An examination of the Bellum Gallicum and Bellum Civile of Caesar, and books 21-30 of Livy, with particular reference to battle narratives; this thesis analyses the characterisation of commanders and their soldiers, and the use of soldiers as a moral focus, as part of the creation of causative patterns and explanations within narrative.

I: sets out preconceptions and problems in the depiction of soldiers and leaders, and defines the terminology and scope of the argument: it also explains the analytical method of the thesis using Sallust, BC 57-61 as an example.

II: On Caesar, BG. Begins with the drawbacks of the 'propagandist' approach: explores toposi of military action and character thematically (markers of bravery/cowardice, portrayal of Romans/enemies, the role of centurions, Caesar/subordinates/enemy leaders).

III: On Caesar BC. Examines Caesar’s modes of historical explanation in portraying civil war, through discussion of selected sections of the BC (also using comparative material from Cicero’s Philippics): the start of the war; the fall of Corfinium; the Ilerda campaign; Curio in Africa; the battle of Pharsalus. Includes a consideration of Caesar’s treatment of Labienus.

IV (i): Traces narrative explanation on a large scale in Livy 21-3, and sections of 24-5, examining its relation to themes of Roman justification and destiny: observes and comments on parallels with Caesar in the depiction of soldiers and leaders.

IV (ii): Continues with analysis of selected episodes, where particular tensions towards the end of the second Punic war condition and complicate narrative explanation: includes a view of the characterisation of Hannibal and Scipio.

V A brief summary of the conclusions of the argument, and of its possible consequences and implications in a wider historiographical context.
NARRATIVE EXPLANATION
AND THE
ROMAN MILITARY CHARACTER

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D Phil
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INTRODUCTION

Mais Cæsar singulièrement me semble mériter qu’on l’estudie, non pour la science de l’Histoire seulement, mais pour luy mesme, tant il a de perfection et de l’excellence par dessus tous les autres, quoy que Saluste soy du nombre.¹

Mais que mon guide se souvienne ou vise sa charge; et qu’il n’imprime pas tant à son disciple la date de la ruine de Carthage que les meurs de Hannibal et de Scipion, ny tant où mourut Marcellus, que pourquoi il fut indigne de son devoir qu’il mourut là...J’ay leu en Tite-Live cent choses que tel n’y a pas leu. Plutarche en y a leu cent, outre ce que j’ay sceu lire, et, à l’aventure, outre ce que l’auteur y avoit mis.²

Montaigne’s admiration of Caesar here centres itself on the diversity and range of his achievements, including not only the political and military but also the literary. After the passage quoted from the essay ‘des livres’, he goes on to remark that he reads Caesar with ‘rather more reverence and respect than one feels in reading human works’ (‘Certes je lis cet auteur avec un peu plus de reverence et de respect qu’on ne list les humains ouvrages’); his only criticism is that ‘il a esté trop esparrant à parler de soy’ (see below). The essay on his methods in war is prefaced with a claim for Caesar as the supreme model for the art of warfare, rather than as a pattern of historiographical excellence (as suggested by the comparison with Sallust): the examples there cited witness to the powerful persuasion of Caesar’s military writing.³

¹Montaigne, Essaies II.X, ‘Des livres’.

²Essaies I. XXVI, ‘De l’institution des enfants’.

³Essaies II.XXXIV, ‘Observations sur les moyens de faire la guerre de Julius Cæsar’.
In the next century, Bacon was much taken with this confluence of literary and political talents, though he seems not to have rated the Commentarii as highly as Montaigne. In his examination of Caesar’s character in the Imago Civilis Julii Caesaris (published posthumously in 1658), he implies literary interests were secondary, utilitarian, ‘et literis et doctrina mediocriter excultus fuit, sed ea quae ad civilem usum aliquid conferret. Nam in historia versatus erat, et verborum pondera et acumina mire callebat’. However, the fact that this reflection is followed by a note on his manipulation of his felicitas perhaps suggests that Bacon may have sensed a similar manipulative presentation in the extant writings. Like Montaigne, he judges favourably of their quality, ‘solidum rerum pondus et viva tam actionum quam personarum simulachra cum castissima puritate sermonis narrationisque perspicuitate eximia conjuncta’. Both writers show admiration of his skills of disguise and pretence, Montaigne making specific reference to his writings:

Avec tant de sincerité en ses jugemens, parlant de ses ennemis, que, sauf les fauces couleurs dequoy il veut couvrir sa mauvaise cause et l’ordure de sa pestilente ambition, je pense qu’en cela seul on y puisse trouver à redire qu’il a esté trop espargnant à parler de soy. Car tant des grandes choses ne peuvent avoir esté executées par luy, qu’il n’y soit alé beaucoup plus de sien qu’il n’y en met. (‘Des livres’). Cumque summus simulationis et dissimulationis artifex esset, totusque ex artibus compositus, ut nihil naturae suae reliquum esset, nisi quod ars probavisset; tamen nil artificii, nil affectationis appareret, sed natura et ingenio suo frui, eaque sequi existimaretur. (Imago).

4 In De Augmentis Scientiarum (1623).
There is, it seems, a tension present in the judgments passed by both men, between an impression of Caesar as the pattern for successful generalship and an insight into some manipulative further purpose. This conflict, it will be argued here, has yet to be satisfactorily explored.

So much for these sixteenth and seventeenth century views of Caesar. Livy, who provides no impressive exemplum of the combination of literary and military pursuits, seems at first a less hopeful quarry. But Montaigne considered him valuable, and interestingly refers to him, in the passage quoted at the head of this chapter, in an educational context: it is not matters of fact, he seems to suggest in this passage, but the moral lessons drawn from them, which matter. His near contemporary, Machiavelli, offered a more sustained tribute to Livy’s acumen. The Discorsi sopra la prima deca di Tito Livio are an acknowledgement of his educational value on a higher level than that imagined by Montaigne; for those who read them ‘possino più facilmente trarne quella utilità per la quale si debbe cercare la cognizione delle istorie’. More unexpected, perhaps, is the use of Livy as the grounding for an exposition of Machiavelli’s practical view of politics. Since he is concerned with the construction of states, the choice of early

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5From the proemio to book I: the usefulness of history is a familiar ancient justification, e.g. Sempronius Asellio fr. 2P; Cic. Arch. 14; Sallust BJ 4.6; Livy Praef. 10; Tac. Ann. 2.73, 3.5, 4.38. See also G. Avenarius, Lukians Schrift zur Geschichtsschreibung (Meisenheim 1956) 22-6; E. Herkommer, Die Topoi in den Prömien der römischen Geschichtswerke (Diss. Tübingen, 1968), 131.

Rome (and hence of Livy’s first decade) is a natural one, especially when he is trying to determine how ‘tanta virtù’ is to be brought about. Numa’s manipulation of religion has obvious appeal (Discorsi 1.11), while later (3.40-41), he applies his notorious principle of ‘ends before means’ specifically to warfare. In 3.40 (‘Come usare la fraude nel maneggiare la guerra è cosa gloria’), he cites the examples of Hannibal and Pontius: in 3.41, (‘Che la patria si debbe difendere o con ignominia o con gloria, ed in qualunque modo è bene difesa’), the arguments of the consul L. Lentulus, that the army should save rather than sacrifice itself, win high praise:

La quale cosa merita di essere notata ed osservata da qualcunque cittadino si trova a consigliare la patria sua: perché dove si dilibera al tutto della salute della patria, non vi debbe cadere alcuna considerazione né di crudele, né di laudabile né d’ignominioso, anzi, proposto ogni altro rispetto, seguire al tutto quel partito che le salvi la vita e mantenghile la libertà.⁷

I have quoted the views of these writers at some length, because they seem to me indicative of the kinds of modern interpretative tension to which this thesis will return repeatedly. While Montaigne’s estimate of Caesar’s superiority to other historians does not accord with modern taste, his response to the Commentarii is a timely reminder of their persuasive power, and hence of the need for caution in interpretation. So also with Machiavelli, who found the combination of the constructive and the critical in Livy’s

⁷See Livy 9.8-12.
account of the creation of Rome a more profitable springboard for political analysis than the moral negativity and pessimism of Sallust and Tacitus.

This thesis argues for an autonomous critical approach to ancient historical texts, particularly in their narratives of battle: that is, for an approach which concentrates primarily on the narrative construction of the text itself, rather than on the comparison of one source with another, or the attempted reconstruction of what happened through the collection and deployment of available evidence. Comparative use of sources is generally restricted to cases where the author in question can be shown to have adopted a particular narrative version where others are attested, with the aim of illustrating possible reasons for the adoption of such versions (rather than attempting to show that one or other is correct, or to reconcile the two). Through illustration of the results of this critical method, it will be shown that the approaches of Caesar and Livy to narratives concerning soldiers exhibit a conception of the nature of military action, and of soldierly characterisation, which is comparatively as well as internally consistent.

It has always been apparent that soldiers within Roman historical narrative are treated as a moral focus in the examination of events. Montaigne’s ‘Observations sur les moyens de faire la guerre de Julius Cæsar’ returns several times to the theme of his men’s valour and the means used to encourage it. For Machiavelli the behaviour of Rome’s soldiers is a recurrent theme: he rejects Plutarch’s claim
that the Roman people won an empire through 'fortuna', and notes that Livy seems to agree with it, since he usually juxtaposes it with 'virtù' in the speeches; his own view is that 'la virtù degli eserciti' is what made dominion possible.\(^8\) Both accept without question a feature of Roman depiction of soldierly character which is examined in some detail in this thesis,\(^9\) namely that the courage or virtue of soldiers is brought about by external means; that when soldiers show bravery, for example, that bravery is not depicted as a permanent attribute but as a reaction stimulated or produced from elsewhere. Machiavelli makes clear his understanding of 'virtù' thus:

\[\text{Perché se non si è trovata mai repubblica che abbi fatti i profitti che Roma, è nato che non si è trovato mai repubblica che sia stata ordinata a potere acquistare come Roma.}\]

For him the structure of the state produces 'virtù', for Montaigne it is the character of the commander: but the same point is made, namely that soldiers are not perceived as brave of themselves, but through external agency.

This assumption about soldierly character no doubt owes much to the élite bias of the ancient sources. The depiction

\(^8\)Discorsi 2.1; cf. 1.21, 23, 43; 2.2, 6, 16-18, 33; 3.12-15, 38. Machiavelli seems to understand 'fortuna' in Livy as 'luck' or 'chance', rather than as an expression of destiny or the divine will: but see P.G. Walsh, Livy: his historical aims and methods (Cambridge 1963) 49-58; I. Kajanto, God and Fate in Livy (Turku 1957) 54ff.; D.S. Levene, Religion in Livy (Oxford D.Phil. thesis, 1991) 39-44. His expression of Plutarch's view is also simplistic: see, e.g., Plut. Mor. 24aff.

\(^9\)And which is part of a wider problem about the Roman understanding of 'character' (a difficult word to translate: mores, ingenium and natura perhaps come closest).
of plebs Romana in historiography, as another dissociated interest group open to manipulation but potentially both powerful and dangerous, provides an instructive parallel. It will become clear in the course of this argument, that affairs domi and militiae are closely interrelated: military commanders are almost always also politicians, soldiers are, by definition, members of an electorate. It is impossible to tell how far the writing of the early history of Rome has been contaminated and reinterpreted by later generations, but it is nonetheless clear from the first decade of Livy and the conflicts of plebs with patres there depicted that the struggle of the orders domi was perceived to be closely bound up with difficulties militiae. Refusal of military service as a means of achieving political gains by the plebs is a recurrent theme in Livy: indeed the first so-called Secession of the Plebs is really a secession of the army for political reasons:

Timor inde patres incessit ne, si dismissus exercitus foret, rursus coetus occulti coniurationesque fierent. Itaque...per causam


Referred to by him as a 'mos detractandi militiam' (2.43.3; cf.3.25.9).
renovati ab Aequivis belli^{12} educi ex urbe legiones iussere. Quo facto maturata est seditio. [sc. in Sacro monte] sine ullo duce vallo fossaque communitis castris quieti...sese tenuere. (Livy 5.32.1,4)^{13}

The identification of the plebs and its concerns with those of the citizen Roman army proves a constant source of threat: at 2.42.1-4, the patres are described as having cheated the soldiers, a fact which angers the populus:

Haud diurna ira populi in Cassium fuit. Dulcedo agrariae legis ipsa per se, dempto auctore, subibat animos, accensaque ea cupiditas est malignitate patrum, qui devictis eo anno Volscis Aequivisque, militem praeda fraudavere. (2.42.1)

Only bellum externum postpones civiles discordiae (2.42.3).^{14}

Greed on one side, malevolence on the other: the picture does little credit to either side. By 2.43 discord has escalated to such an extent that externus timor no longer offsets the animi plebis: the humiliation of Fabius is potentially the humiliation of any general who fails to win the loyalty of his men:

Cum consul praeter ceteras imperatorias artes...ita instruxisset aciem ut solo equitatu emisso exercitum hostium funderet, insequi fusos pedes noluit; nec illos, etsi non adhortatio invisi ducis, suum saltem flagitium et publicum in praesentia dedecus, postmodo periculum, si animus hosti redisset, cogere potuit gradum accelerare aut, si nihil aliud, stare instructos. (2.43.7-8)

^{12}Cf. 3.10.10.

^{13}So is the second Secession, to the Aventine (3.50): see R.M. Ogilvie, A commentary on Livy books 1-5 (Oxford 1970) 309-312, 489.

^{14}Cf. 3.15-16, 4.43.10: for metaphorical use of the idea, see 3.11.9, 24.1. On metus hostilis, see G.M. Paul, A historical commentary on Sallust’s Bellum Jugurthinum (Liverpool 1984) 124-125.
What is more, Livy clearly marks the danger of such failure: it is immediately picked up by Etruscan *principes* and turned to their advantage (2.44.8-12).\(^{15}\) A more positive model of leadership is offered in the ensuing battle, when personal courage on the part of two Fabii (one of whom had previously suffered the humiliation) inspires the men to victory (2.46.5-7). At 3.38-42, moreover, *plebs* and *patres* are united in their wish of denying military service as a means of bringing down the Decemvirs and re-establishing *libertas*: the idea is not, then, necessarily negative. This theme of the refusal of military service is examined at the beginning of book 4 (4.2-6), where political gains (in the form of the right to a plebeian consul and of intermarriage) are achieved by the threat of secession:

"Nemo est nomen daturus, nemo arma capturus, nemo dimicaturus pro superbis dominis, cum quibus nec in re publica honorum nec in privata connubii societas est". (4.5.4-6)\(^{16}\)

That the function of tribunes includes defending citizens under arms is clear from 4.50, where they cover up for a charge of mutiny and murder against the soldiers.

The interpretation of battle narratives, therefore, requires careful examination of the domestic context. This is not in itself surprising, given that Rome laid such importance on her citizen army:\(^{17}\) but the depiction of later warfare in

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\(^{15}\)Cf. 3.9.1.

\(^{16}\)See Ogilvie, *Comm.* 533-538 (bibliography on Canuleius’s speech, 533).

\(^{17}\)‘Liberos et cives...non servos militare’, Livy 5.2.11. The theme of a citizen army is especially important to Livy in 21-30, and to Caesar in the *BC* (in which latter a more careful
Caesar and Livy alike attests the continuing need for generals to engineer and maintain loyalty, and reveals a general historiographical focus on this ability as both a proof of Roman excellence and a crucial factor in Roman success. The key to Roman military success, in other words, lies in the hands of her military and political leaders, is dependent on their ability to control potential subversion (the negative aspect of leadership) and to inspire selfless bravery (the positive aspect). Livy, indeed, defines part of the purpose of his History in these terms, 'per quos viros quibusque artibus domi militiaeque et partum et auctum imperium sit' (Praef. 9), and later remarks that Rome is stronger in leaders than men, 'facile appareret ducibus validiorem quam exercitu rem Romanam esse' (2.39.2; the reference is to Coriolanus).\footnote{Cf. 2.54.9, 'sicut acies funditur duce occiso, ita dilapsi passim alii alio'.} The \textit{virtus} of Roman soldiers is a product of good leadership, not an autonomous quality in co-operation with it: a point which will become clear both negatively and positively in the course of this thesis. There is no clear perception in either Caesar or Livy of the soldiers as capable of maintaining their \textit{virtus} under a poor commander: of themselves they are always potentially dangerous, open to the temptations of \textit{praeda}, \textit{gloria} or \textit{sedition}. 

In stressing the strength of this early identification between the citizen population and the Roman soldiery, it should not be forgotten that the late Republic was also a time

\footnote{treatment is required).}
in which popular agitation and the threat posed by Roman
armies were perceived as coinciding. Sallust frames his
account in the BJ and BC in terms of a *populus* at odds with
the *nobles*, and shows Marius taking advantage of the fact:
the principle of discord producing military threat is not
dissimilar, whether within the narrative (as with Catiline) or
beyond it (as with Marius). The connection needs to be
underlined in order that the many examples of selfless courage
in Roman battle narratives are not read at face value as
attesting a perception of inherent excellence of character in
the Roman (citizen) soldier. 'Character' is itself a concept
of questionable value when applied to a group rather than to
individuals (and is discussed below accordingly), and the
flexibility with which the actions of soldiers are deployed,
and their moral value assessed, further undermines the idea of
autonomy of character. Only on rare occasions is an ordinary
soldier given more than one anecdote, either of bravery or
cowardice: though individual soldiers may be named at such
moments, as a means of marking the importance attached to an
action, they are nonetheless treated as behavioural types,
assimilated to familiar modes of morally-assessable action.
The strategic deployment of these modes of action is a major
focus of the argument of this thesis.

It was noted above that the first aim of the thesis is to
show the coherence and consistency of the conception of
soldierly nature and character in Caesar and Livy. It has

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On which latter, see D.S. Levene, 'Sallust's *Jugurtha*: an "historical fragment"', *JRS* 82 (1992) 53-70, esp. 53-9.
also been shown that to achieve this aim it is necessary to examine soldierly action within a wider narrative context. This way of reading the text as a causative construction, in which recognisable types of predictive and assessable behaviour both encourage the reader to evaluate the action and offer her or him an interpretation of why something happened as it did, clearly has further consequences, wider implications, for the understanding of historiography: though the relationship of the text to the event, of what is written to what happened, is too wide-ranging a matter for full examination in the limited space available here. Nevertheless, it is possible, indeed necessary, to define terms more closely, and explain briefly some of the assumptions about the nature of Roman historiography which underlie the ensuing discussion: also to give some illustration of the way the argument will be presented. Section a) below sets out the scope and limitations of the subject matter; section b) the historiographical assumptions and analytical method of the thesis.

(a) The subject matter: the Roman military character.

Each of the two texts chosen for this thesis reflects features of military character and narrative explanation with its own peculiar clarity. Caesar's Commentarii, whatever their precise purpose and date of publication, are evidently works of persuasion, of justification; but it will become clear that to define them as apologetic self-aggrandisement and glorification, though it may describe part of their scope,
does not give a sufficient description of their nature. In evoking common modes of narrative explanation (i.e., construction of frameworks of causality to order and explain events; see below), Caesar writes from an insider's perspective, part of a community which viewed history and historiographical explanation in common, shared terms. Hence the value of juxtaposing Livy, who has no so-called 'propagandist' axe to grind. What emerges is a theory of the construction of historical texts not from the point of view of source material or comparison, or rhetorical 'rules', but from the point of view of moral theme, of overall understanding of the nature of the action in question. Sallust, in whose extant works the relationship of moral interpretation to historical events is most sustainedly explicit (and hence more fully treated by scholars), will be discussed below.

The firm Roman distinction between res domi and res militiae does not mean that it is always possible to discuss Roman battle narratives in isolation from their political context. In Livy in particular, as has already been shown, the two are constantly interwoven for moral or thematic point. Even when, as in Caesar (in the BG in particular) this is not

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20See Ogilvie, Comm., 2-5, 563-4 (with bibliography), 742-3: R. Syme, 'Livy and Augustus', HSCP 64 (1959) 27-87: Walsh, Livy, 11-19: see also below on Livy 21-30 (Introduction (b)).

21'Moral': used here and throughout in the senses of mores defined at OLD 4a and 5a.

22On the religious and military implications of this distinction, see J. Rüpke, Domi Militiae: die religiöse Konstruktion des Krieges in Rom (Stuttgart 1990), with full bibliography, 266-298.
so clearly the case, the commander in the field also has at least an electorate and sometimes also a readership to bear in mind as well, when undertaking and/or describing any given action. The portrayal of the ordinary soldiers, then, can be an act of political as well as military or historical significance.

Ancient perceptions of the importance of famous men (which in Roman historiography usually means military commanders) and the influence of ancient characterisation of leaders persist in spite of new approaches and methods. Livy’s protagonists are characterised memorably enough, and still more so when overlaid with the synthetic approach of a Plutarch. Great leaders, however, are not the only participants in the action of history to whom a term like ‘characterisation’ be applied: but the soldiers under their command, despite an equally consistent characterisation by sets of repeating behavioural patterns, tend to be subjected to a different scholarly approach. The differences between the two groups which give rise to these separate scholarly approaches may seem obvious enough, but it is worth restating some of the assumptions underlying this dichotomy.

The normal pattern for a battle narrative offsets a command structure of one or two men (praetor, consul[s], Dictator and Master of Horse) plus subordinates, against a serving army in which the only standard differentiation of rank within the text is that between centurions and legionarii
milites. In fact, this familiar pattern is less appropriate to Roman battle narratives than to more modern ones: for in the Roman army, differentiations of rank are complex among, as it were, the non-commissioned ranks, few and simple among the commissioned. Although individual soldiers (usually centurions) are frequently named in the narrative, and that often at moments of crisis in which a display of virtue is called for, they are not treated as idiosyncratic individuals but as examples of a type. That is, they are perceived by the writers of the texts concerned as representative, paradigms of certain qualities essential to the winning and extension of Roman imperium, and to the maintenance of moral superiority in the process.

To apply an evaluative term like 'characterisation' to Roman historical narrative implies a considerable degree of flexibility in the presentation of events. The use of the terms 'character' and 'characterisation' follows here the definitions set out by Gill: of particular importance is the association which he points out between character (within a text) and evaluation (by the reader of that text), which ties in closely with the strong association between character and achievement to which this thesis will return repeatedly. It does not necessarily follow that definitions drawn from Greek

23 Allied contingents are not usually highlighted in narrative moral explanation.

literature can easily be transferred to first-century B.C. Roman historiography, and indeed the evaluative function of characterisation is more marked in the latter than in any Greek historiographical predecessor. Thus an element of moral explanation enters into this wider picture of narrative explanation. The consistency with which (perceived) ultimate achievement governs characterisation in Livy and Caesar is certainly striking: the folly of Marcellus' death, e.g., is for Livy linked to his role in bringing to Rome the spoils of Syracuse; and the fact of Curio's death in Africa (another failure of achievement) obliges Caesar to characterise him in such a way as to make his downfall explicable.\(^ {25} \)

The point needs to be stressed here because the simplification of the *dramatis personae* of a battle narrative is part of a more general historiographical technique of selectivity and compression of material. As individuals, the soldiers, whether named or not, have no significance in the text: as a body assimilated in character and behaviour to *plebs Romana*, they become a significant protagonist in the events in question. 'Soldiers' is assumed throughout to refer to 'ordinary' soldiers, from the *legionarii milites* to the *primi pili centuriones*. These are distinct in both narrative and analysis from the *tribuni militum, legati* and *imperatores/duces* (with very few, and clearly marked exceptions). Since soldiers have no autonomous character independent of that of their commander, it is not possible to isolate them as a group and examine the nature and purpose of

\(^{25}\)Both these examples are discussed below.
their portrayal in historiography without also making frequent reference to the portrayal of those commanders. It will be argued here that Roman historical texts display close comparative consistency in their understanding of the ideal soldier-commander relationship; and that the characters of a commander and his men are an interdependent construct set up within the narrative for particular moral or thematic point.

(b) Assumptions, strategies: narrative explanation.

This mention of 'moral or thematic point' leads me from the second part of my title ('the Roman military character') to the first ('narrative explanation'). I use the term 'narrative explanation' to cover a number of features in Roman historical texts which may be more familiar in a context of dramatic than historical analysis. Dramatic irony - the engineering and exploitation of a gap between the reader or audience's viewpoint and the viewpoint of the protagonists - is one such feature: but dramatic irony functions as part of a wider phenomenon, the construction of causative frameworks for the ordering of events, by which those events are made explicable and comprehensible. The Commentarii of Caesar and the History of Livy, like all historical texts (and, one presumes, dramatic compositions), are written from a perspective of hindsight, i.e., by writers (and for audiences) who knew what the end of the episode or story would be when they narrated its beginning and progress.

This perspective of hindsight is crucial if one is to grasp the nature of the narratives in question. And it makes
possible the prominence in Livy and Caesar of another feature of narrative explanation, namely construction of character through the perceived consequences of actions. Although this feature sounds more difficult to isolate than 'causative frameworks created from the perspective of hindsight', the two are closely related: in Livy in particular, it is possible to trace how his evaluation of a protagonist’s overall achievements relates to that person’s characterisation.

Flaminius is a relatively straightforward example, Hannibal less so, while Scipio Africanus is treated with a degree of ambiguity which is related to the perceived consequences of Zama, and (like Curio in Caesar) to the manner of his downfall. The reader, an important figure in the argument here, is guided by such features as characterisation and the selection/simplification and arrangement of events into making particular moral judgments about the nature and quality of the action.

The category of 'narrative explanation', moreover, could be subdivided into 'moral causation' and 'moral construction'. The former, 'moral causation', would denote narrative explanation as perceived by the reader: that is, where the series of events in question, constructed in a particular way, is received as a causal fait accompli and evaluated accordingly. To be at its most persuasive, this may entail the abandonment of moral complexity in characterisation, and of factual or evidential complexity in action.\footnote{As D.A. Russell argues in the case of Greek oratory: 'Ethos in oratory and rhetoric', in Pelling (ed.) Characterization 198-9.} The other
aspect, 'moral construction', would refer to the conscious strategy of the writer concerned, who sets up causal connections in order to propound a particular view of events: this is usually assumed, rather than argued, in the course of this thesis.

The uneasy co-existence of dramatic battle narrative with 'historical truth' has been examined by Keegan, who illustrates persuasively how the form and style of such a narrative can affect the reader's ability to assess events:

> Even the best-trained modern historians,...less sonorous to the ear,...less xenophobic [than Napier, are] still trading in his limited stock of assumptions and assertions about the behaviour of human beings in extreme-stress situations. (41)

The focus of his criticism is the simplification of narrative for the purposes of readability, and the consequently distorted perspective on individual motivations and actions: he isolates these narrative features in a passage from Napier, but the criticisms could equally apply to Livy or Caesar:

> The first is the extreme uniformity of behaviour which he portrays: the British are all attacking and all with equal intensity...; the French likewise are all resisting....Second, there is the very abrupt, indeed quite discontinuous movement of the piece.... Third, there is a ruthlessly stratified characterization....This traffic in collective images...reveals a fourth, and the most important element, in Napier's approach: a highly over-simplified depiction of human behaviour on the battlefield. (39)

Admittedly, ancient warfare was a less complex business than its early nineteenth-century European counterpart, but the narrative and descriptive conventions and difficulties are not essentially different. Napier's account of the battle of

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Albuera in 1811, with its justificatory, patriotic tone, stands in the same tradition as Livy and Caesar's battle narratives: in all of which 'completeness' coupled with accuracy gives way to a technique by which both the outcome determines the construction of the course of the battle, and the nature of the account encourages evaluative character judgments from the reader. The role of nationality and perceived national character in battle narratives, whether Roman against Gaul or Roman against Carthaginian, is another factor to be taken into account: here the Gallic war and second Punic war must be set against the civil war of Caesar and Pompey, in which issues of moral superiority and strategies of moral causation had to be created without reference to distinctions of race or national character. 28

It has already been pointed out that an understanding of characterisation is essential not least because in these historians a strong link is apparent first between the character of the commander and that of his soldiers, and then between the character of Roman commanders and the moral quality of Rome's actions: also that the soldiers are in themselves perceived as difficult to control and always potentially dangerous, a theme which Livy presents as inherent in the political and military structure of the Republic from earliest times. Soldiers have no generally-attested autonomous and morally-positive character which shows itself

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28 For a critique of autopsy evidence and accurate reporting of battle narrative (with reference to Thucydides), see A.J. Woodman, Rhetoric in Classical historiography: four studies (London and Sydney 1988) 17-23.
as self-sustaining and independent of the moral state of their commander. In Roman historiography the fiction exposed by Keegan, that the soldiers are an undifferentiated interest group with a uniform character, is taken for granted: yet it is not \textit{a priori} obvious, nor necessarily true even for the more simple world of ancient warfare, that a single character, a single united set of motivations and emotions, can be predicated of a large body of men of different origin and status.

Like characterisation, narrative simplification (or selectivity) can perhaps be understood as ‘dramatic’ in nature and purpose, if not in origin; that is, as producing a compelling account with a beginning, middle and end, in which a complexity of diverse strands and elements is streamlined in order to make the presentation of that account as cogent as possible. In exploring the technique of simplification in the context of historical evidence, the application of a modern principle of forensic evidence - the oath to tell 'the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth' - is illuminating. The form of this oath for witnesses makes it immediately apparent that swearing 'to tell the truth' is not in itself a sufficient guarantee for eliciting a clear picture of events. The reliability of a witness, her or his memory, preconceptions, associated reading, etc., must be taken into account as well. From the point of view of witnesses to military action, Keegan has exposed the difficulties involved in accurate recall and the relationship of the individual point of view to the interpretation of the action as a whole;
of course the problem of reliability of witnesses was
recognised much earlier than this by Thucydides.29

But to return to 'telling the truth', most ancient
historians, most of the time, tell their readers of events
which can be defined as 'truth'. It is the notion of 'the
whole truth' which exposes the first conceptual, rather than
evidential, difficulty. From a legal point of view, 'the
whole truth' means 'the whole truth relevant to the question
at issue': the rules, moreover, governing relevance of
evidence in law are tightly defined. The ancient historian,
on the other hand, might be bound by conventions of what
constituted suitable subject matter, or of how such subject
matter was best recounted: but this is not the same as a
definition of admissible evidence, nor of necessary evidence.
The next difficulty, then, is by what criteria, and by whom,
it is to be decided what constitutes admissible and necessary
evidence. Only Caesar among the Roman historians is writing a
mainly first-hand account: Sallust, Livy and Tacitus mainly or
exclusively use intermediate sources which have already
imposed their individual point of view on the evidence. In
either case, the omission of potentially necessary evidence
can make the question of 'the whole truth' even more
complicated: characterisation by omission (of anecdotes of
bravery, self-sacrifice, etc.) will be found in Livy and
Caesar alike; so, in some cases, will factual manipulation by
omission.

29See Keegan, The face of battle 128-133: Thuc. 1.21-2.
As for the declaration to tell 'nothing but the truth', this rules out clearly enough falsification and elaboration. Ancient criteria of falsification, however, are not ours: the line between elaboration (a proper part of the historian's job) and falsification (universally condemned in theory) is impossible to draw. The clearest example of this perception gap between ancient and modern historical truth is the use of extended oratio recta in ancient historiography. Speeches which certainly, or probably, have no basis in what was actually said, are often composed and inserted because the writer uses them as a vehicle for the revelation of what he perceives as historical truth: they can set out key issues in a war, like the proper treatment of subject peoples, for example, or expose the character of a protagonist in order to make his or her actions explicable and/or causative. This will be found to be true of both Caesar and Livy in their use of speeches. In general, though, the universal tendency of ancient historians to elaborate on principles of likelihood and probability, in order to clarify their view of the nature and quality of the action (and thus assist the presentation of historical truth as they understand it) appears to militate against the inclusion of 'nothing but the truth'.

This matter of criteria of evidence has been laboured a little because it is so important to the argument presented here that the complexities and ambiguities of notions of historical truth are always borne in mind. Manipulation,


30 Woodman gives a concise summary of the problem of truth in ancient historiography, including a survey of influential scholarly views: Rhetoric 197-212.
reshaping, interpretation of the material make a substantial difference to the way a text is read. The example which I have chosen to introduce the analysis of narrative explanation and the Roman military character comes from Sallust. Though a further comparison with Tacitus would no doubt prove interesting and suggestive, the gap which separates him in time from Caesar, Sallust and Livy and the consequent shift in political realities and historical perceptions, make the principles of such a comparison difficult to justify, given the necessary restriction of space.

(c) Sallust, Bellum Catilinae 57-61.

The narrative of Catiline’s last stand owes something to both the BG and BC of Caesar: it also shows affinities with parts of Livy. If, however, as is argued here, the portrayal of Catiline at the end of his life is in certain respects morally positive, it may at first seem that he provides a counter-example to the causal connection between character and achievement which was set out above as central to narrative explanation in both Caesar and Livy.

One possible answer is to dismiss the problem on the grounds that the Catiline cannot validly be compared, as a so-called ‘monograph’, with annales, commentarii or historia. This is surely unsatisfactory. Sallust defines his activity thus, 'statui res gestas populi Romani carptim...perscribere' (Cat. 4.2):\(^{31}\) and Livy makes a point of echoing that

definition, 'facturusne operae pretium sim si a primordio urbis res populi Romani perscripserim nec satis scio nec, si sciam, dicere ausim...' (Pref. 1). Moreover, although Sallust explains further that he has chosen the conspiracy of Catiline because it was a 'facinus in primis...memorabile', and because of the 'sceleris atque periculi novitas' (4.4), he begins his account of his choice of material with his wish to record 'quaeque memoria digna videbantur'. Catiline's story, then, is worthy of record. The strong positive strand in his characterisation at the last can better be explained in terms of narrative goals and contexts. After all, he is a Roman as well as a hostis, and civil war makes narrative explanation more complicated than war against an external foe.

The first chapter of the final phase shows Metellus Celer making good use of knowledge gained from perfugae 'quos ad bellum spes rapinarum aut novarum rerum studium illexerat', and who make up the majority of Catiline's forces (plerique, 57.1). Having good information about the enemy is usually a marker of excellence in command: Caesar uses it of himself, and Livy attributes it to Hannibal in the early part of the second Punic war. Given his eventual success, it is not surprising that Metellus is favourably characterised, but Catiline also receives a strong element of positive characterisation. His qualities of leadership by example are

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32 The phrase usually has a positive slant: see, e.g., Cic. de orat. 2.63; Nepos Reg. 1.1; Livy 4.37.1, 7.10.5. But at BG 7.25.1, Caesar uses the phrase of macabre Gallic courage.

33 He also anticipates Catiline's strategy (57.1); this is another marker of good generalship which helps to point the even match between the two.
highlighted at the end as they were stressed at the beginning of the account.

In 1.5, Sallust had posed the question 'vine corporis an virtute animi res militaris magis procederet', and the same dualism is posited for the regal period, in which 'pars ingenium, alii corpus exercebant' (2.1). With the emergence into history of 'lubido dominandi', it was found that 'in bello plurumum ingenium posse' (2.2). One significance of this analysis is not made clear until BC 5, in which Sallust gives a memorable description of Catiline's character. That Livy borrowed from it for his character sketch of Hannibal (21.4.3-9), and Tacitus for his picture of Sejanus (Ann. 4.1) is certainly suggestive.

Leaving aside here the issue of nobilitas, and inconsistencies of terminology, it is at once stressed that Catiline possesses 'magna vis et animi et corporis', a combination which links him both cum dis and cum beluis (1.2). On the other hand, his ingenium is 'malum pravumque' (5.1): but Sallust has not defined the moral quality of the

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35 At 1.2, vis is distributed between animus and corpus: in 1.3, by implication ingenium is associated with animus, vires with corpus: in 1.5, vis is linked to corpus, virtus to animus. It is not clear that virtus is used in the same sense at 1.4 and 1.5.

36 Cf. Livy 21.4.5, 'Nullo labore aut corpus fatigari aut animus vinci poterat': Tac. Ann. 4.1, 'corpus illi laborum tolerans, animus audax'.
ingenium by which gloria is best achieved, 'Quo mihi rectius videtur ingeni quam virium opibus gloriam quaerere' (1.3). 37 His endurance, so marked in the closing scene, is also first pointed out here, 'Corpus patiens inediae algoris vigiliae': 38 his animus is audax, while his cunning (subdolus; simulator ac dissimulato r) and flexibility (varius) also find their counterpart in the Carthaginian leader and the confidant of Tiberius. 39 Livy draws attention to the dichotomy of characterisation, 'Has tantas viri virtutes ingentia vitia aequabant' (21.4.9), but Sallust leaves his dualistic interpretation implicit, setting out positive and negative characteristics alternately in a way which highlights the remarkable nature of his character. 40 The last sentence clearly indicates that the conclusion is to be negative, but the dualistic presentation serves to explain both why Catiline failed and why he had the influence he did. By putting his character sketch at the beginning of his account, Sallust marks it as having a predictive function: the reader is to

37 Cf. Livy 21.4.3 on Hannibal's ingenium.

38 Cf. Livy 21.4.6-7 on Hannibal's patientia.

39 Livy 21.4.9, 'perfidia plus quam Punica'; cf. 21.4.3. See also Cat. 20.16, 'Vel imperatore vel milite me utimini: cf. Livy 21.4.3, 'pareandum atque imperandum'. Tac. Ann. 4.1, 'sui obtegens, in alios criminato r; iuxta adulatio et superbia...modo largitio et luxus, saepius industria ac vigilantia'.

40 His strength of body and mind/depraved nature (the latter amplified in 5.2): physical endurance/his dangerous mind (amplifying 5.1, 'magna vis et animi et corporis'): greed/generosity (the former amplified by 'ardens in cupiditatibus', 5.4): sufficient eloquence/insufficient wisdom (a key opposition in the final scene). N. Rudd discusses the question of complexity of character in Lines of enquiry (Cambridge 1976) 160-62, with brief reference to Tacitus and Sallust.
watch for the emergence of these characteristics in the course of the narrative.

One point strongly in Catiline’s favour is his refusal to recruit slaves, ‘alienum suis rationibus existumans videri causam civium cum servis fugitivis communicavisse’ (56.5).\textsuperscript{41} Moreover, some of his supporters are so loyal that they do not desert him even on hearing of the conspiracy’s exposure and the execution of its leaders in Rome (57.1): instead, both he and they begin to conform to the proper pattern of behaviour for a Roman army under pressure.\textsuperscript{42} Catiline makes an accurate assessment of the situation,\textsuperscript{43} and decides ‘fortunam belli temptare’ (57.5).

Before the battle, however, comes a an extended piece of O.R., which like his first (20.2-17), begins with the matter of virtus (58.1). It is an emotive opening, and a veiled challenge:

"Compertum ego habeo, milites, verba virtutem non addere, neque ex ignavo strenuom neque fortem ex timido exercitum oratione imperatoris fieri".

His claim to the title of Imperator sets the tone for the rhetoric which follows:\textsuperscript{44} had this speech survived as a

\textsuperscript{41}Though Cicero repeatedly accuses him of it: In Cat. 1.27; 2.19; 4.4, 13. Caesar makes a point in the BC of stressing that Pompey recruits slaves (1.24.2, 34.2, 56.3, 57.3): see Syme, Sallust 82.

\textsuperscript{42}A point highlighted by the use of adjectives, ‘reliquos Catilina per montis asperos magnis itineribus...abducit’ (57.1).

\textsuperscript{43}‘Videt montibus atque copiis hostium sese clausum, in urbe res advorsas, neque fugae neque praesidi uillam spem’, 57.5; the reader should recognise this as an accurate perception in the light of Metellus’ judgement at 57.3.

\textsuperscript{44}Cf. ‘exercitus hostium duo’, BC 58.6.
fragment divorced from its narrative context, it could easily be interpreted as a straightforwardly favourable piece of exhortation.\textsuperscript{45} According to Catiline's presentation, he and his army represent the Roman people: there is no place here for ignoble motivation, 'Quem neque gloria neque pericula excitant, nequiquam hortere' (58.2; but cf. 58.8). He will only offer some advice and explain his consilium (58.3). His account of the state of affairs is accurate, and makes no attempt to disguise the soldiers' plight (58.4): rather he stresses the extremity of their situation, while associating himself with them and complimenting their understanding (58.5-6). Only the most confident of commanders in Roman battle narrative can afford to be so frank.\textsuperscript{46} The soldiers' response to his words is an important factor in the narrative explanation of his role here: when it transpires that his confidence will not have been misplaced, his role is partially affirmed.

The placing of divitiae at the head of a list of motivating factors strikes the first clearly discordant note. Enrichment is regularly an inferior motivation (when Hannibal encourages his men with the hope of praedia or spolia, Livy means the reader to understand his moral inferiority), sometimes a narrative marker of impending defeat, which would seem to fit in neatly here:

\textsuperscript{45}The same cannot be said for the speech of M. Lepidus, cos. 78 B.C. (in some ways a parallel for Catiline), which has survived separate from its narrative context (Hist. 1.55M).

\textsuperscript{46}Livy shows what happens when a policy of frankness fails, in the case of Varro after Cannae (23.5-6; discussed in Ch. IV, i).
Catiline had used exactly the same words in his first speech, 'En illa, illa quam saepe optastis libertas, praeterea divitiae decus gloria in oculis sita sunt': there libertas came first, and there was no mention of patria (20.14; cf. 20.6). On the other hand, divitiae were repeatedly mentioned (20.10, 11, 12, 14), as well as praemia and 'belli spolia magnifica' (20.14-5; see below on 10.2). That speech was an attack upon 'pauci potentes', in which divitiae were a good misappropriated by the pauci, the destroyers of libertas. On this occasion, however, the emphasis is more on the legitimacy of his action: the armies of Metellus and Antonius are 'exercitus hostium duo', 'multitudo hostium' (58.20) and hostes (58.21). Drawing a distinction between what motivates one's own side to fight and what motivates the enemy (especially in favour of those fighting in defence of the patria) is a recurrent theme in Livy 21-30: Sallust’s Catiline uses it to counter the appearance of rebellion:

"Nos pro patria, pro libertate, pro vita certamus, illis supervacuaneum est pugnare pro potentia paucorum". (58.11)

The effect is to deny that civil war is civil war. In a similar way Caesar avoids alienating potential support by blaming pauci for leading the people/soldiers astray.
In the following sentence, as with *divitiae* at 58.6, the adverb *audacius* undercuts an otherwise noble sentiment, for *audacia* is dangerously close to *temeritas*:

"Quo audacius adgredimini memores pristinae virtutis." (58.12)

The point is reiterated at 58.15, ‘audacia opus est’, and again at 58.17, ‘audacia pro muro habetur’. But Catiline has correctly assessed the difficulty of their position, which suggests that *audacia* could be interpreted as a sensible military option. His final appeal is also evocative of true Roman determination:

"Cavete inulti animam amittatis, neu capti potius sicuti pecora trucidemini quam virorum more pugnantes cruentam atque luctuosam victoriam hostibus relinquatis". (58.21)

His command is to be amply fulfilled, and the correspondence between speech and independent authorial narrative underlines the fact: the *audacia* and ‘animi vis’ of Catiline’s men are plain to see; all of them stood their ground and died ‘virorum more’ (61.1-3). With the privileged perspective of hindsight the reader knows already that Catiline and his men will die, but the manner in which his death is narrated is what will give the final evidence for a proper evaluation of his character.

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47 See Sall. BJ 7.5. *Temeritas* is usually a military failing. According to T.J. Moore, *Artistry and ideology: Livy’s vocabulary of virtue* (Frankfurt 1989) 19, *audacia* in Livy is (with few exceptions) favourable *militiae*, but unfavourable *domi*: and Sallust first introduced Catiline’s ‘animus audax’ in a non-military context (5.4).

The first definite evidence pointing to a partially positive evaluation comes at 59.1:

Dein remotis omnium equis quo militibus exaequato periculo animus amplior esset, ipse pedes exercitum pro loco atque copiis instruxit.

Sallust apparently makes Catiline model his action on that of Caesar in BG 1.25.1:

Caesar primum suo, deinde omnium ex conspectu remotis equis, ut aequato omnium periculo spem fugae tolleret, cohortatus suos proelium commisit.

The historiographical model for this marker of courageous leadership is Xenophon, also in a third person account of military exploits (Anab. 3.4.47-8; cf 7.3.44). In that case, a soldier complains that Xenophon rides at his ease while he has to carry a shield: but in the BG, written almost a decade before Sallust’s BC, there is no mention of a prompt to action. Both Caesar and Catiline send away their horses to make the danger equal for all, Caesar to prevent flight, Catiline, perhaps in an improvement on his model, to increase courage. The close verbal correspondences confirm that Catiline’s action is modelled on Caesar’s, rather than independently evoking the same topos.49

Catiline also draws up his forces appropriately (‘pro loco atque copiis’). Taking full account of the terrain in preparing for battle is another marker of good leadership: the fact that it is explicitly mentioned by Sallust excludes the possibility of explanation of Catiline’s failure as caused by tactical weakness. Added to this is his recognition of and dependence on, the best men, including centurions; another

49See also Livy 25.16.17 (Gracchus).
characteristic of Caesar. Sallust does not say 'he chose the men he thought were the best': Catiline's judgment is again authorially affirmed:

Centuriones omnis [lectos] et evocatos, praeterea ex gregariis militibus optumum quemque armatum in primam aciem subducit. (59.3)

He takes his stand 'cum libertis et colonis' in the centre, reputedly ('dicebatur') beside the eagle of Marius.

The even match is again stressed by a parallel description of deployment and quality of forces ('cohortis veteranae', 59.5). Like Catiline, Petreius exhorts his forces by disparaging the opponent, 'se contra latrones inermos...certare' (59.5; cf. 58.11), and claims a noble motive, 'pro patria, pro liberis, pro aris atque focis suis' (cf. 'pro patria, pro libertate, pro vita certamus', 58.11). For him also his men's 'facta fortia' (59.6) are a ground for hope, but in his case, the knowledge, like his own military skill, is authorially affirmed, whereas Catiline merely laid claim to it (58.2), another small pointer to the outcome. This technique of offsetting a claim made by one character against a 'fact' authorially narrated is also used in the matter of virtus: Catiline urges his men in O.R. to be 'memores pristinae virtutis'; but it is Petreius's veterani who are actually described as 'pristinae virtutis memores' (60.3).

When battle is joined, the match is even (60.3). Catiline's bravery is authorially highlighted (without a parallel in Petreius), and affirmed by the reaction of Petreius himself, reinforced by surprise:
Interea Catilina cum expeditis in prima acie
vorsari, laborantibus succurrere, integros pro
sauciis arcessere, omnia providere, multum ipse
pugnare, saepe hostem ferire: strenui militis et
boni imperatoris officia simul exequebatur.
Petreius ubi videt Catilinam, contra ac ratus erat,
magna vi tendere.... (60.4-5)

Catiline has thus fulfilled the promise he made in the
beginning, 'Vel imperatore vel milite me utimini: neque animus
neque corpus a vobis aberit' (20.16). Only when he sees the
rest of his army routed does he abandon hope, and this without
abandoning resistance:

<Catilina>, postquam fusas copias seque cum paucis
relicuom videt, memor generis atque pristinae suae
dignitatis\textsuperscript{50} in confertissumos hostis incurrut
ibique pugnans confoditur. (60.7)

McGushin is right to argue against the suggestion made by
Vretska, and followed by Büchner, that Catiline is here
portrayed as a \textit{tragic} hero.\textsuperscript{51} To identify features of the
narrative structure, as Vretska does, as belonging 'zum Wesen
und zur Form der Tragödie' is to be over-specific: there is no
direct link here with tragedy, except that the \textit{BC}, like
Caesar's \textit{Commentarii} and Livy's History, is constructed in
such a way as to make the events it describes causative,
explicable, comprehensible to the reader. On the other hand,
he is surely not right that the language Sallust uses is

\textsuperscript{50}Catiline does not claim, as Caesar does, motivation by
the need to protect his \textit{dignitas}: that motivation is here
authorially stated by Sallust himself. See further Syme,
\textit{Sallust} 72, 118.

\textsuperscript{51}McGushin, \textit{Comm. Sall. BC} n. \textit{ad loc.}. K. Vretska writes
of a 'tragische Schluß' to the \textit{BC}, 'hier wächst die
Darstellung Sallusts zu tragiischer Größe und Wirkung empor...'
(218) 'Der Aufbau des \textit{Bellum Catilinae}', \textit{Hermes} 72 (1937) 202-
22: K. Büchner picks up the theme of 'Catilinas Heldentod':
\textit{Der Aufbau von Sallusts \textit{Bellum Jugurthinum}} (Hermes Einzelschr.
9, Wiesbaden 1953) 56-61.

34
'almost stereotyped for such a discussion as this':"52 he does not give the reference for the first parallel he cites, the death of Hasdrubal in Livy, but at 27.49 Hasdrubal encourages the men, shares their danger, prevents desertion, and, when all is lost, 'pugnans cecidit' (27.49.4). He died a death worthy of his family. These descriptions of two different men's deaths, by two different historians, are not stale, unthinking stereotypes: rather they witness to a common and emotive conception of noble defeat.53 To die fighting, not running away, is the ultimate marker of courageous leadership: the fact that it does not always prove good leadership equally conclusively points to the general historiographical link between character and achievement, as well as to the theme of 'virtus qualified and corrupted' of which Catiline is an exemplar in Sallust.54

In his concluding chapter, Sallust remarks on qualities in the exercitus which were highlighted at the beginning as crucial to the character of Catiline himself, 'quanta audacia

52 The term 'stereotype' is seriously misleading in this context, if it implies that the characterisation takes no account of the context and overall theme of the BC. And even if the language were stereotyped, Catiline could still be a stereotypical hero.

53 The fact that McGushin finds his second 'almost stereotypical' parallel in Virgil tends to count against his denial that such a self-sacrificial mode of death is in any sense 'tragic' or 'heroic'. The death of Curio in Caesar, BC 2 ('proelians interficitur') offers a closer parallel than these.

quantae animi vis fuisset in exercitu Catilinae’ (61.1).
Evidently for him the character of an army assimilates itself
to that of its commander: something similar will emerge from
writings of Caesar and Livy. A vivid image of his corpse is
succeeded by a pathetic scene, in which Catiline’s
appropriative rhetoric is at last authorially denied and a
proper state of affairs is once more asserted:

Neque tamen exercitus populi Romani laetam aut
incruentam victoriam adeptus erat...Multi autem, qui
e castris visundi aut spoliandi gratia processerant,
volventes hostilia cadavera amicum alii, pars
hospitem aut cognatum reperiebant; fuere item qui
inimicos suos cognoscerent. Ita varie per omnem
exercitum laetitia maeror, luctus atque gaudia
agitabantur. (61.7-9)

The phraseology is that appropriate for civil war, rather than
the righteous conquest of a megalomaniac by the forces of the
State.

This examination of the end of Sallust’s BC has shown how
the idea of narrative explanation can assist the reader to
interpret a continuous piece of text. But the extent to which
the historian’s reader could be depended on to read a piece of
text in the right way, the intended way, cannot simply be
assumed or asserted. It is best to begin with a discussion of
themes and recurrent motifs in the depiction of military
character in a historical narrative, to shed light on the
relationship of the writer’s view, and intentions, to the
reader’s evaluation of the events recounted.
Subicit populos nobis, et nationes pedibus nostris.¹

(a) Introduction

Any discussion of the BG which concerns itself with the analysis of narrative explanation must acknowledge a debt to Michel Rambaud.² His arguments for crediting Caesar with complex motives for composition, and his analysis of the text as a piece of writing designed to persuade, are of crucial importance: nevertheless, in two respects his book fails to offer a complete counter to positivist interpretations, and these are worth a brief consideration.

The first is a question of terminology: Rambaud defines his subject as 'the art of historical distortion in Caesar'. In doing so, he colours his argument in such a way as to make the response of historians of the Republic almost inevitably hostile.³ 'Vérité' is contrasted with 'insincérité': Caesar is either telling the truth or he is lying. And so according to Rambaud's parameters of argument, once belief in Caesar's total veracity is rejected as inadequate, the scholar is

¹Psalm 46 (Vulg.), 4.


³J.P.V.D. Balsdon, 'The veracity of Caesar', GR 4 (1957) 19-28, esp. 21, 28; also JRS 45 (1955), 161-4 [review of Rambaud] is typical. F.E. Adcock's Caesar as man of letters, written at almost the same time as Déformation, makes no reference to it: later, in a useful general essay on Caesar in Latin historians (London 1966), T.A. Dorey makes no reference to him either. Rambaud himself is also polemical in his criticisms of the historians, remarking (with reference to Rice Holmes) on the 'crédulité de l'anglais qui, "scholar and gentleman" défend César, parce qu'un gentleman comme César ne pouvait pas mentir...' (Déformation 8).
obliged to perceive the Commentarii as propaganda, and Caesar
as the purveyor of a deliberate, methodical and sustained lie.

Like ‘déformation’, ‘propaganda’ is an ethically loaded
word: that Rambaud accepts it into his methodological
terminology is disquieting. By accepting the positivist
veracity/insincerity opposition, he allows his detractors a
foothold through the implication that the consequences of his
arguments are essentially negative. This simplistic
definition of parameters is unlikely to give a true
representation of what Caesar understood himself to be doing:
the relationship between the facts he thought it necessary
(for whatever reason, ‘propagandist’ or ‘explanatory’) to
include in his Commentarii and the order and method of
relation of those facts, is more complex than this crude
dichotomy suggests.

Before turning to the second criticism of his work, it
may perhaps be helpful to illustrate this point about the
complexity of factors involved in the construction of an
account, by means of an example which is not per se important
or factually controversial, BG 7.6-9:

Eo cum venisset, magna difficultate [sc. Caesar]
adficiebatur, {a} qua ratione ad exercitum pervenire
posset. Nam, {b} si legiones in provinciam
arcesseret, se absente in itinere proelio
dimicaturas intellegebat; {c} si ipse ad exercitum
contenderet, ne eis quidem eo tempore qui quieti
viderentur, suam salutem recte committi videbat.
(7.6.2-4)
Eo cum pervenisset, {d} ad reliquas legiones mittit
priusque omnis in unum locum cogit quam de eius
adventus Arvernis nuntiari posset. (7.9.5)

The revolt under Vercingetorix is just beginning: and Caesar
is returning from Italy. He states a problem: {a} how can he
reach his forces? There are two possible courses of action open to him: he must expose either (b) his army or (c) himself to danger. Caesar does not state or explain the result of these deliberations. Instead, he illustrates it by implication: (d) forces and commander are reunited against all the odds, to the satisfying surprise of the enemy.

One approach to this small section of text may be termed 'positivist'. It is possible to analyse the text in terms of its adherence to standards of factual veracity, of the 'did this happen' kind: parallel data, analogy and probability can all be mobilised as criteria relevant to an evaluation of the text. Was Caesar [likely to have been] in a dilemma as to his best course of action? Did he [probably] resolve it in the manner described? At the other end of a spectrum of possible approaches is the 'propagandist', 'distortionist' one favoured by Rambaud. Setting aside the matter of whether Caesar either perceived or resolved this particular difficulty in this particular way, the analysis would focus on how the text contributes to giving the reader a sense of Caesar's selfless excellence in leadership: a sense which has been deliberately engineered by the author with a further purpose.4

If it is not already evident that neither of these approaches does justice to the legitimate and proper concerns of the other, it will emerge as such in the course of this Chapter and those that follow. This passage is not just factual narration; it is not just distortionist propaganda:

4Central to the dissimulation of artifice are the speed of Caesar's narrative, and its 'inlustris brevetas', which encourage the reader not to stop and question his account.
Caesar’s understanding of his own role and position, of good generalship itself as well as of himself as an exemplar, his socially and culturally fostered inclination to explain events in particular ways, all make a contribution to his decision to mention, and his manner of describing, individual events.

My second objection to Rambaud’s approach is linked to the first, though it concerns not the definition but the scope of the enquiry as set down by him. That is to say, he concerns himself solely with Caesar, and the issue of Caesar’s ‘veracity’. But the question should be a larger one than simply whether a great Roman figure distorted historical truth to his own advantage, however that advantage is defined. As a historical writer, Caesar does not exist in a vacuum: there are Sallust, Livy and Tacitus to take into account (not to mention historians whose extant work is fragmentary) as well as the Greek historiographical tradition. Respects in which Caesar appears to differ from his fellow historians deserve attention, but of equal interest are similarities between him and them in their attitudes to truth and in their historiographical methods. By treating Caesar in isolation, Rambaud reinforces the very impression (of a unique personality uniquely manipulating truth) which his argument urges us to see discredited. His case for reconsidering the historical nature and value of the Commentarii would be reinforced had he drawn attention to the similarity of attitude shown by different historians, and set Caesar’s writings in their proper context: the understanding and the expectations of both Caesar and his ancient readers, of how a
good commander behaves, are equally dependent on that
historiographical tradition and context.

It is with the themes of Rambaud's fifth chapter that
this discussion will primarily concern itself. He calls them
'propagandist', but they are better understood in terms of a
common, general Roman outlook on the nature of military
action, its causation and explanation, and the proper ways to
describe it: these matters are treated here as integral to
Caesar's historiographical outlook and narrative method. Key
events in the Commentarii are grouped and analysed
thematically, first (Ch. II) the BG and second (Ch. III) the
BC. This will help to clarify some typical parameters of
explanation of military action and character. It will then be
possible, in Ch. IV, to observe the workings of those
parameters within Livy's unified and dramatic narrative of the
second Punic War.

First impressions of the BG, through both style and
factual content, suggest an accurate and convincing military
narrative, in stark contrast with the moralistic, unrealistic
narrative style which is generally thought to characterise
military description in Livy.\(^5\) Caesar is preferred as the
better 'military historian' on the grounds that, unlike Livy,
he possessed experience of soldiers and warfare which he

\(^5\)See Rambaud, Déformation 25-43, on the report style: A.
Klotz, 'Caesar und Livius' RhM 96 (1953) 62-67: J. Schlicher,
'The development of Caesar's narrative style' CPh 31 (1936)
212-24.
deployed in his writings. This conclusion, however, can distract attention towards the minutiae of his battle narratives, and away from larger questions of interpretation. The two matters with which this chapter will be concerned, and which are treated together for the most part, are firstly the techniques and conventions of military narrative (and how these work on a level of causative explanation): and secondly, how these conventions of description and presentation relate to the individuality of Caesar’s text.

One sustained convention which must be acknowledged is simplification. In fact, simplification is more of a sine qua non than a historiographical convention, if it refers to the reduction of quantities of data to a manageable narrative form. It has already been shown in the Introduction that ancient battle narratives were not expected to describe everything that happened on a battlefield: it was the task of the historian to reduce a complexity of individual events and motives to manageable proportions, and to construct his narrative in such a way as to give the reader all the necessary pointers to a correct interpretation of the action.

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(on both a military/strategic and on a moral level). As for
the characters taking part in the drama of a military
narrative, these were conventionally simplified to the minimum
of a commander, a group of subordinates, and the ordinary
soldiers on each side. The characterisation of all three of
these groups is consistently fuller and more complex for the
Romans than for their enemies in Roman historiography: the
enemy commander and his men are not perceived or presented as
having a personality independent of their interaction with the
Romans in the narrative. Moreover, centurions, who regularly
play a conspicuous role at crucial points in the narrative,
have no foreign or enemy equivalent: their interstitial status
works as a unique moral marker in the narrative of Caesar (as
of Livy) and is a primary factor in the understanding of Roman
superiority, as will emerge in the course of the thesis.

The BG presents a tension between its straightforward
'report' style narrative of actions, and its status as a
highly-polished literary production, perhaps best expressed as
a distinction between the apparent objectivity of Commentarii,
and the evident further purposes of Res Gestae. The detail

7 On simplification of battle narrative, see, e.g., C.B.R.
Pelling, 'Caesar's battle-descriptions and the defeat of

8 Fraenkel has illustrated how this communique style could
exercise the emotive force of tradition in, 'Eine Form
römischer Kriegsbulletins' Eratos 54 (1950) 189-94: see also
K. Deichgräber, 'Elegantia Caesaris. Zu Caesars Reden und
Commentarii', Gymn. 57 (1950) 112-23; and more generally L.
Raditsa, 'Julius Caesar and his writings', in ANRW I, 3 (1973)
417-56. On commentarii and res gestae, see F.W. Kelsey, 'The
title of Caesar's work', TAPA 36 (1905) 211-38: F. Boemer,
'Der Commentarius. Zur Vorgeschichte und literarische Form
der Schriften Caesars', Hermes 81 (1953) 210-50: Adcock,
Caesar 6-18: and see further below.
and precision of the military description gives the reader a reassurance of accuracy: the various digressions, e.g., on British chariots (4.33) or Gallic siege techniques (7.23), establish his bona fides as a well-informed 'factual' narrator, as well as a general in control of events. 9

The BG does not lend itself to the presentation of moral explanation through interweaving of the Roman people domi (=plebs) and militiae (=exercitus) which Livy exploits for moral purposes. Nevertheless in their underlying conception of the nature and character of milites, these two writers are much alike. The BG gives a sustained impression of the superiority of Roman over foreign soldiers, but that impression is never clearly articulated or explained in the narrative. The reader is not encouraged to judge between the inherent excellence of Roman soldiers on the one hand and the dependence of that excellence on the right commander on the other. In contrast, it at first appears that the degrees and sources of enemy excellence, especially as detailed in the ethnographical 'digressions', are clearly categorised and articulated. After all, Caesar sets out unique features of the enemy races, and claims distinctions and grades of virtus among them. The depiction of enemy character in the

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9 In his application of the principles of 'Lügendichtung' and 'Lüngengeschichte' to Herodotus, D. Fehling draws particular attention to the point that 'detail makes for credibility', '...when it comes to non-essential details the audience cannot see any sense in these having been made up nor can they credit another human being with so much criminal energy': Herodotus and his 'sources': citation, invention and narrative art (English tr., Leeds 1989) 120-1.
narrative, however, does not support those claims. The case of the Treveri is typical: in the great battle against the Nervii (2.19-27), their reputation for courage is juxtaposed, without comment, with the cowardice of their actions:

Quibus omnibus rebus permoti equites Treveri, quorum inter Gallos virtutis opinio est singularis, qui auxili causa ab civitate ad Caesarem missi venerant, cum multitudine hostium castra compleri nostra...desperatis nostris rebus domum contenderunt; Romanos pulsos superatosque...civitati renuntiaverunt. (2.24.4-5)

Two main narrative markers serve to construct the impression of Roman superiority: the portrayal of acts of bravery by individual Roman soldiers, and the controlling and inspiring influence of their leader. The absence of morally-positive anecdotes of enemy bravery tends to pass unnoticed: but the construction of superiority around the character of a commander, if it is remarked, can be explained, as it is by Rambaud, as ideological in nature, a conscious factor in Caesar’s propaganda. To ascribe this feature of battle narrative, though, solely to the conscious purposes of one writer is misleading: the deployment of this narrative feature in the Commentarii is better understood by comparison with Livy’s method of illustrating and implying Roman superiority. For both writers, it is leadership, and the influence of the leader’s character on that of his men, which makes for differences in practice.

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Leadership encourages *milites Romani* both to overcome their natural (plebs-like) tendency to moral degeneration and to display conspicuous valour. Caesar’s portrayal of the dependence of military success upon his good leadership is undeniably used to his advantage, but he was not engineering an artificial or unfamiliar connection: it is part of his social, cultural and historiographical milieu, as it were the ‘natural’ way for him to explain his own actions.

The lack of narrative evidence for the *virtus* of the enemy races in action, which formed the negative image of the first narrative marker of Roman superiority mentioned above, relates closely to this point. In good wars, the enemy must be perceived as presenting a great threat. In Livy 21-30, this threat is tied almost exclusively to the character of Hannibal (in part because of the moral contrast Livy perceives between the Roman citizen army and Carthage’s mercenaries). Caesar instead provides a series of contests against warlike peoples, yet his narrative still comes to a climax with the emergence of a single worthy antagonist, Vercingetorix. The character of Vercingetorix, being tied to the degree of military success he achieves, has no more independent force in the narrative than Hannibal’s does in Livy: and the same is true of the *virtus* of enemy peoples in the *BG*. When individual enemy leaders (Ambiorix, Dumnorix, Orgetorix, Vercingetorix) or Caesar’s own subordinates (Crassus, Sabinus, Q. Cicero, Labienus) come to the fore, there is revealed an ideology of leadership which is common to Caesar, Sallust and
Livy: soldierly *virtus* is the creation of good leadership, and quickly disintegrates without it.\(^\text{11}\)

\section*{(b) The Roman soldiers}

Typical attributes of the soldier in Latin literature include boastfulness, greed, belligerence, lechery, superstition, and cowardice on the one hand, and pride, bravery, self-sacrifice and devotion on the other. Lechery is out of place in the *BG*, though openly treated in Roman comedy, and even echoed in the more 'romantic' historical treatment of Livy.\(^\text{12}\) Since all the other attributes occur both in Romans and their enemies, the reader must use the proportion of favourable to unfavourable, or the attribution of unfavourable where we might have expected favourable (and *vice versa*), to come to a correct evaluation of the narrative. It was claimed above that Caesar's narrative exhibits an assumption of the military superiority of the Romans: although they have a greater capacity for courage and discipline than their enemies, they are in greater danger from the consequences of falling into the principal weaknesses, fear and aggression.

The negative face of aggression tends to surface among the enemy (the Suebi, for example, are 'gens bellicosissima Germanorum omnium', 4.1.3), while the positive face, *studium pugnandi*, which characterises the Romans, needs particularly

\(^{11}\text{See Rambaud, Déformation 295-311.}\)

\(^{12}\text{And alluded to in Tac. Agric. 5.1. According to Suet. DJ 65.1, 67.1, Caesar's men were no less licentious than other soldiers, 'milites suos etiam unguentatos bene pugnare posse'. Cf. Livy, e.g. 27.15.9; 30.13-15; 36.11ff.; 38.24, for the 'romantic' view.}\)
careful control. The *miles gloriosus*, then, is not simply a figure of comedy but a real problem for leaders, because of the vulnerability of an entire army which may result from individual soldiers' over-eagerness for military success (as the connection between the noun *gloria* and its adjective *gloriosus* suggests). A good leader turns this to his advantage, a bad one loses control because of it. The negotiations between Caesar and Ariovistus at 1.46 highlight this interaction of soldierly zeal with a commander's control: Ariovistus's men try to provoke the Roman troops into breaking a truce by throwing *lapides telaque* at them. Caesar prevents his men from rising to the provocation:

Non putabat ut...dici posset eos ab se per fidem in colloquio circumventos. (1.46.3)

The news of Ariovistus's *arrogantia* further increases their enthusiasm for a fight; *alacritas* and *studium pugnandi* are positive characteristics, but only when, as here, clearly associated with firm leadership.¹³ So also during the siege of Avaricum in 52 B.C., the Roman *milites*, furious that the enemy dares to stand so close, are 'signum proeli exposcentis'.¹⁴ Caesar has to tell them the victory would be too costly, and 'milites consolatus' he leads them back to camp.

¹³See R.M. Ogilvie, I. Richmond, *Corneli Taciti de Vita Agricolae* (Oxford) 33.1n. on *alacritas* as an emotion conventionally inspired by *contiones* (citing BG 1.41.1), perhaps implying that it is a response emotion, rather than a permanently-ascribed characteristic or attribute.

¹⁴When both sides make ready for the fight but battle is not actually joined: 7.14.
Motivation by *studium pugnandi*, then, is generally confined to the Romans: it is characteristic of Caesar's narrative technique that such morally-loaded terminology controls the reader's understanding of the action. That this is moral explanation or causation, not 'factual' reporting, is clear from the flexibility of Caesar's characterisation of the enemy peoples. Their failures can result equally from belligerence or fear, and both of these characteristics can be predicated of them at different times, without any attempt to reconcile the contradiction, or explain why they have moved from the one to the other. Of course, volatility is also a Gallic/German characteristic in Roman historiography, but this theme is usually attached to their sudden changes of allegiance or inconvenient and rapid departures from battlefields, rather than the inconsistency of their character. The reason Caesar chooses to focus on aggression or fear as the cause of failure must also owe something to the moral context, and the strand of narrative explanation which he has adopted.

It is not necessarily immediately obvious that Roman *studium pugnandi* can be dangerous: nor does it at once become clear how often it is used as a kind of narrative compensation or reassurance for military defeat. The dangers of *studium pugnandi* where a subordinate is in command are well illustrated by the case of P. Crassus. He was sent in 56 B.C. to Aquitania to prevent the Celtic Gauls from receiving

15See Ogilvie, Comm. 728-9 (= 5.44.1n.).
reinforcements (3.11.3). The passage in which this episode is described (3.20-27) is curiously ambiguous: it shows Crassus as entirely successful, but includes some narrative hints of his inferiority to Caesar. Crassus’ realisation of the need for caution is a point in his favour (‘non mediocrem sibi diligentiam adhibendam intellegebat’, 3.20.1), as the difficulty of his position is stressed:

Duces vero ei deliguntur qui una cum Q. Sertorio omnis annos fuerant summamque scientiam rei militaris habere existimabantur. Hi consuetudine populi Romani loca capere, castra munire, commeatibus nostros intercludere instituunt. (3.23.5-6)

When he decides to fight, the Gauls do not want to engage, despite their ‘multitudinem et veterem belli gloriam paucitatemque nostrorum’. This is because they know that they can win by harassing him and stealing his supplies (24.2-3). His decision to attack the camp, though, is explained in terms which suggest a gap between the true state of affairs and his perception of them:

Hac re perspecta Crassus, cum sua cunctatione atque opinione timidiore hostes nostros milites alacriores ad pugnandum efficissent atque omnium voces audiretur, exspectari diutius non oportere quin ad castra iretur, cohortatus suos omnibus cupientibus ad hostium castra contendit. (3.24.5)

The general sense of the sentence is clear. The enemy have evoked studium pugnandi in the Romans, to their own advantage: Crassus yields to pressure and attacks. As it happens, he is

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16Rice Holmes rejects Mommsen’s charge that Aquitania was attacked on a pretext: Caesar: de Bello Gallico (Oxford 1914), 3.11.3n..

