Jordan, Palestine and the British World System, 1945-57: Glubb Pasha and the Arab Legion

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This thesis offers a microcosmic insight into Britain’s transition toward a world system without an Empire by exploring the life of the Anglo-Jordan Treaty (1946-57) via the prism of the British financed Jordanian Army, also known as the Arab Legion, and its British commander, Glubb Pasha. In so doing it puts the state of the relationship down to a system of mutual dependence. Britain’s withdrawal from Jordan has primarily been linked either to the success of Arab nationalism or the loss of British will. By examining the Treaty relationship from construction to termination this thesis posits that it is imprudent to push any single factor too deeply, but identifies a shift in the balance of mutual dependence, caused by the changing geopolitical climate, as the driving force.

A subsidiary aspect of this thesis concerns the partition of Palestine. The Arab Legion was the most important Arab army during the 1948 War. Based on unprecedented access to Glubb’s private papers – the most significant new documents to emerge since the opening of the official western archives in the late 1970s – this thesis provides the most accurate portrayal of the Arab Legion’s conduct yet achievable. In so doing it reconciles inconsistencies within the controversial ‘collusion’ debate. It negates the revisionist argument that a firm Hashemite-Zionist agreement existed, but corroborates the notion that Britain approved the Arab Legion’s use to implement an alternative form of partition to that proposed by the UN. It thus supports the revisionist argument that pre-war negotiations helped shape the 1948 War, but explains the Arab Legion’s adherence to this secret scheme by emphasising Glubb’s (limited) autonomy. Moreover, it reveals further details concerning the divisions within the Arab coalition, which further debunks the traditional David (Israel) versus Goliath (Arab coalition) portrayal of the conflict.
The purpose of this thesis is to unpack Jordan’s relationship with two crucial issues during what is arguably the most crucial decade in the history of the Arab world: the 1948 War in Palestine and the nature of Britain’s moment in the Middle East. This thesis tackles these issues by providing an analysis of the post-Second World War role of the Arab Legion – the Jordanian Army, as it was known until 1956 – and its British commander, John Bagot Glubb – more commonly known as Glubb Pasha. This is not a history of Jordan. At heart this is an assessment of Jordan, the Arab Legion, and Glubb within the context of the British world system.

The driving force of this thesis is unprecedented access to what is best described as the unofficial archive of the Arab Legion, which includes a massive new accession of Glubb’s private papers. This new archival material is most pertinently used to provide a significant reappraisal of the partition of Palestine and the 1948 War. The continued contemporary resonance of the Arab-Israeli conflict has helped maintain a lively historiography. During the first three decades following the 1948 War the historiography was dominated by an official history that pitched Israel as the underdog in a David versus Goliath struggle. The opening of the official archives in Britain, Israel and the United States in the late 1970s, however, prompted a wave of revisionist histories. This group of historians challenged three key issues: the causes of the refugee crisis; the military balance of the war; and the reasons why a formal peace settlement proved elusive. It is the military balance issue and its three subsidiary controversies – the Hashemite-Zionist relationship; the war aims of the Arab states; and the role of Britain – that concern us here. The flag-bearer for the revisionist take on the military balance of the war is Avi Shlaim’s controversial
Collusion thesis. Like Uri Bar-Joseph a year earlier, who described Israel and Transjordan as being the Best of Enemies during the 1948 War, Shlaim gave scholarly, archival-based credence to the charge that King Abdullah colluded with the Zionists to partition Palestine in contravention of the November 1947 UN partition plan, which proposed the creation of a Jewish state and an independent Palestinian Arab state when the British mandate ended in May 1948. A subsidiary contention is that Britain supported this 'collusion'. The significance of these negotiations for the revisionist historians is that they helped dictate the outcome of the 1948 War. The 'collusion' thesis has been subject to harsh criticism and the debate has become somewhat stuck in a cycle of revision and counter-revision, based on alternative interpretations of the same sets of sources. What the debate has long been waiting for is access to the official archives of the Arab states, which have remained closed. This thesis is based on the next best thing: unprecedented access to the private papers of the Arab Legion's British commander, Glubb Pasha.

The Arab Legion was the most important Arab army during the 1948 War. It was the best trained; it did most of the fighting; and it successfully secured the West Bank, which was annexed to Jordan when the fighting finished. A better understanding of the Arab Legion's war aims and its conduct is therefore crucial to furthering our understanding of this controversial event. Based on this vital new evidence this thesis supports the revisionist argument that the pre-war negotiations between Abdullah and the Jewish Agency, and between the Jordanians and the British helped shape the 1948 War and yet posits a significant nuance, which reconciles some of the principal criticisms of the 'collusion' thesis. Via its focus on the conduct of the Arab Legion this thesis posits
that the Hashemite-Zionist process of ‘collusion’ did not result in a firm agreement, or understanding. Rather, it provided the two parties merely with a comprehension of each other’s aims and objectives and therefore an awareness of how and where these issues dovetailed. The crucial consequence of these talks was that they encouraged Abdullah to pursue his dynastic objectives in Palestine. It gave him confidence that the Zionists would acquiesce in his annexation of the Arab areas of Palestine – to create Greater Transjordan – and thus prompted him to seek British support for this scheme. It was the resulting meeting between the British Foreign Secretary, the Jordanian Prime Minister, and Glubb in February 1948 that defined the Arab Legion’s conduct thereafter and therefore helped shape the 1948 War. This meeting governed Glubb’s strict adherence to the Greater Transjordan scheme of occupying the Arab areas of Palestine and acquiescing in the establishment of Israel, despite the pan-Arab pressure that influenced Abdullah. Recognising Glubb’s limited autonomy over the Arab Legion, at the height of the conflict, is crucial to reconciling the inconsistencies within both sides of the ‘collusion’ debate. By distinguishing between the influence of Abdullah and Glubb this thesis reconciles the intense fighting, particularly in Jerusalem, with the Arab Legion’s otherwise limited approach to the conflict. This thesis also emphasises the inter-Arab rivalries that helped sustain the conflict and provided the Zionists an opportunity to exploit for the purpose of Israel’s expansion. Had it not been for the political jockeying amongst the Arab states partition would likely have been much smoother, and Israel much smaller. Inter-Arab rivalries made the process much more difficult for the Arab Legion and created the conditions for the Zionists to exploit. This prompted Glubb to acquiesce in the defeat of the Egyptian Army as a means of enabling the
start of negotiations toward peace. In short, what this aspect of the thesis demonstrates is that, while a firm Hashemite-Zionist agreement may not have existed, the 1948 War was nonetheless heavily influenced by the Greater Transjordan scheme; the eventual success of which owed much to Glubb who was integral to its preparation, its implementation, and its eventual consolidation in the form of the 1949 armistice. By offering a more accurate appreciation of the Arab Legion's involvement than has previously been possible, including its war aims and the rationale behind key decisions, this thesis provides significant new insights into the nature of this conflict, which further debunks the David versus Goliath myth.

Beyond the partition of Palestine, this thesis provides important new insights into several key events between 1945-57. It offers a first detailed assessment of British involvement in the royal succession crisis and the short reign of King Talal, which followed the assassination of Jordan’s King Abdullah in 1951. In so doing it emphasises Britain's policy of selective non-intervention as it sought to surreptitiously pull the strings behind-the-scenes, promoting Talal’s accession as a stopgap until Hussein came-of-age. This thesis also contributes to popular debates concerning the causes and consequences of the 1956 Suez Crisis. Via a detailed analysis of the British reaction to Glubb’s abrupt dismissal from Jordan in 1956 this thesis quashes the hitherto accepted contention that the British believed that Egypt's Gamal Abdel Nasser engineered this act. It therefore negates the extent to which Glubb's dismissal was a significant causal factor leading to Britain's attempt to topple Nasser. This study also negates the popular theme that the Suez Crisis was an all-defining watershed moment, by illustrating how this crisis delayed rather than caused the process of terminating
the Anglo-Jordanian Treaty. It details how Glubb’s dismissal exposed the burdens of the alliance – financially, politically, and militarily – from Britain’s perspective.

The overarching rationale of this thesis is to provide a microcosmic insight into Britain’s transition toward a world system without an Empire by examining the life of the Anglo-Jordanian Treaty (1946-57). In his study on Britain’s post-war retreat John Darwin extolled the need to focus on a broad range of relationships in order to understand the deeper causes of decolonisation. Yet he also accentuated his indebtedness to more detailed studies of bilateral relations. That is the entry point at which this study seeks to contribute to the broader issues. By furthering our understanding of how Britain’s bilateral relations with the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan evolved in the aftermath of the Second World War via the prism of Glubb and the Arab Legion. Ronald Hyam astutely observed that you cannot understand how the British Empire was dismantled without knowing how it was constructed. Similarly, on a smaller scale, it is necessary to understand the construction of Britain’s treaty relationship with Jordan, in order to explain its termination. By assessing the life of the Treaty, from construction to termination, and the role of Glubb and the Arab Legion therein, this thesis provides an answer to two core questions: why did the British remain? And why did they retreat? With regards the first question there are three principal explanations for Britain’s presence in the Middle East generally. It was either about maintaining prestige and therefore the perception of British power; or securing practical geostrategic assets; or it had a psychological driver – a neurotic need to cling on to empire. The second question (what factors led Britain to withdraw?) has spawned four principal explanations.
To borrow Ronald Hyam’s cricketing analogy, the British were either: bowled out by nationalists and freedom fighters; run out by imperial overstretch and economic constraints; retired due to loss of will; or booed off by international criticism. In explaining the construction, sustenance and termination of the Anglo-Jordanian Treaty this thesis accords with Peter Sluglett and John Gallagher’s assertions that it is impertinent to emphasise any single factor too deeply. Both Britain’s presence and its withdrawal were products of a multitude of forces. Prestige and neuroses were certainly factors in Britain’s continued presence in Jordan and its desire to control the Arab Legion. However, both these explanations were founded on the practical purpose of securing Jordan as a geostrategic asset for the defence of its world system. Policymakers might not always have made clear-headed balance sheet calculations of material interests, but the national interest was nonetheless the driving force. With regards Britain’s retreat the least convincing explanation, as Ronald Hyam iterated, is the loss of will. Arab nationalism and economic overstretch were both important forces, but neither were singularly determinative. Nor were they the original seed of the Treaty’s demise. If one single factor helps bind these multiple explanations together it is, as both Hyam and Darwin have contended, the changing international climate. This is at the centre of the interaction of forces involved in the existence and demise of the Anglo-Jordanian treaty-based relationship.

The crux of the argument advanced here is that the Treaty was built on and sustained by a system of mutual dependence and it was a change in the balance of this system, as a result of the changing geopolitical climate, that brought about the Treaty’s demise. The British remained in Jordan because they
were reliant on the Hashemite Kingdom as a geostrategic haven and the relationship was sustained because Abdullah was equally dependent on Britain’s financial and military support. For the most part, the Arab Legion was not a British imperial defence asset in its own right; it was primarily the price for maintaining the internal security and goodwill of Jordan. The Treaty relationship deteriorated as the balance of dependence shifted, owing to the changing international and geopolitical environment. Britain's withdrawal from Palestine; its increasingly fraught relationship with Egypt; and the Cold War with the Soviet Union; all these factors increased Britain's dependence on Jordan as a geostrategic safe haven. These same factors, however, made Jordan less reliant on Britain. In response to the Soviet threat the British anglicised the Arab Legion, but this merely added fuel to the fire of anti-British Arab nationalists, which in-turn encouraged the Jordanians to establish greater control of the Arab Legion. The British became more dependent on Jordan, prompting them to maintain and assert more control. Meanwhile the British connection increasingly became a liability to the Hashemite Kingdom and it too desired more control to offset the threat of Arab nationalism. At the centre of this struggle were Glubb and the Arab Legion. Piers Brendon described the mandate system as ‘a continuation of imperialism by other means’. Meanwhile the first moves toward independence have been characterised by M.A. Fitzsimons as ‘Empire by Treaty’. These are apt portrayals of British attempts to maintain control of geostrategic assets of its world system within a changing international climate. The ending of the Anglo-Jordanian Treaty in 1957 was another example of the British world system evolving in response to the global conditions that it adapted to and was shaped by.
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It goes without saying, of course, that any errors and omissions are mine, and mine alone.
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Introduction

In the process of finishing this thesis the Middle East has once again been dominating the international news headlines: civil war in Syria; the surge of the Islamic State in Iraq; and the escalating Israeli siege of Gaza. Since the 2011 uprisings different parts of the Arab world have almost taken it in turns to dominate the international segments of western news media: Tunisia, Egypt, Libya and Bahrain have all had their moment in the spotlight. Jordan, however, has remained largely overlooked, except, if you listen carefully, as a location upon which refugees have descended from other states that have dominated the news headlines, such as Palestine, Syria, and Iraq. This hints at Jordan’s centrality, if only geographically. However, Jordan’s apparent absence within the international current affairs consciousness belies its centrality to the politics of the region, particularly its historical significance in relation both to the Arab-Israeli conflict and to Britain’s moment in the Middle East. The purpose of this thesis is to unpack Jordan’s relationship to these two crucial issues during what is arguably the most crucial decade in the history of the Arab world.¹

In particular this thesis seeks to provide an analysis of the post-Second World War role of the Arab Legion – the Jordanian Army, as it was known until 1956 – and its British commander, John Bagot Glubb – more commonly known as Glubb Pasha. This is not a history of Jordan. At heart this is an assessment of Jordan, the Arab Legion, and Glubb within the context of the British world

system. During the post-First World War carve up of the Middle East Britain was granted a League of Nations mandate over two territories, Iraq and Palestine, and in 1921 the British split the Palestine mandate in two. This created the state of Transjordan, east of the river Jordan. In Palestine Britain retained administrative control of the mandate, effectively running it as a colony, but in Iraq and Transjordan the British installed two brothers of the Hashemite dynasty to rule: Feisal in Iraq and Abdullah in Transjordan. The British maintained control of security, however, and created the Transjordan Reserve Mobile Force, a gendarmerie primarily tasked with policing this fledgling political entity. In 1923 this force was renamed the Arab Legion, by Lieutenant-Colonel Frederick Peake. Glubb arrived in Jordan in 1930, as Peake’s second in command, in order to repeat his feat of pacifying tribes in Iraq during the 1920s. Within two years Glubb had brought an end to tribal raiding across the border with Saudi Arabia by integrating Bedouin tribes into the Arab Legion. In 1939 Glubb replaced Peake as commander of the Arab Legion and almost immediately saw the force revolutionised by the Second World War when it was converted from an internal security force of approximately 1,000 men in 1939, into an ad hoc army containing about 6,000 men by 1945. This thesis explores the evolving role of this newly formed army thereafter. The Arab Legion was very much at the centre of the Anglo-Jordanian connection. This examination thus provides a window

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2 Throughout this thesis ‘Transjordan’ will be used to refer specifically to the pre-1948 state, prior to the occupation of the West Bank. When referring specifically to the post-1948 state, or when referring to the state in general terms, it will be referred to as ‘Jordan’. State association will be referred to as ‘Jordanian’ throughout, regardless of periodization.
into the nature of this relationship and offers an insight into Britain’s moment in the Middle East. A subsidiary, but no less important, aspect of this thesis is its assessment of the Arab Legion’s role in the partition of Palestine and the 1948 War.

As an overarching framework, this thesis very consciously refers to the contraction of the British world system, rather than the decline of the British Empire. In many ways this is a subtle distinction, but it is an important one, which better accommodates the exit point of this thesis. John Gallagher pioneered the term, contending that:

‘[T]he “empire”, as a set of colonies and other dependencies, was just the tip of the iceberg that made up the British world system as a whole, a system of influence as well as power which, indeed, preferred to work through informal methods of influence when possible, and through formal methods of rule only when necessary.’

More recently John Darwin has preferred the concept of a British world system to the usual term ‘empire’, largely because it better conveys British imperialism as a disparate, ‘global phenomenon’, governed by ‘global conditions’. Darwin posited five reasons why it is productive to evaluate British imperialism within this framework. Firstly, it brings to the fore the rest of the globe as a factor to explain Britain’s place in the world, rather than merely its own power. Secondly, it enables a clearer view of the ‘actual trajectory of British world power’, charting its rise and fall. Thirdly, the ‘systemic’ view reminds us that it was a flexible entity in which overseas elements were ruled and interacted with in a multitude of different ways. Fourthly, it encourages the inclusion of the white dominions, which are often ignored within imperial historiography. Fifth, and finally, Darwin

explains that, ‘by thinking in terms of a British system of world power, not of a bundle of territories superintended from London, we can make some better sense of the final strange phase of British imperialism: the zigzags and U-turns after the Second World War’. The British world system is preferred here primarily because it better accommodates the trajectory of Britain’s overseas involvement beyond empire. As Ashley Jackson has pertinently observed: ‘[T]he search for the end of the “British empire” during the “decolonisation period” has led to an artificial division of the post-Second World War years into a period of “declining empire” and one of “post-empire”, in which the links between the two have been very poorly conceptualised.’ Periodization can both help and hinder. Certainly the concepts of a second, third and even a fourth British Empire provide a useful means of observing its evolution and driving forces. The danger, however, of the periodization of decolonisation and declining empire, as Jackson laments, and exaggerating Britain’s retreat, as Philip Murphy reminds us, is that we risk ‘missing the continuities in British policy’. Jackson asserts that a better understanding of the continuities of Britain’s external relations would emerge if ‘imperial historians could connect their accounts to the premierships

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of Margaret Thatcher and Tony Blair'. To be clear, this thesis does not purport to link its findings to more recent events; this is very much a study of the 1940s and 1950s. However, it is nonetheless important to situate this work within a framework that is better able to make these connections. Britain may no longer have an empire of colonies, but it maintains a network of benignly labelled overseas territories across the globe – including Diego Garcia, Gibraltar and the Falkland Islands – that form a part of a continuing British world system. Placing this research within the context of an evolving world system provides greater scope to account for both the changes and the continuities in Britain’s post-war policy and prevents us from being restricted by constructing an artificial division to Britain’s relationship with the world.

While this thesis shuns the ‘end of empire’ as a potentially limiting framework it nonetheless embraces and engages with this historiographical debate. In broad terms the purpose of this thesis is to provide an insight into the nature of British foreign policy during this period of transition toward a world system without an empire and it seeks to contribute to this debate by taking a microcosmic look at British involvement in the Middle East, an area that Ernest Bevin, the British Foreign Secretary between 1945-51, considered to be ‘of cardinal importance to the United Kingdom, second only to the United Kingdom itself’. In his historiographical survey of Britain’s engagement with the Middle East, Peter Sluglett identified a lamentably sparse literature range. He posited two reasons for this. Firstly, historians focusing on the Middle East have tended to consider themselves as regional historians, rather than historians of the

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10 Jackson, ‘Empire and Beyond’, pp. 1354, 1358.
British Empire. As Yoav Alon added, Middle East historians tend not to engage with the wider field of imperial history and its theoretical underpinnings. The second factor highlighted by Sluglett is that broader, more theoretical studies of Empire have tended to ignore the area, or to see its constituent units as part of another whole – the Gulf as part of the wider history of British India, Egypt as part of the Scramble for Africa – or to subsume it under some generalised notion of the “the periphery”. Moreover, historians have primarily focused on the Eastern Question, Egypt, and Palestine. Sluglett cites Cain and Hopkins two-volume study *British Imperialism* as being indicative of this factor and Elizabeth Monroe’s *Britain’s Moment in the Middle East* as the sole exception to cover the whole region over an extended period of time. Sluglett does, however, point to important studies of British involvement across the whole Middle East over a shorter timespan, including Wm. Roger Louis’s *Britain and the Middle East* and John Darwin’s *Britain and Decolonisation*. John Gallagher has also made significant reference to the Middle East in his broader assessments of the British Empire’s decline. Since Sluglett wrote his essay this historiographical schism has started to be rectified. Not in the broader studies of empire. Ronald Hyam’s study of *Britain’s Declining Empire*, and Piers Brendon’s tour de force on the *Decline and Fall of the British Empire*, for example, limit their Middle East related

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15 Gallagher, *Decline, Revival and Fall*, pp. 73-154.
attention to the staple diet of Palestine and Egypt.\textsuperscript{16} Brendon, though, does give brief mention to problems in Iraq after the First World War and an eloquent portrayal of Britain’s presence in Aden. The most notable recent exception is Fieldhouse’s ‘broad introductory overview’ of \textit{Western Imperialism in the Middle East}, written for a ‘general readership’, in which he synthesises that ‘Britain and France were there for their own purposes, strategic, economic, ideological’, and that they ‘left when it was no longer convenient to stay’.\textsuperscript{17} There has, though, been a notable rise of regionally focused studies written with an imperial bent. This trend has primarily focused on Britain’s military withdrawal from east of Suez in the 1960-70s, with particular focus on the Gulf region, and is no doubt a product of the relevant documents being recently released according to the thirty-year rule.\textsuperscript{18}

From both a regional and a British imperial perspective, Jordan has remained somewhat under-researched. The literature on British involvement in Jordan is steadily growing, but it remains a largely overlooked aspect of Britain’s engagement with the Middle East.\textsuperscript{19} Nowhere is this more glaringly obvious than in a recent edited collection designed to explore Britain’s historical and contemporary involvement in the Middle East. While Palestine, Israel, the Levant

\textsuperscript{16} Ronald Hyam, \textit{Britain’s Declining Empire: The Road to Decolonisation, 1918-1968} (Cambridge, 2006), pp. 123-9; 221-40; Piers Brendon, \textit{The Decline and Fall of the British Empire, 1781-1997} (London, 2007), pp. 311-327, 460-509.
(in this case, Lebanon and Syria), Iraq, Egypt, Yemen, and the Gulf all have at least one chapter devoted to them, Jordan is conspicuous by its absence. Yet exploring how Britain managed relations with its closest regional ally during this period of upheaval is crucial to helping us understand how Britain's role in the Middle East and throughout the world evolved after the Second World War. Even where it has been a focus of study, Jordan has suffered from its own periodization pattern. Jordanian historiography, whether it involves a British focus or not, can be almost unanimously divided into two periodical categories. In the first instance, historians have been interested in the making of the Jordanian state under King Abdullah (until 1946 he was Emir). In the second instance historians have explored the political survival of Abdullah’s grandson, King Hussein – and the inherent survival of the state. There are only a handful of exceptions to this periodization divide, including two general histories of Jordan by Ann Dearden and Philip Robins; N.H. Aruri’s study of Jordan’s *Political Development*; Ilan Pappé’s single chapter on British rule between

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20 Levey and Podeh (eds.), *Britain and the Middle East*.  
Joseph Massad’s study of the ‘production’ of Jordanian national identity and culture; and Roberts Satloff’s *Jordan in Transition*. However, while as the title suggests, Satloff explores the transition from Abdullah to Hussein, his primary focus is ‘the years following the 1951 assassination of Abdullah’. This thesis, however, transcends this dividing line and examines Britain’s relationship with Jordan across this transitory period, thus involving the reigns of all three of the Jordan’s first three kings: Abdullah, Talal, and Hussein.

In this assessment of Britain’s relationship with Jordan there are two core questions: Why were the British present? And why did they depart? In part, both questions query the thinking of the ‘official mind’. This term, pioneered by Robinson and Gallagher, describes the ‘collective mind of government’, the sum of Whitehall’s parts. In its fiftieth anniversary year this concept remains an important tool not only for imperial historians, but also for anyone interested in the workings of high-policy. It is particularly useful for helping to understand how Jordan and the Arab Legion fitted into the British world system and, equally, this microcosmic assessment of the Arab Legion provides an insight into the workings of the official mind and the nature of the system it sought to control.

With regard the first question (why were the British present?) there are three principal explanations for Britain’s presence in the Middle East generally:

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prestige, practical, and psychological. During the nineteenth century Britain’s Middle East policy was primarily designed to ensure the maintenance of the Ottoman Empire as a means of limiting the influence of its European rivals – notably Russia – and allowing transit to India and the East. Britain had no desire to become embroiled in direct control of the region.\textsuperscript{29} As a result of the First World War and the capitulation of the Ottoman Empire Britain assumed new imperial burdens in the Middle East in order to uphold its interests in the region – not least the increasing importance of Middle East oil.\textsuperscript{30} This implies that until the Second World War Britain’s presence in the Middle East had primarily practical motives. It is beyond 1945, however, where the debate concerning practical, prestige and psychological factors really centres. The question, perhaps, is not so much why were the British present, but why did they remain? Spencer Mawby’s account of British policy in Aden is underpinned by the notion that policymakers were motivated by a desire to maintain prestige and influence rather than ‘a simple calculation of material interests’\textsuperscript{31} Similarly, John Kent argues that Britain’s military presence in Egypt was primarily about prestige. He contends that it was recognised that the Suez base – the largest military base in the world – was not adequate to defend Middle East oil or Britain’s treaty obligations to keep out the Soviets. Thus, Britain’s military presence must simply have been designed to uphold British prestige and the perception that it was a world power.\textsuperscript{32} Michael Cohen is not convinced by this argument, however,\textsuperscript{3}

\textsuperscript{29} M.A. Fitzsimons,\textit{ Empire by Treaty: Britain and the Middle East in the Twentieth Century} (London, 1965), pp. 4-6.
\textsuperscript{30} Fitzsimons,\textit{ Empire by Treaty}, pp. 15-16.
\textsuperscript{31} Mawby,\textit{ British Policy in Aden}, p. 3.
\textsuperscript{32} John Kent, ‘Informal Empire and the Defence of the Middle East 1945-56’, in: Roy Bridges (ed.),\textit{ Imperialism, Decolonization and Africa} (Basingstoke, 2000),
noting that it belies the ‘gravity’ with which both the civilian and the military leaders regarded the Soviet threat. For Cohen, the primary purpose of Britain’s military presence in the Middle East was its practical strategic importance in the event of global war against the Soviet Union.\(^{33}\) A third explanation for Britain’s continued imperial presence emphasises a psychological, or habitual, driver. William Roger Louis has referred to British statesmen suffering ‘from neuroses about holding what they had inherited.’\(^{34}\) Similarly, Piers Brendon’s has appraised that: ‘[T]he British kept Aden because they could and because they were \textit{conditioned by the past}.’\(^{35}\)

The second question (what factors led Britain to withdraw?) tackles an equally complex process, which has spawned four principal explanations. To borrow Ronald Hyam’s cricketing analogy, the British were either: bowled out by nationalists and freedom-fighters; run out by imperial overstretch and economic constraints; retired due to loss of will; or boozed off by international criticism.\(^{36}\) Elizabeth Monroe emphasised Britain’s loss of will. She pointed to Britain’s inability to quell the drive for self-determination in Ireland, in 1922, as creating a ‘loss of imperial nerve’. Monroe placed this within a generalised decline in ‘confidence about empire’.\(^{37}\) Nigel Ashton considers this ‘equally applicable’ to


\(^{35}\) Brendon, \textit{Decline and Fall}, p. 502 [emphasis added].

\(^{36}\) Hyam, \textit{Britain’s Declining Empire}, p. xiii.

Britain’s retreat from the Middle East during the 1960s and applies this ‘psychological’ explanation to Britain’s military intervention in Jordan in 1958 and Kuwait in 1961. He effectively posits that both Britain’s failures, such as the 1956 Suez debacle, and successes, such as the intervention in Jordan and Kuwait, had a negative psychological impact on Britain’s willingness to act in defence of its interests in the Middle East.  

38 Martin Jones’s account of Britain’s withdrawal from Palestine effectively accords with the loss of will argument. He asserts that ‘the British Government decided to leave because it knew it had failed in Palestine’.  

39 Ronald Hyam, however, describes the ‘failure of will’ as being the ‘weakest’ of all the explanations. Instead he emphasises international pressures and constraints as being the most ‘persuasive’ and the ‘most important’.  

40 Similarly, in The Empire Project Darwin’s overarching argument is that the fate of the British world system was ‘largely determined by geopolitical forces over which the British themselves had little control’.  

41 Spencer Mawby, meanwhile, puts Britain’s withdrawal from Yemen in 1967 down to the success of Arab nationalism rather than a British loss of will or the reduction of material capability.  

42 Similarly, Ilan Pappé argues that Britain failed to deal with the Palestinisation of Jordan and rising anti-British Arab nationalism in the wake of its annexation of the West Bank after 1948. The result was the abrupt dismissal

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40 Hyam, Britain’s Declining Empire, pp. xiii-xiv.  
42 Mawby, British Policy in Aden, p. 3.
of Glubb in 1956, and the end of British dominance in Jordan. Others have accentuated domestic considerations. Shohei Sato argues that Britain’s withdrawal from the Persian Gulf in 1971 was a ‘means to justify the Labour government’s reversal of its [domestic] social policies’. Sato asserts that the economic saving of this military withdrawal was negligible and that it was designed to ‘justify’ more significant social cuts in Britain, which risked harming the Labour Party’s political standing. Both Peter Sluglett and John Gallagher posit that it is unwise to give any single factor too much prominence. Gallagher maintains that at different times and in different locales each of these factors may have been more, or less, significant. The purpose of this thesis is not to seek a universal explanation, but an understanding of the situation within one particular locale: Jordan. In his study on Britain’s post-war decline, John Darwin extolled the need to focus on a broad range of relationships in order to understand the deeper causes of decolonisation. Yet he also accentuated his indebtedness to more detailed studies of bilateral relations. That is the entry point at which this study seeks to contribute to the broader issues. By furthering our understanding of how Britain’s bilateral relations with the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan evolved in the aftermath of the Second World War via the prism of Glubb and the Arab Legion

Hitherto the Arab Legion has largely been spared significant critical analysis. The Arab Legion, as a subject, has predominantly been the preserve of

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45 Sluglett, ‘Formal and Informal Empire’, p. 430; Gallagher, Decline, Revival and Fall, pp. 152-3.
46 Gallagher, Decline, Revival and Fall, pp. 152-3.
its former officers. Meanwhile, writer Godfrey Lias produced an account of his experience observing the Arab Legion while 'in search of a story of adventure'.

Each of these books provide a narrative account of life within the Arab Legion, but offer very little both in terms of critical analysis or the wider context of British policy. The most detailed analytical appraisal remains Vatikiotis's 1967 *Study of the Arab Legion*. In this 'study in civil-military relations' Vatikiotis provided a detailed account of the Arab Legion's evolving structure from its inception to its demise. However, it was written prior to the opening of the official British archives and also scarcely looked beyond the parochial. Vatikiotis identified the Arab Legion's expansion between 1948-56 as being part of a coherent post-war British policy to consolidate the Arab Legion as a military force. This assumption has since remained unchallenged. Both Ilan Pappé and Ron Pundik identify the Arab Legion as being a primary asset, which the British sought to cultivate. Meanwhile, Matthew Hughes has asserted that the Arab Legion provided Britain 'with a cheap and effective means of controlling a key part of the Middle East'. As a subject the Arab Legion is relatively under-researched, but as a component part of broader studies of imperial defence it is almost completely overlooked. No doubt because Jordan was not a British

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colony, the Arab Legion remained excluded from Ashley Jackson's recent exploration of the role of the colonies in Britain's imperial defence system.\textsuperscript{54} Similarly, as the Arab Legion was also not a formal part of the British military forces, it is also absent from David French's recent study, which sought to remedy the absence of the British Army from post-war British history.\textsuperscript{55} The Arab Legion's complex status, as the army of an independent country, but funded by the British and commanded by a British officer, has caused it to slip through the historiographical net. There thus remains a need for a more thorough account of the Arab Legion's existence and its place in the British world system.

Glubb has received more attention than the force he commanded. Though he did not like the label himself, Glubb was sometimes referred to as a 'second Lawrence of Arabia'.\textsuperscript{56} This portrayal was described by a close friend and colleague of Glubb's as a 'poor compliment'.\textsuperscript{57} Nonetheless, Glubb has personified the romanticism of the Englishman in Arabia and James Lunt's biography of Glubb is aimed very much at armchair adventurers.\textsuperscript{58} To a lesser extent Trevor Royle also provides an account of Glubb's life borne out of this romantic fascination.\textsuperscript{59} The twenty-first century has witnessed a mini-surge in academic attention toward Glubb, which was arguably initiated by Joseph Massad's \textit{Colonial Effects}. While Glubb is not the primary subject of Massad's study, he is

\textsuperscript{54} Ashley Jackson, \textit{Colonial Warfare}, p. 15.
\textsuperscript{56} Glubb to Foot, 28 February 1944, Glubb Papers (2006 accession) [Hereafter: GP2006), 83.
\textsuperscript{57} 'Glubb Pasha', Melville to Stanley Priddle (Reuters), 9 February 1956, Melville Papers, 4/45.
very much portrayed as the villain of the piece. So much so that Andrew Shylock described Massad’s controversial critique of Glubb as being little more than a ‘character assassination’.60 Massad portrays Glubb as a wicked oppressor who effectively manufactured the Jordanian national identity.61 Massad’s study directly prompted Yoav Alon to provide ‘a corrective portrayal of Glubb and his work in the Jordanian deserts by attempting to offer a better understanding of Glubb’s motives, attitudes and actual conduct’.62 The nub of the Glubb debate is: whom was Glubb working for? And where did his loyalties lie? In the very first page of his memoirs Glubb nailed his loyalty firmly to the Jordanian mast. Moreover, he maintained: ‘I had no official connection with the British government at all, nor did the latter ever attempt to interfere or give orders.’63 For Avi Shlaim, however, Glubb was ‘really an imperial proconsul’ and appraises that Glubb’s ‘primary loyalty was to Britain’.64 Maureen Norton goes further. She asserts that Glubb’s sole motivation was to further British interests; he was driven ‘to seek solutions for his homeland’s political and economic difficulties’.65 Benny Morris disagrees, though. He describes Glubb as being, ‘above all, the Hashemite’s obedient and loyal retainer and the Arabs’ most successful general’ and argues that, ‘in the pivotal historical junctions he behaved like a loyal servant of the Hashemite crown rather than an Agent of Whitehall’s’, adding that:

63 Glubb, *Soldier with the Arabs*, pp. 1, 420.
'Glubb felt that British and Arab interests converged and overlapped.'

Meanwhile, Alon’s ‘main argument’ is that ‘Glubb tried to combine the interests of Britain with those of the local nomads’. Certainly, as Morris contends, the ‘truth’ is ‘more complex’ than Norton asserts. As this thesis details, Glubb’s primary motivation was the consolidation of the British Empire. However, that did not mean that he advocated dominance of Jordan and Arabs, or that he acted as a British stooge. Glubb advocated the need for interdependence and he did not distinguish between the interests of Jordan and Britain. To him they were mutually compatible.

What makes this assessment of Glubb and the Arab Legion particularly important is its access to significant new sources, both in terms of quality and quantity. This thesis is based on two principal archival collections. In the first instance it relies on the official British Government records held at the National Archives in Kew, London. The official records of the various Whitehall departments – principally the Foreign Office, Colonial Office, War Office, Treasury, and the Cabinet – provide a vital insight into the role of the Arab Legion within British policy. While much of this material – which include minutes, memos, and correspondence between Whitehall departments and the embassy in Amman – has been available to previous researchers, this thesis benefits from several crucial documents obtained via Freedom of Information requests. Moreover, chapter 6 in particular is based primarily on documents released in the mid-late 2000s under the extended 50-year rule. Jordanian

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68 Morris, Road to Jerusalem, p. 240.
documents, unfortunately, are not freely accessible. The Royal Hashemite Archives are not open for public use, but restricted to loyal Jordanian historians. The one exception to this is Nigel Ashton, who was ‘afforded full and unfettered access to King Hussein’s correspondence files’, after eight years of perseverance. Ashton’s access to official Jordanian archives was very much the exception to the rule. Moreover, he did not have access to Jordanian archives relating to the particularly sensitive period, during the Abdullah era, relating to the partition of Palestine and the 1948 War. While the official Arab archives may remain closed, this thesis is nonetheless able to remedy this absence via unprecedented access to what is perhaps best described as the unofficial archive of the Arab Legion, held at the Middle East Centre Archive, St Antony’s College, Oxford. This utterly vital new source material is a major driving force of this thesis and is principally comprised of two highly significant collections of private papers. The most important of these are the private papers of Glubb himself. Upon his death in 1986 fourteen boxes of material, pre-selected by Glubb, were deposited to the archive. Twenty years later after his wife, Rosemary, died, the Glubb family generously deposited the remainder of Glubb’s private papers – a further one hundred boxes, which complete this collection. Because of the enormous scale of this recent accession to the archive it remains un-catalogued. I am tremendously grateful, therefore, to the archivist, Debbie Usher, for making this material available to me in this state. The un-catalogued nature of this

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71 To differentiate the two accessions, which are currently housed separately, they will be identified in the footnotes as: Glubb Papers (1986 accession) and
mass of hoarded material has provided one of the main challenges to this thesis. However, the rewards, as this thesis testifies, are great. When Elizabeth Monroe was establishing the Middle East Centre Archive in the 1960s she contacted Glubb about the existence of any privately held papers.  

Glubb acknowledged that, ‘I have a lot of papers’, however he downplayed their value, noting: ‘I think that most of them are at a fairly humble level. Matters of local administration rather than the fate of empires.’ However, it was Glubb who was being humble. Admittedly, the Glubb collection contains its fair share of the mundane. However, this collection is an exceptionally rich source for anyone interested in Britain’s moment in the Middle East.

The Glubb collection is absolutely pivotal to this thesis. It is therefore only prudent to outline its provenance. In essence, the 2006 accession contains any and all of the paperwork that was found at Glubb’s family home when it was being cleared following the death of Lady Glubb. A substantial part of this collection thus includes material from Glubb’s life after he left the Middle East – including book drafts and correspondence with publishers. The material most salient to this project concerns the working papers from Glubb’s time in the Arab Legion, particularly Glubb’s scattered diary-like notes and correspondence with the British political and military authorities and with other officers within the Arab Legion. While Glubb’s papers are not especially well organised – it does not resemble a set of files taken direct from the office; probably because Glubb

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Glubb Papers (2006 accession) [Hereafter: GP1986 and GP2006]. The box numbers denoted in all references to the Glubb Collection refer to the current temporary housing of the collection.


73 Glubb to Elizabeth Monroe, 6 March 1966, Administration Records, SAMECA.

74 I am grateful to Eugene Rogan and Debbie Usher for their accounts of retrieving this material.
clearly reorganised this material to assist in the writing of his many books – there is nonetheless a coherent paper trail detailing its overall provenance. When he was first notified of King Hussein’s decision to dismiss him on 1 March 1956, Glubb was given just two hours notice to leave the country. However, Glubb refused to leave at such short notice and it was agreed that he could leave at 7am the following morning. This brief period of respite enabled Glubb time to salvage the material that forms an integral component of this thesis. Before Glubb departed he and the British Ambassador, Charles Duke, ‘discussed what arrangements were possible for the disposal of various secret documents and other material which it would be embarrassing to leave in the possession of Jordanians’. As Duke, explained:

We arranged that General Glubb should send to the Embassy certain of his papers and more precious personal possessions for safe custody, and should destroy as far as possible anything else which would be compromising. We also arranged to try and get as many as possible of the files which General Glubb kept in his own personal custody in his office. His Private Secretary and a British Officer succeeded in getting some of these, but were eventually prevented from taking the rest out of Arab Legion Headquarters.\textsuperscript{75}

J.R.B. Knox, an Arab Legion officer who superintended the packing of Glubb’s belongings, confirmed that ‘practically all of Glubb’s papers made it to the Embassy, ‘though one box of papers was removed by the Arabs’.\textsuperscript{76} It is this material that Glubb was able to salvage, which forms the backbone and the driving force of this thesis, and which elevates this study above all previous accounts of Glubb and the Arab Legion.

\textsuperscript{75} ‘The Dismissal of Glubb’, Duke to Lloyd, 8 March 1956, PREM11/1419, TNA.
\textsuperscript{76} ‘Notes on Meeting with Brigadier Mead’, VCIGs to CIGS, 12 March 1956, WO216/912, TNA.
Three previous studies have made partial use of this material, but they have only scratched the surface. James Lunt’s biography refers to Glubb’s private collection in his acknowledgements. However, he clearly had only limited access, as Lunt makes no reference to much of the material on which this thesis has drawn.\textsuperscript{77} Trevor Royle’s biography of Glubb also mentions his private papers. Royle extols his gratitude to Glubb’s wife for the ‘loan of documents’. However, Royle’s belief that ‘the bulk of his collection was donated to the archives of the Middle East Centre’ when Glubb died, reveals that he was unaware that this material was merely the tip of the iceberg.\textsuperscript{78} The third study to have used any of this material is Robert Fletcher’s recent doctoral thesis. Fletcher has had access to the full collection deposited at the archive in 2006. His thesis, though, focuses on an earlier period and a different aspect of Glubb’s career.\textsuperscript{79} Moreover, Fletcher’s thesis has not utilised the collection to the same extent. Only the present author has exhaustively examined the entirety of this collection, which in its current un-catalogued state, is impossible to comprehensively navigate without trawling through the entire collection.

The second part of the unofficial Arab Legion archive is the private papers of Colonel Robert Melville, who ran the Arab Legion Staff Liaison Office in London between 1949 and 1956. The Staff Liaison office was established to bridge the gap between the Arab Legion and Whitehall that had been created by the British withdrawal from Palestine in 1948. Unlike Glubb’s papers the Melville collection feels much more like an official archive, than a collection of randomly

\textsuperscript{77} Lunt, \textit{Glubb Pasha}, p. 237.
\textsuperscript{78} Royle, \textit{Glubb Pasha}, p. xv.
hoarded private papers. While the Melville collection is also un-catalogued, owing to its recent accession to the archive in 2013, it is neatly self-structured, as it is effectively the organised files of the Arab Legion’s London office, which were removed when it was shut down after Melville’s dismissal, a few months after Glubb’s departure in 1956. The Melville collection excels in revealing the nature of the Arab Legion beyond the 1948 War. It is particularly useful for understanding the size, shape and purpose of the Arab Legion, and its relationship with the British Government. Combined, the Glubb and Melville collections provide a unique insight into, and have enabled a completely fresh assessment of, Glubb and the Arab Legion.

The most exciting feature of this new material is what it reveals about the partition of Palestine and the 1948 War. It has enabled a significant reappraisal of a well-worn debate, which maintains significant contemporary resonance. As Kirsten Schulze reminds us: ‘[T]he debate on what exactly happened in the 1948 War and who did what to whom is not just history. It cuts to the heart of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, past and present, and remains one of the most important factors in achieving a just and lasting peace between Israelis and Palestinians.’80 This continued contemporary resonance has helped maintain a lively historiography. During the first three decades following the 1948 War the historiography was dominated by an official history that pitched Israel as the underdog in a David versus Goliath struggle. The opening of the official archives in Britain, Israel and the United States in the late 1970s, however, prompted a wave of revisionist histories. This group of historians challenged three key

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issues: the causes of the refugee crisis, the military balance of the war, and the reasons why a formal peace settlement proved elusive. It is the military balance issue and its three subsidiary controversies – the Hashemite-Zionist relationship; the war aims of the Arab states; and the role of Britain – that concern us here. The flag-bearer for the revisionist take on the military balance of the war is Avi Shlaim’s controversial Collusion thesis. Like Uri Bar-Joseph a year earlier, who described Israel and Transjordan as being the Best of Enemies during the 1948 War, Shlaim gave scholarly, archival-based credence to the charge that King Abdullah colluded with the Zionists to partition Palestine in contravention of the November 1947 UN partition plan, which proposed the creation of a Jewish state and an independent Palestinian Arab state when the British mandate ended in May 1948. A subsidiary contention is that Britain supported this ‘collusion’. In his abridged paperback edition, Shlaim removed the word ‘collusion’ from the title as he believed this had distracted from the crux of his argument. He maintained, though, that it was an accurate description of the British aspect of the thesis. Moreover, in a subsequent article Shlaim regretted omitting the term ‘collusion’ and reiterated that it was an apt description. Regardless of the terminological semantics, however, the significance of these negotiations, for Pappé, Shlaim, Morris and others, was that

they helped dictate the outcome of the 1948 War. The most vocal critic of the revisionist accounts of 1948 is Efraim Karsh, with whom Shlaim has traded accusations of ‘distorting and misrepresenting’ the available evidence. Karsh offers a polar opposite interpretation of the crucial meetings where agreements are alleged to have been made. Another critic, Joseph Heller, has suggested that ‘Abdullah was in fact too busy fighting for his own political survival to take part in collusions’. Meanwhile Avraham Sela has argued that any pre-war agreements were overtaken by subsequent events. More recently, Tancred Bradshaw has reopened this debate. By disputing the interpretation of existing sources, Bradshaw argues that neither the Jewish Agency, nor the British, supported Abdullah’s territorial ambitions in Palestine. If nothing else, Bradshaw’s contribution is evidence that twenty-five years on from the publication of Shlaim’s Collusion thesis, this debate is stuck in a cycle of revision and counter-revision based on conflicting interpretations and emphasis of the same set of sources.

The elephant in the room that has held the debate back is the lack of access to the official records of the Arab states. This, Avi Shlaim lamented, has

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hampered the emergence of post-revisionism.\footnote{91} Indeed, even Eugene Rogan and Avi Shlaim's relatively recent edited collection, which set out to rewrite the history of 1948 admitted: ‘In many cases, the paucity of new material limits the scope of revision. The authors present their work in the hope that official documents will be made available in Arab archives to permit a more thorough revision of the Arab-Israeli conflict.’\footnote{92} Perhaps the most significant addition to the 1948 debate in recent years is Matthew Hughes’s account of Lebanon’s involvement in the revised edition of Rogan and Shlaim’s edited collection. Previously, Lebanon’s role had been either ‘exaggerated militarily or relegated to a few footnotes’. Aided by the newly available Chehab papers Hughes confirmed that the Lebanese military remained inactive and apathetic, thus further negating the David versus Goliath portrayal of the conflict.\footnote{93} The most important Arab army in the 1948 War, though, was the Arab Legion. It was the best trained; it did most of the fighting; and it successfully secured the West Bank, which was annexed to Transjordan when the fighting finished. A better understanding of the Arab Legion’s war aims and its conduct, therefore, is what the debate really needs. On the final page of his Glubb study, Benny Morris lamented that: ‘Only the opening of the Arab states’ archives – all, regrettably, closed to researchers – may provide a definitive answer [regarding the Arab armies’ war aims].’\footnote{94} With the aid of Glubb’s papers this thesis is able to provide a better answer for the Arab Legion. By offering a more accurate appreciation of the Arab Legion’s

\footnote{94} Morris, \textit{Road to Jerusalem}, pp. 241-2.
involvement than has previously been possible, including its war aims and the rationale behind key decisions, it provides significant new insights into the nature of this conflict, which further shatters the David versus Goliath myth.

While this thesis is not formally divided into parts, the first half examines the Arab Legion’s relationship with the Palestine issue. The first chapter details how the Palestine problem helped sustain the Arab Legion’s existence after 1945, thwarting Britain’s intention to disband 80% of that force. This meant that when the UN recommended the partition of Palestine in 1947, the Arab Legion was a military force, and therefore Abdullah was a political force, to be reckoned with. Meanwhile the following three chapters cut to the heart of the 1948 debate by examining the Arab Legion’s involvement in the 1948 War during three consecutive stages of the conflict: the civil war between November 1947 and May 1948; the first two stages of official fighting between Israel and the Arab states during the summer; and the final stage of the conflict leading to the armistice agreements that brought the fighting to an end in the spring of 1949. Via its focus on the conduct of the Arab Legion chapter two posits that the Hashemite-Zionist process of ‘collusion’ did not result in a firm agreement, or understanding. Rather, it provided the two parties merely with a comprehension of each other’s aims and objectives and therefore an awareness of how and where these issues dovetailed. The crucial consequence of these talks was that they encouraged Abdullah to pursue his dynastic objectives in Palestine. It gave him confidence that the Zionists would acquiesce in his annexation of the Arab areas of Palestine – to create Greater Transjordan – and thus prompted him to seek British support for this scheme. It was the resulting meeting between Bevin, Abul Huda and Glubb in February 1948 that defined the Arab Legion’s conduct
thereafter and therefore helped shape the 1948 War. As chapter three details, this meeting governed Glubb’s strict adherence to the Greater Transjordan scheme of occupying the Arab areas of Palestine and acquiescing in the establishment of Israel, despite the pan-Arab pressure on Abdullah. By distinguishing between the influence of Abdullah and Glubb chapter 3 reconciles the fighting, particularly in Jerusalem, with the Arab Legion’s otherwise limited approach to the conflict. Meanwhile chapter 4 emphasises the rivalry between Transjordan and Egypt, revealing the extent to which the two armies worked against each other. On the Arab Legion side, Glubb sought to ensure the defeat of the Egyptian Army as a means of enabling the start of negotiations toward peace. This section of the thesis debunks the David versus Goliath portrayal of the conflict; it supports the revisionist argument that the pre-war negotiations between Abdullah and the Jewish Agency, and between the Jordanians and the British helped shape the 1948 War. Yet by emphasising Glubb’s limited autonomy it posits a significant nuance, which reconciles some of the principal criticisms of the ‘collusion’ thesis.

This detailed appreciation of the 1948 War is important in its own right, but it is not isolated from the rest of the thesis. Rather it is an important component of the larger whole; helping to unpack the nature of Britain’s presence in, and withdrawal from, this part of its world system, which brings us back to the two core questions: Why did the British remain? And, why did they depart? The chronological structure of this account of the Arab Legion, which was pivotal to the Anglo-Jordanian connection, is designed to answer these questions. The existence of the Arab Legion was tied into the Anglo-Jordanian Treaty and this thesis is bookended by an opening chapter on the Treaty’s
creation in 1946 and a closing chapter on its termination in 1957. As Ronald Hyam astutely observed, ‘you cannot properly understand the dismantling of the British empire unless you know how it was constructed.’\textsuperscript{95} Similarly, on a smaller scale, it is necessary to understand the construction of Britain’s treaty relationship with Jordan, in order to understand its demise. By examining how and why the Treaty was constructed, within the context of the Arab Legion’s future, chapter one emphasises the ad hoc nature of Britain’s post-war policy. It reveals that the Treaty was drawn up with scant coordination amongst the multitude of interested departments within Whitehall and argues that the Treaty was complacently constructed, as it failed to deal with Britain’s desire to drastically reduce the Arab Legion. As Chapter two details Britain’s impending withdrawal from Palestine increased the value of the relationship with Jordan and raised Glubb’s profile from marginalised man on the spot to the guardian of British interests. It also emphasises Abdullah’s continued dependence on Britain. This argument is compounded by further detailed analysis of the 1948 War in chapters three and four.

Chapter five reengages with the question of the Arab Legion’s proposed function via the discussions over its future role and its corresponding subsidy during the three years beyond 1948. It examines the implications of the 1948 War and the annexation of the West Bank, both for the Anglo-Jordanian connection generally and for the Arab Legion specifically. In so doing it finds that Jordan and Abdullah emerged from the war ever more dependent upon Britain. It also reveals that, contrary to popular belief, the Arab Legion was not earmarked for expansion in 1948. Rather, developments within the Cold War

\textsuperscript{95} Hyam, \textit{Britain’s Declining Empire}, p. xi.
drove the Arab Legion’s reorganisation. The British only sanctioned an increase in the Arab Legion in response to the Korean War.

Chapter 6 takes a necessary detour away from the primary focus of the Arab Legion. Instead it addresses British involvement in the royal succession crisis created by the assassination of King Abdullah on 20 July 1951. Hitherto, Britain’s relationship with Jordan had been founded on the staunch reliability of Abdullah. His assassination thus put British influence in Jordan and its new role for the Arab Legion in doubt. The royal succession was a pivotal moment in Jordanian history and yet it has hitherto been significantly under-researched. In his chapter on British policy in Jordan between 1943-55, Ilan Pappé devoted only one sentence to the brief reign of King Talal, positing only that his removal was ‘probably because of mental illness, but possibly as a result of local and British intrigues’. Only three studies have devoted any serious attention to the succession question and the short reign of King Talal. The benchmark study is Robert Satloff’s *Jordan in Transition*. Satloff provides a laudable account of this tricky period in Jordan’s history. However, as he himself sets out, his study ‘is principally a study of internal Jordanian politics’. Moreover, many of the documents relevant to this period were released under an extended 50-year rule, and therefore not available to Satloff or Pappé. This material was available to Avi Shlaim and Nigel Ashton in the writing of their respective biographies of King Hussein – although only Nigel Ashton noticeably makes use of this material. Given that these studies’ primary focus was the life and times of Talal’s son, Hussein, there remains a real need to focus on Britain’s approach to this crisis.

and this chapter seeks to fill this gap. This chapter provides a unique insight into Britain’s role in the succession crisis and in relation to the overall thesis provides a vital insight into the extent to which the British sought to maintain influence in Jordan by massaging the royal succession. Indeed, understanding British involvement during this crisis is crucial to understanding Britain's attitude toward the teenage King Hussein and his subsequent dismissal of Glubb in 1956.

The penultimate chapter directly addresses the process that led to Glubb's dismissal, focusing on the struggle for control of the Arab Legion after Hussein's accession as king. It examines the relationship between Hussein and Glubb and between Hussein and Britain within the context of the strains and stresses facing the allies, including the conflict with Israel, the rise of Arab nationalism, and the pressures of the Cold War.

The final chapter examines the final year of the Treaty's existence. It explores the relationship between Glubb's dismissal, the Suez crisis and the termination of the Treaty in 1957. Within the existing literature the Suez crisis is central to both these issues. Glubb's dismissal is widely considered one of the causes of Britain joining the coalition against the Egyptian President, Gamal Abdel Nasser, in October 1956. Meanwhile, the termination of the Treaty is generally regarded – to varying extents – as a product of the Suez debacle. This fits the popular theme that the Suez crisis, to use Brian Lapping’s phrase, 'wrote finis' to the British Empire.\textsuperscript{98} This chapter challenges both these preconceptions, however, concerning the relationship between events in Jordan and the causes and consequences of the Suez crisis. With the aid of three recently released documents this chapter posits an alternative assessment of the British reaction

to Glubb’s dismissal, which debunks the accepted myth that the British blamed Nasser. Regarding the consequences of Suez, this final chapter argues that the Treaty was terminated primarily as a result of a review of the relationship prompted by Glubb’s dismissal and that Suez merely got in the way of this review and thus delayed rather than precipitated the end of the Treaty relationship. This chapter thus challenges the notion that Suez marked the end of Britain’s moment in the Middle East. By debunking the notion that Suez was a watershed moment, this final chapter brings us back to the reason why this thesis uses the British world system as its framework. It challenges the concept of a defining end of empire moment and accentuates a gradual process of Britain’s changing relationships, in this case with Jordan. It emphasises the need to recognise continuities and the dangers of identifying all-defining watershed moments.

By assessing the life of the Treaty, from construction to termination, and the role of Glubb and the Arab Legion therein, this thesis is able to answer the two core questions: why did the British remain? And why did they retreat? Via this approach this thesis accords with Sluglett and Gallagher’s assertions that it is unwise to emphasise any single factor too deeply. Both Britain’s presence and its withdrawal were products of a multitude of forces. Prestige and neuroses were certainly factors in Britain’s continued presence in Jordan and its desire to control the Arab Legion. However, both these explanations were founded on the practical purpose of securing Jordan as a geostrategic asset for the defence of its world system. Policymakers might not always have made clear-headed balance sheet calculations of material interests, but the national interest was nonetheless the driving force. With regards to Britain’s retreat the least convincing
explanation, as Ronald Hyam iterated, is the loss of will. Arab nationalism and economic overstretch were both important forces, but neither was singularly determinative. Nor were they the original seed of the Treaty’s demise. If one single factor helps bind these multiple explanations together it is, as both Hyam and Darwin have contended, the changing international climate. This is at the centre of the interaction of forces involved in the Treaty’s construction, sustenance, and termination. The crux of the argument advanced here is that the Treaty was built on and sustained by a system of mutual dependence and it was a change in the balance of this system that brought about the Treaty’s demise. William Roger Louis identified a fresh post-war approach of dealing with the Middle Eastern states as ‘partners rather than dependents’.

Yet it was a partnership based on dependence. The British remained in Jordan because they were reliant on Jordan as a geostrategic haven and the relationship was sustained because Abdullah was equally dependent on Britain’s financial and military support. The Treaty relationship deteriorated as the balance of dependence shifted, owing to the changing international and geopolitical environment. The British became more dependent on Jordan, prompting them to maintain and assert more control. Meanwhile the British connection increasingly became a liability to the Hashemite Kingdom and it too desired more control to offset the threat of Arab nationalism. At the centre of this struggle were Glubb and the Arab Legion.

1 The 1946 Treaty, Palestine and the Preclusion of the Arab Legion's Planned Post-War Disbandment

When the Second World War ended Britain remained the predominant power in the Middle East. Given the end of France’s mandate over Syria and Lebanon, Britain, which still held mandates in Palestine and Transjordan, was effectively the only external power with a formal political foothold in the region. The future of Britain's position in the Middle East was ominous, however. Its position as a world power was under threat from the two new global superpowers, the US and the Soviet Union; its economy was struggling; and the Arab-Jewish conflict in Palestine had intensified. In many ways Britain's relationship with Transjordan was reassuringly reliable. Abdullah had remained loyal to Britain throughout the Second World War and the Arab Legion had proved to be a useful asset: assisting in overturning the Iraqi coup; helping defeat the Vichy French in Syria; and guarding vital installations in Palestine, such as the Iraq-Haifa oil pipeline, thus freeing up British forces for action in Europe.¹ As a consequence of its wartime role the Arab Legion underwent a radical transformation from an internal security force, to an ad hoc army. It ‘expanded from a strength of about 1,450, costing £186,000 in 1940, to a strength of nearly 6,000, costing over £1,600,000’ by 1945, at which point the military units of the Arab Legion consisted of a Mechanised Brigade of three regiments (each containing 732 men) and sixteen Infantry Companies (containing a total of 3152 men; approximately 200 per company). The Mechanised Brigade and all but one of the Infantry Companies were stationed in Palestine; and even that was ‘used as a reinforcement and training unit for the

¹ Wilson, King Abdullah, pp. 133-4.
companies in Palestine’. As the world returned to a peacetime footing, the
British thus had a decision to make: should they consolidate the Arab Legion in
its new form, or scale it back to its pre-war state?

Hitherto this question has not seriously been examined. Consequently,
anyone searching for an answer within the existing literature will be greeted
with what amounts to a misplaced assumption. Ron Pundik posited that the post-
Second World War importance of Transjordan was ‘by virtue of its central geo-
strategic position in the area, and the strength of its army’. This implies that
Britain considered the Arab Legion a vital asset worth cultivating and tallies with
Ilan Pappé’s statement that: ‘In order to prepare the Arab Legion for this task [a
Third World War in which Palestine was considered a likely battleground],
Britain had immediately after the Second World War strengthened this force by
adding new and substantial numbers of British officers to its core.’ As this
chapter reveals, however, neither of these statements accurately describe
Britain’s post-1945 appreciation of the Arab Legion. In a slightly less inaccurate
account, Vatikiotis contended that after the 1946 Treaty, ‘the Legion entered an
entirely new phase: this was the transition from a security force with limited
military operational functions to a regular army, a fully-fledged military
institution’. While this is not strictly incorrect it is nonetheless
misrepresentative, and is presumably the genesis of the subsequent misplaced
assumptions. Vatikiotis implied that the 1946 Treaty was designed to formalise
the Arab Legion as a military force. This was not the case, however. The problem

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2 ‘The Military Units of the Arab Legion’, Kirkbride, 4 June 1946, CO537/1499,
TNA.
3 Pundik, Struggle for Sovereignty, p. 43 [emphasis added].
with Vatikiotis’s argument, which was made prior to the release of the official British documents, is that, as he explicitly stated, ‘most of the illustrative data [that he used] are drawn from the period of greatest expansion, 1948-1956’. Effectively, Vatikiotis applied evidence of the Arab Legion’s consolidation in 1948, and subsequent expansion, to posit that the 1946 Treaty initiated this process. However, when the Treaty was signed and for the following eighteen months Britain’s intention, as this chapter illustrates, was to disband 80% of the Arab Legion – thus reverting it back to an internal security force.

There were two reasons why the realisation of this intention was prevented. The primary factor, as the second half of this chapter details, was the deteriorating situation in Palestine. In part, however, the 1946 Treaty also helped thwart this planned reduction. Not as a matter of policy, as Vatikiotis implied, but unintentionally. Thus, before exploring Britain’s failed attempt to disband the bulk of the Arab Legion, this chapter begins by examining the manner in which the Treaty was created. Analysis of the 1946 Treaty has hitherto been rather simplistic and cursory. It has traditionally been disregarded as a predominantly ‘unexceptional treaty’. The emphasis has been placed primarily on the limited nature of independence it offered and the extensive strategic rights Britain maintained. As Uriel Dann has asserted, this was the principal reason why the United States did not officially recognise Transjordan as an independent state until 31 January 1949. Tancred Bradshaw, though, puts the US reaction down to Zionist pressure, rather than an altruistic objection to

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the superficial nature of independence.\textsuperscript{8} One of the limitations of the existing literature concerning the nature of the 1946 Treaty is that it has focused on the outcome of the Treaty with little or no analysis of the process of its construction. The purpose of the Treaty and its details have been understood as being part of a single, coherent policy. William Roger Louis explains that: ‘The Colonial Office, Foreign Office, and Chiefs of Staff intended the Treaty with Jordan to confirm both a political and a military alliance.’\textsuperscript{9} In broad terms, this is entirely correct. However, this statement belies the extent to which the Treaty was primarily drafted by the Colonial Office, with scant consultation with the other Whitehall departments. The manner in which the Treaty was drafted reveals important nuances that reveal much about the nature of the British world system, in general, and about the post-1945 foundation of the Anglo-Jordanian relationship and the future of the Arab Legion. In particular, it emphasises that British policy was severely debilitated by a lack of coordination between the various Whitehall Departments. It compounds Michael Cohen’s assessment that Britain did not possess ‘a monolithic policy-making machine’.\textsuperscript{10}

At the outset it is important to emphasise the fractured nature of the British world system, not only as a whole, but also as a microcosm within the Middle East where administration was divided between the Colonial Office – which administered the mandated territories of Palestine and, until 1946, Transjordan – and the Foreign Office, which had responsibility for affairs relating to Egypt, Iraq and Saudi Arabia. Until 1947 the India Office also had a significant

\textsuperscript{8} Bradshaw, \textit{Britain and Jordan}, p. 111.
\textsuperscript{9} Louis, \textit{British Empire in the Middle East}, p. 354.
interest in the region – notably in the Persian Gulf. After the 1946 Treaty
Transjordan came under the umbrella of the Foreign Office, but its primary role
in the British world system was inside Palestine as this is where the Arab Legion
was employed. The Arab Legion, as Trafford Smith, the Colonial Office Assistant
Secretary, neatly summarised, was at the centre of a complex web of interests
within Whitehall:

[It was] a question for the Colonial Office in respect of its political
aspect in Palestine, for the Foreign Office in regard to its
connection with Trans-Jordan, and for the War Office as regards
the possibility of replacing the Arab Legion units by other troops.
The Treasury are also concerned, as they are expected to provide
the funds to pay for the cost of the Arab Legion.\(^\text{11}\)

During the Second World War Glubb proposed the creation of: ‘A single service
to cover the area from Cyrenaica to Persia, and Sudan to Syria.’ Glenday, within
the Colonial Office, commented that: ‘Quite apart from the probable general
advantage of remedying the present system whereby much time is spent by two
Depts – CO & FO – over the Palestinian problem, the ever increasing
international reactions to the Jewish question there would appear to support
strongly such an idea.’\(^\text{12}\) However, the creation of a ‘Levant Civil Service’ did not
become a reality and the diversification of responsibility only served to
exacerbate the difficulty of forming truly holistic policies that would solve all of
the department’s competing interests. In November 1945 Bevin opened the
British Middle East Office (BMEO) in Cairo, and its main function was ‘to develop
and co-ordinate British economic and social policy in the Middle East’. During its
formative years it did acquire a political function, as a hub for information and

\(^{11}\) Trafford Smith to Baxter, 27 June 1946, CO537/1499, TNA.
\(^{12}\) Minute by Glenday, 12 January 1943, CO732/88/9, TNA.
advice on Middle East issues. However, it did not provide comprehensive unity for Britain's Middle East policies and initiatives and it lacked the resources to be an effective institution. It did not remedy the lack of cohesion that would ultimately have an impact on the process of drafting the 1946 Treaty.

The primary motivation behind the decision to grant independence was to reward Abdullah for his support for Britain during the Second World War and to consolidate the position of a proven staunch ally in the Middle East. It was not that the British particularly wanted to grant Transjordan independence, but, for a number of reasons, it had become very difficult to refuse. During the Second World War Abdullah had played his hand astutely. After war was declared in September 1939 Abdullah immediately confirmed his support for Britain and offered the unequivocal service of the Arab Legion. While both Abdullah and Glubb were somewhat disappointed that the Arab Legion did not get to see any action in Europe, the Arab Legion did play a part in Syria and Iraq. By committing himself to Britain from start to finish Abdullah had proved himself to be utterly loyal and consequently enhanced his profile within British thinking. Throughout the war he pressed his case for reward, while the British reassured him that they would consider the matter when the war was over.

Given Britain’s support for Syrian and Lebanese independence from France in 1941, the British were in no position to argue against Transjordan achieving equal status. The Second World War itself provided Britain with an excuse to delay the

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13 ‘Functions and Organisation of the British Middle East Office’, 5 May 1948, Pyman Papers, Liddell Hart Military Archives, King's College London.
15 Wilson, King Abdullah, pp. 129-35.
16 J.V.W. Shaw to Oliver Stanley (Secretary-of-State for Colonies), 24 July 1945, FO371/45415/E6792, TNA.
realisation of independence. However, when the conflict finally came to an end, Abdullah was ready and waiting to claim his prize. Ideally he wanted British support for his ambition to rule over Greater Syria, encompassing Transjordan, Palestine, Syria and Lebanon. However, independence was an acceptable interim compromise – designed to consolidate British influence. On 17 January 1946 the Foreign Secretary, Ernest Bevin, announced Transjordan’s proposed independence in a speech at the United Nations General Assembly. Two months later, on 22 March, Transjordan was granted independence via the signing of the 1946 Treaty of Alliance, and Transjordan’s first ruler was subsequently inaugurated as the country’s first king.

Although the notion of granting independence to Transjordan had been circulating for several years, it was only in mid-January 1946, just weeks before Abdullah was due to arrive to conduct negotiations, that HMG decided to start thinking about ‘the agenda for discussions with the Amir and the sort of treaty we are going to conclude with him’.  

17 Minute by Trafford Smith to Martin, 12 January 1946, CO537/1846, TNA.
18 Trafford Smith to Baxter, 29 January 1946, CO537/1842, TNA.

With Abdullah due to arrive on 22 February and the British Resident, Alec Kirkbride, a couple of weeks earlier for preliminary consultation, the proposed Treaty draft was barely in its infancy less than a month before the arrival of the Jordanian delegation. At this stage the very foundation of the Treaty was still largely baseless other than that it should be ‘on the general lines of the Treaty of Alliance with Iraq of 1930’. The reason for basing it on the Iraqi Treaty had more to do with convenience than content. J.S. Bennett, the head of the International Relations Department at the Colonial Office, acknowledged: ‘It may well be that the kind of Treaty relationship evolved
in the Middle East between the two world wars is now passing out of date, with
the revision of the Egyptian Treaty and the movement to the same effect in
Iraq'. Yet the Colonial Office recommended little more than adding a military
annex to the core of the Iraqi Treaty simply to account for the main difference
between the two relationships of Britain continuing to subsidise the Arab
Legion. The 1946 Treaty was an anachronism knowingly set within a
framework that was recognised as defunct. However, the convenience of
precedent overruled the question of suitability.

