

Plato's Paradigmatic Method

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*Abbreviations for classical authors and texts:* LSJ

*Word Count:* 70,000 (approx.)

### *Abstract*

This study examines Plato's use of paradigms in the *Statesman*, focusing on the paradigm of weaving. The basic thesis of the study is that Plato's use of paradigms to assist with the process of division was motivated by an epistemological limitation indicated by the aporetic conclusion of the *Theaetetus* and that paradigms are used to address this limitation due their greater pre-dialectical doxastic alacrity.

## Plato's Paradigmatic Method

### *1. Introduction*

#### *1.1. An Unloved Text*

The *Statesman*<sup>1</sup> has attracted a dearth of scholarship when compared to other Platonic texts whose authenticity is beyond doubt.<sup>2</sup> This can partly be attributed to its readability, with the pace and integrity of the dialogue suffering due to the intricacy of the myth of Cronus and division of wool-weaving. The text is also replete with highly specialised theoretical and technical vocabulary (much of which is likely Plato's own invention) as well as novel uses of existing terms.<sup>3</sup> The tone of the dialogue also lacks the liveliness of other works, with the passivity of the Eleatic Visitor's (henceforth: 'EV') interlocutor Young Socrates (henceforth: 'YS') resulting in little in the way of any interplay of personalities which might add a

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<sup>1</sup> The Greek terms for the title and topic of the dialogue are especially bereft of accurate English approximations, with 'statesman' being the conventional English translation of the titular 'Πολιτικός' and 'statesmanship' providing the English for 'πολιτική' (shorthand for 'πολιτική ἐπιστήμη' or 'πολιτική τέχνη'), which is ostensibly the main object of the inquiry. The more august connotations of 'statesman' make it a better fit than 'politician' but the use of the former for politicians of higher rank and superior experience still implies an unacceptable engagement in the type of *Realpolitik* which Plato's ideal πολιτικός would shun (cf. Hansen (1983) 36, Rowe (1995a) 177). However, when read in context, the conventional English translations are not so inadequate as to obscure more than they successfully convey the meaning of the original Greek, and I therefore stick with them throughout for the sake of readability. The English terms are also consistent with Rowe (1999), from which all translations of the *Statesman* are taken unless indicated otherwise.

<sup>2</sup> The negative sentiment has motivated claims that the dialogue is spurious, a position shown to be untenable by Lutosławski (1983, 453-8). It should be added that in addition to the issue of its authenticity, I also defer to the scholarly consensus on the chronological positioning of the text which places it in proximity to the *Critias*, *Laws*, *Philebus*, *Sophist*, and *Timaeus* (Ross (1951) 2, 10, Vlastos (1991) 46-7, Brandwood (1992), Young (1994)).

<sup>3</sup> 'aquatic rearing' (ὕγρατροφικόν, 264d7), 'lid-making' (ἐπιθηματοουργία, 280d6), and 'woof-spinning' (κροκονητική τέχνη, 282e14-283a1) being among the many terms whose first recorded use is in the *Statesman* and which are not found again in Plato. See Campbell (1867, xxiv-xxviii of the general introduction), Chantraine (1933, 388-9), Brisson and Pradeau (2011, 273-81), El Murr (2014, 194 n. 2).

dramatic dimension to the text. In fact, YS's deferential replies do little more than punctuate EV's contributions, with the text often taking on the appearance of a quasi-monologue.<sup>1</sup>

Yet it is a testament to Plato's own belief in the overall worth of the *Statesman* that its many seemingly wayward sections inspire EV to perform a pre-emptive explanatory intervention on excess and deficiency, lest the reader lose faith. This self-awareness suggests that, rather than being a product of bad composition, at least some aspects of the dialogue's unwelcoming style were considered a necessary means of conveying its philosophical content.<sup>2</sup> But while the style might often have a philosophical basis, it nonetheless seems to have acted as a repellent and thus compounded the dialogue's status as a more peripheral Platonic text. The result is that, although the *Statesman* does not occupy a central philosophical position within the Platonic corpus, the relative paucity of scholarly attention paid to it thus far is not a fair reflection of its philosophical value.<sup>3</sup>

This study represents an attempt to compensate somewhat for this undue neglect by addressing one of its main sources: the paradigm of weaving (ὕφαντική).<sup>4</sup> And the main

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<sup>1</sup> Rowe (1996) 172-3, El Murr (2014) 20-1.

<sup>2</sup> This is not to say that the text is untouched by Plato's literary talent. In fact, an unfortunate side-effect of its stolid tone and often seemingly bizarre subject matter is that it risks concealing the instances of dry humour with which the dialogue is laced, and which were presumably motivated in part to provide comic relief from its stylistic deficiencies. As Campbell notes, the humour is all the more intense for its infrequency: 'If the Socratic humour no longer makes perpetual skirmishes, it lurks in ambush to take the reader by surprise, and is occasionally transformed by the intensity of Plato's mood into an almost savage irony.' (1867, xix); e.g. 263d3-e1, 266c4-8. See also Diès (1935, lvi) on the exceptional literary quality of 298a-299e.

<sup>3</sup> Erler (1992, 151) is therefore correct to describe it as 'unfairly neglected' ('zu Unrecht vernachlässigten'). A short summary of this generally negative sentiment and relative dearth of scholarship is provided in El Murr (2010, 109-12). It should be added that French language scholarship has done more to defy this trend than scholarship in any other language, a fact which I presume can be attributed in large part to the snowballing effect of Victor Goldschmidt's seminal work *Le paradigme dans le dialectique platonicienne*, first published in 1947. The text was also the subject of extensive but mostly nonextant commentary by the Neoplatonists, as evidenced by its inclusion in Iamblichus's list of dialogues (Dillon (1995) 364, Westerlink (2011) xxxvii-xxxix). The myth of Cronus appears to have been the main source of this interest, forming essential interpretive support for Iamblichus's reading of the *Sophist* (Dillon (1995) 366, Westerlink (2011) xxxviii) and being the subject of a number of passages in Proclus's surviving commentaries (e.g. *in Prm.* 959, *in Ti.* I.288-9, I.389, II.95, III.273, III.150, III.309, *Theol. Plat.* V), which also suggest nonextant treatments by Syrianus and Severus (Dillon (1995) 367-9, Zamora (2020) 124-5).

<sup>4</sup> Shorthand for 'ὕφαντική τέχνη' or the 'art of weaving woollen cloth' (Campbell (1867) v). In particular, it is the main component of the paradigm of weaving – the division of wool-weaving – which must take the lion's share of the responsibility for the consistently negative sentiment the text has attracted. The division's lack of literary appeal has even incited open disdain, being variously described as 'wearisome' (Ryle (1966) 27), 'ponderous reading' (Seeskin (1984) 234), and 'truly painful' (Dixsaut (2013b) 25).

purpose of this study may therefore be summarised as an attempt to address the following basic question:

- (S) *Why is wool-weaving introduced and subjected to a dialectical analysis within an inquiry concerning the nature of statesmanship?*

Whilst addressing (S) necessitates forays into almost every aspect of the *Statesman* (with the result that this study verges on a comprehensive analysis of the text through a methodological lens), of primary importance is an understanding of the philosophical basis of what I refer to as ‘the paradigmatic method’, whose ability to overcome certain epistemological limitations appears to offer Plato’s main philosophical justification for the inclusion of the topic of weaving in the dialogue.

The study’s attempt to answer (S) may be divided into three broad areas of inquiry:

- (S1) The epistemological limitations that the paradigmatic method is intended to overcome.
- (S2) The nature and genesis of the paradigmatic method.
- (S3) The application of the paradigmatic method in the analysis of statesmanship.

(S1) is addressed mainly in §3 and §6. In §3 I provide an analysis of 285d8-286b2, which I refer to as ‘the methodological interlude’. I argue that if this passage is to be read as explaining the greater ease of dialectical analysis on paradigms, then it implies that true judgements concerning certain things cannot be attained pre-dialectically. If this is correct, then the main purpose of paradigms in the *Statesman* is to exploit the superior pre-dialectical doxastic alacrity in relation to certain topics in order to improve the efficiency of dialectical analysis in relation to topics for which pre-dialectical true judgements are not possible. In §6 I examine the παράδειγμα παραδείγματος, involving the model of children learning their letters. I argue that the pedagogical procedure it describes explains certain features that are

specific to the use of the paradigm of weaving, particularly in terms of its use to assist with the recognition of statesmanship as a component or ἀρχή of a larger whole.

(S2) is mainly addressed in §2, where I provide an analysis of Plato's use of simple analogies and argue that one variant of this usage (simple heuristic paradigms) appears to be the main inspiration for the development of the paradigmatic method. This is argued for on the basis of features shared by this use of simple comparisons and the paradigms used in the *Sophist* and *Statesman* to assist with the method of division. A brief analysis of the method of division is also provided, as well as an analysis of the differences between Plato's simple analogical comparisons and what I (somewhat arbitrarily) refer to as 'the paradigmatic method' in the *Sophist* and *Statesman*. I also introduce a distinction between two different ways that paradigms are employed in combination with the method of division: the intra and inter-generic modes of comparison, with the switch from the former to the latter during the application of the paradigm of weaving potentially representing a deliberate development in Plato's use of the method which intended to overcome a basic limitation of the intra-generic mode of comparison.

(S3) is addressed in §4, §5, §7, §8, and §9. In §4 I examine the paradigm of the herdsman used during the initial division of statesmanship. This appears to serve a pedagogical purpose by providing an example of the poor application of dialectic, including the improper use of the paradigmatic method. In §5 I examine the myth of Cronus which is used to correct the initial division resulting from the application of the paradigm of the herdsman, with its demonstration of the need for a division of labour and the essentially moral nature of the statesman's expertise forming basic principles which help to explain the application of the paradigm of weaving. In §7 I provide a fairly brief exposition of the division of weaving, whose paradigmatic function does not become clear until the final division of statesmanship. In §8 the digression on excess and deficiency is analysed. Here I argue against a reading of

the divisions of weaving and statesmanship which reduce their value to preparatory exercises in dialectic. Although EV emphasises the importance of dialectical improvement throughout the digression, this is only to be given relative rather than absolute priority over an inquiry's epistemic aim. Additionally, any assessment of discussions in the *Statesman* as exceeding their contribution to the epistemic aim of the inquiry must be made in relation an expert dialectician (such as EV). In §9 I relate the final division of statesmanship to the division of weaving in an attempt to understand how it fulfils its purpose of making the division of statesmanship easier. This includes an analysis of how this division relates to the initial failed divisions, as well as of the importance of the metaphorical purpose of the paradigm of weaving. I conclude with §10, arguing that (S) may be answered by referring to the general increase in the efficiency of divisions informed by paradigms, as well as the paradigm of weaving's capacity to overcome problems specific to the initial failed division of statesmanship.

## *1.2 Chapter Outline*

In the remainder of this chapter, I address (S)'s implicit assumption that the *Statesman* concerns the nature of statesmanship. The assumption that the *Statesman* should be read as an attempt to analyse the nature of statesmanship is thrown into doubt by remarks made in the proem. These remarks have been used to support the hypothesis that, in addition to its overt analysis of statesmanship, the *Statesman* contains a covert or subtextual analysis of the nature of the philosopher. I therefore offer an examination of the proem in relation to the dialogue's philosophical aims, which in turn requires a discussion of the status of the missing *Philosopher*.

I also discuss the use of the terms 'πολιτικός' and 'πολιτική τέχνη', their relationship to one another, and what their use implies about the *Statesman*'s political project. In particular, I

address the question of why the text is dedicated to πολιτική τέχνη to the apparent exclusion of firm details on the formation of the πολιτικός. Since the rest of this study is concerned primarily with the methodology of the *Statesman*, this provides a useful opportunity to briefly examine the scope of the *Statesman*'s political project in relation to the Platonic corpus as a whole.

I conclude with an overview of the first part of the *Statesman*'s inquiry consisting of a division of knowledge, which provides some of the philosophical background for one of the more intriguing facets of the text – the implication that dialectic is to be used in the acquisition of certain *a posteriori* facts necessary for the exercise of the statesman's expertise.

### 1.3 The Proem (257a1-258b2)

Before examining why EV resorts to the use of the paradigm of weaving in the *Statesman*, it is worth clarifying the dialogue's philosophical aims. This task is complicated by the proem, whose simple purpose of determining the dialogue's topic and interlocutors does not prevent it from creating interpretive problems whose solution has important ramifications for the understanding of the text as a whole. The complications arise mainly from its presentation of the analysis of the statesman as part of a wider project involving two other topics of analysis: the sophist, the discussion of which by EV and Theaetetus is portrayed in the *Sophist*; and the philosopher, for which there is no authentic extant text bearing this title.<sup>1</sup>

#### 1.3.1 The Choice of Topic

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<sup>1</sup> It should be added that although not mentioned in the proem, due to its shared setting and characters the project is often classified as a tetralogy beginning with the *Theaetetus* (*Plt.* 258a4, *Sph.* 216a1-2, *Tht.* 210d1-4; Ast (1816) 376, Diès (1935) vii, Skemp (1952) 20, Cornford (1960) 168).

The dialogue begins with Older Socrates, Theodorus, and EV agreeing upon a suitable topic of inquiry. Theodorus implies that, having already analysed the sophist, EV and Theaetetus will also provide an account of the statesman and the philosopher, thereby trebling Socrates' debt of gratitude to them (257a1-5). Socrates immediately rebukes Theodorus for implying that the three separate projects have equal worth (257b2-4)<sup>1</sup> and Theodorus then encourages EV to choose either the statesman or the philosopher and 'go through him in his turn [προελόμενος διέξελεθε]' (257c1) – to which EV agrees, adding that the task must be seen through to the end (257c2-4). These remarks combined with intimations made in the *Sophist* have led many interpreters to conclude that the *Statesman* was intended to be part of a series of dialogues of which the finishing piece on the philosopher was never completed.<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> It has been suggested that Older Socrates is making a serious point here about the impossibility of attributing relationships of quantifiable proportion to heterogeneous things (Diès (1935) 1 n. 1). But the criticism is delivered in jest (Apelt (1914) 120 n. 2, Robinson (1953) 209), as evidenced by the tone of Theodorus's response (257b5-8). In fact, Socrates deliberately gives Theodorus's metaphor of owing a debt an overly literal criticism in order to emphasise the severe differences in value between the philosopher and the other two topics, while also giving himself the pretence of superior mathematical knowledge to make a joke at Theodorus's expense (see Skemp (1952, 119 n. 1); cf. Campbell (1867) lvi, Brisson and Pradeau (2011) 214 n. 7). The exchange is an excellent example of the type of interplay of characters which is sorely lacking between YS and EV. It also provides further evidence that Plato had not lost his literary abilities when writing the *Statesman* and that their full expression was likely restrained by other considerations.

