria. Eddé, the staunch defender of a Christian Lebanon led the short negotiations for a (never to be approved by France) Franco-Lebanese treaty shortly after approval of the Franco-Syrian agreement. The treaty provided for Lebanese independence under the protection of France, a move which triggered massive disturbances across the country. Notables of all communities came together to calm down popular unrest, and so did representatives of the Syrian National Bloc, which had hitherto been the key supporter of Lebanese Sunni

[134] "Propagande Séparatiste Au Liban-Nord," 1936, CADN 411.
[135] "Conseiller Administratif Du Liban Nord à Delegue Du Haut-Commissaire," March 17, 1936, CADN 411.
[136] Gérard Khoury, ed., "Sélim Takla 1895-1945: Une Contribution à l'Independance Du Liban" (Beirut: Edition Dar An-Nahar, 2004), 283.

irredentism. There was no doubt that their aspirations had faltered, and a new era began, marked by a forced compromise between incompatible visions of the state.[137]

Consociationalism becomes the only available option

Separatist tendencies were thus irreversibly integrated into Lebanon through a combination of factors which forced their cooperation. In exchange for his cooperation with the project of Lebanon, Sunni member of parliament Khair Al-Din Al-Ahdab received the premiership in January 1936. Eddé hoped that he would bring his followers and hitherto opponents of the mandate and the Lebanese entity into the fold.[138] It was the beginning of a tradition of cooperation between a Maronite president and a Sunni prime minister, which continues to exist until today. Eddé hoped that this cooperation would gradually lead to an acceptance of the Lebanese entity and an end to Sunni resistance.[139] The draft Franco-Lebanese treaty included the following Sunni demands: Equality in the eyes of the law, without favouritism; equal representation of all members of society in the public services; equal distribution of expenditure on matters of public interest; unification of the tax system; and administrative centralization. In addition, a series of notes exchanged between Emile Eddé and De Martel specified fair representation of the country's sects in government and high administration.[140] These demands had been agreed upon by a majority of Muslim representatives at a nationalist conference in October 1936 – only the Tripolitan nationalists under Karamé refused to accept the existence of Greater Lebanon even under those circumstances.[141]

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[137] Seale, *The Struggle for Arab Independence: Riad El-Solh and the Makers of the Modern Middle East*, 346–48.
[138] Muḥammad Jamīl Bayyuhum, *Lubnān : Bayna Musharriq Wa-Mugharrib 1920-1969* (Beirut, 1969), 27 [Lebanon: Between Orient and Occident, 1920-1969]; Hallaq, *Dirāsāt Fī Tārīkh Lubnān Al-Muʿāṣir, 1913-1943*, 178.
[139] Hallaq, *Dirāsāt Fī Tārīkh Lubnān Al-Muʿāṣir, 1913-1943*, 178.
[140] Ibid.
[141] Atiyah, "The Attitude of the Lebanese Sunnis towards the State of Lebanon," 149–52.

Agitation for a revision of the territorial status quo did not cease[142], but there was a trend toward progressive appeasement. In February 1937, even the staunchest of nationalist leaders, Abdul Hamid Karamé, was appeased when Khair Al-Din made his way to Tripoli for a meeting with local leaders. A newspaper report at the time quoted Karamé as explaining his change of heart thus: 'The Syrians have abandoned us and we must now claim our rights in Lebanon.'[143] Karamé's followers continued to consider any participation in Lebanon's political system a betrayal of the Syrian cause, but the former mufti of Tripoli replaced his outright opposition to Lebanon with electoral abstention.[144] A French report of the 1937 elections even spoke of Karamé's 'favourable attitude toward the Lebanese government'.[145]

Some of the more committed nationalist groupings continued to boycott elections, but the majority of the Sunni leadership adopted a more conciliatory stance.[146] A more cooperative stance with the Lebanese state was not only visible among the elites. The evolution of electoral participation in Lebanon between 1922 and 1937 indicates a marked change in attitude after the loss of the Syrian option in 1936:

Table 8: Electoral participation 1922-1937[147]

	Beirut	Mount Lebanon	Bekaa	North Lebanon	South Lebanon	Tripoli	Total
1922	44%	25%	59%	54%	54%	17%	43%
1925	41%	42%	58%	34%	39%	26%	42%
1937	64.20%	60%	71.80%	76.51%	66.90%	NA	67.11%

[142] "Information No. 1570," March 23, 1937, CADN 411.
[143] Khoury, "Sélim Takla 1895-1945: Une Contribution à l'Independance Du Liban," 286.
[144] "Conseiller Administratif Du Liban Nord à Delegue Du Haut-Commissaire," September 14, 1937, CADN 396.
[145] Surete Generale, "Information No 4498," August 31, 1937, CADN 396.
[146] Surete Generale, "Information 4564," September 3, 1937, CADN 396.
[147] Own production based on "Le Délégue Du Haut-Commissaire à Haut-Commissaire," July 6, 1925, CADN 396; "Rapport Sur Les Élections Législatives Libanaises Des 24 et 25 Octobre 1937," n.d., CADN 396.

While turnout increased in all districts in 1937, the former nationalist stronghold of North Lebanon showed a participation far superior to all other districts. Also the electorate of Beirut, a city with a strong Sunni contingent, showed greater interest in the elections than ever before. In Shiite South Lebanon and the Bekaa valley – which had formed one of the most contentious issues between France and King Faysal of Syria – voter turnout was equally solid. It looked as if the state of Lebanon had finally become legitimate in the eyes of most Lebanese. In Atiyah's assessment, however, the Sunnis viewed this participation as a first step toward 'arabizing' Lebanon rather than towards their own integration into the Lebanese state.[148] This would later turn into one of Lebanon's main problems, as chapter 7 will show.

Conclusion

By 1926, the existence of the state of Lebanon and its rule through a consociational system were all but set in stone. The main obstacle to its realization was the opposition – and at times active resistance – of its large Sunni population. Changes in Sunni attitude tended to follow French policy rather than reflecting acceptance of the Lebanese state. This does not mean that the Syrian national identity espoused by the Muslim community was not sincere or profound. However, opportunity structures impacted it, like they impact any other social movement. When opportunities to further the community's interests arose within the structure of the new Lebanese state, Sunni leaders considered cooperating within this framework. When union with Syria seemed a more promising option (for instance, when threatened by the tobacco monopoly in 1935) because the Lebanese state seemed to be at the service of Christian minorities, unity became more attractive. As a result, when the Syrian window of opportunity closed in 1936, and the Lebanese window opened

[148] Atiyah, "The Attitude of the Lebanese Sunnis towards the State of Lebanon," 155.

simultaneously with the presidency of Emile Eddé and the negotiation of the French-Lebanese treaty, the Sunnis began to look inward.

Nevertheless, the underlying divisions between mostly Maronite and some Shia pro-French forces and pro-Syrian Sunnis never disappeared. Whenever the Syrian window of opportunity reopened in the future, the conflict would be reactivated thus weakening the Lebanese state for years to come. As one commentator said in 1937,

> We do not want to exaggerate any dangers – but we invite our friends not to close their eyes in front of inevitable events. After a few years, (perhaps even a few months!), we will have to defend ourselves from […] an Arab imperialism that has not relinquish and cannot relinquish the wish to annex us.[149]

By prioritizing the failure of Arab nationalism through the prevention of a return to smaller Lebanon and by repeatedly preventing the rise of a dominant pro-Arab force in the 1930s, France forced two equally powerful and competing visions of the state to coexist. In doing so, it created the seeds of the state's weakness.

Contrary to opposing Lebanese visions that were forced to live alongside each other, the dominant group within the Zionist Organization and the Yishuv repressed competing visions in the 1930s. They were unwilling to enter a compromise with what they viewed as extremists. These had to accept the ideology of the more powerful Zionist mainstream or else they would be excluded from the decision-making mechanisms. If the Revisionists wished to hold on to their vision of the Zionist project, enforcing this view by means of a discipline clause on members of the Zionist Organization, they had to leave. The Zionist Organization activated all levers of power, as it had done during the discussions

[149] "Pour Un Liban... Libanais." Original text: Nous ne voulons exagérer aucun péril – mais nous invitons nos amis à ne pas se bander les yeux devant des événements inévitables. Dans quelques années, (dans quelques mois peut-être!), nous aurons à nous défendre contre les mouvements agressifs d'un impérialisme arabe qui n'a pas renoncé ET QUI NE PEUT PAS RENONCER A NOUS ANNEXER.

surrounding the community regulations in 1926, to ensure discipline and unity. Non-intervention on the British side enormously aided the Zionist Organization's success in enforcing discipline. Revisionist reactions also followed the creation of opportunity structures created by both the mandatory and the Zionist Organization – secession was only pursued after the Zionist Organization had put in place mechanisms to exclude the group from its activities. However, at the end of the day, ideology rather than opportunity prevailed: The majority of the movement chose to follow Jabotinsky in refusing to continue cooperation with the Zionist Organization once the opportunity to get its political ideas endorsed disappeared. The episode discussed in this chapter paved the way for the emergence of a dominant vision of the state, as will be discussed in the next chapter.

Lebanon, then was put on a path to inevitable consociationalism: Contradictory attitudes toward the state could not be excluded, dominated or attenuated because of the structures put in place by the mandatory. They could be temporarily deactivated through promises of power-sharing at best. However, the underlying conflict between Kiyanists and Syrian nationalists was left intact. Any political measures to be taken during the crucial first years of statehood were thus stultified by political differences that ran much deeper than the day to day politics which the new state had to confront. As explained in the introduction to this dissertation, this is a characteristic of deeply divided societies: every political issue is viewed through the prism of communal affiliation thus making consensus on such issues more difficult.

The Zionist Organization, on the contrary, was able to remove a powerful contradicting ideology from its midst, thus opening the path to the rise of a dominant vision of the state. Once Labour became the hegemonic power, and Mapai the dominant party, it was in a position to dominate day to day politics, thus stabilizing the political system and putting it in a position to deal with the formidable challenges that war, economic hardship

and mass immigration would bring in the 1950s. Chapter 7 will consider how these different outcomes impacted the creation of both independent states and the development of their political systems in the first years of statehood.

CHAPTER 7
ISRAELI AND LEBANESE DEMOCRACY: TWO DIFFERENT TYPES OF CONSENSUS

As chapter 6 showed, the main point of contention in Lebanese society were the country's boundaries and identity. While the nature of the conflict in the Yishuv, and later Israel, was different, there were some noticeable similarities. On the one hand, the Revisionist movement – whose influence on the state-building project had been curtailed during the 1930s – did not immediately agree on the partition of what they considered to be Israel's historical territory. On the other hand, non-Zionist orthodoxy continued to fight for a religious definition of Israel's identity. This directly contradicted the secular attitude of the founding fathers, but a compromise solution was needed, as citizenship was partly defined in religious terms. The challenge for the new state was now to deactivate and integrate these groups into a state-building project with which they were only partly satisfied. The group that had formed the core, the Ashkenazic immigrants associated with the pioneering ideology, would now be the dominant force in a consociational system which sought the integration of all political and social segments into the state rather than the maintenance of communal division.

It was in this sense that the ultimate nation-building project was substantially different from the Lebanese which was based on the respect for and maintenance of communalism in Lebanon's political system. Instead of seeking a state-building compromise that a core might be able to impose on minorities, the Lebanese compromise might be summed up with the sentence 'agree to disagree'. As a result, the fundamental disagreement was frozen in place instead of being resolved, and the segmentation of Lebanese society was taken as a given and conceptualized as a political virtue. The state-

building compromise in Israel, on the contrary, imposed the view of the nation which had been defined in the previous decades and everyone was expected to integrate into it. As this chapter will show, the state-building compromises that emerged in each new state were instrumental for their subsequent political development and stability.

Both countries had to confront what political scientist Peter Medding called 'acid test for newly independent states', i.e. disagreements and divisions which might lead to the breakdown of the democratic constitutional system in a new state.[1] Through centralization and domination – at times, negotiated, at others, imposed – the State of Israel was able to meet these challenges more successfully than Lebanon. Government effectiveness was required to absorb a large number of immigrants, face regional war and go through economic hardships. This chapter will follow up with the case studies that have been discussed in this dissertation, of the Agudat Israel and Revisionist movements, to illustrate how centralization of power during the mandate period and the vision of the state that it enabled helped the new state manage such formidable challenges. It will then be shown that the vision of the state and the fragmentation of power in Lebanon lead to the opposite result there.

The Israeli State-building Consensus

If there is anything that may be highlighted as the guiding principle of Israeli state-building during the first decade of statehood, it is the principle of *Mamlakhtiyut*, often translated as

[1] Peter Medding, *The Founding of Israeli Democracy* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990), 16.

statism[2], republicanism (in the sense of Rousseau)[3] or state-centrism[4]. The concept implied not only sovereignty of the formal state-machinery versus pre-state segmentation of power but was also a form of 'state consciousness' that stressed the society's ability to build a state based on a series of shared values.[5]

As has been discussed throughout this dissertation, during the mandate period, several organizations coexisted within the Yishuv. The Jewish Agency and the Jewish community institutions in Palestine held many official powers (e.g. representation vis-à-vis the mandatory, distribution of immigration certificates, distribution of international funds for the settlement effort) in their hands. This weakened the chances of success of rival organizations carrying out the same activities, but it did not exclude the establishment and promotion thereof. As a result, political parties, religious communities, rival militias and other corporations were free to establish alternative power centres. To recall the term used by sociologist Amitai Etzioni, the Yishuv was a 'neo-feudal society'.[6] Nonetheless, after 1933, Mapai achieved not only solid majorities in the elections to the Zionist Congress and the Yishuv's institutions, its domination of these institutions as well as of the powerful Histradrut (trade federation) made it ideologically dominant in the Jewish community of Palestine. In other words, it became a classical dominant party.[7]

Given the party's supremacy, it became the primary vehicle for translating pre-state power into state power, and its ideology became the guiding principle in the process.

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[2] Mitchell Cohen, *Zion and State: Nation, Class and the Shaping of Modern Israel* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1992), 7.
[3] Avi Bareli, *Authority and Participation in a New Democracy: Political Struggles in Mapai, Israel's Ruling Party, 1948-1953* (Brighton: Academic Studies Press, 2014); Paula Kabalo, "Pioneering Discourse and the Shaping of an Israeli Citizen in the 1950s," *Jewish Social Studies* 15, no. 2 (2009): 82–110.
[4] Paula Kabalo, "The Historical Dimension: Jewish Associations in Palestine and Israel 1880s–1950s," *Journal of Civil Society* 5, no. 1 (2009): 11.
[5] Nir Kedar, "Ben- Gurion's Mamlakhtiyut : Etymological and Theoretical Roots," *Israel Studies* 7, no. 3 (2002): 117.
[6] Etzioni, "The Decline of Neo-Feudalism: The Case of Israel."
[7] Cohen, *Zion and State: Nation, Class and the Shaping of Modern Israel*, 1992, 127–28.

Mamlakhtiyut was a central concept in this ideological construct. With the advent of statehood, a series of new challenges would be faced by the citizens and the state. The government expected a fourfold population growth over the years following 1948. Elite agricultural settlement was no longer sufficient; the state now needed to create a more complex pattern of economic activities. Furthermore, it had to weld the new citizens into a cohesive nation whilst absorbing new groups of immigrants.[8] While institutions such as the army, and undoubtedly the need for unity in the war against the Arabs, were instrumental in bringing about this cohesion, the identity discourse that came along with independence and informed post-independence policy was indispensable to bringing this about. It was during the years of transition between Yishuv and state that the standard of the ideal citizen was established to which subsequent generations would be held.[9]

Mamlakhtiyut required citizens to be loyal to the state and to follow the laws engendered by one national, democratically elected centre. In the words of Dan Horowitz mentioned elsewhere in this thesis, the state was becoming an articulator of commitment.[10] Contrary to the pre-state setting, relations between citizens and the state were to be direct rather than mediated through corporations that segmented the body of citizens.[11] It was the adaptation of the pioneering principle (*Chalutziyut*) which defined the ideal member of the Yishuv during the pre-state period to the situation of statehood and citizenship.[12] Just as pioneers were defined by their sacrifice for the cause of settling Palestine, citizens would

[8] Kabalo, "Pioneering Discourse and the Shaping of an Israeli Citizen in the 1950s," 83.
[9] Ibid., 84–85.
[10] Horowitz, "Dual Authority Polities."
[11] Avi Bareli, "Mamlakhtiyut , Capitalism and Socialism during the 1950s in Israel," *Journal of Israeli History* 26, no. 2 (2007): 203–4, http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/13531040701552132.
[12] Shafir Gershon and Yoav Peled, *Being Israeli: The Dynamics of Multiple Citizenship* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 19.

be strongly committed to the collective and to national goals in the new State of Israel. Citizenship was not defined as much by entitlements as by obligations.[13]

Ben-Gurion explicitly linked pioneering with the new concept of citizenship when he unveiled his government's first program.[14] The guiding principle of state-building, however, had already crystallized among the political leadership in the pre-independence years. The labour movement's ideology underwent a process of reification of the state, by which the latter ceased to be an essential means to the liberation of the Jewish people and became a thing unto itself.[15] The worker's movement, represented by the cooperation between Ahdut Ha-Avoda and Ha-Poel Ha-Zair – and the labour union, Histadrut, which they founded in 1920 – moved from a socialist conception of the settlement effort to a nationalist conception in the mid-1920s. If the pioneering ideal based on the virtues of agricultural labour had been the centre of the movement's ideology until the Fourth *Aliyah*, the influx of middle class Jews thereafter and the recognition that private capital would be needed to avert recurring economic disaster convinced the workers' leadership of the need for a change of course. If the worker's movement wished to retain influence over the creation of a Jewish national home, it had to appeal to a wider audience and attain hegemony within the Zionist Organisation.[16]

According to Horowitz and Lissak's influential work about the political development of the Yishuv, the power centre of the Jewish community only began to gain supremacy over subcentres after this change of orientation by the labour subcentre. This

[13] Kabalo, "Pioneering Discourse and the Shaping of an Israeli Citizen in the 1950s," 82; 87; Orit Rozin, "Forming a Collective Identity: The Debate over the Proposed Constitution, 1948–1950," *Journal of Israeli History* 26, no. 2 (2007): 258.
[14] Kabalo, "Pioneering Discourse and the Shaping of an Israeli Citizen in the 1950s," 97.
[15] Cohen, *Zion and State: Nation, Class and the Shaping of Modern Israel*, 1992, 6–7.
[16] Bareli, *Authority and Participation in a New Democracy: Political Struggles in Mapai, Israel's Ruling Party, 1948-1953*, 26–32; Cohen, *Zion and State: Nation, Class and the Shaping of Modern Israel*, 1992, 120–23.

change followed a reformulation of policy by labour leader – and first Prime Minister of Israel – David Ben-Gurion, encapsulated in the maxim 'from class to nation'.[17] The citizen was not to be a member of any subunits; rather, his relationship with the polity was to be unmediated.[18] This, in turn, would later translate into *Mamlakhtiyut* as an opposition to the maintenance of pre-state organizations mediating between the citizen and the government. As had been the case with the members of the Histadrut during the mandate period, 'the individual was required to identify completely with the common aim, divesting himself of all individualism, not deviating from existing norms'.[19] Given that all efforts had to be placed at the service of the nation, neo-feudalism had to be reined in – Building the state was the most important task of the moment.[20] The remainder of this section will illustrate what *Mamlakhtiyut* meant in practice, when dealing with the challenges of the Non-Zionist orthodox groups, the Revisionists and a segmented education system which the state inherited from the mandate period.