17The reading timidiore is not certain: see Rice Holmes, Comm. 3.24.5n.: Rambaud, Comm. 195 prefers to read ‘opinione timoris hostes’.
successful, but that act of yielding to the pressure of the men’s *studium pugnandi* marks his inferiority to Caesar.

In 54 B.C. when the Nervii attack Q. Cicero’s winter camp, it is the turn of Caesar, who speeds to the rescue, to try and tempt the enemy to open battle: and unlike Crassus Caesar succeeds in his objective. This time it is the Romans who appear to be *timidi*, though it is stressed that this is deliberate trickery on Caesar’s instructions: 18

> Caesar si forte timoris simulatione hostes in suum locum elicere posset, [continet copias] ut citra vallem pro castris proelio contenderet; ...Caesar consulto equites cedere sequi in castra recipere iubet; simul ex omnibus partibus castra altiore vallo muniri portasque obstrui atque in his administrandis rebus quam maxime concursari et cum simulatione agi timoris iubet ...Sic nostros contemperunt ut ...alii vallum manu scindere, alii fossas complere inciperent. (5.50.3, 5; 51.3)

The plan works. The pretence of fear arouses incautious contempt, the enemy is tempted to approach the camp, then is taken by surprise and routed. 19

As well as provoking the enemy to fight, or controlling the *studium pugnandi* of his own men, it is sometimes also necessary for Caesar to evoke that enthusiasm (*studium* or *alacritas*) in the Romans. There is a conspicuous and extended example of this at 1.40.1-15, a passage which represents Caesar’s own version of the mutiny at Vesontio. 20 The

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18 At 3.24.2-3, the Gauls’ decision not to give battle is not intended to appear to the Romans the result of *timor*.


20 In which the word *seditio* is not used. On the mutiny, see H. Hagendahl, ‘The mutiny of Vesontio; a problem of tendency and credibility in Caesar’s narrative’, *Class. et
The immediate context of his speech is given as the need to control Roman fear of fighting the unknown Germans (1.39.1-7). Its wider narrative context, somewhat surprisingly for an episode which figures elsewhere as an embarrassment if not a threat, is justificatory: for it is prominently placed rather than discreetly hidden, and offers a forceful exposition of Caesar’s self-image and motivation. Rambaud, who does not discuss the episode as a whole, does nonetheless draw attention to a key feature of the speech as part of his discussion of ‘popularité’:

L’opinion du légionnaire, soldat citoyen, électeur et parent d’électeurs...faisait la réputation politique de son chef militaire...le refus d’obéissance des troupes avait le poids d’une véritable condemnation populaire. Cette approbation avait manqué à César au début de la campagne contre Arioviste, puisque, si l’on en croit Dion [38.35.2], l’opposition partit des simple soldats...La mise en scène du Bellum Gallicum sauvegarde le principe plébiscitaire...négativement...en rejetant sur les officiers l’origine de l’opposition...

At 1.39.2, Caesar ascribes responsibility for the unrest to his officers, ‘hic [sc. timor] primum ortus est a tribunis militum, praefectis reliquisque qui ex urbe amicitiae causa Caesarem securi non magnum in re militari usum habebant’.

Then at 1.39.5 he illustrates the effect of their timor upon the men:


21 Déformation, 274: cf., e.g., 268 (Caesar’s avarititia), 349 (the panic at 1.39).
Horum vocibus ac timore paulatim etiam ei qui magnum in castris usum habebant, milites centurionesque quique equitatui praeerant, perturbabantur. 

Still as part of the 'independent' narrative, he precludes the possibility that unease about the strategic situation is reasonable by presenting it as a pretext:

Qui se...minus timidos existimari volebant, non se hostem vereri sed angustias itineris et magnitudinem silvarum quae intercederent inter ipsos et Ariovistum, aut rem frumentariam...timere dicebant. (1.39.6)

The speech is delivered at a consilium at which, unusually, all the centurions are present. 22 The introductory 'vehementer eos incusavit' sets the tone: Caesar shows that he does not need to curry favour in order to carry a point, and his first objection is to their presumption ('quod aut...putarent', 1.40.1; cf. 39.6). He next criticises their fear of Ariovistus as unnecessary (1.40.2-3) before admitting the possibility that Ariovistus is hostile, and then dismissing him as a serious threat (1.40.4-9). This leads back to the matter of presumption, but now with greater vehemence and open condemnation:

Qui suum timorem in rei frumentariae simulationem angustiasque itineris conferrent, facere arroganter, cum aut de officio imperatoris desperare aut praescribere viderentur. (1.40.10)

The final section of the speech calls the men's bluff: he claims he cannot believe they will disobey, and so will set

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22 See Rice Holmes, Comm. 1.40.1n. .
out in any case, trusting in the Tenth ('de qua non
dubitaret') to follow:\(^{23}\)

\[\text{Scire...quibuscumque exercitus dicto audiens non fuiert, aut male re gesta fortunam defuisse aut aliquo facinore comperto avaritiam esse convictam: suam innocentiam perpetua vita, felicitatem Helvetiorum bello esse perspectam. (1.40.12-4)}\]

The implication that he cannot rely on the other legions at once produces the desired effect:

\[\text{Hac oratione habita, mirum in modum conversae sunt omnium mentes, summaque alacritas et cupiditas belli gerendi innata est. (1.41.1)}\]

Rambaud remarks perceptively, 'Le \textit{studium, l'alacritas des troupes ont une signification apologetique, et plébiscitaire}'.\(^{24}\) In this extended example, the justificatory narrative function of \textit{studium pugnandi} is clear: it will appear with even greater prominence in the \textit{BC}, when Caesar's troops are eager to fight for Rome under their commander, while their fellow-citizens in the armies of Pompey and his associates are reluctant to engage.

The confidence of Roman troops can be shaken as much by unfamiliar ground as by unknown enemies, as happens in the course of the first invasion of Britain, when the Britons fight expertly with their chariots and cavalry, and the Romans are \textit{perterriti}:

\[\text{...}\]

\(^{23}\text{On the special role and status of the Tenth, see 1.41.2, 42.5; 2.21.1, 23.1, 26.4-5; 7.47.1, 51.1. Cf. Rambaud, \textit{Déformation} 233, 274-5, 360.}\]

\(^{24}\text{In \textit{Déformation} 275.}\]
Non eadem alacritate uti proeliis consuerant utebantur. (4.24.4)

As at 1.40, so here a challenge to virtus inspires the Romans to avoid dedecus and fight acriter (4.25.5, 26.1). This time the challenge comes from a soldier, the aguilifer of the Tenth, and is issued in O.R.: after the destruction of their ships, when the Romans were despairing of returning home, they were particularly vulnerable to enemy attack, 'magna, id quod necesse erat accidere, totius exercitus perturbatio facta est'. The problem resurfaces during the second invasion in 54, 'novo genere pugnae perterritis nostris' (5.15.4). In Caesar, timor is something to be evoked in his own men so that the reader can observe the process by which it is overcome. He is careful never to show sustained unease about the character of his men: on the contrary, when inexperienced soldiers are in danger, he stresses that he understands their weaknesses, 'nemo est tam fortis quin rei novitate perturbetur' (6.39.3).

Studium pugnandi and timor, then, are key markers in the action: both can be evoked, and both controlled, provided that the right man is in command of the army in question. At 2.12, e.g. Caesar assesses enemy fear, and makes use of it while he can, 'priusquam se hostes ex terrore ac fuga reciperent': his

25 Alacritas here functioning as a characteristic, a synonym for studium, rather than the commander-generated response noted above.

26 On the distinction between O.R. and O.O. in Caesar, see Appendix below ('Caesar's use of O.R.').

27 For rumour and superstition affecting the Romans, cf. 6.37.7-8: the Gauls, on the other hand, use law to guard against rumor and fama (6.20.1-2; cf. 4.5.2-3).
haste is rewarded by the surrender of the Suessiones (2.12.1, 5). Among subordinates, the case is different: when Q. Cicero’s camp is besieged, and he tries to send letters to Caesar to tell him of the danger, the nuntii are caught and tortured where the Romans can watch, in an attempt to increase their fear:

Litterae nuntiique ad Caesarem mittebantur; quorum pars deprehensa in conspectu nostrorum militum cum cruciatu necabantur. (5.45.1)

Within Caesar’s simplified parameters of narrative explanation, there is no real place for the cavalry. When its actions are integrated into any causative pattern, the leading characteristic of those actions is usually cowardice, as befits a force largely composed of non-Roman auxiliaries. The great battle with the Nervii (2.19ff.), when the cavalry’s flight brings the army into danger (2.19.6-7), is typical: Caesar attributes the repulse of the attack, and the compensation of that cavalry flight, to two factors:

His difficultatibus duae res erant subsidio, scientia atque usus militum, quod superioribus proelis exercitati quid fieri oporteret non minus commode ipsi sibi praescribere quam ab aliis doceri poterant, et quod ab opere singulisque legionibus

28 On the other hand, when they are needed to provide a greater threat, the Gauls are said to be quick at learning from other peoples, ‘est genus summae sollertiae atque ad omnia imitanda et efficienda quae ab quoque traduntur aptissimum’ (7.22.1).


30 But mitigated to some extent by Caesar’s earlier remarks on cavalry tactics among the Nervii (2.17.4-5).
singulos legatos Caesar discedere nisi munitis castris vetuerat. (2.20.3)

The next time the cavalry flees (24.1, 4–5), it forces decisive action upon Caesar alone (2.25). After this charge and the rally led by the Tenth (2.26) lead to a change in fortunes, the cavalry is inspired to wipe out the shame of its retreat, 'equites vero, ut turpitudinem fugae virtute delerent, omnibus in locis pugnant quo se legionariis militibus praeferrent' (2.27.2). Moral condemnation is avoided, but the credit for victory goes elsewhere.

Cavalry cowardice is the norm: much more unusual is the exemplum virtutis attached to a cavalryman (4.12–3) after a treacherous German attack in which 74 equites are killed:31

In his vir fortissimus Piso Aquitanus, amplissimo genere natus, cuius avus in civitate sua regnum obtinuerat, amicus ab senatu nostro appellatus. Hic cum fratri intercluso ab hostibus auxilium ferret, illum ex periculo eripuit, ipse equo vulnerato deiectus quoad potuit fortissime restitit: cum circumventus multis vulneribus acceptis cecidisset atque id frater...procul animadvertisset, incitato equo se hostibus obtulit atque interfecit est. (4.12.6)

Rambaud explains this in terms of a proof of Caesar’s popularity (275). Piso’s bravery does not wipe out the cavalry’s disgrace, however: the next day, they are put at the back of the agmen as a punishment.

So, Caesar evokes and controls the studium pugnandi of the Romans, and provokes that of the Gauls to their own disadvantage: the one substantial exception to this is the disastrous battle at Gergovia (7.47–52), which he makes into a

31 After setting their force of 800 against 5,000 of the Roman horse, 'nil timentibus nostris' (4.12.1).
tension-increasing prelude to victory at Alesia, to deflect attention from his own failure. Rambaud draws attention to the similarity of Caesar's treatment of Gergovia in the BG and that of Dyrrachium in the BC, quoting Caesar's words at BC 3.73.6, 'futurum ut detrimentum in bonum verteret, uti ad Gergoviam accidisset'. He is sensitive to the way narrative is constructed to shift the blame for defeat, but his suspicion of Caesar's motives in what he calls 'une oeuvre consacrée à sa gloire' (208), like his belief that the account is wholly the product of a conscious strategy, does not do justice to the way Roman historiography judges interaction of character and circumstance, and attributes praise and blame according to perceived long-term achievement. The introduction to the defeat (7.32-43) brings out a contrast between the deceitful and avaricious Gauls (7.37-8, 40.1; cf. 43.2, 'Impellit alios avaritia, alios iracundia et temeritas quae maxime illi hominum generi est innata') and the noble Romans (7.40.4, 41.4): the construction of narrative to prove moral superiority at times of military failure is similar in Caesar and Livy. The warning Caesar gives to the subordinates at 7.45.8, by prefiguring exactly what then happens, gives the reader a strong impression of his foresight, and thus excludes the possibility of his own culpability:

32 Déformation, 170-171, 'D'un récit à l'autre, l'ordre [des] éléments varie peu: c'est la logique de la défaite, selon César'. Cf. 208-214 (with comparison of Caesar and Livy, 209), 221ff.. His article on 'La bataille de Gergovie' in REL 52 (1974) 35-41 treats the probable site of the battle.

33 This point will become clearer after the examination of commanders' characters in Ch. IV below.
In primis monet [sc. legatos] ut contineant milites, ne studio pugnandi aut spe praedae longius progrediantur.

In Livy too, display of foreknowledge concerning potential difficulties will be deployed as a means of mitigating defeat. Caesar then claims success for a limited-range operation ('Haec cogitanti accidere visa est facultas bene rei gerendae...Consecutus id quod animo proposuerat’, 7.44.1, 47.1).  

The construction of the narrative in 7.47 gives extended illustration of Caesar’s narrative explanation which repays detailed analysis. After the success of his operation, he orders the retreat, and is obeyed by the Tenth (7.47.1). The other legionaries do not obey his signal, and he attributes this to the fact that they could not hear the order ('non exaudito...intercedebat’). They were restrained by the tribunes and legati: this is presented as a contrast which shifts blame from Caesar:

Tamen ab tribunis militum legatisque...retinebantur. Sed elati spe celeris victoriae et hostium fuga et superiorum temporum secundis proeliis, nihil adeo arduum sibi esse existimaverunt quod non virtute consequi possent, neque finem prius sequendi fecerunt quam muro oppidi portisque appropinquarent. (7.47.2-3)

It seems that the reader is offered a choice: either they heard the signal and were disobeying Caesar, or they did not and were disobeying his subordinates. But the case is not presented in this way. The implication of sed (reinforced by

34 See Rice Holmes, Gaul, 149-158, 245-249 for a defence of this account.

35 Which is apparently with him at the time, 'quacum erat +concionatus+' (7.47.1).
repetition at 7.45.8, cf. 7.52.1) is that the subordinates are responsible for losing control (‘Retinebantur. Sed’), while the disobedience is disguised by a triple attribution of motive, reinforced by polysyndeton, all hinging upon virtus. Two exempla virtutis attached to named centurions further assist this vindication of studium pugnandi: the first of these is L. Fabius, who wants to be first over the rampart and thus win Avaricensia praemia. As in Livy, the narrative focus on individual bravery compensates and offsets the more obvious tendency of defeats to suggest inferiority. The subsequent fighting, and Caesar’s response to the problem (7.48-9) leads quickly to the death of Fabius (7.50.3), and then to the second exemplum virtutis.

Unlike Fabius, Petronius is given a speech in O.R.: both committed the sin of leading their men into danger (7.47.7, 50.3; cf. 50.4), but Petronius redeems himself by acknowledging his fault and sacrificing his own life to save his comrades:

"Quoniam...me una vobiscum servare non possum, vestrae...vitae prospeciam, quos cupiditate gloriae adductus in periculum deduxi." (7.50.4)

His own bravery (‘pugnans...concidit ac suis saluti fuit’) is complemented by that of his men (‘conantibus auxiliari sui’, 7.50.6). It is made clear that these two cases are exemplary, not unique, ‘Nostri, cum undique premerentur, XLVI centurionibus amissis deiecti sunt loco’ (7.51.1), as the

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36 7.47.7: the corona muralis is meant. For a survey of such awards, see V. A. Maxfield, The military decorations of the Roman army (London 1981) 67-100: 67-9 corona obsidionalis; 70-4 corona civica; 76-8 corona muralis.
defeat is contained once more by the Tenth, 'intolerantius Gallos insequentis legio decima tardavit' (7.51.2). In all, 700 men are lost (7.51.4).

This is Caesar's most serious defeat in Gaul. Yet even these carefully recorded casualty figures give an indication of superiority, being less than the least of Gallic battle casualties. At a contio afterwards, Caesar restates the cause of defeat:

Teneratatem cupiditatemque militum reprehendit, quod...[non] ab tribunis militum legatisque retineri potuissent. (7.52.1)

Caesar's condemnation of cupiditas is unlikely to be a reference to cupiditas praedae, which was not mentioned in the preceding narrative. It is more likely that he is referring to cupiditas in a more general sense of desire for power (thus implying presumption): this would fit in with the warning to the men that he expects them to display modestia and continentia as much as virtus and animi magnitudo.

At 6.31-4 the motivation of the Roman soldiers is treated somewhat differently, as perhaps befits a situation in which the harassment tactics of the Eburones make simple force not only unhelpful but actually dangerous. Diligentia is required towards individual soldiers ( 'in singulis militibus conservandis', 6.34.3) who may feel tempted to stray in search of booty while the army is on the move (6.34.4). This time,

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37 See Rambaud, Déformation 182-186, on manipulation of numbers.
38 See Rambaud, Déformation 296-7.
39 Or perhaps cupiditas pugnandi: cf. BC 3.74.2.
it is his men’s praeda cupiditas (6.34.4) that he is concerned to guard against lest it make them vulnerable: but he plays down the moral risks they run in straying in search of plunder, and instead focusses on the tactical difficulties of punishing the Eburones, and his own reluctance to risk the men’s safety:

Ut in eiusmodi difficultatibus (see 6.34.5-6), quantum diligentia provideri poterat providebatur, ut potius in nocendo aliquid praetermitteretur, etsi omnium animi ad ulciscendum ardebant, quam cum aliquo militum detrimento noceretur. (6.34.7)

The men’s desire for ultio works to their advantage, at the same time as Caesar’s concern for their welfare works to his. Ultio will surface again as a powerful and positive factor in motivating aggressive action in Livy, especially in the actions of Scipio Africanus.

Sometimes, as at 6.34 above, a Roman desire for ultio gives a favourable colour to the accepted, but not morally-advantageous, motivation of praeda.\(^4^0\) In the case of the siege of Avaricum, spes uliaonis even overcomes spes praedae, so completely that Caesar is able to remark on it as a proof of his men’s moral superiority: when the siege is over (52 B.C., 7.27), he explains their brutal and merciless behaviour thus:

Nec fuit quisquam qui praedae studeret. Sic et Cenabi caede et labore operis incitati non aetate confectis, non mulieribus, non infantibus pepercerunt. (7.28.4)

The massacre of Roman citizens at Cenabum which preceded the siege may provide a respectable excuse for this slaughter:

\(^4^0\)Lintott, Violence in Republican Rome (Oxford 1968), 49-50, 64; esp. 49 on Cic. Off. 2.50.
Caesar's second reason appears to be more problematic. But *labor operis* means more than 'the hard work, or effort, of the siege': *labor* is a forceful word, even emotive in contexts where Caesar uses his men's willingness to undergo *labores* for him as a moral superiority marker. The balanced structure of this sentence (and anaphora of *non*), moreover, suggests that Caesar means to highlight this moment for the reader, rather than glossing over it: for *labor* means not just 'work' but 'work associated with suffering and self-denial'. The collective nature of the *labores* of Caesar's men is an expression of group identity and loyalty, and as such its use to explain the slaughter is meant to be positive. At moments of threat or danger, Caesar's men are shown as undergoing even *labores* with enthusiasm under his leadership, as when he sets out on a march:

Adhortatus milites ne necessario tempore itineris
labore permoveantur, cupidissimis omnibus progressus
milia passuum XXV.... (7.40.4) (7.40.4)

The contrast between Caesar's soldiers and the enemy troops is strong. The *cupiditas praedae*, for example, of the latter is usually more conspicuous and morally-negative. This contrast of treatment is clear from 7.37, a passage in

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42 As in the case of the 'cupidissimi barbari' (Germans) at 6.35.6. Rambaud, *Déformation* 321-2, 'César les a dépréciés [les intentions et mobiles des Gaules] avec un parti-pris systématique...Dans toute intrigue, toute entreprise contre lui, il dénonce les mêmes entraînements: cupidité, légèreté, jeunesse.' His remark that 'Le peuple éduen est encore moins bien traité' (322) reinforces the defensive tone of his argument.
which, amid an atmosphere of deceit and intrigue, Convictolitavis the Aeduan\textsuperscript{43} negotiates with \textit{principes adulescentes} of the Aedui to take over the tribe: his speech appeals to the dangerous and emotive ideal (and recurrent theme) of \textit{communis libertas} (7.37.4). His claim, however, that this outweighs \textit{Caesaris beneficium} is undercut, first by the reader’s prior knowledge that he has been bribed to do so (‘sollicitatus ... pecunia,’ 7.37.1), and then by the reaction of his hearers, who are persuaded ‘et oratione... et praemio’ (7.37.6).\textsuperscript{44}

Eagerness for battle on the part of the enemy usually figures as aggression rather than \textit{studium pugnandi}: he is no more favourably treated in the matter of readiness for labor. Even when they do exhibit it, inspired by Vercingetorix, its moral excellence is undercut:

Simul in spem veniebant eius adfirmatione de reliquis adiungendis civitatibus; primumque eo tempore Galli castra munire instituerunt, et sic sunt animo consternati homines insueti laboris ut omnia quae imperarentur sibi patienda existimarent. (7.30.4)

Likewise when Sabinus arrives in the territory of the Venelli, he finds a motley crew assembled from all over Gaul, who have joined the rebels led by Viridovix:

Magnaque praeterea multitudo undique ex Gallia perditorum hominum latronumque convenerat, quos spes praedandi studiumque bellandi ab agri cultura et cotidiano labore revocabat. (3.17.4)

\textsuperscript{43}In whose favour Caesar had earlier given judgment. See 7.32-3.

\textsuperscript{44}But note that there was no mention of \textit{praemia} in the actual speech.
The hope of *praeda* is mentioned first, and then *studium bellandi*, rather than *pugnandi*: as if warfare were a pastime, not a serious affair. Sabinus takes advantage of their *contemptio* (‘opinionem timoris praebuit’, 3.17.5-6) to win a complete victory (3.19).

Renown for valour and military success are shown as vital elements in an army’s success or failure: both sides boast of and try to prove their reputation in battle, an indication that military and moral superiority are interdependent. This ultimate dependence of conquest upon consent works on two levels: within the narrative the protagonists, especially the Gauls, have to be impressed by Roman superiority, while outside it the Roman readership must ultimately give similar acknowledgement of the right of *populus Romanus* to conquer. To describe this complex inter-relationship of concerns as ‘propaganda’ again fails to do justice to the many strands of narrative explanation involved.

The influence of reputation can work both ways. A reputation for warfare is an important factor in Gallic decision-making, ‘Illi...propter multitudinem et *veterem belli glori*am paucitatemque nostrorum se tuto dimicaturos existimabant’ (3.24.2). A warlike reputation can also induce fear in the enemy, as when the reputation of the Germans produces *timor* and nearly leads to mutiny at Vesontio (1.39.1). On the other hand, a closer look at these references to reputation reveals that the military reputation

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45 Cf. 6.24.1-6, for relative *bellicae laudis opinio* among the Gauls and Germans (an important passage for the association between way of life and excellence in war).
of the Gauls is usually cited by themselves, while that of the Romans is remarked on by their enemies as well. Book 2, for example, begins with Caesar hearing of plots among the Belgae, who resent the Romans wintering in Gaul as much as they had once resented the presence of the Germans. When Caesar discovers that they alone among the Gauls had repelled the invasion of the Cimbri and Teutones, as a result of which 'magnam sibi auctoritatem magnosque spiritus in re militari sumerent' (2.4.3) he is at first reluctant to fight:

Et propter multitudinem hostium et propter eximiam opinionem virtutis proelio supersedere statuit. (2.8.1)

After ascertaining from skirmishes, however, that this renown is undeserved ('Ubi nostros non esse inferiores intellexit', 2.8.2), battle is joined and the Romans win.

The effect of a military reputation as an influencing factor on generals' decisions is again evident in 54 B.C., when the Eburones attack and destroy a Roman army. Sabinus makes the unwise decision to believe a suggestion made by the treacherous Ambiorix on the following grounds:

Ardere Galliam tot contumeliis acceptis sub populi Romani imperium redactam, superiore gloria rei militaris extincta. (5.29.4)

His argument (in O.O., 5.29.2-7) is undercut first by statement of his lack of reliance on Caesar ('Caesarem arbitrari profectum in Italiam', 5.29.2) and then by heavy ironic ambiguity, of which he is himself unaware, 'Postremo
quis hoc sibi persuaderet, sine certa re Ambiorigem ad eiusmodi consilium descendisse? (5.29.5).[^46]

At 4.16.6-7 the Ubii ask Caesar for help in terms which stress the military advantages of opinio virtutis:

Tantum esse nomen atque opinionem eius exercitus Ariovisto pulso et hoc novissimo proelio facto etiam ad ultimas Germanorum nationes, uti opinione et amicitia populi Romani tuti esse possint.

A reputation for valour can encourage communities to go over to Rome: it can also act as a motivating factor in battle. Labienus urges his men ‘ut suae pristinae virtutis et secundissimorum proeliorum retinere memoriam’, and in the ensuing battle they fight to the very end.

In this speech he exhorts his men to imagine that Caesar himself is present looking on, ‘ipsum Caesarem, cuius ductu saepe numero hostis superassent, praesentem adesse existimarent’ (7.62.2). So also at 6.8.4 he urges them to even greater efforts, (this time in O.R.) as if Caesar were present and watching, ‘”illum adesse et hanc coram cernere existimate”’. When subordinate commanders in the BG mention Caesar, the use of his name is meant to be a moral guide to their actions: Labienus’s words are approved, and his dependence on Caesar portends success, while Sabinus’s lack of trust in Caesar (5.29.2) acted as a clear narrative marker of coming defeat. This use of subordinates’ relationships to the commander as a moral marker is related to what Rambaud called the ‘principe plébiscitaire’: in other words, to the

[^46]: The dramatic irony in narrative explanation used here on a small scale is more extensively deployed by Livy, as is discussed below.
presentation of events as a continuously successful interaction between Caesar and the army, with which the successful subordinate is presumed to conform, and which the unsuccessful is assumed to have rejected. The decisive influence of Caesar himself is made clear during his account of the great battle against the Nervii:47 his seizing of a shield to lead a rally at once displays both his qualities of fearless leadership and his participation in the dangers of his men:

Spe inlata militibus ac redintegrato animo, cum pro se quisque in conspectu imperatoris etiam in extremis suis rebus operam navare cuperet, paulum hostium impetus tardatus est. (2.25.2)

A year later, during naval operations against the Veneti (3.14), the Romans are at a disadvantage until the Gallic ships are immobilised and it becomes a soldiers' battle, which the Romans win. Again, the presence of Caesar is pivotal:

Atque eo magis quod in conspectu Caesaris atque omnis exercitus res gerebatur. (3.14.8)

The Roman soldiers are inspired by the presence of their commander because they fear his censure and hope to win his praise. The fruits of such labours are evident in 54 B.C.: when Caesar rejoins Q. Cicero after repulsing the attack of the Nervii upon the latter's camp (5.52), he finds not one man in ten left unwounded:

Ex eis omnibus iudicat rebus quanto cum periculo et quanta cum virtute res sint administratae. Ciceronem pro eius merito legioremque collaudat; centuriones singillatim tribunosque militum

47In 57 B.C.: see Rice Holmes, Gaul, 75-80, 671-677.
(c) Gauls, Germans, Britons

Among the races of the Gauls, Britons and Germans, there are few unambiguously positive markers of virtus. There are, however, plenty of examples of aggressive or cowardly behaviour, unsoftened by attributions of motive or explanations of circumstance. When discussing Caesar’s portrayal of Rome’s enemies Rambaud is perhaps most alert to narrative manipulation, but once again he neglects the overall historiographical context of depiction of enemies: instead, he lapses into defensive criticism, remarking, for example (after analysing the depiction of the Aedui) ‘il est utile d’ajouter que la totalité de la nation gauloise n’a pas été traitée plus justement [my italics]’. The implied expectation that some notion of ‘fairness’ ought to govern the presentation of enemies in such a text is misleading, not to say anachronistic. For the enemy character is not the point, not the focus of interest. Comparison with Livy’s presentation of the Carthaginians will help to clarify how and why, in Roman

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48Polybius approves this means of encouraging the men to bravery (6.39.1-11), noting that rewards accompanied praises: but although he remarks that timē and timōria balance each other in the excellent Roman military system (6.39.11), there is little mention of the latter in Caesar.

49Déformation 324: for the Aedui see also 312-324; and on the ethnography of Gaul, 324-328.
historiography, the character of an enemy nation is mainly of interest insofar as it relates to the Romans themselves.\textsuperscript{50}

The ethnographic sections of the \textit{BG} are central to at least one of Caesar's likely purposes in this work, namely proving the necessity of conquest to justify his extraordinary proconsular command. The orthodox view that Caesar drew on Posidonius for his ethnographic material, has been questioned by Malitz, who notes that 'Der Beweis [my italics] von Caesars Kenntnis der Historien ist aber nicht so einfach'.\textsuperscript{51} It is unlikely that Caesar had not read Posidonius, but if this is so, the question remains, why he does not draw on him for the \textit{BG} (at least, not clearly enough for the debt to be conclusively identifiable). Caesar may well have been influenced by Posidonius' attempt to explain in philosophical terms why the Roman conquest of other peoples was a good to be desired (provided that the right kind of warfare was espoused).\textsuperscript{52} The reason why he does not draw conspicuously on

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{50}For a discussion of Caesar's portrayal of Ariovistus as the aggressor, also in somewhat defensive terms, see Walser, \textit{Caesar und die Germanen} 21: the influence of national pride is surely at work here.}


\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{52}Cf. Polyb. 6.51-6, with Walbank I, 735-743, for analysis of the relationship between political organisation, \textit{mores} and military achievement (comparing Rome and Carthage).}
Posidonius here must be related to the nature of Commentarii as a genre. It would be inappropriate for such works to show citation of, or obvious reliance on, external sources: the BG carries conviction by its status as an autopsy report-style account.

Like Livy and Sallust, Caesar combines admiration of the simple bravery of barbarian races with an urbane and detached reaction against their essential primitiveness. The same tension is present in Tacitus' Germania, which is not (as has been suggested) a picture of 'the virtues of unspoilt barbarism...to throw into strong relief...the blemishes of contemporary Roman civilisation': Anderson is right to reject the thesis that it was composed for a particular historical occasion; but part of the support for this notion comes from a theme which throws some light on Caesar's purposes:

The manner in which German and Roman life are contrasted...was calculated to bring home to the Roman mind that abundant man-power, strict morality, untamed passion for freedom, and the warlike spirit fostered by their whole manner of life combined to make the Germans the most redoubtable foes...This impression would be strengthened by the description of the individual tribes - their great number, their diversity of character.... (xi)

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55 See also R.F. Thomas, Lands and Peoples in Roman Poetry (Camb. Phil. Soc. Suppl. 7, 1982), 124-130.
Portrayal of the courage and warlike virtues of the enemy, then, is essentially responsive and reactive rather than absolute. The character of such peoples, within its narrative context, is used as a foil to enhance or highlight particular aspects of the Roman military character. So when Caesar stresses that one or another tribe is great in virtus because of the absence of culture and luxury, the reader is perhaps meant to perceive a degree of moral challenge to Rome herself; but the focus remains on the magnitude of threat, more than the possibility of Roman defeat. So also when Livy highlights Hannibal’s excellence as a commander, it is not so much to offer a moral challenge to Roman leaders as to play up Rome’s danger. It is an important distinction.

It was noted above that reputation for bravery is a key factor in the presentation of the Gauls and Germans: Caesar also independently distinguishes the various Gallic tribes according to their bravery, seemingly in such a way as to suggest the validity of his categories. At the beginning he states that of all the Gauls the Belgae are fortissimi:

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57Tacitus, e.g. in his use of libertas in the Agricola, does include elements of both threat and moral challenge. By the fourth decade, Livy is also combining the two: but the point holds true for Caesar. See esp. Fr. 284E-K [= Seneca Epist. 90.5] for the Golden Age ideal that ‘Officium erat imperare, non regnum’: cf. Frr. 257, 265-7, 271, 273-4E-K; with H. Strasburger, ‘Poseidonios on the Problems of the Roman Empire’ JRS 55 (1965) 40-53. Posidonius’s views on empire may have influenced Caesar’s portrayal of his dealings with Rome’s enemies.
Similarly the Helvetii are remarkable for *virtus* among the Gauls:

Qua de causa Helvetii quoque reliquos Gallos virtute praecedunt, quod fere cotidianis proeliis cum Germanis contendunt.... (1.1.4)

The spectre of the Germans is thus linked to the Gallic enemies from the beginning in the reader’s mind, to prepare for impending conflicts.59 The Helvetii are dealt with first (1.1-30) and are afterwards only mentioned in passing (1.40.7; 4.10.3; 6.25.2; 7.75.3): but when Caesar attempts the subjection of the Belgae (2.1.1-15.2), he has to face their fiercest tribe, the Nervii (2.15-32):

Nullum aditum esse ad eos mercatoribus; nihil pati vini reliquarumque rerum ad luxuriam pertinentium inferri, quod eiis rebus relanguescere animos eorum et remitti virtutem existimarent: esse homines feros magnaque virtutis; increpitare atque incusare reliquos Belgas, qui se populo Romano dedidissent patriamque virtutem proiecissent; confirmare sese...[sc. nullam] condicionem pacis accepturos. (2.15.3-5)

Greater emphasis on the *virtus* of the Nervii is appropriate to the greater threat which they pose: their attack on Q. Cicero almost ends in disaster (5.38-48, cf. 56; 6.2-3).

The bravery of the Helvetii is used to stress both the potential threat posed and the superiority of the Romans who

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58 Here lack of luxury goods enforces the absence of cultus, while the Nervii deliberately reject them (see below).

59 A point noted by J.F. Drinkwater, Roman Gaul: the three provinces, 58 B.C.–A.D. 260 (London and Sydney 1983), 16: the first chapter (1-34) is a useful introduction to Gallic affairs and Caesar’s impact on them.
overcome it. At 1.26.2, it is vividly described, 'aversum hostem videre nemo potuit', but they are quickly compelled to surrender (1.27.1): Caesar's treatment of them, which is wisely lenient (1.27.3-28.5), again hints at future trouble with the Germans ('ne propter bonitatem agrorum Germani qui trans Rhenum incolunt e suis finibus in Helvetiorum finis transient', 1.28.4), and prepares for controversial future action. When he exemplifies Nervian virtus, his narrative reveals how (a) enemy bravery is used to underline (b) the magnitude of Roman success:

(a) Hostes, etiam in extrema spe salutis, tantam virtutem praestiterunt ut, cum primi eorum ceccidissent, proximi iacentibus insisterent atque ex eorum corporibus pugnarent...ut non nequiquam tanta virtutis homines iudicari deberet ausos esse transire latissimum flumen, ascendere altissimas ripas, subire iniquissimum locum; quae facilia ex difficilimis animi magnitude redegerat.  
(b) Hoc proelio facto et prope ad internecionem gente ac nomine Nerviorum redacto.... (2.27.3-28.1)

The motif of soldiers standing on the bodies of the fallen to continue the fight reappears much later (at the siege of Avaricum in 52 B.C.), and once more shows a narrative shift from (a) enemy bravery to (b) defeat:

(a) Accidit inspectantibus nobis quod dignum memoria visum praetereundum non existimavimus. Quidam ante portam oppidi Gallus...scorpione ab latere dextro trajectus exanimatusque concidit. hunc ex proximis unus iacentem transgressus eodem illo munere fungebatur;...alteri successit tertius et quartus; nec prius ille est...relictus locus quam...finis est pugnandi factus. (b) Omnia experti Galli, quod res nulla successerat...consilium ceperunt ex oppido profugere.... (7.25.2-26.1)\(^{60}\)

\(^{60}\)For the refusal to retreat, cf. 7.62.7, 'Ne eo quidem tempore quisquam loco cessit, sed circumventi omnes interfectique sunt'.

74
Like anecdotes of extraordinary virtus, the absence of trade and luxury goods is a theme common to Gauls and Germans: the discovery that the Nervii admit no mercatores, vinum, or luxuria (and are thus ‘homines feros magnaeque virtutis’) is paralleled by the example of the Suebi, highlighted at the beginning of book 4, which is worth quoting at length:

Sueborum gens est longe maxima et bellicosissima Germanorum omnium...Neque agri cultura nec ratio atque usus belli intermittitur. Sed privati ac separati agri apud eos nihil est...Neque multitum frumento sed maximam partem lacte atque pecore vivunt, multumque sunt in venationibus; quae res et cibi genere et cotidiana exercitacione et libertate vitae, quod a pueris nullo officio aut disciplina assuefacti nihil omnino contra voluntatem faciant...et vires alit et immani corporum magnitudine homines efficit. Mercatoribus est aditus magis eo ut quae bello ceperint quibus vendant habeant, quam quo ullam rem ad se importari desiderent. Vinum ad se omnino importari non sinunt, quod ea re ad laborem ferendum remollescere homines atque effeminari arbitruntur. (4.1.3-9, 2.1, 6)

Almost all of these characteristics are perceived as positive and therefore threatening: only their refusal to accept officium and disciplina gives the reader reassurance about the threat they pose. As for the restrictions on private agriculture, wine and trade which are common to Gauls and Germans, and explained in similar terms (remollescere, effeminari, relanquescere), the bans on wine and trade are relatively straightforward (morally-positive markers), but agriculture is more problematic. The notion that, as a civilisation marker, it has a weakening influence on valour stands out among these peoples, but this has to be integrated with the strong appeal of the image of the Roman citizen-
soldier-farmer attested in Livy, Horace, Virgil and elsewhere, and eloquently praised by Cicero: 61

Venio nunc ad voluptates agricolarum...quae...mihi ad sapientis vitam proxime videntur accedere. Mea quidem sententia haud scio an nulla beatior possit esse...quod hominum generi universo cultura agrorum est salutaris.... (de Senect. 51, 56)

The fact that the Gauls of the Province do practise agriculture, the Germans and Britons less so, and that the non-agricultural peoples present a fiercer threat, would seem to suggest that Caesar opts for the weakening-influence model. But the presence or otherwise of agriculture alone cannot explain this presentation: the key lies in its combination with other factors, chiefly the lack of settled or fortified habitation and the absence of disciplina. 62 The Germans, for example, live 'lacte, caseo, carne', and have no permanent land holdings lest studium belli give way to agri cultura: they build no homes either, in order to maintain their duritia (6.22). 63 Among the Britons too, those living near Cantium (and therefore closest to civilisation) are humanissimi, much

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61 See Livy 3.26.6-12, with Ogilvie, Comm. 441-2 (cf. Dionysius 10.17.3; Cicero, de Senect. 56); Virgil, Geo. 2.458-540 (with Thomas, The Georgics of Virgil: a commentary I, 244-5; R.A.B. Mynors, Virgil: Georgics (Oxford 1990) 162-177; Horace, Sat. 2.6. Whether the focus is on labor as a proof of virtus or on retirement in the country as a rejection of city life, the view of agriculture itself is morally-positive.

62 For similar reasons, Caesar stresses the presence of factiones and internal politicking among the Gauls and Germans.

like Gauls, while further inland the men are said not to sow corn, 'lacte et carne vivunt pellibusque sunt vestiti'.

The primitive nature of these enemy peoples is taken for granted by Caesar, and curiosities such as human sacrifice among the Gauls are pointed out as gory and fascinating proof (6.16). Of a piece with this is their treatment of the young and their attitude to warfare. Of the Gauls, Caesar says (6.18.3) that children may not approach their fathers until they are old enough to provide the munus militiae (6.18.3). Likewise the Germans practise labor and duritia from a young age, and spend their time 'in venationibus atque in studiis rei militaris' (6.21.3). Rambaud notices a distinction between the treatment of the Gauls and Germans, the one 'relativement policée, hiérarchisée', the other 'primitive, où le semi-nomadisme est de rigeur et la constitution politique, inexistante' (334-5), and concludes:

En réalité, le contraste entre les Gaulois et les Germains implique une conclusion militaire: les Germains sont plus valeureux et plus redoutables.... (337)

As well as these descriptions of the society and customs of the enemy peoples, in which there is at least a tension between virtue and primitiveness, there are instances of Gallic behaviour which are treated as straightforwardly primitive, barbarian in our sense. Caesar describes, for example, a Gallic custom for the initium belli: when all the puberes armati meet, the last to arrive is tortured to death

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64 For hunting as military training for Romans, see Cic. de nat. deor. 2.64: Hor. Sat. 2.2.10-11; 4.1.8-9 (quoted above): cf. Epist. 1.18.45-9.
in front of the others, to promote readiness to serve in battle. No doubt the reader is meant to think it far preferable to fight for the safety of populus Romanus. Another remarkable example is that of Critognatus, an Arvernan of noble birth and great auctoritas, who, during the siege of Alesia in 52 B.C. makes a long speech (all the more striking in O.R.), persuading his fellows that the only way out of their difficulties is cannibalism (7.77-8). Caesar claims to record it because of its 'singularem et nefariam crudelitatem': when Critognatus accuses his hearers of 'animi... mollitia, non virtus' (for being reluctant to carry out his plan), there is implied an essential difference between Roman and Gaul, centred not on the innate character of the men, but on qualities of leadership and command.

The depiction of the distinctive characteristics of the Gauls and Germans by Caesar is, as the passage describing the Suebi showed, firmly linked to a perception of the otherness of their way of life. Anecdotes of their bravery or savagery, self-sacrifice, cowardice or volatility, all betray an awareness of this sense of an alien culture. The point is perhaps best made by comparison with Livy, who, as we shall see in Chapter IV, depicts the Carthaginians, and the milites in particular, with almost no distinctive detail: for Punic civilisation was not perceived as inferior to Roman.

(d) Subordinates
Caesar mentions fewer than fifty soldiers by name in the BG, usually his legati. His treatment of the centurions (less than ten of whom are named) is more complex, and insufficiently appreciated by Rambaud, who fails to see the centurion-theme in its historiographical context. Instead he associates the centurions closely with the milites legionarii as a vehicle for Caesar 'faire briller sa propre vaillance' Déformation 243-245). Nor does he give proper weight to the unique moral status of the centurions: he gives, for example, no single discussion of Caesar's accounts of the senior centurion of the Twelfth, P. Sextius Baculus, though he is mentioned three times by name for conspicuous bravery, and therefore intentionally and unusually highlighted. Baculus is first mentioned at 2.25 (in one of the longest periodic sentences of the BG: 2.25.1-2 = 17 lines of O.C.T.), when in the course of the battle against the Nervii, the men of the Twelfth find themselves in difficulties:

...omnibus fere centurionibus aut vulneratis aut occisis, in his primipilo P. Sextio Baculo, fortissimo viro, multis gravibusque vulneris confecto....

Later, when Caesar sends Galba and the Twelfth to open a passage over the Alps and the Romans are in danger, Baculus goes to Galba (with Volusenus, a tribune) to advise a sortie (which succeeds, 3.5.3). In naming him, Caesar reminds the

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65 See Rambaud, Déformation 295-301.
66 See Dorey, Caesar 77-8.
67 For the figures given here, and for Caesar's portrayal of this figure, see T. Horn, 'P. Sextius Baculus' GR 8 (1961) 180-183.
reader that he has mentioned him before, 'Baculus, primi pili centurio, quem Nervico proelio compluribus confectum vulneribus diximus' (3.5.2). His action works as a proof of what Caesar claimed earlier, that his men could take the initiative:

Superioribus proeliis exercitati quid fieri oporteret non minus commode ipsi sibi praescribere quam ab aliis doceri poterant. (2.20.3)

It is not, however, until the summer of 53 B.C. that Baculus's virtus is shown in action, and again Caesar remarks that he has been mentioned before, 'cuius mentionem superioribus proeliis fecimus' (6.38.1). With Caesar away in pursuit of Ambiorix, and Q. Cicero nearly causing disaster at Atuatuca, the Sugambri make an attack: although ill, Baculus leaves his tent to guard the gate:

Inermis ex tabernaculo prodit; videt imminere hostes atque in summo esse rem discrimine: capit arma a proximis atque in porta constitit. (6.38.2)

The borrowing of weapons mirrors Caesar's own actions at 2.25.2: his bravery inspires others first to emulate and then to save him, and this encourages the defence:

Consequuntur hunc centuriones eius cohortis... paulisper una proelium sustinent. Relinquit animus Sextium gravibus acceptis vulneribus: aegre per manus tractus servatur. Hoc spatio interposito reliqui sese confirmant tantum ut in munitionibus consistere audeant speciemque defensorum praebent. (6.38.3-4)

No more is heard of this centurion whom Caesar evidently admired: nor is it clear why he, rather than any other, is so conspicuously singled out. If there was some special motive, it cannot now be recovered: on the other hand, on each occasion on which Baculus is named, his actions clearly
conform to a type of selfless leadership unique to centurions in Roman historiography. However impressive a soldier Baculus may have been, the intended moral is more general: it helps to counter any ominous impression which Gallic success may have given, and hence to reassures the reader of ultimate victory.

Though mentioned with less conspicuous praise, other centurions are deployed in a similar way, their individual gallant actions saving a desperate situation. During the invasion of Britain, when the Romans, in their fear, hesitate to press the advantage their commander’s tactics have won for them, the _aguilifer_ of the Tenth suddenly prays to the gods ‘ut ea res legioni feliciter eveniret’ (4.25.3) and then, in the first _O.R._ speech of the _BG_, urges his comrades to follow him, unless they wish to desert the _aquila_. Anxious to avoid _dedecus_, they do follow, and the danger is averted. His prayer, naturally, is for the legion’s safety rather than his own.

During the great Gallic revolt, when the town of Noviodunum first capitulates, then revokes its decision, the centurions trapped inside the town find themselves in danger but manage to fight their way out, and save their men, without a casualty (7.12.6). Their bravery, like the _caveat_ with which Caesar introduces the story (‘ut celeritate reliquas res conficeret, qua pleraque erat consecutus’, 7.12.2), acts as a compensation for the possibility that Caesar acted unwisely in 

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68 At 5.37.5-6, another _aguilifer_, L. Petrosidius, does his best to ensure the eagle’s safety, then dies _fortissime pugnans_. The _aguilifer_ of the Tenth does not die, which may partly explain his not earning a mention by name.
believing in their capitulation. At Gergovia, however, when disobedience is shown to bring disaster, a centurion pays the price of his misdirected studium pugnandi: the description of the death of M. Petronius is both an admission of responsibility and a narrative reassurance of Roman superiority. Narrative reassurance will emerge as a crucial part of narrative explanation in Livy. It is a means of controlling potential unease on the reader’s part; perhaps, as here, through reminders of superiority of character, by the deployment of familiar markers of moral excellence at times of military difficulty (which portend ultimate success), or, as often in Livy, by more direct reference to future events. Petronius is fatally wounded while warding off the Gauls at the gate: he calls to his men not to put their lives at risk trying to save him:

A multitudine oppressus ac sibi desperans, multis iam vulneribus acceptis, manipularibus suis, qui illum secuti erant, "Quoniam," inquit, "me una vobiscum servare non possum, vestrae quidem certe vitae prospiciam, quos cupiditate gloriae adductus in periculum deduxi...". (7.50.4)

The realisation that he has no hope of survival is both admitted by himself and remarked upon by Caesar: when it is linked first with the loyalty of his men to himself, and then with his determination to save them, it is a powerful expression of the selfless nature of Roman virtus, for which no Gallic equivalent is ever offered. Petronius’s admission of blame, of motivation by a desire for gloria, likewise plays up this positive interpretation of a negative event. To shift the narrative focus still further from his own loss of
control, Caesar remains with Petronius and his men a little longer:

Simul in medios hostes irrupit duobusque interfectis reliquos a porta paulum summovit. Conantibus auxiliari sui, "Frustra," inquit, "meae vitae subvenire conamini, quem iam sanguis viresque deficiunt. Proinde abite, dum est facultas, vosque ad legionem recipite." Ita pugnans post paulum concidit ac suis saluti fuit. (7.50.5-6)

This compensatory function, the use of centurions for narrative reassurance through the display of a type of bravery governed by no ties of blood and conditioned by no hope of reward, will re-emerge in Livy's accounts of the great defeats in 21-22.69

The Roman military ideal as it is evoked here stresses a need for co-operation between commander and men, rather than competition for individual pre-eminence. In Caesar, individual excellence is not allowed to triumph over the common weal, unless the circumstances are exceptional. One such case is the story of rivalry between two centurions, which Caesar relates with every appearance of both tolerance and pride (5.44). It is conspicuously located in the middle of the siege of Q. Cicero’s camp, a siege which becomes, instead of a simple source of threat, a backdrop for the display of extraordinary courage. Pullo and Vorenus are ‘fortissimi viri, centuriones’, who quarrel every year about promotion. When Pullo challenges Vorenus (in O.R.) and runs extra munitiones into the thick of the enemy line, he is soon

69Cf. 5.35.6 (T. Balventius; Q. Lucanius ['fortissime pugnans']), 37.6 (L. Petrosidius ['fortissime pugnans']). The occasion of the defeat of Sabinus's army by the Eburones (in 54 B.C.) is an obvious location for narrative reassurance anecdotes.
surrounded, at which point Vorenus comes to the rescue. When Vorenus is himself surrounded, Pullo rescues him in turn: both escape unhurt, 'compluribus interfectis summa cum laude sese intra munitiones recipiunt' (5.44.12). Caesar chooses this moment to make one of his rare generalisations:

Sic fortuna in contentione et certamine utrumque versavit, ut alter alteri inimicus auxilio salutique esset neque diiudicari posset, uter utri virtute anterendus videretur. (5.44.13)

Vorenus responded initially ' omnium veritus existimationem' (5.44.5): the stress on their hostility to one another (through repetition of inimicus (5.44.9, 13) only makes their loyalty more remarkable: they win the acclaim of summa laus mainly because their sortie is successful ('compluribus interfectis', 5.44.12), but also because their action endangers no-one but themselves.

(e) Caesar as leader

Whether or not Rambaud is right about the 'propagandist' purpose of the BG, there can be no doubt of its persuasive power: the reader is effectively convinced that without the personal presence of Caesar, operations would have failed in Gaul, and the provincia, perhaps Italy itself, would have been put at risk.\(^70\) The bravery of the soldiers, far from challenging this view, confirms it: there is no suggestion that general of any quality in command of the same men could have achieved the same results. The defeat of Cotta and Sabinus, the near-defeat of Q. Cicero and the disaster at

\(^70\)For a full discussion of Caesar's techniques of persuasion, see Déformation 177-242.
Gergovia are only the most conspicuous proofs that the excellence of character of the Roman miles is leadership dependent.

Caesar constantly stresses that Populus Romanus is the source of all authority and every action: it is against the Roman People that the Gauls are fighting, not against Caesar Imperator. Rambaud is right to begin his book by discussing the dating and publication of the Commentarii, for Caesar's self-presentation and indeed his reasons for writing at all must surely be connected in some way with the political tensions of the fifties and forties: there will always be disagreement on the matter, though Rambaud has made the separate publication thesis more difficult to defend. His illustration of the political themes of the BG is similarly persuasive and needs no lengthy discussion.

A few points are nonetheless worth noting. Firstly, stress on populus Romanus is particularly prominent in the

71 See Déformation, 7-12 (bibliography cited nn.6-8): cf. 403-5: Adcock, Caesar 19-20. See also H. Gesche (791)-(804) ('Abfassungszeit'). It will already be clear that the 'annually-published military report' theory finds no favour here. This is not the place for lengthy justification of this viewpoint, except to say: (i) that arguments for annual publication based on detection of a shift in Caesar's style cannot prove that the present text is not a combination of contemporary and later arrangements of material; (ii) that arguments for the same based on connections between sections of text and political events at Rome with the same notional dates are open to a similar objection; (iii) that the text does not respond well to being treated as a factual military report (and disappoints the historian who makes the attempt), but is capable of coherent, consistent analysis in terms of narrative explanation (such as is offered here on the assumption that a shift in style may have been intended to mark the increased intensity of the Gallic threat).

72 See Déformation 264-293: for the theme of clementia Caesaris (= 283-293), see below on the BC.
opening chapters of the BG. The original revolt is described as a rejection of amicitia populi Romani (1.3.5), the tribes are unfriendly to populus Romanus (1.6.3, 10.2) and Caesar turns back the Helvetii on grounds which remind the reader that he is aware of its control of his scope for action, 'negat se more et exemplo populi Romani posse iter...per provinciam dare' (1.8.3). Likewise, a victory for the Helvetii is emphasised to be a 'calamitas populo Romano' (1.12.6, 13.7; cf. 1.14.1): Caesar then shows himself the avenger of populus Romanus. By such means he shows his own awareness of where sovereignty really lies, at the same time suggesting that he is the only man capable of defending it.

The conjunction of Caesar’s honour with that of populus Romanus is first, and characteristically, made explicit at 1.33, when he has to decide whether to protect the Aedui, Rome’s allies:

Aeduos fratres consanguineosque...in servitute...Germanorum teneri...intellegebat; quod in tanto imperio populi Romani turpissimum sibi et rei publicae esse arbitrabatur...Germanos consuescere Rhenum transire et in Galliam magnum multitudinem venire populo Romano periculosum videbat. (1.33.2-3)

It is worth noting in passing that although dishonour concerns both, danger is only mentioned as relevant to populus Romanus, which thereby implies his lack of concern for his personal safety. The conjunction is made in such a way as to suggest he views himself merely as the agent of the Populus, while still making clear to the reader the vital nature of his role. When he decides to bridge the Rhine (4.16ff., 55 B.C.), he claims to choose this method of crossing on the grounds that it is more appropriate for the dignitas both of himself and of
the Roman people: similarly he claims that the invasion of Britain (4.20ff.), is an attempt to win more peoples to fides populi Romani, but the lasting fame for the exploit belongs to himself and to his men. 73 Caesar's claim to defence of his dignitas in the BC rests on such exploits.

The theme of the Cimbri and Teutones is handled with similar sensitivity. They are several times recalled as a former threat to the Roman people: 74 Caesar himself refers to them as a parallel for Ariovistus in an O.O. speech at 1.33.4, and again at 1.40.5, this time bringing the figure of Marius into the picture. The magnitude of the threat they posed is independently confirmed by the Belgae (2.4.2). 75 He does not point out the family connection between himself and Marius, but the parallel is clearly implied, with all its justificatory consequences with regard to the length of his command and his popular stance. 76 Cicero makes explicit what Caesar does not:

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75 Cf. 2.29.4; 7.77.12-14. See Rambaud, La Guerre des Gaules, Livres II et III (P.U.F.) 2.4.1n., 'César rappelle le souvenir de cette invasion pour suggérer que ses exploits égalent ceux de Marius, dont il gardait le souvenir'.

76 On the supplicatio as a reminder of his publicly-acknowledged achievements, see Rambaud, Déformation 2.35.4n.. See also Plut. Caes. 5-6, 19. For the popular nature of Marius's army reforms, see Sall. BJ 86.3, with Keppie, The making of the Roman army 61-63: E. Gabba (tr. P. J. Cuff), Republican Rome: the Army and the Allies (Oxford 1973) 1-19 [= 'Le origini dell'esercito professionale in Roma: i proletari e la riforma di Mario', Athenaeum 27 (1949), 173-209].

87
Bellum Gallicum, patres conscripti, C. Caesare imperatore gestum est, antea tantum modo repulsum. ...

...Ipse ille C. Marius...influentis in Italiam Gallorum maximas copias repressit, non ipse ad eorum urbis sedisque penetravit. (de prov. cons. 32)\textsuperscript{77}

The presence, imagined presence or regretted absence of Caesar provides more than unity or continuity in the narrative: all actions focus on him and depend upon him for success. The stress on his omniscience and control is unrelenting: when the Nervii attack, everything depends on him, 'Caesari omnia uno tempore erant agenda' (2.20.1); he knows the centurions by name, 'centuriones nominatim appellatis' (2.25.2); he takes a pride in ensuring their safety, on one occasion boasting that not one ship bearing milites was lost (5.23.3), and on another abandoning the chance of rooting out the Eburones, preferring to let Gauls be killed instead:

\begin{quote}

Omnis [finitimas civitates] ad se vocat spe praedae ad diripiendos Eburones, ut potius in silvis Gallorum vita quam legionarius miles periclitetur. (6.34.8)
\end{quote}

As often as Caesar proclaims his own intentions, so also does he allow them to surface through the reactions of others, most often his own soldiers. The stress on his special relationship with the Tenth evidences both points of view, the former e.g. at 1.40.14, the latter at 4.25.3 ('ego certe meum rei publicae atque imperatoris officium praestitero').\textsuperscript{78} While he expects to be able to depend on his men, he also expects

\textsuperscript{77}See H.E. Butler, M. Cary (edd.) M. Tulli Ciceronis de prov. cons. oratio (Oxford 1924) n. ad loc.: they link Cicero's words to the early days of the Gallic command, and the threat posed by Ariovistus.

\textsuperscript{78}See 1.40-42; 2.21, 23, 25-6; 7.47, 51, discussed above.
them to depend upon him: Q. Cicero’s inferiority is marked by his lack of trust, ‘diffidens de numero dierum Caesarem fidem servaturum’ (6.36.1). The result is timor among the men, ‘quem timorem Caesaris adventus sustulit’.79

Willingness to lead from the front, to use calculated personal bravery to inspire the men is another topos mobilised by Caesar to highlight his own centrality in the narrative. Livy uses it at 30.12.1 in negative fashion: when the morally-inferior Syphax tries to rally his men by these means, he fails:

Ibi Syphax, dum obequitat hostium turmis si pudore, si periculo suo fugam sistere posset,...opprimitur capiturque et vivus...ad Laelium pertrahitur.

Pudor and periculum are the foci of the topos: soldiers may rally through fear of the shame of failure, or through the desire to protect some object of their loyalty (commonly a commander or a signum). When, in an early engagement with the Helvetii, he has all the horses sent away, the action is depicted as calculated to harden the men’s resolve:

Caesar primum suo, deinde omnium ex conspectu remotis equis, ut aequato omnium periculo spem fugae tolleret. (1.25.1)80

It also emphasises his personal courage. It may be that the source of Plutarch’s very similar anecdote of Sulla is the Dictator’s Res Gestae, which would make the parallel more

79 Cf. 7.56, when the difficulty of crossing the Loire is outweighed by the danger hanging over Labienus and his men.

80 Cf. Xen. Anab. 7.3.44-45: Plutarch records the same anecdote of Caesar (Caes. 18.3), with stress on his confidence in victory; cf. Crass. 11.8-9 (Sertorius), Sulla 21.2 (Sulla combines abandoning his horse and seizing a standard). The parallel with Sallust BC 59.1 was discussed in the Introduction.
intriguing: in any case, the inadequacy of treating Caesar in isolation is further underscored. Certainly it is clear from Suetonius that the same themes could be described in less attractive terms:

Inclinatam aciem solus saepe restituit obsistens fugientibus retinensque singulos et contortis faucibus convertens in hostem et quidem adeo plerumque trepidos, ut aquilifer[o] moranti et cuspide sit comminatus, alius in manu detinentis reliquerit signum. (Suet. DJ 62) 81

Caesar’s action at 1.25 is successful. Likewise his seizing of a shield leads to renewed spes, as the men strive to acquit themselves well in conspectu imperatoris (2.25.2-3).

The inferior military skill of his subordinates, as was noted earlier, contributes to an overall impression of Caesar’s unique ability to resolve the Gallic problem: the handling of this inferiority, however, may vary widely according to his wider narrative purpose. 82 The case of one P. Considius, a man ‘rei militaris peritissimus’ who had served under Sulla and Crassus, shows Caesar as an understanding commander, a long way from the man who uses force to produce loyalty reported by Suetonius and Plutarch. Because of fear, Considius erroneously reports that the enemy has taken control of a position which is in fact in Labienus’ hands; Caesar is full of regret that he has ruined a fine military record, timore perterrimit (1.22.1-5). On the other

81See Butler and Carey, Suetonius: Divus Iulius (Oxford 1927) 62n.. His seizing of reluctant soldiers by the throat is reported by Plutarch (Caes. 52.3); cf. Appian (2.95), Val. Max. (3.2.19).

82Labienus is only slightly less talented than Caesar himself: but his problematic presentation is discussed in the next Chapter.
hand, Caesar's narrative treatment of Sabinus in book 5 is a sustained indictment of his folly, his incompetence and finally his cowardice. He is given the second O.R. speech in the BG, in which he appears to address Cotta and the centurions, but is in fact attempting to influence the men:

"Vincite," inquit, "si ita vultis," Sabinus, et id clariore voce, ut magna pars militum exaudiret.... (5.30.1) 83

His culpability is reinforced by the independently related (and, in itself, laudably conscientious) reaction of the men:

Consumitur vigiliis reliqua pars noctis, cum sua quisque miles circumspiceret... Omnia excogitantur, quare nec sine periculo maneantur et languore militum et vigiliis periculum augeatur. (5.31.4-5)

The use of the soldiers' actions as an independent judgment on their commander is a sustained theme in Livy, who likewise feels no need to explain how he knew what they were thinking. The point is emphasised by a contrast with Cotta, who by behaving as Caesar would himself, is justified by the narrative:

In appellandis cohortandisque militibus imperatoris et in pugna militis officia praestabat. (5.33.2)

The Livian theme of tension between consuls is here worked out in miniature in the persons of two of his subordinates. There can be little doubt of the dire consequences of disputed leadership. 84

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83 The first is at 4.25; see J. Schlichter, 'Caesar's narrative style', CPh 31 (1936) 212-24.

84 E.g. 21.52-3 (Sempronius and Scipio); 22.27 (Fabius [Dictator] and Minucius [Master of Horse], resolved 22.29); 22.43-4 (Paullus and Varro): all discussed in detail below. Cf. 33.22-4 (Minucius and Cornelius).
(f) Enemy leaders

Techniques of manipulation in the portrayal of enemy generals have been covered in detail by Rambaud, with particular reference to Vercingetorix. He points out the unique prominence given to Vercingetorix over all the other leaders by repetition of his name (303-4), and draws attention (304) to an important narrative reason for this:

Dans les Commentaires, Vercingétorix a sur les autres Gaulois le privilège de l’organisation... Il est donc certain que César a voulu montrer dans Vercingétorix un parfaite capitaine et son principal adversaire.

Vercingetorix is a new and greater danger. The threats uttered against Caesar by Ariovistus, king of the Suebi, at 1.44.10-11 were undercut by his earlier assimilation to the type of the miles gloriosus (‘de suis virtutibus multa praedicabant’, 1.44.1). Ariovistus is Caesar’s first great adversary (1.31-53) as Vercingetorix is his last: from his portrayal the reader can see both what aspects of Vercingetorix portend the greatest threat, and what factors give narrative reassurance of ultimate victory.

The first glimpse of Ariovistus is a character-sketch, spoken in 0.0. (1.31.3-16): Caesar does not begin with his own concern to stress the threat posed by the German king, but allows another - the Aeduan Diviciacus - to do it for him:

85 Déformation 301-311; cf.127-130. Caesar’s portrayal of Ariovistus has been treated in similar terms by Walser, Caesar und die Germanen 22.

86 The character of Dumnorix was likewise denigrated when he was described as ‘cupidus rerum novarum, cupidus imperii’ (5.6.11).
Ariovistum autem...superbe et crudeliter imperare, obsides nobilissimi cuiusque poscere, et in eos omnia exempla cruciatusque edere, si qua res non ad nutum aut ad voluntatem eius facta sit. Hominem esse barbarum, iracundum temerarium: non posse eius imperia diutius sustinere. Nisi quid in Caesare populoque Romano sit auxili, omnibus Gallis idem esse faciendum quod Helvetii fecerint.... (1.31.12)

Ariovistus is accused of arrogance, cruelty, torture of hostages, barbarism, anger and rashness. These characteristics will play their part in explaining his defeat: **crudelitas** is backed up at once (1.32.3-4), and arrogance soon afterwards, in his message to Caesar (1.34.2-4: cf. 46.4). But most of all, his rashness in threatening the Roman people (1.36.2) and boasting of his invincibility encourages the reader to look forward to his downfall:

*Cum vellet, congrederetur: intellecturum quid invicti Germani, exercitatissimi in armis, qui inter annos XIIIItectum non subissent, virtute possent.* (1.36.7)

He makes a claim for German superiority in both arms and courage: those claims will play their part in encouraging Caesar’s own men to doubt him (at 1.39), and thus make plain at the start of the BG that such behaviour by an enemy is too dangerous to be tolerated. At the parley between Ariovistus and Caesar, the German is used (as Diviciacus had earlier been) to mouth Roman political criticisms of Caesar’s position, and to undermine them:

*Quod si eum interfecerit, multis sese nobilibus principibusque populi Romani gratum esse facturum: id se ab ipsis per eorum nuntios compertum habere, quorum omnium gratiam atque amicitiam eius morte redimere posset.* (1.44.12)

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87 See 1.47’4-6 on his treatment of hostages.
Caesar makes no reply to this part of the speech: nor does he challenge the enemy's claim to *virtus*. But when finally Ariovistus' boastful claims are seen to be unfounded, military and moral explanations will have converged to make his defeat the deserved and welcome result.

The characterisation of Vercingetorix, however, is more complex, as befits Caesar's portrayal of his revolt in terms of a climax to hostilities in Gaul. As at the beginning of the first book, so at the beginning of Caesar's last the political situation in Rome is linked with the state of affairs in Gaul (7.1.1-3). The coin issues of Vercingetorix reveal a historical leader of power and stature: Caesar depicts him in terms of a Roman type, as the charismatic leader nevertheless doomed to failure. In doing so, he is not necessarily distorting truth: the characterisation of Hannibal by Livy reveals a similar perception that military defeat must depend on moral inferiority. If Vercingetorix's revolt fails, the cause is assumed to lie in his inferiority as a commander,

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88 See 1.52.1-7: in hand-to-hand fighting, Roman courage is highlighted ('Reperti...vulnerarent', 1.52.5), German success attributed to strength of numbers ('Cum hostium...premebant', 1.52.6).

89 Rambaud introduces the problem of his speeches (Déformation 305-6) in terms of a distinction between 'César acteur historique' and 'historiographe': while it is unnecessary to reproduce his arguments at length, he is right that 'literary motives and dramatic interest' prompt this focus on Vercingetorix.

an inferiority which is then constructed in the narrative. So, for example, he is 'summae potentiae adulescens' (7.4.1), and he unites support not by force and threat like Ariovistus, but by appeal to emotive slogans like 'communis libertas' (7.4.4). His realisation, though, of the need for sacrifice of possessions in advocating a scorched earth policy (7.14), is undercut by the reader's prior knowledge that his idea of the severitas appropriate to a commander is torture and disfigurement (7.4.9): his diligentia and imperium mark a greater degree of excellence than Ariovistus, but the contrast with the lenitas of Caesar is still marked. Nor are his supporters impressive ('habet dilectum egentium ac perditorum', 7.4.3: cf. 7.5.1).

At 7.20, he uses O.R. to deceive the Gauls, another pointer to his innate inferiority. Later, Caesar relates with irony how his apparent foresight pleased them so much that the failure at Avaricum magnified, rather than diminishing, his reputation (7.30.3-4). Nonetheless, he does attribute to him the diligentia on which he had earlier remarked, even at the same time as he shows the weakness of Vercingetorix' position through his need to bribe his allies (7.31.1-5). He is perhaps most movingly portrayed in final defeat, when Caesar can afford to be generous:

Postero die Vercingetorix consilio convocato id bellum se suscepisse non suarum necessitatum sed

917.4.4: cf., e.g., 7.66.4 (and the effect, 37.4), 77.14-5, 89.1. Cf. Tac. Agr. 30.1; Ann. 12.34.

92See Adcock, Caesar 66-7. Vercingetorix's O.R. speeches are discussed in the Appendix: when his words offer an unambiguous threat, they are delivered in O.O. (7.66.3-6).
communis libertatis causa demonstrat et, *guoniam sit fortunae cedendum*, ad utramque rem se illis offerre, seu morte sua Romanis satisfacere seu vivum tradere velint. (7.89.1-2)

The inferiority of the Gallic and German leaders is simple both to assume and to illustrate in the BG. Characterisation of enemy leaders conforms to the usual pattern of Roman historiography, as is appropriate to the straightforward situation of foreign leaders and soldiers, pitted against the army and Imperator of *populus Romanus*. It should be remembered, as was shown in the Introduction, that Caesar’s seven-book account of the Gallic wars is necessarily a post-eventum creation: whatever view is taken of the original publication date(s), by the end of 50 B.C. his reader would know the end of the story, and the moral causation factors which he introduces to make explicable these events, and justify his part in them, would be recognised and appreciated as such.

The BG, as it were, has established for Caesar a claim to *dignitas*, which the BC will defend. In the BC, however, the issue of justification is yet more prominent, the characterisation of Caesar’s enemies much more sensitive, and consequently the construction of narrative explanation considerably more complex.
Multum oppugnaverunt me a juventute mea, sed non devicerunt me.¹

(a) Introduction.

The narration of his war against Pompey faces Caesar with peculiar problems of presentation. They centre on a twofold difficulty: as a writer, he had both to present Pompey as distanced from the side of Populus Romanus, and to identify himself with the interests of the same. This latter requirement meant he could not simply reapply his characterisation of the Gauls and Germans to Pompey's soldiers to prove the superiority of his cause. The difficulties of denigrating a Roman enemy needed a more complex and sensitive strategy. This need to avoid criticising Pompey's soldiers forces Caesar to shift the focus of blame: thus when Rambaud analyses both the justificatory nature of the BC (133-151) and the techniques by which this was achieved (e.g. 177-242, 339-358), it becomes easy to dismiss Caesar's presentation as a deliberate distortion of truth. It will be argued here that the emphasis of his argument is once again misleading: this time, the argument will rest on examination of key examples within their narrative context.