<sup>2</sup> See esp. *Sph.* 216c4-217a3. Summaries of the textual evidence are provided by Jackson (1886, 283) and Gill (2012, 203-4). Further evidence may also be found in a possible forward-reference to the *Philosopher* later in the proem, where Older Socrates sets the scene for a belated recognition (ἀναγνώρισις) of innate similarities between YS and himself which never actually transpires in the text. This occurs after EV and Theodorus agree that YS should replace Theaetetus as an interlocutor, at which point Older Socrates interjects with a comparison between the way Theaetetus bears a physical resemblance to himself and the fact that YS and himself share a name, concluding that: 'we must always be eager to recognise [ἀναγνωρίζειν] those akin to us by talking to them [διὰ λόγων]' (258a2-3). A natural reading of this need to establish similarities 'διὰ λόγων' is that it is intended to give prior notification to the reader that more meaningful similarities between Older and Younger Socrates are likely to be revealed (see Campbell (1867, 3-4 n. 12 and n. 14)). Such a reading would also be in keeping with a passage in the *Sophist*, where shortly after Theaetetus refers to YS as Older Socrates' 'ὁμώνυμον' (*Sph.* 218b3), EV warns of the dangers of presuming that the use of a word implies that it always refers to the same thing, claiming that this is best determined by verbal explanation (*Sph.* 218c1-5; Erler (1992) 155-6, Casertano (1995) 141). Furthermore, we find a textual precedent for Plato's use of superficial similarities as a harbinger of innate similarities in the proem of the *Theaetetus*, where after pointing out the resemblance between Socrates' and Theaetetus's facial features, Theodorus goes on to praise Theaetetus for his intellectual talents, especially his 'quickness [εὐμαθῆ]' (*Tht.* 144a3, trans. Levett (1990) 261; see also *Tht.* 144a6-8, Erler (1992) 154-5). The subsequent discussion reveals this assessment to be correct, something Socrates alludes to at the end of the dialogue (*Tht.* 210c2-3). YS's failure to demonstrate possession of his namesake's philosophical prowess or any other innate Socratic characteristic in the *Statesman* therefore creates a peculiar textual discrepancy. However, this could be resolved if Older Socrates' remarks in the proem refer to the *Philosopher*, especially if Older and Younger Socrates would have been its main interlocutors. Since at 258a5-6 Older Socrates implies that YS will be his interlocutor on another occasion, there is evidence to suggest that this was Plato's intention (see also Cornford (1960, 168), Skemp (1952, 20); cf. Campbell (1867, lvii, 3 n. 4), Mattéi (1983, 334-5, 352), Notomi (1999, 24; 2011, 217 n. 8), Sayre (2006) 84 n. 6).

### 1.3.2 *The Statesman and the Missing ‘Philosopher’*

The fact that the proem presents the *Statesman* as part of a larger project involving the study of three topics, only two of which form the imperative of separate extant texts, has also led to an alternative hypothesis: that Plato never intended to dedicate a separate text to the philosopher and instead delivers this analysis partially or wholly via the text of the *Statesman* (usually in conjunction with the *Sophist*).<sup>1</sup>

#### 1.3.2.1 *The Philosopher as Metadialogue*

Since the *Sophist* and *Statesman* do not provide an overt dialectical analysis of the philosopher, if the reader is to establish a definition from the texts, this must be achieved indirectly. The most coherent version of this hypothesis takes the *Philosopher* as being delivered partly negatively via the *Sophist*'s division of one of the rivals to the claim of being the true expert in philosophy, and partly ostensibly, via a demonstration of philosophical method throughout both the *Sophist* and the *Statesman*.<sup>2</sup> This has also been supplemented by the claim that gaps in the *Statesman*'s reasoning involve tacit invitations to complete some of its argumentation with details on the philosopher-ruler in the *Republic*, with the excessive

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<sup>1</sup> Jackson (1886) 283-4, Ritter (1910) 66-7, Alline (1915) 20, Frede (1996) 146-50, Notomi (1999) 25, (2011) 218-9, Sayre (2006) 84 n. 6. Another potential explanation of the *Philosopher*'s absence is that Plato did complete this project, but not under the expected title (see Campbell (1867, lvii), Taylor (1929, 375 n. 1), Davidson (2005, 239)). But unless we presume that Plato had a change of heart which the extant proem of the *Statesman* predates, this reading has the unwelcome implication that Plato may have willingly obfuscated his clear signposting in the *Sophist* and *Statesman* concerning the title of this text. Additionally, Campbell's (1867, lvii-lviii) observation that any such text should include a positive definition of the philosopher seems fatal to any version of this hypothesis. A more feasible view is that material intended for the *Philosopher* was absorbed by a later work such as the *Philebus* (see Skemp (1952, 17), Roggerone (1990, 368-9)), thereby sapping the impetus to write a separate dialogue. But this abandonment narrative is weakened slightly by evidence showing that Plato edited the proem of the *Theaetetus* (Diels and Schubart (1905) quoted in Alline (1915, 21 n. 2); see also Cornford (1960, 15), Guthrie (1978, 62), Long (1998, 14 n. 3), Sedley (2004, 1 n. 1)); if Plato was not averse to editing previously inscribed works to produce new editions, and had conceived but later abandoned a text on the philosopher, it raises the question of why the allusion in the extant proem of the *Statesman* to a forthcoming analysis of the 'philosopher' was never excised.

<sup>2</sup> See *Sph.* 253c6-9; Frede (1996) 146-50, Notomi (1999) 25, Pradeau (2010) 105-6, Brisson and Pradeau (2011) 11-2.

agreeableness of YS thus acting as a ruse designed to encourage the reader to fill in dialectical lacunae themselves intertextually.<sup>1</sup> The nature of the philosopher is therefore to be derived using a certain amount of extra-textual input, with the dialogues providing guidance through some combination of the following: an analysis of sophistry as a foil for philosophy;<sup>2</sup> demonstrations of philosophical method from which the reader might derive general principles about philosophy; and deliberate explanatory ellipses which can be filled with details on the nature of the philosopher from other Platonic texts. The result is that the *Philosopher* is posited as a kind of metadiologue to be pieced together by the reader from available texts as well as their own dialectical analyses.<sup>3</sup>

Since this reading of the *Philosopher* as a type of metadiologue delivered at least partially through the *Statesman* allows for the possibility that sections of the text may pursue the philosopher to the exclusion of the statesman, it would have important consequences for any interpretation of the dialogue (including for the sections dedicated to weaving). In particular, once combined with the fact that EV makes a point of stating that some of the *Statesman*'s discussions are motivated by a desire to foster dialectical improvement and that their intent is therefore pedagogical (e.g. 286d9-e3, 287a1-6), this reading would make it much easier to dismiss certain sections of the text as making no important contribution to the discovery of the statesman. And the long-winded nature of the sections on the myth of Cronus and division

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<sup>1</sup> See Effe (1996, esp. 200-2).

<sup>2</sup> See esp. *Sph.* 250e7-251a1 with 253c8-9 and 254a4-6.

<sup>3</sup> Plato's potential motivations for resorting to such an unorthodox method of delivery are unclear and rarely expanded upon in the literature. But plausible rationales offer themselves. For instance, Plato's reservations concerning the limitations of the written word would provide one obvious candidate (*Phdr.* 274e1ff.; Effe (1996) 200; see also *R.* 506d2-507a5). Gill, who argues that the *Philosopher* is delivered through the *Parmenides*, *Sophist*, *Statesman*, and *Theaetetus*, sees Plato's motivation as primarily pedagogical, with this 'devious strategy' (2012, 5) being justified on the basis that: 'by making his audience work very hard to dig out his meaning, he fosters in them (and us, his modern readers) a skill in reading and a competence in using dialectical techniques and adopting new ones.' (2012, 5; see also Gill (2013) 27-8). But although the provision of a clear description of this strategy in the texts would diminish its purported pedagogical value in relation to 'a skill in reading', it is much less clear how the reader's dialectical training would be adversely affected. And such an elaborate scheme for the sole purpose of improving the reader's interpretive skills would seem unwarranted, especially as it is employed so furtively as to have eluded even the most experienced of Platonists.

of weaving could thus be explained with relative ease. It would therefore allow for the possibility that (S) could be addressed at least in part by questioning one of its underlying assumptions: that the dialogue concerns the nature of statesmanship. Whilst the topic of weaving may have been introduced primarily as a means of advancing the dialogue's overt dramatic aim of discovering the statesman, the intricacy of its division may serve a separate covert aim to be garnered by the reader.

Conversely, if the reading is incorrect, the dubious contribution of many aspects of these passages to finding the nature of the statesman creates an important interpretive problem that cannot be solved so readily. For although certain discussions are said to have been elongated in order to provide demonstrations of philosophical method for its own sake, without the subtext offered by the interpretation of the *Philosopher* as being implicitly contained within the *Statesman*, the plethora of demonstrations of philosophical method found throughout the rest of the Platonic corpus would seem to render this unnecessary. The *authorial* motivation for the length of these passages would therefore be in need of some further explanation, with the result that EV's appeal to dialectical improvement to explain their length would be at least partly a red herring.

### 1.3.2.2 *The Philosopher as Metadialogue: Obfuscation in The Proem*

A clear objection to the claim that we should look for the *Philosopher* in the *Statesman* is that Plato does little to discourage the inference that he planned a separate dialogue.<sup>1</sup> In particular, Theodorus's statement that 'whether you choose the statesman first or the philosopher, make your choice and go through him in his turn.' (257b9-c1)<sup>2</sup> and EV's subsequent agreement are

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<sup>1</sup> Cf. use of 'ἔτι' at *Sph.* 254b4 (Jackson (1886) 283-4, Ritter (1910) 70, Frede (1996) 149, Notomi (1999) 24, (2011) 218.

<sup>2</sup> 'ἀλλ' ἐξῆς, εἴτε τὸν πολιτικὸν ἄνδρα πρότερον εἴτε τὸν φιλόσοφον προαιρῆ, προελόμενος διέξελεθε.'; alternatively: 'proceed at once to your description of the statesman or the philosopher, whichever you prefer to take first.' (trans. Taylor (1961) 253).

most naturally read as implying that there will be a separate discussion dedicated to the philosopher.<sup>1</sup> Hence, if Plato had no intention of writing the *Philosopher* when composing the *Statesman*, he seems to show a lack of sympathy for the reader, or at least had a very high opinion of their ability to decipher his intentions.

### 1.3.2.3 The Philosopher as Metadialogue: Plato's Readership

One way of overcoming this allegation of authorial oversight is to challenge the implicit assumption that Plato was writing for an extensive readership reaching beyond his own philosophical milieu. For while it would be easy for the modern reader to presume that Plato was writing for a wide readership (including posterity), his ambitions may have been narrower. He may therefore never have supposed that his readership would extend beyond or outlive his own students and contemporaries, or at least considered this likelihood insignificant enough to disregard it when composing the dialogues.<sup>2</sup> Consequently, if Plato never intended to write the *Philosopher* as a separate text, it would not be unreasonable for

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<sup>1</sup> Cf. Notomi (1999) 24.

<sup>2</sup> The scale of Plato's readership during his lifetime is impossible to estimate. It has been argued that the labour-intensive production of hand-written papyrus scrolls made their private ownership a rarity (Ryle (1966) 22), but there is conflicting evidence (*Ap.* 26d6-e2; Alline (1915) 1-2). And since after Plato's death the first Academic edition of his works could be consulted at bookshops for a fee (D.L. 3.66; Alline (1915) 46-7), any limitations in supply may have been compensated for by the lending of texts as well as group readings (Schuhl (1960) 57-8). It may not therefore have been the supply of physical texts as much as Plato's own desire to distribute his work which acted as the main limiting factor in its diffusion during his lifetime. But with regards to the extent of Plato's own ambitions and expectations for his readership, the evidence fails to supply us with a definite conclusion. The fact that Plato seems to have written his works under a nickname certainly suggests a more intimate intended readership and modest expectations concerning their potential legacy (see D.L. 3.4; cf. Notopoulos (1939) who notes that 'Πλάτων' was actually a common formal name in Athens, but relies on the unjustified and thoroughly anti-Platonic assumption that homonymity implies homogeneity of use when he argues from this that: 'If we insist on the tradition of the ancient lives and consider Πλάτων as a nickname...we would have to assume a similar condition in the case of all the other persons with the name Πλάτων in Athens' (141)). To this informality we can add Plato's stated ambivalence towards the value of the written word beyond an *aide-mémoire* or *ὑπόμνημα* as well as Socrates' potentially bibliophobic influence as further evidence of an indifferent attitude towards the publication of his work (cf. Alline (1915) 3). But while it would be fair to assume that Plato wrote each dialogue for a modest primary readership consisting of other disciples of Socrates as well as members of the Academy and other philosophical schools whose interest was guaranteed, he was likely aware that his work would seep out into the general population and thus paid at least some regard to a secondary readership of laymen (on Plato's different readerships see Alline (1915, 4-5), Ryle (1966, 26-7)).

him to presume that most of his intended readership would be immune to misdirection on this matter, as his intentions would likely become known through the grapevine.

But while this might avoid the implication of outright obfuscation, it still does little to explain in a positive way why the philosopher is referred to as a discrete topic of analysis in the same context as the sophist and the statesman, whose analyses were presented as separate dialogues.<sup>1</sup>

#### 1.3.2.4 *The Philosopher as Metadialogue: The Philosopher-Ruler and the Republic*

One way of explaining the presentation of the three separate topics in the proems of the *Sophist* and *Statesman* which both avoids attributing misleading language to Plato, and is consistent with the interpretation of the *Philosopher* as a metadialogue, involves the claim that the need for a political ruler to have philosophical expertise established in the *Republic* implies that ‘sophist’, ‘statesman’, and ‘philosopher’ refer to only two different kinds (the sophist and the philosopher), thus indicating the need for only two separate inquiries. Some interpreters have therefore argued that rather than being obfuscatory, the proems of the *Sophist* and *Statesman* rely upon a conceptual equivalence already established in the *Republic*.<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> This could be explained if any allusions to an inquiry into the philosopher relate to a separate esoteric oral doctrine and are thus meant only for the parts of his readership privy to these arcane teachings (see Krämer (1990, 113), Szlezák, T., *Platon und die Schriftlichkeit der Philosophie, Teil 2: Das Bild des Dialektikers in Platons späten Dialogen* (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 2004), quoted in Ricken (2008, 84 n. 2)). This would also have the advantage of absolving Plato of the accusation of obfuscation in relation to this esoteric part of his readership. And if Plato’s estimation of the size of his lay readership was modest or not a priority, then some esoteric allusion at the expense of exoteric obfuscation might be more excusable (see Ryle (1966, 27)). The reading suffers from being extremely difficult to verify or disprove entirely. But although a thorough analysis is beyond the scope of this study, it suffices to say here that, unless Plato thought that he was in a unique position to acquire knowledge of what the philosopher is, and thus had a monopoly over its transmission, there is no reason to think that any doctrines only transmissible by the spoken word could not be initially attained by nonmembers of the Academy via their own dialectical efforts. Thus, even if Plato restricted the transmission of a complete account of the philosopher to oral teachings, this does not preclude a reading of the *Philosopher* as being *subtextually* contained within the *Statesman* in the form of a metadialogue, since this relies heavily on the idea that Plato put much of the onus of the analysis of the philosopher on the reader.