Having failed to consider the details of the post-mandate alliance in good
time, the Treaty had to be drafted in haste, and this stifled inter-departmental
coordination. Less than a month before negotiations with Abdullah were due to
start it was still undecided as to ‘whether the discussions with the Amir should
be conducted by the Foreign Office and the Colonial Office jointly’, or by some
other combination. While acknowledging that the Treasury would have a huge
interest, and that the subject should be ‘discussed with the Middle East (Official)
Committee’, Trafford Smith also noted that there was clearly ‘no time to be lost’.
Thus, he suggested that preliminary discussions take place between the Foreign
and Colonial Offices only, thus side lining potentially crucial input into the
discussions from other relevant departments. Urgency trumped the need for
coordination. Even the Foreign Office, the department set to assume
responsibility for Jordanian affairs after independence, had minimal input into
the drafting of the Treaty. The first discussion relating to drafting of the
proposed Treaty took place on 11 February and it was the Colonial Office’s

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19 Minute by Bennett, 11 April 1946, CO537/1849, TNA.
20 Trafford Smith to Baxter, 29 January 1946, CO537/1842, TNA.
21 Ibid.
intention to submit the draft Treaty and annexures to the Cabinet ten days later for approval prior to the Amir’s arrival the following day.\textsuperscript{22} Thus, when requesting the Foreign Office’s input the Colonial Office informed them that it had become ‘necessary to move very fast in preparing the first rough draft’, and that in order to keep to this timetable the Foreign Office would have to forward its views to the Colonial Office by 15 February at the latest ‘in order that higher authority and the Secretary of State may have an opportunity of considering them before the Cabinet meeting’.\textsuperscript{23} Consequently, the Foreign Office response was ‘hurriedly compiled’ and was of limited value given that there had ‘not as yet been sufficient time to formulate any definite “Foreign Office views” on the proposed Treaty’.\textsuperscript{24} Despite being the department about to inherit responsibility for Jordanian affairs, and despite its present predominant involvement in the negotiations to renew the treaties with Iraq and Egypt, the Foreign Office had barely any input into the drafting of the Treaty that would set the tone for future relations with Transjordan.

The Chiefs of Staff were also given limited time to consider their ‘preliminary reactions … on the Treaty and Military Convention’, prompting the Colonial Office to apologise for presenting them ‘with a problem of this magnitude at such short notice’.\textsuperscript{25} From a bilateral perspective the Chiefs of Staff appraised that the proposed Treaty and Military Annex more than covered its strategic requirements in war and peace, which allowed some room for

\textsuperscript{22} Trafford Smith to Parker, 13 February 1946, ibid.
\textsuperscript{23} Trafford Smith to Baxter, 13 February 1946, ibid.
\textsuperscript{24} Baxter to Trafford Smith, 15 February 1946, ibid.
\textsuperscript{25} Martin to Major-General Jacob, 13 February 1946, ibid.
movement in the negotiations with Abdullah.\textsuperscript{26} The Chiefs of Staff Committee therefore approved the Joint Planning Report with just one main amendment: to make sure that land forces could be stationed in Transjordan during peacetime. It was pointed out that such a clause ‘might be deemed by U.N.O. to be incompatible with our professed intention of granting independence to Trans-Jordan’, but ultimately it was decided that: ‘this should not prevent us trying to obtain Treaty rights of this nature if we can get them’.\textsuperscript{27} And in article 1 of the annex to the final treaty this desire was acceded to.

The lack of time for input from the Foreign Office, Treasury and the Chiefs of Staff prevented a truly coordinated or holistic regional policy from being implemented, resulting in a lamentably bilateral agreement. The Chiefs of Staff felt that the Treaty ‘must be related to our overall needs in [the] Middle East as a whole’.\textsuperscript{28} They warned that having the Treaty run for 25 years and the Military Convention run for only 5 years might encourage the Egyptians to press for a similar short-term military arrangement relating to the much more important Suez Canal base, during the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty renewal process.\textsuperscript{29} The commanders-in-Chief of MELF added that: ‘all treaties with Middle East states should be negotiated on the lines set out in telegram No.25 Saving’.\textsuperscript{30} This Foreign Office telegram, which offered guidelines for the preliminary Treaty negotiations with Egypt, stipulated that the question of Egypt’s defence should

\textsuperscript{26} Cabinet Offices to Commanders-in-Chief, 20 February 1946, CO537/1499, TNA.
\textsuperscript{27} ‘Extract of minutes from: C.O.S.(46) 28\textsuperscript{th} Meeting’, 21 February 1946, CO537/1843, TNA.
\textsuperscript{28} Cabinet Offices to Commanders-in-Chief, 20 February 1946, CO537/1499, TNA.
\textsuperscript{29} ‘Extract of minutes from: C.O.S.(46) 28\textsuperscript{th} Meeting’, 21 February 1946, CO537/1843, TNA.
\textsuperscript{30} G.H.Q. Middle East to Cabinet Offices, 6 March 1946, CO537/1844, TNA.
be transformed ‘from the level of a purely bilateral understanding ... to the level of a general partnership between the Middle East states and His Majesty’s Government’. Clearly the intention within the Foreign Office was to establish a consistent approach to its future relationship with the Arab states. However, the Colonial Office was completely unaware of this telegram until it had seen reference to it in another telegram on 6 March. Bennett lamented that it was ‘a pity’ that the Foreign Office had not shared this telegram earlier. He went on to exclaim:

The political side of our current re-adjustments in the Middle East – e.g. Trans-Jordan, Egypt, Libya ... needs close co-ordination: the F.O. don't seem to be 100% effective in providing it: ... In my view it is becoming an urgent matter to get some improvement made in the arrangements for handling these big Middle Eastern issues.

If British policy in the Middle East was to have a clear sense of direction it was essential that the relevant departments communicated and coordinated. But this was not the case and the 1946 Treaty was drawn up with both these bureaucratic fundamentals largely absent. The Colonial Office acted under the assumption of three basic tenets: ‘that there should be an alliance between H.M.G. and Trans-Jordan, that H.M.G. must continue to give Trans-Jordan financial help, and that British strategic interests must be safeguarded’. To that end the Colonial Office only really had to get a treaty agreed. This approach satisfied the ministerial requirements for the Treaty. As was outlined in the Cabinet discussions, the military arrangement with Transjordan, like all the others throughout the region, were created as an ‘insurance’ against what was

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31 FO to Cairo, 25 Saving, 25 January 1946, ibid.
32 Minute by Bennett, 11 March 1946, ibid.
33 Minute by Reilly, 24 January 1946, CO537/1842, TNA.
deemed the very possible failure of the UN.\textsuperscript{34} The Treaty was designed to give Britain as much freedom of action as possible, and article 2 of the military annex, which stipulated that Britain would be granted ‘facilities at all times for the movement and training of the [British] armed forces ... and for the transport of the supplies of fuel, ordnance, ammunition, and other materials required by these forces, by air, road, railway, water-way and pipe-line and through the ports of Trans-Jordan’, was deemed to be ‘as wide as we can draw it’.\textsuperscript{35} The details of the Treaty were not deemed crucial. The Colonial Office was primarily pre-occupied with getting the Treaty signed, and this precluded the time needed for proper consultation. The mere existence of a Treaty and the veneer of independence were the primary objectives. The only caveat was that the Treaty should not stifle Britain’s strategic use of Transjordan in relation to its geopolitical position.

Ultimately, the problem with trying to coordinate policy between several interested departments was that it was a time-consuming process, and in this instance getting the Treaty signed quickly was deemed more important than dealing comprehensively with any potential problems. The Acting High Commissioner, J.V.W. Shaw, warned: ‘To delay showing tangible signs of appreciation for the loyalty of Trans-Jordan would, I consider, involve the grave risk that this goodwill might be undermined by resentment and disappointment and the existing assets of friendship be dissipated in political argumentation.’\textsuperscript{36} This haste resulted in a number of details being left unresolved. In relation to the

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{34} Cabinet Secretaries Notebook, 25 February 1946, CAB195/4/6, TNA.
  \item \textsuperscript{35} Cabinet Secretaries Notebook, 18 March 1946, CAB195/4/13; Treaty of Alliance, 22 March 1946, CO537/1844, TNA.
  \item \textsuperscript{36} Shaw to Oliver Stanley, 24 July 1945, FO371/45415/E6792, TNA.
\end{itemize}
question of whether the Treaty should contain a provision relating to civil aviation, the Colonial Office lamented that ‘this is only one of a great many points which have had to be covered in extremely hurried preparation for the negotiations’. Moreover, Grafftey Smith, the British Ambassador in Jedda, warned that independence for Transjordan would reignite disputes with the Saud’s regarding Transjordan’s frontiers. He cautioned: ‘I fear that we will have a good deal of bad blood and friction if [the] British mandate in Trans-Jordan is terminated without some attempt at a simultaneous resolution of frontier disputes with Saudi Arabia.’ Indeed, King Saud himself raised the issue with Britain after he was forewarned of Transjordan’s proposed independence. However, despite this warning, and despite sharing Grafftey Smith’s foreboding, the High Commissioner for Palestine and Transjordan, Sir Alan Cunningham, exclaimed:

I trust, however, that there will be no question of holding up negotiations of the Trans-Jordan Treaty or the date of its (?execution) [sic] pending attempt to promote settlement of the dispute. Such delay, whatever the final outcome, would exasperate the Amir Abdullah and imperil the existing fund of goodwill in Trans-Jordan towards Great Britain.

The strength of Abdullah’s goodwill was seemingly given precedence over the risk of exacerbating inter-Arab tensions. Kirkbride agreed that it would be preferable to leave this dispute ‘for eventual settlement through the machinery of the Arab League’, even though it was expected to put a huge strain on this fledgling organisation. Ultimately it was deemed preferable to allow the problem to fester and leave it to someone else to clear up rather than run the risk that

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37 Minute by Martin to Bigg, 5 March 1946, CO537/1844, TNA.
38 Jedda to FO, 12, 5 January 1946, CO537/1842, TNA.
39 ‘Memorandum from King Ibn Saud’, 18 January 1946, ibid.
Britain ‘be blamed for failure of attempt at settlement’. The British Government had a vested interest in the outcome of this matter. As Arthur Creech Jones, the Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for the Colonies, told the Cabinet: ‘it was to our interest that the port of Aqaba should not pass into the possession of Ibn Saud’. Nonetheless, it was deemed preferable to ignore any complications in the expectation that the situation would work itself out after the Treaty was agreed.

This slipshod approach to constructing the treaty relationship was quintessentially apparent in Britain’s handling of the future of the Arab Legion. In the interest of economising, the Treasury had instigated a review of the post-war future of the Arab Legion, with the intention of securing a significant reduction. It had always been the intention to eventually disband the garrison companies, which had been formed merely as a ‘wartime measure’ to undertake guard duties in Palestine. Indeed, their ‘creation as part of the Arab Legion was primarily a matter of administrative convenience’. As the Second World War drew to a close, and ‘in view of the changed military situation in the Middle East’, the Treasury requested that the Colonial Office seek the opinion of the War Office as to whether the current levels were still necessary. The financial implications of the Second World War set forth a candid demand for clarity over the role of the Arab Legion as a means of identifying its true value. In 1945/6, the total cost of the military units of the Arab Legion was £1,743,202. If the infantry companies were disbanded, as planned, that would reduce the cost of the Legion to

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40 Cunningham to Hall (S. of S. for Colonies), 10 February 1946, ibid.
41 ‘Extract from CONCLUSIONS of a Meeting of the Cabinet held at 10 Downing Street, S.W.1., on Monday 25th February 1946’, CO537/1843, TNA.
42 Minute by Garran, 8 April 1947, FO371/62203/E2014, TNA.
43 James to Sabben-Clare, 23 January 1945, CO537/1499, TNA.
approximately £1.1m – a reduction of about 30%.\footnote{Total cost of military units of Arab Legion 1945/46, Kirkbride, undated, CO537/1842, TNA.} After consulting the Middle East Command, the War Office replied: ‘we are satisfied that the present strength of the Arab Legion is justified by military requirements.’\footnote{D.E. Howell to J.D. Chalmers, 27 May 1945, CO537/1499, TNA.} The War Office response that it was too early to start reducing the Arab Legion was hit by a sharp rebuff from the Treasury. It wished to know whether the Arab Legion has or has not an Imperial role as a military force. If it has not, then we feel it should be reduced to the level required for local purposes only \ldots{} \footnote{L. Petch to T.A.G. Charlton, 14 August 1945, ibid.} [with] its cost remaining on the Trans-Jordan vote \cite{i.e. budget}. If, as would seem to be the case, it is on the other hand a force with actual or potential Imperial duties, then surely the Army Votes should bear at least a part of its cost.

The Treasury felt it wrong that a civilian department – presently the Colonial Office – should bear the cost of a military force whose size and expense was set by the War Office.\footnote{Sabben Clare to James, 16 June 1945, ibid.} As the intermediary in the review of the Arab Legion’s future the Colonial Office was non-committal. Having forwarded the War Office’s reply to the Treasury with the comment that ‘we agree generally’ with those views,\footnote{Minute by Anderson, 29 August 1945, ibid.} Major F.H. Anderson of the Colonial Office felt that the Treasury’s counter-argument was ‘very well reasoned’. In Anderson’s view: ‘there is considerable force in the Treasury argument and now that the war is over the whole matter should certainly be reviewed’.\footnote{L. Petch to T.A.G. Charlton, 14 August 1945, ibid.} A further complication was that the Arab Legion was considered a vital \textit{quid pro quo} in the relationship with Abdullah. The outgoing High Commissioner of Palestine and Transjordan, Lord Gort, argued against any reduction of the Arab Legion on the basis that Abdullah considered
the Arab Legion’s Mechanised Brigade a symbol of Transjordan’s ‘progress and prestige’. As such he believed: ‘the political effect of any reduction in this Brigade at the present time would be out of all proportion to any economy effected’.  

Gort added: ‘in view of their war record any unilateral reduction of the Arab Legion would be regarded by the Emir and his people, in the nature of an ungrateful and unwarranted affront.’ Gort objected to reduction primarily on grounds of loyalty and political impact. How could Britain on the one hand seek to maintain Abdullah’s solidarity by rewarding him with independence, but at the same time massively reduce the Arab Legion – a symbol of Abdullah’s power and prestige? However, the Treasury felt: ‘it will be difficult to justify its continued maintenance on anything like the expanded scale to which it rose during the war’. This dilemma provided an unwanted complication to the process of agreeing a swift treaty. Thus, when the process of drafting the Treaty began, the Colonial Office opted to separate the two issues. Bennett suggested that talks regarding the future of the Arab Legion be conducted independently of the strategic aspects of the Treaty because, in his view:

> if we try to deal with the Treaty question as a “by-product” of the Arab Legion discussions, the matter will get into the wrong perspective and may take a long time to reach finality. By asking for a new full-scale strategic appreciation on the basis of a new Treaty, we should, on the contrary, be able to mop up the Arab Legion question much more easily. The future size and role of the Arab Legion will automatically fall into place once we have worked out our own future strategic requirements in an independent Trans-Jordan, our military relations with the Trans-Jordan Government, and the amount of any subvention that may be paid to Trans-Jordan after it has become independent.

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49 Lord Gort, to Oliver Stanley, 23 May 1945, ibid.
50 Minute by Anderson, 2 June 1945, ibid.
51 Creech Jones to Cunningham, 30 January 1946, FO371/52605/E2099, TNA.
52 Bennett to Reilly, 23 January 1946, CO537/1842, TNA.
The Treaty therefore did not take into account the future of the Arab Legion. Despite being under review for almost a year this complication was put off until after the Treaty was signed.

Meanwhile, as the Treaty was being finalised, a British consensus that the Arab Legion should be significantly reduced was emerging. The Chiefs of Staff believed that the Arab Legion should revert to its pre-war status as an internal security force. The future role of the Legion as set out by the Chiefs of Staff Committee was threefold: ‘(a) to maintain law and order in Trans-Jordan and to safeguard the pipeline; (b) to deter neighbouring States from attacking Trans-Jordan, (c) to prevent smuggling into Palestine.’ The Chiefs of Staff wanted the Arab Legion to be responsible only for maintaining security within the borders of Transjordan. This tallied with the political authorities responsible for the security of Palestine, who now wanted the 80% of the Arab Legion, which was stationed there, withdrawn. While recognising the vital internal security role that the Arab Legion was performing inside Palestine, the new High Commissioner, Sir Alan Cunningham, was concerned about the political implications of employing a ‘foreign force’. This, he felt, ‘will inevitably give rise to a series of embarrassing questions’. In particular, if the Arab Legion became involved in incidents with ‘the Jews’ it would likely ‘arouse considerable adverse comment in both the United Kingdom and America’. Consequently, Cunningham pleaded: ‘For both constitutional and political reasons, therefore, I must urge that the War Office be asked to consider the replacement of the units of the Arab

53 ‘Memorandum drawn up by Mr Kirkbride explaining the operation of certain claims in the Military Annex to the draft Treaty with Trans-Jordan’, 13 March 1946; Cabinet Offices to Commanders-in-Chief, 20 February 1946, CO537/1499, TNA.
Legion now employed in Palestine by other troops.' The Foreign Office also agreed that the 'War Office should replace the units of the Arab Legion now in Palestine with other troops', because: 'The continued presence in Palestine of the troops of a Foreign Power is obviously highly anomalous and is likely to get us into all sorts of difficulties'. The Treasury, unsurprisingly, ‘entirely’ endorsed these recommendations. The War Office effectively agreed too. It wished to keep the 15 Garrison Companies presently in Palestine to meet its ‘imperial commitment for Garrison Companies in the Middle East’. However, as these were to be used outside Transjordan the War Office now felt ‘they should form part of the TJFF [Transjordan Frontier Force] rather than the Arab Legion’. The TJFF and the Arab Legion were two quite different entities. As Harold Beeley, of the Foreign Office, succinctly explained: ‘The TJFF, despite its name, is a Palestinian force, but the Arab Legion is in fact the national army of the independent State of Transjordan.’ Although a British national was in command of the Arab Legion, Glubb was contracted to the Jordanian Government and had no official link to HMG except for an administrative link to the Colonial Service, for pension purposes. Meanwhile the TJFF was a ‘Colonial Force’, funded by the War Office, for which the Palestine Government was responsible. It was not even made up primarily of Jordanians. When the force was disbanded in February 1948 the nationality breakdown, excluding its British officers, was: 1,463 Palestinians; 130 Jordanians; 113 Egyptians and Sudanese; 24 Lebanese; and 4

54 Cunningham to Hall, 8 June 1946, ibid.
55 [indecipherable] (FO) to Trafford Smith, 8 July 1946, ibid.
56 Trafford Smith to Baxter, 27 June 1946, ibid.
57 WO to J.D. Chalmers, 7 May 1946, ibid.
58 Minute by Beeley, 22 March 1947, FO371/62203/E2014, TNA.
59 Russell Edmunds to P. Garron [sic], 5 March 1947, ibid.
other nationalities. Politically and constitutionally it was deemed appropriate for the TJFF to takeover the Arab Legion's responsibilities in Palestine. It was believed that the TJFF would be ‘less vulnerable to hostile Jewish criticism’ and that it would be easier to defend its presence in Palestine. Moreover, because of its greater number of British officers the War Office considered the TJFF to be both more efficient and more reliable. Thus, the War Office proposed an expansion of the TJFF to meet Britain's military requirements in the Middle East, and was preparing the reduction of the Arab Legion into a small force dedicated solely to maintaining internal security within Transjordan.

One obstacle to this large-scale reduction of the Arab Legion, however, was the hastily considered 1946 Treaty. By separating the review of the Arab Legion from the details of the Treaty the Colonial Office had inadvertently put in place a mechanism that obstructed Britain’s ability to disband the Arab Legion unilaterally. The Treaty effectively consolidated the garrison companies, which had originally been attached to the Arab Legion merely as a matter of political convenience, as a formal part of the military forces of Transjordan. When designing the quid pro quo upon which Britain’s treaty rights would be based the Colonial Office worked along the premise of giving ‘assistance to the Amir in the maintenance of his armed forces, in return for his agreeing to meeting H.M.G.’s strategic requirements in Trans-Jordan’. As Peter Garran of the Colonial Office observed, this meant that despite the original remit of the garrison companies and the intention to disband them, ‘we probably could not maintain the view ...

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60 Gurney to Fletcher-Cooke, 3 February 1948, CO537/3577, TNA.
61 Cunningham to Oliver Stanley, 6 November 1946, CO537/1499, TNA.
62 ‘Comments on Reorg of Arab Legion’, undated, WO191/82, TNA.
63 Minute by Trafford Smith, 29 January 1946, CO537/1842, TNA.
that the garrison companies should not be regarded as constituting military units of the Transjordan Forces within the meaning of the Treaty and its annex'.\textsuperscript{64} Article 8 of the Military annex to the Treaty stipulated that: ‘The strength of such units [the Arab Legion] will be agreed upon annually by the High Contracting Parties’.\textsuperscript{65} When HMG posited the reduction of the Arab Legion Glubb was quick to point out that according to this article: ‘Any decision would therefore have to be a subject for negotiation on a diplomatic level’.\textsuperscript{66} Under the terms of the new Treaty any reduction in the Arab Legion would require the Jordanian Government’s approval. The Foreign Office acknowledged that this point had been seemingly ‘overlooked’.\textsuperscript{67} In an example of apparent complacency the British had seemingly failed to consider the ramifications of the Treaty.

There is also scope to suggest that there was some degree of manipulation from the men on the spot, because Kirkbride had not overlooked the fact that the military annex allowed for annual discussions to fix the strength of the Arab Legion. During the Treaty negotiations he reasoned that the Arab Legion strength would effectively be dictated by Britain, although he noted that it would be ‘desirable to avoid any appearance of dictation by His Majesty’s Government’.\textsuperscript{68} Kirkbride therefore approved the wording of the Treaty so as to avoid any explicit statement of British control, while noting that in actual fact Britain would be able to dictate the size of the Arab Legion. However, less than

\textsuperscript{64} Minute by Garran, 8 April 1947, FO371/62203/E2014, TNA.
\textsuperscript{65} ‘Treaty of Alliance: Between His Majesty in respect of the United Kingdom and his Highness the Amir of Trans-Jordan’, 22 March 1946, CO537/1844, TNA.
\textsuperscript{66} ‘Account of a Meeting on 18/7/46 in Jerusalem Headquarters’, Glubb, 18 July 1946, FO371/52930/E7781, TNA.
\textsuperscript{67} Henderson for Baxter to Winnifrith, 24 June 1946, CO537/1499, TNA.
\textsuperscript{68} ‘Memorandum drawn up by Mr Kirkbride explaining the operation of certain claims in the Military Annex to the draft Treaty with Trans-Jordan’, 13 March 1946, ibid.
two months later Kirkbride, like Glubb, used the ambiguous wording to preclude reduction of the Arab Legion to two mechanised regiments, as proposed, as he warned that it was likely to be strongly resisted by King Abdullah and the Jordanian Government.69 Owing to Britain’s lack of coordination and Kirkbride’s intervention Abdullah had managed to cling onto the army that had nominally been created in his country’s name during the Second World War. Glubb, Kirkbride and Abdullah were each against reduction of the Arab Legion, and the wording of the Treaty gave them a lever to use. It meant the Foreign Office had in the back of its mind that: ‘we are not in a position to disband, or otherwise modify the strength of the Arab Legion except by agreement with the Trans-Jordan Government, in accordance with Article 8 of the Annex to the Treaty’.70 This therefore made a mockery of the Colonial Office’s belief that the future of the Arab Legion could be mopped up more easily after independence.

This oversight created an obstacle to Britain’s ability to reduce the strength of the Arab Legion unilaterally, but it was not determinative. The future of the Arab Legion was ultimately decided by the precarious situation in Palestine. Although the Arab Legion was controversial politically, militarily strong practical arguments existed for maintaining the status quo. The General Officer Commanding in Palestine and Transjordan, Lt.-General Barker, warned: ‘The precarious situation in Syria and the fact that Palestine is facing the gravest crisis in its history makes any suggestion of reduction dangerous to contemplate.’ He concluded:

I cannot stress too strongly that this is a most inopportune moment to introduce changes and disturb a going concern. I

69 ‘The Military Units of the Arab Legion’, Kirkbride, 4 June 1946, ibid.
70 R.G. Howe to C.S. Sugden, 15 October 1946, ibid.
therefore strongly recommend that [the] situation should remain as at present until next spring when we should have a clearer idea of the future.\footnote{Evelyn Barker to Mideast, 20 July 1946, FO371/52930/E8187, TNA.}

If the Arab Legion was withdrawn without replacement it was expected that ‘a large increase in thefts of arms ammunition and explosives is bound to result’.\footnote{C-in-C MELF to WO, 7 August 1946, CO537/1499, TNA.}

Even if the British could unilaterally disband the Arab Legion they were presently performing a vital function, and while the plan was to replace the Arab Legion with the TJFF, this could not be done overnight. The War Office proposed that the Arab Legion garrison companies should simply be transferred wholesale to the TJFF.\footnote{WO to C-in-C Middle East, 23 March 1946, ibid.} However, this was deemed ‘out of the question’ because of the ‘political implications’. As one Colonial Office official explained: ‘The Arab allegiance [within the Arab Legion] is to the Amir and their personal loyalty is also very strong to Brigadier Glubb’. This meant that compulsory transfer was ill-advised and large-scale voluntary enlistment in a British unit such as the TJFF, by those disbanded from the Arab Legion, was deemed highly unlikely.\footnote{Chalmers to Thelwall, draft, 31 May 1946, ibid.} Kirkbride added that simply transferring the 15 garrison companies currently in Palestine from the Arab Legion to the TJFF would also be false economy, noting that the running costs of the TJFF was even more expensive than the Arab Legion, owing to its ‘much larger cadre of British officers than is the case of the Arab Legion’.\footnote{‘Memorandum drawn up by Mr Kirkbride explaining the operation of certain claims in the Military Annex to the draft Treaty with Trans-Jordan’, 13 March 1946, ibid.} However, this was not a meaningful factor. Regardless of the economic aspect, the plan was for the TJFF to take over the role being performed by the Arab
Legion garrison companies. The main problem was how best to handle the handover, given the ‘imminent crisis’ presently facing Palestine.\footnote{‘Account of a Meeting on 18/7/46 in Jerusalem Headquarters’, Glubb, 18 July 1946, FO371/52930/E7781, TNA.}

It was decided that the replacement could only be safely arranged via a gradual handover process. The War Office requested that the Mechanised Brigade of the Arab Legion remain in Palestine with the position scheduled to be reviewed in early 1947. Meanwhile it was all set to begin the gradual transition of disbanding the Arab Legion garrison companies and replacing them with equivalent units of the TJFF immediately.\footnote{Sugden to Bernard Reilly, 3 October 1946, CO537/1499, TNA.} This would raise the strength of the TJFF from 2,500 to 7,500 men.\footnote{Russell Edmunds to P. Garron [sic], 5 March 1947, FO371/62203/E2014, TNA.} It was expected to take about one year to recruit and train fourteen new TJFF companies. As long as there were no objections to the recruitment of Jordanian subjects, particularly those from the disbanding Arab Legion Companies, the War Office proposed to instruct MELF ‘to begin recruiting and training fourteen Trans-Jordan Frontier Force Companies as soon as possible’.\footnote{Fitzgeorge-Balfour to Chalmers, 27 September 1946, CO537/1499, TNA.} At the end of 1946 the Arab Legion was all set to undertake a yearlong disbandment that would result in it losing the bulk of its manpower.

However, the Palestine situation continued to preclude the planned reduction of the Arab Legion in favour of the TJFF. Having failed to find a political solution to the Palestine problem, in February 1947 the British handed the problem of finding a solution to the Arab-Jewish conundrum in Palestine to the UN. The uncertainty this created led the Treasury, in agreement with the Colonial Office, to suggest that, as long as the Foreign Office did not think it would affect the Palestine case in the UN, it would be advisable to delay the
formation of new TJFF units and continue using the Arab Legion garrison companies until the situation was clearer.\textsuperscript{80} The Foreign Office agreed with this course.\textsuperscript{81} From a ‘practical point of view’, it was deemed preferable to maintain the status quo ‘until the present crisis in Palestine is over’. This would mean maintaining the ‘anomalous situation’ of using the national army of an independent state rather than the misleadingly named Palestinian Force.\textsuperscript{82} This did not end the intention to replace the Arab Legion with the TJFF. Indeed, the British ploughed ahead with plans to rename the TJFF so that it more accurately reflected its status. Abdullah had initially requested that the word ‘Transjordan’ be removed from its title because it created political difficulties with his Arab neighbours, who struggled to distinguish between the two. HMG agreed that a name change was desirable and the first alternative recommended was the ‘Palestine Legion’.\textsuperscript{83} The new name eventually decided upon was the ‘Palestine Frontier Force’.\textsuperscript{84} However, just like the expansion of the TJFF, the announcement of this name change was put on hold while the fate of Palestine was considered, lest the reason for the alteration be misrepresented. However, after the UN agreed to partition Palestine in November 1947 it was decided to disband the TJFF and the name change became redundant.\textsuperscript{85} With the British mandate in Palestine set to end, the TJFF, which was a Colonial Force of the

\begin{flushright}
80 Russell Edmunds to P. Garran [sic], 5 March 1947, FO371/62203/E2014, TNA.
81 P. Garran to Russell Edmunds, 21 April 1947, ibid.
82 Minute by Beeley, 22 March 1947, ibid.
83 CO to P. Garran, 14 October 1947, FO371/62203/E9694; WO to C-in-C MELF, 5 May 1947, FO371/62203/E1321, TNA.
84 Cunningham to S. of S. for Colonies, 2 August 1947, FO371/62203/E5864, TNA.
85 WO to C-in-C MELF, 3 December 1947, WO32/15562, TNA.
\end{flushright}
Palestine Government, no longer had a purpose and on 8 February 1948 this force was formally disbanded and the Arab Legion avoided reduction.

For two years after the Second World War ended, the Arab Legion was maintained merely on an ad hoc basis until conditions in Palestine allowed for its reduction. The Arab Legion maintained its Second World War strength after 1945 not by British design, but as a result, partly, of an uncoordinated and hastily designed treaty, yet mainly by force of circumstance. When the Treaty was signed, and for the following eighteen months, the British Government planned to disband 80% of the Arab Legion; it was all set to revert to a mere internal security force. The British had little interest in the Arab Legion as an asset beyond its ability to maintain internal security within Transjordan and its value as a quid pro quo for securing dominant access to an important geostrategic area. The Treaty gave Glubb, Kirkbride and Abdullah a lever with which to hinder this plan, but ultimately the Arab Legion avoided reduction because it was required to meet the demands inside Palestine. Within the existing literature it is well-worn tale that the 1946 Treaty of Alliance granted only nominal independence to Transjordan and that Britain maintained significant military privileges. This chapter does not deny this. However, it does contend that acceptance of this truism has obscured other important nuances. Yes, Britain maintained significant privileges, but the Treaty was not part of any grand strategy. Its construction was not well coordinated within Whitehall and it declined to consider any finer details. The British gave almost no consideration to the Treaty’s implications. They merely sought to retain the geostrategic advantages that Transjordan offered, within a new framework that would satisfy Abdullah and the wider international community.
Ultimately the preclusion of the Arab Legion’s planned disbandment was a symptom of a much bigger problem facing the British: how to solve the Palestine question that had plagued them since the First World War. In an effort to secure Arab and Zionist support the British made two conflicting promises. The 1917 Balfour Declaration ambiguously promised a Jewish National Home. Meanwhile, in his correspondence with Abdullah’s father, Sherif Husayn, the British High Commissioner in Cairo, Sir Henry McMahon had already made an equally ambiguous pledge to support Arab independence after the war.¹ Thereafter the British struggled to deal with the competing demands of the two communities in Palestine. The Second World War put the problem of Palestine on hold to some extent as Britain and the Zionists were united against Nazi Germany.² However, in 1944 a new Zionist insurgency against the British ensued.³ Moreover, the immigration issue had been significantly compounded by the Holocaust in Europe. Palestine thus emerged from the Second World War as an ever more intractable problem. After several failed attempts to find a satisfactory solution and with the continued threat of Zionist terrorism, Bevin announced, in February 1947, Britain’s decision to pass the problem of finding a political solution to the Palestine problem on to the United Nations. To that end the UN established the United Nations Special Committee on Palestine (UNSCOP). While the Jewish Agency was eager to negotiate with UNSCOP, the

³ Bradshaw, *Britain and Jordan*, p. 118.
Arab League and the Arab Higher Committee (AHC), which represented the Palestinian Arabs, refused to have any involvement. This has widely been acknowledged as the Arabs’ biggest mistake, as by boycotting UNSCOP’s investigation they had no input in its eventual recommendations. When it reported its conclusions in September UNSCOP recommended an end to the mandate and partition, thus creating an independent Arab state and an independent Jewish state. This proposal was welcomed by the Jewish Agency, but rejected by the Arabs. Two months later, on 29 November, the UN General Assembly endorsed this partition plan [Map 2]. This decision immediately sparked a viscous civil war between the two rival communities. The chaos that ensued and the impending end of the mandate had significant implications for both Britain and Transjordan and the purpose of this chapter is to assess how the two sought to deal with this issue. At the heart of this were Glubb and the Arab Legion, both of which became crucial tools for securing British and Jordanian interests in post-mandate Palestine.

In assessing the relationship between the partition of Palestine and the role of Glubb and the Arab Legion, this chapter drives at the heart of the controversial ‘collusion’ debate. In essence there are two facets to Avi Shlaim’s ‘collusion’ thesis. Firstly, he argued that in a secret meeting between King Abdullah and the Jewish Agency twelve days before the UN partition plan was approved, an ‘explicit agreement was reached between the Hashemites and the Zionists to carve up Palestine’, whereby Abdullah would annex the areas allotted

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5 Fraser, *Arab-Israeli Conflict*, pp. 34-5.
7 Fraser, *Arab-Israeli Conflict*, pp. 29-40.
to the Arab state to create a Greater Transjordan.\textsuperscript{8} Ilan Pappé has described it as a ‘tacit agreement’.\textsuperscript{9} For Efraim Karsh, however, this distinction is semantic. In his view there was simply no agreement, tacit or otherwise.\textsuperscript{10} A subsidiary argument advanced by Shlaim, which is the aspect this chapter is primarily concerned with, was that Britain was party to this collusion. Shlaim argues that Britain gave Abdullah the ‘green light’ to use the Arab Legion to implement Hashemite-Zionist partition of Palestine when the Transjordan Prime Minister, Tewfiq Abul Huda, and Glubb met the British Foreign Secretary, Ernest Bevin, in London on 7 February 1948. Shlaim has described the February meeting as marking ‘a major turning point in Britain’s policy towards the Middle East’.\textsuperscript{11} Efraim Karsh has refuted this claim, describing it as: ‘The warning that Whitehall never gave.’\textsuperscript{12} Meanwhile Maureen Norton echoes Shlaim’s argument that Britain supported the Greater Transjordan scheme, but claims that the February meeting was not a turning point, but a charade. According to Norton the British had already backed the Greater Transjordan scheme and the Abul Huda-Bevin meeting was ‘staged’ to hoodwink historians into believing that the Greater Transjordan scheme was a Jordanian, rather than a British, initiative.\textsuperscript{13} Norton also contends that Glubb was the Machiavellian mastermind behind this scheme. Armed with the most significant archival material related to the partition of Palestine to emerge since the late 1970s, this chapter is able to move this debate forward. By examining the conduct of Glubb and the Arab Legion after this

\textsuperscript{10} Karsh, ‘Collusion that Never Was’, p. 570.
\textsuperscript{12} Karsh, \textit{Fabricating Israeli History}, p. 109.
\textsuperscript{13} Norton, ‘Last Pasha’, p. 362.
meeting until the end of the mandate in May this chapter negates the revisionist contention that a Hashemite-Zionist agreement, or even a tacit understanding, existed, but corroborates Shlaim’s ‘green light’ argument by emphasising that the Arab Legion was given the objective of securing the Arab areas of Palestine and acquiescing in the establishment of a Jewish State. This chapter argues that the February meeting was a watershed moment. It marked the end of a period of deliberation and the moment at which the Greater Transjordan policy was set in motion. Moreover, it defies Norton’s claim that Glubb influenced high-policy, but emphasises that the British did come to rely on Glubb to implement the scheme.

Before addressing the February meeting itself and the role of Glubb and the Arab Legion thereafter, it is important to begin by briefly addressing the genesis of the Greater Transjordan option and Glubb’s ability to influence high-policy. The idea of partitioning Palestine between a Jewish state and an enlarged Transjordan first became a serious option to solve the dispute in 1937, when it was recommended by the Palestine Royal Commission headed by Lord Peel, after it was established by the British in response to the Arab Revolt, which began in April 1936 [Map 1]. Abdullah welcomed this proposed expansion of his rule. However, the other Arab states were opposed to the expansion of Abdullah’s influence and the AHC was singularly opposed to partition. In an attempt to quell the intensifying Arab opposition the British published a White Paper in 1939, which restricted Jewish immigration, and the Peel Report was discarded. The Greater Transjordan option resurfaced at the end of the Second World War when Glubb posited it as an alternative to Jordanian independence.14

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Second World War, Glubb had been vehemently opposed to partition. For Glubb, the only post-war solution was for Britain to maintain firm control of Palestine. However, Glubb was also opposed to Jordanian independence. Glubb explained: ‘I do not deprecate complete independence because I want to make Arabia a British colony, but because I think they want our positive help. For us to cut our losses and clear out would be the worst thing that could happen for the Arabs’.

Glubb believed that Britain should:

emphasize the increasing inter dependence of all nations, and the fact that even great European powers have come to the conclusion that they must sacrifice part of their independence in future.16

Glubb therefore posited Greater Transjordan as a means of rewarding Abdullah and enhancing his profile without independence. He backed partition more forcefully, though, after the failure of the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry, which was set up to examine the Palestine problem at the end of 1945. However, when the Committee’s report was published in May 1946 its recommendations were immediately thwarted after the US President, Harry S. Truman, angered Bevin and the British Prime Minster, Clement Attlee, by emphasising the immigration aspect of the report and ignoring the other political recommendations.17 Ultimately this report, in its entirety, failed to cultivate the support of the Americans, the British, the Arabs or the Zionists. This prompted Glubb to suggest, in an unsolicited memo, that partition between a Jewish state

16 Glubb to Owen Tweedy (Ministry of Information), 14 April 1943, GP2006, 83 [emphasis in original].
and Transjordan was the only possible solution to the Palestine problem. Glubb explained that he had ‘been converted to partition’ based on the apparent futility of any other solution. Initially Glubb advocated a gradual process of implementing partition, whereby Britain should announce its intention to partition Palestine with the transparent intention of Transjordan assuming full control of the Arab areas twelve months later. However, given the return to prominence of the Mufti of Jerusalem, Hajj Amin al-Husseini, a leading figure during the 1936-9 Arab Revolt against the British, and now leader of the AHC, Glubb revised his suggestion in a further unsolicited memo. In December 1946 Glubb advocated immediate implementation after announcing partition in order to prevent the Mufti from stirring up opposition in advance. With the belief that ‘the defection of Trans-Jordan to the side of partition would break the solid front of Arab opposition’, in 1946 Glubb advocated a fairly transparent Hashemite-Zionist partition of Palestine.

Glubb’s proposal had little influence on British policy, however. The reaction to Glubb’s recommendations on Palestine was indicative of his marginal role within Whitehall, particularly inside the Colonial Office. Glubb regularly bombarded HMG with lengthy memoranda on a multitude of Middle Eastern issues in an attempt to influence high policy. This was Glubb’s ultimate ambition, but he lamented his failure to realise it. In a revealing letter to Hugh Foot, the Colonial Secretary in Nicosia, Glubb exposed his hopes and regrets:

There is nothing I should like more than political influence in London. But how am I to acquire it? I do not know a single

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18 ‘A Note on Partition as a Solution of the Palestine Problem’, Glubb, 13 July 1946, WO216/207, TNA.
19 ‘A Further Note on Partition as a Solution of the Palestine Question’, Glubb, December 1946, CO537/1856, TNA.
prominent person in England. The trouble is that we have to choose [sic] our careers when we are young, and at that time we (or I at least) are not interested in politics or in careers, but only adventure.... I took the wrong turning 15 years ago, because I was more attracted then by adventure and romance, than by official career. I see no way to rectify my mistake.20

When he first arrived in the Middle East in 1920 Glubb dreamed of being a writer, but he turned to soldiering because he had neither the money to sustain him, nor the experiences to write about.21 Glubb was now frustrated that he had got himself stuck in a ‘sluggish backwater’ from which he would ‘never attain high rank’. Although it did not deter him, Glubb complained to his friend and confidant that: ‘it is a sheer waste of time for us out here to keep writing memos on British policy. Probably no official in any authority ever reads them in England. Even if they do and go so far as to minute them “Very interesting”, our effusions are quite ineffective.’22 Glubb’s fears were not unfounded. In one of the more sympathetic appraisals of Glubb’s memoranda Bernard Reilly of the Colonial Office remarked that: ‘I feel that there is much that is sound in what he writes, but I doubt whether his efforts will have much effect on practical policy’.23 Most dismissed Glubb as ‘dealing with matters on which he is not in the least qualified to express an opinion’.24 It was no surprise therefore that the reaction within the Colonial Office to Glubb’s memorandum on partition was primarily one of disinterest. One Colonial Office official ridiculed it as being written in ‘Glubb’s usual tiresomely long-winded and repetitive style’.25 Another

20 Glubb to Foot, 28 February 1944, GP2006, 83.
21 ‘Of the Object of My Life’, Glubb, 24 October 1920, GP2006, 47.
22 Glubb to J. de C. Hamilton, 10 June 1944, ibid.
23 Minute by Reilly, 30 August 1946, CO537/1856, TNA.
24 Minute by Butterhill, 15 March 1943, CO732/88/9, TNA.
25 Minute by Martin, 20 January 1947, CO537/1856, TNA; Bradshaw, Britain and Jordan, p. 121.
remarked, several months later, how the memorandum had been filed away unread and was now out of date. 26 Contrary to Norton’s contention that Glubb ‘influenced policy at the highest levels of the British foreign policy establishment’, Glubb’s effusions had little or no impact on high-policy. 27 During the Second World War Glubb had fruitlessly advocated the creation of a Levant Office. He had also been an ineffective opponent of granting Transjordan independence. Now his views on partition were ignored. HMG sought an entirely different solution. Britain’s final attempt at solving the problem, in what became known as the Bevin Plan, was a five-year trusteeship that would pave the way for an independent Palestinian state with a permanent Jewish minority. 28 However, the Jewish Agency would only accept partition and the AHC would only accept immediate independence in the whole of Palestine. 29 Consequently, the Bevin Plan was rejected and Britain lost all hope of mediating a solution. The British Cabinet therefore decided to ‘refer the problem of Palestine to the judgement of the General Assembly of the United Nations’. 30

Bevin’s announcement caused Abdullah to be consumed by a mixture of anxiety and excitement. 31 The fear stemmed from the likely turmoil in neighbouring Palestine, the possibility of it being overrun by his enemy, the Mufti, and the withdrawal of British forces from close proximity. Transjordan also faced losing crucial access, strategically and financially, to the

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26 Minute by [indecipherable], 25 June 1947, ibid.
29 Shlaim, Collusion, pp. 84-5.
30 ‘Conclusions of a Meeting of the Cabinet’, 14 February 1947, CAB128/9/22, TNA.
31 Shlaim, Collusion, p. 87.
Meanwhile, Abdullah’s excitement stemmed from his long-standing expansionist ambitions. Described by one of his contemporaries as a ‘falcon trapped in a canary’s cage’, it had been a long-term goal of Abdullah’s to establish his rule over a Greater Syrian Empire, incorporating much of the Levant – Transjordan, Palestine, Syria, and Lebanon. Abdullah’s invitation to Britain to cooperate in this desire had been consistently met with ‘unavoidable official rebuff’. Palestine, however, presented Abdullah with an opportunity to expand. In her advocacy of Glubb’s agency Norton all but omits Abdullah from the scene. However, Abdullah was the driving force of the Greater Transjordan option and it was who he sought Zionist, and subsequently British, support to that end.

Abdullah’s relationship with the Zionist movement dated back as far as the 1920s. From Abdullah’s perspective he was prompted to make this connection to combat British financial prudency and Transjordan’s ‘dire economic outlook’. Meanwhile, the Zionists were eager to procure the support of an Arab ruler as a ‘counterweight’ to local opposition in their pursuit of a Jewish National Home in Palestine. This relationship found a real purpose as the question concerning the future of Palestine intensified after 1945. The first significant talks between Abdullah and the Jewish Agency occurred in August 1946. These two meetings did not result in any agreement, but as Avi Shlaim appraised, it identified common ground and formed a basis for future

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32 Kirkbride to Burrows, 29 October 1947, FO816/112, TNA.
33 Wilson, King Abdullah, p. 136.
34 Pirie-Gordon to Bevin, 10 September 1947, FO371/62226/E8679, TNA.
35 Bradshaw, Britain and Jordan, pp. 55-65.
A further meeting took place between King Abdullah and Golda Meir, the Acting Director of the Jewish Agency’s Political Department, on 17 November and the relative significance of this meeting is at the heart of the ‘collusion’ debate. There are two contemporary records of this meeting: by Ezra Danin and Elias Sassoon, two of the Jewish Agency’s Arab experts who accompanied Meir at the meeting. Combined they have spawned two polarised interpretations. Shlaim argues that ‘the two reports prove beyond doubt that a firm deal was concluded’.38 Meanwhile Efraim Karsh contends that ‘careful examination of the two documents … proves that Meir was implacably opposed to any agreement that would violate the letter and the spirit of the UN Partition Resolution passed twelve days later. In no way did she consent to Transjordan’s annexation of the Arab areas of Mandatory Palestine’. Karsh adds that Golda Meir’s verbal recollection of the meeting several months later and the inferiority of her position further negate the notion that any agreement was made.39 To an extent, Karsh is right. The two documents do not support Shlaim’s claim that a firm deal was concluded. Yet the veracity with which Karsh has sought to deny any hint of ‘collusion’ has obscured the true significance of this meeting. Certainly, the two parties openly discussed the possibility of reaching a Hashemite-Zionist accommodation over the future of Palestine. It is also indisputable that the Zionists confirmed that they would ‘look favourably’ upon an attempt by him to seize the Arab areas of Palestine:

especially if it did not hinder us in the establishment of our state, if it did not lead to clashes between us and his forces, and particularly if this action were taken under a declaration that the

37 Shlaim, Collusion, pp. 76-83.
38 Shlaim, Collusion, pp. 110-6.
seizure was only to ensure order and keep the peace until the U.N. could establish a government in that part.

The meeting ended with the Jewish Agency asking, and Abdullah accepting, that ‘should there be a common basis – whether political, economic, or security - ... he [would] be prepared to sign a written agreement’. This open-ended conclusion in itself negates the notion that a firm agreement was reached. It does, however, confirm that Abdullah received encouragement that his dynastic objectives could be achieved. The salient point that emerges from the records of this meeting is that it provided both sides with a clear comprehension of each other’s main objectives; it demonstrated a mutual willingness to find a solution; and Abdullah received encouragement that the Zionists would acquiesce in the establishment of Greater Transjordan. As Golda Meir retrospectively recorded: ‘If he was prepared to confront the world and us with a fait accompli – the tradition of friendship between us would continue’. Thus, contrary to Karsh’s assertion that she in no way gave consent for Abdullah’s annexation of Arab Palestine, she did it seems acknowledge that the Jewish Agency would acquiesce in just such an outcome.

Meanwhile Abdullah simultaneously sought support from his patron, Britain, which, despite divesting the problem of finding a solution to the UN, maintained a vested interest in the outcome. Hitherto the British may have ignored Glubb’s Greater Transjordan recommendation, but in light of the UN partition plan the scheme being advocated by Abdullah became an increasingly attractive option. The British were fully aware that Abdullah ‘was naturally

41 Quoted in: Karsh, ‘Collusion that Never Was’, p. 573.
anxious to ensure that the remaining Arab areas of Palestine are united to Transjordan and looks to us, as his ally, to achieve this object'.

As a result of Abdullah’s probing the Greater Transjordan option and possible intervention of the Arab Legion in Palestine was discussed throughout Whitehall during the second half of 1947. The resulting conclusion was that the Greater Transjordan option offered the best opportunity of safeguarding British interests. This solution offered Britain two principal benefits in comparison to the UN scheme. The British were particularly keen to limit disorder and protect its strategic assets in the region, and the UN scheme threatened both these aims. If an independent Palestinian state were created it would most likely be led by the anti-British and anti-Hashemite Mufti of Jerusalem. Meanwhile the alternative prospect of an enlarged Jewish state, if it was allowed to conquer more territory, was equally undesirable to the British. Both scenarios would establish in Palestine an unreliable anti-British state. It was much more favourable to see Arab Palestine come under the influence of King Abdullah, Britain’s closest regional ally. As James Eric Cable, a recent recruit at the Foreign Office, remarked: ‘It would establish in a strategic and central position a state stronger than Transjordan as it now exists, but bound to us by ties not merely of friendship and obligation but also of dependence’.

The first benefit of the Greater Transjordan option, therefore, was that it offered the best chance of safeguarding Britain’s strategic position. The second benefit was that occupation of the Arab areas by the Arab Legion offered the best chance of maintaining law

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42 ‘Correspondence Between King Abdullah and the Secretary of State’, J.E. Cable, 4 November 1947, FO371/62226/E10711, TNA.
43 Minute by Burrows, 13 November 1947, ibid.
44 ‘Correspondence Between King Abdullah and the Secretary of State’, Cable, 4 November 1947, FO371/62226/E10711, TNA.
and order. Unlike the Zionist movement, which already possessed the political, economic and military mechanisms of a state, the AHC was not a meaningful equivalent. Thus, aside from Britain’s dislike of the Mufti, an independent Arab state would lack any semblance of structure. Rather, it was only likely to foment a hotbed of anarchy that risked destabilising the whole region. The onset of the civil war that followed the UN resolution was proof positive that the end of the mandate would be beset by disorder. As Kirkbride predicted:

> If present developments are anything to judge by, the whole of Palestine is going to be in a state of disorder by the time we lay down the mandate. … Arab Palestine will be without any central authority or police force and whoever takes over will have to compete with the jealousies and ambitions of the local leaders, bands of patriots who want to fight the Jews, bands of patriots who want to fight each other for supremacy and bands of brigands out for loot from any source whatsoever.\(^5\)

Kirkbride was warning that the Arab Legion’s task of occupying the Arab areas of Palestine would not be a smooth one. However, as the High Commissioner advised, the intervention of the Arab Legion provided ‘the best chance of maintaining some semblance of order in the area of the Arab state’.\(^6\) The Greater Transjordan option was not universally popular within Whitehall.\(^7\) Harold Beeley, an anti-Zionist who joined the Foreign Office after serving as Secretary to the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry, scoffed at the notion that the Palestinian Arabs would support this and he doubted whether the Arab Legion would follow such orders.\(^8\) Ultimately, however, the Foreign Office deemed that any disadvantages of the Greater Transjordan option were

\(^{45}\) Kirkbride to Orme Sargent, 5 January 1948, FO371/68367/E2095, TNA.
\(^{46}\) Cunningham to FO, 2477, 20 December 1947, FO371/62226/E12317, TNA.
\(^{47}\) Pappé, *Britain and the Arab-Israeli Conflict*, pp. 10-1.
\(^{48}\) Minute by Beeley, 23 December 1947, FO371/62226/E12084/G; Minute by Beeley, 30 December 1947, FO371/62226/E12317, TNA.
outweighed by the advantages it would provide, such as the maintenance of Britain's strategic interests in a large part of Palestine and 'the only way of avoiding major bloodshed'. At a meeting between the Treasury, the Foreign Office and the War Office on 6 January it was deemed 'very much to our [Britain's] interest that conditions of security should be restored in Palestine as soon as possible after our withdrawal'. The Arab Legion was considered the only possible means of filling the politico-security vacuum that the end of the mandate would leave in the Arab areas of Palestine.

By the start of 1948 there was a general consensus within Whitehall that it would be preferable for the Arab Legion to occupy the Arab areas of Palestine. However, this preference was essentially private and Abdullah was yet to receive British backing. Kirkbride had 'been at pains to conceal from the King and Samir' his own preference for Transjordan's claim to the Arab areas of Palestine. He presumably concealed his own view to avoid prematurely giving Abdullah the impression that he had HMG's support. But for the counsel of Kirkbride Abdullah had been set to announce his intentions to claim the Arab areas of Palestine to the Arab League. Kirkbride reported that 'the King had been getting increasingly restless about developments regarding Palestine and the absence of any advice about or indication of His Majesty's Government's future policy concerning Transjordan was disturbing him seriously'. Kirkbride had to impress upon Abdullah 'the importance not only of avoiding commitments but, also, of

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49 FO to Amman, 493, 11 November 1947, CO537/2107, TNA.
50 'Arab Legion', L.F.L. Pyman, 7 January 1948, FO371/68827/E449/G, TNA.
51 Minute by Walker, 11 December 1947, FO371/62226/E11928/G, TNA.
52 Amman to FO, 321, 29 October 1947, CO537/2107, TNA.
53 Amman to FO, 368, 6 December 1947, CO537/2107; Kirkbride to Burrows, 8 December 1947, FO371/62226/E12416, TNA.
concealing his own intentions’. The British realised that Abdullah wanted British backing for his desire to ‘intervene in Palestine contrary to the decisions of the Arab League’. However, the British were reluctant to provide more than ‘vague generalisations’. In his quest for more concrete British approval, Abdullah instructed his Prime Minister, Samir Rifai, to arrange a meeting with Bevin before the end of 1947. In agitating for this meeting Rifai outlined ‘a [brief] plan for Transjordan’s action that on British withdrawal from Palestine the Arab Legion, if it had been withdrawn, should return at once’. The Prime Minister ‘emphasised that he did not expect any agreement officially from His Majesty’s Government’. However, it is clear that Abdullah wanted his Prime Minister to engage in high-level talks with the British Foreign Secretary in order to gauge Britain’s reaction to his intentions. When Rifai’s replacement as Prime Minister, Taufiq Abul Huda, visited London in January 1948, to discuss a revision of the 1946 Treaty – which was prompted by the Jordanians for the purpose of combatting, albeit in style rather than substance, the imperialist stigma associated with the 1946 Treaty – the new Prime Minister also requested a private meeting with Bevin to discuss the future of Palestine. Abul Huda requested that it ‘be arranged without the knowledge of the Transjordan Foreign Minister or other members of the delegation’. The purpose of the meeting was for the Jordanian Prime Minister to ‘put to Mr Bevin certain opinions on possible developments in Palestine which would not be altogether acceptable to the Foreign Minister, as representing younger and more Nationalist opinion in the

54 Kirkbride to Burrows, 8 December 1947, FO371/62226/E12416, TNA.
55 FO to Amman, 11, 10 January 1948, FO371/62226/E12264/G, TNA.
56 BMEO to FO, 67 Saving, 12 December 1947, FO371/62226/E11928/G, TNA.
57 Pappé, Britain and the Arab-Israeli Conflict, p. 9.
This meeting eventually took place on 7 February and understanding what transpired at this meeting and thereafter is crucial to understanding the manner in which Palestine was partitioned and Britain's approach to its withdrawal.

The existing debate regarding the significance of this meeting – present at which were: Bevin, Abul Huda, Glubb and Pirie-Gordon, from the British Legation in Amman – is based on scant contemporary documentary records: Glubb's memoirs, written nine years after the event, and a handful of Foreign Office documents. In his memoirs Glubb recounted that as he was translating Abul Huda's message that the Jordanian Government proposed to send the Arab Legion to occupy the Arab areas of Palestine when the mandate ended, Bevin interrupted him, ‘saying “it seems the obvious thing to do.” ... “It seems the obvious thing to do,” repeated Mr Bevin, “but do not go and invade the areas allotted to the Jews.”’ Glubb added: ‘Mr Bevin thanked Taufiq Pasha for his frank exposition of the position of Trans-Jordan, and expressed his agreement with the plans put forward. We rose, shook hands cordially and took our leave.’ With that shake of the hands Britain had given Transjordan the ‘green light’ to occupy the Arab areas of Palestine. Tancred Bradshaw and Efraim Karsh have challenged this argument, both emphasising that it rests on ‘Glubb's memoirs alone’ and that the declassified documents do not substantiate this claim. Even Benny Morris, who broadly concurs with the ‘collusion’ thesis, concedes that

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58 Pirie Gordon to Burrows, 28 January 1948, FO371/68366/E1730/G, TNA.
59 Glubb, Soldier, pp. 63-6.
60 Shlaim, Collusion, p. 1.
'Glubb’s remembered version of that meeting is only partly confirmed by the Foreign Office documents written at the time'. In a telegram to Amman, recording the conversation, Bevin explained that Abul Huda used this meeting to inform HMG of Abdullah’s view that ‘it would be to the public benefit if it [the Arab Legion] returned to the Arab areas of Palestine to maintain law and order’. He added:

I asked his Excellency whether, when he spoke of the Arab Legion entering Palestine, he referred to the Arab areas as laid down in the United Nations’ decision or whether he thought it would also enter the Jewish areas. Tawfiq Pasha replied that the Arab Legion would not enter Jewish areas unless the Jews invaded Arab areas.

Perhaps the most striking feature of this telegram is the extent to which Bevin portrayed himself as a passive recipient of information. What Glubb described as an instruction, Bevin reported as a question. Bevin added: ‘In conclusion Tawfiq Pasha repeated his assurance that he did not desire to create difficulties for His Majesty’s Government or to involve them in responsibility. Any action which might be taken would be purely on Transjordan’s responsibility’. At face value, therefore, the official record divests Britain of any responsibility and portrays Bevin as passively receiving information from an independent ally in whose plans he had a curious interest – hence the question – but no control and no interest in exerting influence. However, this belies the extent to which Britain did wish to exert influence, Britain’s preference for the Greater Transjordan

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62 Morris, Road to Jerusalem, p. 110.
63 ‘Conversation with the Transjordan Prime Minister’, Bevin to Kirkbride, 19, 9 February 1948, FO371/68366/E1916/G, TNA.
64 Shlaim, Collusion, p. 137.
65 ‘Conversation with the Transjordan Prime Minister’, Bevin to Kirkbride, 19, 9 February 1948, FO371/68366/E1916/G, TNA.
scheme, and the extent to which Transjordan was dependent upon Britain, who continued to bankroll the Hashemite Kingdom.

Moreover, new sources have emerged, which further support the notion that Bevin gave active approval. The most explicit new documents are located in Glubb’s papers. In reference to the account in his memoirs it is important to acknowledge that they were not simply reliant on almost ten years of memory. The organisation of his papers demonstrates that Glubb used them when writing his memoirs and he was able to call on contemporary documents, which support his retrospective account. These documents may not satisfy Karsh et al because Glubb is again the author. However, it is notably corroborative that during the weeks, months and years following the February meeting, Glubb made numerous references to an agreement being reached. Shortly before the end of the mandate Glubb outlined the understanding:

The situation envisaged by us and by H.M.G. when we were in London, was that nothing much would happen until May 15th. The Jews would then implement the Jewish state, with the blessing of a united U.N.O., and the Arab areas of Palestine would be a vacuum, into which the Arab Legion would march.66

Three months later in a private letter to Kirkbride – where nothing was to be gained from skewing the narrative and so it can surely be relied upon for its accuracy – Glubb recounted what had transpired during the meeting with Bevin:

You are of course aware that when I was in London with Tewfiq Pasha in February for the treaty negotiations, Trans-Jordan’s intention to occupy part of the Arab areas of Palestine was explained to Mr Bevin. The only comment he made was that we should be careful not to enter the Jewish areas.67

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66 Glubb to Sir John Crocker (Commander in Chief, MELF), 24 April 1948, GP2006, 83.
67 Glubb to Kirkbride, 4 August 1948, ibid.
This is almost identical to the account Glubb made in his memoirs and supports the notion that Bevin, while not urging Transjordan to send the Arab Legion into Palestine, gave his approval so long as it did not obviously defy the UN resolution by entering the proposed Jewish state.

Meanwhile, further official British documents have been released, which, while not providing a smoking gun, further support the contention that Bevin gave his agreement. The first time the question of Palestine was discussed in Cabinet after the February meeting between Bevin, Abu Huda and Glubb was several weeks later on 22 March. Hitherto the best record of this Cabinet meeting were the minutes, which provide a rather bland, homogenous account of the meeting where:

The Cabinet agreed that ... the British civil and military authorities in Palestine should make no effort to oppose the setting up of a Jewish State or a move into Palestine from Transjordan.

The minutes summarised both these moves as things that ‘might’ happen. The recently released Cabinet Secretary’s Notebook provides a more revealing, and slightly different, appraisal. Here, Bevin is recorded as saying that the ‘Jews will prob.[ably] establ.[ish] a State in some area’ and, crucially, he stated that he was: ‘Convinced Abdullah will put troops into parts of Pal.[estine] wh.[ich] Jews can’t hold’. He added:

That will mean a row among Arab States. But don’t think we sh[ould] use B.[ritish] troops to check this develop[men]t. of events. “Nature” may partition Palestine.’

No doubt Bevin was left ‘convinced’ of Abdullah’s intentions as a result of his meeting with Abul Huda in February, and he was seemingly reconciled to

68 ‘Conclusions of a Meeting of the Cabinet’ 22 March 1948, CAB128/12, TNA.
69 Cabinet Secretary’s Notebook, 22 March 1948, CAB195/6, TNA.
allowing this to happen, in spite of any inter-Arab conflict that may occur. The most tantalising remark made by Bevin was his final comment: ‘“Nature” may partition Palestine’. Bevin, it seems, was reconciled to the Arab Legion filling the politico-security vacuum inside Palestine and establishing an alternative form of partition that the international community would be compelled to accept as the new *natural* order. The intention was that the Arab Legion would enter the Arab areas of Palestine under the pretext of ‘restoring order’.\(^{70}\) It was understood that: ‘For publicity purposes they [the King and the Prime Minister] say to the Arabs that they are going to try and occupy the whole of Palestine, but this is merely to forestall the accusation that they are implementing partition.’\(^{71}\) It was not envisaged that the Arab Legion would enter as an invading army. As Glubb outlined: ‘I may repeat that, when we were in London last February nobody envisaged a war in Palestine. A peaceful occupation of the vacant Arab areas with the tacit acquiescence of the Jews was the plan agreed upon.’\(^{72}\) In February Bevin approved this scheme; he approved the use of the British financed and officered Arab Legion for that purpose. The official contemporary British records do not contain a formal and explicit written agreement. Yet that is not surprising. Kirkbride warned, on the very day that Abdullah met Golda Meir, that a formal agreement between ‘Abdullah and the Jews would be dangerous in that secrecy would be impossible’.\(^{73}\) This danger would be even more applicable to British involvement. Indeed, when discussing the pros and cons of Transjordan occupying the Arab areas of Palestine in November 1947 Bevin was adamant.

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\(^{70}\) Minute by Walker, 14 February 1948, FO371/68367/E2095, TNA.
\(^{71}\) Amman to FO, 90, 14 February 1948, FO371/68367/E2163, TNA.
\(^{72}\) Glubb to Kirkbride, 4 August 1948, GP2006, 83.
\(^{73}\) Amman to FO, 342, 17 November 1947, CO537/2107, TNA.
that ‘we must, however, clearly be extremely careful not to be associated with any such scheme, at any rate to begin with, as this would only increase opposition of Arab and Jewish extremists’.\textsuperscript{74} It is not surprising, therefore, that the official records are not explicit – but British support for the Greater Transjordan scheme is nonetheless clear.

In order to allow the Arab Legion to perform this function the British approved a reorganisation scheme, including a subsidy of £2 million, plus £500,000 capital expenditure, which consolidated the Arab Legion at its present strength of approximately 7,000 men.\textsuperscript{75} In that respect, both Britain and Abdullah were fortunate that the Arab Legion had not been reduced as previously planned. Given that the main obstacle to the Arab Legion’s reduction had been the vital role that it was performing in Palestine, it might have been expected that Britain’s withdrawal from Palestine would have finally allowed for this reduction to be enacted. However, as Burrows explained: ‘it is precisely the withdrawal of our own forces from Palestine that gives the Arab Legion its present high political value’. The case put to the Treasury to justify an increase to the subsidy was that it was ‘imperative that the Arab Legion should be maintained on its present footing for the next year and in our own interest we must pay for this to be done’.\textsuperscript{76} Aside from the Greater Transjordan objective Britain’s withdrawal from Palestine did render a reorganisation of the Arab Legion necessary. Hitherto the Arab Legion depended on the British forces in Palestine for much of its essential services and support. The imminent departure of the British forces from Palestine meant that the Arab Legion ‘must in future,

\textsuperscript{74} FO to Amman, 493, 11 November 1947, ibid.
\textsuperscript{75} Minute by Walker, 10 February 1948, FO371/68828/E1864, TNA.
\textsuperscript{76} Burrows to Russell Edmunds, 22 January 1948, WO32/15562, TNA.
be able operationally and administratively to stand on their own feet.’ 77 It also needed to be more capable of defending itself against external aggression. 78 Nonetheless, the 1948 reorganisation was considered a short-term measure. It was no coincidence that the supply of new equipment was expedited. Ordinarily the Arab Legion’s reorganisation and the supply of new equipment would not have begun until after the start of the new financial year in April. However, in this instance it was vital that the Arab Legion received its new equipment well in advance of the end of the mandate. 79 The reorganisation of the Legion in 1948 was primarily required as a short-term measure to cope with the immediate problems in Palestine. The British still hoped that the Arab Legion could be reduced once the Palestine situation was resolved. As Burrows explained: ‘If conditions are more settled when the problem comes to be reconsidered in twelve months’ time it is to be hoped that it will be possible to reduce our contribution substantially.’ 80 The fact that the 1948 reorganisation of the Arab Legion was based on Glubb’s 1947 proposal, albeit with minor modifications, and that Glubb had also shown himself to be in favour of partition since 1946 has led Maureen Norton to conclude that Glubb was the Machiavellian mastermind behind the Greater Transjordan scheme. 81 However, just as his political suggestions were ignored, his original reorganisation proposal was initially
written off as being ‘like all of Glubb’s schemes, ... somewhat ambitious’. Glubb’s significance lies not in the plan's inception, but in its execution, which further corroborates the existence of an Anglo-Hashemite plan to implement an alternative form of partition, and simultaneously negates the firmness of any Hashemite-Zionist understanding.

After the February meeting Glubb actively sought to ensure that the ground was prepared for the smooth occupation of the Arab areas of Palestine when the mandate ended. Principally, Glubb sought to eliminate two problems that threatened the Greater Transjordan scheme. The first problem arose within weeks of the February meeting when Glubb reported an unexpected development. The Arab Liberation Army (ALA), which had been set up by the Arab League as a means of allowing the member states to avoid direct intervention, was gradually infiltrating the Arab areas of Palestine. Glubb reported that upon arrival in Nablus the ALA, which was dominated by Syria and led by Fawzi al-Qawakji, quickly gained control of the civil population and proved to be well disciplined and were welcomed by the local Arabs. The ALA’s influence was spreading and Glubb warned: ‘If they continue at their present rate, the Arab League army will have complete control of the Arab areas of Palestine before May 15th.’ This posed a significant problem to the scheme agreed in London. Glubb was concerned that:

In order to justify the re-entry of the Arab Legion into Palestine on May 15th some invitation to them from the people of Palestine would be desirable. If the “holy warriors” [referring to the ALA rather than the Mufti’s Holy War Army] are already in control such an invitation will not come. Thus if Arab Legion units evacuate

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82 DMO to VCIGS, 18 June 1947, WO32/15562, TNA.
Palestine according to the present programme, the chance that they will return later on, will be greatly reduced.  