Statism in Action

Entrenching Identity: Between Secular and Religious

The deep religious divisions among world Jewry and the Yishuv have already been touched upon in previous chapters. Disagreements regarding religion and national identity did not disappear with independence. Indeed, the identity issue was so complex that it stood in the

[17] While these analysts present the new policy as one of recognition of the need for interclass cooperation in the creation of a Jewish national home[17], other analysts argue that it did not involve as dramatic a change in course. On the contrary, the labour movement continued to seek supremacy over the nation-building effort – however, the concept of 'worker' was expanded to include sectors of society other than the agricultural pioneers of the *kibbutz* movement.
[18] Bareli, *Authority and Participation in a New Democracy: Political Struggles in Mapai, Israel's Ruling Party, 1948-1953*, 35–38.
[19] Sasson Sofer, *Zionism and the Foundations of Israeli Diplimacy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 13.
[20] Rozin, "Forming a Collective Identity: The Debate over the Proposed Constitution, 1948–1950," 252.

way of adopting an Israeli constitution from the outset, as the 'identity-forming aspect of the constitution was liable to ignite a cultural controversy and even a *Kulturkampf*.'[21] The Zionist project was predicated on an ethno-nationalist definition of citizenship[22]: Every Jew was to have the right to immigrate to Israel. Thus defined, citizenship and religion were undeniably intertwined. Indeed, the line between nationalism and religion was very difficult to ascertain; religious symbols not only had a 'religio-cosmic' but also a 'historico-national' meaning.[23] Furthermore, the very choice of Palestine as the locus of the project was based on the history of a religious community, as defined in the Hebrew Bible. Finally, as explained in chapter 5, the orthodox community was powerful outside Palestine, and their financial and ideological support was as important to the success of Zionism as that of any other sector. As the discussion between mainstream Zionists and Agudat Israel surrounding the creation of Jewish community institutions in the 1920s (chapter 5) showed, the nation-building project had to continuously balance the competing demands of secularist and orthodox groups (including the Mizrahi party, which supported the Zionist project). As a result, religious groups received a privileged position in the nation[24] with a power that far superseded their electoral strength.[25]

With independence on the horizon, the definition of the role of religion in public life became more urgent. This is especially true as the Agudah's attitude toward the establishment of a Jewish state had not changed since the 1920s. In the context of the 1947

[21] Ibid., 251. Note that there were other reasons preventing the adoption of a constitution at this juncture of Israel's political history. So, for instance, Ben-Gurion biographer Anita Shapira explains that Ben-Gurion feared that a constitution would curtail the freedom of action of parliament, something which he wanted to avoid for the nascent democracy. Anita Shapira, *Ben-Gurion: Father of Modern Israel* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2014), 190.
[22] Gershon Shafir and Yoav Peled, "Citizenship and Stratification in an Ethnic Democracy," *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 21, no. 3 (1998): 408–27.
[23] Avi-Hai, *Ben Gurion, State-Builder: Principles and Pragmatism, 1948-1963*, 94.
[24] Shafir and Peled, "Citizenship and Stratification in an Ethnic Democracy."
[25] Agudat Israel represented approximately 20% of the Yishuv, as per data from the 1936 Royal Commission of Enquiry, Palästina-Centrale der Agudas Israel, *Die Vertretung Der Agudath Israel Vor Der Royal Commission in Palästina* (Frankfurt am Main: Hermon Verlag, 1937), National Library of Israel.

Partition Plan, through which the United Nations decided to create one Jewish state and one Arab state in Palestine, the organization was threatening to actively oppose the creation of the state when summoned before the Anglo-American Committee of Enquiry that the UN had appointed. In fact, just prior to the issuing of said resolution, Agudat Israel held its first post-war conference. In his opening speech, the organization's president, Jacob Rosenheim, reaffirmed the Agudah's existing policy on Palestine: It was opposed to partitioning the holy land and to the establishment of a state that was not based on the Torah, 'but dependent on the whims of the majority'. A different speaker added that while the Agudah was ready to cooperate with other agencies in Palestine, it was not willing to accept the hegemony of any one of them (i.e. the Jewish Agency). It viewed itself as the sole legitimate representative of orthodox Jewry and would negotiate with others only as an equal.[26]

Thus, while it is often asserted that the Holocaust brought the ultra-orthodox closer to the idea of creating a Jewish state[27], it was not sufficient to overcome their opposition to a secular state the way the Jewish Agency envisioned it.[28] The prospect of the emergence of a Jewish state brought the long-standing conflict with the non-Zionists, who had largely remained autonomous from the Yishuv's political organization, back to the table. As was discussed in chapter 5, non-Zionist orthodox Jews – no matter how incompatible their political ideology was with that of the Zionist pioneers – could not be ignored in the Yishuv's nation-building effort. Their cooperation could only be assured in exchange for substantial concessions regarding the role of religion in the life of the new state. The

[26] Agudas Israel World Organisation, "Extracts from the J.T.A. Bulleting of August 21st, 1947," August 21, 1947, CZA Z4-30592.
[27] Medding, *The Founding of Israeli Democracy*, 23–24.
[28] Menachem Friedman, "The Structural Foundation for Religio-Political Accommodation in Israel: Fallacy and Reality," in *Israel: The First Decade of Independence* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1995), 51–52.

Agudah was not only opposed to the creation of a Jewish state as a matter of principle, but it feared that such a state would imply the existence of a state-wide education system and other services that would curtail their cultural rights.[29] If they were faced with the creation of such a state then, they would have to ensure that orthodox Jews continued to be able to exercise these rights.[30]

On the other hand, the Jewish Agency was conscious of bringing all sectors of the Zionist and Jewish endeavour in Palestine together, into one united front.[31] The matter became especially urgent with the appointment of a United Nations Committee of Enquiry after Britain had announced its intention to withdraw from Palestine, in 1947. The Agudah had related its stance on Palestine policy to the previous Anglo-American committee of 1946; Chairman of the executive, H.A. Goodman explained that the Agudah's stance was for Britain to open the borders of Palestine to Jewish immigration while explicitly stating that 'the problem of a Jewish State does not arise', adding that 'it should be made clear that Jews will not be allowed to dominate Arabs, no Arabs Jews'.[32] In other words, the Agudah was interested in an improvement of the immigration situation, in particular for their followers, but it had no interest in the establishment of a Jewish state. Indeed, the organization strongly favoured continuation of British tutelage or the establishment of an Arab-Jewish federation over the creation of such a state.[33] To prevent independent Agudist action vis-à-vis the Committee of Enquiry, and thus ensure a united front, Ben-Gurion prompted negotiations with the Agudah.

[29] Ibid., 57.
[30] Ibid., 61.
[31] Agudas Israel World Organisation, "The Following Reports Appeared in the J.T.A. Bulletin of September 7th 1947," September 8, 1947, CZA Z4-30592.
[32] "Goodman to Beeley," 1946, CZA Z4-30592.
[33] Friedman, "The Structural Foundation for Religio-Political Accommodation in Israel: Fallacy and Reality," 62.

The outcome was a well-known 1947 letter from the Jewish Agency to Agudat Israel outlining the concessions it was willing to make. It is to this letter that the so-called 'status quo agreement' – the fundamental compromise solution to the religious-secular problem in Israel – is often traced back. In it, the Agency promised that the new state would establish Saturdays as a day of rest, that government institutions would serve Kosher food, that orthodox courts would have jurisdiction in issues of personal status law and that religious institutions would have autonomy.[34] In addition, the state would recognize the autonomy of educational institutions which had existed during the mandate period, while allowing for state supervision of a minimal curriculum. Even though this seemed to cover all orthodox concerns, the organization's leadership did not accept the compromises outlined. Instead, it made its own separate representation in front of the committee of inquiry. It was only after the Partition Plan had been approved that the Agudah decided not to oppose the establishment of the new state.[35] This decision was made shortly before the war of independence began. Thus, acquiescence to the creation of the state was not due to the Holocaust or the Arab threat; political opportunity structures led to consensus.

The letter's concessions – which came to form the basic secular-religious compromise of the State of Israel – were made despite David Ben-Gurion's own disapproval of orthodox beliefs. While Israel's founding father believed in the existence of God, he also doubted that the contents of the Bible were to be taken literally. In fact, while professing respect for those who believed in it, he declared that he could not accept the Bible as a full record of what had happened.[36] To justify large-scale concessions to the

[34] Hanna Lerner, "Entrenching the Status-Quo: Religion and State in Israel's Constitutional Proposals," *Constellations* 16, no. 3 (2009): 447.
[35] Friedman, "The Structural Foundation for Religio-Political Accommodation in Israel: Fallacy and Reality," 65–67.
[36] Moshe Perlman, *Ben Gurion Looks Back in Talks with Moshe Perlman* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1965), 216–17.

orthodox minority, Ben-Gurion referred to his statist principle, *Mamlakhtiyut*. Building the state superseded any other political goal; as long as he received support for this priority, he could compromise on other issues that were of importance to his partners.[37] There were simply more urgent matters than personal status and kosher food[38]: 'Saving the nation and preserving its independence and security in this conflict-ridden and storm-tossed world have priority over any religious or anti-religious ideal', he proclaimed.[39] If he could keep religion out of politics by meeting such demands, he would be able to ensure that the state remained secular.[40]

However, the issue of religion went far beyond granting demands relating to the role of religion in everyday life. With an identity discourse so closely intertwined with ethno-religious elements, the declaration of independence could not but address the religious factor. The matter proved contentious, and a compromise solution – much like the one that was struck in Lebanon, in 1943, as will be explained below – had to be reached. Whereas the religious elements in Israeli politics sought a clear reference to God and his support in establishing the Jewish state, secular Zionists considered such a reference an offense against their political convictions. A compromise formula referring to the 'Rock of Israel' was eventually included at the insistence of Ben-Gurion.[41] It was a vague formula, with biblical and Jewish liturgical roots, that did not fully satisfy either side but provided a minimal basis for cooperation.

There is no denying that the incorporation of the Agudah into the new state's structures via compromise gave the non-Zionist orthodox community substantial power over the political process for years to come. However, the negotiations were always led by

[37] Ibid., 219.
[38] Ibid., 218.
[39] Avi-Hai, *Ben Gurion, State-Builder: Principles and Pragmatism, 1948-1963*, 97.
[40] Ibid., 96.
[41] Medding, *The Founding of Israeli Democracy*, 27; Shapira, *Ben-Gurion: Father of Modern Israel*, 161.

the core which had held supreme authority – albeit informally – during the Yishuv years. In other words, even though the *status quo* agreement involved the establishment of a consensus or consociational democracy, it was directed and dominated by the secular Zionist leadership. Mapai was the dominant party, it had established its dominance over the system since the 1930s, and while it needed to co-opt other important elements of Israeli society, it was able to do so from a position of supremacy. In fact, religious parties were the easiest ones to form partnerships with, because they would allow Ben-Gurion the greatest freedom to formulate policy. Aside from protecting their religious interests, their involvement in politics was expected to be minimal.[42]

Thus, consensus meant the deactivation of opposition rather than its entrenchment as was the case in Lebanon. This was, as political scientist Avi Bareli explains in his monograph on the development of Mapai in the first years of statehood, the continuation of a general political pattern which began to crystallize long before. The foundation of the Histadrut, for instance, in 1920, on the basis of 'unity rather than agreement' was representative of the political strategy going forward. Once a decision was made, with the input of all members – through regular elections and deliberation – unity of action and decision dominated. The founders of the labour organization, who were to lead Mapai – and indeed, the Yishuv years later – tended toward 'politics of decision'.[43]

This was not the case in Lebanon where there was no political core, and where no group had enough power to trump the other. If British policy in Palestine had indirectly aided the emergence of a dominant party in the Yishuv, French policy directly prevented this in Lebanon. There, agreements took place on an egalitarian basis, not allowing any

[42] Avi-Hai, *Ben Gurion, State-Builder: Principles and Pragmatism, 1948-1963*, 96.
[43] Bareli, *Authority and Participation in a New Democracy: Political Struggles in Mapai, Israel's Ruling Party, 1948-1953*, 21.

vision of the state to come out ahead. In Israel, Ben-Gurion's vision of a strong state with a significant role for the Jewish religion became incontestable – it was the dominant vision which the state now went on to implementing. Thus, the vertically divided society of the Yishuv had through the monopolization of physical and ideological power turned into a horizontally divided society: one dominant group imposing its power over subordinate groups formed of Jews of other ethnic origins, the ultraorthodox and the right wing (and, of course, Palestinian Arabs). As will be discussed below, Lebanon's consensus was so vague that it could not be translated into policy – indeed, it stunted policy making and weakened the system for years to come.

Dealing with the far right

While the United Nations were in session to decide the future of Palestine in 1947, the Jewish Agency pleaded with the Irgun – the Revisionist[44] paramilitary organization that had led a protracted fight against the British in Palestine – to temporarily halt its military activities. This request, however, was met with refusal – the Irgun was not ready to accept the Agency's leadership.[45] Just as had been the case with the Agudah, the horrors of the Holocaust did not automatically prompt wholesale support for the existing political centre in the Yishuv and its leadership of the state-building effort. Moreover, as will be explained below, the conflict with the Arabs did nothing to deactivate the long-standing conflict between the Irgun and the Haganah (the Yishuv's underground militia). Indeed, the relative

[44] The Irgun was the ideological heir to Jabotinsky's Revisionism but was largely independent of it. A meeting in 1938 between Eliahu Golomb, leader of the Haganah, and Jabotinsky, leader of the New Zionist Organization since 1935 – and ideological father of the Revisionist movement – clearly illustrates this separation between the two movements (also alluded to in chapter 6). At the time, Golomb was pleading with Jabotinsky to stop the Irgun's separate military activities against the Arabs. Jabotinsky explained that he has no influence over the local leadership and that his orders would not be obeyed. As he put it, a spider cannot spin its web from a distance. "Talks Between Eliahu and Jabotinsky," July 10, 1938, JA A1/4-39.
[45] Sasson Sofer, *Begin* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1988), 73.

calm that followed after the truce between Jews and Arabs was declared following the war of independence, in June 1948, led to a reopening of the internal Jewish conflict.[46]

During the years that preceded the British withdrawal from Palestine, the Revisionist movement and the labour movement and its allies clashed once more like they had done during the 1930s after the Arlosoroff murder (chapter 6). While the Jewish Agency opposed fighting the British, the Irgun and the Stern Gang led an all-out war of attrition against the mandatory power. The Palmach and the Haganah, in turn, began to decisively move against the Irgun with the start of what is called the *Saison*, in 1944. They moved against the group's military powers and funding abilities, while handing Irgun members over to the British.[47] At the same time, however, there were moments of unity. In 1946, the Haganah, the Irgun and Lehi established a temporary military alliance, galvanized by British immigration restrictions despite the dire state of European Jewry after the war and the international community urging the mandatory to allow more immigration.

Even when the *Saison* was going on, the majority of Yishuv condemned it.[48] Indeed, one of the interviewees for this project who lived in Jerusalem at the time explained that once three Jewish boys knocked on her family's door with weapons and ammunition, stating the British were chasing them. Her mother had let them in and hid them underneath the interviewee's bed. She later found out that the boys were members of the Irgun, and even though her parents were ideologically convinced members of the Haganah, they had provided cover for them.[49] Thus, the relationship between the two sides was ambivalent, and the fight against the British – which was closely related to the Holocaust – softened

[46] Shapira, *Ben-Gurion: Father of Modern Israel*, 164.
[47] Uri Ben-Eliezer, *The Making of Israeli Militarism* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1998), 120–21.
[48] Shindler, *The Rise of the Israeli Right: From Odessa to Hebron*, 214–15.
[49] Interview with S.L., Jerusalem, 28/4/2016.

their differences to a certain extent. It was not, however, a sufficient condition to end fragmentation of political and military power in the Yishuv.