<sup>2</sup> See esp. R. 473c11-e5, 517a8-521a8, 540a4-b1; Jackson (1886) 282, Effe (1996) 200-2, Frede (1996) 149. See also Taylor (1961, 251-2). Against this reading Roggerone (1990, 365) cites EV’s claim at *Sph.* 217a1-b3 that people in Elea consider sophists, statesmen, and philosophers as belonging to three distinct kinds (see also

However, although the ideal political ruler of the *Republic* must have knowledge of the good which is to be attained through philosophical method (i.e. dialectic),<sup>1</sup> this only carries the implication that the ideal political ruler must *also* be a philosopher and have undergone the relevant training to achieve this. It does not follow from this that philosophical expertise *is* statesmanship, such that that the philosopher and the statesman are in need of only one inquiry into their nature.<sup>2</sup> Furthermore, we find an indication of the distinct nature of the philosopher and statesman in the myth of Cronus, where philosophy loses none of its value under the providence of Cronus's reign, yet statesmanship is rendered otiose (271e8, 272c1). At least part of the statesman's role therefore appears to concern the management of the entropic tendencies implied by the *a posteriori* conditions of our current cosmic era, and it is far from clear that this is wholly reducible to expertise in philosophy.

### 1.3.3 The Philosopher as Metadialogue: A Bridge Too Far

In summary, the claim that Plato intended to provide an analysis of the philosopher through the *Statesman* carries the unwelcome implication that Plato used misleading language in the proems of the *Sophist* and *Statesman*. This problem might be alleviated if Plato had a narrow view of his readership, but this does nothing to rule out Plato's intention to write a separate text, which the phrasing of the proems still points towards. Attempts to overcome the implications of this phrasing by arguing that the nature of the philosopher and the statesman are identical also appear to be unsound. Thus, despite its appeal, the interpretation of the *Philosopher* as being contained within the *Statesman* seems guilty of overamplifying the strength of what is otherwise relatively weak textual evidence purely on the basis that this

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Taylor (1961, 251), El Murr (2014, 18)). But the passage only implies that this is a popular opinion in Elea, and popular opinions are wont to be disregarded throughout the dialogues.

<sup>1</sup> R. 532a1-b2, 533a8-10, 534b8-d1; see also Dixsaut (2000, 123 with n. 1), Brisson and Pradeau (2011, 23 with n. 3).

<sup>2</sup> Strauss (1973) 42. See also Dixsaut *et al* (2018, 290).

would enable the *Statesman* to help fulfil an explanatory demand for which there is no other extant supply.<sup>1</sup>

#### *1.4 An Overlapping Trilogy*

But while there is insufficient support for the claim that the nature of the philosopher forms an aim in itself in the *Statesman*, this is not a reason to discount the less radical hypothesis that the *Sophist* and *Statesman* do indeed contain some details on the nature of the philosopher, but that these details form only the groundwork for a complete analysis which was to be provided by an unwritten text.<sup>2</sup>

##### *1.4.1 An Overlapping Trilogy: Three Oft-Confused Topics*

This hypothesis derives some support from its consistency with the main motivation behind the presentation of the sophist, statesman, and philosopher as members of a set of related topics: the tendency for each of them to be confused with one another in the popular imagination. For example, in the *Sophist* it is said that ignorance leads people to identify the philosopher with statesmen and sophists (*Sph.* 216c8-d1), leading Socrates to ask EV if they might classify the terms differently in Elea – perhaps as representing only one or two kinds (*Sph.* 217a6-8). EV then confirms that they are believed to be three distinct kinds and implies

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<sup>1</sup> This conclusion might be countered with the claim that interpretive difficulties are to be expected, since if the *Philosopher* is a metadialogue intended to be mapped out from the text of the *Statesman*, it is heuristic in nature, with the reader being left with the responsibility of filling in the details (see Effe (1996, 201), Frede (1996, 150)). Such an inaccessible subtext would also be in keeping with the *Statesman*'s use of obscure terminology and general lack of concern for the lay reader (see Ryle (1966, 27), Sayre (2006, 105-6 with n. 9)). However, the level of disagreement among interpreters is evidence in itself that if Plato intended to deliver the *Philosopher* through the *Statesman*, he was either overly coy in doing so, or failed in the execution of this project. And the failure of expression implied therefore counts strongly against any such reading.

<sup>2</sup> See Wilamowitz (1919, 564).

that their frequent confusion with one another is due to the fact that they are inherently difficult to distinguish (*Sph.* 217b1-3).<sup>1</sup>

#### 1.4.1.1 *Overlap Between the Statesman and the Philosopher*

Thus, although it seems that Plato intended to provide a comprehensive analysis of philosophy in the *Philosopher*, the *Sophist* and *Statesman* may still provide some of the groundwork for this by distinguishing the philosopher from two closely related terms. But whereas the *Sophist*'s task would best be described as having a negative function in relation to the philosopher – consisting of an analysis showing that the sophist's claim on philosophy is unfounded – the *Statesman*'s task appears to be more complex. This is implied by the fact that important aspects of the connection between philosophical and political expertise in the *Republic* seem to persist in the *Statesman*.<sup>2</sup> Most importantly, the *Statesman* shares the *Republic*'s claim that optimal political rule depends upon knowledge of the good and the just.<sup>3</sup> The statesman is also said to possess wisdom (φρόνησις), whose strong association with philosophical expertise in the *Republic* is also mirrored in the myth of Cronus.<sup>4</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> See also *Plt.* 291c3-6. At base, this inherent difficulty is due to the lack of reliable pre-dialectical beliefs about each topic. But this still fails to explain why it is these three topics in particular that are identified as vulnerable to being confused or conflated with one another. In addition to the existence of at least some legitimate overlap between their properties, this may also be a product of the honorific and pejorative connotations their names ordinarily inspire, resulting in a tendency to foment disagreement due to status-seekers unduly appropriating or shirking such designations and thus creating a multitude of opposing beliefs about their correct usage (*R.* 495c8-496a9; Broadie (2016) 108-9 n. 50).

<sup>2</sup> On the continued presence of the ideal of the philosopher-ruler in the *Statesman*, see Skemp (1952, 21-2, 51-2), Rowe (1996, 172 n. 48), Brisson and Pradeau (2011, 14-6), Blondell (2005, 47-8); cf. Grube (1935) 279, Schofield (1999).

<sup>3</sup> 293c5-e5, 295e4-296a2, 296c8-297b3, Kahn (1995) 51, Blondell (2005) 48; see also Schofield (1999, 227). And as detailed by Effe (1996, 202-3, 207-11), the philosopher's knowledge of the good would fill a number of important explanatory gaps. For example, having classified statesmanship as a form of theoretical knowledge (259c10-d2), the nature of this knowledge is never analysed. These explanatory omissions persist with the discussion of excess and deficiency and the due measure (283a10-287b1), the primacy of expertise over laws (292b6-299e4), and the statesman's ability to interweave different temperaments to find a mean (306a8-311c8) – all of which fail to discuss the standard that guides this expert decision-making (on the latter point, see also Kube (1967, 221-2)).

<sup>4</sup> 272c4, 294a8, *R.* 431c9-d2, 582e7-9; Schaefer (1981) 71, 160, Blondell (2005) 47-8.

Consequently, although the balance of evidence favours the hypothesis that Plato did intend to dedicate a separate text to the analysis of the philosopher, in understanding the *Statesman* it is still important to recognise its place in the context of a set of topics which includes philosophy. And the motivations behind the presentation of the *Statesman* as part of a trio of difficult and oft-confused terms thus provides an important part of the philosophical context in which the dialogue must be understood.

But it is important to emphasise that unlike the reading of the *Philosopher* as a metadialogue, this does not justify reading significant sections of the text as being dedicated to the nature of the philosopher alone. And as a result, excluding any instances of the Platonic tendency to offer digressions into other topics of inherent philosophical interest, I assume throughout that the discussions within the *Statesman* are motivated by the pursuit of a single aim.

### *1.5 The Aim of the Statesman*

But although the evidence suggests that the *Sophist* and the *Statesman* each have a single epistemic aim which forms the guiding force of their inquiries, with any details they provide on the philosopher being ancillary to their pursuit of this aim, the proem's initial presentation of the *Statesman*'s aim as the nature of the πολιτικός is still deceptive. For rather than it being the discovery of the statesman which forms the main aim of the inquiry, it is instead the discovery of *statesmanship* or πολιτικὴ τέχνη.

In what follows I offer an overview of Plato's motivations for making πολιτικὴ τέχνη the central focus of the dialogue and examine how these motivations affect the scope of the inquiry. I also relate this decision to the inquiry's relationship to the political project of the

*Republic* and analyse what this relationship implies about how the *Statesman*'s own political project should be understood.

### 1.5.1 πολιτικός and πολιτική τέχνη in Plato's Earlier Works

The main topic of inquiry is initially presented as the nature of the πολιτικός,<sup>1</sup> a term often found in earlier works with a purely descriptive sense for actual politicians and their delegates who are described as lacking knowledge.<sup>2</sup> As a result, most uses before the *Sophist* and *Statesman* take on a pejorative sense akin to 'σοφιστής'.<sup>3</sup> The pejorative intent of Plato's earlier uses of 'πολιτικός' is confirmed in the *Statesman*, where its referents are divided off from the true art of statesmanship on the basis of their involvement with illegitimate forms of government such as democracy, and are described as: 'the greatest sophists among the sophists' (303c4-5). This earlier pejorative use stands in marked contrast to the rest of the extant Attic corpus which yields uses whose intent is primarily honorific,<sup>4</sup> a positive sense which can be traced to the -ικός suffix which commonly denotes the possessor of a special art, skill, or capacity (τέχνη).<sup>5</sup>

To avoid the unviable implication that Plato had sometimes fallen prey to the risk of conflating two of the topics mentioned in the proems of the *Sophist* and *Statesman* by ceding the practice of πολιτική τέχνη to sophists, it is necessary to find an explanation for this earlier use of 'πολιτικός' which avoids the positive connection to πολιτική τέχνη implied by the -

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<sup>1</sup> There is also an unexplained change to βασιλεύς (258e8) and βασιλική (259b1). The motive for this sudden switch to royal terminology is unclear, but it is consistent with statesmanship's status as an expert capacity gifted by birth as much as education or upbringing (see Brisson and Pradeau (2011, 30-3)). Cf. Cooper (1999).

<sup>2</sup> On their ignorance see *Ap.* 21e2-22c8 and *Men.* 99b11-99d5. See also Cooper (1999, 166-7 n. 3), Dixsaut *et al* (2018, 289).

<sup>3</sup> Strong examples of this pejorative sense are found at *Phdr.* 257e1-258a2 and *R.* 489c3-7; but cf. 'τῆ ἀληθείᾳ πολιτικοὶ' (*R.* 426d5).

<sup>4</sup> Hansen (1983) 36.

<sup>5</sup> Chantraine (1933) 391. I use 'art' as the English translation of 'τέχνη' where necessary, but more as a placeholder for the Greek than as an accurate translation.

ικός suffix.<sup>1</sup> One possibility is that Plato was inverting its usual honorific sense derisively to emphasise politicians' *lack* of πολιτικὴ τέχνη, such as could be expressed in English punctuation with scare quotes.<sup>2</sup> But a simpler explanation is that Plato's choice of 'πολιτικός' in these earlier instances was not motivated by its ability to express the possessor of a τέχνη. Instead, the -ικός suffix is being used more generically to express the fulfilment of a role, with no implication of expertise.<sup>3</sup> Thus, instead of resulting from the conflation of sophistry and statesmanship, this earlier use of 'πολιτικός' seems to have been used to denote a person engaged in the affairs of the city, expertly or otherwise.

### 1.5.2 πολιτικός and πολιτικὴ τέχνη in the Statesman

By contrast, Plato's use of 'πολιτικός' in the *Statesman* is in keeping with the -ική/-ικός pattern of suffixes found throughout the text to designate a τέχνη and its possessor respectively (πολιτικὴ [τέχνη]/πολιτικός).<sup>4</sup> The interdependence expressed by the use of the -ική/-ικός pattern therefore represents the *Statesman*'s renunciation of the men who happened to hold office in Greece at the time (due to their lack of πολιτικὴ τέχνη). However, this normative use of 'πολιτικός' also shares some of the practical connotations of its earlier descriptive usage in Plato, particularly by helping to emphasise the need for the statesman to

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<sup>1</sup> In the case of Athenian politicians, their failure to engage in πολιτικὴ τέχνη – the true art of statesmanship – is implied by *Grg.* 473e6 in conjunction with 521d6-8 (cf. Dodds (1959, 369) who sees a formal contradiction between the two passages). It should be added that although 'οἶμαι μετ' ὀλίγων Ἀθηναίων, ἵνα μὴ εἶπω μόνος, ...' at *Grg.* 521d6 does not logically exclude the possibility that some Athenian politicians practise true statesmanship, it seems likely that it was phrased this way mainly to ensure consistency with Socrates' profession of ignorance (cf. Dodds (1959) 369).

<sup>2</sup> See Skemp (1952, 19); *Lg.* 693a6, *R.* 488c7-d4.

<sup>3</sup> E.g. πατρικός (*La.* 180e2), φονικός (*Phdr.* 252c7). See Chantraine (1933, 391), Ammann (1953, 8, 259).

<sup>4</sup> See Delcomminette (2000, 149), Brisson and Pradeau (2011, 273-80). The exaggerated use of the -ικός suffix by Aristophanes in *The Knights* (1378-81, quoted in Ammann (1953, 234)) to ridicule the contrived speech patterns of rich young Athenians suggests that its proliferation towards the end of the 5<sup>th</sup> century had sophistic origins (Chantraine (1933) 387, Ammann (1953) 265-6, Brisson and Pradeau (2011) 274). It is therefore unclear whether the wide use of this lexical convention in the *Statesman* is purely for the sake of expediency or instead represents a deliberate attempt at mimicry. But there are other traces of sophistic terminology in the text consistent with the latter possibility (see page 150, n. 3). It is also notable in this regard that Antiphon the Sophist wrote a work entitled *Πολιτικός*, suggesting that Plato may have been aware of competing sophistic accounts of πολιτικὴ τέχνη with which he presumed his readership was acquainted (see *Men.* 75c7-d7; Diels, H. and Kranz, W. (eds.) *Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker* 87 B 72-77).

hold office and have power over a command structure in order to practise their art. As a result, the use of ‘πολιτικός’ in the *Statesman* also signifies a renunciation of the Socratic conception of πολιτικὴ τέχνη evidenced in the *Gorgias* (521d6-8), which by implication consists in the moral elevation of the citizenry through elenctic examination and whose exercise is not therefore dependent upon political power or the assistance of other arts.<sup>1</sup>

### 1.5.3 Τέχνη and Power in the Statesman

This recognition of the statesman’s dependence upon other arts results in a description of the statesman’s role which broadly follows the results of the *Euthydemus*’ discussion of πολιτικὴ τέχνη, in which it is classified as among those arts which make proper use of the work of other arts.<sup>2</sup> The *Statesman*’s classification of statesmanship as a τέχνη that issues directions also likely draws upon the *Cratylus*’ inference that the expert use of the products of other arts implies a certain directive capacity.<sup>3</sup> However, unlike in the *Euthydemus*, where the ultimate product of πολιτικὴ τέχνη is the citizenry’s possession of knowledge,<sup>4</sup> in the *Statesman* the purpose of this directive capacity is broadened out to encompass more than just pedagogical ends, with the myth of Cronus implying that the statesman is responsible for the material well-being of the citizenry in addition to its education and upbringing.<sup>5</sup> Hence, the product of the statesman’s art appears to be the well-functioning city in its entirety.<sup>6</sup> And as a result, the

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<sup>1</sup> See Pohlenz (1913, 159-61). While the *Statesman* allows for the possibility that one could possess political expertise without actually holding office (259b3-5, 292e9-293a1; Taylor (1961) 199, Natali (1981) 114), the salient point is that there is no way of actually exercising it without being in a position of political power.