If the ALA had control of the Arab areas of Palestine before the end of the mandate, the Arab Legion could hardly re-enter and fill the politico-security vacuum as planned. Indeed, there would be no vacuum to fill.

To counter the unexpected progress of the ALA Glubb wanted to ‘change the programme for the withdrawal of the Arab Legion’. With the British mandate now coming to an end it was necessary for the Arab Legion units stationed in Palestine to return to Transjordan – despite the covert intention to return. According to the original withdrawal programme the entirety of the Arab Legion was scheduled to return to Transjordan between 1 February and 15 April. However, given the progress of the ALA, Glubb was concerned that this withdrawal programme seemed ‘to play into the hands of the extremists, both Fawzi and the Mufti’. Due to the location of the Kirkuk-Haifa oil pipeline and the main British army installations the Arab Legion was primarily stationed in the Jewish areas of Palestine and this helped allow the ALA to gain a foothold in the Arab areas. According to the ‘present programme’ of withdrawal Arab Legion units when released from duty in the Jewish areas, would ‘return directly to Trans-Jordan, thereby [as Glubb forewarned] leaving the League army in undisputed possession of the Arab areas until May 15th’. With the Arab Legion presently absent from the Arab areas of Palestine Glubb warned: ‘The Mufti and

84 Glubb to Montgomery, 23 February 1948, ibid.
85 ‘Withdrawal of Arab Legion’, undated, WO191/82, TNA.
Fawzi, two of the bitterest enemies of Britain, will be free to dispute the Arab areas between them.’ Glubb therefore suggested that if, instead of withdrawing directly to Transjordan as planned, ‘Arab Legion units could be released from Jewish areas and stationed in Arab areas, the situation would be reversed’. He added:

In Ramallah, Hebron and Beersheba, the Arab Legion could still get in before the League army influence spreads there. In Nablus, the Arab Legion could easily attain influence equal to that of the League army, and would gradually eclipse it.

Glubb proposed: ‘If Arab Legion units were to move to Arab areas now, they would of course *ostensibly* do so under the orders of the British army, to help maintain order and keep the roads open.’ In reality, though, the Arab Legion was being redeployed to prepare the Arab areas of Palestine for occupation by the Arab Legion after the end of the mandate. Glubb did not suggest that the promise to withdraw the Arab Legion from Palestine before the end of the mandate be broken – although the fact at least one unit never withdrew back to Transjordan suggests that may have been a part of Glubb’s thinking. What he suggested was strategic redeployment of Arab Legion units to ‘establish local contacts’ and consolidate their position before a last minute withdrawal and almost immediate re-entry. Rather than allow the ALA to fill the void, Glubb proposed to counteract this by moving the Arab Legion forces from the Jewish areas into the Arab areas first.  

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transferred to Nablus, Hebron and Ramallah. The War Office also had ‘no objection ... provided, of course, it is all withdrawn by 15th May, 1948’. Thus, with British acquiescence Glubb re-deployed the Arab Legion in order to thwart the spread of the ALA’s influence in the areas that the Arab Legion planned to occupy when the mandate ended.

The object of eclipsing the ALA and establishing local contacts in the Arab areas of Palestine ultimately proved successful. By mid-April Kirkbride reported that the notables in Gaza, Hebron and Ramallah were openly in favour of Arab Legion occupation when the mandate ended. Nablus was more cautious, owing to the presence of the ALA, but had not shown any opposition to the scheme. Meanwhile Beersheba, terrorised by Zionist forces, would welcome any saviour according to Kirkbride. He therefore deemed the atmosphere ripe for securing Jordanian interests and fearing that the situation could easily change in the space of a month asked, to no avail, whether the end of the mandate could be brought forward. Nonetheless, just two weeks before the end of the mandate it was reported that: ‘The morale and value of the Liberation Army in the Nablus-Jenin-Tulkarm area is falling rapidly. Fauzi has gone to Damascus and may not return.’ The virtual collapse of the ALA was not simply a consequence of the Arab Legion’s redeployment effort. It was also a result of the Jewish force’s military superiority and the devastating impact of the Haganah’s Plan D – a series of military operations designed to secure control of the proposed Jewish state and key Jewish settlements within the proposed Arab state in preparation

88 COS (Milpal) to Glubb, GO530, 25 February 1948, ibid.
89 War Office to C-in-C MELF, 6 March 1948, WO32/15562, TNA.
90 Amman to FO, 225, 13 April 1948, FO371/68852/E4687, TNA.
91 Amman to FO, 230, 17 April 1948, FO371/68852/E4805, TNA.
92 ‘Note’, most likely by Glubb, 29 April 1948, GP2006, 90.
for the end of the mandate. 

However, the Arab Legion’s aim was clear and its target met. ‘The first contre temps was the arrival of the Arab Liberation Army’. This problem Glubb had managed to overcome.

The second contre temps of realising the Greater Transjordan scheme was maintaining the adherence of, and coordinating with, the Zionists. During the final few weeks of the mandate Colonel Goldie, commander of the Arab Legion Mechanised Brigade, made two clandestine visits to meet with Zionist officials. As Glubb explained to Kirkbride: ‘The peaceful occupation of the range of hills from Nablus to Hebron was thus the agreed policy of the Trans-Jordan Government. In order to ensure that it would be peaceful we even made certain demarches through Col. Goldie of which you are aware.’ Previous accounts of the Goldie mission referred to a single meeting between Goldie and the Haganah held in Naharayim on 2 May. Indeed, in an interview almost forty years later Goldie himself stated: ‘there was only one meeting’. However, we now know that Goldie met with Zionists at least twice before the end of the mandate. Benny Morris recently referred to an earlier meeting held in Afula on the 10 April with a Haganah ‘District Officer’ codenamed ‘Barkai’. Hitherto the only record of this meeting was a report located in the Haganah archives. We now have access to the Arab Legion account of this earlier meeting, which provides fresh insight into

94 ‘The Trans-Jordan Situation’, Glubb, 12 August 1948, FO371/68822/E11049/G, TNA.
95 Glubb to Kirkbride, 4 August 1948, GP2006, 83.
97 Goldie Interview with Avi Shlaim, Wallingford, 15 September 1985, Shlaim’s Private Collection.
98 Morris, *Road to Jerusalem*, p. 140.
this meeting and the role of Glubb and the Arab Legion during 1948. Norman Lash, the Arab Legion Divisional Commander, provided Glubb with a nine-point ‘gist’ of what transpired, which reveals three primary aims of the meeting in Afula, each geared toward avoiding conflict. Principally Goldie had been sent on a fact-finding mission. Glubb wanted to ascertain what the Haganah’s intentions were. The first point Lash reported, which hints at the principal fact-finding objective, was that: ‘It is quite definitely the Jewish policy to avoid hostilities with the Arab Legion. They refer to the opening of hostilities with us as “the third bent” which they are anxious to avoid (at this stage anyway).’ Presumably this was the number one enquiry that Goldie was instructed to make. The second reason for this meeting was that Goldie had been sent to request that the Haganah be instructed to ‘lay off’ Arab Legion transport; something that Barkai agreed to instruct, although he warned that ‘it was impossible to arrange for immunity of our transport when engaged in protecting Arab civilian transport’.99 The third purpose of the meeting was to prepare the way for further talks as and when they might be required. Indeed, Goldie’s second meeting on 2 May was initiated within that context. Benny Morris emphasised that there existed a three-week delay between the two meetings.100 However, the delay was not surprising. After the first meeting Lash reported: ‘The D.O. [Barkai] said that he had no doubt that a meeting could be arranged between a senior British officer on our side and a senior officer of the Hagana General Staff if we thought it useful’.101 At this point Glubb was seemingly satisfied with the gist he had received. The Arab Legion account of the first meeting indicates that it was more

99 Lash to Glubb, 11 April 1948, GP2006, 83 [emphasis in original].
100 Morris, Road to Jerusalem, p. 140.
101 Lash to Glubb, 11 April 1948, GP2006, 83 [emphasis added].
productive than the Haganah report suggests. The Haganah account reveals little more than that Glubb sent Goldie to initiate discussions ‘about not attacking from both sides’ after 14 May.\(^{102}\) The Arab Legion account is more revealing however. Goldie’s meeting with Barkai had reassured Glubb that the two sides were on the same wavelength and that partition could be implemented with minimal conflict. Indeed, he had learned that the Haganah planned to avoid hostilities and that: ‘The Jews fully expect us to go into Arab Palestine next month and are on the whole in favour of it: they have a pretty good idea as to where we are going’. The Haganah apparently had no intention of obstructing Glubb’s task of occupying the Arab areas of Palestine, meaning the Greater Transjordan scheme and the fate of the Arab Legion both appeared reasonably secure. Moreover, Glubb learned that Haganah policy would work in the Arab Legion’s favour. Goldie had been informed by Barkai that: ‘Their policy at present is: 1) Picquet L of C [picket lines of communication]; 2) Kill Arab leaders; 3) Drastic local reprisals’. In relation to the second point, the Haganah had ‘appreciated that the Arabs have no good junior leaders and think if a few outstanding men are disposed of they will become a complete rabble.’\(^{103}\) The elimination of the Arabs as an effective fighting force would indeed play into the hands of the Arab Legion’s operational objectives of entering the Arab areas of Palestine under the pretext of establishing law and order. Indeed, on the previous day Abd al-Qadir al-Husayni, the most prominent commander of the Mufti’s Holy War Army, was killed in battle, thus initiating the collapse of that

\(^{103}\) Lash to Glubb, 11 April 1948, GP2006, 83.
Meanwhile drastic local reprisals would surely increase the demand for Arab Legion protection. Glubb was not intending on staging a mock battle. He was seeking to launch a ‘police operation’, which the international community would hopefully ratify. There was therefore no reason to arrange the follow-up meeting.

The follow-up meeting was only an option if deemed *useful* and this only became so when, towards the end of April, Glubb observed:

> The situation has recently developed very rapidly and in quite a different manner. The Jews have taken the initiative and shown their hand, presumably in order to show the world that they can implement partition, before U.N.O. has time to cancel it.

Glubb remained concerned that:

> What we do not know is whether the Jews will then have the self-control to limit themselves to the boundaries of the Jewish state, or whether they will get drunk with victory, and try and seize more.

Glubb did concede, though, that: ‘On the other hand, the situation may still arise in which the Jews voluntarily withdraw within the boundaries of the U.N.O. Jewish state, and the Arab areas are left empty.’ One thing that seems clear from Glubb’s dialogue is that he and the Arab Legion were not working according to a firm Hashemite-Zionist agreement, but an assumption that the Arab areas would be vacant. The Greater Transjordan scheme was predicated on the belief that the Zionists would not violate the UN partition scheme. The uncertainty was heightened by the fact that the Palestinian Arabs were ‘proving helpless’. They had no organisation, no plan, and scant resources, which meant: ‘The result is that Arab resistance in Palestine is almost at an end already.’ This posed a

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104 Shlaim, ‘Israel and the Arab coalition’, p. 86.
105 ‘The Trans-Jordan Situation’, Glubb, 12 August 1948, FO371/68822/E11049/G, TNA.
significant problem for the Arab Legion’s planned re-entry into the Arab areas of Palestine in order to effect partition. The Arab Legion required a politico-security vacuum to enter and protect. As Glubb acknowledged: ‘I think that the Trans-Jordan Government would not be justified in re-invading Palestine against Jewish resistance, if all other Arab resistance is at an end’. Glubb was treading a fine line between nullifying the threat of Arab resistance, as with the ALA, but maintaining enough resistance for Arab Legion assistance to be required when the mandate ended. Within days, however, Glubb realised that his fears would not be realised. His appreciation of the situation as of 1 May was that the Haganah was consolidating the Jewish areas, but had ‘not penetrated much to Arab areas’, with the exception of Jerusalem. Glubb therefore surmised: ‘If this goes on until May 15th, the Jews will by then more or less have control of their areas, and we can then take over the Arab areas. In other words, partition will have come into existence.’ With the end of the mandate just two weeks away implementation of the Greater Transjordan partition scheme was in sight.

One problem remained, however. Glubb believed: ‘The snag is Jerusalem.’ Under the UN partition plan Jerusalem was set to be an international zone; it was scheduled to be an island within the Arab state [Map 2]. Despite the improved prospects for the Greater Transjordan scheme, Glubb predicted: ‘[I]f no international force has arrived, the Jews will certainly try to capture the whole city from the Arabs. They will probably succeed.’ Moreover, despite Glubb’s desire to avoid genuine conflict, he was to some extent a hostage to populism. Indeed, he reported:

107 Glubb to Crocker, 1 May 1948, ibid.
Passionate excitement about Jerusalem already exists in Trans-Jordan. The idea of the Jews occupying the Holy Places is working everyone into a frenzy. I am afraid that if this takes place on May 15th, I shall be unable to resist Arab pressure to put the whole Arab Legion into Jerusalem. This will almost destroy the Arab Legion, will certainly destroy Jerusalem, and will spoil all our plans for settlement. If it were not for the Jerusalem snag, I think the prospects after May 15th might not be too bad.\(^{108}\)

Glubb’s principal objective during the remaining few weeks of the mandate, therefore, was to try and eliminate this complication.

Glubb employed two different tactics to try to remove the Jerusalem problem. The ideal solution was to obtain international protection. To that end Glubb wrote to the MELF Commander-in-Chief in the hope that he could use his influence to secure international assistance to enforce a truce in Jerusalem. After detailing the likely destruction that fighting in Jerusalem would cause, Glubb proposed that the only feasible solution was to threaten retaliation against residential areas by British, American, and French rocket-firing fighters. He suggested that:

> both sides could be told that any attack by either party would be dealt with by fighter aircraft. As Jews and Arabs live in separate quarters of Jerusalem, the residential areas of the attacking community would be shot up by fighters. Town fighting is so confused that it would be impossible to stop the “front line advance” by air action. But retaliation of residential areas would probably do it.\(^{109}\)

The punishment suggested by Glubb was severe, but it was designed as a deterrent. It was in line with his intention to avoid as much genuine fighting as possible. Glubb sought British assistance in obtaining a truce for Jerusalem and an international force to maintain it.\(^{110}\) If he could obtain international

\(^{108}\) Glubb to Crocker, 24 April 1948, ibid.

\(^{109}\) ibid.

\(^{110}\) Glubb to Crocker, 1 May 1948, ibid.
protection for Jerusalem then Glubb believed the Arab Legion could re-enter Palestine and effect partition with minimal conflict, as planned. This option, however, was out of Glubb’s hands and his request for international protection was made more in hope than expectation.

The second means by which Glubb sought to avert the problem of Jerusalem was to invoke the option of further talks with the Haganah. Now a follow up meeting was useful and Goldie was accordingly sent by Glubb to meet with Shlomo Shamir, who was due to become the commander of the Haganah’s newly created 7th (Armoured) Brigade. On 2 May Goldie travelled to Nahayarim where he was to pass on a verbal message from Glubb to the Haganah. The most reliable account of this meeting is the Haganah report, written the following day. This account hints strongly that the purpose of this meeting was to solve the issue that concerned Glubb most: The Jerusalem snag. According to this report, after a brief discussion about how to arrange future meetings, Goldie began by stating: ‘We want contact with you for preventing a collision. Is this possible?’ And after Shamir replied in the affirmative, Goldie brought up what was surely the crux of the meeting: ‘We are worried about the situation in Jerusalem. How can we prevent collision there?’ Indeed, it was recorded that ‘they [the Arab Legion] were anxious particularly to avoid any clash with us in Jerusalem’. These talks between the Haganah and the Arab Legion did not result in a mutual restraint pact. However, it did provide the two forces with an

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111 Goldie Interview with Avi Shlaim, 15 September 1985, Wallingford, Avi Shlaim’s Private Collection.
112 ‘A report from a meeting with the representatives of the Arab Legion: Transmitted by SH.R’, 3 May 1948, Israel Defence Forces Archive.
understanding of each other’s post-mandate objectives and intentions. This left Glubb concerned about possible complications in Jerusalem, but confident that otherwise the Greater Transjordan scheme was achievable. As agreed in February the Arab Legion was well placed to occupy the Arab areas of Palestine with the tacit acquiescence of the Jews.

For this to happen, however, it was vital that Glubb and the British officers remained in control of the Arab Legion. With the mandate about to end and the prospect of an Arab-Israeli War imminent, the position of British Officers in the Arab Legion became a major source of debate in London. The Colonial Office, which was presumably unaware of the Greater Transjordan scheme, considered it impossible to allow Glubb to be left in command of the Arab Legion if it were to become involved in operations against the new Jewish State.¹¹⁴ Moreover, back in October 1947 the Foreign Office opined that if King Abdullah sent the Arab Legion back into Palestine,

we should probably have to withdraw those British officers who are seconded to the service of the Transjordan Government and we should also have to consider to what extent we would continue payment of the subsidy.¹¹⁵

However, British involvement within the Arab Legion was crucial to the subsequently approved Greater Transjordan scheme and Bevin understood this.¹¹⁶ Bevin was aware of Goldie’s negotiations with the Haganah and understood that, ‘the object of these top secret negotiations is to define the areas of Palestine to be occupied by the two forces’. Bevin therefore confirmed:

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¹¹⁴ Minute by Mathieson to Martin, 5 May 1948, CO537/3579, TNA.
¹¹⁵ FO to Amman, 470, 25 October 1947, FO371/62226/E10711, TNA.
¹¹⁶ ‘British Officers in the Arab Legion’, Walker, 11 May 1948, FO371/68852/E6008, TNA.
I am reluctant to do anything which might prejudice the success of these negotiations which appear to aim at avoiding actual hostilities between the Arabs and the Jews. Since their conduct, and no doubt also their implementation, seems to depend to a considerable extent on British officers serving with the Arab Legion, I feel we ought not to withdraw the latter prematurely.\textsuperscript{117}

Bevin and the Foreign Office therefore agreed with Kirkbride’s suggestion that the removal of British Officers from the Arab Legion should only be considered in the event ‘of a Trans-Jordanian attack on the Jewish State within its frontiers as laid down by the Assembly’, which would contravene the scheme agreed in February.\textsuperscript{118} Bevin therefore ensured that those responsible for implementation remained able to carry out this task.\textsuperscript{119}

When the mandate ended the Greater Transjordan option was the unspoken policy of both Britain and Transjordan. Contrary to Maureen Norton’s assertion Glubb was not the mastermind of the scheme; he may have supported it, but its origins lay in a convergence of Abdullah’s and Britain’s hopes and fears. Glubb was nonetheless crucial to its implementation. In February Glubb was given the task of securing the Arab areas of Palestine and acquiescing in the creation of a new Jewish state in accordance with the UN partition resolution. Glubb was tasked with exploiting the lack of authority in the Arab areas. To that end he did all he could during the final few months of the mandate to maintain a politico-security vacuum in the Arab areas of Palestine – to combine muted Arab resistance that would require Arab Legion security and Jewish acquiescence of this fait accompli. These efforts, moreover, are particularly revealing in relation

\textsuperscript{117} FO to Amman, Draft, May 1948; Bevin to Minister of Defence, 13 May 1948, CO537/3579, TNA.
\textsuperscript{118} ‘British Officers in the Arab Legion’, Walker, 11 May 1948, FO371/68852/E6008; FO to Amman, Draft Telegram, May 1948; FO to Amman, 382, 14 May 1948, CO537/3579, TNA.
to the controversial ‘collusion’ debate. On the one hand they imply that there was no firm Hashemite-Zionist agreement. Transjordan and the Zionists did not enter the 1948 War with a firm understanding, but they did have a comprehension of each other's objectives and intentions. The conduct of the Arab Legion, however, does suggest that Greater Transjordan solution was pursued on the premise that the Zionists would tacitly acquiesce in the Arab Legion's occupation of central Arab Palestine and it does seem to confirm, beyond a shadow of doubt, that the Arab Legion was governed by a Greater Transjordan objective – approved by Bevin.

In the broader context of Anglo-Jordanian relations, the Greater Transjordan scheme shows that despite obtaining independence Transjordan remained a British dependency. Kimche and Kimche highlighted Abdullah's negotiations with Golda Meir in November 1947 as evidence that ‘Abdullah was not acting as a pawn for the British’.120 Tancred Bradshaw has emphasised Abdullah's pursuit of Greater Syria to debunk the notion that Abdullah was ‘a British pawn’.121 Similarly, Ron Pundik has asserted that, after independence, ‘Abdullah was definitely not acting as a British puppet’.122 Abdullah undoubtedly had his own ambitions, but he remained dependent on Britain. The British, as Kirkbride exclaimed to the King and Prime Minister, ‘had never urged Transjordan to intervene in Palestine’.123 He nonetheless required, and received, British approval for use of the British officered, and financed, Arab Legion. The Greater Transjordan option became policy because it suited both Bevin and

121 Bradshaw, Britain and Jordan, pp. 128, 200.
122 Pundik, Struggle for Sovereignty, p. 4.
123 Amman to FO, 687, 28 August 1948, FO816/128, TNA.
Abdullah. Britain was relinquishing the Palestine mandate because it did not have the resources, or means, to sustain its position. Moreover, the international climate precluded direct imperial intervention. Nonetheless, Britain’s desire to maintain as much influence as possible compelled it to contrive in a policy of indirect intervention via an informal asset of the British world system: Glubb and the Arab Legion. Despite its retreat the British sought to ensure that post-mandate Palestine was pro-British and stable. To that end, Glubb and the Arab Legion, which were on the cusp of being severely marginalised, proved to be valuable tools.
The 1948 War and Glubb’s Management of the Greater Transjordan Scheme

In February both Britain and Transjordan pinned their hopes for a satisfactory resolution to the Palestine problem on Glubb and the Arab Legion occupying central Arab Palestine with the tacit acquiescence of the Zionists, but it was not expected that the end of the mandate would descend into a full-blown war involving the regular armies of the neighbouring Arab states. Not until the final week of the mandate did this become certain and at midnight on 14/15 May, when the British mandate ended, the Arab Legion marched across the Allenby bridge as part of the invading Arab coalition, rhetorically intent on preventing the creation of a Jewish state in any part of Palestine and establishing an independent Arab Palestinian state.¹ When the war came to an effective end in 1949 with the signing of a series of bilateral armistice agreements between Israel and the Arab states the Greater Transjordan result had largely reached fruition. Transjordan obtained the bulk of central Palestine allotted to the Arabs under the UN partition resolution [Map 8]. Thus, two states – two apparent enemies – emerged from the war territorially victorious.

The purpose of this chapter is to assess the role of Glubb and the Arab Legion during the course of the two rounds of official fighting, between May and July. In so doing it examines the relevance of the pre-war Greater Transjordan scheme. The core questions that need to be asked are: What was the Arab Legion’s war aim? And what factors explain the nature of its conduct? The key to answering these questions is to distinguish between the influence of Glubb and Abdullah. Avi Shlaim provides little distinction between the conduct of the Arab

¹ Amman to FO, 331, 15 May 1948, FO371/68372/E6304, TNA.
Legion and the will of the king. Shlaim portrays Abdullah as an ‘independent actor’ who dictated Jordanian policy and emphasises that ‘Abdullah fulfilled his part of the original agreement with Golda Meir despite the apparent collapse of this agreement by the time of the second meeting [between the two in May 1948]’. Shlaim acknowledges that Glubb was ‘fully behind this limited strategy’, yet he seemingly underplays the significance of Glubb’s role in waging the limited war that the Arab Legion fought. 2 Meanwhile Maureen Norton has argued too far in the opposite direction. Norton is right to emphasise Glubb’s significance but she casts Abdullah as an almost completely passive nonentity and explains almost every action as exposing the will of Glubb’s grand design. 3 Understanding the true dynamic of the Arab Legion’s role in the 1948 War can only be understood by recognising the balance of power between Glubb and the king over the Arab Legion. It would be a mistake to associate the actions of the Arab Legion as representing the mere whim of one or the other. By acknowledging this dynamic this chapter corroborates the notion that the Arab Legion conducted a limited campaign, which merely sought to occupy the Arab areas of Palestine and accept the emergence of Israel, but places the emphasis for this on Glubb’s adherence to the Greater Transjordan scheme approved in February, rather than Abdullah’s adherence to an agreement with the Jewish Agency.

Although Greater Transjordan was Abdullah’s desire, as a more achievable alternative to his Greater Syria ambition, the climate created by the civil war including high-profile incidents such as the massacre of the Arab

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population in Deir Yassin (9/10 April), and the expulsion and flight of Arab inhabitants from Tiberias (17/18 April), Haifa (21/22 April) and Jaffa (25-27 April), put increasing pressure on Abdullah to act in pan-Arab solidarity. While Benny Morris has convincingly argued against the suggestion of a coherent Zionist plan for the expulsion of Palestinian Arabs, it was undoubtedly the case that attacks on Arab towns and villages contributed to a vicious circle of mass panic and flight. Under the weight of this pressure Kirkbride observed that Abdullah alternated between ‘moods of lucidity and something approaching a complete nervous breakdown’. Abdullah still hoped to enlarge his kingdom, but was wary of appearing to undermine the Arab cause. It was within the context of this dilemma that he had a second meeting with Golda Meir on the 10/11 May – just days before the mandate ended. The actuality of the meeting was in itself evidence that Abdullah still hoped to ratify an agreement with the Zionists. However, the mounting pan-Arab pressure compelled him to attempt to alter the premise of their discussion in November 1947. When asked by Golda Meir if he had broken his original promise Abdullah replied: ‘When I made that promise, I thought I was in control of my own destiny and I could do what I thought right. But since then I have learned otherwise’. Abdullah then, Meir recalled, ‘went on to say that before he had been alone, but now, “I am one of five”’. It was difficult for Abdullah to break from the united Arab front. As a result of the mounting pressure Kirkbride reported that Abdullah ‘realises that he has now embarked on an enterprise which may carry him beyond original scheme for occupation by

4 Amman to FO, 234, 21 April 1948, FO371/68852/E5013, TNA.
6 Kirkbride to Burrows, 29 April 1948, F0816/118, TNA; Amman to FO, 302, 8 May 1948, CO537/3579, TNA.
Transjordan of some of the Arab areas of Palestine’. Still wary of his dependence on Britain Abdullah therefore sought British ‘support or at least acquiescence’ to go beyond the approved scheme. Abdullah did not detail specified intentions, but made notable reference to ‘his national and religious duties in regard to Palestine as a whole and Jerusalem in particular’.8 At Bevin’s insistence, however, Kirkbride warned Abdullah that ‘any departure from the original scheme of things would necessitate a reconsideration by His Majesty’s Government of their own position’.9 Abdullah still maintained his desire to implement partition, but his ability to act had been compromised.

Abdullah’s change of heart did not alter the Arab Legion’s war aim, though. Avraham Sela’s principal criticism of the ‘collusion’ thesis is that even if an agreement had been reached between the Jewish Agency and Abdullah in November 1947, and approved by Britain in February 1948, the turn of events between then and May had rendered the agreement ‘antiquated and impractical’.10 This appreciation, however, is too rigid. Yes, the situation in May was not as envisaged in February, when a full-scale Arab-Israeli war was not anticipated. However, the Arab Legion’s war aim remained consistent with the target of the scheme approved by Bevin. Abdullah wavered, but Glubb, who spent the previous three months preparing to implement partition, remained an active adherent. Thus, on the last day of the mandate Kirkbride was able to report that, despite Abdullah’s misgivings, tonight ‘the Arab Legion will adhere to their original scheme and will establish themselves in Hebron, Ramallah and

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8 Amman to FO, 341, 17 May 1948, FO816/120, TNA.
9 Kirkbride to Abdullah, 22 May 1948, ibid.
Nablus and then extend the sector over Arab areas’.\textsuperscript{11} The Arab Legion entered Palestine with the intention of remaining utterly passive: to simply occupy the Arab areas of Palestine.\textsuperscript{12}

Despite this intention the Arab Legion was nonetheless engaged in bouts of fierce fighting. One of the perennial questions hanging over the ‘collusion’ thesis concerns the intense fighting that occurred in Jerusalem: why did Abdullah and the Jewish Agency not come to an agreement over Jerusalem?\textsuperscript{13} The answer is not simply, as Pappé suggests, that the two parties decided that their difference of opinion was so great that they would leave it to be decided on the battlefield.\textsuperscript{14} Equally unsatisfying is Shlaim’s suggestion that: ‘One explanation of this paradox is that within the context of the tacit understanding between the two sides, there was plenty of scope for misunderstandings.’\textsuperscript{15} The answer corresponds to the conclusion in the previous chapter that there was no firm Hashemite-Zionist understanding – merely an expressed willingness to accept Hashemite-Zionist partition. Uri Bar-Joseph’s principal contention is that a degree of conflict, even if not authorised by Glubb, was inevitable in the fog of war.\textsuperscript{16} This certainly explains a number of skirmishes. Holistically, however, the Arab Legion’s inconsistent conduct is best explained by the limited nature of Glubb’s autonomy. Glubb was determined to avoid conflict with the Zionist forces and adhere to the original Greater Transjordan scheme, but he was being hounded from above. Abdullah, who had been subjected to repeated pleas to

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  \item \textsuperscript{11} Amman to FO, 326, 14 May 1948, CO537/3579, TNA.
  \item \textsuperscript{12} ‘1 Div O.O. No 3/48’, 12 May 1948, GP2006, 84.
  \item \textsuperscript{13} Sela, ‘Transjordan, Israel and the 1948 War’, p. 626; Pappé, \textit{Britain and the Arab-Israeli Conflict}, p. 32.
  \item \textsuperscript{14} Pappé, \textit{Britain and the Arab-Israeli Conflict}, p. 32.
  \item \textsuperscript{15} Shlaim, ‘Israel and the Arab coalition’, p. 92.
  \item \textsuperscript{16} Bar-Joseph, \textit{Best of Enemies}, pp. 77-8.
\end{itemize}
help the Arabs in Palestine, wanted Glubb to send the Arab Legion to save Jerusalem.\textsuperscript{17} Thus, at midday on the 17 May the king sent written orders to Glubb to that effect.\textsuperscript{18} Glubb, however, was determined, as far as possible, to adhere to the original scheme. To that end Glubb visited the Arab Legion units at Nablus and Ramallah on 17/18 May, ‘principally in order to escape from the insistence of the King and the Prime Minister for immediate action’.\textsuperscript{19} However, Glubb could only ignore Abdullah’s command for so long.\textsuperscript{20} Eventually Glubb, as he always feared, had to succumb to pan-Arab pressure over Jerusalem. As he explained to Kirkbride:

\begin{quote}
The excitement was so intense, and the King issued repeated orders for the Arab Legion to enter Jerusalem, which orders I ignored. Eventually you yourself agreed that we could resist no longer.\textsuperscript{21}
\end{quote}

Just as Glubb feared during the month prior to the end of the mandate, Jerusalem proved to be the snag.

When it arrived, the fighting in Jerusalem was real and fierce. Indeed Glubb remarked: ‘In Jerusalem we immediately got into real fighting of an intensity equal to that of European warfare, although we had not meant to fight at all.’\textsuperscript{22} However, the intense nature of fighting in Jerusalem should not obscure the nature of what transpired in 1948. Rather, it further reveals the dynamics of the conflict. As Kirkbride explained, with the Arab Legion under pressure to take offensive action:

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\textsuperscript{17} Sela, ‘Transjordan, Israel and the 1948 War’, p. 650.
\textsuperscript{18} Glubb, \textit{Soldier}, p. 110.
\textsuperscript{19} Amman to FO, 348, 19 May 1948, F0816/120, TNA.
\textsuperscript{21} Glubb to Kirkbride, 4 August 1948, GP2006, 83.
\textsuperscript{22} Ibid.
\end{flushright}
Glubb had the choices of turning outwards on operations which might ultimately lead him into a Jewish area or inwards to relieve the Arab areas of Jerusalem. He chose the latter, I think wisely.23

A crossed out foreign office minute concurred with Kirkbride’s appraisal, noting: ‘Brigadier Glubb’s decision is almost certainly a wise one, I should say.’24 Although Jerusalem was designated to be an international zone by the UN, it was to be located within the Arab state. The fighting in Jerusalem was thus, in itself, pursued by Glubb to prevent a breach of the original scheme approved by Bevin – to avoid encroaching on the designated Jewish state. Moreover, the Arab Legion’s objective in Jerusalem remained defensive. The eventual order to move Arab Legion forces into Jerusalem was issued late on 18 May. However, the Arab Legion was confined to securing the area of Jerusalem east of Notre Dame: the Old City, in the centre, and the Arab City, in the east.25 Barring a few minor skirmishes in the Jewish colony in the west of Jerusalem, such as in Rememeh on 1 June, the Arab Legion made no attempt to infiltrate the Western Jewish part of the city.26 Meanwhile most of the Arab Legion’s battles during this period were defensive as it fended off repeated attacks at Latrun, the main stronghold protecting the road to Jerusalem from Tel Aviv. The fighting in and around Jerusalem was itself indicative of the limited nature of the Arab Legion’s objectives.

The fighting that occurred in Jerusalem and its environs did not prevent the tenets of the Greater Transjordan scheme being implemented. Rather, it

23 Amman to FO, 348, 19 May 1948, FO816/120, TNA.
24 Minute by Beith, 20 May 1948, FO371/68829/E6577/G, TNA.
25 HQ Arab Legion to British Minister et al, COSI Nos. 30, 32, 34, and 42, 19-31 May 1948; HQ 1 Div to HQ Arab Legion, COSI No. 11, 20 May 1948, GP2006, 85, 97.
proved to be a useful smokescreen for the real objective. As Kirkbride appraised, the ‘original Transjordan plan was upset’, but not broken, by the breaking of the truce covering Jerusalem ‘by the Jews’. Indeed, it may even have saved the scheme. Kirkbride reasoned that:

To have saved the Holy Places of Jerusalem would give Transjordan great merit in the Arab world and the troops can be given the battle for which they are clamouring without the risk of being involved in what might be described as an act of aggression against the Jewish state.

Moreover, it provided an unexpected advantage. Indeed, Kirkbride surmised that the:

Unforeseen commitment of Jerusalem was however in a sense a benefit for it would have been impossible for the Arab Legion having arrived at the border of the Jewish State to remain inactive both on account of the attitude of the men themselves and because Arab public opinion which would have described the attitude as due to a British plot to effect partition.

The unexpected fighting in Jerusalem provided a convenient alibi for the implementation of partition. Within seven days of the mandate ending the Arab Legion had gained effective control of the areas allocated to the Arabs – except for Western Galilee and Gaza – without violating any non-Arab territory. When a truce brought fighting to a halt on 11 June the territorial aspect of the Greater Transjordan objective had essentially been achieved. Having prepared the ground in the months leading up to the end of the mandate Glubb subsequently implemented the Arab Legion’s occupation of the Arab areas of Palestine, without entering the designated Jewish areas.

27 Amman to FO, 370, 22 May 1948, FO371/68373/E6897, TNA.
28 Amman to FO, 348, 19 May 1948, FO816/120, TNA.
29 Amman to FO, 370, 22 May 1948, FO371/68373/E6897, TNA.
Consolidating Transjordan was always going to be the most difficult part of the process and it was the aspect most affected by the unexpected intervention of the Arab states. To that end the British sought to arrange a truce and on 29 May the Security Council adopted a British proposal for a ceasefire in Palestine after HMG ‘gave an assurance’ that it ‘would suspend the deliveries of all war-like materials to the Arab Governments’.\(^\text{31}\) Tancred Bradshaw has emphasised the British inspired arms embargo as proof of Britain’s non-involvement in attempting to establish Greater Transjordan.\(^\text{32}\) However, Bradshaw’s argument that Britain did all it could to restrict the Arab Legion’s role in the war and that therefore it was not party to the Greater Transjordan scheme skews the rationale for British approval. It was not simply about territorial aggrandizement, but minimising conflict. Thus, Britain’s attempt to reduce the supply of arms was a continuation of policy within this context. Moreover, it is telling that the embargo was not posited until after the Greater Transjordan territorial objectives had been achieved. Until that point Glubb was utterly content with Britain’s support. Glubb expressed his deep appreciation for the ‘magnificent support’ of the MELF Commander-in-Chief and added that: ‘Actually H.M.G. have also done us very well’.\(^\text{33}\) The British sought a truce as a means to end the conflict and consolidate this fait accompli. To that end, after the Egyptians requisitioned a shipment of ammunition bound for Transjordan the British opted not to make good this loss of ammunition so as ‘to do nothing to


\(^{32}\) Bradshaw, Britain and Jordan, p. 142.

\(^{33}\) Glubb to Crocker, 13 June 1948, GP2006, 83.
true to Bevin’s original desire that nature would partition Palestine, the UN mediator, Count Folke Bernadotte, was ‘instructed to carry out his functions of seeking a peaceful settlement of the situation without any reference to previous decisions or attempts to find a settlement.’ Instead, Bevin encouraged the UN to seek a solution based on the situation that had been created on the ground. An arms embargo was seen as the best way of securing Transjordan’s gains. Firstly, the Foreign Office believed it was the only means to ‘forestell the lifting of the American arms embargo’ and prevent an influx of Soviet arms, which otherwise ‘would undoubtedly have enabled and encouraged the Jews to invade Arab territory outside Palestine’. Secondly, the British believed that by denying the Arab states the means to wage war they could be persuaded, or compelled, to cease fighting. Indeed, convincing the Arabs to accept Hashemite-Zionist partition was the principal obstacle to securing a satisfactory resolution. The British hoped they could militarily starve the Arab states into ‘holding their hand for the moment and possibly even of their eventually acquiescing in some modified form of the Mediator’s proposals’.

Once a ceasefire had been achieved Glubb, like the British, was determined not to see fighting renewed, but this decision was completely beyond his control. The Arab League Political Committee met to discuss the situation in Cairo during the first week of July. Owing to rumours that the Arab League may reject the extension of the truce Glubb visited Abdullah to warn him about the

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34 Crocker to Glubb, 9 June 1948, ibid.
35 Foreign Office note attached to: Pirie-Gordon to Tewfiq Pasha, 31 May 1948, F0816/115, TNA [emphasis added].
36 BMEO to FO, 228, 5 July 1948, F0371/68374/E9072/G; FO to Amman, 648, 6 July 1948, F0371/68375/E9168/G, TNA.
lack of artillery and mortar ammunition. Alarmed by this Glubb reported that Abdullah ‘sent [a] letter to Taufiq [Abul Huda] in Cairo by Special Aircraft’. But it was too late. The Arab League had ‘already rejected [the] truce’. 37 Glubb was informed by his second in command, Abdul Qadir, that ‘the Arabs were absolutely insistent on rejecting everything. ... The military experts, Abdul Qadir and [General] Sabbar [of the Egyptian army] etc., were not even asked their opinion.’ 38 Glubb lamented that the fighting had been resumed because politicians in Syria and Egypt made ‘fanatical demands for war’ as a sop to the mobs back home. Such was his fury that Glubb felt ‘the best solution would be a really good bombing of Damascus and Cairo’ in order to frighten them into peace. 39 Ultimately this was hyperbole but Glubb was deeply frustrated that the Jordanian Government was subject to the collective whim of the Arab League. As Glubb summarised:

The stages by which we have been led into a real war against the Jews are familiar to you. I think that you will agree that I did everything I could to prevent a war, and even since it began, I have done everything in my power to stop it, to avoid a renewal of hostilities or to make or prolong a truce. I have again and again told Taufiq Pasha that our resources are inadequate for war, but (under possibly irresistible pressure from the Arab League) he has again and again just drifted into war, and then rejected truces or the extension of truces. 40

The Jordanian Government and, to a lesser extent Abdullah, took the view that consolidation of the Greater Transjordan scheme, and the protection of Jordanian prestige generally, was best served by toeing the Arab line and renewing the fight.

38 Glubb to Kirkbride, 8 July 1948, ibid.
39 Glubb to Lash, 9 July 1948, GP2006, 90.
40 Glubb to Kirkbride, 4 August 1948, GP2006, 83.
The British and the Jordanians understood each other's predicament, though. The British recognised that it was impossible for Transjordan to accept a ceasefire alone among the Arab states. To proffer a lone dissenting voice would not have affected the Arab League's course; it would merely have exposed Abdullah's true desire and put him in the firing line for criticism throughout the Arab world. Meanwhile the Jordanian Prime Minister was conscious of Britain's – and indeed Transjordan's – need to court the UN. Fearing that the Arab world had got into the habit of ignoring Britain's advice, Kirkbride felt that UN sanctions may be very useful in convincing the Arab states of the need to comply. Much to his surprise he found that Abdullah and the Prime Minister would 'welcome the idea of the imposition of sanctions on Transjordan also'. Clearly they recognised their isolated position and were desperate for a solution to be imposed. In order to 'extricate Transjordan from its present position' the Prime Minister felt: 'What was now wanted were sanctions by the Security Council against all the Arab states including Trans-Jordan'. He even posited that withholding the subsidy 'would also be useful pressure'. Indeed, the 12 July subsidy payment was duly withheld for a short time. At the political level Britain and Transjordan remained at one. They both sought to find a way of consolidating Greater Transjordan. For Britain that meant toeing the line of the UN and for Transjordan that meant aligning with the Arab League.

When the second round of fighting officially began at 8am on 9 July the Greater Transjordan objective was put at risk. As a result of Britain's adherence

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41 Kirkbride to Bevin, 390, 25 May 1948; Kirkbride to Bevin, 386, 24 May 1948; Kirkbride to Bevin, 399, 26 May 1948, FO816/121, TNA.
42 Kirkbride to Bevin, 547, 9 July 1948, FO816/125, TNA.
43 Kirkbride to Bevin, 546, 9 July 1948, ibid.
44 L.F.L. Pyman to H.G. Downie, 29 July 1948 FO371/68830/E7548, TNA.
to, and Israel's flouting of, the arms embargo, the balance of forces had been radically altered during the first truce. Moreover, given its limited objectives the Arab Legion had nothing more to gain from a continuation of fighting; it merely had existing gains to lose. Thus, Glubb's policy morphed into trying to protect Greater Transjordan until an agreement could be reached. Kirkbride reported that Glubb was to 'make (in his own words) arrangements for a phoney war to follow a phoney truce'. Glubb announced that 'the policy now is to have a war of passive defence'. The arms embargo made it very difficult to go on the offensive in any case, but this policy of 'passive defence', as Glubb admitted, was 'really going back to the original scheme before May 15th, of holding the Arab areas and doing nothing'. This policy was consistent with the intentions of the Jordanian Government with the Prime Minister having informed Kirkbride that 'the Arab Legion would be ordered to play a purely defensive role and would not fire unless attacked'. The Arab Legion therefore entered the second round of fighting with the intention of merely hanging on to the gains made during the first round. Events may have moved beyond what had been envisaged back in February, but the Greater Transjordan concept continued to govern the Arab Legion's instruction.

Owing to competing pressures beyond the Greater Transjordan objective, however, Glubb and the Jordanian Government's comprehension of the Arab Legion's defensive role were subtly, but crucially different. When fighting resumed Glubb was given a written order by the Jordanian Government to 'hold

46 Kirkbride to Bevin, 548, 10 July 1948, FO816/125, TNA.
47 Glubb to Lash, 9 July 1948, GP2006, 83.
48 Kirkbride to Bevin, 9 July 1948, 546, FO816/125, TNA.
Glubb’s passive defence policy, however, had three tiers of increasing importance: 1) Safeguard Transjordan itself; 2) Protect the Arab Legion; and 3) Hold onto the gains in Palestine. Holding the gains in Palestine was the least important. Goldie certainly believed: ‘His primary concern was to spare the Arab Legion. He did not want his little army to get a bloody nose’. As the second round of fighting began Kirkbride was in the process of seeking an exit strategy. As Glubb explained:

Kirkbride is thinking out some means of getting T.J. [Transjordan] out of it altogether, but he thinks that we could not have a private truce in Pal[estine] – it would not work. He thinks the only way would be to withdraw the Arab Legion from Pal[estine] entirely, but he is afraid that this might lead to a mutiny of the Arab Legion itself.

With that problem in mind Glubb instructed Lash to find out whether the Arab Legion was ‘still mad to fight or would they secretly be rather glad to see it all over?’ Personally, Glubb felt that ‘withdrawal from Pal[estine] for political reasons would be too difficult and that it would be easier to stay in Palestine but stop fighting, but of course this depends rather on the Jews’. To abandon Palestine would look a lot ‘like treachery’. With the safety of the Arab Legion and the protection of lesser Transjordan in mind Glubb therefore considered contingencies in case ‘complete withdrawal from Palestine [became] necessary’, thus abandoning the original, yet least important, objective of holding the Arab areas of Greater Transjordan. Fearing that the Arab Legion’s evacuation routes might be blocked by refugee traffic, Glubb even queried: ‘Could we demobilise all

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49 Amman to FO, 555, 12 July 1958, ibid.
50 Goldie Interview with Avi Shlaim, Wallingford, 15 September 1985, Shlaim’s Private Collection.
51 Glubb to Lash, 9 July 1948, GP2006, 90.
civilian vehicles in Ramallah by removing some vital part?" This action was neither feasible nor seriously considered, but it reveals the extent to which safeguarding the Arab Legion and lesser Transjordan was Glubb's first priority. In a subtle, but significant, difference to the Jordanian Government Glubb's approach to a 'passive defence' policy was much more flexible. Glubb was not committed to clinging to the gains made during the first round of fighting. He was not prepared – as the Jordanian Government ordered – to hold on at all costs.

The archetypal expression of Glubb's 'passive defence' policy was the infamous evacuation of the Arab towns of Lydda and Ramle close to the border of the new Jewish state, which Glubb claimed was previously agreed with the Jordanian Prime Minister – although it contravened the Jordanian Government's order to hold on at all costs. When the first truce ended Brigadier 'Teal' Ashton, Commander of the Arab Legion 3rd Brigade in Latrun, was informed by Arab Legion Headquarters that the Jordanian Government did not want war and that Jerusalem should be kept closed. When the Israeli Defence Forces (IDF) launched Operation Dani – designed to open the road from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem – on 9 July, the Arab Legion opted to consolidate the defensive stronghold along that road at Latrun. In the face of overwhelming Israeli force and after the surrender of the local inhabitants Lash gave the order for the Arab Legion companies besieged in the Lydda and Ramle police stations to withdraw to Latrun. Losing Lydda and Ramle was far from ideal strategically. As Glubb explained: '[It] doubled the length of our front ... [thus leaving] the two regiments at Latrun in a

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52 Glubb to Lash, 13 July 1948, GP2006, 83.
53 'The Trans-Jordan Situation', Glubb, 12 August 1948, ibid.
54 Diary of 'Teal' Ashton, pp. 36-42 [not clearly labeled], GP2006, 84.
very dangerous salient.’55 Crucially, though, it meant the Arab Legion came away unscathed and the strategic stronghold at Latrun was consolidated – albeit left more exposed. This contravened the Jordanian Government’s order to hold on at all costs, but it was consistent with the order to ensure that the road to Jerusalem be kept closed.

The loss of Lydda and Ramle created immense political difficulties for Glubb and the British connection. It was immediately followed by anti-Glubb and anti-British demonstrations. When Glubb visited the front he was persistently spat at and called a traitor by the inhabitants of villages that he passed through, both in Palestine and Transjordan.56 In describing the immediate fallout Glubb remarked: ‘On 14 July crowds demonstrated in Amman. They shouted down with Britain down with Glubb. What a life.’ The day before, Glubb ‘was summoned before session of King and Cabinet’, where Abdullah suggested he ‘resign’. Glubb recounted that: ‘Ministers stated they suspected me of sabotage [sic] Transjordan war effort on secret orders from Britain.’57 It was ‘made clear that his stories of ammunition shortages were disbelieved as being part of British propaganda.’58 An hour later Glubb was called to see the Prime Minister who told Glubb: ‘He understood [the] military situation and approved of my action but [the] King and [the] Ministers [are] very angry. He asked me not to resign.’59 As a result of his predicament Glubb asked Kirkbride:

Do you think it would carry any influence if I resigned. If it were accepted it would be difficult because Abdul Qadir has not got a

55 Glubb to Lash, 13 July 1948, GP2006, 83.
56 Pirie-Gordon to Burrows, 25 July 1948, F0371/68822/E10325, TNA.
57 Glubb to H.E. Pyman, undated, GP2006, 86.
58 Pirie-Gordon to Burrows, 25 July 1948, F0371/68822/E10325, TNA.
59 Glubb to H.E. Pyman, undated, GP2006, 86.
Glubb was prepared to abandon his pride and joy in order to help salvage British prestige, but also to relieve some of the unpleasantness associated with his scapegoat status. Pirie-Gordon reported: ‘Kirkbride’s view is that of the two evils the lesser one would be to remain on to the end’, and Glubb was informed by the British Legation that if Abdullah asked him to resign again, he should insist on being dismissed.61 Bevin, though, suggested the ‘best course’ was for Glubb to call the king’s bluff.62 When Glubb saw Abdullah on 17 July he duly offered to step down and ‘serve his majesty in another capacity’, if the King felt it advisable to defuse the hostile propaganda by replacing him as commander. However, having given Glubb the opportunity to stand down just four days earlier in front of the Council of Ministers, Abdullah asked Glubb to remain in his post.63 Privately Abdullah knew Glubb was needed to secure Greater Transjordan, but he was also deemed a vital component in maintaining the British connection. As Kirkbride explained: ‘It is undoubtedly the case that ... King Abdullah and his Ministers considered removing those officers [Glubb and other British officers] from positions of executive authority and retaining their services in the form of a military mission’, but that this idea was ‘dropped because it was feared that His Majesty’s Government would be offended’ and the subsidy consequently reduced.64 For both allies Glubb was considered the key to accessing the fruits of the alliance.

60 Glubb to Kirkbride, 13 July 1948, GP2006, 90.
61 Amman to FO, 570, 14 July 1948, FO816/126, TNA.
63 Amman to FO, 586, 18 July 1948, FO816/126, TNA.
64 Kirkbride to Bevin, 25 September 1948, FO371/68832/E12875, TNA.
In order to offset the negative ramifications of surrendering Lydda and Ramle Glubb launched a minor, and considered a major, military offensive. On 13 July Goldie passed Ashton a plan from Lash designed to raise morale after the Ramle loss. This took the form of ‘an attack to capture some place with a name’. There were two suggestions: re-conquer either the village of Qubab or Qula, both in the sub-district of Ramle. Although Qula was deemed ‘not important’, Lash, Goldie and Ashton decided that would be the target and on 16 July a successful operation was launched. 65 The motive for attacking Qula was merely to boost morale within the Arab Legion with a winnable offensive operation; it had no other tactical or strategic significance. It was not about defeating the enemy or gaining new ground; it was simply designed to give the appearance that the Arab Legion was actively fighting. Meanwhile Glubb also explored the feasibility of launching a more significant offensive operation. Not for the purpose of defeating the enemy, but in order to rebuild his and the British officers standing. Given the political fallout of withdrawing from Lydda and Ramle Glubb asked Lash if it would be possible ‘to mount a bigger operation during the last 48 hours’, in the event of a truce being agreed. Glubb appraised:

It is important if there is a truce to whiten our faces before it begins. Otherwise when all the war is over, there may be political pressure to get rid of all British from the A.L. [Arab Legion] which would be against [the] policy of HMG.

Glubb’s preferred option was ‘to recapture Lydda’. Though he posited: ‘An alternative might be an objective more to the north’. The most important criterion for operation ‘Glucose’ – as it was labelled – was to be seen to be taking some form of major offensive operation – in the interests of British prestige.

65 Diary of ‘Teal’ Ashton, pp. 44-8, GP2006, 84.
However, Glubb was adamant: ‘We could not do it unless a truce were imminent because we have not enough men [or ammo] to hold the ground taken.’ Despite the embargo the Arab Legion did obtain 250 two-pounder shells from the Egyptians on 15 July. However, this was not enough to alter the military balance and without the protection of a truce retaking Lydda would only replicate the problem that prompted the Legion to retreat in the first place. Consequently, the key to such an operation would be timing. With the safeguard of an imminent truce Glubb suggested: ‘Consequently we could poop off most of our 25 p[oun]d[e]r [ammunition].’\textsuperscript{66} Despite receiving forty-eight hours notice prior to the start of the second truce, operation ‘Glucose’ was consigned to the filing cabinet. Nonetheless, it reveals a great deal about Glubb’s mind-set. It confirms the extent to which Glubb planned military offensives in terms of political outcomes, rather than as a means of destroying the supposed enemy, and it demonstrates that he was thinking in terms of British interests.

When the second truce began on 18 July, after a disastrous ten days fighting for the Arabs, Glubb’s fear that he and the British officers would need to \textit{whiten their faces} proved true. During the following weeks Glubb became an ever more vivid scapegoat and the fall of Lydda and Ramle became the symbol of his alleged treachery. The contradictory predicament that Glubb was in vis-à-vis Abdullah and the Jordanian Government left him in a ‘very unsatisfactory’ position. Glubb resented that:

\begin{quote}
The King and the Prime Minister continue to ask me in private not to resign, but they do nothing publicly to express their satisfaction with my services, or to exonerate [sic] me from the charge of having treacherously handed over Lydda and Ramle to the Jews. In other words, they seem to wish to continue to take advantage of
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{66} Glubb to Lash, 15 July 1948, GP2006, 86.
my services and of those other British Officers, but they are not 
loth to see the blame for all reverses laid on me and British Officers 
alone.67

Glubb lamented: ‘One can stand any amount of fighting with the enemy, but this 
war on two fronts is depressing.’68

Glubb’s isolation was compounded after he revealed the Arab Legion’s 
dire financial predicament. On 4 August Glubb visited Kirkbride to report what 
Kirkbride described as ‘an almost incredible state of affairs financially’.69 As of 9 
August 1948, only £185,000 of the annual subsidy remained for the rest of the 
financial year. The other £2.315 million had already been spent – in just four 
months.70 Kirkbride reported:

The most astounding feature of the matter is that Glubb did this 
without any reference to the Transjordan Government either as 
regards promise of cash or actual expenditure. This Legation was 
kept equally ignorant until yesterday.

The Jordanian Government was furious with Glubb, and Kirkbride ‘was 
unsympathetic’.71 Upon resuming duty – after a period of leave – one of the first 
things Kirkbride did was to ‘reproach the King and the Prime Minister on the 
subject of accusations or worse which had been levelled against British officers 
of the Arab Legion and against Glubb in particular after the occupation of Ramleh 
and Lydda by the Jewish forces’.72 But Kirkbride reported: ‘this latest 
development cuts the ground from under my feet and I do not feel able to defend

67 Glubb to H.E. Pyman, 1 August 1948, GP2006, 83. 
68 Glubb to H.E. Pyman, 27 July 1948, ibid. 
69 Amman to FO, 634, 5 August 1948, FO371/68830/E10466/G, TNA. 
70 M.M.C. Charteris to L.F.L. Pyman, 9 August 1948, FO371/68830/E10610/G, 
TNA. 
71 Amman to FO, 634, 5 August 1948, FO371/68830/E10466/G, TNA. 
72 Amman to FO, 635, 5 August 1948, FO371/68830/E10502, TNA.
him on this particular issue in which he is entirely in the wrong’. 73 Kirkbride somewhat clinically informed Glubb that:

while I have transmitted all the explanations you give for the over-expense I have not found myself able to give any support for the “fait accompli” with which we have now been faced. ... I realise that this policy will inevitably cause considerable embarrassment and will involve you in complete re-organisation in order to effect the necessary economies but I think we shall be fortunate if we can persuade the Treasury to go even as far as I have recommended.74

Glubb’s over expenditure – as a result of having to manage a war on a peacetime budget – exasperated Kirkbride. In his view, Glubb ignored discrepancies within the budget and heard what he wanted to hear in meetings with the War Office and the Treasury so that he could act as he pleased.75 The financial situation strained Glubb’s relationship with Kirkbride and compounded the friction between himself and the Jordanian Government.

The exigencies with which Glubb had to cope during the 1948 War increasingly made Glubb’s role seem like a poisoned chalice. In order to resolve his predicament, one way or another, Glubb turned to Britain. Instinctively Glubb exclaimed: ‘These various factors give me a personal inclination to hand in a written resignation to the Trans-Jordan Government’. Glubb hoped it would be refused meaning: ‘I would thereby be exonerated [sic] from the charge of treachery now circulating, and my position would be much stronger’. However, he understood that ‘there is the risk of it being accepted’. Because this would have wider ramifications for Britain, Glubb explained:

I have, therefore, asked the Legation to cable H.M.G., and to ask them to what extent they consider this an imperial interest. If it is such, I think they should give me a clear directive, in which case I

73 Amman to FO, 634, 5 August 1948, FO371/68830/E10466/G, TNA.
74 Kirkbride to Glubb, 10 August 1948, GP2006, 83.
75 Kirkbride to Bevin, 9 August 1948, FO371/68830/E10894/G, TNA.
will of course carry on, whatever personal unpleasantness and humiliation may result. If on the other hand, H.M.G. say that they are indifferent, and the matter is merely a personal one for myself, then I can with a clear conscience take whatever action is necessary to defend myself from libellous propaganda.

In an effort to secure British support Glubb painted a gloomy picture of his departure being followed by all the other British officers and the Arab Legion therefore collapsing. The ultimate consequence being that: 'In the end Trans-Jordan herself might disappear'. Glubb wanted British support to ease the burden he was facing and when he departed for London on 13 August this was at the forefront of his mind.

Glubb's visit to London had initially been arranged, at his instigation, to discuss the Legion’s ‘pressing’ financial situation. However, as Glubb explained to the MELF Chief of Staff on the day he departed Amman, what he really wanted to know was:

“What importance does H.M.G. attach to Trans-Jordan and the Arab Legion?” This is what I want to ask in London. If H.M.G. say that this is a most important strategic or political asset, then we will put our pride in our pockets and try all we can to salvage the situation. If, on the contrary, H.M.G. say they could not care less, then I may make enquiries in London to find another job.

Glubb made a similar request, for a job in London, in May 1946. Glubb feared that Jordanian independence would soon result in his services being dispensed with and he preferred to find a new job to support his family while he was still young enough to do so. However, on that occasion also, he accepted that: ‘Should His Majesty’s Government be of [the] opinion that I am best employed in Trans-

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76 Glubb to H.E. Pyman, 1 August 1948, GP2006, 83.
77 Glubb to Kirkbride, 4 August 1948, ibid.
78 Glubb to H.E. Pyman, 13 August 1948, ibid.
Jordan, I will continue in my present post without complaint.” Ultimately, Glubb considered himself a servant of HMG and although his visit to London in August-September 1948 had initially been instigated as a result of a financial crisis, by the time of his departure Glubb was as much, if not more, concerned about his personal authority and the value of the Arab Legion. Since February he had been guided by the Greater Transjordan scheme, but in the three months since the mandate ended and the war began he increasingly found himself to be the only active adherent. Now Glubb needed further guidance and reassurance.

Glubb’s visit to London proved to be the fillip that he required. Given the rollicking Glubb received from Kirkbride and the Jordanian Government concerning the accumulated debt, Glubb may have expected a similar rebuke in London. However, HMG was strikingly uncritical of Glubb. In the Foreign Office discussions that followed it was the practicalities of dealing with the over expenditure that was discussed rather than Glubb’s role in it. Moreover, the Foreign Office laid the blame for the over expenditure at the door of the War Office for not keeping their accounts in a clearer manner and MELF for not presenting their bills in good time. Glubb was not the subject of Foreign Office criticism. Meanwhile he received positive news regarding future instalments of the subsidy. Prior to his arrival Glubb warned: ‘If H.M.G. do not release any money during August, the Arab Legion will dissolve. It may dissolve in mutiny and anarchy.’ To Glubb’s relief, he was given ‘an assurance to the effect that for the present the subsidy (including the equipment grant) will continue to be paid to meet the recurring expenditure and the re-equipment expenditure of the Arab

79 Glubb to Kirkbride, 27 May 1946, FO371/52931/E10014, TNA.
80 Minute by Burrows, 12 August 1948, FO371/68830/E10610/G, TNA.
81 Glubb to Kirkbride, 4 August 1948, GP2006, 83.
Legion in accordance with the agreement reached last January’. From a financial perspective Glubb considered Britain’s intentions to be ‘satisfactory’. However, in order to keep up the appearance of non-aggression it was explained to Glubb that HMG could not supply war material. This provoked an equally agreeable response from Glubb who concurred that it would be ‘unwise’ to send war material immediately, although he warned of the need for speed as the Arab Legion could only hold off a renewed attack for a few days. Glubb’s relaxed acceptance of HMG’s decision to continue adhering to the embargo is somewhat surprising given his repeated pleas for more ammunition, but it can be explained by strong indications that Glubb was able to circumvent this problem by procuring war materiel from elsewhere. While there is not a concrete paper trail confirming completed transactions, Glubb’s papers contain enough material to indicate that the Arab Legion did make productive efforts to rearm. While Glubb was in London he received a letter from Lt.-Col. Charles Coaker, from Arab Legion HQ, in which he remarked that: ‘I hear from the Def[ence] Minister that you have been successful over money and rations [from the British] and that Pakistan may help with ammo, so perhaps you have not had quite such a thankless trip as you had feared’. Glubb was seeking to order ‘15,000 hand grenades’ and 30,000 anti-aircraft rounds from Switzerland to be paid for in dollars and shipped via Karachi. Moreover, Glubb wanted to ‘enquire into [the] possibility to entering into contract with a Swiss or Belgian company, in conjunction with the Iraq Government for the manufacture of 25,000 rounds of 3” Mortar ammunition’, 25,000 rounds of 25 pounder ammunition, an

82 FO to Amman, 821, 20 August 1948, FO371/68831/E11168, TNA.
83 Coaker to Glubb, 29 August 2948, GP2006, 83.
unspecified amount of 3” mortars, plus ammunition on a scale of 1,000 rounds per mortar.84 Glubb may also have initiated contacts related to the Nigerian Government while in London. Certainly negotiations to that effect took place shortly after Glubb’s return to Amman. Reporting back to Glubb, the Jordanian Military Attaché, Major Kemal Hamoud, explained: ‘The Nigerian representative who arrived in London two days ago is the expert in important export for purchasing mission who are expected to arrive in London any day. This man assures me that the Nigerian Government wants to help us and that our goods will be bought and shipped with theirs.’85 A week or so later Kemal further reported: ‘Great hope. Effort continuing all repeat all our requirements. … When Nigerian representative secures necessary papers suggest authorize former proceed Amman to report personally.’86 Whether or not deals via Pakistan, Europe and Nigeria were agreed and arms received are not confirmed. However, it is certain that Glubb had productive communication toward that end. Whether or not the British Government was aware of this is also uncertain. However, it would seem highly unlikely that the British could be oblivious to such a transaction, especially involving Nigeria, which did not obtain independence until 1960. Any such procurement of arms was not enough to significantly alter the military balance and offer the Arab Legion the means to go on the offensive. Indeed, Glubb vented renewed desperation for military materiel in November/December.87 The prospect of new military supplies that would help consolidate the Arab Legion’s ability to maintain its defensive line was, however,

84 ‘Switzerland’, Undated [located in a bundle of papers dated August 1948], ibid.
85 Kemal to Glubb, undated [25th of unspecified month, but most likely October], GP2006, 97.
86 Kemal to Glubb, 5 November 1948, GP2006, 86.
87 Glubb to unknown [2nd page missing], 9 November 1948, ibid.
enough to ease the pressure on Glubb in September. Consequently, when Glubb left London in mid-September, not only had he received financial assurances from Britain, but also he seemingly made progress toward the procurement of much-needed military supplies. When he initially arrived in London one journalist reported: 'He looks a tired, sick man, his eyes heavy and bloodshot.' However, Glubb returned to Amman with new vigour. He seemed to get the reassurance that he craved and with his position stabilised Glubb was able to focus his efforts on securing a satisfactory resolution to the conflict.

Meanwhile Glubb’s month-long absence seemed to have a positive effect of easing the tension between himself and the Jordanian Government. When he left Amman in August it appeared that the Jordanians were attempting to edge Glubb out – or at least diminish the extent of his power. As an alternative to removing Glubb, which risked damaging relations with Britain, Kirkbride explained that the Jordanian Government created a separate Ministry of Defence, headed by Fawzi al-Mulki, seemingly with the intention of ‘concentrating all authority in the hands of the Minister’, thus side-lining Glubb as a mere adviser. Glubb likewise suspected that one reason why the Jordanian Government had approved his visit to London was to enable the new Minister of Defence to get ‘himself dug in’ in Glubb’s absence. He believed:

They are afraid to dismiss me lest H.M.G. cut off the subsidy, but they might like to reduce my power but still keep me as a figure-head so that they will still get the money. It is not however clear to what extent the King would support this idea.

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89 Kirkbride to Bevin, 25 September 1948, FO371/68832/E12875, TNA.
90 Glubb to H.E. Pyman, 13 August 1948, GP2006, 83.
Glubb arrived back in Amman on 17 September and a few days later he reported that: ‘The appointment of the Defence Minister has not led to any catastrophic results.’ Instead, he described it as little more than ‘perhaps a minor annoyance’. He added:

I am still inclined to think that when the Defence Minister was created, in the hysterical days of July, he was meant to oust me. But the excitement has now subsided, and in fact some of the Trans-Jordanians are a little ashamed of their attacks on us. As a result, the Defence Minister has not developed offensively.91

Similarly, Kirkbride reported that the Jordanian Government’s antipathy toward Glubb and the British officers had dissipated as it became generally accepted that previous criticism had been unjustified.92 By the end of October Glubb reported: ‘The position of the Arab Legion and the British Officers in Trans-Jordan has been more or less re-established as it was a year ago’. Though he added that it was ‘still widely believed that, without it’s [sic] British Officers it would have done much more [in Palestine].93 This belief was not unfounded. As Glubb acknowledged: ‘They [the men of the Legion] were so frightfully keen to fight on May 15th.’94 The supply situation certainly limited the Arab Legion’s capabilities, but it was Glubb and the British officers in executive command positions that maintained the Arab Legion’s adherence to the Greater Transjordan scheme. But for their presence it is unlikely that the Arab Legion could have been restrained as it was, in the interests of partition. Nigel Bromage, a British officer in the Arab Legion recounted how, as the Israelis began taking Ramle, he set about destroying the Israeli colony at Qeezer, which overlooked the main road to

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91 Glubb to H.E. Pyman, 22 September 1948, ibid.
92 Kirkbride to Bevin, 25 September 1948, FO371/68832/E12875, TNA.
93 Glubb to Brigadier O’Connor (Acting Chief of Staff, MELF), 27 October 1948, GP2006, 86.
94 Glubb to Lash, 9 July 1948, GP2006, 90.
Jerusalem, ‘without the authority of the Brigade’, after his request to attack an Israeli settlement at Ben Shemen was ‘refused’. Bromage was subsequently reprimanded by Ashton for this unsanctioned offensive, which is illustrative of the will to fight amongst both Arab and British men of the Legion.95 When the second truce began Glubb reported that: ‘The rank and file of the Arab Legion were rather annoyed’. This was because: ‘They were unaware of the strategic plan or the supply situation, but were elated at having killed lots of Jews.’96 It would have been almost impossible for the Arab Legion to adhere to the strategic plan of securing Greater Transjordan and acquiescing in the establishment of Israel but for the control of Glubb.