The results of Caesar's victory in the civilis dissensio of 50 and after were not necessarily foreseen by him, at least not in the tyrannical terms in which they were later

¹Ps. 128 (Vulg.), 2.
understood. At the very least, he considered his res gestae and the defence of his dignitas adequate and reasonable grounds for crossing the Rubicon: the matter of whether he also believed them does not admit of a conclusion. Moreover, he was not to know that the emergence of the Principate was to make his march into Italy and subsequent Dictatorship appear to posterity in so different a light from the essentially similar actions of Sulla half a century before. This is not to suggest that an equally simplistic acceptance of his narrative at face value is satisfactory, but to stress that the BC is only one side of a constant dialogue of self-justification, and that Caesar’s very success precludes the possibility of a complete understanding of its milieu.

Thus the problem with Rambaud, even more acutely here than in the BG, lies in a failure to put Caesar’s writings in their proper context. It is often said that there was no conception of modern-style party politics in the Roman Republic: but if it is true that ideology has little or no part to play in political divisions, it follows that the terminology of approval and condemnation is not generated by each interest group uniquely, or applied with any degree of

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2See, e.g., Cic. Off. 3.82-3; Suet. DJ 30.5. See also S. Weinstock, Divus Julius (Oxford 1971) 35-6.


consistency. The evaluative terminology applied to a character depends on his political relationship to the person writing of him, rather than to a specialised ideological stance. According to Sallust, a political grouping is amicitia among good men, factio among bad, but the crucial evaluation of quality and degree of goodness or badness in itself is assumed to be obvious. Cicero makes almost the same point at Rep. 3.23, but further exposes the context dependency of political terminology by drawing a distinction between what the men concerned call themselves (optimates) and what they really are (factio). 'What they really are', of course, actually means 'what I Cicero think they really are'. Politicians like Caesar and Clodius figure prominently in the tradition for their alignment with the interests of Populus Romanus, but men like Pompey and Cato also involved themselves in so-called popularis issues like restoration of the tribunate, leges agrariae and corn doles. Consistency and success of championship of popularis issues, or maintenance of an optimate stance, must also be taken into account.


6See, e.g., Cic. Att. 9.7.3 ('Gnaeus noster Sullani regni similitudinem concupivit'); cf. 7.8.4, 9.10.6: also Fam. 7.3.2 ('coepi suadere pacem...cum ab ea sententia Pompeius valde abhorret'); cf. 6.6.6. For Cato as a démerastês, see Dio 37.22.3.

7See further on the popularis/ optimates distinction K. Hanell, 'Bemerkungen zu der politischen Terminologie des Sallustius', Eranos 43 (1945) 263-76, esp. 271-2: Ch. Wirszubski, Libertas as a political Idea at Rome during the late Republic and early Principate (Cambridge 1950) 39-40,
To make the point more clearly, that Caesar's way of describing a civil war is not a uniquely self-interested distortion, but participates in a set of perceptions and political modes of interpretation common to his contemporaries also, it is helpful to look briefly at a near contemporary source, which also attempts to condemn a dangerous opponent in the context of civil war: Cicero's Philippi. Cicero's problem is the same as Caesar's: how to identify his own cause with the interests of Populus Romanus and dissociate that of his enemies; and the portrayal of the soldiers is problematic for both. His speeches, as might be expected from contemporaneous compositions, show more flexibility in their presentation of the issues and betray a greater urgency of argument than is the case in the BC. The remarkable consistency and relative completeness of narrative explanation in the BC owes much to the fact that Caesar's narration is post eventum: there is no place for inconsistency of characterisation of the soldiers or leaders of either side.

The first point, then, which emerges from a consideration of the Philippi in this context is the subtlety of Caesar's


On Cicero's intended audience, see Newbound, 142-155, esp. 143.
narrative method when juxtaposed with Cicero’s tactics. It is a contrast which owes much to the distinction of genre, and to the streamlining of issues and material possible in Roman historiography (how much it owes to the political acumen of either man is not so simple to determine). Cicero does know how to be subtle: in Phil. 1, delivered at a time when he had not committed himself fully to Antony’s condemnation, his approach is careful and sensitive.\textsuperscript{10} In 2-14, however, invective is to the fore: Antony is a gladiator, a latro, with no mitigation of circumstance or character.\textsuperscript{11} At 13.22 he is another Spartacus, while his brother Lucius is a myrmillo (7.17).\textsuperscript{12} Cicero is at pains to present Antony as alienated from Caesar’s cause, as at 2.49, where Antony petitions favours from a Cicero who is in Caesar’s confidence, or 2.71 where Cicero hints at a split between Antony and Caesar (cf.

\textsuperscript{10} See, e.g., 1.2 (‘praecelara...confirmata est.’); 1.11 (‘pauca querar...tuli.’): with 2.6; 5.19. See also Att. 14.13b, Fam. 16.23.2 (but cf. Att. 11.9.1).

\textsuperscript{11} See J.D. Dennistont (ed. and comm.), Orationes Philippicae I, II 2.7n.. Cf. Phil. 2.63; 3.17; 5.31; 6.3. On latro, see 2.6, 9, 62; 4.5 (‘latro et parricida patriae’), 14: cf. latrocinium at 4.15; 12.17; 13.10. See also Cicero’s attacks on Catiline in Mur. 50 and 83, where the term gladiator is clearly expected to delineate one who has forfeited citizen rights and deserves death.

\textsuperscript{12} On L. Antonius as a gladiator, see also 5.20; 12.20: a more positive view emerges in the portrayal of senators as gladiators, on which see Newbound, 40-41: C.W. Wooten, Cicero’s Philippics and their Demosthenic model (Univ. of N. Carolina 1983) 62: on ambivalent attitudes to the gloria and infamia attached to gladiators, see G. Ville, la gladiatur en occident dès les origines à la mort de Domitien (Rome 1981) 334-44. On Antony as a Spartacus or a Catiline, see 4.15: the accusation that one’s opponent is another Spartacus is not confined to Cicero: Antony himself uses it to attack Octavian, according to Phil. 3.21.
2.88). There is no place in Cicero for a posture of goodwill towards his enemy, a fact which suggests the audience for the Phil. was intended to be wider than just the Senate.

Where Antony's soldiers are concerned, Cicero's method of denigration is more careful. The reason for this is clear from 2.59, in which he admits the difficulty of condemning Antony ("difficilis est sane reprehensio et lubrica") without arousing their hostility ("ne apud [sc. veteranos] me in invidiam voces"). Like Caesar, he prefers to shift blame where possible on to their leaders, but unlike him, Cicero clearly reveals his fear of their power and influence. In the BG, spes gloriae and spes praedae emerged as the two main motivations governing the conduct of Roman soldiers in battle. Though both needed careful control by a commander, the former was generally morally positive, the latter occasionally justifiable but regularly inferior. The view of Cicero is much the same: he defines gloria thus:

Est autem gloria laus recte factorum magnorumque in rem publicam meritorum, quae cum optimi cuiusque, tum etiam multitudinis testimonio comprobatur.15

Motivation by gain, on the other hand, is condemned:

Sollicitant homines imperitos Saxa et Cafo, ipsi rustici atque agrestes, qui hanc rem publicam nec viderunt umquam nec videre constitutam volunt, qui

13At 13.1-2 Cicero is critical of Caesar, and admits his own inconsistency of portrayal of one 'cuius acta defendimus, auctorem ipsum iure caesum fatemur'. The point is later amplified, 'acta Caesaris...concordiae causa defendimus' (13.10).

14See, e.g., Phil. 2.59.

15Phil. 1.29, addressing Dolabella and contrasting gloria with the desire for pecunia.
The problem is not that there is no agreement among leading politicians as to the proper aims and motivations of a Roman army: the problem is the apparently infinite flexibility of their attribution. In the *BC*, Caesar attributes to his own soldiers motivation by loyalty to *Res Publica*, while his opponents' are corrupted by the greed of their leaders: and yet Cicero can interpret Antony's imitation of Caesar's actions and his attitude to his men as purest self-interest, and (depending on context) the soldiers themselves as motivated by simple greed. Where Caesar in the *Commentarii* reinterprets his *popularis* stance in politics in terms of a relationship of emotive loyalty between himself and his men, Cicero depicts Antony's attempts to win military support as a straightforward threat. Yet he is noticeably more open about this when speaking before the Senate, as at 1.20, when he condemns and exaggerates Antony's jury proposals. The contrast of presentation between *Phil.* 3 and 4, which relate the same material first to the Senate and then to the people,

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16 See also *Phil.* 8.9-10: but cf. *Phil.* 3.14. The flexibility with which financial inducements could be treated is apparent from *BC* 1.39.3-4, in which both the borrowing and the distribution of money prove Caesar's good judgment, while pledges of reward by Pompey (1.3.2, 3.82.1, etc.) are not shown to be to his narrative advantage.

17 Cf. e.g. *Phil.* 1.6-7: *Fam.* 11.1 (from D. Brutus to M. Brutus, 'adeo esse militum concitatos animos et plebis'); 11.2; 12.2.1 (making clear Antony's adoption of Caesar's *popularis* stance): *Att.* 14.21.2; 15.4.4; 15.5.3. See also *Phil.* 2.25 and Denniston's note on Antony's charges that Cicero was involved in Caesar's murder.

18 Cf. 5.12. Denniston comments on the adroit argument (1.20n.) and on the problem of jury-composition (App. II).
exposes his reluctance to alienate the latter by criticising the soldiers, and his need to win the favour of both. Thus at 3.7 the *legio Martia* is praised (and see below on Corfinium for the justification of mutiny), but at 4.5 the praise is combined with a flattering reflection, 'quae mihi videtur divinitus ab eo deo traxisse nomen, a quo populum Romanum generatum accepimus'.

Before both Senate and people, Cicero tries to claim Antony is a *hostis* as early as December of 44, by presenting the tribunes' convening of the Senate to request an armed guard for the consuls as a declaration of war (3.14; cf. 4 passim). At the same time, he attempts to dissociate Antony from the veterans' interest ('Doletis tris exercitus populi Romani interfecitos: interfecit Antonius'); and to prove that the veterans themselves oppose him. Once a state of *tumultus* has been declared in February of 43, Cicero begins to condemn Antony and his followers as at least *inimici*, and preferably *hostes* (*Phil.* 8.1-10). As hostilities mount, his criticism becomes more open:

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19For a note on the effect of *Phil.* 3, see *Fam.* 10.28.2 (to Trebonius), 'Hic dies meaque contentio atque actio spem primum populo Romano attulit libertatis recuperandae'. The claim that Antony is a 'hostis patriae' is made in *Phil.* 2.2 (cf. 2.51), but this speech was circulated, not delivered (November 44, after Antony's departure for Cisalpine Gaul). On the constitutional problem of Antony's position see Syme, *The Roman revolution* 162, 168, 170.

20On the dissociation, *Phil.* 2.55 (the armies at Pharsalus, Thapsus and Munda: cf. 2.61: 3.4; 13.18, with App. BC 3.43; Dio, 45.13). On veteran opposition to Antony, see *Phil.* 3.6-8.

21E.g., *gladiatores* (2.106; 13.20): *latrones* (2.5, 87; 5.6-7, 18; 6.3; 8.9: 11.10; 12.15).
Quae, malum! est ista ratio semper optimis causis veteranorum nomen opponere? Quorum etiamsi amplectere virtutem, ut facio, tamen si essent adrogantes non possum ferre fastidium. An nos conantes servitutis vincla rumpere impediet, si quis veteranos nolle dixerit?...Quos quidem vos libertatis adiutores complecti debetis, servitutis auctores sequi non debetis. (Phil. 10.18)

This distinction is developed in Phil. 11.37-8, where Antony’s veterans are ‘non milites veterani sed importunissimi hostes’. 22

Cicero is fully aware of the difficulties inherent in describing a civil war (5.26-7): the consequent anomalies are explored in Phil. 10, when he contrasts the armies of Antony and Brutus:

Omnes legiones, omnes copiae, quae ubique sunt, rei publicae sunt;...Omne enim et exercitus et imperium amittit qui eo imperio et exercitu rem publicam oppugnat. Alter...exercitu populi Romani contra ipsum populum Romanum utebatur;...nec vero nos hoc magis videbamus quam ipsi milites a quibus tanta in iudicando prudentia non erat postulanda. (10.12)

His attempt to endow his own side with an aura of constitutional authority, and to condemn his opponents as outlaws who have forfeited their citizen rights is ultimately a failure: it is important to remember that Antony was clearly justifying his own actions in similar terms. 23 The allegiance of the veterans, which Cicero was earlier (e.g. Phil. 3-4) prepared to treat as a proof of his own rectitude, has to be cast aside when the weakness of his position is exposed by

22 See Syme, The Roman revolution 149-161 (political catchwords).

their continuing loyalty to Antony. In Phil. 13, he tries a different argument:

Si enim nos exercitu terret, non meminit illum exercitum senatus populique Romani atque universae rei publicae esse, non suum. (13.14) 24

Criticism of Antony on the grounds that he is treating the Republic’s army as his own is followed up by condemnation of Antony himself as a barbarian tyrant (13.18): most revealing of all in this speech is his response to charges made by Antony in a letter:

[Antony’s accusation] "Milites aut meos aut veteranos contraxistis tamquam ad exitium eorum qui Caesarem occiderant et eosdem nec opinantes ad quaeestoris sui aut imperatoris aut commilitonum suorum pericula impulístis."

[Cicero’s response] Scilicet verba dedimus, decepimus! ignorabat legio Martia, quarta, nesciebant veterani, quid ageretur; non illi senatus auctoritatem, non libertatem populi sequabantur.

(13.33)

The striking inconsistency with 3.5-6 has no parallel in the BC.

Naturally Cicero’s Philippics present a variety of pictures over a period of time. His varied means of condemning his opponent and treating his soldiers may reveal contradictions which he might have expunged later; or they may simply show that he was a different kind of politician from Caesar, perhaps a less astute one. The fragments of Antony’s self-justification noted above (n.23), and the general

24 There is no consistency, however, in his remark that Antony is a ‘latronum et gladiatorum dux’ (13.20). 106
tendency of such propaganda in this period suggest that Cicero is not untypical. 25

In Caesar’s depiction of civil war, this style of presentation of issues and characterisation of sides is integrated in a coherent and causative narrative form: the portrayal of the enemy soldiers is almost wholly sympathetic, and of the commanders considerably more complex than Cicero’s. It was noted above that the weakness of Rambaud’s argument lies more in the interpretation than the collation of material. Thus in matters of detail he is often acute: in his excellent analysis of the portrayal of Pompey’s soldiers (339-343) he points out the strategic use of personal terminology to dissociate Pompey and his supporters from the cause of Populus Romanus (341). Listing examples of soldiers being called Afraniani or Pompeiani, he notes that Caesar never refers to his own men as Caesariani (341). 26 He further remarks that such terms belong ‘au langage familier et militaire’: 27 also that ‘[ils] ne comportaient rien de péjoratif par eux-mêmes’. There is certainly a strategy behind Caesar’s choice of terminology, reminiscent of the propaganda of Cicero in the Philippics: but whether it is a


26 Caesar refers to the men of his own army as nostri, maintaining his practice in the BG, and the regular practice of Roman historiography for denoting Roman soldiers, thus suggesting the legitimacy of his actions.

27 No examples are given: but cf., e.g., Livy 2.59.2 for ‘Fabianus exercitus’ (cf. 2.48.9, a ‘familiare bellum’). For soldiers themselves adopting the name of a battle, see L.J.F. Keppie, ‘A Note on the title Actiicus’, CR 21 (1971) 329-30.
convenience born of conviction that he, and not Pompey, represented Populus Romanus, or a device to disguise his own guilt, is not open to proof. Rambaud could also have pointed out that this sensitivity is not observed by Caesar's continuators: the author of the *B. Afr.*, e.g., refers to 'equites Caesariani' (14.2, 52.2; 66.3), 'remiges Caesariani' (7.5), and '[milites] Caesariani' (13.1, 15.3, 24.3).\(^{28}\) It would appear that in the later tradition, from a position of hindsight in which Caesar would naturally figure as the destroyer, not defender, of the Republic, his own terminological strategy is reversed: *Caesariani* appear frequently enough, but *Pompeiani* rarely outside the *BG*.\(^ {29}\) Caesar's own success, moreover, in illustrating the devotion of his men to himself as well as to Res Publica (though he himself identified the two) may also influence the use of such terminology in the later tradition.

The misleading tendency of Rambaud's argument, on the other hand, can be illustrated by his attitude to Hirtius, who provides the link between the Gallic war and the civil (BG 8.50-55).\(^ {30}\) Where others have attributed inconsistencies in

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\(^{28}\) Cf. *B. Alex.* 59.1; *B. Hisp.* 34.1.


Hirtius' text to a lack of revision, or to bureaucratic incompetence, or to a conflict between technical and artistic considerations, Rambaud is in no doubt that here is evidence of propagandist distortion:

Il devient évident que, fidèle césarien, connaissant les intentions de son chef, il a voulu compléter le camouflage politico-militaire du début de la guerre civile. 31

Calling Hirtius a 'fidèle césarien' is intended to assist the conclusion that he deliberately maintained what he knew to be an organised historical fiction after the death of his chef: but the implication cannot be accepted as it stands. Because he interprets Caesar too much in isolation from his political and ideological milieu, Rambaud is bound to depict Hirtius as merely a faithful tool giving a post-eventum justification of his political master: but his function as a post-Ides of March apologist underlines the fact that neither civilized dissensio nor the issues which provoked it had ended with Caesar’s death (BG 8, Praef. 2; see also above). To write of Hirtius as completing Caesar’s 'camouflage politico-militaire' is to over-simplify both political milieu and issues at stake alike.

In the BG (as in Livy 21-30, though with a slightly different slant) it is necessary to a satisfactory narrative explanation of events that military conquest is matched by moral superiority, that is, by superiority of character. The inferiority of the Gauls, in other words, acts as a

PHW (1941), 128: L.W. Daly, 'Aulus Hirtius and the Corpus Caesarianum', CW 44 (1951) 113-17.

31 Rambaud, Déformation 107 (citing alternative interpretations). See also L.R. Taylor, Party politics 10 (on factio).
justification of Caesar’s actions to his audience. This
notion of narrative reassurance works on two levels: the
reader must be reassured both that the enemy deserves to be
fought (reassurance by negative characterisation); and that
the Romans deserve to win (reassurance by positive
collection). The former tends to appear at moments of
Roman military success, the latter at times of threat or
setback. This is true of leaders as well as their soldiers:
in BG 7, for example, the reader was given predictive
reassurance of the eventual defeat of Vercingetorix by his
assimilation to Roman stereotypes of military failure. In the
BG, the portrayal of enemy leaders and their men is more
sensitive and complex, but the narrative techniques are not
dissimilar. The soldiers of both sides are seen to display
loyalty to Res Publica, but only in Caesar’s case is that
loyalty wholly identified with loyalty to a commander: he
gives negative narrative reassurance, through his
collection of the Pompeian commanders, that their men
are justified in looking to him instead; and positive, through
the implied contrast with himself. As for commanders, Pompey
was clearly no adulescens nobilis, but rather a man of both
military achievement and at times popularis political stance:
thus he is characterised as a proud, calculating, arrogant and
belligerent commander. Caesar depicts himself, on the other
hand, as a charismatic leader of conspicuous personal courage,
who exhibits a constant striving after compromise and peace.32

32This presentation of their military abilities persists
in later scholarship, e.g. Adcock, Caesar, 46, 57-61: H.M.D.
Parker, The Roman legions (Cambridge 1958), 49: R. Seager,
This moral contrast governs the whole of the BC: Caesar’s justification, ultimately, is offered in terms not of constitutional legality but emotive loyalty. His loyalty is to Populus Romanus and Res Publica: and in consequence he can inspire enduring loyalty to himself.

It is not sufficient, therefore, to acknowledge that Caesar’s account of the war contains chronological distortions and factual rearrangement, nor to point out the systematically denigratory characterisation of his opponents. He was criticised even in antiquity for inaccuracy, by Pollio:

Pollio Asinius parum diligenter parumque integra veritate compositos putat, cum Caesar [A] plebraque et quae per alios erant gesta temere crediderit et [B] quae per se, vel consulto vel etiam memoria lapsus perperam ediderit; existimatque rescripturum et correcturum fuisse. (Suet. DJ 56.4)

These words, quoted by Suetonius, presumably come from Pollio’s history of the civil wars, and have been assumed to refer to the BC, for which Pollio was in a position to criticise inaccuracies: certainly the charge that the commentaries in question were written ‘parum diligenter’ is more appropriate to the last three than the first seven. But the point of the criticism is not as straightforward as it appears: ‘parum diligenter’ suggests carelessness, disregard for accuracy; while ‘parum integra veritate’ (especially coupled with ‘consulto’) suggests deliberate distortion.

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33See Rambaud, Déformation 133-151.

34Cf. App. BC 2.82 (on Caesar BC 3.99.4).

35But see Peter, HRR II, lxxxxvii: Rambaud, Déformation 7.
Perhaps the last phrase ('existimat... fuisse') reveals Pollio as being tactful in excusing Caesar's flaws, while the context of the comment - now lost - explained that his own version was more accurate and satisfactory.

Debate of the legal and constitutional questions involved does not suffice to explain Caesar's narrative either: the amount of scholarly debate is in itself an indication that the legality of Caesar's actions in 49 B.C. is not open to proof or refutation. In the narrative, however, the facts that the armies of Pompey contained Roman citizens, and that Caesar either viewed himself, or presented himself, or both, as defender of the rights of Populus Romanus, force the issue of blame and rectitude back onto Pompey and his subordinates. Caesar cannot exploit the assumed inferiority of the enemy, or provide characterisation by cowardice, rashness and incompetence to support it as he had done in the BG. The bravery of his own men, and their willingness to endure labores, are given prominence without corresponding bravery or incompetence on the part of Pompey's men: this illustrates

36 H. Gesche, Caesar (Erträge der Forsch., Bd. 51, Darmstadt 1976) cites thirty articles on the terminal date of Caesar's Gallic command and the consequent political problems, Caesar (1052)-(1081) (= pp. 273-5).

37 J.M. Carter, Julius Caesar: the civil war books I and II (Warminster 1991), 11-12 sees Caesar as looking for a pretext to start a war he had already prepared: M. Gelzer, Caesarpolitician and statesman (tr. Needham, Oxford 1968) 192-94, gives essentially the same intentional interpretation ('The great gamble could now begin; for he was starting a civil war...', 194): Syme, The Roman revolution, 48, talks of 'a constitutional pretext': cf. H. Strasburger, 'Cäsar im Urteil seiner Zeitgenossen', HZ 175 (1953) 243. Adcock, Caesar, 46, is more sympathetic, 'Caesar is an advocate for himself, not wholly scrupulous, but wholly sincere'.

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their superiority as it were by default. When Livy has to combine narrative reassurance of ultimate Roman success in the second Punic war with stress on the magnitude of the threat posed by Carthage, he adopts (in the opening books) a similar policy of silence.

The sensitivity with which Caesar handles the narrative justification of his cause may be illustrated from 1.44, in which he first makes (a) and then explains (b) a claim for the military inferiority of the enemy, in order to compensate for the narrative of his own men’s retreat which then follows:

Genus erat pugnae militum illorum ut {a} magno impetu primo concurrerent, audacter locum caperent, ordines suos non magnopere servarent, rari dispersique pugnarent, si premerentur, pedem referre et loco excedere non turpe existimarent, cum Lusitanis reliquisque barbaris...genere quodam pugnae assuefacti; {b} quod fere fit, quibus quisque in locis miles inveteraverit, ut multum earum regionum consuetudine moveatur. (1.44.1-2)

No explicit moral criticism is made of his Roman opponents, but an implicit contrast is drawn with his own men:

Haec turn ratio nostros perturbavit insuetos huius genere pugnae;...ipsi autem suos ordines servare neque ab signis discedere neque sine gravi causa eum locum quem ceperant dimitti censuerant oportere. Itaque perturbatis antesignanis legio...locum non tenuit atque in proximum collem sese recepit. (1.44.3-4)

This theoretical contrast, between those who fight in ranks and stand their ground, and those who do not, effectively compensates for the fact of the retreat.38 After establishing that the men of Petreius and Afranius do not consider such action dishonourable, Caesar first states ('Ipsi...autem')

38Or obscures it, e.g. for Carter, 1.44.3n.
that his men do not give ground 'sine gravi causa', then notes negatively ("non tenuit") that on this occasion they retreat.

This episode recalls BG 4.24.4, in that in both cases unfamiliar tactics are the cause of his men's fear: here however, because they retreat rather than rallying, he gives prominence first to a morally negative view of enemy tactics. It is paradigmatic of Caesar's problem in the BC, highlighting the flexibility of the miles as a factor in narrative explanation without the complicating factors of national bias and ethnic stereotypes.

(b) The start of the war.

The unfolding of the BC around the central theme of Caesar's popularis stance, beginning with the division of Rome into sides, has been traced by both Rambaud and Carter. 39 There is also a wealth of bibliography on the events of 50/49 B.C., discussing political alignments and military dispositions. 40 The approach used here (as in all the key examples) is to examine the effect of Caesar's version as a synthesis; in other words, showing how the actual construction


of the account contributes to the impression of narrative causation and to the explanation of events.

The line of Caesar’s moral explanation was followed, retrospectively, by Hirtius at the end of book 8 (8.49-55). Caesar’s mind, according to Hirtius, is concentrated on maintaining the fragile loyalty of the Gauls (‘continere in amicitia civitates’, 49.1; amplified in 49.2-3, esp. ‘facile in pace continuit’). The motivation for his actions in 8.50 come from two contrasted sources, first friendship with Antony, and second the need to oppose ‘factio et potentia paucorum’. A contrast between his concern for Gallic peace beyond his own interest, his loyalty and popularity, and the boastful arrogance and scheming of his opponents is obvious.\footnote{Concern for peace, 49.2; loyalty, 50.1-2 (to Antony), 52.2 (to Labienus); popularity, 51.1-3): arrogance, 50.4; scheming, 52.3. See also below on Labienus.}

It was a topos of later comment that Caesar’s own clementia ultimately destroyed him, and the idea may be reflected in Hirtius’s eagerness to show Caesar reluctant to believe in Labienus’s disloyalty (8.52.3).\footnote{See, e.g., Suet. DJ 73-5, with H.E. Butler and M. Carey (ed. and comm.), C. Suetoni Tranquilli Divus Iulius (Oxford 1927) 75.1, 4nn..} Likewise, the belief Hirtius makes Caesar express that ‘liberis sententiis patrum conscriptorum causam suam facile obtineri’ (cf. 8.53) is clearly written with the opening chapters of the BC in mind (e.g. BC 1.2.6). The contrast of presentation is still more marked at 8.52.4:

C. Curio, tribunus plebis, cum Caesaris causam dignitatemque defendendam suscepisset, saepe erat senatui pollicitus, si quem timor armorum Caesaris
laederet, et quoniam Pompei dominatio atque arma non minimum terrem foro inferrent, discederet uterque ab armis...

The language ('causam...defendere') is that of legitimate self-help, but more influential is the implied contrast in timor/terror, and the reminder that Pompey offers the more immediate threat of arma. The last sentence of the book highlights the contrast between belligerence and pacification which is to become a leitmotiv in the BC:

Quamquam nulli erat dubium quidnam contra Caesarem pararetur, tamen Caesar omnia patienda esse statuit, quoad sibi spes aliqua relinquetur iure potius disceptandi quam belligerandi. (BG 8.55.2)

The BC opens with a debate in the Senate, in which is revealed not only the threatening behaviour of Caesar’s opponents towards himself, but also their disregard of the Senate (1.1.3-4, 6). The efforts of Calidius and Caelius to avoid 'armorum causa' are routed (2.3), while Caesar’s fears of Pompey’s army, reported by the former, prove to be justified:

Multi undique ex veteribus Pompei exercitibus spe praemiorum atque ordinum evocantur. (1.3.2)

To belligerence is added the inferior means of eliciting soldierly support: Caesar regularly portrays his opponents as winning loyalty by rewards. The presence of these soldiers within the pomerium adds to the sense of threat. 43 No attempt is made to excuse the aggressive behaviour of Pompey’s supporters: rather it is exacerbated by their personal grievances and hope of advancement (1.4.1-3). Pompey, however, is treated with greater policy (4.4-5). Two points combine to make him turn from amicitia with Caesar, and the

43See Carter, 1.3.3n..
first appears to offer some small degree of mitigation, 'ab inimicis Caesaris incitatus...se ab eius amicitia averterat'. This is mentioned, though, not so much to shift blame from Pompey as to introduce a presentation of him as swayed and influenced by others, at the same time reminding the reader of Caesar's good-faith towards him. The second point introduces his characterisation by pride, 'neminem dignitate secum exaequari volebat': in contrast, Caesar's concern for his dignitas is positive rather than comparative in degree. A third motive is his guilt over the two legions taken from Caesar ('quas...ad suam potentiam dominatumque converterat', 1.4.5). The result of this combination of motives - 'rem ad arma deduci studebat'.

After the overriding of the tribunician veto and passing of the S.C.U. (1.5.1-5) Caesar moves on to make a more overt contrast of Pompey with himself (1.6-8). There is irony in Pompey's praise of the Senate and implied threat in the presence of soldiers (6.1); with the reader's superior viewpoint of hindsight, not only re the outcome of the war but also the impending desertion of Domitius at Corfinium, the claim that Caesar's men were disloyal is strong dramatic irony. In 6.6-8 Pompeian disregard for the Populus is expressed in strong terms. The juxtaposition of this

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"A point confirmed by Cicero, above n.6.

"See Kraner-Hofmann-Meusel, 1.6.8n.. Rambaud, Comm. 33, associates Caesar's concern here with his position as Pontifex Maximus."
presentation with Caesar's speech before his troops in the following chapter makes the justificatory tone clear.\(^4^6\)

When Caesar addresses his soldiers, his first concern is the explaining of Pompey's conduct (cf. above on 4.4):

\[\text{Iniurias inimicorum in se commemorat, a quibus deductum ac depravatum Pompeium queritur invidia atque obtrectatione laudis suae, cuius ipse honori et dignitati semper faverit adiutorque fuerit. (1.7.1)}\]

Both Rambaud and Carter comment on difficulties in interpreting his comments on the tribunician *intercessio* (7.2-4nn.): but it should be pointed out that in creating an irony (Pompey destroying a right he had previously fostered), Caesar is underlining the dissociation of Pompey from the interests of Populus Romanus which was noted earlier as crucial to his moral explanation of events. His appeal to the soldiers is also an appeal to the reader:

\[\text{Hortatur, cuius imperatoris ductu VIII annis rem publicam felicissime gesserint plurimaque proelia secunda fecerint, omnem Galliam Germaniamque pacaverint, ut eius existimationem dignitatemque ab inimicis defendant. (1.7.7)}\]

\(^{46}\)Despite the conflict of Caesar's version with those of Suetonius (DJ 33) and Dio (41.4.1), there is no agreement as to the exact nature of the deception here: Caesar says he was at Ravenna (within his province) when the tribunes arrived and he made his speech, while according to Suetonius and Dio he had already crossed the Rubicon and reached Ariminum. Kraner-Hofmann-Meusel notes the apparent reference of 'Quibus rebus cognitis' (7.1) to ch. 6, not, as more accurately, ch. 5. Carter accepts that Caesar was at Ravenna, not Ariminum: also noting that the correct chronological order is 1.5, 1.7, then 1.6, he remarks that 'the measures of ch. 6...followed inexorably from the desire of his enemies to crush him...The chronological displacement...does not fundamentally distort the truth as Caesar saw it'. Rambaud, *ad loc.*, is less generous in his assessment.
The charges of Pompey (6.2) are not denied by authorial comment, but independently revealed as false by the reaction of Caesar's men:

Conclamant legionis XIII., quae aderat, milites... sese paratos esse imperatoris sui tribunorumque plebis injurias defendere.

Having put his case to the troops, Caesar next puts it to Pompey (9.1-6). This time his justification of himself, once more in terms of defence of his dignitas and of the rights of the Populus, is more complex; and his proposals for peace are detailed:

Metus a civitate tollatur, libera comitia atque omnis res publica senatui populoque Romano permittatur...fore uti per colloquia omnes controversiae componantur. (1.9.5-6)

After Pompey's response to these proposals (10.2-4) has been explained to be unsatisfactory (11.1-3), proof of the rectitude of Caesar's case is once more given by an independent means.47 The reaction of the municipia to the conflict corroborates Caesar's position: Iguvium ejects the Pompeian Thermus and welcomes Curio. Simple parallel phrases make the point of a relationship of reciprocal trust:

'[Thermus] diffisus municipi voluntati'; 'Confisis municipiorum voluntatibus Caesar' (12.2-3). The second municipium to declare for Caesar is given reasons for its choice which make these individual exempla into a general principle:

47 Cicero is equally eager in the Philippics to present a consensus among the municipia and coloniae of opposition to Antony: see, e.g., 4.7 (cf. 3.32, 'Italia tota'); 5.25, 37; 6.18; 7.20 ('consensus Italiae'), 22; 13.18, etc..
Their arguments, in mirroring Caesar's own, further reinforce his interpretation of the problem. Attius Varus's flight and desertion of his soldiers (13.2-4; cf. Lentulus at Asculum, 1.15.3) confirms the moral inferiority of Pompey's side, while Caesar underlines his lenitas to enemies and fides towards the loyal (13.5). In contrast with the desperation of the Pompeians at 1.14, Caesar receives further support, this time from the prefectures (1.15.1): among them is Cingulum, a town which, he points out, was founded and paid for by Labienus. This is the first time he has mentioned Labienus in the BC, and there is as yet no comment on his defection (the rumours of his change of allegiance reported by Hirtius in BG 8 were written after 44 B.C.).

(c) The fall of Corfinium

This episode, described from 1.16.1-23.5, is the first large-scale proof of Caesarian superiority worked out in terms of soldierly loyalty. The 'clemency of Corfinium', however, is a misleading term: while it is true that Caesar presents the affair as an illustration of his generous treatment of enemies, it should be stressed that he nowhere refers to this

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48 See Carter, 1.14.4n. on Lentulus' arming of Caesar's gladiators.

49 Cicero also records these events; see Att. 8.3.7, 6.1-3, 7.1-2, 8.8.
policy as *clementia* in his writings. 50 His preferred terms are *lenitas* and *beneficium*, *clementia* being reserved, and even then only rarely, for subject peoples. 51

The desertion of Domitius' soldiers to Caesar requires and receives careful handling. Rambaud describes well the logic behind the construction of the narrative, with reference to Corfinium:

Comme la démonstration et les thèmes de la propagande s'accordent pour attribuer aux masses des dispositions favorables à César, et rejettent sur les intrigants les responsabilités du conflit, cette logique veut que les soldats du parti opposé soient en désaccord avec leurs chefs. (p. 340)

The nature of the 'désaccord' is problematic: for the credit of the soldiers to be maintained despite what might be termed disloyalty, there must first be significant proof of the moral failure of their commander. Comparison with the *Philippics* confirms the nature of this problem of narrative explanation:

*Quis amicior umquam rei publicae fuit quam legio Martia universa? quae cum hostem populi Romani Antonium iudicasset, comes esse eius amentiae*

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50 On the treatment of enemies, see BG 2.14.5; 3.1.4). In the case of Corfinium, he simply 'dimittit omnes incolumes': later referred to as a *beneficium*, 2.29.3. Cf. Cic. *Phil.*, 2.59-60 (ironic). Such flexibility of terminology and interpretation may be paralleled in the language of liberation and assassination analysed by E. Rawson, 'Cassius and Brutus: the memory of the Liberators', in Moxon, Smart and West (edd.), *Past Perspectives*, 101-119.

noluit: reliquit consulem; quod profecto non fecisset si eum consulem iudicasset... (Phil. 3.6)
Legio Martia...non ipsa suis decretis prius quam senatus hostem iudicavit Antonium? Nam si ille non hostis, hos qui consulem reliquerunt hostes necesse est iudicemus. (Phil. 4.5)

Cicero is clearly on difficult ground here: the adjective *universa* underlines the need to stress the unanimity of their decision in order to prop up the impression of rectitude. Moreover, he suggests that to criticise their decision is to call them, and not Antony, *hostes*, thus making good use of fear of the veterans. Yet not even the use of the verb *iudico*, with all its associations of legal judgment and careful consideration, can conceal the fact that soldiers should not be in a position to make decisions about their leaders. Cicero’s earlier characterisation of Antony is crucial to his justification of the soldiers’ actions here: he can then treat that desertion as conclusive proof of Antony’s wrongness, making use of the troops’ dissatisfaction as an index of their commander’s inferiority.

The construction of moral inferiority in this episode of the BC begins with Domitius’ reaction to Caesar’s approach: he bribes men to send messages to Pompey and to fight (17.1, 4; cf. 21.1).52 This is juxtaposed in the following chapter with Caesar being offered the free support of the people of Sulmo, ‘et oppidani et milites obviam gratulantes Antonio...exierunt’ (18.2). When Domitius receives Pompey’s reply to his plea for help, his immediate reaction is to conceal its unfavourable

52 On Caesar’s portrayal of Domitius, see Rambaud *Déformation*, 218, 237, 277, 288, 340, 354-5 (‘thème de la désertion’).
contents, and deceive his con
silium, 'dissimulans...pronuntiat
Pompeium celeriter subsidio venturum' (cf. 19.3, 'dissimulari
non potuit'). The effect of the contrast between his public
and private pronouncements is clearly unfavourable,
'hortatur...eos ne animo deficiant'; 'Ipse arcano...consilium
...fugae capere constituit' (19.1-2); and Caesar gives
epigrammatic expression to the failure of his deceit, 'vultus
domiti cum oratione non consentiret' (19.3).

Excusing the soldiers' mutiny begins with this emphasis
on Domitius' attempted deceit: they read his character, and
see through his pretence of courage. Their reaction is
orderly, with proper regard for distinctions of rank, 'inter
se per tribunum militum centurionesque atque honestissimos sui
generis colloquuntur' (20.1). The fact that their thoughts
are reported in O.O. gives a picture of sincere and unanimous
grievance: an authorial statement of their feelings would have
detracted from the impression of independent reporting, while
O.R. would have undermined the impression of unanimity:

Ducem suum Domitium, cuius spe atque fiducia
permanserint, proiectis omnibus fugae consilium
capere; debere se suae salutis rationem habere.
(1.20.2)

The order of thought is important here: they begin with
emphatic placing of 'ducem suum' and the statement of previous
loyalty; then his desertion of them, 'proiectis
omnibus...capere' and finally their need to take thought for
themselves. Reasonably enough, this reproduces the order of

53 Cf. Pompey's letters to Domitius in Att. 8.12B-D.

54 Cf. Cic. Phil. 13.33, where Cicero responds to Antony's
letter by justifying deception of the soldiers.
events as given by Caesar, making their mutiny dependent upon Domitius’ prior desertion (and thus no mutiny at all). Not surprisingly, there is no suggestion that their disloyalty preceded his. It is possible to suggest, on the basis of Att. 8.12D.2, that in leaving Corfinium Domitius was acting under orders, or even, given the ignorance of his intentions expressed by the Marsi (20.3), that the ‘consilium fugae’ was a fabrication by Caesar.\(^5\) This ignorance, however, admits of another narrative interpretation. The loyalty of the Marsi towards a commander they believe to be loyal to them is tenacious, and again, only after his treachery is certain do they join the others:

> Ab his primo Marsi dissentire incipiunt...tantaque inter eos dissensio exstitit ut manum conserere atque armis dimicare contentur; post paulo tamen...qua ignorabant de L. Domiti fuga cognoscunt. Itaque omnes uno consilio Domitium productum in publicum circumsistunt.... \(1.20.3-5\)\(^6\)

Corresponding to the actions of Domitius’ men is the behaviour of Caesar’s. He takes steps to avoid the looting of Corfinium (21.2), while they keep a vigilant guard (21.5); the combination of these two points underlines the fact that Caesar is in full control, and that his command elicits the best from his men.\(^5\)

\(^5\)According to Pompey, Domitius’ men are more reliable than his own: but it is unlikely that he would have welcomed the arrival of Domitius in Luceria without them.

\(^6\)Cf. Velleius 2.85.3 on Antony’s flight, ‘imperator, qui in desertores saevire debuerat, desertor exercitus sui factus est’: quoted by Pelling (ed. and comm.) on Plut. Ant. 66.7 (cf. 68.5).

\(^5\)In contrast, Pompey relies on ‘servos pastores’, 24.2.
Carter suggests that the *exspectatio* described at 21.6 may reflect 'something of Caesar's own anxiety and excitement' (*n. ad loc.): it also provides a suitably tense atmosphere for Caesar's decision on the fate of his opponents, emphasising that clemency could not be expected with any certainty and underlining the extent of his generosity (cf. 22.6). The pleas of Lentulus that he remember his *amicitia* and *in se beneficia* allow Caesar another justificatory O.O. speech using the language of legitimate self-help: his *lenitas* extends to all his captured enemies, even to their protection from the jeering of the soldiers ('a contumeliis...prohibet', 23.3). 58 The final proof of Caesar's moral superiority comes when he refuses the offer of six million sesterces from 'IIIiviri Corfinienses' and returns the money to Domitius, 'ne continentior in vita hominum quam in pecunia fuisse videatur', despite the fact that it was intended for funding hostile forces (23.4).

(d) The Ilerda campaign

As in Corfinium, so in Spain Caesar faces not Pompey himself but his subordinates, this time Afranius and Petreius. Unlike the case of Corfinium, the Ilerda campaign, which occupies the whole of the rest of book 1 (37.1-87.5) save for a brief update on Massilia (1.56-8), describes the clash of armies in battle. 59 Again, the moral contrast between the two

58 See Carter, 1.22.5n..

sides is focussed on the leadership, and the behaviour of the 'enemy' soldiers is used as an independent index of Caesar's rectitude.

Anticipation of the enemy's moves is a reiterated theme of the opening chapters: the first engagement proper takes place between four legions led by Afranius and two led by Plancus, a subordinate of the Fabius who as Caesar's legate (37.1) had been sent ahead to Spain. Inequality of numbers, caused by ill fortune (40.3) is compensated by the selection of a superior position by Plancus (40.5), until the two legions earlier cut off are seen approaching and Afranius withdraws. Caesar explains that Fabius had anticipated his opponent here:

Suspicatus id quod accidit, ut duces adversariorum occassione et beneficio fortunae ad nostros opprimendos uterentur. (1.40.7)

Fabius' skilful anticipation is soon mirrored by Caesar's own. As soon as he arrives (41.1), he acquaints himself with the situation and the terrain, and takes careful precautions on his march to Ilerda (41.1-2). These are familiar markers of excellence in a commander (usually predictive of success), for which no sustained counterpart is given on the Pompeian side.60

The thread of narrative explanation in 41-2 is suggestive: it begins with Caesar making camp, but deciding not to have the men build a rampart, on the grounds that it would give the enemy an opportunity to attack them while

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60Cf. Suet. DJ 58.1. See also Polyb. 3.48 (Hannibal); Sall. Juq. 7.5; Livy 35.28.1 (Philopoemen); Plut. Mar. 18.4.
vulnerable. The reader is encouraged to follow Caesar’s expectation and see whether the narrative confirms it. Meanwhile, the digging of a trench is successfully kept secret (41.4). At the time, then, when Petreius and Afranius make their attack, the reader knows that not only the fact of it but also the reason for it has been anticipated: Caesar’s men are well prepared thanks to his foresight, and the phrasing chosen reflects the fact (‘ne...milites repentino hostium incursu terrerentur atque opere prohiberentur’; ‘Afranius Petreiusque terrendi causa atque operis impediendi copias suas...producunt’, 41.4, 42.2).

A similar display of strategic foresight in 1.43 precludes a wholly unfavourable interpretation of Caesar’s failure to attain his objective: indeed the fact of the failure is mentioned as if in passing (43.5). In 1.44 (discussed above, 17-8) it is the inferiority of the enemy troops which causes difficulties for nostri. Excessive courage makes the position worse (‘elati studio’; ‘incitati studio’, 45.2, 6), until despite ‘omnia vulnera’, and despite the exhaustion of their weapons (46.1), they draw their swords and succeed in breaking through (46.2). Caesar’s own conclusion to the battle is that ‘vario certamine pugnatum est’, but before remarking that each side thought it had done better than the other (47.1), he notes the casualty figures for each side: on this calculation, Caesar’s men had the better of it.61 When he gives the reasons for each side’s

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61 See Rambaud Déformation 179-182, on Caesar’s treatment of casualty figures.
assessment (47.2-3), the impression is strengthened, without any morally uncomfortable proclamation of victory on his part. The strategic advantage is once more with his opponents in 1.48-52, but while they are celebrating this apparently advantageous situation, Caesar puts his military experience to good use (1.54). From 1.59 on, the morale of the enemy begins to deteriorate quickly, again marking the vanity of their hopes: he is kept informed of their plans and reacts accordingly (62.1). This change of circumstance leads into a passage in which Caesar begins to use his men’s eagerness to attack as a counterpoint to his lenitas. This eagerness to fight (‘milites circulari et dolere hostem ex manibus dimitti’) and bring the war to an end (‘bellum non necessario longius duci’) outweighs hardship and danger (64.2). In yielding to their request, swayed ‘studio et vocibus’, Caesar continues to display concern for their welfare (64.3-4). In allowing them to rest before offering battle, he aligns himself with a commonplace of good generalship which is also found in Livy as a marker of impending military success (65.2; cf. 65.5).  

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62 For the topos of premature celebration as a marker of impending failure, cf. 3.83.5: BG 5.43.3, 59.1.

63 I.e., through their readiness to lose heart, a topos which Livy associates with Gauls (38.17.7, 21.7).

64 In 21 in particular, Livy repeatedly stresses Hannibal’s efficiency in resting his men repeatedly: e.g., 21.11, 21, 27, 37, 55. The predictive quality of this narrative marker is stressed by contrast with Sempronius (21.54.8; juxtaposed with Hannibal 21.55.1). Later in the decade, it is taken over by Scipio (26.48). In Sallust, cibum rather than guies is the focus of the topos: e.g., Marius (91.2), Sulla (106.4).
At the consilium held by Afranius and Petreius, the decision to march by day is taken as a result of doubts of the loyalty of their troops (67.3-4). This is immediately contrasted with the efforts and co-operation of Caesar’s men, 'sublevati alii ab aliis...hunc laborem recusabat nemo' (68.2-3). The counterpoint is continued by the setting up of dramatic irony in 1.68: Caesar first explains his strategy, then illustrates the reaction of his opponents. Afranius display relief, their duces self-satisfaction:

Afraniiani milites visendi causa...procurrebant contumeliosisque vocibus66 prosequebantur nostros: necessarii victus inopia coactos fugere....Duces vero eorum consilium suum laudibus ferebant.... (1.69.1-2)

This noting of their eagerness to taunt his men is as close as Caesar comes in the BC to explicit criticism of his Roman opponents in recognisably Gallic terms. The irony is revealed by a vivid description of their realisation of Caesar’s objective:

Sed ubi paulatim retorqueri agmen ad dexteram conspexerunt iamque primos superare regionem castrorum animadverterunt, nemo erat adeo tardus aut fugiens laboris quin statim castris exeundum atque occurrendum putaret. (1.69.3)

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65 See Carter, n. ad loc.: cf. BC 2.31.7.

66 This is as close as Caesar ever comes to outright criticism of the enemy soldiers.

67 See, e.g., BG 1.13-15; 3.17.5-7 (when Sabinus allows Gauls and even some of own men to taunt him, then takes them by surprise); 5.51.3; 7.20.6. In the BC, Pompey uses contumeliae against the people of Brundisium (1.28.1), as Labienus does against captive soldiers (3.71.4), while at Corfinium Caesar prevents his own men from insulting captives (1.23.3).
The efforts to which they are then spurred build up tension in the following chapter, 'Erat in celeritate omne positum certamen, utri prius angustias montisque occuparent' (70.1 - though Caesar's record in the BG makes it clear who will win): the resolution of the contest is described with striking understatement, 'Confecit iter prior Caesar' (70.3). 68

Carter observes of the arguments for and against battle presented in 1.71-2 that because Caesar's judgment stands outside the action, 'it acquires an illusory validity as a seemingly objective statement'. He is also right to point out that Caesar is presenting his hopes for a peaceful resolution to his readership. These perceptions are corroborated when the passage is seen in the context of narrative explanation: Caesar's judgments are reported here in order to be confirmed by the ensuing action and validate his own assessment of the situation. Thus he expects the enemy to be demoralised by witnessing the deaths of four cohorts of caetrati, and they are (70.5-71.1, perterritum; cf. 74.2, perterritis). His men also assess their situation accurately, predicting that lack of water will force Afranius down, which it does (71.4; cf. 78.1). When they urge him to fight, however, he is reluctant on two grounds:

(1) Cur etiam secundo proelio aliquos ex suis amitteret, cur vulnerari pateretur optimé meritos de se milités? Cur denique fortunam periclitaretur?
(2) ...Movebatur etiam misericordia civium, quos interficiéndos videbat; quibus salvis atque incolumbis rem obtinere malebat. (1.72.2-3) 69

68 See Carter, 1.70.1-2n.: Rambaud Déformation, 251-54; 1.70.1n..

69 On 'rem obtinere', see Rambaud, Comm. 1.72.3n.
His first concern, wisely, is for his men. His second, conspicuously placed here, is a comparative, rather than positive, proof of his desire to avoid bloodshed: in other words, it is stressed in order to set up a contrast with the behaviour of Afranius towards Caesar’s men. This theme is related to lenitas, but on a higher emotional level: ‘misericordia civium’ highlights a sense of pathos and re-emphasises all the reluctance to fight and sensitivity to the horror of civil war of the opening chapters. When Caesar ignores his men’s threat not to fight (72.4), he makes no reference to a belief that they have no intention of carrying it out: but it is not mentioned again.

Afranius and Petreius’ men seize their opportunity to speak with Caesar’s (‘liberam nacti milites colloquiorum facultatem’, 74.1) and explore the possibility of changing sides. The rectitude of Caesar’s policy is first revealed obliquely: their gratitude for his and his men’s beneficium is responsible for their interest in going over:

Agunt gratias omnes omnibus...Eorum se beneficio vivere. Deinde imperatoris fidem quaerunt, rectene se illi sint commissuri, et quod non ab initio fecerint armaque quod cum hominibus necessariis et consanguineis contulerint queruntur. (1.72.3)

They are further justified by a concern for the safety of their commanders (72.3). In the general rejoicing (‘plena laetitia et gratulatione’, 74.7), Caesar’s judgment is further corroborated first by their echoing of his own concern (72.3; cf. 74.7), then directly by a statement of their iudicium:

Magnum...fructum suae pristinae lenitatis omnium iudicio Caesar ferebat consiliumque eius a cunctis probabatur. (1.74.7)
Conflict is thus apparently resolved. A rude shattering of this illusion, emphasised by the willingness of Afranius to capitulate (75.1), is effected by Petreius, whose subsequent actions are implied to be typical of his character ('non deserit sese', 75.2). He has no qualms about slaughtering cives (75.3; 76.4), and his attempt to bring his men back to the Pompeian cause (76.2-3) is undercut by their willingness to help Caesar’s men escape (76.4). Caesar’s lenitas and misericordia, meanwhile, reaps further rewards (77.1-2, 78.2).

By 1.81, the situation of the enemy is desperate, as Caesar once more tries for a surrender instead of battle (81.6; 82,3-5). This time he gains his objective: his strategy is again vindicated by its results, when Afranius and Petreius seek a colloquium (84.1). Rambaud succinctly assesses the construction of the narrative to Caesar’s advantage here, including the suspicious length of his O.O. reply to Afranius’ miseratio. The speech acts as an explicit expression and summary of earlier implicit themes: on the one hand, recognition of the separation of the soldiers’ interests from those of their commander, the earnest striving after peace, the reluctance to harm fellow citizens (85.2); on the other, the duces’ reluctance for peace and negotiation,

70 See Carter, n. ad loc.

71 This appears to sit uneasily with ‘spem praesentis deditionis sustulit mentisque militum convertit’, but the phrase could imply no more than that the loss of any chance of immediate peace overcame the soldiers’ hopes of surrender.

72 Rambaud, Comm. 1.84.5, 85.1nn.: cf. Carter, 1.85n..

73 See Rambaud Comm. 1.85.2n., ‘Reliquos omnis, dialectique démocratique qui sépare les chefs pompéiens de tout le monde.’
their readiness to kill innocent men (85.3). The conclusion Caesar draws from this comparison is emphatically marked by his only use of the word igitur: they are reaping the rewards of their pertinacia and adrogantia.

From 85.6, the argument shifts to a direct attack on Pompey which is more comprehensive, more vehement, and certainly more rhetorical that any previous statement of justification: anaphora of neque and nihil (85.5-7) is followed by a rush of clauses emphasising that the whole war is a personal attack on Caesar himself:

In se novi generis imperia constitui...in se iura magistratum commutari...in se aetatis excussionem nihil valere...in se uno non servari quod sit omnibus datum semper imperatoribus.... (1.85.8-11)

Despite all which, his demands are reasonable (85.12), and gladly accepted by the men (86.1).

The first book, then, ends with a persuasive illustration of Caesar’s rectitude. The moral differentiation of the two sides through their commanders rather than their soldiers, which has been illustrated both for Corfinium and for Ilerda, sets the pattern for the next two books. So does the care with which the narrative explanation is constructed to guide the reader to a correct moral evaluation of the action.

(e) The Defeat of Curio

74See Carter, 1.85.4n..

In terms of narrative explanation, the Ilerda campaign is relatively straightforward, as befits a victory, albeit over fellow Romans. This second example, however, is more difficult to assess. That Caesar’s narrative of the defeat and death of Curio is in some way unique in the *Commentarii* is generally agreed: but the how and why of its uniqueness are still a matter for debate. Though aware of the dramatic nature of its presentation (259-60), Rambaud’s emphasis is on concealment and deception:

> Le désastre résultait à la fois de la témérité de Curion et du mauvais esprit des troupes qui obligea leur chef à prendre l’offensive....Cet état d’esprit des soldats démentait la propagande césarienne; le caractère du chef impliquait une erreur de César qui l’avait choisi. L’intention de dissimuler... apparaît...surtout dans les discours [30-32]. (239)

Carter is less suspicious and negative, remarking that ‘this crypto-tragedy is rightly felt to stand apart...in the dramatic nature of its presentation and...the character of Curio’, and summarising the features which mark it off from the text as a whole (16). Rowe assimilates it to other dramatic structures in the *BC*, before concluding that ‘of all the dramatic episodes in Caesar’s writings, the Curio episode is the most organically constructed’. He observes, moreover, that this fact is owing to its causal coherence, ‘demonstrating the interaction of external and internal causes’, and implies that in this causality lies its ‘tragic’ force.

91975) 247-300. See also E. Wistrand, ‘The date of Curio’s African campaign’, *Eranos* 61 (1963) 38-44 (arguing for August of 49).

\[76\] In ‘Dramatic structures’, 409.
To understand the Curio episode aright, it needs to be put in its proper context as a case of Caesar describing military failure for which not he but one (or more) of his subordinates was responsible. Military failure within a context of overall victory, as in the case of Cotta and Sabinus in the BG, cannot but carry with it some implication of inferiority, however transient: there must always be a reason for defeat. On the other hand, Curio was an influential man from an important family, to whom Caesar owed a great deal: explaining his failure in terms of a degeneration into cowardice and deceit, as he did for Sabinus, was not an option open to him in the BC. Caesar’s debt to Curio, combined with the inescapable fact of his defeat, gave, as it were, the negative reason for his choice of narrative explanation: but there is another motivation at work here, beyond the simple need to display reciprocal fides. With the right narrative treatment, Curio’s defeat could be presented as a further proof of Caesar’s excellence in inspiring loyalty — even to the death. In constructing a narrative explanation of the African campaign, then, Caesar had to find a way to characterise Curio which would make his defeat consequent upon his actions and therefore explicable (i.e. construct a causative framework) without encouraging the reader to evaluate that character in negative terms. The use of extended O.R. to enhance his characterisation of Curio is sufficiently unusual to preclude the possibility that BC 2.23-

77See Gelzer, Caesar, 178-9, 181, 185-7, 208, 210, 228 n.2: cf. Cic. Fam. 16.11.2.
44 is intended to be a minimising of the defeat: clearly he has highlighted the episode, so an analysis of the text in terms of narrative explanation, bearing in mind the fact that it would be read with hindsight and thus awareness not only of Curio's death but also of Caesar's ultimate victory, should help to clarify the nature of its uniqueness.

From 2.23-5, Caesar describes Curio's arrival and reconnoitre, an initial cavalry engagement and the securing of supplies. After the engagement ('his rebus gestis') he is hailed Imperator, following which a more substantial victory is won by a quick initiative (26.2-4). The desertion of two Marsian centurions to Varus (27.1), however, soon introduces the chain of causation which eventually leads to Curio's downfall. Nonetheless, this does not happen by a direct narrative route: their claim that 'totius exercitus animos alienos esse a Curione' is independently doubted by Caesar (27.2), and his doubts are confirmed by the response of Curio's men to Quintilius Varus' proposals. In these the appeal to their loyalty (28.2) is undercut both by the as yet unsubstantiated claim that they are stigmatised as perfugae and by open bribery, 'Pauca ad spem largitionis addidit, quae ab sua liberalitate...exspectare deberent' (28.3). No

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78 According to Carter, 2.26.1 'a note of sarcasm is detectable' here, since Curio has achieved nothing which justifies the salutation. Rowe, 'Dramatic structures', 406, disagrees. Note Curio's response to the title at 2.32.13-4, discussed below: see also below on Pompey at Dyrrachium.

79 On P. Attius Varus and Quintilius Varus, see Kraner-Hofmann-Meusel, 2.23.1, 1.23.2nn. The army was composed almost entirely of soldiers from Domitius' forces at Corfinium (28.1; see Carter, 2.27.1n.).
response ('nulla...significatio') comes from Curio's soldiers (28.4).

Despite the fragmentation of the text at 2.29, it is clear that Quintilius Varus's words have an adverse effect on the men, and that at the consilium called to discuss what to do, both opinions expressed accept as their basis the fact that the loyalty of the men is in question (30.2-3). To these O.O. arguments Curio is given a lengthy O.R. response (31.2-8), in which his presentation of the situation is wholly to his credit as a commander. His assessment of the opinions expressed by the consilium strikes a middle path between rashness and timidity, 'quantum alteri sententiae deesset animi, tantum alteri superesse dicebat' (31.1): given that later it is the extreme of rashness which is his undoing, it is difficult to argue that his moderation here is morally disadvantageous. If the idea that 'felicitas rerum gestarum exercitus benevolentiam imperatoribus et res adversae concilient' (31.3) is a commonplace, it is a commonplace which Caesar expresses himself, also in a context of potential mutiny (BG 1.40.12). His judgment of the soldiers' character and state of mind is confirmed by the later narrative (33.1-2; cf.1.67.3-4). The concluding phrase, 'omnia prius experienda arbitror magnae ex parte iam me una vobiscum de re iudicium

80 Rowe disagrees, 406-7, putting Curio's two speeches under his heading of hybris on the grounds that they are full of 'platitudes and commonplaces suggesting a naïve view of the world': cf. D. Rasmussen, Caesars Commentarii: Stil und Stilwandel am Beispiel der direkten Rede (Göttingen 1963) 107; 'Gemeinplätze werden eher gesucht als gemieden'. He also remarks, rightly, that Curio's first speech 'ist nur im Zusammenhang mit seiner Rede vor den Soldaten (2.32) zu verstehen' (108).
facturum confido' (31.8) is, as Carter points out, equally easy to interpret as a 'fine sounding but meaningless declaration' or as 'a sensible decision not to be panicked into action' (2.31.8n.).

His speech to the troops is subtle in its argument. It begins with a captatio recalling their beneficium and auctoritas (32.1-2) which seems straightforward enough, and reminding them that Caesar was reliant on their fides (32.3). He shifts to the matter of potential desertion at 32.4, 'at sunt qui vos hortentur ut a nobis desciscatis': in suggesting that the intention of illi is 'et nos circumvenire et vos nefario scelere obstringere', he picks up a point latent in the form of his captatio, in other words, their responsibility for Italy having fallen to Caesar's control. To revert to the Pompeian side would be an admission of guilt, and entail reprisals. The sentence beginning 'Quid enim' introduces a forceful series of twelve rhetorical questions: Curio raises the possibility of vengeance upon them, which the behaviour of Petreius in book 1 makes plausible (32.4). He then switches to the matter of Caesar himself, and the speed and completeness of his victory in Spain (32.5), using irony to stress the folly of changing sides ('Vos autem...debeatis', 32.6). Having recalled Caesar's strength, he goes on to underline their debt to him: in appealing at 32.7 to an event

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81For Rasmussen, it is an expression of self-confidence, 'Die sententia...hält sich ganz im Unbestimmten, zeugt aber von großem Selbstvertrauen', 108.

82Cf. 2.32.3, 'Pompeius...vestri facti praeiudicio demotus Italia excessit'.
already narrated in the BC, and in offering a view of it confirmed by the preceding narrative, Curio shows himself to be in the right here:

"Vosne vero L. Domitium an vos Domitius deseruit? Nonne extremam pati fortunam paratos proiect ille? Non sibi clam vobis salutem fuga petivit? non proditi per illum Caesaris beneficio estis conservati?" (2.32.7-8)

The final section of his speech challenges the soldiers on the grounds that any dissatisfaction must be with Curio himself (32.11). He is wise enough to align himself with a *topos* of good generalship by hinting at financial recompense for their services only by means of a *praeteritio* ('Qui de meis... leviora'), and ends with an irony which the reader knows to be dramatic:

Hac vos fortuna atque his ducibus repudiatis
Corfiniensem ignominiam, Italiae fugam, [an]
Hispaniarum deditionem, [in] Africi belli
praedia sequimini! (2.32.13)

At Corfinium, Caesar took care to stress that the soldiers only rejected Domitius on learning of his plan of treachery, so by making Curio appeal finally to the same sense of loyalty to a commander (32.13-14), he does all that he can to affirm Curio's efforts: at the same time, he perhaps insinuates that his own personal presence makes a difference, through the dramatic irony of Curio's expectation that he will be able to repeat Caesar's success.

Any suggestion that the manner of describing the bestowal of the title of Imperator is in some way critical is surely

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83But see 2.39.3, where *praeda* comes before *gloria* and *praemia* before *gratia*, '"...ad praedam, ad gloriam properate, ut iam de praemiis vestris et de referenda gratia cogitare incipiamus".'
denied here by the way in which Caesar makes Curio express his response in terms of loyalty to himself:

Equidem me Caesaris militem dici volui, vos me imperatoris nomine appellavistis. (2.32.14)

If there is, as has been suggested by some, any hint of character defect in Curio’s contio, it lies in the form, rather than the content, of his persuasion. Caesar does not use O.R. to justify himself, and his narrative is usually free of the rhetorical and stylistic complexities which abound in this passage. It is, of course, true that the reader’s privileged hindsight also bestows awareness of Curio’s ultimate military failure, but the two speeches here are not the first evidence for the moral failure which must accompany it. If anything, the fact that Curio handles both his officers and men with such skill (proven by the result, confirmed loyalty) rather implies that the speeches, unusual as they are, were included as a kind of introductory moral compensation for the criticism which his defeat must entail.

The reaction of the soldiers vindicates Curio’s handling of the situation, ‘Qua oratione permoti milites...magno cum dolore infidelitatis suspicionem sustinere viderentur’ (33.1). So does the independent narrative statement at 33.2, ‘Quo facto commutata omnium et voluntate et opinione’. Longer narrative confirmation comes at 2.34 in the battle, in which Curio’s initial success (34.3) is followed by emotive O.R. of a familiar exhortatory type:

Tum Rebilus, legatus Caesaris...quem Curio...magnum habere usum in re militari sciebat, “Perterritum,”

84 See Carter, 2.31-2n. on the rhetoric of the speech.
Rebilus' military expertise corroborates Curio's actions here, in which there is no doubt of his bravery: like Caesar, and unlike Pompey, he fights in the van, 'praecurrit ante omnis' (34.5). The detailing of the enemy's confusion and flight, and the nearly-successful attempt on Varus' life, put the superiority of Curio's strategy and army over Varus' beyond doubt (34.6-35.6).

The folly of Curio, then, begins only with the arrival of news about the approach of Juba (37.1), whose intentions he misjudges (37.2). Even so, his reaction once he does believe the news is entirely correct: he withdraws to Castra Cornelia, securing both supplies and an advantageous position, while his caution meets with independent authorial approval (37.3-5). His catastrophic error is briefly described, then excused:

Ex perfugis...audit Iubam revocatum fimitimo bello...His auctoribus temere credens consilium commutat et proelio rem committere constituit. Multum ad hanc rem probandam adiuvat adulescentia, magnitudo animi, superioris temporis proventus, fiducia rei bene gerendae. His rebus impulsis.... (2.38.1-3)

Rowe explains this characterisation as providing 'the recipe of the tragic hero', claiming that when Curio takes the trouble to check his information, but asks the wrong questions and elicits a misleading answer, his final O.R. speech is to

85 The close parallel for this address to a commander in the speech of Crastinus before Pharsalus (3.91; cf. 3.99.1) indicates a favourable interpretation.

86 A commonplace: cf. Xen. Cyr. 1.3-4; Livy 7.24.3-4; 30.12.1 (Syphax): Plut. Pel. 32.6 (Pelopidas at Cynoscephalae); Pyrrh. 16.7-8; Sert. 13.6.
be understood in terms of 'hybris and folly' (408). Carter is closer to the truth when he cites parallels from Herodotus (39.2n.). While Rowe is right to observe 'the chain of cause and effect', he fails to establish that this is to be understood specifically in terms of tragedy and the tragic hero. Here more than anywhere else in the Commentarii, Caesar approximates his style to the dramatic presentation of a Livy, but drama and tragedy are not the same thing. To apply a term like 'dramatic' to a historical narrative should be to perceive a common conception of causality in events: not to imply the conscious application of one genre to another.

The exhaustion of his men after a march of sixteen milia passuum (41.1) bodes ill for Curio, but his own leadership and skills of inspiration are reiterated, emphasising the harmony between him and his men:

Non deest negotio Curio suosque hortatur ut spem omnem in virtute reponant. Ne militibus quidem, ut defessis, neque equitibus, ut paucis et labore confectis, studium ad pugnandum virtusque deerrat. (2.41.3)

The attacks of his cavalry (41.4) cannot be sustained because they are too few, and the exhaustion of the men prevents them from following up their charges (41.6) The dilemma then stated ('neque in loco manere...neque procurrere et casum subire tutum videbatur', 41.6) is elaborated with ominous detail: the enemy receives reinforcements while nostri are fatigued, it is impossible to carry away the wounded, the whole army is surrounded and gives up hope:

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87 Cf. Rowe, 'Dramatic structures', 414 and n.20.
Hi de sua salute desperantes, ut extremo vitae tempore homines facere consuerunt, aut suam mortem miserabantur aut parentis suos commendabant, si quos ex eo periculo fortuna servare potuissent. Plena erant omnia timoris et luctus. (2.41.8)

The despair of Curio’s men poses a difficulty of interpretation: Carter cites a parallel with the despair of the Massiliotes at 2.5.3 (as a similar emotional detail before a moment of crisis), but this is in itself problematic. Soldiers are not supposed to fall into such despair: if they are in great danger, desperation should make them fight all the harder. In this final chapter of Curio’s story, the courage he has already shown does not desert him. When his men are too afraid to listen to his exhortations, he tries to take up a more favourable position (‘proximos collis’, 42.1). The failure of this last effort is succinctly noted, ‘hos quoque praeoccupat missus a Saburra equitatus’ (42.2), as the men abandon all hope:

Tum vero ad summam desperationem nostri perveniunt et partim fugientes ab equitatu interficiuntur, partim integri procumbunt. (2.42.2)

Even at this disastrous moment, Caesar makes a point of defending his lieutenant’s reputation. When a cavalry officer, Cn. Domitius, encourages him to attempt flight he spurns the suggestion:

Hortatur Curionem Cn. Domitius praefectus equitum ...ut fuga salutem petat atque in castra contendat...At Curio numquam se amisso exercitu quem a Caesare fidei commissum acceperit in eius

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88 The closest Caesar himself comes to having to deal with such despair is at BG 1.39.5.
Emotive loyalty to his commander and the shame of having failed him prompt Curio to seek honourable death: so Caesar uses the climax of the episode to highlight once again the issue of 'popularité'. Curio offers a positive exemplum of fides towards his soldiers and his commander which contrasts with the previous lack of faith shown by Domitius in book 1, and the ensuing desertion by Pompey himself in 3 (discussed below). The escape of 'perpauci equites' (42.5) may perhaps be taken to suggest that Caesar's account of Curio's last moments is based on an autopsy account: but only the otherwise unmentioned Domitius was in a position to have reported these last words (n.b., 'milites ad unum omnes interficiuntur', 42.5), and Caesar does not tell the reader if this was in fact the case. Assessments for or against the veracity of Caesar based on this kind of naïve and simplistic source argument are no doubt unsatisfactory, but in this case the unlikelihood of his having learned of this story from an actual witness is suggestive. Illustrating the creativity of his narrative construction is not usually so straightforward.

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89 On Domitius, see Kraner-Hofmann-Meusel, 2.42.3n.. For the commander who refuses to flee after defeat, cf. Paullus at Cannae (Livy 22.49.6-12).