<sup>2</sup> *Euthd.* 291c4-d3; Skemp (1952) 46, Barker (1960) 316, Klosko (1986) 192, Effe (1996) 207, Pradeau (2010) 58, 112.

<sup>3</sup> *Crat.* 390b1-d5; Cambiano (1991) 200-1, Pradeau (2010) 110-1.

<sup>4</sup> *Euthd.* 292b4-d7.

<sup>5</sup> Since the myth of Cronus also seems to imply that the material well-being of the citizenry is not a good in itself, the statesman’s role may still be ultimately pedagogical, with material well-being being merely a Maslowian precondition of the citizens’ engagement in philosophy. However, it is notable that Plato chooses to define the statesman’s role in the broadest possible terms without any special pedagogical emphasis, for example, by describing the statesman’s role as the weaving together of everything in the city (305e3-4), and thus as: ‘embracing its capacity with the appellation belonging to the whole’ (305e4-5).

<sup>6</sup> Pradeau (2010) 114-6. It is noteworthy that in the *Laws* there appears to be a move away from attributing a τέχνη to the law-givers, possibly as a result of the need for a τέχνη to produce a fixed product (Bartels (2017) 157-162, 188).

role of the statesman necessitates power over the labour and products of a wide variety of other arts and hence the possession of political power.

### *1.6 The Formation of the Statesman*

One notable consequence of the *Statesman's* concern with πολιτικὴ τέχνη is that it comes at the expense of a subdued focus on the development of the epistemic and moral attributes of the statesman. We are given no firm details on how the statesman might acquire his exceptional talent, his moral knowledge and wisdom, nor his grasp of the essential empirical facts such as the division of labour essential to the exercise of statesmanship. And the *Statesman's* narrow focus on the activity of statesmanship from a position of political power therefore results in an explanatory deficit when it comes to the broader characteristics and development of 'τὸν πολιτικὸν ἄνδρα' (257b9, 258b3).<sup>1</sup> Unhelpfully, this explanatory gap is accompanied by comments on the undersupply of true statesmen, causing some debate over whether this shortage of statesmanlike persons should be attributed to Athens' moral and educational framework being inimical to their development, or perhaps as an expression of a newfound fatalism concerning human capabilities which would reach maturity in the *Laws*.<sup>2</sup>

But while the professed rarity of true statesmen and the apparent omission of a special educational programme conducive to their development could be taken as an indication that Plato now considers the statesman to be the result of pure chance,<sup>3</sup> if the *Statesman's* topic is not to be so rare as to reduce its discovery to a nominal exercise, the lack of a supply of existing statesmen should be taken as a *prima facie* reason to presume that Plato still adheres to the idea espoused in the *Republic*: that no matter a person's natural talents, if they are not

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<sup>1</sup> Skemp (1952) 51, Schofield (1999) 222, Brisson and Pradeau (2011) 18.

<sup>2</sup> *Plt.* 301d8-e4, *Lg.* 874e8-d5 (cf. Brisson (2010) 189-94, Bartels (2017) 163-6). See Vlastos (1981, 213-7), Kahn (2009, 160-4).

<sup>3</sup> Colli (2007) 110-1.

exposed to the correct social and educational environment, then: ‘unless saved by some divine chance’<sup>1</sup> they will fail to develop the characteristics of a legitimate ruler.<sup>2</sup>

Since it would be reasonable to presume that the restricted remit of the *Statesman*’s political project represented by its focus on πολιτική τέχνη is motivated by more than textual brevity, this raises the question of exactly why its scope is limited in this way, and more particularly, why Plato fails to offer a comprehensive account of the development of the statesman.

### 1.7 *The Statesman and the Republic as Counterparts*

One promising answer to this question involves reading the *Statesman* as inheriting much of the moral and educational framework detailed in the *Republic*, a possibility which derives some support from the fact that the *Statesman* and the *Republic* tend to occupy distinct territory. The presumption of moral knowledge and the lack of concern for its attainment we find in the *Statesman* could thus represent an area of inquiry that Plato considered to be conclusively covered by the generous treatment of this area we find in the *Republic*. The

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<sup>1</sup> *R.* 492a5 (trans. Vlastos (1981) 215 n. 26). See also *R.* 366c6-d1, 492e6-493a2, 592a1-9.

<sup>2</sup> Vlastos (1981) 215 with n. 26, Goldschmidt (1947) 13-4. Socrates may therefore have been considered an exception, his knowledge having been divinely instilled (Taylor (2006) 166-8). Since the requisite educational practices are unlikely to ever be instituted by non-statesmen, and nature seems to offer no supply of incorruptible inherently statesmanlike persons on its own, the ‘divine chance’ clause serves an important function as a *primum movens* of the ideal state – something Socrates alludes to in the *Meno* (99e4-100a7) with self-referential overtones. As with many of the *Statesman*’s political ideas, the source and resolution of this supply problem lies somewhere between the idealism of the *Republic* and the apparent fatalism of the *Laws*, with the possibility of an ideal state relying heavily upon both divine chance and the frailty of human nature, yet never being ruled out entirely (cf. Ricken (2008) 240-1, Kahn (2009) 158-9). It is natural to presume that this supply problem and the resulting need for a divine *primum movens* dented Plato’s confidence in the possibility of an ideal autocratic ruler and thus formed one of the main contributory factors leading to a pessimistic turn in the *Laws*: if practically no one can recognise the correct moral and educational framework conducive to the development of statesmen without divine intervention, then what is to prevent a statesman not under divine guidance from reverting to their former ignorance or weakness even after this framework has been instigated? Plato’s answer in the *Laws* is that political power would make this reversion even *more* likely and the *primum movens* thus becomes an irrelevance, with institutional entropy being an inevitability (*Lg.* 691d1-4; Schofield (1999) 234). There it is stated that education and upbringing cannot spare anyone from their inherent human weaknesses, and thus, when the divine chance clause is mentioned again in the *Laws* (875c3-6), it is used as a foil to illustrate the inevitable moral frailty of most men (Kahn (1995) 53-4).

*Statesman* would therefore be read as a counterpart to the *Republic* – with the latter text providing the doctrinal reservoir from which many of the explanatory ellipses in the *Statesman* can be filled, whilst also being the ultimate source of some of the problems and omissions that the *Statesman* intends to resolve.<sup>1</sup>

### 1.7.1 *The Distinct Territory of the Republic and the Statesman*

The *Republic* and its educational programme may therefore be read as dealing primarily with the ruler's ascent out of the cave, with the *Statesman* offering a corresponding account of their subsequent return after the completion of their educational programme. This coheres particularly well with the myth of Cronus, where it is implied that the role of the statesman is to rule over a chaotic fallen world and to try to re-establish certain aspects of the order exemplified by the divine reign of Cronus through mortal labour. And it is implied throughout the *Statesman* that the achievement of this task requires a combination of the 'divine'<sup>2</sup> moral knowledge of the philosopher and a profane understanding of the entropic and unforgiving circumstances of our own divinely forsaken cosmic order.<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> 'La compréhension de la recherche politique du *Politique* doit s'appuyer sur la *République* que en constitue le fonds doctrinal: c'est dans le cadre défini par la seconde que le premier paraît s'efforcer de résoudre certaines difficultés, de préciser certains points.' (Pradeau (2010) 99-100). See also Effe (1996, 212). Schofield (1999, 227-8) offers textual arguments against any such thesis, concluding that the *Statesman* works from a blank canvas with no starting commitment to any of the political doctrines of the *Republic*. But some of the arguments offered in favour of this conclusion appear counterintuitive. For example, it is argued that, if the texts were complementary, one would expect the *Statesman* to provide an account of the education of statesmen and their acquisition of political expertise (227). Yet if the dialogues are complementary, such an account would be redundant (at least where this would involve going over areas adequately covered by the *Republic*). Schofield also cites the lack any explicit intertextual references to the *Republic* in the *Statesman*, despite its references to the *Sophist* and *Theaetetus* (228). But if the *Statesman* mainly covers fresh ground then such a need would also seem to be obviated, with the interpretive principle that the *Republic* forms a doctrinal reservoir for the *Statesman* forming an unspoken rule.

<sup>2</sup> *R.* 500b8-d2, *Sph.* 254a10-b1.

<sup>3</sup> One problem with this interpretive framework is that the *Statesman* offers no explicit account of how the statesman might gain an understanding of some of the *a posteriori* facts necessary for the exercise of πολιτικὴ τέχνη – most notably in the form of the division of mortal labour into τέχνηαι. Hence, the philosopher's triumph over their initial inability to adjust to the darkness of the cave and to apply their knowledge to the imperfect empirical realities they encounter (which forms the most demeaning aspect of the philosopher's descent; *R.* 516e3-517a6, 518a1-b4) is notably lacking the explanation one might expect. And although we are given at least some indication in the *Republic* that Plato recognised that the philosopher-ruler would need a grasp of certain empirical realities with the inclusion of 'practical experience' (ἐμπειρία) of war and minor offices in their education (484d5-7, 539e2-540a2; Schofield (1999) 226), this does not seem to offer sufficient detail on its own

Under this reading the *Statesman*'s much more pronounced recognition that the arbitrary conditions of the cosmos can be antithetical to the ideal political order would therefore be a product of a deliberate strategy to address the philosopher-ruler's engagement with the city as an imperfect empirical entity. And unlike the *Republic*, where the minimal concern shown for how the philosopher's knowledge might be practically applied to the city often gives the impression of a seamless transfer of abstract ideals into empirical reality,<sup>1</sup> the *Statesman* gives due consideration to how pre-existing cosmic characteristics affect the city and thus limit the statesman's executive capacity.

The treatment of the *Statesman* and *Republic* as complementary therefore offers a natural explanation of the restricted remit of the *Statesman*'s political project, particularly its recognition, as Campbell puts it, that: 'in forming our conception of true statesmanship we must take account of the imperfect conditions of the actual world'.<sup>2</sup>

### 1.8 *The Statesman and the Laws*

However, rather than being indicative of the implicit inheritance of many of the political ideas formulated in the *Republic*, there are reasons to believe that the tendency for the texts to cover distinct territory may instead indicate some ambivalence about these ideas. Thus, rather than being a product of a settled confidence in their conclusiveness, the fact that the *Statesman* tends not to encroach upon the territory of the *Republic* may instead be a result of growing doubts over the adequacy of its ideas. For although the account of the ideal political

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to fill this explanatory gap in the *Statesman*. Plato's lack of concern for the development of the statesman would therefore seem to extend, at least overtly, to the statesman's *a posteriori* understanding of the city. However, one is at least given hints of what this process of adjustment might consist in – namely in the form of an application of the method of division.

<sup>1</sup> *R.* 592a10-b6. This attitude is typified by the Plato's use of the analogy of the painter and their model (*R.* 484c6-d3, 500c9-501c8; Gill (1979) 152, Pradeau (2010) 94-5).

<sup>2</sup> (1867) xxviii.

ruler in the *Statesman* may derive some explanatory support from the account provided in the *Republic*, a common reading of the *Statesman*'s political project is that it represents a transitional or 'tormented'<sup>1</sup> text in which Plato seems to vacillate between the idealism of the *Republic* and a loss of faith in the actualisation of the ideal autocratic ruler attributed to the *Laws*.<sup>2</sup> And there is therefore a risk that the account of the *Republic* and *Statesman* as being complementary oversimplifies the *Statesman*'s project and conceals important tensions in Plato's political thought at the time the text was written.

### 1.8.1 Fundamental Differences Between the *Statesman* and the *Republic*

That Plato's confidence in the ideas of the *Republic* was beginning to wane at the time of writing the *Statesman* is suggested by the fact that not only does Plato revise important aspects of the *Republic*'s more idealistic account, but that these revisions often undermine other areas of the *Republic*'s political framework. For example, Plato abandons the idea of fixed ideal laws, as the organisation of a city is always subject to changing circumstances.<sup>3</sup> Instead, Plato develops an account of the statesman's expertise based on the concept of the due measure, thus granting it a versatility that allows it to respond to the varying demands of a city subject to constant change.

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<sup>1</sup> Colli (2007) 106 ('uno dei dialoghi piu tormentati').

<sup>2</sup> Schaefer (1981) 161, Annas and Waterfield (1995) xxii, Colli (2007) 106-7; cf. Ricken (2008) 239-48, Rowe (2020) 324. As Gomperz puts it, while Plato's mind may have already reached many of the conclusions of the *Laws* when writing the *Statesman*, his heart seems to have remained firmly attached to the ideals of the *Republic*: 'der Geist seines [sc. *Statesman*] Verfassers ist schon in neuen Hafen angelangt, während sein Herz noch am alten Ufer haftet.' (1903) 463; quoted in Colli (2007, 107).

<sup>3</sup> 'for the dissimilarities between human beings and their actions, and the fact that practically nothing in human affairs ever remains stable, prevent any kind of expertise whatsoever from making any simple decision in any sphere that covers all cases and will last for all time.' (294b2-6). See also Vanhoutte (1954, 91-2), Kube (1969, 221), Schofield (1999, 222-3). On the need for laws in the *Republic*, see Owen (1953, 90-1 with n. 3), Ricken (2008, 243); cf. Barker (1960) 322. Further differences between the texts are detailed by Owen (1953, 90-1), who argues that since many of the doctrines from the *Republic* that are abandoned in the *Statesman* reappear in the *Timaeus*, and would thus leapfrog the *Statesman* under the established chronology, the *Timaeus* (and much of the *Laws*) must predate the *Statesman* – an argument which suffers from a heavy reliance on the unstated but questionable assumption that Plato never allowed for a counter-revision of his ideas.

There is also reason to believe that Plato had adopted a more deflationary view of the ideal ruler's psychological exceptionalism and had potentially abandoned the *Republic's* moral psychology.<sup>1</sup> For example, in addition to the statesman being described as having a similar nature (φύσις) to the citizenry as a whole (275b8-c4),<sup>2</sup> the city is said to have an integrated citizenry for whom intermarriage is based on the harmonisation of certain universal moral traits which tend towards excess if not properly managed (310b2-e3) but whose possession is never expressly linked to a psychological hierarchy. The political salience of the tripartite division of the soul is therefore eclipsed, having been either being renounced or deemed less relevant to the social organisation of the city.<sup>3</sup> The implied difference between the statesman and the rest of the citizenry is thus apparently reduced to an exceptional ability to acquire πολιτικὴ τέχνη, yet without any implication that the statesman also has any equivalent ability to develop the supreme moral fortitude required to always act on this expertise.<sup>4</sup> And this more deflationary attitude may help explain the fact that although the *Statesman* retains some of the *Republic's* ideas on the education of the ideal ruler,<sup>5</sup> whatever details one can infer from the text are often inconsistent with the educational and social framework designed to cultivate philosopher-rulers in the *Republic*.<sup>6</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> See esp. *R.* 581c3-4; Annas and Waterfield (1995) xx-xxii, cf. Rowe (2020) 323-4.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. Delcomminette (2000) 219-20.