When the mandate ended the Arab Legion entered Palestine merely with the objective of occupying central Arab Palestine and acquiescing in the establishment of Israel. The plight of the Palestinian Arabs and the groundswell of pressure throughout the Arab world compelled Abdullah to err beyond the scheme approved by Bevin. Abdullah did not lose his original desire to expand his authority, but it was difficult for him to go it alone. Thus, on the eve of the mandate Abdullah made one final attempt to coax the Jewish Agency to acquiesce in a scheme that would be more presentable to the rest of the Arab world. He also tried to obtain British approval for more expansive Arab Legion involvement. Both these diplomatic manoeuvres proved fruitless. Nonetheless, Abdullah was under pressure to come to the aid of the Arab Palestinians, particularly in Jerusalem and had he been in sole control of the Arab Legion its role would have been much less limited than it actually was. Yet, with Glubb in

96 Glubb to H.E. Pyman, 25 July 1948, GP2006, 83.
charge, the Arab Legion was largely able to restrain itself and stick to the *strategic plan* of occupying the Arab areas of Palestine and acquiesce in the creation of Israel. The situation may have been altered between February and May, as Sela has emphasised, but the February meeting did help shape the 1948 War. The Greater Transjordan scheme approved at that meeting continued to govern the actions of Glubb and therefore the Arab Legion.

The key to understanding the discrepancies within the collusion debate is to recognise Glubb and the Arab Legion as a distinct actor, or entity, that was crucial to shaping the outcome of the 1948 War. Indeed, but for Glubb’s (limited) autonomy over the Arab Legion it is likely that it would not have acted in accordance with the restrained object of securing the Arab areas of Palestine in the interest of Abdullah’s dynastic ambitions. A memorandum, most likely written by Glubb, stated: ‘Unfortunately his Majesty is a good political strategist, but a bad tactician. His blueprints are excellent but they rarely go into production.’97 This description of Abdullah neatly summarises the fate of the Greater Transjordan scheme. It was based on Abdullah’s blueprint, but reliant on Glubb to put it into production. He ensured that the Arab Legion conducted limited war with Israel. Glubb did so in the interests of both Britain and Transjordan, but without much support from either. Glubb later complained that: ‘In the moments of worst stress, both Governments let the Arab Legion down. The Trans-Jordan Government tell me that it is my job to get the money from my compatriots the British, who are bound by treaty to do their stuff. H.M.G. say that they have nothing to do with operations in Palestine and will only

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pay at peace time rates. 98 Glubb was caught between a Jordanian Government that wanted to appear to fight and a British Government that would not provide the means. Yet all the time Glubb’s mission remained to secure Greater Transjordan. Glubb was left alone to navigate a way through the mire. During the first round of fighting this was manageable and when the first truce ended the Arab Legion had successfully assumed control of central Arab Palestine without encroaching upon land designated to the new Jewish state. The Greater Transjordan scheme’s lack of exit strategy is what put the most strain on Glubb. His visit to London during the second truce eased the pressure somewhat. Yet when he returned to Amman in September, this conundrum still remained.

98 Glubb to H.E. Pyman, 13 April 1949, GP2006, 22.
Glubb's return to Amman in September 1948 both marked and coincided with a significant shift toward seeking a resolution to the conflict. By September the front lines had been established and both sides had signed corresponding maps.\(^1\) The war was eventually resolved by a series of bilateral armistice agreements negotiated and signed between Israel and the Arab states – except Iraq – during the first half of 1949. The primary purpose of this chapter is to assess the role of Glubb and the Arab Legion during the September 1948 – April 1949 process of bringing the conflict to an end, firstly by analysing their role in enabling the start of formal negotiations and, secondly, by focusing on the armistice negotiations themselves. As the war assumed an increasingly political nature after September 1948 Glubb's ability to influence events inevitably decreased. Uri Bar-Joseph has gone as far to suggest that Glubb ‘played virtually no role in the political negotiations throughout this period … [w]ith the exception of certain phases in the armistice negotiations’.\(^2\) Benny Morris quite rightly suggests Bar-Joseph’s statement seems to be an exaggeration.\(^3\) Morris concedes that the ‘continued inaccessibility of contemporary Arab documentation’ makes it:

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\text{difficult to assess Glubb’s actual input in the armistice negotiations: How important was his advice in the shaping of Jordan’s positions and concessions? A definitive answer must await the opening of Jordan’s state archives.}^{4}
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\(^1\) Pappe, *Britain and the Arab-Israeli Conflict*, p. 57.
\(^3\) Morris, *Road to Jerusalem*, p. 283.
Although they still do not provide the full picture Glubb’s papers help us understand his continued importance during this period. As this chapter demonstrates, Glubb made a significant contribution to the myriad of uncoordinated and ad hoc approaches that searched for and eventually found a resolution to the conflict. This process was arduously complicated by Inter-Arab competition. Although this had been a feature of the Palestine conflict from the outset, this issue really came to prominence, particularly with Egypt, as the first Arab-Israeli war came to a close.

The difficulty of finding a solution to end the 1948 War was classically illustrated during the time it took Glubb to pack his bags and travel from London back to Amman in mid-September. On 16 September the UN mediator, Count Folke Bernadotte, put together his second resolution proposal, which, true to Bevin’s original hope back in February, was based largely on the situation on the ground.\(^5\) In his initial proposal, during the first truce, Bernadotte suggested the Arab areas of Palestine, including Jerusalem, which was the most coveted prize of the conflict, and the Negev be incorporated into Transjordan and that Galilee form part of the new Israeli state. He also suggested Israel and Transjordan should form a union to deal with economic, defence, and foreign policy issues.\(^6\) This solution, however, only suited those behind the Greater Transjordan scheme – Britain and Abdullah. Transjordan’s Arab allies had long been opposed – almost singularly – to Abdullah unilaterally gaining from the conflict, but the Egyptians were particularly appalled that the Negev, which they presently occupied, was to be handed to Transjordan. Meanwhile the Israelis had been

\(^6\) Ibid., pp. 221-2.
awarded the Negev as part of the original 1947 UN partition resolution and although they stood to gain Galilee, which they currently occupied, they were in no mood to compromise. Moreover, the Israelis were fighting for statehood, not union with Transjordan. Bernadotte’s similar second proposal was equally unpalatable to both the Israelis and the other Arab states and it was quite literally short-lived. On 17 September, while Glubb was still travelling back to the region, Bernadotte was assassinated in Jerusalem by Zionist terrorists. The UN Mediator had failed to meet the impossible challenge of finding a solution that would satisfy all parties and before he had a chance to publish his second plan, both he and his proposal were dead. His assassination had shown that it would be up to the warring parties themselves to enforce a resolution to the conflict and one of the key sticking points over the Bernadotte scheme, the Negev, would prove to be the political and military battleground, where the 1948 War would be decided.

Understanding exactly what transpired in the Negev, and why, between October 1948 and January 1949, is absolutely crucial to understanding the nature of the 1948 War, the interplay that brought it to an end, and the nature of Glubb’s role. On 15 October the Israelis brought the ‘shooting truce’ to an end when they launched Operation Yoav, an offensive against the Egyptians, who held a defensive front in southern Palestine from Isdud in the west to Hebron and Bethlehem in the east [Map 5]. Behind this line lay the vast area of the Negev, including a small cluster of Jewish colonies, which provided the *casus belli* for Operation Yoav to begin. The notorious Arab Legion defector, Abdullah al-Tall, later claimed in his memoirs that King Abdullah knew and approved of

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Operation Yoav in advance. However, as Shlaim notes: ‘No evidence can be found in any Israeli sources to corroborate this charge of a deliberate war plot against Egypt.’\(^8\) Nor is there any such evidence in Glubb’s papers. Yet while Glubb and Abdullah were not involved in or aware of the instigation of the Jewish offensive the Arab Legion reaction remains a point of significant contention. As Fawaz Gerges has emphasised: ‘One of the intriguing questions is why Transjordan did not come to the aid of Egypt? Egyptians believed they were stabbed in the back.’\(^9\) This question is not just intriguing; it is absolutely crucial to understanding not only the role of Glubb and the Arab Legion, but also the process of resolving the conflict. Thus, the first half of this chapter is devoted primarily to answering this question.

With regard to Transjordan’s failure to come to Egypt’s aid, King Farouk’s initial complaint was that he had expected the Arab Legion and the Iraqi Army to relieve the pressure on the Egyptian front by engaging the Israelis elsewhere. In his memoirs Glubb complained that this option would not have been much help because ‘we did not know of the Egyptian defeat until after it had occurred [by 22 October]’\(^10\). Contrary to this assertion, however, it seems that Glubb was aware of the Egyptian Army’s impending doom. Already on 18 October Glubb reported:

> It seems possible that present operations in South Palestine may be a major offensive by Jews against Egyptian Army. If Jews can move large forces to area west of Beersheba they may try and cut off Egyptian Army from Egypt. In such an event Egyptians may meet with major defeat.\(^11\)

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\(^11\) Glubb to H.E. Pyman, 18 October 1948, GP2006, 86.
The following day Glubb informed Kirkbride that: 'Unless U.N.O. can stop the fighting quickly, it looks as if the Egyptian Army in Palestine may be destroyed.'

Glubb was not certain about the likely fate of the Egyptian Army and his insistence in his memoirs that, ‘the Egyptian Army never informed us of its operations’, appears true. Indeed, his information of the Egyptians' predicament came not from the Egyptians themselves, but from claims made by the Israelis. Glubb's understanding was that: '[The] Jews claim to be astride [the] main Jaffa Gaza road' and 'they claim [a] large Egyptian force [was] hemmed in with its back to the sea at Isdud and Mejdel'. Glubb concluded that: 'If these claims are true it looks as if [the] Egyptian army in Palestine may be destroyed unless UNO stops fighting.' So, why did Transjordan not come to the aid of its Arab ally when Glubb was aware of its likely defeat? Apart from the fact that Glubb was evidently uncertain of the situation, which was fluid and fast moving, two factors were at play. Firstly, Glubb’s actions relate to his three priorities outlined in the previous chapter: first, protect Transjordan; second, protect the Arab Legion; third, protect the gains in Arab Palestine. With regards his first priority Glubb was not unduly concerned as he: ‘Rather assumed that the Jews would not violate the basic frontiers of Trans-Jordan for fear of bringing in the Anglo-Trans-Jordan Treaty.’

Regarding his second and third priorities, Glubb was less confident. He had a number of concerns about the precarious position he was trying to hold. The Arab Legion was spread too thin and lacked

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12 Glubb to Kirkbride, 19 October 1948, GP2006, 91.
13 Glubb, Soldier, p. 199.
14 Glubb to H.E. Pyman, 19 October 1948, GP2006, 91 [emphasis added].
15 Glubb to O’Connor (Acting Chief of Staff, MELF), 27 October 1948, GP2006, 86.
ammunition and air capabilities. As Glubb explained to Kirkbride: ‘The Iraq Army is not in a condition to fight seriously, and thus the Arab Legion will be hopelessly outnumbered and short of ammunition.’ Launching a diversionary offensive to save the Egyptian Army was too great a risk for Glubb to consider.

The second reason why Glubb was loath to aid the Egyptians was because Operation Yoav had the potential to promise great rewards, which Glubb undoubtedly sought to capitalise upon. There was no love loss between the two Arab states and Egypt’s demise in the Negev provided an opportunity to force them into submission, thus removing the main obstacle that would enable a convenient exit strategy for Transjordan and the Arab Legion. When Glubb returned to Amman in September the principal obstacle to peace and British and Jordanian interests, as he saw it, came from inter-Arab rivalries. Indeed, Glubb blamed the political motives of Egypt and Syria for ending the first truce. The figurehead of the anti-Hashemite bloc was the Mufti and his ‘Arab Government of All Palestine’. The Gaza Government, as it was otherwise known, had been established on 22 September by the Egyptian dominated Arab League to challenge Transjordan’s authority to annex Arab Palestine. Abdullah refused to acknowledge the Gaza Government and sought to undermine it politically by arranging two congresses with Palestinian Arab notables in October and December. These congresses were a rather crude and transparent attempt to legitimise Greater Transjordan and were unlikely to sway Abdullah’s main rivals.

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16 ‘An Appreciation of the Position of the Arab Legion in Palestine’, 7 November 1948, ibid.
17 Glubb to Kirkbride, 19 October 1948, GP2006, 91.
18 Glubb to Chapman Walker; Glubb to Kirkbride, 25 September 1948, GP2006, 83.
within the Arab League. The military aspect of the conflict still had a significant part to play and, therefore, so did Glubb. He believed that if the Mufti and the Gaza Government could be knocked out Transjordan would be in a much stronger position to claim the Arab areas of Palestine. On 3 October Glubb received a written order from the Minister of Defence to disband and disarm all bodies of armed men not under orders of the Arab Legion. To that end, five days later, the Arab Legion produced a detailed plan, codenamed ‘Operation Beer’, to capture the Headquarters of approximately 200 armed men who were actively supporting the Mufti and the Gaza Government in Ramallah. This move, however, would merely amount to cutting the tail of the snake.

What was really needed was an opportunity to cut off the head. Glubb suspected the Mufti was being supported by Egypt and Syria with a view to instigating a revolt against the Arab Legion. Glubb warned that, ‘the Mufti with strong Egyptian support, is apparently about to start a rebellion against the Arab Legion in Palestine, like the Arab rebellion against the British in 1936.’ Glubb believed: ‘If the Egyptians withdrew from the south, the Gaza Government would probably collapse, and thus the problem would solve itself.’ Operation Yoav presented Glubb with an opportunity to eliminate this problem. Immediately Glubb expressed his hope that this ‘Jewish offensive ... may finally knock out the Gaza government and give the gyppies [Egyptians] a lesson’. This opportunity to knock out Egypt and the Gaza Government was exactly what Glubb had been

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20 Glubb to Chapman Walker; Glubb to Kirkbride, 25 September 1948, GP2006, 83.
21 Glubb, Soldier, p. 192.
waiting for. Thus, Glubb decided: ‘if the Jews are going to have a private war with the Egyptians and the Gaza Government, we do not want to get involved. The Gyppies and the Gaza Govt are almost as hostile to us as the Jews!’ If the Arab Legion’s achievements in Palestine were to be consolidated, and a resolution to the conflict found, it was clear that the submission of the other Arab forces would be necessary. The Arab League had to be cajoled into ceasing its desire to fight. It was the only way Transjordan could exit the war without being accused of treachery.

With the Egyptians on the back foot Glubb sought to capitalise by coercing the British into driving home a solution. When Glubb first heard of the Israeli offensive he predicted: ‘the Jews are going to try at U.N.O. to get both Galilee and Negeb’. Glubb initially lamented: ‘The Mufti and the Gyppies have given them just the chance they wanted.’ However, within days, Glubb was willing to acquiesce and promote the same outcome. With the Egyptian Army in Palestine looking like it would soon be destroyed Glubb was at pains to point out: ‘I think H.M.G. should understand clearly that unless a final settlement can be made quickly, it is within the power of the Jews to conquer the whole of Palestine.’ He thus suggested: ‘British and American delegations at U.N.O. should accept Jewish amendments to Bernadotte’s plan – namely Neqb [Negev] and Galilee to the Jews.’ Glubb believed the UNO was split between two factions: H.M.G, who wanted the Bernadotte plan, which it did; and ‘the Jews’ who wanted the 1947 UN partition resolution. Glubb proposed a compromise between the two

25 Glubb to Goldie, 16 October 1948, copy in possession of Avi Shlaim.
26 Ibid. [emphasis in original].
27 Glubb to Kirkbride, 19 October 1948, GP2006, 91.
28 Glubb to Kirkbride, 21 November 1948, GP2006, 100; Minute by Balfour, 9 November 1948, FO371/68822/E13851/G, TNA.
schemes, which he suggested that Kirkbride, if he liked it, could send off to the Foreign Office as his own idea, as it would carry more weight. And Kirkbride duly obliged. Glubb’s view on how the Arab areas of Palestine should be divided up fluctuated as the war progressed, reflecting a largely pragmatic attitude to the balance of forces of the moment. When he left for London in August Glubb believed the annexation of the Arab areas of Palestine would make Transjordan ‘a more valuable ally’. While in London, during August/September, Glubb proposed that Gaza and Beersheba should be annexed by Egypt, and the rest to Transjordan. But after returning to the Middle East he now believed that the Palestinian Arabs would prefer the Arab areas of Palestine not to be partitioned further and that they favoured complete takeover by Transjordan. And now that the Israelis were about to drive out the Egyptian Army Glubb was prepared to allow the Israelis to obtain the Negev as a means of enabling a settlement.

Allowing the Egyptians to be defeated was also not without its risks, but the risk-reward ratio was heavily in favour of the Arab Legion remaining passive. Although Glubb welcomed the Egyptians’ downfall he was wary that it might give the Israelis confidence to turn on the Arab Legion. His main concern was that: ‘We don’t want the Jews to capture Hebron too’. Moreover, here lay a further opportunity. Glubb reasoned: ‘If we step in and occupy Hebron, we shall have no further political complications in the Hebron area! We shall appear as saviours,

29 Glubb to Kirkbride, 21 November 1948, GP2006, 100.
30 Amman to FO, 910, 26 November 1948, FO816/134, TNA.
32 Amman to FO, 769, 30 September 1948; Glubb to Kirkbride, 29 September 1948, FO816/129, TNA.
to rescue Hebron from the Jews when the Egyptians have run away.’

Hebron had proved to be a source of tension between Egypt and Transjordan, as both sides wrestled for control. And herein lay an opportunity to kill two birds with one stone: to take the Egyptians out of the equation and to obtain legitimacy for Jordanian control of Arab Palestine by appearing as its saviour. However, this would leave the Arab Legion defensive line even further stretched and in preparation for a potential Israeli offensive Glubb was concerned that the Arab Legion would have to ‘hold each [road to Hebron from Beersheba, to the south, and Beit Jibrin, to the west] with one squadron, and at the same time cover the southern front of Jerusalem!!’ On 19 October Abdullah ‘ordered’ Glubb to send a regiment to Hebron. However, just as he had done in Jerusalem in May, Glubb initially ignored these orders. It is difficult to be certain exactly what Abdullah’s motivation was. Did he seek to protect Hebron to gain territorially or did he seek to be seen to be aiding his Egyptian allies? It was most likely the latter. What does seem certain, though, is that Glubb ignored this order to protect the Arab Legion and allow the Egyptians to be defeated. Throughout the first week Glubb was uncertain as to whether the Israelis were launching a major operation or whether they only had a limited objective. His first call was not to get involved, but simply to preserve the Arab Legion and allow the Israelis to defeat the Egyptians.

In a further example of Glubb’s limited autonomy he could only ignore Abdullah’s order for so long, and on 22 October he sent a small force of 350 men

33 Glubb to Goldie, 16 October 1948, Shlaim’s private collection.
34 Shlaim, Collusion, p. 300.
35 Glubb to Goldie, 16 October 1948, Shlaim’s private collection.
36 Glubb to Goldie, 21 October 1948, ibid.
to protect Bethlehem and Hebron. But this force was not sent to aid the Egyptian forces. Glubb, and Kirkbride, had two primary motives. Firstly, Glubb realised that if he did nothing:

    Politically we should have another Lydda and Ramle as the king ordered me to send a regiment 2 days ago! It would again be me who betrayed the Arab cause.

Secondly, he noted: ‘Economically it would mean another 50,000 to 100,000 refugees.’ Although Glubb did not meaningfully send the Arab Legion to Hebron to aid the Egyptians, nor did he send them simply to take advantage of their plight by gaining additional land to that already held by the Arab Legion. A token Arab Legion force was moved south primarily to strengthen the Anglo-Jordanian connection in Arab Palestine and halt any further Israeli expansion and resulting instability. Just like the original Greater Transjordan scheme it was designed to uphold the status quo and, further, it was designed to enhance the legitimacy of Greater Transjordan. Glubb expected that the Israelis would accept a ceasefire in two-three days. His immediate objective, therefore, was that: ‘It is really essential to hold Bethlehem and if possible Hebron for those 3 days.’ As it turned out the Arab Legion did not have to hold out that long, as a ceasefire was agreed that very same day.

After the 22 October ceasefire we have to look beyond Glubb’s opportunism as an explanation for the role of the Arab Legion and its failure to aid the besieged Egyptian forces. By the time the ceasefire was agreed the Israelis had captured two crucial strategic junctions on the road south: Beit Hanum, on the main Western road and Beersheba on the main eastern road. This

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37 Glubb, Soldier, p. 200.
38 Glubb to Goldie, 21 October 1948, Shlaim’s private collection.
39 Ibid.
left the Egyptian forces in three separate positions: Gaza, which remained connected to Egypt; and Falluja and the Bethlehem-Hebron sector, both of which were now cut off and isolated.\footnote{Glubb, \textit{Soldier}, pp. 197-202.} In the Arab Legion failing to aid these isolated pockets, Egyptian intransigence became equally important. Contrary to the suggestion that the Egyptians were stabbed in the back, inter-Arab rivalry was not one-sided. The Iraqi Parliamentary Commission of Inquiry challenged the Egyptian account that the Hashemites did little or nothing to help the besieged Egyptian forces – albeit this appraisal is contradicted by many Arab historians and by former Iraqi soldiers.\footnote{Gerges, ‘Egypt and the 1948 War’, p. 166.} However, there is new evidence from the Jordanian side that challenges the notion of a one-sided betrayal. Indeed, when two Egyptian companies were besieged in Beit Jebrin, in late October, Glubb reported that an ‘Arab Legion patrol contacted them and offered to escort them out but they refused [to] leave [the] fort.’\footnote{Glubb to O’Connor, 27 October 1948, GP2006, 84, 86.} The Arab Legion may not have launched a diversionary offensive elsewhere, but it did offer to help the besieged Egyptian forces escape. It would seem that the Egyptians, however, were loath to allow the Arab Legion to appear as their saviours. Perception and appearances within the Arab coalition were deemed all-important – and proved to be a significant factor sustaining the war.

One of the keys to resolving the conflict was to not be the first to negotiate. With that in mind the Egyptian stance took a curious turn. As the Egyptians came closer and closer to destruction during the first week of November they sent out peace feelers to Elias Sassoon, head of the Arab Section of the Jewish Agency’s Political Department, who was in Paris, where the UN
Security Council was in session. The Egyptians were prepared to abandon their Hashemite ally by agreeing to sit out of any renewed warfare between Israel and any other Arab state.\textsuperscript{43} Moreover, concurrent with these peace overtures, the Egyptians seemingly sought to sell out the Jordanians direct in their efforts to seek a reprieve from becoming the first to negotiate. On 3 November General Sabbar, of the Egyptian Army, gave Abdullah a personal message from the Egyptian Defence Minister, Haider Pasha, ‘begging him [Abdullah] to propose to King Farouq to make peace.’ This was an odd request, which Glubb interpreted as follows:

[The] Egyptians will of course double cross us. Having begged us to propose peace they will denounce us in the end as the people who let down the Arab League by first proposing peace!\textsuperscript{44}

Glubb was in no doubt that the Egyptians wanted Abdullah to make himself a scapegoat to enable them to formalise the peace agreement with the Israelis that they so desperately needed. It would have been easy to fall into this trap as by the beginning of November both Glubb and Kirkbride noticed a change in the opinion of the public and Arab Legion officers in favour of securing the best terms possible before the situation worsened.\textsuperscript{45} Glubb reported that: ‘Large numbers of Palestinians, in Amman and Palestine, openly asking for peace at any price.’ The first Glubb heard of this Egyptian request was when Abdullah read out his reply in front of the Jordanian Cabinet and he was relieved to hear that Abdullah’s reply was ‘elastically worded’.\textsuperscript{46} Nonetheless, this evident and

\textsuperscript{44} ‘2/11/48, 11-00 hrs’, diary like note by Glubb, GP2006, 86.
\textsuperscript{45} Amman to FO, 844, 2 November 1948, FO816/132, TNA.
\textsuperscript{46} ‘3/11/48’, diary like note by Glubb, GP2006, 86.
vociferous mistrust of Egyptian intentions was sure to influence Glubb's actions over the coming weeks.

This was followed by an even more curious incident, which while well known, requires a retelling based on new evidence, which compounds the issue of power politics between Egypt and Transjordan. In his memoirs Glubb recounted the Arab Legion’s attempt to assist the Egyptian forces besieged in Falluja. In mid-late November Geoffrey Lockett, an Arab Legion officer, volunteered to visit the besieged Egyptian troops to find out their real situation. Accordingly he walked across enemy lines, stayed for two days, and reported upon his return that the Egyptian troops were being mortared day and night. After the Arab League failed to produce a feasible plan to rescue the besieged troops, Glubb decided to act. He recounted:

I accordingly sent Geoffrey once more to walk through the Jewish lines to Falluja and offer them a plan. Our proposal was that, on a night agreed upon, the Egyptians should walk out of Falluja to the east. We should advance to meet them and engage from the rear any Jewish forces attempting to bar their way. The distance between us was about twelve miles. The Egyptian garrison was a weak brigade group, about 2,500 strong. They would have had to abandon or destroy their heavy stores, but I still believe that eighty per cent of the personnel would have reached our lines in safety. Geoffrey passed successfully through Israeli lines, but the Egyptian commander rejected the proposal. This was the end of our attempts to relieve Falluja.47

Within the existing historiography this is the accepted account of events. And an Arab Legion evacuation plan, dated 17 November, corroborates this narrative.48 Surprisingly, some key texts have omitted to mention this event.49 Perhaps this

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49 Shlaim, Collusion; Morris, Road to Jerusalem.
reflects Glubb’s straightforward, uncontested narrative, the gist of which was briefly corroborated in Kirkbride’s memoirs also.\textsuperscript{50} However, newly available sources provide fresh details about this sequence of events in late November, which necessitates a retelling. Frustratingly, the new sources raise questions for which definitive answers are elusive, but they strongly intimate at a very different story to the one told by Glubb. At the very least it reveals subtle and significant nuances regarding the final stage of the 1948 War and the interplay between two apparent allies: Egypt and Transjordan.

That Lockett made two visits on foot to the besieged troops in Falluja is confirmed by two contemporary documents. Lockett’s first trip is corroborated almost word for word.\textsuperscript{51} The document recording the second expedition, though, poses the first serious challenge as, curiously, it contains no mention of Lockett proposing an evacuation plan, let alone its refusal by the Egyptians. The entire signal simply records:

[An] Arab Legion NCO returned yesterday having walked through Jewish lines to Falluja and back. [A] Convoy of fifty camels reached Falluja with rations and ammunition but Jews now tightened siege. Rank and file mostly Sudanese and morale fairly good. Garrison seem to have rations for about a fortnight at least but they refuse to tell us. Jews should have withdrawn to truce line on November Nineteenth and abandoned siege but had not done so yesterday. Jews shell and mortar Egyptians constantly but latter make little reply to save ammunition.\textsuperscript{52}

If Glubb did send Lockett to offer the besieged Egyptian troops a way out of Falluja it is hard to fathom why he made no mention of the offer or the refusal in

\textsuperscript{51} Glubb to COS, MELF, 24 November 1948, GP2006, 86.
\textsuperscript{52} Glubb to COS, MELF, 27 November 1948, ibid.
this signal to the MELF Chief of Staff, as he had done exactly a month before in relation to Beit Jibrin.

So, did Glubb actually provide the besieged Egyptian forces in Falluja with a withdrawal plan, which they refused? It is difficult to be certain, but a huge question mark has been raised over the validity of this claim. On the whole, Glubb’s memoirs are an accurate portrayal of events, but on this occasion it is difficult to see past the fact that Glubb makes no mention of this withdrawal plan in the contemporary documents. Moreover, we have already established that a month earlier, an Arab Legion officer – most likely Lockett because he was the commanding officer in the area at the time – had offered an escape route for Egyptian forces besieged in Beit Jibrin, east of Falluja, on the road to Hebron, which was refused. Curiously, this refused withdrawal plan did not make it into the memoirs. Glubb did reproduce a detailed account, written by an unnamed Arab Legion officer, of a reconnaissance mission in Beit Jibrin led by Lockett on 28 October, but there is no mention of the withdrawal plan offered and refused sometime before 27 October, when it was recorded in a signal to the MELF Chief of Staff. It seems pertinent to point out that the dates of these signals are not clearly marked. They merely record the date and the time that the signal was sent, but not the month. It is possible – perhaps even likely – that Glubb’s apparent error regarding the seemingly non-issued Falluja withdrawal plan can be attributed to Glubb accidentally merging the two separate, but similar, incidents into one single memory based on two documents from 27th of two different months. Yet even if we accept this, it still does not solve the curious puzzle of exactly what did transpire in Falluja in late November.
If we go back to the beginning, the whole incident was initiated by the most curious feature of all. Having suspiciously asked the Arab Legion to get Abdullah to propose peace on 3 November, on 15 the Arab Legion received another odd request from General Sabbar. Lash reported:

Sabour Bey [the Egyptian General] had invited Lockett to go and command the B[riga]de G[rou]p at Faluja! Lash has told Lockett to hold his horses on this one for the moment, while it was being referred to you.53

This raises the ultimate curiosity: why, if Lockett had offered the Egyptians a withdrawal plan, did they refuse it, if they had originally requested Lockett to come and command the Brigade? According to an un-cited source quoted by Kimche and Kimche, the Egyptian reply given by General Faud Sadeq, the Commander-in-Chief at Gaza, to Brigadier Taha Bey, the Sudanese commander of the besieged Egyptian force, when confronted with the withdrawal plan, was that:

It is impossible to rely on a plan whose initiator is Glubb Pasha, and it is impossible to keep the details of the plan from the Jews if it originated in Amman. The evacuation of the troops by foot through areas held by Jews means a massacre for these troops. Reject the plan and drive out the mercenary Lockett. Defend your posts to the last bullet and to the last soldier as befitting Egyptian soldiers.54

If we accept the increasingly unreliable claim that a withdrawal plan was offered and refused, as recorded in a document cited by Kimche and Kimche, the Egyptians are seemingly revealed as double crossers who first asked Lockett to command them, before turning him away when he tried. If Lockett’s withdrawal plan was to be dismissed so unceremoniously, presumably there was no genuine will to have Lockett command the besieged force. What is more likely is that

53 Coaker to Glubb, 15 November 1948, GP2006, 97.
54 Kimche, Both Sides of the Hill, pp. 252-5.
Glubb suspected the Egyptians were intending to double cross the Arab Legion via their offer for Lockett to command the Brigade, just as Glubb suspected when General Sabbar requested Abdullah suggest peace. For that reason, this withdrawal plan was probably never put on the table – at least not seriously. Whether or not the Egyptians were actually seeking to double-cross their Jordanian allies, that is what Glubb believed and is surely why Glubb decided to keep out of the fighting between Israel and Egypt; his utter distrust of the Egyptians and his recognition that Egypt needed to be knocked out of the war by Israel in order to pave the way for peace.

The fate of the Egyptian forces besieged in Falluja was a concern to Glubb. He explained unambiguously that: ‘The matter affects us rather intimately owing to the great quantities of British equipment the Jews are likely to get, if the Fallujah garrison surrenders. This equipment will be used against us.’\(^{55}\) This is where the issue of a withdrawal plan would make sense from Glubb’s perspective. Contrary to the claim in Glubb’s memoirs that the besieged Egyptian force was a ‘weak brigade group’, Glubb was of the opinion that this force was so well armed that it ‘should be able to march up and down Palestine with impunity, but the Egyptians cannot make up their minds to come out.’\(^{56}\) Glubb put its predicament down to poor leadership and perhaps sought to call the Egyptians’ bluff by sending Lockett to ensure the Egyptians’ defeat by making sure they destroyed their weapons and retreated. Whether or not Glubb offered the Falluja brigade a serious escape route has been brought into question. But what is certain is that a welter of intrigue and suspicion between two apparent

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\(^{55}\) Glubb to O’Connor, 18 November 1948, GP2006, 85.

\(^{56}\) Ibid.
allies surrounded this whole episode and that Glubb’s primary objective was to ensure the Egyptian Army’s presence in Palestine came to an end, in order to allow peace negotiations to begin.

What Glubb and the Arab Legion were doing, or not doing, on the military side also has to be considered within the context of the political situation. While Glubb was busy attempting to manufacture a situation conducive to peace, Abdullah was re-establishing his connection with Zionist politicians and Transjordan-Israel negotiations over a Jerusalem ceasefire were progressing. Having reluctantly distanced himself from the Greater Transjordan scheme during the height of the conflict Abdullah’s previous impatience resurfaced. He was eager to come to an agreement with Israel and on 9 November King Abdullah sent a message to the Israeli delegation in Paris informing them of his desire to reignite cooperation. Meanwhile, Glubb was aware that the Israelis were keen on negotiating with Abdullah and that:

[T]he Jews three days ago suggested a real cease fire with the Arab Legion in Jerusalem. As a result the last 48 hours in Jerusalem have been the quietest for several weeks!\(^{58}\)

On the same day Glubb reported Lockett’s first trip to Falluja, he also reported that a meeting was being arranged in the next few days between the Arab Legion Commander in Jerusalem and the Israeli Commander, Moshe Dayan, under UN auspices.\(^{59}\) The meeting eventually took place on 29 November and the following day a ‘sincere and absolute’ ceasefire was agreed.\(^{60}\) Given that Jerusalem had always been the key snag in Glubb’s view, it is understandable that he would

\(^{57}\) Shlaim, *Collusion*, p. 348.
\(^{58}\) Glubb to O’Connor, 18 November 1948, GP2006, 85 [emphasis in original].
\(^{59}\) Glubb to COS, 24 November 1948, GP2006, 86, 100.
\(^{60}\) Shlaim, *Collusion*, p. 354-5.
have been reluctant to get involved in the war between Israel and Egypt at such a critical moment.

Abdullah’s renewed contact with the Israelis failed to transform into formal peace negotiations, though, and this was partly because of a split in the Anglo-Jordanian camp on how to proceed. Glubb recorded that: ‘For six weeks past [the] Jews have been angling for negotiations with King Abdulla.’

Abdullah wanted to negotiate but was ‘deterred’ by the Prime Minister and HMG. The British were still absolutely committed to seeing Greater Transjordan emerge, but had to tread a fine line between active support, on the one hand, and undermining its legitimacy, on the other. The British also adhered to the mantra that it was imperative not to be the first to negotiate. As its principal ally in the region, the British were determined that King Abdullah should not fall victim to that fate. The British did not have an alternative strategy to Abdullah’s desire to negotiate. Thus, British policy was, in effect, to wait and see how things developed. In the meantime both the British and their proxy, Transjordan, just had to hold on and do nothing obtrusive, which included not openly negotiating with Israel. By the beginning of December the Foreign Office questioned whether it should stop restraining Transjordan from negotiating directly with the Israelis and encourage them instead to try ‘to obtain the best settlement they can by any means they like’, regardless of the policy of the Arab League.

However, the Foreign Office felt: ‘We cannot advise him [Abdullah] until we have reached

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61 Glubb to COS, 24 November 1948, GP2006, 86, 100.
62 Glubb to O’Connor, 18 November 1948, GP2006, 85.
63 FO to UK Delegation, UN General Assembly, 767, 3 December 1948, FO371/68822/E15531/G, TNA.
agreement with the Americans’. A significant factor contributing to Britain’s wait and see policy was a reluctance to do anything that may upset its transatlantic partner. The British position continued to be affected by the wider international concerns, including the Arab League, the UN and the United States, that had inhibited its freedom of action at the height of the conflict. This led Britain to advise the Jordanian Government not to negotiate a resolution with Israel openly. It was deemed imperative that Transjordan not lay itself, and by implication Britain, to charges of treachery. Not only would this damage British prestige, but it would also harm the chances of ratifying Greater Transjordan. This put Glubb in an awkward position. He indeed lamented that: ‘H.M.G. have asked the Trans-Jordan Government through diplomatic channels, not to negotiate with the Jews and not to withdraw the Arab Legion from Palestine.’

Faced with this dichotomy it is not surprising that Glubb was keen to allow the Egyptians to be defeated to enable the start of peace negotiations that would put an end to the threat facing the Arab Legion.

As December progressed the men on the spot, Glubb and Kirkbride, became increasingly anxious that Abdullah must be allowed to negotiate regardless of the political ramifications. Kirkbride believed it was time to ‘cease to check any tendency of Transjordan to come to terms with the Jews if they can’. Previously Kirkbride had also advised against Abdullah negotiating with the Jews as he was ‘not really in a strong enough position to ride out the storm

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64 Minute by Hector McNeil, 15 December 1948, F0371/68862/E16002, TNA.
65 Glubb to unknown [second page is missing], ALC/53(a), 9 November 1948, GP2006, 86.
66 Amman to FO, 931, 6 December 1948, F0371/68822/E15533/G, TNA.
which such action would cause in the Arab world’. 67 However, he had since changed his mind owing to the increasing vulnerability of the Arab Legion. Kirkbride requested that Transjordan required positive advice from Britain. 68 Glubb, similarly, considered it, ‘very important to get a decision from H.M.G.’, in order to prevent the Jordanians from postponing negotiations indefinitely. Glubb was frustrated that: ‘at present we keep having meetings and saying nothing and the Jews suspect we are playing with them’. Glubb lamented:

I have been trying to get them to make peace since last June and I usually only make them angry and suspicious. But sometimes I feel we shall drift on like this for ever, until the Jews get all Palestine – but still Taufiq Pasha will not negotiate! 69

Like HMG Taufiq Abul Huda was also conditioned to wait and see. As Robert Satloff has observed, Abul Huda was of the mindset that: ‘To procrastinate was to gain time, and time was the essence of survival’. 70 This trait was deeply evident in his approach to extricating Transjordan from the 1948 War. According to Glubb, the Prime Minister ‘said that it would be better for the Arab Legion to be destroyed in Palestine, rather than that we should open negotiations with the Jews. He was afraid of the Egyptian Papers and also he said of the verdict of history!’ After telling Kirkbride this:

he [Kirkbride] said he thought it was time to take a stand with the T.J. Govt to make peace. If necessary, it might be the time “to chop Taufiq”, he [Kirkbride] said. The difficulty was to find another P.M. to undertake the task of opening negotiations. 71

In order to initiate consolidation of the Greater Transjordan scheme – or, at least, to secure extrication from the conflict – both Glubb and Kirkbride deemed a

67 Amman to FO, 693, 31 August 1948, FO 71/68822/E11532/G, TNA.
68 Amman to FO, 952, 14 December 1948, FO371/68862/E15867/G, TNA.
69 Glubb to Kirkbride, 14 December 1948, GP2006, 85.
70 Satloff, Jordan in Transition, p. 23.
change of government necessary. Glubb reported that on 12 December the
Israelis threatened to cease their meetings in Jerusalem if the Jordanian
Government did not agree to formal peace negotiations. However the Jordanian
Government, as Glubb explained: ‘hesitate [to] open direct negotiations owing to
hostility [of] other Arab countries. T.J. Govt also hope for advice from HMG but so
far British Govt has preserved silence.’ The Jordanian Government was swayed
by Egyptian propaganda and the inter-Arab political ramifications of negotiating
with the Israelis. Glubb was exasperated by the influence of the other hostile
Arab states – most notably Egypt. Despite Glubb explaining ‘that steel and lead
were more important than talk’, the Minister of Defence, was adamant that ‘the
political situation was more important than military matters’. Fawzi Pasha told
Glubb:

that he believed H.M.G. did not want us to negotiate with the Jews,
and thus we could not do so unless the British and Iraq govts both
agreed. The Iraq govt, he said, have asked for time in order to
“break it gently” to the public in Iraq.

While the British and Jordanian Governments preferred to wait and see how
things developed, Glubb wanted to be pro-active. Glubb was adamant that, in
terms of obtaining a satisfactory resolution to the conflict: ‘The longer we wait,
the worse our situation becomes and the worse terms we shall have to accept in
the end.’ And contrary to the notion espoused by Shlaim that Abul Huda was
believed to have ‘changed his tune’ in favour of taking an independent line, the
Prime Minister’s stance, despite the deteriorating situation, became ever more

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72 Glubb to COS, MELF, 14 December 1948, GP2006, 85.
73 Glubb to Kirkbride, 14 December 1948, ibid. [emphasis in original].
74 Glubb to H.E. Pyman, 30 December 1948, ibid.
intractable.\textsuperscript{75} By the turn of the year Glubb reported: ‘The King is anxious to negotiate, but the present Prime Minister has made a vow that he will never negotiate with the Jews.’\textsuperscript{76} In opposition to the policy emanating from London, both Glubb and Kirkbride were in favour of Abdullah’s desire to initiate peace negotiations with the Israelis and were anxious for negotiations to begin as soon as possible. But all Glubb and the Arab Legion could do was hope that the Israelis could knock out the Egyptians. Thus, when the Israelis asked what the Arab Legion reaction would be to a renewed offensive against the Egyptians, Abdullah al-Tall replied: ‘“Hit the Egyptians as much as you can. Our attitude will be completely neutral”’.\textsuperscript{77} Meanwhile Glubb could only wait, either for the Egyptians to be defeated, thus enabling the start of negotiations, or for Abdullah to subvert the will of HMG or force a change of government to initiate peace negotiations with Israel.

The problem with forcing a change of government, as Glubb observed, was that it risked making the outgoing government heroes and leave Abdullah ‘with the full responsibility of being the first to negotiate’. Thus, Glubb explained: ‘The King cannot make up his mind to do this, nor is it easy to find a new Prime Minister willing to come in on such terms.’ This left the King paralysed by the dilemma, which meant: ‘As a result of the above, we continue to drift without any policy.’ At the turn of the year, Glubb felt Transjordan and the Arab Legion were in limbo:

Unless the King can harden his heart to get rid of this Prime Minister, we seem likely to drift on – unable to make war and

\textsuperscript{75} Shlaim, \textit{Collusion}, p. 366.
\textsuperscript{76} Glubb to H.E. Pyman, 30 December 1948, GP2006, 85.
unwilling to make peace – until the Jews get impatient and the war begins again.78

Glubb was powerless to influence Abdullah in the face of opposition from HMG and the Jordanian Government. By the end of 1948 Abdullah had two options open to him. He could either avert military defeat by biting the bullet and negotiating openly with the Israelis despite the political ramifications or he could wait and hope that one of his Arab rivals would negotiate first. Without the support of either HMG or even his own government, Abdullah was not strong enough to take that leap. Glubb understood this and not aiding the Egyptian forces besieged in Falluja was a means to that end.

As it turned out the uncoordinated and ad hoc approach exhibited by Glubb, on the one hand, and the British and Jordanian governments, on the other, enabled Arab-Israeli armistice negotiations to begin in a manner that suited the interests of Greater Transjordan. Their wait and see policy was neatly complemented by Glubb’s efforts to position the Egyptians into submission. On 22 December, just over a week after Abdullah al-Tall informed Sassoon that the Arab Legion welcomed the destruction of the Egyptian Army, the Israelis launched Operation Horev as a final push to destroy Egyptian resistance in the Negev. True to Abdullah al-Tall’s word the Arab Legion – just like all the other Arab armies – gave the Egyptians no assistance. Despite the Israelis backing down in response to an ultimatum issued by the British under the terms of the 1936 Anglo-Egyptian Treaty, on 4 January 1949 Egypt announced its intention to begin formal armistice negotiations. The Egyptians had avoided all-out defeat in

78 Glubb to H.E. Pyman, 30 December 1948, GP2006, 85.
Falluja and Gaza, but the Israeli onslaught had finally taken its toll. Bilateral negotiations between the two, under UN auspices, began on 13 January on the neutral island of Rhodes and a month later, on 24 February, they signed a formal armistice agreement in which Israel accepted an Egyptian military presence in the Gaza strip, while Israel consolidated its control of the northern Negev. Egypt became the first Arab state to negotiate an armistice with Israel, thus allowing the Jordanians to begin formal and public armistice negotiations free of the charge of treachery. The process of bringing the conflict to the point of resolution was, as much as anything, an inter-Arab power play. The aim was not to be the first to negotiate, and to that end Transjordan had been successful.

This did not mark the end of the conflict’s inter-Arab struggle. On the day before armistice talks between Israel and Transjordan opened in Rhodes, Glubb reported that the Egyptian Government was being ‘obstinate as a face-saver’ in its promise to withdraw from Hebron and Bethlehem. Owing to a story circulated in Egypt that the Arab Legion was going to push them out, Glubb reported:

As a result the Gyppy Govt. got on it’s [sic] dignity and said it would never leave, if we tried to push it out but would leave before the end of April if we were polite! As a result, the Prime Minister wants everyone to be extremely polite and cordial to the Egyptians and talk a lot about our brave allies, in the hope that the brutes will go away quickly!

This prompted Glubb to instruct Goldie, rather sarcastically, ‘to inform everybody of the form – “cordial friendship for our gallant allies”’. If Transjordan were to negotiate the best terms possible, unhindered by its Arab

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82 Glubb to Goldie, 3 March 1949, GP2006, 3 [emphasis in original].
allies, it would have to pander to Egyptian pride. However, during the final month of the conflict inter-Arab rivalries took a backseat as Israeli belligerence became the dominant concern for Transjordan during the armistice negotiations.

The Israel-Transjordan negotiations lasted exactly one month, beginning on 4 March and concluding on 3 April. As the war entered the final diplomatic phase Glubb’s influence and involvement inevitably declined, but contrary to Uri Bar-Joseph’s suggestion that he became largely non-existent Glubb remained a central figure. Yes, Glubb had little involvement in the post-armistice pursuit of a formal peace settlement, but he was integral to the armistice negotiations. Glubb was not part of the Jordanian delegation sent to Rhodes, but this was hardly surprising. Glubb had proved in April 1948 to be careful not to associate himself directly with the Zionists – even in secret, let alone in public. Moreover, it was essentially a puppet delegation that was sent to Rhodes. It is well known that the real negotiations secretly took place behind closed doors in King Abdullah’s winter palace in Shuneh. However, the decisive negotiations in Shuneh were not set in motion until the middle of the month. At the outset the Jordanians sought to conduct the negotiations not elsewhere, but in Rhodes, albeit via Amman. And the middleman in this setup was Glubb. Although telegrams to the delegation were signed as being sent from the Minister of Defence, this was a mere bureaucratic technicality. The telegrams being sent to the delegation in Rhodes were drafted in Glubb’s handwriting. While the official negotiations in Rhodes may have been a sideshow to the real bargaining behind the scenes in Shuneh, the Rhodes negotiations were nonetheless important. The Israelis and the Jordanians did not from the outset concert to conduct the negotiations at Rhodes

83 Taufiq Pasha to TJD Rhodes, 9 March 1949, GP1986, 10/2.
as a front for real negotiations elsewhere. The Israelis clearly approached the Rhodes negotiations at face value and appointed an appropriately senior delegation, including Moshe Dayan who had overseen the November 1948 ceasefire agreement in Jerusalem. It was Transjordan that sent a puppet delegation, which initially angered the Israelis who believed that the Jordanian delegation was not empowered to sign an armistice. They did have this power, but it was made clear to them that: 'Actually you are empowered to sign but you must submit the text to this Government before doing so.'

Managing the negotiations in Rhodes from Amman, however, proved not to be as practicable as the Jordanians presumably hoped. The real power brokers in Amman soon became concerned that they might be bypassed by events in Rhodes. Thus, a week into the negotiations – after some worrying silences – Glubb informed the delegation that: 'From now onwards you will report progress every day by signal. Even if there is no meeting you will report the fact.'

There was concern that the delegation in Rhodes may have been given too much responsibility. Indeed, after the opening exchanges Glubb had to reprimand the delegation and inform them that:

[The Jordanian] Government was greatly disturbed at reports that negotiating nearly broke down because officers refused to shake hands. Transjordan is the only country which won military victories over [the] Jews. Now you must win diplomatic victories. Your duty is much more important than your personal feelings.

The initial Jordanian approach to the negotiations was to send a puppet delegation to Rhodes, which would be directed via strings stretching back to

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84 Taufiq Pasha to TJD Rhodes, 9 March 1949, ibid.
85 Minister of Defence [Glubb’s handwriting] to TJD Rhodes, 10 March 1949, ibid.
86 Qiada [Glubb’s handwriting] to TJD Rhodes, 8 March 1949, ibid.
Amman, but this proved to be completely impractical and the Jordanians shifted their approach to higher-level contacts behind the scenes.

The secret Shuneh talks only began, however, after two principal obstacles left the Rhodes negotiations in deadlock. Ultimately the lack of progress during the opening two weeks of the negotiations had almost nothing to do with the inferiority of the Jordanian delegation, or the system of direction from Amman, and everything to do with Israeli belligerence. Glubb, Kirkbride and Abdullah had been so keen on beginning negotiations since the autumn of 1948 because of the vulnerability of the Arab Legion’s position. Transjordan thus entered the negotiations from a position of relative weakness, and during the negotiations the Israelis immediately exploited this. The day after the armistice negotiations began the Israelis launched Operation Uvda (fait accompli), a military offensive against the Arab Legion in the south eastern Negev. They delayed signing a general ceasefire agreement with Transjordan and instead drove south toward Eilat, on the Red Sea, in two columns: from Beersheba on the western approach and down the Wadi Araba on the eastern border with Transjordan [Map 6].

In the original 1947 UN partition resolution the Negev had been awarded to the proposed Jewish state and the Israelis were determined that it would be included, in its entirety, in the Israeli state as part of the final settlement. Although they had reached agreement regarding the Negev in the armistice with Egypt, the Arab Legion occupied a wedge of land at the south-eastern tip of the Negev. In order to reverse the situation on the ground the Israelis opted to use their military superiority to conquer this area by force. On 7

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March the Jordanian Government made a formal complaint to the armistice commission, but by 10 March the Israeli’s fait accompli was complete. The Negev had been successfully captured and the following day the ceasefire with Transjordan was finally signed.\textsuperscript{88} The southern Negev was important to Transjordan because it gave them a land bridge to Egypt and, therefore, potentially vital access to the Mediterranean. Thus, despite the ceasefire Glubb intended to make life difficult for the Israeli forces. The following day Glubb instructed Southcol, the Arab Legion force commanded by Nigel Bromage to defend the Negev, that: ‘You will not repeat not begin guerrilla warfare until further orders.’\textsuperscript{89} Before subsequently instructing:

> As soon as possible you will organise guerrilla ops to keep all Jewish L[ines] of C[ommunication] cut permanently. This will mean western track as well as main road. Suggest you close main road again immediately as soon as Jewish force has passed. Suggest you employ dismounted forces along West track. They can block track wherever possible and resist passage of all convoys.\textsuperscript{90}

This instruction followed the advice of Lockett who, after reporting that he had ‘watched’ an Israeli brigade drive down to Eilat on the night of the 10\textsuperscript{th}, suggested that they ‘cut the Wadi Araba R[oad] at a convenient place’, lay mines, and conduct ambushes. Lockett believed they could cut off the Israeli brigade in Eilat or, at the very least, ‘make its maintenance precarious’.\textsuperscript{91} Glubb was adamant that: ‘No Jewish veh[icle] must get through without a battle’.\textsuperscript{92} Yet this bravado proved futile. Operation Uvda was a dramatic demonstration of Israel’s military superiority, which proved irreversible. Moreover, during the first two

\textsuperscript{88} Rogan, ‘Jordan and the 1948 War’, p. 119; Shlaim, \textit{Iron Wall}, p. 44.
\textsuperscript{89} Qiyada [Glubb] to Southcol, 12 March 1949, GP2006, 3.
\textsuperscript{90} Qiyada [Glubb] to Southcol, undated, ibid.
\textsuperscript{91} Lockett to Glubb, 10 March 1949, ibid.
\textsuperscript{92} Qiyada [Glubb] to Southcol, undated, ibid.
weeks of the armistice negotiations it effectively precluded the possibility of fruitful discussion regardless of the seniority or setup of the Jordanian delegation.

During the second half of the month-long armistice negotiations the Israelis’ fait accompli in the Negev, combined with the second obstacle – the Iraqi front – would prove decisive toward the outcome of negotiations. Indeed, Glubb exclaimed: ‘These two factors have revolutionised the situation.’93 No sooner had the ceasefire been agreed in the Negev than the armistice talks came to a ‘standstill’ over the Iraqi front. The Iraqis ‘refused to negotiate’ with Israel, but the Arab Legion planned to take over their front by 18 March.94 However, the Jordanians were wary of doing so ‘unless the Israeli Delegation first sign a temporary cease fire’.95 The Israelis, however, ‘categorically refused’. This created a ‘deadlock’.96 Israeli aggression in the Negev provided an ominous precedent if a ceasefire was not agreed before the Arab Legion took over the Iraqi front. Glubb genuinely believed that the Israelis were planning an attack in the triangle at the northern tip of the Iraqi front, between Nablus, Tulkarm and Jenin. A planned Israeli offensive against the Iraqis in October was deemed ‘absolutely confirmed’ by the Arab Legion and was apparently only delayed by a decision to deal with the Egyptians first. This apparent fact combined with a series of other points of circumstantial evidence led the Arab Legion to conclude: ‘It seems probable that the Jews will now postpone their attack until the Arab

93 Glubb to Pirie-Gordon, 17 March 1949, ibid.
95 Glubb to Col. Ahmed Sudqi al Jundi, ALC/31(B)1, 15 March 1949, ibid.
Legion takes over from the Iraqis’. Transjordan had lost the south-eastern Negev as a result of an Israeli military offensive and it feared suffering the same fate in the Iraqi sector of central Arab Palestine.

Transjordan was thus placed very much on the back-foot in the armistice negotiations and left short on options. Glubb remained confident that: ‘On the main front – from the present southern flank of the Iraq army through Jerusalem and round to [the] south of Hebron – such an armistice should be attainable.’ However, he was conscious that the south eastern Negev, which the Israelis had conquered during the negotiations could cause a problem, as he expected the Israelis to demand that Transjordan agree that this be included in the new Jewish state. The predicament this created, as Glubb explained, was that:

Trans-Jordan can scarcely do this, when her troops have just been driven out by an outstandingly flagrant piece of treachery during the negotiations. At the same time, Trans-Jordan is not in a position to try and reconquer it. Some formula must be found to cover this. Using force to regain the lost land was not an option. Transjordan either had to negotiate a solution with the Israelis or rely on the UNO to arbitrate. However, Israel’s use of force meant it was unlikely to relent willingly. Indeed on 15 March Transjordan was compelled to make a further protest to Bunche, this time relating to the Israeli occupation of Ain Jeddi on the west shore of the Dead Sea, which was behind the Arab defensive line. Transjordan was reliant on the

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99 Glubb to Col. Ahmed Sudqi al Jundi, ALC/31(B), 15 March 1949, ibid.
fledgling United Nations to prove its worth. However, Glubb had almost zero faith in this organisation. He described it as:

in practice an arrangement for helping the strong to oppress the weak. UNO is too weak to tackle anyone influential but forms a pretext by which powers can evade their obligations. Before UNO, Britain would have been obliged to help us. The existence of UNO provides her with an excuse for doing nothing. Bunche, when asked what T.J. should do in face of the Jewish offensive in the W[adi] Araba, replied “get a friendly majority in the [UN] Sec.[urity] Council.” But meanwhile T.J. is not even a member of U.N.O., because she is an ally of Britain. Britain pleads that U.N.O. is solving the problem and she cannot interfere – but UNO is the most shameless truce server of all.100

Transjordan was therefore left alone to reach an agreement with Israel.

Israel's intransigence over the Negev and the Iraqi front set the tone for the secret talks that followed in Shuneh. With the Rhodes negotiations in deadlock, Moshe Dayan was recalled from Rhodes in order to initiate meaningful discussions away from the official armistice negotiations.101 On 22 March the two sides met at Shuneh where Israel made its demands and a written agreement was drafted, subject to King Abdullah’s approval – though the Israelis had made it clear that they were not prepared to negotiate further. It was, in effect, an ultimatum.102 The next day Glubb was ‘called to an urgent consultation in Shuna’. When he arrived at this consultation he already understood that Transjordan could not fight. It either required help from Britain and the US or else they would be forced to ‘accept whatever [the] Jews give us’.103 Presumably he would have proffered this advice during the consultation prior to Abdullah’s meeting with the Israelis later that evening. That night the Israeli delegation

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100 ‘18/3/49’, diary like note by Glubb, ibid. [emphasis in original].
102 Shlaim, Collusion, pp. 411-2; Bar-Joseph, Best of Enemies, pp. 221-2.
103 Glubb to Pirie-Gordon, 23 March 1949, FO816/144, TNA.
returned to Shuneh where King Abdullah was waiting for them and a secret agreement, with corresponding maps, was signed.\textsuperscript{104} Glubb declined to take part in this meeting, apparently not wanting to look into the eyes of the Jews.\textsuperscript{105} That may well have been true, but knowing how politically conscious Glubb was, it is highly plausible that he deduced that his presence at these negotiations, where it was clear that the Israelis held all the aces, could only have negative consequences for his personal position as well as that of Britain generally. Glubb sent Charles Coaker in his stead, just as he had during the April 1948 Goldie mission. Glubb was intimately aware that: ‘If a single village is lost, bitter criticism is directed against the Arab Legion.’\textsuperscript{106} He could not avoid this criticism if a village was lost in the military theatre, but he could limit his association to losses made in the political realm. It is not surprising that Glubb wanted to keep his distance from involvement in negotiations that he knew Transjordan would have to acquiesce to Israeli demands. In July 1948 it had relinquished the towns of Lydda and Ramle. Now it had ceded territory in the Negev and the Little Triangle – a strip of land along the top of what had been the Iraqi front line [Map 7]. It was not the end that Abdullah wanted, but as Glubb explained: ‘To secure [the] armistice we were obliged [to] surrender [the] following villages now held by Iraqis … In return we got small village west of Hebron’.\textsuperscript{107}

This land was conceded, however, in conjunction with the genuine belief that it could be reclaimed. In the first instance Abdullah – fruitlessly – contacted

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{105} Shlaim, \textit{Collusion}, p. 414.
  \item \textsuperscript{106} Glubb to Pirie-Gordon, 17 March 1949, GP2006, 3.
  \item \textsuperscript{107} Glubb to H.E. Pyman, 5 April 1949, GP2006, 22.
\end{itemize}
President Truman in the hope that he could use his influence to counsel moderation and overturn Israel’s demand for territory in the Little Triangle.\textsuperscript{108}

Secondly, the armistice was intentionally worded with later reversing it in mind.

On 26 March the Rhodes delegation queried with Amman as to whether: ‘[The] T[rans]J[ordan] international frontier between [the] south Dead Sea and Gulf of Aqaba considered as armistice lines. Do you agree?’\textsuperscript{109} Glubb replied with an emphatic instruction:

\begin{quote}
When you come to draw [the] line on [the] map it may coincide with [the] Transjordan frontier in time of mandate. We do not want to refer to it as the international boundary because we retain our rights to claim it in the final settlement because it was seized by a breach of the truce. Is this understood?\textsuperscript{110}
\end{quote}

The Jordanians may have ceded territory to Israel because of its position of weakness, but it remained intent on reclaiming this land in the final peace settlement. For that reason, article II of the armistice stated:

\begin{quote}
[N]o provision of this Agreement shall in any way prejudice the rights, claims and positions of either Party hereto in the ultimate peaceful settlement of the Palestine question, the provisions of this Agreement being dictated exclusively by military considerations.\textsuperscript{111}
\end{quote}

As it turned out a conclusive peace settlement proved elusive, but when the armistice was signed, a formal peace settlement was genuinely believed to be the next – attainable – step.

The final armistice aptly reflected the nature of events since September. Abdullah and Glubb had got the formal end to the conflict they had been

\textsuperscript{108} Abdullah to Truman, 25 March 1949, FO816/146, TNA.
\textsuperscript{109} T.J.D. Rhodes to Minister of Defence, 26 March 1949, GP1986, 10/2.
\textsuperscript{110} Trans-Jordan Delegation Rhodes to Minister of Defence Amman, 26 March 1949; Minister of Defence [Glubb’s handwriting] to Transjordan Delegation Rhodes, 26 March 1949, ibid.
desperate to obtain and Greater Transjordan had effectively come into existence – albeit formal annexation did not occur until April 1950. Moreover, this had been achieved without Transjordan having to negotiate first. Yet the armistice also reflected Transjordan’s vulnerability. After Glubb’s return to Amman in mid-September attentions were geared toward seeking a solution to the conflict and this period proved to be a continuing example of Glubb’s limited autonomy. Ultimately, the political decision-making was in the hands of King Abdullah and the Prime Minister. Yet Glubb was in control of the military sphere and he maintained political influence. Glubb and the Arab Legion’s approach to the fighting in the Negev was a key component enabling the start of the armistice negotiations, where Glubb again had a surprisingly significant input. Kimche and Kimche portrayed Glubb as being completely out of the loop regarding the Shuneh discussions. So much so that: ‘Glubb criticised Abdullah for making this deal with the Israelis.’\(^\text{112}\) On the contrary, Glubb was pragmatic not angry. He knew Transjordan was at the mercy of the Israelis and after the event he surmised that: ‘In view of fact we have no ammunition, aircraft or tanks and Iraqis are already withdrawing it might have been worse’.\(^\text{113}\) Glubb may not have been involved directly in the Shuneh negotiations, but it was Glubb who was communicating with the Jordanian delegation in Rhodes. At the very least, Glubb was the intermediary in this setup. Moreover, he had the opportunity to partake in the meeting at Shuneh on 23 March, where the preliminary armistice agreement was made, but he chose not to and was involved in the private consultation held in Shuneh earlier that day. While the inner-workings of the

\(^{112}\) Kimche, \textit{Both Sides of the Hill}, pp. 269-72.

\(^{113}\) Glubb to H.E. Pyman, 5 April 1949, GP2006, 22.
official Jordanian mind may be locked in the Royal Hashemite Archives Glubb’s advice was surely crucial. Glubb was fully aware of the negotiations with Israel at Shuneh, which enabled him, secretly, to brief HMG.\footnote{Glubb to Pirie-Gordon, 15 and 23 March 1949, F0816/144; Glubb to Kirkbride, 3 April 1949, F0816/145, TNA.} Moreover, nobody in Transjordan understood the military situation like Glubb did and ultimately it was a military – rather than a political – armistice, which reflected the balance of forces in the field.

The resolution process provided a continuing example of the limited autonomy not just of Glubb, but of all the parties in the Anglo-Jordanian alliance. Abul Huda and the Jordanian Government were subservient to pressure from the other Arab states; HMG was restrained by its need to appear neutral and in particular its reliance on US support; and Abdullah was beholden to Britain and, to a lesser extent, his own government. Perhaps more than any other actor in this affair, Abdullah was a hostage to others. He knew what he wanted, but he did not know how to achieve it. Avi Shlaim described the November-December period as: ‘Abdullah’s game of playing for time.’\footnote{Shlaim, \textit{Collusion}, p. 366.} But in actuality it was Britain and the Jordanian Prime Minister who compelled Abdullah to play by these rules. This critical final stage of the 1948 War thus further reveals the spectre of British influence over Abdullah. HMG did not directly control Abdullah or dictate Jordanian policy, but the British presence loomed over Abdullah’s decisions. Abdullah had required British acquiescence over the Greater Transjordan scheme back in February and during the final throes of the conflict he required British approval in his efforts to extricate himself. While the British advised against it, Abdullah reluctantly avoided negotiations with the Israelis until Egypt
had become the first to openly negotiate, by which time it was made clear to him that: 'His Majesty's Government are of the opinion that it would now be advisable to associate your Government in your discussions with the Jews.'

Competition between the Arab states further complicated the conflict between the Arabs and Israel. Both the war and its resolution were dictated as much by political considerations as they were military. And the final act in this saga aptly reflected this. In a diary like note, Glubb described the return of the Jordanian delegation from Rhodes:

> When the T.J. Delegation returned to Amman airport after signing the Rhodes armistice, they expected to be met by reps of [the] King and Govt and thanked for their weary efforts. Instead they were greeted by an officer and Amman police, who whispered to them that their lives were in danger and warned them to slip away individually to their homes.

It was a rather muted end to a muted conflict, which encapsulated the driving force of events since Glubb returned to Amman in September. Formal negotiations with the Israelis were not something that anyone wanted to be directly associated with. All parties, particularly on the Arab side of the conflict, were eager to see the fighting brought to an end, but nobody was willing to be seen negotiating with Israel. Between September 1948 and January 1949 the war had been sustained by a battle of wills between Jordan and Egypt over who would negotiate first. In this battle the Jordanians emerged victorious, but as the Arab state set to gain most from the conflict it remained in the spotlight. Thus the true power brokers sought to distance themselves from the negotiations with Israel. For that reason a set of junior scapegoats were sent out to act as the face

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116 ‘Aide-Memoire’, 21 January 1949, F0816/143, TNA.
of the negotiations. Neither Glubb nor Abdullah wanted to be seen to be
involved. But they were; both of them were crucial. Distance from the armistice
negotiations did not remove all traces of criticism. However, it was not as intense
as it might otherwise have been. At the height of the conflict Glubb, who was
desperate for peace, was particularly sensitive to criticism, but the relief of
having the war brought to a close was palpable. Glubb was now able to laugh off
blame falsely attributed to him, remarking that: ‘I was glad to read a few days
ago in a British paper, that the only obstacle to peace in Palestine was the
presence of “bellicose British Generals in Amman”. A little light relief should
always be included in a tragedy’.118

118 Glubb to H.E. Pyman, 13 April 1949, GP2006, 22.
Beyond 1948: The Arab Legion, Arab Nationalism and the Cold War

The end of the 1948 War heralded the start of a new era in the Middle East and no state was affected more than Transjordan, which was completely redefined: geographically, via the annexation of the West Bank territory – leaving it with an extensive border with Israel – and demographically, via the incorporation of 400,000 Palestinian Arabs living in the West Bank plus 500,000 additional Palestinian refugees. Although the Arab areas of Palestine were not formally annexed to Transjordan until April 1950, Greater Transjordan's existence was effectively consolidated by the signing of the 1949 armistice, which bore the first official usage of Transjordan's new name: ‘The Hashemite Jordan Kingdom’. So began a period of transition, which culminated with the assassination of King Abdullah on 20 July 1951. The king’s murder had its roots in the 1948 War, which was undoubtedly a major factor shaping the future of Jordan, the Modern Middle East and Britain's position in the region. However, a full understanding of British policy and the Anglo-Jordanian connection beyond 1948 requires a much broader appreciation of the prevailing international factors.

As the principal link between the two allies the Arab Legion provides an ideal barometer for assessing the nature of British policy and the status of Anglo-Jordanian relations between 1949-51. Just like the end of the Second World War, the Arab Legion emerged from the 1948 War in a rapidly expanded form and, again, a decision on its future size and shape had to be made. It is an established

myth that the 1948 War led to an expansion of the Arab Legion. Vatikiotis observed the Arab Legion’s expansion between 1948-56 and related this simply to the 1948 War and the armed truce [with Israel] that followed.\(^3\) Of course, the 1948 War and the changed size and shape of the Hashemite Kingdom did have an impact. However, the Arab Legion's expansion after 1948 was not sanctioned until 1951 because it was related primarily to the emerging Cold War and, in particular, the onset of the Korean War. Previous studies have noted that the Korean War prompted a review of Britain’s Middle East Defence strategy, making its defence more essential and strengthening the Chiefs of Staff’s resolve to hold on to Suez as a main base.\(^4\) Yet the significance of the Korean War in relation to the Arab Legion has hitherto been largely overlooked, with the exception of Ron Pundik.\(^5\) However, it is important we recognise and emphasise this trend, because it reveals the interaction between the British world system and the onset of the Cold War. In this instance Cold War concerns dictated British policy in Jordan where, despite its independent status, British involvement became increasingly formal and direct, which jarred with the counter-trend of Arab nationalism that increased simultaneously. Combined, these two factors significantly contributed to, and therefore help explain, a deterioration of the Anglo-Jordanian alliance during the 1950s in addition to the more recognisable consequences of 1948.