While the majority of the Yishuv received the Partition Plan with joy, celebrating on the streets upon hearing of the results of the UN session[50], the Revisionist movement under Menahem Begin announced that the outcome was unacceptable and warned the government that if it did not fight for the full incorporation of the biblical land into the state of Israel, including Jerusalem as its capital, they would do it themselves.[51] Within the context of the civil war with the Arabs which erupted immediately after the Partition Plan was announced, the Irgun organized a large secret arms shipment to Palestine. The *Altalena* was to carry five million dollars' worth of arms, and the Mossad had informed Ben-Gurion of Irgun plans for a future confrontation with the government, and of its intention to lead a separate effort in the ongoing civil war. The provisional government assumed that the Irgun was preparing to improve its position vis-à-vis the government in order to extract concessions by force.[52] Indeed, Ben-Gurion expected a European-style coup d'état.[53]

Even though the Israeli army, which had grown throughout the years of the mandate as the Haganah, was significantly stronger than Begin's five thousand soldiers[54], with the new arms shipment it could become a challenge for Israel's young army. Especially in the midst of a war against the Palestinian Arabs, rebellion within the Yishuv would spell the end of the state of Israel. It was thus the task of every Israeli to protect the country from

[50] Various interviews conducted for this dissertation in Israel, in 2015-2016.
[51] Ehud Sprinzak, *Brother against Brother:Violence and Extremism in Israeli Politics from Altalena to the Rabin Assassination* (New York: The Free Press, 1999), 19; Shindler, *The Rise of the Israeli Right: From Odessa to Hebron*, 226.
[52] Medding, *The Founding of Israeli Democracy*, 21.
[53] Shindler, *The Rise of the Israeli Right: From Odessa to Hebron*, 236.
[54] The Israeli Defence Forces which were created in 1948 and replaced several underground militias, including the largest unit, the Haganah, numbered over 100,000 conscripts. Ronald W. Zweig, ed., *David Ben-Gurion. Politics and Leadership in Israel* (London: Frank Cass, 1991), 178.

these centrifugal tendencies.[55] Furthermore, David Ben-Gurion was thinking long term. When asked by a member of the provisional state council why he was so afraid of an armed minority, the prime minister responded that weapons were solely for killing, and such killing should be strictly controlled and placed under the discipline of the state.[56] The issue came to a head when the *Altalena* arrived in Kfar Vitkin, north of Tel Aviv, without an agreement between the Irgun and the government as to the shipment's distribution. The Israeli army was instructed to prevent the unloading of the vessel by any means necessary, and a battle developed between these two long-standing enemy factions – indeed, in a military document containing orders for the Israeli army, the Irgun was described as 'the enemy'.[57]

It was the closest the Jewish community of Palestine had ever come to civil war and the culmination of years of rivalry between the Haganah and the Revisionist militia. Despite Begin's subsequent order for his soldiers not to fight against the Israeli army and to avoid civil war at all costs, the Israeli government triggered 'operation purification', aimed at deactivating the Irgun for good. As President Chaim Weizmann explained after the *Altalena* affair, it would take 'more surgical treatment before the canker of dissidence has been completely extirpated.' Like Ben-Gurion, Weizmann thought that the assertion of military authority was the only course 'worthy of a State and a government'.[58] By the end of 1948, the Irgun had disbanded and its leader, Menachem Begin, became the leader of a new political party, Herut, which would fully integrate into the political system that had developed during the mandate years and that was dominated by Mapai. Ben-Gurion's

[55] Sprinzak, *Brother against Brother:Violence and Extremism in Israeli Politics from Altalena to the Rabin Assassination*; David Ben-Gurion, *Rebirth and Destiny of Israel* (London: Thomas Yoseloff, 1959), 254.
[56] Ben-Gurion, *Rebirth and Destiny of Israel*, 255.
[57] Sprinzak, *Brother against Brother:Violence and Extremism in Israeli Politics from Altalena to the Rabin Assassination*.
[58] "Weizmann to 'Chief,'" June 20, 1948, WA 2843A.

ruthless response to the challenge which the Altalena presented to Israeli governmental authority sent a message: The government of Israel was asserting a monopoly on the legitimate use of force.[59] In the words of political scientist and expert on Israel's far right Ehud Sprinzak, the affair left 'a legacy of stability and responsibility for the newly created Jewish state.'[60] The Irgun had attempted to 'wound the unity and sovereignty of the state'[61] and Ben-Gurion clearly stated that there would not be two governments, and there would not be two armies.[62]

Fighting segmentation on all fronts

The transition to statehood not only involved confronting opposition forces. For Ben-Gurion, the task of state-building was the ultimate policy priority, the state had to recover the powers which under the mandate had been left to corporations such as the Histadrut, and political parties, including his own Mapai party. In other words, *Mamlachtiyut* 'emphasized the shift from sectoral interests to the general interest, from semi-voluntarism to binding obligation.'[63] Subgroups had to be repressed in the interest of the state. A widely read political survey of the Yishuv describes the situation before statehood as one of 'authority without sovereignty'.[64] The Yishuv's institutions wielded informal authority but lacked the sovereign powers to impose themselves on society. In the field of education, for instance, three different education streams coexisted: That of the Mizrachi party, that of the

[59] Medding, *The Founding of Israeli Democracy*, 17; Sofer, *Begin*, 78; Moshe Lissak and Uri Cohen, "Scientific Strategists in the Period of Mamlakhtiyut: Interaction between the Academic Community and Political Power Centers," *Journal of Israeli History* 30, no. 2 (2011): 191.
[60] Sprinzak, *Brother against Brother:Violence and Extremism in Israeli Politics from Altalena to the Rabin Assassination*.
[61] Ben-Gurion, *Rebirth and Destiny of Israel*, 251.
[62] Medding, *The Founding of Israeli Democracy*, 21.
[63] Shafir and Peled, "Citizenship and Stratification in an Ethnic Democracy," 416.
[64] Dan Horowitz and Moshe Lissak, "Authority without Sovereignty: The Case of the National Centre of the Jewish Community in Palestine," *Government and Opposition* 8, no. 1 (1973): 48–71.

Histadrut and that of the Jewish Agency.[65] Now, after the creation of the State of Israel, this had to change. Indeed, Ben-Gurion had long advocated the elimination of the party-based education system, blaming it for the rifts and divisiveness of the Yishuv's society. However, in this pursuit, Ben-Gurion faced the opposition of his very own labour movement, which promoted a rival ideology, *Tnu'atiyut*, or loyalty to a particular movement.[66] The movement sought not only the maintenance of its autonomy in providing social services, including education, but also the promotion of labour ideology by the state.[67]

Within the governmental coalition of Mapai and the Religious Front (which included all religious parties of the First Knesset), Ben-Gurion was outnumbered by those who favoured a continuation of the stream system. Meantime, the parties supporting state education, Herut and the General Zionist, were a negligible minority in parliament.[68] Between 1949 and 1951, the number of schoolchildren in Israel had doubled, and given the varied national backgrounds of newcomers, the educational system fragmented even further.[69] Indeed, the overall population of Israel doubled within the first three years of statehood, thus more than half of the new state's population was made up of immigrants with diverse languages and cultures.[70] There was an all-out competition by political parties

[65] Shlomo Swirski and Mark B. Ginsburg, eds., *Politics and Education in Israel: Comparisons with the United States* (London: Falmer, 1999), 88; Eliezer Don-Yehiya, "Mamlakhtiyut, Education and Religion in the Struggle over the Mass Immigration," *Journal of Israeli History* 26, no. 2 (2007): 230. To this, the system of the Agudat Israel must be added, which these works do not highlight.
[66] Lissak and Cohen, "Scientific Strategists in the Period of Mamlakhtiyut: Interaction between the Academic Community and Political Power Centers," 190.
[67] Don-Yehiya, "Mamlakhtiyut, Education and Religion in the Struggle over the Mass Immigration," 229–30.
[68] In the 1949 elections to the Constituent assembly – which later turned into the First Knesset, Herut received 11.5% of the votes, and the General Zionists, 5.2% of the vote. This translated into 14 and 7 seats, respectively, in an assembly of 120 representatives, of which 46 were affiliated with Mapai, which had received 35.7% of the vote. The Knesset, "Constituent Assembly (Which Later Turned into the First Knesset)," accessed May 29, 2018, https://knesset.gov.il/description/eng/eng_mimshal_res1.htm.
[69] Shimon Reshef, "Ben Gurion and Public Education," in *David Ben-Gurion. Public Leadership in Israel*, ed. Ronald W. Zweig (London: Frank Cass, 1991), 261.
[70] Kabalo, "The Historical Dimension: Jewish Associations in Palestine and Israel 1880s–1950s," 11.

to capture as many newcomer children as possible for their own stream.[71] It was clear that the integration of newcomers was the primary basis for the accumulation of power within the new state structures.[72]

For those who favoured state education, the school now ceased to be a forum to inculcate party values. On the contrary, it turned into the centre of an 'effort to mould the newly-arrived children in image of the minority born and raised in the country.'[73] As director of the Department for Cultural Absorption of the Immigrants of the Ministry of Education Nahum Levin put it: The only factor that could integrate immigrants into Israeli society was the State of Israel itself; they had to become a partner in the Israeli revolution and abandon the spirit of exile. Furthermore, he declared that the Religious Front, which opposed state education, had 'declared a war against the educational project' which was only the beginning of an onslaught 'upon all the cultural projects of the State of Israel'.[74] As was the case with the 'enemies' that the State confronted during the *Altalena* affair, retention of autonomy was viewed as an all-out assault on the new state.

It was precisely the fierce partisan competition in the field of education that helped Ben-Gurion overcome leftist opposition to the state system. At first, it was established that uniform education would be implemented in immigrant camps, even eliminating the religious stream. Faced with the opposition of the Mizrachi, this was then replaced with a system whereby uniform education was accompanied by the religious stream where needed. Parties, however, found a loophole by transferring immigrants quickly to transit

[71] Swirski and Ginsburg, *Politics and Education in Israel: Comparisons with the United States*, 102–3.
[72] Don-Yehiya, "Mamlakhtiyut, Education and Religion in the Struggle over the Mass Immigration," 231–32.
[73] Reshef, "Ben Gurion and Public Education," 252.
[74] Quoted in Don-Yehiya, "Mamlakhtiyut, Education and Religion in the Struggle over the Mass Immigration," 235.

camps in which these rules would not apply.[75] Thus, even years after the establishment of the state, the competition for power between pre-existing power centres was fierce – subordination to the new realities of statehood was far from simple. As a result of the labour movement's control of transit camps, by 1953, the workers' stream enrolled 43.3% of all Jewish schoolchildren while the general stream enrolled 27%.[76]

In 1951, Ben-Gurion announced his plan to homogenize the educational system.[77] Now in a coalition government with a strengthened General Zionist and National Religious Party contingent, the context was more propitious to get the measure approved. The issue came to a head over the flying of a red flag in labour schools on the 1st of May. General Zionist members of the coalition government resigned over the matter, and Ben-Gurion settled the issue by promising that once state education was in place, only two trends would remain: secular and religious. No segmentary symbols would henceforth be allowed in schools. The State Education Law which enshrined this principle came into effect in 1953.[78]

Within the first ten years of statehood, the government further reduced the power of the Histadrut, the organization which had acted as a springboard for Ben-Gurion's political career. This organization had been the all-powerful labour organization of the Yishuv. Its task was to channel the incoming workforce into the new economy, and it provided social security services to its members. Indeed, successful immigration to Palestine as a labourer almost required Histadrut membership. It was considered a state within a state during the mandate period. At the Histadrut convention of 1957, the prime minister signalled an important change: The organization would not be the state's rival nor

[75] Ibid., 232–33.
[76] Swirski and Ginsburg, *Politics and Education in Israel: Comparisons with the United States*, 102–3.
[77] Don-Yehiya, "Mamlakhtiyut, Education and Religion in the Struggle over the Mass Immigration," 242–43.
[78] Avi-Hai, *Ben Gurion, State-Builder: Principles and Pragmatism, 1948-1963*, 76.

its competitor, 'but its loyal aide and dedicated supporter'.[79] Conscious that much of his power base laid in the labour movement, however, he could not openly confront the organization. Instead, part of its activities – the labour exchanges – were nationalized, while the sick fund was maintained for paying Histadrut members. Non-members would henceforth be covered by a public fund.[80] Thus, the principle of *Mamlakhtiyut* permeated every political project on which the new state embarked during the first years of statehood. The state, and now private corporations, would be in charge of social services in order to bind disparate elements of the country's immigrant population into a coherent nation.

The Lebanese State-Building Consensus

A compromise solution to the two opposing nationalisms in Lebanese politics had begun to emerge in the years leading up to Lebanon's independence, as chapter 6 showed. As Riad Al-Solh had presaged: While the Sunnis were willing to give up their dream of a united Syria for better relations within Lebanon, they expected the Christians to also sacrifice part of their identity for the sake of the country. In the latter part of the 1930s, the opposing sides of the Lebanese political spectrum had slowly begun to make common cause. Under patriarch Arida, the Maronite church began to distance itself from the French and made overtures to the Syrian nationalists. At the same time, pragmatist Riad Al-Solh had inaugurated a moderate Sunni political movement. In September 1943, Maronite Bishara Al-Khoury was elected to the presidency of Lebanon, despite the fact that his competitor and *Kiyanist* hardliner Emile Eddé had won a landslide victory in the parliamentary elections. The new president immediately set out to outline the executive's policy. As the next section will show, the elections had taken place within a thoroughly anti-French context, and it was within this context the Eddé lost his bid for the presidency.

[79] Ibid., 74.
[80] Ibid., 74–75.

Thus, Al-Khoury declared immediately after his election that the country would seek full independence, adding that it would not seek to isolate itself from its Arab neighbours but rather reach out for cultural and economic cooperation with them.[81] In doing so, he was outlining the principles of what would become known as the National Pact.

This verbal understanding was reached between Bishara Al-Khoury and Riad Al-Solh shortly after the elections. The parties agreed that Lebanon is an independent republic, 'with an Arab face', of Arabic language, that is an 'integral part of the Arab world'.[82] The National Pact embodied what political scientist Farid El-Khazen called 'Lebanon's dichotomous unity', i.e. internal unity within Lebanon, and Lebanese unity vis-à-vis the outside world.[83] In other words, it was a statement of internal and external sovereignty. With the National Pact, the Muslim political establishment recognized the legitimacy of a sovereign Lebanese entity, while the Christian communities declared themselves willing to share power with Lebanese Muslims, and to recognize that Lebanon had a certain Arab character. The Christians thereby discarded the idea of an isolated Lebanon under French protection while the Muslims discarded the idea of merging Lebanon with the rest of the Arab world.[84]

However, the polity it created was not based on the existence of a shared vision of the state, however much the National Pact seemed to enshrine such a vision. Rather, it was a 'confederation of protonational communities each of which claimed the ultimate

[81] Edward Spears, "A Brief Review of Events in Iraq, Syria and the Lebanon, 1918-1943," December 1943, 32, MECA, GB165-0269, Sir Edward Spears Collection, Box 2, File 4; Bishara Khuri, *Majmūʿat Khuṭab : Aylūl 1943-Kānūn Al-Awwal 1951* (Beirut: al-Dār al-Lubnānīyah, 1983), 1–3.
[82] Antwan Messarra, *Le Modèle Politique Libanais et Sa Survie : Essai Sur La Classification et l'aménagement d'un Système Consociatif*, Beirut (Université Libanaise, 1983), 64.
[83] F Khazen and Centre for Lebanese Studies, "The Communal Pact of National Identities: The Making and Politics of the 1943 National Pact," *Papers on Lebanon*, vol. 12 (Oxford, 1991), 4.
[84] Atiyah, "The Attitude of the Lebanese Sunnis towards the State of Lebanon," 182.

allegiance of its members'.[85] In the words of a commentator in 1975, it was 'an accord about two negations and it [did] not contain any positive element […] The Lebanese nation is born […] as an alliance of communities and not from the integration of its citizens.'[86] Under such circumstances, the state could not become an articulator of commitment as the State of Israel. The consensus enshrined respect for diversity but did not pave the way to an integrated Lebanon. The sectarian system of government was maintained, with a 6:5 distribution of seats in parliament for Christians and Muslims respectively, and the continuation of the convention established in the 1930s[87] by which the president would always be a Maronite, the Prime Minister a Sunni, and the speaker of the chamber a Shia.

Thus, the Pact and the conditions that surrounded it did not, contrary to what some authors assert, lead to 'the rise of a Lebanese nation and state.'[88] While the Pact was concluded within a context of consensus surrounding the need for an end to the mandate and real Lebanese independence, it was not the result of a united national liberation movement. The Free French, who had toppled the Vichy government in the Levant with British military support, confirmed commitment to the independence of Syria and Lebanon under pressure from the British, in November 1941. General Catroux, who was in charge of France's political operations in the Levant, declared Lebanon free and independent after visiting different parts of the country to ascertain people's wishes.[89] However, the declaration remained a dead letter for years as the Free French considered it to be unwise

[85] Itamar Rabinovich, *The War for Lebanon, 1970-1985* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1985), 24.
[86] Ryad Taha, president of the Lebanese press syndicate, quoted in, Messarra, *Le Modèle Politique Libanais et Sa Survie : Essai Sur La Classification et l'aménagement d'un Système Consociatif*, 55. Original text: 'C'est un accord sur deux négations et ne comportant pas d'élément positif […] La patrie libanaise est née au moment de l'Independence d'une alliance de communautés et non de l´intégration des citoyens.´
[87] Pierre Rondot, "Les Structures Socio-Politiques de La Nation Libanaise," *Revue Française de Science Politique* 4, no. 1 (1954): 95, http://www.persee.fr/web/revues/home/prescript/article/rfsp_0035-2950_1954_num_4_1_452638.
[88] Kheir Hussein Alkhajar, *Al-Madlul Al-Ta'ifi Li-Nitham Al-Hukm Fi Lubnan, 1925-1943*, 106.
[89] Alfred Naccache, "Note Sur L'Independance Libanaise et L'Evenement Politique Du 18 Mars 1943," May 12, 1943, FO 226/245.

to hold elections during times of war.[90] General Edward Spears, leader of the British mission in the Levant, however, considered this to be an excuse. The Free French, he argued, had never been serious about granting the country independence.[91]

In the latter part of 1943, public pressure was mounting in Lebanon for the government to press for true Lebanese sovereignty and an end to the mandate.[92] While calls for Lebanese independence came from all corners[93], the rapprochement between Christians and Muslims of the previous decade had faded away and confessional polarisation had returned.[94] Indeed, suspicions between the parties ran so high that Patriarch Arida demanded that all candidates in the 1943 elections swear allegiance to the *Kiyan*, i.e. the entity of Greater Lebanon.[95] Meantime, British foreign office reports continued to emphasize the importance of Syrian unity for the Muslim community, and advocated for a vague declaration of Lebanese independence that would allow for the revision of boundaries in the future.[96] The following paragraphs will explore the months surrounding the Pact and the attainment of independence in further detail, but the preceding should suffice to illustrate the fact that the Lebanese state-building consensus was a functional least common denominator rather than a roadmap for building a new state that integrated disparate communities into a common long-term framework. In the words of Lebanon scholar Malcolm Kerr, 'national consensus exists only in the negative form of mutual

[90] "H.M.Minister to Foreign Office, No. 453," August 29, 1942, MECA, GB165-0269, Sir Edward Spears Collection, Box 2, File 6.
[91] "General Spears Who Played a Great Role in the 'November Days' Speaks for the First Time - Translation of Hayat Interview, Al-Hayat, 24 November 1965," n.d., MECA, GB165-0269, Sir Edward Spears Collection, Box 2, File 7.
[92] "Foreign Office to British Legation Beirut," 1943, October, FO 226/245.
[93] Kheir Hussein Alkhajar, *Al-Madlul Al-Ta'ifi Li-Nitham Al-Hukm Fi Lubnan, 1925-1943*, 104.
[94] Seale, *The Struggle for Arab Independence: Riad El-Solh and the Makers of the Modern Middle East*, 478.
[95] Ibid., 486.
[96] "H.M.Minister," January 23, 1943 FO 226/245.

rivalry and suspicion' and as a result, there was no majority opinion based on which a coherent state program can be implemented.[97]

The Pact was not only a foundational agreement or a historical curiosity. On the contrary, even today, it is still "imprinted into everyday life in Lebanon".[98] Over the decades, it has been an overarching political principle, perhaps a dominant ideology, much like *Mamlakhtiyut* was during the first years of Israeli statehood. As a principle, it has informed every revision of the constitution and of the electoral system since independence. Due to its importance in Lebanese political life, it has also been 'a rag-bag, a scapegoat, a wailing wall for a politicised opinion that assimilates the Pact with all reasons for complaint in Lebanese political life.'[99] In other words, the National Pact is viewed as the foundational text of Lebanon, the one that made the state possible and that simultaneously laid the basis for its downfall.[100] We must be careful, however, not to blame all of Lebanon's political ills – or, indeed, Israel's ills – on developments during the mandate period and its results (whether that be *Mamlakhtiyut* or the National Pact). After all, these are highly dynamic processes dependent on variables other than structural constraints. As shown throughout this dissertation, contingency and agency continuously impacted political developments. The structures and agreements which this dissertation analyses, only contribute to explaining the political landscape in these two countries.