<sup>3</sup> See Barker (1960, 328), Pradeau (2010, 109-10, 125-6). The analogy between the city and the soul is also absent and fails to make any reappearance in the *Laws*. It is noteworthy in this respect that in the *Laws* the status of the tripartite theory of the soul is at best indeterminate (Vanhouette (1954) 151-2), if not abandoned entirely (Bobonich (2002) 262-3, cf. Kahn (2004) 357-62).

<sup>4</sup> 292e1-5; cf. Skemp (1952) 50. See also *Lg.* 875a2-4.

<sup>5</sup> For example, the implied need for the statesman to possess the moral knowledge of the philosopher is evidence of at least one common educational aim (Kahn (1995) 51). And it is implied during the *Statesman's* methodological discussions that the statesman's requisite moral knowledge is to be acquired through dialectic (285c4-286b2), thus retaining similar ideas about the necessity of dialectical training. The ability of a musical education to represent a harmony between opposing moral qualities (*R.* 399a5-c4, 522a3-b1; see also 503c2-d5) is also recognised in the *Statesman* (308d1-309b7, 309d1-4; Diès (1935) lxi, Rowe (1995a) 243; see also Delcomminette (2000) 152).

<sup>6</sup> Most notably, we are given no indication of a stratified education system (see esp. 275b8-c4). It is noteworthy in this respect that a firm belief ('ἀληθῆ δόξαν μετὰ βεβαιώσεως', 309c6-7) about: 'what is fine, just, good, and the opposites of these' (309c5-6) is one of the main educational aims applied to the citizenry as a whole, and we are thus presented with the possibility that the statesman is to be given the same education and upbringing as the citizenry, only with different epistemic results.

Hence, rather than being an indication that the *Statesman*'s ideas are implicitly supported by details from the *Republic*, the fact that the statesman's status is expressed purely in the decidedly deflationary terms of a necessary division of labour into τέχνη may be better understood as being a product of the fact that Plato's views were undergoing a transition.<sup>1</sup> And rather than being a counterpart to the *Republic*, the restricted political remit of the *Statesman* can therefore be understood as representing the tentative beginnings of a fundamental change in Plato's political beliefs which led him to generally avoid reengaging with the ideas of the *Republic*. However, glimmers of this growing ambivalence do nonetheless reveal themselves in a number of important revisions to the *Republic*'s ideas, and it was likely Plato's failure to reconcile these revisions with his former idealism which created much of the friction that eventually led to the realism of the *Laws*.

With this context in mind, I want to conclude by providing an account of the very beginning of the *Statesman*'s inquiry into πολιτικὴ τέχνη, which consists of a division of knowledge. In keeping with the restricted remit of the text just described, statesmanship is treated as a theoretical form of knowledge without any overt moral emphasis. The introduction of the distinction between theoretical and practical knowledge which forms the basis of this division also has some relevance to the characteristics of paradigms themselves, which are examined in the next chapter.

### *1.9 The Division of Knowledge (258b2-261a2)*

The division begins from the agreement that the statesman should be classed as among those who possess knowledge (‘τῶν ἐπιστημόνων’ 258b4; 258b1-5) and it is further agreed that knowledge itself (ἐπιστήμη, 258c7) should be divided into two forms (258c3-8). This

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<sup>1</sup> See Klosko (1986, 190).

division proceeds by separating theoretical forms of knowledge such as arithmetic – which do not involve any practical actions (258d4-6; 258e5) – from those forms of knowledge which involve practical actions and produce material things, such as carpentry (258d8-e2; 258e5).

Since ‘the power of the king to maintain his rule has little to do with the use of his hands or his body in general in comparison with the understanding and force of his mind’ (259c6-8), it is agreed that statesmanship belongs to the theoretical form of knowledge, which is then further divided into a directive form, which includes master-builders, ‘who don’t act as workers themselves, but manage workers’ (259e8-9; 260b3-5), as well as a critical or purely theoretical form which includes calculation, and is only involved in making judgements (259e5-6; 260b3-5). After agreeing that statesmanship is directive (260c1-4), this is then divided again into self-directive expertise, to which statesmanship belongs (260e5-261a1), and another unnamed expertise which issues directions from others, which includes the herald (260d7-9).




Figure 1

### 1.9.1 Practical and Theoretical Knowledge

This specific distinction between theoretical and practical knowledge, which is never so clearly distinguished elsewhere in Plato, has two important consequences. First, it allows for

the possibility that one can have purely theoretical knowledge of practical arts which does not bestow the ability to actually practise these forms of expertise.<sup>1</sup> The directive form of expertise under which the statesman is classified thus issues directions to practical and other (non-self-) directive arts, without entailing the type of knowledge required to expertly carry out these directions himself.

Second, it is clear that philosophy would naturally fall under the genus of the critical or purely theoretical forms of expertise (such as calculation) defined as being involved in making judgements, thus distinguishing it from statesmanship, which has an additional directional component.<sup>2</sup> The implication is that this additional directional component requires a knowledge-component not required for expertise in philosophy, and this is naturally filled at least in part by theoretical knowledge of the arts the statesman directs. Thus, although the philosopher's moral knowledge may facilitate the statesman's directional expertise, the statesman must still possess additional knowledge which furnishes the unique capacity to issue directions about the city. The division of knowledge therefore presents us with a partial division of philosophy from statesmanship.<sup>3</sup> And since by implication any special educational framework aimed at achieving moral knowledge would need to be supplemented by training which would allow abstract knowledge of the good to be applied using the statesman's

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<sup>1</sup> See Striker (1996, 320-1), Schofield (1999, 229). The division also implies that the practical arts depend upon a form of *ἐπιστήμη*, a consequence which goes some way to explaining the interchangeability of *ἐπιστήμη* and *τέχνη* throughout the dialogue (see esp. 292e2 with e6-7; Kube (1969) 222 n. 12, Rowe (1995a) 178, Petit (1996) 159, Blondell (2005) 56, Brisson and Pradeau (2011) 17, El Murr (2014) 11 n. 2). This equivalence presumably has the same cause as EV's implication that the sophist has *ἐπιστήμη* at 258b3-5 (see *Sph.* 221d1-6, 241b4-7; cf. Sayre (2006) 16-7, 19-20, Brown (2010) 164-8, Gill (2012) 178), with *ἐπιστήμη* being given a wider range of meaning in the *Statesman* than its use for the highest form of philosophical knowledge in the *Republic* (see esp. *R.* 533d4-534a8; Sayre (2006) 191-2).

<sup>2</sup> Leisegang (1929) 98-9. That one can practise philosophy without ever issuing directions or managing the work of others is also implied by the fact that, unlike statesmanship and most other arts, philosophy is still possible and just as valuable under the reign of Cronus (271e8, 272c1; El Murr (2014) 147).

<sup>3</sup> Cf. Cornford (1960, 171), who sees such a distinction occurring at the earlier division of practical (statesmanship) and theoretical knowledge (philosophy).

directional expertise, it is natural to suppose that this would require a division of the various arts essential to a well-functioning city.<sup>1</sup>

### *1.10 Conclusion*

Although the *Statesman* must be understood as part of a broader project including analyses of the sophist and the philosopher, the subtlety of expression entailed by any reading of the *Statesman* as a vehicle for the *Philosopher* favours a reading of the *Statesman*'s discussions as being guided by a quest to understand the nature of statesmanship, albeit within a dramatic context consisting of interlocutors of profoundly different philosophical abilities.

Despite indicating a clear conviction in a noocratic political project at odds with the sophistic forms of rule perpetrated on Plato's contemporaries, the *Statesman*'s narrow focus on the statesman as a possessor of a τέχνη whose exercise is dependent upon a division of labour may also be indicative of Plato's ambivalence concerning some of the ideas expressed in the *Republic*. Hence, possibly in an effort to avoid offering a less than surefooted reengagement with some of the territory of the *Republic*, the *Statesman* offers a political project restricted in scope to an attempt to define the *Statesman*'s unique capacity primarily in relation to other closely related arts.

This attempt begins with a division of knowledge, whose first stage has a number of philosophical consequences. Most importantly, it may allow for a form of theoretical knowledge of other arts which does not confer any ability to expertly practise them. Additionally, it seems to offer an implicit division of philosophy from statesmanship, with

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<sup>1</sup> 'The statesman cannot be expected to exercise these several skills in detail himself, but he must understand them enough to know how and when to use them for the good of the whole community.' (Skemp (1952) 47).

the latter potentially differentiating itself at least partly on the basis of the type of theoretical knowledge of arts just described.

## 2. Platonic παραδείγματα

### 2.1 'παράδειγμα' in Plato

The *Statesman's* inquiry is characterised by its use of dialectical tools referred to using the term 'παράδειγμα', with the first failed definition involving the use of the παράδειγμα of the herdsman,<sup>1</sup> and the ultimate resolution of this failure being a result of the introduction of the παράδειγμα of weaving. Additionally, a παράδειγμα παραδείγματός uses the scenario of children learning their letters to provide an account of the function of paradigms themselves (277d9-10).

Much of the methodological appeal of Plato's use of paradigms in the *Statesman* can be traced to his use of 'παράδειγμα' elsewhere in the corpus. More specifically, to the use of the term for simple analogies. In this chapter I offer an overview of Plato's use of 'παράδειγμα' throughout the corpus and examine the resemblance between the term's use for simple analogies and the more specialised usage introduced in the *Sophist* and *Statesman*. An analysis of this use in the *Sophist* and its relationship to its occurrence in the *Statesman* is also offered, providing an opportunity to assess some important features of the distinctively Platonic application of the term found in both dialogues.<sup>2</sup> I conclude with an overview of the occurrences of 'παράδειγμα' in the *Statesman* which are the focus of this study and outline some of the interpretive problems the use of this term creates in relation to the paradigm of weaving.

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<sup>1</sup> Referred to as such retrospectively at 275b4-5 ('τὸ παράδειγμα ποιμένων τε καὶ βουκόλων').

<sup>2</sup> The other idiosyncratic extension found in Plato being its use for Forms as patterns in the *Parmenides*: 'τὰ μὲν εἶδη ταῦτα ὡς περ παραδείγματα ἐστάναι ἐν τῇ φύσει' (132d1-2). The status of the theory of Forms in the *Statesman* is indeterminate, and unless stated otherwise, I therefore treat any uses of 'εἶδος' or 'γένος' as referring only to concepts, properties, or classes, with no metaphysical implications.

The analysis of Plato's use of simple paradigms or analogies shows that these often serve a heuristic function, involving a comparison between something of which the interlocutors have a more reliable pre-dialectical understanding with something about which their understanding is more deficient in order to form true beliefs about the latter in virtue of the recognition of certain similarities with the former. At least one cause of this superior pre-dialectical understanding of certain things is the availability of particulars whose perception reveals features which are not revealed by the particulars of the less well understood thing. This heuristic function of Plato's simple paradigms appears to have been the main inspiration for the use of paradigms on the *Sophist* and *Statesman*, where the disparity in pre-dialectical doxastic alacrity is used to assist with the application of the method of division. This leads to an initial problem for this use of paradigms. For their initial use in the *Sophist* and *Statesman* is to select a starting genus as well as forms in accordance with which this genus can be divided which may also be used in the division of the object of inquiry. However, as the paradigmatic division will have to apply forms which account for its distinct nature, it must eventually branch off from the division of the object of inquiry. This use of paradigms to assist with a division will therefore be of only limited utility in assisting with a division of the object of inquiry – a problem exacerbated by the need for a disparity in pre-dialectical understanding. For if this is a product of the paradigm having particulars whose perception allows for a clearer understanding of its nature, this will be reflected in the nature of the paradigm itself and thus its division.

## 2.2 Simple Paradigms

Plato's use of 'παράδειγμα' throughout the corpus is much more extensive than the more specialised instances found in the *Statesman*. The term is often used with the sense of an

example or approximation of something,<sup>1</sup> sometimes coming with prescriptive force, acting as a precedent to be followed,<sup>2</sup> an abstract ideal,<sup>3</sup> or as a model or pattern an artist seeks to replicate.<sup>4</sup> Conversely, it is also used to refer to a foil,<sup>5</sup> or a bad example in the proscriptive sense which has the potential to be used as a deterrent.<sup>6</sup> And these prescriptive and proscriptive uses thus exploit the term's comparative sense inherent to its etymology.

This aspect is also prominent in Plato's use of the term for comparisons between otherwise unrelated things in order to provide support for an argument, most commonly, to denote comparisons whose relations of resemblance produce an analogy elucidating a particular assertion or line of reasoning.<sup>7</sup>

### 2.2.1 Simple Paradigms and the Capacity of Recognition

Plato offers no comprehensive account of how his simple analogical paradigms operate, nor does their varied use throughout the corpus submit to an analysis that is both comprehensive and systematic.<sup>8</sup> Nonetheless, a number of features can be derived from Plato's simple analogical usage of 'παράδειγμα'. Most notably, they exploit a capacity whose role in the

<sup>1</sup> *Ap.* 23b1, *Lg.* 663e9, 692c2, 722a1, 795a5, *Phdr.* 262c9, 262d1, *R.* 409b1, 409d2, 529d7, 557e1, 559a8, 561e6, 617d5, 618a1, *Phlb.* 53b8, 53c3, *Sph.* 251a7, *Tht.* 154c1, *Tim.* 24a3. See also *Hdt.* 2. 86. Since Plato often exploits multiple aspects of the term's meaning, its usage frequently defies neat classification. There are also a number of instances where Plato combines different aspects of its meaning such that the extent of the overlap makes it impossible to identify one meaning as being more dominant than the other e.g. *Euthd.* 282d4 (instance and prescriptive model; Dancy (2004) 116), *R.* 472d5 (illustration and prescriptive ideal).

<sup>2</sup> *La.* 187a7, *Men.* 77a9-b1, 79a10, *Lg.* 876e2. See also *Hyp.* *Epit.* 6.32.

<sup>3</sup> *Euthphr.* 6e4, *Lg.* 746b7, *Prt.* 326c8, *R.* 472c4, 472d9, 540a9, 592b2.

<sup>4</sup> *R.* 484c8, 500e3, *Sph.* 235d7. See also *Tim.* 28a7, 28b2. A number of unique prescriptive uses occur in the *Laws*, where the term is given its greatest semantic range: 794e6 (referring to the folly of using right handed activities as a prescriptive model for other activities more suited to the left); 811b8, 811c6, 811d6 (educational curriculum or model); 801b9 (lesson or demonstration); 927d6 (prescriptive model for parenting based on rules managing other areas of life).

<sup>5</sup> *R.* 409c7, *Phdr.* 264e5. See also *E.* *El.* 1085.

<sup>6</sup> *Grg.* 525b2, 525c2, 525c6, 525d3, *Lg.* 855a1, 862e5. See also *D.S.* 10.23, *Lycurg.* 1.9., *Lys.* 12.92.