\(^3\) Vatikiotis, *Study of the Arab Legion*, p. 91.


One of the paradoxes of the 1948 War was that it enabled the creation of Greater Transjordan, which Abdullah desired as an achievable alternative to Greater Syria in order to increase his power and status, but this served to make the Hashemite Kingdom even more dependent on Britain. As part of the general mid-September 1948 shift toward resolution the British finally sought to assess the implications of creating Greater Transjordan.\(^6\) All those best placed to make an estimation – Kirkbride, the BMEO, and the Jerusalem Consulate – agreed that Greater Transjordan would not be financially viable.\(^7\) Britain nonetheless remained committed to supporting the Hashemite Kingdom, despite the likely increased burden for two reasons. Firstly, Britain relied on Transjordan as a strategic hub. The loss of Palestine, which had effectively been run as a colony, left a significant hole in Britain’s position in the Middle East that Greater Transjordan would fill.\(^8\) Secondly, British support for Transjordan was self-perpetuating. As J.M. Troutbeck, Head of the BMEO, observed: ‘H.M.G. are now so committed in the public eye to the support of Transjordan that it would be difficult for them, even if they so wished, to leave her to her fate. Their prestige is by now too deeply involved.’\(^9\) Transjordan was effectively an advertisement for the British connection and the decline of its closest ally would leave a huge stain on British prestige and power. Britain did not have an equally reliable alternative to the pro-British connection of Abdullah’s Transjordan. As Kirkbride outlined:

\(^6\) FO to Amman, 892, 17 September 1948; Minute by Burrows, 15 September 1948, FO371/68861/E12205, TNA.
\(^7\) Kirkbride to Bevin, 67, 28 September 1948, FO371/68862/E12910/G; Jerusalem Consulate-General to FO, 9 October 1948, FO371/68862/E13502/G; Troutbeck to Burrows, 20 December 1948, FO371/68862/E16467/G, TNA.
\(^8\) Templer to Glubb, 6 October 1948, GP2006, 91.
\(^9\) Troutbeck to Bevin, 16 October 1948, FO371/68862/E12635, TNA.
So long as the other Arab states continue to protest their friendship for Great Britain and, at the same time, consistently disregard our advice and, in some cases, frustrate our policy, it seems worthwhile taking some trouble to keep Transjordan alive and on our side.10

In an era and region where Britain’s word was becoming increasingly less powerful Transjordan stood out as a uniquely reliable collaborator. It was the bastion of Britain’s regional presence, status, and influence. Despite the general need for financial stringency, for both practical and prestige reasons it was therefore worth paying for. Indeed, Bernard Burrows concluded: ‘If we can get a viable Greater Transjordan for this expenditure, we shall have made a good bargain.’11

With Greater Transjordan having been effectively established by the signing of the armistice, with implicit British support and despite the negative financial implications, the true test of its place in the British world system, and the extent of British investment in the Hashemite Kingdom, ultimately manifested itself in the size and shape of the Arab Legion, which was completely dictated by the British. As stipulated in a secret letter attached to the Treaty the Arab Legion subsidy was supposed to be ‘agreed upon annually by the High Contracting Parties’.12 Despite some initial concerns in 1946 that this would obstruct Britain’s ability to act unilaterally, in practice the Jordanians had no say. Ultimately it was the various Whitehall departments that had to agree. The Chiefs of Staff would recommend an order of establishment, taking into consideration imperial defence requirements, which the Foreign Office would

10 Kirkbride to Burrows, 21 October 1948, FO371/68864/E13343, TNA.
11 ‘Transjordan Finances’, Burrows, 22 October 1948, FO371/68862/E15249/G, TNA.
consider from a political perspective before submitting a proposal to the Treasury, with additional comments from the War Office and occasionally other Whitehall departments, such as the Air Ministry. After agreement had been reached in Whitehall HMG would then put forward a ‘proposal’ to the Jordanian Government to avoid the accusation that Britain was ‘dictating’, but there was no room for negotiation. Abdullah and the Jordanian government were beholden to London as regards the subsidy and had to resort to pleas, threats and scaremongering if they wanted to influence HMG’s subsidy negotiations.

The 1948 War enhanced the Arab Legion’s reputation and provided it with significant new challenges, but this did not lead to expansion. Hitherto the Arab Legion was justified primarily for political, as opposed to military, purposes and the 1948/9 subsidy was symbolic of this fact. The 1947/8 subsidy was £2 million, split between the Foreign Office (£700,000) and the War Office (£1.3 million). The War Office contribution in 1947 reflected the Arab Legion’s deployment in mandatory Palestine. Yet since Britain’s departure from Palestine, the Foreign Office had borne the full cost. The 1948 War raised the Arab Legion’s military profile and enhanced its reputation as an effective fighting force. The War Office acknowledged that:

the Arab Legion have, by all accounts given a very good account of themselves in the fighting, and have thereby proved their ability to be of valuable assistance to us in war.

Consequently the Chiefs of Staff envisaged an ‘important role’ for the Arab Legion in its ‘plans for the defence of the Middle East in an emergency’ and

13 FO to Amman, 153, 18 February 1949, FO371/75299/E1919/G, TNA.
15 Minute by Minshull, 31 August 1949, FO 371/75301/E10604/G.
16 Charteris to L.F.L. Pyman, 4 August 1948, FO371/68830/E10502, TNA.
recommended it be maintained at its present unauthorised strength of 14,000, to
which it had risen during the 1948 War.\textsuperscript{17} However, the War Office was adamant
that:

\begin{quote}
there can be no question whatever of any expenditure on the Arab
Legion being borne on Army Votes in 1949/50.
\end{quote}

The War Office was prepared to ‘accept the consequence that in the absence of
any War Office contribution the size of the Arab Legion may be something less
than would be desirable from the Imperial defence aspect.’\textsuperscript{18} The War Office was
therefore reluctant to back the Arab Legion’s needs too strongly, lest it be
compelled to foot the bill and Ministers decided that the 1949/50 subsidy would
be based on the force of 7,000 agreed the previous year. In 1949 the subsidy was
increased from £2.5 to £3.5 million – again including £500,000 for capital
equipment expenditure – and within the existing historiography the myth
pervades that a gross increase in the subsidy reflected Britain’s reinforcement of
the Arab Legion.\textsuperscript{19} Yet this merely reflected an increase in prices and fell well
short of the Foreign Office request for £5 million. Nonetheless Kirkbride still
made political capital out of the apparent increase by:

\begin{quote}
not reveal[ing] to the Transjordan Government that three and a
half millions this year had about the same buying power as two
and a half million last year and left them to cherish the belief that
they would be better off.\textsuperscript{20}
\end{quote}

The reasons for not consolidating the Arab Legion were threefold. Firstly, it was
felt that, even in its expanded form, British troops would offer better resistance
against an Israeli attack than the Arab Legion. Secondly it was considered that: ‘If

\begin{footnotes}
\textsuperscript{17} ‘Size and Shape of the Arab Legion for 1949/50: Note by the War Office’, 31
December 1948, F0371/75299/E296/G, TNA.
\textsuperscript{18} Key to Russell Edmunds, 24 December 1948, F0371/68832/E16464/G, TNA.
\textsuperscript{19} Bradshaw, \textit{Britain and Jordan}, pp. 176-7.
\textsuperscript{20} Kirkbride to Burrows, 9 March 1949, F0371/75300/E3381/G, TNA.
\end{footnotes}
additional money were available for defence purposes, it might be better employed on additional British forces rather than on subsidising the Arab Legion’. Thirdly, it was believed that the political situation in the Middle East had changed since the end of January, which offered ‘greater hope of a measure of stability’ in the region. Ultimately, these three reasons were justifications for financial stringency.

In order to save money, HMG gambled on two outcomes. Firstly, that the border tension with Israel would settle down and, secondly, that the Jordanian Government would be compelled to contribute financially to maintaining the Arab Legion. MELF and the War Office warned that the previous year’s approved strength of 7,000 men was deemed ‘totally inadequate’. Moreover, Kirkbride exclaimed that it was folly to budget for a force half the size that was presently overstretched, particularly with the Arab-Israeli conflict unresolved. An annotation by Bevin indicated that the ‘intention’ was to compel the Jordanian Government to contribute. When the 1949/50 subsidy was agreed it was explained to Glubb that: ‘you will be maintaining the Arab Legion at a strength greater than you can afford’ and that unless the Jordanian Government made a contribution, the strength of the force would have to drop below that required during the latter part of the year, in order to make up for the initial over-expenditure. Consequently the subsidy was no longer linked to a pre-determined size of 7,000. Instead the subsidy was now provided to fund the Arab

21 ‘Subsidy for the Arab Legion in 1949’, Minutes of a Cabinet meeting held on 1 February 1949, FO371/75299/E2249/G, TNA.
22 ‘Size and Shape of the Arab Legion for 1949/50: Note by the War Office’, 31 December 1948, FO371/75299/E296/G, TNA.
23 Amman to FO, 76, 8 February 1949, FO371/75299/E1919/G, TNA.
Legion at as large a size as was possible. In 1949 the subsidy was set at £3.5m unofficially for a force of 7,000. In practice it had been at 14,000 men and was expected to be reduced to 11,000 by the beginning of 1950. Yet there was to be no real increase in the subsidy. Nor was there an increase in the size of the Arab Legion, but, rather, a planned reduction. British policy was to maintain the Arab Legion at the bare minimum level deemed necessary to maintain internal Jordanian security and to induce the Jordanians to stump up the cash if they wanted a larger force.

Both these risks were misjudged, however. Firstly, it had already been established that Greater Transjordan was likely to be even less financially viable than the original pre-1948 state, making a Jordanian contribution highly unlikely. Secondly, the political decision makers had underestimated the day-to-day struggle that the Arab Legion continued to face. The armistice had not brought about a complete cessation of hostilities. Rather, Glubb lamented: ‘There has been more shooting in the front line since the Rhodes Armistice was signed than before it!’ Between December 1949 and October 1950, Glubb reported 117 incidents of Israeli forces either crossing or shooting across the demarcation line. The process of reducing the Legion’s establishment had begun immediately after the armistice was concluded, but Israeli aggression ‘put an abrupt stop to this process’. Just as it had after the 1946 Treaty, the situation on the ground in Palestine prevented any reduction of the Arab Legion. Even at its present strength of 14,000 regulars and 3,000 irregulars, the Arab Legion was

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26 Glubb to H.E. Pyman, 13 April 1949, GP2006, 22.
'extremely thin on the ground'. Later that year, therefore, the Foreign Office recommended that the present size of the Arab Legion should be the approved strength for the rest of the financial year, with a £1 million supplementary subsidy to support it. The Foreign Office warned that failure to do so would result in an embarrassing reduction of the Arab Legion. Yet the Treasury remained unconvinced. Moreover, the Jordanian Government declined to contribute financially. Instead they threatened to demobilise 4,000 men unless HMG increased the subsidy. Although the Foreign Office and the War Office did not want to see the Arab Legion reduced they accepted the consequences of the ultimatum, given the difficulty of trying to obtain a supplementary grant from the Treasury. In the event it was reduced by 2,000 men, though further reductions were deemed likely.

Despite the 1949/50 subsidy being proved inadequate the British stubbornly stuck to the principle of financial stringency throughout the year and continued in this vein when deciding upon the 1950/1 subsidy. In 1950 the Chiefs of Staff estimated that the Arab Legion required a strength of 25,000 men to defend Jordan for one month until British reinforcements from the Canal Zone could arrive, in the event of a ‘hot’ war. Yet they suggested a minimum force of

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29 Bevin to Attlee, draft, 26 August 1949, FO371/75301/E11052/G, TNA.
30 Amman to FO, 540, 21 October 1949, FO371/75302/E12726, TNA.
31 Minutes by Brinson, 22 and 24 October 1949, FO371/75302/E12726, TNA.
32 Kirkbride to Bevin, 8 November 1949, 8 November 1949, FO371/75302/E13631, TNA.
33 ‘Arab Legion Subsidy 1950/51’, Furlonge, 13 May 1950, FO371/82752/ET1202/33/G, TNA.
12,000 men to ‘ensure the security of Jordan’. The Chiefs of Staff, therefore, recommended £5.764 million as the amount:

> which will most effectively [enable the Arab Legion to] carry out its function for the local defence and internal security of Jordan and play its part with other States in the stability of the Middle East and defence against external aggression.

It was reasoned that, ‘the paucity of British troops in the Middle East will not allow us to honour effectively at the start of operations our existing obligations to Jordan in the event of the Anglo-Jordan treaty being invoked’. Strengthening the Legion would render ‘more remote the possibility of His Majesty’s Government having to go to the aid of Jordan in accordance with their Treaty obligations’. However, the Arab Legion was still primarily considered a political factor and the Treasury remained extremely reluctant to use Foreign Office funds for military purposes. The Treasury was concerned that: ‘in our view at least we have in this case got a contribution to Imperial Defence which is not subject to the ordinary controls of defence expenditure or scrutinised in relation to general defence requirements’. The Treasury wanted to limit the subsidy to £4 million, but a £4.9 million compromise was reached, subject to repayment of a £650,000 debt. Thus, the subsidy for 1950/1 was effectively £4.25 million and a

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34 ‘Chiefs of Staff Committee: Size and Shape of the Arab Legion 1950/51, Note by the Secretary’, 21 January 1950, FO371/82751/ET1202/4/G, TNA.
35 ‘Arab Legion Subsidy: Note by the War Office’, 25 May 1950, FO371/82753/ET1202/40/G, TNA.
37 ‘Chiefs of Staff Committee: Size and Shape of the Arab Legion 1950/51, Note by the Secretary’, 21 January 1950, FO371/82751/ET1202/4/G, TNA.
38 G.P. Humphreys-Davies to H.C. Care, 24 February 1950, FO371/82751/ET1202/9/G, TNA.
50% rise in War Office equipment prices negated any real increase.\textsuperscript{39} However, with this amount Glubb felt the Arab Legion could ‘scrape through without disbanding any major units’.\textsuperscript{40} During the two years immediately following the 1948 War the Arab Legion was intended to maintain Jordan’s security and the subsidy was merely set at the minimum necessary to avoid significant reduction. The War Office Director of Finance, Charles Key, acknowledged that: ‘the maintenance of the Arab Legion, whatever its size, is an advantage from the Imperial defence point of view.’\textsuperscript{41} Yet despite incidental advantages to imperial defence, the Arab Legion was not at all organised with this in mind.

Things changed, however, after the Korean War began. This brought into focus the Cold War and for the first time the threat of the Soviet Union became a significant consideration affecting the size, shape and cost of the Arab Legion. War broke out in Korea when the communist North invaded the South on 25 June 1950. Two weeks later the UN agreed to send a force, commanded by the American, General Douglas MacArthur, to support the South.\textsuperscript{42} Believing that it would be advantageous to have at least one Arab state providing active support the United States intimated that they wanted the Arab Legion to send at least a token force to Korea.\textsuperscript{43} The Foreign Office believed that Abdullah was unlikely to agree owing to the Arab Legion being too busy dealing with issues on the border

\textsuperscript{40} Glubb to Furlonge, 14 June 1950, FO371/82753/ET1202/48/G, TNA.
\textsuperscript{41} Key to Russell Edmunds, 24 December 1948, FO371/68832/E16464/G, TNA.
\textsuperscript{42} Cohen, ‘Strategic role of the Middle East’, p. 30.
\textsuperscript{43} Pundik, \textit{Struggle for Sovereignty}, pp. 256-7.
with Israel. Yet, apparently unprompted, Abdullah expressed his own desire to send a 1,500 man force from the Arab Legion to assist. Although Kirkbride warned it was imperative that Britain did not propose the idea – after Abdullah requested that Glubb do just that owing to anticipated disapproval within the Jordanian parliament – the British were not against the idea as long as the US bore the cost. Despite the US initially suggesting that it was prepared to finance the Arab Legion’s involvement in Korea it gradually lost faith in the idea causing it to shy away from financing the deployment. Thus, due to financial constraints, HMG also lost interest and the idea fizzled out. Nonetheless, the conflict in Korea was to have a direct impact on the future of the Arab Legion.

The Korean War prompted Britain to reconsider its plans for the defence of the Middle East. The Foreign Office believed the Soviet Union was involved in North Korea’s decision to invade and the day after the invasion expressed concern about Soviet aggression elsewhere, including Persia. In the aftermath of the Second World War the British produced their first emergency global war plan, codenamed Doublequick. Out of this emerged Sandown, a plan for the defence of the Middle East, which was drawn up in August 1948. This plan prioritised all available forces to defend the Suez base, which meant other areas, including the oil-producing regions, would be unsupported. In June 1950,

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44 FO to Amman, 425, 18 August 1950, FO371/82711/ET1025/1, TNA.
45 Amman to FO, 287, 19 August 1950, FO371/82711/ET1025/2, TNA.
46 Amman to FO, 292, 23 August 1950, FO371/82711/ET1025/3, TNA.
47 ‘Arab Legion and Korea’, 28 August 1950; FO to Amman, 130 Saving, 29 August 1950 FO371/82711/ET1025/5, TNA.
however, as a result of the conflict in Korea, Sandown came under review, under the codename Celery.\textsuperscript{50} Talks in Washington between the US and British Chiefs of Staff concluded that Middle East oil production would be vital in a war of any duration.\textsuperscript{51} Accordingly Britain’s Middle East defence plans were expanded to include the Persian Gulf. While planning the build up of forces to protect Abadan, home of the world’s largest oil refinery, it was accepted that a complete division could not be found from MELF and that the US could not be relied upon to assist while the Korean War was on-going. If Russia moved into the Middle East it was considered that, in view of Britain’s many other present defence commitments, not least Korea, there would be a shortage of available British forces to counter Russian moves.\textsuperscript{52}

Increasing the Arab Legion was seen as one way to contribute to remedying this problem.\textsuperscript{53} As part of the post-Korea reappraisal the Chiefs of Staff approved two papers, entitled \textit{A Review of Middle East Policy and Strategy} and \textit{Persia}, both of which concluded that ‘the strength and efficiency of the Arab Legion should be increased’.\textsuperscript{54} Colonel Melville, the Arab Legion Staff Liaison Officer in London, was given a forewarning by the War Office, which he passed on to Glubb in confidence. He explained: “The Ministry of Defence and the Foreign Office consider that steps should be taken now “to increase the size and

\textsuperscript{50}Cohen, ‘Strategic Role of the Middle East’, p. 30.
\textsuperscript{51}Brownjohn to Robertson, 31 October 1950, WO216/718, TNA.
\textsuperscript{52}Chiefs of Staff Committee to H.A.A. Hankey, 3 August 1950, FO371/82753/ET1202/56/G, TNA.
\textsuperscript{53}Ibid.
\textsuperscript{54}Brian Calvert to Furlonge, 8 September 1950, enclosed draft letter from WO to GHQ MELF, FO371/82753/ET1202/59/G; ‘Arab Legion Subsidy’, Brinson, 10 January 1951, FO371/91819/ET1201/5/G, TNA [emphasis added].
efficiency of the Legion with a view to adding to the security of the Middle East’. He added that the rationale was that:

If a “Korea” occurs in Persia or Iraq, UNO troops will go to help. These troops are likely to be British in the initial stages. The British will wish to use the Legion troops if they are available.\footnote{Melville to Glubb, 28 September 1950, Melville Papers, 11/71 [emphasis in original].}

Specifically, the Arab Legion was earmarked for deployment in the South Persian Gulf Area, Abadan and elsewhere to ‘support law and order’ and to ‘support British/United Nations forces in cold war counter measures’.\footnote{Minute by Redman (DMO), ‚The Arab Legion‘, 3 October 1950, FO371/82755/ET1204/18/G; Brian Calvert (WO) to Furlonge, 8 September 1950, enclosed draft letter from WO to GHQ MELF, FO371/82753/ET1202/59/G, TNA.} The Arab Legion was now expected to be ready ‘for employment as required by the general allied war plan for the defence of the Middle East’, under the Allied Commander-in-Chief.\footnote{Minute by Redman, ‚The Arab Legion‘, Appendix B, ‚Expansion of the Arab Legion‘, WO to GHQ MELF, 3 October 1950; FO371/82755/ET 1204/18/G, TNA.} As Melville informed Glubb, MELF intended the ‘Legion to be used in all those roles in the M.E. which the British Army usually took.’ Melville was told: ‘Apparently MELF think we are good enough to do any job which would be entrusted to a British force of up to one B[riga]de Group.’\footnote{Melville to Glubb, 14 September 1950, GP2006, 57.} The increased threat of war with the Soviets, highlighted by Korea, finally provided a motive for Britain to build on the reputation that the Arab Legion had built in 1948 and, to a lesser extent, during the Second World War. It was decided that the Arab Legion needed to be expanded because its present size did ‘not take into account the possibility of war with Russia’.\footnote{Minute by Redman, 7 November 1950, FO371/82754/ET1202/67/G, TNA.}
‘threat from Russia’ became ‘a new factor’ influencing the organisation and cost of the Arab Legion.⁶⁰

This was music to the ears of Glubb who had been desperate for an increase to the Arab Legion since 1948. Glubb had become increasingly irritated at HMG’s apparent ignorance of the Arab Legion’s plight. He had been unsatisfied with the 1949 subsidy, prompting Kirkbride to comment that Glubb ‘seems to entertain illusions on the subject of what His Majesty’s Government can and will do of a nature which I can remember suffering from when I was in my teens.’⁶¹ Meanwhile, towards the end of September 1950, while Glubb was unaware of the impact Korea was having on HMG’s thinking in relation to the future of the Arab Legion, Glubb vented his obvious frustration:

> Every time I see a British General he tells me how much they all need the A.L. in war. But without giving any money. … I am not particularly keen to die a martyr’s death in the next war. I am getting near to the point when I shall write to the W.O. and tell them that the Arab Legion will NOT repeat NOT fight against the Russians in the next war. Do you think it would be good policy to get cross? After all, only the superhuman efforts of the BO’s [British officers] here can make it fight the Russians. If we say we are not playing, the party is definitely off. The Jordan Govt will not do it if the B.O.’s here do not push it.⁶²

Glubb clearly saw himself as a vital facilitator of Anglo-Jordanian co-operation.⁶³ Glubb refrained from issuing his threat, though, as Melville advised him to hold his tongue because he had received positive news that: ‘Almost certainly some increase will materialise’.⁶⁴ Thanks to Korea and the apparent increased threat

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⁶⁰ ‘Arab Legion Subsidy’, Brinson, 10 January 1951, FO371/91819/ET1201/5/G, TNA.
⁶¹ Kirkbride to Burrows, 9 March 1949, FO371/75301/E3381/G, TNA.
⁶³ Pundik, Struggle for Sovereignty, p. 270.
⁶⁴ Melville to Glubb, 28 September 1950, Melville Papers, 11/71.
from the Soviet Union, the Arab Legion was set to receive the increased funds Glubb had long desired.

The Arab Legion was now intended to have a genuine dual function and a reorganisation plan was created to enable this. The War Office vision for the Arab Legion was that: ‘In peace and during the armistice with Israel the Arab Legion is disposed as required by the Jordan Government for internal security and the defence of Jordan’s frontiers. This is the force subsidised as an act of Foreign policy.’ But it was also required that it should ‘be capable of providing at short notice one brigade group or equivalent units for employment on Middle East cold war security tasks outside Jordan’. In a major war the Arab Legion would effectively become a division within the British army. As Furlonge explained: ‘Plans were therefore worked out by G.H.Q., M.E.L.F., in consultation with Lt. General Glubb, to reorganise the Legion so as to make it more capable of fulfilling its role in conjunction with British forces.’ The key to establishing a cost efficient force capable of performing this dual role was the creation of a reserve scheme. In 1950 two-thirds of the Arab Legion’s regular units were deployed along the border with Israel, ‘preventing minor Jewish incursions or [as Glubb sardonically put it] arresting Arabs who have stolen a cow’. Apart from the fact that this was keeping the Arab Legion regular forces occupied, it also meant it was ‘impossible’ for them to do any training. If the Arab Legion were

67 ‘Minutes of a Meeting: Arab Legion Reserve Units Scheme’, Leonard, 16 March 1951, FO371/91820/ET1201/20/G, TNA.
sent away to fight the Soviets, another force would have to be found to takeover its day-to-day duties along the border with Israel. Indeed, the Jordanian Government’s focus was Israel and it wanted the whole of the Arab Legion to be deployed along the border.\(^{68}\) This meant the peacetime strength had to be increased to free up regular units. \(^{69}\) Owing to its current defensive vulnerabilities the Soviet Union was deemed unlikely to start a major war until 1954. For that reason a three-year plan was initiated to reorganise the Arab Legion from a force comprising 1 Armoured car regiment, 1 Infantry Brigade Group, and 2 Infantry Brigades, at the end of 1950, into a force containing 2 Infantry Brigade Groups, 1 Mobile desert force, a training organisation, and the necessary administrative and internal security units, by April 1954.\(^{70}\) The reorganisation plan set out that the Arab Legion regular units would be given authorisation for a 2,000-man increase up to a maximum of 13,500. To make up the required 24-25,000 men, it was ‘proposed that this additional strength should be found in a reserve adequate to produce 11,000 men’. The reserve system introduced in 1947 had created a reserve by 1951 of just 2,000 men. The Army Council believed that expanding the reserve would create at:

> a very small cost ... an effective and strong fighting force available for service outside the State of Jordan; and by 1954 the Arab Legion could provide, if need arose, a fully mobile division for remote defence of the Middle East.\(^{71}\)

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\(^{68}\) Glubb to Melville, 17 September 1950, Melville Papers, 11/71.

\(^{69}\) ‘Expansion, Organisation and Employment of Arab Legion in event of War’, 17 September 1950, ibid.


\(^{71}\) G.W. Lambert to The Secretary to the Treasury, 9 March 1951, FO371/91819/ET1201/17/G, TNA.
Having previously been organised primarily to defend Transjordan from attack by Israel or its Arab neighbours, now the Arab Legion was designed to be capable of supporting the British Army in the event of war with the Soviet Union in the Persian Gulf or elsewhere.

The upshot of this re-evaluation and the perceived increased Soviet threat that Korea represented was that both the War Office and the Foreign Office pressed much more strongly for an increase in the subsidy. Obtaining Treasury approval, for what was described as ‘a heavy increase’, was not expected to be easy.\(^72\) Given the scale of increase desired Furlonge remarked: ‘The battle for next year’s Arab Legion Subsidy is about to begin and, as I have mentioned before, is going to be a stiff one.’\(^73\) Just getting the minimum required to avoid reductions had proved tough the previous two years. This year, however, as Melville informed Glubb, the War Office and Foreign Office intended to take a strong line with the Treasury. He was informed: ‘on this occasion, I understand the Israelis will not be quoted to the Treasury as the reason for an increased subsidy – but the Russians!’\(^74\) Bevin indeed emphasised that the previous year the subsidy had been calculated to deal only with the threat from Israel and its Arab neighbours, but the international situation was now different. It was hoped that the May 1950 Tripartite Declaration – in which Britain, France and the United States agreed to limit the influx of arms into the region – had reduced the threat emanating from other Arab states, but he emphasised to the Chancellor of the Exchequer, Hugh Gaitskell, that ‘the risk of aggression against Jordan by

\(^{72}\) ‘Arab Legion Subsidy’, Furlonge, 19 January 1951, FO371/91819/ET1201/5/G, TNA.
\(^{73}\) Furlonge to Kirkbride, 19 December 1950, FO371/82753/ET1202/60, TNA
\(^{74}\) Melville to Glubb, 14 September 1950, GP2006, 57.
Russia has become much greater than a year ago’.75 Owing to more vociferous support from both the War Office and the Foreign Office, as well as a more easily recognisable enemy, the Treasury finally backed the expansion of the Arab Legion that the military had desired, but not wholeheartedly supported since 1948. For 1951/2 the Treasury agreed a subsidy of £6.5m based on the £7.265m requested.76 The subsidy was not cut from the amount requested because the expansion was not fully approved, but merely because the rate of expansion was not deemed attainable. The subsidy was merely reduced to reflect a gradual increase in strength over the course of the year.77 However, Glubb succeeded in obtaining both the men and vehicles required in the original expansion scheme without delay. Accordingly, an £800,000 supplementary grant was requested and approved.78 Thus, the full amount was eventually provided over the course of the year, in stark contrast to previous years – not least 1949/50 when a £1 million supplementary grant was refused. Moreover, the War Office was now prepared to help fund the Arab Legion in addition to the Foreign Office subsidy. The British Army would therefore provide £1.6, £1.12 and £1.15 million to fund the maintenance of the Special Reserve for the next three years.79 This meant that in 1951/2 HMG spent a total of £8.9 million on the Arab Legion as compared to just £4.25 million the previous year – more than double. The 1951 subsidy

75 Bevin to Gaitskell, 23 January 1951, FO371/91819/ET1201//G, TNA.
76 Russell Edmunds to Brinson, 31 March 1951, enclosing: 'Note of a meeting held at the Treasury on Friday, 16th March, 1950 [sic], to discuss the Arab Legion Estimates for 1951/52', FO371/91819/ET1201/18/G, TNA.
77 Ibid.
78 Russell Edmunds to Furlonge, 3 January 1952, FO371/91822/ET1201/71/G, TNA.
79 Melville to Glubb, 15 March 1951, Melville Papers, 4/43.
thus proved to be a realisation of the post-Korea recommendation that the
strength of the Arab Legion be increased.

The other post-Korea recommendation was an increase in the Arab
Legion’s efficiency and this led to even greater cooperation with the British
Army.\textsuperscript{80} In an attempt to make the administration more efficient the Arab Legion
became much more closely associated with MELF, under whose command it
would fall in the event of a major war. In terms of the Arab Legion’s integration
into Britain’s broader Middle East defence structure this represented a
significant change. Glubb observed that:

Until the autumn of 1950, the Arab Legion has had very little to do
with G.H.Q. M.E.L.F., and has always corresponded direct with the
War Office. Since the commencement of the war in Korea,
however, and the danger of a third World War, in which the Arab
Legion would come under the operational command of the C-in-C
[Commander-in-Chief] M.E.L.F., relations between the Arab Legion
and G.H.Q. have become very close.

Both Melville and Glubb agreed that this had a negative impact on the day-to-day
administration of the Arab Legion because while Cairo – where MELF General
Headquarters was located – was closer to Amman geographically than London,
in truth it was much easier for the Arab Legion to connect with London, via daily
available flights, than Cairo, which was out of bounds owing to the Egyptian
Government refusing to provide visas to Arab Legion officers. Moreover, since
1948 the Arab Legion had an office in London, which made liaison direct with the
War Office much easier than liaison via MELF, which had little understanding of
the Arab Legion setup.\textsuperscript{81}

\textsuperscript{80} Glubb to Robertson, 17 May 1951, GP2006, 93.
\textsuperscript{81} Glubb to Kirkbride, 10 August 1951, Melville Papers, 4/43.
The more significant consequence of the Arab Legion’s greater integration into the structure of the British Army was the by-product of weighting military efficiency over political sensitivities. In order to prepare for a major war, when the Arab Legion would come under the command of MELF, closer co-operation began in earnest and this contributed to an increasingly rapid Anglicization of the Arab Legion. Kirkbride had been concerned about Anglicization even before the onset of the Korean War. In May 1950 Kirkbride observed that since 1948 ‘practically no locally engaged British officers have been recruited to the establishment’. In September 1949 the Arab Legion had 45 British Officers, of whom 22 were seconded from the British Army. In May 1950, 49 British Officers were serving with the Arab Legion of which 37 were seconded. The gross number of British officers may not have increased much, but the proportion of seconded, as opposed to contracted, officers did. Kirkbride had warned that it was ‘necessary to have more permanent British officers [who understood the language and mentality of the Arab troops] employed under contract by the Jordan Government and identified in a permanent manner with the Legion and the men’. The MELF Commander-in-Chief, Brian Robertson, however, was ‘against contract officers as there was no guarantee either of their efficiency or standards of personal conduct. He preferred the carefully chosen seconded officer who was under a definite obligation to learn Arabic and to get to know his men.’ Kirkbride understood some of the technical benefits from the

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82 Kirkbride to Furlonge, 20 May 1950, FO 371/82753/ET1202/47/G, TNA.
84 Kirkbride to Furlonge, 20 May 1950, FO371/82753/ET1202/47/G, TNA.
85 Rapp to Furlonge, 27 November 1950, FO371/82754/ET1202/66/G, TNA.
War Office perspective, but warned that the political effects of over Anglicisation could prove counter-productive.\(^{86}\)

While Robertson and Kirkbride held polarised positions, Glubb took up an intermediate stance as he hoped to benefit from greater military efficiency while warding off any political dangers. Since the end of the 1948 War Glubb had been in favour of Anglicisation as a means of bringing the Arab Legion up to speed after it unofficially and rapidly doubled in size during the course of the 1948 War. This left him at odds with Kirkbride. As Glubb explained to Lash: ‘You are aware that Kirkbride is carrying on a war against us for over Anglicization.’\(^{87}\) Glubb understood that British officers were needed to manage the proposed expansion and to oversee the technical changes in the Arab Legion’s role and train Arab officers.\(^{88}\) After two years of under-funding and a persistent conflict along the border with Israel, Glubb became increasingly frustrated and desperate for the Arab Legion to obtain greater resources. He therefore welcomed the planned reorganisation of the Arab Legion – including increased Anglicisation. This is an aspect of Glubb’s attitude that Ron Pundik has overlooked. He has suggested that Glubb was at one with Kirkbride on this issue.\(^{89}\) In fact, Glubb was much more pragmatic – at least initially.

Glubb was keenly aware of the dangers of Anglicisation and he did not promote permanent Anglicisation of the Legion. Glubb acknowledged Kirkbride’s concern, noting: ‘There is a good deal in what he says. It is such an easy and slippery slope, and has I think been responsible more than anything for the

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\(^{86}\) Kirkbride to Furlonge, 20 May 1950, FO371/82753/ET1202/47/G, TNA.

\(^{87}\) Glubb to Lash, 17 June 1950, GP2006, 47.

\(^{88}\) Glubb to Robertson, 10 February 1951, Melville Papers, 2/26.

\(^{89}\) Pundik, *Struggle for Sovereignty*, p. 270.
tragedies of India and Egypt.' Glubb continued to work along the premise that: 'as soon as an Arab Officer is available to do any job, we want to get rid of the corresponding British Officer.' Glubb thus advocated to MELF that a fixed establishment should not set the number of British officers. Rather, the establishment should be flexible so that they can be replaced by Arab officers as and when appropriate. Moreover, Glubb was wary that military efficiency could not be the sole criteria driving the Arab Legion reorganisation. The future of Brigadier 'Teal' Ashton was a case in point. After visiting the Arab Legion, in autumn 1950, Robertson came away hugely impressed, but he was concerned about the quality of some British officers. Robertson picked out Ashton as having 'gone to seed' and requested: 'He should not stay there any longer and Glubb Pasha will take steps to bring his appointment to an early end.' Glubb did not completely concur, however. He opined that: 'he is actually very useful to us'. Glubb explained:

> I agree [Ashton] is not fit to command a brigade in war. On the other hand, he is extremely competent at training infantry up to battalion level. He was Chief Instructor at the Middle East training centre during the last war. He also now speaks Arabic and has a thorough knowledge of the country and has worked on the National Guard since it's [sic] inception. It is essential for me to have someone in the static headquarters in West Jordan who has local contacts, speaks Arabic, liaises with the police and can organise the National Guard in villages.

In short, the military efficiency of officers seconded from the British Army could not compensate for the value of having locally engaged officers. Glubb

90 Glubb to Lash, 17 June 1950, GP2006, 47.
91 Glubb to Robertson, 10 February 1951, GP2006, 2.
92 Robertson to Brownjohn, 24 October 1950, WO216/718, TNA.
93 Glubb to Robertson, 10 February 1951, GP2006, 2.
understood this and hoped to find a balance between military efficiency and political sensitivity.

Glubb had already had success since the end of the 1948 War with a military initiative, which had a positive political effect. In May 1949 Glubb proposed the formation of ‘a sort of Home Guard’. And within a month the ‘National Guard’ was created, which provided basic training to villagers in the areas of Palestine occupied by Jordan, and armed them with rifles. The primary rationale behind its creation was to protect the frontier against Israeli incursions. Given its length the Arab Legion could not adequately secure the entire border. Within a year of its establishment the National Guard was ‘no longer [just] an organisation for teaching villagers to defend their homes’; it had ‘become the main source of supply for recruits for the regular army’. By 1951 the National Guard meant the Arab Legion had a pool of men from which it could raise several thousand new recruits in 24 hours. This is what enabled Glubb to raise the Arab Legion establishment to 13,500 so quickly on 1 April 1951. The creation of the National Guard had a second effect, however. As well as providing a rudimentary military force for the defence of Jordan’s frontier with Israel the programme of popular military training had the political effect of rallying the people around the present administration. As a result, Glubb reported a marked improvement in the internal security situation in Palestine by mid-July 1949. During the National Guard’s infancy Glubb surmised: ‘The immediate

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97 Glubb to Wardrop, 21 April 1951, FO371/91820/ET1201/25, TNA.
military value of these activities has been small, but the political effect has been remarkable.’ This initiative appeared to successfully counter much of the propaganda being spouted by the neighbouring Arab states. The National Guard thus proved to be a successful defence initiative, which also had a positive political effect; it helped galvanise the enlarged Jordanian state and offset some of the potential problems of integrating a Palestinian majority.

Anglicisation of the Arab Legion was something quite different, however, and much less likely to have the same positive political effect – unless, perhaps, the increased military efficiency would prove successful in a conflict with the Israelis – a scenario which never materialised. The key to its success, therefore, was to keep any political issues in check. In Glubb’s view, ensuring the right men were found could eliminate the potential dangers. Shortly after the 1948 War ended Glubb complained that: ‘The selection of British Officers for the Arab Legion has not during the past 3 years, been entirely satisfactory.’ Glubb considered it ‘most important at the present time that the best and most efficient British Officers should be posted to the Legion which has rapidly expanded in the last year and is short of fully trained officers’. With the British Army taking a keener interest in the military efficiency of, and compatibility with, the Arab Legion, in 1951 it was seemingly set to provide Glubb with the better quality officer he had long desired. In a memo to the Vice-Chief of the Imperial General Staff, Robertson asserted: ‘I hope that special efforts will be made to provide first class officers for these jobs. Even second class is not good enough and can do us more harm than good.’ While recognising that the Arab Legion was technically a

100 Glubb to The Adjutant General, ‘Selection of British Officers for the Arab Legion’, 22 June 1949, GP2006, 55.
Robertson argued that owing to Britain’s ‘special interest’ in it, it should not be treated as such. Robertson urged most strongly that ‘the requirements of the Arab Legion should be handled as expeditiously as those of our own forces’. Moreover, Glubb was given further encouragement by the Chief of the Imperial General Staff, Field-Marshall Sir William Slim, who wrote: ‘I can assure you that I wish to send you the best possible officers and will do all that I can to do so. ... Rest assured that the provision of first-rate British officers for the Arab Legion and for similar forces is having my personal attention’.

In reality the Arab Legion did not get the first-class officers Glubb desired and he quickly came to realise that the 1951 reorganisation was not as positive as he hoped. Although Slim had promised to give the search for first-rate British officers his personal attention, he was also advised to consider the Arab Legion’s needs within the context of the broader British military requirements lest they fall prey to reacting to pressure from Glubb, who was described as a ‘most persuasive and persistent chap’. Slim was advised: ‘the Arab Legion should have its share of nuggets, but that will not work out at 100%’. Although the Arab Legion was getting greater attention as a quasi-British division in the event of war with the Soviet Union, the Arab Legion remained subordinate to a genuine British division and would have to accept at least some British officers of ‘average quality’.

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101 Robertson to Brownjohn, 24 October 1950, WO216/718, TNA.
102 Slim to Glubb, 30 November 1950, ibid.
104 ‘Expansion of the Arab Legion’, Mcleod, (DMO) to GHQ MELF, 31 May 1951, WO216/718, TNA.
Having considered Kirkbride’s ‘anxiety’ over Anglicisation to be ‘groundless’ in June 1950, a year later, and less than two months after the reorganisation began, Glubb took ‘fright at the same issue’. 105 Both Glubb and Kirkbride were now united in their concern that the decreasing number of contract officers risked weakening the ‘close relationship which must exist between the officers and the men of the Legion’. 106 As Glubb explained: ‘One always has to remember that the high morale of the Arab Legion is due to the fact that they think themselves an Arab Army’. 107 Ron Pundik described the competition between contract versus seconded officers as being a battle between the ‘sentimental’ and the ‘professional’. 108 This appraisal, however, does scant justice to Kirkbride’s astute political acumen and his, and Glubb’s awareness of Jordan’s precarious political balance, in an age of Arab nationalism and anti-imperialism. Neither of them were motivated by a rustic fantasy of the past. Both were singularly concerned with the pragmatic reality of raising the standards of the Arab Legion in due consideration of the politics of the day. Glubb became particularly concerned that Arab Legion correspondence was increasingly being conducted in English, which served to isolate non-English speaking Arab officers and placed a disproportionate amount of power in the hands of interpreters. 109 This, Glubb warned, was likely to arouse criticism from anti-British elements. He added: ‘This “rule of the interpreters” has been one of the major causes of the downfall of many other regimes – e.g. the French in Syria.’110 Wary of the

105 Kirkbride to Furlonge, 21 May 1951, FO371/91820/ET1201/33, TNA.
106 Wardrop to R.A. Fyffe, 17 July 1951, FO371/91821/ET1201/43, TNA.
107 Glubb to Robertson, 17 May 1951, GP2006, 93.
108 Pundik, Struggle for Sovereignty, pp. 270-1.
109 Glubb to Robertson, 17 May 1951, GP2006, 93.
110 Glubb to Lash, 17 June 1950, GP2006, 47.
‘dangers of too much anglicization’, Glubb warned: ‘If the Arab Legion were to become a T.J.F.F. it would end up in a similar fiasco.’ As a British colonial force dominated by a large cadre of British officers the TJFF lacked the esprit de corps associated with the Arab Legion and was the subject of a mutiny amongst the Arab non-commissioned officers and a plot to seize arms and turn against the British during the Second World War. In May 1950, during his battle with Kirkbride, Glubb was at pains to point out that while ‘the TJFF should certainly be a lesson to us, it should not be assumed that we are repeating their mistake’. Twelve months later, with the reorganisation in full swing, however, Glubb was now taking fright at the very issue he had previously downplayed. This prompted Glubb to keep a watchful eye on the situation as he warned: ‘At the moment we are moving steadily, if unconsciously, towards becoming a unit of the British Army.’ Glubb was fully aware that: ‘The Arab Legion will be more loyal as an equal ally than it would as a paid servant!’ He warned: ‘It is not possible to have a first class army based on a politically hostile country. It is therefore absolutely essential for us to avoid the development of anti-British feeling in Jordan.’

Meanwhile increasing Anglicization of the Arab Legion coincided with an increasing anti-British Arab nationalist sentiment throughout the Middle East and within Jordan and the Arab Legion. In part, Glubb’s initial support for Anglicisation, was a reaction against this trend. Glubb felt that since the Legion’s rapid expansion since 1941, they had been promoting young Arab officers too

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111 Glubb to Melville, 19 May 1951, Melville Papers, 4/43.
113 Glubb to Kirkbride, 27 May 1950, FO816/165, TNA.
114 Glubb to Melville, 19 May 1951, Melville Papers, 4/43.
115 Glubb to Robertson, 17 May 1951, GP2006, 93.
fast, thus giving these officers ‘swollen heads’. In consultation with the Jordanian Minister of Defence he noted: ‘We are now in a period of reaction against too rapid promotion.’\textsuperscript{116} The most ardent dissenter in the immediate post-1948 era, and the swollen head Glubb particularly had in mind, was Abdullah al-Tall. With the support of the king – and against the wishes of Glubb – al-Tall rose through the ranks in 1948, playing a key role in the events of the conflict.\textsuperscript{117} Abdullah al-Tall spent most of his time in Jerusalem during the war. As the second truce began al-Tall suggested that the Arab Legion should ‘change from the defensive [sic] to the offensive’ in Jerusalem.\textsuperscript{118} As far as he was concerned Jerusalem was the most important objective, and as the most senior Arab commander in Jerusalem, whom, al-Tall said, people thought was, ‘in charge of the all Arab forces in the city’, he demanded that he be given the support he requested. If not, he wrote: ‘I beg you to release me from this great responsibility and transfer me to anywhere else so that the responsibility of defending Jerusalem does not rest on me.’\textsuperscript{119} This perhaps explains why al-Tall kept copies of secret correspondence between Abdullah and the Israelis, which he later passed onto the Egyptian press after his resignation from the Arab Legion in 1949. Glubb believed that this action ‘proved he was contemplating treachery even when he was high in the King’s favour’.\textsuperscript{120} Yet perhaps his initial motivation for making copies was less about betrayal and more about stockpiling evidence to absolve himself of responsibility for the Arab Legion’s defensive posture during the 1948 War. Whatever the motivation, he became an outspoken critic of the Anglo-

\textsuperscript{116} Glubb to Kirkbride, 27 May 1950, FO816/165, TNA.
\textsuperscript{117} Glubb, \textit{Soldier}, p. 255.
\textsuperscript{118} Lt. Col. [Abdullah al-Tall’s handwriting] to Comd 4 Bde, undated, GP2006, 86.
\textsuperscript{119} ‘Subject: Defence of Jerusalem’, Abdullah al-Tall to OC 4 Bde, undated, ibid.
\textsuperscript{120} Glubb, \textit{Soldier}, pp. 255-7.
Abdullah regime and a year after Glubb published his own memoirs in 1957, al-Tall followed suit, but with a very different, anti-British account. Alongside the ex-Mufti, Hajj Amin al Husseini, he became the standard bearer of anti-British and anti-Hashemite Arab nationalism after 1948.

The primary threat facing the Anglo-Abdullah regime from nationalist enemies was assassination. Abdullah had already been the subject of a failed assassination attempt while the armistice negotiations were still taking place. On 26 March 1949 an improvised explosive device was discovered on the road to the King’s palace in Shuneh. The two men arrested had received their orders from two of the Mufti’s supporters and they ‘confessed that they had been sent from Damascus to murder King Abdulla’. The arrested men alleged that the Mufti, the Chief of the Damascus Police and the President of the Syrian Republic, Shukri Bey al-Kuwatli, were all involved in the assassination plot. Moreover, they provided a list of other assassination targets, which included Glubb, the Regent of Iraq, and six other prominent Hashemite and pro-Hashemite Arabs. In April 1950 Glubb reported that Jordan’s new Palestinians greeted King Abdullah with immense popularity and that the general situation in Jordan was more favourable than they would have dared hope a few months ago. Yet there remained an ever-increasing undercurrent of antipathy toward the Anglo-Hashemite clique in Jordan and the threat from external enemies remained ever-present. At the end of April 1950 Kirkbride, who was not known for hysteria or falling foul of idle gossip, informed Glubb:

121 For a reconciliation of the two texts account of 1948 see: Rogan, ‘Jordan and 1948’, pp. 104-24.
123 Glubb to H.E. Pyman, 31 March 1949, ibid.
I have heard, from what has proved to be a fairly reliable source in the past, that the pro-Mufti elements in Syria and Beirut are considering embarking on a campaign of assassination of British Officers of the Arab Legion. They have decided that murdering Arabs would probably react against their party but that British Officers ruling an Arab reactionary force would be fair game and would create disorder here without necessarily attracting any disapproval from the Arab world.125

British officers provided a convenient target for the enemies of the Anglo-Hashemite regime and increasing Anglicisation of the Arab Legion merely added fuel to the fire. It was arguably only a matter of time before the assassination campaign caught up with Jordan and on 16 July 1951 the country was rocked by the assassination of the former Prime Minister of Lebanon, Riyadh al Sulh, who was shot in Amman. Two days later Abdullah ‘received an anonymous letter warning him that he and I [Glubb] were about to be killed’.126 Forty-eight hours later, on 20 July, the king was shot in the head at point blank range by a Palestinian Arab as he entered the Al-Aqsa Mosque in Jerusalem. One of the men charged in connection with the conspiracy to murder the king was none other than Abdullah al-Tall.

In some respects Abdullah’s assassination was a catastrophic failure for the Arab Legion. It was ‘normal practice’ that ‘any place visited by the King should be thoroughly inspected 24 hours beforehand and a police guard be on permanent duty in the place during the 24 hours before the King arrives’. However, it was noted that: ‘For some reason, perhaps connected with the religious body, this does not appear to have been done in this case.’ Consequently the assassin was able to lie in wait inside the doors of the Mosque. Moreover, as the king approached the entrance he was able to move away from

125 Kirkbride to Glubb, 28 April 1950, GP2006, 38.
126 Glubb to Kirkbride, 7 August 1951, FO371/91823/ET1201/75, TNA.
the escort of officers surrounding him and entered alone – leaving him completely at the mercy of the assassin. The Arab Legion’s failings continued in the immediate aftermath. An Arab Legion officer, ‘Rocky’ Walsh, reported:

There was pandemonium and the King’s escort, which was not his normal one from the Hash[emite] Regiment but came from the 8th Regiment, became completely out of hand. I do not have all the facts of the case but it seems that a considerable number of people were shot. Radi Ennab [Chief of Police, Jerusalem District] himself was shot and is still seriously wounded. Whether or not he and the others were shot by the assassin as he fell down or by mistake by the escort, I do not know.

It was a disaster for the Arab Legion, although it must be qualified that Abdullah was a reluctant subject of protection, even in such difficult circumstances. Glubb instructed the escort ‘to take special precautions as to his security’. However, in the event it was ‘extremely difficult to make everything absolutely secure in view of the large crowds and the Old City itself’. Moreover, Abdullah proved himself to be impatient and ‘requested to be left alone’ so that he could speak to members of the crowd.127 It is somewhat ironic that Abdullah’s final moments played out like a microcosm of his whole life. Abdullah, the ‘falcon trapped in a canary’s cage’, was eager to spread his wings, but relied on the British cage for his security and having escaped the cage of the security that surrounded him during his visit to Jerusalem, the falcon was shot dead.

Politically and strategically Abdullah’s death was a huge blow to the status quo that the British had been trying to maintain via Jordan ever since it had decided to withdraw from Palestine. It was a huge blow personally for Glubb who ‘wept almost throughout’ at the king’s funeral.128 Yet, more importantly, it plunged the whole country and its relationship with Britain into unchartered

127 ‘Rocky’ to Melville, 24 July 1951, Melville Papers, 6/57.
128 Ibid.
territory. The 1951 reorganisation of the Arab Legion had been enabled because of the certainty of the Abdullah connection. Right to the end Abdullah was supportive of British intentions with regard the Arab Legion. In one of his final acts Abdullah helped counter opposition to the 1951 Arab Legion reorganisation plan. Glubb emphasised that:

the King and Cabinet are 100% on our side. The fact that they dissolved Parliament when some members got “fresh”, is proof of the fact. What they do say to us is “we will deal with these trouble-makers. But meanwhile please help us by not doing anything which gives them too obvious a chance to criticize us”.\(^{129}\)

It was a feature of British policy in the region that: ‘As long as King Abdullah lives, the Arab Legion is almost certain to be entirely at the disposal of Britain in an emergency.’\(^{130}\) Abdullah proved this when he dissolved parliament and when he ‘assured’ General Robertson that, ‘in the event of trouble with Russia his forces would be unreservedly at our disposal from the start’.\(^{131}\) Abdullah’s acquiescence in Britain’s expansion of the Arab Legion was not surprising. He understood that the more Britain relied on the Arab Legion the more support he would receive. Abdullah and the Jordanian Government, like Glubb, had, for a long time, been attempting to coax out additional British support and one of their primary tools had been to emphasise – and often exaggerate – the communist threat. Just a month before the Korean conflict began, as the 1950/1 subsidy was being discussed, the Jordanian Government warned, while requesting more money, that:

> In the last two years, communism has made great progress in the Middle East, based on Israel and Lebanon, and has permeated

\(^{129}\) Glubb to Robertson, 17 May 1951, GP2006, 93.
\(^{130}\) ‘A Note on the Employment of Arab Armies’, Unsigned, 30 October 1949, GP2006, 47.
\(^{131}\) Robertson to N.C.D. Brownjohn (VCIGS), 24 October 1950, GP2006, 57.
actively into Jordan. The Russians aim to bring ruin and confusion to the Arab countries, as they have China, Burma, Malaya, and Greece.\textsuperscript{132}

This warning was designed to encourage increased British assistance, yet it made no bearing on the British subsidy in 1950. Charles Tilly has written that: “governments themselves commonly simulate, stimulate, or even fabricate threats of external war” for their own ends’.\textsuperscript{133} This is essentially what Abdullah had been doing in order to coax out increased British support. He may have been largely unsuccessful – except in as far as convincing the British that Jordan was considered worth supporting because of its loyalty – but he was well primed to accept and support the 1951 reorganisation and Anglicisation of the Arab Legion. For many years British policy in and around Jordan had been framed around the reliable loyalty of King Abdullah, but in July 1951 that anchor was removed.

In comparison to its size and wealth, the Hashemite Kingdom became an increasingly disproportionate part of Britain’s position in the Middle East, but the British emerged from the 1948 War committed to Greater Transjordan despite its financial unviability because of the reliability of the Abdullah connection, especially given the weakness of Britain’s relationship with the other Arab states. In 1951 the Abdullah alliance proved its worth, as Britain was able to bolster the defence of its world system by reorganising the Arab Legion into a quasi-British division. The onset of the Cold War raised the stakes in the race for world power status and although the Soviet Union and the US emerged as the benefactors of the changing post-war global order, Britain had no intention of relinquishing its status as a world power and very much saw itself as a key Cold

War competitor. The British were determined to hold onto their world system and were equally determined to make greater use of it as a source of self-preservation. The changing role of the Arab Legion between 1948-51 provides a clear indicator of this trend. An important point worth emphasising, which emerges from Britain’s post-1948 attitude toward the Arab Legion is that it shows that until 1951 Britain did not support Jordan because of the Arab Legion. Rather, it supported the Arab Legion because of the Jordanian connection. Despite proving its military worth in 1948, only in 1951 did the Arab Legion assume greater responsibilities beyond Jordan’s borders. This was a radical turnaround from 1946 when the Arab Legion was set to be disbanded and its role in Palestine was to be replaced by the TJFF because it was deemed politically expedient to be using the Jordanian Army for purposes beyond its own borders.

The fate of the Arab Legion in the two years following the 1948 War was further evidence of Abdullah’s subordination to Britain. Abdullah was beholden to Britain and despite his use of the Soviet threat he failed to coax out additional British support. Until the summer of 1950 Abdullah and Glubb had been the most ardent advocators of Arab Legion expansion. After the start of the Korean War, however, this changed and HMG became the driving force. Both Abdullah and Glubb were therefore receptive to this, which enabled their dream of Arab Legion expansion to become a reality. The problem, however, was that this reorganisation was being driven by military efficiency, which jarred with rising anti-British Arab nationalism. When change did finally emerge it came at the most inopportune moment. The reorganisation began in April 1951 and within four months the Hashemite Kingdom was plunged into uncertainty. Just as the
British became more reliant on the Arab Legion, Abdullah, the man that helped allow the British to do almost as they pleased, was assassinated. In an instant Jordan had become a canary’s cage without a falcon.
6 A Puppeteer in search of a Puppet: The Royal Succession and Britain’s Policy of Selective Non-Intervention

While the focus during the months prior to Abdullah’s assassination was on the reorganisation of the Arab Legion for Cold War purposes, the king’s assassination provided the British with a much more pressing concern: how to maintain the ‘special’ relationship with Jordan that they had been able to depend upon with Abdullah. His death, on 20 July 1951, initiated a period of uncertainty for both parties of the Anglo-Jordanian relationship. This chapter therefore digresses from the primary focus of the Arab Legion to assess Britain’s involvement during the succession crisis. Abdullah’s assassination opened up the Pandora’s box of Jordan’s future at an inopportune moment. Not only was Jordan forced to face a future without its founding ruler, but also Abdullah’s successor was far from clear-cut. His son, Talal, eventually succeeded Abdullah on 6 September, seven weeks after his father’s assassination, but Talal’s reign lasted less than a year. He was deposed on 11 August 1952 and Talal’s teenage son, Hussein, was immediately proclaimed king before formally acceding the throne on 2 May 1953; during which time a Regency Council dominated by the Prime Minister, Tewfiq Abul Huda, held the reins. There is a surprising dearth of literature on the question of succession and the short reign of King Talal. Only three studies broach this topic.¹ Yet none of these explore the British angle in any great depth. This chapter seeks to fill this gap and by detailing Britain’s manipulation of events after Abdullah’s assassination this chapter identifies Britain’s will and its ability to influence high-policy in Jordan in order to ensure

¹ Satloff, Jordan in Transition, pp. 3-57; Shlaim, Lion of Jordan, pp. 40-60; Ashton, King Hussein, pp. 13-36.
that it remained a reliable geostrategic asset, despite the loss of the relationship’s principal prop.

When Abdullah passed away the question of who would succeed him was far from straightforward. Abdullah left behind two sons: Princes Talal and Naif. Constitutionally, Talal, as the eldest son, was the natural and rightful heir to the throne. However, Talal’s long-held status as heir had been an uneasy one owing to a fractious relationship with his father; the result of what appeared to be a clash of personalities, but in hindsight this clash was a consequence of Talal’s tragic mental illness. During a period of intense dispute between the pair, at the height of the Second World War, Abdullah stripped Talal of that right via a secret irade [royal command]. By the end of the war, however, relations had improved, the secret irade was cancelled, and Abdullah publicly confirmed Talal as heir to the throne.² However, during the weeks immediately preceding his assassination Abdullah had been seriously reconsidering Talal’s status. At the end of 1950 Kirkbride reported a renewed deterioration in their relationship.³ Subsequently, when Abdullah visited Turkey during May 1951 he preferred to appoint Naif as Regent, in his absence, as he and the Prime Minister, Samir Rifai, had become angered with Talal due to him compiling huge, unexplainable debts. Kirkbride advised against such a public rebuke of the heir to the throne and reluctantly Abdullah appointed Talal Regent on the proviso that he made a ‘signed undertaking to do or not do certain things in which the King took a personal interest’.⁴ Within hours of Abdullah’s departure to Turkey, however, Talal telephoned Kirkbride and asked a series of questions that made Kirkbride

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² Kirkbride to Baxter, 25 March 1947, FO371/62220/E2874, TNA.
³ Kirkbride to Furlonge, 27 December 1950, FO371/91836/ET1941/1, TNA.
⁴ Kirkbride to Furlonge, 9 May 1951, FO371/91836/ET1941/9, TNA.
believe ‘something serious had happened to his mind’. Showing signs of paranoia
Talal told the Prime Minister that he believed Abdullah had been sent into exile
as part of a plot to make Naif king and he believed that he himself would shortly
be killed to make way for Naif.5 As Kirkbride explained: ‘This was bad enough,
but worse was to come’. The following day Talal attempted to murder his wife,
Sharifa Zein, while she was in hospital with their three-day old baby, Princess
Basma.6 In Kirkbride’s account: ‘At 3 am ... Talal forced his way into [the]
hospital, and after announcing that he was not the father of the baby, attacked
his wife with a dagger.’ He was disarmed before he had a chance to hurt her, but
later that day he was found using violence to extort information from his ten-
year old son, Prince Muhammad.7 As a result of this episode the Prime Minister,
the Minister of Health and Kirkbride agreed that Talal should be sent to Beirut to
be seen by a mental health specialist and, still believing there was a plot to
assassinate him in Amman, Talal willingly departed.8 This episode merely
compounded Abdullah’s concerns about Talal’s suitability to rule. Despite what
the Jordanian constitution said, Abdullah felt that the throne was in his gift.
Samir Rifai suggested that Abdullah immediately remove Talal from the line of
succession, but after a talk with Kirkbride Abdullah decided to wait until Talal
returned from the holiday that he had taken to recover from this recent episode
before making a final decision. Kirkbride explained: ‘I agreed to this, with the
hope (unexpressed) that nothing would happen in the meanwhile to His

5 Amman to FO, 162, 16 May 1951, FO371/91836/ET1941/2, TNA.
6 Walker to Cairo, 8 June 1951, FO371/91836/ET1941/12, TNA.
7 Kirkbride to Furlonge, 17 May 1951, FO371/91836/ET1941/4/G, TNA.
8 Ashton, King Hussein, pp. 21-2.
Majesty.” Yet within just three days of returning to Amman, ’Talal made another murderous attack on his wife and children’, and, as a consequence, on 10 July, he departed for further treatment in Geneva. Ten days later, while Talal was still convalescing in Switzerland, Abdullah was assassinated and as such, Talal, constitutionally at least, remained heir to the throne. However, Talal’s present incapacity and Abdullah’s apparent wishes put Talal’s succession in serious doubt.

In Talal’s absence Naif was installed as Regent after Abdullah’s death. Officially he was holding the fort in his brother’s absence, but within days of the assassination Kirkbride noticed that Naif was ‘showing signs of wanting the throne for himself’. Under the influence of his wife’s family and other palace officials, Naif was soon openly expressing his designs on the throne. According to Kirkbride, the whole Palace had become ‘a welter of intrigue’. Naif’s claim to the throne had some credence, however. Unlike Talal, Naif had a stable relationship with his father and on the eve of his assassination Abdullah had, in the presence of Naif, told Malcolm Walker, from the British Legation in Amman, that in Arab tradition, ‘the bravest, wisest, strongest and, generally, the most suitable member of the reigning family should succeed’. He added: ‘since Talal was incapable and Talal’s eldest son was an untried boy, the only man who fulfilled all the requirements was the Amir Naif’. Abdullah made it clear that he did not propose to take any definite action until Sir Alec Kirkbride returned but [prophetically] he wanted His Majesty’s Government

9 Kirkbride to Furlonge, 2 June 1951, FO371/91836/ET1941/9, TNA.
10 Walker to Furlonge, 11 July 1951, FO371/91836/ET1941/25, TNA.
11 Amman to FO, 259, 25 July 1951, FO371/91838/ET1942/28, TNA.
12 Kirkbride to Furlonge, 23 August 1951, FO371/91837/ET1941/51, TNA.
13 Amman to FO, 264, 27 July 1951, FO371/91838/ET1942/33, TNA.
to know that if in the meanwhile anything should happen to him, those were his wishes.14

When Abdullah was murdered Kirkbride was still absent on leave and so no definite action was taken, but it is pertinent to note that: firstly, Abdullah deemed it necessary that the British be informed of his wishes – apparently he believed that they had a role as kingmaker; secondly, he required – or at least desired – Kirkbride’s approval; and, thirdly, this meant it was apparently clear to the British that Abdullah wanted Naif to succeed him.

Meanwhile, the Iraqis, who also had designs on the throne, muddied the royal succession waters further. Like Naif they could also point to tangible indicators that Abdullah intended to forge a stronger union of the two Hashemite kingdoms. In the spring of 1951 Abdullah put forward a proposal that would make King Feisal II of Iraq his heir. The Iraqi Government returned with a counter proposal that would allow for steps to be taken over the following five years to align the two countries in such a way that they could be united under Feisal upon Abdullah’s death.15 With Abdullah’s passing, however, this dialogue was cut-short.16 That was not the end of the matter though. On the morning after Abdullah’s assassination the Regent of Iraq, Abdulilah, notified Kenneth Younger, Minister of State at the Foreign Office, of these plans and requested he inform the Foreign Secretary, Herbert Morrison, of the situation. He was sounding the British out; testing the water to see if this proposal might become a reality.17 The Iraqis also, it seems, considered the British to be kingmakers. Within twenty-four

14 Walker to Furlonge, 11 July 1951, FO371/91836/ET1941/25, TNA.
15 Kenneth Younger to Eastern Department, FO, 21 July 1951, FO371/91797/ET10393/3, TNA.
17 Kenneth Younger to Eastern Department, FO, 21 July 1951, FO371/91797/ET10393/3, TNA.
hours of Abdullah’s assassination Jordan was faced with a serious succession struggle. The natural heir to the throne was incapacitated in Europe. Meanwhile, two other Hashemite contenders had tangible and competing evidence seen by the British that suggested Abdullah wanted them to succeed him.

Before the question of royal succession could be resolved, however, Jordan went through a Prime Ministerial change, which the British had been tempted to halt. After learning of Naif’s desire to remove him, just days after Abdullah’s death Samir Rifai tendered his resignation. Before accepting it, however, Naif, like his father, sought Kirkbride’s counsel. Kirkbride much preferred not to see any changes take place so soon. However, Rifai requested that Kirkbride not intervene for fear that he would appear to be kept in power by the British. 18 Local convention meant that regime change required the resignation of the existing government. 19 Consequently, Kirkbride muted his disapproval, Rifai’s resignation was accepted, and Jordan’s other perennial Prime Minister, Tewfiq Abul Huda, replaced him. 20 The Foreign Office later commented that Samir’s decision to ‘refuse the British support that might have kept him in power, but embarrassed him and us’ was ‘wise and important’ and ‘should not be overlooked’. 21 Indeed, seemingly it was not overlooked, because this was to set a tone of selective non-intervention that would characterise British policy throughout the next twelve months as Britain helped guide Jordan through two successive royal successions.

18 Kirkbride to Furlonge, 25 July 1951, FO816/172, TNA.
19 Satloff, Jordan in Transition, p. 22.
20 Kirkbride to Furlonge, 25 July 1951, FO816/172, TNA.
21 Minute by Hunter, 8 August 1951, FO371/91789/ET1015/17, TNA.
With the change of government complete the full attention of the Jordanian Government, and the British, could be given to the royal succession. Eventually Talal did succeed his father. How and why this occurred provides a fascinating insight into the nature of British involvement in independent Jordan. The existing literature has tended to gloss over Britain’s role in these events, but Britain’s attitude and influence were crucial and worth identifying. While Nigel Ashton surmises that events during the five weeks between Abul Huda’s appointment and Talal’s succession ‘remain somewhat murky’, he asserts that ‘the basic outline of what transpired can be deciphered’. He explains that:

For various reasons, including an improvement in his health, the vigorous sponsorship of his wife Zein, the backing of the Saudis and the political ineptitude of Nayif, Talal emerged as Abu’l Huda’s favoured candidate for the throne.22

Curiously he omits to mention arguably the most significant factor and the one that we have most information about: Britain. The official records in London show beyond doubt that HMG quickly favoured Talal and why it discounted the other options. Avi Shlaim does intimate that ‘Kirkbride and Glubb Pasha together played a critical part in resolving the crisis of the succession in favour of Prince Talal and ultimately his son Hussein.’23 However, he does not go into any detail of their involvement. This chapter delves into this hidden detail to reveal the nature of British interests and influence during this pivotal moment in Jordan’s history.