90 Other sources are unhelpful: both Appian and Dio report that Curio was beaten by Juba, while Caesar's account suggests that the king stayed in the background until after the battle (2.41.7; cf. 41.2, 42.1, 44.2). Appian hints that Caesar's source may have been Pollio (2.45), but also states both that the latter had remained at Utica, and that none of Curio's men escaped.

91 The death of Gracchus in 212 B.C., described by Livy at 25.16-7, is similarly creative.
(f) The battle of Pharsalus. 92

Caesar's narrative of this last major battle of the BC (3.82-101) brings together a number of earlier themes: the inferior numbers, enthusiasm for labores, emotive loyalty and lower casualty figures of his men, for example. Even more markedly than before, moreover, moral responsibility for the war is shifted on to Pompey and his lieutenants, as is appropriate for such a victory, in which no gloria could be won, and no praeda be seen to be taken. Augustus' Actium was re-presented by Virgil, while he had many years of supremacy in which to simplify and justify the past: but for Caesar there is only Lucan, further in time from the events he describes, and hostile from the beginning. And Caesar, who died only a few years later, does not attempt to reinterpret the war with Pompey in terms of a conflict of East and West, civilisation and barbarism. 93 His justification and explanation, his understanding of victory, are offered in purely personal terms.

The narrative of final defeat begins with a prelude (3.82.92), but in assessing these chapters, the defeat of Caesar's army at Dyrrachium (3.59.74) must be borne in mind. 94 By showing how Pompey's side misunderstands and misuses victory, he reassures the reader that its impending defeat is


94 The narrative manipulation of this episode is discussed by Rambaud Déformation, 170-1, 211-2, 296-7 (with comparison of Gergovia).
deserved; while by showing that he comprehends his own situation, he gives a similar reassurance that his victory will be justified. The narrative of the desertion of the two Allobroges is prepared by stress on his beneficia towards them, and in the context of his desire to see the cavalry fairly treated (3.59 60): thus the desertion which could have been a marker of disloyalty is turned as much as possible to Caesar’s advantage:

Nam ante id tempus nemo aut miles aut eques a Caesare ad Pompeium transierat, cum paene cotidie a Pompeio ad Caesarem perfugerent. (3.61.2)

The information which the brothers give to Pompey prepares for the excusing of defeat (61.3): simple incompetence cannot explain Caesar’s failure. Particularly suggestive is the juxtaposition of 3.64.3-4, in which a wounded aquilifer speaks in emotive O.K. urging his fellows not to let Caesar down, with 65.1, ‘Pompeiani magna caede nostrorum castris Marcellini appropinquabant non mediocri terrore inlato’.95 Fortuna has her way, however, at 68.1, and Caesar’s men panic (‘omnia erant tumultus, timoris, fugae plena’, 69.4). They are saved from destruction, significantly, by the fear and caution of Pompey himself, ‘insidias timens’ (70.1).96

95 The contrast of personal designation (Pompeiani) with the naming of nostri makes the moral categories clear. Cf. 3.71: the emotive naming of Caesar’s losses is followed by the remark that ‘Pompeius eo proelio imperator est appellatus’ (71.3). He allows his men to celebrate a victory over fellow citizens. This may be one reason why Caesar is ambivalent about Curio receiving the title (2.26.1): but see Rowe, ‘Dramatic structures’, 412 and n.14.

96 The role of Labienus in the Dyrrachium narrative is discussed below.

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Because the reader knows that Pharsalus will soon follow, the Dyrrachium episode gives Caesar an opportunity to exploit dramatic irony. Temporary success lures Pompey into assuming victory is won, and revealing once more his arrogance. His consequent carelessness and pride are used causatively, to bring about, and to explain, his ultimate defeat. In the first chapter of the prelude, the moral categories of the impending action are clearly apparent:

[A] Pompeius...Scipionis milites cohortatur, ut parta iam victoria praedae ac praemiorum velint esse particeps. (3.82.1)
[B] Auctis copiis Pompei duobusque magnis exercitibus coniunctis pristina omnium confirmatur opinio et spes victoriae augetur adeo ut quidquid intercederet temporis, id morari reditum in Italiam videretur. (3.82.2)
[C] Si quando quid Pompeius tardius aut consideratius faceret, unius esse negotium diei sed illum deletari imperio et consularis praetoriosque servorum habere numero dicerent. (3.82.2)

Pompey encourages Scipio’s men with the hope of gain [A]; his forces are enormous, but his men anxious to return home [B]; he is under pressure to act in haste, despite the natural slowness of his character [C]. The last two points cover a shift of focus: in [B], the opinio reported is that of omnes, but the verbs change from third person singular passive to third person plural active. The subject in [C] is no longer omnes but Pompey’s subordinates, and this leads into a further factor in the narrative explanation:

[D] iamque inter sese palam de praemiis ac de sacerdotiis contendebant in annosque consulatum definiebant, alii domos bonaque eorum qui in castra erant Caesaris petebant; magnaque inter eos in consilio fuit controversia.... (3.82.3-4)

The imperfects combined with anaphora of iam, aided by the privileged perspective of historical hindsight, help to
suggest how premature were their calculations of profit and advantage. In dramatic terms, this presumption of victory on the part of the subordinates is hubristic, but the same is not true of Pompey's *milites*. They are given no response to his lure of *praeda* and *praemia*: they want only to go home. The contrast with their leaders is stark, and amplified by the following chapter, in which the quarrelling subordinates are vividly characterised:

Iam de sacerdotio Caesaris\(^{97}\) Domitius, Scipio Spintherque Lentulus cotidianis contentionibus ad gravissimas verborum contumelias palam descenderunt, cum Lentulus aetatis honorem ostentaret, Domitius urbanam gratiam dignitatemque\(^{98}\) iactaret, Scipio adfinitate Pompei confideret. (3.83.1)\(^{99}\)

More sinister than simple greed is the suggestion of a proscription which Caesar attributes to Domitius.\(^{100}\) He represents this proposal as a proof of their inferior motives for fighting, criticising their behaviour explicitly:

Postremo omnes aut de honoribus suis aut de praemiis pecuniae aut de persequendis inimiciis agebant,


\(^{98}\)Perhaps ironic in the light of the Corfinium episode, and intended to evoke a contrast with Caesar.


\(^{100}\)This has some independent confirmation from Cicero, *Att.* 11.6.2, 'non nominatim sed generatim proscriptio esset informata'; cf. 6, 'Lentulus...Caesarius hortos et Baias desponderat...omnes enim qui in Italia manserant hostium numero habebantur'.
nec quibus rationibus superare possent sed quem ad modum uti victoria deberent cogitabant. (3.83.4)

The triple anaphora of aut in phrases of increasing length is juxtaposed with a series of three ablative absolutes describing Caesar’s actions, which contrasts his attitude to the desirability of battle: the contrast of the proposed proscriptio with his own lenitas is left implicit, but the necessity of handling his men wisely is twice stressed:

Re frumentaria praeparata confirmatisque militibus et satis longo spatio temporis a Dyrrachinis proeliis intermisso, quo satis perspectum militum animum videretur, temptandum Caesar existimavit quidnam Pompeius propositi aut voluntatis ad dimicandum haberet. (3.84.1)

The strengthening of the men’s resolve is reiterated at 84.2, but again the contrast with Pompey’s is left implicit. Caesar makes mention here of an innovative strategic use of the cavalry as if in passing, but it will be picked up later and used to his moral advantage (3.84.3-5; cf.75.5). He does make a point, moreover, of drawing attention to the death of one of the Allobrojan brothers in the first cavalry engagement, and reminding the reader of his desertion to Pompey; the nature of any causal connection between that foolish choice and his death is not made explicit (84.5).

In ch.85, in which the battle lines draw up, a complex of factors combines to give the right moral judgment of the action. Pompey’s battle strategy is not independently recounted. Caesar merely remarks that he watched his movements (85.1). He does, however, describe his own tactical arrangements, and with a telling judgment on the quality of Pompey’s men which recalls a cause of Gallic military and
moral inferiority, 'insolitum ad laborem Pompei exercitum cotidianis itineribus defatigaret' (85.2). Those tactics are never put into practice: they are described not in order to tell what happened, but to sustain the impression of Caesar’s controlled assessment of affairs, and to show him reacting quickly to a favourable opportunity for battle ('paulo...progressam', 85.3). This swift change of plan is impressive in itself, and provides a suitably exciting context for what follows: for the first and only time in the BC, Caesar himself speaks in O.R.:

Tunc Caesar apud suos, cum iam esset agmen in portis, "Differendum est," inquit, "iter in praesentia nobis et de proelio cogitandum sicut semper depoposcamus. Animo sumus ad dimicandum parari: non facile occasionem postea reperiemus." Confestimque expeditas copias educit. (3.85.4)

The speech conforms closely to the type of morally-positive exhortatory O.R. analysed in the Appendix, but within its narrative context, its function is more than simple encouragement: it is immediately contrasted with a pair of O.R. speeches from his opponents, first Pompey and then Labienus. It is significant that neither of these two latter is a speech of simple encouragement, and that both deal instead with tactical matters. Caesar reports what was said at a consilium, prompting the decision to offer battle, 'Pompeius quoque, ut postea cognitum est, suorum omnium hortatu statuerat proelio decertare' (86.1). While Caesar’s decision was all his own, Pompey is under pressure to fight.

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101 Cf. 1.78.1-2, '[caetratorum et auxiliarium] corpora insueta ad onera portanda.'
Pompey’s speech is in effect an exposure, on first a moral and then a military level, of his unworthiness to win: he is reported as having said at previous consilia that ‘prius quam concurrerent acies fore uti exercitus Caesaris pelleretur’ (86.1). The folly of such arrogance is first exposed not by Caesar but by Pompey’s own subordinates, ‘Id cum essent plerique admirati’ (86.2; it is an elegant irony to use a positive factor like admiratio to bring this out), and leads into his O.R. justification of his tactics (86.2-3). The construction of the narrative is complex here: his opening words are heavy with dramatic irony, ”Scio me...paene incredibilem rem polliceri”, but he tries to justify his confidence through an explanation of ‘ratio consili’ which is undercut by the preceding narration of Caesar’s cavalry tactics:

"Persuasi equitibus nostris, idque mihi facturos confirmaverunt, ut cum proptius sit accessum, dextrum Caesaris cornu ab latere aperto aggredieruntur." (3.86.3)
Superius...institutum in equitibus quod demonstravimus servabat...ut equitum mille etiam apertioribus locis VII milium Pompeianorum impetum...sustinere auderent neque magnopere eorum multitudine terrentur. (3.84.3-4)

The point is reiterated even more clearly at the end of his speech:

"Ita sine periculo legionum et paene sine vulnere bellum conficiemus. Id autem difficile non est cum tantum equitatu valeamus". (3.86.4)

Though its military weakness is exposed, this plan to save the legions is more difficult to assess in terms of the moral advantage. It is not presented (as it might have been) as prompted by a concern to spare fellow-citizens. Rather,
dependence on cavalry to win the battle reflects negatively on Pompey’s reliance on his milites, whether he doubts their loyalty and wants to avoid putting it to the test, or whether he simply fails to understand the importance of being seen to trust them as his most reliable force.

The speech of Labienus which follows in support of Pompey’s proposal requires equally careful evaluation. It should not, however, be treated in isolation as an example of Caesar’s moral causation technique. It represents the culmination of a consistent characterisation in the BC. Apart from Caesar himself, Labienus is the only character who appears throughout the Commentarii, but unlike Caesar, his depiction undergoes a marked moral shift between the BG and BC. A single example from the former gives the flavour of this earlier presentation:

Labienus... de suo ac legionis periculo nihil timebat; ne quam occasionem rei bene gerendae dimitteret cogitabat... Labienus suos intramunitionem continebat timorisque opinionem quibuscumque poterat rebus augebat... Subito Labienus duabus portis omnem equitatum emittit; praecipit atque interdicit, proterritis hostibus atque in fugam coiectis (quod fore, sicut accidit, videbat) unum omnes peterent Indutiomarum.... Comprobat hominis consilium fortuna... Pauloque habuit post id factum Caesar quietiorem Galliam. (BG 5.57-8)

Rambaud perceives in Caesar’s presentation of subordinates a general tendency to shift military credit away from them and on to himself, pointing to his taking the credit for crushing the Tigurini (BG 1.12.7), a victory attributed by Appian and Plutarch to Labienus.102 Such passages as the one quoted

102 Rambaud Déformation 66: cf. App. Celt. 1.3; Plut. Caes. 18.2. For a different general view, see, e.g., Rice Holmes, Gaul 91, 196, 250 (esp. on BG 7.59.6), and on the defeat of 152
above, however, make it hard to accept this thesis. While it is true that action is centred firmly upon Caesar even when he is not present, the repetition of Labienus's name, the impression of swift control given by BG 5.57-8, is anything but a misappropriation of credit, at least in the sense implied by Rambaud. The excellence of subordinates, who look as Labienus does to Caesar for their inspiration and orders, does work to Caesar's narrative advantage; but it does so by illustrating a mutually beneficial relationship of trust. Thus at BG 6.8.4, when Labienus speaks in O.R. to inspire his men, his deception of the enemy recalls Caesar's stratagems, while he himself recognises Caesar as the source of the men's inspiration.

His alienation from Caesar in 49 B.C. has given rise to speculation among scholars, the main lines of which are summarised by Tyrrell (424), who is quick to reject 'Rambaud's intricacies', and tries to steer a middle course between Caesar the deliberate falsifier of his legates' reports and Caesar the writer of impartial description (427-8).\textsuperscript{103} He rightly notes that Labienus is given the only O.R. speech by a legatus;\textsuperscript{104} though oddly he uses this to claim that 'there is a coolness visible in [Caesar's] treatment of Labienus', and goes on to depict him as a man embittered by Caesar's lack of appreciation (429-30). The first datable evidence for his the Tigurini, 251-3.

\textsuperscript{103}W.B. Tyrrell, 'Labienus' departure from Caesar in January 49 B.C.', Hist. 21 (1972) 424-40. See also R. Syme, 'The allegiance of Labienus', JRS 28 (1938) 113-25.

\textsuperscript{104}I.e., in the BG: cf., e.g., BC 2.34.4.
change of loyalty comes from Cicero (Att. 7.11.1), though
Hirtius mentions it was a rumour even earlier, and in terms
which reflect the focus of moral explanation in the BC:

T. Labienum Galliae praefecit togatae, quo maiore
commendatione conciliaretur ad consulatus
petitionem....Quamquam crebro audiebat Labienum ab
inimicis suis sollicitari...tamen neque de Labieno
creditit quicquam neque contra senatus auctoritatem
ut aliquid faceret adduci potuit. (BG 8.52.2-3)

This correspondence of interpretation between Hirtius and
Caesar tells against Tyrrell’s thesis: he tries to associate
Labienus’ departure with the influence of other men than
Pompey, but in doing so underplays the link between Hirtius’s
attribution of the breach to inimici and Caesar’s account of
the beginning of the war. In which latter, as was shown above
 esp. on 1.7.1), Caesar’s alienation from Pompey is portrayed
as having been engineered by these inimici. In other words,
in the winter of 50-49, Caesar is still concerned to
demonstrate a desire for continued amicitia with Pompey, which
‘pauci inimici’ are doing their best to subvert.105 This
misunderstanding on Tyrrell’s part undermines his conclusion
that ‘personal motives aside, [Labienus]...joined the
legitimate government...against a revolutionary proconsul’
(439).

It seems unlikely, given the available evidence, that any
fully convincing explanation of Labienus’ conduct in 49 can be
given. The striking shift in presentation of his character
between the BG and BC is not in itself surprising (given the

105Cf. BG 6.1.2, 4; 7.6.1. The question of publication
dates for the Commentarii is of course crucial to the
interpretation of such references.

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corresponding shift in personal allegiance), but the fact that Caesar makes no attempt to reconcile the two portraits does call for investigation. Such an investigation is not helped by the problem of publication date(s) for the BG, but in any case, the lack of any explanation for the change presents a puzzle. What did Caesar intend the reader to make of it?

Labienus is never mentioned in the BC without criticism, but that criticism is not simple or overt: Caesar seems instead to rely on the reader’s knowledge of his earlier work to exploit ambiguity in the actions and words he is given.\textsuperscript{106} The irony in the scene of his vow of loyalty to Pompey is obvious:

Princeps Labienus procedit iuratque se eum non deserturum eundemque casum subitum, quemcumque ei fortuna tribuisset. (3.13.3)

There is further denigration, with still heavier irony, at 3.19, in which the friendly relations between the soldiers of the two sides (3.19.1; cf. 1.74) and Caesar’s eagerness for peace (‘quae maxime ad pacem pertinere viderentur’; ‘locutus est de sua atque omnium salute’, 19.2-3) prepare the scene for a strong contrast:

Magna utrimque multitudo convenit magnaque erat exspectatio eius rei atque omnium animi intenti esse ad pacem videbantur. Qua ex frequentia T. Labienus prodit et superbissima\textsuperscript{107} oratione loqui de pace atque altercari cum Vatinio incipit. (3.19.5-6)

The polysyndeton, anaphora of \textit{magna} and ‘omnium...videbantur’ reinforce the isolation of Labienus, whose speech is cut off

\textsuperscript{106}See 1.15.2 (noted above); 3.13.3, 19.6-8, 71.4, 87.1-5. Cf. \textit{B.Afr. passim}, esp. 16.1-4, 19.3-4.

\textsuperscript{107}The MSS read \textit{summissa}, which makes no sense in the context: see Kraner-Hofmann-Meusel, \textit{ad loc}..
by 'subito undique tela immissa'. His only response is to harden his attitude, to demand Caesar's destruction (19.8): if the war is fought to the bitter end, Caesar implies, it is not his fault.

It was noted above that the defeat of Caesar at Dyrrachium is compensated by the presentation of Pompeian moral inferiority. The most striking proof again comes from Labienus, who adds cruelty and contempt for citizens to his earlier arrogance, in his treatment of the prisoners he has specially requested be handed over to him:

Labienus...omnis [captivos] productos ostentationis ut videbatur causa, quo maior perfugae fides haberetur, commilitones appellans et magna verborum contumelia interrogans, soleretne veterani milites fugere, in omnium conspectu interfecit. (3.71.4)

The word commilitones, used with such contemptuous irony, focusses his treachery, which is now commented on for the first time ('perfugae fides'): the men he once commanded he now openly taunts with cowardice, before killing them in full view, to convince Pompey of his fides.\textsuperscript{108}

In his speech at the consilium before Pharsalus, the authorial comment that 'Caesaris copias despiceret, Pompei consilium summis laudibus efferet' (87.1) is supplemented by the way Labienus is made to base his arguments for Caesar's weakness on his personal knowledge of the men who had served in the Gallic campaigns:

"Noli", inquit, "existimare, Pompei, hunc esse exercitum, qui Galliam Germaniamque devicerit.

\textsuperscript{108}With a similar narrative focus, the author of the B.Afr. depicts Labienus' arrogant taunts to Caesar's soldiers (16.1-3).
Omnibus interfui proeliis neque temere incognitam rem pronuntio." (3.87.2)

The reader is thus reminded once more of his desertion, while, as with Pompey, the argument of his speech is undercut by the dramatic irony of Caesar’s ultimate victory. His oath at the end reinforces this irony, for Caesar has already shown that he is a man without fides, as does the general reaction to his words:

Magna spe et laetitia omnium discessum est; ac iam animo victoriam praecipiebant, quod de re tanta et tam perito imperatore nihil frustra confirmari videbatur. (3.87.7)

Manipulation of historical hindsight and the construction of a moral explanation for past events, techniques used extensively in the third decade of Livy, are at their most conspicuous here in Caesar. In the BG, they were mainly confined to simple examples of Gallic overconfidence before defeat, but in the BC, where the narrative justification of action is so much more sensitive, more complex constructions are essential.

Caesar’s account of the battle itself leaves no doubt that he deserves to win. His speech to the troops (in O.O., 90.1-2), which stresses first his desire for peace, and then his concern not to expose his soldiers, produces an enthusiastic reaction, ‘exposcentibus militibus et studio pugnae ardentibus’, followed by the emotive exemplum of Crastinus. As a former primi pili centurion of the Tenth, he is an appropriate figure to make the declaration that ‘unum hoc proelium superest, quo confecto et ille suam dignitatem et nos nostram libertatem reciperabimus’ (91.3). His words act as independent confirmation of the rectitude of Caesar’s
protection of his dignitas, and the identification of his cause with 'libertas populi Romani'. Caesar's way of using exempla virtutis differs somewhat from the Livian method, in which such examples tend to act as retrospective narrative reassurance in times of defeat (especially in 21-22): for he also uses such exempla, and frequently with O.R., at crucial turning points - anticipatory reassurance (before victory), as it were, as well as retrospective (mitigating defeat).

Caesar had already undermined Pompey's strategic superiority in the matter of cavalry, and does so again in the matter of infantry at 3.92. Pompey decides not to advance, with the intention of keeping his own men in formation while scattering and tiring Caesar's. His decision is authorially criticised:

Quod nobis quidem nulla ratione factum a Pompeio videtur, propterea quod est quaedam animi incitatio atque alacritas naturaliter innata omnibus quae studio pugnae incidit. Hanc non reprimere sed augere imperatores debent. (3.92.4-5)

Because the reader knows the outcome, this statement itself condemns Pompey: but it is independently confirmed by the reaction of Caesar's milites:

Sed nostri milites...cum infestis pilis procurrissent atque animum advertissent non concurri a Pompeianis, usu periti ac superioribus pugnis exercitati sua sponte cursum represserunt... ne consumptis viribus appropinquarent. (3.93.1)

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109 See Rambaud Déformation 231; cf. 207, 348 (on the death of Crassinus).

110 See, e.g., BG 4.25.3-4; 5.44.3 (anticipatory): 7.50.4-6; BC 3.64.3 (retrospective).
Their decision to halt is attributed to military experience: they do not merely take the initiative, rather they do so on grounds which expose the failure of Pompey’s stratagem.

The actual fighting is glossed over as quickly as possible. In only two chapters (3.93-4), Caesar’s men first defeat Pompey’s cavalry (93.4-8), then his infantry (94.1-4).\textsuperscript{111} When Pompey realises all is lost, he sneaks back to camp on a pretext to await the final outcome (94.5-6). By the end of 3.95, the battle is over, but moral justification continues (as it began in this section) with proofs of the moral inferiority of Pompey’s supporters [1] and of their arrogance [2], as the dramatic irony is at last driven home:

\begin{quote}
[1] In castris Pompei videre licuit trilichas structas, magnum argenti pondus expositum, recentibus caespitibus tabernacula constrata, L. etiam Lentuli et non nullorum tabernacula protecta hedera multaque praeterea quae nimiam luxuriam et victoriae fiduciam designarent, ut facile existimari posset nihil eos de eventu eius diei timuisse qui non necessarior conquirerent voluptates. [2] At hi miserrimo ac patientissimo exercitu Caesaris luxuriem obiciebant, cui semper omnia ad necessarium usum defuissent. (3.96.1-2)\textsuperscript{112}
\end{quote}

Although Pompey is never subjected to the kind of contumely and contempt heaped upon Antony by Cicero, he is nonetheless allowed no dignity in defeat, disguising his identity by removing the ‘insignia imperatoris’ (96.3) before making an ignominious escape.\textsuperscript{113}

\textsuperscript{111}With a reminder of Caesar’s good judgment, 3.94.3.
\textsuperscript{113}Cf. 3.71.3: see also Plut. \textit{Caes.} 45.8.
According to Plutarch (Caes. 46.1), as Caesar surveyed the field of dead, he lamented the necessity which had driven him to war: the same words are reported in Latin by Suetonius in a quotation from Pollio's History: 114

Hoc voluerunt: tantis rebus gestis C. Caesar condemnatus essem, nisi ab exercitu auxilium petissem. (PJ 30.4)

Caesar's own version of the immediate aftermath of Pharsalus is sparsely factual and pragmatic, but with as much concern to prove moral superiority as before. His men are not allowed to put praeda before negotium (97.1). Pompey's abandoned soldiers negotiate for surrender (97.5): his response to their pleas ('proiecti ad terram flentes ab eo salutem petiverunt', 98.2) is the culminating proof of the lenitas by which he has characterised himself throughout:

Pauca apud eos de lenitate sua locutus, quo minore essent timore, omnis conservavit militibusque suis commendavit, ne qui eorum violaretur neu quid sui desiderarent. (98.2)

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"I entirely agree that a historian ought to be precise in detail; but unless you take all the characters and circumstances concerned into account, you are reckoning without the facts. The proportions and relations of things are just as much facts as the things themselves".¹

(i) 21-25

INTRODUCTION

(a) The significance of the war

The second Punic war had a special importance for the Romans: its more precise significance for Augustan Rome is harder to define, but to judge from the role of Carthage in the Aeneid by no means negligible. In the Preface to his History, Livy highlights what is to be a key idea of his work, namely playing the theme of Rome’s greatness off against a momentous and complex threat, in this case the threat of moral decline: in a similar way, in the opening book of the Aeneid, tantae irae and the urbs Carthago are played off against prophecies of future glory for Rome.² Virgil uses his reader’s knowledge of the Punic wars to fill his opening book with dramatic irony, to create a blend of tension and reassurance, and this is a technique he shares with Livy; the

¹Dorothy Sayers, Gaudy night (London 1935), ch. 1.

parallel between the Rome-Carthage struggle in the third and second centuries, and the moral, universal struggle of Rome’s progenitor against the leader of early Carthage is appreciated by Hardie in his *Cosmos and Imperium*.³

Livy’s shaping of 21-30, his use of the events of the war to illustrate the destiny of Rome, may reflect Virgil’s influence or a more general milieu of Augustan interest: in any case, in his preface to this decade, acknowledging that he stands in a long line of predecessors, he is at some pains to state the importance of his subject (21.1.1):

In parte operis mei licet mihi praefari, quod in principio summae totius professi plerique sunt rerum scriptores, bellum maxime omnium memorabile quae umquam gesta sint me scripturum.⁴

In terms similar to Thucydides’, he sets out the similarities between the two sides (1.2): this emphasis on the even match between Rome and Carthage, picked up in the last battle of the war,⁵ makes the differences he does highlight all the more important as guides to the reader. It also helps to justify his conception of the Second Punic War as a contest for *imperium orbis terrarum*.⁶

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³In Virgil’s *Aeneid*: *Cosmos and Imperium* (Oxford 1986) 284, 351: 82, 168f., comparison of Ennius and Lucretius; 381f., the influence of Virgil.


⁵Cf. 30.34.12, ‘Ita novum de integro proelium ortum est; quippe ad veros hostes perventum erat, et armorum genere et usu militiae et fama rerum gestarum et magnitudine vel spei vel periculi pares’.

⁶Cf. Polybius 1.3.1-6, with Walbank I, 43-4.
(b) The unity of 21-30

Narrative unity in the third decade is a problematic issue, perhaps better described as 'unities' or 'unification'. Burck gives a full account of the evidence for Livy's debt to Peripatetic historiography, with the aim of proving a connection between Livy's concern for artistic shape, structure and unity, and a historiographical school. Walsh provides some corrective to Burck's Graecocentric view of the sources of Livy's narrative artistry by emphasising a Roman strand of influence, and claiming for his subject a conscious attempt to fulfil the ideal expressed by Cicero in de oratore II. It has been observed by Hoffmann that books 21-30 can naturally be divided into 21-22 and 23-30, the former following a single clear narrative thread of Hannibal's advance and Rome's response, the latter consisting of series of isolated events and artistically rounded episodes in a

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8In Die Erzählungskunst des T. Livius (2ed. Berlin 1964) 176-233: Burck argues at length for the adoption of innovative qualities associated with hellenistic/peripatetic historiography by Roman historians, and especially Livy. For a study of narrative explanation in the third decade, perhaps the most important section of his book is that on enargela (197-209; see below for discussion of individual examples): his approach to the narrative of the first pentad in Die Erzählungskunst is applied to 21-30 in Einführung in die dritte Dekade des Livius (2ed. Heidelberg 1962).

variety of locations, not only Italy, but Spain, Sicily, Greece and Africa as well.\textsuperscript{10} He raises an important question as a result of this observation, after noting that Livy’s sources also treat 217/6 as a unity (following which their accounts diverge):

So drängt sich die Frage auf, ob hier der Wille zu einer einheitlichen Gestaltung des Stoffes überhaupt versagt hat, oder ob gerade in dieser scheinbaren Lockerung doch eine bestimmte Phase des Krieges...einen Ausdruck finden sollte. (p.47)

The internal unity of 217/6, however, common to Livy and his sources, need not be at odds with the overall unity of the decade, nor does a coincidence of opinion between Livy and his sources necessarily deny his conscious adoption of that interpretation. Hannibal’s march on Rome over the Alps, and the great Roman defeats which followed it, were probably the most easily remembered and famous part of the war soon after it ended: oral tradition is likely to have influenced Livy in his treatment of the events of 21-2 as distinct.\textsuperscript{11} But their artistic shaping and unity are due to more than simply the influence of sources: they are designed to be paradigmatic, to set the stage for the conflict, to show the potential follies and failures of Rome’s generals, and to illustrate the

\textsuperscript{10}In Livius und der zweite punische Krieg (Berlin 1942) 46-57. See also P.G. Walsh, ‘Livy and the aims of "historia": an analysis of the third decade’, in ANRW II, 30.2 (1982), 1058-74, esp. 1059.

\textsuperscript{11}The involvement of Fabius Pictor in these events (22.7.4, 57.5) is surely influential on the internal unity of 21-2. The Romans were not unique in enjoying tales of their own defeat or turning them to long-term moral advantage. Parallels like Dunkirk or the charge of the Light Brigade perhaps suggest a conscious desire to divide off a negative phase, to point the contrast with a positive sequel.
character of her foe. Livy’s account of the siege of Saguntum becomes paradigmatic for the question of treatment of allied and other peoples, as the war opens up opportunities for dissent, rejection of Roman rule and independent action of a kind impossible when Rome was in control.

In addition to written influences on unity of theme and structure in Livy’s work, another strand of influence, closely linked to an oral tradition, is perceptible. This is not the written form but the living sense of history in which Romans were steeped, and the conviction of a special national destiny prevalent so conspicuously in the time of Augustus, which Augustus did his best to foster. 12 The third decade is our first example of a perceived narrative unity across ten books, a single war against a single foe in which Rome’s wars with other nations than Carthage are seen as bound up in a wider struggle.

(c) The sources for 21-30

21-30 are the first extant books for which Livy had available sources which were not so far removed from the witness of primary sources as to make them inherently suspicious or incredible. In parts of the analysis set out below, I have used Polybius where comparison helps to illustrate the special nature of Livy’s account. While,

however, few would doubt that Livy uses sources of Polybian origin or influence for 21-30, the extent of his direct use of Polybius is a matter of dispute. The difficulties are set out by Tränkle, who considers mainly books 31-45, but in the third section of his book claims general agreement that 21-23 are based not directly on Polybius (himself drawing on Fabius Pictor and Silenus), but on a version mediated via Coelius Antipater. He notes that opinions vary on the Polybian origin of the rest of the decade.\textsuperscript{13} It can nevertheless be stated with reasonable certainty that Livy depends on Polybius for events in Sicily 215-212 B.C. (the conquest of Syracuse (24-5), the capture of Tarentum (25), the events of the war in Greece (211-205 B.C., 26-27), and the clashes in Africa at the end of the war (29-30). Luce, however, in refuting the belief that most of Livy's references to second century writers (Fabius, Calpurnius Piso, Cato) are copied from Sullan sources, and citing Livy's account of the casualties at Trasimene (22.7.2-4), also gives a brief assessment of the problem: he concludes that the narrative suggests Polybius is not being used extensively, but that at times this is demonstrably untrue.\textsuperscript{14} Burck too deals with the problem of

\begin{quote}
\textsuperscript{13}In Livius und Polybius (Schwabe u. Cr. 1977), 193-241, 'Polybius in der dritten Dekade?' See also Hoffmann, Livius 6-11, 'Livius und Coelius'.

\textsuperscript{14}See T.J. Luce, Livy: the Composition of his History (Princeton 1977) 162; cf 189.
\end{quote}
Livy’s sources for the decade, remarking that those for 21-22 are particularly problematic.\(^\text{15}\)

While it seems to be true that Livy prefers to use one source at a time, and treats events as separate entities which one author or another may have combined more intricately, comparison of factual discrepancies was also part of his task.\(^\text{16}\) It is still open to question whether such comparison was continuous and thorough (while Livy drew attention only to obvious discrepancies) or whether such comparison was only made at the points where it is explicitly stated (usually for casualty figures and death scenes).

With the exceptions noted above, Livy seems to have followed Coelius rather than Polybius:\(^\text{17}\) since he was aware of Polybius’s version and prepared to use it when appropriate, it must be legitimate, and profitable, to see what can be learned from differences between the two. Livy’s talent for creative manipulation of source material in the first decade entails at least the possibility of a similar flexibility in the third. In the fourth decade, when Polybius is the main source, his willingness to recast his model is still more conspicuous. So, when he chose any one source in preference to another, it was because it gave the version most in accord with his own

\(^{15}\) In 'The third decade' (a condensed version of his Einführung in die dritte Dekade), in T. A. Dorey (ed.) Livy (London 1971) 21-46.


\(^{17}\) In 21-22 Polybius is mentioned only once, Coelius ten times; see Burck, 'The third decade', n.15; 27n.10.
view: and even when we see him following a known source very closely, the subtle reshaping of that source marks the account as uniquely his own.\(^{18}\) In consequence, the question of which parts of the narrative bear the mark of Livy’s own interpretation (and which are inherited from whatever tradition), becomes less problematic.

(d) Method

In contrast to the discussion of Caesar above, Livy’s narrative is treated book by book.\(^{19}\) The characteristic themes and techniques of narrative explanation have been defined and illustrated: it is now possible to see what can be learned from observing Livy’s use of these techniques and themes to shape his material within a sustained dramatic narrative. Thus not only the factual content of anecdotes, but also their placing in the narrative, their apparent strategy and point, their relation to the text as a whole or to individual themes, will be taken into account. The relationship between politics domi and success militiae will emerge as an important narrative marker in the moral explanation of events. So also will the manipulation of familiar topoi according to Livy’s moral judgment of events and actions.

Roman historiography may be criticised for attributing victory and defeat to the actions and character of individual

\(^{18}\)See below, e.g., on the fall of Syracuse (25); the parley at Zama (30).

\(^{19}\)To the end of 23: thereafter the discussion is confined to significant themes and episodes (models of relationship; the fall of Syracuse; the character of Hannibal; the victories of Scipio, etc.).

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commanders: but it has been pointed out that it is equally possible to conclude that the real hero of the History is populus Romanus.20 The parallel between the Roman people domi and Roman soldiers militiae explored in the Introduction of this thesis can help to suggest a means of reconciling this contradiction: however dangerous or difficult, the populus functions, like the exercitus, as the sine qua non of glorious achievement, the only means and medium for a leader to prove his ability. This decade contains some of the most forcefully drawn of all Livy’s characters:21 and he makes it clear that military success or failure depends upon the character of Rome’s leaders. Thus when Rome loses a battle, her commander is weak, and the opponent correspondingly strong: when she wins a battle (or in the case of Fabius contains a foe) it logically follows that her opponent must be weaker, and so Hannibal’s defects come to the fore in the narrative. One way of indicating strength and weakness is by means of the degree of co-operation shown between a leader and his men. This point can help to clarify a fundamental principle of Livy’s work, namely that military (proven by ‘facts’) and moral (proven by characterisation) superiority are bound up in each other. Either can be inherited from the sources or created by Livy himself. Natural, innate moral superiority is proven by

20By T.J. Luce, Livy 292-3 and bibliography there cited: Hoch, Die Darstellung der politischen Sendung Roms bei Livius 42, favours the leadership model.

21See I. Bruns, Die persönlichkeit in der Geschichtsschreibung der Alten (Berlin 1898) for ‘character’ in Polybius and Livy, as represented by two distinct types, the subjektivist (13-15) and the indirekt (18-27), esp. 15-18 on differences between Polybius and Livy.
Rome's eventual victory. If she were not both militarily and morally superior, she would have lost the second Punic War, and so the success of her conquests acts also as their justification.

Livy's historical scruples, his attitude to his source material and his success in holding to principles of veracity, are discussed by Hoffmann, who establishes the care with which he chose and shaped his material. It may appear that Livy's desire to surpass, by his *ars scribendi*, the 'rudem vetustatem' of predecessors is at odds with the wish to produce 'in rebus certius aliquid' (*Praef.* 1-2): nevertheless, as Hoffmann shows, to the ancients the two aims are not incompatible, and Livy goes some way to succeeding in both. Moreover, Livy implies in his Preface that he is doing something new and different: the second Punic war is part of a detailed and causative account of the shift from the *viri* and *artes* by which 'et partum et auctum imperium sit' to the degeneracy of 'haec tempora'. Though his assumptions about the nature of Roman superiority and destiny in this war are related to those of the his predecessors, the third decade must, by reason of length, scope and narrative skill, stand as a unique interpretation of the events of 219-201 B.C..

The speeches are also an important part of Livy's narrative technique, but rather than analysing their formal rhetorical components, the account given here focusses on

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their arrangement and content, on how they illustrate, develop and contradict key themes, and on the relation of content to the surrounding narrative.  

This decade, because it covers a single war against a single enemy, is structurally more elaborate that either 1-10 or 31-40: in 21-2 in particular, Livy is essentially a dramatic artist, exploiting his readers' knowledge of events to hint at eventual success despite immediate failure or even disaster. He is no Virgil, to be reassuring the reader of victory through speeches from the gods, and then dwelling on the misery of the individuals by whom success was made certain: but he knows how to involve the reader in the struggles of those he describes, and how to win and hold their interest in the issues at stake.

THE FIRST PUNIC WAR: Periochae XVI-XIX; Fragments 3-10

Livy's second decade is lost. It seems probable, then, that narrative explanation of the third decade can at best only be partial: we have no means of knowing the extent to

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23 A method which owes much to the approach of Burck's analyses, e.g., 'Einzelterpretation von Reden' (in Burck (ed.) Wege zu Livius [Darmstadt 1967]): see below on the mutiny at Sucro and parley at Zama. See also Walsh, Livy 219-44, esp. 242-4 on O.R. and O.O.: K. Gries, 'Livy's Use of Dramatic Speech' AJP 70 (1949) 118-141; A. Lambert Die indirekte Rede als künstlerisches Stilmittel des Livius (Diss. Zürich 1946), esp. 18-9 on O.O. as fully-developed rhetorically. See also N.P. Miller, 'Dramatic Speech in the Roman Historians' GR 22 (1975) 45-57, esp. 50-55.

24 The warning of Hanno (21.10); first clash (21.29); Hannibal's dream (21.22); mention of Scipio Africanus (21.46); cry of the ingenuus infans (21.62.2) etc. provide predictive narrative compensation for Roman defeats.

25 Although his use of omens and prodigies contributes a somewhat similar effect; D. Levene, Religion in Livy (Oxford D.Phil. thesis 1991), esp. 54-106.
which the Second Punic War was interlinked and connected to the First.\textsuperscript{26} The fact that Livy centres responsibility for the war on the character of Hannibal, though it helps to define 21-30 as a separate narrative unit,\textsuperscript{27} does not dispose of the possibility that he was preparing from book 16 onwards for this 'bellum maxime omnium memorabile'.\textsuperscript{28} To judge from the introductory chapters of 21 and the paradigmatic speeches of Hannibal and Scipio (below) the possibility is strengthened: reference is several times made to the First Punic War in such a way as to imply linkage of the issues at stake, of the factors which combine to create a moral explanation of the events.\textsuperscript{29} The \textit{Periochae} and fragments, moreover, provide some hints of factors like \textit{Punica fraus} and the moral explanation of military action, which imply a continuity of treatment.\textsuperscript{30}

\begin{footnotes}
\item[26] 264-241 B.C.: Polybius 1.13.1-64.6, with Walbank I, 63-130.
\item[29] See, e.g., 21.1.2-2.3; 10.4-9; 40.11; 41.6-7; 43.6; 44.7, etc..
\end{footnotes}
chickens is a famous example of moral explanation, which probably played a narrative role similar to that of the omens attached to Flaminius (22.4.11-13). Livy does not make the connection between these two commanders given by his probable source, Coelius: 31 instead he transfers it to Varro at Cannae, who is then made to recall both Claudius and Flaminius as previous spurners of divine warnings. 32 He also discussed the origins of Carthage (Per. 16.1), and it is likely that the contrast of the enemy's heterogeneous mercenary army with the citizen army of the Romans began to be drawn in book 16.

THE ORIGINS OF THE CONFLICT (222-218 B.C., 21.1.1-5.2) 33

The main themes of 21-30 are all to be found in the opening chapters of 21: 34 Roman destiny, the justification of Roman supremacy, the excellence of Roman leadership and the superiority of Roman over foreign soldiers. When Livy sets out the grounds of complaint which led to the conflict, the Romans' is simply stated, 'quod victoribus victi ultras inferrent arma'; the Carthaginians' is first stated, 'quod superbe avarique crederent imperitatum victis esse', then

Histoire Romaine xxxiii (Paris 1979) 242-3 (the defects of Servius' version make it unlikely that the phrase comes from Livy, though the theme of moral causation is clear enough).

31 H. Peter, H.R.R. (1914) I, ccxxiv and n.2, with fr. 20 (= Cic. de div. 1.77).

32 See Levene, 57-8.

33 See P. G. Walsh, Livy; ab urbe condita XXI (London Univ. Tut. Press 1973) ad locc.: the causes of the war as presented in Livy are discussed by Burck, Einführung, 58-63.

34 On the 'drei Teile' of 21 (1-20; 21-38; 39-63), see Burck, Einführung, 57-8.
elaborated with an anecdote to prove the point (1.4-5). These Carthaginian charges of **superbia** and **avaritia** are not negligible: Livy has made them criticise Rome just where she is potentially weakest (as he hints throughout 21-30, particularly at 28-9, as well as in greater depth in the following decade). The dangers of moral corruption attendant on military success are another expression of the tension between the destiny of Rome and her decline which was first highlighted in the Preface.

Three stories set the scene for the Rome-Carthage contrast: the first concerns Hannibal’s boyhood (21.1.4). At 35.19.3, Livy will tell how Hannibal himself recounted it to Antiochus while in exile, but differs from the Polybian version to stress Hannibal’s eagerness for military experience, the early **studium belli** in which the Roman reader would recognise a threat. Moreover, although both Polybius and Livy report the oath, ‘numquam amicum fore populi Romani,’ here Livy has added ‘cum primum posset,’ to alter its force. Thus he appears to be objective in noting the grievances of

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35 Note the subjunctives of alleged cause for both sides, ‘quod...inferrent...quod crederent’; possibly **crederent** implies less right on the Punic side. Hoch notes that ‘Gegenüber der Tatsache, daß die Römer angegriffen worden sind, verlassen die Gründe der Punier, wobei das imperitatum crederent noch abschwächend wirkt’ (Die Darstellung der politischen Sendung Roms bei Livius, 73-4).

36 Also told by Polyb. 3.11.5-7, with Walbank I, 315: Nepos Hann. 2.3-4: App. Iber. 9.

37 On the origins of this fama, see J. Briscoe, A commentary on Livy 34-37 (Oxford 1981) 172-3.

38 See Walsh, Comm., 121 (on Valerius Antias a possible source for the divergence).
each side, while stressing the aggressive nature of the Carthaginians and of Hannibal in particular: the remark (21.2.3) that 'mors Hamilcaris peropportuna et pueritia Hannibalis distulerunt bellum' plays up the sense of the dramatic inevitability of the second Punic war.  

The second and third anecdotes (21.2.3-4.10) help to set the Carthaginian political scene: revelation of political faction at Carthage is important to the undermining of Hannibal’s position later, and provides necessary narrative reassurance as a counterpoint to the domi/militiae interplay of Roman affairs in the course of the decade. Narrative reassurance is an important part of the creation of dramatic tension: just as later events can be predicted early in a narrative to create tension, so the reader can be reminded of the eventual outcome, or the reasons and causes of that outcome, to compensate the sense of unease thus created. Yet within the wider scheme of composition, the 'res populi Romani' ('quae ab exiguis profecta initiis eo creverit ut iam magnitudine laboret sua', Pref. 1, 4), any such narrative reassurance is bound to be complex, to involve more than just the events of one war, however important. The victory of Africanus, which provides narrative reassurance within the decade, is not the end of the story of Rome-Carthage conflict: nor is the distinction conferred by victory the end of Africanus’ story.

There is always some kind of narrative compensation in Livy for political discord at Rome, either long- or short-

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39 See Walsh, Comm., 21.1.4n.
term, complete or (more often) partial: in 21-2, discord may
be highlighted to explain a military defeat for which long-
term reassurance has been given, while later in the decade
such disputes are described in such a way that their
resolution comes to serve as a proof of Roman moral
superiority.40 This picture of Carthaginian politics is
intended to be paradigmatic of the whole decade, acting as a
warning of the possible sources of failure not just for the
Carthaginians (to whom it primarily applies) but also for the
Romans.

In the first anecdote, describing the period of
Hasdrubal’s rule, Livy hints at the improper means by which he
attained prominence (21.2.3). This is also alluded to later,
but first we may observe that he stresses the presence of
factiones in Carthage, and that he explains these factiones in
terms familiar and significant to his Roman readers
(21.2.4):41

Factionis Barcinae opibus, quae apud milites
plebemque plus quam modicae erant, haud sane
voluntate principum, in imperio positus.

40 This technique of interplay between Roman and foreign is
not unique to Livy. E. Keitel, 'The Role of Parthia and
Armenia in Tac. Ann. 11 and 12, AJP 99 (1978) 462-473,
illustrates Tacitus' use of foreign affairs to demonstrate the
inevitable pattern of (in this case) dynastic politics, a
technique she describes as a 'contrapuntal effect between
events at Rome and those in the East'.

41 In general he applies two-party terminology more readily
to foreign states than to Rome; C. B. R. Pelling, 'Plutarch
and Roman Politics' (in Moxon, Smart, Woodman (edd.) Past
Perspectives 159-187, esp. 181-185), notes the unusual
prominence of the two-party analysis of Roman politics in Livy
22.
This discord, then, between the two parts of Punic society, acts as a warning to the Romans; Livy depicts a familiar opposition of *plebs/exercitus* and *nobiles*, with each group led by a faction of *principes*.\(^{42}\) Walsh notes on this passage that Livy’s information about Carthaginian politics is scanty, and that he assimilates it to familiar Roman types: in calling Hamilcar *rex*, and noting the insistence that Hannibal be kept ‘sub legibus sub magistratibus’, he echoes late Republican political controversies, thus suggesting to the reader the familiar consequences of such discord. As in the first decade, the link between a happy *plebs* and a loyal army is for Rome a close one, and here too factional strife in Rome and in Carthage are played off against each other for thematic point.

Hasdrubal’s death is made to seem necessary to the fated clash between Rome and Hannibal, and this sense of inevitability is sustained by the third anecdote in this opening section, introducing Hanno, ‘alterius factionis princeps’ (21.3.2). His *sententia* at the debate on whether to allow Hannibal to join Hasdrubal on campaign is ominous, ‘et aequum postulare videtur Hasdrubal, et ego tamen non censeo quod petit tribuendum’. His accusation that Hasdrubal will abuse the young man picks up Livy’s earlier suggestion of the same practice between Hamilcar and Hasdrubal: it is not a

\(^{42}\)The actions of Varro illustrate possible exploitation of this discord (cf. Caesar’s depiction of Sabinus in the *BG*, discussed above).
topos which ever attaches to Roman generals and their subordinates.\textsuperscript{43}

The conclusion of Hanno's opinion is stated in ominous form, 'ne...parvus hic ignis incendium ingens exsuscitet' (21.4.1), and the comment which follows it makes clear the popularis type to which Hannibal is being assimilated:

Pauci ac ferme optimus quisque Hannoni adsentiebantur; sed, ut plerumque fit, maior pars meliorem vicit.\textsuperscript{44}

The suspected threat is further confirmed by what follows: his popularity is immediate, 'primo statim adventu omnem exercitum in se convertit', as a result of his strong resemblance to his father, whose implacable hostility to Rome has already been illustrated. It is the old soldiers for whom this resemblance is said to be important, 'Hamilcarem iuvenem redditum sibi veteres milites credere'. At this point in the narrative, Livy must emphasise the threat to Rome, which requires that both troops and commander be impressive: Hannibal is a great general, with a great father; his troops are loyal veterans. Later it is possible to emphasise reassuring chinks in the Carthaginian armour: Hannibal's craftiness begins to fail, and the loyal 'veteres milites' are overshadowed by 'milites mercennarii'.

Factiones are the first main indicator of future trouble for Carthage, but Livy's summary of Hannibal's character is also shaped to conform to the theme: though it begins with his

\textsuperscript{43}Not in historiography, but cf. Catullus 10.12-3; Suet. DJ 52.3, 67.1.

\textsuperscript{44}Cf. Sall. BJ 15-16. On Hannibal becoming imperator, and the reaction of Hanno, see further Burck, Einführung, 61-2.
soldierly virtues, it does not portray him as a perfect ideal of generalship. This is apparent from the clear echoes of Sallust's character-sketch of Catiline, which combined military excellence with a dangerous ingenium (see Introduction). The list of positive traits is impressive: he is ready to obey as well as to command ('parendum atque imperandum', 21.4.3), fights fortiter and strenue (4.4), combines audacia and consilium, is untiring in either corpus or animus (4.5), able to endure extremes of temperature, frugal of appetite (4.6), alert and hardy (4.6-7), modest in his dress, and of immense courage (4.8). The list of vitia which balances the virtutes, 'crudelitas, perfidia...nullus deum metus, nullum ius iurandum, nulla religio' (4.9), is influenced by Livy's moral explanation of the course of the war: the first two prevail in the early part of the narrative, the latter three towards the end of the decade. Polybius presents a different moral view of his character: the question of his cruelty is left open, that of his avarice accepted. There is no hint of avarice in Livy's picture: Polybius remarks that among the Carthaginians he had a reputation for greed, but among the Romans one for cruelty. The charge was there for Livy to use if he wished, but he rejects it. The chain of moral causation between desire for wealth and corruption and military failure is so strong in Livy (as it is in Caesar) that such a criticism would be

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45See 9.22.1-26.11, with Walbank II, 150-55.
incompatible with his presentation of Hannibal as Rome's greatest ever enemy.\textsuperscript{46}

Livy makes Hannibal identify strongly with the men and plays up his \textit{popularis} aspects to reveal his moral inferiority to the best of the Roman generals. His independent view compares interestingly with the self-portrait of a \textit{popularis} general examined in Chh. II-III above. Although, for example, caring for the men is a conspicuous theme in both, the need to please and placate them, stressed in Livy's account of Hannibal, does not figure in Caesar's own narrative: nor does Caesar depict himself sleeping on the ground among his men (cf. Livy, 21.4.7), though Plutarch and Suetonius remedy his deficiency by supplying appropriate marks of the \textit{popularis} general.\textsuperscript{47} The character sketch completes the preliminaries to this decade: the threat to Rome, the nature of Carthage, the personality of Hannibal have all been declared, and Livy can open the narrative proper, with \{a\} a provocative comparison and \{b\} an independent admission of guilt:

\begin{center}
Ceterum ex quo die dux est declaratus, \{a\} velut Italia ei provincia decreta bellumque Romanum mandatum esset, nihil prolatandum ratus ne se quoque, ut patrem Hamilcarem, deinde Hasdrubalem,
\end{center}

\textsuperscript{46}On greed leading to failure, see, e.g., Caesar, \textit{BC} 3.97.1: Livy 25.20.6; 28.23.1-4 (cf. Polyb. 11.24.11): Plut. \textit{Sulla} 12.8. It is not surprising that two other Polybian themes are not to be found here in Livy: 11.19.1-7 (his ability to unite his forces), 23.13.2 (the loyalty he inspired); for they cut across the presentation of Carthage's armies as morally and militarily inferior. Both are found, however, in the later sketch at 28.12: and earlier, at 26.38.1-3, Hannibal is characterised by \textit{avaritia}, when it is appropriate to the narrative context.

cunctantem casus aliquis opprimeret, {b}
Saguntinis inferre bellum statuit. (21.5.1-2)

THE START OF THE WAR (219 B.C., 21.5.3-47.8)

It was said above that this decade reflects on the
Romans’ right to rule, their fitness for their destiny: it is
characteristic of Livy’s narrative method to raise such
matters through the mouths of Rome’s opponents. It is also
important to bear in mind that enemy criticism is not allowed
to be groundless (as was noted above), but becomes a means of
reflecting on real potential weaknesses in the Roman moral
armour. The reader must judge enemy criticism (the accuracy
of their prophecies, the justice of their representations of
Roman behaviour) through comparison of their words with the
testimony of the narrative. The speech of Hanno, opposing
Hannibal and the pro-war party, puts forward Roman fides and
iustitia as the issue which the whole of the war is to
decide. By making a Carthaginian expose the illegality of
the capture of Saguntum, ‘Saguntum vestri circumsedent
exercitus unde arcentur foedere’ (21.10.5), Livy shows the

48 Perhaps a hint of future confrontation with Fabius? See
30.26.9, ‘sicut dubites utrum ingenio cunctator fuerit an quia
ita bello proprie quod tum geregatur aptum erat, sic nihil
certius est quam unum hominem nobis cunctando rem restituisse,
sicut Ennius ait’.

49 As Hoch points out, ‘Die Feinde Roms erlauben sich
Bemerkungen, die in ihrer Pragnanz oft unubertrefflich sind
und ungeschminkt den römischen Machtdrang als das bezeichnen,
was er ist’, in Die Darstellung der politischen Sendung Roms
95; cf. 94-106.

50 Walsh, Comm., e.g. 21.19.9n.; see also ‘Livy and

51 See Walsh, Comm., 21.10.5-12nn.

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rectitude of the Roman cause while maintaining a stance of historical impartiality: this independent judgment sets the framework for the justification of Rome throughout the decade. Hanno’s assertion that the gods will bring Rome victory, as before, and for the same reason (breaking peace terms, 10.6) has a similar effect, giving that claim independent worth as a statement of the truth.\textsuperscript{52} When he asks ‘utrum hostem an vos an fortunam utriusque populi ignoratis?’ (10.6), his words carry different significances for Carthaginian listener and Roman reader. The speech’s primary purpose is political and context specific, so Livy makes Hanno indulge in invective against Hannibal (10.7-8, 11-12), but he uses it at the same time as a prediction of the future course of the war:\textsuperscript{53} Hanno foretells the eventual siege of Carthage, which is still ten books away (10.5).\textsuperscript{54} One section of the speech gives particular insight into this theme of Roman destiny and justification: at 10.9, Hanno is made to express the following opinion about the first Punic war:

\begin{quote}
Vicerunt ergo di hominesque et, id de quo verbis ambigebatur uter populus foedus rupisset, eventus
\end{quote}


\textsuperscript{53}His readers would be familiar with literary commonplaces of good advice rejected (especially as a dramatic irony figure) and of prophecy fulfilled against the odds. For speeches with similar multiple narrative significance, cf. e.g. Critognatus (Caesar \textit{BG} 7.77, above, Ch. II); Micipsa (Sall. \textit{BJ} 10); Marius (ibid. 85); Camillus (Livy 5.51-54); Cato (Livy 34.2-4).

\textsuperscript{54}Cf. 21.16.5-6.
belli velut aequus iudex, unde ius stabat, ei victoriam dedit.

This statement comes as close as anything in Livy to a declaration that Roman destiny is proven by Roman achievement, that the success of Roman conquest serves as its own justification.\(^{55}\) Dramatic irony reinforces the point. We may compare 21.19.8-11, where a Volcianian elder denounces Rome in forceful O.R. as untrustworthy because she broke faith with Saguntum:\(^{56}\)

Ibi quaeratis socios censeo ubi Saguntina clades ignota est; Hispanis populis sicut lugubre, ita insigne documentum Sagunti ruinae erunt ne quis fidei Romanae aut societati confidat.\(^{57}\)

Later in book 21, Livy again uses the O.R. speech (this time a pair) in this paradigmatic, predictive manner, juxtaposing the leadership skills of Hannibal and Publius Scipio.\(^{58}\) The

\(^{55}\) It also helps to explain the importance for Livy of stressing why Roman military activity is bound up in religious observance: as Hanno himself says, the gods must be on Rome’s side (because she wins), and they take care to keep them there. See below on Flaminius.

\(^{56}\) This is at odds with Livy’s own account: but even if Rome did not break faith, she was perceived as having done so. Walsh cites parallels at 10.16.4 and 26.13.4. Rome expects that fides will win her socii; while we know from 21.5.5 that only praeda makes Hannibal’s socii loyal (see also 21.10.3-4, 15.1, 45.4-9, etc.). The opposition of fides and praeda is a clear moral explanation marker in Caesar, BC 1-3.


\(^{58}\) On the Ticinus engagement, see Burck, Einführung 70-74; on the speeches, 72-3.
valour of the latter opens and closes this pentad. He is wounded and dies with his brother in Spain (25.34ff.), and also looks forward to Africanus and Roman victory: but his arguments, in the speech of exhortation to his men, are conventional. Livy has reversed the order of speeches in Polybius to make Scipio speak first, and on close examination his words are found less satisfactory than they may at first appear. For they do not concur with what has been narrated 'independently' in the narrative. On the contrary, disturbing discrepancies begin to surface, in such a way as to undercut his assurance. He begins with a claim that Hannibal ran away after being defeated at the Rhone (21.40.2): but this was independently narrated as a strategic withdrawal, made in order to speed up the march into Italy (21.29.6). As for his claim that the Carthaginians are effigies and umbrae (40.9), when the battle begins it is they who are eager, 'omnes, velut dis auctoribus in spem suam quisque acceptis...proelium uno animo et voce una poscunt' (45.9); while the Romans, juxtaposed in the next sentence, are afraid, 'Apud Romanos haudquaquam tanta alacritas erat' (46.1).\textsuperscript{59} In claiming that Carthage's previous defeat by Rome is proof of her inferiority (40.5), and that the crossing of the Alps will have weakened their strength (40.9), he is not distorting the truth.\textsuperscript{60} but

\textsuperscript{59}Note that despite Scipio's assurance (40.11) it is the Carthaginians who trust in the gods (the Romans instead being frightened by portents, 46.1).

\textsuperscript{60}Cf. e.g. Caesar, BG 1.50.5 (the enemy is inferior proven by previous defeat); BC 3.87.1-4 [Labienus]: Sall. Cat. 58.11 [Catiline]: Livy 23.45.2-5, 'exprobando hosti Marcellum suorum militum animos erigeret'; 36.17.4-5, the battle of Thermopylae; 23.42.6-13, the Samnites and Hirpini persuade
his misinterpretation of the situation in other respects, unmitigated by authorial comment that, for example, he knew this to be untrue but thought it best to encourage the men, undermines the reader’s confidence in his judgment. 61

This method of speech-composition, the deliberate engineering of different viewpoints between narrative and utterance, is a key technique in Livy’s moral explanations: a similar technique is to be found in both Caesar and Sallust, not essentially different from the Thucydidean method of speech composition. Like Thucydides (admittedly at a less complex level), Livy does not make Scipio’s speech unambiguously right or wrong: but his reasons for making it ambiguous at all are directed to a different end. The point is related to the more general theme discussed earlier (the inclination of the Roman historian to judge rectitude in terms of perceived results): the engagement at the Ticinus (218 B.C.; 21.46-7) is lost by the Romans, who pack up and flee:

Proxima nocte iussis militibus vasa silentio colligere castra ab Ticino mota festinatumque ad Padum est.... (21.47.2)

It therefore follows that Scipio has misjudged the situation, and his speech is adjusted accordingly to provide the necessary moral causation for the defeat. Livy does not, however, allow the Ticinus engagement to negate Scipio’s skill

Hannibal to join them against Rome (encouragement by criticism of the enemy’s troops as weak); 9.1.11 Pontius to the Samnites (contrast 9.4.16, where the gods are against Rome); 30.30-31 the speeches of Hannibal and Scipio (30.4, Hannibal; 31.5 Scipio). See above on 21.10.9, and 21.38 for the size of Hannibal’s losses.

61 See below on Scipio [Africanus], in Spain and before Zama: Scipio does use deception to encourage his men.
and judgment completely: narrative reassurance has already been provided by 21.29.4, and the conclusion of the speech reinforces all that he has said of the inferiority of the enemy as he encourages his men to believe themselves the injured party:

Itaque vos ego milites, non eo solum animo quo adversus alios hostes soletis, pugnare velim, sed cum indignatione quadam atque ira, velut si servos videatis vestros arma repente contra vos ferentes. (21.41.10)\(^{62}\)

He plays up the idea that Rome is a generous and merciful conqueror (41.12), and that her lenient behaviour has been exploited by a 'furiosus iuvenis' (41.13): in the latter case, he is attempting to assimilate Hannibal to the 'rash youth' stereotype of (domi) politicians and (militiae) commanders, but again no authorial comment mitigates the seriousness of this misjudgment of his opponent - on the contrary, the 'independent' narrative shows the contrary.\(^{63}\) When finally he has to remind them that they are fighting for the preservation of their patria (a theme not prominent in the speech, which is hortatory/justificatory, not desperate in tone), he adapts the familiar topos that soldiers fight more bravely when being watched:\(^{64}\) here it is not the commander, but the Senate and people of Rome (to whom the soldiers' loyalty is properly due)

\(^{62}\)Indignatio is the emotion roused by an insult to dignitas; ira reinforces the theme that Rome is the injured party.

\(^{63}\)21.4.2-10. Cf. e.g. Caesar, BG 7.4.1 (Vercingetorix), 7.37.1 (Litaviccus and his brothers); BC 2.23-42 (Curio): Sall. Cat. 5.1: Livy 2.33.5 (Coriolanus); 23.2.2 (Calavius); 24.6.9 (Hieronymus).

\(^{64}\)See e.g. Caesar BG 3.14.8; 6.8.4; 7.62.2, 80.2.
who are looking on (41.16). As well as adding to the drama of a threat so close to the city itself, this idea may also be meant to contrast the Roman soldiers’ loyalty to Senatus Populusque with the personal dominatio exercised by Hannibal over the Carthaginians.

Hannibal does not answer Scipio’s speech immediately; and the words with which Livy explains this give further confirmation that at this point he is the more formidable, ‘Hannibal rebus priusquam verbis adhortandos milites ratus...’ 65 First comes the curious incident of the Gallic single-combat spectacle which Livy presents as intended to encourage the milites (42.1). 66 At 43.1-44.9 Hannibal explains the point of the spectacle (‘spectaculum...quaedam veluti imago vestrae condicionis erat’) and his view of the coming conflict. He shows awareness of their difficult position (43.5), and then reminds them of the rewards of victory (43.6-9), which will replace their former poverty with riches. On a Roman readership, familiar with the topos that wealth is a corrupting influence on a nation, and that soldiers (as primary producers of such wealth) are particularly vulnerable, such an argument has a less threatening impact than it does on those Carthaginians who hear it: especially when the conclusion drawn, as here, is

65 In 21-22 the phrase ‘Hannibal ratus...’ invariably introduces a correct supposition. In the later books this changes, as he loses the omniscience of the great general. See below on 26-30, ‘The character of Hannibal’.

that 'hic vobis terminum laborum Fortuna dedit’ (43.10). Fortune is notoriously deceptive and the terminus may not be quite what Hannibal intended.67 He picks up a point already made by Scipio when he contrasts his veteran troops with the raw Roman recruits:

Novo imperatori apud novos milites pauca verba facienda sunt. (21.40.4)
Pugnabitis cum exercitu tirone, hac ipsa aestate caeso, victo, circumsesso a Gallis, ignoto adhuc duci suo ignorantique ducem. (21.43.14)

He is right about the quality of the Roman army facing him, and right about the potential of their leader for misjudgment: as Scipio contemptuously dismissed Hannibal as a furiosus iuvenis, so Hannibal denigrates Scipio as 'semenstris...dux, desertor exercitus sui' (21.43.15). Both tags are unjust, invective rather than criticism:68 but it is Scipio’s men who run away (46.6), and Scipio who loses. The military advantage remains firmly with Hannibal for the present. It should be noted, furthermore, that Hannibal’s veteran army gives him in one respect the propaganda advantage: he can appeal to his troops’ own observations of his personal bravery, and to their experiences of his excellence as a commander (43.15-18).

He ends with the same theme as Scipio: the rectitude of the seizure of Saguntum. He too motivates his men by their sense of 'dolor, iniuria, indignitas' (44.4 cf. 41.10), and since it is unlikely that Livy wants the reader to think there

67As Hannibal implies, 21.43.11.

68Livy notes (21.39.8) that each is in fact aware of the other’s excellence.
is right on both sides, we must be meant to decide between the two. Typically, the answer is provided only obliquely:

Ad supplicium depoposcerunt...vos omnes qui Saguntum oppugnassetis; deditos ultimis cruciatibus adfecturi fuerunt. [proposition]
Crudelissima ac superbissima gens sua omnia suique arbitrii facit. [generalisation]

The claim that the Romans would torture captives is a transparent attempt at denigration, and if anything it rebounds on Hannibal, who has just ordered Gallic prisoners to fight to the death for his men’s entertainment and edification. Thus the conclusion drawn from the claim cannot stand: whatever the weaknesses of Roman empire, crudelitas is not to be included among them. Not until the parley before Zama does Hannibal admit himself to be the one guilty of injuria and even then he has strong motives for appeasing Scipio.

As was mentioned above, Livy prefaces this pair of speeches with an account of an insignificant clash between the two sides. The interpretation of the speeches is coloured, and the misjudgments of Scipio mitigated, by an authorial reassurance when, at 21.29.2-4, Livy explains his reasons for including the clash, namely that it both marks the start of the war and prefigures its course and end:

Hoc principium simul omemque belli ut summae rerum prosperum eventum, ita haud sane incruentam ancipitisque certaminis victoriam Romanis portendit. (21.29.4)

69 See Walsh, Livy, 223.
70 See E. Burck, 'Zum Rombild' (in Vom Menschenbild), 330.
71 Cf. Caesar, BC 1.76.4; 3.71. Livy has already pointed to crudelitas as a key characteristic of Hannibal.
Walsh notes that this is a comment of Livy’s own, and it aptly illustrates his own attitude to the symbolic and paradigmatic in historical narrative. He draws attention to what he perceives as the symbolism behind events, and with the help of his treatment of these early episodes, we are expected to find reassurance for Rome’s dangerous predicament, and to draw conclusions about the relative moral excellence of the two sides. Hannibal shows himself to have command of a temporary advantage, able to capitalise on the Romans’ mistakes; nevertheless, the superiority of the best of Roman generals, which both creates and is supported by the superiority of Roman soldiers over Carthaginians and mercenaries, is something not even he will be able to withstand.

If this way of reading the text as constructed to provide moral explanation and causation is valid, it should be possible to predict individual Roman successes and failures in the narrative by analysing the moral presentation of events and characters. To a Roman reader, Livy’s moral categories and conventions of narrative explanation would have been familiar, recognisably predictive: while not even the modern reader could doubt from the arrangement of the narrative that Flamininus would fail at Trasimene or Varro at Cannae, the more ambiguous episodes (the death of Gracchus; Marcellus and Sicily; mutiny in Spain; Scipio’s deceit, etc.) necessitate a more subtle analysis of moral categories. This decade of Livy, like any historical narrative, must be read with two ends in view, namely the outcome of the war and the outcome of the event at hand. It is the interplay of these two factors
which produces many apparent anomalies of characterisation and factual 'errors'.

There is, for example, a clear shift in Livy's depiction of Hannibal across the course of the decade. While he is successful, he is also a fine commander, but as the Romans begin to take control, he seems to degenerate morally: a good Roman commander's defeat may be owing to circumstance, but when Hannibal fails, his failure has a moral cause. Livy sometimes treats him as a tragic figure (his dream, his prayer to Hercules, his actions working contrary to fate etc.) but the issues at stake take his portrayal beyond a simple wish to create sympathy for a character. The subject of Livy's depiction of leadership qualities has already been dealt with in detail by P. Scott, but its relation to characterisation in Roman historiography is a complex problem. Some discussion is therefore inevitable, especially in view of what the earlier analysis of Caesar's Commentarii revealed about Roman conceptions of the relationship between generals and their troops. It soon becomes apparent that Livy is more open than Caesar can afford to be in making the actions and character of the commander crucial to the army's success. The nature and purpose of the Commentarii can help to explain this: Caesar has to suggest, rather than baldly state, that he is central to every success, and uses the valour of his men (and its motivation) as a discreet proof of his own excellence. Livy has no need to tread so carefully, and can therefore simplify

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Caesar's delicate narrative balance between commander and troops. He uses, for example, the *topos* of the need for a commander to rest his men and to consider their bodily welfare as a predictive marker, one aspect of his scheme of moral causation;\(^73\) Caesar, though, makes its absence from his accounts of his own commands a mark of excellence.\(^74\) While, however, actual neglect of the *milites'* need for rest and food always has disastrous consequences, care for them may not always be morally as well as militarily favourable: Hannibal's high-profile efficiency in this respect, though it works in terms of military results, reminds the reader that he has the greater problem in maintaining the loyalty of his troops.\(^75\)

It is quickly established that bribery is part of Hannibal's scheme of loyalty and that trickery is a hallmark of his military strategy.\(^76\) Livy uses the success or otherwise of stratagems and ambushes as a key to the moral progress of the action, so when Hannibal confronts Scipio, Scipio will not only see through Hannibal's *fraudes* (in a way Varro fails to do) but will also use trickery himself, and to great advantage. Moreover, in contrast to his belligerence and eagerness for the war, the Romans are anxious to be seen to fight a *bellum iustum* (21.18-19), while their annually

\(^{73}\) E.g. 21.35.5, 37.6 etc.; below, *ad locc.*.