<sup>7</sup> *Lg.* 735c4, 961e8, *Phlb.* 13c8, *Prt.* 330b2, *Sph.* 233d3, *Tht.* 202e4. More accurately, it is used in this way either for the paradigm alone or for the relationship between the paradigm and its analogue as a whole.

<sup>8</sup> See Lyttkens (1952, 21-6), Robinson (1953, 205-6), Lloyd (1966, 389-392).

development of knowledge was frequently remarked upon by Plato: the recognition of similarities in otherwise distinct things.<sup>1</sup>

### 2.2.2 The Process of Comparison

In the case of Plato's simple analogical paradigms, this capacity is exploited via a process of comparison between instances of some generic feature – a description which also applies to many of Plato's other uses of comparative explanations and analogies, whether or not they are referred to as a 'παράδειγμα' (e.g. the famous analogies of the *Republic*).<sup>2</sup>

#### 2.2.2.1 The Process of Comparison and Mental Division

One benefit of comparing instances in this way is that it allows a generic feature to be considered separately from the instances compared. Whilst the recognition of a feature in a single instance may result in an understanding of its nature affected by other features possessed by that instance,<sup>3</sup> by limiting one's apprehension of an instance in terms of its

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<sup>1</sup> E.g. *Plt.* 285a4-b6, *R.* 402a7-c8, 531c9-d4, *Sph.* 253d5-e2. I treat this natural mental aptitude for recognition as a primitive capacity throughout, although it seems highly likely that Plato would have appealed to recollection (i.e. the interlocutors' access to the cognitive relics of their prenatal knowledge of the forms) to provide it with further explanatory support.

<sup>2</sup> See esp. *R.* 440d4-6, 487e7-489a6, 508b12-c2, 509d1-511e5, 533e7-534a8. See also *Cri.* 47a13-48a11, *Grg.* 463e5-466a, *Men.* 97a9-b7. Plato's preference for one term over another is not always clear. 'παράδειγμα' certainly has the advantage of conveying the fact that a comparison involves examples or instances of some generic feature, whilst 'εικόν' and 'ἀναλογία' would offer greater familiarity to the reader due to their use for comparisons in rhetoric and mathematics (see McCall (1969, 3-11)). Broadly speaking, 'ἀναλογία' is restricted to comparisons resulting in a mathematical proportion (Robinson (1953) 209), with Plato favouring 'παράδειγμα' and 'εικόν' for more general comparisons. If any clear distinction can be drawn at all between Plato's uses of the latter outside of the *Statesman*, 'εικόν' appears to be favoured for comparisons between sensible things as well as for lengthier illustrations or parables (McCall (1969) 11-7; see also use of 'παραβολή' at *Phlb.* 33b2), whilst 'παράδειγμα' seems to be preferred for comparisons involving clearer examples of some generic feature or part/whole relationship. 'εικός' is the most distinct term used for comparisons in Plato, being able to convey the notions of both likelihood and resemblance (Robinson (1953) 216, Burnyeat (2009) 170). When used for comparisons, it can therefore be used to in specialised ways that are difficult to render in English (see Burnyeat (2009, esp. 179-81) on 'τὸν εικότα μῦθον', *Ti.* 29d2; compare also 'ἄξύνετοι ἀκούσαντες κωφοῖσιν εὐόικασι' (Heraclitus DK 34), which does not refer to the feature of deafness, but a result more fitting or appropriate to a deaf person (Fränkel (1955) 260 n. 1)).

<sup>3</sup> E.g. those pertaining to a man, woman, child, or slave may affect how virtue will be understood in each case (*Men.* 72a6-b6, 72e4-73b5). Since the pernicious effect ('σμήνος', *Men.* 72a6) resulting from the multitude of instances can be avoided by disregarding their differences (*Men.* 72b5-6), it is implied that it is variations in the combinations of forms across instances that creates this confusion (*R.* 476a4-b2; Menn (1998) 302-3).

resemblance to other instances possessing the same generic feature, the process of comparison allows for features extraneous to their shared nature to be more easily disregarded. One reason Plato values this process of comparison is therefore for its propensity to encourage a type of mental division of each instance, such that the generic feature is separated from other features that are present in the same instance (or falsely presumed to be by the interlocutor).<sup>1</sup>

#### 2.2.2.2 *The Process of Comparison and Proportionalities*

This task is often facilitated by comparing the relationships different instances maintain with other things. In its simplest form, this means that the paradigm compares one relationship (A:B) with another (C:D) in order to demonstrate their resemblance, in which case the paradigm may be expressed as an analogy of proportion (A:B::C:D).<sup>2</sup> The features recognised across instances will therefore often be those which explain something's relationships to other things,<sup>3</sup> including in terms of how it may form a component of a larger whole.<sup>4</sup> And in

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<sup>1</sup> This would therefore require an understanding of some of the combinatorial properties of the particular form being recognised (Menn (1998) 302-3). Hence, in addition to its role in simple analogies, whose immediate purpose is the recognition of a generic feature within instances, the capacity to recognise similarities is also touted for its ability to enable the collection of a single generic feature from a sample of its instances (*Phdr.* 249b7-c1, 265d3-5, 266b3-c1). See Menn (1998, 302-5), Stenzel (1959, 151-2).

<sup>2</sup> E.g. 'Tolstoy is to Russia what Shakespeare is to England' (Tolstoy:Russia::Shakespeare:England). This relationship can also be expressed as a metaphor, e.g. 'Tolstoy is Russia's Shakespeare', see Arist. *Po.* 1457b 16-30, Ross (1981, 27-32, 95). The analogies are thus akin to the mathematical concept of *ἀναλογία* (e.g. Euc. 5. 6, 7. 20; see also Toeplitz (1929, 6-8), Lyttkens (1952, 15-8)). It has been argued that the extension of analogies of proportion beyond the mathematical sphere is a Platonic innovation (Lyttkens (1952) 16, 18, 20). However, Archytas' interest in the mathematical concept of *ἀναλογία* (Porph. *in Harm.* 1. 5 (DK B2); Huffman (2005) 179-81) combined with his own philosophical use of analogies of proportion (Arist. *Metaph.* 1043a 14-26 (DK A22); Huffman (2005) 494-7) suggest that Plato may have been drawing upon a Pythagorean innovation.

<sup>3</sup> For example, for the comparison of the claim to produce everything from a single type of expertise, with the claim to be able to teach everything from a single type of expertise in the *Sophist*; *Sph.* 233d3; (a single type of expertise:production of everything::a single type of expertise:teaching of everything). In this case it is ultimately the veracity of each of the claims that is being compared, with their impossibility leading to the inference that both must be illusory and refer instead to a process of imitation or image-making. Later than the *Statesman* under the established chronology, 'παράδειγμα' is used in a similar way for the comparison of the role of thinning out the herd in animal breeding with the purging of people from the citizenry in the *Laws* (735c4; thinning the herd:animal breeding::purging the citizenry:statesmanship); and the comparison of the importance of health to the role of the doctor and victory to the general with the target ('σκοπὸν', 962a9) of the statesman (961e8; victory/health:general/doctor::τὸν σκοπὸν οἱ βλέπειν δεῖ τὸν πολιτικὸν':statesman).

<sup>4</sup> For example, we find 'παράδειγμα' used for the comparison of the relationship between facial features and the face as a whole, with the relationship between individual virtues and virtue as a whole in the *Protagoras* (*Prt.*

the latter case, this may therefore translate into an understanding of the whole as much as of any of its components, which may not exhibit the feature demonstrated by their combination.<sup>1</sup>

### 2.2.2.3 *The Heuristic Function of The Process of Comparison*

Due to its ability to encourage the separation of a generic feature across instances, the process of comparison can offer a simultaneous or reciprocal clarification of the instances compared.

In some cases, this reciprocal improvement in the interlocutors' understanding of each instance forms the main motivation for the use of the process of comparison, leading to an improved understanding of a shared generic feature and thus of each of the instances themselves.<sup>2</sup>

However, whether denoted by 'παράδειγμα' or not, the introduction of Plato's simple paradigms into a discussion is often motivated by a desire to improve the interlocutors' deficient understanding of the illustrandum by means of a comparison with the illustrans. And it is this feature in particular which may form the main theoretical link between the use of 'παράδειγμα' for simple analogies and its more specialised use in the *Statesman*.<sup>3</sup>

This heuristic function of Plato's simple analogies can be distinguished by its reliance upon the interlocutors' understanding of the illustrans being *less* imperfect than that of the illustrandum, amounting to a more accurate and extensive set of beliefs. Thus, for example,

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330b2; facial features:face as a whole::individual virtues:virtue as a whole); and for the comparison of the relationship between letters and syllables with the relationship between irreducible elements and knowable complexes in the *Theaetetus* (*Th.* 202e4; letters:syllables::elements:complexes). And later than the *Statesman* under the established chronology, we find comparisons of the relationship between different colours and colour itself, as well as figures and figure itself, with the relationship between different pleasures and pleasure itself referred to as 'παράδείγματα' in the *Philebus* (13c8; colours/figures:colour itself/figure itself::pleasures:pleasure itself)

<sup>1</sup> E.g. the 'γράμματα' (*R.* 368d3, d4) of the soul and state not themselves being instances of justice, but components of a whole which may be described as just. See also Goldschmidt (1947, 66 n. 12), Menn (1998, esp. 294-5).

<sup>2</sup> E.g. the analogies of the city and the soul and the divided line in the *Republic*: 'καὶ τάχ' ἂν παρ' ἄλληλα σκοποῦντες καὶ τρίβοντες, ὥσπερ ἐκ πυρείων ἐκλάμψαι ποιήσαιμεν τὴν δικαιοσύνην: καὶ φανεράν γενομένην βεβαιωσόμεθα αὐτὴν παρ' ἡμῖν αὐτοῖς.' (434e5-435a3; see page 43, n. 1 below)

<sup>3</sup> It also serves as further support for the hypothesis that the intellectual lineage of Plato's use of proportional analogies may be traceable to Archytas (Huffman (2005) 498-9).

the use of facial features in the *Protagoras* and letters and syllables in the *Theaetetus* would seem to be employed on the basis that the interlocutors possess or may more easily acquire a more accurate set of beliefs about the paradigmatic relationship, thus allowing these paradigms to be used as heuristic frameworks for the illustranda.<sup>1</sup>

#### 2.2.2.3.1 *The Process of Comparison and the Limits of the Philosophical Imagination*

As a lack of a reliable source of pre-dialectical beliefs makes the failure to consider a hypothesis a potential hindrance to the progress of an inquiry, at the simplest level, this heuristic function will allow something to be revealed about the nature of the illustrandum which might otherwise go unconsidered.

#### 2.2.2.3.2 *The Process of Comparison and Pre-dialectical False Beliefs*

This failure to consider the possibility introduced by the paradigm may be a result not only of a lack of true beliefs, but of certain false pre-dialectical presuppositions. For example, where beliefs about an instance falsely dictate that its possession of a certain feature is an impossibility, or where the interlocutor is likely to possess the false belief that a certain feature could never be found in combination with some other feature also recognised in that instance.<sup>2</sup> And since the likelihood of possessing erroneous pre-dialectical beliefs about an

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<sup>1</sup> 'λάβωμεν τοίνυν σαφέστερόν τι παράδειγμα περὶ τούτων.' *Sph.* 233d3-4; Goldschmidt (1947) 18-9. Although the distinction between the heuristic and purely comparative functions of Plato's analogies is often vague, similar claims could be made about thinning the herd/animal breeding (*Lg.* 735e3-736c4), victory/health/general/doctor (*Lg.* 961e7-962b2), and colours/shapes (*Phlb.* 12e3-13d1). It is worth noting here that if the success rate of these analogies is not to be attributed to pure serendipity, then although deficient, this prior understanding of the illustrandum must still allow for the detection of similarities between it and the illustrans which can assist in the selection of an appropriate analogy. However, since each interlocutor may have a mutually imperfect pre-analogical understanding of the illustrandum, this need not imply that the use of an analogy is destined to be a purely didactic exercise.

<sup>2</sup> For example, one purpose of the παράδειγμα of a herdsman thinning their herd at *Lg.* 735a7-c5 is to show that, despite culling or purging some of its members, both agricultural husbandry and statesmanship care for a group. Another interesting example may be found at *Sph.* 233d3-235a9, where the incompatibility of being a single type of expertise and being able to produce everything is used to show that the analogous case of a single type of expertise being able to teach everything is also illusory, with their impossibility leading to the inference that both must instead refer to a process of imitation or image-making. Hence, in this case, it is the incompatibility of a set of features is used overcome the presumption that sophistry could not be a kind of imitation.

instance is compounded by a lack of reliable beliefs, the paradigm used to introduce a possibility which would otherwise be prevented by false pre-dialectical beliefs ought therefore to be better understood by the interlocutors. Plato's simple paradigms therefore often serve a purgative function, which, in concert with the basic capacity of recognition, results in the removal of presuppositions which may have prevented an instance's possession of a certain feature from being considered in the first place.

### *2.3 Simple Heuristic Paradigms: Ease and Likelihood of Understanding*

Since this heuristic use of Plato's simple analogies (henceforth: 'simple heuristic paradigms') depends for its utility upon the existence of a more advanced prior understanding of the paradigmatic relationship that can be leveraged in this way, it is implied that true beliefs about the paradigm can be acquired pre-dialectically with greater ease than for the *illustandum*. In theory, this condition need not imply that the interlocutors must already possess a sufficient understanding of the *illustrans* prior to the introduction of the comparison. However, in practice, this condition is generally coupled with a high likelihood that the nature of the *illustrans* is already well understood prior to its introduction.

In addition to the existence of a salient similarity (usually expressed as a verbal proportionality), two further conditions can therefore be posited which are often satisfied by Plato's simple heuristic paradigms: ease of understanding and likelihood of prior understanding.

In order to fulfil this heuristic function, the choice of an appropriate paradigm or *illustrans* ought therefore to be made in relation to the interlocutors' stock of pre-dialectical true beliefs or capacity to understand certain topics in light of their philosophical and educational background. But the actual choice of paradigms suggests that the conditions of both ease and

likelihood of understanding are better understood as being applied in relation to the *reader* – the extent of whose background knowledge of certain disciplines and prior understanding of more rarefied topics is indeterminate.<sup>1</sup> In most contexts this therefore results in the selection of a paradigm that is both inherently easier to understand than the illustrandum and quotidian enough to ensure that a decent stock of true beliefs about it are likely to have already been acquired by the reader.

### *2.3.1 Ease of Understanding and Empirical Accessibility*

The functional importance of the greater doxastic alacrity of the illustrans is made explicit during the description the comparison of the city and the soul in the *Republic*, where, ironically, no such disparity in ease of understanding is actually operative. Nonetheless, using the familiar analogy of letters (‘γράμματα’, 368d3, d4) to explain the basis of the comparison,<sup>2</sup> Socrates likens their own lack of cleverness to myopia and compares the individual to small letters in the distance and the city to a set of larger letters that are easier to read. It is then suggested that the easier recognition of the latter can be used to assist in their recognition of the former by way of comparison.<sup>3</sup> The disparity in ease of understanding said to operate in the analogy of the city and the soul is therefore rather unconvincingly attributed to the greater size of the city and its components, as represented in the letter analogy by the greater size of the second set of letters in relation to our visual field.