The British were certainly opposed to the first alternative to Talal: Naif.24 Ashton notes that: ‘To date no evidence has come to light as to why the British

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22 Ashton, *King Hussein*, p. 25.
24 Ibid., p. 53.
government failed to act on King Abdullah’s final wishes regarding the succession and support Nayif’s persistence in pursuing his claim to the throne.’25

However, there is pretty clear evidence that the British had no faith in Naif as being good for either Jordan or Britain. Throughout the Middle East it was widely believed that Britain was supporting Naif against Talal. Within the Egyptian and Syrian press, Naif was labelled ‘weak-minded and entirely subservient to British influence’. Meanwhile Talal was heralded as a ‘great patriotic anti-imperialist’.26

This was not true, however. The British considered Naif utterly undesirable. He was thought to be irresponsible and heavily involved in the trading of contraband.27 Kirkbride described him as being ‘quite unsuited for responsibility ... feather headed and too susceptible to the immediate influence around him’.28 Naif was unlikely to bring stability to the Hashemite state, because he was an unconstitutional heir and because he was criticised for being a British stooge. Coupled with Britain’s general dislike of Naif and the expectation that he was unlikely to be a reliable conduit for British policy, due to his apparent susceptibility to intrigue, it is far from surprising that the British offered no encouragement for Naif’s claim to the throne, despite Abdullah’s apparent wish.

The Hashemite Union option, on the other hand, did offer at least some attraction to the British. Prior to Abdullah’s death the Foreign Office was open to all possibilities with ‘the suggestion of some form of “Commonwealth” relationship’ with Iraq being described as ‘one of the best yet’.29 However, in the

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25 Ashton, King Hussein, p. 381.
26 Damascus to FO, 232, 23 July 1951, FO371/91838/ET1942/23, TNA.
27 ‘Likely Reactions in the Middle East on the Death of King Abdulla in Jordan’, undated, FO371/91839/ET1942/40, TNA.
28 Kirkbride to Furlonge, 23 August 1951, FO371/91836/ET1941/51, TNA.
29 Minute by Hunter, 18 June 1951, FO371/91836/ET1941/11, TNA.
final analysis the Foreign Office opposed union for two reasons. Firstly, it would upset the status quo in the Middle East and stir up Arab intrigue. Secondly, it was feared Britain’s position in Jordan might be weakened if it came under the domination of Bagdad.\(^{30}\) It was suggested by Saleh Jabr, the Iraqi Foreign Minister, that a Hashemite union would benefit Britain as Iraq could protect Jordan from Israel and from the intrigue of other Arab states and therefore enable Britain to secure its ends in Jordan ‘without being held responsible as at present for everything’ that went wrong.\(^ {31}\) The Foreign Office, however, believed that payment of the subsidy would mean that Britain would continue to be blamed for everything and that Jordan’s protection from Israel was better guaranteed by Britain and the Arab Legion.\(^ {32}\) Moreover, the head of the BMEO, Thomas Rapp, warned against the Arab Legion coming under the orders of Bagdad and the complication that would arise regarding the maintenance of British influence within the Legion.\(^ {33}\) This was particularly important given the increased significance of the Arab Legion as a constituent part of Britain’s global defence strategy since the onset of the Korean War.

Britain’s objection to a Hashemite union was not unanimous, however, and the debate that ensued revealed a key feature of British policy during this period of upheaval. That is: the policy of appearing neutral. Troutbeck, the British Minister in Bagdad, was critical of Rapp and the Foreign Office. He agreed that the disadvantages of union outweighed the advantages, but was quick to point out that this evaluation was predicated on the basis that it was possible to

\(^{30}\) FO to Bagdad, 720, 22 July 1951, FO371/91797/ET10393/3; Minute by Hunter, 25 July 1951, FO371/91797/ET10393/4, TNA.
\(^{31}\) Amman to FO, 253, 24 July 1951, FO371/91797/ET10393/4, TNA.
\(^{32}\) Minute by Hunter, 25 July 1951, ibid.
\(^{33}\) Rapp to Furlonge, 1 August 1951, FO371/91797/ET10393/17, TNA.
maintain an independent and friendly Jordan. This, Troutbeck felt, was a 'dubious proposition' that had been taken for granted. In Troutbeck’s view, the notion that Britain could ‘avoid serious repercussions in the Middle East merely by trying to ossify the present situation from which the principal prop [Abdullah] has been eliminated’, was wishful thinking in the extreme. In Troutbeck’s opinion, British policy regarding the royal succession should be shaped less by the question of which scenario was preferable, but instead more consideration should be given to the feasibility of Jordan remaining independent and friendly.

Troutbeck counselled:

If we played our cards well we might conceivably not only retain our position in Jordan but strengthen it in Iraq. Conversely, if we were to put a spoke in the wheel of union, we might seriously weaken our position in Iraq, and a strong position in Jordan would in that event surely be of much less use to us.34

At the core of this conflict of opinion was a striking commonality, which Hunter, within the Foreign Office Eastern Department, observed. He considered Troutbeck to have reached the same conclusion as the Foreign Office, but via a different route. At present, Britain’s interests were best served by continued control of the Arab Legion, and an independent Jordan. While Hunter recognised that at some point in the future Britain may be forced to take sides, he maintained that the tenet of British policy should be ‘to remain as far as possible on good terms with all concerned, and neutral as long as we can’.35 Troutbeck’s position was built upon the same premise. He warned that in order to avoid antagonising Iraq, ‘great care should be taken not to express our policy of neutrality, with which I agree, in such a way as to create suspicion that it masks a

34 Troutbeck to Furlonge, 15 August 1951, FO371/91798/ET10393/27, TNA.
35 ‘Jordan-Iraq Union’, Hunter, 30 August 1951, FO371/91798/ET10393/30, TNA.
positive hostility towards a closer association between the Hashemite
kingdoms.'\(^{36}\) With Abdullah gone and the prospect of Jordan being sucked into
the orbit of one of its Arab neighbours the Foreign Office concluded: The best
guarantee of Jordan's independence is clearly our continued support, and our
continued abstention from taking sides in any of the schemes of union.'\(^{37}\) It was
effectively agreed that HMG should avoid direct interference and avoid publicly
endorsing the question of union either way. The main difference of opinion was
merely that Troutbeck advised neutrality so as not to ostracise the Iraqis, while
the Foreign Office and the BMEO favoured neutrality as a means of enabling the
preferred option of sustaining the existing 'special relationship' with Jordan.

With Naif and the prospect of union with Iraq discounted by the British
this left two royal succession options: the constitutional heir, Talal, and his
seventeen-year-old son, Hussein. In the immediate aftermath Samir Rifai, the
Jordanian Prime Minister, was in favour of Talal being overlooked as Abdullah's
successor. He suggested to Kirkbride that 'the best solution' was for Talal to
forego his rights willingly and for the next in line, Hussein, to be proclaimed king
with Naif as Regent.\(^{38}\) However, as Hunter minuted: 'It may not be quite so
simple', as Abdul Rahman Azzam, the Egyptian Secretary-General of the Arab
League, had issued a statement 'suggesting that Talal, as the rightful heir and
opponent of Britain ... was being improperly deprived'.\(^{39}\) Talal's breakdown in
May had led Kirkbride to conclude that Talal was 'not fit to succeed to the

\(^{36}\) Troutbeck to FO, 612, 31 July 1951, F0371/91797/ET10393/11, TNA.
\(^{37}\) Minute by Hunter, 2 August 1951, F0371/91839/ET1942/40, TNA.
\(^{38}\) Amman to FO, 246, 22 July 1951, F0371/91836/ET1941/22, TNA.
\(^{39}\) Minute by Hunter, 24 July 1951, ibid.
Kirkbride to Furlonge, 17 May 1951, FO371/91836/ET1941/4/G, TNA.
41 Pirie-Gordon to Burrows, 12 July 1949, FO371/75316/E8782/G, TNA.
42 Minute by Hunter, 26 July 1951, FO371/91838/ET1942/25, TNA [emphasis in original].
43 Ashton, *King Hussein*, p. 25.
44 Kirkbride to Furlonge, 27 July 1951, FO816/172, TNA.
apolitical, and popular. Talal’s succession would provide a controllable pro-British heir without intimating British interference.

The British promoted Talal primarily because they believed he would be a benign ruler who would allow the teenage Hussein to accede to the throne when he came of age after a period of grooming at school in Harrow and later at the British military academy in Sandhurst. Hussein provided the best opportunity for the British to mould a long-term collaborator akin to Abdullah and thus uphold the status quo of the alliance and its strategic value. The principal problem of supporting the immediate accession of Hussein was his youth; a fact that was exacerbated by the equally young age of the heir to the other Hashemite line, Feisal II of Iraq. The question of succession therefore became not just a matter of who was most suitable or who had the constitutional right, but was as much about who was ready. British hopes for the future of Hashemite rule of Jordan were pinned on Hussein. And as Kirkbride noted: ‘the surest way of ensuring Hussein’s ultimate accession is for Talal to become the King first’. While Kirkbride feared that Talal’s popularity would ‘not survive his enthronement for long’, this mattered not.45 The British saw Hussein as the future of Jordan and saw Talal as a necessary, but brief constitutional interim.

Britain’s support for Talal’s accession has been obscured by the fallacy that Talal was anti-British. Yet the contemporary evidence suggests this was little more than a myth and acknowledging this is crucial to understanding British involvement during the royal succession crisis. In their memoirs, both Glubb and Kirkbride dismissed the notion that Talal was anti-British.46 Avi

45 Kirkbride to Furlonge, 23 August 1951, FO371/91837/ET1941/51, TNA.
46 Glubb, Soldier, pp. 281, 293; Kirkbride, From the Wings, p. 121.
Shlaim, however, has rejected their claims. He suggests they both played down Talal’s anti-British stance in their memoirs because of their ‘self-serving’ desire to ‘protect Britain’s reputation’. Shlaim described Talal as being completely at odds with his father in regard to their attitude toward Britain and explains that Talal ‘bitterly resented British interference in the affairs of his country’.47 However, the contemporary evidence indicates that both Glubb and Kirkbride provided an honest and accurate account in their memoirs. The evidence for Talal’s anti-British attitude goes back primarily to the Second World War, when he criticised his father for his pro-British policies. However, as Kirkbride outlined, Talal’s anti-British tirades were merely an expression of his personal problems with his father that prompted Abdullah to exclude Talal from the line of succession. Kirkbride certainly believed that Talal indulged in criticism of Abdullah’s pro-British policies ‘in order to make himself as big a nuisance as was possible’ and for ‘purely personal reasons’ related to the tension between father and son.48 All of the existing studies that refer to Talal’s anti-British stance emphasise the same quotation from 1939 in which Kirkbride described Talal as being, ‘at heart, deeply anti-British’.49 However, too much emphasis is placed on this single statement made at the start of the Second World War. Aside from such outbursts during periods of intense disagreement with his father, there is scant evidence – particularly after 1945 – to suggest that Talal was at all anti-British. Talal’s strained relations were primarily with his father, with both parties

48 Kirkbride to Baxter, 25 March 1947, FO371/62220/E2874, TNA.
49 Shlaim, Lion of Jordan, p. 43; Ashton, King Hussein, p. 20; Satloff, Jordan in Transition, p. 16.
deemed equally to blame for arguments that were deemed often ‘entirely childish’.\textsuperscript{50}

Given the awful relationship that Talal had with his father, the British offered Talal a sense of security. When, in 1950, he was due to become Regent while his father was absent from the country, Talal openly expressed his reluctance to accept this honour owing to the teasing that he suffered at the hands of Abdullah’s inner circle. In pained words, Talal lamented that those who make fun of him, ‘enjoy always his [Abdullah’s] encouragement and protection’. With fear preying on his mind it was to Kirkbride that he turned to for ‘support’ and ‘advice’.\textsuperscript{51} Moreover, the British Legation in Amman suggested that it ‘would not be an exaggeration to say that Talal’s only friends were British and American’.\textsuperscript{52} Back in 1949 Pirie-Gordon reported that Talal had ‘many friends amongst the British of his own age’ and that he ‘much likes being asked back to English homes, usually stipulating that there should be no Arabs among the guests.’\textsuperscript{53} Meanwhile Glubb always maintained that the ‘hostile propaganda’ regarding Talal’s enmity to Britain was ‘entirely without foundation’. And as Talal’s reign neared its end Glubb lamented that the king’s illness was ‘peculiarly poignant’ owing to his view that he was ‘so ideally qualified to be a successful King, had his health permitted’.\textsuperscript{54} Glubb described the ‘much publicized hatred of King Tellal to Britain’ as being ‘a piece of propaganda with no foundation

\textsuperscript{50} Kirkbride to Furlonge, 27 December 1950, FO371/91836/ET1941/1, TNA.
\textsuperscript{51} Talal to Kirkbride, 20 October 1950, FO816/166, TNA.
\textsuperscript{52} Walker to Eastern Department, FO, 16 August 1951, FO371/91837/ET1941/43, TNA.
\textsuperscript{53} Pirie-Gordon to Burrows, 12 July 1949, FO 371/75316/E8782/G.
\textsuperscript{54} ‘A Note on the Situation in Jordan’, Glubb, 1 July 1952, FO371/98861/ET1081/1, TNA.
whatever in fact’. 55 A prime example of this occurred in the spring of 1951 when it was reported in the Egyptian press that Talal had attacked both Glubb and his wife, Rosemary. 56 This story was completely false. However, as with any great lie, it was based on a truth. In this case the genesis of the story was the 3am attack by Talal on his own wife while she was in hospital just days after the birth of Princess Basma. The British certainly did not believe that Talal was anti-British and lamented the fact that this ‘canard’ of the extreme Arab press began to creep into British journals, such as the Daily Mail and the New Statesman. 57 This drastic misperception served Britain well, though, because it obscured Britain’s true desire and enabled its preferred outcome to reach fruition without the need for direct intervention.

Talal was eventually brought back to Amman to fill the void left by Abdullah at the beginning of September. Although there had been no immediate urgency to confirm Abdullah’s successor – thus allowing Talal time for convalescence and assessment in Europe – as time progressed so the urgency increased. Talal’s continued absence from the country and the resulting uncertainty fuelled rumours within Jordan and throughout the Middle East to the effect that Talal was being kept away as part of a British plot. Meanwhile Glubb and Kirkbride foresaw the possibility that Naif might use the Hashemite Regiment to carry out a coup d’etat and proclaim himself king before Talal returned from Geneva. To guard against this Glubb moved the Hashemite Regiment to Mafraq for ‘training’ while ensuring that two loyal Bedouin

56 Wardle-Smith to Chancery, 2 June 1951, FO371/91836/ET1941/8, TNA.
57 Walker to FO, 16 August 1951, FO371/91837/ET1941/43, TNA.
regiments were stationed on training exercises in Amman.\textsuperscript{58} It thus became increasingly imperative that Talal return as soon as possible and so put an end to the present political vacuum. Talal arrived back in Amman on 6 September and later that day took the required oath.\textsuperscript{59} It was believed that Talal’s succession would ‘kill’ the notion that there was a British plot to exclude him.\textsuperscript{60} As Furlonge outlined, ‘it was hoped that Talal’s presence would breed stability’.\textsuperscript{61} Initially this proved to be the case. The British Embassy in Alexandria reported that the Egyptian press had lost interest in Jordanian affairs as the ‘return of Talal has exploded the favourite theme of a British plot’.\textsuperscript{62} Meanwhile Glubb observed: ‘Now the country once more feels as secure, stable and contended [sic] as before the murder of King Abdullah.’\textsuperscript{63} Thus, the British had achieved exactly what they hoped without having to directly intervene. Jordanian stability had been maintained; a pro-British king had succeeded Abdullah; and this had all been attained without breaking the constitution and without the suggestion that it was the result of a British plot.

Less than two months after Talal’s return, however, the Anglo-Jordanian connection was rocked by another departure when, in late-December 1951, Kirkbride transferred to Libya after thirty years service in Palestine and Jordan. After the Prime Ministerial and royal successions this was the third change wrought by the death of Abdullah. Politically this departure was unnecessary and as such should perhaps have sent a signal to London that the status quo had

\textsuperscript{58} Kirkbride to Furlonge, 3 September 1951, FO371/91837/ET1941/55, TNA.
\textsuperscript{59} Kirkbride to Furlonge, 6 September 1951, FO371/91837/ET1941/60, TNA.
\textsuperscript{60} Kirkbride to Furlonge, 23 August 1951, FO371/91837/ET1941/51, TNA.
\textsuperscript{61} Minute by Furlonge, 12 September 1951, FO371/91797/ET10393/29, TNA.
\textsuperscript{62} Alexandria to FO, 3 October 1951, FO371/91793/ET10316/3, TNA.
been irrevocably shaken by the assassination of Abdullah. Indeed, the timing was particularly telling. Just days before Kirkbride’s departure was ratified he reported a serious decline in Talal’s mental state that was causing both him and Abul Huda considerable anxiety. Kirkbride warned: ‘One of the dangers of the situation is that Tewfiq [Abul Huda] and I are the only two people left who can calm the King down in his nervous fits and get him to do things without causing resentment. If the King turns against us [Abul Huda and Kirkbride], it will be awkward.’64 Given Kirkbride’s utter centrality to the king’s trust, it is most curious that only two days later Kirkbride advised that there was no local reason why he should not be redeployed from Amman to Tripoli. Against this, the Foreign Secretary, Anthony Eden, minuted: ‘I am very troubled by this.’65 Abdullah’s absence, however, had left Kirkbride with a determined urge to leave. He instigated the Foreign Office’s search for a suitable vacancy elsewhere in the Arab world and was determined that he not be held back.66 Kirkbride’s evident desperation to depart, while partly inspired by his personal sense of loss, was an ominous sign for the future of Anglo-Jordanian relations. It was the first real indication that British influence in Jordan was on a downward slope.

Kirkbride’s successor as British Minister to Jordan was Geoffrey Furlonge, who arrived in Amman on 14 February 1952.67 Robert Satloff has argued that this appointment was ill conceived.68 Yet in many ways he was a logical choice. Not least because he was well acquainted with the situation in Jordan having

64 Kirkbride to Furlonge, 26 November 1951, FO371/91837/ET1941/70, TNA.
65 Minute by Strang to Eden, 30 November 1951, ibid.
66 Kirkbride, From the Wings, p. 145.
been the primary recipient of Glubb's and Kirkbride's recent reports, in his capacity as Head of the Foreign Office's Eastern Department. Furlonge, therefore, began his post as up to speed as anybody outside Amman could be. The fact of the matter was that Kirkbride was irreplaceable. It was almost inevitable that his replacement, whoever that was, would slot into something much closer to a traditional ambassadorial role and shortly after Furlonge’s arrival his job title changed to reflect this – after the British Legation became an Embassy in August 1952. What is most evident in contrasting the two is that Furlonge was much more beholden to London. Shortly after Transjordan had assumed independence Bevin emphasised that: ‘Sir Alec Kirkbride will be responsible for the execution of His Majesty’s Government’s policy in regard to Transjordan’. Kirkbride’s modus operandi was to execute British policy using his own initiative wherever possible and after the immediate turmoil surrounding Abdullah’s assassination Kirkbride was praised for having ‘handled the situation with the minimum of telegraphic references home’. In stark contrast Furlonge’s contact with London gives the distinct impression that he referred almost every problem back to the Foreign Office in London. Furlonge’s arrival heralded a significant departure from the level of political power exhibited by his predecessor and it diminished the degree to which the British Minister was part of Jordan’s inner circle. Furlonge was significantly reliant on others, particularly the Prime Minister, with regards the state of affairs within the palace. By the end of March 1952 Furlonge

69 Ibid., p. 179.
70 Henderson to The Under-Secretary of State for Air, 3 July 1946, FO371/52920/E5257, TNA.
71 Minute by Furlonge, 11 August 1951, FO371/91789/ET1015/17, TNA.
reported a sharp deterioration in Talal’s mental state.\(^{72}\) Interestingly, Furlonge reported that he had not heard a single whisper from anyone other than Abul Huda about this most recent violent episode, which led Furlonge to privately question whether ‘Tewfiq [Abul Huda] was telling the truth’. However Furlonge surmised: ‘it seems hardly conceivable that he could have made up the whole thing’.\(^ {73}\) Although Furlonge was evidently more reliant on the Prime Minister and others for information and intelligence the Prime Minister still turned to the British Minister for advice, as was customary in moments of crisis in Jordan. Furlonge’s assumption was that he should advise the same course as last autumn: to stick to the constitution and be guided as far as possible by medical opinion.\(^ {74}\) Furlonge observed that one benefit of Talal’s decline was that it had enabled him to break the ice between him and both Abul Huda and Talal.\(^ {75}\) The Foreign Office and Eden agreed that this had been a ‘welcome effect’.\(^ {76}\) Furlonge’s relationship with the king appeared to blossom as Talal expressed a desire to see more of Furlonge, including a regular weekly meeting. According to Furlonge he more than once ‘expressed the desire to be “guided by my advice as his father was by Sir Alec”’.\(^ {77}\) This was further evidence that Talal was far from anti-British and seemingly justified the British decision to support Talal’s accession and the British therefore sincerely hoped Talal’s deterioration would blow over.

\(^{72}\) Furlonge to Bowker, 31 March 1952, FO371/98898/ET1941/16/G, TNA.
\(^{73}\) Furlonge to Bowker, 5 April 1952, ibid.
\(^{74}\) Furlonge to Bowker, 31 March 1952, ibid.
\(^{75}\) Furlonge to Bowker, 5 April 1952, ibid.
\(^{76}\) Minute by Bowker, 9 April 1952; Minute by Eden, 10 April 1952, ibid.
\(^{77}\) Furlonge to Bowker, 28 April 1952, FO371/98898/ET1941/24/G, TNA.
However, as April turned to May Talal's health rapidly deteriorated. This shattered the privacy of the king's decline and consequently launched Jordan back into turmoil. With the Queen due to return on 3 May – from convalescence in Europe relating to repeated heart attacks – it was hoped that, thereafter, 'things will be easier'. However, upon her return the Jordanian Prime Minister reported that Talal repeatedly threatened to kill her and assaulted his children. Abul Huda feared that Talal would soon actually murder someone or at the very least cause a huge public scandal. On 14 May Talal, after appearing normal and pleasant in the presence of Furlonge, was reported by Abul Huda to have 'assaulted the Queen, the children, and the servants and was really raving against all and sundry'. Abul Huda was at a loss for what to do. As such Furlonge arranged a meeting with him and Glubb where they successfully advised the Prime Minister 'to tell the full Council of Ministers the situation instead of trying to handle it all himself, the time for complete secrecy being completely over'. Consequently Abul Huda induced the King to seek treatment abroad. Furlonge was confident that once Talal was safely out of harm's way, 'the country will, after the shock has passed, carry on much the same as before'. Moreover, he noted: 'It is important to remember that in all this we are only playing for a year's respite: Hussein comes of age on May 2nd, 1953'. In short, he stated: 'if we can secure 6 months' treatment and convalescence and 6 more months' relative sanity, we shall be fairly safe'. The Foreign Office considered Talal's mental decline 'disquieting news', but was not panicked as the uncertainty that had been wrought by Abdullah's unexpected death had been remedied. It was comforted

78 Ibid.
79 Furlonge to Bowker, 15 May 1952, FO371/98900/ET1941/44/G, TNA.
by the fact that: ‘The Jordan Constitution, as revised, provides for the steps to be taken if the King becomes ill or insane; and Prince Hussein having been declared the heir, the succession is constitutionally secure.’ The British Government had already settled on Talal as a mere stop-gap and the constitution had been revised with the specific purpose of providing for all eventualities.

In the meantime the British remained intent on maintaining a low profile. Talal departed for treatment in France on 17 May 1952 and the British were careful not to lay themselves open to adverse charges of connivance. Consequently the British ensured that Talal travelled via a British civil aircraft. An RAF aircraft was put on standby, but ‘in view of possible hostile propaganda’ this was very much a last resort. Major Hutson, an Arab Legion intelligence and information officer, nonetheless reported that Amman was still ‘seething with a rumour to the effect that the Legion, or the Cabinet, intend handing over West Jordan to Israel, and that King Talal was deported by the British for refusing to agree’. Thus, when Furlonge suggested that Britain should take action necessary to prevent Talal from returning to Amman by forcing him into a French clinic, the Foreign Office was reluctant to do anything that might lead to claims that Talal had been forced out of Amman by the British. Even when the Talal situation reached its nadir the British were determined not to intervene. During May and June a game of cat and mouse was played out across Europe as Talal chased his fearful wife around the continent. On 29 May Queen Zein arrived

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80 Minute by Ross, 8 April 1952, FO371/98898/ET1941/16/G, TNA.
81 Minute by Hunter, 21 May 1952, FO371/98898/ET1941/35, TNA.
82 Minute by Ross, 16 May 1952, FO371/98899/ET1941/41, TNA [emphasis added].
84 Minute by Ross, 26 May 1952, FO 371/98899/ET1941/42/G.
at the British Embassy in Paris in a ‘frightened’ state seeking British protection after Talal ‘threatened her with a knife’ and ‘attempted to kill one of his younger children’. She was therefore offered accommodation at the Embassy.\(^85\) When Hussein arrived in Paris on 30 May he too was attacked by his father before he escorted his mother to Lausanne where they were subsequently followed, but not found, by Talal.\(^86\) On 6 June Queen Zein reported that ‘the present situation has become intolerable’. The King was actively pursuing her in Lausanne and she was ‘seriously apprehensive’ for the safety of her youngest son, Prince Hassan, who was still in the care of the King.\(^87\) The entire episode was described by one Foreign Office official as a ‘comic opera’ and attracted fanciful headlines such as ‘Lost Queen Hunt’ in the Evening Standard.\(^88\) Regarding what to do with Talal the British were ‘reluctant to take action which might be construed as an attempt to keep the King out of Jordan against his will’.\(^89\) The Foreign Office considered ‘the only possible solution seems to be for King Talal to return to Jordan and to be put under proper restraint’.\(^90\) However, the British preferred not to intervene to ensure this. Thus the British effectively decided that: ‘In the circumstances we are inclined to wait and see how things develop’.\(^91\) Maintaining a low profile, however, was becoming increasingly difficult, whatever the British did, or did not, do.

Despite now favouring the king’s return to Amman the British were still mainly concerned with avoiding the appearance of interfering. To remedy this

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\(^85\) Paris to FO, 328, 30 May 1952, FO371/98900/ET1941/50/G, TNA.

\(^86\) ‘King Talal’, Hunter, 3 June 1952, FO371/98900/ET1941/54/G, TNA.

\(^87\) ‘Message from Queen Zein to Prime Minister’, 6 June 1952, FO816/185, TNA.

\(^88\) Minute by Bowker, 9 June 1952, FO371/98902/ET1941/96/G, TNA.

\(^89\) FO to Amman, 274, 7 June 1952, FO371/98901/ET1941/66/G, TNA.

\(^90\) Minute by Bowker, 9 June 1952, FO371/98902/ET1941/96/G, TNA.

\(^91\) FO to Amman, 274, 7 June 1952, FO371/98901/ET1941/66/G, TNA.
the Foreign office opted to ‘strongly recommend’ two things. Firstly, that the Jordanian Prime Minister immediately send a competent emissary to Switzerland armed with the necessary medical evidence to arrange Talal’s return to Jordan. Accordingly, Anastas Hanania, Jordan’s Minister of Social Welfare, was sent to Switzerland for that purpose within twenty-four hours. Secondly, the Foreign Office recommended that the Jordan and Swiss governments ‘should issue an early statement making it clear they are handling this affair on their own entirely uninfluenced by any external pressure’. Wardrop also raised the possibility of making a statement in Parliament ‘designed to dispose of charges that we are intervening’. Eden questioned the logic of this: ‘Why need we make statement? Better keep quiet?’ Eden quite understandably questioned whether making a statement would merely draw more attention to the issue and provide further fuel to the rumours. Despite claims that Britain was not interfering and only acting as ‘a channel of communication’ it was not strictly not interfering. Indeed, Hunter later caveated that term when he noted that: ‘we are still letting the Jordanians work out their own salvation as far as possible’.

Britain's attitude toward intervening in Jordanian affairs was neatly illustrated in the aftermath of a curious incident. As Talal’s reign was fast coming to an end in the summer of 1952 he was visited in Geneva by his brother, Naif – whom Talal had exiled as a result of his attempts to claim the throne. In a

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92 FO to Amman, 282, 12 June 1952; ‘King Telal’, Wardrop, 11 June 1952, FO371/98902/ET1941/99, TNA.
93 Furlonge to FO, 263, 12 June 1952, FO371/98902/ET1941/100, TNA.
94 FO to Amman, 282, 12 June 1952, FO371/98902/ET1941/99, TNA.
95 Minute by Wardrop, 11 June 1952, ibid.
96 Furlonge to Amman, 267, 13 June 1952, Annotation by Eden, FO371/98902/ET1941/103, TNA.
97 ‘King Talal of Jordan’, Hunter, 24 June 1952, FO371/98903/ET1941/146, TNA [emphasis added].
message to the Jordanian Prime Minister, Dr Hafiz Abdul Hadi described the encounter:

The Prince [Naif] had a prolonged audience in a locked room with the King. They asked for paper and a fountain pen. I was told by His Majesty that Naef asked him for money but that he had not given any. His Majesty would not say anything about the paper and fountain pen but he assured me that he himself had written nothing. ... In carrying out this mission Naef begged me to procure something from His Majesty to the effect that there was no disagreement between him and his brother.98

The Foreign Office only found out about this meeting after it had taken place via press reports, resulting in the lamentation that ‘we are too late to influence it’.99 For the British not intervening should not be synonymous with not having influence. With regard to this family matter Hunter suggested, and Wardrop agreed, that Britain should follow ‘a policy of masterly inactivity’.100 This neatly describes Britain’s approach to the yearlong episode that followed Abdullah’s death. The British had a definite vested interest in the outcome of events and ensured that the Jordanian Government was imbued with strong recommendations.101 The British may not have dictated decisions, but they were heavily influential, subtly pulling the strings behind the scenes.

The British followed a consistent policy of selective non-intervention. After Talal returned to Amman at the start of July 1952 the resultant furore concerned negotiations regarding the Queen’s potential return to Amman. In handling this matter Wardop stated: ‘our role is limited to that of a post-office’. In that vein, he initially suggested that Queen Zein’s message to the Prime Minister, asking for a written guarantee that she and her family would be

98 Geneva to FO, 26, 16 June 1952, FO371/98902/ET1941/104/G, TNA.
99 Minute by Hunter, 16 June 1952, FO371/98902/ET1941/110, TNA.
100 Minute by Hunter, 16 June 1952; Minute by Wardrop, 16 June 1952, ibid.
101 FO to Amman, 282, 11 June 1952, FO371/98902/ET1941/99, TNA.
protected from Talal if she returned to Amman, be passed on without amendment.\textsuperscript{102} However, in actuality the British went beyond the role of mere messenger. A written guarantee was not believed to carry much weight and it was felt that the Queen would be better off staying in Switzerland both from her and the British point of view.\textsuperscript{103} The Foreign Office preferred the Queen to remain outside of Jordan as her presence might make it more difficult to maintain the present light restraint of the king.\textsuperscript{104} Thus the Foreign Office believed it would be ‘justified in “shading” our message in such a way as to avoid the suggestion that the Queen would be prepared to go home to Jordan provided she were given the written guarantee she asked for’. Consequently, Wardrop, Bowker and Furlonge agreed to pass on the Queen’s message to the Jordanian Prime Minister expressing her anxiety about returning to Amman, ‘but omitting any intimation that she would do so on receipt of a written guarantee’.\textsuperscript{105} Meanwhile the Queen was led to believe that Furlonge would ‘discuss the matter fully with the Jordan Prime Minister’.\textsuperscript{106} Again the British had secured their wish via subtle manipulation rather than direct intervention.

While the Queen’s return was being discussed Talal’s reign was visibly coming to an end and the British kept a watchful eye on Prime Minister Abul Huda’s own manipulation of events. Talal himself was expressing his desire to abdicate, but he was being staved off from doing so by the Prime Minister until all the necessary arrangements could be made – not least the grooming of Hussein. The Prime Minister therefore refused two written abdication requests

\textsuperscript{102} Minute by Wardrop, 7 July 1952, FO371/98903/ET1941/156, TNA.
\textsuperscript{103} Minute by Wardrop, 8 July 1952, ibid.
\textsuperscript{104} FO to Amman, 403, 8 July 1952, FO371/98903/ET1941/156, TNA.
\textsuperscript{105} Minute by Wardrop, 8 July 1952, ibid.
\textsuperscript{106} FO to Geneva, 78, 8 July 1952, ibid.
from the king. The Jordanian Government, like the British ‘were playing for time in the King Talal affair. They wanted to keep him out of harm until his eldest son came of age, when his abdication could be arranged.’ For that reason the Prime Minister stated his intention to inform the Egyptian doctors, who were arriving to assess the king, that Talal ‘should not (repeat not) be forced to abdicate until Hussein came of age’. In a letter handed to the Egyptian doctors on their arrival he wrote:

It is important for me to let you know that the Jordan government does not, as a result of the medical advice, wish to make any constitutional arrangements (changes) which concern H.M. the King, as it is determined that he should retain his Kingdom without obstruction of his powers until his heir becomes of age.

The Prime Minister had requested Talal be assessed by Egyptian doctors to ‘stifle criticism in this or any other Arab country by pointing out that the arrangements made for Talal are based on reports from Egyptian doctors and that an Egyptian is in charge.’ However, with the knowledge of the British he actively sought to influence the doctors’ assessment of Talal’s condition in order to manipulate a particular outcome. Namely, that Talal remain on the throne, regardless of his medical condition, until Hussein came of age. In light of the Egyptian doctors’ report, however, Abul Huda changed his mind. The Egyptian doctors told the Jordanian Prime Minister that it was ‘a miracle’ that he had ‘not already murdered the Queen or someone else’. The British also now believed that abdication was probably the best solution; far easier, politically, for

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108 Amman to FO, 339, 13 July 1952, FO371/98904/ET1941/166, TNA.
109 Abul Huda to Kamel Bey El Khuly and Yusef Bey Barada, 14 July 1952, FO371/98907/ET1941/216, TNA.
110 Amman to FO, 348, 19 July 1952, FO371/98905/ET1941/176, TNA.
arrangements to be made for Talal, including the possibility of him living in the
Hejaz - which was now the king's desire - if he was no longer king.\textsuperscript{111} By the end
of July both the Prime Minister and the British had become reconciled to the
benefits of Talal's abdication - the days of light restraint of the king being over.

In a final twist, however, Abul Huda had to resort to enforcing Talal's
departure. To avoid suspicion of foul play the Prime Minister wanted Talal to
confirm in writing that he had made several abdication requests, but that he had
dissuaded him.\textsuperscript{112} Instead, Talal subjected the Prime Minister to a bitter reproach
stating that he 'had no intention of abdicating'. The Prime Minister received
reports that Talal was denouncing the government and attempting, in vain, to
seek assistance from 'private individuals' and 'an officer in the Arab Legion'. The
Prime Minister concluded 'that he had now lost all influence over Talal' and the
Council of Ministers therefore summoned 'both Houses of the Majlis to an
extraordinary session on 11\textsuperscript{th} August at which they would be asked to approve a
motion deposing Talal on the grounds of insanity'.\textsuperscript{113} Patrick Coghill, the Arab
Legion's Director of Intelligence, reported that when Parliament met on 11
August 1952, during the lunch break:

\begin{quote}
several deputies from both Banks ... all said that the deposition of
the King for medical reasons was a certainty, but in view of the
importance of the decision they felt that they had to go through the
motions of a long and careful examination so that the outside
world would be led to believe that they had not reached so serious
a decision after a brief, cursory examination of the problem.
\end{quote}

Later that day, after a 'unanimous vote' that the king be deposed, Talal was
informed of the decision, which he accepted 'quietly and with dignity'. Talal was

\textsuperscript{111} Minute by Hunter, 31 July 1952; Minute by Bowker, 1 August 1952,
F0371/98905/ET1941/188, TNA.
\textsuperscript{112} Furlonge to FO, 30 July 1952, FO816/184, TNA.
\textsuperscript{113} Amman to FO, 375, 5 August 1952, F0371/98906/ET1941/190, TNA.
recorded as saying: ‘I have been expecting this for a week. If it is in the best interests of my country I accept it.’ And in Coghill’s words: ‘So ends Act I of the tragedy of King Talal.’\textsuperscript{114} Talal lived out the rest of his life in a private home in Istanbul where he died in 1972.\textsuperscript{115}

Talal’s deposition passed without incident. Glubb was in Britain when Abul Huda announced his intention to summon the houses but was not at all concerned that this present situation would lead to anything untoward that would endanger security and cause his recall.\textsuperscript{116} And so it proved. As Furlonge reported: ‘Extensive security precautions were taken but there are no signs of disorder’.\textsuperscript{117} Coghill reported to Glubb that both banks of the Jordan had received the news of their king’s deposition with ‘complete calm’.\textsuperscript{118} Furlonge even suggested that Glubb’s absence from Jordan on leave at this time was ‘perhaps fortunate’ from Britain’s point of view as he ‘can hardly be accused of having staged it’. For that same reason, Furlonge recommended the postponement of General Robertson’s proposed visit to the Arab Legion on the day after the Majlis were scheduled to meet.\textsuperscript{119} If the commander of the British Middle East forces was to visit Jordan the day after the King was deposed this might have fuelled unwelcome rumours. It remained important that Britain not lay itself open to charges of imperial interference.

Between Talal’s deposition on 11 August 1952 and Hussein’s formal accession to the throne on 2 May 1953 the Prime Minister, Tewfiq Abul Huda,
effectively ruled the Hashemite Kingdom. Even before his deposition, Talal’s political reticence was such that it created a power vacuum in Jordan filled by the Prime Minister. The Prime Minister ruled in an almost dictatorial manner, which was reassuring for the British as it neatly filled the void left by Abdullah. In Glubb’s opinion Arab countries were still presently unfit for democracy on the British scale and the most stable Arab countries were those ruled by one man, as Abdullah had done. Given Talal’s incapacity Glubb felt ‘the next best thing may well be to have a Prime Minister dictator’. Abul Huda was a suitable dictator from the British perspective because, as Glubb pointed out, he was part of the old guard. He had served for 30 years under Abdullah and was therefore accustomed to the existing system and the relationship with Britain. Despite the Prime Minister’s dictatorial approach, Furlonge reasoned: ‘I do not think we are in a position to criticise methods which have given, and are apparently continuing to give, such generally satisfactory results’. Indeed, the Foreign Office concurred, with Hunter noting: ‘We need not shed too many tears over the continued presence of a firm hand at the Jordanian tiller.’ This position sat well with two principal tenets of British policy in Jordan. Firstly, that Britain simply wanted to see Jordan remain stable; and, secondly, Britain’s preference for non-interference.

Britain’s non-interference policy was selective, however. They were not prepared to give the Prime Minister unrestricted authority. The policy of non-

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121 ‘A Note on the Situation in Jordan’, Glubb, 10 December 1951, WO216/747, TNA.
122 Furlonge to Bowker, 17 September 1952, FO371/98859/ET1015/9, TNA.
123 Minute by Hunter, [undated, but approximately late September 1952], FO371/98859/ET1015/9, TNA.
interference was a means of storing influence for when it mattered most. As James Wardrop noted, and James Bowker echoed, there was only so much ‘influence we can safely exercise in Jordan. Undoubtedly we have some influence here, but if we abuse it ... we shall merely risk losing it altogether’.124 On matters of ‘lesser importance’ the Foreign Office was happy for the Prime Minister to ‘have his own way’. However, on matters of greater importance it was stated that ‘we must insist on ours’. The difficulty was distinguishing between matters of greater or lesser importance.125 As a general rule it was matters relating to foreign policy that Britain was most keen on influencing. Thus, when Abul Huda began seeking an independent line on foreign policy that appeared to depart from Abdullah’s – including moves closer to the Arab League and away from Iraq – Britain decided to act.126 In January 1952 Abul Huda entered Jordan into the Arab League Collective Security Pact, which was something Abdullah had previously refused to sign.127 The Foreign Office understood that: ‘We shall of course have to make allowances for Jordan's wish to get on with the other Arab states.’ However, Abul Huda was venturing into realms that impinged on direct British interests, as it moved Jordan closer to Britain’s enemies. It was therefore deemed crucial that the Prime Minister be made aware of this, lest he gain encouragement to go further.128 A crucial component of Britain’s non-interference policy was to ensure that the spectre of British authority remained over the decision makers. As such, Hunter noted that it would be in British

124 Minute by Wardrop, 3 March 1952, F0371/98865/ET10393/9/G; 'Iraq-Jordan Relations', Bowker, 13 May 1952, F0371/98865/ET10393/15, TNA.
125 Minute by Hunter, 27 March 1952, F0371/98862/ET1022/1, TNA.
126 Furlonge to Bowker, 17 March 1952, ibid.
127 Satloff, Jordan in Transition, p. 45.
128 Bowker to Furlonge, 29 March 1952, F0371/98862/ET1022/1, TNA.
interests to have a brief ‘showdown’ with the Prime Minister lest he ‘become too accustomed to British complaisance’.\(^\text{129}\) Against this comment the Foreign Secretary, Anthony Eden, minuted, ‘yes’, and went on to note that ‘Tewfiq should be given an early reminder’ of Jordan’s reliance on Britain and the need for consultation.\(^\text{130}\) This facet of Britain’s relationship with the Prime Minister is important because it confirms the extent to which he was subject to British influence. And if we return to the question of why the Prime Minister came to support Talal as Abdullah’s successor this surely exacerbates the extent to which the British desire to see Talal accede the throne was crucial to this outcome. Indeed, it reveals the extent to which Britain continued to pull the strings in Jordan after independence and after Abdullah’s death. Acknowledging this attitude is also important looking ahead to Britain’s relationship with King Hussein.

During the two years that followed Abdullah’s death the British sought to act as puppeteer in Jordan and this was because during the course of this trying period Jordan’s strategic significance to the British world system continued to increase. After the abrogation of the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty in October 1951 and the prospect of British troops having to withdraw from Egypt, Jordan was considered as an option for stationing a Brigade Group of British forces.\(^\text{131}\) Moreover, the Free Officers coup by General Neguib and Gamal Abdel Nasser, which resulted in the overthrow of King Farouk in July 1952, further destabilised Britain’s relationship with Egypt, which in-turn exacerbated the importance of

\(^{129}\) Minute by Hunter, 27 March 1952, ibid.  
\(^{130}\) Minute by Hunter, 6 April 1952, ibid.  
\(^{131}\) Ross to Fitzgeorge Balfour, 20 February 1952, FO371/98884/ET1204/1/G, TNA.
the connection with Jordan. Meanwhile the Arab Legion maintained the level of importance that it had been awarded in the wake of the Korean War. Having been subjected to a significant three-year reorganisation and expansion plan, which began less than four months before Abdullah’s assassination, the British sought to maintain the Arab Legion at this new level. Inevitably the 1951 reorganisation scheme was adjusted to some extent, but this was largely due to a recognition that the original reorganisation plan had been hurriedly compiled in the wake of the Korean War and had not been fully thought-out.132 The War Office, for example, increased its financial contribution to provide for approximately 1,200 extra men, after it was realised that for the Arab Legion to perform the Cold War role it was now designed for, it would require a greater reserve than previously agreed.133 Despite some tinkering with the Arab Legion’s reorganisation plan, the general principle of the Arab Legion’s post-Korea wartime role in conjunction with British forces remained unchanged.134 The departure of Abdullah did nothing to change Britain’s thinking regarding the role of the Arab Legion in its Cold War defence strategy. Indeed, the Arab Legion was still considered to be ‘our “cornerstone” in the Middle East’.135 Jordan remained a valuable investment. The returns were primarily threefold: Firstly, Britain could count on, in the event of war, an efficient division of troops already based in the Middle East and the peacetime cost of this was much less than that of a British division; Secondly, Britain had firm possession for another 15 years, under

132 Brian Robertson to The Under Secretary of State, 17 September 1951, Melville Papers, 1/8.
133 'Development of the Arab Legion', 4 October 1951, ibid.; FO to Amman, 22, 16 January 1952, FO371/98882/ET1202/1, TNA.
135 Minute by Brownjohn to Mcleod, 13 December 1951, WO216/520, TNA.
Treaty rights, of two air bases (Amman and Mafraq), which was particularly valuable given the increasing possibility of having to relinquish similar rights elsewhere in the region; and finally it provided Britain with a foothold of goodwill and influence in the Middle East at a time when this was slipping away elsewhere in the region. Furlonge concluded that British expenditure in Jordan ‘could justifiably be regarded as the essential price to be paid for retention of advantages which already seem great and which might well prove essential for the maintenance of our position in the Middle East’. Abdullah’s death did not devalue the Jordanian connection or the Arab Legion in British eyes.

Abdullah’s death did, however, strengthen the argument for avoiding the appearance of imperial influence. As with the previous year the question of exactly which Whitehall department should finance the Arab Legion was raised by the Chancellor. The previous year the Labour Chancellor, Hugh Gaitskell, requested that the subsidy be switched from the Foreign Office to the War Office budget and the following year the new Conservative Chancellor, Richard Austin Butler, made the same demands because he considered that it was a constituent part of British strategy. He exclaimed: ‘I am convinced that, whatever may have been the situation in the past, it is the military aspect which is paramount now.’ However, the political situation was now even more sensitive. Antony Head, the Secretary of State for War, referred Butler to Bevin’s argument against this back in January. And Eden added:

In my opinion the objections raised by Bevin when this proposal was put to him by Gaitskell early this year have even more force now than they had then. We are no longer dealing with an absolute monarch, but with a Cabinet which is responsible to Parliament,
and has to take account of popular feeling. As you yourself recognise, it would be politically undesirable to suggest openly that the Legion was a mere adjunct of the British Army.\footnote{Eden to Butler, 29 December 1951, ibid.}

In the grand scheme of things Abdullah’s assassination did not affect the role of Jordan or the Arab Legion in British strategy. On the contrary, external events, such as the situation in Egypt, increased the significance of the Anglo-Jordanian relationship. For that reason the British paid considerable attention to maintaining a malleable pro-British regime in Jordan. Britain recognised that it could no longer rely on Abdullah’s steadying hand and there could be ‘no return to the benevolent autocracy exercised by Abdullah until the promulgation of the present constitution’.\footnote{‘Assassination of King Abdulla of Jordan’, 22 July 1951, FO371/91839/ET1942/40, TNA.} Yet that did not stop it attempting to direct Jordan’s royal and political future.

Despite obtaining independence five years earlier King Abdullah and the Jordanian Government had continued to look toward Britain in moments of crisis – the 1948 War being a prime example. With Abdullah gone Britain stood out even more as the real power broker in Jordanian politics as all those interested in Jordanian affairs looked toward Britain as the arbiter of Jordan’s future. Abdullah, Samir Rifai, Abul Huda, Naif, Talal, Queen Zein and the Iraqis all turned to Britain for assistance – either for advice, protection or in pursuit of support for their own designs. It is not surprising, therefore, that post-Abdullah Jordan emerged largely according to the template desired by the British, taking into account Britain’s own limitations regarding direct intervention. Despite the ignominy of Talal’s departure from Jordan, his reign had effectively served its purpose. As Furlonge reflected, the country had to readjust ‘itself to the new
conditions created by the disappearance from the scene, first of all of King Abdullah and, later of my predecessor [Kirkbride]. And this process was aided by the ‘steadying and stabilising influence’ of having Talal on the throne and in Jordan.\textsuperscript{140} Despite the tragic turmoil behind the scenes, caused by Talal’s mental illness, his royal presence had provided a semblance of stability and proper constitutional practice.

What this episode reveals is the extent to which the British had a desire, and the capability, to exert influence at the highest level of Jordanian politics, despite six years of apparent independence. Hunter summed up Britain’s attitude when he remarked that: ‘since we pay the piper we are entitled to call the tune’.\textsuperscript{141} While wary that they should not – and could not – dictate internal Jordanian affairs the British had a definite vested interest in Jordan’s general stability, its pro-British leaning, and the reliability of the Arab Legion. In pursuit of these interests the British were prepared to intervene – often via subtle manipulation – when deemed necessary. In his 1995 article Douglas Little described King Hussein, during the first two decades of his reign, as a ‘puppet in search of a puppeteer.’\textsuperscript{142} After the assassination of Abdullah Britain, in Jordan, became a puppeteer in search of a puppet. Behind the scenes the British quietly and selectively pulled the strings in an attempt to ensure that Jordan and its hierarchy remained stable and pro-British.

\textsuperscript{140} Furlonge to Eden, 63, 22 May 1952, FO816/184, TNA.
\textsuperscript{141} Minute by Hunter, 2 August 1951, FO371/91839/ET1942/40, TNA.
After the assassination of Abdullah the British pinned their hopes on Hussein as the best option for maintaining the ‘special’ relationship with Jordan. However, Hussein had no intention of playing the pliant role the British had intended for him. Less than three years after he acceded the throne – on 2 May 1953 – the young king proved this when he broke free of British constraints in a manner that could not have been imagined during the era of his grandfather. On 1 March 1956 Hussein unceremoniously dismissed Glubb and several other British officers from the Arab Legion. In public Glubb maintained he had ‘no complaints.’\(^1\) In private, however, he could not hide his regret ‘that King Hussein did things in such an unnecessarily high-handed manner.’\(^2\) The process that led to this fait accompli was a complex one and the purpose of this chapter is to explore the events that led to this move – to reassess the early years of Hussein’s reign and the final years of Glubb’s.

Perhaps unsurprisingly the existing historiography detailing Glubb’s dismissal has focused primarily on King Hussein and his rationale. Gaining an accurate appreciation of any individuals thought process is inherently difficult – especially in this case given the scarcity of Arab sources. It is perhaps for this reason that Glubb’s dismissal, as Robert Satloff observed, has assumed ‘almost mythical dimensions’.\(^3\) While a broad consensus exists that Hussein dismissed

\(^2\) Glubb to Sir Harold MacMichael, 10 March 1956, MacMichael Collection, 1/4, SAMECA.
\(^3\) Satloff, *Jordan in Transition*, p. 135.
Glubb to consolidate his position, there are two principal variances on this theme. The first is that it was a matter of survival. Uriel Dann considers the decision to be primarily a reaction to Cairo’s propaganda campaign directed against Glubb. The King’s survival was endangered by association; hence Glubb’s removal.⁴ The second suggests it was a question of authority – personal and/or political. Nigel Ashton concludes that it was an expression of the King’s desire to assert his personal authority and was compounded by his attachment to Arab nationalism.⁵ Avi Shlaim views it more broadly as an expression of Jordanian independence.⁶ Meanwhile other contributors have accentuated Glubb and Hussein’s personal differences, with Philip Robins emphasising their generational divisions.⁷ All these factors contributed to Hussein’s decision to some extent. Yet they were unified by a single common denominator: British obstinacy. Hussein’s action, as this chapter illustrates, was primarily a reaction against being ignored by the British and restricted as a result of Britain’s apparent desire to control. And Glubb symbolised this rebuke.

In analysing the events that led to Glubb’s dismissal it is important to consider two contingent components: the trigger and the trail. The first part of this chapter will examine the trail that led to the eventual trigger moment, tracing the nature and the evolution of Hussein’s relationship with Glubb and Britain. Meanwhile the second part will hone in on the months immediately preceding the dismissal to reveal exactly what triggered the decision. Regarding the trigger, one of the most intriguing questions, as posed by Robert Satloff, is:

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⁴ Dann, *Challenge of Arab Radicalism*, pp. 32-33.
⁵ Ashton, *King Hussein*, p. 53.
'why March 1?' Satloff pointed to a mounting fear of renewed fighting between Israel and the Arab states. Surprisingly this pertinent observation has been overlooked in subsequent studies. Based on significant new evidence this chapter will further emphasise the threat of renewed Arab-Israeli conflict as an explanation for the abrupt manner of the dismissal and yet simultaneously posit that this trigger merely brought forward and added a distasteful touch to a process of vanquishing British control that had already been set in motion by October 1955. Unpacking the timing of the decision is crucial to understanding the motive and in order to understand why Glubb was dismissed it is imperative that the trigger and the trail are considered together. In so doing this chapter finds that the British were, in some respects, the architects of their own – and Glubb’s – downfall. Several studies note that Britain should not have been surprised that Glubb was dismissed. However, perhaps because the British angle was not their primary focus, these studies have tended to acknowledge this aspect in passing reference, with a wry smile at Britain’s misplaced confidence, and have neither fully appreciated its significance nor acknowledged how it contributed to the dismissal of Glubb and several other British officers from the Arab Legion. Philip Robins, for example, remarked that ‘in retrospect, Glubb and others should not have been so sure of themselves.’ However, as this chapter will show, British complacency was conversely borne out of its uncertainty rather than vice versa. This precluded Britain from attending to Hussein’s increasing frustrations.

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Hussein's decision to fracture the British connection less than three years after acceding to the throne was exactly what the British had tried to guard against in the wake of Abdullah's death. Having decided upon Talal as a mere stopgap until Hussein came of age, the British immediately turned their attention toward grooming Hussein to be a pro-British ruler akin to his grandfather. Hussein switched schools from Alexandria, Egypt, to Harrow, London, where it was hoped he could form personal bonds that would encourage him to maintain the British connection. While the year that Hussein spent at Harrow was thought useful, it was shorter than considered necessary to integrate Hussein into the British world. Upon finishing his schooling Hussein was therefore sent to Sandhurst. The Foreign Office was anxious about Hussein’s planned stint at the military academy, where cadets ‘must expect to put up with some pretty rigorous discipline.’ The concern was that: ‘There is, of course, always the risk that either the general treatment he receives or some (possibly imagined) slight may make an unfortunate impression on the King such as to prejudice him against this country for the rest of his days.’ The Foreign Office was anxious that ‘he should derive the greatest possible benefit from his short course at the College and go home with the happiest possible recollections of it’. The future king was thus afforded some privileges at Sandhurst. When Hussein left Sandhurst the Foreign Office was pleased with the result. He was believed to have ‘both enjoyed his course and profited by it, not only in his military instruction but in the many friends he has made and the aspects of British life’

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11 Minute by Seton Dearden, 21 August 1952, F0816/187, TNA.
12 Wardrop to Furlonge, 2 September 1952, F0371/98908/ET1941/229/G, TNA.
13 ‘King Hussein’, Hunter, 8 September 1952, F0371/98909/ET1941/238/G, TNA.
that had been revealed to him. This was considered a boost to Britain’s future relations with Jordan, with James Bowker noting: ‘The continuance of good relations between the United Kingdom and the Kingdom of Jordan is of great importance, and in this the friendship of the young King, in whose education the six months at Sandhurst have virtually taken the place of three years at a university, will play an essential part’.14

Despite the apparent success of Hussein’s Sandhurst stint, Britain’s relationship with the new king got off to an ominous start as a result of discussions concerning how best to occupy Hussein after his Sandhurst course finished in February 1953. In anticipation of a several month gap until his accession to the throne the Foreign Office was asked by his mother, Queen Zein, to consider options for his occupation during this interim period. However, in what Bowker described as a ‘regrettable accident’, Hussein ‘got wind’ of British ‘ideas for his occupation after February’ prematurely. The Foreign Office consulted several departments and the War Office proposal was an attachment to the Royal Horse Guards at Windsor. It was rumours regarding this option that reached Hussein. The idea that the British planned for him to spend time in a ‘British “Royal Regiment”’ led Hussein to express ‘indignation at such a suggestion which he said he would never accept’.15 Upon Hussein’s premature discovery they ‘did not (repeat not) reveal that this was done in accordance with Queen Zein’s or the Jordan Government’s wishes’. Instead the British decided to halt such talks until guided further by his mother.16 The British were resolved to keep the queen’s secret because ultimately she was believed to be ‘a helpful

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14 Bowker to Major-General Dawney, 4 February 1953, ibid.
15 Bowker to Furlonge, 1 December 1952, F0816/187, TNA.
16 FO to Amman, 707, 27 November 1952, ibid.
power behind the throne and worth cultivating’. The Foreign Office deemed it more important to keep Queen Zein outside rather than appease Hussein. Meanwhile the Foreign Office hoped ‘this unhappy affair ... will not cause any lasting trouble’. However, this incident ignited the notion that Britain sought to control Hussein and put Britain’s relationship with the king-in-waiting off on the wrong foot.

If Hussein began his reign harbouring a degree of resentment against British control, this frustration was compounded a few months after his accession when Hussein was faced with his first significant test: a devastating attack by the IDF on the Jordanian Village of Qibya on 14 October 1953. Since the end of the 1948 War the Jordan-Israeli border had been beset by tension. The general pattern was incidents of infiltration from Jordan into Israel, which subsequently prompted retaliatory raids by the IDF on villages inside the West Bank. According to Benny Morris, at least 90% of Arab infiltration was economically or socially motivated, including farmers harvesting crops. Sometimes, however, infiltration took the form of deliberate acts of terrorism, which Glubb believed was often sponsored by anti-Hashemite elements including Egypt and Saudi Arabia. The Israeli raid on Qibya was preceded by a murderous attack of this ilk. On 13 October infiltrators from Jordan entered the Israeli settlement of Yehuda where a grenade was thrown into a house killing a mother and two of her children. As ever, the Arab Legion did all it could to bring the infiltrators swiftly to justice. Immediately the Legion invited Israeli trackers with dogs to follow the perpetrators into Jordan. According to Morris, Glubb was

17 Minute by Hunter, 19 September 1952, FO371/98867/ET10393/61, TNA.
18 Wardrop to Furlonge, 1 December 1952, FO816/187, TNA.
19 Morris, Israel’s Border Wars, p. 428.
so concerned by the potential ramifications of the Yehuda incident that he was
compelled to do this for the ‘first time’.\textsuperscript{20} Newly available evidence reveals that
this was not new, however. After a previous murderous incident in June 1953
Glubb had ‘immediately offered [to] permit Israel police with dogs [to] follow
tracks into Jordan with a view [to] arrest [the] murderer’.\textsuperscript{21} Thereafter this
agreement was left in place as a means of dealing with infiltration.\textsuperscript{22} It was
therefore invoked during the Yehuda incident, but the scent of the infiltrators
was lost and the perpetrators escaped.\textsuperscript{23} The following night the Israelis
seemingly took revenge via a retaliatory raid as an IDF unit, commanded by
future Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon, launched a murderous attack on the
village of Qibya, leaving between 60 and 70 Arab villagers – men, women and
children – dead.\textsuperscript{24}

The Qibya incident was indicative of the dilemma facing the Arab Legion.
On the one hand it was doing all it could to prevent infiltration emanating from
Jordan and bringing the perpetrators to justice. Yet on the other hand it was
responsible for defending against Israeli retaliation. As a consequence of a rise in
attacks by Israeli forces in January 1953 all villages along the frontier were put
on a state of defence.\textsuperscript{25} Moreover, Glubb issued a Special Order to all officers of
the Arab Legion, which made it abundantly clear that any breach of the border
from Israel should be met with force. He stated:

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\textsuperscript{20} Ibid., p. 257.
\textsuperscript{21} Qiada [Hutson] to T.J.L. [Melville], 20 June 1953, Melville Papers, 10/70.
\textsuperscript{22} Qiada [Glubb] to T.J.L. [Melville], 23 June 1953, ibid.
\textsuperscript{23} H.Q. Arab Legion [Hutson] to unknown, 15 October 1953, GP2006, 51.
\textsuperscript{24} Morris, \textit{Israel's Border Wars}, pp. 260-1; Glubb, \textit{Soldier}, p. 313; Shlaim, \textit{Iron
Wall}, pp. 90-1.
\textsuperscript{25} ‘A directive for putting villages in a state of defence’, 8 February 1953, GP2006,
78.
\end{flushright}
Incidents continue to occur from time to time, in which officers or O.R.'s [other ranks] of the Arab Legion fail to fire upon enemy patrols or forces which enter the Kingdom, and subsequently excuse themselves on the grounds that they had no orders to fire. It is hereby notified once again, that it is the duty of every officer and man of the Arab Legion to open fire on any enemy force which enters the Kingdom of Jordan, on the sole condition that he is sure the enemy has crossed the border and entered the Kingdom.

He added: ‘In future any commander who fails to seek out and attack an enemy who has entered the Kingdom within reach of his position, will be liable to trial by Court Martial.’ After Qibya Glubb reissued this Special Order because the local Arab Legion units had not been deployed and this was exactly the kind of situation the Special Order was designed to counter. Long-serving British officer 'Teal' Ashton was in command of the local Arab Legion Brigade that night and in a Court of Inquiry he was found to have been negligent. Consequently, he was dismissed. The Arab Legion's inaction during the Qibya raid was in direct contravention of orders issued by Glubb at the beginning of the year. Nobody was more frustrated by this inaction and its ramifications than him.

Despite Glubb’s internal frustration the Arab Legion came under intense criticism throughout the country for not defending Qibya. This incident put the role of the Arab Legion and, by implication, the value of the British connection under the spotlight. Glubb reported that the ‘whole [of] Jordan [was] strongly shaken’, resulting in ‘extremist politicians and agitators’ visiting front line villages ‘preaching intense hatred of Britain’. When he and other officers drove

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27 Glubb to ‘All British Officers’, 2 November 1953, ibid.
29 Amman to FO, 508, 16 October 1953, FO371/104789/ER1091/365, TNA.
through villages on the West Bank they were subjected to ‘curses and insults’. Moreover, the Jordanian press contained strong criticism of the past and present failure of Britain and the US to prevent Israeli aggression. HMG presented Israel with a note of protest after Qibya, but the Jordanian Government suggested this was inadequate and requested that Britain should sever diplomatic relations with Israel or prohibit trade and transfer of currency. The Jordanian Government also requested the expansion of the Arab Legion as this incident proved that Britain could not provide rapid assistance to Jordan and therefore it was necessary for the Arab Legion to be sufficiently strengthened so that it could resist attack on its own.

However, this demand to expand the Arab Legion came at a time when Britain was once again looking to scale back expenditure on the Arab Legion. Although a three-year expansion plan had been initiated in 1951, by the end of 1952 the international situation was perceived to have ‘changed owing to the progress of Western Re-armament, and a major war within the next few years’ was no longer considered likely. It was therefore deemed necessary to overhaul the Arab Legion’s plans ‘to suit the new World situation’. Given Britain’s worsening financial status this effectively meant that the Arab Legion’s expansion would be brought to a halt – if not subject to reductions. Even before Qibya Glubb was adamant that the subsidy needed to be increased to help the Arab Legion cope with Israeli belligerence. However, despite War Office support,

30 Qiada [Glubb] to T.J.L. [Cruickshank, FO, and WO], 16 October 1953, FO371/104788/ER1091/385, TNA.
31 Amman to FO, 507, 16 October 1953, FO371/104788/ER1091/363, TNA.
33 ‘Build up of Reserves for the Arab Legion’, Glubb, 19 October 1952, Melville Papers, 2/22.
the Treasury refused the Foreign Office's request for a £1 million increase in the subsidy for 1954/5.\textsuperscript{34} As before, the Israeli emphasis regarding the Arab Legion's role was not sufficient justification for Treasury approval. Instead the Foreign Office subsidy remained at £7.5 million, supplemented by £1.8 million contributed by the War Office for the Reservist scheme and the Mobile Desert Force.\textsuperscript{35} Thereafter the Foreign Office annual subsidy plateaued at £7.5 million for every year between 1953 and 1956. Additional targeted subsidies meant that HMG's total annual expenditure on the Arab Legion during this period was between £9.3 and £10.2 million.\textsuperscript{36} The Arab Legion had only experienced rapid growth in 1951 because of its new role in British global defence plans and the Treasury was not prepared to sanction increases in the Arab Legion merely to deal with Israel – despite high profile incidents such as Qibya.

The Qibya incident prompted Hussein to take a more active political role.\textsuperscript{37} This drew Hussein's attention to the Arab Legion and therefore to the limitations on his authority imposed by Britain. The failure to obtain any expansion of the Arab Legion was a bitter blow – which Glubb shared – but perhaps more galling than the subsidy amount was the method of its payment, which was paid direct to Glubb and the Arab Legion. The Jordanian Government queried this setup in 1950, but it was agreed that while payments to the War Office and other British departments should be deducted at source the balance of the subsidy should be paid direct to the Arab Legion.\textsuperscript{38} The issue was raised

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\item \textsuperscript{34} Minute by Thompson, 24 February 1954, FO371/115682/VJ1201/6, TNA.
\item \textsuperscript{35} Furlonge to Stephenson, 5 April 1954, FO371/110924/VJ1201/20, TNA.
\item \textsuperscript{36} Falla to Bredin, 25 August 1954, FO371/110925/VJ1202/16/G; 'The Arab Legion', 13 September 1955, FO371/115682/VJ12010/1, TNA.
\item \textsuperscript{37} Ashton, \textit{King Hussein}, p. 41; Shlaim, \textit{Lion of Jordan}, p. 76.
\item \textsuperscript{38} Drake to Falla, 28 April 1954, FO371/110924/VJ1201/19, TNA.
\end{itemize}
again in August 1953 and then again during the Anglo-Jordanian financial talks in October/November – immediately after Qibya. The Jordanians claimed it was contrary to the Treaty, but the British were concerned that ‘we cannot trust the Jordan Government to deal fairly by the Legion once they get their hands on the subsidy’. After a brief period of silence on this issue the British opted to assume that the Jordanians had dropped this request. However, Hussein returned to the matter with renewed vigour when he visited London in December 1954. Yet the British again believed – or at least hoped – that the Jordanian delegation had returned to Amman having ‘agreed (reluctantly) to drop their demand for the Arab Legion subsidy to be paid direct’. The use of the term ‘reluctantly’ is telling. Whatever the Jordanian delegation said – or whatever the British heard – Hussein was not satisfied with this outcome. Moreover, at least one Foreign Office official recognised this and counselled:

I do not feel very happy about the way we have left this. The Jordanians will never be satisfied with the present method of payment, and we shall have recurrent trouble over it. Are we really sure that we have been into their case thoroughly and that there is nothing more we can do?

True to this portent, Hussein was left frustrated and resentful.

The outcome of these talks proved undesirable to both parties. The British failed to listen to the Jordanians’ main concerns, they reciprocated and as a result neither side achieved their desired ends. During this visit the Jordanian delegation raised three primary issues. They initiated exploratory discussions to

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39 ‘Method of Payment of Arab Legion Subsidy’, Thompson, 24 March 1954, FO371/110924/V1202/18, TNA.
40 Russell Edmunds to Thompson, 5 July 1954, FO371/110924/V1201/26, TNA.
41 Eden to Butler, 29 December 1954, FO371/115670/V1192/1/G, TNA.
42 Minute by [undecipherable signature], 1 January 1955, FO371/115670/V1192/2, TNA.
elicit British views on revising the Treaty; they requested additional financial assistance for the National Guard; and they suggested that the Arab Legion subsidy be paid direct to the Jordanian government. At the end of this visit the Jordanian delegation handed over an aide memoire and it was the method of payment for the Arab Legion that received by far the most detailed attention.43 This was the Jordanians’ primary objective. Meanwhile Britain’s primary target was to obtain permission to move a British armoured regiment from Aqaba, in the south of Jordan, to Mafraq, in the north. Britain’s regional defence strategy was now based upon securing the northern tier, from Turkey to Pakistan. It was deemed vitally important to this strategy to have British forces stationed in north Jordan so that they could be deployed quickly into Iraq in the event of war with the Soviet Union.44 To that end, the British offered to accede partially to one of the Jordanians’ lesser requests. During the December talks the British had inferred that the Jordanians would look favourably upon their request if additional funding for the National Guard were forthcoming.45 Despite deep Ministerial and Treasury reluctance the British therefore offered an additional £350,000 per annum to support the National Guard for the next five years. This was a fraction of the £1 million annual commitment requested by the Jordanians.46 However, it was believed that this would be enough to convince the Jordanians to give permission to station an armoured regiment from the British

43 ‘Aide-Memoire’, 30 December 1954, FO371/115670/VJ1192/2, TNA.
44 BMEO to Richmond, 17 January 1955; Head to Eden, 2 February 1955, FO371/115671/VJ1194/1-2, TNA.
45 FO to Amman, 11, 11 January 1955, FO371/115671/VJ1193/2, TNA.
46 Eden to Butler, 31 December 1954, FO371/115670/VJ1192/1/G, TNA.
Army at Mafraq. This was not an agreed *quid pro quo*, though, and although the Jordanians accepted the additional subsidy for the National Guard they repeatedly refused to respond to the request to station troops at Mafraq until they received a reply to their aide memoire. This therefore prompted HMG to reconsider the method of payment of the Arab Legion subsidy. However, this matter required careful consideration and much debate. Thus the British continually put off replying to the aide memoire, and in-turn the Jordanians avoided replying to HMG’s request to station British troops at Mafraq. Thus neither side achieved what it wanted.