Notwithstanding the high importance of the Pact, it is clear that it simply consecrated the status quo, rather than reinventing the wheel. This may be the explanation

[97] Malcolm Kerr, "Political Decision Making in a Confessional Democracy," in *Politics in Lebanon*, ed. Leonard Binder (New York: Wiley, 1966), 188.
[98] Hassan-Tabet Rifaat and Antoine Messarra, "Qu'est-Ce Que Le Pacte National?," *L'Orient Le Jour*, October 31, 2016.
[99] Messarra, *Le Modèle Politique Libanais et Sa Survie : Essai Sur La Classification et l'aménagement d'un Système Consociatif*, 53.
[100] Zisser, *Lebanon: The Challenge of Independence*, 41.

for the lack of attention that this verbal agreement received in official documents that were perused for this dissertation.[101] Without the ideological developments in the Muslim and Christian camps of the 1930s, this pact would not have been possible.[102] Furthermore, the consociational distribution of political positions was not only an inheritance of the *Mutasarrifiyah*, as chapter 5 explained, but an institutional legacy of the mandate years. Given the institutional evolution of Lebanon since 1920, no other solution was possible. As a result, the Pact was not creative; it was consolidating.

Its weakness, however, went beyond confirming a system of government fraught with contradictions. The agreement was brought about only after the surrounding Arab states, particularly Egypt and Syria had given Bishara Al-Khoury their approval for Lebanese independence.[103] As a result, its stability also rested on the assumption that the regional balance of power would remain the same. In other words, if the status of Arab approval of the Lebanese entity changed, the pact could easily be thrown into question.

Moreover, far from being an agreement endorsed by large parts of the population, it was an agreement between the elites only. There is no reason to believe that the outcome of the 1943 elections, which brought pro-Arab candidate Bishara Al-Khoury to the presidency, reflected a pro-Arab stance of the Maronite electorate, for instance.[104] Moreover, other political leaders continued to advocate economic union with Syria, and even Riad Al-Solh declared his willingness to rescind the National Pact if the Christians

[101] British Foreign Office archives, Edward Spears' private papers and newspaper reports focus on the crisis November 1943, when the French authorities detained the president, the prime minister and other government officials in response to the introduction of constitutional amendments eliminating the mandatory's prerogatives.
[102] Khazen and Studies, "The Communal Pact of National Identities: The Making and Politics of the 1943 National Pact," 12:36.
[103] Zisser, *Lebanon: The Challenge of Independence*, 34–35.
[104] Khazen and Studies, "The Communal Pact of National Identities: The Making and Politics of the 1943 National Pact," 12:39.

desired to do so.[105] Indeed, it cannot be ascertained whether Al-Solh agreed on the pact's formula of a state 'with an Arab face' as a first step toward Arab unity later on, or because he truly accepted the status quo of Lebanon as an independent entity.[106] All these factors came together to turn Lebanon's foundational agreement and dominant political principle into a recipe for instability.

The National Pact in Action

Between Unity and Political Sectarianism

The National Pact was preceded by an agreement on communal quotas which it then went on to confirm. In January 1943, General Catroux announced the re-establishment of the Lebanese constitutional regime, which had been suspended since 1939. It has already been mentioned that 1943 saw a resurgence of Maronite political assertion. With Franco-British rivalry in Lebanon at its peak, it comes as no surprise that France would be setting the wheels into motion to guarantee its victory in the upcoming elections. In June 1943, French-installed president Ayub Thabit[107] issued two decrees that would clearly enhance Christian Lebanese power, and thus consolidate France's position in the country.

Decrees 49 and 50 laid the basis for the participation of Lebanese expatriates (most of them Christians) in the elections, while raising the number of seats in parliament and setting the quota of Christians versus Muslims at 8:5. The Sunni community vigorously protested as they considered the distribution to be unfair to them. An all-Muslim committee was formed and headed by the Mufti of Lebanon, demanding the revocation of the decrees and the celebration of a new population census. If their demands were not met, they would

[105] Ibid., 12:43.
[106] Atiyah, "The Attitude of the Lebanese Sunnis towards the State of Lebanon," 180.
[107] Seale, *The Struggle for Arab Independence: Riad El-Solh and the Makers of the Modern Middle East*, 484. Thabit enjoyed the mandatory's trust and was close to the Maronite patriarchate. Kheir Hussein Alkhajar, *Al-Madlul Al-Ta'ifi Li-Nitham Al-Hukm Fi Lubnan, 1925-1943*, 89.

boycott the elections. Egypt's president Nahhas Pasha intervened in their favour and, with the cooperation of British General Spears and Prime Minister of Iraq Nuri Al-Said, the ratio of Christians to Muslims in parliament was set at 5:6.[108] It is thus undeniable that the sectarian logic continued to prevail on the verge of independence.

The elections were waged according to the same electoral system that had persisted throughout the mandate years, i.e. there were five electoral districts with a number of seats commensurate with the size of the population, and seats were distributed according to the electoral strength of each religious community, even though all voters cast a vote for a list containing candidates from all of them. Votes continued to reflect traditional beliefs and attitudes. In this sense, anti-French and pro-Syrian nationalist Abdul Hamid Karamé's list won the elections in Tripoli, while Emile Eddé, the Maronite hardliner, won a landslide victory against moderate Bishara Al-Khoury. This indicates that the years preceding 1943 had not led to an overall change of attitudes toward the identity of Lebanon.[109]

What had changed, however, was that parliament had turned anti-French and pro-independence. While it was unclear what shape this independence would take, the overall tone of the elections was that things had to change. Given this transformation of the overall political climate, Emile Eddé's resistance to change could not but spell his downfall, which was aided by Britain's opposition to his rising to the presidency.[110] As a result, despite Eddé's popular support, pro-Arab Maronite Bishara Al-Khoury[111] won the bid for the

[108] Spears, "A Brief Review of Events in Iraq, Syria and the Lebanon, 1918-1943", MECA, GB165-0269, Sir Edward Spears Collection, Box 2, File 4. For more information see, Atiyah, "The Attitude of the Lebanese Sunnis towards the State of Lebanon," 169–71; Zisser, *Lebanon: The Challenge of Independence*, 38–39; Kheir Hussein Alkhajar, *Al-Madlul Al-Ta'ifi Li-Nitham Al-Hukm Fi Lubnan, 1925-1943*, 90.
[109] Zisser, *Lebanon: The Challenge of Independence*, 48.
[110] Ibid., 51–52.
[111] Al-Khoury only began his pro-Arab politics in earnest at the time of the 1943 elections, to secure victory against Emile Edde. Atiyah, "The Attitude of the Lebanese Sunnis towards the State of Lebanon," 177–79.

presidency. His nomination of Riad Al-Solh for the post of prime minister laid the basis for subsequent developments, including the National Pact.

On 25 October 1943, the Lebanese government issued a memorandum declaring its intention to eliminate clauses limiting full Lebanese sovereignty – i.e. those referring to the mandate – from the constitution. The initiative was met with staunch French opposition: The mandate was still legally in place and a unilateral change of the constitution was thus unacceptable. Political representatives of several Lebanese parties got together on 7 November and decided to press for independence, without any hesitation, well aware of the potential for a violent French response.[112] In the early morning of 11 November, the son of President Bishara Al-Khoury knocked on General Spears' door, with his faced spattered with blood, relating how the French forces had arrested his father, Prime Minister Riad Al-Solh, and other members of the government.[113] In addition, the French had taken over the means of communication and had appointed Emil Eddé to form a government while bombing Beirut and violently repressing the numerous strikes and demonstrations that ensued. Spears' assessment of the situation could not be any clearer: The movement 'was a symbol of national unity in one of its finest forms'.[114] During the crisis, ideological extremes converged: The Maronite archbishop of Beirut called for British intervention against the French to safeguard Lebanese independence, Abdul Hamid Karamé was arrested in Tripoli, exciting Muslim resentment.[115] The crisis was resolved with the threat

[112] "Al-Ra'is Kamil Chamoun Yarwi Dhikrayatuhu 'an Ayam Tashrin," *Al-Hayat*, November 24, 1965.
[113] "General Spears Who Played a Great Role in the 'November Days' Speaks for the First Time - Translation of Hayat Interview, Al-Hayat, 24 November 1965", MECA, GB165-0269, Sir Edward Spears Collection, Box 2, File 7; "H.M. Minister, Beirut to Foreign Office," November 11, 1943, MECA, GB165-0269, Sir Edward Spears Collection, Box 3, File 3.
[114] "General Spears Who Played a Great Role in the 'November Days' Speaks for the First Time - Translation of Hayat Interview, Al-Hayat, 24 November 1965", MECA, GB165-0269, Sir Edward Spears Collection, Box 2, File 7.
[115] "British Legation Beirut to Foreign Office," November 11, 1943, MECA, GB165-0269, Sir Edward Spears Collection, Box 3, File 3.

of British military intervention and the members of the Lebanese government were released on 23 November 1943.

A temporary show of unity may have led to the end of foreign control in Lebanon, but the maintenance of communal quotas and the vague vision of the state contained in the Pact meant that the dominant ideology of the new state would continue to emphasize what divided the Lebanese rather than what united them. It was the opposite of 'forced fusion based on a single ideology'[116], and thus the exact opposite of *Mamlakhtiyut*. Not only did the Pact create a polity that recognized confessionalism; it legitimized it.[117] Elections would continue to be waged based on variations of the electoral system inaugurated during the mandate period. As a result of mixed – in the sense of combining different communities – lists, moderate candidates had a clear advantage over staunch communitarian representatives. This measure was intended to reduce inter-communitarian strife, as lists are voted on by a mixed electorate which is prone to choosing candidates that represent 'the nation' rather than individual communities. The result, however, is a parliament that avoids the most pressing and controversial issues.[118] As a result, the system was rendered ineffective. A similar situation resulted from the replication of communitarian formulas in the distribution of administrative posts.[119]

Weak monopolization of legitimate use of force

The lack of a dominant vision of the state not only impacted its decision-making institutions. On the contrary, it permeated the entire state apparatus. It has been discussed

[116] Iliya Harik cited in Messarra, *Le Modèle Politique Libanais et Sa Survie : Essai Sur La Classification et l'aménagement d'un Système Consociatif*, 93.
[117] Ibid.
[118] Pierre Rondot, "The Political Institutions of Lebanese Democracy," in *Politics in Lebanon*, ed. Leonard Binder (New York: Wiley, 1966), 133.
[119] Ralph Crow, "Confessionalism, Public Administration, and Efficiency in Lebanon," in *Politics in Lebanon*, ed. Leonard Binder (New York: Wiley, 1966), 167–86.

above that the deactivation of rival power centres was the essence of *Mamlakhtiyut*. By contrast, in post-independence Lebanon, traditional power structures and paramilitary groups linked with political parties remained pillars of society. Lebanon had inherited its army from the French – a force mainly composed of Christians. With a weak internal security apparatus, the Lebanese government had to rely on the army to maintain order, and armed non-state actors were still able to take matters into their own hands. So, for instance, in 1948, members of a Shiite tribe attacked Catholic farmers in the Baalbek region. The Lebanese government demanded from (Shiite) speaker of parliament Sabri Hamadeh that he restrain his clients, but to no avail. Instead, he warned the local Christians that the military force loyal to him would be able to defeat the Lebanese army.[120]

If tribal clashes were rather apolitical, armed forces associated with political parties were intimately connected with the underlying ideological controversy surrounding the identity of Lebanon. In fact, it was within the context of the 1936 upheaval surrounding the Syrian treaty and the controversies sparked as a result of said treaty – analysed in chapter 6 – that these groups gained prominence. In support of a Christian pan-Syrian movement, Antoun Saadeh created the Syrian Social National Party (SSNP) in 1932, whose foundation was followed by the *Kata'ib* or Lebanese Phalange party – under Pierre Gemayel – in 1936. The latter found its main support among the Maronite community and consequently sought to consolidate Lebanon's 1920 borders and its independence from the Arab world. In representation of the pan-Arab trend, a rival Muslim organization – *Al-Najjadeh* – was founded simultaneously. These groups, however, worked in discordance with the consociational elites operating within the institutional confines of the Lebanese state: While

[120] Oren Barak, *The Lebanese Army: A National Institution in a Divided Society* (New York: State University of New York Press, 2010), 51–53.

the institutional trend under Bishara Al-Khoury and Riad Al-Solh tended toward national understanding, their rank and file were polarized.[121]

During the 1943 Lebanese crisis, Phalanges and *Al-Najjadeh* came together in an exemplary show of national unity against the French and in support of the imprisoned Lebanese government. Paramilitary groups retained their role in governmental support – as well as opposition – after independence. Instead of deactivating all paramilitary groups – whether pro-government or not – immediately upon attaining independence, as the government of Israel did, they were left untouched. Indeed, at different times during the foundational years, governments were found to rely upon the support of the Phalange against anti-government militias. Paramilitary rivalry soon moved from the Christian-Muslim sphere onto the Christian camp. The SSNP, for instance, was considered a dangerous enemy of Bishara Al-Khouri's regime. Rumour had it that they were planning a coup d'état with the support of the Syrian government. Bishara Al-Khoury, in turn, enjoyed the Phalange's support. Violence broke out in June 1949, when both groups clashed in Beirut. Contrary to the accusations levelled against the government at the time, it is unlikely that it directly instigated the clash. Nevertheless, it took advantage of the situation to move speedily against the SSNP. It disbanded the party, prosecuted its leaders and executed Antoun Sa'adeh and a series of other leaders. Other paramilitary organizations were declared illegal in the process, but in practice, the government only implemented the decision with regards to the SSNP.[122]

This episode exemplifies the lax attitude of the Lebanese government toward paramilitary groups in general. When the 1958 civil war – which pitted pro-Arab and pro-

[121] Fawwaz Traboulsi, *A History of Modern Lebanon*, Pluto Pres (London, 2007), 103, http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=7jxR2q-F3o4C&pgis=1.
[122] Zisser, *Lebanon: The Challenge of Independence*, 176–89; Joseph A Kechichian, "The Lebanese Army : Capabilities and Challenges in the 1980s," *Conflict Quarterly*, no. Winter (1985): 18–19.

Western politics against each other, as will be further explained below – was in the making, numerous illegal weapons entered Lebanon via other Arab states. In May 1958, it was reported that 300 armed Druzes had crossed into Lebanon from Syria.[123] However, the U.N. observer group's assessment of the situation (see below for further information) was that movement across the border was rather limited and that arms used during the conflict were largely from internal sources. Possession of arms was, according to the group's findings, 'common practice'.[124] This weak monopolization of the legitimate use of force could not but affect the chances of survival of Lebanon's democratic system. In 1958, the system was threatened by a host of factors, as will be explained further below. The existence of armed bands coupled with the relative weakness of the Lebanese armed forces made armed rebellion possible. In April of that year, bands of Druze armed rebels under the leadership of Kamal Jumblatt started troubles in the mountainous areas of Lebanon. With the Lebanese army busy trying to subdue the Druze revolt, Jumblatt urged the opposition to trigger a rebellion against the government elsewhere.[125] Unsuccessful as his invocation may have been – as the opposition had little appetite for all-out rebellion – it showed how much potential power armed bands still held against the government 15 years after independence.

Indeed, the Druze rebellion raged for several months, with large swathes of the mountainous Shouf region to the south of Beirut being completely under their control.[126] This is no doubt indicative of formidable military power which the Lebanese government had not been able to bring under its control. It was only after Jumblatt expressed a willingness to come to an agreement with president Chamoun that the conflict in the Shouf

[123] "Telegram from the Embassy in Lebanon to the Department of State," *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958-1961, Volume XI*, May 11, 1958, 5 p.m.
[124] "Headow to Rose," 1958, FO 371/134133.
[125] British Embassy Beirut, "Letter 1011/61/58," April 18, 1958, FO 371/134116.
[126] Sir G. Middleton, "Telegram No. 648," May 31, 1958, FO 371/134120.

could come to an end.[127] Rebellion was not limited to the Druze Shouf. Rather, during the 1958 crisis, rebels managed to assert control over one-fifth to one-fourth of the entire Lebanese territory within a couple of months.[128]

The crisis quickly assumed sectarian overtones. Indeed, the power of the communitarian discourse was such that when the army sought to assert control, its fear of sectarian division limited its leeway. So, for instance, fearing that implementing martial law would raise tensions within the ranks of the army, commander-in-chief Fouad Chehab refused to commit to such course of action.[129] In general, Chehab's attitude during the civil war was to use the army as a buffer between warring parties rather than as an actor tasked with suppressing the conflict altogether.[130] In his view, the army had no role to play in politics and he impressed this vision onto the entire apparatus.[131] Intervention, he insisted, would cause his army to split along sectarian lines.[132] As a result, in 1958 as in 1952 – when Bishara Al-Khoury's regime was successfully brought down by his political adversaries – the army remained on the margins.[133] Chehab's aim was to hold the cities, whilst allowing rural areas to become 'quasi-autonomous regions under opposition control'.[134] This could not be more contrary to the reaction of Ben-Gurion's government to attempted revisionist control as described above.