However, the feature most frequently manifests itself at least partly in the form of a much more convincing asymmetry: a difference in empirical accessibility. For example, in the case

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<sup>1</sup> By contrast, given their mathematical background, a complex mathematical relationship might qualify as being easy enough, or as having a high enough likelihood of already being understood, to qualify for use in a simple heuristic paradigm for Theaetetus or Young Socrates.

<sup>2</sup> It is unclear why Plato prefers ‘γράμματα’ to ‘στοιχεῖον’ here, since the latter would enable the ambiguity of meaning Plato so frequently leaves to ‘shimmer’ before the reader (Burkert (1959) 175: ‘Platon liebt es, die Worte in ihrer Bedeutung schillern zu lassen’). However, since ‘γράμματα’ is mainly used for letters appearing in documents (Diels (1899) 58-9, Burkert (1959) 173-4), its use may be imposed by the fact that the analogy relates to a meaningful word or sentence rather than syllables or assorted individual letters.

<sup>3</sup> R. 368c7-369a3; Robinson (1953) 210-1.

of the paradigm of the composition of the face in the *Protagoras*, the fact that the interlocutors have reliable beliefs about the human face but not virtue can be attributed to the fact that only the paradigm has perceptible particulars which can be used as a reliable pre-dialectical basis for the formation of true beliefs.<sup>1</sup> Thus, if the relationship between facial features and the face as a whole resembles the relationship between the individual virtues and virtue as a whole, this results in a proportionality which can be exploited by using the former relationship as an analogy for the latter (*Prt.* 329d4-330b2). And the ability to exploit this resemblance of relationships for epistemic gain appears to depend upon the fact that details about the composition of the face can be grasped empirically, thus rendering true beliefs about the illustrans more forthcoming than for the illustrandum. By some unexplained capacity of recognition, these empirically derived beliefs can therefore be used to help generate equivalent beliefs about the composition of virtue due to the presence of some resemblance or proportionality. The process does not therefore offer any proof or explanatory support for this recognition, but simply enables the interlocutors to develop beliefs about the illustrandum whose probability of being true is apparently reliant upon the accuracy of the interlocutors' recognition of similarities.

#### *2.4 The Epistemic Limitations of Simple Heuristic Paradigms*

Since, in such cases, the similarity between illustrans and illustrandum will also encompass any differences which allow only the former to have particulars whose perception reliably yields true beliefs, this asymmetry in empirical accessibility will often come at the cost of limiting the specificity of the similarity discovered, and thus any common εἶδος that the components of the illustrans and illustrandum may fall under. This disparity in ease of

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<sup>1</sup> See also: *Phlb.* 12e3-13d1 (colours/shapes), 53a5-c2 (whiteness), *Prt.* 329d5-8 with 330b2 (the properties of gold), *R.* 508b12-c2 (the sun).

understanding therefore often necessitates a corresponding difference in the meaning of the predicate terms that can be used to denote the generic feature, resulting in terms that are equivocal in important respects, but nonetheless analogous in meaning.<sup>1</sup>

Where the disparity in ease of understanding is a product of a difference in the empirical accessibility of the particulars of the *illustrans* and *illustrandum*, the fact that true beliefs about the nature of the paradigmatic relationship are more forthcoming than for the relationship it is used to clarify will therefore often necessitate differences between the instances that preclude the possibility of them being referred to with terms that are too closely related in meaning. In Platonic terms, this means that if such a heuristic paradigm were used to identify an εἶδος or γένος to which components of the *illustrans* and *illustrandum* belong, or of which they partake, then it would have to be broad enough in meaning to encompass these differences.

It is therefore unsurprising that Plato never uses simple heuristic paradigms to produce an account or definition of the object of inquiry, implying some recognition that they are unable to directly assist in the discovery of the distinct nature of the *illustrandum*. Their use for issues of more peripheral interest to a discussion can therefore be understood as being motivated by the fact that simple heuristic paradigms obviate the need for a lengthier analysis which might yield knowledge – or at least a considerably more extensive set of true beliefs – where a more moderate improvement in the accuracy of the interlocutors' belief-set will

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<sup>1</sup> E.g. 'composed of' would take on spatial presuppositions when used in relation to the composition of the face and letters and syllables that would be cancelled in the case of the virtues (and primitive elements of the *Theaetetus*, depending on how they are interpreted). Thus, while spatial terms such as 'symmetrical', 'next to', 'above', 'below', etc. could be used in statements in relation to the paradigmatic (A:B) relationship, they would be semantically unacceptable for the corresponding relationship in the *illustrandum* (C:D) – a fact which is indicative of the degree of equivocation involved in the uses of 'composed of' for each relationship (Ross (1981) 28, 42, 56-7, 112-3; see also Vlastos (1981b) 409 n. 16). This contrasts with cases such as the comparison of the city and the soul which lacks any disparity in ease of understanding between its components and which does not therefore perform this heuristic function – with Socrates even going as far as to suggest that the elements and relationships compared are identical, differing only in the scale of the *relata* (*R.* 435b4-435e3). Strictly speaking, this section of the *Republic* is therefore better classified as a comparison than an analogy (see Pradeau (2010, 61-2)). On the nature of analogy as being neither merely equivocal nor merely univocal, see Ross (1981, esp. 6-7, 28-32, 63-86, 93-108).

suffice. Plato's simple heuristic paradigms would therefore appear to be prized more for their efficiency and versatility than their epistemic effects, which are often limited by the fact that the disparity in the accuracy of one's pre-dialectical belief-set between illustrans and illustrandum will imply that the relationships compared can only be similar in a highly analogous sense, and as a result, any attempt to discover the distinct nature of any of the components of the illustrandum via a simple comparison with a paradigm could only demonstrate the possession of traits that are too broadly applicable to uniquely identify the instances themselves.

### 2.5 Origins of 'παράδειγμα' in the *Statesman*

That the more specialised use of 'παράδειγμα' found in the *Statesman* is at least in part an elaboration of its use throughout the Platonic corpus to refer to the type of simple heuristic paradigms just described can be seen most clearly in the passage which comes closest to providing an explanation of the heuristic role of paradigms in the *Statesman*:

'Well then, have we grasped this point adequately, that we come to be using a model [ὅτι παραδείγματός γ' ἐστὶ τότε γένεσις] when being the same thing in something different and distinct, it is correctly identified, and having been brought together with the original thing, it brings about a single true judgement about each separately and both together?' (278c3-6)

Just as many of Plato's simple heuristic paradigms leverage the interlocutors' prior true beliefs about the paradigm to generate true beliefs about the more difficult 'original thing' by way of a basic recognition of similarities, the paradigm of weaving in the *Statesman* represents a systematic attempt to leverage true beliefs relating to something easier to grasp to produce corresponding true beliefs about the harder to grasp object of inquiry. The true beliefs leveraged in this way also concern relationships between the activity of weaving and

other arts, as well as the materials used to produce woollen cloth, which are deemed to be analogous in important ways to relationships between the statesman and other arts as well as the citizens and raw materials that comprise the city, thus forming a number of potential proportionalities.

Hence, although the underlying reasons for their efficacy were never expressly outlined, Plato's use of simple heuristic paradigms shares a key aim with the more methodical use of the paradigm of weaving in the *Statesman* – namely, to generate true beliefs about something which the interlocutors have an incomplete or inaccurate set of beliefs by comparing it with something about which the interlocutors already possess a much more accurate and comprehensive belief-set.

#### *2.5.1 Origins of 'παράδειγμα' in the Statesman: The Method of Division*

But although the use of 'παράδειγμα' in the *Statesman* shares this aspect with its use for simple heuristic paradigms, it would be wrong to consider the former a mere formalisation of the latter. For whereas Plato's simple heuristic paradigms are used to clarify issues ancillary to the discovery of the main object of inquiry and are thus unburdened of the need to produce an account or definition,<sup>1</sup> the paradigm of weaving is used to produce a definition of what statesmanship is – a purpose fulfilled using the method of division. Much of the heuristic value of the paradigm of weaving in the *Statesman* therefore centres on its ability to demonstrate how to successfully carry out a division of statesmanship. More specifically, it is introduced primarily to distinguish the object of inquiry from other closely related things with

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<sup>1</sup> See Goldschmidt (1947, 28).

which it might be falsely identified. As a result, the paradigm of weaving in the *Statesman* is inextricably linked to the use of division.<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> If restricted to the method of dividing genera in accordance with a series of forms that are then used to define the object of the division ('When any concept has been finally determined, all the various higher concepts on the side of 'being' are 'brought together', and the 'proper' definition of the concept results.' Stenzel (1940) 93/(1961) 60), this dialectical component is lacking from Plato's use of 'παράδειγμα' in all other works except the *Sophist* (cf. *Ti.* 24a2-b5, 27d5-b2). This need for dialectical analysis helps to distinguish weaving from the doctor and the noble steersman which are also compared with statesmanship (see 293a9-c3, 295b10-e2 and 296e4-b3, 301e6-b3 respectively; see also 297e8-299e9) and explains why they are described as 'likenesses' ('τὰς εἰκόνας', 297e8, 297e8-13) rather than παραδείγματα. The doctor and the noble steersman may therefore have the requisite similarities to qualify as an effective paradigm, but since they are not compared with statesmanship in a systematic division, they qualify only as εἰκόνες rather than instances of the paradigmatic method. See also Pender (2003, 71-2).

Thus, although the use of ‘παράδειγμα’ in the *Statesman* shares a great deal with its use to denote simple heuristic paradigms, its use in the *Statesman* for a tool that assists in the application of the method of division represents a more specialised and distinctly Platonic usage of the term. Plato’s widespread use of ‘παράδειγμα’ for simple analogical comparisons is therefore given a uniquely Platonic extension in the *Statesman*, where it refers to something more akin to a formal method used to supplement the method of division.<sup>1</sup> And I shall refer to this use of ‘παράδειγμα’ in the *Statesman* with the umbrella term ‘the paradigmatic method’ throughout,<sup>2</sup> although this is not meant to paper over the significant differences concerning how each of these paradigms is used.

## 2.6 Paradigms in the *Sophist*

However, the specialised use of ‘παράδειγμα’ we find in the *Statesman* does not appear on stage fully developed, being initially introduced with minimal theoretical backing at the start of the *Sophist*. A cladistic analysis of this usage in the *Sophist* suggests that it is closely related to the use of ‘παράδειγμα’ for weaving and agricultural husbandry in the *Statesman*, with each usage inheriting a number of features from the simple heuristic paradigms described above. This use of ‘παράδειγμα’ in the *Sophist* can therefore be seen as a first attempt at using the principles which govern simple heuristic paradigms in the development of a more specialised philosophical method.

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<sup>1</sup> Goldschmidt (1947) 2, Sayre (2006) 74; cf. Roggerone (1990) 258.

<sup>2</sup> On the fairly loose parameters of the notion of μέθοδος in Plato, see Robinson (1953, 61-9). Although the etymology of ‘μέθοδος’ would accommodate a description of the paradigm of weaving as involving two separate instances of the application of the same μέθοδος (one preparatory and one consummatory), I use the term to refer to a singular overarching method partly on the basis that the use of the paradigm of the herdsman does not involve a set of separate divisions. However, the use of each paradigm in the *Statesman* fits the loose parameters of a dialectical μέθοδος by being sequential and having the clear aim of discovering the unique nature of its object, thus contrasting both with Plato’s simple heuristic paradigms as well as Plato’s descriptions of rhetorical or sophistic methods which are said to follow a μέθοδος aimlessly (see the use of ‘πορεύεται’ and ‘πορεία’ at *Phdr.* 269d7 and 270e1 respectively; Classen (1960) 39).

### 2.6.1 The Paradigm of the Angler and Pre-dialectical Equivocation

After warning Theaetetus that just because they both use the name ‘σοφιστής’, this need not imply that they have been using it to refer to the same ‘thing’ (‘ἔργον’, 218c2; ‘πρᾶγμα’, 218c4), EV states that they must therefore determine via discourse whether they agree about the thing itself rather than just the name:

‘In every case, though, we always need to be in agreement about the thing itself by means of verbal explanation rather than doing without any such explanation and merely agreeing about the name.’<sup>1</sup>

‘δεῖ δὲ ἀεὶ παντὸς περὶ τὸ πρᾶγμα αὐτὸ μᾶλλον διὰ λόγων ἢ τοῦνομα μόνον συνωμολογηθῆσαι χωρὶς λόγου.’ (*Sph.* 218c4-5)

That interlocutors may unknowingly use the same name to refer to different things is mentioned as a particular hazard of speech in the *Phaedrus* (263a2-4), one whose capacity to be exploited by rhetorical or sophistic techniques to nefarious effect is also demonstrated in the *Euthydemus* (esp. 295c4-7). In many cases, such divergences in usage might relate only to different species or sub-genera of a broader genus (such as practical or theoretical ‘art’, different kinds of ‘equality’, or different kinds of ‘love’),<sup>2</sup> and will have a stultifying effect upon rational discourse only if an interlocutor fails to specify which species they have in mind at the outset, or falsely believes that one such species exhausts the term’s extension. But in other cases, the divergence may relate to entirely different genera, such as occurs if two separate genera (such as the sophist and the philosopher) are actually conflated or mistaken for one another. If the interlocutors are misled by their agreement on the name into thinking that this implies agreement on its referent and thus proceed ‘χωρὶς λόγου’, they are therefore

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<sup>1</sup> Unless otherwise indicated translations of the *Sophist* are from White (1993).

<sup>2</sup> *Lg.* 757b1-c1; Heitsch (1972) 45-6.

at risk of agreeing or disagreeing with a proposition on the basis of different understandings of one of its constituent terms.

It should be added that Plato did not seem to think that pre-dialectical referential divergence affects all things equally. For elsewhere in the *Phaedrus* it is implied that the tendency for such divergence is compounded by an absence of clear empirical instances which might be used as a standard for the application of a term. When condemning Lysias' speech for failing to define its topic at the outset, Socrates states that the utterance of words such as 'iron' and 'silver' are less prone to pre-dialectical equivocation than 'just', 'good', or 'love' (*Phdr.* 263a6-b1, c7-12). And although no further explanation for this varying tendency is offered, it is notable that earlier in the dialogue Socrates states that justice, prudence, and 'the other things which are of value to souls' (250b2)<sup>1</sup> do not offer any clear images ('ὁμοιώμασιν', 250b3), and that the images ('εἰκόνας', 250b4) they do offer are so obscure as to be unrecognisable as representations of a genus to all but a few, and even then with great difficulty.<sup>2</sup>

Hence, one way of understanding this varying tendency for pre-dialectical equivocation is to read it as being dependent upon the availability of clear empirically given 'images' or particulars of a concept, form, or genus. Whereas it is difficult to verify whether pre-dialectical divergence in the use of the names of the psychically esteemed objects implies that an interlocutor holds false beliefs about the nature of the genus, for names such as 'silver' or 'iron' there is a multitude of particulars with empirical features that may be used as criteria for the term's application. It is therefore easier to determine what criteria are used when someone uses these latter names in discourse, and consequently, a much lower risk that the

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<sup>1</sup> Trans. Rowe (1986).