Hussein’s request that the subsidy be paid direct to the Jordanian Government was effectively a first attempt to release – or at least loosen – the shackles of British control. And his failure in this effort led him to contemplate a first attempt to remove Glubb. A document released via a Freedom of Information request reveals that in the spring of 1955 Hussein made, as Glubb explicitly recorded, a ‘first attempt to get rid of me and some of the senior British officers’. Documents previously available meant that it was already apparent that Hussein was frustrated with Glubb in the spring of 1955 and Robert Satloff put this down ‘ostensibly to Glubb’s plans for the defence of the West Bank and

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47 FO to Amman, 11, 11 January 1955; Brewis to Richmond, 15 January 1955; FO to Amman, 26, 18 January 1955, FO371/115671/VJ1193/1-7, TNA.
48 ‘Move Northwards of the British Armoured Regiment’, Rose, 7 February 1955, FO371/115672/VJ1194/2, TNA.
49 Rose to Richmond, 25 February 1955, ibid.
51 ‘Note on King Husain and the Police’, Glubb, 19 May 1955, FO371/115706/VJ1641/1, TNA.
the pace of Arabisation. This indeed correlates with Hussein’s explanation in his memoirs for the eventual dismissal in March 1956. In April 1955 Hussein did indeed rave against Glubb on these points. In what Charles Duke, who replaced Furlonge as British Ambassador in November 1954, described as a ‘remarkable’ episode, King Hussein lambasted Glubb’s defence plans during a meeting of the Jordan Supreme Council on 9 April. After Glubb explained his defence plans in detail he invited questions and the king responded by excitedly reading out a pre-prepared speech in which, among other things, he announced that the number of British officers should be reduced and expounded his utter disagreement with Glubb’s plan, even though, according to Glubb, the king had not seen the plans before, which suggested that the attack on Glubb had other underlying causes. These issues indeed masked a much deeper frustration regarding Hussein’s general lack of control over the Arab Legion, which was exacerbated by Hussein’s fruitless visit to London in December 1954 and was entangled in the request to have the Arab Legion subsidy paid to the Jordanian Government. This is where Hussein’s frustrations with Glubb truly emanated. The aide memoire handed over in December contained a veiled attack on Glubb as it lamented that the only reason HMG wanted the subsidy paid direct to the Arab Legion was because it was commanded by a British officer. Hussein made an almost identical attack on Glubb in his Cabinet speech on 9 April. Here, he remarked that the subsidy was being misspent and that ‘it was all wrong that the

52 Satloff, Jordan in Transition, p. 136.
loyalty of the Arab Legion should be to “one man”.\textsuperscript{55} Hussein returned from the December 1954 visit to London with a ‘frigid and obstructive attitude’ towards Glubb.\textsuperscript{56} The reason for this was that:

he had been told that the reason why the Jordan mission’s visit to London last December had not been more successful was because their proposals had not been cleared first with General Glubb.\textsuperscript{57}

This was not strictly true. Prior to Hussein’s visit Glubb did warn HMG in no uncertain terms that the Arab Legion would disintegrate into an unreliable and inefficient rabble if the Jordanian Ministry of Finance obtained control of the subsidy.\textsuperscript{58} However, at this point the British were equally opposed. The British blocked Hussein’s attempt to acquire some degree of control over the Arab Legion and as a result Glubb became the focus of Hussein’s frustration. This was the crux of Hussein’s first attempt to remove Glubb. He was frustrated at effectively being ignored by Britain and Glubb symbolised this rebuke.

This breakdown in relations did partially open Britain’s eyes to Hussein’s primary frustrations. However, it also reaffirmed Britain’s reliance on Glubb and in the final analysis the latter trumped the former. The Foreign Office surmised that:

The long-term answer to all this is, we believe, gradually to transfer as much as possible of our control over the Arab Legion to the Jordanians themselves, i.e. financial control, by paying our subsidy to the Jordan Government and not direct to the Legion and administrative control by a gradual process of “Arabisation” of the Legion to place greater responsibility in the hands of the Arab officers.\textsuperscript{59}

\textsuperscript{55} Duke to Shuckburgh, 16 April 1954, FO371/115674/VJ1201/8/G, TNA.
\textsuperscript{56} Duke to Shuckburgh, 14 July 1955, FO371/115719/VJ1941/110, TNA.
\textsuperscript{57} Duke to Shuckburgh, 20 May 1955, FO371/115715/VJ1941/43, TNA.
\textsuperscript{58} Drake to Falla, 28 April 1954, FO371/110924/VJ1201/19, TNA.
\textsuperscript{59} ‘King Hussein’s attitude to General Glubb and the Arab Legion’, Rose, 7 May 1955, FO371/115674/VJ1201/17/G, TNA.
Moreover, it was acknowledged within Whitehall that the legal argument was in favour of Hussein’s request. However, this appreciation jarred with Britain’s increasing reliance on Glubb as the guardian of British interests in Jordan. When consulted about the future of British officers in the Arab Legion the War Office was adamant that British officers should be retained and that Glubb must continue in command. Otherwise it would no longer be worth subsidising the Arab Legion at the present level. Glubb wanted advice from HMG as to what action he should take in the event that a sudden crisis should arise regarding his position. If Glubb felt the need for a ‘showdown’ with the king the Foreign Office was resolved to give Glubb its ‘wholehearted support’ and as a ‘last resort’ the Foreign Office was prepared to consider threatening to withdraw the subsidy. Although the Foreign Office recognised the likely benefits of giving Hussein greater control over the Arab Legion it was recommended that no change could be made without first giving full consideration to Glubb’s opinion. He, however, was utterly against relinquishing any control over the Arab Legion. As was explained in a Foreign Office memo: ‘For political reasons we are anxious to do what we can to meet the Jordanians on this; but General Glubb is opposed to any change.’ Glubb now assumed the omnipotent presence that Hussein had attributed to him in December. Yet more significantly the Foreign Office was

60 Somerville (DMO) to MELF, ‘Method of Payment of Arab Legion Subsidies’, 23 May 1955, Melville Papers, 5/54.
62 BMEO to FO, 151, 2 May 1955, FO371/115674/VJ1201/10/G, TNA.
63 King Hussein’s attitude to General Glubb and the Arab Legion’, Rose, 7 May 1955, FO371/115674/VJ1201/17/G, TNA.
65 ‘The Arab Legion’, 13 September 1955, FO371/115682/VJ12010/1, TNA.
determined to support Glubb ‘to the hilt’ if the king tried to direct a move against him.\footnote{Minute by Summerhayes, 3 May 1955, FO371/115674/VJ1201/10/G, TNA.} This tense period during the spring of 1955 served to consolidate Glubb’s position and Britain’s reliance on him. Supporting Glubb was more important than appeasing Hussein.

What is particularly interesting – as revealed by a series of recently released documents – is how Britain therefore sought to deal with the king’s animosity toward Glubb. According to Glubb the principal cause of tension between himself and the king was Hussein’s maternal uncle, Sherif Nasser, who was eager to remove British obstacles to his smuggling activities.\footnote{‘King Husain and the Arab Legion’, Glubb, 11 October 1955, FO371/115683/VJ12011/2, TNA.} After Glubb was informed by one of his Arab officers that Sherif Nasser had told him that ‘British officers were about to be removed’ Glubb and Duke agreed that it was time to make a ‘serious effort to get Nasser out of the country for good’.\footnote{Amman to FO, 166, 19 April 1955; Minute by Summerhayes, 20 April 1955, FO371/115674/VJ1201/7/G, TNA.} While Glubb’s ‘age and personality’ were thought to play a part, the Foreign Office surmised that ‘clearly … the King’s attitude towards Glubb and the Legion generally can be attributed to the influence of his uncle Sharif Nasser’.\footnote{Minute by Hadow, 22 April 1955, FO371/115674/VJ1201/8/G, TNA; ‘King Hussein of Jordan’s Attitude to Glubb and the Arab Legion’, Hadow, 2 May 1955, FO371/115674/VJ1201/9/G, TNA.} The Foreign Office therefore decided: ‘Our main objective is to get rid of Nasser.’ Thereafter the British would be free ‘to convince the King that his personal dynastic interests demand the closest relations with the British and the maintenance of a British-officered Arab Legion under Glubb.’ To achieve this the British discussed two options. He could be removed either ‘by force (i.e. talking
tough to the King, demanding Nasser’s removal, threatening to withhold supplies from the Legion, casting doubts on our willingness to implement the Anglo-Jordan Treaty, etc.’. Alternatively, the British would need to ‘discredit Nasser’ before getting Hussein to remove him, possibly with offers of further assistance, such as the supply of Vampire Jets for the Arab Legion Air Force. In a continuation of Britain’s policy of selective non-intervention, as enacted during the aftermath of Abdullah’s assassination, the British sought to remove Nasser as a means of maintaining the pro-British tendency of the Jordanian hierarchy. As this was threatened the British were prepared to intervene. However, the British remained intent on avoiding obvious interference. The danger was that the British risked turning Sherif Nasser into a ‘martyr’ and consolidating the king’s anti-British stance if their attempt to oust him was unsuccessful. However, finding a subtle means of removing Sherif Nasser without obvious British interference proved elusive. Nonetheless, despite Britain’s failure to appease Hussein, or remove his uncle, this first attempt to remove Glubb and some of the senior British officers petered out and the British therefore clung to Glubb’s assertion that Hussein ‘had ceased his efforts in this direction for the moment’.

This episode left a bitter taste in Glubb’s mouth and caused him to become increasingly frustrated with the king’s interference. Glubb resented that Hussein attempted to bypass his advice. In order to reassert his position Glubb explained that it would ‘be of considerable assistance to me if someone of importance in H.M.G. could drop two points into the King’s ear.’ Firstly, Glubb

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70 Minute by Hadow, 22 April 1955, F0371/115674/VJ1201/8/G, TNA [emphasis in original].
71 ‘Note on King Husain and the Police’, Glubb, 19 May 1955, FO371/115706//VJ1641/1, TNA.
wanted it made clear that he had already discussed the issue of gradual Arabisation of the Arab Legion and that they therefore saw eye to eye on this issue. Secondly, he wanted Hussein to be informed that ‘my long experience probably makes me the best judge of how quickly the process can be carried out’. He added: ‘My object in venturing to suggest the above is to make the King see that I am his correct military adviser, and that in the long run he will get more by working through me, than by concocting plots with his boy friends.’

Glubb resented anybody’s interference in the running of the Arab Legion. When the Arab Legion Air Force was formed the British Air Ministry wanted it to be independent of the main Arab Legion with its own British commander with direct access to the Jordanian Minister of Defence. Glubb, however, was opposed to this system, which would effectively bypass him.

Glubb was reluctant to give up any degree of control as Patrick Coghill discovered when he was appointed as the Arab Legion’s Director of General Intelligence in April 1952. After the assassination of Abdullah the Jordanian Government requested that Britain supply an officer to organise a ‘Special Branch’ as they were most concerned about internal security. Although Coghill only agreed to take on the role if he had Glubb’s blessing, when he arrived he had a ‘puzzling’ and ‘disappointing’ first meeting with Glubb. Evidently he was not especially welcomed. Coghill described his first few weeks in the job as ‘hell’. He found it impossible to find out how anything operated and the only answer he received when he asked who did what was: ‘”It is for the Pasha” – i.e. Glubb’.

As Kirkbride observed Glubb tended ‘to regard himself and the Legion as being something of an autonomous

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72 Glubb to Duke, 5 June 1955, FO371/115674/VJ1201/21, TNA.
73 Pundik Struggle for Sovereignty, p. 266.
74 Coghill, Before I Forget, unpublished memoir, SAMECA.
organisation inside the Jordan state.’ 75 Under the Abdullah regime this system worked, but with Hussein this led to a clash of wills and mutual frustration. Indeed, according to Farhan Shbeilat, the Minister of Defence, Hussein’s principal complaint with Glubb was that he ‘tried to keep everything in his own hands and had his own favourites.’ 76 This contributed to the emerging power struggle. Hussein resented Glubb’s authority and Glubb resented Hussein’s interference.

The real problem that Glubb faced after Abdullah’s death was that apparently undesirable political elements were now able to gain the ear of the king. Just as in Egypt the Arab Legion experienced the emergence of a Free Officers movement intent on vanquishing British influence. Ambiguity surrounds when exactly this group became established in Jordan, as well as the level of unity amongst nationalist officers within the Legion. 77 However, the touch-paper for this problem was lit in 1948; Anglicisation of the Legion added fuel to the fire; and the flame began to burn more brightly after the assassination of Abdullah. One of the most notable members of this group was Ali Abu Nuwar who had been a member of the marginalised Transjordan delegation at the armistice negotiations at Rhodes in 1949. Describing Abu Nuwar Melville explained: ‘They were perfectly polite, but you could tell that they had an agenda that wasn’t the same as ours.’ Prior to 1948 any anti-British, or anti-Hashemite, dissent was well hidden, if it meaningfully existed at all. As Colonel Melville explained: ‘There weren’t the Ali Abu Nuwar’s in those days – as far as one knew.

75 Kirkbride to Furlonge, 29 April 1950, FO371/82752/ET1202/23, TNA.
76 Duke to Shuckburgh, 6 October 1955, FO371/115683/VJ1201/1, TNA.
They may have been cooking in the background, but they hadn’t emerged.\textsuperscript{78} The 1948 War, however, sowed the seeds for a new breed of Arab officer to emerge and Abdullah’s death provided an opportunity for these nationalist elements to exploit. In a private meeting with Major-General Benson, Ali Abu Nuwar admitted that at the time of Abdullah’s murder he was involved in a separate plot, which was almost complete, to assassinate the king.\textsuperscript{79} Meanwhile Glubb observed that Ali Abu Nuwar ‘suddenly emerged as an extremist politician’ during the uncertain period after Abdullah’s assassination. After Talal became king Abu Nuwar sought a private interview with him and fruitlessly tried to convince Talal that Glubb had murdered Abdullah. Recognising the threat posed by Abu Nuwar, Glubb had him transferred to Paris, as Military Attaché, where it was hoped he would be beyond doing harm in Jordan and the Arab Legion.\textsuperscript{80} It was here, though, that he first got to know the London-based Hussein.\textsuperscript{81}

Similarly, Glubb wanted Ali Hiyari, the Commander of the Arab Legion 5\textsuperscript{th} Regiment who later replaced Hutton as the Arab Legion Chief of Staff after the dismissal of British officers in March 1956, removed from Jordan for approximately 6 months, for political reasons.\textsuperscript{82} Glubb’s tactic for nullifying the threat of adverse political influence infiltrating the Arab Legion was to isolate them away from positions of influence.

Jordanian nationalists were just one of several sources of influence on the king who damned either Glubb, the British connection, or both. One such

\textsuperscript{78} Interview with Colonel Melville, 13 March 2013, London.
\textsuperscript{79} ‘Report by Major-General E.R. Benson in amplification of the minutes of the 10\textsuperscript{th} meeting of the AJJDB’, 24 July 1956, FO371/121534/VJ1192/91/G, TNA.
\textsuperscript{80} ‘King Husain & the Arab Legion’, Glubb, 11 October 1955, FO371/115683/VJ12011/2, TNA.
\textsuperscript{81} Shlaim, \textit{Lion of Jordan}, pp. 64-5.
\textsuperscript{82} Qiada [Hutton] to T.J.L. [Melville], 31 October 1953, Melville Papers, 10/70.
influence was his uncle, Sherif Nasser, whom Glubb had already tried to remove. His motive was primarily financial – related to his smuggling of hashish and arms – and a personal ambition for power. Another influence was the exiled Abdullah al-Tall, with whom Hussein secretly corresponded, according to Glubb’s intelligence sources. 83 A further influence was Wing-Commander Jock Dalgleish, a British RAF pilot seconded to the Arab Legion Air Force. The two became close friends after Dalgleish evacuated Hussein from Jerusalem immediately after Abdullah’s assassination. 84 Like so many of Hussein’s close associates, Dalgleish was also unsupportive of Glubb. In particular Dalgleish was frustrated by Glubb regularly rejecting newly trained pilots for political reasons. 85 Despite Dalgleish being considered a ‘king’s man’ neither Glubb nor HMG believed he exercised a suitable influence upon Hussein. 86 Partly as a result of this, but also because his secondment period was legitimately expiring, it was announced in September that Dalgleish would have to leave Jordan. While Glubb’s relationship with Hussein improved after the failure of his first attempt to remove Glubb in May 1955 Glubb had always been concerned that things would deteriorate when the king was informed of British plans to replace Dalgleish and so it proved after this was announced. When Hussein’s antagonism toward Glubb resurfaced in the autumn of 1955 the Court Minister, Fawzi al Mulki, the Minister of Defence, Farhan Shbeilat, Duke, Glubb, and the Foreign Office all attributed the king’s poor relations with Glubb to his irritation over the decision to replace Dalgleish and

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83 ‘King Husain and the Arab Legion’, Glubb, 11 October 1955, FO371/115683/VJ12011/2, TNA.
84 Royle, *Glubb Pasha*, pp. 443-5.
85 Fisher to Glubb, 26 July 1952; Dalgleish to Fisher, 26 July 1952, GP2006, 1.
86 Minute by Laurence, 12 October 1955, FO371/115683/VJ1201/1; Summary of points discussed between Glubb and Minister of State, by Shuckburgh, 11 August 1954, FO371/110928/VJ1208/5, TNA.
believed that Dalgleish probably stoked the king’s animosity toward Glubb.87 This was not the sole reason for Hussein’s renewed ire, but it was a factor and acknowledging this reveals two salient points. Firstly, Hussein was not avowedly anti-British personnel purely because they were British. What he resented were those who threatened and challenged his control. Secondly, Hussein was not merely surrounded by Arab nationalists. Instead, he was subject to anti-British and anti-Glubb influence from several different quarters with varying motives.

Nonetheless Arab nationalism was a heavy weight on Hussein’s shoulders and a further influence that Glubb could do little about, was Gamal Abdel Nasser and the Egyptians who disseminated a steady stream of anti-British and anti-Glubb propaganda into Jordan.88 Since the 1952 revolution Egypt became an increasing threat to both Hussein and the British as the Nasser regime became ‘regionally interventionist and globally activist’.89 Nasser sought Arab independence and unity and in June 1954 concluded an Anglo-Egyptian Treaty that involved Britain’s military withdrawal from the Suez Base within two years.90 Nasser’s influence was particularly telling during Britain’s failed attempt to secure Jordanian accession to the Bagdad Pact. Although arguably opposed to what had begun as America’s ‘northern tier’ project, Britain became its principal champion as a result of the belief that it could be used as a vehicle to uphold

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87 Duke to Shuckburgh, 6 October 1955; Minute by Laurence, 12 October 1955; Duke to Shuckburgh, 26 October 1955, FO371/115683/VJ1201/1; Duke to Shuckburgh, 20 October 1955, FO371/115683/VJ1202/2, TNA.
88 ‘Cairo Propaganda – Attacks on General Glubb’, 28 February 1956, FO371/121560/VJ1206/6, TNA.
British interests in the region. Britain joined Iraq, Turkey, Pakistan and Iran in the pact on 4 April 1955 and hoped to extend its membership to other Arab States, principally Jordan. At the end of October 1955 Egypt signed mutual defence pacts with Syria and Saudi Arabia. This, combined with Egypt’s procurement of Soviet arms via Czechoslovakia in September, increased Britain’s desire to secure Jordanian accession to the Bagdad Pact. However, Nasser was utterly opposed to the Bagdad Pact and in early 1955 he had warned Eden not to encourage Jordan to join. Owing to the success of Egyptian propaganda, particularly via Radio Cairo, the Jordanian Government was ‘afraid to sign’ without an obvious *quid quo pro*. Glubb sent frequent signals to Melville in November, vehemently requesting that HMG make a ‘really generous’ offer to expand the Arab Legion as a means of securing Jordan’s accession to the Bagdad Pact. By the end of month Hutton was assured by the Chief of the Imperial General Staff, Sir Gerald Templer, that this matter was currently the top priority and that Glubb’s signals had been seen by the Prime Minister and been ‘most effective’. Glubb’s demand for an extra division – which would cost £10 million on top of the existing subsidy – was deemed ‘excessive’, but Britain was willing to make a ‘package offer’. Thus, Templer was sent to Amman to persuade Jordan to make a public statement of its intention to join the Bagdad Pact by offering material and financial assistance to the Arab Legion and a promise to replace the 1948 Treaty with a Special Agreement. It is pertinent to note that the

92 Ashton, *King Hussein*, p. 47.
94 See Melville Papers, 7/61.
95 T.J.L. [Hutton] to Qiada [Glubb], 26 November 1955, ibid.
96 Harold Macmillan to Eden, 25 November 1955, FO371/115532/VJ1073/1336, TNA.
British once again sought to obtain a *quid pro quo* by partially adhering to one of Hussein's lesser requests made in December 1954. It is arguable that offering Hussein more control over the Arab Legion – particularly over its finances – would have been a more valuable *quid pro quo* to counter Egyptian and nationalist criticism. Indeed, on 13 December the Jordanians handed Templer a counter-proposal of conditions for Jordan to join the Bagdad Pact, which included paying the subsidy to the Jordanian Government rather than direct to the Arab Legion. However, the British were not prepared to go that far and on 14 December Templer left Jordan empty-handed.

The following day the Foreign Office tried to change tack and resolved to use propaganda as a weapon to persuade Jordan to join the Bagdad Pact. Glubb and Duke were requested to try to get articles published in the Jordanian press. However, on 16 December, before any such action could be taken, anti-Bagdad Pact riots broke out in Jordan. Hussein apparently still wanted to join the pact. However, politically it was not possible. Popular opinion against the pact, as manifested in the disturbances on the street – egged on by Egypt – was too well established and no amount of propaganda or material assistance for the Arab Legion would be able to reverse this. At the beginning of 1956 Glubb created a new branch of twenty people within the Arab Legion Headquarters tasked with tackling the problem of propaganda in Jordan, with plans for a sister

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101 Amman to FO, 699, 22 December 1955, FO371/115659/VJ1015/130, TNA.
branch to be created in London.\textsuperscript{102} However, this department did not have time to establish itself as just four weeks later Glubb was dismissed. Glubb lamented Britain’s failure to conduct propaganda over the past seven years. It was now too little too late.\textsuperscript{103} Pan-Arab pressure made it very difficult for Jordan to join the Bagdad Pact and the disturbances that plagued Jordan in December and January were only lastingly quelled when Samir Rifai led a new government – the third new government in three weeks – upon the premise that Jordan would not join the Bagdad Pact.\textsuperscript{104}

Although it would be short-sighted to simply draw a direct correlation between the Bagdad Pact disturbances in Jordan and the dismissal of Glubb a few months later, it was within the atmosphere of pan-Arab pressure that Hussein was compelled to take dramatic action against Glubb. The specific context was the gathering possibility of Jordan’s Arab allies becoming embroiled in renewed conflict with Israel. Abul Huda had already committed Jordan to the Arab League Collective Security Pact before Hussein’s accession, but thereafter the king repeatedly confirmed Jordan’s commitment to pan-Arab solidarity. In response to a rumour that Israel intended to attack Syria and Lebanon in 1954 Hussein assured both Arab states ‘that Jordan would assist in this event’.\textsuperscript{105} After a rise in incidents in Gaza throughout 1955 an official Jordanian statement emphasised that any breach of the armistice line would be regarded as a breach of the entire front with all Arab states.\textsuperscript{106} This belligerent attitude deeply concerned Glubb.

\textsuperscript{102} Young to Melville, 30 January 1956, Melville Papers, 4/44.
\textsuperscript{103} Qiada [Glubb] to T.J.L. [Melville], 18 December 1955, Melville Papers, 2/21.
\textsuperscript{104} Amman to FO, 51, 8 January 1956, FO371/121491/V]1051/13, TNA.
\textsuperscript{105} Melville to Glubb, repeating signal from Hutton, 24 August 1954, Melville Papers, 7/61.
Since Qibya he firmly believed that the Israelis were deliberately creating tension with the object of initiating a preventative war designed to extend Israel's eastern frontier to the river Jordan.\(^{107}\) The dilemma the Arab Legion faced was that if it got involved it would almost inevitably be defeated and lose the West Bank; but if it stood by and did nothing it would lay itself open to the charge of treachery throughout the Arab world and would significantly damage the British connection.\(^{108}\) Moreover, Hussein would have been acutely aware that to abandon his Arab neighbours would be to risk not only his political survival, but also his life. Indeed, he had witnessed the assassination of his grandfather for allegedly betraying his Arab allies during the 1948 war.

In February 1956 these fears reached a crescendo and detailed consideration of the timing indicates that this proved to be the trigger that compelled Hussein to take the desperate action of dismissing Glubb. One explanation for the timing of Glubb's dismissal was that Hussein acted in a fit of anger at an article published in the *Illustrated* magazine, which stated: 'The real ruler of Jordan is a short, blue-eyed soldier named John Bagot Glubb.'\(^{109}\) Yet while this might have rankled, it hardly seems commensurate with the abrupt manner of the dismissal.\(^{110}\) A much more convincing trigger for Glubb's dismissal was the urgent threat of a second Arab-Israeli war. After the Jordanian Government pledged its support for Egypt in September 1955, if it were attacked

\(^{107}\) ‘Need for Increases to Arab Legion as a Result of Russian Penetration into Egypt’, 30 October 1955, Melville Papers, 3/28; Qiada [Glubb] to T.J.L. [Melville], 20 November 1953, Melville Papers, 10/70.


\(^{110}\) Philip Geyelin, *Hashemite: The Story of King Hussein of Jordan* (unpublished manuscript), Chapter 19, pp. 2-3, Geyelin Papers, SAMECA.
by Israel, Glubb, who was in London at the time, replied that the view in London was that the tension in Gaza was designed to create a *casus belli* for an Israeli offensive against Jordan and he urged that this be explained to Hussein, the Prime Minister and the Minister of Defence.\(^{111}\) Cooke duly advised the King and the Prime Minister against taking any action to assist Egypt without first consulting HMG and this was accepted.\(^{112}\) True to this promise, when a specific threat of conflict arose the Jordanian Government consulted Britain. The Jordanians first expressed their concerns of a specific threat of renewed conflict between Israel and the Arab states to Britain on 24 January.\(^{113}\) It was anticipated that hostilities would break out when Israel was set to begin work on the Jisr Banat Yacoub canal to divert waters away from this demilitarised zone between Israel and Syria.\(^{114}\) The Israelis threatened to start work on 1 March – the same day that Glubb was dismissed – or any day thereafter.\(^{115}\) The Jordanian Prime Minister was convinced that if Israel did resume work on the canal then the Syrian Army would intervene.\(^{116}\) Glubb, who was ‘extremely anxious’ about the prospect, reported that, ‘King Hussein declared yesterday that if fighting begins between Egypt or Syria and Israel he will immediately order the Arab Legion to attack’.\(^{117}\) The Jordanians were anxious to know what degree of support they would receive under the terms of the Treaty if Jordan became embroiled in war.

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\(^{112}\) Qiada [Hutton] to T.J.L. [Glubb], 5 September 1955, ibid.

\(^{113}\) Amman to FO, 156, 25 January 1956, PREM11/1418, TNA.

\(^{114}\) Amman to FO, 255, 25 February 1956, ibid.

\(^{115}\) Amman to FO, 239, 21 February 1956, ibid.

\(^{116}\) Amman to FO, 21 February 1956, ibid.

\(^{117}\) Glubb to Templer (CIGS), Amman to FO, 218, 17 February 1956, ibid.
as a result of having to fulfil its obligations under the Arab League Collective Security Pact.  

However, Hussein was facing the daunting prospect of being unable to send his own army to war. His request for support from Britain on 24 January went unanswered and he was at odds with Glubb who would not countenance the use of the Arab Legion in the event of fighting breaking out between Israel, Egypt and Syria. Glubb believed: ‘If we obey the King’s orders the Arab Legion will be destroyed and Israel occupy the west bank’. Thus, as Glubb saw it: ‘The only way to avoid this would be for me and British officers to refuse.’ Just as Jordan had asked Britain to clarify its position, Glubb also pleaded for counsel. Glubb warned: ‘We are drifting towards disaster with no plan and no (repeat no) advice from Her Majesty’s Government.’  

The Jordanians considered the prospect of Arab-Israeli hostilities breaking out a matter of ‘extreme urgency’. However, as Ben Gurion had publicly renounced any intention of causing trouble at Banat Yacoub the British explained to Glubb: ‘We do not believe, however, that the immediate situation is as black as you fear. We have no indications that the Israelis intend to attack in the near future.’ Britain’s appreciation might well have been more accurate, but that mattered not to the Jordanian perception as February progressed. Glubb pleaded that it was ‘absolutely essential (repeat absolutely essential) [that] Her Majesty’s Government immediately inform us of their proposed action in the event of Israeli-Syrian hostilities on March 1.’

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118 Amman to FO, 251, 23 February 1956, ibid.
119 Amman to FO, 218, 17 February 1956, ibid.
120 Amman to FO, 251, 23 February 1956, ibid.
121 Brownhill (VCIGS) to Glubb, FO to Amman, 271, 18 February 1956, ibid.
122 Glubb to Templer, Amman to FO, 240, 21 February 1956, ibid.
owing to the lack of urgency that it attached to this threat, Britain laboured.\textsuperscript{123} Britain’s response was not given until Duke met the Jordanian Prime Minister, Samir Rifai, on the morning of 1 March, by which time the process of Glubb’s dismissal had been set in motion.\textsuperscript{124} Duke described it as an ‘ironical coincidence’ that as he left the Prime Minister’s office having given the reply to the question of Britain’s response to an Israeli attack on Syria, ‘King Hussein was on his way to instruct the Prime Minister to dismiss General Glubb’.\textsuperscript{125} Perhaps, though, it was too little too late.

The prospect of a second Arab-Israeli war almost certainly explains the timing and the manner of the dismissal. However, new evidence indicates that Hussein’s decision to dispense with Glubb’s services and limit British interference had seemingly been made several months earlier. A light is shined on this aspect when we look beyond Glubb and consider another victim of the March 1956 purge of the Arab Legion. On 1 March King Hussein not only removed Glubb, but he dismissed Glubb’s Chief of Staff, Brigadier W.M. Hutton, four senior Arab officers, eight British commanding officers and four other Arab officers deemed particularly loyal to Glubb.\textsuperscript{126} The second most significant departure was the Arab Legion’s Director of General Intelligence, Patrick Coghill.\textsuperscript{127} However, a document released via a Freedom of Information request reveals that Coghill’s dismissal was only a partial surprise. His departure had

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\textsuperscript{123} Shuckburgh, \textit{Descent}, p. 337.
\textsuperscript{124} Amman to FO, 272, 1 March 1956, PREM11/1418, TNA; Satloff, \textit{Jordan in Transition}, p. 142.
\textsuperscript{125} Amman to FO, 315, 3 March 1956, PREM11/1419, TNA.
\textsuperscript{126} ‘The Arab Legion between 1 March and 1430 hours 6 March 56’, Nigel Bromage, 6 March 1956, Melville Papers, 2/21; ‘Officer Situation’, undated [but 1956 after dismissal], GP2006, 54.
\textsuperscript{127} Amman to FO, 274, 1 March 1956, FO371/121540/VJ1201/8/G, TNA; Dann, \textit{Challenge of Arab Radicalism}, p. 31.
\end{footnotesize}
already been arranged months in advance. The Jordanian Government notified Coghill in early October 1955 that his contract would not be renewed when it expired on 31 March 1956 and that his present Arab assistant would replace him.\textsuperscript{128} However, in the event Coghill was dismissed along with Glubb on 1 March despite his already imminent departure. This surely confirms that something made the removal of Glubb and British control of the Arab Legion an urgent matter. Satloff previously queried why Hussein dismissed Glubb on 1 March when he could have let his contract expire on 31 March to emphasise apparent urgency.\textsuperscript{129} The case of Coghill is much more significant in this regard, though, because unlike the Glubb scenario – which was circumstantial speculation by Satloff – Coghill had, in fact, already been informed that his contract would not be renewed.

The Coghill scenario is all the more informative when we consider two other factors. Firstly, at the end of September the Arab Legion Air Force was renamed the Royal Jordan Air Force.\textsuperscript{130} Similarly, after Glubb’s dismissal the Arab Legion was renamed the Jordan Arab Army. This would seem to indicate the gradual process of reducing the British connection and rebranding the Jordanian military had already begun in September 1955. Secondly, when questioned why he dismissed Glubb Hussein was adamant that he had warned the British of his grievances with Glubb in October 1955. On the day he dismissed Glubb Hussein explained that despite warning London in October,

\begin{footnotesize}
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\item[\textsuperscript{129}] Satloff, \textit{Jordan in Transition}, p. 140. As a point of fact it should be acknowledged that Glubb’s contract was actually due to expire on 16\textsuperscript{th} May 1956; Qaid [Heisch] to CGS, Appendix A, GP2006, 54.
\item[\textsuperscript{130}] ‘King Husain & the Arab Legion’, Glubb, 11 October 1955, FO371/115683/VJ12011/2, TNA.
\end{itemize}
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‘nothing seemed to be done’. The crucial exchange was a private conversation on 24 October between Hussein and Evelyn Shuckburgh, the Under-Secretary in charge of Middle Eastern Affairs for the Foreign Office. It was Shuckburgh who raised the topic of Glubb with Hussein. He did so in response to a memorandum from Glubb, which detailed the dire state of his relationship with the king. In this document, released via a Freedom of Information request, Glubb reported: ‘For the moment we must assume that the King is intent on getting rid of me.’ After speaking to Hussein the Minister of Defence informed Glubb that:

the King’s mind had been completely poisoned against the Arab Legion and myself [Glubb]. He said that the King had said with some heat that the Arab Legion was a mob without organization. That he felt the time had come when he must intervene himself and insist on a higher standard of efficiency, and so on.

In passing on Glubb’s ‘cri de coeur’ Duke counselled that he did not believe that a major crisis over Glubb was imminent. However, he explained, ‘it does seem that the process has started of making life as difficult for Glubb as possible in the hope that he will soon resign and the question is therefore what we are to do about it’. As it turned out the British did virtually nothing. As Satloff observed the striking feature of the meeting is the disparity with which the two participants seemed to perceive the results of this discussion. Shuckburgh came away believing that if Hussein ever lost full confidence in Glubb that he would let HMG know. Meanwhile Duke reported that when the king returned to Amman he said that he had confidence in Glubb, but he did so ‘without much
warmth’, leaving Duke with the ‘impression that he had made up his mind to carry out some changes in the administration of the Arab Legion’.

This suggests that just like the situation a year earlier, in December 1954, the British underestimated Hussein’s frustration, resentment, and vulnerability to attack from Arab nationalists. Considered in tandem with the Coghill situation it would seem fairly certain that Hussein did indeed have Glubb’s departure – if not dismissal – in mind as early as October 1955.

The British response to Hussein’s concerns in October 1955 mirrored its response to Hussein’s desire to remove Glubb in the spring. In reporting on the meeting Shuckburgh noted that it was, ‘still clear that the King has considerable reservations in his attitude to Glubb and that we must do our best to clear them up’. As in the spring, the British had no intention of appeasing Hussein in his complaints against Glubb and his lack of control over the Arab Legion. Rather, the British sought to clear things up by once again attempting to remove perceived undesirable influences. Just days after his meeting with Hussein Shuckburgh reignited the previously halted campaign against Sherif Nasser. Because of the ‘malign influence’ that Sherif Nasser had been exercising on the king the Foreign Office became re-determined that ‘he should be removed’. The British regretted that hitherto ‘no feasible method has presented itself.’ However, the removal of Sherif Nasser once again became a firm Foreign Office objective and Shuckburgh therefore requested the advice of Duke and Glubb ‘on the best way to tackle this very tricky business’.

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136 Duke to Shuckburgh, 28 November 1955, WO216/891, TNA.
137 Shuckburgh to Duke, 5 November 1955, FO371/115683/VJ12011/4, TNA.
138 Shuckburgh to J.H.N. Poett (DMO), 27 October 1955, FO371/115683/VJ12011/2, TNA.
that it had become ‘increasingly apparent that most of the trouble we are having with the King derives from the poison which Sherif Nasser and others are continually pouring into the King’s ear and that we shall see our best efforts frustrated unless we can bring about his removal’. While Hussein departed London in October 1955 believing that HMG would act against Glubb, instead they were more intent upon acting against his uncle. Once again the British decided that the best way to solve Hussein’s frustrations with Glubb was not to appease him, but to attempt to eliminate what they perceived to be a malign influence.

Britain’s failure to deal with Hussein’s frustrations regarding Glubb and control of the Arab Legion was a symptom of the Glubb paradox that was created by the assassination of Abdullah and compounded by the departure of Kirkbride soon after. The departure of Abdullah and Kirkbride meant that Glubb was hoisted into the role of elder statesman within the Hashemite Kingdom. Abdullah’s absence meant that Britain’s position in Jordan had been weakened and as the influence of Jordanian and Arab nationalists increased, Britain became ever more reliant on Glubb. The paradox this created was that by the time Hussein came to power Glubb was increasingly becoming both indispensible and detrimental to Britain’s position in Jordan. Glubb’s position posed a dilemma. On the one hand it was believed that ‘a successful campaign for his dismissal would be the final blow to our prestige in Jordan’. Britain might be expected, therefore, to have taken remedial action to avoid compelling Hussein to take drastic action. Yet on the other hand, removing Glubb even on British terms was

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139 Shuckburgh to Duke, 5 November 1955, FO371/115683/VJ12011/4, TNA.
140 Minute by Summerhayes, 28 December 1955, FO371/115683/VJ12011/6, TNA.
deemed equally undesirable. For as Shuckburgh reflected, such a retreat would have been seen as ‘another case of “scuttle”’.\textsuperscript{141} Given the undesirability of Glubb’s departure, whether forced or voluntary, the British clung to signs of improvement. At the start of 1956 Rose, the head of the Foreign Office Eastern Department, accepted Duke’s appraisal that the January riots in Jordan had drawn ‘the King and Glubb closer together’ meaning Glubb would hopefully ‘be able to carry on for a few years yet’.\textsuperscript{142} In truth, however, Glubb’s relationship with Hussein had experienced no such renaissance. Months before the dismissal it was suggested by a Northern Ireland MP, based on the views of former British Arab Legion officer Ronnie Broadhurst, that Glubb, ‘may now, in spite of his good work in the past, prove to be an embarrassment to our interests.’\textsuperscript{143} The Foreign Secretary, Selwyn Lloyd, dismissed this, however. He countered that he had ‘complete confidence’ in Glubb, noting: ‘naturally he is sniped at by Communists, Egyptians and anti-Western elements in Jordan. But I do not think that makes him a liability.’\textsuperscript{144} This was despite the belief that Britain’s position in Jordan depended ‘quite considerably on General Glubb’s prestige’.\textsuperscript{145} Given the Arab nationalist pressure on Hussein, Glubb was a liability to the king. However, the British did not take this into consideration and talked themselves into accepting criticism of Glubb as par for the course.

The Glubb paradox was evident in the fruitless discussions concerning Glubb’s potential successor, after the murder of Abdullah made Glubb the

\textsuperscript{141} Shuckburgh, \textit{Descent}, p. 292, n. 1.
\textsuperscript{142} Duke to Rose, 1 February 1956; Rose to Poett, 13 February 1956, FO371/121560/VJ1206/4, TNA.
\textsuperscript{143} Currie to Lloyd, 3 January 1956, FO371/121491/VJ1051/21, TNA; Royle, \textit{Glubb Pasha}, pp. 450-1.
\textsuperscript{144} Lloyd to Currie, 16 January 1956, ibid.
\textsuperscript{145} Shuckburgh to Duke, 5 November 1955, FO371/115683/VJ12011/4, TNA.
number one target for assassination. It was adjudged that Glubb’s successor would require two pre-requisites. In Glubb’s view: ‘My successor wants two (almost incompatible) qualifications – a capable Arabist and an efficient soldier.’ He also required ‘considerable political acumen’. These criteria posed a problem because no such candidate existed. Ultimately, the problem was that ‘the Pasha [Glubb] did everything’ and no one else could do ‘everything’ like Glubb did. When the issue had been discussed after the 1948 War Glubb and Kirkbride both recommended Gawain Bell, from the Sudan Political Service, as a potential replacement. Although he had spent time on secondment with the Arab Legion during the Second World War and had the required skills as an Arabist, he had no meaningful military experience. He was therefore discounted. In 1951 Sam Cooke, the Arab Legion Divisional Commander, came to the fore as a candidate. However, despite Glubb initially putting his name forward both he and Kirkbride quickly established that he was a mirror opposite of Bell. While he was militarily very capable he was deemed not to have the required political acumen. Nonetheless Cooke was earmarked as the best immediate replacement in the event of Glubb’s sudden unexpected departure, but it was deemed necessary to begin the search for a more suitable ‘long term successor’. It was established that a suitable officer would need to spend several years inside Jordan to get to know and be known by all the leading personalities. However, no candidate was ever found. Nor, it seems, were they meaningfully searched for. MELF and Glubb agreed that the ‘correct procedure’ for finding a successor to

146 Glubb to Crocker, 6 November 1949, GP2006, 44.
147 Furlonge to Kirkbride, 21 November 1951, FO371/91823/ET1201/78, TNA.
148 Interview with Colonel Melville, 13 March 2013, London.
149 Walker to Wardrop, 19 December 1951, FO371/91823/ET1201/94, TNA.
150 Kirkbride to Furlonge, 28 November 1951, FO371/91823/ET1201/86, TNA.
Glubb was to install potential candidates in the Arab Legion as and when Arab Legion vacancies occurred. Yet four-and-a-half years later, when he was dismissed, Britain was still dependent on Glubb to plough a lone furrow, with no replacement in sight. In October 1955 Cooke was still being bandied about as a potential immediate replacement in the event of Glubb’s unexpected dismissal even though he was still considered little more than a ‘simple soldier’ who would be out of his depth politically. The War Office collected names of potential successors, but did not believe that anyone could fully replace Glubb. The problem was that Glubb was deemed ‘irreplaceable’. Glubb ‘grew’ with the role, but a replacement of the required rank would have to jump straight into the fire; they would need concrete reward for leaving the British Army mid-career and to ensure he became ‘a contented and efficient servant of the Jordan Government’. The British were dependant on Glubb’s loyalty to the role – to what had effectively become the Glubb role. Consequently, the British found it almost impossible to look beyond Glubb. The British took advantage of the scant reward and the heavy price that he was prepared to accept because of his loyalty to the role and when faced with the prospect of his removal, the British effectively buried their heads in the sand; almost as if they hoped Glubb would continue forever. In so doing they broke one of the tenets of British imperial strategy. As Edward Said noted, during the nineteenth century it became commonplace for British colonial administrators to be retired off by the age of 55

151 Robertson to Brownjohn, 3 April 1952, WO216/767, TNA.
152 Duke to Shuckburgh, 20 October 1955, FO371/115683/VJ1202/2, TNA.
153 Poett to Shuckburgh, 28 October 1955, FO371/115683/VJ12011/3, TNA.
154 Furlonge to Kirkbride, 21 November 1951, FO371/91823/ET1201/78, TNA.
155 Hunter to Major Newall, Draft Letter, 5 October 1951, FO371/91822/ET1201/63/G, TNA.
to avoid the Oriental subjects seeing the Western superiors age and degenerate.\footnote{Edward Said, \textit{Orientalism} (London, 1995), p. 42.} Born in 1897, Glubb hit the magic number of 55 in 1952 – shortly before Hussein’s accession – and thereafter he was perceived to be increasingly anachronistic and irksome in the eyes of the younger generation of Jordanians entering the political scene – not least the king himself.

Ultimately it was this Glubb paradox that precluded Britain from satisfying any of the king’s requirements in his quest for control of the Arab Legion. In the wake of Glubb’s dismissal Duke questioned whether the ‘action taken against Glubb was (a) directed against him personally or (b) intended as a blow against British influence and position generally.’\footnote{Amman to F0, 339, 5 March 1956, FO371/121492/VJ1051/47/G, TNA.} The King’s action does not fit neatly into either of these categories though. Ultimately Hussein’s decision was not simply about striking a blow against Britain. Rather, it was about reacting against British obstinacy; breaking free of British constraints; and Glubb was the personification of this problem. Referring to questions about the details of his dismissal in a television interview less than a year after the event Glubb remarked: ‘In reality the details of the crisis were unimportant. It was the build up [over several years] that was important. Once the crisis arises, it is probably too late to do anything.’\footnote{Transcript of Glubb’s interview with Richard Dimbleby on the TV programme: ‘At Home: Glubb Pasha’, 23 January 1957, GP2006, 47.} Indeed it was the build up of frustration over a number of years that fed Hussein’s desire to be rid of Glubb. The British declined to expand the Arab Legion after Qibya; they failed to reply to the aide memoire of December 1954, and acknowledge Hussein’s vehemence regarding the method of paying the subsidy; and they failed to appease Hussein’s frustrations with
Glubb in the spring and then again in the autumn of 1955. Time and again the
British decided that appeasing Hussein was not the answer. When he was irked
by plans for his occupation before acceding the throne the British favoured
appeasing his mother. When he sought to obtain greater control over the Arab
Legion the British preferred to plot against his uncle. This approach was borne
partly out of Britain's original belief that it could act as puppeteer. But it was also
because Britain had become increasingly reliant on Glubb. The British therefore
clung to the fiction that they could mould Hussein to work with Glubb. They did
this not out of misplaced sureness, but out of the ominous uncertainty of a
Glubbless Jordan.

After a brief lull in the friction between Glubb and Hussein during the
summer of 1955 Hussein set in motion a process of Arabising the Arab Legion in
the autumn, as evidenced by the change of name to the Arab Legion Air Force,
the notice that Coghill would be replaced by his Arab assistant when his contract
expired and Hussein's evident – and now public – displeasure with Glubb, which
led Glubb to believe that Hussein was intent on replacing him. This gradual
process of Arabisation, however, was expedited when the threat of a renewed
Arab-Israeli conflict raised its head. Indeed, we know this process was expedited
because: why else would Hussein dismiss Coghill when he was already scheduled
to leave just a few weeks later? In February 1956 Hussein's frustrations with
Glubb and Britain collided with a sense of urgency. Added to the increasingly
anti-British, Arab nationalist atmosphere this proved to be a potent mix. The
trigger for dismissing Glubb was the urgent threat of renewed Arab-Israeli
fighting. However, the underlying cause of removing Glubb was the king's lack of
authority over the Arab Legion, which was compounded by Britain repeatedly
ignoring Hussein’s concerns and requests. Just as Glubb’s dismissal was indicative of the king’s need to exert his authority, it was indicative of Britain’s struggle to adapt to evolving global conditions. As Samir Rifai astutely appraised, Britain had been ‘unable [to] adjust traditionalist thinking to new circumstances’. It hoped that through ‘waiting and patience all will turn out well.’ 159 As it turned out Britain’s policy of waiting and patience frustrated Hussein and therefore resulted in change being thrust upon it. The British were hostage to the Glubb paradox. That is why Britain failed to remedy the king’s complaints and in-turn why Hussein decided that Glubb must go.

159 Mallory to State Department, 26 January 1956, FRUS, 1955-57, V.XIII, pp. 21-23.
In his memoirs Hussein described the dismissal of Glubb and other officers from the Arab Legion as a ‘strictly Jordanian affair’. Glubb, after all, was contracted to the Jordanian Government with no official link to Britain. Moreover, the removal of seconded British officers was not contrary to the Treaty as Britain was only obligated to supply officers if requested. However, the British deemed that the manner of the dismissals – given the lack of consultation – broke the spirit of the Treaty, if not the letter. Moreover, the removal of Glubb was a crushing blow not only to British dominance of the Arab Legion, but also to British prestige throughout the Middle East. Glubb’s dismissal was a headline event. Yet hitherto its consequences have largely avoided critical analysis. Within the existing literature Glubb’s dismissal has been considered primarily within the context of King Hussein’s political survival, or, within the British context, as a component part of the Suez crisis later that year, which culminated in a botched collusion between Britain, France and Israel at the end of October after Nasser nationalised the Suez Canal Company in July. The purpose of this chapter is to explore the relationship between Glubb’s dismissal, the Suez crisis and the termination of the Anglo-Jordanian Treaty in March 1957. In so doing this chapter fills a crucial gap in the Anglo-Jordanian historiography, but also the

1 Hussein, Uneasy Lies the Head, p. 107.
3 The Arab Legion was formally rebranded as the Jordan Arab Army on 12 July 1956. For ease of reference, though, this chapter will continue to refer to this force as the Arab Legion.
broader historiographical debates concerning the Suez crisis and Britain's Middle East retreat.

In assessing the impact of Glubb's dismissal it is necessary to break the analysis down into two aspects: the reaction and the response. The bulk of this chapter will focus on the practicalities of the British response; assessing how Britain sought to cope with the dismissal and exploring the process that led to the termination of the Treaty almost exactly twelve months after Glubb was dismissed. Hitherto the veil of Suez has obscured analysis of this process. As A.J. Stockwell reminds us: 'It is readily claimed that the Suez crisis marked the end of the British Empire.' 4 Both Peter Hahn and Scott Lucas, for instance, contend that Suez was a watershed moment that marked the end of British influence in the Middle East. 5 Nigel Ashton has convincingly countered the watershed argument by emphasising Britain’s continued involvement in the region after 1956, particularly British military intervention in Jordan in 1958 and Kuwait in 1961. 6 Stephen Blackwell, like Ashton, posits that the British military intervention in Jordan was more than just 'brief Indian summer' that Keith Kyle dismissed it as. 7 Similarly, Simon Smith and Ashley Jackson emphasise Britain's continued commitments and influence even after the 1971 withdrawal from East of Suez. 8 Lucas, though, has remained unconvincing by those who 'cling to tangible

6 Ashton, 'Microcosm of Decline', pp. 1069-83; Ashton, 'Britain and Jordan 1957-73', pp. 221-244.
8 Smith, Britain's Revival and Fall in the Gulf, pp. 5-6; Murphy, 'Britain as a Global Power', p. 69.
markers of continuing but limited British presence’. It is beyond the scope of this chapter to explore Britain’s continued relationship with Jordan beyond 1957. However, it nonetheless contributes to the Suez watershed debate by revealing the insignificant role that Suez played in Britain’s retreat from Jordan. Stephen Blackwell, for example, considers the British abandonment of Jordan as being one of the results of the Suez debacle. This notion supports the template that Suez was a watershed that heralded the end of Britain’s moment in the Middle East. Blackwell argues that the Suez crisis ‘wrecked’ Britain’s attempt to renew the Anglo-Jordanian relationship. As this chapter reveals, though, the Suez crisis did not significantly contribute to the termination of the Anglo-Jordanian Treaty. Although the termination discussions took place after Suez, the re-evaluation process had been initiated by Glubb’s dismissal – and was delayed, rather than caused by, the Suez crisis. Suez was undoubtedly a significant aspect of Britain’s moment in the Middle East, but it was not the all-defining watershed it is often portrayed to be. In that regard this chapter supports Stockwell’s contention that ‘the ebb and flow of empire washed over the supposed Suez watershed’.

In the first instance, though, this chapter will hone in on the immediate British reaction – where Suez has again dominated the historiographical analysis. Within the existing literature it is generally accepted that the British Prime Minister, Anthony Eden, was initially furious at the decision to dismiss Glubb. Even one of Eden’s most sympathetic biographers concedes that the

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11 Ibid., p. 31.
initial telegrams suggest that Eden ‘initially overreacted’. It is accepted as an almost undisputed fact that the British – and the Prime Minister, Anthony Eden, in particular – blamed Gamal Abdel Nasser of Egypt for engineering the dismissal. The significance of this, as Nigel Ashton has contended, is that Glubb’s dismissal marked ‘the point at which the British Government abandoned the strategy of trying to work with Nasser’. By playing close attention to the nuances of the reaction and with the aid of three recently released documents this chapter challenges this hitherto accepted contention that Eden blamed Nasser. Instead it posits an altered understanding of the link between Glubb’s dismissal and the origins of the Suez crisis.

The traditional appreciation of the British reaction has its origins in the memoirs of Sir Anthony Nutting, the Minister of State for Foreign Affairs. In 1967, after a self-imposed ten-year wait and amidst much government debate, Nutting published his memoirs of the Suez Crisis. In the very first line he pinpointed Glubb’s dismissal as being where the ‘drama that was to become the Suez disaster actually began’. He added, in notably unequivocal terms:

As one who spent the evening and half of the night after Glubb’s dismissal arguing with Eden, I can testify that, at the time, he put

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all the blame on Nasser ... And on that fatal day he decided that the
world was not big enough to hold both him and Nasser.\footnote{Anthony Nutting, No End of a Lesson: The Story of Suez (London, 1967), p. 17-18, 29.}

This appreciation is reinforced by the initial reaction of the British Foreign Secretary, Selwyn Lloyd, who had been dining with Nasser at the time of Glubb’s dismissal. When Lloyd first heard news of the incident – after leaving his engagement with Nasser – he sent a telegram to Eden stating that he found ‘it difficult to believe that Nasser did not know, but he [Nasser] gave no hint.’\footnote{Cairo to FO, 413, 2 March 1956, F0371/121243/V1071/85, TNA.} This has been unanimously interpreted as evidence that Lloyd blamed Nasser for engineering Glubb’s dismissal.\footnote{Steven Freiberger, Dawn Over Suez: The Rise of American Power in the Middle East, 1953-1957 (Chicago, 1992), pp. 246-247; Tal, Politics, the Military, and National Security in Jordan, pp. 29-30; Kyle, Suez, p. 94; Monroe, Britain’s Moment, p.190; Shlaim, Lion of Jordan, pp. 105-6.} Within the existing literature Eden is deemed to have shared this opinion and become intent on revenge.

However, new evidence and close attention to timing of correspondence during the twenty-four hours after Glubb’s dismissal posits an alternative interpretation of the British reaction. When news of Glubb’s dismissal first reached London, the initial reaction was consistent with the pre-dismissal policy hampered by the Glubb paradox; instinctively the British hoped that the decision could be reversed and the status quo maintained. It was mooted that Britain should ‘try to preserve the fiction that he has gone to Cyprus on leave while we work on the King to modify his view’.\footnote{FO to Amman, 347, 2 March 1956, F0371/121540/VJ1201/11/G, TNA.} In his first message to the King – sent before receipt of Lloyd’s telegram – Eden warned Hussein that if he did not reverse Glubb’s dismissal, ‘the resentment in Britain at this action will be widespread and deep. I cannot foretell its final consequences upon the relations...
between our two countries.’ Eden tempered this warning, though, by explaining that it was being made, ‘in the interests [sic] of the friendship of our two countries.’ In his memoirs Nutting claimed that Eden’s first instinct was ‘to telegraph to the King personally to say that if he persisted in removing Glubb our relations with Jordan would be at an end’, but that Nutting ‘managed to dissuade him’. Eden’s initial message to the king perhaps reads, therefore, like a threat tempered by Nutting. However, a document released in 2007 posits another interpretation to explain the construction of this message. The preceding telegram to London, from the British Ambassador, Charles Duke, contained the following passage:

Reverting to the subject of Anglo-Jordan relations the Prime Minister [Samir Rifai] said, speaking personally to me as a friend, that he suggested that Her Majesty’s Government should make clear to the King the gravity of his action but should not allow it to damage those mutual interests which were served by the maintenance of cooperation between the two countries.

In light of this telegram Eden’s message to the King reads like a considered response, which heeded the Jordanian Prime Minister’s advice – rather than, or perhaps in addition to, Nutting’s counsel – to demonstrate the gravity of the king’s action, while simultaneously protecting the maintenance of cooperation between the two countries. Indeed, this interpretation is supported by a minute written by Sir Phillip de Zulueta, the Foreign Affairs Private Secretary, who stated that Eden simply wanted to avoid giving the impression that the ‘British will always accept a fait accompli’. Given the general tone of Nutting’s memoirs there is a distinct possibility that he exaggerated the extent of Eden’s anger

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21 FO to Amman, 346, 2 March 1956, ibid.
22 Nutting, No End of a Lesson, pp. 28-29.
23 Amman to FO, 279, 1 March 1956, FO371/121540/VJ1201/10/G, TNA.
24 De Zulueta to Eden, 7 March 1956, PREM11/1419, TNA.
somewhat.²⁵ Although deeply stunned, Eden was seemingly more pragmatic than Nutting and much of the subsequent literature have given him credit for. Perhaps, though, this equates to little more than a diluted version of Nutting’s account.

Yet what of Nutting’s claim that Eden turned his attention toward Nasser? Here a more significant reappraisal emerges. Notably, this contention is not supported by the Cabinet Secretary’s notebook – released in 2008. These notebooks had been previously withheld on the basis that they revealed the contribution of individual members to Cabinet debates and so might have undermined collective responsibility. According to the notes taken during the 5 March cabinet meeting, when the dismissal of Glubb was discussed, Eden apparently made no mention of Nasser. In fact, Eden’s comments – although possibly diluted by their note form – appeared to be pragmatically concerned with establishing the future course of policy toward Jordan. Richard Austen Butler, the Lord Privy Seal and Leader of the House of Commons, indicated that measures should not be confined to Jordan and suggested that Britain ‘may have to move closer to Israel and ... [perhaps] unseat Nasser’. Yet even after Butler had brought Nasser into the debate Eden seemingly dismissed this suggestion, stating only that: ‘We are more likely to transfer support elsewhere – e.g. reinforce [the] P.[ersian] Gulf.’²⁶ Not only did Eden not mention Nasser himself, but he dismissed claims by others to act against him. This belies the notion that Eden wanted Nasser destroyed as a consequence of Glubb’s dismissal.

²⁶ Cabinet Secretary’s Diary, 5 March 1956, CAB195/14, TNA [emphasis added].
So how do we explain the change in Eden’s attitude from anger directed at Nasser on the night of Glubb’s dismissal – as claimed by Nutting – and his rebuttal of linking this incident to Nasser a few days later in the Cabinet meeting? Or does the Cabinet Secretary’s notebook merely mask Eden’s anger toward Nasser? The answer to the second question is seemingly: no. It is reasonable to accept that Eden did rage against Nasser to Nutting during the twilight hours following Glubb’s dismissal. Perhaps this was fuelled by Lloyd’s euphemistic report that he found it hard to believe that Nasser did not know – which is not quite the same as saying he believed Nasser was to blame. Eden’s apparent change of heart can be explained by the third recently released document. On the morning after Glubb’s dismissal Lloyd met Nasser again at breakfast. After this meeting – the first time the pair had met since hearing news of Glubb’s dismissal – Evelyn Shuckburgh, Assistant Under-Secretary at the Foreign Office in charge of Middle East affairs, informed Sir Ivone Kirkpatrick, the Permanent Under-Secretary of State, that: ‘the Secretary of State had been with Colonel Nasser last night and had derived the impression that Nasser knew nothing about it.’ Lloyd’s suspicion, it seems, was at most an instinctive reaction, which lasted for one night only. It is wholly plausible therefore that Eden’s alleged indignation directed at Nasser in the early hours of 2 March was placated, in the cold light of day, by Lloyd’s better-informed and unequivocal appraisal that Nasser was not involved.

British indignation against Nasser did increase in early March 1956. However, there is an important nuance that must be acknowledged. On 8 March

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27 Shuckburgh to Kirkpatrick, 2 March 1956, FO371/121542/VJ1201/57, TNA [emphasis added].
Shuckburgh recorded that: ‘Today both we and the Americans really gave up hope of Nasser and began to look around for means of destroying him.’\textsuperscript{28} The question, therefore, is: what explains this sudden change on 8 March if the widely held turning point – Glubb’s dismissal – had occurred a week previously? The United States frustration with Nasser was a result of Robert Ande\textsuperscript{29} rson’s failed mission to secure Nasser’s support for an Arab-Israeli rapprochement. Britain’s stance, meanwhile, can be explained by another incident, of which Glubb’s dismissal was related: the House of Commons debate on Glubb’s dismissal on 7 March. Evelyn Shuckburgh immediately predicted that Eden would be ‘jeered at in the house’ and that this was ‘his main concern’.\textsuperscript{30} And so it proved. Eden’s winding-up speech received heavy parliamentary criticism.\textsuperscript{31} Consistent with the pragmatism displayed thus far, Eden was not criticised for overreacting but for under-reacting. When Lloyd tackled Nasser over Glubb’s dismissal he remarked that, as a result of Egypt’s vociferous propaganda campaign against Glubb, it would ‘rightly or wrongly be attributed to Egypt in large measure’.\textsuperscript{32} It was this kind of ill-informed assumption that contributed to the parliamentary criticism that Eden received. If a decisive turning point linking Glubb’s dismissal to the Suez crisis exists, this was surely it. Glubb’s dismissal itself did not rouse Eden’s antagonism against Nasser, but the parliamentary criticism concerning this event did. Glubb’s dismissal might have assisted the

\textsuperscript{28} Shuckburgh, \textit{Descent}, p. 345.
\textsuperscript{32} Bahrain to FO, 156, 2 March 1956, FO371/121540/VJ1201/24, TNA.
abandonment of working with Nasser, but he was not believed to be behind the decision by those in the know. The subsequent policy toward Nasser seemingly had more to do with Eden’s temperament, parliamentary wrangling and Anglo-Egyptian relations than events in Jordan.

Beyond this initial reaction, the response to Glubb’s dismissal was more concerned with repairing the Anglo-Jordanian relationship in the short-term, while the future value of the relationship was re-evaluated. During the 5 March Cabinet meeting R.A.B. Butler and Lord Salisbury, the Lord President of the Council, were in favour of immediately ending the subsidy and the Treaty. Others, such as Harold Macmillan, wanted to save what they could in Jordan.33 All those best placed to make an informed judgement regarding the situation in Jordan – Glubb, Kirkbride, and Duke – advised against pressing Hussein too hard or too fast.34 There was nothing to be gained by acting hastily and this was the line that was followed. It was deemed necessary to re-evaluate the value of the alliance and carefully consider the implications of any change to the existing arrangement. Instinctively the Foreign Office questioned whether the subsidy was still a worthwhile investment.35 Meanwhile, the War Office and the Chiefs of Staff had consequently ‘written the Legion off as a military body in which they have any serious interest’.36 The War Office had always justified its portion of the subsidy on the basis that it could rely on Arab Legion assistance in the event of a global war. After Glubb’s departure this was no longer the case and the War

33 Shuckburgh, Descent, p. 343.
34 Nicosia to FO, 139, 2 March 1956, FO371/121540/VJ1201/14/G; Amman to FO, 289, 2 March 1956, FO371/121540/VJ1201/18/G; ‘My conclusions and queries’, Kirkbride, 8 March 1956, PREM11/1419, TNA.
35 Kirkpatrick to Levant Department, 5 March 1956, FO371/121541, TNA; Pappé, ‘British Rule in Jordan’, p. 217.
36 Hadow to Mason, 13 June 1956, FO371/121549/VJ1201/216, TNA.
Office believed it could no longer justify any expenditure on the Arab Legion. 37 Nonetheless, the Foreign Office appraised that cutting the subsidy abruptly would further damage relations. The whole value of the relationship would have to be considered first. 38 Thus Britain continued to pay the subsidy on a month-by-month basis at the same level as the previous year while the long-term future of the relationship with Jordan was reconsidered. 39

In the meantime the British had to deal with two more immediate and interconnected problems created by the dismissal of Glubb: the future of seconded British officers within the Arab Legion and the impact that the recent changes would have on Britain’s treaty obligations. Regarding the former, not only were there now fewer British officers, but also those who remained had their authority extinguished overnight. Technical and training officers continued as normal, but executive officers were now in the awkward position of holding command without authority. 40 When Lieutenant-Colonel Dingwall, commander of the 3rd Tank Regiment, inspected his men on 3 March, while the larger and better part of his regiment were elsewhere on guard duties, only 5 out of 100 men raised a salute: ‘some turned their backs, some got behind vehicles, and others found similar excuses. A few laughed’. Although Dingwall was still officially in command of the regiment, authority now rested with Adeeb Abu Nuwar, Ali Abu Nuwar’s cousin. Over the next few days Dingwall reported that ‘a truly remarkable number of officers’ visited the regiment, but instead of going to

37 ‘Arab Legion Subsidy’, Rose, 20 April 1956, FO371/121577/VJ1205/15/G, TNA.
38 Minute by Horley, 6 April 1956, FO371/121557/VJ1205/17/G, TNA.
39 Rose to Duke, 17 May 1956, FO371/121558/VJ1205/24/G; FO to Amman, 2750, 30 November 1956, FO371/121500/VJ1051/252/G, TNA.
40 ‘Notes on Meeting with Brigadier Mead’, VCIGs to CIGS, 12 March 1956, WO216/912, TNA.
see Dingwall, they all went to see Adeeb Abu Nuwar. British officers ‘as a whole’ were keen to leave Jordan ‘as quickly as possible’. They were angry at the events of March 1st, but they also felt that it was ‘extremely dangerous’ for them to serve in executive command of fighting units as they would be blamed for any defeat in war. As the Chief of the Imperial General Staff, General Templer, informed ‘Sam’ Cooke, the Arab Legion Divisional Commander, British officers were now in an ‘impossible position’. In the first instance HMG’s ‘main object’ was to ‘maintain the cohesion and stability of the Arab Legion as a whole’. Thus, the remaining British officers were instructed by HMG to ‘obey the orders’ given by their new superiors and if any Arab officers of Bedouin battalions protested about the replacement of the British commanding officer, then the displaced officer was told he ‘must do all in his power to prevent trouble’. In the second instance, HMG was intent on revising the nature of British involvement in the Arab Legion; to remove the dilemma of British officers being blamed for reverses in a war with Israel when they had no control over operations. The impossible position that the remaining seconded British officers were now placed meant that some change was needed.