There is no doubt that the situations are only comparable to a limited extent: The Lebanese army was up against a much more formidable enemy than the Haganah. If the

[127] D.C. British Embassy Washington, "Air Bag 10243/182/58g," June 6, 1958 FO 371/134122.
[128] Sir P. Dixon, "Despatch No. 514," June 17, 1958, FO 371/134123.
[129] British Embassy Beirut, "Telegram No. 87 (1011/124/58)," June 4, 1958, FO 371/134121.
[130] Kechichian, "The Lebanese Army : Capabilities and Challenges in the 1980s," 17.
[131] Barak, *The Lebanese Army: A National Institution in a Divided Society*, 38; 52.
[132] Frank Stoakes, "The Supervigilantes: The Lebanese Kataeb Party as a Builder, Surrogate and Defender of the State," *Middle Eastern Studies* 11, no. 3 (1975): 220.
[133] Adel Freiha, *L'Armée et l'État Au Liban, 1945-1980* (Paris: Librairie générale de droit et de jurisprudence, 1980), 124–25; Kechichian, "The Lebanese Army : Capabilities and Challenges in the 1980s," 16.
[134] Barak, *The Lebanese Army: A National Institution in a Divided Society*, 54.

Irgun had 5,000 soldiers against 100,000 Haganah conscripts, as explained above, the 10,000 Lebanese troops were up against 12,000 insurgents.[135] In part, however, this state of affairs can be traced back to its inability to control the possession of arms during the previous 15 years of independence and to the underlying disagreement regarding the identity of Lebanon. The army could not be seen as an instrument for any one group, and being a Christian-dominated institution, the dangers of moving against any sectarian or political element in the country were obvious. During the crisis, a Western observer working with Saeb Salam – the Sunni leader of the revolt in Beirut and later four times prime minister of Lebanon – suggested that Chehab's fears surrounding his multi-sectarian army were justified. Indeed, he reckoned that sending an army into a rebel-controlled district would likely require Chehab to comb out Muslim and Druze soldiers and to send in an all-Lebanese army, which in turn would split Lebanon forever. Sending in a mixed detachment would likely have resulted in its disintegration in the field.[136] Thus, the peculiarities of the Lebanese system as developed under the mandate and as confirmed by the National Pact were directly responsible for the army's limited performance when the Lebanese system came under threat.

Even after Chehab's nomination to the presidency of the country in July 1958 brought an end to the crisis, he made it clear that he did not contemplate strong military action to clean out rebel strongholds across the country.[137] Indeed, rather than full disarmament at the hands of the government, rebel groups were deactivated by their leaders: Druze rebels, for instance, were ordered by Kamal Jumblatt to return their weapons to him.[138] Chehab's method of disarmament after the crisis was to instruct the security

[135] Ibid., 55; Freiha, *L'Armée et l'État Au Liban, 1945-1980*, 114.
[136] Barak, *The Lebanese Army: A National Institution in a Divided Society*, 58.
[137] Sir G. Middleton, "Despatch No. 1157," August 1, 1958, FO 371/134133.
[138] Sir G. Middleton, "Despatch No. 1162," August 2, 1958, FO 371/134133.

forces that anyone found carrying arms was to be made to surrender them rather than forcing all-out disarmament.[139] It was only with the Christian Chamoun loyalists, the Phalanges and the SSNP that he was willing to take a harder stance. By August 13th, only days after his election as president, there were rumours that he intended to disarm these Christian groups before even moving against the others. First scuffles between the Lebanese army and the loyalist militias had already been witnessed.[140] Despite these and subsequent efforts, the parties to the civil war continued to stockpile weapons. A discussion of the causes and consequences of the more severe 1975-1989 Lebanese civil war goes beyond the purpose of this dissertation. However, the role of militias in its outbreak showed how weak the monopolization of power remained more than 30 years after independence.[141]

Maintaining Cultural Neo-feudalism

Article 10 of the 1926 constitution stipulates freedom of education: 'There shall be no violation of the right of religious communities to have their own schools provided they follow the general rules issued by the state regulating public instruction'.[142] This clause was maintained in 1943, in accordance with the general spirit of the National Pact. In the words of one commentator, 'one of the greatest failures of the Lebanese society was its inability to establish a unifying education and cultural belief-system'.[143] Religious communities were allowed to maintain a segmented educational system, where private education promoted by religious groups instilled confessional identities, and the less subscribed public schools provided non-confessional socialization. The former engaged

[139] Sir G. Middleton, "Despatch No. 1181," August 8, 1958, FO 371/134133.
[140] Sir G. Middleton, "Letter 1011/212/58," August 13, 1958, FO 371/134133.
[141] Barak, *The Lebanese Army: A National Institution in a Divided Society*, 66.
[142] "The Lebanese Constitution, Promulgated May 23, 1926. With Its Amendments" (1926), http://www.wipo.int/edocs/lexdocs/laws/en/lb/lb018en.pdf, accessed April 24, 2018.
[143] N. Kliot, "The Collapse of the Lebanese State," *Middle Eastern Studies* 23, no. 1 (1987): 58.

civic and citizenship education only marginally, and by socializing children into their confessional identities, they attracted students with similar religious backgrounds.[144] Confessional identities were instilled not only through an emphasis on religion in private schools, but they focused on a curriculum aligned with traditional views of identity. Different schools followed different philosophies of education, and imparted instruction in different languages (French, English and Arabic), as they had done for centuries. This continued exposure to Western vs. Arab influences have meant that conflicts between the West and socialist countries, or between different Arab countries, could be played out on the Lebanese scene, as the crisis of 1958 outlined below shows.[145]

Given the historical development of the Christian education system in the country – and the superior resources available in those schools – the system increased social differences. Thus, literacy rates varied greatly between Christian pupils, more likely to be enrolled in superior quality private schools, and Muslim pupils, more likely to attend public school. The overlap between educational opportunities and sectarian affiliation was further exacerbated by the regional concentration of communities. So, for instance, majority Shia areas in the Bekaa valley and the south were less well-endowed with high quality private schools than the core area of Lebanon composed of Mount Lebanon and Beirut.[146] This could not but have a negative influence on any attempt at creating a cohesive social fabric in Lebanon.

[144] Hoda Baytiyeh, "Has the Educational System in Lebanon Contributed to the Growing Sectarian Divisions?," *Education and Urban Society* 49, no. 5 (2017): 547–48, https://doi.org/10.1177/0013124516645163.
[145] Halim Barakat, "The Social Context," in *Lebanon in Crisis*, ed. Edward Haley and Lewis Snider (New York: Syracuse University Press, 1979), 9.
[146] Kliot, "The Collapse of the Lebanese State," 58–60.

The result of this system was that new generations of Lebanese were not socialized into a clear sense of national identity[147] – as became the case in Israel in the 1950s. Rather, some students continue to view Lebanon as an independent nation, whilst others see it as a temporary entity, *en route* to reunification with Syria or other Arab countries. As Lebanese sociologist Halim Barakat found out in his study on the causes of the 1975 civil war, in the run-up to the conflict, 63% of Sunni and 72% of Shia students identified with Arab nationalism. Druze responses were more diffuse, but a staggering 39% identified with either Arab or Syrian nationalism. The exact reverse was true for Maronite students of whom 62% identified with Lebanese nationalism.[148]

While it is safe to assume that at the time of Barakat's study, in the late 1960s, the system of education had led to a hardening of positions as it had brought up successive generations of Lebanese, it is reasonable to extrapolate these results to the foundational period of the Lebanese system. After all, the segmented system had been in place for centuries, and sectarian tensions did not subside after independence. A commentator on the Lebanese educational system put it the following way: 'The uprisings of 1958 […] speak to the poor outcomes of the civic education program in the country'.[149] Whatever general curriculum was set in place as mandated by article 10 of the constitution could not have any major effect given the freedom of religious education that it confirmed. This was diametrically opposed to the dictates of *Mamlakhtiyut* in Israel, where education ceased to be a vehicle for partisan indoctrination and became a mechanism to socialize newcomers into the new nation.

[147] Baytiyeh, "Has the Educational System in Lebanon Contributed to the Growing Sectarian Divisions?," 548.
[148] Halim Barakat, *Lebanon in Strife: Student Preludes to the Civil War* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1977), 66–67.
[149] Baytiyeh, "Has the Educational System in Lebanon Contributed to the Growing Sectarian Divisions?," 151.

A 1992 study of Lebanese confessionalism shows the effect that this system has had over the long haul. The design of Lebanese political scientist Hilal Khashan's sample speaks volumes: Even as much as 50 years after independence, Beirut's universities continue to reflect the educational segmentation outlined above. Maronite students included in the survey were much less likely to study at either the American University of Beirut or Beirut University College, two institutions modelled after the Anglo-American system. In following the trend of the previous centuries, Maronites were more likely to join Saint Joseph University, an institution modelled after the French system and imparting instruction in French.[150] Thus, there is no doubt that over the decades, the educational system has contributed to maintaining sectarian segregation in Lebanon's society.

As illustrated above, the 1958 crisis as well as the run-up to the 1975-1989 civil war highlight the ultimate consequences of the system put in place by France. This does not mean that there was never an opportunity for alternative developments. As the introduction to this dissertation has shown, the presidency of Fouad Chehab which followed the 1958 was a time of rapprochement between Lebanon's communities. What has come to be known as Chehabism was not as much an ideology or political movement as it was a new approach to Lebanese politics which sought a pragmatic interpretation of the National Pact.[151] Indeed, it was an approach led by Fouad Chehab as a leader who was acceptable to both Christians and Muslims because of the neutral role that he had played during the 1958 crisis. Chehab sought to correct the ills stemming from an unequal representation of Muslims and Christians within the administration and economy in general by promoting projects that would lead to the development of disadvantaged regions and by integrating more Muslims into the military and civil services. While this even-handed approach was

[150] Hilal Khashan, *Inside the Lebanese Confessional Mind* (Maryland: University Press of America, 1992), 37–39.
[151] F Khazen, *The Breakdown of the State in Lebanon* (London: I.B. Tauris, 2000), 176.

welcomed by the Muslim elite, the Maronites were highly critical of his policies. Thus, his potential for uniting the country was limited by his own community which sought to hang on to the privileges entrenched in the pre-independence period. Moreover, Chehabism did not manage to convince the masses. Rather, it remained an elite movement led from above. With the presidency of the successor whom Chehab had endorsed in 1964, Charles Helou, the reform process stalled. It is thus unlikely that it was solely the 1967 Arab-Israeli war and the establishment of the PLO in Lebanon which put an end to Chehab's statist project. Communal identities continued to play a pervasive role and the structural constraints that the Lebanese state inherited from the past (a political system based on fragmentation, a segmented educational system, a weak monopolization of the use of force) had an influence on the failure of this movement. Once Chehab was gone, the charismatic legitimacy of his ideas also ceased to exist.[152]

Conclusion

By creating Greater Lebanon in 1920, the French had set Lebanon on a course that would inevitably lead to this outcome. It was confronted with two options: create a cohesive nation or a stained-glass window of isolated communities. To perpetuate its own power, division rather than cohesion was chosen, and it was institutionalized via the electoral system and the maintenance of the personal status system. This, in turn, opened the doors to the development of strictly communal political narratives in order to gain as much of a stake in the state as possible. Once entrenched, the survival of the Lebanese state could only be secured through the continued acceptance of these stakes. This chapter has shown that the state-building consensus this led to was inadequate to integrate the communities over the

[152] For more on Chehabism see Michael C. Hudson, *The Precarious Republic: Lebanon*; Salibi, "Lebanon under Fuad Chehab 1958-1964"; Georges Naccache, "Un Nouveau Style: Le Chehabisme," *Cenacle Libanais*, no. November (1960): 9–35; Khazen, *The Breakdown of the State in Lebanon*, 176–84.

long-run, inhibiting monopolization of physical and ideological power by the state. Fragmentation has time and again contributed to political instability. At the same time, it has prevented Lebanon from becoming a state much like its neighbours: one in which the dominant religious or ethnic group rules with an iron fist. Without the strict quota system and other safeguards put in place to keep the communal balance, minority groups (such as the Lebanese Maronites) might have all but disappeared. Lebanon would be a different place – or not exist at all anymore in the face of Syrian irredentism.

Conversely, '*Mamlakhtiyut* was the Israeli version of the end of ideology'.[153] While it is true that it embodied a consensus that had emerged during the mandate years, this chapter has shown that it was far from set in stone by 1948. Contrary to some authors' assertions that there was 'no need to put to constant use 'the armour of coercion' thanks to the hegemonic nature of Zionist values[154], the Israeli government had to confront centrifugal tendencies such as those expressed by the Agudat, the Irgun, the Histadrut, and, in matters of education, Ben-Gurion's own party, Mapai. Ben-Gurion and his inner circle were in a position of strength to dominate the system and thus to deactivate centrifugal tendencies thanks to developments during the mandate period. Britain's hands-off approach made the development of the Jewish political entity possible. Its endorsement of political centralization within the Yishuv prevented administrative fragmentation, thus allowing the dominant group to monopolize the levers of power in their own hands. When 1948 came along, then, the basis for a strong centripetal response had been created. In the process, the expression of cultural diversity within the Jewish community was vilified and repressed, ideological dissent was ostracised and the individual came to be subordinated to statism. Stability in the first years of statehood was gained at the expense of freedom.

[153] Cohen, *Zion and State: Nation, Class and the Shaping of Modern Israel*, 1992, 268.
[154] Swirski and Ginsburg, *Politics and Education in Israel: Comparisons with the United States*, 93.

CHAPTER 8: CONCLUSION

This dissertation has argued that the institutionalization of power in the Yishuv/Jewish Agency and Lebanon during the mandate period and the visions of the state that this resulted in provide an insight into the development of divergent regime trajectories in Israel and Lebanon. Developments during the mandate period help to explain why Israel became a stable though flawed democracy upon independence, characterized by repression of minorities and exclusion of dissidence, whilst Lebanon became a democracy with high levels of religious and ideological freedom, but ridden with instability and governmental ineffectiveness.

Not only that, this dissertation suggest that the way divisions were managed during the mandate period ultimately changed the *type* of divided society that both became and thus the divisions which they would have to continue managing after attaining independence. The rise of a dominant group to power in the Yishuv led to a dominant vision of the state and thus Israel became a horizontally divided society with the associated political stability. Institutional centralization by the mandatory power was instrumental in producing this result. The fragmentation of power in Lebanon which the mandatory encouraged made the emergence of a dominant vision of the state more difficult. As a consequence, it contributed to producing the instability that typically afflicts vertically divided societies. Contingency and agency, both on side of the mandatory power and local leadership, led to the creation of structural-institutional constraints which would then impact the visions of the state and the political actions which could be undertaken in the future.

In this conclusion, I will begin by reviewing the line of argument followed in this dissertation and how each chapter has contributed to it. I will then discuss the insight which my two case provide into democracy in deeply divided societies and colonial legacies, before considering the applicability of my conclusions to other divided, post-colonial societies and possible avenues for further research.

Managing divisions in deeply divided societies: Lesson from Israel and Lebanon

This project's initial puzzle was why Israel was able to establish a stable democracy whilst Lebanon's was unstable, despite the deep divisions that both societies grapple with. Scholars have long associated deep divisions with political instability, whereas homogeneity or at the least agreement on 'visions of the state'[1], 'political values' or 'political culture' (i.e. values and principles related to public policy)[2] had long been associated with political instability. As many scholars before me have asked: Why then did some deeply divided societies establish stable democracies, whilst others didn't?[3]

My journey through the history of both countries led me to focus on the mandate period as the foundational period for both the Lebanese and the Israeli democracies. What was so different about their development that led to a reduction of centrifugal tendencies in the Yishuv, enabling the State of Israel to impose itself on society, to overcome the destabilizing tendencies of its divided society? Was it a case of whole-sale support for Israeli nationalism or Zionism, as the Zionist myth portrays? Did the horrors of the Holocaust and the Arab war lead to an attenuation of differences among future Israeli citizens thus lending support to the central government and its policies? Was it the

[1] Lerner, *Making Constitutions in Deeply Divided Societies*.
[2] Horowitz, "Dual Authority Polities"; Almond, "Comparative Political Systems"; Lipset, *Political Man: The Social Bases of Politics*.
[3] Lijphart, "Typologies of Democratic Systems"; Nordlinger, *Conflict Regulation in Divided Societies*.

institutions applied to manage divisions during the mandate period? The same was true for Lebanon: Was Lebanon's political fragmentation exclusively the result of primordial attachments that no institution could have 'managed'? Alternatively, could Lebanon have developed a dominant vision of the state, an agreement on political principles, that might have strengthened centripetal tendencies? How did institutional mechanisms during the mandate period contribute to the fragmentation on which political instability is often blamed?

My research points to a complex set of factors such as contingency on colonial interests and historical contexts, individual agency and institutional factors. Chapter 2 detailed the deep divisions that existed in the Yishuv and Lebanon before the establishment of their democratic systems. Whereas in the Yishuv ethno-linguistic, religious and ideological divisions related to visions of the state took centre stage, in Lebanon, religious divisions overlapped with social cleavages and visions of the state. The Yishuv was a vertically divided society when the British arrived in Palestine and by the end of the mandate period, it was firmly on the way to becoming a horizontally divided society. Ethnic divisions had been attenuated by large-scale Ashkenazi immigration, but this did not eliminate ethno-linguistic cleavages nor different visions of the state, which overlapped with religious and ideological differences. Rather, consensus was engineered by raising one group to political dominance. Lebanon had always been a vertically divided society, but the expansion of the state's boundaries increased the number of cleavages to be managed. Furthermore, the institutions established by the mandatory power ensured a maintenance of these vertical divisions whilst preventing the rise of a dominant power even after independence.