\(^{74}\) E.g. *BG* 7.17, 40, 44; *BC* 1.64, 68; 2.16; 3.41, 94.

\(^{75}\) This ties in with a stereotype of the uneasy closeness of commander and men, such as attaches to Sulla, Piso and Sejanus: see Pelling, *Plutarch: Life of Antony* (Cambridge 1988) 4.4n.

\(^{76}\) Bribery; 21.10.3-4, 20.8, 24.2-5, 26.6, 45.4-9, etc.: trickery; 21.23.6, 53.11 etc.
elected consuls give a very different model of leadership from Hannibal’s, and an apparently weaker one.

As for the soldiers, in 21-2, at the high point of Carthaginian success, we can judge Livy’s view of the Carthaginian milites by what he does not say about their victories, by the lack of anecdotes to prove their military or moral excellence. At this point, with the stress on Carthaginian threat, not weakness, we see only hints of the future theme of mercenary militias contrasted with citizen armies, e.g. at 21.22.3, where Livy mentions apparently in passing that among Hannibal’s forces are some ‘Libyphoenices’, which he explains as ‘mixtum Punicum Afris genus’: the implication is that Carthaginian forces are inferior (for such mixed blood would be abhorrent to the Romans). 77 Again, his treatment of the crossing of the Alps (21.29.5-38.9) is not overtly denigratory about the Punic forces, and it is by what he does not say about that we must analyse his judgement of them. 78 The crossing is a set-piece of a polished and exciting type, and it is not surprising that Livy dwells on the fear felt by those taking part. A closer look, however, reveals that something is missing: the fear has no counterpart in anecdotes of valour and self-sacrifice, nor does Livy use the topos of total trust in their commander’s wisdom to mitigate the impression of the Carthaginian soldiers’ natural

77 Cf. the Gallograeci, 38.17.9, and Walbank III, 148-9.
78 The assumption of Roman superiority over Carthaginian is not quite so evident as it was for Caesar in the case of the barbarian Gauls.
cowardice. So the account of the crossing opens with this sense of Carthaginian fear:

Multitudo timebat quidem hostem nondum oblitterata memoria superioris belli; sed magis iter immensum Alpesque, rem fama utique inexpertis horrendam, metuebat. (21.29.7)

It seems, from a comparison with Polybius (3.44.10ff), that in the speech of Hannibal to his men which immediately follows (21.30.2-11) Livy has inserted an element of reproof (castigando), and makes Hannibal upbraid the milites for the repens terror which has overcome them.79 This suggests that he wants to draw attention to fear as a Carthaginian defect. Moreover, he repeatedly details the disorganisation and panic which arise among the Carthaginian troops, e.g. at 31.12, 33.3 (the key word is trepidatio here). The crossing, Livy suggests, is achieved only through the force of personality of Hannibal himself, who must use all his powers of persuasion as well as tactical skill to drive the men on. The weather is also against them: snow causes desperation among the men ('pigritia et desperatio in omnium volutu emineret,' a vivid phrase, 35.7).

As soon as the crossing is over, a clash between Hannibal and Publius Scipio becomes likely, and it is helpful to look here at the narrative which immediately precedes the pair of speeches discussed above. Livy begins his version of early operations in Italy (21.39.1-48.10) by remarking that peropportune (for Hannibal) war has broken out among the Gauls:

79See Walbank I, 379.
Sed armare exercitum Hannibal ut parti alteri auxilio esset, in reficiendo maxime sentientem contracta ante mala, non poterat; otium enim ex labore, copia ex inopia, cultus ex inluvie tabeque squalida et prope efferata corpora varie movebat. (21.39.2)

The effect on soldiers of sudden luxury following deprivation is a familiar theme; the Carthaginians fall into that error most significantly after the taking of Capua. Here, however, Livy must be content to imply the existence of seeds of moral decline (given the series of terrible defeats they immediately inflict) by means of his epigrammatic expression, and by stating the reaction of Scipio:

Ea P. Cornell consuli causa fuit.. ad Padum festinandi ut cum hoste nondum refecto manus consereret. (39.3)

THE GREAT DEFEATS (218-216 B.C., 21.48.1-22.61.15)

His leadership-centred view of the causes of victory or defeat in battle makes it possible for Livy to tell of the disasters at the Trebia, Trasimene and Cannae without implying the logical consequence that Roman soldiers are inferior to Carthaginian ones. He also invokes as a guiding principle of the narrative the theme of Punic calliditas (i.e. Hannibal's) in contrast to Roman military morality (depicted as a mixture of naïveté and honour), and this helps to mitigate charges of Roman incompetence. Hannibal’s cunning and trickery are brought to the fore at the Trebia, and

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80 The theme is worked out on a larger scale in the effects of Rome’s conquest of the East, 31-40.

81 218 B.C., 21.52-57.4; 217 B.C., 22.3-7; 216 B.C., 22.38-61. See H. Bruckmann, Die römischen Niederlagen im Geschichtswerk des T. Livius (Münster 1936), 59-103.

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alongside the *temeritas, superbia, ferocia, ambitio* and *cupiditas gloriae* of Sempronius (the consul in command there) help to excuse the Romans' failure (21.53.2, 5, 7 etc.).

Bruckmann draws attention to this flexibility of presentation in his analysis of Trasimene:

> Die virtus der Römer betont Livius daneben nachdrücklich im Schlachtbericht, in dem er ihren tapferen Kampf und Widerstand...gegenüber ihrer Bedrängnis und den übrigen widrigen Umständen...eindringlich herausarbeitet. In der Darstellung der Folgen der Schlacht bemerken wir die Absicht des Livius, die Feinde herabzusetzen...und das Ansehen Roms zu heben. (p. 70)

The account of the battle of the Trebia is an excellent introductory example of Livy's set-piece symbolic narrative technique.⁸² Walsh notes on this passage (53.2) Livy's use of *O.O* to reveal the thoughts of a speaker: Sempronius appears to be motivated by rivalry, and does not know how to handle his men. Chapter 53 is paradigmatic of the problems of the Roman command, something to be watched for as an indicator of the likely success or failure of Roman soldiers, while Hannibal's glee at discovering his opponent has a 'percitum ac ferox ingenium' tells its own story.

As so often, it is the discrepancy between what a speaker says, and what the narrative reveals or implies, which gives the reader a clue to the proper interpretation of events: so although Sempronius reasons 'restitutos ac refectos militibus animos,' according to the narrative he forgets to care for them:

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Ad hoc raptim eductis hominibus atque equis, non capto ante cibo, non ope ulla ad arcendum frigus adhibita, nihil caloris inerat... (21.54.8)  

This is immediately contrasted with Hannibal:

Hannibalis interim miles ignibus ante tentoria factis oleoque per manipulos, ut mollirent artus, missoque et cibo per otium capto, ubi transgressos flumen hostes nuntiatum est, alacer animis corporibusque arma capit atque in aciem procedit. (21.55.1)

Dramatic irony adds to the sense of impending Roman doom. At 53.11 Hannibal prepares an ambush with his expert cavalry: while (54.6) Sempronius places his hopes in the same, the weakest part of his forces, 'ferox ea parte virium'. Livy reassures the reader that in animus the Romans are as brave as ever (though sudden attack causes terror 55.8-10), and omits mention of their fear of the enemy cavalry. As Bruckmann remarks, 'Es ist evident, wie Livius alles tut, um die virtus der Römer während des ganzen Kampfes ausser Zweifel zu stellen' (63). Bruckmann’s excellent analysis of this

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83 In contrast to Caesar, whose speed of action does not entail neglect of the men (though they may undertake hardships gladly as a proof of excellence). Cf. Polyb. 3.72.3 (the Romans are not fed), 5 (the Romans affected by cold and hunger), 6 (the Carthaginians well fed and rested).

84 With incidental detail not in Polybius, e.g. Hannibal and Mago discuss a suitable spot (54.1-2).

85 Ferocia is usually, though not always, negative. On ferocia as a negative characteristic, see, e.g., 1.19.2 (Populus Romanus); 1.58.5 (Tarquinii); 22.3.14 (Flaminius); 22.12.11, 14.15 (Minucius); 27.2.2 (Hannibal); 28.43.2 (Scipio accused); 30.15.9 (Masinissa). Ferocia as positive: 2.46.4 (Tuscus); 3.11.6 (Caeso Quinctius); 3.70.10 (Agrippa); 21.20.8 (the Gauls have ‘ferocia atque indomita ingenia’); 25.18.2 (the Campanians). T.J. Moore, Artistry and ideology: Livy’s vocabulary of virtue (Frankfurt 1989) does not comment on ferocia.

86 See Polyb. 3.74.5.
narrative might also have included a small indirect point which nevertheless has some import for the issues at stake in the war: at 56.2-9, Livy tells how some of the Romans escaped, and how, because of Carthaginian neglect, others managed to cross the river and join Scipio at Placentia: 87

[Poeni] torpentes gelu in castra rediere. Itaque nocte insequenti, cum praesidium castrorum et quod reliquum...ex magna parte militum erat ratibus Trebiam traicerent, aut nihil sensere obstrepente pluvia aut, quia iam moveri nequibant prae lassitudine ac volneribus, sentire sese dissimularunt. (21.56.8-9)

The end of this escape reassures the reader that the true qualities of Roman leadership are still apparent. Scipio leaves Placentia for Cremona, 'ne duorum exercituum hibernis una colonia premeretur': this is a supplementary reassurance, of Roman consideration for allies; it is all the more necessary because Sempronius' successor is to be Flaminius. 88

At the end of 21 (62-3), the sacrilegious actions of Flaminius are an unmistakeable warning of impending disaster. 89 Here is a good example of Livy's ambivalent attitude to the oddities of Roman religion, combining contempt for individual superstitious aspects with a firm conviction that scrupulous religious observance had in some way

87 Neque prae imbri satis decernere possent qua suis opem ferrent', 21.56.3.

88 See Walsh on 57.4, and Livy, 58, 68, 131, 167. He sees Livy's picture of Flaminius (e.g. 22.3.4-5) as influenced by 'tragic' history; cf. F. W. Walbank, 'Tragic history: a Reconsideration', BICS 2 (1955) 4-14; also I, 10-16. Recognition of a dramatic/tragic element in historiography is not necessarily the same as identification of a historiographical school.

89 See Levene, 55-61.
contributed to Rome's destiny and success. Flaminius endangers that success by his refusal to take the auspices (63.7, 9), or to listen to the Senate's order of recall: he even ignores the gods' own message of the sacrificed calf (63.13-14), 'a plerisque in omen magni terroris acceptum.' The catastrophe at Trasimene is thus directly linked to Flaminius' impiety, though Livy is not concerned with deciding how far this is directly causal, or the result of the operations of Fate.

Unease about the impiety of Flaminius' position carries over into 22, by which time the portents and omens of disaster have become specifically military. Soldiers' spears catch light, shields sweat blood, the sun and moon fight, a tablet is found at Falerii inscribed with the words 'Mavors telum suum concutit,' and the statue of Mars on the Via Appia is seen to sweat (22.1.5-8, 12). To balance the omens, Livy's description of Hannibal's army as it marches to meet Flaminius gives some indirect reassurance: the backbone of Hannibal's army, his veterans, are not all Carthaginian, 'Hispani et Afri - id omne veterani erat robor exercitus' (22.2.3). Moreover, his chances are impeded by the presence of the notoriously unreliable Gallic soldiers, who, as a mollis gens, have to be put in the middle of the agmen (22.2.4). The reassurance

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90 See Levene, 33: 'the link between scepticism and belief [is] not merely fortuitous but fundamental to the way Livy treats his material'. Cf. 55-61.

91 See Walsh, 'Livy and Stoicism', AJP 79 (1958) 366 (on 22.3.4) for the view that Fortuna here is hellenistic Tyche in disguise.
provided by the weakness and incompetence of this Gallic contingent gives the Romans at least some long-term hope:

Galli neque sustinere se prolapsi neque adsurgere ex voraginibus poterant, neque aut corpora animis aut animos spe sustinebant, alii fessa aegre trahentes membra, alii, ubi semel victis taedio animis procubuissent, inter iumenta et ipsa iacentia passim morientes. (22.2.6-7)

In 22.3, however, Hannibal’s cunning and strategy are once more to the fore; he is well-informed of the Roman position and even consilia, and aware of Flaminius’ character defects, his ferocia and temeritas, which he encourages to the full, ‘quoque pronior esset in vitia sua, agitare eum atque irritare Poenus parat’ (22.3.6). Flaminius’s character is further sunk in the reader’s estimation by the fact that he lacks another of the great skills of generalship, namely the ability to listen to advice. The obligation of a dux to listen to consilia was an institutionalised part of Roman warfare (and politics), but Flaminius ignores the united voice of his subordinates (22.3.8-9) and responds to their suggestions of caution with anger (iratus, 3.9) and in O.R.. His comparison of himself with Camillus is a moment of folly, perhaps even hubris, and this grandiose claim is immediately followed by two more portents: he is thrown from his horse, and the standards stick in the ground. Again he responds in O.R. and contemptuously, suggesting that the portents are part of a senatorial plot to sway him (22.3.11-13).

92As also of the depiction of warfare in literature: see M. Schofield, 'Euboulia in the Iliad', CQ 36 (1986) 6-31.
93See Burck, Einführung 81.
Livy closes this preliminary section on Flaminius' military follies with a characteristic distinction:

Incedere inde agmen coepit primoribus, superquam quod dissenserant ab consilio, territis etiam duplici prodigio, milite in volgo laeto ferocia ducis, cum spem magis ipsam quam causam spei intueretur. (22.3.14)

This essential disunity in itself portends disaster, but it is also characteristic of the effects of popularis leadership on military success. Flaminius' faults are linked to his characterisation as a popularis politician, but it is not unreasonable to suspect that his temeritas and ferocia have at some stage in the tradition been supplied (as appropriate for a man of his political record) to explain the fact of Roman defeat at Trasimene.⁹⁴ We are dealing not with an undeniable fact of the character's personality, but with the explanation of events in personal terms: the characterisation of Flaminius reveals, like the BG and BC of Caesar, a perception that nobiles/duces and plebs/ milites are of a different essential nature, and that their roles may not be combined without disastrous consequences. The natural belligerence of soldiers must be restrained by the wisdom of the commander if success is to be possible.⁹⁵ In playing up to, rather than restraining, that natural belligerence, Flaminius is an embodiment of much that was perceived in Livy's time as degenerate in Roman political life. Meanwhile Hannibal's cunning is further underscored by his ability to manipulate a positive characteristic of Roman soldiers: at 22.4.1 he tries

⁹⁴See Walsh, Comm., 21.57.4n.: Hoffmann, Livius 37-8.
⁹⁵See below on Centenius in 25.
to provoke Flaminius and his army to vengeance, 'quo magis iram hosti ad vindicandas sociorum injurias acuat.'

In setting the scene for Trasimene, Livy combines Flaminius' incompetence (4.4 he fails to reconnoitre his position, in contrast to Hannibal), with the obstacle of nature herself, in the form of a mist which obscures their actions. Like Catiline 'before' him, in defeat Flaminius is no longer an incompetent belligerent, but a dogged and courageous Roman: at 22.5-6 he is impavidus, urges the men to depend on their vis and virtus, and hunts out the thick of the fighting, 'ipse quacumque in parte premi ac laborare senserat suos impigre ferebat opem.' Moreover, this display of courage succeeds in inspiring his men to protect him (i.e. displaying a selfless motive for ferocity, rather than a mere desire for self-preservation), as Livy notes in epigrammatic form, '[Flaminium] insignem armis et hostes summa vi petebant et tuebantur cives'. Cives is an interesting choice of noun, used to stress the solidarity of the Roman citizen body in the face of external threat, and ultimately, in demonstrating the reciprocal loyalty of commander and men, a proof of Roman superiority.

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96 On the narrative of Trasimene, see Burck, Einführung 79-83: Hoch, Die Darstellung der politischen Sendung Roms 30.

97 On the problem of the terrain, see Burck, Die Erzählungskunst 198n.6.

98 Though in a different context, cf. Sall. Cat. 59-61.
Unlike Polybius, Livy knows (presumably from Coelius) the name and the words of the Insuber eques who kills Flaminius: he is slaughtered as a sacrifice to the manes of those he killed himself. The term legiones nostrae in the mouth of a non-Roman is probably meant to strike the reader by its incongruous connection here with what is, in effect, human sacrifice; and again to imply Roman superiority (22.6.3). At any rate, the triarii, the top-ranking milites, are said to have surrounded the body to protect it from spoliation.

In the case of the Insuber eques, Livy provides more detail than Polybius, but this is not always the case. For example, at 22.6.6, he generalises a Polybian detail (3.84.8), so that instead of only a particular section of troops (those caught in the narrow pass) being forced into the lake and butchered, we are told simply that pars magna was in this predicament. It could be that Livy is simply careless about his facts, but this discrepancy probably results rather from a desire to maintain a clear narrative thread, for he creates an overall impression of the disastrous fate of Roman soldiers rather than a confusion of detail on what happened to individual units. Livy seems to see his task as the conveying

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99Cf. Polyb. 3.84.6, with Walbank I, 419 (note the different emotional tone of his death in Polybius): cf. 22.7.4. On 22.6.1-7 (Flaminius and Ducario), see J. Fries, Der Zweikampf: historische und literarische Aspekte seiner Darstellung bei T. Livius (Meisenheim 1985) 171-9 (argues that Livy does not invent the name, despite the fact that it is only elsewhere attested in Silius Italicus, Pun. 5.644).
of accurate overall impressions rather than obscurantist detail.\textsuperscript{100}

As a sort of \textit{sphragis} to the Trasimene disaster, apparently incidental detail is again used in a paradigmatic way, to provide reassurance of Roman moral superiority at a time of actual weakness. In this case, the evidence of Polybius allows us to see Livy’s narrative strategy clearly. All Livy says of the Romans who surrender to Maharbal is this:

\begin{quote}
[Sex milia ferme primi agminis] cum super cetera extrema fames etiam instaret, fidem dante Maharbale, ...si arma tradidissent, abire cum singulis vestimentis passurum, sese dediderunt; quae Punica religione servata fides ab Hannibale est atque in vincula omnes coniecti. (22.6.11-12)
\end{quote}

This is Carthaginian double-dealing indeed, but Polybius, with a different narrative strategy and no need to exalt Roman morals where Roman actions had failed, includes the scene of a speech by Hannibal to these captives, explaining that Maharbal had overstepped the bounds of his authority and was not entitled to make such a bargain (3.85.1).\textsuperscript{101} Even if Livy was using Coelius here, he must have known of the Polybian version and deliberately ignored it: yet the reason for the rejection is not that it is unfavourable to Rome, unless between the third and fourth decades he has drastically changed his criteria for selection of material. Maharbal’s lack of authority would have been, even to Roman eyes, a vindication

\textsuperscript{100}Burck points out that Livy ends his account not with a disaster but with an escape, ‘...[er] schließt seinen Kampfbericht nicht mit dem Bilde der Schrecken dieses Untergangs ab, sondern mit der Erzählung von dem Abzug der 6000 Reiter die sich haben retten können...’.

\textsuperscript{101}See Hoch, \textit{Die Darstellung der politischen Sendung Roms}, 23.
of Hannibal's conduct, but it is omitted because Livy has a longer-term narrative perspective: since Rome won the war, he looks for causes of her losing the battle. He is inclined to accept the anti-Hannibal version because it gives a moral causation for the temporary quality of Hannibal's success. *Punica fraus* is a symbol of the innate inferiority of Carthage's greatest general. For this reason, there is no intended contradiction with what he tells of Hannibal at 22.7.5, where Hannibal searches for the body of Flaminius, not to spoil it but to do it honour. 102 This time, the credit of Rome is best served by enemy reverence and admiration, and Hannibal's actions are accordingly included.

Polybius sees the battle of Trasimene as a *peripeteia* which the Romans' lack of experience of military defeat meant they could not cope with (3.85.9). Livy ignores this uncomfortable idea, preferring only to note the rarity of Roman defeat (22.7.1) and then move on, first to scenes of pathos in the city itself (7.7-13), and then to another pointer to eventual success (22.8.1-4). The appointment of Q. Fabius Maximus as dictator introduces a strong contrast with the impiety of Flaminius: scrupulous religious observance is attributed to him, and illustrated at some length (22.9.7, 10.1ff.). 103 Livy was writing at a time when the Populus Romanus had been, and was being, reminded of the relationship between Rome's leaders and Rome's gods (Augustus and the temple programme, the vow to Mars Ultor, the defeat of the

102 Cf. 22.52.6.

Parthians, Apollo’s protection of Augustus etc.): he confirms what Augustan Rome knew, namely that the offering of worship, cult and sacrifice in exchange for success and security was a bargain which worked. Within Livy’s narrative, the reaction at Rome to news of Cannae is typical of the theme: at 22.57.2-6, he describes how the defeat was assumes to have been the result of some nefas, and how two Vestal Virgins were accordingly punished for unchastity.

So much for the immediate effects at Rome: the actions of Hannibal are also used to hint at future Roman success in spite of recent defeat. Thus at 22.9.2ff., Hannibal tries to take Spoletium, and learns from the (failed) attempt, ‘coniectans ex unius coloniae minus prospere temptatae viribus quanta moles Romanae urbis esset’. When he moves on to Picenum, an area rich in fruges and praeda, and plunders it because his milites are ‘avidis atque egentibus’, the significance of the incident is quickly brought out:

Per dies aliquot stativa habita refectusque miles hibernis itineribus ac palustri via proelioque magis ad eventum secundo quam levi aut facili adfectus. Ubi satis quietis datum praedia ac populationibus magis quam otio aut requie gaudentibus, profectus [sc. est Hannibal]. (22.9.4-5)

Evidently Carthaginian soldiers do not appreciate the wisdom of their own commander, and their eagerness for praeda is

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105 Levene 2, 8-12, 16-17. In the Aeneid, the link between religious/moral care and military/political success is made problematic, but in Horace, Odes 3.6, gives a more Livian picture; e.g., 3.6.5, ‘dis te minorem quod geris, imperas’ (cf. 3.6.33-6).
another disquieting signal (from a Carthaginian point of view).

As the narrative is prepared for the conflict between Fabius and Hannibal, we find a change in the latter’s characterisation to meet the change of Roman commander. Fabius Maximus’ great reputation must owe more than most to the bias of tradition, since his actual military achievements are not conspicuous:106 also the characterisation of Minucius by temeritas is elaborated (22.10.11ff) to explain Roman defeat under Fabius. At any rate, the adjustment of Hannibal is of a familiar type: some attributes of the miles gloriosus begin to attach to him, to contrast with the caution and prudence of Fabius:

In conspectu hostium posuit castra, nulla mora facta {contrast Cunctator} quin...copiam pugnandi faceret. Sed ubi quieta omnia apud hostes...videt, increpans quidem victos tandem illos martios animos Romanis, debellatumque et concessum propalam de virtute ac gloria esse, in castra redit. (22.12.4)

The Master of Horse, Minucius, by his temeritas, undoes all Fabius’ good work.107 His fault here recalls an incident from Caesar (who uses it to distance himself from his subordinates’ failure), namely criticising a commander before the milites (22.12.12):108 this encouragement to partisan side-taking, and

106 See Hoffmann, Livius 27-45, esp. 33, 35, 41 n.1; 45, ‘Für Plutarch und seine vorlivianische Quelle bildeten im Einklang mit der Auffassung eines Ennius und Fabius Pictor die beiden Jahren 217/6 gewissermaßen die Aristie des Fabius...’.

107 I.e., giving the men experience of success; encouraging them to trust their virtus and fortuna (12.8-10; cf. Caesar BG 1.40.12).

108 See BG 5.30.1 (Sabinus).
play to subvert their loyalty, is an unequivocal criticism of him.

The theme of loyalty to allies is turned to Rome’s advantage in the events which follow the entrance of Minucius. First Hannibal tries to manipulate an enemy weakness, namely loyalty to allies (13.1), then Livy asserts their loyalty, ‘nec tamen is terror...fide socios dimovit, videlicet quia iusto et moderato regebantur imperio nec abnuebant, quod unum vinculum fidei est, melioribus parere’ (13.11): and only then does he reveal a soldierly seditio (14.1ff). The milites are given the best of motives for this mutiny, namely the desire to save Campania from devastation, and are incited further by Minucius in O.R.. Minucius does all he can to fire them to fight, calling them laeti (with irony), and saying they are behaving pecorum modo (14.7-8). Moreover, Livy’s narrative method reveals that his defeat is imminent by the suggestive use of exempla - Minucius compares himself to Camillus, just as Flamininus had done only a few chapters earlier, before the Trasimene disaster (22.3.10). What clearer indication could Livy have given us that another Roman defeat is at hand? With a readership well aware of the impending outcome of Minucius’ hubris, Livy exploits dramatic irony to the full.

Minucius’ speech has a stirring finish, proclaiming how Romans ought to fight. Rome’s need to find a more complex approach to warfare, to take strategy as well as virtus and

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109 With all the sense of drama which so familiar a character type and role excites; cf. Scipio and Sempronius, 21.52-57.
fortuna into consideration, is another theme of this decade, and Livy presents Hannibal as the character who calls forth this growing sophistication: Minucius' speech must be understood within this overall narrative context. Thus although the sentiments he expresses are not wholly negative (for example he shows concern for allies, 14.4), he has been presented as a stirrer-up of trouble by popularis methods, encouraging the men to feel themselves badly treated (14.8) and to indulge in uncontrolled belligerence. The reader knows, through dramatic irony, that his strategy of haste will fail, in such a context and against such a commander as this, although haste is not in itself a marker of inferiority: Scipio's speed of action, like Caesar's, is to his credit, when the nature of the war changes and Fabius' methods are superseded. Both the independent undermining of his motives for encouraging this type of action, and the reader's foreknowledge of the superiority of Fabius' strategy contribute to putting Minucius firmly in the wrong:

Arma capias oportet et descendas in aequum et vir cum viro congrediaris. Audendo atque agendo res Romana crevit, non his segnibus consiliis quae timidi cauta vocant. (22.14.14)

Livy does not make him go as far as holding a contio militum, but has him make the speech to the military tribunes and equites, and notes 'ad aures quoque militum dicta ferocia evolvebantur,' no doubt intentionally. Had it been put to a vote ('si militaris suffragii res esset...' 14.15), the soldiers would have made Minucius their dux. How lucky for Rome, implies Livy, that she is not a democracy, and that optimus quisque makes the decisions.
The moral inferiority of this speech is further underlined by its consequence, the defeat and death of Mancinus with 400 allied cavalry. The young man's rashness is attributed to Minucius' influence (15.5), which leads him to forget his orders (from Fabius, 15.6) and fall into a trap, 'ipse et delecti equitum circumventi occiduntur.'

Before Cannae, one other defeat, which takes place in Apulia, must be mentioned (22.27-30). As in the case of Trebia, disaster results from a lack of unity between the two leaders. This time, however, the rash Minucius admits his folly and pays generous tribute to the wisdom of Fabius. Not only will he call Fabius parens, but his men will call Fabius' men patroni, because they have been set free by them (22.30.2). That this incident is a favourable sign for Rome is apparent from, as usual, the reaction of Hannibal, who realises the threat now Fabius is in sole charge (30.10, 32.2-3). Further positive indicators in the narrative include Naples' voluntary donations and the building of a temple of Concordia.

These optimistic indications are not allowed to predominate, however: at Rome conflict between patres and plebs is stirred up by Baebius Herennius (22.33.9ff.), a tribune and relative of a certain C. Terentius Varro. He claims that the nobles are prolonging the war deliberately,
because they are unwilling to pass on opportunities for *gloria* (34.11). Once elected consul (35.1-3), Varro holds 'contiones feroces' in which Livy reveals his *gloriosus* nature, as well as his readiness to exploit discord between the orders:

Contiones...multae ac feroces fuere denuntiantis bellum arcessitum in Italiam ab nobilibus;...se quo die hostem vidisset perfecturum. (22.38.6-7)

Livy means us to focus on the dual leadership as one of Rome's key problems in this war: this much is already clear from the way he treats the defeats discussed above. The consulship is both a source of danger and a great strength: at the end of the pentad, he will show consular leadership working successfully (in the persons of Fabius and Marcellus), with the implication of military recovery which that co-operation produces. The co-operation between Scipio and Laelius in the sixth pentad offers a similar resolution of the conflict between supreme commander and primary subordinate. Here, however, he uses Fabius to draw attention to the difficulty, in an O.R. speech to L. Aemilius Paulus, Varro's consular colleague:

Nescio an infestior hic adversarius quam ille hostis maneat; cum illo in acie tantum, cum hoc omnibus locis ac temporibus certatus es. (22.39.4-5)

Adversus Hannibalem legionesque eius tuis equitibus ac peditibus pugnadum tibi est, Varro dux *tuis* militibus te est oppugnaturas. (39.5)

Fabius warns ominously of the consequences of Varro's rash policy: a worse disaster than Trasimene may follow (as indeed

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112 It is more usual to find the extension of demagogy from the political into the military sphere than, as here, the other way round.
the reader knows it does; there is more of the dramatic irony so prominent in the opening chapters of 21 here). His prophecies are complemented by Paulus’ reply, which likewise acknowledges the weakness of the Roman command structure but can offer no solution (40.3).

In the build-up to Cannae, Livy uses a narrative technique similar to the citation by Minucius of Camillus as an exemplum (14.9). This time not only is the rash consul’s confidence increased by a successful minor engagement, but also the consuls agree to command on alternate days, the very method rejected by Fabius as likely to lead to defeat when the rash commander was in sole charge.¹¹³ Livy records Hannibal’s knowledge of this clash between the Roman leaders, but includes a further piece of information, ‘dissimiles discordesque imperitare, duas prope partes tironum militum in exercitu esse’ (41.5). Thus when Hannibal sets an obvious type of trap (the apparently deserted camp), Varro and his men fall headlong into it:

Clamor inde ortus ut signa proferri iuberent ducerentque ad persequendos hostes ac protinus castra diripienda. Et consul alter velut unus turbae militaris erat. (42.3)

A leader ought to lead (as Hannibal has always done), not to behave like one of the soldierly rabble: Varro is now yet more clearly heading for disaster. The ambush eventually comes to nothing; yet Livy’s reason for discussing the incident in such detail is not simply to reveal the character of Varro, or even that of Paulus, who is sensible and cautious without

¹¹³See 21.52.7-53.1; 22.27.10.
possessing any of the necessary force of character to bend the men to his will. As part of the careful crescendo worked in to the events before Cannae, Livy uses this incident to fill out the consequences of weak or self-seeking leadership: in the end, the milites are ready to disobey not just Paulus but Varro as well. Livy has no very high opinion of the good sense of the Roman miles: when Statilius (sent by Paulus to reconnoitre the camp) returns with the news that it is an obvious trap, the men are not cowed but inflamed:

Quae ad deterrendos a cupiditate animos nuntiata erant, ea accenderunt, et clamore orto a militibus, ni signum detur, sine ducibus ituros, haudquaquam dux defuit. (42.7)

This last phrase, is the light of 42.3, is surely ironical in its contrast both with 42.3 and with the threats of the milites that 'sine ducibus ituros'. At this moment, there seems to be no need of mutiny, since Varro is equally eager to move in, but when an omen makes him change his mind ('religionem animo incussit'), full-scale mutiny threatens, until the certain fact of an ambush is providentially established, and the men quieted.\footnote{He thinks of Flaminius and the consul Claudius in the First Punic War; see above on Flaminius.} It is plain that only good fortune stops the milites rebelling against both commanders, as the end of the passage shows, 'ambitio alterius suam...apud eos prava indulgentia maiestatem solvisset' (42.12).

22.41.6-42.12, therefore, becomes by Livy's narration no mere passing incident, but a key moment. It deepens the character portrayal of both commanders and men, exploits the
tensions inherent in the protagonists’ relationships and is explicitly symbolic of more famous events, ‘Di...magis distulere quam prohibuere imminetem pestem Romanis’ (42.10). He now switches abruptly to Hannibal’s difficulties, highlighting them to show how, had the Roman leaders been as well-informed as their opponent, they could and should have been recognised and exploited. Instead, they are unable to capitalise on either his supply problems or his heterogeneous forces, despite the fact that he too is marked by the theme of assimilation of leader and men (and influence of the latter upon the former):

Ibi...propter inopiam frumenti manere nequit, novaque consilia in dies non apud milites solum mixtos ex conluvie omnium gentium sed etiam apud ducem ipsum oriebantur...Cum haec consilia atque hic habitus animorum esset in castris, movere inde statuit.... (22.43.2, 5)

It is interesting that Livy chooses this moment to draw attention to the fact that Hannibal too has problems maintaining the loyalty of his men: certainly a reminder of the large mercenary component in his forces is some reassurance to the Roman reader. The Roman milites’ desire to engage, their ‘studium pugnandi’, had been the cause of their dissent: Hannibal’s mercenaries, however, refuse to fight unless they are paid, and this pressure affects Hannibal’s strategy (he has to move into Apulia because the harvest is earlier there). Whatever long term reassurance this provides for the reader, in the short term it is the Roman army’s failure to capitalise on Hannibal’s weakness which is to the fore, and is described in impressive terms:
The scene quickly changes to Cannae itself (44.1), where disunity among the Romans is once more highlighted, this time with both consuls citing the examples of the earlier defeats as evidence in favour of their own view:

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\text{Rursus sollicitari seditione militari ac discordia consulum Romana castra, cum Paulus Sempronique et Flamini temeritatem Varroni, Varro speciosum timidis ac segnibus ducibus exemplum Fabium obiceret...} (22.44.5)
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This disagreement allows full rein to the men’s aggression, and as soon as Varro’s day of command comes, they are led out to battle; again their weakness is shown to be not cowardice but excessive belligerence, and their pride is indicated by the fact they consider it shameful to be beaten by a force of Carthaginian auxilia (45.4).

Nothing happens to contradict Livy’s earlier remark that Rome’s defeat is fated: not only are Hannibal’s own soldiers portrayed armed with weaponry captured from Rome, ‘Afros Romanam [magna ex parte] crederes aciem; ita armati erant armis et ad Trebiam ceterum magna ex parte ad Trasumenum captis’ (46.4), but also the weather once more is in his favour (this time the wind). The exhaustion of brave Romans fighting a fresh foe, and the lack of good Roman leadership once Paulus has been incapacitated by injury, are blamed for the ensuing disaster (22.47.10, 49.1, 4-5). The battle narrative proper ends with a moving proof of Roman greatness, as Paulus redeems his earlier defeatism and lack of strong leadership (49.1-3): when the military tribune Cn. Lentulus...
addresses him, badly-wounded, in O.R., Paulus' response to the former's exoneration is concern not for his own fate ('frustra miserando') but for the city, 'Abi, nuntia publice patribus urbem Romanam muniant ac priusquam victor hostis adveniat praesidiis firment'. Even this simple piece of patriotism has a further significance: for Livy is to make great play of Hannibal's failure to follow up his advantage and attack Rome. That decision is in a sense to be the moral and military turning point in the war. Paulus' dying words are a stirring testimonial to the heights which Roman leaders can achieve, heights of selfless concern for the men under their command:

Privatim Q. Fabio L. Aemilium praecceptorum eius memorem et vixisse [et] adhuc et mori. Me in hac strage militum meorum patere exspirare....

(22.49.10-11)\textsuperscript{115}

The chapters following the Cannae defeat, when taken together, show a variety of ways of reassuring the reader of eventual Roman recovery. This was true also of the earlier defeats, but as Livy remarks at 54.11, Cannae was twice as bad as Trasimene, for it meant the annihilation of two consular armies. He goes on there, at the end of that section of the narrative, to use this fact to make a general point, 'Nulla profecto alia gens tanta mole cladis non obruta esset' (54.10), and to claim a contrast between Roman and Carthaginian reactions to defeat:

\textsuperscript{115} Cf. 50.7 '[is] qui bene mori quam turpiter vivere maluit'. Hoffmann draws attention to the role of Fabius in providing narrative reassurance for the defeat, 'Das Ringen des Fabius um Anerkennung seiner Grundsätze ist ins Paradigmatische erhoben, er tritt auf als Repräsentant der Kräfte, die den Sieg verbürgen. In seiner Person, so fühlen wir, ist Cannae schon überwunden': Livius 40.
This divergence in reactions to defeat is crucial to the proof of Rome's superiority, while the anecdotes of her behaviour in defeat are what make her eventual victory certain. It begins with what happened among the soldiers who escaped the slaughter. Having no commander, they are consequently in danger of succumbing to quarrelling and disagreement about the best course of action, until a military tribune (50.6) in O.R. chides them for their folly and urges them to brave action, 'ite mecum qui et vosmet ipsos et rem publicam salvam voltis.' The success of their escape attempt through the midst of the Numidians is meant to establish further at this moment of supreme disaster their moral superiority to their enemy:

Haec apud victos magis impetu animorum, quos ingenium suum cuique aut fors dabat, quam ex consilio ipsorum aut imperio cuiusquam agebantur. (22.50.12)

Not until this illustration of Roman soldierly excellence has been deployed does Livy reveal a corresponding Carthaginian weakness: Maharbal's speech of warning is couched in prophetic terms:

Non omnia nimirum eidem di dedere. Vincere scis, Hannibal: victoria uti nescis. (22.51.4)

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116 Cf. 22.51.9.

117 22.51.9; this is better than recording enemy failure without Roman excellence; cf. 52.6, where he notes that Hannibal has lost 'octo milia fortissimorum virorum'.

118 Cf. Hanno, 21.3; Fabius, 22.39, etc.
Livy points out that while they should have been marching on Rome, the Carthaginian soldiers are busy clearing the battlefield of booty (52.1), the moral of which is drawn as plainly as possible by the remark (52.5) that they found more silver on the horses' harness than on the armour of the Roman soldiers themselves.\footnote{Cf. Caesar BC 3.96 (Pharsalus).} Despite the weakness of his men, Hannibal is no barbarian; as usual in these Roman defeats, he searches for the body of the dead Roman commander to bury him with honour.

The Carthaginians' concentration upon praeda is picked up again later, when Varro's dispatch to Rome gives the panic-stricken city a more accurate statement of affairs:

Poenum sedere ad Cannas, in captivorum pretiis praedaeque alia nec victoris animo nec magni ducis more nundinantem. (22.56.3)

Another interesting example of this narrative technique occurs at 52.7, where the fugitivi have to choose a leader; they offer the command to one of their military tribunes, a certain P. Scipio. Livy reminds us that this youth is the same Scipio who will eventually save Rome, and it is interesting to see how he carefully exonerates Scipio from any charge of temeritas or audacia in undertaking the command while still so young: Scipio declares his aim in selfless and patriotic terms, 'ut ego rem publicam populi Romani non deseram neque alium civem Romam deserere patiar' (52.10). When Livy further remarks (52.13) that the men are as awed by Scipio as if he had been Hannibal himself, the reader can be assured, in the light of her or his superior knowledge, that at last Hannibal

\footnote{Cf. Caesar BC 3.96 (Pharsalus).}
will have met his match. To a similar end, at 22.57, Livy mentions Marcellus, the eventual conqueror of a rebellious Syracuse: Marcellus resolves the Sicilian threat, the detailing of which gives unity to the remaining books of the pentad.

One major narrative set-piece remains to be discussed before moving to 23-5, namely the debate in the Senate on the fate of the survivors of Cannae. Livy's technique here is similar to that used in the Lex Oppia debate in book 34: in both cases, the arguments put forward play off notions of custom and precedent against the need for severity and strict control, and in both it becomes clear that severitas is indeed necessary, but that the speaker arguing in its favour is not applying it in the best way.

It opens with Hannibal addressing his Roman captives (all the foreign ones have been freed) on his aims and motives: he does not want an 'internecivum bellum', but is fighting 'de imperio atque dignitate' (58.3). For him, as for the Roman soldiers mentioned earlier, victory is a matter of courage (virtus) combined with luck (felicitas). Livy's Roman readers, of course, knew all about a war which was concerned with issues of imperium and dignitas. The end of chapter 58 describes one of the captive Romans evading (by an unlikely piece of trickery) Hannibal's terms for ransom, but this small incident is carefully deployed to draw a contrast between Roman and Carthaginian standards of honour. Trickery is an

120 See Burck, Einführung 101, on the contrast between the versions of Livy and Polybius.
aspect of *Punica fraus*, and Livy not only passes his own judgement on the man ('minime Romani ingenii homo' 22.58.8), but also uses the Senate’s reaction to his dishonourable behaviour as a further proof of Roman moral superiority (22.61.4).121

First the representatives of the prisoners address the Senate (22.59), then various opinions are given; Livy reports that of T. Manlius Torquatus, a man 'priscae ac nimis durae, ut plerisque videbatur, severitatis' (60.5). Although it is clear that other ideas were put forward (60.3), Livy does not give Torquatus' view just because it was the *sententia* which prevailed: he relates it at length because it illustrates something felt to be fundamental to Roman military success, namely that *severitas* attributed to Torquatus himself.

Livy’s attitude to Roman *severitas*, like his attitude to Roman *religio*, is ambiguous. Where military leaders are concerned, it is often favourable, but is still marked out as risky: thus at 5.26.8, it is for Camillus a means of controlling 'ira militum' (yet eventually brings about his exile). At 3.69.2, the *plebs*’s enthusiastic reception of Quinctius’ speech, the speech of a ‘severissimus consul’, is presented as paradoxical. Likewise, the execution of Manlius

121As such a proof, this incident has a close parallel in the story of Camillus and the Falerian schoolmaster, related in Livy 5.27. Camillus’ determination not to win by underhand means ('Ego Romanis artibus, virtute opere armis, sicut Veios vincam', 5.27.8) is causally related to an advantageous result ('tanta mutatio animis est iniecta ut.. pacem universa posceret civitas. Fides Romana, iustitia imperatoris... celebrantur; consensuque omnium legati ad Camillum... qui dederent Falerios proficiscuntur', 5.27.10-11: and see Burck, *Die Erzählungskunst* 239).
in 340 B.C. (8.8.1), is described as a piece of severitas which has good consequences, but is in itself distasteful (‘atrocitas poenae....ea severitas profuit’). The case of L. Papirius makes the point clear:

Sensit peritus dux quae res victoriae obstaret: temperandum ingenium suum esse et severitatem miscendam comitati...Rem per se popularem ita dextere egit ut...animi...militum imperatori reconciliarentur...Cum hoste congressus...ita fudit fugavitque Samnites.... (8.36.5, 7-8)

At 34.6.2, L. Valerius can attack Cato’s opposition to the repeal of the Lex Oppia by means of his ‘severissimi mores’. Severitas, then, marks the Romans off as different: on the battlefield in particular, it points a higher standard of discipline, but there is almost always a suggestion that it is at times inappropriate, and even risky. It may seem to entail contradiction of the topos of a commander’s need to care for the physical well-being of his men: but the writings of both Caesar and Livy reveal that severitas is not simply a quality of character which leads to the imposition of stern discipline, or punishments beyond the desert of the misdemeanour. Rather it implies that no moral or disciplinary laxity on the part of the men will be expected by their commander, an expectation which (because of the moral excellence of the commander who possesses severitas) is usually fulfilled. Thus the example set by a severus commander can bring out in the men a willingness to undergo labores and suffer hardship, a willingness which is contrary to the natural bias of their inclination. At the same time, a
willingness to moderate *severitas* for some further purpose is not presented as a marker of moral inferiority.\(^{122}\)

Torquatus' *severitas* seems excessive to the majority (*plerique*): the reference is to the Senators present at the debate, who have to be exhorted and inspired to set aside weakening factors like kinship or pity. The ambiguity of *severitas* as a moral marker means that this judgment cannot be taken lightly, as indeed Livy's concluding remarks on the decision not to ransom the prisoners suggest. For he does not say, as we might have expected him to do, that the words of Torquatus were a proof of the old Roman virtues. Instead, though (like Cato's in the Lex Oppia debate) Torquatus' intention is right, but his reasons are not, and are accordingly altered:

> Postquam Manlius dixit, quamquam patrum quoque plerosque captivi cognitio attingebant, praetert exemplum civitatis minime in captivos iam inde antiquitus indulgentis, pecuniae quoque summa homines movit, quia nec aerarium exhauriri...nec Hannibalem, maxime huiusce rei, ut fama erat, egentem, locupletari volebant. (22.61.1-2)

That the senators are, in the end, guided by reasons of strategy and policy, and not by emotional calls to an age-old tradition, is meant by Livy to be a point in their favour. On closer inspection, Torquatus' arguments in 60.15-16 begin to sound unreasonable, and in one case are not borne out by the

\(^{122}\) Cf. Suet. *DJ* 65, 'Militem neque a moribus neque a fortuna probabat, sed tantum a viribus, tractabatque pari severitate atque indulgentia. Non enim ubique ac semper, sed cum hostis in proximo esset, coercetabat: tum maxime exactor gravissimus disciplinae...'. Tac. *Ann.* 13.35, gives a simpler model: Corbulo finds *severitas* effective, 'quia...multi abnuebant deserebantque, remedium severitate quaesitum est...pauciores illa castra desereuere quam ea in quibus ignoscebatur'. See Moore, *Artistry*, 137-41, and esp. n.44..
text: at 60.17, he claims that Sempronius had had to fight his way through Roman soldiers, 'Prius, inquam, P. Sempronio per civium agmen quam per hostium fuit erumpendum' (cf. 22.50). In the end, after all the arguments produced by the captivi and by Torquatus, the Senate eventually decides on very different grounds what it should do.

The difficulty of interpreting the debate on the survivors of Cannae is a timely warning that Livy does not make it easy to judge the text in terms of simple right and wrong. Some of what Torquatus says about the necessity of severitas is upheld, some of it is undercut: and this becomes easier to understand later, in the light of the role played by those survivors in subsequent events.

It was stated above that books 21-2 have a unity of their own, and it is partly because of this close internal coherence that their narrative has been analysed in such detail. This detailed exposition has also made clear the main parameters of the narrative explanation of 21-30 as a whole. In 23-5, and 26-30, the narrative begins to break up into episodes: but detailed analysis continues up to the clash of Hannibal and Marcellus at Nola (23.41.13ff.), to clarify Livy’s handling of the shift from disastrous defeat to a stabilisation of the Roman position. After this point in the narrative, only episodes which cast a new light or give a different angle on causation and characterisation are discussed in detail. The chronological arrangement of the discussion is broadly maintained.
Book 23 opens with the victorious Hannibal heading for Capua. All that remains of Polybius' account of this part of the war is a brief paragraph preserved by Athenaeus, noting Capua's luxury and fertile soil, her rebellion against Rome and punishment for disloyalty, which are the main themes of the Livian account. The contrasting example of Petelia, a town which endured incredible privation rather than submit to Carthage, is also included. Livy provides narrative reassurance by juxtaposing the theme of Capua's treachery with a debate in Carthage: though the first shows the disastrous effects of Cannae, the second illustrates from an enemy point of view the partial and temporary nature of Carthaginian success. Narrative explanation of Capua's desertion is necessarily complex: its folly is underlined by the treatment the city receives at Hannibal's hands, while the threat posed to Rome by that desertion is undercut by the speech of Hanno, whose warnings are disregarded by his peers but to the reader (with the advantage of historical hindsight) clearly correct.

Livy begins with the moral weakness and political defects of Capua:

Capua...luxurians longa felicitate atque indulgentia fortunae, maxime tamen inter corrupta omnia licentia plebis sine modo libertatem exercentis. (23.2.1)

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123 Hoffmann discusses the post-Cannae narrative of books 23-4 in Livius 46-57: n.b. 54-7 on Capua.

124 12.528a (= Polyb. 7.1.1-3; with Walbank II, 29-31).

125 At 23.20.4-10, 30.1-2.

126 Further elaborated at 23.4.1-4.
Knowing already what the fate of Capua is to be, the reader is in no difficulty about the significance of either luxuria or libertas. Livy uses Capua, like Sicily, as paradigmatic of the problem of Rome’s relationship with her allies: Capua’s excessive libertas brings one Pacuvius Calavius to prominence, a man described as ‘nobilis idem ac popularis’ (23.2.2), and a supporter of Carthage. After revealing the corruption and base conduct of this Calavius, Livy describes their effect:

Ad contemptum legum, magistratuum, senatus accessit tum, post Cannensem cladem, ut cuius aliqua verecundia erat, Romanum quoque spernerent imperium. (23.4.6)

The first aim which criticism of the Capuan character was intended to achieve is accomplished: it is a morally degenerate people which rejects Roman imperium. It also foreshadows the degeneration of Carthaginian soldiers once Capua is in their hands and justifies Rome’s attack, capture and ruthless subjugation of it, as well as offering further moral signals for Rome herself. Livy’s deployment of the existing material, then, makes maximum strategic use of the tradition on Capua’s fall.

The problem of allied loyalty following the Cannensis clades is prominently encapsulated at the start of 23 by a single speech. The Capuans do not speak in reply to the defeated consul Varro, not surprisingly since a justification of their intended conduct would have laid bare their intentions. Livy states that the sight of Varro ‘cum paucis ac semiermibus’ (5.1) should have been a pitiable sight, at least to boni socii: he does not suggest that in the circumstances revolt was natural, or understandable, any more
for them than for the Syracusans. Nor does Varro help Rome's situation. Already revealed as an incompetent in military tactics, his oratorical efforts also bring disaster on his own side. An embarrassing series of rhetorical questions, followed by an emphatic *nihil*, is scarcely designed to inspire allied confidence and loyalty. Varro could have spoken of Rome's destiny, or have cited *exempla* of her suffering great reverses and recovering spectacularly, but instead dwells on her weakness:

Quid enim nobis ad Cannas relictum est ut, quasi aliquid habeamus, id quod deest expleri ab sociis velimus? Pedites vobis imperemus, tamquam equites habeamus? Pecuniam deesse dicamus tamquam ea tantum desit? Nihil...nobis reliquit fortuna. (23.5.5)

The moral he draws from this long list of Roman needs is that 'non iuvetis nos in bello oportet, Campani, sed paene bellum pro nobis suscipiatis.' When finally he does cite *exempla*, he does not use them to say Rome will recover, but to stress that as Rome helped Capua out of difficulties, so Capua should help Rome. Varro's speech wins the reward its folly deserves, for on their way home, one of the envoys, Vibius Virrius, remarks in *O.O.* that 'tempus venisse quo Campani non agrum solum ab Romanis quondam per iniuriam ademptum recuperare sed *imperio etiam Italiae potiri possint*' (23.6.1).¹²⁷

The Capuan reaction is swift: envoys are sent to Hannibal and the *praefecti sociorum* and other Roman citizens are killed (23.7.1-3). Equally swift is the degeneration of the pact

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¹²⁷Evoking an impression of a longer historical perspective which the reader knows to be false. Vibius Virrius' words bring out the irony of Varro's 'reward': there is more than one way of understanding the call to 'repay Rome for the past'.
into Punic tyranny. Livy uses the opposition to Hannibal of one Decius Magius to reveal his tyrannous intentions (23.7.4-7; 10). Hannibal is here concitatus ira, an ominous sign. Likewise the story of Pacuvius Calavius and his son illustrates the proper loyalties of Capua not through the criticisms of any Roman, but the fears of her own citizens (8.6-9.13). Punica fraus is not just a Roman problem, and Rome alone can be relied on to repel it. She has the Delphic oracle’s prediction in her favour, but on one very significant condition, ‘lasciviam a vobis prohibetote’ (11.3). Again Livy builds up the narrative to show the degeneration of Carthaginian soldiers into lascivia as a turning point in the war. In Carthage itself, events also seem to suggest eventual victory for Rome (23.11.7-13.8). The warnings of Hanno again go unheeded, and Livy, appropriately at such a moment as the treachery of Capua, makes them hinge on the loyalty of Rome’s allies (23.12.15-13.4). Nor, Hanno correctly predicts, is Rome’s position fatally weakened by the Cannae defeat (13.2).

At 23.14, after a brief comment on the difference of Roman and Carthaginian temperament (‘segniter otioseque gesta’/‘insitam industriam’ 14.1), Livy goes on to the attempt on Nola, where Hannibal and Marcellus (praetor 216 B.C.) clash. Marcellus is as good at evoking loyalty as his enemy: he offers both dignitas and emolumentum to one Bantius

128 Cf. 23.35.1.
Erat iuvenis acer et sociorum ea tempestate prope nobilissimus eques. Seminecem eum ad Cannas in acervo caesorum inventum curatumque benigne, etiam cum donis Hannibal domum remiserat. (23.15.8)

Treating allies well is a matter of prudentia for Roman and Carthaginian, but it is a model of behaviour from which Hannibal and his men quickly deteriorate. The tactical motive behind his generous treatment of some of his foes becomes apparent, as Marcellus is aware:

Ob eius gratiam...in ius dicionemque dare voluerat Poeno, anxiumque eum...cura novandi res praetor cernebat. Ceterum cum aut poena cohibendus esset aut beneficio conciliandus, sibi adsumpsisse quam hosti ademisse fortem ac strenuum maluit socium. (23.15.9-10)

He addresses Bantius in O.R., 'quo frequentior mecum fueris, senties eam rem tibi dignitati atque emolumento esse' (15.14). Livy stresses the general significance of this event: 'nemo inde sociorum rem Romanam fortius ac fidelius iuverit' (16.1). He then illustrates its consequence: Hannibal fails to take Acerrae and Casilinum (23.17-18). Now, following this failure, the reader is shown the degeneration of the Carthaginian soldiers:

Quos nulla mali vicerat vis, perdidere nimia bona ac voluptates immodicae, et eo impensius quo avidius ex insolentia in eas se merserant. (18.11)

This passage is marked as a turning point in the narrative; from now on, 'magis...praeteritae victoriae eos quam

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129 Cf. Plut. Marc. 10-11.1; Plutarch's version does not include the wider implications of Livy's account.

130 Cf. 23.42.4.
praesentes tutarentur vires’ (18.12). Livy claims here to be in accord with the opinions of ‘peritos artium militarum’ in claiming that Hannibal’s cunctatio at Capua (instead of marching against Rome), lost him the war:¹³¹ the choice of the word cunctatio highlights in another field (as did his treatment of socii, symbolised in Bantius) that even Hannibal’s virtues (cunctatio is Fabius’ claim to fame) are inferior to what Romans can show with the same artes. The eventual surrender of Casilinum is treated as a success for Rome (19.14; 20.1-2).¹³²

Despite such hints of Roman superiority, Livy maintains narrative tension. After the election of Gracchus to the consulship, together with Postumius (‘absens qui tum Galliam provinciam obtinebat,’ 24.3), comes a nova clades: Postumius, in a vividly-described piece of action, falls fighting in Gaul (‘omni vi ne caperetur dimicans occubuit,’ 24.6). The predictable reaction at Rome to the death of another consul [elect] is controlled by Gracchus, who has to urge the Senate, ‘ne qui Cannensi ruinae non succubuissent ad minores calamitates animos summitterent’ (25.3). The survivors of Cannae are sent to Sicily to join M. Marcellus for the duration of the war as part of a necessary redeployment of troops following this reverse (23.25.7; cf. 25.6.1ff). In contrast to the setbacks in Gaul, in Spain the Scipios enjoy

¹³¹Cf. 37.39.3: Caes. BC 3.92.3-4.

¹³²Rome also shows ingens misericordia towards Petelia, though she cannot offer help, and assures her legati that whatever they now do, they have fulfilled their obligations (20.6)
considerable success against Hasdrubal, whose men are disloyal (23.26.4). His savage treatment of the Spaniards who attack him (26.11-27.8) bodes ill for future Carthaginian support in Spain, and when he has to leave (27.9), almost the whole of Spain goes over to Rome.

The threat to Rome, should he succeed in joining forces with Hannibal in Italy, prompts the Scipios to challenge Hasdrubal to battle (23.29). The Roman soldiers' superiority is clearly illustrated here, both by statement and narrative technique: for the former, Livy remarks, 'ne multum quidem aut numero aut genere militum hi aut illi praestabant. Militibus longe dispar animus erat'. Apparent equality, i.e. of situation or strength of numbers, is an important point to establish if innate superiority is to be proven. The Romans are easily convinced of a selfless reason for fighting well:

Romanis enim, quamquam procul a patria pugnarent, facile persuaserant duces pro Italia atque urbe Romana eos pugnare; itaque...obstinaverant animis vincere aut mori. (23. 29. 7) 133

We can see narrative technique at work when nothing is said of the state of mind of the Carthaginians: their motives for action are passed over, as Livy chooses instead to focus on the Spaniards:

Minus pertinaces viros habebat altera acies; nam maxima pars Hispani erant, qui vinci in Hispania quam victores in Italian trahi malebant. (29.8)

133Cf. their insita industria, 23.14.1.
At 29.4 he states that Hasdrubal draws the Carthaginians up on the wings, the Spaniards in the centre.\textsuperscript{134} It is certainly an odd tactic to put the weakest troops in this position, but in terms of narrative explanation a suggestive one. This deployment is mentioned before the revelation of the Spaniards' weakness, and picked up later as the reason for the Carthaginian defeat. The Spanish line breaks and flees 'cum vix pila coniecta essent' (29.9):\textsuperscript{135} despite the brave resistance of the Carthaginians themselves, the battle is over:

\begin{quote}
Magna vis hominum ibi occisa et, nisi Hispani vixdum conserto proelio tam effuse fugissent, perpauci ex tot superfuissent acie. (23.29.13-14)
\end{quote}

Rome wins an important victory, and the allegiance of the Spaniards with it (29.16).

The highlighting of this victory is crucial, not least because at the same time (30.1) Petelia and the other towns of Bruttium are falling to Carthage, and even Sicily begins to waver (30.10-12). At 23.33.1ff., the threat to Rome increases further: Philip of Macedon is introduced and gives his support to Carthage (33.4, 10-12). Sardinia looks likely to revolt (34.10). When the Carthaginians try to induce Cumae to revolt as well, the reader is given narrative reassurance as to the outcome of their attempt, through the nature of the Romans'---

\textsuperscript{134}23.29.9: presumably to make it more difficult for the latter to break ranks. That they do break ranks, despite this precaution, underlines the 'dispar animus' of the two sides.

\textsuperscript{135}A marker of shameful defeat; cf. Livy's description of the Allia (5.38.6). Hasdrubal is relying on forces which would rather lose than win, so this flight comes as no surprise.
military preparations. The consul, Gracchus (215 B.C.), makes
his men practise manoeuvres. His army includes not only
regular *legionarii milites* but also *tirones*, and *volones* at
that: the danger of defeat is immediately felt (we have
already seen Hannibal’s skill in taking advantage of raw
recruits), but the *topos* of exercises (‘ut tirones - ea maxima
pars volonum erat - adsuescerent signa sequi et in acie
agnoscere ordines suos’) prefigures ultimate success:

> Maxima erat cura duci...ne qua exprobratio cuiquam
vetoris fortunae discordiam inter ordines sereret; vetus miles tironi, liber voloni sese exaequari
sineret; omnes satis honestos generousque ducerent
quibus arma sua signaque populus Romanus
commisisset;...ea non maiore cura praecpta ab
ducibus sunt quam a militibus observata brevique
tanta concordia coaeterant omnium animi ut prope in
oblivionem veniret qua ex condicione quisque esset
miles factus. (23.35.7-9)\(^{136}\)

This is not, however, a case of the army being infected with
democracy: the motivation comes from the *dux* and his
subordinates, and the unifying factor is loyalty to Rome.

*Concordia* among Roman troops must be firmly established so as
to contrast later with the *discordia* among Hannibal’s. Its
consequence in terms of military achievement is spectacular
(35.18-19).

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\(^{136}\)For this *topos* as a marker of the good general, cf.,
e.g., 26.51.3-4, 7: Livy gives a full description of Scipio’s
exercises at New Carthage, and points to a specific result;
‘Ipse paucos dies...exercendis navalibus pedestribusque copiis
absumpsit. Primo die legiones in armis quattuor milium spatio
decurrerunt; secundo die arma curare et tergere ante tentoria
iussi; tertio die rudibus inter se in modum iustae pugnae
concurrerunt praepilatisque missilibus iaculati sunt; quarto
die quies data; quinto iterum in armis decursum est...Haec...
corpora simul animosque ad bellum acuebant’. See also Plut.
*Mar.* 13.1, 14.1; *Sert.* 14.1; *Phil.* 3.2-4 (on military training
contrasted with athletic).
Afterwards it is revealed just how important this is, and typically Livy does so by means of the reaction and strategy of Hannibal: this is the first time that the words *ratus Hannibal* have introduced an incorrect supposition:

Ratus Hannibal ab re bene gesta insolenter laetum exercitum tironum, magna ex parte servorum, spoliantem victos praedasque agentem ad Hamas se inventurum... Hamis vacua ab hostibus castra nee quicquam praeter recentis vestigia caedis strataque passim corpora sociorum invenit. (23.36.2, 4)

To turn the presence of these *volones* and *tirones*, as Gracchus does, into a pointer to Roman excellence (for Hannibal does not imagine the possibility of their showing any reliability) is a striking, and reassuring, achievement.

This hopeful sign is followed up by three subsidiary indicators. The first gives a specific reversal of a recent Roman failing: Fabius is deterred from engaging by unfavourable auspices (a marker of *pietas* and *religio*, 36.9-10, 37.1). Secondly, at Cumae Gracchus forces Hannibal to raise the siege (37.9): again, ‘ratus Hannibal’ introduces a false judgement, for there is no *temeritas* in this commander (37.8). The third sign also reverses a previous failing. At 37.10, a victory over Hanno is won by Ti. Sempronius Longus, who had been in command at the Trebia.

**HANNIBAL AND MARCELLUS AT NOLA (215 B.C., 23.41.13-48.3)**

In strong contrast with the wise actions of Gracchus and their encouraging results, on the Carthaginian side difficulties begin to be played up. Livy stresses the importance of this section of the narrative with a pair of speeches, the plea of Samnite allies for help (in O.R.) and
Hannibal’s reply (in O.O.; 23.42, 43). The Samnites recognise that the failure to capitalise on Cannae was crucial: this time accurate criticism by foreigners is directed at Hannibal rather than the Romans:

Sumus aliquotiens...devastati ut M. Marcellus, non Hannibal, vicesse ad Cannas videatur glorienturque Romani te, ad unum modum ictum vigentem, velut aculeo emisso torpere. (23.42.5).

They try to spur Hannibal to action by denigrating their foe (though this is logically inconsistent with the wish to play up the threat posed):

Iam ne manipulatim quidem sed latronum modo percursant totis finibus nostris negotentius quam si in Romano vagarentur agro. (23.42.10)\(^{137}\)

Hannibal’s reply reveals that he is governed not only by strategic need but also by the necessity of pandering to his troops:

Exercitum sese...in proxima loca populi Romani adducturum: iis populandis et militem suum repleturum se et metu procul ab his summoturum hostes. (23.43.3)

His concluding promise brings him dangerously close to the miles gloriosus type:

Quod ad bellum Romanum attineret, si Trasumenni quam Trebiae, si Cannarum quam Trasumenni pugna nobilior esset, Cannarum se quoque memoriam obscuram maiore et clariore victoria facturum. (23.43.4)\(^{138}\)

A further pointer to the start of Rome’s recovery from her series of defeats comes when Hannibal and Marcellus clash at Nola: both commanders give exhortatory speeches to their men, but this time Marcellus speaks only in O.O., Hannibal in

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\(^{137}\)The Samnites cannot repel them because ‘nostra iuventus...sub signis militat tuis’ (42.11).

\(^{138}\)Cf. BC 3.86.1-2: promising great victories can be rash.
This is unlikely to be Livian imitation of Caesar’s narrative technique, but in a context of wavering (Carthaginian) loyalty, the distinction is not accidental. Marcellus first exploits the Carthaginians’ enervation at Capua, ‘luxuria, vino et scortis omnibusque lustris per totam hiemem confectos’ (23.45.2). Now the hardihood proven by the crossing of the Alps can be mentioned and dismissed, ‘abisse illam vim vigoremque, delapsa esse robora corporum animorumque quibus Pyrenaei Alpiumque superata sint iuga’ (45.3), leading to the famous conclusion, ‘Capuam Hannibali Cannas fuisse’. What clearer statement could there be that moral superiority is essential to military victory, than when – as here – a real battle is equated with a conflict of a very different kind?

Livy picks up the theme of Marcellus’ speech when he introduces Hannibal’s:

Cum haec exprobrando hosti Marcellus suorum militum animos erigeret, Hannibal multo gravioribus probris increpatabant. (23.45.5)

His denigration of the enemy sounds perfunctory (45.8), and he then breaks into O.R. with a series of embarrassing rhetorical questions (45.7-9) which increase in brevity and agitation:

...Ubi ille miles meus est, qui...consuli caput abstulit? ubi, qui L. Paulum ad Cannas occidit? Ferrum nunc hebet? an dextrae torpent? an quid prodigii est allud? (23.45.8-9)

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139 H. Bornecque, ‘Die Reden bei Livius’ in Burck (ed.) Wege zu Livius 399-400, puts this pair of speeches in the category of suasoriae (and parallels 25.28; 21.40-44): such formal categorisation is, however, unlikely to do justice to Livy’s complex interrelations of speech and narrative.

140 Cf. 25.18.6-7: Badius challenges in O.R., Crispinus replies in O.O.
The effect on the reader is similar to that produced by the speech of Varro at 23.5.4-15: stressing the weakness of one’s own side may be inspiring for Romans (who, fighting in Italy have nothing to lose), but with allies and Carthaginians it is a great mistake. The subject with which Hannibal ends is presumably what he considers the strongest source of inspiration to his men:

Expugnate Nolam, campestrem urbem,...Hinc vos ex tam opulenta urbe praeda spoliisque onustos vel ducam quo voletis vel sequar. (23.45.10)

That he appeals directly to their greed and sense of self-advantage, instead of urging them to regain their former virtus and robor is significant, but even more ominously he reveals the weakness of his position as one required to maintain a personal loyalty. If they succeed, the next move will be their own decision, and the subtle shift implied from ‘vel ducam quo voletis’ to ‘vel sequar’ bodes ill for Carthage, with a commander who is prepared to relinquish his authority in order to maintain loyalty.

Hannibal’s persuasion fails (46.1). The pugna is depicted as a spectaculum, with the Nolans cheering the Romans on. Another remark made seemingly in passing confirms Roman moral as well as military superiority:

Quae [castra Carthaginians] oppugnare cupientes milites Romanos Marcellus Nolam reduxit cum magno gaudio et gratulatione etiam plebis quae ante inclination ad Poenos fuerat. (23.46.3)\footnote{See Hoffmann, Livius 52, on the shift in leadership marked by the depiction of Marcellus, ‘An seine Person knüpft sich der Ruhm der siegreichen Verteidigung Nolas gegen die Karthager’.}
The subsequent desertions to Marcellus, the mention of the
good treatment they received, Marcellus' burning of the
spolia, all serve to confirm this encouraging picture.\textsuperscript{142}

As a summary of the events in Italy in 215 B.C., and of
the book, Livy recounts a curious anecdote of single combat
(23.46.12-47.8) between a Campanian, Cerrinus Vibellius
Taurea, and a Roman, Claudius Asella.\textsuperscript{143} This incident
provides a link to the opening of the next book, when Fabius
cites it as an exemplum (24.8.3), and explains its moral
force: his speech gives a narrative reassurance domi to
complement the picture of Marcellus militiae.\textsuperscript{144} Fabius'
speech is delivered at the consular elections in Rome, as a
warning (in O.R.) against the election of Otalicius, and an
exhortation to curtail libertas in time of military necessity.
He argues that in time of war the libertas of the people of
Rome must be curtailed (24.8.1), like milites giving up their

\textsuperscript{142}Burck is very selective in his treatment of book 23
(Einführung 102-6), but he does show that the reader is
becoming aware of a change of tone in the narrative, 'So
blickt der Leser den kommenden Ereignissen entgegen, die er
aus der Anbahnung des neuen Kräfteverhältnisses nicht ohne
Hoffnung für eine Siegeschance der Römer erwartet' (106).

\textsuperscript{143}See also below on 25.18 (single combat between Badius
and Crispinus), with S. P. Oakley, 'Single Combat in the Roman
Republic', CQ 35 (1985) 392-410 (qualifies the Polybian
picture of single combat as an accepted means of deciding
battle, 6.54.3-4). In both Caesar (e.g. 4.25.3-5; 5.43.6-7;
5.44.1-3; 6.38.1-4; 7.12.6, 47-51) and Livy, single combat
does not decide military issues: the reason for its inclusion,
therefore, tends to be moral or paradigmatic. See further J.
Fries, Der Zweikampf, 194-203.

\textsuperscript{144}In the narrative of the combat, the Roman held the
moral advantage: he readily responded to, but did not offer,
the challenge. The Campanian provoked the fight, and then,
'verbis ferocior quam re' (47.6), avoided actual combat.
citizen rights, and emphasises the link between citizenry and
soldiery:

Eadem vos cura qua in aciem armati descenditis inire
suffragium ad creandos consules decet et sibi
quemque dicere: Hannibali imperatori parem consulem
nomino. (24.8.2) 145

The point is stressed at 24.8.18: the people must vote for a
man they can imagine fighting under, and his reminder of
Trasimene and Cannae emphasises (without direct criticism) the
danger of what inferior generalship can lead to. The force of
the examples of single combat which he cites (24.8.3-6) is to
suggest that in electing a consul, the people are choosing a
champion to strive with Hannibal for mastery.146 Co-operation
between leader and led, then, is central to success: yet
although a potential weakness of the Romans is exposed here,
it is still presented from a positive angle, for only they are
shown to have the power of positive co-operation. Livy ends
the scene with indirect proof of Fabius' rectitude: Otalicius
accuses him of wanting to prolong his command and Fabius
threatens him in return. That Otalicius speaks ferociter
('vociferatur atque obstrepit') makes clear his unsuitability
for the office.147

The consequences of the election of Fabius and M.
Marcellus are elaborated, with Livy employing some ingenuity
in his argument that in seeking re-election, Fabius shows
magnitudo animi (24.9.11) because of his lack of concern at

145 Cf., e.g., Polyb. 6.36.6-38.4.

146 On the structure of Fabius' speech, see Bornecque, 'Die
Reden bei Livius', 405.

147 See also Burck, Einführung, 108, on this election.
being thought to possess cupiditas imperii. Fabius has declared Rome's need of a leader to match Hannibal; but the emergence of Scipio is still some way off.