The nature of this change, however, has hitherto been misunderstood, or at least misrepresented, within the existing literature. Avi Shlaim has stated that:

‘The British officers on secondment to the Arab Legion were withdrawn, but

41 ‘Report by Lt-Col. J.J. Dingwall, commanding 3 Tank Regiment Arab Legion, upon the events which took place on 1 March 1956 as they affected him’, 8 March 1956, GP2006, 54.
42 ‘The Arab Legion: Between 1 March and 1430 hours 6 March 56’, Nigel Bromage, 6 March 1956, Melville Papers, 2/21.
43 FO to Amman, 494, 12 March 1956, GP2006, 54.
44 FO to Amman, 353, 2 March 1956, FO371/121540/VJ1201/9/G, TNA.
45 FO to Amman, 494, 12 March 1956, FO371/121542/VJ1201/73/G, TNA.
those, like Glubb, under contract to the Jordanian government were allowed to
stay'.\textsuperscript{46} Meanwhile Stephen Blackwell has asserted that British officers seconded
to the Arab Legion were converted into a ‘military mission’ in May.\textsuperscript{47} Both these
statements are incorrect. Instantaneously the British concluded that British
officers could not ‘be asked to continue in positions of responsibility without
authority’. As Eden stated in the Commons: ‘We have therefore asked that such
officers should be relieved of their commands.’\textsuperscript{48} Ironically, the Jordanians were
less keen on such a swift process of Arabisation. They wished to maintain a
number of seconded British officers in command positions, including Cooke and
Dingwall, in order to allow time for an orderly transition.\textsuperscript{49} It appeared to Hutton
– who was asked to stay on for a couple of weeks, despite his dismissal, in order
to handover to his replacement as Chief of Staff, Ali Hiyari – that the Jordanians
now expected to run the Arab Legion themselves, but with all the same benefits
of British support in terms of men, money and materials.\textsuperscript{50} The Foreign Office
was adamant that in the interest of preventing future friction HMG could not
adhere to the king’s request for British officers to remain in executive command
positions at any level. However, it was vital that this rejection did not encourage
Hussein to turn to his Arab neighbours because, in an advisory capacity, the
British were keen to provide the Arab Legion with as much ‘unobtrusive British
assistance and guidance as possible at all levels’.\textsuperscript{51} The presence of British

\textsuperscript{46} Shlaim, \textit{Lion of Jordan}, p. 105.
\textsuperscript{47} Blackwell, \textit{British Military Intervention}, p. 41.
\textsuperscript{48} ‘Sir Anthony Eden’s Statement in the House of Commons on 5th March, 1956’,
GP2006, 54.
\textsuperscript{49} Amman to FO, 399, 12 March 1956, FO371/121542/VJ1201/73/G; Amman to
FO, 410 and 411, 13 March 1956, FO371/121542/VJ1201/74/G, TNA.
\textsuperscript{50} Amman to FO, 290, 2 March 1956, FO371/121540/VJ1201/19/G, TNA.
\textsuperscript{51} FO to Amman, 518, 15 March 1956, FO371/121543/VJ1201/79, TNA.
officers was still required in order to limit any decline in the Arab Legion’s efficiency and ‘thereby prevent the disruption of Jordan’.52 The War Office wanted ‘all British officers in command’ positions ‘withdrawn from the Legion and reconstituted as a Military Mission’. From the Foreign Office perspective, this would ‘satisfy Jordanian aspirations to command’ and enable British officers to maintain some influence.53 To that end, Brigadier Brooke, who had experience setting up a military mission in Burma, was sent to Amman to advise Duke in his negotiations with the Jordanian Government.54 The Jordanians, however, were utterly opposed to a military mission, which would be a separate British team. They wanted British officers to continue as integrated members of the Arab Legion under the same terms as before Glubb’s dismissal, albeit performing training and advisory functions.55 This was not the first time Britain had faced opposition to installing a military mission in an Arab army because it implied control and therefore provided a target for hostile propaganda. For that reason British military advisers in Iraq were labelled ‘British Loaned Personnel’ (BLPI).56 The BLPI was a War Office establishment, much like a military mission, but as far as the Iraqis were concerned it was ‘simply a number of British service personnel integrated in Iraqi forces’.57 The War Office suggested doing the same

52 F.A. Bishop to N. Forward, 1 April 1956, FO371/121545/VJ1201/143, TNA.
53 FO to Amman, 495, 12 March 1956, FO371/121563/VJ1208/6, TNA.
55 Amman to FO, 466, 21 March 1956, WO32/16704; Amman to FO, 478, 22 March 1956, FO371/121543/VJ1201/96, TNA.
56 ‘British Officers for Jordan’, 22 March 1956, FO371/121543/VJ1201/100, TNA.
57 FO to Amman, 574, 22 March 1956, FO371/121543/VJ1201/88, TNA.
in Jordan, although it preferred a straightforward military mission. However, the Jordanians were equally opposed to a loan system as this would also involve a change to the present system and therefore imply a lack of confidence in Arab officers and the new command of the Legion. Brooke concluded that there was ‘definitely no chance’ of the Jordanians accepting a military mission and that rather than compel the Jordanians to seek advisers from elsewhere, they should ‘provisionally accept their proposals as the lesser evil’. Having British officers serving solely under the control of Jordanians was deemed highly undesirable, but if it was the only option for maintaining British influence and Arab Legion efficiency Duke felt, and Eden agreed, Britain had to accept. The two parties therefore agreed to maintain British officers within the same framework as before. Seconded officers were neither withdrawn, because both the British and the Jordanians required their stabilising presence and expertise, nor converted into a military mission, because the Jordanians would not accept a change to the existing arrangement. Yes, it was agreed that seconded British officers would be employed ‘exclusively in training and technical duties’. However, seconded British officers would continue to wear the Jordanian uniform and to hold the king’s commission. This was formalised in an agreement eventually published by the Jordanians on 14 October.

The continued presence of British officers was pursued to offset the potential reduction in the Arab Legion’s efficiency. However, it did not solve the

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58 ‘British Officers for Jordan’, 22 March 1956, FO371/121543/VJ1201/100, TNA.
59 Amman to FO, 478, 22 March 1956, FO371/121543/VJ1201/96, TNA.
60 Amman to FO, 479, 22 March 1956; Cairncross to Sinclair, 23 March 1956, FO371/121543/VJ1201/97/G, TNA.
61 Duke to Lloyd, 28 April 1956, FO371/121565/VJ1209/19, TNA.
62 W.G.A. Lawrie to DMO, 23 November 1956, FO371/121562/VJ1207/44, TNA.
problem of reliability. With no British officers in positions of executive authority, the Arab Legion was now deemed liable to take offensive or defensive action contrary to British policy. The British therefore pursued two means of maintaining influence over the Arab Legion’s command. The first was to collaborate with the currents of Jordanian nationalism that had overturned the Glubb regime, which was indicative of Britain’s pragmatic response to the Glubb crisis. While the British did not believe Nasser had engineered the decision to dismiss Glubb they did believe that Ali Abu Nuwar had heavily influenced Hussein.\textsuperscript{63} Yet despite this he did not become the subject of any British retribution. Rather, the British were prepared to support him. Glubb’s immediate replacement was Radi Anab. However, real authority was believed to be held by Ali Abu Nuwar and it was deemed only a matter of time before he assumed the top job within the military. When Major Kawwar approached the British embassy in an attempt to enlist British support for Ali Abu Nuwar, Duke surmised that Abu Nuwar himself was ‘angling for British political and possibly financial support’. Duke therefore suggested that Britain should give Abu Nuwar ‘discreet support for [the] position of Chief of the General Staff’ and offer him £2,000 of ‘personal financial assistance’.\textsuperscript{64} Templer distrusted Abu Nuwar and was against Britain have dealings with him. Similarly Eden questioned the logic of bribing ‘the least reputable military character’.\textsuperscript{65} However, based on the judgement of Duke and, crucially, Kirkbride, that the British should swim with the tide and embrace his approach Duke was given authorisation to offer Ali Abu

\textsuperscript{63} Amman to FO, 277, 1 March 1956, FO371/121540/V]1291/9/G, TNA.
\textsuperscript{64} Amman to FO, 570, 7 April 1956, PREM11/1420, TNA.
\textsuperscript{65} Eden to Lloyd, 15 April 1956, ibid.; Ashton, \textit{King Hussein}, p. 55.
Nuwar ‘discreet support’. In the event Duke ‘decided not to’ offer Abu Nuwar the bribe. Nonetheless, the British had opted to work with, rather than against the current of Jordanian nationalism and when Abu Nuwar finally became Chief of the General Staff on 24 May, Selwyn Lloyd was once again ‘anxious that we should try to establish some relationship with him’.

Two other recent studies have commented on Britain’s willingness to support Abu Nuwar. However, there is scope to reinterpret the rationale behind this move. Nigel Ashton has suggested that, ‘in hindsight it seems to have been a misjudgement on the part of the British government to extend “personal financial assistance” to Ali Abu Nuwar, who proved an unreliable guarantor of anyone’s interests, except his own’. Abu Nuwar’s involvement in a failed coup against the king in April 1957 is evidence of his eventual unreliability. Meanwhile Stephen Blackwell suggested that the British ‘decided to place their bets on Abu Nuwar as the future of Jordanian politics’. However, contrary to Ashton’s assertion of hindsight the British were under no illusion about Abu Nuwar’s unreliability. It was noted that: ‘Nuwar is essentially pro-Nuwar, and King Hussein is taking a considerable risk with him.’ Moreover, there were fears that a power struggle between Abu Nuwar and the king may eventually occur. However, Britain’s acceptance of Ali Abu Nuwar was a means of keeping a lid on the immediate turmoil created by Glubb’s dismissal and the consequent upheaval within the Arab Legion. It was believed that: ‘King Hussein, Abu Nuwar

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66 Lloyd to Eden, 14 April 1956; FO to Amman, 782, 17 April 1956, PREM11/1420, TNA.
68 Ashton, King Hussein, p. 56.
69 Blackwell, British Military Intervention, p. 41.
70 Minute by [indecipherable], 25 June 1956, FO371/121548/VJ1201/203, TNA.
and senior officers in the Legion constitute a power complex of which component parts provide support for each other’. 71 To disrupt that power complex would have been to risk further destabilising the kingdom. The British recognised that Hussein would not be receptive to any complaints being made against one of his close allies. 72 Support for Ali Abu Nuwar within Jordan was not unanimous and there was an opportunity to intrigue against him. There was some dissension against Abu Nuwar within the Arab Legion. Moreover, Queen Zein was known to be ‘intriguing hard’ against him. However, opposition was not believed to be ‘as united or well organised as Queen Zein’ asserted. 73 The British were comforted by the belief that Abu Nuwar gave the impression of being a ‘Jordanian nationalist’ rather than a ‘disciple’ of Nasser. 74 Therefore it was deemed not ‘the moment to throw a rock into the pool by trying to shake the King’s confidence in him.’ 75 Britain supported Abu Nuwar not because he was the future, as Blackwell suggested, but because he was the present. Britain was hedging its bets with Abu Nuwar. Britain had not thrown its lot in with Abu Nuwar, but accepted his primacy as a short-term fix to the upheaval created by Glubb’s departure, partly because he was considered a Jordanian nationalist, but mostly because he was in a position of power and had the support of the king. This was in stark contrast to the pre-dismissal approach of ignoring Hussein – thus frustrating him – and intriguing against those believed to be influencing

71 Amman to FO, 626, 19 April 1956, PREM11/1420, TNA.
72 Cabinet Minutes, 27 March 1956, CAB128/30; Amman to FO, 617, 17 April 1956, PREM11/1420, TNA.
73 Amman to FO, 1058, 2 August 1956, FO371/121550/VJ1201/245/G; Amman to FO, 617, 17 April 1956, PREM11/1420, TNA.
74 Amman to FO, 570, 7 April 1956, PREM11/1420, TNA.
75 FO to Damascus, 9 June 1956, FO371/121568/VJ12013/1, TNA. [emphasis added].
him. In the absence of Glubb’s control, collaboration was now deemed the best means of exerting influence.

In order to ensure a smooth relationship with Abu Nuwar and in light of the breakdown in relations with Glubb during the eighteen months prior to his dismissal, the British became increasingly pre-emptive regarding the personality of the Senior British Officer (SBO) – a position that the Jordanians reluctantly, and privately, agreed to recognise merely as a point of contact for British officers on welfare matters. After Glubb’s departure Cooke was by default the most Senior British Officer. However, he had no desire to remain and it was generally considered preferable for the new SBO to be a fresh face not tainted by the previous regime. In his stead the War Office seconded Brigadier Mackenzie, who was appointed Head of the Infantry Training Team. Mackenzie did not last long in this role, though. Duke quickly became concerned that he lacked the required tact. Duke warned Mackenzie of the ‘delicacy’ of his task. Yet while he provided reassuring replies Duke cautioned: ‘I have a premonition, which I hope will prove unfounded, that he may through excessive zeal and a tendency to look on Arabs as “wogs”, land us in trouble and open up once again the whole question of British officers in the Legion.’ General Templer agreed that Mackenzie ‘appears to be a complete bull in a china shop’. He added: ‘I am very doubtful indeed of the wisdom of allowing such a person to continue to serve in Jordan today. It seems to me much better to grasp the nettle now rather than wait until he has blotted

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76 Amman to FO, 485, 24 March 1956, WO32/16704, TNA.
77 ‘British officers in the Arab Legion: Record of a meeting in the Jordan Prime Minister’s Office – 24th March, 1956’, 24 March 1956, FO371/121544/VJ1201/121, TNA.
78 Duke to Shuckburgh, 6 June 1956, FO371/121549/VJ1201/223/G, TNA.
his copy book properly.’ Shuckburgh believed this was sound advice, noting: ‘With things as they are we cannot afford to take risks in our military relations with Jordan.’ Completely unprompted Abu Nuwar informed Duke that the Jordanians were happy with Mackenzie. Nonetheless it was deemed necessary to remove Mackenzie as a precaution because: ‘Since the dismissal of General Glubb, the position of the senior British officer in the Arab Legion has become an extremely delicate one’. Mackenzie was therefore replaced as SBO by Lieutenant Colonel Strickland. Duke suggested that because Strickland was deemed to be ‘flexible in his approach to the Jordanians … [and] … sensitive to political undercurrents within the army’, he was the man through whom Britain could ‘exercise the greatest influence upon the Jordan army and its present Chief of the General Staff [Ali Abu Nuwar].’ Mackenzie was therefore removed from Jordan and Strickland was promoted to the rank of Brigadier, thus making him the SBO attached to the Arab Legion. It was hoped that Abu Nuwar would gravitate toward Strickland for advice given his new rank.

Placating Ali Abu Nuwar and the tide of Jordanian nationalism was one avenue pursued by Britain for maintaining influence over the Arab Legion. The second means by which Britain sought to maintain influence was via the Anglo-Jordan Joint Defence Board (AJJDB), which the British had hitherto been reluctant to utilise. The AJJDB had been created at Britain’s instigation in 1948 with the hope that it would set a trend for the creation of similar bilateral

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79 Templer to Shuckburgh, 14 June 1956, ibid.
80 Shuckburgh to Duke, 16 June 1956, ibid.
81 Duke to Shuckburgh, 6 June 1956, ibid.
82 Ross to Lt.-Gen. Euan Miller, 11 July 1956, FO371/121550/VJ1201/236/G, TNA.
83 Amman to FO, 1220, 5 September 1956, FO371/121551/VJ1201/256/G, TNA.
84 Bill Oliver to Rose, 12 September 1956, ibid.
defence boards with the other Arab states. With the onset of the 1948 War, however, the first meeting of the AJJDB was delayed until 1950. Consequently, it never became an effective machine. The private directive given to the original British delegation was that the AJJDB should meet at least quarterly. However, when Glubb was dismissed it had not met since November 1954. The British felt that they gained little from the AJJDB and so made no effort to instigate any meetings. Less than two weeks prior to his dismissal Glubb suggested an AJJDB meeting be arranged to allay Jordanian fears over British adherence to its obligation to defend Jordan in the event of an attack by Israel. For ‘security reasons’, though, the Ministry of Defence did not want to discuss its plan for defending Jordan – Operation Cordage – with the AJJDB. Operation Cordage was not even discussed with Glubb, except in the broadest terms. A meeting would have provided some operational advantages in the event of Cordage being implemented, as it would have ensured that the efforts of the Arab Legion and the British Army were coordinated. However, while Glubb was in charge this was not considered a major problem. The British could rely on Glubb to cooperate fully from the outset – even if he was not fully briefed in advance.

Glubb’s dismissal changed this. After Glubb’s dismissal the Jordanians made the first move in asking Britain for an early meeting of the AJJDB. However, the British were no longer reluctant to agree. MELF believed that the security risks and the political dangers of discussing Britain’s defence plans with the

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86 MELF to MOD, 16 February 1956, FO371/121531/VJ1192/17/G, TNA.
87 MOD to MELF, 17 February 1956, ibid.
88 Minute by Summerhayes, 16 February 1956, ibid.
89 ‘Draft Report to Minister of Defence: The Implications of the Anglo-Jordan Defence Treaty’, Note by the Chiefs of Staff, 19 April 1956, FO371/1215312/VJ1192/36/G, TNA.
AJJDB were even greater since Glubb's dismissal.\textsuperscript{90} However, the British were now prepared 'to disclose to the Jordanians at least in part our plan to come to her aid in the event of aggression by Israel.'\textsuperscript{91} This was because the AJJDB was now considered Britain's only means of 'exercising any control over Arab Legion planning'.\textsuperscript{92} The British were 'anxious to hold it as soon as possible'.\textsuperscript{93} After the Jordanians kept postponing, much to Britain's frustration, the AJJDB eventually convened on 23/24 July.\textsuperscript{94} Given Britain's reluctance to reveal details about its own defence plans, the British used this as an opportunity to listen. This had the dual benefit of giving the Jordanians the impression that they were being consulted rather than dictated to, but primarily it enabled Britain to discover how closely Jordanian plans corresponded with Operation Cordage without needing to divulge any details. During the early stages of the meeting the Jordanians outlined their requirements for British aid to expand and strengthen the Arab Legion. Having taken this on board the British then directed the Jordanian delegation to outline their plans for the defence of Jordan given their existing strength.\textsuperscript{95} Under Jordan's plan for defence against Israeli attack it required only air and naval support from Britain; the Jordanians did not want

\textsuperscript{90} MELF to MOD, MECOS 128, 11 April 1956, F0371/121531/VJ1192/30/G, TNA.
\textsuperscript{91} Ministry of Defence to MELF, 10 April 1956, F0371/121544/VJ1201/118/G, TNA.
\textsuperscript{92} 'Anglo/Jordan Defence Board', Rose, 12 April 1956, F0371/121531/VJ1192/30/G, TNA.
\textsuperscript{93} FO to Amman, 947, 12 May 1956, F0371/121531/VJ1192/30/G; ‘Anglo/Jordan Joint Defence Board’, Rose, 11 May 1956, F0371/121532/VJ1192/45/G, TNA.
\textsuperscript{94} MOD to MELF, COSME 120, 13 July 1956, F0371/121533/VJ1192/66, TNA.
\textsuperscript{95} ‘Anglo Jordan Joint Defence Board: Minutes of a meeting held on 23\textsuperscript{rd} and 24\textsuperscript{th} July, 1956’, F0371/121534/VJ1192/91/G, TNA.
British land forces in the West Bank or the north. This chimed with Britain’s revised plans.

The existence of Operation Cordage and British concerns over its obligation to defend Jordan against Israeli attack has become a point of contention within the historiographical debate exploring the causes of the Suez crisis. The infamous British, French and Israeli collusion to evict Nasser from the Suez Canal was concocted during a secret meeting held in the French city of Sèvres between 22-24 October and was laid bare in a secret document that became known as the ‘The Protocol of Sèvres’. The basic timetable of the conspiracy, which was faithfully followed, was that Israel would invade the Sinai on the evening of 29 October, the following day Britain and France would issue an ultimatum to Israel and Egypt, including a demand that both parties withdraw ten miles from the Canal. If the Egyptians did not agree within twelve hours this would provide the European powers with the *casus belli* that they required to intervene militarily against Nasser on 31 October. In article 5 of the Sèvres Protocol Israel agreed not to attack Jordan – an act that would have invoked the Anglo-Jordanian Treaty and therefore Operation Cordage. Equally, the British agreed not to aid Jordan if it should attack Israel during this operation. This has led Scott Lucas to suggest that protecting Jordan was a primary motivation for Eden’s adherence to the Suez collusion. Lucas argues that the French encouraged

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the Israelis to create tension on the border with Jordan as a means of encouraging Britain to join their collusion against Egypt. He posits that this was one possible reason for the Israeli attack on the West Bank village of Qalqilya on the night of 10/11 October.99 Led by Ariel Sharon this retaliation for the murder of two Israeli farmers was the most serious Arab-Israeli clash since the 1948 War.100 Yet regardless of whether the Qalqilya attack was calculated for that reason, Lucas is adamant that the French used this to pressure Britain to join the collusion and that this is what explains Eden’s decision to join the tripartite coalition against Nasser.101 As Zeid Raad has illustrated, being called upon to defend Jordan while military operations were on going against Egypt was the ‘nightmare’ scenario for Eden.102 From the British perspective, they could not implement Operation Cordage concurrent with Operation Musketeer Revise – the British plan, eventually enacted, for attacking Egypt. The problem was that both operations relied on the same forces stationed in Cyprus. It was therefore incumbent upon the Prime Minister to eliminate that conundrum. Yet that does not necessarily mean that it was the raison d’être for attacking Egypt or for joining forces with France and Israel. As Ashton has convincingly countered Eden had plenty of existing reasons to join the coalition against Nasser without contriving to portray British involvement as being designed to prevent Israel from attacking Jordan.103 This aspect of the Suez crisis has recently been revisited by Eric Grove, who appears to confuse policy and planning. His general

99 Lucas, *Divided We Stand*, pp. 227-37.
100 Shlaim, *Lion of Jordan*, p. 110.
101 Lucas, *Divided We Stand*, pp. 227-37.
argument corresponds with the implication in his title that Britain had a choice of enemies and that, at the last minute, ‘a new choice of enemy was made’.\textsuperscript{104} While it is true that Operations Cordage and Musketeer could not be executed simultaneously, Cordage was not evidence of a British policy to attack Israel. Rather it was a contingency plan to meet its treaty obligation to defend Jordan in the event of an Israeli attack on Britain’s Hashemite ally.

The Anglo-Jordanian Treaty did not deepen British involvement in the Suez crisis. Rather the situation in Egypt impacted upon the process of revising the Treaty, as the uncertainty created by the Suez crisis delayed Britain’s desire to alter the status quo. Having individually reconsidered the value of the Jordanian alliance during the months immediately following Glubb’s dismissal, all of the interested Whitehall departments eventually gathered to discuss Britain’s future relationship with Jordan on 17 July. The purpose of the meeting was to discuss a draft Cabinet paper produced by the Foreign Office. The meeting was chaired by the Treasury, and framed around the fact that the £12.5 million [£10.2m for the Arab Legion and £2.25m for development] a year spent by HMG in Jordan was 13% ‘of the cost of all Foreign Office, Colonial Office and the Commonwealth Relations Office activity and two-thirds of what was put into the Colonies each year by way of development’. From the Treasury perspective: ‘This situation was objectionable in every way.’\textsuperscript{105} This meeting did not culminate with an agreed future policy, but it was essentially established that a way had to be found to reduce Britain’s financial commitment to Jordan and that an agreed

\textsuperscript{105} ‘Note of a Meeting held in the Treasury on the 17th July to discuss the Foreign Office draft of a Cabinet Paper on Jordan circulated under cover of a Treasury Letter of 10th July 1956’, FO371/121529/VJ1153/7/G, TNA.
paper should be put to Ministers for consideration in Cabinet soon. Less than ten
days later, however, the problem of Britain’s future relationship with Jordan was
overshadowed by events in Egypt. In response to the United States’ decision to
withdraw the offer of Anglo-American funding for Egypt’s Aswan Dam project,
on 26 July Nasser nationalised the Suez Canal Company. Although Nasser was
legally entitled to do this, the Company’s principal shareholder, Britain, was
aghast. The most worrying aspect of nationalisation was that Nasser now had
control of a vital artery of Britain’s world system. Thus, Eden immediately
created the Egypt Committee, which comprised of a small group of ministers
with the primary objective of attaining the downfall of the Nasser regime. 106 But
for the Suez crisis, Michael Rose, the Head of the Eastern and Levant Department
at the Foreign Office, admitted, HMG might have risked halting expenditure on
Jordan. 107 However, given the uncertainty over the Suez Canal it was deemed
advisable to have as few changes as possible during this period. 108 Consequently,
Britain’s internal review of the Treaty was halted. The impending Jordanian
elections, scheduled for October, did not help as this meant Britain could not
effectively discuss a revision of the Treaty until the new government was in
place. 109 However, it was the deterioration of the Suez Crisis that meant the draft
Cabinet paper was never circulated to the Cabinet and on 18 September Eden
agreed with Lloyd that HMG should ‘delay forming a view on the question until

1956, pp. 112-3.
107 ‘Anglo-Jordan Joint Defence Board’, Rose, 13 August 1956,
F0371/121534/VJ1192/106/G, TNA.
108 Rose to Duke, 16 August 1956, F0371/121550/VJ1201/248/G, TNA.
109 Rose to Peck, 21 August 1956, F0371/121529/VJ1153/9/G, TNA.
we could see how developments over the Suez dispute proceeded’. Nonetheless, the British had effectively concluded that the subsidy had become an undesirable expense, but vanquishing this burden was put on hold given the uncertainty created by the Suez crisis.

In the meantime, tension along the border with Israel continued to increase and this raised the ominous question of Britain’s obligation to defend Jordan in accordance with the Treaty. The British may not have joined the tripartite collusion against Nasser for the purpose of averting an Israeli attack on Jordan, but they were nonetheless anxious to avoid becoming embroiled in an Israeli-Jordanian dispute. This prompted the Foreign Office to ask the Chiefs of Staff to advise whether it could seize the first opportunity to liquidate the Treaty and the subsidy, if and when it should become politically convenient to do so. The Foreign Office requested the Chiefs of Staff’s assessment of the military importance of the Treaty on 5 October and after the Jordanians made a number of military requests in the wake of the Qalqilya incident, during which the Jordanians attempted to invoke the Treaty, the Foreign Office asked if this assessment could be expedited. With increasing pressure from the Jordanians for Britain to intervene militarily, the British became ever more eager to vanquish this unwanted and burdensome responsibility. At the very least, the British had a decision to make. The dilemma, as Kirkpatrick spelled out was that: ‘If we do not give some satisfaction to the Jordanians, we risk compromising the Treaty. But if we do give them satisfaction this involves us in political and military complications.’ Before giving the Jordanians a clear indication of the

110 ‘Jordan Treaty Revision’, Rose, 19 October 1956, FO371/121499/VJ1051/211/G, TNA.
111 Ross to Dickson, 22 October 1956, FO371/121535/VJ1192/115/G, TNA.
level of support that Britain would provide Jordan against Israeli belligerence, the British needed to decide whether it was worth maintaining its Treaty rights.\footnote{Minute by Ivone Kirkpatrick, 18 October 1956, ibid.} Britain benefited from two principal military assets in Jordan. Firstly, the Treaty provided Britain with overflying and staging rights. The Chiefs of Staffs’ view was that these rights provided advantages but they were ‘not militarily essential’. They were certainly considered to be ‘not of such importance as to make essential the continuance of our present commitments to Jordan’.\footnote{‘Strategic Importance of Jordan’, 26 October 1956, FO371/121499/VJ1051/216/G, TNA.} Secondly, the British had RAF bases at Amman and Mafraq. The Chiefs of Staff were already examining relinquishing rights to Amman airfield and withdrawing the RAF squadron there.\footnote{‘Jordan’, 3 July 1956, FO371/121529/VJ1153/5/G, TNA.} At the inter-departmental meeting in July the Air Ministry expressed its desire to pull out of Amman as soon as possible.\footnote{‘Note of a Meeting held in the Treasury on the 17th July to discuss the Foreign Office draft of a Cabinet Paper on Jordan circulated under cover of a Treasury Letter of 10th July 1956’, FO371/121529/VJ1153/7/G, TNA.} The airfield itself was not part of Britain’s global war strategy or Operation Cordage and since the events of 1 March, the RAF fighter squadron stationed there was considered ‘a hostage to fortune’. The Chief of the Air Staff therefore wanted to transfer this squadron to Cyprus where it would be available for a strike role against Egypt.\footnote{F. Cooper (Air Ministry) to Rose, 2 August 1956, FO371/121576/VJ1226/4/G, TNA.} Mafraq was more valuable, however. It was important to Britain’s strategic requirements as a medium-range bomber base. In July the Air Ministry advised that an alternative would have to be found if Britain was denied access to Mafraq and warned that Iraq was too close to
Russia and Habbaniya was not suitable. However, as part of the October assessment the Chiefs of Staff concluded that Mafraq was deemed ‘highly desirable but not vital’. The conclusion, therefore, was that if the Foreign Office deemed it politically necessary to terminate the Treaty ‘there would be no overriding military objective’. Thus, by the time the Suez crisis reached its climax it had already been established that financially and militarily the British were in favour of terminating, or at the very least, substantially revising, the Treaty. Acting on this desire was put on hold, however, until the Suez crisis was over.

While the gathering crisis over the Suez Canal primarily served to delay the process of treaty revision, it certainly did not help Anglo-Jordanian relations. Hussein’s statement of support for Nasser after he nationalised the Suez Canal riled the British, resulting in Duke being instructed to tell Hussein that his statement had produced the ‘most deplorable impression’. The mounting dispute with Egypt also led to a deterioration in the relationship between British and Arab officers within the Legion. Moreover, British military intervention in November put Anglo-Jordanian relations further under strain, prompting Hussein to sarcastically enquire whether Britain expected the Arab Legion to assist in its current operations against Egypt. The most notable contribution that the Suez crisis made to the process of terminating the Treaty, though, was

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117 ‘Note of a Meeting held in the Treasury on the 17th July to discuss the Foreign Office draft of a Cabinet Paper on Jordan circulated under cover of a Treasury Letter of 10th July 1956’, FO371/121529/VJ1153/7/G, TNA.
118 ‘Strategic Importance of Jordan’, 26 October 1956, FO371/121499/VJ1051/216/G, TNA.
119 FO to Amman, 1326, 28 July 1956, PREM11/1422, TNA.
120 Amman to FO, 1084, 9 August 1956, FO371/121550/VJ1201/245/G, TNA.
121 Duke to Rose, 2 November 1956, FO371/121500/VJ1051/235, TNA.
that it ended the fallacy of attempting to maintain the presence of seconded British officers on the same basis as before. On 29 October – shortly before Israel launched its initial strike on Egypt later that evening – RAF Amman commenced evacuation to Mafraq – a move that took the Jordanians by surprise. This left the seconded officers in the RJAF more exposed. Thus, on 30 October, Wing Commander Dobree-Bell – who had been replaced as commander of the RJAF, at Ali Abu Nuwar’s request, by Major Ibrahim Othman the previous day – Strickland, and the British Military Attache, W.G.A. Lawrie, made plans for the withdrawal of British officers in the Arab Legion and the RJAF to Mafraq in case the political situation in the Middle East should deteriorate further. In the early hours of the 31 October Othman telephoned Dobree-Bell where he insisted that all seconded RAF personnel remain in their quarters due to rising anti-British feeling among the Arab officers, as a result of the attacks on Egypt. Nonetheless, at Dobree-Bell’s request, and with Ali Abu Nuwar’s approval, all officers seconded to the RJAF were evacuated to Mafraq on 31 October. 122 They were soon followed, at Ali Abu Nuwar’s recommendation for their own safety, by all British officers attached to the Arab Legion. 123 Because of restricted accommodation and water access, by 9 November nearly all of the seconded and contracted British officers in the Arab Legion and the RJAF had withdrawn from Mafraq to Britain or Cyprus, without the knowledge of the Jordanians. 124 As far as Ali Abu Nuwar was concerned this evacuation was supposed to be only

122 ‘Extract from letter from Wing Commander Dobree-Bell to Air Ministry’, 6 November 1956, FO371/121576/VJ1226/10, TNA.
123 Amman to FO, 1605, 1 November 1956, FO371/121562/VJ1207/35, TNA.
124 FO to Amman, 2455, 9 November 1956, FO371/121562/VJ1207/35; Amman to FO, 1718, 10 November 1956, FO371/121562/VJ1207/38, TNA.
However, less than two weeks after their departure, Duke appraised: ‘I think we must now regard this chapter of Anglo-Jordan military relations as closed.’ He explained that confidence in the British training teams was already dire and after they had evacuated, the British officers had their houses looted, ‘probably by their own servants’. This compounded the British officers’ desire not to return.  

Moreover, the new terms of service, published on 14 October, were unacceptable to most of the British officers who would not have remained after March had they known that this is what the War Office would agree to. After the evacuation from Mafraq it was considered that: ‘notwithstanding our obligation under the Anglo-Jordan Treaty to provide personnel on request, we are never likely to return to the old arrangement whereby British officers held King Hussein’s commission and wore the Jordanian uniform’. The British were now decided that officers could no longer be seconded to the Arab Legion on the old basis. They could only return as a military mission or something akin to the BLPI. The evacuation of British officers from Jordan thus marked the end of attempts to continue as before.

The most significant correlation between the climax of the Suez crisis and the eventual termination of the Treaty was simply that the crisis had reached a conclusion. Regardless of the details, the one thing that had delayed a firm British decision regarding the future of the Treaty was an end to the uncertainty over Suez. On 27 November the Jordanian Government – newly elected in

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125 Amman to FO, 1605, 1 November 1956, FO371/121562/VJ1207/35, TNA.
126 Amman to FO, 10 November 1956, FO371/121562/VJ1207/37, TNA.
127 W.G.A. Lawrie to DMO, 23 November 1956, FO371/121562/VJ1207/44, TNA.
129 Lawrie to DMO, 23 November 1956, FO371/121562/VJ1207/44; Hamilton (DMO) to Rose, 7 December 1956, FO371/121562/VJ1207/46, TNA.
October – issued a ministerial statement announcing its intention to dispense with the ‘unequal Treaty’ with Britain.\textsuperscript{130} Yet, as Ashton has observed, the Jordanians were ‘pushing at an open door’.\textsuperscript{131} From conversations between the new British Ambassador, Charles Johnston, and the new Prime Minister, Suleiman Nabulsi, the Foreign Office garnered the impression that the Jordanians had in mind a ‘leisurely long drawn out process’ of negotiating the end of the Treaty. This meant Britain believed it could hold on in Jordan for some time, if it wanted to.\textsuperscript{132} The British, though, had no interest in clinging onto the Treaty. They had already decided that the costs outweighed the benefits. However, they were eager not to withdraw abruptly, thus leaving a vacuum for what they considered to be undesirable elements – notably Egypt or Russia – to fill.\textsuperscript{133} Thus, the British stance was that they should not hasten the process of terminating the Treaty, but work at the Jordanians’ pace instead.

It was in Britain’s interest to allow time to seek a replacement. The ideal successor was its most reliable ally: the United States. Conveniently, the Jordanians were also looking to the US for future financial and material support and they approached the US on 9 November to that end.\textsuperscript{134} Consequently, after Jordan announced its intention to terminate the Treaty the United States Assistant Secretary of State, Herbert Hoover Jr., asked the British Ambassador in Washington point blank whether Britain would wish the US to take on the

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\item \textsuperscript{130} Amman to FO, 1854, 27 November 1956, FO371/121500/VJ1051/246, TNA.
\item \textsuperscript{131} Ashton, \textit{King Hussein}, p. 61.
\item \textsuperscript{132} ‘Anglo-Jordan Treaty’, Rose, 5 December 1956, FO371/121501/VJ1051/279/G, TNA.
\item \textsuperscript{133} Minute by Shuckburgh, 25 April 1956, FO371/121577/VJ1205/15/G; Minute by H.N. Shepherd, 9 July 1956, FO371/121529/5/G; ‘Strategic Importance of Jordan’, 26 October 1956, FO371/121499/VJ1051/216/G, TNA.
\item \textsuperscript{134} Ashton, \textit{King Hussein}, p. 61; Shlaim, \textit{Lion of Jordan}, p. 124.
\end{itemize}
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subsidy if the Anglo-Jordanian Treaty was terminated. The US made no promises, but by merely asking this question, the British were encouraged that US assistance for Jordan was a real possibility. When the Foreign Secretary met John Foster Dulles, the US Secretary of State, on 14 December Selwyn Lloyd explained that Britain hoped the US could subsidise Jordan, either directly, or indirectly via Saudi Arabia, to prevent it from collapsing. Thereafter the British sought time to encourage the US to ‘relieve’ Britain of the ‘burden of the subsidy’ and to allow ‘time to work out the details of the hand-over.’ Britain’s intention was to try to ‘persuade the United States to relieve us of the responsibility for financial and military support of Jordan’. The British were encouraged by the United States stance, but they were not dependent on the US formally agreeing to takeover the burden. The Treaty had become a financial and military obligation with no vital return. For that reason Britain was eager to end the Treaty, without too prolonged a delay. Despite announcing its intention to terminate the Treaty in November, at the start of 1957 the Jordanians still had not approached HMG to begin negotiations. However, the British wanted the Treaty terminated by 31 March at the latest; they did not want the subsidy to continue into the new financial year. Thus, Ross advised: ‘Since we are prepared to accept the risk of Jordan getting her money from the Arabs the

135 Washington to FO, 2414, 4 December 1956, F0371/121529/VJ1153/15, TNA.
136 FO to Washington [Draft], 1 January 1957, F0371/121900/VJ1051/16/G, TNA.
137 Commander Allan Noble to Henry Brooke, 13 December 1956, F0371/121501/VJ1051/270/G, TNA.
138 FO to Amman, 2925, 21 December 1956, F0371/121501/VJ1051/273, TNA.
139 FO to Bagdad, 24, 4 January 1957, F0371/121900/VJ1051/5/G, TNA.
140 ‘Anglo-Jordan Treaty’, C.C.B. Stewart, 2 January 1957, F0953/1831/PG1808/1, TNA.
141 ‘Future Relations with Jordan: Brief for Meeting of the Cabinet on January 3’, 2 January 1957, F0371/121900/VJ1051/16/G, TNA.
sooner we tell the Jordan Government that we are as sick of the Treaty as they, the better.’ 142 Finally, on 16 January, Johnston informed the Jordanian Government of HMG’s readiness to discuss termination of the Treaty. 143 The British were eager to set this process in motion before Hussein met his Arab allies on 19 January when it was anticipated that he might accept financial support from them. 144 Indeed, on 19 January Jordan signed the ‘Arab Solidarity Agreement’, which provided for a replacement of the British subsidy by Saudi Arabia, Syria and Egypt. 145 In the event, only Saudi Arabia made any financial contribution. 146 Nonetheless, this agreement worked to Britain’s ‘advantage’ as it enabled Jordan to go ahead with the termination, as it needed a replacement for the subsidy. When Britain notified Jordan of its intention to begin negotiations to terminate the Treaty the British simultaneously informed the US in the hope that it would agree to take over the financial commitment. 147 Dulles replied that the US could not takeover Britain’s present commitment as it stood, but he gave enough hope that the US could and would be able to provide Jordan with financial aid in some form. 148 There was no firm Anglo-American agreement to handover financial responsibility for Jordan, but the British agreed to terminate the Treaty with the belief that the US would prevent Jordan from collapsing or succumbing to other external influences.

142 ‘Anglo-Jordan Treaty’, Ross, 11 January 1957, FO371/121900/VJ1051/20, TNA.
143 Johnston to Lloyd, 28 January 1958, FO371/134006/VJ1011/1, TNA.
144 Cabinet Minutes, 15 January 1957, CAB128/31/1, TNA.
145 Satloff, Jordan in Transition, p. 159.
146 Fieldhouse, Western Imperialism, p. 241.
147 FO to Washington, 218, 16 January 1957, FO371/121900/VJ1051/20, TNA.
148 Washington to FO, 89, 18 January 1957, FO371/121900/VJ1051/23, TNA.
Once formal negotiations for terminating the Treaty began on 4 February, the process was largely straightforward. The first few weeks were hindered by a dispute over missing British Army stores, which the Jordanians had taken after the British officers departed in November, and vast differences of opinion over the valuation of facilities to be handed over to Jordan. However, these differences were ironed out by the beginning of March and the negotiations, in the end, were swift.\textsuperscript{149} On 13 March, just over a month after formal negotiations began, the Anglo-Jordanian Treaty was terminated. The British were relieved that the Jordanians did not complicate the negotiations by raising the issue of future development loans or Jordan’s place in the Sterling area.\textsuperscript{150} Instead, the negotiations were confined to the task of dealing with the remnants of Britain’s military presence. The termination of the Treaty stipulated that all British forces would be withdrawn from Jordan within six months. Johnston suggested protracting the military withdrawal in order to give time for a favourable emerging coalition between Jordan and Saudi Arabia to flower and therefore keep the Egyptians out.\textsuperscript{151} London, however, felt that the military withdrawal had to be as swift as possible.\textsuperscript{152} In the event, British military withdrawal from Jordan was smooth and ahead of schedule, with the final evacuation of British troops from Aqaba completed on 6 July.\textsuperscript{153} As part of the termination agreement the Jordanian Government agreed to pay Britain £4.25 million. In return the Jordanians received RAF stations at Amman and Mafraq and the military camps

\textsuperscript{149} Johnston to Lloyd, 28 January 1958, FO371/134006/VJ1011/1, TNA.
\textsuperscript{150} Johnston to Lloyd, 20 March 1957, FO371/127905/VJ1051/136, TNA.
\textsuperscript{151} Amman to FO, 188, 4 February 1957, FO371/121902/VJ1051/63, TNA.
\textsuperscript{152} ‘Jordan’, Rose, 6 February 1957, FO371/121902/VJ1051/70, TNA.
\textsuperscript{153} Johnston to Lloyd, 9 July 1957, FO371/127930/VJ1192/41, TNA; Johnston to Lloyd, 28 January 1958, FO371/134006/VJ1011/1, TNA.
at Zerqa, Aqaba and Maan, along with ammunition and other stores. Britain also wrote-off the £1.5 million debt owed since the 1948 War. Britain’s main failure from the termination negotiations concerned overflying, landing and staging rights. On this they managed only to obtain an agreement in principle, subject to future negotiations. Nonetheless, the Foreign Secretary thanked Johnston for securing an agreement that was ‘better’ than he had hoped. The British secured a satisfactory sum for the facilities they left behind, but most importantly they had rid themselves of the on-going financial burden of the subsidy and the military obligation to defend Jordan against attack.

Existing accounts of the British reaction and response to Glubb’s dismissal have been largely unanimous. It has been generally accepted that Eden was furious; that the British blamed Nasser; that they therefore resolved to destroy Nasser; and that the British initially sought to cling on to its predominant position in Jordan until the Suez crisis shattered this hope. As this chapter has illustrated, however, each of these apparent truisms need to be adjusted to some extent. Eden was certainly rattled by the action taken against Glubb and initially refused to accept the finality of the decision. Moreover, it is not an exaggeration to suggest that he was angry and anxious as he considered the implications during the night following Glubb’s dismissal. However, the notion that Eden and the British blamed Nasser for engineering the dismissal does not hold water. The only substance to this claim comes from the memoirs of

154 Johnston to Lloyd, 20 March 1957, FO371/127905/VJ1051/136, TNA.
156 Johnston to Lloyd, 20 March 1957, FO371/127905/VJ1051/136, TNA.
157 FO to Amman, 645, 15 March 1957, FO371/127904/VJ1051/119, TNA.
Anthony Nutting. Despite the evident bias of Nutting’s account it surely has to be accepted that Eden did express indignation against Nasser during the uncertain late-night hours that followed Glubb’s dismissal. However, in the cold light of day any words uttered in anger against Nasser were quickly forgotten. Contrary to the prevailing account new evidence reveals that Selwyn Lloyd did not believe that Nasser was to blame. While a few hard-line members within the Cabinet may have linked the dismissal to Nasser and called for a dramatic cutting of the ties with Jordan, Eden, Lloyd, Macmillan and the Foreign Office responded much more pragmatically than the prevailing accounts suggest. This pragmatic reaction fuelled an equally pragmatic British response, where far from blaming Nasser for Glubb’s dismissal and therefore seeking retribution against him, the British were much more convinced that Ali Abu Nuwar was significantly involved in the plot to oust Glubb and yet they opted to work with, rather than against, him. At face value this perhaps confirms the notion that Britain was trying to cling onto its position of influence within Jordan. In part this is true. It is evidence of the British having learned lessons from their previous policy, which had helped contribute to the king’s decision to dismiss Glubb in the first place. However, Britain’s decision not to take abrupt action against Jordan or any of the perceived conspirators in the wake of Glubb’s dismissal was a short-term policy designed to avoid any hasty action until the long-term future value of the alliance with Jordan had been thoroughly re-evaluated. This reappraisal of the alliance unanimously concluded that it was in Britain’s interest to rid itself of the disproportionate financial and military burden of the Treaty. The Suez crisis did not prompt this reappraisal. Rather, it delayed it. Avi Shlaim has argued that dismissal of Glubb – in combination with the election of Nabulsi and the Suez
debacle – had caused the subsidy ‘to become a costly white elephant.’ It is perhaps more accurate to suggest that Glubb’s dismissal exposed, rather than rendered, the subsidy as such. While the election of Nabulsi and the Suez crisis certainly did not help Anglo-Jordanian relations, neither did they make the subsidy any less palatable to the British than it already was. Glubb’s dismissal prompted the British to evaluate the cost-benefit ratio of the Treaty and its conclusion was that the costs outweighed the benefits. What Britain gained from the Treaty was desirable, but non-vital military rights. In return, Britain was obliged to defend Jordan against Israeli attack and committed to spending a disproportionate amount of its foreign budget on the small Hashemite kingdom. On 1 March 1956 Hussein garnered Jordanian control of the armed forces from the British. A year later the British, in agreement with the Jordanians, rid themselves of the on-going financial and military burden of the Treaty. Hitherto British policy making had been obscured by the Glubb paradox. With that filter removed the British were able to see more clearly the pragmatic value of the existing treaty relationship.

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Conclusion

The termination of the Treaty was not the end of Britain's relationship with Jordan. It was merely the end of a particular phase of the relationship characterised by British control of the Arab Legion. As Nigel Ashton has detailed, Britain continued to count on Jordan as one of its most important Arab allies and the Jordanians also 'strove to sustain “special” relations with London'. Indeed, almost exactly a year after the last British troops exited Jordan after the termination of the Treaty King Hussein requested they return in order to help protect himself and his kingdom in light of the coup in Iraq, during which his cousin, King Feisal II, his uncle, Abdulilah, and the Iraqi Prime Minister, Nuri Said, were murdered, and an Iraqi republic was created. The British duly agreed to intervene because Jordanian stability and the Hashemite dynasty remained important to the British world system. As Nigel Ashton asserted, the fundamental reason for British intervention in Jordan in 1958, as well as in Kuwait three years later, was 'to maintain in power a regime friendly to British interests'. The events of 1958 even led to the return of British involvement with the Jordan Arab Army in the form of a military mission, which included former SBO of the Arab Legion, Lt-Col. Strickland, and Hussein’s good friend, Wing-Commander Dalgleish. The British Ambassador emphasised, however, that this

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did ‘not in itself mean a return to the Glubb system’. While it is beyond the scope of this thesis to delve deeply into Britain’s post-Treaty relationship with Jordan, this would certainly be a worthwhile endeavour toward bridging the gap between the ‘declining empire’ and ‘post-empire’ division and therefore eking out the continuities of the relationship, as well as the more obvious changes. Ashton’s article is the only study that significantly addresses the Anglo-Jordanian relationship beyond 1958. Thus there is surely scope for Ashton’s work to be challenged and for the relationship to be explored in greater detail, particularly beyond Britain’s general military withdrawal from East of Suez in 1971.

While the ‘special’ relationship endured at the diplomatic level, Hussein’s personal connection with Glubb also survived, despite the abrupt manner in which they parted ways. They remained in direct correspondence for the rest of Glubb’s life. Hussein visited Glubb at his home in Mayfield and after Glubb’s death the king read out a touching address at Glubb’s memorial service. Glubb never returned to Jordan, though. He explained that the Arabs are such ‘frenziedly hospitable people’ that if he ever returned he would be invited to ‘breakfast, lunch, tea and dinner at a different place every day, and I couldn’t take it at my age’. This was no doubt Glubb demonstrating his innate British stoicism. As his daughter suspected ‘he felt it would be too painful to go back. My father told us that he dreamt about Jordan almost every night.’ Given that Glubb spent the best part of his adult life in the Middle East, including 26 years in Jordan, this

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4 Amman to FO, 1888, 16 October 1958, DEFE11/174, TNA.
6 For correspondence in the 1980s see: GP2006, 93.
7 Private correspondence with Glubb's daughter.
is hardly surprising. Glubb’s attachment to Jordan – to the land that he inhabited and the people that he lived and served with for most of his life – never diminished and he was ‘devastated’ when it lost the West Bank during the 1967 War.9 This, indeed, was exactly what Glubb had attempted to guard against since 1949, most notably during the month leading up to his dismissal.

Despite enforced retirement Glubb remained committed to the mission that had motivated him throughout his career in Jordan: the consolidation of the British Empire. That is not to say Glubb was a mere stooge of London or an advocate of Jordanian subservience. Glubb respected London as the centre of the British world system, but he nonetheless considered the Hashemite Kingdom a part of that system. Indeed, in an alternative preface to that published in his memoirs Glubb indeed set out that: ‘I was convinced that the interests of Jordan (indeed of all the Arabs) were identical with those of the British Commonwealth.’10 As far as Glubb was concerned Britain and Jordan were interdependent with shared interests and enemies. Since 1945 Glubb had devoted much energy toward thwarting the influence of those enemies: most notably Egypt, Israel, and the Soviet Union. Despite leaving the political scene Glubb maintained his penchant for advising the British Government of the day. In 1970, for example, the Foreign Secretary, Alec Douglas-Home, and the US Assistant Secretary of State, Joseph J. Sisco, both politely thanked Glubb for offering suggestions on how to settle the Arab-Israeli conflict.11 His musings, however, had even less bearing on high-policy than they had in the 1940s when

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9 Private correspondence with Glubb’s daughter.
Glubb lamented his lack of political influence. At the end of the Second World War Glubb was full of regret regarding the trajectory of his career, but he must surely have reflected, during his dying days, on an ambition ultimately fulfilled. In 1920 Glubb put his dream of being a writer on hold. When he left the region thirty-six years later Glubb now had the experiences required to devote himself to the career he craved. The result was a plethora of written words; 22 published books and countless articles.¹²

Glubb is ultimately remembered, however, not for his written work, but for his pivotal role in the history of the Middle East and his greatest contribution, certainly beyond 1945, was to the shaping of the 1948 War. Glubb was not the architect of the Greater Transjordan scheme, as claimed by Maureen Norton, but he was nonetheless crucial to its implementation. After Bevin approved the scheme in February 1948 – and new evidence detailed here corroborates this – Glubb actively sought to cultivate the conditions that would allow the Arab Legion to peacefully occupy the Arab areas of Palestine. In his assessment of Glubb’s role in the Arab-Israeli conflict, Benny Morris asserted that: ‘If Israel and Jordan entered the 1948 War with a secret, unwritten understanding of mutual non-belligerence, it was primarily Israel that violated it in May and June and then again in July and October 1948, not Jordan.’¹³ It is beyond the scope of this thesis to provide a thorough analysis of Israel’s war aims, but this assessment of the Arab Legion’s conduct in 1948 suggests that there was no firm agreement, or even a tacit understanding with the Zionists. Abdullah’s negotiations with the Jewish Agency did, however, provide the two parties with a good comprehension

¹² Glubb’s published books are listed in: Royle, *Glubb Pasha*, pp. 500-1.
of each other's aims and objectives. The key feature of the Abdullah-Meir meeting was that the Zionists confirmed they would favour and accept Transjordan's occupation of the Arab areas of Palestine and emphasised their intention to work within the parameters of the UN resolution. This was the foundation upon which the Greater Transjordan scheme was built. Abdullah trusted the Zionists to adhere to the UN scheme, thus allowing the Arab Legion to fill the politico-security vacuum in the Arab areas of Palestine. This gave Abdullah confidence that his dynastic ambitions could be realised in Palestine and prompted him to seek British approval to use the Arab Legion to that end.

The Arab Legion's conduct in 1948 was dictated not by a Hashemite-Zionist agreement to carve up Palestine, but by an Anglo-Hashemite accord cemented in February 1948. As the situation in Palestine deteriorated during the final few months of the mandate Abdullah began to have second thoughts about the original scheme. This is where Glubb's command of the Arab Legion was pivotal. The rank and file of the Arab Legion, both British and Arab, were eager to fight and it is unlikely that Abdullah would or could have stopped them in the face of pan-Arab pressure. However, Glubb and the other British officers in executive command positions, such as Lash, Goldie and Ashton, ensured that the Arab Legion remained on the defensive. At no point did the Arab Legion seek to destroy the enemy. Even when the Arab Legion did plan offensives, such as the victory in Qula, and the discarded 'Operation Glucose', the attacks were politically motivated; they were designed to provide the appearance that the Arab Legion was fighting for the purpose of justifying the annexation of the Arab areas, in the eyes of the Arab world, and the value of the British connection. Glubb's management of the war effort should not be construed as the actions of a
complete lone ranger, or that of a British stooge. Abdullah and the Prime Minister remained in favour of the Greater Transjordan scheme, but were under political pressure not to be seen breaking ranks from the rhetoric of Arab unity.

The principal flaw in the Greater Transjordan scheme was that it did not have an exit strategy. A full-blown war involving the Arab states was not originally anticipated and it was hoped that the Arab Legion’s occupation of the Arab areas of Palestine would be accepted as the new natural order. Indeed, the Greater Transjordan scheme was effectively in accordance with the UN partition plan. It merely sought to exploit the AHC’s unwillingness to accept partition and its inability to secure an independent Palestinian Arab state. Once the territorial objectives of the Greater Transjordan scheme had been achieved, both Britain and the Jordanians sought to manipulate an end to the conflict. The key to consolidating Greater Transjordan and withdrawing from the conflict was to avoid being the first to negotiate publicly with the Israelis. To that end the British sought to starve the Arab states into submission by proposing an arms embargo. Far from being evidence of Britain thwarting the Greater Transjordan scheme, as Bradshaw has argued, this was consistent with Britain’s desire to minimise the level of conflict and consistent with its desire to see Greater Transjordan emerge from Arab Palestine. Similarly, the Jordanians suggested, during the first truce, the imposition of UN sanctions against the Arab states, including themselves. This was to no avail, however, and Transjordan was compelled to follow the Arab consensus of renewing the fight. By October Abdullah had returned to his more forthright pursuit of his dynastic objectives and he was keen to establish a peace accord with the Israelis. However, under the auspices of British guidance, he was persuaded not to risk ostracising himself.
from the rest of the Arab world. Accordingly, Abdullah avoided being the first to negotiate. To that end Glubb was again pivotal as he successfully helped push the Egyptians into a corner that forced them to begin armistice negotiations first. Contrary to the traditional Zionist narrative of the conflict, the Arabs were far from a united coalition. This had been the case from the outset, but it was particularly telling during the final stages of the conflict as it was here when the Arab Legion and the Egyptian army were actively working against each other. As the incident in Falluja illustrated they were beset by mutual suspicions. Had it not been for the political jockeying amongst the Arab states then partition would likely have been much smoother, and Israel much smaller. Inter-Arab rivalries made the process much more difficult for the Arab Legion and created the conditions for the Zionists to exploit. The Arab Legion’s limited objectives and the inter-Arab rivalries thus debunk the traditional David versus Goliath narrative. While a Hashemite-Zionist agreement may not have existed, the 1948 War was nonetheless heavily influenced by the Greater Transjordan scheme; the eventual success of which owed much to Glubb who was integral to its preparation, its implementation, and its eventual consolidation in the form of the 1949 armistice.

The Arab Legion proved to be a valuable tool for the British in 1948, but this did not alter its role in Britain’s imperial defence system. Contrary to Vatikiotis’s portrayal of the Arab Legion’s progression the British did not seek to expand the Arab Legion after the Second World War, or after 1948. When the 1946 Treaty was signed the British planned to drastically reduce the Arab Legion back to its pre-war size. It was only maintained at its Second World War level on an ad hoc basis because the situation in Palestine required replacement units to
be raised within the TJFF first, in order to allow for a gradual handover of responsibility. The Arab Legion was not deemed an imperial defence asset in its own right; it was primarily considered the cost for securing strategic rights in Transjordan and was funded merely for the purpose of maintaining internal security. As the end of the Palestine mandate drew near the Arab Legion assumed a more practical purpose in the pursuit of Britain’s geostrategic assets. The Arab Legion became a useful tool for securing an alternative form of partition more favourable than that proposed by the UN. It was therefore consolidated via an increased subsidy. During the course of 1948 the Arab Legion exceeded the approved size and the intention in 1949 was for the Arab Legion to revert back to its pre-war setting. Again, however, the Palestine problem – the on-going tension on the new West Bank border with Israel – precluded planned reduction. It was only in 1951, in response to the Korean War, that the British actively sought to expand the Arab Legion as an imperial defence asset in its own right – capable of supporting the British Army in Cold War counter measures. Even this expansion was short-lived though. Despite initiating a three-year reorganisation scheme, by the end of 1952 fears of a global war had receded and the British once again sought to cut the cloth of the Arab Legion – or at least to cease further expansion. Ultimately, between 1945-57 the British funded the Arab Legion primarily as a quid pro quo for keeping Jordan on side and stable.

Understanding how and why the Arab Legion was designated this role provides a useful insight into the workings of the ‘official mind’ and the process of policy-making at the centre of the British world system. The War Office and the Chiefs of Staff were certainly keen for the Arab Legion to be expanded for the
purpose of contributing to Britain’s imperial defence needs and the Foreign Office was generally willing to acquiesce. If they had a free hand the Arab Legion would probably have expanded at a much greater rate. However, its imperial defence role was very much kept in check by the Treasury. This supports George Peden’s assessment that the Treasury played a vital role ensuring ‘that strategists were thinking clearly about priorities’. The Whitehall structure meant that despite the military’s desire to build the Arab Legion for imperial defence purposes, Treasury restrictions prompted the War Office to prioritise its budget toward the British Army. Consequently the Arab Legion’s contribution to imperial defence was incidental rather than integral. This identifies a self-regulating Whitehall system with its own checks and balances. We should be wary of over-emphasising the efficacy of the official mind’s systemic structure, however. Indeed, there was also a distinct lack of coordination between the various Whitehall departments. The construction of the 1946 Treaty was a case in point. The Arab Legion, Jordan and the Middle East were all the subject of interest from numerous Whitehall departments. Yet the Treaty was drafted almost exclusively by the Colonial Office – the department about to relinquish its interest in Transjordan. This resulted in a distinctly bilateral Treaty unrelated to the process of Treaty revision being simultaneously undertaken by the Foreign Office with Egypt and Iraq.

Understanding the construction and sustenance of the treaty-based relationship is crucial to explaining its demise. Otherwise we risk losing perspective. By simply emphasising Glubb’s dismissal one might conclude, as

Pappé does, that the British were bowled out of Jordan by nationalists. Certainly Hussein’s frustrations with Glubb and the British were formulated within a toxic atmosphere stoked by Nasser’s anti-Glubb and anti-British diatribe. We also cannot deny that nationalists such as Ali Abu Nuwar, and even, it seems, Abdullah al-Tall, had the ear of the king. However, this portrayal ignores the fact that Hussein received anti-Glubb encouragement from non-nationalists, including Wing-Commander Dalgleish and that Hussein wanted to maintain the British connection despite dismissing Glubb. By emphasising the termination of the Treaty it would be easy to appraise that Britain’s withdrawal from Jordan was the result of a loss of will, on the basis that the British no longer had the stomach to rail against the forces that had removed Glubb, particularly after the Suez catastrophe. However, this would seem to ignore the fact that the British maintained the will to intervene in 1958. Even Britain’s pragmatic attitude toward Ali Abu Nuwar after Glubb’s dismissal negates the loss of will argument, for as William Roger Louis has argued: ‘it demanded just as great an “act of will” to treat the Arabs as equals as it did just to sit on them.’ More convincing is the idea that imperial over-stretch and economic constraints prompted Britain to retreat. Certainly the British willingly terminated the Treaty after a post-Glubb reappraisal of the relationship established that the costs of the Treaty – politically, financially, and militarily – outweighed the benefits. Yet the British would not have conducted this re-evaluation had it not been for Glubb’s dismissal and the subsequent loss of control of the Arab Legion. This therefore drags us back to the process that led to Glubb’s dismissal.

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15 Louis, *British Empire in the Middle East* p. 737.
Ultimately it is impertinent to pinpoint one single factor to explain the sustenance or the demise of the Anglo-Jordanian Treaty relationship. As Gallagher has pointed out, the historian’s task is not to rank the causes, but to join up the dots: ‘to identify ways in which one set of forces worked on the other in critical situations’. The key to piecing together the puzzle of Britain’s withdrawal from Jordan – to join those dots – is to identify the relative balance of dependence. With the Arab Legion at the heart of the Treaty – as a *quid pro quo* – the Anglo-Jordanian relationship was founded on a system of mutual dependence and it was a shift in the balance of this system that caused the Anglo-Jordanian relationship to deteriorate and ultimately resulted in the Treaty’s termination and Britain’s withdrawal. Transjordan was dependent on Britain financially and militarily and Abdullah accepted this. The 1948 War is particularly illustrative of this feature of the relationship. Abdullah’s pursuit of Greater Transjordan and his subsequent desire for an armistice with Israel were both subject to British approval. Because of his personal dependence, Abdullah willingly worked within the parameters of a dominant British presence over Jordanian foreign policy and the Arab Legion. In some respects Abdullah’s assassination was therefore a turning point. In a letter to Attlee, written shortly before the king’s death, Abdullah explained: ‘few are the people who comprehend that independence is a gradual affair and take into consideration the necessity of allowing a time lapse from the moment of its inception to its maturity’. Abdullah accepted his dependence on Britain in a way that Hussein, regardless of the pan-Arab fervour that threatened his kingdom, would not – as

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16 Gallagher, *Decline, Revival and Fall*, p. 74.
17 Abdullah to Attlee, 10 July 1951, FO371/91799/ET1052/1, TNA.
his outburst against serving with the British Army prior to acceding the throne in 1953 indicated. The underlying cause, though, was the changing international climate within which the British world system was operating. The Treaty began to break down as the balance of dependence shifted. Britain's withdrawal from Palestine; its increasingly fraught relationship with Egypt; and the Cold War with the Soviet Union; all these factors increased Britain’s dependence on Jordan as a geostrategic safe haven. These same factors, however, made Jordan less reliant on Britain. The British had hoped that Greater Transjordan would be tied to Britain by even greater dependence than the pre-1948 state, and materially it was. However, the impact the 1948 War had on Arab nationalism within Jordan and the Arab Legion and the rise of Nasserism after 1952 made British dominance, including Glubb’s presence, an increasing liability. Consequently, both parties sought to exert more control. In response to the Soviet threat the British anglicised the Arab Legion, but this merely added fuel to the fire of anti-British Arab nationalists, which in-turn encouraged the Jordanians to establish greater control of the Arab Legion. The British acknowledged that control of the Arab Legion would have to be transferred to the Jordanians in the long-term and that Glubb would eventually have to be replaced. Yet because of their dependence on maintaining their position in Jordan the British nonetheless failed to make any positive moves in either direction. From a practical point of view the British were comforted that they could rely on Glubb’s influence if and when Jordanian support and the support of the Arab Legion was required. And from a prestige perspective the British were concerned that Glubb’s departure, whether forced or voluntary, would look like scuttle. Glubb had become symbolic of British power and his departure was anticipated to be worse than the
propaganda attacks he was the target of. In that respect Arab nationalism encouraged the British to stay, rather than forcing them to depart. Yet this merely exacerbated the tensions within the relationship. Meanwhile Jordan’s dependence on the British connection was further weakened by Britain’s failure to assist in its struggle against Israel, including attempts to invoke the Treaty in relation to Qibya in October 1953, Qalqilya in October 1956 and the tension surrounding Banat Yacoub in February 1956, which proved to be the trigger for Glubb’s dismissal.

What this thesis has demonstrated is that British policy cannot be appraised simply as a rational balance sheet calculation of material interests, or as a mere psychological capitulation. The ‘official mind’ just like the human mind is prey to a number of competing considerations, influences and afflictions. Moreover, the ‘official mind’, of either Britain or Jordan, is also prey to external factors beyond its control. British policy in Jordan, as this appraisal of Glubb and the Arab Legion has demonstrated, was indeed a product of this melting pot. The foundation of British policy towards Jordan was to consolidate Britain’s strategic interests. The transition toward a Treaty-based relationship in 1946 was testament to Britain’s recognition that mandatory control could no longer be justified. It would damage Abdullah and Britain’s reputation. Equally, however, the maintenance of British interests also inculcated an imperialist character to the Treaty. As with Britain’s support for Abdullah’s Greater Transjordan option when the Palestine mandate ended, and Britain’s policy of selective non-intervention during the royal succession crisis, HMG was motivated by the perceived need to secure the lines of communication across the globe; to protect its oil interests and to provide freedom of access in the event of global war with
the Soviet Union. Maintaining predominance in Jordan and Palestine was considered a key component of this system of British imperial defence. The Arab Legion itself was not considered a part of this system, except to the extent that it was capable of maintaining internal security within, and the goodwill of, a strategically located ally. The Arab Legion was primarily the price – a cheap one – for maintaining these rights. The international climate made Britain ever more dependent upon the alliance with Jordan. The Korean War, for example, made the Arab Legion a direct asset to imperial defence. Moreover, Britain’s deteriorating relationship elsewhere in the Arab world, particularly in Egypt where the Suez base was located, made Jordan an increasingly important geostrategic asset. Because of this rising significance the British felt compelled to exert greater control. However, increased British dominance jarred with the rise of anti-British Arab nationalism. Hussein was therefore simultaneously prompted to assert more authority in order to vanquish the puppet tag associated with the British connection. The Anglo-Jordanian Treaty relationship was built and sustained by a system of mutual dependence. Its demise can be explained by a gradual shift in the balance and mutual recognition that this system of dependence no longer existed. Piers Brendon described the mandate system as ‘a continuation of imperialism by other means’.18 Meanwhile the first moves toward independence have been characterised as ‘Empire by Treaty’.19 These are apt portrayals of British attempts to maintain control of geostrategic assets of its world system within a changing international climate. The ending of

18 Brendon, Decline and Fall, p. 317.
19 Fitzsimons, Empire by Treaty.
the Treaty was another example of the British world system evolving in response
to the global conditions that it adapted to and was shaped by.

As a final thought it seems pertinent to reflect on Glubb’s legacy. Shortly
before his departure Melville explained, with all sincerity:

I don’t think that one would be exaggerating to say that the
majority of what British influence still remains in the Middle East,
is a result of Glubb’s lifelong work out there. I do not think his
unique position can be overstressed or his enormous services to
the British, as well as the Arabs, exaggerated.20

In some respects, given Glubb’s dismissal less than three weeks later, Melville’s
eulogy is tinged with a degree of irony. It is nonetheless utterly apt. Between
1945-56 Glubb was central to Britain’s position in the Middle East – for good and
for bad. And while his time may have been up, that does not detract from the fact
that, for many years, Glubb had been a unique servant of Anglo-Arab interests
and both Britain and Jordan would find life without him at the helm of the Arab
Legion very, very different; but it was not the end of the world – for Glubb,
Jordan, or Britain.

20 ‘Glubb Pasha’, Melville to Stanley Priddle (Reuters), 9 February 1956, Melville
Papers, 4/45.
Maps

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Map 1: Peel Report partition plan, 1937.¹

¹ Shlaim, Collusion, p. 63
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² Shlaim, Collusion, p. 118
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3 Shlaim, Collusion, p. 255
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⁴ Shlaim, Collusion, p. 268
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\textsuperscript{5} Shlaim, \textit{Collusion}, p. 322
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⁶ Shlaim, Collusion, p. 403
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\textsuperscript{8} Shlaim, \textit{Collusion}, p. 421
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⁹ Shlaim, Collusion, p. 429
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