Chapter 3 showed that the institutional choices made by both mandatory powers did not follow anything that could be dubbed as a typical French or British colonial policy. On

the contrary, neither France nor Britain entered the mandate period with a clear vision for what these countries were to look like once they attained independence. Policy was contingent on political developments – in Palestine, the unexpected conflict between Jews and Arabs; in Lebanon, the unexpected breakdown of an agreement with Faisal. One major difference between Britain and France was that the former had no pre-defined interest in Palestine and that British presence in the region was highly contested at home. As a result, Britain was free to react to developments on the ground without being constrained by a pre-defined political strategy. Even whilst lacking a clear policy on Lebanon at the beginning of the mandate period, it was clear that France needed to establish an outpost in the Middle East to guard its commercial and cultural interests in Lebanon and Syria as well as its more valuable colonial territories in North Africa. As a result, it had to make itself indispensable to the Maronites of Lebanon who turned out to be their only loyal allies after the Faisal-Clemenceau Agreement broke down.

Chapter 4 provided further evidence of Britain's dynamic and unplanned (almost haphazard) policy approach and France's clear policy principles following the fall of Faisal. In both cases, colonial policy was mainly conducted by the High Commissioners from the mandate territories rather than the metropolis. Once again, this shows that no typical colonial policy was applied. Britain started out with a plan to create a vertically divided society in Palestine, with a consociational political system in which Jews and Arabs would be represented according to their population numbers. They were not, however, wedded to this strategy: When the 1923 elections showed that cooperation was elusive, the mandatory switched gears. In the name of government effectiveness, it chose to govern the territory without the aid of a locally elected parliament whilst allowing the development of separate Jewish and Arab institutions to lobby the Palestine government and administer their own affairs. In doing so, the mandatory inadvertently traced the boundaries of the future Israeli

state: The Yishuv would become the pre-state community. France first sought to ensure Faisal's support for its presence in the region by negotiating away some of the territories which the administrative council of Mount Lebanon claimed for a new Lebanese state. The wisdom of creating such an enlarged Lebanon was also highly disputed by French government officials like Robert de Caix. It was only with the breakdown of Clemenceau's agreement with Faisal that it became clear that the Maronites were the only reliable allies that would secure France's continued presence in the region. By creating Greater Lebanon against the wishes of the majority of the population, France accomplished two goals: It turned the Maronites into a vulnerable minority that would need to rely on French protection and culture for its survival and it denied Arab nationalism the success which could have jeopardized its standing in both the Middle East and North Africa. New boundaries of the demos had thus been traced and the number and nature of cleavages had been dramatically transformed vis-à-vis the divisions that had prevailed in Mount Lebanon.

Once the framework conditions of both polities were created, i.e. quasi-partition in Palestine, with the Yishuv developing separate political institutions from the Arabs, and physical partition of Syria with the independence of Greater Lebanon, the mandatory powers applied institutional mechanisms to manage diversity in both countries. In doing so, they also contributed to transforming the type of divided society that the new states harboured – and consequently, their levels of political stability. As chapter 5 showed, Britain emphasized political stability and associated such stability with national cohesion. As a result, it sought to support the Zionist Organization's claims for the centralization of power in a single set of community organizations in the Yishuv rather than allowing separate religious communities (and by extension, communities based on other cleavages) to establish separate community organizations. France, on the other hand, feared that mechanisms conducive to creating a shared national sentiment would result in the

absorption of its only ally – the Maronites – into Arab society. This in turn would lend strength to Syrian – and even Arab – nationalism, thereby frustrating their political goals in the region. As a result, it decided to create a system of government that would entrench sectarian divisions and further politicize them. Elections were waged with communal quotas, administrative posts were distributed according to a sectarian key, and personal status law was maintained for Christian groups and extended to Sunnis, Shias and other minorities.

Chapter 6 showed that the dynamic of institutional centralization of power was reproduced in the Zionist Organization/Jewish Agency in the 1930s, when the competing vision of the state that was advanced by Jabotinsky's Revisionists was eliminated. Instead of reaching a consensus with an incompatible version of the future, the Revisionists were forced to comply or leave. This elimination enabled Mapai (and its supporters) to gain dominance of the centralized institutions which had been put in place. In Lebanon, excluding incompatible visions would have required the return of Lebanon's territory to the status quo ante. Emile Eddé pleaded with the French mandatory for a return to little Lebanon, but to no avail. Forced to cooperate, the Sunnis, who had hitherto opposed the Lebanese state and sought reunification with Syria, had to find their place within the Lebanese system. Sectarian representation was the most effective way to ensure that their interests were protected.

As chapter 7 explained, these institutional developments had a clear effect on the visions of the state which could come out ahead to guide the new states. Turned into the dominant party within the Yishuv and the Zionist Organization, Mapai was in a position to impose its vision on subordinate groups. *Mamlakhtiyut* became the guiding principle: subordination to the state-building effort and its ideology rather than diversity would become the central value of the new democracy. Some level of consensus, especially with

the ultra-orthodox, became necessary, but Mapai could do so from a position of supremacy. The government was thus able to face the challenges of independence effectively, maintaining political stability throughout. In Lebanon, forced cooperation between incompatible visions of the state meant that a compromise solution had to be found. Nonetheless, this did not create a clear direction for post-independence policy. On the contrary, it confirmed the basic disagreement between elements of Lebanon's population, leaving them intact to be reactivated when internal and regional dynamics tapped into the sensitivities surrounding these disagreements.

Theoretical implications

Managing divisions in deeply divided societies: best practices?

Overall, then, the mandatory powers impacted the relative levels of political stability in Israel and Lebanon during the first years of statehood and beyond by contributing to the formation of different types of divided societies and establishing different ways of managing those divisions. As a horizontally divided society with a control system, characterized by the centralization of power in the hands of a dominant group, Israel reaped the benefits of a long period of political stability. Nonetheless, as Adrian Guelke explains, conflict in such societies can be even more pronounced once this system breaks down.[4] Over time, this control system has bred suspicions and tensions between the dominant group of the day (which is now the Israeli right) and subordinate groups which have been alienated from the system. It remains to be seen whether the control system can engineer permanent stability in Israel's divided society, but it has clear that it has contributed to political stability for the past 60 years.

[4] Guelke, *Politics in Deeply Divided Societies*, 10.

There can be no doubt that institutionally, Lebanon continues to be the vertically divided society engineered by France. Demographically, however, it has become a horizontally divided society, with a clear Shia majority. With the quotas that are still in place – with the minor modification introduced with the 1989 Taif Agreement which set equal quotas for Christians and Muslims – this change of the type of divisions cannot be translated into political representation. As a result, the system's unrepresentative character has increased, thus contributing to further political instability in modern day Lebanon. It is a country that has been afflicted with the tit for tat violence and pervasive instability which is associated with vertical divisions. At the same time, Lebanon is one of the few countries in the Middle East where religious freedoms are protected, where communities of different creeds live in relative peace and where a wealth of cultural influences are allowed to find expression. Without the quota system, Lebanon might have ceased to be this free cultural enclave a long time ago.

Thus, the case studies provided in this dissertation do not provide a clear-cut answer as to what the best institutions to manage deep divisions are. Institutional centralization can lead to the rise of a dominant group to power. Through co-optation, negotiation and repression, this dominant group can implement its own vision of the state whilst exacting acquiescence and even support from the rest. This, in turn, breeds stability and increases government effectiveness. As a result, the case of Israel analysed here may seem to support to the conclusions of scholars who claim that control and dominance are more conducive to stability in deeply divided societies. Fragmentation of power can protect the historical rights of minority groups, ensure the survival of their cultural heritage and prevent the domination of majorities which can reduce the representativeness of democratic systems in divided societies. At the same time, institutional fragmentation in Lebanon impeded the emergence of a sense of national solidarity whose inklings were visible during the mandate

period. The structure furthermore provided incentives to identify with a subgroup and its vision of the state rather than with the state of Lebanon. As a result, the country remained fragmented, cooperation was hard to come by and the instability associated with deeply divided societies was maintained. Thus, the case of Lebanon seems to confirm the critics of the consociational approach.

My conclusion is that there is no 'correct' or 'incorrect' way to manage divisions in order to ensure the survival of a democratic regime. In other words, scholars on both sides of the control versus consociational debate advance valid arguments. At the end, it comes down to the political values of the observer and to the objectives pursued by the political engineer. If political stability is valued over individual freedoms, then the control model exemplified by Israel in the first decade of independence represents the most appropriate strategy. If, on the contrary, inclusiveness and religious and cultural freedoms are to be emphasized, Lebanon's consociational system provides a better answer. Stability – at least compared with its neighbours – is a valuable virtue that the state of Israel has long offered its inhabitants.

At the same time, one may speculate that Israel, and by extension, the Middle East would be better places if the Yishuv and Israel had retained their initial diversity. Perhaps Arabs and Jews would have reached an agreement and created a confederation if the dominant Zionist group had not acted as a break on Mizrachi identity, ultra-orthodox autonomy or the Revisionist vision of the state. If these currents had succeeded, the Jewish community might have been so divided that it would have been forced to enter into negotiations with the Arabs, and a vertically divided, consociational society might have developed. The Israeli-Palestinian conflict would never have reached the current proportions, with all the consequences that it has had for the Palestinian, Israeli and Arab people in the region and beyond.

Israel's northern neighbour, Lebanon, could have become an instrument of a then Maronite majority. This would likely have alienated Sunni, Greek Orthodox and Shia Lebanese who might have demanded the immediate incorporation of their territories into Syria. Lebanon would have been reduced to the territory of Mount Lebanon: Without access to the sea and fertile land, the country might have disappeared. Alternatively, a proportional representation system could have ensured representation of all minorities but also domination by a majority. Once again, if the Sunnis became a politically dominant force, they might have sought integration with Syria or at the very least a relationship much closer than the National Pact allowed. This, in turn, could have resulted in a Syrian style autocracy, with the resulting repression of minorities. Also in this scenario, Lebanon's special characteristic as a place of freedom in the Middle East would have been lost. As was mentioned in the introduction, the current Shia majority would likely bring Hezbollah to power, with all the consequences that this might entail for Lebanon's democracy given its theocratic leanings, and the strong influence of the Assad regime and Iran on this political movement.

In short, there is no right answer to the best way of managing divisions: Israel enjoys – at least until now – remarkable political stability. This has allowed its citizens to live in a relatively prosperous country, enjoying privileges that Egyptians, Syrians or Iraqis can only dream of. At the same time, it has led to the political alienation and repression of large parts of not only its Arab society but also parts of the Jewish society that do not agree with the dominant group's views and has led to the creation of the Arab-Israeli conflict. Lebanon is an Arab country like no other: religious and cultural freedom like the one exhibited in Beirut is more reminiscent of European capital cities than of the Middle East. Its peculiar political system has certainly contributed to this. Nonetheless, this very political system

has also exposed the country to political instability, civil strife and even external wars which often interrupt life and inhibit economic and social development.

In addition to highlighting the results, strengths and weaknesses of different ways to manage deep divisions, the case studies show that divisions are not stationary: They are engineered through the definition of the boundaries of a political system (or state), through the application of institutional mechanisms which can emphasize integration of subgroups or fragmentation, and through demographic changes. The most important finding of this research in these regards is that institutions not only manage divisions; they also alter their nature. The Yishuv started off as a vertically divided society and gradually turned into a horizontally divided society in which Mapai as a dominant party and its followers dominated the system, with the right wing and the ultra-orthodox forming subordinate groups. Ethnically, this meant that the Ashkenazim, now the majority group, would dominate the system. The Mizrachim, many of whom entered the country after independence, and those Palestinian Arabs who were not forced out of Israel, became subordinate ethnic groups, largely removed from political power.

The institutions of the mandate period were only partly responsible for this outcome. After all, a larger number of Ashkenazim entered Palestine than of any other group. However, this group was not homogenous, as has been mentioned elsewhere in this dissertation. It is conceivable that German Jews – many of whom I interviewed for this dissertation – might have set up a separate community if the system had allowed them to do so. The same is true for other national groups, such as the Polish. Furthermore, many of the supporters of Agudat Israel and the Revisionists were Ashkenazim. Thus ethnic heritage did not automatically result in a dominant vision of the state. The unity of purpose that the dominant vision of the state conferred was certainly strengthened over time with the Israeli-Arab wars and by the fact that after the Holocaust, there was a sense that Jews could not be

safe but in their own country.[5] Nonetheless, it is unlikely that this vision would have emerged without the institutional base created during the mandate period. As a result, it is fair to conclude that in the Yishuv's deeply divided society a control system was conducive to reducing the salience of deep divisions.

In Lebanon the impact of mandate policy is even clearer: The mandatory created the demographic realities of Lebanon and thus the nature of the divisions to be managed in the new state. However, even after tracing these boundaries, the mandatory could have opted for a system which, whist allowing adequate representation for all groups (e.g. through the application of a proportional representation system), might have been more conducive to developing a dominant vision of the state over time. As has been discussed several times, the removal of quotas could over time have resulted in rule by the majority and thus domination with all the consequences for Lebanon's diversity that have been discussed above. The quotas have forced Lebanon to remain a vertically divided society on an institutional level even though it has since become a horizontally divided society, with a Shia majority and over a dozen recognized minorities, on a popular level. This could not but result in endemic instability. Consequently, the case of Lebanon shows that the consociational system can lead not only to an entrenchment of divisions, but also to the artificial maintenance of politically defined divisions which might have disappeared without its mechanisms.

Political Legacies of European Colonialism

Given that this institutional management was facilitated by colonial policies, my research could seem to suggests that there is a relationship between colonial heritage and political stability. The institutions put in place by Britain to manage the divisions within the Yishuv

[5] Asher A., Interview with the author, 23.3.2016, Jerusalem.

were more conducive to political stability in Israel after independence. France's divide and rule strategy had precisely the desired effect: It fragmented the Lebanese polity and destabilized it, even long after France had left the region. If the results are viewed in isolation from the process traced in this dissertation, this would seem to confirm those scholars who have found a positive relationship between British colonial heritage and democracy, state-building or development.[6]

If we look at the way colonial policy developed, however, we cannot identify a clear line in British policy. Indeed, since Britain's plan for Palestine started with a binational, consociational project, Palestine could have looked a lot like Lebanon by the end of the mandate: an artificially strengthened Jewish majority (e.g. veto powers in the legislative) cooperating with a natural Arab majority – possibly split into Christians and Muslims. No dominant vision of the state could have emerged under these circumstances. This state would likely be less politically stable and effective than modern day Israel. At the same time, the Arab-Israeli conflict would not exist, having a stabilizing effect on the whole region. By the same token, there would not have been a state to which the Jews might have emigrated during and after the Holocaust, keeping in mind that other countries largely denied Jews entry during World War II. Once again, it is up to each observer to decide what the best outcome might have been. What can be said based on my analysis is that Britain contributed to the emergence of a dominant vision of the state in the Yishuv which in turn stabilized Israeli politics in the first years of statehood, helping it to face the challenges of independence.

[6] Myron Weiner, "Empirical Democratic Theory," in *Competitive Elections in Developing Countries*, ed. M Weiner and E Ozbudun (Durham: Duke University Press, 1987); Lipset, Seymour Martin; Seong, Kyoung-Ryung; and Torres, "A Comparative Analysis of the Social Requisites of Democracy."; Norris, "Stable Democracy and Good Governance in Divided Societies : Do Powersharing Institutions Work ?"

Nonetheless, this outcome was not due to a characteristically British policy; it was contingent on the developments on the ground (particularly, the Jewish-Arab conflict in Palestine) and agency (the influence of Herbert Samuel when choosing institutional mechanisms). Thus, having considered the details of the institution building process, this research cannot confirm that British policy was inherently more conducive to political stability than France's. The outcome was a coincidence more than a planned political project. Nevertheless, the findings contribute to solving the puzzle of how colonial heritage has impacted postcolonial political systems. The answer is: It varies[7], depending on the circumstances of each territory and the men in power in each of them. In the cases of the Yishuv and Lebanon, it depended on the interests which each power sought to defend in their mandate (Britain had no need to sow disorder; France did), the alliances made possible by the situation on the ground (binationalism was impossible in Palestine; Arab nationalism undesirable in Lebanon), the values held by High Commissioners at the helm of local government (Herbert Samuel mindful of political effectiveness and national unity; Henri Gouraud defender of fragmentation to protect French interests). While this is not much of a theoretical statement and can, by definition, not be extrapolated to other deeply divided postcolonial societies, it contributes to our understanding of the matter by providing a detailed analysis of the factors which impacted institution building in two Middle Eastern mandates.

Generalizability and Avenues for Further Research

The research conducted for this dissertation used process tracing techniques to follow the process by which deep divisions were created and managed during the mandate system,

[7] Mamdani, *Citizen and Subject*; Matthew K Lange, "British Colonial Legacies and Political Development" 32, no. 6 (2004): 905–22, doi:10.1016/j.worlddev.2003.12.001; Croissant, "From Transition to Defective Democracy: Mapping Asian Democratization"; Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson, "The Colonial Origins of Comparative Development: An Empirical Investigation."

and how a dominant vision of the state emerged in the Yishuv and not in Lebanon. It argued that institutional mechanisms put in place by the mandatory powers help us understand these outcomes. It furthermore suggested that the existence of such a vision contributed to political stability in Israel whilst the lack thereof contributed to instability in Lebanon. Centralization of power enabled one group to monopolize power, impose its dominant vision of the state and thus govern effectively. Fragmentation of power prevented such a development in Lebanon, no dominant vision emerged, thus making cooperation difficult and destabilizing the system in the long run.

As a study considering the implications of different ways of managing deep divisions, its results may provide lessons for other deeply divided societies. Nonetheless, the use of process tracing in this dissertation limits its generalizability. Indeed, the inherent strength of process tracing techniques is also its greatest weakness: The detailed study of one or a few cases, which allows us to elucidate nuances which large-N studies cannot explore almost precludes the generalization of lessons extracted from their study. Nonetheless, individual parts of the theory espoused in this dissertation may find application to other divided societies. Some examples will be explored below.