It is appropriate here to change from a continuous to a selective treatment of Livy's narrative in the rest of the fifth pentad: this chapter concludes with some key examples of narrative explanation, which serve both to summarise what has been said so far, and to introduce some of the themes and preoccupations of 26-30.

MODELS OF CO-OPERATION: from morally-ambiguous to morally-positive

(a) Sempronius Gracchus and his volones

It was noted above that Livy shows some ingenuity in presenting Fabius' re-election as morally-positive. A larger-scale example of ingenious handling of material which is potentially morally ambiguous occurs at 24.14, where he treats the problem of the slaves in Gracchus' army at Beneventum. An army of slaves is not usually a marker of excellence in warfare: Caesar's claim that his opponents recruited slaves is meant to weaken their moral position, while Catiline avoids recruiting slaves for that same reason. The superior character of these volones is vividly expressed, 'qui iam alterum annum libertatem tacite merer! quam postulare palam maluerant' (24.14.3). When they become dissatisfied,

moreover, they are motivated not by _studium praedae_ or even _studium belli_, but by the desire to serve as free men; ‘en umquam liberi militaturi essent’. It is, of course, important to this positive presentation that their desire is to be free soldiers, and not just to be free men. Gracchus’ appeal to the Senate on their behalf shows that _libertas_ has its positive connotations too:

_Bona fortique opera eorum se ad eam diem usum neque ad exemplum iusti militis quicquam eis praeter libertatem deesse._ (24.14.4)

It is important, as Gracchus himself stresses, that the battle in which their worthiness to receive _libertas_ is to be tested will be one of _vera virtus_, rather than _insidiae_ (24.14.6). If tactical subtlety were needed, it would have been an act of folly to offer _libertas_ to all ‘qui caput hostis rettulisset’: perhaps there is a suggestion here that the Romans are learning to fight according to the situation, a lesson not yet learnt at the time of the great defeats.

Despite their ensuing enthusiasm for battle, Gracchus is also shown to have his men under control:

_Pugnam poscebant signumque ut daret _exemplo_ ferociter instabant. Gracchus proelio _in posterum diem_ pronuntiato contionem dimisit: milites laeti...armis expediendis diei reliquum consumunt._ (24.14.10)

Livy makes a point of indicating to the reader that his bargain with the _volones_ could have gone disastrously wrong: they are so determined to win an enemy head that their ability to fight is impaired, ‘primum capite aegre inter turbam tumultumque abscidendo terebat tempus’ (24.15.4). He responds
quickly to the problem\textsuperscript{149} by announcing that 'claram satis et insignem virtutem esse nec dubiam libertatem futuram strenuis viris' (24.15.6). Still Livy keeps up the tension: the outcome hangs in the balance, Gracchus taunting Hanno (with truth, 24.15.7), and Hanno (without it) claiming that 'mancipia Romana et ex ergastulo militem'. Not until the last moment does Gracchus force the battle to a decisive outcome, 'pronuntiat...esse nihil quod de libertate sperarent, nisi eo die fusi fugatique hostes essent' (24.15.8). The Carthaginians are routed, thirty-eight of their standards captured. Livy's handling of the subject of praeda here is also intended to suggest Roman superiority. No mention is made of it until the very end, 'praeda omnis...militi concessa est' (24.16.5), when the men return to camp 'praeda onusti': thus enrichment has played no (visible) part in their motivation. The contrast with Carthage is strong here, perhaps suggesting that Livy mentions praeda not so much incidentally as strategically: i.e., to make the moral point, rather than (or as well as) for the sake of factual completeness in the battle narrative.

The close of the episode (24.16.6-19) is likewise shaped to minimise possible misgivings about the emancipation of the volones. When Livy tells of Gracchus' contio militum, he gives the reader reassurance about the continued importance of two crucial status boundaries; first rank, and then virtus. The veteres milites are dealt with first, their virtus

\textsuperscript{149}vividly described; 'in dextris militum pro gladiis humana capita esse' (24.15.5).
acknowledged and militaria dona awarded: only then does he turn to the volones (24.16.8-9). All are freed, according to the bargain, but, 'ne discrimen omne virtutis ignaviaeque pereat' (24.16.12), those who had been lacking in virtus are in future to be marked by eating and drinking standing up (24.16.13). His granting of libertas is thus dissociated from the kind of pandering to popular support which characterises his opponent.150

(b) Fulvius at Beneventum

At 25.13.1-14.14 Livy gives an account of a Roman victory at Beneventum: this battle narrative offers a suggestive parallel for the actions of Gracchus, as well as pointers to the construction of narrative explanation. In 212 B.C. the consul Fulvius, on his way to Capua, engages and defeats Hanno.151 The Roman soldiers are made to play a part here which Livy intends as positive, but which would surely have been treated very differently in Caesar, for reasons which soon become apparent.

Livy begins by remarking on the socordia and neglegentia of the Campanians (25.13.7): by 25.13.11-14 the Carthaginian camp is almost taken, but for the luck of the ground. He

150 A parallel case of the morally-ambiguous point turned to moral advantage occurs at the end of book 24: the final sentence records that the only thing 'ad memoriam insigne' which happened in Spain was Rome's first employment of mercenaries, 'Mercennarium militem in castris neminem antequam Celtiberos Romani habuerunt' (24.49.8). There is an obvious risk here of losing moral superiority: but Livy also notes that it was not necessary to increase their pay to induce them to desert Carthage, a small but favourable point.

151 See Hoffmann, Livius, 62.
makes this battle into a set-piece illustration of Roman
courage, 'vincit tamen omnia pertinax virtus,' and thus the
wall is reached, but at a price, 'multis volneribus ac militum
pernicie' (25.14.1). It is to the credit of the consul that
he decides to call a halt because of these excessive losses
(25.14.2), and the reasoning he gives (in O.O.) is sensible
and sound: nevertheless, it is not to prevail:

Haec consilia ducis, cum iam receptui caneret,
clamor militum aspernantium tarn segne imperium
disiecit. (25.14.3)\textsuperscript{152}

It is ignored because of the action taken by one Vibius
Accaus, the prefect of a Paelignian cohort, who throws his
vexillum over the rampart. In pursuit of it, the Paelignians
also cross, 'iamque intra vallum Paeligni pugnabant'.
Valerius Flaccus, military tribune of the third legion, then
exhorts the Romans not to be outdone in valour by allies,
'exprobrans Romanis ignaviam qui sociis captorum castrorum
concederent decus' (25.14.6). In response to his appeal, 'T.
Pedanius princeps primus centurio' in O.R. (marking this as a
climax of the passage) challenges his men:

"Iam hoc signum et hic centurio...intra vallum
hostium erit; sequantur qui capi signum ab hoste
prohibituri sunt". (25.14.7)

At this point, Livy says, Fulvius changes his plan:

Consul ad conspectum transgressentium vallum \textit{mutato}
consilio ab revocando[que] ad incitandos
hortandosque versus milites, ostendere in quanto
discrimine ac periculo fortissima cohors sociorum et
civium legio esset. (25.14.8)\textsuperscript{153}

\textsuperscript{152}The parallel with Gergovia in Caesar, \textit{BG} 7.47.1ff.
(presented as the fault of Caesar's subordinates) suggests
itself here.

\textsuperscript{153}Note the emotive use of the term \textit{cives} again.
To show a commander changing his consilium so radically in the middle of an assault is certainly unusual: but had he not done so, the men would have been disobeying orders, and all the moral value of their victory would have been lost. His changes of consilium retrospectively validates their action, as does the organisation of the episode around a familiar topos of military encouragement. The topos of signum-throwing is first found in Livy at 3.70.10 (the consul Agrippa), and his second and third examples (4.29.3; 6.8.3) are also of consuls. The double example given here (first the allied vexillum then the Roman signum) is potentially difficult because it shows the initiative being taken not by the consul but by men of inferior rank; however, Caesar himself tells of an aquilifer doing likewise in a wholly favourable light. Moreover, the initial action contrary to the 'consilium consulis' is not begun by a Roman but by an ally; the Roman response is then constructed not (as it might have appeared) as an infection with allied indiscipline, but as a wholly favourable piece of aemulatio. Finally, the consul himself responds to the new circumstances, and changes his strategy accordingly, thus sidestepping the problem that he might have appeared to be out of control of his men. The complete success of this assault (14.11-14) justifies the preceding narrative, and both Accaus and Pedanius are rewarded.

154 The third, Camillus, is strictly 'tribunus militum consularis potestas'.

155 BG 4.25.3-6. When Livy mentions it at 34.46.12-13 (also by men of lesser rank), he describes it as a 'res in asperis proeliis saepe temptata': cf. Front. Strat. 2.8.1-4: Plut. Sulla 21.2; Aem. 20. But see also Suet. D}_{3} 62.
Caesar would not have written on his own command in such a way. A successful outcome would have had to be owing to the excellence of his command: had he found himself, in Gaul, in Fulvius’ position, we may suspect that his version of the beginning of the action would have been changed to suit. Caesar evidently approves of a degree of initiative among his men, but would not have set such initiative in contrast to his own strategy, as Livy does with Fulvius here.

(c) The survivors of Cannae

In military terms, Cannae was a disaster for Rome. Yet it has already been shown that there was some moral advantage to be gained from the recounting of the defeat: and at the beginning of book 25, the debate on how to treat those men who had survived the battle is further turned to Rome’s moral advantage. Juxtaposed as it is with the problems of the dilectus in 212 B.C., the petition of the survivors, laid before the Senate by Marcellus (25.5.10-11), is marked by the same concern for maintenance of status boundaries as marked Gracchus and his volones. It is put forward by the leading men among the survivors, ‘primores equitum centurionumque et robora ex legionibus peditum’ (25.6.1). The interplay between their words and the evidence of Livy’s preceding account is, as usual, revealing, and it is at once noticeable that they do

156 Burck expresses this shift as a continuous progression beginning after the battle, ‘Dennoch führt Livius als roten Faden durch die bunte Kette der Ereignisse die Linie der römischen Wiedererstarkung fort, an deren Aufweis er seit der Niederlage von Cannae gearbeitet hat, um die inneren Voraussetzungen deutlich zu machen, die um endgültigen Sieg der Römer in diesem Krieg geführt haben’ (Einführung, 108; he does not discuss the debate as part of that continuous progression).
not begin with self-justification, 'etsi non iniquum certe triste senatus consultum factum est' (25.6.2). This is immediately followed up with a familiar theme, the eagerness of Roman soldiers to prove their virtus to a commander: here, however, loyalty is expressed not to any commander but to the Senate of Rome:

Hoc sperassemus in provinciam nos...turbatam ad grave bellum...mitti, et sanguine nostro volneribusque nos senatui satisfacturos esse. (25.6.3-4)

The precedent of Pyrrhus' prisoners is cited (25.6.3), before the legati move on to more dangerous ground, namely the problem of leadership. For the first time in this decade Livy gives the soldiers' view of a problem already outlined, namely the nature and dependent responsibilities of leaders and their men. They begin positively, not with criticism, 'te, M. Marcell...quern si ad Cannas consulem habuissemus, melior et rei publicae et nostra fortuna esset'. The risky question with which they follow this up is mitigated as far as possible by the praeteritio which accompanies it:

Si non deum ira nee fato...sed culpa periimus ad Cannas, cuis tandem ea culpa fuit? miltum an imperatorum? Equidem miles nihil unquam dicam de imperatore meo cui praesertim gratias sciam ab senatu actas.... (25.6.6)

In fact, they do go on to do so, but attack no one man: rather, they make it an issue of concordia between senate and plebs, 'an vobis vestrisque liberis ignoscitis facile, patres

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157 See 25.6.5, 'Ambo mihi consules et universum senatum intueri videor cum te, M. Marcell, intueor...'.

158 Cf. 25.6.13, where the deaths of milites are implicitly contrasted with the consul's flight.
conscripti, in haec vilia capita saevitis?’ (25.6.9). It is easy to forget that they are actually addressing Marcellus in his winter quarters, so clearly is their speech marked for senatorial ears. Their next point seems unanswerable:

Et consuli primoribusque aliis civitatis fugere, cum spes alia nulla esset, turpe non fuit, milites utique morituros in aciem misistis? (25.6.9)

and is supplemented by the famous exempla of the Allia and the Caudine Forks (25.6.10).

Their punishment (not to be allowed to return to Italy while the enemy is still there) is, they claim, unfair: but there is an unexpected twist; it is unfair not because it means they cannot go home, but because they cannot fight. It had been the custom to allow such soldiers to wipe out infamy by virtus (25.6.15-16), and they too want such a chance:

Nos, quibus, nisi quod commisimus ut quisquam ex Cannensi acie miles Romanus superesset, nihil obici potest, non solum a patria...sed ab hoste etiam relegati sumus, ubi senescamus in exsilio ne qua spes, ne qua occasio abolendae ignominiae, ne qua placandae civium irae, ne qua denique bene moriendi sit. (25.6.17-18)

This is fine, persuasive rhetoric, and it leads up to an unexpected conclusion: their final exemplum cites the parallel of Gracchus and his slave legions, ‘pro servis saltem ad hoc bellum emptis vobis simus; congraudi cum hoste liceat et pugnando quaeerere libertatem’ (25.6.21-3).

The Senate, to which Marcellus conveys the request, leaves the matter to Marcellus’ discretion (25.7.4). The

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159 The address to ‘patres conscripti’ encourages the reader to compare this scene with the Torquatus episode (22.59-60), and to see in it a development of Rome’s earlier position.
presence in Sicily, however, of men so eager to clear themselves of ignominia even by death, augurs well for his campaign there, as well as illustrating how even troops designated by the Romans themselves as inferior, are full of determination, ready to die for honour's sake.  

MODELS OF LEADERSHIP

(a) The death of Gracchus

The death of the consul Gracchus in Lucania (25.16.1-17.7), is a useful indicator of the flexibility of narrative explanation, and in particular of the problem of handling causality on different levels. Had his death occurred earlier in the pentad, it would surely have been cast as a marker of Rome's incompetence: as it is, the story Livy gives is to the consul's credit, and only later does he reveal that it is a historical problema capable of different interpretation. Unlike Flaminius, Gracchus does not ignore a triste prodigium, and though he takes the wise precaution of checking it, he is similarly unable to avoid his fate: 'nulla tamen providentia fatum imminens moveri potuit' (25.16.4). As Levene has noted, the only other writer to treat the story of

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160 Meanwhile, the revolt of Tarentum (25.7.8-11.20) underlines the continuing threat to Rome from the south, and hence the importance of so determined an army: see further Tränkle, Livius und Polybios, 206-10; Burck, Einführung, 109-111.

161 Hoffmann sets it within a wider context of dramatic narrative, from 25.13-22; Livius, 62-3.

his end does opt for a simple temeritas model, rather than this remarkable picture of ineluctable doom.  

After Gracchus has recognised the danger and abandoned his horse, he addresses the few men who accompanied him to the treacherous rendezvous in 0.0.: if death is inevitable, they can still choose honour or shame:

Reliquum autem quid esse...praeter mortem? id referre, utrum praebentes corpora pecorum modo inulti trucidentur an toti a patiendo exspectandoque eventu in impetum atque iram versi, agentes audentesque, perfusi hostium cruore inter exspirantium inimicorum cumulata armaque et corpora cadant. (25.16.18-19)

Ultio is the motivation to which he appeals, a motivation powerful enough to prevail even without the hope that it will secure their survival: he urges them to kill the Lucanus proditor responsible for the trap, and is eventually killed himself in the attempt.

(b) Cn. Fulvius

Though his parallel with Oedipus is perhaps overdrawn: Gracchus is deceived by Flavus, but not as an explicit result of his determination to avoid the prophesied doom. See Levene, 74-5: Val. Max. 1.6.8 ('temeritas Ti. Gracchi').

For commanders abandoning their horses as a marker of brave leadership, see Sall. Cat. 59.1; Caes. BG 1.25.1 (=Plut. Caes. 18.3) and above, Introduction.

Cf. e.g. Caes. BC 2.42.4; Sall. Cat. 61.4. Livy notes that accounts vary not only on the place and manner of his death, but of his funeral as well. The favourable version of the death has a correspondingly favourable version of the funeral, complete with recognition of Gracchus' excellence as an adversary by Rome's great enemy (25.17.5). After his death, Gracchus' volones desert: perhaps a pointer to the dangers of armies loyal only to their commander: 'volonum...exercitus, qui vivo Graccho summa fide stipendia fecerat, velut exauctoratus morte ducis ab signis discessit' (25.20.4).

Not to be confused with Q. Fulvius, cos. 212 B.C. (25.3.1, cf. 25.14, discussed above).
A complete contrast to the Gracchan model of leadership is given by the example of Cn. Fulvius.\textsuperscript{167} Morally-loaded vocabulary gives a clear warning of trouble (\textit{temeritas, libido militum, libido aut metus, stultitia}) as Hannibal hears of a rumour that the praetor Cn. Fulvius has let his men become lax, 'nimio successu et ipsum et milites praeda impletos in tantam licentiam socordiamque effusos ut nulla disciplina militiae esset' (25.20.6). This \textit{licentia} is Fulvius' fault. He has fallen prey to the same arrogance and greed as his men: this time Hannibal's judgment that he is facing an \textit{inscius dux} (25.20.7) is accurate. Cowardice does not yet accompany rashness and belligerence in the Roman ranks, but this is the most that can be said for the men in their folly, while Hannibal, after a long interval, once again displays the ominous omniscience which had brought him his great victories earlier in the pentad:

\begin{quote}
Hannibal, cum tumultuatum in castris et plerosque ferociter, signum ut daret, institisse duci ad arma vocantes sciret.... (25.21.2)
\end{quote}

Fulvius' weakness, which has tainted his men also, makes him incapable of refusing combat (\textit{nec Fulvius est cunctatus} 25.21.5; that word again), and he gives in to his men. The military tribunes try to save the situation (25.21.7), but in vain.

Fulvius proves himself as defective in the qualities attaching to a real commander as Centenius had earlier in the book (see below): but he does not even receive the credit (as

\textsuperscript{167}His defeat is yet more blameworthy than that of Centenius (25.19.1ff.; see below) which precedes it, because he has not the excuse of inferior rank.
Centenius does) of a display of inappropriate soldierly

virtus:

Dux stultitia et temeritate Centenio par, animo
haudquaquam comparandus, ubi rem inclinatam ac
trepidantes suos videt, equo arrepto cum ducentis
ferme equitibus effugit. (25.21.9) 168

THE SOLDIERS

(a) Single combat: Badius and Crispinus

Two episodes from 25 illustrate the positive and negative
possibilities of soldierly action. The first, an anecdote of
single combat between Crispinus and Badius which Livy recounts
at 25.18, is explicitly made symbolic. 169 It acts as a
narrative counter, partly to Gracchus' death (25.16), partly
to defeat (25.18.1-2) at the hands of Capuans earlier
described as degenerate. Although this surprise attack
damages the Romans, hope is not lost:

Restituit tamen his [Romanis] animos et illis
[Campanis] minuit audaciam parva una res; sed in
bello nihil tam leve est quod non magnae interdum
rei momentum faciat. (25.18.3)

The parva una res is the single combat, but its magnae rei
momentum is not immediately apparent: its importance may be
narrative as much as tactical. 170

In this single combat between a Roman and a Campanian
(25.18.4-15), the latter is clearly marked out as the

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168 A striking reversal of the horse-abandoning topos.

169 See J. Fries, Der Zweikampf, 204-213. Walsh points out
the similarity of this incident to the single combat at 23.46,
'Livy and the aims of "historia", 1072.

170 I.e., it provides a counter to the disastrous example
of Centenius which follows it (see below).
aggressor: he had been tended by Crispinus at Rome after falling ill, but sets aside their friendship, calls him out and challenges him in O.R.: Postquam in conspectum venere, 'provoco te' inquit 'ad pugnam, Crispine' Badius; 'conscendamus equos summotisque aliis eter bello melior sit decernamus'. Ad ea Crispinus nec sibi nec illi ait hostes deesse in quibus virtutem ostendant.... (25.18.5)

Crispinus responds in O.O., but Badius' only reply is a stream of abuse (18.8) of the most insulting (to a soldier) kind. The ensuing fight, into which Crispinus is reluctantly persuaded and for which he seeks the proper permission (25.18.11-12), justifies the Roman completely. It is not a very exciting single combat, or a very equal struggle: if we assume the magnae rei momentum to have some link with the contrast of Roman and foreign soldiers, the speed of Crispinus' success puts beyond all doubt the superiority of the Romans over their enemies. 171

(b) Centenius and the misappropriation of function

In the story which immediately follows that of Badius and Crispinus, the figure of a centurion is used in an unusual context to make a point about the moral conditions of Roman military success. 172 He is introduced in glowing terms, 'M. Centenius fuit cognomine Paenula, insignis inter primi pili centuriones et magnitudine corporis et animo' (25.19.9). This fine introduction, however, is undercut by the preceding sentence, in which Livy has warned the reader that 'Hannibali

171 Cf. 28.21 (Corbis and Orsua), with Fries, Der Zweikampf 214-226, and on the terminology of Zweikampf, 227-231.

alia...bene gerendae rei fortuna oblata est’. As a centurion, Centenius is clearly an excellent man, but when he tries to take on a higher status, that of commander, he comes to grief. This incident is a conspicuous proof of a principle voiced by Caesar, that the qualities appropriate for a soldier and his commander are not the same. Centurions, of course, are interstitial in this scheme of command and obedience, but there is still a difference between ability to take the initiative and rally the men, and functioning as a regular commander. T. Pedanius (25.14) illustrated the former perfectly: M. Centenius attempts the latter with disastrous results.

In promising to beat the enemy at his own game, ‘se...
quibus artibus ad id locorum nostri et duces et exercitus capti forent iis adversus inventorem usurum’ (25.19.11), Centenius sets himself up as Hannibal’s equal, a hubristic hope:

Haud dubia res erat, quippe inter Hannibalem ducem et centurionem exercitusque alterum vincendo veteranum, alterum novum totum. (25.19.14).

Livy’s authorial judgment on Centenius’ folly is memorably expressed as a general principle:

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173 See BG 7.52 (his reprimand after the men’s appropriation of control at Gergovia).

174 Here the narrative demands that the degeneracy of Hannibal’s men after wintering in Capua be temporarily suspended.
Id non promissum magis stolide quam stolide creditum tamquam eadem militares et imperatoriae artes essent. (25.19.12)

Although he allows him an honourable death, even the death itself is made to underline the dangers of ignoring status differentials. Thus when it becomes clear that all is lost (19.16), Centenius dies a death befitting a soldier or centurion of virtus, but it is not the option chosen by a real commander like Gracchus, only two chapters earlier:

Postquam is non pro vetere fama solum sed etiam metu futuri dedecoris, si sua temperitate contractae cladi superesset, obiectans se hostium telis cecidit, fusa extemplo est Romana acies. (25.19.16)

In the preceding sentence, the soldiers are conspicuously exonerated from blame (though the corrupt text makes the exact sense unclear), 'concitata, donec dux stetit, Romana acie'. The actions of Marcius at the end of the book will provide a

175 There is a parallel for Centenius in the action of Veientanus, Prefect of the Allies ('proseris aliquot populationibus...justi ducis speciem nactus', 25.1.3). He engages Hanno and bringing about the slaughter of 'magna vis hominum sed inconditae turbae agrestium servorumque' (25.1.4), an action firmly condemned by Livy through his comment on Veientanus' character, 'minimum iactura fuit quod praefectus inter ceteros est captus,...temerariae pugnae auctor et ante publicanus...et rei publicae et societatibus infidus damnosusque' (25.1.4).

176 Hoffmann's suggestion that the Geschichtlichkeit of this story is doubtful (Livy 63 and n.1) may strengthen the case for regarding it as deliberately highlighted by Livy.

177 Or, for that matter, like Paullus (22.49) who refuses to escape instead of dying with his men, or to return to Rome and face the shame of failure. The example of Curio (Caesar BC 2.42) is discussed above.
compensation for his disastrous action, and restore a positive model of initiative (see below). \(^{178}\)

**CO-OPERATION, LEADERSHIP, SOLDIERY: TWO EXTENDED EXAMPLES**

(a) The fall of Syracuse (212 B.C., 25.23.1-31.15; 40.1-41.7)

The defection of Sicily gives Livy a fresh source of grievance between Rome and Carthage, and potentially a more serious one than Spain: it begins to look as if the first Punic War will have to be fought all over again (though this offers a hopeful precedent). \(^{179}\) He delays explaining the significance of the fall of Syracuse until 25.31.11, and it is thus only in retrospect that the reader discovers the story of Syracuse points forward to the fall of Carthage:

> Hoc maxime modo Syracusae captae; in quibus praedae tantum fuit, quantum vix capta Carthagine tum fuisset cum qua viribus aequis certabatur.

It began with the succession of Hieronymus, arrogant and foolish son of the faithful Hiero. \(^{180}\) Yet the overcoming

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\(^{178}\)Cf. 24.48.3, for a case of limited and controlled centurion initiative: the Scipios send from Spain three centurions to form an amicitia and societas with Syphax, who is impressed by their expertise in ratio belli gerendi, 'Ut veterum militum verba audivit, quam multarum rerum ipse ignarus esset ex comparatione tam ordinatae disciplinae animum advertit' (48.4). Though one of the three agrees to stay behind as magister rei militaris, they are careful to make provisos, should their commanders disagree with this arrangement (24.48.8).

\(^{179}\)The bibliography on historical aspects of Syracuse is extensive: see Walbank, II, 69-78 (siege), 134-6 (spoils). Livy’s narrative is discussed by Burck, Einführung, 112-8; see also Tränkle, Livius und Polybios, 196-205.

\(^{180}\)He is conformed to the ‘rash young man’ type noted earlier, as a ‘puer vixdum libertatem, nedum dominationem modice latus’ (24.4.1): cf. 24.6.9, ‘iuvenis furiosus’. See Tränkle, Livius und Polybios 96-201.
first of his and then of others' tyrannical ambitions, by a
Roman army under Marcellus, was not presented as unambiguously
favourable narrative explanation. The capture and sack of
Syracuse is preceded by the taking of Leontini, an event for
which a degree of moral unease is indicated.

Marcellus first tried to deal with Syracuse by the
ejection of Hippocrates and Epicydes (24.29.5), while at
Leontini, his men were full of righteous indignation, and were
correspondingly successful, 'tanto ardore militum est usus ab
ira inter condiciones pacis interfectorae stationis ut primo
impetu urbem expugnarent' (24.30.1). Livy glossed over the
actual taking of Leontini. It was mentioned in 24.30.1, then
at 24.30.6 he noted that the execution of 2,000 deserters led
to rumours of indiscriminate butchery, 'caedem promiscuam
militum atque oppidanorum' (24.30.4). He cast further doubt
on the rumours by his depiction of Hippocrates' cunning in
writing, and reading to the Syracusan army, a letter
supposedly from the 'praetores Syracusani' to Marcellus,
commending him for sparing no lives in Leontini (24.31.6-8).
The letter made use of the heterogeneous composition of these
forces to win support for Hippocrates:

Omnium mercennariorum militum eandem esse causam nec
unquam Syracusas quieturas donec quicquam externorum
auxiliorum aut in urbe aut in exercitu suo esset.
(24.31.8)

The result of Hippocrates' and Epicydes' manipulation of the
mercenarys against their commanders was to make Syracuse shut

181 The Syracusan army marching to meet them is on the
point of mutiny (24.30.9).
her gates against the Romans, believing in Roman
\textit{crudelitas}.\textsuperscript{182} So Livy says little of the actual capture of
Leontini: and whether the Romans had behaved savagely there or
not, the belief that they had is made to be responsible for
the struggles which follow.\textsuperscript{183}

The sack of Syracuse is perceived in all the sources as
to some extent a moral disadvantage for Marcellus. Because of
this, the reader is alert for moral markers in Livy's
narrative of his treatment of other enemy towns before that
event. At 24.35.2, it is remarked that he made it a policy to
sack cities on the Carthaginian side, including Megara;
'diruit ac diripuit ad reliquorum ac maxime Syracusanorum
terrem'. Then at 24.37.2-39.8 Livy focussed on a single
example, perhaps significantly not involving Marcellus
himself. When L. Pinarius, commander of the garrison at
Henna, realised that the town was about to revolt, he summoned
his men and addressed them in \textit{O.R.} (24.38.1-9):
\begin{quote}
Nec praecoccupati spem ullam nec occupantes periculi
quicquam habebitis; qui prior strinxerit ferrum,
eius victoria erit. (24.38.5)
\end{quote}
The next day, only when violence was clearly inevitable did
Pinarius order the attack (24.39.3), but by his vivid
description of the slaughter and the \textit{militum ira}, and his
concluding sentence, 'ita Henna aut malo aut necessario
facinore retenta' (24.39.7), Livy at least suggests the
possibility that the action was a mistake. Its consequences

\textsuperscript{182} The civil strife which contributes to the success of
these plots provides some long term hope for Rome: the pair is
opposed by the magistrates and \textit{pauci optimatum} (32.3), but
supported by 'militare genus omne parsque magna plebis'.

\textsuperscript{183} The reasonable terms offered by the Romans are refused
(24.33.5-8), and the assault \textit{o2i5$y$r$acu$se} begins.
bear this out: Marcellus believed it would put an end to revolt, but the reverse was true (24.39.8-9). The sack and slaughter is seen as an act of desecration ('deorum sedem violatam esse', 24.39.9), as in its own way Syracuse will be too.\(^{184}\)

The disasters brought about by Fulvius and Centenius (25.19-21) show that faults and weaknesses among the Romans, both soldiers and commanders, have not been done away. Narrative reassurance, however, is close at hand, and introduced in such a way as to stress its force as a counter to the disasters Livy has just related:

Syracusarum oppugnatio ad finem venit, praeterquam vi ac virtute ducis exercitusque intestina etiam proditione adiuta. (25.23.1)\(^{185}\)

When proditio fails (25.23.4-7), Marcellus turns his thoughts to scaling the wall. Livy’s account here parallels closely that given by Polybius (8.37.1-13), and although there are several discrepancies, the correspondence is certainly close enough to make it probable that both accounts are dependent on a common source.\(^{186}\) Plutarch’s version of the capture of

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\(^{184}\)In the last ten chapters of 24, the scene of battle changes: the detailing of problems faced by Rome not only in Italy and Sicily, but also in Macedon, Spain and Africa reminds the reader that degeneration in Hannibal’s army is not a complete guarantee of Rome’s fulfiment of her destiny.

\(^{185}\)Burck draws attention to the creation of narrative reassurance here (though he does not call it by that name) when he remarks of this sentence that ’Livius nimmt das Endergebnis seines Berichts mit dem ersten Satze vorweg...und konzentriert dadurch die Aufmerksamkeit des Lesers völlig auf die Frage der Durchführung der folgenden Operationen, die schwer genug (23.3) erscheinen’: Einführung, 114-5.

\(^{186}\)See Walbank II, 111-114: he notes parallels and discrepancies, but draws no conclusions about Livy’s probable source.
Syracuse shares common features with both: it is syncopated and brief, but the mention of a trumpet blast being part of a strategy to produce alarm and confusion (Marc. 18.4) brings his account closer to Livy's than to Polybius' (at least as we have it). Marcellus' plan gives him a chance to show both his caution and command of strategy, when he hears of a festival of Diana taking place over three days, at which 'vino largius epulas celebrari' (25.23.14; cf. Polyb. 8.37.2; Plut. Marc. 18.3).

Livy underlines these narrative indicators of success by his picture of Marcellus' consultation with his officers, 'cum paucis tribunorum militum conlocutus', after which the best of the centurions are chosen for the first attack (25.23.15). Polybius records no such consilium, and ascribes the choice of the best men (not mentioned by Plutarch) to Marcellus himself, not to his officers. If the excerptor of Polybius has not obscured matters, this discrepancy may indicate a particularly Roman favourable slant on the matter. The courage of the leading men is infectious, another promising sign; 'secuti [sc. primos] ordine alii, cum priorum audacia dubiis etiam animum faceret' (25.23.17).

187 Another familiar marker of impending success follows this, 'signum dari iubet [Marcellus] ut mature corpora curarent quietique darent' (25.23.15).

188 There is a brief but perceptive comment on this passage (Livy 25.23.15ff.; cf. Polyb. 8.37.3-5) by Pianezzola, who remarks that 'Per Livio il soldato romano combatte per la salvezza o la grandezza della patria, spinto dal suo senso del dovere, mai dall'avidità di preda o di premi. Ogni incentivo di questo genere riferito da Polibio ai soldati romani viene sistematicamente censurato da Livio': Traduzione e ideologia: Livio interprete di Polibio (Bologna 1969), 75. See also Burck on the contrast of 'römische Disziplin' with the actions
The strategy of the ensuing action works perfectly. When silent, they are not discovered, and when silence gives way to uproar, it is a deliberate tactical move:

Tuba datum signum erat et iam undique non furtim sed vi aperta gerebatur res. Quippe ad Epipolas...perventum erat terrendique magis hostes erant quam fallendi, sicut territi sunt.' (25.24.4)

This is not in Polybius. Nor, unfortunately, is the description he must have given of Marcellus looking down upon the city, but Plutarch’s evocative scene (Marc. 19) proves that at least one Greek writer thought it a compelling and symbolically important episode: his legetai...dakrusai parallels closely Livy’s inlacrimasse dicitur (Marc. 19.1; cf. Livy 25.24.10). Livy gives a twofold reason for Marcellus’ grief, ‘partim gaudio tantae perpetratae rei, partim vetusta gloria urbis’: the latter prompts him to recall the city’s history in miniature, ‘ea cum universa occurrerent animo subiretque cogitatio iam illa momento horae arsura omnia et ad cineres reditura...’.

Plutarch’s Marcellus thinks only of the destruction of a great city. This difference of focus is not surprising, but while Livy’s Marcellus is prompted to make a last effort to save the city from sack, and recalls particularly the loyalty of Rome’s friend and ally Hiero, ‘ante omnia quae virtus ei fortunaque sua dederat beneficiis in populum Romanum insignis’ (25.24.15), Plutarch’s recalls a rather different Roman topos, that of the commander akôn biastheis, compelled to do as his men require. Both are attempts to vindicate Marcellus and

shift the blame for what was felt to be an act of sacrilege (25.40.2) even by the Romans themselves. Oddly, Plutarch seems to be more successful in this than Livy, and his version of Marcellus' grief at the death of Archimedes is similarly sympathetic (25.19.4-6; cf. 25.31.9-10).

According to Plutarch (19.2), Marcellus prevented two possible acts of savagery by his soldiers; first the burning of the city, and second the slaughter of its inhabitants. As mentioned above, he is also said to have been reluctant to plunder the city, and to have been compelled to do so by his men. Plutarch's favourable attitude to Marcellus is explained in an important passage (Marc. 20), in which he claims that Marcellus changed the Romans' reputation for uncivilised barbarity by educating them in Greek art, τα καλά και θαυμάστα τῆς Ηλλάδος...τιμάν και θαυμάζειν ρωμαίους didaxas (21.5). Paideia is an important factor in Plutarch's view of the relationship between Greece and Rome, and the ability to learn from Greece is shown as something essential to a good life (cf. Mar. 2) He cites as the source for his anecdote Posidonius, a writer much concerned with expounding the proper relationship which ought to exist between Rome and her subjects, and the maintaining of this proper relationship is also made integral in the Livian account.189

The criticism dismissed by Plutarch (Marc. 21.4-5) is not so easily ignored by Livy: nor does he confine his remarks upon the booty of Syracuse to the chapters immediately

following the conquest. Livy’s Marcellus is in full control of operations, aware of the danger of giving his troops a free rein (25.25.5), deciding after debate the terms and extent of the plunder (25.25.7), making arrangements to ensure that none of the milites starts an attack (25.25.8). His efforts are successful, ‘refractis foribus cum omnia terrore ac tumultu streperent, a caedibus tamen temperatum est’ (25.25.9). The possible consequences of the plunder are not yet mentioned, however: Livy chooses first to vindicate Marcellus’ and Rome’s actions in Sicily and Syracuse by a less direct and more subtle method already familiar. That is to say, he provides an O.O. speech (25.28.6-9) agreed to by all the people (25.29.1), defending Rome’s conduct towards her former ally:

Romanis causam oppugnandi Syracusas fuisse caritatem Syracusanorum, non odium...quam superesse causam Romanis cur non, perinde ac si Hiero ipse viveret unicus Romanae amicitiae cultor, incolumes Syracusas esse velint? (25.28.7-8)

Accordingly, an embassy addresses Marcellus (25.29.2-7, O.R.) and is successful (25.30.1): he has no interest in making Syracuse into a serva civitas (25.31.5). The death of Archimedes (25.31.9-10) is reserved until now as a pathetic postscript, and Livy offers a brief conclusion (25.31.11) which, by paralleling Syracuse and Carthage, foretells at the end of one pentad the conclusion of the next, before turning to affairs in Spain.¹⁹⁰

His remarks on the tradition of the booty of Syracuse and its moral consequences are thereby delayed until 25.40:

¹⁹⁰See Burck, Einführung 117 on the balance of the unfavourable ‘booty’ and favourable ‘honour to Archimedes’ sections.
although conceding that the spoils are rightfully taken, 'hostium quidem illa spolia et parta belli iure' (25.40.2), he records that their effect on Rome was damaging to the Roman gods:

Inde primum initium mirandi Graecarum artium opera licentiaæque hinc sacra profanaque omnia volgo spoliandi factum est, quæ postremo in Romanos deos, templum id ipsum primum quod a Marcello eximie ornatum est, vertit. (25.40.2)\textsuperscript{191}

For the time being this remark is left obscure. Its force is clarified much later, when, in the debate on the Lex Oppia (34.1-8), Cato links the plunder of Syracuse to the moral dangers of excessive expenditure: the possession may become the possessor. He thus voices an idea also found in Polybius, which became a cliché of Roman thought, and of which the capture of Syracuse is made a first proof:

Et iam Graeciam Asiamque transcendimus omnibus libidinum illecebris repletas et regias etiam adtractamus gazas - eo plus horreo, ne illae magis res nos acceperint quam nos illas. (34.4.3)\textsuperscript{192}

Polybius' attitude to the sack of Syracuse is again somewhat different: at 9.10.1-13 he expounds a view of the matter, but from the beginning makes clear the opinion that despite arguments on both sides having some weight (9.10.2) the taking of this plunder was and still is wrong. His argument is threefold: that such works of art are not natural to the Romans (as they are, he implies, to the Greeks); that they

\textsuperscript{191}On the religious implications of the sack, see Levene, 77-9: cf. A.W. Lintott, 'Imperial expansion and moral decline in the Roman Republic', Hist. 21 (1972) 626-38, esp. 629.

\textsuperscript{192}Hor. Epist. 2.1.156-7, 'Graecia capta ferum victorem cepit et artis/ intulit agresti Latio': see Briscoe, Comm. Livy 34.4.3n.
will create phthonos and orgê (dangerous things for conquerors to excite); and that the conquerors are taking on the attributes of the conquered. Polybius suggests that they should rather have taken the gold and silver and left the works of art (9.10.11). That works of art are in some way detrimental to the military character of a people is a view shared by Plutarch, who contrasts the behaviour of Fabius at Tarentum (Marc. 21.3-4), and observes that Marcellus became unpopular with the older citizens for making the Romans behave like Athenians.193

Burck has suggested that Livy delays his final section on Syracuse to the end of the book to avoid ending a pentad with the disaster of the deaths of the Scipios. The final part of Syracuse’s story, in contrast, he describes as a ‘beruhigende Erfolgsmeldung’. Although the conquest of Syracuse does make a better end to a pentad than the deaths of two Roman commanders, Burck does not give full weight to the complexity of Livy’s arrangement here: the deaths of the Scipios were followed, after all, by Marcius’ successes, which could themselves have provided the necessary Erfolgsmeldung. Nor do the consequences of the sack of Syracuse for Roman mores indicated by Livy offer quite the kind of narrative reassurance that Burck implies. Rather, Livy is likely to be looking beyond the end of the pentad (to the manner of Marcellus’ death), and beyond the end of the war. In a

193 Plut., Marc. 21.5: they are full of skholē and lalia peri tekhnōn kai tekhnitōn. See Walbank II, 134-36.
similar way, themes and concerns carry over from the end of
the sixth pentad, when the fourth decade begins.

At 25.40.1, when Livy turns to Marcellus' last battle in
Sicily, it begins to look as if the defects of the Roman
leadership are being transferred to the Carthaginians. For
they begin to look not to a fellow-countryman, but to a
Libyphoenician called Muttines for their success.\textsuperscript{194} He is a
protégé of Hannibal, but his skill, which causes the Romans
some initial trouble (25.40.10), is offset by\textit{ seditio} among
his own men and by a disagreement with his fellow-generals
over the best strategy. The Carthaginians are dependent upon
a half-breed for good tactics, while the true Carthaginian
Hanno in particular resents this: the topos of\textit{ aemulatio}
between joint commanders proves as disastrous for the
Carthaginians as it once had for the Romans. The folly of
Hanno, and his distorted motives, are similarly revealed in
O.0.:

\begin{quote}
Id ambo aegre passi duces, magis Hanno, iam ante
anxius gloriae eius: Muttines sibi modum facere,
degenerum Afrum imperatori Carthaginiensi misso ab
senatu populoque? Is perpulit cunctantem Epicyden ut
transgressi flumen in aciem exirent: nam si Muttinem
opperirentur et secunda pugnae fortuna evenisset,
haud dubie Muttinis gloriām fore. (25.40.12-13)
\end{quote}

The defects of this\textit{ aemulatio} and\textit{ studium gloriae} are revealed
by means of the men's reaction: the Numidians tell Marcellus
that they will not fight in the battle, and also tell him why:

\begin{quote}
Quod praefectum suum ab obtrectantibus ducibus
gloriae eius sub ipsam certaminis diem ablegatum
videant. (25.41.3)
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{194}See Walbank II, 53 on the Libyphoenicians.
Marcellus’ final battle in Sicily is, as a consequence, a complete success.¹⁹⁵

(b) The deaths of the Scipios: the command of Marcius (212 B.C., 25.32-39)

So there are difficulties in evaluating the narrative explanation of the fall of Syracuse. Unfavourable elements prepare the reader for the ultimate failure of Marcellus, and for the infection of Roman mores with Greek culture: favourable elements prefigure the ultimate fall of Carthage, and prepare to compensate for the deaths of the Scipios. That military failure has a moral component has been said before, but in the cases of these two commanders, its evaluation is complicated by their relationship to Africanus. It is in part for this reason that the figure of Marcius is used to give narrative reassurance about the consequences of their deaths.¹⁹⁶

The narrative begins when the Scipios decide to abandon their containment strategy and try to force Hasdrubal out of Spain, ‘tempus esse id iam agi ut bellum in Hispania finiretur’ (212 B.C., 25.32.3). There is no superbia or temeritas evident in their plan.¹⁹⁷ Also by agreement rather than aemulatio, they divide up their forces: Publius with two-

¹⁹⁵ Muttines will be important later, when this lack of appreciation on the part of the Carthaginian generals makes him desert to Rome (210 B.C.; 26.40.1-12, cf. Polyb. 9.27.1-10 with Walbank II, 157-161).

¹⁹⁶ Burck has a brief section on the deaths of the Scipios, Einführung 118-20. He does not treat the narrative of Marcius’ success.

¹⁹⁷ Though they do come to their decision partly because of the extra forces provided by 20,000 Celtiberian troops, perhaps implying a risky reliance on foreigners.
thirds of the men to face Hasdrubal (son of Gisgo) and Mago, Gnaeus with one third against Hasdrubal son of Hamilcar 'vetus in Hispania imperator'. Livy tells that while they marched together, the Celtiberians were at the head of the column (25.32.9), and the point of this is explained in what follows, when Hasdrubal bribes them to desert:

Hasdrubal postquam animadvertit exiguum Romanum exercitum...et spem omnem in Celtiberorum auxiliis esse, peritus omnis barbaricae et praecipue omnium earum gentium in quibus per tot annos militabat perfidiaie...paciscitur magna mercede cum Celtiberorum principibus ut copias inde abducant. (25.33.1-3)

This action is not, however, left as a simple act of Punic cunning, for he goes on to describe Hasdrubal’s own opinion of its rectitude, ‘nee atrox visum facinus - non enim ut in Romanos verterent arma agebatur’ (25.33.4). Moreover, for such a sum as he has promised them, he could have engaged their active support. Livy draws a moral from this episode, without actually criticising the Scipios:

Id quidem cavendum semper Romanis ducibus erit exemplaque haec vere pro documentis habenda, ne ita externis credant auxiliis ut non plus sui roboris suarumque proprte virium in castris habeant. (25.33.6)

He also lays the foundation of his explanation of their eventual defeat and death, by focussing the blame on allied treachery, rather than on the Romans themselves. There is a further moral exemplum to be drawn, though Livy leaves this one implicit: the Celtiberians who desert are those mentioned in 24.48 as the first mercenaries Rome has ever employed, a point which, perhaps in a desire to exonerate the Scipios,
Livy obscures by referring to them as *externa auxilia*, rather than *milites mercennarii*.

The danger which threatens Publius in 25.34 reminds the reader once again of 24.48, for he has to face Masinissa, an ally of Carthage and a man who has already proven his military skill by his crushing defeat of Syphax. Masinissa’s Numidian cavalry is the key to the Carthaginian success (25.34.9), so Publius is not blamed for the unfavourable conditions under which battle is joined: once he is wounded, it is the belief that he is dead which causes panic among the Romans, rather than any innate cowardice or incompetence. He dies bravely:

Pugnanti hortantique imperatori et offerenti se ubi plurimus labor erat latus dextrum lancea traicitur; [hostes] alacres gaudio cum clamore per todam aciem nuntiantes discurrent imperatorem Romanum cecidisse. Ea pervagata passim vox, ut et hostes haud dubie pro victoribus et Romani pro victis essent, fecit. (25.34.11-12)

The Carthaginians are filled with confidence by this victory over ‘imperator tantus cum omni exercitu’ (25.35.2), and even at Rome there is a presentiment of disaster (25.35.3), ‘maestum quoddam silentium...et tacita divinatio’: the supernatural element helps to mark the importance of this event. The Numidian cavalry thwarts Gnaeus’ attempts to evade the enemy (25.35.8) and make the best of the position he has found (25.36.2); the enemy is contemptuous of his munitiones:

Duces undique vociferarentur quid starent et non ludibrium illud, vix feminis puerisve morandis satis validum, distraherent diriperentque? (25.36.9)

198 There is an element of reassurance in Livy’s reminder that Masinissa will later ally with Rome (and again prove superior to the less reliable Syphax).
The death of Publius was not worked up by Livy with any dramatic O.R. speech to his men: indeed it is not actually stated at all, only implied by the reactions of both sides and of his brother. Gnaeus' death too is obliquely treated (25.36.14). In the case of Gracchus (25.16-17), a moving and inspiring version was put forward before the alternative versions (with their varying moral emphases) were mentioned: neither Publius nor Gnaeus is accorded this treatment.199

A brief section on the reaction at Rome to the two deaths (25.36.14-15), and then on the regret felt by Spain (25.36.16), emphasises the sense of loss before Livy produces his deus ex machina:

Cum deleti exercitus amissaeque Hispaniae viderentur, vir unus res perditas restituit. Erat in exercitu L. Marcius...eques Romanus, impiger iuvenis animique et ingenii aliquanto quam pro fortuna in qua erat natus maioris. (25.37.1-2)

Hoffmann draws attention to the almost-miraculous appearance of Marcius as saviour of Rome's fortunes, and to the freedom with which Livy developed that interpretation of his role and character.200 By establishing at once the superiority of his abilities to his station, Livy points a contrast with Centenius. He attributes Marcius' ensuing successes to a combination of summa indoles and 'Cn. Scipionis disciplina' through which he had learned the militiae artes. This excellence is confirmed by his gathering together of the

199 The compression of Livy's account is clear from the fact that the twenty-nine days which elapsed between the two deaths (25.36.14) are covered in two chapters.

200 Gewiß finden sich auch hier mitunter Gestalten, die an die erste Dekade erinnern könnten, so etwa jener Marcius...’, Livius, 111; cf. 69.

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scattered Roman forces to form a 'haud contemnendum exercitum' (25.37.4), and further by the unanimous support of those men, 'ad L. Marcium cuncti summam imperii detulerint'.

The successes of Marcius, like the defeat and flight of Fulvius, will be raised as a matter for debate at the beginning of the next pentad (26.2.1-6). Roman leadership is always an issue in this war, and Livy provides the reader with a series of characters who exhibit a spectrum of positive and negative leadership qualities. Although none is wholly bad, none is unequivocally excellent. In the framework of narrative moral explanation which Livy has constructed, it may be deduced that the reason for this depends on a feature noted above: the interconnection between Roman military success and the justification of Roman action. With foreknowledge of the role of Scipio Africanus, the reader reacts to these predecessors as prototypes of an ideal. The appearance of that ideal will then make victory certain. What makes it necessary to construct the account in these terms, however, is the fact that not Fabius or Marcellus, Gnaeus or Publius, Gracchus or Marcius, but Scipio Africanus wins the war. The most successful commander, according to the Livian schema of moral causation, must come last: in Scipio the reader is

\[^{201}\text{It is also significant that the command arises from necessity, unlike Centenius' which was authorised by the Senate (25.19.10) and therefore did pose a challenge to the accepted status definitions of military activity.}\]
presented with the culmination of a steady rise in the military and moral stature of the Romans.\textsuperscript{202}

In the \textit{BG} (1.40.12), Caesar highlighted the commander’s need of two things; ‘suam innocentiam perpetua vita, felicitatem Helvetiorum bello esse perspectam’. \textit{Innocentia} marked the kind of moral superiority which is also seen in Livy 21-25: but without \textit{felicitas}, it is insufficient to create the best type of leadership. Ultimately, a commander who possesses the former without the latter is a defective commander. Hannibal’s successes lack \textit{innocentia}, while the efforts of all Roman commanders (Scipio excepted) in some degree lack \textit{felicitas}. \textit{Felicitas}, then, turns out to be a character trait in the same way as \textit{innocentia}, or \textit{temeritas}, or \textit{prudentia} are. It cannot be isolated as an external causative factor, independent of the degree of moral excellence to be ascribed to a commander.\textsuperscript{203}

Unlike the deaths of the Scipios, the battles of Marcius are given the full emotive treatment, in a way which makes clear their importance to Livy at the end of this pentad. Roman moral superiority has once more to be re-established at a time of disastrous defeat, and the actions of the Carthaginians help to prove this superiority. The Roman \textit{milites} respond to Marcius’ efficient preparations for the inevitable Carthaginian follow-up action with enthusiasm

\textsuperscript{202}Though a degree of ambiguity attaches even to him: it is suggested in the next chapter that this owes something to his later disgrace and death.

\textsuperscript{203}On \textit{innocentia}, see Moore, \textit{Artistry} 126-7: he does not discuss \textit{felicitas} as part of the Livian scheme of virtues.
(25.37.7), but when Hasdrubal son of Gisgo appears, their reaction reveals the difficulty of Marcius’ task:

Postquam Hasdrubalem...ad reliquias belli delendas transisse Hiberum...signumque pugnae propositum ab novo duce milites viderunt, recordati quos paulo ante imperatores habuissent...flere omnes repente et offensare capita et alii manus ad caelum tendere deos incusantes, alii strati humi suum quisque nominatim ducem implorare. (25.37.8-9)

The centurions fail to encourage them, and even Marcius seems not to succeed, but the force of his words, if it does not actually rouse them, evokes the same motivations for action to which they immediately respond as the trumpet sounds:

Neque sedari lamentatio poterat...mulcente et increpante Marcio, quod in muliebres et inutiles se proiecissent fletus potius quam ad tutandos semet ipsos et rem publicam secum acuerent animos et ne inultos imperatores suos iacere sinerent; cum subito clamor tubarumque sonus...exauditur. Inde vero repente in iram luctu discurrunt ad arma.... (25.37.10-11)

Rarely does disorganisation and crowd emotion among Roman soldiers act to their advantage in Livy, but that is certainly the case here. Nothing could be more emphatic in shocking the enemy than the disordered fury of the Romans, ‘velut accensi rabie discurrunt,’ and the slackness of the over-confident Carthaginians prevents this attack from endangering the Romans themselves, ‘et in hostem neglegenter atque incomposite venientem incurrunt’. 204

Marcius proves himself to be well aware of the dangers attendant on the ensuing rout, ‘fuisset... temerarius periculosusque sequentium impetus’ (25.37.14). Livy vividly

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204 Punic neglegentia arises from the hasty assumption that the Romans have no-one left to lead them: it is given prominence by a rapid series of indirect rhetorical questions (25.37.12).
evokes the belligerent state of his men, then shows how he nevertheless controls and curbs it:

Quosdam ipse retines concitatam repressisset aciem. Inde in castra avidos adhuc caedisque et sanguinis reduxit. (25.37.14)

The *aviditas caedis* of the Romans, excluding as it does here the *studium praedae* which is such a powerful factor in Hannibal’s control of his men, makes a strong contrast with the folly of the Carthaginians. They misunderstand the strategy of Marcius’ halt, and return to their *neglegentia* (25.37.16).²⁰⁵ Marcius’ plan to take their camp is ostensibly rash, ‘consilium prima specie temerarium magis quam audax,’ though underlying wisdom is implied by Livy’s phrasing, and is confirmed in the O.R. speech which follows (25.38.2-22).

Marcius begins with his *pietas* towards the Scipios, and after emphasising the difficulties of his command, he returns to a theme by which he had already tried to motivate the men (25.37.10), namely *ultio*. He describes this need by means of a dream, of which nothing has been said in the preceding narrative: like his response to the probable fears of his men in 25.38.1, the exhortation to vengeance illustrates his understanding of their psychology, and by coming to him in a dream it acquires an independent force which makes it more compelling. His strategy is thereby reinforced by the personal commendation of the Scipios:

Scipiones me ambo dies noctesque curis insomniisque agitant et excitant saepe somno, neu se neu invictos per octo annos...milites suos, conmilitones vestros,

²⁰⁵The reader has prior authorial affirmation of its wisdom, ‘Et aut fugientium caedes...repressisset aciem’ (25.37.14).
neu rem publicam patiar inultam...ita post mortem suam, quod quaque in re facturos illosuisse maxime censeam, id optimum ducere. (25.38.5-7)

The Scipios join ultio of themselves with another, and an emotionally persuasive, ultio. Through Marcius they urge the Roman soldiers to avenge not only their conmilitones, but also the Republic itself. In exhorting the men to imagine that the Scipios are present at the battle and watching them, Marcius echoes a theme also found in Caesar, 'Vos...velim, milites... velut si adhortantes signumque dantes videatis eos, ita proelia inire' (25.38.8).

At 25.38.11, the second part of the speech turns to the plan of attack: the fact that Marcius is allowed to expound his ratio proelii gerendi proves it to have been carefully thought out. Unlike the Carthaginians, he is shown as having read his enemy’s mind correctly, 'Nihil omnium nunc minus metuunt hostes quam ne...castra sua ultro oppugnemus', and the example of Hannibal in particular has shown the importance of this narrative device in suggesting the outcome of a battle. The men are given a further inducement to ensure the success of this night attack at 25.38.17, 'Tum inter torpidos somno...illa caedes edatur a qua vos hesterno die revocatos aegre ferebatis'. By acknowledging the consilium as audax (25.38.18), and explaining his position (thereby proving that it is a calculated risk, not a rash decision), Marcius persuades his hearers (25.38.22).206 The narrative, then, is

206 At 25.38.22-23 Livy uses a familiar marker of victory when he notes his command to the men to rest (corpora curate) and their obedience to that command.
constructed both to justify him, and to imply the success of the consilium.

Marcius' success is owing, in part, to his use of Punic strategy against the Carthaginians, a fact to which Livy draws conspicuous attention, 'in huius silvae medio ferme spatio cohors Romana arte Punica abditur et equites' (25.39.1). Trickery and deception as a necessary part of the commander's skills will re-emerge in the next pentad, with a greater degree of moral ambiguity attached, in the person of Scipio. The ensuing slaughter is described with virtuosic rhetorical skill (25.39.3-8): short sentences ('Inde signa canunt et tollitur clamor'; 'Incidunt inermes inter catervas armatorum') are blended with balanced tripartite sentences with historic present ('Pars semisomnos hostes caedunt, pars ignes...pars portas...'; 'neglecta...omnia ac soluta invenere, arma tantum posita...milites inermes...sedentes'), antithesis ('Nee audire nec providere'; 'Alii ruunt...alii...super vallum saliunt') and asyndeton ('ignis clamor caedes').

At the end of Marcius' aristeia, Livy gives one of his source-analyses (25.39.12-17). These may be a device for stylistic variation, but they can also have something to contribute to the narrative explanation. A flame is supposed (presumably by Claudius, Valerius and Piso) to have blazed up on Marcius' head as he addressed the men: the fact that Livy both draws attention to this miraculous tradition, and chooses not to affirm it himself, gives a suggestive insight into his narrative technique.207 His notions of Roman destiny, and of

207See Hoffmann, Livius 107.
the relationship between Rome’s *pietas erga deos* and her military achievements, are suggested discreetly by means of that narrative technique: the refusal to give authorial affirmation of such miraculous material helps his account to read as an objective record of the truth, while it nonetheless influences the reader’s perception of events.
The sixth pentad opens with an exploration of the question of leadership: Livy juxtaposes problems of leadership among the Carthaginians at the end of 25 with Roman deliberations on a pair of similar problems at the beginning of 26. The first of these concerns Marcius, who has assumed the title of propraetor. In the second, that of the real praetor Cn. Fulvius, a pair of O.O. speeches is used to mark a shift in Roman attitudes from those prevailing at the time of Cannae.

The objection raised against Marcius, that 'titulus honoris, quod imperio non populi iussu, non ex auctoritate patrum dato 'propraetor senatui' scripserat' (26.2.1), is explained in terms of the dangers of allowing troops control over their leaders:

Rem mali exempli esse imperatores legi ab exercitibus et sollemne auspiciandorum comitiorum in castra et provincias procul ab legibus magistratibusque ad militarem temeritatem transferri. (26.2.2)

This is not to criticise Marcius, but to guard against a malum exemplum, a dangerous precedent: the contrast between leges

1Discussion of the sixth pentad follows the arrangement by selection of key episodes established in the second part of previous chapter.

2No conclusion to the problem is given here, but it is picked up later and resolved by Scipio (26.20.5).

3Livy prepares the reader for this by drawing attention to the parallel between the punishment of the survivors of Cannae and that meted out to the remnant of Fulvius' army (26.1.9-10).
magistratusque and militaris temeritas is an important one, and to Livy's readers a familiar one. The passage acts as a proof that the Romans are aware of the potential risk in the prominence of such men as Marcius: it also reveals that this risk is centred in the power of the milites for independent and uncontrolled action in time of war.

The trial of Fulvius illustrates the perceived danger of ceding control to militaris temeritas. Both Fulvius and his attacker Blaesus appeal to emotive precedents: in the case of Fulvius, the discrepancy between what he asserts to have been the case, and what Livy has independently narrated (25.20.5-21.10) militates against his arguments and undermines the force of his appeal to precedent, highlighting the shift in Roman attitudes mentioned above. This is not to say that the arguments of Blaesus are wholly to be accepted by the reader. There is a strain of invective running through his attack, and although his accusations can be confirmed in part, for example 26.2.8, they are nonetheless clear exaggerations, politically

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4 See, e.g., Centenius Paenula (above on 25.19ff.). On the danger of milites appropriating the decision-making function, cf. Caesar, BG 1.40.10; 7.52.3-4.

5 The charges are corruption of morals, 26.2.8; cowardice, 2.12-13; immorality, 2.15. See Cicero, In Pisonem (ed. R.G.M. Nisbet, Oxford 1961), 194-5, for charges of immorality and self-indulgence as standard in invective: cf. e.g. pro Cael. 6-9, with R.G. Austin n. on 6.21; Brut. 65 (listing among the marks of Cato's greatness as an orator the fact that he was 'acerbus in vituperando'): Quint. 12.9.8ff. on the proper use of invective. K.J. Dover, Greek popular morality in the time of Plato and Aristotle (Oxford 1974) discusses Greek parallels, 25-6, 30-35.
motivated. Thus instead of falling into vice alongside his men, Fulvius is charged with having led them into vice ('vilibus vitiis imbuisse,' 26.2.11).

Despite the usual pattern of events, that a commander's character transfers on to, and influences, his men (and that Fulvius is thus responsible for any moral degeneration) it is important to see Blaesus' argument as partial: he takes no account of the natural propensity of milites towards vice and moral degeneration, and is at some pains to play down their folly and mutinous disobedience (25.21). The popular tone of the speech undercuts its arguments, pointing the danger of leaning too much towards blame of the commander: this is no Fabius delivering a weighty warning, but a tribune with an axe to grind. His opening charge makes this clear:

Multos imperatores temeritate atque inscritia exercitum in locum praecipitem duxisse...neminem praeter Cn. Fulvium ante corrupisse omnibus vitiis legiones suas quam proderet. (26.2.7-8)

He goes on to illustrate this by means of a contrast with Gracchus: at first (thereby showing his priorities), Blaesus confines himself to the claim that the character of each commander affected and influenced the behaviour of his men, but he makes Fulvius' role in bringing his men into vice a more conspicuous one than the single sentence in book 25 would

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6 E.g. the charge that he allowed discipline to lapse is confirmed at 25.20.6, 'et ipsum et milites praeda impletos in tantam licentiam socordiamque effusos.... N.b. licentia and socordia are considered more reprehensible than temeritas and inscitia (26.2.7).

7 His tribunician rank is not actually stated here, though it is implied by the tone and content of his speech. Broughton, MRR I, lists him as a tribune of the plebs in 211 B.C.
seem to justify. Gracchus made slaves fight like Romans: Fulvius made Romans behave *servilibus vitiiis* (26.2.10-11). His position as tribune makes it natural for him first to exonerate the *milites* from blame at their commander’s expense (‘nec hercle mirum esse <cessisse> milites in acie cum primus omnium imperator fugeret’), then to stress the bravery of those who held their ground (not mentioned by Livy in 25.21).

Blaesus, naturally, cites the precedents of defeated commanders which reflect most unfavourably on his opponent (26.2.13). He conspicuously avoids mentioning Varro, though Fulvius hastens to correct the omission. Nevertheless, the fact that he compares the punishments of Varro’s and Fulvius’ men (26.2.14-15), shows his own awareness of that precedent: it is not then necessary for him to take the argument further by criticising the Senate’s lenient attitude towards Varro after Cannae. The tribunelian bias of his speech is maintained at the end, first by defence of the *milites* and implied criticism of their commander, then by a generalised claim of unfairness in the treatment of rich and poor:

> Facinus indignum...milites qui nihil aliud peccaverint quam quod imperatoris similes fuerint relegatos prope in exsilium ignominiosam pati militiam; adeo imparem libertatem Romae diti ac pauperi, honorato atque inhonorable esse. (26.2.16)

Fulvius’ response to these accusations, and his explanation of the disastrous defeat, are made to diverge from the account Livy gave in 25. He first claims to have been in control of his men (‘milites...productos in aciem non eo quo voluerint...die,’ 3.1): in 25, however, the delay is nothing to do with his assertion of his power of command, but rather a
means to Hannibal’s successful organisation of a trap. This trap (‘tria milia expeditorum militum in villis circa…disponit qui signo dato simul omnes e latebris exsisterent,’ 25.21.3), like the insidia he sends Mago to set up on all the roads, plays no part in the brief narrative of defeat which follows: its function is not practical but moral, to remind the reader of the disaster to Roman forces which Hannibal’s cunning strategy usually portends. Fulvius, of course, takes no thought for the possibility of fraus, and pays the usual price for such ignorance.

Fulvius’ second claim is that his men had been drawn up for battle at a good time and in a good position, ‘et tempore et loco aequo instructos’ (26.3.1). This is not mentioned in book 25 either: indeed, the opposite is implied, ‘eadem tementitate qua processum in in aciem est instruitur ipsa acies’ (25.21.5). The clearest proof of his guilt is his third statement, ‘cum effuse omnes fugerent, se quoque turba ablatum, ut Varronem Cannensi pugna, ut multos alios imperatores’ (26.3.2). This is contradicted by the sworn statements of his soldiers (26.3.5-6) as well as by the preceding narrative (25.21.9, with a comment on his stultitia and temeritas). Incompetent as Varro had been at Cannae, neither such cowardice, nor such deceit in defending himself, was so systematically attributed to him.

The final charge brought against Fulvius is one of perduellio, and the Senate prevents him from appealing for help to his brother Quintus at Capua, whither, after his exile, the narrative shifts. The trial of Fulvius, however,
has served its function: Rome will not tolerate rash, cowardly
or deceitful models of leadership, and a different tone has
been established for the second half both of the decade and of
the war. The popular motivation behind Blaesus' arguments
does hint, though, at possible difficulties arising from this
precedent, which will become increasing prominent in the next
decade. In Livy, plebs Romana is not conspicuously wise in
submitting to good leadership, and its successful condemnation
of Fulvius is narrated almost without reference to the Senate.
The stress is rather on popular anger, 'tanta ira accensa est
ut capite anquirendum contio suclamaret' (26.3.6), and the
passage ends with confirmation of the popular focus (26.3.12).

At 26.4.3, the Romans' readiness to resort to ars marks
another narrative shift from earlier attitudes.\(^8\) Inclusion of
velites among the cavalry was adopted as regular practice, and
due credit is given to its instigator, one Q. Navius, a
centurion (26.4.10).\(^9\) Roman success is at once juxtaposed
with Carthaginian difficulty: Livy shows Hannibal in a
quandary before deciding to go to Capua. This uncertainty
marks a further shift in his characterisation:

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\text{Vicit tamen respectus Capuae in quam omnium sociorum}
\text{hostiumque conversos videbat animos, documento}
\text{futurae qualemunque eventum defectio ab Romanis}
\text{habuisset. (26.5.2)}
\]

example of Romans using ars to defeat an artful enemy.

\(^9\)Cf. Caesar BC 3.84.3-4 for a similar, and similarly
effective, ruse. The fact of Carthaginian superiority in
cavalry (21.47.1) is challenged for the first time, 'Inde
equitatu quoque superior Romana res fuit' (26.4.9).
The last battle before the surrender of Capua, described at 26.5.4-6.13, concludes with confirmation to the reader that 'hoc ultimum, utcumque initum finitumque est, ante deditionem Capuae proelium fuit' (6.13), a conclusion which is intended to provide narrative reassurance, but which also prepares the reader for the difficult question of the rectitude of Rome's behaviour towards her conquered enemy. The battle begins with the Roman dual leadership working to advantage:¹⁰ and the attempt by some of Hannibal's Spanish troops to penetrate the Roman camp is used to stress Roman superiority: Fulvius immediately recognises the threat and turns to the centurion Q. Navius for help (26.5.12). Navius' excellence has already been established by his plan for the cavalry (26.4), and he takes swift action of a type which entails success. He threatens to throw a standard into the midst of the enemy:

 Secundi hastati signum ademptum signifero in hostes infert, iacturum in medios eos munitans ni se propere sequantur milites et partem capessant pugnae. Ingens corpus erat et arma honestabant; et sublatum alte signum converterat ad spectaculum cives hostesque. (26.5.15-16)

The glory is not all Navius',¹¹ but the narrative focusses on his role in saving the Roman camp: the fact that the battle is described as such an even match confirms the crucial role his intervention played. The topos of standard throwing is exclusively a Roman domain in Livy, the superiority in courage

¹⁰26.5.8: the consuls of 212, their commands extended into 211, divide their areas of action, with Claudius concentrating on the city and Fulvius on the Carthaginians.

¹¹Livy also records that Appius Claudius was honourably wounded, 'cui suos ante prima signa adhortanti sub laevo umero summum pectus gaeso ictum est' (26.6.5).
which it suggests something to which foreigners never aspire: thence can this battle be regarded as setting the tone for the rest of the pentad, in which Roman moral superiority begins to triumph on the battlefield.¹²

In the fifth pentad (and in 21-22 in particular), dramatic irony was used to heighten the pathos of the Romans’ situation: now it is Hannibal who does not realise the weakness of his own position, and his attempted march on Rome is worked into this theme.¹³ A comparison with Polybius makes the point clear, for although in his version, the decision to march on Rome is made for the same reasons as Livy gives, the Livian version includes reflections on Hannibal’s position which emphasise the folly of his previous failure:

Multa secum quonam inde ire pergeret volventi subiit animum impetus caput ipsum belli Romam petendi, cujus rei semper cupitae praetermissam occasionem post Cannensem pugnam et alii fremebant et ipse non dissimulabat. (26.7.3)¹⁴

Whether Livy is following a different source here or is giving his own version of what happened at Rome, his account differs from Polybius’s in such a way as to emphasise not panic, but efficiency at Rome. Thus at 26.8.1, we learn that the Romans are well aware of Hannibal’s plan, ‘Id priusquam fieret ita

¹²As in the case of the death of Gracchus, Livy here chooses to record a favourable version, and merely to note a variant at the end: it seems probable that the main source here is Valerius Antias, the variant Coelius, though this is disputed. See Klotz, Livius 172: Walbank II, 119 for bibliography.