For the theory to apply outside the cases studied in this dissertation, a country must present a deeply divided society, it must have been under European rule, and the colonial power must have introduced institutions to manage deep divisions. In addition, they must be democracies, whether stable or not. To fully test my theory a much more systematic and in-depth study of such cases is needed, but a superficial overview presented below suggests that the scope of the theory may well go beyond Israel and Lebanon.

Limitations

Before presenting these examples, however, some words regarding the limitations of this study are in order. Teasing out the precise process by which divisions were managed in the Yishuv and in Lebanon during the mandate period required meticulous archival, interview and literature research in several languages. The time constraints imposed by the doctoral programme combined with limited financial resources to inhibit further research both into my two case studies and into its applicability to other cases. First of all, both case studies could be further enriched and nuanced with additional material that I was unable to access. For instance, it would be enlightening to more fully ascertain the impact of local leadership on the state-building process in both cases. In the case of Israel, such research would require a better understanding of local languages (Hebrew, Yiddish, Ladino, Polish, Russian) than I was able to offer. In addition, it would require extensive financial resources and time to find archival material outside of the main state archives that can shed light on micro-processes that I was unable to cover.

In the case of Lebanon, it would require not only a better command of the Arabic language than my own (even though I am able to read Arabic sources, it is too time consuming to rely on it extensively) but also access to local archival materials. At present, the only archives that are publicly accessible in Lebanon are those of the Maronite Patriarchate in Bkerké. While I received an appointment to browse the archives (with great difficulty to find out whom to contact to gain access) during my week-long stay in Lebanon, identifying relevant material proved difficult. Moreover, reproduction of the material for foreign researchers is fraught with difficulties; selected documents were copied for me on CD, albeit without a descriptor or archival reference ID for each set of documents, making it impossible to cite said sources for this thesis. In any case, I was unable to find sources that provided information on the state-building process beyond what I had already found in the French archives. In addition, much of the Arabic literature on the mandate period is

based on French archival sources as well as French and English secondary literature. My research on Lebanon might have been enriched by a longer stay in the country, during which I could have integrated more fully into the scholarly community and conducted more meaningful research at local universities and research institutes (in particular, the German Orient Institute has an interesting library) and search out private archives.

I have attempted to remedy these shortcomings by using archival material from different sources. In this sense, for the Yishuv case study, I consulted archives linked with the Zionist Organization and the State of Israel (Central Zionist Archives, Weizmann Archives, Ben-Gurion Archives, Israeli State Archives), opposition groups (the Jabotinsky Archives, original documents from the Agudat Israel at the National Library of Israel), and foreign archives (the National Archives in the UK, the Middle East Centre Archives at Oxford University, Hansard, Cabinet Papers) to reduce as much bias as possible in telling the story of state-building in the Yishuv. While sources on Lebanon were less ubiquitous than on Israel, I sought to balance out the French discourse (Diplomatic Archives in Nantes and Paris, Military Archives in Paris) with British sources (the National Archives, the Middle East Centre Archives at Oxford University, Cabinet Papers).

India

One example which may be usefully compared with Israel is India. India scored 9 out of 10 on the Polity IV democracy score during its first three decades of independence and has maintained remarkable democratic stability. It is likewise a deeply divided society which attained independence from Britain roughly at the same time as Israel (1947). Its foundation likewise required the partition of the country into two separate states, India and Pakistan, along religious lines. India's conflict with Kashmir and Pakistan can be expected to have a similar effect on politics as Israel's conflict with the Palestinians, and the Arab world as a

whole. As was the case with the young state of Israel, partition required large-scale population transfers. Also India suffered – and continues to suffer – from economic hardship during its foundational years. While the similarities are extensive, they do not share one essential variable in this project: Palestine was a mandate, and as such, Britain was called upon to create a sovereign polity. India, on the other hand, was directly administered by Britain as the colonial power. Thus, there are limits as to how comparable their colonial experiences are. Nonetheless, other elements of my theory can be tested with a cursory analysis of the Indian case.

India was ruled by Britain for close to a century, and according to some scholars, it owes much of its democratic stability to this colonial past. This is so because British 'tutelary democracy' emphasized the rule of law and created bureaucratic order, and because the colonial power installed suffrage and encouraged political competition. The participation of indigenous leaders as civil servants and political representatives allowed them to develop democratic political traditions. When independence was attained, they thus took over a system imbibed with British political values.[8]

However, the argument that the British left a legacy of good government in India by strengthening its state apparatus with a strong civil service and military is highly contested. Atul Kohli and Maya Tudor have separately pointed out that the argument runs into problems when the divergent regime trajectories of India and Pakistan are considered.[9] Whereas India has become a stable democracy, Pakistan came under military dictatorship soon after independence. These authors also point to several causal variables that tie in with the theory outlined in this dissertation. For Kohli, India inherited a series of political traits

[8] Weiner, "Empirical Democratic Theory," 19–20.
[9] Atul Kohli, "Introduction," in *The Success of India's Democracy*, ed. Atul Kohli (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 1–20; Maya Tudor, "The Historical Inheritance of India's Democracy," *SSRN*, 2011; Sumit. Ganguly, "Six Decades of Independence," *Journal of Democracy* 18, no. 2 (2007): 30–40.

from Britain that are conducive to stable democracy, including a relatively centralized state.[10] In addition, he highlights the role of the dominant party, the Indian National Congress, in managing the first years of independence and creating a stable political system. In other words, just as I have suggested about Israel, he regards centralization and the emergence of a dominant party as crucial for democratic stability in deeply divided, post-independence India.

According to Maya Tudor, the key causal factors determining the divergent regime trajectories of India and Pakistan were the type of social classes that led the independence movement and the strength of the dominant party. In Pakistan, the landed elites led the movement, thus making democratization less likely. In India, on the contrary, the middle classes (often associated with greater democratization) led the movement. This factor, she argues, determined the type of regime, i.e. whether democratic or authoritarian that would emerge. Tudor further finds that the *stability of the regime* – an outcome more interesting in terms of the theory espoused in this dissertation – was largely determined by the degree of institutionalization of the dominant party, and its espousal of what she calls a 'programmatic ideology'..[11] This is akin to what I – following Hannah Lerner[12] – have called dominant 'vision of the state' in this dissertation. In an article explaining India's democratic success, Ashutosh Varshney unequivocally supports the thesis that the institutionalization of national unity was instrumental in this process:

> Between the 1920s and the 1940s, the independence movement, under the leadership of Ghandi, Nehru, and the Congress party, turned what previously had been only a cultural unit […] into a cultural-political unit – a nation. *Without this transformation*,

[10] Kohli, "Introduction."
[11] Maya Tudor, *The Promise of Power. The Origins of Democracy in India and Autocracy in Pakistan* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013).
[12] Lerner, *Making Constitutions in Deeply Divided Societies*.

> *Indian democracy would have been still-born: There has to be a political unit before there can be a democracy.*[13]

By adding the importance of the Congress party's strength and lack of competition[14], Varhsney hints at a connection between party dominance, visions of the state and democratic stability that resembles the argument made in this dissertation. These similarities between the aforementioned works on India and my theory on Israel and Lebanon are insufficient to confirm its applicability beyond my case studies. However, they provide an indication that similar dynamics may be at work elsewhere and suggest an interesting avenue for future research.

Nigeria

Similar arguments are made in Mahmood Mamdani's seminal work on colonialism in Africa, where both Britain and France set up what he calls 'bifurcated states'[15], with one administrative and legal order for the colonizers modelled on European systems, and one to be applied in rural areas, based on tribal structures. The rationale behind this was to maintain a racially segregated society between the 'civilized' urban dwellers and the rural hinterland.[16] Indirect rule through tribal structures 'reinforced ethnically bound institutions of control'[17]. Where these did not exist at the time of colonization, they were created. Colonial officials deliberately categorized communities – such as the Fulbe of northern Cameroon – and appointed a suitable chief to act as an intermediary between the colonial

[13] Ashutosh Varshney, "Why Democracy Survives," *Journal of Democracy* 9, no. 3 (1998): 37–38, doi:10.1353/jod.1998.0053.
[14] Ibid., 38.
[15] Mamdani, *Citizen and Subject*, 16–18.
[16] Ibid., 4–6.
[17] Ibid., 24.

power and the community.[18] Mamdani's assessment reflects my conclusions about Lebanon:

> What would democratization have entailed in the African context? It would have entailed the deracialization of civil power and the detribalization of customary power, as starting points of an overall democratization that would transcend the legacy of a bifurcated power. A consistent democratization would have required dismantling and reorganizing the local state, the array of Native Authorities organized around the principle of fusion of power, fortified by an administratively driven customary justice.[19]

In other words, Mamdani argues that an elimination of ethnically defined political identities and the centralization of power would have been a prerequisite for 'consistent' or stable democracy in Africa. From his description of post-independence state-building, it seems clear that it would have been the task of the colonial powers to set this process into motion.

Another scholar explains that the salience of ethnicity in modern-day Africa is due to the fact that they 'continue to serve contemporary social, political and economic needs'[20], and traces their creation back to the colonial era. The European powers classified communities into regional blocs, which are now denominated 'tribes' to facilitate their political and economic management. With the political system structured around tribes, communities bought into the logic as it was the main path through which state-allocated good could be accessed, and not belonging to a tribe resulted in exclusion from them.[21] This dissertation has highlighted similar dynamics in mandate Lebanon.

Thus, just as I have argued in this dissertation, the colonial powers acted according to their colonial imperatives – rather than political ideals or philosophy. The way deep divisions were managed was not a matter of whether they were under French or British

[18] Alex Thomson, *An Introduction to African Politics* (London: Routledge, 2009), 64.
[19] Mamdani, *Citizen and Subject*, 25.
[20] Thomson, *An Introduction to African Politics*.
[21] Ibid.

rule, but of which institutional strategies each of them pursued in a particular case. In Africa, both the British and the French pursued a policy of fragmentation, and once they had established the system, a path-dependent process was installed which provided incentives for communities to buy into the ethnopolitical logic. This process closely mirrors the emergence of ethnic identities in Lebanon during the 19th century.[22] Furthermore, Mamdani's words above directly associate the failure to centralized institutions with Africa's difficulties to democratize. Often, the colonial state was replaced with a despotic centralism, justified by the very divisions which the Europeans had entrenched.[23]

Nigeria is an example of British rule that led to a result similar to French rule in Lebanon – an unstable multi-ethnic democracy. Nigeria's boundaries were demarcated by the colonial power in 1914, encompassing over 250 ethnic groups. Ethnic power-sharing dates back to the 1946 constitution, which was drafted by the British colonial power. At the time, nationalist forces were rising, and Britain feared that their triumph in national legislative elections might overwhelm its long-term plans. [24] This clearly aligns with French fears about Syrian nationalism in mandate Lebanon. Britain found a compromise solution to her predicament in the form of a federation between the three regions, each dominated by a majority ethnic group. Since independence, three groups have dominated Nigerian politics: the Hausa-Fulani in the North, the Yoruba in the West, and the Ibo in the East. These groups coincide with the administrative boundaries of the colonial era. Once they had been categorized as tribes by the colonial power, these groups, which were formerly loose, fluctuating coalitions (much like the Lebanese communities during the 19th century),

[22] Makdisi, *The Culture of Sectarianism, Community, History and Violence in Nineteenth-Century Ottoman Lebanon*.
[23] Larry Diamond and Marc Plattner, *Nationalism, Ethnic Conflict and Democracy* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University, 1994), x.
[24] Brandon Kendhammer, "Getting Our Piece of the National Cake: Consociational Power Sharing and Neopatrimonialism in Nigeria," *Nationalism and Ethnic Politics* 21, no. 2 (2015): 150–51.

turned into fixed tribes. It was in this way that they extracted benefits from the colonial regime.[25]

When Nigeria attained independence in 1960, the constitution consecrated the ethno-political divisions established during the colonial era: They established a federal state encompassing these three regions, each with a strong autonomous government. With representatives competing for their region's share of the national spoils, no powerful national party or constituency emerged. The instability this competition caused led to two military coups in 1966 alone, putting an end to civilian government until 1979.[26] Once again, colonial imperatives resulted in the creation of identity discourses that were not conducive to the emergence of a dominant vision of the state thus weakening Nigeria's chances at stable democratic development.

Iraq

A second unsuccessful democratizer illustrates the impact of colonial policy on democracy in deeply divided societies: Iraq. Iraq shared many more pre-mandate characteristics with Lebanon and the Yishuv than India and Nigeria. Having been under the Ottoman Empire before British rule, the country was composed of multiple ethnic groups, placed under the mandate system, and subjected to similar colonial imperatives. Therefore, the similarities with my two case studies are sufficient to warrant an attempt at applying my theory to its pre-state developments. The outcome, however, differs markedly, as Iraq did not become an unstable democracy. Rather, its democracy never consolidated as it came under military dictatorship soon after independence.

[25] Kendhammer, "Getting Our Piece of the National Cake: Consociational Power Sharing and Neopatrimonialism in Nigeria."
[26] Thomson, *An Introduction to African Politics*.

It is often asserted – especially in the context of the 2003 invasion of Iraq – that Iraq has been unable to democratize because of a lack of political traditions and culture. So, for instance, historian of the Middle East David Fieldhouse asserts that without the colonial powers, either the former Ottoman notables would have taken over, or Mesopotamia would have fallen into 'endemic quarrels and fighting between the main tribes'.[27] In other words, they were ill-equipped for democratic government. However, when the Iraqis rose against British forces that were occupying the country, they established self-governing local institutions.[28] In some areas, they even created elected legislative and executive councils, much like the Yishuv had done on the eve of British occupation. Rather, 'it was the failure of British attempts at nation-building in the 1920s […] that caused Iraq to become the front of regional instability and dictatorial government from its independence in 1932 until the US invasion in 2003'.[29] Fieldhouse agrees that the Arabs were capable of running local and municipal affairs but asserts that national-scale institutions would not have emerged were it not for the mandate powers. This, he argues, is a positive legacy of the mandate period.[30]

State-building, however, was an abortive mission for the mandatory. When the British mandate was approved in 1920, the empire was already in decline and a dearth of military and financial resources meant that the mandatory would not be able to dedicate resources to the development of a democratic state in Iraq. Instead of developing new state institutions (even though nominally, a democratic parliamentary system was installed), Britain relied on coercive power, exercised through the RAF, which would bomb areas that were in contradiction with its policy, i.e. engaging in rebellion. Given its limited resources

[27] David Fieldhouse, *Western Imperialism in the Middle East 1914-1958* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 340.
[28] Adeed Dawisha, "Democratic Attitudes and Practices in Iraq , 1921-1958," *Middle East Journal* 59, no. 1 (2005): 13–14.
[29] Toby Dodge, "Iraq: The Contradictions of Exogenous State-Building in Historical Perspective," *Third World Quarterly* 27, no. 1 (2006): 187–88, doi:10.1080/01436590500370061.
[30] Fieldhouse, *Western Imperialism in the Middle East 1914-1958*, 342.

for state-building in Iraq, it relied on existing patron-client structures, thus perpetuating the power of local sheikhs and the social fragmentation that came with it. Indeed, when the mandatory power arrived, traditional power was in decline in the face of a rising urban elite. It was Britain who recreated the ancient regime.[31] This also meant that they would rely on the Sunni element of the country.

Iraq was, much like Syria and Lebanon, an invention of the colonial powers. In 1921, the Kingdom of Iraq was formed of three former Ottoman provinces: Basra in the south (primarily Shia), Baghdad (predominantly Sunni) and Mosul (Sunni Kurd) in the north. Initial plans for the creation of the separate state of Kurdistan had thus been abandoned. Aside from the fact that Britain sought to gain dominance of Kirkuk's oil fields, the inclusion of Mosul in the new state followed political calculations. Shias formed the demographic majority in the new state ruled by Sunni King Faisal. To offset their hegemony, the British included the Sunni Kurds within the new Iraqi boundaries, thus directly manipulating the ethnic balance of power, as the French had done in Lebanon.

While they had done so to safeguard the stability of Faisal's regime (again, emphasizing governmental effectiveness and stability as they had done in Palestine/the Yishuv), they were actually sowing the seeds for future turmoil in the country. As scholar Michael Rear explains, the main source of instability in Iraq is a lack of defining national character due to the way its boundaries were drawn. Combining the Arab provinces of Basra and Baghdad might have provided greater cohesion, as it would have been based on a Shia majority. However, this would have contradicted British colonial imperatives.[32] The issue of ethnic diversity was left unresolved in mandate Iraq, as Britain did not trace

[31] Ibid., 75.
[32] Michael Rear, *Intervention, Ethnic Conflict and State-Building in Iraq: A Paradigm for the Post-Colonial State* (New York: Routledge, 2008), 166–67.

boundaries conducive to the emergence of a dominant vision of the state, nor did it attempt to create democratic institutions capable of channelling conflicts stemming from deep divisions. After turbulent years of ethnic and tribal conflict with the government[33], Iraq came under military rule in 1958 and was subjected to successive coups in the decades that followed.

Ethnic divisions continue to be the fault lines of political conflict in Iraq and the cause of its political instability. Britain bears responsibility for this outcome in two ways: 1) By tracing boundaries which forced incompatible visions of the state to cooperate; 2) By creating a system which artificially maintained a balance of power between several communities. Both techniques are reminiscent of French actions in Lebanon. Iraq did not, like Lebanon, become an unstable democracy, but it never consolidated as a democracy and became a military dictatorship instead. However, it can be argued that the seeds of instability which brought down quasi-democratic structures in Iraq in 1958 can be traced back to these mandatory policies.

This cursory overview of three examples in South Asia, Sub-Saharan Africa and the Middle East shows that the theory developed in this dissertation may apply to other deeply divided, post-colonial societies. In India, partition, administrative centralization and the development of a dominant party with a dominant vision of the state or a 'programmatic ideology' was conducive to stable democracy. Some of these developments can be traced back to colonial policy. In Nigeria, on the other hand, Britain applied a method more akin to French policy in Lebanon. It institutionalized tribal identities and turned them into the primary tool for accessing the spoils of the new state.