¹³See Burck, Einführung 120-3: Hoffmann, Livius 106.

¹⁴Polyb. 9.4.8, with Walbank, II, 121; cf. Livy 26.7.5: probably both are following Silenus, the latter mediated via Coelius.
futurum compertum ex transfugis Fulvius Flaccus senatui Romam
cum scripsisset...'. This foreknowledge, like the calm and
efficiently-resolved debate in the Senate (26.8.2-8), is
lacking in Polybius, but essential to the new direction and
moral tone of the Romans in this pentad: it also shows a
significant reversal of the pattern of the previous pentad, in
which ignorance and doubt belonged to the Romans,
foreknowledge (n.b. from deserters) to Hannibal.

In the debate, two contrasting opinions are put forward,
one for the abandonment of the siege and defence of the city,
the other (by Fabius Maximus and couched in characteristic
language) displaying a degree of awareness of the enemy’s
situation which marks it as the more right of the two:

Fabius Maximus abscedi a Capua terrerique et
circumagi ad nutus comminationesque Hannibalis
flagitiosum ducebat: qui ad Cannas victor ire tamen
ad urbem ausus non esset, eum a Capua repulsum spem
potiundae urbis Romae cepisse! non ad Romam
obsidendam, sed ad Capuae liberandam obsidionem ire.
Romam cum eo exercitu qui ad urbem esset Iovem
foederum ruptorum ab Hannibale testem deosque alios
defensuros esse. (26.8.3-5)

He too makes comparison with Cannae, in a way perhaps intended
to remind the reader of Marcellus’s opinion, and gauges one of
Hannibal’s intentions correctly. But he does not give due
weight to the enemy aim of capturing Rome, and for this
reason, the morally positive conclusion is not adoption of his

15 Polybius focusses more conventionally on tarachē and
phobos (9.6.1), on the reactions of the men and the women
(9.6.2-4); there is no mention of the debate.

16 'Ad Capuae liberandam obsidionem': cf. 'Capuam extemplo
omissuros', 26.7.5.
opinion, but a compromise, 'Has diversas sententias media
sententia P. Valeri Flacci vicit' (26.8.6).

26.9-16, though comprising both the reaction of Rome to
the arrival of Hannibal and the fall of Capua, works as a
unified piece of narrative, for Livy makes the final decision
of Capua to surrender dependent on the character shown by the
Romans. This kind of moral causation by now comes as no
surprise, and Livy's reasons for using it are linked to a need
to justify Rome's treatment of Capua. Thus when Hannibal
leaves Capua for Rome, Fulvius also leaves, and the eagerness
of his men confirms in the Romans the moral advantage
conferred by defence of a patria, 'alacres...milites alius
alium ut adderet gradum memor ad defendendam iri patriam
hortabantur' (26.9.5).17

Comparison with Polybius reveals several minor variants
and discrepancies, which, when taken together, confirm the
picture of Livy reshaping events to make them morally
causative.18 Terror (26.9.6) corresponds to Polybius' tarakhé
and phobos (9.6.1); rumour exacerbates the situation in both
accounts, though only Polybius specifies it as a fear that the
legions at Capua had been destroyed (9.6.2); the pleas of

17But Hannibal has reassured the Capuans that he will not
desert them, 26.7.7-8, cf. Polyb. 9.5.1-3, 6. On the question
of Hannibal's route for the march on Rome, see Walbank II, 119
for the standard view that Livy uses Antias for the route,
with Coelius the variant: the reverse is proposed by Klotz,
Livius 172-3. A plausible solution is offered by Salmon,

18Polybius's narrative breaks off before the crucial
moment, but it is unlikely that he would have made the speech
of Vibius Virrius (as Livy does) such a closely worked piece
of moral explanation.
Roman women occur in both (26.9.7; Polyb. 9.6.3), though Livy gives them greater prominence and includes the substance of their prayers. Moreover, while Polybius only remarks that the men took measures for the defence of the city (9.6.3), Livy centres their actions on the guidance of the Senate, and adapts his style to suggest the efficiency of the preparations, with short clauses, historic presents and asyndeton:

Senatus magistratibus in foro praesto est si quid consulere velint. Alii accipiunt imperia disceduntque ad suas quisque officiorum partes: alii offerunt se si quo usus operae sit. Praesidia in arce, in Capitolio, in muris, circa urbem, in monte etiam Albano atque arce Aefulana ponuntur. (26.9.9)

A more serious discrepancy concerns the identity of the troops sent to face Hannibal: in Polybius they are a legion newly recruited by the consuls of 211 (9.6.6), while Livy makes no mention of tirones, and attributes the defence of the city to the army brought by the proconsul Fulvius from Capua (10.1).

The divergence becomes more conspicuous in what follows (26.10.1-11.13; Polyb. 9.6.7-7.10): Livy records a cavalry engagement (won by the Romans, 10.9), and at 26.11, after the crossing of the Anio, two attempts at pitched battle both of which are prevented by a providential downpour of rain, 'imber ingens grandine mixtus ita utramque aciem turbavit ut vix armis retentis in castra sese receperint' (11.2). It is the

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19 See Pianezzola, Traduzione e ideologia 45.
20 'Ut urbem Romanam e manibus hostium eriperent matresque Romanas et liberos parvos inviolatos servarent;' see Levene, 83.
21 See Walbank II, 126 (9.6.6n.).
enemy, and not the Romans, who are made to draw the correct conclusion, 'In religionem ea res apud Poenos versa est, auditaque vox Hannibalis fertur potiundae sibi urbis Romae modo mentem non dari, modo fortunam' (11.4). Livy recounted the effect of weather upon a battle as a kind of divine intervention before (at Trasimene, 22.4-6), and, while not prepared to vouch for its veracity (fertur), is well aware of the potential value of such independent corroboration of his moral explanation.

He ends his account of the failure of the march and Hannibal’s withdrawal with three points, all of which give encouragement to the Roman side. The first two he links together:22 the third is narrated separately. In the first (magna res) Hannibal’s confidence is shaken by hearing of the Roman plan to send forces to Spain, 'cum ipse ad moenia urbis Romae armatus sederet milites sub vexillis in supplementum Hispaniae prefectos audiet', and this proof of Roman confidence on a political/military level is supplemented by an anecdote of a private transaction which then reaches him. Hannibal’s disappointment and anger at Roman determination will be echoed again at the fall of Capua, in the crucial speech of Vibius. The third narrative reassurance is given by the looting of the Grove of Feronia. The Polybian version gives none of these details (9.7.4-10).

The Capuans begin to lose faith in Hannibal (26.12.3-4), and doubts cast on his reliability are highlighted by Roman

22 'Minuere etiam spem eius duae aliae parva magna res' (26.11.5).
efforts to make a peaceable end of the siege: that no Capuan takes up the offer of a free pardon (26.12.5-6) is attributed to metus, not fides, and this sense of guilt at having deserted Rome, coupled with the refusal to abandon resistance, reinforces the impression of their culpability. The theme of Capua's blameworthiness and Rome's innocence is maintained by a report of a letter from Bostar and Hanno, reproaching Hannibal for deserting the city: the terms of the reproach follow a familiar pattern, providing independent witnesses to the excellence of the Roman character:

Incusabant abisse eum [sc. Hannibalem] in Bruttios velut avertentem sese ne Capua in oculis eius caperetur. at hercle Romanos ne oppugnatione quidem urbis Romanae abstrahi a Capua obsidenda potuisse; tanto constantiorem inimicum Romanum quam amicum Poenum esse. (26.12.12-13)

The discovery and punishment of the letter bearers 'fregit animos Campanorum' (26.12.15-19); and despite the cowardice of the primores, a senate meeting is held, at which the speech of Vibius proves beyond doubt that Rome's subsequent treatment of Capua is justified. The justification is compelling because it takes the form of an admission of guilt. In terms of narrative technique, it is also given independent force by being placed before the actual subjugation: the summary given at 16.11-13 reveals none of the unease so apparent in the conclusion to Livy's account of the fall of Syracuse.

In a series of forceful rhetorical questions, Vibius focusses on the deliberate treachery of Capua:

Iam e memoria excessit, quo tempore et in qua fortuna a populo Romano defecerimus? iam, quemadmodum in defectione praesidium, quod poterat emitti, per cruciatum et ad contumeliam necarimus? quotiens in obsidentes, quam inimice eruperimus,
castra oppugnarimus, Hannibalem vocaverimus ad
opprimendos eos? hoc quod recentissimum est, ad
oppugnandam Romam hinc eum miserimus? (26.13.5-6)

The anaphora of *iam*, and picking up of the verb *deficio* with
its cognate noun, the forceful tricolon 'eruperimus...
oppugnarimus...vocaverimus' complement well the deliberate
stress on the wickedness of Capua's actions: Vibius mentions
the decision not to expel the garrison in order to emphasise
the impossibility of clemency from Rome, but the reader
recognises it as a repellent proof of Capuan barbarity.

A more subtle point is made by Livy's narrative strategy
at the end of the passage quoted above: at 26.7.3, it was
stated merely that 'subiit [sc. Hannibalis] animum impetus
caput ipsum belli Romam petendi...', but here Vibius is made
to claim that the Capuans ordered Hannibal to make the
attempt. This disposes of the possible defence that they were
acting under Punic coercion. Despite Vibius' words, the
senators decide to sue for *clementia*:23 but the proconsuls
Claudius and Fulvius cannot agree, and Fulvius has the Campani
at Teanum executed (26.15.8). He is similarly about to pre-
empt the Senate's decision on the prisoners' fate at Cales,
when letters arrive, and rightly suspecting they will order
him to desist, he refuses to read them until the executions
are over. This incident poses several problems of
interpretation, not the least of which is whether Livy intends
the incident as a proof of the proconsul's ingenuity and

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23So his speech has no direct relation to the ensuing
action: rather, like that of Critognatus (Caesar BG 7.77.3-16)
it is meant to be a paradigmatic revelation of the enemy
character.
severity, or as an unfavourable reflection on Rome’s behaviour towards the conquered. The parallel with Syracuse hints at the latter, but his remarks about Capua elsewhere, and the wholly inimical picture he has given of her treachery, suggest the former is more likely. The Romans were, after all, fond of illustrating their own severitas, towards themselves as well as their recalcitrant foes. The severity of Fulvius, however, is highlighted further by the suicide of Vibellius Taurea (15.11-15), who challenges the proconsul in emotive O.R., ‘me quoque...iube occidi ut gloriari possis multo fortioerum quam ipse es virum abs te occisum esse’. The killing of his wife and children to preserve them from indignitas puts his action on a level of Roman virtus, perhaps in order merely to dignify the narrative, perhaps with some more subtle narrative purpose. That Livy considers the actions of Fulvius blameless is finally established at 16.11:

Ita ad Capuam res compositae consilio ab omni parte laudibili. Severe et celeriter in maxime noxios

24 Severitas figures prominently in the exempla tradition: see e.g. Val. Max. 5.8.1-5, 6.3.1-12 (Romani), 3.13-15 (externi), with Litchfield, HSCP 1913; G. Maslakov, 'Valerius Maximus and Roman Historiography: a Study of the Exempla Tradition', in ANRW II 32.1, 437-96. See also above on Torquatus after Cannae.

25 Cf. Lucretia in Livy 1.57-9, with Ogilvie, Comm. 218-29. Only at 26.16.1-4 does Livy remark on the dispute surrounding this story. In the first variant (that Claudius was already dead by the time of the executions; denying dissent between the consuls) Taurea’s was no heroic suicide: he was merely one of the prisoners, who cried out in the words reported. The second offers an addendum to the decree: Fulvius might refer his decision to the Senate (‘si ei videretur’) and so felt justified in using his own initiative in ordering the executions. Livy rejects both: the version he narrates first, though not permitted to weaken Rome’s moral position (unlike the Syracuse narrative), is surprisingly positive in its portrayal of an enemy.
animadversum;...non saevitum incendiis ruinisque in tecta innoxia murosque, et cum emolumento quaesita etiam apud socios lenitatis species incolumitate urbis nobilissimae opulentissimaeque, cuius ruinis omnis Campania, omnes qui Campaniam circa accolunt populi ingemuiissent; confessio expressa hosti quanta vis in Romanis ad expetendas poenas ab infidelibus sociis, et quam nihil in Hannibale auxili ad receptos in fidem tuendos esset. (26.16.11-13)

The enemy is made to admit not Roman crudelitas but Roman severitas. Rome punishes the treacherous; she is not guilty of persecuting the innocent.

THE END OF THE WAR (203-201 B.C., 30.1.1-45.7)

(a) Tension and reassurance in the prelude to victory

There is a certain lack of finesse about Livy's moral shaping of the last book of the decade. Perhaps the end of the second Punic war is an obvious and even appropriate place to find relatively straightforward narrative explanation: certainly where there are ambiguities in narrative explanation in 21-30,\textsuperscript{26} they tend to attach to narrative threads which do not break off at the end of the book. To look first at the invasion of Africa and Hannibal's defeat at Zama, before examining the emergence of Scipio, helps to clarify this contrast between the straightforward and the ambiguous, particularly through comparison of the Livian version with that of Polybius.\textsuperscript{27}

\textsuperscript{26}Both ambiguities in the portrayal of the individual (in this case Scipio) and those attaching to Rome as a whole.

\textsuperscript{27}For an analysis of parallels and discrepancies, underlining the pro-Roman tone of the Livian version, see Tränkle, Livius und Polybius 229-235.
So the reader finds that preparation for the final conflict is thorough: that careful measures have been taken for the defence of Italy and Sicily (30.2.1-7): that prodigia have been expiated (30.2.9-13): before the narrative turns to Scipio (30.3.1). Negotiations with Syphax begin, but with further reassurance that Scipio will not fall prey to the wiles of a plausible foreigner, as he pretends to be flexible only in order to allow his men an opportunity to observe Syphax's camp (30.3.5-7).

Flexibility in Hannibal's characterisation (see below) finds a counterpart in the depiction of Scipio's use of trickery: though essentially similar to Hannibalic sollertia, this is made to act positively on the Roman side. Livy's stress is not on the deception, but on the seizing of the initiative, the control of the situation which he displays. Thus the agents through whom he enacts that deception are

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28 See Levene, 101-2. He suggests that Livy tries 'to justify Hannibal's defeat in religious terms' (at 30.20.6 and 30.25.11-12): but rivalry between the censors, M. Livius (Salinator; see 37.3-4) and C. Claudius ('aeque foedum certamen inquinandi famam alterius cum suae famae damno factum est exitu censurae', 29.37.11; cf. 37.9) does not suggest a wholly unambiguous picture of Rome's position at the end of the war. Cf. 29.37.13-16, and below.

29 Positive moral causation here combines the reassurance that all Rome is united behind Scipio with a record of his own efficient preparations (30.3.3-4).

30 A comparable tactic is used by Jugurtha, at Sall. BJ 38.1-3. Cf. Polyb. 14.1.1-5, with Walbank II, 424-34. The structure of the two accounts is similar, but Polybius gives a fuller, and less muddled, account of the negotiations, partly because he does not obscure Scipio's breaking of the truce: see Tränkle, Livius und Polybios 230-1. Scipio plans to fire the Carthaginian camp, which has been described in morally causative terms as 'congesta temere ex agris materia exaedificata, linea ferme tota' (30.3.8: cf. 30.3.9-10).
found to be of the most morally-positive type. Nor does Scipio’s efficiency stop there:

Et inter crebra colloquia alii atque alii de industria quo pluribus omnia nota essent mittebantur. (30.4.3)

Both this fact and the deliberation behind it (‘de industria’) are omitted by Polybius, who is less concerned with Scipio’s honour than Livy and therefore does not need to play up the foresight and wisdom of his strategy in order to conceal its treachery.

Scipio sends Laelius with Masinissa to fire Syphax’s camp (5.4). In both Livy and Polybius he exhorts them not to fall prey to the dangers of a night attack, but while in the latter he is made to say that at night dianoia and tolme must compensate for lack of actual sight (14.4.3), in the former the focus is different, ‘quantum nox providentiae adimat tantum diligentia expleant curaque’ (30.5.5). The two accounts of the firing of first the camp of Syphax and then that of Hasdrubal correspond closely, though there is no record of casualties and booty in Polybius.

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31 In place of slaves (‘calonum loco’), but dressed to look like slaves (‘servili habitu’), are sent men chosen not for their cunning but for Roman courage, ‘primos ordines [i.e. senior centurions] spectatae virtutis atque prudentiae’ (30.4.1).

32 See Walbank II, nn. on 14.2.3, 13, with Livy 30.4.8-10, esp. ‘tollit indutias ut libera fide incepta exsequeretur’.

33 If he included one, it may have been at the end of 14.5 (see Walbank II, 14.5.10n.: Tränkle, Livius und Polybios 231-2). Livy’s record includes Scipio’s dedication of captured weapons to Vulcan (30.6.8-9).
At 30.7, Livy recounts Hasdrubal's flight to Carthage and the ensuing debate.\textsuperscript{34} A brief sentence in Polybius notes the adoption of one of three proposals, namely to communicate with Syphax and regroup (14.6.12), but Livy amplifies with authorial comment, as he begins to highlight the even match of the two sides to increase tension:

\begin{quote}
Tertia [sc. sententia] Romanae in adversis rebus constantiae erat; reparandum exercitum Syphacemque hortandum ne bello absisteret censebat. (30.7.6-7)
\end{quote}

This is enhanced by the detailed narration of the preparations of Syphax and Hasdrubal for further battle (30.7.8-13), which precedes a statement of Scipio's confidence:

\begin{quote}
Scipionem, velut iam debellato quod ad Syphacem Carthaginiensesque attineret, Uticae oppugnandae intentum iamque machinae admoventem muris avertit fama redintegrati belli. (30.8.1)
\end{quote}

Scipio swiftly changes tack, however, in reaction to the \textit{fama} (30.8.2), and sets off in pursuit of the enemy and open battle (30.8.3-4).\textsuperscript{35}

The reader has already had a hint of Roman success at 30.7.10, for the Carthaginians are seen to be reliant on 'Celtiberorum egregia iuventus', and this is confirmed by Livy's account of the disposition of forces, 'Celtiberos in mediam aciem adversus signa legionum' (30.8.6). He also explains away the stand made by the Celtiberians ('quod nec in fuga salus ulla...nec spes veniae ...obstinate moriebantur', 30.8.8): comparison with Polybius confirms Livy's reluctance

\textsuperscript{34}Cf. Polyb. 14.6.6-13, with Walbank II, 430-34.

to give them any credit for courage. Nor do Syphax and Hasdrubal emerge with honour, 'aliquantum ad fugam temporis Syphax et Hasdrubal praeciperunt', before the account of the battle ends with a vivid summary, 'Fatigatos caede diutius quam pugna victores nox oppressit' (30.8.9).

This victory is crucial to Livy's version of the end of the war: he explains it as directly responsible for the decision to recall Hannibal, and this brings to the fore once more that sense of dramatic irony so apparent in the early books of the decade. That Livy has made play of this is evident from comparison with the closely-parallel account given by Polybius: both record the same Carthaginian options, but in a different order and with different stress. Polybius begins, briefly with the akatastasia and tarakhē at Carthage: he then recounts first the proposals of the andrōdestatoi that the fleet should sail to raise the siege of Utica and that Hannibal should be recalled (14.9.7-8), and then that of tines that the city should prepare for siege and make efforts to secure peace (14.9.9-10). He states that all these proposals were adopted (14.9.1).

For Polybius' tarakhē, Livy offers ingens terror, amplified by an O.O. explanation of the Carthaginians' thoughts, 'circumferentem arma Scipionem omnibus finitimis

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36Cf. Polyb. 14.8.8-14, esp. 8.14, where the escape of Syphax and Hasdrubal is the result of their courageous epistasis.

37Polyb. 14.8.14 notes that Hasdrubal escaped to Carthage with the survivors, a point omitted by Livy, who want to imply that the flight was selfish and cowardly.

3830.9.1-9; cf. Polyb. 14.9.6-10.1.
raptim perdomitis ipsam Carthaginem repente adgressurum credebant’ (30.9.3). He then describes preparations for a siege, without suggesting that they were the result of debate:

Et muri reficiebantur propugnaculisque armabantur et pro se quisque quae diutinae obsidionis tolerandae sunt ex agris convehit. (30.9.4)

Livy’s Carthaginians take the siege for granted. Only then does debate take place, and here he at once dismisses the possibility of negotiations (‘Rara mentio est pacis’) before noting Polybius’ first two proposals in reverse order (‘Hannibal arcessendum; classem...mittere...ad Uticam’, 30.9.5-6). Instead of remarking that all the proposals found favour, he highlights the importance of Hannibal in Carthaginian thinking as he has (30.9.3) highlighted Scipio:

Censent...Carthaginem ipsam qui tueatur neque imperatorem alium quam Hannibalem neque exercitum alium quam Hannibalis superesse. (30.9.7-8)

Carthaginian bravery is again played up to increase tension (‘in quo...rebatur’, 30.9.9), before the narration of the sea-battle (10.1-21) with which they had hoped to take the Roman fleet by surprise (‘incaute’, 30.9.6). But Scipio is ready for them, the inadequacy of their efforts to take him unawares underlined by the order of narration: first Scipio’s preparations (30.10.1-8), then the reason for the enemy’s failure:39

Carthaginienses, qui si maturassent, omnia permixta turba trepidantium primo impetu oppressissent, perculsi terrestribus cladibus atque inde ne mari quidem ubi ipsi plus poterant satis fidentes, die segni navigatione absumpto sub occasum solis in portum...classem adpulere. (30.10.8-9)

39The extant fragment of Polybius’ version (14.10.2-12) ends with Scipio’s preparations.
They fail to capitalise on their own excellence at sea, which helps to compensate for the success of their tactics at 30.10.12-21: as Livy implies Roman moral superiority at the beginning of the battle, so he qualifies the enemy success at the end, 'maior quam pro re laetitia' (30.10.20).

This minor enemy victory is followed by a Roman success of greater importance (marked by authorial comment, 'Caedes... minor quam victoria fuit', 30.12.4): the defeat of Syphax by Laelius and Masinissa (30.11.1-12.2). It is presented as victory secured by the legiones after Syphax fails to press his cavalry advantage (30.11.8-11). The defeat itself leads into the story of Masinissa and Sophoniba, presented as a Herculean choice between virtue and pleasure. For Livy, however, the episode has additional importance as illustration of Scipio's brilliance in handling his subordinates: the familiarity of the theme that commanders, like soldiers, are weakened by liaisons with women establishes Masinissa's folly, and helps to maintain the focus of moral excellence on the Romans alone, and on Scipio in particular. The contrast is made explicit:

Et eo foediora haec videbantur Scipioni quod ipsum in Hispania iuvenem nullius forma pepulerat captivae. (30.14.3) 41

Masinissa is treated sympathetically by Livy: though Scipio fears what this ferox iuvenis (30.15.9) may do, the weakness of his character is tempered by the revelation of his struggle

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40 See 27.15.9-19 (praefectus); 29.23 (Syphax); 27.31-2 (Philip); 36.11 (Antiochus); 39.42-3 (Flamininus).

41 See 26.50.1-11.
to do his duty and keep his promise, however rashly made (30.15.1-6). Of course, he chooses the right side in the end, but Livy shapes his story to fit a pattern of moral explanation: he does better than his counterpart Syphax, who chose for the Carthaginians, but his **virtus** is still barbarian, and he is here firmly subordinated to the commander who transcends such ordinary temptations.\(^{42}\)

At the end of this episode, Livy records negotiations in such a way as to emphasise the impossibility of peace: Scipio’s declaration that ‘victoriam se non pacem domum reportaturum esse’ (30.16.8) is vindicated by authorial judgment on the negotiators, ‘nullas recusandas condiciones pacis... censuissent quippe qui moram temporis quaererent dum Hannibal in Africam traiceret’ (30.16.14). Livy picks up this reference to Hannibal at the moment of his receiving the summons to return home (30.19.12). It is a dramatic moment, marked as such by prophetic **O.R.**:

\[\textit{Vicit ergo Hannibalem non populus Romanus totiens caesus fugatusque sed senatus Carthaginiensis obtrectatione atque invidia.} (30.20.2)\]

Though Hannibal refers to the present moment, not to the future of which the reader is aware, the metaphor of conquest prefigures literal conquest at Zama.

Livy gives a brief but significant report of the tale of his slaughtering suppliants in the temple of Juno Lacinia,

\(^{42}\)As in Spain, so in Africa, Scipio uses judicious flattery to induce loyalty: he publicly praises Masinissa (30.15.11-13), and his praises yield immediate results (30.15.14).
'multis...foede interf ectis' (30.20.6). The early presentation of Hannibal combined his formidable qualities (which led to Carthaginian success) with defects (which pointed forward to book 30): so the story of the slaughter of suppliants does not only reinforce the second category, but also (because it is a failure of leadership skills and insight) reverses the first category. The final military failure is thus yet more powerfully prepared: the focus of the narrative is not on his crudelitas but on his folly, as he reproaches himself for throwing his opportunity of victory away, again as if Rome is already victorious:

Ferunt...Hannibalem...respexisse saepe Italiae litora, et deos hominesque accusan tem in se quoque ac suum ipsius caput exsecratum quod non cruentum ab Cannensi victoria militem Romam duxisset; Scipionem ire ad Carthaginem ausum qui consul hostem Poenum in Italia non vidisset: se, centum milibus armatorum ad Trasummenum ad Cannas caesis, circa Casilinum Cumasque et Nolam consensu isse. (30.20.7-9)

Again, the tone is prophetic: at last he acknowledges the justice of the criticism more than once (but most famously by Marcellus) made against him.44

It is important to Livy that this victory should be not merely military but also political: his account of the Senate’s negotiations with the Carthaginian envoys indicates that moral superiority is a general Roman characteristic,

43 Cf. 30.21.6-10, where the seniores at Rome warn that though Rome was saved from Hannibal by the gods, no-one was now giving them thanks (21.9): the whole Senate responds to this by putting Rome once more in the right with the gods by supplicatio and sacrifice.

44 At Rome the Senate also marks the clash of Hannibal and Scipio in Africa as the climax of the war, 'omni belli mole in unum exercitum ducemque inclinata' (30.21.2).
rather than the prerogative of Scipio, who of necessity figures largely in these final chapters of the decade. The debate, then, proves to be no place for contention between Romans: all are united in their response to the envoys, a point the inherent importance of which is amplified as each speaker picks up different aspects of the problem as set out at 30.16.1-15. The envoys’ case is made at 30.22.1-6, in the presence of C. Laelius, Scipio’s trusted subordinate: they argue that all Hannibal’s actions were without Carthaginian senatorial sanction, and thus that he, and not Carthage, is to blame for the war. It is hard to see Punica fraus in the actual youth of the envoys (‘omnes ferme iuvenes erant,’ 30.22.6): perhaps Livy intends to suggest it as showing that the Carthaginians did not take the negotiations seriously.

When the Senators begin to express their sententiae, a suggestion is made that the consuls should be present, as befitting the dignitas populi Romani in so crucial a matter (30.23.1-2). The first sententia proper, that of Q. Metellus, proposes that ‘nullius alterius consilio quam Scipionis accipiendam abnuendamve pacem esse’, which should recall Scipio’s decision to reject peace (30.23.4; cf. 16.8). Metellus raises the first suspicion of Punic motives, ‘qua mente ea pax peteretur,’ and the sententia of M. Valerius Laevinus develops it, ‘speculatores non legatos venisse arguebat’ (30.23.5). The final sententia amplifies this:

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45 See 30.21.11; but cf. 30.17.2.

46 On this claim, see Hoch, Die Darstellung der politischen Sendung Roms 75.
Laelius and Fulvius argue that the negotiations are intended to buy time for Carthage:

Omnia simulaturos Carthaginienses, duces eos exercitusque exspectantes; deinde quamvis recentium foederum et deorum omnium oblitos bellum gesturos.
(30.23.7)

This view is intended to recall 30.16.14-15: narrative technique proves the Carthaginians guilty of deception.

This account poses a historical problem. Livy’s version, in which the Senate rejects Carthage’s plea for peace, contradicts that of Polybius and others, in which the peace terms are accepted.\(^{47}\) It is unlikely that Livy was ignorant of this version (in which peace was made, but its terms quickly broken), and thus important to establish why he chooses not to follow it. The most probable reason is not historical confusion but narrative explanation: Livy succeeds in illustrating Punic bad faith and Roman foresight at the same time. Foresight is central to Scipio’s successes, and on the eve of final victory it is appropriate that such foresight should be extended to the Roman leadership domi as a whole.\(^{48}\)

He is thus also able to make the seizure of Cn. Octavius’s fleet a piece of treachery (30.24.6-25.10), in which the

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\(^{48}\)Its united action quells the foolish behaviour of the consul Servilius Caepio (30.24.1-3): cf. 30.27.2, where *aemulatio* is countered. For the problem of the African command in 202 B.C., see Butler and Scullard, *Commentary on Livy XXX* (London 1939) 113: Broughton, *MRR* I, 315.
majority ignores the warnings of the few, 'quidam pacis petita, alii indutiarum...fidem opponerent' (30.24.11).49

In his introduction to the final phase of the war (30.28), which in content resembles previous summaries of the action, Livy makes no mention of the excellence of milites Romani: the stress is all on the contrast of Scipio’s former enemies with the foe he must now face:

Locum nimirum non periculum mutatum; cuius tantae dimicationis vatem qui nuper decessisset Q. Fabium haud frustra canere solitum graviorem in sua terra futurum hostem Hannibalem quam in aliena fuisset. Nec Scipioni aut cum Syphace inconditae barbariae rege...aut cum...Hasdrubale fugacissimo duce rem futuram, aut <cum> tumultuariis exercitibus ex agrestium semiermi turba subito conlectis, sed cum Hannibale.... (30.28.2-3)

Hannibal’s achievements are cited with the full force of rhetoric, and with stress on the strength of his army. This passage brings the reader back to the threat depicted at the start of book 21 as it once more becomes appropriate for the sake of dramatic tension, that the Carthaginians should appear capable of overcoming Roman forces:

...[sed cum Hannibale] prope nato in praetorio patris fortissimi ducis, alto atque educato inter arma, puero quondam milite, vixdum iuvene imperatore, qui senex vincendo factus Hispanias Gallias Italiam ab Alpibus ad fretum monumentis ingenti rerum complessset. Ducere exercitum aequalem stipendiis suis, duratum omnium rerum patientia quas vix fides fiat homines passos, perfusum miliens cruore Romano, exuvias non militum tantum sed etiam imperatorum portantem. Multos occursuros Scipioni in acie qui praetores, qui

49This point is stressed by reiteration in Scipio’s thoughts (30.25.1-2): he behaves with conspicuous moral superiority to the enemy’s treachery (30.25.10). The moral division of sides is underlined by the contrast of Hannibal’s omen (30.25.11-12) with Scipio’s (29.27.12). The death of Fabius is also recorded, with an elogium of his achievements (30.26.7-9).

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imperatores, qui consules Romanos sua manu occidissent, muralibus vallaribusque insignes coronis, pervagatos capta castra captas urbes Romanas. Non esse hodie tot fasces magistratibus populi Romani quot captos ex caede imperatorum prae se ferre posset Hannibal. (30.28.4-7)

In the second half of this chapter, Livy focusses on the 'supremum certamen' between Hannibal and Scipio (30.28.8); but the passage which began with Roman anxiety ends with Carthaginian fear, '[Scipionem] velut fatalem...ducem in exitium suum natum horrebant' (30.28.11). Tension and reassurance are effectively combined before the narrative resumes: but the stress is on fulfilment of expectation of Roman victory.

(b) the battle of Zama (202 B.C., 30.29.1-35.11)

Hoffmann gives a detailed and useful discussion of the introduction to the parley and to the parley itself, noting variants between Polybius's and Livy's versions. So it is possible to omit discussion of this section of narrative as a whole, and instead to focus on a few points of particular

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50 A description which parallels Scipio with Camillus ('fatalis dux ad excidium illius urbis', 5.19.2). As Livy recalled his earlier depiction of Hannibal (30.28.4; cf. 21.1-3), so here the naming of Scipio as 'fatalis dux' recalls 22.53.6 ('fatalis dux huiusce belli'; cf. 21.46.8).


52 In Livius 93-102: see also Burck, 'Einzelinterpretation von Reden' in Wege zu Livius, 440-52 (in part a response to Hoffmann).
interest. The incident of the three spies sent by Hannibal, whom Scipio has shown around the Roman camp and then escorted back to Hannibal, is reported by both historians: Livy, however, gives details not found in Polybius, well-integrated with his overall narrative strategy, which may derive from Coelius. According to him the spies both see and report the arrival of Masinissa, which in Polybius takes place after their departure (15.5.12): this helps to justify the reaction of Hannibal to his _speculatores'_ report, a reaction noted only by Livy, 'Hannibal nihil quidem eorum quae nuntiabantur... laeto animo audivit' (30.29.4).

In Polybius, moreover, Hannibal's request for a conference is prompted by his admiration of Scipio's _megalopsuchia_ and _tolmé_ (15.5.8), while in Livy, his reasons are more negative: he acts first from fear, and is seeking _pax_, not indulging in admiration (30.29.5-6).\(^{53}\) This stress on fear and the consequent need to negotiate allows Livy to undermine what Hannibal subsequently says, making his admission of guilt (30.30.2) appear to be prompted by circumstance, and thus undercutting its immediate validity at the same time as its ultimate truth is acknowledged by the reader. Both give the same account of the positions occupied by each side, but Livy omits Polybius' detail that lack of water proved a disadvantage to Hannibal's men (30.29.9-10;

\(^{53}\)Livy also notes a further variant in Antias, 30.29.7. Hoffmann remarks, 'Man ist leicht geneigt, dieser hier berichtete Anekdote als geschichtlich unwesentlich oder gar als billige Erfindung zu verwerfen': _Livius_ 94.
Polyb. 15.5.14-6.2). It is no time to be playing down enemy strength.

Hoffmann is surely right that the initial section of Hannibal’s speech is more than a simple captatio benevolentiae:

Doch eine solche formale Erklärung genügt nicht... [Hannibal] bringt zum Ausdruck, war für einzigartige Männer hier voneinander standen, und steigert... Scipios Bedeutung, dem es beschieden sei, diesen Krieg siegreich zu beenden und ihn, einen Hannibal, zu besiegen. Von vornherein hat dadurch die Unterredung eine Wendung auf Scipio hin erhalten, die ursprünglich kaum in Andeutung da war. (98-99) 54

It does focus what follows on the person of Scipio, but it should also be noted that even if his admission of guilt is, for him, merely part of a captatio, in terms of narrative explanation it gives independent proof of Roman rectitude: it both justifies Scipio, and aligns the actions of the Roman people with a destiny of conquest (‘si hoc ita fato datum erat’, 30.30.2). It has received narrative corroboration from the independent judgment expressed at 30.29.5, ‘ipse causa belli erat’: the character of Hannibal is crucial, as Livy attributes to this factor alone the responsibility for the war. The form of the admission (the protasis of a conditional) marks a gap between what the reader knows to be true (that fate has forced the aggressor to sue for peace) and what Hannibal is actually prepared to admit: the conditional

54 This pair of speeches has also been briefly but perceptively discussed within a wider historiographical context by N.P. Miller, ‘Dramatic speech in the Roman historians’, GR 22 (1975) 52-4: she includes a table comparing the subject-matter and order of themes in Polybius and Livy (Table I). In presentation as well as content, the bias of rectitude is with Scipio, whose speech comes second and is characterised by brevitas and a lack of rhetorical flourishes.
suggests that for him the question of seeking peace is still open, while narrative explanation, through dramatic irony and historical hindsight, reminds the reader that the ultimate issue is not in doubt. The sensitivity of Livy’s approach is impressive: his depiction of Hannibal manages at the same time to include admission of responsibility and to exclude, through narrative technique, any blame of Scipio for rejecting peace terms.  

Emphasis on an equal match on the eve of battle is combined with the exhortations of both leaders, Hannibal acknowledging the bravery of individual *milites*, Scipio concentrating upon his admission of guilt:

Procedunt...duorum opulentissimorum populorum duo longe clarissimi duces, duo fortissimi exercitus.... Poenus sedecim annorum in terra Italia res gestas, tot duces Romanos, tot exercitus occidione occisos et sua cuique decora *ubi ad insignem alicuius pugnae memoria militem venerat referebat*: Scipio Hispanias et recentia in Africa proelia et confessionem hostium quod neque non petere pacem propter metum neque manere in ea praemexit animis perfidia potuissent. (30.32.6-7)  

While the *confessio* of Hannibal is fresh in the reader’s mind, courageous deeds on the part of Carthaginian soldiers are not. Livy chooses, moreover, to highlight once more Scipio’s use of deception to control the minds of his soldiers by misrepresenting what had been said at the parley (30.32.8), and describes his noble stance, ‘celsus haec corpore voltuque

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55 Hoffmann is inclined to see the arguments of Livy’s Scipio as reflecting a kernel of historical truth, ‘Zum mindesten in der Scipiorede mögen noch Gedanken enthalten sein, die damals wirklich ausgesprochen wurden’, *Livius* 96.

56 Livy is here summarising, with a different slant, the two pre-battle speeches reported by Polybius (15.10.2-11.12).
ita laeto ut vicisse iam crederes dicebat' (30.32.11): neither point is mentioned by Polybius. There is no correspondingly impressive vignette of Hannibal.

When Livy describes the arrangement of forces for both sides at 30.33, the basic content of his narrative is the same as Polybius', but with significant differences which clarify the moral explanation. In Polybius, the arrangement of forces follows at once from the parley, each general then making a speech of encouragement: 57 his preamble to this takes the form of an address to the reader (15.9.3-5) which corresponds to Livy’s independent report of the men’s feelings, and to the words of Hannibal discussed above (30.32.1-6). Livy uses this report to lead in to Scipio’s speech of encouragement, which is therefore placed before the account of his disposition of forces (32.7-11; 32.11-33.3). Polybius notes, as Livy does, Scipio’s strategy for dealing with the elephants (30.33.3; cf. Polyb. 15.9.9-10), but only Livy marks the corresponding passage in Hannibal’s disposition of forces to suggest moral causation (in that Hannibal is unaware of Scipio’s foresight) ‘ad terrorem primos elephantos...instruxit’ (30.33.4; Polyb. 15.11.1). 58 As for the content of the forces, Livy takes Polybius’ tous ex Italias (15.11.2) to mean native Italians, ‘Brutii plerique erant, vi ac necessitate plures quam sua voluntate decedentem ex Italia secuti’ (30.33.6): it could be simple confusion, but

57Arrangement of forces, 15.9.6-10; 11.1-3: speeches, 15.10.1-7; 11.4-12.

58Polyb. 15.12.4 notes Scipio’s pronoia only at the point when it pays off, a less effective procedure.
vi ac necessitate also helps to suggest the definition of moral categories.59

Polybius leads straight from the position of the cavalry into Hannibal’s order for each mercenary commander to address his own contingent (15.11.3-4). It is possible that Livy uses an intermediate source for his description of Hannibal’s army at 33.8-12, but the accounts in other respects match up so exactly (30.33.12 corresponding to 15.11.4) that it is likely this passage gives his own moral interpretation:

Varia adhortatio erat in exercitu inter tot homines quibus non lingua, non mos, non lex, non arma, non vestitus habitusque, non causa militandi eadem esset. Auxiliaribus et praesens et multiplicata ex praeda merces ostentatur: Galli proprio atque insito in Romanos odio accenduntur: Liguribus campi uberes Italiae...in spem victoriae ostentatur: Mauros Numidasque Masinissae impotenti futuro dominatu terret: aliis aliae spes ac metus lactantur. Carthaginensibus moenia patriae, di penates, sepulcrum maiorum, liberi cum parentibus coniugesque pavidae, aut excidium servitiumque aut imperium orbis terrarum, nihil aut in metum aut in spem medium, ostentatur. (30.33.8-11)

Polybius’ remark at 15.11.4 is amplified: if different speeches were given, the reason was the variety of languages spoken by those fighting for the Carthaginians. This triggers a rhetorical tour de force illustrating the disparate nature of their forces, followed by a summarising sentence explaining the one unifying factor – praedae. The repetition, three times, of ostenta[n]tur is emphatic; the motivations of allied contingents pass from hatred, to gain, to fear, all three being summarised in the depiction of the Carthaginians.

59See Walbank II, 457-8.
Livy modifies Polybius again when he describes the start of the battle: in the latter, the fight begins after all is ready on both sides (15.12.1), while the former’s account suggests that the Roman attack took the Carthaginians by surprise (30.33.12-13). Where Polybius quotes Homer to illustrate the Punic battle-cry, Livy uses forceful antithesis to draw his contrast without impeding the flow of the narrative. In doing so, he also makes the point of 33.8-11 clear, bringing out the disunity of the enemy action:

Dictu parva sed magna eadem in re gerenda momenta: congruens clamor ab Romanis eoque maior et terribilior, dissonae illis, ut gentium multarum discrepantibus linguis, voces; pugna Romana stabilis et suo et armorum pondere incumbentium in hostem, concursatio et velocitas illinc maior quam vis. (30.34.1-2)

The conceptual shift from disparate languages to disorganised fighting capacity is not explained, but assumed.

In the whole of Livy’s account of the battle (30.33.13-35.3), there is not one mention of Hannibal: for that matter there is only one mention of Scipio (30.34.11). Nor are there any anecdotes of bravery by Roman soldiers. As a victory, Zama requires no moral superiority markers in the way that Rome’s defeats did. Livy’s account corresponds closely with

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60 ‘Pugna...vis’: Polybius’ reference to the initial advantage gained by the eukhereia and tolmê of the Carthaginian mercenaries (15.13.1) is dropped by Livy, who mentions only the [subsequent] advantage won by Roman suntaxis and kathoplismos.

61 Cf. Polyb. 15.13.9.

62 So Caesar’s account of Alesia (BG 7.80.88) has no anecdotes of bravery (cf., e.g., Camillus’ victory over the Gauls in Livy, 5.49.3-6). A morally-ambiguous battle like Pharsalus does need, and receive, narrative assistance from anecdotes of bravery.
Polybius from 30.34.3-35.3, though he does not suggest that in the *novum proelium* (30.34.12) the issue was ever in doubt. After the record of casualty figures, he records Hannibal’s flight (30.35.3-4). Only now is he given any credit for his management of the battle, the *ultimum virtutis opus* (30.35.5-11). Of course, Livy can afford to be generous after Roman victory, but he does not go as far as Polybius, who claims that Hannibal must be pardoned for his failure because he had taken all the right measures for success. The victory over Hannibal belongs to Scipio and Rome, as much as to Fortune: the stress on the equal balance of the two sides (30.34.12) may be part of the reason for the lack of anecdotes of Roman *virtus*, as well as making possible the final conclusion that Scipio is the better general, leader of a superior army, of a superior nation.

**CHARACTERISATION AND HANNIBAL**

Narrative explanation, then, both of the prelude to battle and of the battle itself, is relatively straightforward. In one sense, despite the flexibility with which he is depicted, the same can be said of the characterisation of Hannibal and its relationship with narrative explanation (especially at the end of the decade). After all, many of the themes and ideas tied up in the figure of the Carthaginian leader are brought to an end with the end of the war, and provide a satisfying closural force for the

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64 *Suggnômë́n doteon*, 15.16.5.
narrative, a sense of unity to the decade. Such flexibility of characterisation is evident at 29.7.6, when he is outwitted by his enemy after being made to look foolish, ‘Progressus ad murum scorpione icto qui proximus eum forte steterat, territus inde tam periculo casu receptui canere cum iussisset, castra procul ab ictu teli communit’. In the earlier context of his successes in battle, moving his camp out of range could have showed his wisdom as a commander, his mastery of strategy; but here he moves away because of fear for his own safety.

Similar flexibility, however, is to be found in the portrayal of Romans: Livy remarks of the audax iter proposed by Claudius that no-one was sure whether to blame or praise it, and concludes that ‘apparebat, quo nihil iniquius est, ex eventu famam habiturum’. Had Claudius failed, he would probably have been added to the list of generals characterised by temeritas, but since he succeeds, and so spectacularly, his temeritas is transformed into audacia, a more favourable characteristic.

Livy claims to take the opportunity provided by a lack of hostilities in 206 B.C. to make a general assessment of Hannibal’s character and role as a man mirabilis both in bad

65 In contrast, the characterisation of Scipio, which interacts with themes and ideas extending beyond the close of the war, helps to maintain the onward momentum of the narrative and the reader’s attention. The ambiguities of his portrayal, therefore, which are discussed below, are not resolved within the third decade.

66 27.44.2: an ironic conclusion from one whose method of moral explanation rests on precisely that thesis.

67 Cf. the character sketch given at Claudius’ election (27.34.2). On audacia, see Moore, Artistry and ideology 19-23.
and good fortune. From book 23 on, he has been depicted in relatively unfavourable terms, his thoughts no longer reflecting a true state of affairs, his behaviour dictated by his soldiers' wishes and alienating his allies: the previous chapter repeatedly drew attention to examples of such shifts in his characterisation, and linked them to the idea of a relationship between perceived success and moral excellence; all of which may perhaps imply that characterisation is in itself a simple and straightforward matter in Livy.

This is surely not the case. But what makes characterisation complicated is not the depiction of idiosyncratic, unique, personality-type features in Hannibal, or, for that matter, in the other protagonists. It has already been argued in the Introduction that typicality, rather than uniqueness, is the norm in Roman historiography. Complexity in characterisation, of Hannibal, Scipio, Fabius and others, centres upon Livy's perception of the interrelation of particular goals and consequences, both short- and long-term. To understand Livy's characterisation of Hannibal, as has been said before, it is necessary to look at the results of his actions, and their long-term

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68 At 28.19.1-9: Burck remarks that the inclusion of this passage, which is found in the sources, 'wirkt als eine Art "poetischer Gerechtigkeit" nach dem Untergange Hasdrubals und vor dem großen Endsiege Scipios in Spanien': Einführung 134.

69 On alienation of allies, see above on Syracuse and Capua; cf., e.g., Tarentum (24.20.9-10).

70 Even, according to Gill, where the depiction of people appears to approach a notion of personality rather than character, as in Tacitus: 'The question of character-development: Plutarch and Tacitus', CQ 33 (1983) 469-87.
consequences for Rome. One (very) long-term consequence of his failure is the third Punic war, from which resulted the removal of 'metus hostilis', according to Sallust. Livy espoused the theory of 'metus hostilis' and he admired Sallust: perhaps there is more to the favourable aspects of Hannibal, and to the modelling of his character upon Sallust’s Catiline, than meets the eye. Other goals, however, can play their part in shaping characterisation:

Ac nescio an mirabilior adversis quam secundis rebus fuerit, quippe qui cum in hostium terra per annos tredecim, tam procul ab domo, varia fortuna bellum geret, exercitu non suo civili sed mixto ex conluvione omnium gentium, quibus non lex, non mos, non lingua communis, alius habitus, alia vestis, alia arma, alii ritus, alia sacra, alii prope di essent, ita quodam uno vinculo copulaverit eos ut nulla nec inter ipsos nec adversus ducem seditio extiterit, cum et pecunia saepe in stipendium et commeatus in hostium agro deesset, quorum inopia priore Punico bello multa infanda inter duces militesque commissa fuerant. (28.12.2-5)

The rhetorical force of the passage is obvious, but it is also revealing in terms of narrative strategy: Livy reminds us, at a point in the war at which Hannibal is looking inferior and unimpressive, of his greatness as a general. Moreover, he chooses to do so by noting his ability to unite his disparate forces. This confirms the reader’s impression of the inferiority of Carthaginian milites at the same time as it evokes the topos so familiar (and so recently highlighted by Claudius) of the dependence of success in battle on great

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71See G.M. Paul, Comm. Sall. BJ 124-5.
72See, e.g., 2.39.7, ‘Quae [sc. discordia inter patres plebemque] profecto orta esset...sed externus timor, maximum concordiae vinculum, quamvis suspectos infensosque inter se iungebat animos’.
leadership. Hannibal’s undiminished skill in this respect, reinforced by the contrast with the first Punic War, confirms Livy’s claim that he still poses a great threat despite the dearth of military operations.

The focussing of the assessment on the problem of potential seditio is also illuminating: it it suggestively placed just before the mutiny of Scipio’s men at Sucro (28.24-29). To have praise of Hannibal’s generalship focus on this characteristic conveys a moral warning on a different level from any yet encountered: in order to keep the pace and tension of the narrative going, Livy substitutes moral excellence where military is lacking, just as he did for the Romans in 21-2. The Carthaginians are still not permitted to appear superior, but they can thus continue to provide enough of a threat to make Scipio’s victories worth winning. In this respect, Livy is more adroit than Caesar, who never convincingly makes the Gauls out (or even the Germans) to be so great a threat to Roman imperium as to necessitate the action taken against them.

Polybius had earlier given a similarly complex character-sketch, but his centred on the difficulty of judging how far Hannibal was influenced by friends and affected by circumstances. For example, ‘Punica crudelitas’ becomes a question of whether Hannibal was cruel through necessity of

73 Polyb. 9.22-26, with Walbank II, 150-55 (and cf. above on 21.4). Walbank notes (II, 295) that he gives another such sketch (this time of Hannibal’s generalship), at a point (206 B.C.) which corresponds with Livy’s placing of this summary at 28.12. On the difficulty of assessing character because of influence of friends, see 9.22.10: on the relation of influence and circumstance on judging character, see 9.26.1.
circumstance or whether he was persuaded into behaving cruelly by his advisers (9.24.5-8). Polybius' criteria, therefore, are explicit, which is not the case for Livy's characterisation. Another instructive contrast is offered by Nepos. Not for him the subtleties of Livy: his version of Hannibal's character is much simpler, and so is his method of narrating it. While it may be true that his chosen form, the lives of great foreign generals, does not demand intricacies of character-portrayal, the parallel is nonetheless instructive, for it offers a Roman conception of Hannibal's character close in time to Livy, but independent of him. For Nepos as for Livy, Hannibal is Rome's greatest foe:

Si verum est, quod nemo dubitat, ut populus Romanus omnes gentes virtute superarit, non est infinitandum Hannibalem tanto praestississe ceteros imperatores prudentia quanto populus Romanus antecedat fortitudine cunctas nationes. Nam quotiensemcumque cum eo congressus est in Italia, semper discessit superior. Quod nisi domui civium suorum invidia debilitatus esset, Romanos videtur superare potuisse. Sed multorum obtrectatio devicit unius virtutem. (Nepos, Hann. 1.1-2)

Nepos includes the inheritance of hatred from Hamilcar (1.3), and the crossing of the Alps (3.4): the defeats of P. Scipio, Sempronius, Flaminius and Centenius follow in rapid succession. Fabius Maximus is duped (5.1-3), Marcellus

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74 On Nepos' portrait of Hannibal, see Burck, Einführung 135
75 Livy records Hannibal's loss of an eye before Trasimene (22.2.13), as does Polybius (3.79.12), but Nepos' version suggests that the victory over Flaminius was yet more impressive because of it, 'adeo gravi morbo adficitur oculorum, ut postea numquam dextra aequo bene usus sit. Qua valetudine cum etiam tum premeretur lecticaque ferretur, C. Flaminium consulem apud Trasumenum...occidit...' (4.2). Cf. Plut. Sert. 1.4-5: Juv. Sat. 10.157.
lured into an ambush and killed (5.3), and Hannibal’s return to Carthage does not diminish his eagerness to fight (6.1-2). This swift catalogue of success is no doubt appropriate in such a context, but it leaves the reader with a puzzle: Nepos has shifted the question of why Hannibal loses away from any link with his character, and attributed it to an external cause, ‘apud Zamam cum [Scipione] conflixit; pulsus - incredibile dictu - ...Hadrumetum pervenit’ (6.3). Livy’s account, in contrast, began the narrative explanation of defeat with the very start of the war. His Hannibal is not always unambiguously excellent: and so his version of the outcome at Zama is not only comprehensible but also necessary.

AMBIGUITY AND THE CHARACTERISATION OF SCIPIO
(a) The fall of New Carthage (211 B.C.; 26.17.1-51.4)  
The tracing of Scipio’s characterisation does not begin and end with the beginning and end of a compositional unit. Nor are the issues raised by his charismatic command and handling of his supporters resolved by the end of the war; or even, for that matter, by the end of his life. The fact that Livy takes such pains to reassure the reader about Scipio’s conduct at the end of the war (as was shown above) is some indicator of the degree of unease attaching to his actions and character in the earlier narrative. He recalls, for example,

76 The ‘multorum obtrectatio’ noted at the beginning.

77 See Walbank II, 191-192: on Scipio’s strategy in Spain, see A.M. Eckstein, Senate and general: individual decision-making and Roman foreign relations, 264-194 B.C. (Berkeley and Los Angeles 1987), 210-14.
Pompey in his youthful military exploits, Caesar in his charismatic command. When he is first given prominence in the narrative (on his election to a proconsulship at the age of twenty-four), Livy insures against this election weakening justification of the Roman position by the form of the preceding narrative: but unease about the character and role of Scipio himself is not so easily compensated. In that preceding narrative, an instance of *Punica fraus* in Spain (26.17.15) leads into a debate at Rome on how to deal with that country (now a priority after the recovery of Capua):

Nec tam quem mitterent satis constabat quam illud, ubi duo summi imperatores...cecidissent, qui in locum duorum succederet extraordinaria cura deligendum esse. (26.18.3)

The election then announced, in which no candidature is offered, is used to indicate the magnitude of Rome’s difficulties (26.18.4-5). Only after the city has been shown to be nonplussed does Livy bring forward Scipio:

Maesta...civitas prope inops consilii...tamen in campum descendit;...circumspectant ora principum aliorum alios intuentium fremuntque adeo perditas res desperatumque de re publica esse ut nemo adeat in Hispanicam imperium accipere, cum subito P. Cornelius <Publi filius eius>...quattuor et viginti ferme annos natus, professus se petere, in superiore unde conspici posset loco constitit. (26.18.6-7)

He is acclaimed at once, and everyone votes in his favour.

Initial enthusiasm followed by doubts of his ability, because

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78 An unease which can perhaps be traced back as far as 25.2.6 (212 B.C.) when he was elected curule aedile, also before the usual age, and answered tribunician criticism with an O.R. speech, 'si me...omnes Quirites aedilem facere volunt, satis annorum habeo'. Livy chose to make him say this, and with the prominence of direct speech to evoke the precedents of Pompey and Octavian.

of both his youth and the fortuna of his domus, are swiftly
delineated and summarised, 'nonne favor plus valuiisset quam
ratio' (26.18.10). Scipio, however, shows himself master of
the situation, and his contio (in 0.0.), as well as using
skilful argument, receives authorial approval, 'impleret
hominis certioris spei quam quantam fides promissi humani aut
ratio ex fiducia rerum subicere solet' (26.19.2). Picking up
the positive nature of Scipio's persuasion, Hoffmann remarks,
'Mit dem ganzen Zauber seines Wesens weiß Scipio die Zuhörer
mit sich fortzureißen und ihnen ein Gefühl des Vertrauens zu
geben:' 80 his manipulation of the people is careful and
reasoned, not the self-seeking demagogy of a popularis.

The passage in which Livy explains the source of this
'Zauber des Wesens', namely Scipio's manipulation of the
divine, is not easy to assess. 81 He depicts it in morally-
positive terms, 'Fuit enim Scipio non veris tantum virtutibus
mirabilis, sed arte quoque quadam...in ostentationem earum
compositus' (26.19.3): i.e. his verae virtutes come before his
ostentatio earum, he makes a conscious display of genuine
qualities. The anecdotes of his divinity which follow are
intended to supplement this view. The historical origin of
the Scipio legend has been investigated by Walbank: 82 here it
is necessary to determine the moral value of Scipio's actions

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80 See Livius 64-65; cf. 80-3 ('Die Einnahme
Neukarthagos').

81 Cf. Polyb. 10.2-5, with Walbank II, 196-7.

82 In 'The Scipionic legend' PCPS 193 (1967) 54-69: Walbank
stresses the sceptical aspects of Livy's account. Cf.
Hoffmann, Livius 78-79.
as Livy describes them. For, characteristically, he raises
the question of divine powers without making clear his own
view of the matter. At first, the phrase ‘arte in
ostentationem earum compositus’ seems to deny Scipio’s own
belief in the ensuing examples, but the sive...sive clause
tends to negate this: again Livy is careful not to commit
himself to any ascription of policy on Scipio’s part in the
matter of visits to the Capitol, ‘seu consulto seu temere
volgatae opinioni fidem apud quosdam fecit...’ (26.19.6). And
though he notes that Scipio himself was careful neither to
affirm nor to deny the tales (26.19.8), he does confirm that
some of the miracula were stratagems, and that there was a
causal connection between them and his election to a command:

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Multa [sc. miracula]...alia vera, alia adsimulata,
admirationis humanae in eo iuvene exesseratmodum;
quibus freta tunc civitas aetati haudquaquam maturae
tantam rerum molem tantunque imperium permisit.
(26.19.9)
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Manipulation of the divine can be favourable when, as here,
its perceived result is good.\footnote{Cf. 1.16.5-8 (speech of Proculus); 21.3 (Numa).} Scipio’s ultimate
justification is his success in the following chapters.\footnote{See Levene, 24-5, 83-5.}

26.19-20 is a passage closely equivalent in narrative
function to the summaries of Hannibal’s character: but in this
case, the character of Scipio is revealed through his actions
rather than in absolute terms. 26.19.1-9 showed his control
over populus Romanus; 26.19.12-14 illustrates his skill in
handling Rome’s allies, showing both maiestas and fides. In
26.20.1-2 he addresses the army with similar skill, and proves
his wisdom in handling subordinates (26.20.2-3): the difficult case of how to treat Marcius (a matter for debate at the start of the book) is thus reassuringly resolved. Lastly, Livy depicts the reaction of the enemy (26.20.5), again providing narrative reassurance.85

When Scipio assembles his forces at the mouth of the Ebro, he holds a contio, reported in Q.R. (26.41.3-25). The placing of this speech within the pentad may be intended to recall the speech of an earlier P. Scipio, at 21.40, but this Scipio makes no comparable errors in his handling of the men. His youth and popularity are both grounds for concern, but the reader is quickly reassured on both counts. So he begins with acknowledgement of the men’s services, their pietas and virtus (26.40.3-5):86 then he states his aim of recapturing Spain (26.40.6). He then imagines an objection to his fitness for the task on grounds of youth, and responds by implying that

85 The speech of Manlius refusing the consulship is a positive sign (26.22), though three chapters earlier, reluctance for office indicated desperation. Livy comments with vehemence, ‘Eludant nunc antiqua mirantes: non equidem, si qua sit sapientium civitas quam docti fingunt magis quam norunt, aut principes graviiores temperantiioresque a cupidine imperii aut multitudinem melius moratam censeam fieri posse’ (26.22.14). The key to Roman success is stated in terms reminiscent of the Preface: the contribution of the plebs is negative (it must be controlled and checked), but that of the leaders (‘per quos viros...’) active and positive. He follows up this comment, again recalling the Preface, with the contrast of modern times (26.22.15). In the context of conquest of Carthage, there is perhaps an echo here of Sall. BC 10.1-3, ‘Sed ubi...Carthago aemula imperi Romani ab stirpe interiit...primo pecuniae, deinde imperi cupidio crevit’, which confirms that his account of the second Punic war looks forward to Rome’s problems in the second century.

86 Pietas being especially appropriate in underlining the need for soldierly loyalty, and helping to dissociate his words from the taint of flattery.
his own motivation is the desire for *ultio* (26.40.8-9).\(^{87}\)

*Ultio* is not easy to assess as a justifiable motivating factor: it is certainly preferable to *praeda*, perhaps also to *gloria*, but the distribution shows up Scipio’s stress on *ultio* as unusual, and perhaps ‘popular’ in the Caesarean mould.\(^{88}\)

The speech grows into a reflection on the whole war, when he claims that ‘*Ea fato quodam data nobis est ut magnis omnibus bellis victi vicerimus*’ (26.40.9): using *praeteritio* to cite famous *exempla* of his thesis, he summarises in elevated language the course of the war so far (26.40.11-.12). The conclusion is a statement of Roman moral superiority, ‘*In hac ruina rerum stetit una integra atque immobiles virtus populi Romani; haec omnia strata humi erexit ac sustulit*’. Wiser than his father, Scipio cites only the advantages of Rome’s position, and makes no mention of the Carthaginian victory at sea (26.39.23; cf. 21.41.14-16). The final section of the speech (40.18-25) further underlines his clever handling of the men, through the readiness to present himself as divinely guided which Livy has earlier described:

\begin{quote}
Nunc di immortales imperii Romani praesides qui ...
\end{quote}

87 He is careful not to state it, because it is a private grievance as well as a public loss: only inferior commanders are motivated by personal factors before *Res Publica*.

88 E.g., 28.19.8 (Scipio in *Q.Q.*), ‘*nefandam commilitonum necem et in semet ipsos...instructam fraudem ulciscerentur*’. *Ultio*: 28.39.13; 23.25.4. *Ulciscor*: 24.26.12; 28.19.8; 29.6.7, 18.18, 27.4. Suet. *DJ* 67 offers a suggestive parallel, attributing to Caesar both the popular form of address to soldiers (*commilitones*) and determination to avenge comrades (there *vindico*, rather than *ulciscor*).
quoque meus, maximus mihi...vates, praesagit nostram Hispaniam esse. (26.41.18-19)

The immediate result of the speech is favourable, 'Hac oratione accensis militum animis' (26.42.1).

Further affirmation of his ability comes with a second speech, at 26.43.3-8 (part of which is lost). He informs the milites of his objectives in besieging New Carthage, and in doing so, reiterates exactly the advantages of its capture which Livy independently narrated in 26.42.3-4. The coincidence of narrative and speech gives objective corroboration of the wisdom of his plan. Not only his plans but also his actions are admirable, a point reinforced by use of the historic present:

Hortatur imperat quae in rem sunt, quodque plurimum ad accendendos militum animos intererat, testis spectatorque virtutis atque ignaviae cuiusque adest. (26.44.7-8)

As the assault intensifies, Livy mentions once more Scipio’s manipulation of his supposedly divine inspiration, again implying that it was consciously done:

Hoc cura ac ratione compertum in prodigium ac deos vertens Scipio qui ad transitum Romanis mare verterent...viasque ante nunquam initias humano vestigio aperirent, Neptunum iubebat ducem itineris sequi. (26.45.9)

The final victory is matter-of-factly described; the focus on his firm control of the milites suggests Livy’s approval, 'Quoad dedita arx est, caedes tota urbe passim factae...tum

See Burck, Einführung 127.

Hoffmann emphasises the element of pretence in Scipio’s action, 'Er deutet also, anscheinend spontan aus der Situation heraus, seinen Soldaten diese Erscheinung, deren Herkunft er genau kennt, als ein sichtbares Eingreifen Neptuns', Livius 82-3.
signo dato caedibus finis factus, ad praedam victores versi’ (46.10). Scipio shows himself no less able a commander in victory, as Livy makes clear by a familiar means (26.48.1).91

The capture of New Carthage is recounted without Roman exempla virtutis. But when Scipio attributes success to di immortales (this time in 0.0.), thanks the men for their efforts, and asks who has won the corona muralis (26.48.5), a dispute arises between a centurio and a socius navalis, each strongly supported by his comrades (26.48.6). The rivalry is described in strong terms, ‘Ea contentio cum prope seditiunem veniret...’ (26.48.8), and the praefectus classis Laelius warns Scipio of the dangerous situation brewing:

Rem sine modo ac modestia agi ac prope esse ut manus inter se conferant...nihilo minus detestabili exemplo rem agi quippe ubi fraude ac periurio decus petatur virtutis. Stare hinc legionarios milites, hinc classicos, per omnes deos paratos iurare magis quae velint quam quae sciant esse vera et obstringere periurio non se solum...sed signa militaria et aquilas sacramentique religionem. (26.48.11-12)

Scipio’s prompt action in ordering the honours to be shared (48.13-14) shows him to be fully in control:92 and their rivalry, though potentially dangerous, is at least favourable in its motivation (virtus and the desire for dignitas). Livy has a further narrative purpose here, to which the description

91See also 26.51.3; 28.14.7 (with Polyb. 11.22.1-4, Walbank II, 296-304).

92Note also that he acknowledges fully the role of Laelius (‘sibimet ipsi aequavit’) thus doing his best to avoid rivalry (26.48.14; cf. 51.1).
of the rivalry as *seditio* gives the clue: he uses it to prepare the reader for a real mutiny in book 28 (28.24-29).  

(b) Mutiny at Sucro (206 B.C., 28.24.1-29.12)  

The story of the mutiny is a clear sign of the unease attaching to Scipio, made less surprising by an earlier indicator of ambiguity. In 27.17-18, Livy took great pains to show Roman actions in a positive light, and up to this point, his version corresponded closely with Polybius': but the two diverge in their accounts of the Spaniards hailing Scipio king. Livy simplifies the stages by which this takes place in Polybius, with first the leaders (Edeco [=Edesco] and Andobales [=Indibilis], 10.40.3) then the men (10.40.4) saluting Scipio:

> Multitudo Hispanorum...regem eum ingenti consensu appellavit. Tum Scipio silentio per praecorum facto sibi maximum nomen imperatoris esse dixit quo se

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93 Another encouraging marker, wise treatment of the vanquished (‘bonum animum habere iussit: venisse enim eos in populi Romani potestatem, qui beneficio quam metu obligare homines malit, 26.49.8), is proven by two anecdotes. First a promise to an old woman, 26.49.14): and then a speech to Allucius, lover of a young and beautiful woman, 26.50.7; cf. 26.50.13-4). This strategic treatment of defeated races augurs well for the future: see Eckstein, Senate and general 226-8. In contrast, the reaction of the Carthaginians, with which the book closes, is gloomy indeed (26.51.11-14).

94 Cf. Polyb. 11.25-30 with Walbank II, 306-309. Walsh, *Livy*, 99-100, draws attention to similarities between Livy and Caesar in their depiction of generalship which may reflect suggestively on Scipio’s handling of mutiny here. The mutiny is not discussed at length by Tränkle.

95 See Walbank II, 245.

milites sui appellassent: regium nomen alibi magnum, Romae intolerabile esse. regalem animum in se esse, si id in hominis ingenio amplissimum ducerent, taciti iudicarent. (27.19.3-5)

Livy's Scipio draws a nice distinction between regium nomen and regale animum (not in Polybius), and states that the title imperator, conferred on him by his own men, is maximum nomen. Again, this Roman nuance is lacking in Polybius, whose Scipio merely orders them to call him stratēgos, after rejecting the title of basileus. Livy, moreover, describes the reaction of the Spaniards, thus weaving the incident into his larger theme of the need to impress and win over allies, 'Sensere etiam barbari magnitudinem animi, cuius miraculo nominis alii mortales stuperent id ex tam alto fastigio aspernantis' (19.6).⁹⁷

In their accounts of the mutiny, there are once again conspicuous differences. The excerpt of the latter, after a summarising opening sentence, begins at the stage of affairs which corresponds to Livy 28.25.8ff., and his account of the causes of the mutiny is lost. Appian, however, who does deal with it, attributes the unrest to two factors which hint more clearly at difficulty in depicting Scipio: first, the men had wasted their gains, and second they felt Scipio had appropriated all the doxē for their erga. He also includes the fact that the command fell to Marcius during Scipio's illness.⁹⁸

⁹⁷Cf. 19.7 and his gift to Indibilis; his decision not to follow Hasdrubal also ties in here (27.20.2). His treatment of Massiva, nephew of Masinissa, is part of the same theme (19.8-12).

⁹⁸App., Hisp. 34.
Livy does not mention this, and only turns to the mutiny after stressing the effect of his illness on the Spanish communities (28.24.1-5). Nor does he suggest that the men resented Scipio. Rather, their mentes were motae even before he fell ill, and licentia (the erosion of disciplina) had arisen because of diutinum otium (28.24.6). The sermones occulti which he reports in Q.O. (28.24.7) underline a familiar theme, that it is not for soldiers to question the decisions of their general.\footnote{See e.g. Polyb. 3.44.12; Caesar BG 1.40; 7.52; Vell. 2.113.3; Livy 4.41.3, 44.34: cf. Plut. Galb. 1.2; Aem. 13.6.} Charges of indiscipline and presumption are laid down before the matter of the soldiers' stipendia (28.24.8) to make it clear that their discontent arises initially from a disinclination for idleness and inactivity: this locates the origin of their fault in something more positive than simple greed, as the careful construction of 28.24.6 already implied. The temporal progression of the discontent is clearly marked (non tum primum: iam antea; primo; quoque; postremo), leading into an epigrammatic summary:

Omnia libidine ac licentia militum, nihil institute aut disciplina militiae aut imperio eorum qui praeerant gerebatur. (28.24.9)

When seditio leads to the ejection of the tribuni militum (24.12), imperium is given 'omnium consensu' to two 'gregarii milites' (28.24.13), who, not content with 'tribunicia ornamenta', seize the rods and axes, 'insignia...summi imperii'. Condemnation of their folly serves also as narrative reassurance that the mutiny will be quelled:
Thus Livy focusses on the greedy ambitions (28.24.15-16) of the two ringleaders, dissociating them from the mass of the milites. When the rumour of Scipio’s death is not confirmed, those auctores are sought out (28.25.1), and stand alone:

Subtrahente se quoque ut credidisse potius temere quam finxisse rem talem videri posset, destituti duces iam sua ipsi ingenia et pro vana imagine imperii quod gerent veram iustamque mox in se versuram potestatem horrebant. (28.25.2)

The mutiny peters out (‘stupente ita seditione’, 28.25.3) as soon as confirmation of Scipio’s health comes: \(^{100}\) when the tribuni militum arrive, their handling of the affair is a masterpiece of tact, acknowledging the justice of the men’s grievances and playing down the seriousness of the business (28.25.4-7). \(^{101}\)

Livy focusses next on the inexperience of Scipio in dealing with mutiny, a point also mentioned by Polybius (11.25.1): his decision to act leniter is picked up in the O.O. thoughts of the mutineers:

Imperatoris vel iustae irae vel non desperandae clementiae sese committerent: etiam hostibus eum ignovisse cum quibus ferro dimicasset: suam seditionem sine volnere, sine sanguine fuisse nec ipsam atrocem nec atroci poena dignam – ut ingenia

\(^{100}\)Cf. 28.25.11.

\(^{101}\)Appian’s version of the men’s behaviour is strikingly different from Livy’s: according to him, the men incite other garrisons to join them; they negotiate with Mago, and set up their own command structure. There is no suggestion that two men only were responsible for inciting mutiny, and indeed the whole account gives a picture of a more serious threat: it seems likely that Livy is reformulating or avoiding an accepted version.
humana sunt ad suam cuique levandam culpam nimio plus facunda. (28.25.13-14)

Thus they are aware of wrongdoing (*justa ira*); and their decision to rely on Scipio's *clementia*, rather than persisting in their folly, also augurs well. We then see the deliberations from the other side ('Per eosdem dies', 28.26.1), as Scipio holds a *consilium* to debate their treatment. Though Livy notes the two conflicting *sententiae*, the decision to adopt *sententia lenior* (the punishment of only the thirty-five *auctores seditio*is) is reached without a set-piece exposition of the arguments (28.26.2). *Lenitas* is a hallmark of Scipio as much as of Caesar, and it is entirely appropriate that the decision be implemented immediately.¹⁰² Extended deliberation of the point might suggest dissent among the leaders as well as the men: Livy's aim here is to stress Scipio's swift and efficient reaction to the situation. The skill with which he handles the men before announcing his decision also contributes to this impression (28.26.4-9).

The set-piece speech appropriate to such a symbolic event is placed here (28.27.1-29.8), as Scipio addresses the men whose execution (28.29.12) he is about to order.¹⁰³ To stress his command of the situation, instead of simply describing his stern mien Livy has the mutineers themselves exclaim at it:

*Tum omnis ferocia concidit et, ut postea fatebantur, nihil aequum eos terruit quam praeter spem robur et colos imperatoris.* (28.26.14)

¹⁰² On *clementia* in Livy, see Moore, *Artistry and ideology* 83-5, and on *lenitas* 89-92, esp. 90 (comparing the two).

¹⁰³ See Burck, *'Einzelinterpretation von Reden'* , in *Wege zu Livius* 430-40: he stresses the importance of the speech for the depiction both of Scipio and of Rome (441).
Scipio’s speech could usefully be compared with some of Caesar’s in the Gallic and civil wars: this will be the last major challenge to total Roman supremacy before final victory, and it is fitting that his words should act as an exposition of the ideal relationship between commander, soldier and Res Publica. By opening with the question of how to address them, and rejecting the terms cives and milites in favour of hostes (28.27.4), he dissociates them from the body of the army:

Corpora, ora, vestitum, habitum civium adgnosco: facta, dicta, consilia, animos hostium video.
(28.27.4)\textsuperscript{104}

The parallel construction of these two clauses, with the careful balance of appearance and action, and the forceful contrast of the two verbs (‘I recognise/can identify’; ‘I (actually) see’) recalls what Scipio said of himself (28.27.2, contrasting verba and res). Polybius’s tediously elaborate medical simile (11.25.2-7) is reduced to a single effective image, ‘Invitus ea tamquam volnera attingo; sed nisi tacta tractataque sanari non possunt’ (28.27.7), and this phrase acts as a summary of 28.27.6, to Scipio’s credit.\textsuperscript{105} His reluctance to believe in the infamous conduct of his men, his plea to them to exonerate themselves, suggest that the punishment of the mutineers will not be allowed to affect his good relationship with the army as a whole. In fact, the men are not even given the opportunity to deny their guilt, and

\textsuperscript{104}Cf. Suet. DJ 69-70, Tac. Ann. 1.42-3, for Caesar’s handling of mutiny, and speech to ‘Quirites...non milites’.

\textsuperscript{105}The language of disease is also incorporated into the speech at 27.11 (‘contagione insanistis’); 29.3 (‘nec maior in corpus meum vis morbi quam in vestras mentes invasit’).
the end of the passage (28.29.9-10) shows why: Scipio’s words are not intended to affect the mutineers; they are meant to encourage and strengthen the dissociation between the mutineers and the rest of the army, as indeed they do.

The rest of the speech goes on to develop this separative strategy at considerable length, as Scipio appeals to the fides of the army as a whole not only towards himself (28.27.8-13), but also towards their patria (27.13-29.8). With impressive skill he explains the nature of their villainy first in general and inclusive terms, then (28.27.11) brings up a possible means of escape: only the auctores are responsible. It is thus in the interests of the rest of the army to reject these men as loudly and conclusively as possible. In the same way he dwell on the enormity of Albius and Atrius’ presumption (28.27.14-16): theirs is a crime against nature. By repeatedly pointing out the futility of the mutiny (28.7, 9-12, 14) he makes the mutineers appear fools as well as knaves.

At the end of the speech, Scipio returns to his opening thesis, that the mutineers have shown themselves to be hostes: this time, though, he states it as a fact (as if proven by the argument of the speech), 'Stipendiumne diebus paucis imperatore aegro serius numeratum satis digna causa fuit cur patriae indiceretis bellum?' (28.29.2). He gives a clear lead to the main body of troops in his last words:

106 The two categories, however, continually overlap, as he intends they should. Rejection of a commander’s imperium is rejection of the patria.
They are not slow to react appropriately (28.29.10), and the mutiny is satisfactorily resolved for the time being (28.29.12). Echoes of Caesar, however, in the words and actions of Scipio look forward to future difficulties for Rome: and give impact to the attack mounted by Fabius. (c) Scipio and Fabius (205 B.C., 28.38.1-45.7)

Antagonism between Fabius and Scipio, which finds expression first in a pair of speeches and then in an illustration of action (Pleminius), brings the thread of ambiguity in narrative explanation surrounding Scipio to a climax: after the Pleminius episode, positive characteristics are to the fore as the war comes to resolution. On his return to Rome, the hope of bringing the war to an end is expressed by the people, to explain their election of Scipio to the consulship (28.38.6):

Spondebant animis, sicut C. Lutatius superius bellum Punicum finisset, ita id quod instaret P. Cornelium finiturum, atque uti Hispania omni Poenos expulisset, sic Italia pulsrum esse; Africamque ei perinde ac debellatum in Italia foret provinciam destinebant. (28.38.9-10)

Between the people's reaction and that of the Senate, there follows a speech by envoys from Saguntum (28.39.1-16). Livy's reasons for highlighting this speech are surely connected to the role of Saguntum in precipitating the war. He makes the envoys point out the shift which has taken place

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107 See Burck, Einführung 140.
in Roman fortunes and endorse the view of the current balance of fortune already attributed both to Scipio and to the populus Romanus (28.39.2). The deaths of the elder Scipios have their place, as they do for Scipio himself in his speeches, in pointing the change of fortuna of the Romans in Spain: their arrival seemed to mark the optabilis fortuna of the Saguntines (28.39.6), but although this was overturned when they perished, it was replaced by the Scipio who made them ‘fortunatissimi omnium Saguntinorum.’ With rhetorical force, Livy has them declare their confidence in him, ‘P. Scipionem...consulem declaratum videmus ac vidisse nos civibus nostris renuntiatiuri sumus, spem, opem, salutem nostram’ (28.39.9): the triple asyndeton is reinforced by the shift from one to two to three syllables, and by the logical progression from hope to help to salvation. They express the defeat of their enemies the Turdetani (on whose behalf Hannibal entered the war) in terms of ultio rather than fructus (28.39.12) before voicing formal thanks for the services rendered by the Romans (28.39.13-16).

Determination to include Africa in his provincia does not reflect well on Scipio. Once again, the element of dubiety or moral unease is linked to echoes of late-Republican controversies, particularly in this case that concerning Caesar and his Gallic command. There are two grounds for concern: first, that he wants to take a nova provincia without

\[108^\] And with the reader’s privileged perspective of hindsight, recalls the parallel case of Flamininus (32.32; 34.33: cf. 33.5.3).
drawing lots (28.40.1), and second, that he declares himself willing to put the question directly to the people:

Ipse nulla iam modica gloria contentus non ad gerendum modo bellum sed ad finiendum diceret se consulem declaratum, neque id aliter fieri posse quam si ipse in Africam exercitum transportasset, et acturum se id per populum aperte ferret\(^{109}\) si senatus adversaretur... (28.40.1-2)

The reader can be in no doubt that Livy disapproves of his hero's attitude here, for he states that the Senators disapproved ('id consilium haudquaquam...placeret'), and then, before introducing the speech of Fabius, explains their failure to criticise it, 'ceteri per metum aut ambitionem mussarent'. Mussarent is a vivid and unexpected word, effectively conveying the sense of covert opposition: it takes a man of Fabius' stature to provide a foil for Scipio.\(^{110}\)

The pair of speeches which Livy has given us (28.40.3-44.18) symbolise a shift in thought and in the war's progress. The master of the old strategy of caution makes a stand against the new man of skill and daring: Livy marks this via the response of the Senate to Fabius:

Auctoritate et inveteratae prudentiae fama magnam partem senatus et seniores maxime <cum> movisset, pluresque consilium senis quam animum adolescencia ferocem laudarent.... (28.43.1)

Fabius' opening move reveals his hostility to his successor; his choice of vocabulary (simulando; ludibrio) and his irony (viri fortis ac strenuui) indicate an unwillingness to believe

\(^{109}\) Ferret; OLD 28a.

\(^{110}\) Cf. Plut. Fab. 25.1-26.2: Plutarch's Fabius begins by acting from diinterested motives which are recognised by the Senate, but the dèmos thinks he is motivated by phthonos and a fear that Scipio will take the whole credit for victory: but later he is driven by philotimia and philoneikia.
in Scipio's achievements or motives (28.40.4-5). He anticipates the arguments of his opponent in proper rhetorical manner: and again there are two possible openings. He deals first with the issue of strategy (28.40.6-7), and second with that of invidia (28.40.8-14). The strategy of cunctatio, according to Fabius, is still valid but will be criticised:

Insita ingenio meo cunctatio, quam metum pigritiamque homines adulescentes sane appellent... aliorum speciosiora primo adspectu consilia semper visa, mea usu meliora. (28.40.6-7)

He avoids for the moment dealing with the possibility that a change in Roman fortunes makes a corresponding change of strategy necessary. Quickly he moves onto the safer ground of his own reputation and status:

...obtrectatio atque invidia adversus crescentem in dies glorian fortissimi consulis. A qua suspicione si me neque vita acta et mores mei neque dictatura cum quinque consulatibus tantumque gloriae belli domique partae vindicat ut propius fastidium eius sim quam desiderium, aetas saltem liberet. (28.40.8-9)

He then makes the pre-empted criticism specific to his attitude to Scipio, from 28.40.9-14 denying any aemulatio on his part: in doing so, he revives the spectre of rivalry between Roman leaders leading to Roman defeat (esp. at 28.40.10) which has been absent from the narrative throughout the period of Scipio's victories. Personal enmity is again evident at 28.41.1, when he says with irony:

Illud te mihi ignoscere, P. Corneli, aequum erit, si cum in me ipso nunquam pluris famam hominum quam rem publicam fecerim, ne tuam quidem glorian bono publico praeponam.

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In denying also that Hannibal will follow Scipio should he cross to Africa (28.41.8), Fabius is made to alienate the reader from his own point of view:

Nondum est Hannibal, quem non magis timuisse videatur quam contempsisse qui aliud bellum maluerit. Quin igitur ad hoc accingeris nec per istos circuitus, ut cum in Africam traieceris secuturum te illuc Hannibalem speres, potius quam recto hinc itinere, ubi Hannibal est, eo bellum intendis. (28.41.7-8)

The words underlined indicate Fabius' *invidia*. He taunts his rival with cowardice, accusing him of preferring a devious to a straightforward path: the balanced contrast of *Hannibalem speres* with *Hannibal est* is particularly effective in conveying the point.

From 28.41.13 onwards, Fabius tries a different tack, this time arguing from precedent that attacking Africa will be unwise. After citing the untimely deaths of the elder Scipios in Spain (28.41.14-15) as others have previously done, he draws a different lesson:

Dies me deficiat si reges imperatoresque temere in hostium terram transgressos cum maximis cladibus suis exercituumque suorum enumerare velim. Athenienses, prudentissima civitas, bello domi relictto, auctore aequo impigro ac nobili iuvene, magna classe in Siciliam tramissa, una pugna navali florentem rem publicam suam in perpetuum adflixerunt. (28.41.16-17)

Nowhere has Livy stated that the Scipios fell in battle because of *temeritas*: as for the citation of the Sicilian expedition, and the comparison of Alcibiades with Scipio, it
is so misleading an analogy as rather to weaken than strengthen Fabius' case.\textsuperscript{111}

A more cogent parallel is then adduced with Regulus, recalling the fickleness of fortune (28.42.1), to introduce the theme of the difficulty of a war in Africa. The denial ('neque ea elevo', 28.42.6) that he is trying to belittle Scipio's achievements, like a kind of praeteritio, draws our attention to that very fact: and all the more so because Livy puts the belittlement first and the denial afterwards.\textsuperscript{112} Fabius is shown to be wrong here not only through the reader's privileged viewpoint of hindsight but also through the comparison of speech and narrative, for Livy's independent account of Scipio's recent achievements stressed their magnitude, not their insignificance.

Like Torquatus before him and Cato after him, Fabius is half-right: his warning not to trust Syphax turns out to be justified, but not (despite some wavering over Sophoniba) his warning against Masinissa: and his awareness of the danger of reliance on allies evokes familiar topoi of treachery. The threat of future fraus, the reminder of 'Celtiberorum fraus' (28.42.8) and the risk of reliance on Numidians ('Numidis tu credere potes, defectionem militum tuorum expertus', 28.42.9) are not foolish or inherently incredible. In arguing that

\textsuperscript{111}The parallel does focus attention on Scipio's youth (a constant theme with Alcibiades), but the situation of Attica was hardly parallel to that of Italy ('bello domi relictio'): Scipio does not behave like Alcibiades ('impigro ac nobili iuvene'): Athens did not change from a flourishing state into one of endless decay ('florentem...adflixerunt').

\textsuperscript{112}'Cum ex alto Africam conspexeris, ludus et iocus fuisse Hispaniae tuae videbuntur', 28.42.2-7.

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externus timor will disperse the aemulatio currently rife among the African peoples, he speaks in accord with a communis locus of Roman historiography, while the admittedly conventional claim that the Carthaginians will fight more bravely for the safety of their own city, 'moenia patriae, templae deum, aras et focos' (28.42.11), is particularly persuasive in view of the often-depicted reaction of the Romans to Hannibal at their gates.

Such arguments, however, though their range is intended to extend beyond the immediate context, must also be seen as embedded in Fabius' overall stance. He uses the rhetorical and historical material at hand as effectively as possible to defeat Scipio:

Victum [sc. Hasdrubalem] a te dices; eo quidem minus vellem - et id tua non rei publicae solum causa - iter datum victo in Italian esse. Patere nos omnia quae prospera tibi ac populi Romani imperio evenere tuo consilio adsignare, adversa casibus incertis belli et fortunae relegare: ...Non potes ne ipse quidem dissimulare, ubi Hannibal sit, ibi caput atque arcem huius belli esse.... (28.42.15-16)

Fabius' final example accords with this picture of half-truth: he correctly interprets Scipio's motives (a), but criticism of his negotiations with Syphax is undermined by their success (b):

Tu cum Hannibale in Italia sit relinquere Italian paras, non quia rei publicae utile sed quia (a) tibi id amplum et gloriosum censes esse - sicut (b) cum provincia et exercitu relictuo sine lege sine senatus consulto duabus navibus populi Romani imperator fortunam publicum et maiestatem imperii, quae tum in tuo capite periclitabantur, commisisti. (28.42.20-1)

His closing words, by reiterating the theme of personal enmity, distance the reader firmly from his conclusion; the speech claimed to criticise Scipio's desire for gloria...
(28.40.1; 42.20), but ends by condemning him for regius mos and superbia (28.42.22).

But Scipio himself has rejected the title of rex:¹¹³ and his demeanour in Spain has been such as to make a charge of superbia seem ridiculous. Fabius' criticisms are not ultimately justified, but it remains to be seen whether Scipio can defend himself adequately. His speech is somewhat briefer than Fabius's (6 pages of O.C.T. instead of 8), and similarly rhetorical and emotive. He begins with a denial, ironic in tone and picking up the latter's invective:

Et ipse Q. Fabius principio orationis...commemoravit in sententia sua posse obtrectionem suspectam esse; cuius ego rei non tam ipse ausim tantum virum insimulare.... (28.43.2)¹¹⁴

He effectively undercuts Fabius' denial of the invidiae crimen by acknowledging the truth of two of his claims (28.43.3-4):

that he wishes to rival him, and that he is worth emulating:

Honores suos et famam rerum gestarum extulit verbis ad exstinguendum invidiae crimen tamquam mihi ab infimo quoque periculum sit ne mecum aemuletur, et non ab eo qui, quia super ceteros excellat, quo me quoque niti non dissimulo, me sibi aequari nolit.

By describing cupiditas gloriae as extending beyond life into memoria and posteritas (28.43.5), Scipio reassures his listeners (and the reader), that he wants only what other great Romans want, and that his desire for gloria is not of the perverted kind which seeks achievements for itself at the expense of a colleague or the Res Publica (28.43.8). From

¹¹³See above on 27.19.3-6.

¹¹⁴Insimulare: cf. 28.42.16 dissimulare. Scipio draws attention to this pejorative terminology, cf. 28.43.4, 7. The praeteritio is effective in impugning Fabius' credibility.
28.43.9-16 he counters the charge that fighting in Africa would be folly, with a rapid succession of rhetorical questions, the first of which (28.43.10-12) extends over almost 9 lines of O.C.T.: the artistry of his ironic conclusion to them is impressive (28.43.14-16).

In refuting the Regulus exemplum, Scipio does not simply deny its relevance to the present situation, but rather counters it with an exemplum of his own:115

Nec felicius Xanthippum... Carthagini quam me patriae meae sinerem natum esse, cresceretque mihi ex eo ipso fiducia quod possit in hominis unius virtute tantum momenti esse. (28.43.19) 116

With even greater force does he refute arguments about allied loyalty, and again in a way calculated to appeal to his hearers: Rome’s allies deserted her because of Hannibal’s victories in Italy, and so will Carthage’s allies in Africa, indeed more so, because of the different natures of the two forces:

Nos, etiam deserti ab sociis, viribus nostris milite Romano stetimus: Carthaginiensi nihil civilis roboris est: mercede paratos milites habent, Afros Numidiasque, levissima fidei mutandae ingenia. (28.44.5)

His prophecies at 28.44.6, post-eventum in effect, reassure as well as reminding the reader, while the appended caveat (28.44.7) confirms that allied treachery will not catch him


116 The Sicilian expedition exemplum is also countered (28.43.20-21).
unawares (‘Syphax...sim’) because he has foreseen the risk.\textsuperscript{117} At the same time his appeal to \textit{Fortuna populi Romani} and \textit{di...testes} recalls the events of earlier books, promising to right them.

After reshaping the argument at 28.44.10-11, to suggest Fabius cannot criticise him without denigrating the abilities of the consul who is to be left in Italy, he turns to a point the importance of which for a Roman readership/audience is difficult to appreciate. Caesar’s expressions in the \textit{BC} of his own \textit{dignitas}, and in the \textit{BG} of \textit{dignitas populi Romani}, highlight the centrality both in self-justifications and in the historiographical genre of the impression Rome and her representatives make on other peoples: Scipio’s words here, then, focussing as they do on \textit{dignitas populi Romani}, are intended to dissociate him from the type of leader who seeks \textit{gloria} at the expense of Res Publica. Rather, he appeals to his hearers’ sense that the maintenance of \textit{dignitas} is essential for the preservation of \textit{imperium Romanum}:

\begin{quote}
Ad dignitatem populi Romani famamque apud reges gentesque externas pertinebat, non ad defendendum modo Italiam sed ad inferenda etiam Africae arma videri nobis animum esse, nec hoc credi volgarique quod Hannibal ausus sit neminem ducem Romanum audere.... (28.44.12-13)
\end{quote}

This section ends with another emotive appeal, ‘Requiescat ...Italia’ (28.44.15), before he concludes his speech at 28.44.16-18. There is now no more pretence that he believes

\textsuperscript{117}Livy undercuts Fabius’ warnings in the next book: e.g., in his account of the revolt of Indibilis in Spain, he first explains the revolt as a response to the excellence of Scipio (29.2.19), and later notes that the \textit{tumultus} was ‘haud magno motu intra paucos dies concitus et compressus’ (29.3.6).
Fabius is not belittling him, as he neatly reverses Fabius’ contrast of rash youth and temperate maturity:

Longa oratio nec ad vos pertinens sit, si quemadmodum Q. Fabius meas res gestas in Hispania elevavit sic ego contra gloriam eius eludere et meam verbis extollere velim. Neutrum faciam...et si nulla alia re, modestia certe et temperando linguae adulescens senem vicero. (28.44.17-18)

The immediate aftermath of these two speeches (28.45.1-11) does not give the reader any definitive criteria for judging the relative rectitude of the two men. It is noted, however, that Scipio was less favourably heard because of a rumour that he would put the matter to the populus (28.45.1), after which is described the process by which the Senate was placated and Scipio got the desired command (28.45.8). Livy’s technique of moral explanation allows the reader to see that the judgment falls nonetheless with Scipio. Fabius’ advice is flawed, and seen to be so, because unlike the reader he does not know that Scipio is going to win the war in Africa, and achieve a brilliant victory over Hannibal.\(^{118}\) Thus his speech acts both as a proof of Roman caution, and as a narrative reassurance that the Res Publica is secured by the presence of both types of men: Fabius acts as a check on the ambitio and studium gloriae of Scipio, Scipio as a counter to the policy of caution, essentially unappealing to the Roman reader (as the

\(^{118}\)A point further underlined in the next book, first when the Carthaginians respond to the threat of invasion of Africa by urging their leaders in Italy to keep Scipio there, ‘ut omni terrore Scipionem retinerent’ (29.4.5). Fabius’ advice, in retrospect, coincides with their wishes. At 29.4.7-5.1, Masinissa’s words to Laelius reinforce the point, ‘segniter rem agi ab Scipione questus’.

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unus qui nobis paradox suggests) which can contain a war but not bring it to an end.

So the book ends on a note of cautious optimism, with affairs domi under control;\textsuperscript{119} but not before some disturbing possibilities have been examined. Livy may once more be looking beyond the end of the war to Scipio's clashes with Flamininus,\textsuperscript{120} to his disgrace,\textsuperscript{121} and beyond the second century to the clashes and controversies of the late Republic. The parallel between Scipio and Caesar is certainly disquieting.\textsuperscript{122}

\textbf{(d) Scipio, Pleminius and the problem of responsibility (205-204 B.C., 29.6.1-22.12)}

The Pleminius episode could easily be dismissed as an unimportant aside at the end of the previous section on Scipio.\textsuperscript{123} There is apparently nothing new to glean from it; until at 29.17.6-9 disquieting, forward-looking themes begin

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{119}Supplies and men are contributed by allied communities to Scipio's forces (45.13-21), and he sets sail for Sicily (46.1). Meanwhile, the Senate takes measures to check the activities of Mago (46.7-13).
\item \textsuperscript{120}On their rivalry and the dispute over a provincia, see Eckstein, Senate and general 306, 309-10.
\item \textsuperscript{122}The similarities in their skills of command (care for the men, wise treatment of allies and conquered peoples, vengeance, foresight, etc.) show adherence to a commonly-recognised ideal: but the attempted acclamation of both as 'king', though in different circumstances, makes for a closer identification, as does their readiness both to legislate through the people and to claim protection of their dignitas.
\item \textsuperscript{123}A mistake not made by Burck, who perceives its pivotal role in the narrative: 'Pleminius und Scipio bei Livius' Palingenesia 4 (1966) 301-14.
\end{itemize}
to interrelate with the success of the moment. The story begins with the subjugation of Locri: Scipio is goaded by the words of Masinissa, but his men are enthusiastic from another, and a more ominous, motive:

Scipione stimulato Masinissae adhortationibus et militibus praedam ex hostium terra cernentibus tota classe efferri accensis ad traiciendum quam primum, intervenit maiori minor cogitatio Locros urbem recipiendi... (29.6.1).

This eagerness for precipitate action from motives of greed is clearly dangerous: the infection of *studium praedae* intrudes ominously in this paradigm of Roman-allied interaction. Events at Locri, unlike the revolt in Spain (29.1.19-2.18), are worked up into a full-scale narrative set-piece, in which the character and actions of Pleminius have a disastrous effect, and convey a strong warning to Scipio:

Spes autem adfectandae eius rei ex minima re adfulsit. Latrociniiis magis quam iusto bello in Bruttiiis gerebantur res, principioque ab Numidis facto et Bruttiiis non societate magis Punica quam suopte ingenio congruentibus in eum morem; postremo Romani quocumque milites Jam contagione quadam rapto gaudentes, quantum per duces licebat, excursiones in hostium agros facere. (29.6.2)

For the time being, the *contagio* is under control ('quantum... licebat'), but the possibility of *avaritia* making the Romans lose their moral superiority has been disclosed. The hope of

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124 For Scipio, the narrative context is positive (29.1.2-14), and is mirrored by the reaction of the Carthaginians to a rumour of his approach (29.3.8, 3.10-11). The weakened position of Carthage is paralleled by that of her commander, 'Hannibalem ipsum iam et fama senescere et viribus' (29.3.15).

125 See 29.4.8.

126 The story of Marcius' soldiers at Astapa (28.22.1-23.5) makes a similar causal link between greed and ruin.
taking the city comes closer because of the motivation of certain of the Locrians, 'qui simul desiderio patriae angerentur simul cupiditate inimicos ulciscendi arderent' (29.6.7): but the nobility of their motives also casts a shadow over the less impressive motivation of the Romans at this point. It must be remembered that Scipio is not present (29.6.8): but the question of his responsibility for subsequent events means that any moral assessment of his role in the taking of Locri will reflect on his suitability for attacking Carthage.

Scipio's treatment of Locri is a model of propriety (29.8.1-5), but the behaviour of the praesidium left behind under Pleminius at last makes clear why warnings about avaritia were delivered earlier:

Ita superbe et crudeliter habiti Locrenses ab Carthaginiensibus post defectionem ab Romanis fuerant ut modicas iniurias non aequo modo animo pati sed prope libenti possent; verum enimvero tantum Pleminius Hamilcarem praesidii praefectum, tantum praevidiarii milites Romani Poenos scelere atque avaritia superaverunt ut non armis sed vitiiis videretur certari. (29.8.6-7)

When their avaritia leads even to temple-robbing, Livy reminds the reader of the case of Pyrrhus (29.8.9-11). For the Romans, retribution comes in the shape of discord, 'ducem in ducem, militem in militem rabie hostili vertit'. The reference is to what happens in the following chapter, an example of moral degeneration of commander and men second to none for repellent savagery: the milites under the tribunes

\[127\] Crudeliter: see Burck, 'Pleminius und Scipio', 303.
Sergius and Matienus fight with Pleminius’ men, after the former have tried to put a stop to such wanton looting:

Iurgium...et clamor, pugna postremo orta inter Plemini milites tribunorumque, ut suis quisque opportunus advenerat multitudine simul ac tumultu crescente. (29.9.3)

As the tribunes are brought before Pleminius, stripped and beaten, their men arrive and attack first the lictors and then Pleminius himself (29.9.6-7). Their action in defence of the tribunes is condemned rather than excused by Livy, ‘sine respectu non maiestatis modo sed etiam humanitatis in legatum impetum...faciunt’.

When Scipio also condemns it (29.9.8), we have to remember the warning of Fabius (28.42.9): it is true that mutiny, even against a bad officer, poses a threat to the commander’s control which cannot be ignored, but it is also true, in terms of narrative explanation, that Scipio must be seen to defeat Fabius’ expectations. The subsequent behaviour of Pleminius brings not only himself but also Scipio into disrepute (29.9.9-12; cf. 16.4-5), but no narrative consequence is as yet adduced. It is not until 29.16-22 that Pleminius is punished and right treatment of allies is restored: this reassertion of Roman moral superiority provides the narrative reassurance for the subsequent invasion of Africa, for which preparations immediately begin (29.23). Meanwhile the moral ground for invasion is prepared on quite
another front, the introduction of Cybele to Rome (29.10.4-14.14).¹²⁸

At 29.16.4, the narrative returns to Pleminius at Locri, and in a way which bodes well for ultimate Roman superiority:

Locrensium clades...volgatae sunt; nec tam Plemini scelus quam Scipionis in eo aut ambitio aut negligentia iras hominum inritavit. (29.16.4-5)

The speech of the representatives of Locri before the Senate is a set-piece expression of the problem of Roman justification.¹²⁹ It focusses not simply on the behaviour of the Romans there but on the contrast with Carthage and the issue of religio, and thus becomes a symbolic examination of the right of Rome to her imperium orbis terrarum. Moreover, it comes soon after Livy’s own account of the happenings there, and the correspondences between narrative and speech guide the reader to acceptance of the Locrians’ arguments.

The first aim of the Locrians is to explain their desertion to Hannibal: this is briefly mentioned (29.17.1-4), but they request that full discussion be postponed until Scipio is present, thus allowing the reader to be reminded of his role in recovering the city. They do not criticise him

¹²⁸Livy’s attitude is ambivalent, but it is a suggestive juxtaposition with the temple- loot ing of Pleminius’ men: see Levene, 98-101 on the moral connection of the Pleminius and Cybele episodes. On the introduction of Cybele, see Th. Köves, ‘Zum Empfang der Magna Mater in Rom’, Hist. 12 (1963) 321-47: Levene, 94-8: cf. Sulla Comm. fr. 9P. Cic. de Div. 1.72-78 treats prediction of the results of battle, including Flaminius (77-8); the refutation, esp. 2.110, shows part of his motivation for doing so. Though he denies the worth of divination, he evidently does so against a background of popular belief: metus deorum, as a mark of civilisation is desirable for Livy’s Romans here.

for upholding Pleminius any more than Livy himself had earlier: criticism is left for the Senators, and worked into the theme of Roman awareness of the need for moral superiority to uphold imperium (29.19.3ff). 130

Their next point is crucial, and deserves quotation in full: the issue at stake is whether Rome deserves to be 'princeps orbis terrarum':

In discrimine est nunc omne genus, utrum vos an Carthaginienses principes orbis terrarum videat. Si ex ipsis Locrenses aut ab ipsis passi sumus aut a vestro praesidio nunc cum maxime patimur aestimandum Romanum ac Punicum imperium sit, nemo non illos sibi quam vos dominos praepetet. Et tamen videte quemadmodum in vos Locrenses animati sint. Cum a Carthaginensibus iniurias tanto minores acciperemus, ad vestrum imperatorem confugimus: cum a vestro praesidio plus quam hostilia patiamur, nusquam alio quam ad vos querellas detulimus. Aut vos respicietis perditas res nostras, patres conscripti, aut ne ab dis quidem immortalibus quod precemur quicquam superest. (29.17.6-9)

Livy has already made it clear, both implicitly (in the debate on the consular provinces and the introduction of Cybele) and explicitly (at 29.10.5 and 14.2) that the Romans are expecting an end to the war. He has also marked, in both set-pieces, a connection between moral excellence and conquest. The Senators, then, like the reader, are made to be in sympathy with the arguments of the Locrians here, especially since the justice of their querreellae has already been independently narrated. 131 The hyperbole of the last sentence has its place

130 Burck, 'Pleminius und Scipio', 309, underestimates the degree of unease left attaching to Scipio by Livy, but is right to emphasise the importance placed upon the plundering of the temple.

131 The anxiety of the Locrians, that the unexpiated 'Frevel' against Proserpina could bring ill-fortune upon Rome, is a further point in their favour: Burck, 'Pleminius und
in preparing the audience for a more delicate issue (as does the interjection at 29.17.11): the Locrians have to expose the character of Pleminius, and choose the wisest course for their predicament; if Pleminius is so evil, he is no true Roman:

In hoc legato vestro...nee hominis quicquam est... praeter figuram et speciem neque Romani civis praeter habitum vestitumque et sonum Latinae linguae. (29.17.11)

The next sentence is a risky one for the Locrians, comparing him to 'pestis ac belua' (29.17.12), but the explanation of that image in what follows, by evoking the Roman conception of the character of a leader transferring itself to his men (and thus also calling up previous instances in the decade of the ruinous consequences of bad leadership) wins over the listeners:

Ac si scelus libidinemque et avaritiam\textsuperscript{132} solus ipse exercere in socios vestros satis haberet, unam profundam quidem voraginem tamen patientia nostra expleremus: nunc omnes centuriones militesque vestros - adeo in promiscuo licentiam atque improbitatem esse voluit - Pleminios fecit; omnes rapiunt, spoliant, verberant, vulnerant, occidunt; constuprant matrones, virgines, ingenuos raptos ex complexu parentium. (29.17.13-15)

Both content and style here are powerfully controlled: the Locrians make use of Roman sensibilities to the utmost. The stress on socios vestros, centuriones militesque vestros, helps to dissociate Pleminius from his peers: the former plays on a sense of duty to allies; the latter, by putting the centurions first, highlights the depth of his infamy in corrupting those exempla virtutis Romanae. Libido and

\textsuperscript{132}Corresponding to 8.7ff.; scelus, avaritia (twice), vitiis, contumeliae.
avaritia are key moral failings for soldiers, and their commander has enticed his men into them. A rapid series of verbs and phrases in asyndeton ('omnes...ingenuos') forces home the point. At the end of this chapter (29.17.19-20) they combine the denunciation and dissociation of Pleminius with the earlier theme of the right to imperium, by isolating him as 'exitiabilis tyrannus' (cf. 'crudelissimi atque importunissimi tyranni', 29.17.20).

In the second part of the speech, they turn to the matter of religio: this too must be read in the light of what has just passed. 'Religio infixa animis' is what forces them to speak, and religio will likewise prompt the Romans to act (29.18.1): the pillaging of the temple of Proserpine and the consequences for Pyrrhus of his impiety to which they point (29.18.3-6) have already been independently narrated (29.8.9-11). Again Pleminius is isolated, this time along with his subordinate officers, 'nefanda praeda se ipsos ac domos contaminare suas et milites vestros' (29.18.8). When the Locrians say that his impiety must be atoned for, before the invasion of Africa, they show themselves to have Roman interests at heart (29.18.9):

Quibus per vos fidemque vestram, patres conscripti, priusquam eorum scelus expietis neque in Italia neque in Africa quicquam rei gesseritis, ne quod piaculi commiserunt non suo solum sanguine sed etiam publica clade luant. (29.18.9)

The clash between Pleminius and the tribunes Sergius and Matienus is explained by the Locrians, as it was by Livy (29.8.10-11), as the result of ira deae (29.18.10): only the

133 Not, of course, the tribuni militum of 29.9.2.
intervention of Scipio, they say, prevented Hannibal from recovering the city. The theme of the goddess’s wrath makes a rousing end to the speech (29.18.15-20).

When Fabius questions them further, he encourages the Locrians to comment on Scipio’s handling of the affair, which leads them to remark on ‘legati gratia...apud imperatorem’ (29.19.2) as an explanation of Scipio’s failure to condemn Pleminius. More straightforward in terms of narrative explanation is the fact that the already discredited Fabius leads the attack on Scipio, and that his arguments are biased:

Q. Fabius {a} natum eum [sc. Scipionem] ad corrumpendam disciplinam militarem arguere: {b} sic et in Hispania plus prope per seditionem militum quam bello amissum; {c} externo et regio more et indulgere licentiae militum et saevire in eos. (29.19.4)

{a} is not argument but invective; {b} is an outright lie (28.26.2; cf. e.g. 28.3.16); and {c} repeats the phraseology of his earlier speech (28.42.22), already undercut. Livy makes his irony explicit when he notes, ‘Sententiam deinde aequa trucem orationi adiecit’ (29.19.4). His proposal for punishing Pleminius and restoring Locri is sensible (29.19.5, 6-9; cf. 20.1), that for punishing Scipio, by depriving him of his command (29.19.6) unreasonable, as the sententia finally adopted shows (29.20.1-8). Before Q. Metellus suggests this latter course, however, Livy includes a passage of O.O. representing the criticisms of those who were suspicious of Scipio, after which he remarks that ‘Haec...partim vera partim
mixta eoque similia veris iactabantur’. He makes no comment on which were true and which not.\textsuperscript{134}

The description of Pleminius’ fate witnesses to the same dual interpretation of Scipio’s character, making plain for the first time that it results from a divergence of sources:

Duplex fama est quod ad Pleminium attinet. Alii... in exsilium Neapolim euntem forte in Q. Metellum... incidisse et ab eo Regium vi retractum tradunt: alii ab ipso Scipione legatum...missum qui Q. Pleminium in catenas et cum eo seditionis principes conicerent. Ii omnes seu ante Scipionis seu tum praetoris iussu traditi in custodiam Reginis sunt. (29.21.1-3)

Livy does not choose between these variants. His view of Scipio’s character has been sufficiently established, and of his blamelessness in the Pleminius affair independently narrated.\textsuperscript{135} He ends with a stirring affirmation of Scipio:

Tantaque admiratio singularum universarumque rerum incussa ut satis crederent aut illo duce atque exercitu vinci Carthaginiensem populum aut alicui nullo posse, iubenterque quod di bene verterent traicere et spei conceptae quo die illum omnes centuriae priorem consulem dixissent primo quoque tempore compotem populum Romanum facere; adeoque laetis inde animis profecti sunt, tamquam victoriam non belli magnificum apparatum nuntiaturi Romam essent. (29.22.4-6)

\textbf{AFTER HANNIBAL}

Livy is not utterly dependent on his sources for a moral interpretation of the action he describes. His independence

\textsuperscript{134}Metellus very properly defends Scipio against any assumption of guilt (29.20.1-3), whilst also making provision for an inquiry into his conduct (29.20.4-8): he is only to be recalled if he is found to have been responsible for the atrocities at Locri (29.20.8). Thus Rome’s rectitude is proven, and Scipio’s position secured.

\textsuperscript{135}The Locrians themselves exonerate him from actual blame at 29.21.9-11; cf. 29.21.13).
in shaping his early narrative was conclusively demonstrated
by Burck in *Die Erzählungskunst*, and his narrative techniques
in the third decade examined in Burck’s later writings.
Hoffmann, Walsh, Luce and Tränkle have also all given him
credit, in differing degrees, for innovation, autonomy and
creativity. Applying the idea of ‘narrative explanation’ to
Livy’s text can shed new light on difficult passages, so that
supposed ‘mistakes’ can sometimes be reinterpreted: the battle
of Baecula, for example (27.17-20), offers the reader a wholly
positive piece of narrative explanation, in which the
commander’s character and the *virtus* and eagerness for *labores*
of his men correspond satisfyingly with an increase in allied
loyalty and the dismay of the enemy. Unlike Polybius, Livy
narrates the battle of Baecula first, and postpones the death
of Marcellus (27.26-27).\(^{136}\) It has been said that he does so
simply because of a mistake in dating Baecula to 209, not 208
B.C.,\(^ {137}\) but the victory of Scipio acts as a narrative
reassurance, without which Marcellus’ death might appear too
calamitous for Rome. The fact that Livy deliberately reminds
the reader of Marcellus’ unwise actions at Syracuse
strengthens the possibility that narrative explanation, and
not chronological confusion, is at work.

Narrative explanation can also resolve ambiguities like
the death of Marcellus, if that death is seen within the

\(^{136}\)See Polyb. 10.32.1-33.7, with Walbank II, 15-16.

\(^{137}\)See Polyb. 10.34-40, with Walbank II, 15-6 (on the date
of the battle), 245-255: also Eckstein, *Senate and general*
216.
overall context of the consequences of the spoils of Syracuse.\textsuperscript{138} It is recounted with a strong degree of unease: he arouses tribunician hostility (27.20.10-13, 21.2), once more reminding the reader that Rome is threatened not merely \textit{militiae} but \textit{domi} as well. Religious ambiguity is also marked (27.25.2).\textsuperscript{139} The reader has to balance this difficulty against concern shown by Marcellus, which allies him with Camillus in book 5. In both cases, the reason for failure to fulfil a vow does not compensate the fault, and the individual concerned suffers accordingly. In terms of narrative explanation, Camillus' failure allowed Livy to show a reason for his exile, without implying a moral weakness: but Marcellus' case is complicated by the spoils of Syracuse, and necessitates a more complex narrative construction.

An explanation for Marcellus' death is also constructed through Hannibal, whose response to the joining of the two consular armies (27.25.14) is typical: rejecting open battle, he decides on a trap, 'totus in suas artes versus insidiis locum quaerebat' (27.26.2). The consuls' strategy is no sooner described (27.26.3-4) than it is relayed by spies to Hannibal (27.26.5) and results in the death and imprisonment of 3,500 Romans (27.26.6). Hannibal sets up his ambush of his Numidian cavalry on a hill not yet occupied by either side (27.26.8): when Marcellus decides to include himself in a


\textsuperscript{139}See Levene, 86-9, for the use of prodigy-lists to contribute to a sense of impending disaster: he views the narrative as constructed to put Marcellus firmly in the wrong, but this is too simple an interpretation.
sortie to investigate the position, it is ominous that he does
so not of his own accord but in response to his men’s
complaints (27.26.9-10). The fragment of Polybius which
describes Marcellus’ death does not include mention of the two
sets of auspices (the first ominous, the second too
favourable, 27.26.13-4). Nor is there mention of divine
retribution: for him, Marcellus dies because of his folly:140

Mors Marcelli cum alioqui miserabilis fuit, tum quod
nec pro aetate...neque pro veteris prudentia ducis
tam improvide se collegamque et prope totam rem
publicam in praeceps dederat. (27.27.11)141

There were several versions of Marcellus’ death available to
Livy (27.12-14), some of which were evidently less critical of
the consul’s actions: Plutarch gives more detail on his burial
by Hannibal, including the taking of his signet ring, but
unlike Livy does not expand on the reasons for, or
consequences of, its seizure.142

His remarks on the death of Crispinus underline that the
nature as much as the fact of Marcellus’ death is dangerous
for Rome (27.33.7).143 The Senate assimilates Marcellus to
the same type of rash leadership as earlier commanders:

140 Polyb. 10.32.1-12, Marcellus’ death is ‘akakôteron’,

141 Plutarch, Comp. of Pel. and Marc, is also critical of
Marcellus on this point, and more fully, 3.1-4. See E. M.
Carawan, ‘The tragic history of Marcellus and Livy’s
characterisation’ CQ 80 (1984) 131-41. Montaigne’s remarks on
the subject were quoted in the Introduction to this thesis.

142 Plut. Marc. 30.1-4; cf. Livy 27.28.1-12.

143 27.33.6; cf. Plut. Marc. 29.9: placed after the
activities of Sulpicius and Philip in Greece (208 B.C.;
27.29.9-33.5).
Una praecipue cura patres populumque incessit consules...creandi et ut eos crearent potissimum quorum virtus satis tuta a fraude Punica esset: cum toto eo bello damnosa praepropera ac fervida ingenia imperatorum fuissent, tum eo ipso anno consules nimia cupiditate conserendi cum hoste manum in necopinatam fraudem lapsos esse. (27.33.10-11)

This reasoning in O.O. depicts an encouraging unity: it uphelds Rome’s overall moral superiority by dissociating the weakness of individual commanders from the failures of armies as a whole, 'deos...pepercisse innoxiiis exercitibus, temeritatem consulum ipsorum capitis damnasse' (27.33.11).

When Livy tells of Carthaginian efforts to subvert the alliance between Syphax and Rome, the reason for the marked ambiguity of Scipio’s portrayal is likewise to be found in the perceived consequences of his actions. It is underlined by the fact that Fabius, who had criticised both the risks taken by Scipio to achieve this alliance and his trust in Syphax and Masinissa (28.42.7-11, 21; cf. 28.17-18) is proved to have been partially right: the Carthaginians win societas Syphacis regis (29.23.2) through the marriage of Syphax with Hasdrubal’s daughter Sophoniba (29.23.4). In the chapter telling of Scipio’s reaction to the news, his first aim, 'magno momento rerum in Africa gerendarum magna spe destitutus', is to conceal the fact of Syphax’s desertion (29.24.2-3), but when this proves impossible, he deceives the army as to the purpose of the envoys instead:

Quando neque celari adventus Numidarum poterat...et si sileretur quid petentes venissent...timor...in exercitum incederet ne simul cum rege et

144 Hasdrubal, mindful of 'vana et mutabilia barbarorum ingenia' (23.6), contrives that Scipio should be warned, while still in Sicily, of the change of allegiance.
His reason for deceit is a good one, but it prompts him to decide hastily on invasion (described in such a way as to recall Fabius) at the moment when such an action appears most risky. On the other hand, his preparations leave nothing to be desired (29.24.7-9): and his deception has the desired effect upon the men, 'tantus omnibus ardor erat in Africam traiiciendi ut non ad bellum duci viderentur sed ad certa victoriae praemia' (29.24.11).

The attribution to Livy of wholehearted approval of Scipio (and the excusing of disquieting factors as accidental remnants of hostile sources) is best replaced by a view of his account as an interplay between competing forces in narrative explanation: the decade and the war are ended by him, but he survives into the next decade as an ambitious and difficult figure. Hannibal also survives. He too has been transformed, but into a Croesus-like figure, endowed after humiliating defeat with all the wisdom which was so lacking in success:

Hannibal...magis mirari se aiebat, quod non iam in Asia essent Romani, quam venturos dubitare...itaque desineret Aniochus pacem sibi ipse spe vana facere. In Asia et de ipsa Asia brevi terra marique dimicandum ei cum Romanis esse, et aut imperium adimendum orbem terrarum adfectantibus, aut ipsi regnum amittendum. Unus vera et providere et fideliter praedicere visus. (36.41.2-6)

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145 29.24.7 (cf. 25.13), 'dis bene iuvantibus', marks another narrative point in Scipio's favour.

146 Praemia implying a more positive aim than praeda did at 29.6.1.
It seems that Montaigne was right. What matters most about Marcellus' death, for Livy and his reader, should not be where or when he died, but how and why he died where and as he did. What matters most about the second Punic war is not the precise dating of its inception any more than the precise strategy by which it was brought to an end, but rather its role in explaining the rise of Roman imperium, and the dangers attendant upon Roman destiny. Livy's narrative is shaped and directed towards answering questions of interpretation, significance and meaning, towards the structuring of a narrative of the past which can explain the evolution and significance of the present.

Livy was writing of the res populi Romani, from the very beginnings of the city. Not so Caesar, whose narratives both concentrate upon relatively short periods of time. Yet Caesar and Livy use predictive markers of soldierly behaviour in very similar ways, to show the reader what is to happen, and to indicate the proper moral evaluation of the action of which those markers are a part. Both attest a similar set of assumptions about the proper way to describe military action, characterise enemy soldiers and leaders, and indicate moral and/or military superiority.

The first aim of this argument has been to show the consistency with which the Roman military character is depicted within the historical narratives of both Caesar and Livy. It has also been argued that their presentation of individuals and groups participating in particular military
actions, by exploiting the reader’s privileged perspective of historical hindsight, appeals to her or his awareness of a wider historical perspective beyond the immediate context; making that particular action explicable through parallels with, and divergences from, familiar types of military behaviour and their consequences. From this argument it has emerged that the character of the Roman soldiers within such narratives is not depicted as autonomously or naturally morally-positive: and that in fact their superiority, insofar as it exists at all, only becomes observable because Rome’s leaders inspire and create it, or perhaps evoke it. This tension, between a presumption on the writer’s part that Roman soldiers are always superior to foreign (except in rare and morally-signposted moments) and the narrative reality that they are treated with a high degree of ambiguity and caution, remains unresolved.

In the Introduction, and again in Chapter II, it was stressed that simplification is an essential feature of battle narrative, if it is to be clearly causative and morally-explanatory: that is, if the reader is successfully to be encouraged to evaluate the action in the way intended by the writer. It has also emerged repeatedly that flexibility is another essential feature, and that narrative explanation does not entail naïve, straightforward, unambiguous correlations between action and character on the one hand, and consequence (moral and military) on the other. A commander who claims to rest his men may then forget to do so and subsequently meet with failure, in which case his forgetfulness serves to
underline the seriousness of that failure. He may remember to
rest them, but that remembrance may at the same time be used
to highlight his excessive dependence on their goodwill. He
may deliberately deny them rest, or show them denying it to
themselves, as a means of illustrating his own excellence.
All these possibilities stem from the common basic perception
that a good commander rests his men; and all these
possibilities must be read and evaluated in terms of their
correlation to that simplest model, of the commander who rests
the men and wins the battle.

The portrayal of foreigners again is flexible, but where
excellence is attributed to them, the focus of the attribution
is still on Rome, and the moral challenge to her imperium
which any such excellence may pose. It may also be used to
enhance the impressiveness of a Roman achievement. This is
ture of Caesar's victories over the Gauls, as it is also true
of Rome's victory over Carthage. When Caesar narrates his war
against fellow-Romans, he uses a variety of techniques to
shift moral criticism and responsibility on to Pompey and his
subordinates, and underlines the shift through the portrayal
of his own relationship both with subordinates and with
ordinary supporters.

Livy's skill in shaping his narrative for justificatory
purposes, to enhance Roman greatness or hint at Roman destiny,
has long been recognised, if not specifically in terms of a
theory of intentionally causative narrative explanation.
Criticim of Caesar the historian, on the other hand, has
tended to be too much concerned with whether the great man was
a mere factual reporter of events or a devious and subtle propagandist to pay full attention to causative structures within his text as part of a wider historiographical phenomenon. This survey of character and explanation has concentrated upon observing the creation and operation of these structures. The further implications of the argument presented here for the use of Livy and Caesar by historians have only been hinted at: but this examination of the scope and nature of narrative explanation should make it at least a little easier to discern the logic of what might once have been condemned as historical fabrication.
APPENDIX: CAESAR’S USE OF ORATIO RECTA

"If a speech be well drawn up, I read it with pleasure, by whomsoever it be made - and probably with much greater, if the production of Mr. Hume or Mr. Robertson, than if the genuine words of Caractacus, Agricola, or Alfred the Great."¹

This Appendix is not intended as a full stylistic examination of Caesar’s use of O.R.² Nevertheless, in a work in which most protagonists are soldiers, the way in which Caesar characterises them through O.R. is of obvious importance. It is a curious fact that Caesar almost entirely avoids giving O.R. to himself in the Commentarii, and a fact which his impersonal narrative stance cannot alone explain. Inspiring and noble speeches are regularly given to men on his own side, while moving and persuasive speeches are given to his opponents (which latter are often a vehicle for the dissemination of dangerous or misleading information). The reader is left in no doubt of the narrative power and importance of O.R., and this draws attention to the problem of Caesar’s own avoidance of it. The possibility is suggested here that Caesar may be treating O.R. as a sophisticated historiographical technique of persuasion, and hence that he may himself be avoiding its use to imply that he is above the need for such persuasion.

¹Jane Austen, Northanger Abbey.

²There is a thorough discussion of such matters by Detlef Rasmussen, Caesars Commentarii: Stil u. Stilwandel am Beispiel der direkten Rede (Gottingen 1963) (Reviewed E.L. Bassett, CW 58 (1964) 88-9, A. Maniet AC 34 (1965) 250-1). Rasmussen stresses stylistic unity of design in order to refute theories that the Commentarii were published separately.
If this suggestion is correct, his use of O.R. is more complex than it at first appears. A lack of O.R. in the early books (BG 1-3, BC 1) is succeeded by an increasing frequency, perhaps suggesting that he builds a deliberate crescendo into each work. Two types of O.R. are clearly differentiated: direct speeches put into the mouths of his opponents carry with them a suggestion of inferiority, revealing the desire, and need, to persuade effectively. On the other hand, direct speeches by Romans are short, straightforward, and exhortatory, often accompanied by acts of singular bravery, or even self-sacrifice, which separate them from this implied inferiority. For Caesar, then, O.R. played a double role, enhancing the image of his own men while diminishing that of his opponents.

A Bellum Gallicum

(1) [4.25.3] During the first invasion of Britain, Caesar’s men get into difficulties: despite his efforts to resolve the problem (4.25.1), they continue to hesitate until the aquilifer speaks:

Atque nostris militibus cunctantibus...qui decimae legionis aquilam ferebat contestatus deos, ut ea res legionii feliciter eveniret, "Desilite" inquit "milites, nisi vultis aquilam hostibus prodere: ego certe meum rei publicae atque imperatorii officium praestitero".

The enemy tells lies in O.R., but Caesar relies (successfully) on indirect speech to put his own case.

Though even his subordinates were found to have something of a delicately insinuated and qualified inferiority.

Caesar attributes this to fear not of the enemy but of the water, 'propter altitudinem maris'.
After more than three books without O.R., this interlocution is extremely dramatic in its effect on the reader. A prayer to the gods highlights the momentous quality of speech and action, as he appeals to the *milites* to avoid all taint of dishonour, and claims that he at least does not shrink from his duty to Res Publica and Imperator. The coupling of loyalties is characteristic.

(2) [5.30.1] In 54 B.C., Q. Titius Sabinus and L. Aurunculeius Cotta, with five cohorts, are sent by Caesar to the Eburones, a tribe ruled by Ambiorix and Catuvolcus. The latter revolt, and after they have warned Sabinus and Cotta to escape under Ambiorix' protection, there is disagreement at a Roman *consilium*. Cotta, significantly with the support of military tribunes and *primi pili* centurions, wants to wait for Caesar, but Sabinus rejects this plan (5.28.7), at first in O.O.: when he is opposed, however, he changes to O.R.:

> Hac in utramque partem disputatione habitur, cum a Cotta primisque ordinibus acriter resisteretur, "Vincite", inquit, "si ita vultis", Sabinus, et id clariore voce, ut magna pars militum exaudiret: "neque is sum", inquit, "qui gravissime ex vobis mortis periculo terrear; hi sapient; si gravius quid acciderit, abs te rationem reposcent qui, si per te liceat, perendino die cum proximis hibernis coniuncti communem cum reliquis belli casum sustineant, non reiecti et relegati longe ab ceteris aut ferro aut fame intereant".

Like (1), the speech begins with an imperative followed by *inquit* and a conditional clause expressing what the speaker knows the hearer does not want to happen. Caesar attributes to Sabinus a wish of deceiving the men (*ut clarior*...); he shapes the scene to indicate a moral defect in Sabinus, whose lack of faith in Caesar's ability to come to the rescue is
depicted as a flaw of character. The point is made by various means: (i) The majority, including the centurions, sides with the opinion expressed first; (ii) only when O.O. has failed to persuade the men does Sabinus turn to O.R. (Caesar thus shows him as increasing his efforts to persuade); (iii) he is in effect bribing the troops (with a promise of safety) and casting doubt on his fellow officers’ good faith.

(3) [5.44.3] At the instigation of Ambiorix the Nervii try the safe-conduct trick on Q. Cicero. In the midst of this predicament comes the story of the rival centurions Pullo and Vorenus. When the fighting at the munitiones is at its height, Pullo challenges Vorenus with a question:

Ex his Pullo, cum accerrime ad munitiones pugnaretur, "quid dubitas", inquit, "Vorene? aut quem locum tuae pro laude virtutis spectas? hic dies de nostris controversiis iudicabit".

Like the previous Roman soldier in (1), he speaks brief words of exhortation: the rhetorical questions help to spur Vorenus to follow his rival.

(4) [6.8.4] Caesar marches against the Treveri, who are attacking Labienus. At a critical point in the fighting, Labienus encourages the men:

"Habetis", inquit, "militis, quam petistis facultatem: hostem impedito atque iniquo loco tenetis: praestate eandem nobis ducibus virtutem, quam saepe numero imperatori praestitistis, atque illum adesse et haec coram cernere existimate".

This time the imperative follows a statement of fact; Labienus is allowed to exhort the troops, but only by reminding them of their previous record of virtus under Caesar, and of the need to fight as if he were present and looking on. The effect is to make Caesar, not Labienus, the real source of inspiration.
(5) [6.35.8-10] This example of German treachery returns to the deceptive persuasion, rather than the brief exhortatory model, of O.R. One of the captivi interrogated by the Germans regarding Caesar's whereabouts (6.35) replies in O.R.:

"Quid vos", inquit, "hanc miseram ac tenuem sectamenti praedam quibus licet iam esse fortunatissimos? Tribus horis Aduatucam venire potestis: huc omnis suas fortunas exercitus Romanorum contulit; praesidi tantum est ut ne murus quidem cingi possit neque quisquam egredi extra munitiones audeat".

The deceptive O.R. of the captivus is here set against the dogged, and silent, bravery of Baculus (6.38).

(6) [7.20.8,12] At 7.14, following his defeat at Noviodunum, Vercingetorix calls a concilium to defend his actions, in O.O.: but when he and Caesar camp close to Avaricum (7.17-18), Vercingetorix is accused of treachery by his own side (7.20), and defends himself, first explaining the situation accurately, again in O.O., then changing to O.R., calling on witnesses to prove his case:

"Haec ut intellegatis", inquit, "a me sincere pronuntiari, audite Romanos milites". (7.20.8)

He produces servi (7.20.9), whom he had taught to state 'milites se esse legionarios' (and that the Roman army was starving and Caesar desperate). Again he breaks into O.R., after the O.O. account of what the slaves were to say:

"Haec", inquit, "a me" Vercingetorix "beneficia habetis, quem proditionis insimulatis; cuius opera sine vestro sanguine tantum exercitum victorem fame consumptum videtis; quem turpiter se ex fuga recipientem ne qua civitas suis finibus recipiat a me provisum est".

"A misrepresentation: see 6.36.1.

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O.R. here makes his false promise, and guarantee of what is outside his control, more striking; especially because of the dramatically ironic assertion of his honesty in the first O.R. There is an irony in the conclusion Caesar claims the Gauls drew from the speech:

Summum esse Vercingetorigem ducem nec de eius fide dubitandum nec maiore ratione bellum administrari posse. (7.21.1)

(7) [7.38.2-3] Convictolitavis the Aeduan, bribed by the Arverni, negotiates with Litaviccus, urging him to desert the Romans. Litaviccus leads the agreed 10,000 men to join Caesar, but thirty miles from Gergovia he calls a halt, gathers the milites, and addresses them, lacrimans:

"Quo proficiscimur", inquit, "milites? Omnis noster equitatus, omnis nobilitas interiit; principes civitatis...ab Romanis indicta causa interfecti sunt. Haec ab ipsis cognoscite qui ex ipsa caede fugerunt: nam ego fratribus atque omnibus meis propinquis interfectis dolore prohibeo quae gesta sunt pronuntiare".

As in (6), Litaviccus produces false witnesses, this time saying the Aeduan cavalry have been killed. He then urges the Aedui to go to Gergovia and join the revolt:

"Quasi vero", inquit ille, "consili sit res, ac non necesse sit nobis Gergoviam contendere et cum Arvernis nosmet coniungere. An dubitamus quin nefario facinore admisso Romani iam ad nos interficiendos concurrant? Proinde, si quid in nobis animi est, persequamur eorum mortem qui indignissime interierunt, atque hos latrones interficiamus".

The ironic conditional (quasi vero), rhetorical question, (an dubitamus), false logic (proinde), pejorative vocabulary
(nefaris facinore, indignissime, latrones) and a rousing jussive subjunctive are forcefully combined here.  

(8) [7.50.4-6] Gergovia leads to near-disaster through the incompetency of Caesar’s subordinates. The words of the wounded centurion M. Petronius re-establish Roman moral superiority at a time of military weakness:

"Quoniam", inquit, "me una vobiscum servare non possum, vestrae quidem certe vitae non prospiciam, quos cupiditate gloriae adductus in periculum deduxi. Vos data facultate vobis consulte".

In another context, he might have been condemned for letting personal ambition overcome his responsibility to protect his men, but the narrative needs a hero, and he provides one, like the aequilifer, and like Baculus, who rallied the men when ill. When his men still try to save him, he speaks again:

"Frustra", inquit, "meae vitae subvenire conamini, quem iam sanguis viresque deficiunt. Proinde abite, dum est facultas, vosque ad legiōnem recipite!"

Urgent imperatives and simple clauses emphasize the drama of the moment, as does the unelaborated statement of the result, 'Ita pugnans post paulum concidit ac suis saluti fuit'.

(9) [7.77.3-16] The frequency of O.R. has increased as the narrative draws to a climax: the longest direct speech is a set-piece illustration of Roman moral superiority through the depiction of Gallic primitiveness. During the siege of Alesia, when food becomes scarce, Critognatus recommends cannibalism. The speech, some 43 lines of O.C.T., is by far the longest in the BG: it is also the only extended ‘Gallic’

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The pejorative term latrones is not so much a contrast with the role of soldier, as a denigratory description of it. See e.g. Petron. Sat. 81-2, Apuleius Met. 4.8-13.
statement of the Gallic view of Rome. The following points are particularly significant:

(a) Critognatus repudiates deditio as servitus (77.3).

(b, i) He rejects a sortie (eruptio) as proving Gallic animi mollititia rather than virtus (because it would show they could not endure inopia (77.4-5). So far a plausible argument in military terms.

(b, ii) He develops this point with an example (77.5): more men are ready to die than to endure dolor or patientia.

(c) A further argument against eruptio - they may die through stultitia and temeritas, and still subject Gaul to perpetua servitus.

(d) In view of (6) and (7) above, there may be some irony in his rhetorical question at 77.10, 'An de eorum fide constantiaque dubitatis?': the reader knows there is good reason to doubt the reliability of Gauls.

(e) Vehemence increases with another rhetorical question, this time full of intentional irony (77.10).

(f) He gives another reason to be of good courage: the Romans are panicking (77.11; not substantiated in the narrative).

(g) The climax of the speech. He cites a precedent to support his argument: when the Cimbri and Teutones attacked their ancestors, they were forced to eat human flesh, 'eorum corporibus qui aetate ad bellum inutiles videbantur' (77.12). Thus Caesar suggests the primitive savagery and moral inferiority of the enemy.

(h) This is confirmed at 77.13, when Critognatus claims it is no regrettable necessity, but a fine example to future
generations: after all, the Cimbri moved on, but the Romans would stay and inflict 'aeternam...servitutem' (77.14-.15).

(i) A generalisation: 'neque enim ulla alia condicione bella gesserunt' (77.15).

(j) He ends the speech by pointing to the example of the part of Gaul which was already under Roman control (servitus).

This final speech is the only one in the BG in which O.R. becomes a vehicle for the exploration of themes and ideas, as well as for persuasion to action.

**Distribution of Speeches in the Bellum Gallicum.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Inspiring/Impressive</th>
<th>Deceptive/Barbarous</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1) Roman <em>aquilifer</em></td>
<td>2) Sabinus</td>
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<tr>
<td>3) Roman centurion</td>
<td>5) Gallic captive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4) Labienus</td>
<td>6) Vercingetorix</td>
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<tr>
<td>8) Petronius</td>
<td>7) Litaviccus</td>
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<td>9) Critognatus</td>
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**Length of Speeches (in lines of O.C.T.)**

1) 2.5  2) 6.5  3) 2  4) 4  5) 5  6) 1/5  7) 6.5/6  8) 4  9) 43.

Note: No Gaul is given an inspiring O.R. speech: the only Roman who uses *oratio recta* to deceive is condemned, not emulated.

All direct speeches in the BG are straightforward in form, always with *inquit*, always urging action of some kind: the distribution between sides is even (with the exception of Sabinus) - four Roman 'good' speeches, four enemy 'bad' speeches.
B Bellum Civile

In the BC, the reader again has to wait for Q.R. (this time until the second book): the problem of characterising a Roman enemy is reflected in the less clear-cut way in which direct speech is used. 8

(1a) [2.31] After some initial skirmishes, fear of a mutiny leads Curio to hold a consilium (2.29), at which some suggest flight, others engagement, but Curio rejects both in a long speech (24 O.C.T. lines). This first example of Q.R. exposes the importance of the role of persuasion in maintaining loyalty in the war.

(1b) [2.32.2-14] Curio then holds a contio militum (32.1). The juxtaposition of speeches on the same theme but to different audiences underlines the importance of persuasion: it is no accident that the speech to the men is twice the length of that to the officers. Curio begins in Q.O. by recalling Corfinium, but breaks into direct speech to describe how omnia municipia followed suit (thereby helping his hearers to feel they are comfortable in the majority). He encourages in them a sense of superiority to Pompey’s troops (32.3), and hints at Pompey’s cowardice (‘nullo proelio pulsus...’). His reminder to the men of Caesar’s achievements and strong position (32.5-6) includes a dramatic irony, for in trying to be rhetorically persuasive, he also makes a (post eventum in effect) prophecy. When he defends them against charges of betrayal, he is upheld by the narrative (1.19.2): this defence

8 Many of these examples have already been discussed in Chapter III.
is expressed in a series of twelve rhetorical questions (32.4-9), answered with heavy irony, 'Relinquitur nova religio'.

(2) [2.34.4] A brief speech by a legatus called Rebilus, a man who showed 'magnum...usum in re militari', urging Curio to follow up his advantage:

"Perterritum', inquit, "hostem vides, Curio; quid dubitas uti temporis opportunitate?"

This speech recalls the use of O.R. in the BG to persuade the listener to action.

(3) [2.39.2-3] Curio's lapse into folly is highlighted by the dramatically ironic false logic which Caesar has him use:

"Videtisne", inquit, "milites, captivorum orationem cum perfugis convenire?"

(4) [3.18.4] Here Caesar gives Pompey a speech which acts as a proof text of his arrogantia. He rejects 'beneficium Caesaris' as an insult, making 'colloquia de pace' impossible (18.5). Caesar claims it is a report made by those who were present, anxious to establish its authenticity as a proof of Pompey's responsibility for the continuation of the war.

(5) [3.19.8] Unlike Pompey, Labienus has not even pride to excuse him, but with Gallic bloodthirstiness he ends negotiations:

"Desinite ergo de compositione loqui; nam nobis nisi Caesaris capite relato pax esse nulla potest".

(6) [3.64.3] Caesar's men are in some danger (3.63.8, 65.1) in the lead-up to Pharsalus: but an aguilifer is once more at hand. This time he bravely sacrifices his own life and saves the aquila.

(7-9) [3.85.4; 86.2-4, 91.2-3] The next three O.R. examples form what is perhaps the most interesting case in the BC: in
quick succession come speeches from Caesar himself (a very
dramatic moment), from Pompey, and from Labienus. Caesar's
message is simple, the sort of thing he has said before in
O.O.:

"Differendum est", inquit, "iter in praesentia nobis
et de proelio cogitandum, sicut semper depoposcimus.
Animo sumus ad dimicandum parati; non facile
occasionem postea reperiemus". Confestimque
expeditas copias educit.

Nothing could be simpler or more direct than these short
sentences, but this very simplicity suggests greater courage
and determination than a long speech could do. In a speech
nearly three times as long, Pompey sets out his elaborate
battle strategy, to beat the enemy even before the lines have
met. In stylistic contrast, Pompey speaks in long and complex
sentences. This contrast is highlighted by the introduction
of Labienus to play the sycophantic adviser. His speech is
three lines longer than Pompey's, which was six lines longer
than Caesar's. It is no doubt intentional that Caesar has him
make the judgement that Pompey's plan is right on the basis of
his knowledge of the Caesarean forces in Gaul.

(10) [3.91.2-3] The final example of O.R. from one of
Caesar’s men, this is an inspiring speech from Crastinus, who
had been primi pili centurio of the Tenth the previous year.
He proclaims his belief in their eventual victory, and
displays his loyalty to Caesar:

"Sequimini me", inquit, "manpulares mei... et vestro
imperatoris quem constituistis operam date. Unum hoc
proelium superest; quo confecto et ille suam
dignitatem et nos nostram libertatem reciperamus".
Simul respiciens Caesarem, "Faciam", inquit, "hodie,
imperator, ut aut vivo mihi aut mortuo gratias
agas".

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With the words *libertas* and *dignitas*, the interests of leader and men are identified in a way which leaves no doubt of the eventual result of the battle: no such harmony of interests is shown by the Pompeian side.

(11) [3.94.6] The last O.R. speech of the BC is reserved for Pompey, a clinching proof of his cowardice and also a strong reminder of Domitius’ betrayal. Pompey lies to the centurions guarding the praetorian gate:

"Tuemini", inquit, "castra et defendite diligenter, si quid durius acciderit. Ego reliquas portas circumeo et castrorum praesidia confirmo".

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**Distribution of Speeches in the Bellum Civile**

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<thead>
<tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1a) Curio (to officers)</td>
<td>4) Pompey</td>
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<tr>
<td>1b) Curio (to men)</td>
<td>5) Labienus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2) Rebilus</td>
<td>8) Pompey</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3) Curio (mistakenly)</td>
<td>9) Labienus</td>
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<tr>
<td>6) Aquilifer</td>
<td>11) Pompey</td>
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<tr>
<td>7) Caesar</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10) Crastinus</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Length of Speeches (in lines of O.C.T.)**

1) 24; 2) 48; 3) 2; 4) 3.5; 5) 2; 6) 4.5; 7) 3; 8) 9.5; 9) 12; 10) 5.5; 11) 2.5.

Note: None of Caesar’s opponents is allowed to inspire, but the emphasis is on folly and self-deception. Only Labienus gets the full ‘Gallic’ treatment.
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