[33] Elie Kedourie, *The Chatham House Version: And Other Middle Eastern Studies* (Chicago: Ivan R.Dee, 2004), 236–83.

The usefulness of ethnic identification resulted in the entrenchment of regional identities which Nigeria continues to grapple with, and which has plunged the country into endemic instability. Periods of democratic rule have been interrupted by military coups and civil wars. Finally, the example of Iraq closely mirrors that of Nigeria and Lebanon. Iraq was composed of three ethnically defined provinces of the Ottoman Empire, resulting in a mixture of different visions of the state which continue to vie for power in modern-day Iraq. In both Nigeria and Iraq, borders were designed according to Britain's colonial interests, and the empowerment of ethnic groups by the mandatory prevented the emergence of a dominant vision of the state and thus political stability.

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The limitations in terms of the general applicability of my theory have already been alluded to above. In order to make a stronger case for extrapolating my theory to other deeply divided post-colonial polities, in-depth process tracing of a medium number of case studies would have been required. However, this would have inhibited in-depth knowledge of each of them, which was the main focus of this dissertation. While the trade-off was necessary for this particular project, delving further into depth to understand the development and impact of dominant visions of the state in other case studies – such as the ones reviewed above – presents an interesting avenue for further research.

APPENDICES

A Note about Interviews

I conducted most of my interviews in Israel. Identifying and accessing Jews who lived in Palestine during the mandate period was difficult. I followed snowball sampling. Sara Y., my first interviewee, whom I contacted through somebody I met at the Central Zionist Archives, put me in touch with Bertie S., who lived in a senior home for Eastern and Central European Jews in Ramat Gan. I was then able to talk to administration in that home, supplying the information pack reproduced below (including the information sheet, sample questionnaire and ethics approval). Given that some of the inhabitants of the home are vulnerable, I had to receive approval from the administration first. I did the same in several other senior homes across the country. In some of them, I was allowed to distribute informational flyers in their post boxes, in others, the administrator would arrange the interviews for me.

In some cases, friends of other interviewees got in touch with me on their own initiative, because they wanted to participate in the project. Some of the interviewees gave me material from their personal archives (e.g. letters they sent to their parents – who had remained in Europe – after they had left to Palestine). Unfortunately, they were not relevant to this dissertation, so I was unable to use them. In addition, I reached out to academics who specialize on the mandate period and was able to interview two of them. These contacts were established through the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, with which I was affiliated during my stay in Israel.

Regarding the interview that I conducted in Lebanon: I got in touch with several organizations that promote Lebanese democracy and that campaign for the elimination of

sectarian quotas in parliament. Some of these organizations provided me with literature and information material on their activities. One of the organizations put me in touch with their campaign leader, Omar K., with whom I met, and who explained the current situation and his view of the sectarian system and its effects on Lebanese democracy.

List of Interviewees

Name	Place	Date	Role
Sara Y.	Rehovot	20.3.2016	German immigrant, 1939 Mizrahi
Chaya A.	Jerusalem	23.3.2016	Born in Jerusalem, 1920s Unknown affiliation
Asher A.	Jerusalem	23.3.2016	Polish immigrant, 1945 Holocaust survivor, Haganah
Bertie S.	Ramat Gan	29.3.2016	German immigrant, 1939 Unknown affiliation
Moshe M.	Jerusalem	30.3.2016	Born in Tel Aviv, 1935 Irgun Expert on Israeli Arabs/Palestinians
Jonathan B.	Rishon Letzion	31.3.2016	German immigrant, 1939 Unknown affiliation
Bracha S.	Ramat Gan	6.4.2016	Born in Tel Aviv, 1928 Palmach
Raya N.	Ramat Gan	10.4.2016	Born in Tel Aviv, 1933 Unknown affiliation
Judith F.	Ramat Gan	10.4.2016	German immigrant, 1934 Unknown affiliation
Lisbett R.	Ramat Gan	15.4.2016	Austrian immigrant, 1938 Hashomer Hatzair
Lily G.	Ramat Gan	15.4.2016	Austrian immigrant, 1939 Unknown affiliation
Tubi E.	Ramat Gan	15.4.2016	British immigrant, 1949 Unknown affiliation
Ernst S.	Ramat Gan	17.4.2016	German immigrant, 1949 Unknown affiliation
Ruth R.	Ramat Gan	17.4.2016	German immigrant, 1938 Haganah
Agnes G.	Ramat Gan	17.4.2016	Hungarian immigrant, 1949 Holocaust survivor, Unknown affiliation
Chanan I.	Ramat Gan	18.4.2016	German immigrant, 1933

			Unknown affiliation
Zeev R.	Ramat Gan	18.4.2016	Austrian immigrant, 1938 Unknown affiliation
Chava C.	Kiryat Yovel, Jerusalem	18.4.2016	German immigrant, 1933 Mizrachi
Esther T.	Kiryat Yovel, Jerusalem	18.4.2016	Born in Haifa, 1929 Unknown affiliation
Lucy K.C.	Kiryat Yovel, Jerusalem	18.4.2016	German immigrant, 1935 Haganah
Elisheva A.	Kiryat Yovel, Jerusalem	21.4.2016	Romanian immigrant, 1933 Haganah
Ruth G.	Talpiot, Jerusalem	28.4.2016	Czech immigrant, 1939 Mapai
Shoshana L.	German Colony, Jerusalem	28.4.2016	American immigrant, 1935 Haganah
Ahron A.	German Colony, Jerusalem	28.4.2016	German immigrant, 1935 Youth Aliyah/Jewish Agency
Menachem K.	Talpiot, Jerusalem	1.5.2016	Expert on Arab-Jewish conflict during mandate period
Meir C.	Ramat Hasharon	2.5.2016	German immigrant, 1938 Haganah
Omar K.	Beirut, Lebanon	2.11.2017	Expert on Lebanese Electoral System

Information Sheet for Interviewees (English)

INFORMATION SHEET FOR PARTICIPANTS

Study Title:

'THE CHOSEN PEOPLE' AND 'THE HOUSE OF MANY MANSIONS': How Nationalism Stabilized Israel's Democracy and Destabilized That of Lebanon

Background and Aims:

My name is Zaha Marisa Kheir and I am PhD candidate at St. Antony's College and the Department of Politics at the University of Oxford. My dissertation is supervised by Dr. Philip Robins.

This study aims to answer the following question: Why was Israel able to establish a stable democratic system upon independence while Lebanon was not? I believe that the root causes for an enduring democratic system in Israel are to be found during the mandate period, in the Yishuv, while the root causes for political instability in Lebanon lie in local political developments during the French mandate. What was different in these two countries that explains the divergent regimes outcomes? Was it the leadership style and attitudes of its founders? Was it the policy of the mandate power?

What happens with the research data provided?

The data that you provide will be stored securely by the researcher and only to the extent needed for this study. Your personal data will not be used for any non-academic purposes and will not be forwarded to a third party without your consent.

The University of Oxford is committed to the dissemination of its research for the benefit of society and, in support of this commitment, has established an online archive of research materials. This archive includes digital copies of student theses successfully submitted as part of a University of Oxford postgraduate degree programme. Holding the archive online gives easy access for researchers to the full text of freely available theses, thereby increasing the likely impact and use of that research.

If you agree to participate in this project, the research will be written up as a thesis. On successful submission of the thesis, it will be deposited both in print and online in the University archives, to facilitate its use in future research. The thesis will be published with restricted access.

If your name is mentioned in the final text of the dissertation and you are quoted directly, you will be contacted with the copy of the relevant page/s beforehand to obtain your consent.

Who has reviewed this project?

This project has been reviewed by, and received ethics clearance through, the University of Oxford Central University Research Ethics Committee. Drafts of the final text will be reviewed periodically by the student's supervisor, peers and examiners at the University of Oxford.

Who do I contact if I have a concern about the study or I wish to complain?

If you have a concern about any aspect of this project, please speak to Ms. Zaha Kheir (00972-544988572) or her supervisor, Dr. Philip Robins (0044-1865274472) who will do his/her best to answer your query. The researcher should acknowledge your concern within 10 working days and give you an indication of how he/she intends to deal with it. If you remain unhappy or wish to make a formal complaint, please contact the chair of the Research Ethics Committee at the University of Oxford (using the contact details below) who will seek to resolve the matter in a reasonably expeditious manner:

Chair, Social Sciences & Humanities Inter-Divisional Research Ethics Committee

Email: ethics@socsci.ox.ac.uk

Address: Research Services, University of Oxford, Wellington Square, Oxford OX1 2JD

Information Sheet for Interviewees (German)

MERKBLATT FÜR TEILNEHMER

Titel der Studie:

Englisch: 'THE CHOSEN PEOPLE' AND 'THE HOUSE OF MANY MANSIONS': How Nationalism Stabilized Israel's Democracy and Destabilized That of Lebanon

Hintergrundinformation und Ziele:

Mein Name ist Zaha Marisa Kheir und ich bin Doktorandin am St. Antony's College und der Fakultät für Politikwissenschaften der Oxford Universität. Der Leiter der Studie ist Dr. Philip Robins, ebenfalls Mitglied des St. Antony's College.

Diese Studie versucht folgende Fragen zu beantworten: Warum ist es Israel gelungen nach seiner Unabhängigkeit ein stabiles demokratisches System aufzubauen, während die des Libanon gescheitert ist? Ich bin davon überzeugt, dass die Wurzeln der politischen Systeme beider Länder in ihren Mandatszeiten zu suchen sind. Was ist zu dieser Zeit in den beiden Ländern so unterschiedlich gemacht worden, dass es zwei so verschiedene politische Systeme zum Vorschein brachte? Waren es die Politiken der Mandatsmacht, die Verpflichtung der lokalen Akteure mit dem Projekt (evtl. Nationalismus) und die Kultur der jeweiligen lokalen Teilnehmer? Es gibt momentan keine Studie, die diese Fragen ausreichend beantwortet.

Was passiert mit der Information, die ich zur Verfügung stelle?

Die Information, die Sie zur Verfügung stellen wird von der Forscherin selbst, auf sichere Art und Weise verwahrt und wird nur für die Ergebnisse dieser Studie verwendet. Ihre persönlichen Daten werden unter keinen Umständen für nicht-akademische Zwecke benutzt und werden an niemanden weitergeleitet.

Die Oxford Universität verpflichtet sich zur Verbreitung ihrer Forschung zugunsten der Gesellschaft und besitzt, um dieses Verpflichtung umzusetzen, ein Online-Archiv von Forschungsmaterialien. Dieses Archiv beinhaltet u.a. digitale Ausgaben der Dissertation, die unsere Doktoranden erfolgreich, als Teil ihres Doktortitels, an der Universität vorgetragen haben. Eine Online-Veröffentlichung der Doktorarbeiten ermöglicht es anderen Forschern, diese Dissertationen kostenfrei lesen zu können, was die Auswirkungen und Nutzung unserer Forschung ausweitet.

Wenn Sie sich zur Teilnahme an diesem Projekt entscheiden, wird die Forschung als Dissertation in unserem Universitätsarchiv veröffentlicht.

Sollte ihr Name im endgültigen Text der Dissertation erwähnt werden, oder ein direktes Zitat von Ihnen enthalten sein, werden Sie im Vorhinein kontaktiert, um Ihre Zustimmung einzuholen.

Wer hat das Projekt genehmigt?

Dieses Projekt wurde von dem Komitee für Forschungsethik der Oxford Universität evaluiert und genehmigt. Der Leiter dieser Doktorarbeit, Mitarbeiter der Doktorandin und Prüfer der Oxford Universität evaluieren Entwürfe des endgültigen Textes der Dissertation auf laufender Basis.

An wen kann ich mich wenden, wenn ich Bedenken bezüglich dieser Studie habe oder eine Beschwerde einreichen möchte?

Sollten Sie Bedenken über diese Studie haben, setzten Sie sich bitte mit Fr. Zaha Kheir (00972-544988572) oder ihren Doktorvater, Dr. Philip Robins (0044-1865274472) in Verbindung. Beide werden versuchen, Ihre Fragen bestmöglich zu beantworten. Die Forscherin ist dazu verpflichtet, ihre Beschwerde innerhalb von 10 Tagen nach Erhalt Ihrer Nachricht zu bearbeiten und Ihnen eine Antwort zu geben, wie sie gedenkt, die Situation anzugehen. Sollten Sie weitere Bedenken oder Beschwerden haben, wenden Sie sich bitte an den Leiter der Komitees für Forschungsethik der Oxford Universität (unten angeführt), der sich umgehend um Ihre Anfrage kümmern wird:

Leiter der Komitees für Forschungsethik der Oxford Universität

Email: ethics@socsci.ox.ac.uk

Adresse: Research Services, University of Oxford, Wellington Square, Oxford OX1 2JD

Sample Questionnaire (English)

SAMPLE QUESTIONNAIRE

Questions about the interviewee:

1. When did you arrive in Israel?
2. Why did you come to Israel, what was the motivation?
3. What were your everyday activities in Israel after you arrived?
4. What official institutions were you involved with after you arrived?

Questions specific to the the study:

5. Looking back to the education that you received as a child in your hometown…

    a) What was taught about Palestine?
    b) Was Zionism discussed widely?
    c) Was the establishment of a Jewish state viewed as a reality soon to be realized?

6. Which group of leaders among the Jewish community in Palestine had the greatest power in the country?

7. At the time, newspaper reports often spoke about a danger of civil war between the Jews of Palestine, there was a lot of rivalry between IZL, Lehi and the Haganah… Can you remember any of this? If so, what do you think were the main differences and how were they eventually resolved?

8. What can you recall about the religious communities in the country? For a long time, they were quite unhappy with the mainstream Zionist policies… Can you recall any of this?

9. In 1947, the partition plan was announced… What was the general feeling in the country? How did people feel about the very fact that Palestine was to be broken up?

10. How did the situation evolve between the Partition Plan and the declaration of the state of Israel one year later?

11. What was the general feeling and atmosphere when Ben Gurion announced the creation of the State?

12. In spite of the many cultural and religious differences that exist among the Jews of Israel, its democracy has worked remarkably well. What do you think is the secret to success?

Sample Questionnaire (German)

INTERVIEWFRAGEN (BEISPIEL)

Fragen zur Person:

13. Wann kamen Sie nach Israel?
14. Warum kamen Sie hierher, welche Motivation stand dahinter?
15. Erzählen Sie mir bitte ein bisschen über Ihre Aktivitäten hier nachdem Sie in Israel ankamen.
16. Hatten Sie mit öffentlichen Institutionen zu tun, als Sie hier ankamen? Wenn ja, welche?

Fragen der Studie:

17. Wenn Sie an Ihre schulische Ausbildung in Ihrem Herkunftsland zurückdenken…

    d) Was wurde dort über Erez Israel gelehrt?
    e) Wurde der Zionismus allgemein besprochen?
    f) War die Gründung eines jüdischen Staates ein Thema?

18. Welche politische Gruppe hatte die größte Macht in der jüdischen Gemeinschaft in Palästina als sie ankamen?

19. Zeitungsartikel von 1946 bis 1948 deuten oft an, dass ein Bürgerkrieg unter den Juden Palästinas ausbrechen könnte. Es gab zu der Zeit eine starke Rivalität zwischen IZL, Lehi und der Haganah. Können Sie sich daran erinnern? Wenn ja, was denken Sie, waren die Unterschiede zwischen diesen Gruppen und wie wurden Sie letztendlich gelöst?

20. Wie war damals das Verhältnis zwischen nicht-religiösen Juden und orthodoxen Gruppen?

21. Im Jahr 1947 wurde der UN-Teilungsplan für Palästina verabschiedet… Können Sie sich an den Tag erinnern? Was war damals die Atmosphäre in Israel? Was haben die Menschen davon gehalten, dass das Gebiet geteilt wurde?

22. Wie hat sich die Situation zwischen der Ankündigung des Teilungsplans und der Unabhängigkeitserklärung am 15 Mai 1948 entwickelt?

23. Wie war die Atmosphäre in Israel an dem Tag der Unabhängigkeitserklärung?

24. Trotz der großen kulturellen, sprachlichen, religiösen und politischen Verschiedenheiten Israels, hat die Demokratie des Landes standgehalten. Was denken Sie, ist Israels Erfolgsgeheimnis?

Research Ethics Approval, DPIR

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Zaha Kheir,
St Antony's,
Oxford

3 December 2015

Dear Zaha,

Research Ethics Approval: Ref No.: SSH_DPIR_C1A_15_006

Title: THE CHOSEN PEOPLE' AND 'THE HOUSE OF MANY MANSIONS: How Nationalism Stabilized Israel's Democracy and Destabilized That of Lebanon

The above application has been considered on behalf of the DPIR Departmental Research Ethics Committee (DREC) in accordance with the procedures laid down by the University for ethical approval of all research involving human participants.

I am pleased to inform you that, on the basis of the information provided to the DREC, the proposed research has been judged as meeting appropriate ethical standards, and accordingly approval has been granted.

Should there be any subsequent changes to the project, which raise ethical issues not covered in the original application, you should submit details to the DREC for consideration.

Yours sincerely,

A. Melling

Andrew Melling,
Secretary to the DPIR DREC

cc. Philip Robins, St Antony's

BIBLIOGRAPHY

This bibliography is selective, including only sources that were referenced in this dissertation. Works consulted but not referenced are not included herein.

Archives

Below is a list of archival material consulted for this dissertation. I have used primary material from all of them, except for the Archives of the Maronite Patriarchate in Lebanon, for the reasons stated in chapter 8. For specific references, please view the footnotes within the dissertation.

United Kingdom

Cabinet Papers, Kew, London

Confidential Print Middle East (online source)

Hansard (online source)

Middle East Centre Archives, St. Antony's College, Oxford

The National Archives, Kew, London

France

Centre de Archives Diplomatiques, Nantes

Centre des Archives Diplomatiques, La Courneuve

Service Historique de la Défence, Vincennes

Israel

Ben-Gurion Archives, Sde Boker

Central Zionist Archives, Jerusalem

Israeli State Archives, Jerusalem

Jabotinsky Archives, Tel Aviv

National Library, Jerusalem

Weizmann Archives, Rehovot

Lebanon

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