<sup>2</sup> With the exception of beauty (*Phdr.* 250b5-6, 250c8-e2).

pre-dialectical use of such names diverges between interlocutors in ways that fail to agree with the same thing.<sup>1</sup>

Although sophistry itself may not be among the psychically esteemed objects described in the *Phaedrus*, the unavailability of clear empirical instances of sophistry which might provide criteria for the term's application would be a potential contributing factor in the implied risk that the pre-dialectical use of 'σοφιστής' may diverge between EV and Theaetetus. This contention is further supported by the use of angling as a paradigm, which arguably does have easily identifiable empirical instances, a fact which would help explain why EV's claim that agreement about the referent of the name 'σοφιστής' must be achieved διὰ λόγων is not applied to angling.

#### 2.6.1.1 Pre-dialectical Equivocation and the Methods of Collection and Division

In order to achieve the stated aim of agreeing about the thing and not just the name, the interlocutors must therefore discover the unique *ιδέα* of sophistry through discourse. In the *Phaedrus* two methods are outlined to assist with this process: collection (*συναγωγή*), in which a scattered multitude ('τὰ πολλαχῆ διεσπαρμένα', *Phdr.* 265d3-4) are brought together under one *ιδέα* 'in order that one can define each thing and make clear whatever it is that one wishes to instruct one's audience about on any occasion.' (265d4-5);<sup>2</sup> and division (*διαίρεσις*), in which the distinct *ιδέα* of the object of inquiry can be determined by a further division of the original genus into parts or sub-genera on the basis of their distinct traits, a process succinctly summarised by Taylor:

'If we wish to define a species *x*, we begin by taking some wider and familiar class *a* of which *x* is clearly one subdivision. We then devise a division of the whole class *a* into two mutually exclusive sub-classes *b* and *c*, distinguished by the fact that *b*

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<sup>1</sup> See Heitsch (1972, 48).

<sup>2</sup> Trans. Rowe (1986).

possesses, while  $c$  lacks, some characteristic  $\beta$  which we know to be found in  $x$ . We call  $b$  the right-hand,  $c$  the left-hand, division of  $a$ . We now leave the left-hand division  $c$  out of consideration, and proceed to subdivide the right-hand division  $b$  on the same principle as before, and this process is repeated until we come to a right-hand “division” which we see on inspection to coincide with  $x$ . If we now assign the original wider class  $a$  and enumerate in order the successive characters by which each of the successive right-hand divisions has been marked off, we have a complete characterisation of  $x$ ;  $x$  has been defined.’<sup>1</sup>

In order to allow themselves to come to an agreement on the thing being referred to and not just the name, EV and Theaetetus broadly follow this methodology. But before proceeding to an analysis of the application of this method, it is worth analysing how it is thought to result in a unique characterisation of the referent of the term in question.

### 2.6.2 *The Methodology of Division*

Exactly how the correct divisions are identified is left unexplained, with Socrates merely stating that a division should proceed according to forms (‘κατ’ εἶδη’, *Phdr.* 265e1)<sup>2</sup> – a procedure illustrated using the analogy of the expert butchering of an animal by the joints or natural segments of its body.<sup>3</sup> Just as the ribs, liver, or legs of an animal have distinct identities as discrete parts of the body that are relatively easy to identify, so too it is stipulated that the dialectician will be able to identify which traits ought to be used to carve out correct divisions.<sup>4</sup>

#### 2.6.2.1 *The Methodology of Division: What is Being Divided?*

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<sup>1</sup> (1929) 377; quoted in Bluck (1975, 34).

<sup>2</sup> See also *Phdr.* 273e1, *Sph.* 265e5-8, *Plt.* 285a4; Moravcsik (1973b) 163.

<sup>3</sup> *Phdr.* 265e1-3, *Plt.* 287c3-4.

<sup>4</sup> As with the capacity for recognition which underlies the efficacy of the process of comparison, the process of successful division is therefore reliant upon some natural mental aptitude, with interpreters have often appealing to recollection (i.e. the interlocutors’ access to the cognitive relics of their prenatal knowledge of the forms) to provide further explanatory support for this ability. However, the elitist attitude displayed in relation to this capacity would suggest that recollection is not a sufficient explanation of this aptitude (*Plt.* 277c3-6, *Sph.* 264e3-265a2).

This raises the question of what exactly is being divided ‘κατ’ εἶδη’. One way of understanding this process is to view it as involving the division of the intensions of Platonic forms. Under this reading, the method of division exploits a development in the theory of forms from the simplistic entities described in the *Phaedo*, to entities which admit of having parts.<sup>1</sup> Since, under this conception, forms may be parts of other forms, the method of division would represent an attempt to define forms in relation to these parts on the implicit assumption that no two forms have exactly the same set of relations of participation to other forms. In favour of this reading is Plato’s tendency to describe the method as involving a division of forms or singular arts into parts.<sup>2</sup>

However, Plato’s terminology of dividing or ‘cutting up’<sup>3</sup> forms would suggest divisions of the classes of particulars or kinds that a form extends over.<sup>4</sup> Under this reading, ‘εἶδος’ or ‘γένος’ may therefore be taken as being used with both an intensional and an extensional sense in relation to divisions: sometimes for a form alone and sometimes for the extension of a form.<sup>5</sup> The texts are unclear on what the nature of the entities populating these classes could be, but are consistent with both classes of particulars (*Plt.* 262e5-6) as well as classes of kinds (in the sense of further classes whose members all participate in the same form).<sup>6</sup>

Both of these conceptions confront some philosophical issues. For example, reading the extensions divided as being populated by kinds confronts difficulties in explaining the final stage of a division, as the divisions would apparently have to arrive at either a member (kind) of the preceding classes in the division, or alternatively, a subclass with only one kind as a

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<sup>1</sup> Moravcsik (1973a) 325-7, (1973b) 159-60.

<sup>2</sup> *Plt.* 267a8-c3, *Sph.* 258e7, 264c4.

<sup>3</sup> Moravcsik (1973b) 168; See use of τέμνω: *Phdr.* 266a4-6, 277b7-8, *Plt.* 261b10-11, 262b6-7, 264e12-13, 266e4-7, 276c12-d2, 276d8-9, 279b8-9, 282c7-9, 284e2-3, 287c3-5, 287b10, 302c8-9, *Sph.* 219d9, 219e4-5, 221e3-4, 223c12, 227c10-d1, 264e1-2, 265e8, 266a1-2, 266a3.

<sup>4</sup> Cohen (1973) 181-3, Wedin (1990) 16-21, Delcomminette (2000) 69-78, Sayre (2006) 213-4, 225-30.

<sup>5</sup> Cohen (1973) 184, Sayre (2006) 214. Hence why ‘part’ (μέρος) and ‘form’ (εἶδος/γένος) are sometimes used interchangeably (Wedin (1990) 17; cf. Moravcsik (1973b) 173).

<sup>6</sup> Sayre (2006) 229-30.

member.<sup>1</sup> The former possibility results in a significant difference in the relations involved in the divisions which are never alluded to by Plato: class-inclusion for all but the final division, and then an unannounced switch to class-membership; whilst the latter possibility that a division ends with a class with only one kind as a member seems absurd. However, the latter difficulty seems much less severe, and may be overcome if the final part of the division is a class of multiple kinds which is ‘uncuttable’<sup>2</sup> and may therefore form no further sub-classes (e.g. multiple kinds of sophistry or statesmanship).

The alternative suggestion that the classes which form the parts of the divisions are populated by particulars confronts an apparent problem when accounting for the relationship between the members of a class and the form or property in relation to which it is divided. It has been argued that since many of the properties used in the divisions are second-order predicates applying to concepts rather than first-order predicates that apply to particulars, it cannot be classes of particulars that are divided in relation to these properties.<sup>3</sup> For example, being an acquisitive art cannot apply to individual sophists or acts of sophistry, but only to sophistry itself. But Plato certainly seemed to allow for a τέχνη to be predicated of an individual or act in some way without implying that the individual or act is itself a τέχνη, and in the case of individuals, the -ικῆ/-ικός pattern of suffixes is employed throughout the *Sophist* and *Statesman* to express this very relationship.<sup>4</sup> The divisions of classes of particulars may therefore be divided in accordance with forms of which they partake, without implying any relationship of identity.<sup>5</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Moravcsik (1973b) 174.

<sup>2</sup> ‘ἀλλὰ γὰρ ἡμῖν ἔτι καὶ τοῦτο σκεπτέον, ἄρ’ ἄτομον ἤδη ἐστὶ πᾶν ἢ τινα ἔχον διαίρεσιν ἀξίαν ἐπωνυμίας.’ (*Sph.* 229d5-6); Philip (1966) 350.

<sup>3</sup> Moravcsik (1973b) 169.

<sup>4</sup> Cohen (1973) 183.

<sup>5</sup> See *Sph.* 254b7-259d8.

However, the criticism highlights an important point about the extensional reading of Plato's divisions: that since the intensions of forms are not reducible to their extensions,<sup>1</sup> Plato would not be concerned with extensions *themselves* except as tools for reaching the singular form which is the target of the division (and which is to be defined with a definitional λόγος that weaves together the many forms used throughout its division).<sup>2</sup> And it would therefore not be surprising if Plato applied the same forms to both the particulars comprising the extensions of the different parts of the division as well as the intensional form of the definiendum itself.

In addition to the textual evidence provided by the fact that EV often frames divisions in terms of pluralities,<sup>3</sup> the reading of the parts of the divisions as consisting of classes of particulars is also better able to accommodate the fact that successive divisions are made in accordance with concepts which do not entail the genus mentioned in the preceding division.<sup>4</sup> For example, there can be instances of bird-hunting that are not aquatic (*Sph.* 220a6-b5; see fig. 2, page 60), instances of impaling or trapping that do not involve fishing (*Sph.* 220b7-d3), and as discussed later, classes of animal which cannot be subject to the art of agricultural herd-rearing (§3.4). For the intensional reading, this seems to preclude any attempt to dispel the quantitative connotations of EV's talk of cutting forms by treating it as a metaphor for relations of logical entailment, and the divisions would therefore be reached by a mysterious process of cutting forms into parts which do not themselves entail the previous parts of the division.<sup>5</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Although the difference is not always fully recognised by Plato (Bostock (1984) 104-10).

<sup>2</sup> 'Telle est le véritable vocation de la division: si d'un point d'vue extensionnel la division divise, d'un point de vue proprement dialectique en revanche elle entrelace des Idées entre elle.' (Delcomminette (2000) 70; 69-70).

<sup>3</sup> *Plt.* 258b7, 260e4-8, 261b4-5, 263e4-5, *Sph.* 219a8-b2; Moravcsik (1973a) 328, (1973b) 172-3, Wedin (1990) 16, Delcomminette (2006) 69.

<sup>4</sup> Delcomminette (2000) 77, Sayre (2006) 61-2, 213-4.

<sup>5</sup> See Moravcsik (1973b, 175-6).

In contrast, under the extensional reading, there is an important distinction to be made between the form used to make a division and the form to which the class or extension resulting from that division corresponds. Thus, if the extension of fishing is divided into the extension of fish-impaling by reference to the form of impaling, while the form of fish-impaling entails the form of fishing, the form of impaling need not do so. In other words, under the extensional reading, a class or extension which is a part of a division need not exhaust the extension of the form according to which it is divided.<sup>1</sup>

The picture is confused somewhat by the fact that rather than offering a unique name or description of the parts of a division (which could therefore also be used to denote the unique form the part corresponds to), Plato often refers to parts by reference to the form *in accordance* with which the part is divided. This linguistic practice is confirmed at *Plt.* 265c2-4, where, having hitherto often referred to the parts of each division by reference to the most recent form in reference to which they were divided, EV then states that providing a name for a part of a division would be too complicated and that a definitional λόγος summarising the results of the divisions thus far can be used instead (*Plt.* 265c6-8). The implication is that the parts are often not uniquely named, but referred to with the misnomer of the form according to which the part has just been divided. The practice of naming parts in relation to the most recent form used in their division is therefore adopted for the sake of brevity and elegance, as the onomastic laziness of the ancients (*Sph.* 267d5-9) means that many parts would require either the creation of neologisms or the insertion of lengthy descriptions which summarise the combination of forms used in the divisions thus far.<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Although it will exhaust the extension of the combination of forms used in the divisions thus far: ‘D’un point de vue strictement dialectique, cela signifie que nous avons subordonné dialectiquement B et C à A, de manière à détacher de B et de C ce qui, parmi les éléments qui composent leur extension respective, participe également à A, c’est-à-dire ce qui participe à la communauté qu’entretiennent A et B (A\*B), d’une part, et à celle qu’entretiennent A et C (A\*C), d’autre part.’ (Delcomminette (2000) 77).

<sup>2</sup> The use of ‘περιπελεγμένον’ at *Plt.* 265c4 may therefore refer either to the proliferation of neologisms that uniquely naming each part would necessitate, or the fact that the neologisms themselves would most naturally take the form of inelegant compound words. Since some parts or forms used in divisions in the *Sophist* and *Statesman* give forth to what are almost certainly Platonic neologisms (e.g. ἀγελαιοτροφία and κοινοτροφική at

This also leads to another strength of the extensional reading: its superior ability make sense of the repeated use of the phrase ‘κατ’ εἶδη’ to describe the divisional process.<sup>1</sup> Not only does the use of the preposition ‘κατά’ give the impression that the forms that act as divisional criteria are separate from what is being divided, but if the method of division were intended to divide forms into other forms or intensions then it would be unclear why it would be necessary to repeatedly emphasise what would amount to an uninformative precept. However, under the extensional reading, the phrase ‘κατ’ εἶδη’ can be taken as emphasising the principle just mentioned: that each division creates a subclass, which, although divided in accordance with a form, does not exhaust that form’s extension. Under the extensional reading, the repeated use of the phrase ‘κατ’ εἶδη’ would therefore be both informative and able accommodate the implied separation of the forms from what they are used to divide.

Interpreting the parts formed by the process of division as the extensions of forms therefore offers the most coherent account of the process of increasing refinement implied by the divisional process. Since these extensions are divided in accordance with distinct forms whose extensions they do not exhaust, the reading also grants a clear and coherent meaning to the phrase ‘κατ’ εἶδη’, as well as being able to make sense of Plato’s frequent practice of naming parts of a division in relation to a form whose extension it does not exhaust. Each division will therefore result in a part which will correspond to a unique form whose extension it *does* exhaust, but which will often remain nameless or be referred to with the misnomer of the form used to make the division. An exception to this general rule is the class which is the result of the final division, which will correspond to the name of the object of inquiry. This can be summarised with a definitional λόγος which weaves together the many

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*Plt.* 261e2; Rowe (1995a) 219, Joly (2001) 33, Brisson and Pradeau (2011) 219), the latter possibility seems more likely. It would not therefore be the bewildering effect of the accumulation of too many neologisms that worried Plato, but the inelegance and outright absurdity of the neologisms that would denote the more refined parts of a division. See Campbell (1867, 28-9 n. 20).

<sup>1</sup> Cohen (1973) 184, Moravcsik (1973b) 173, Sayre (2006) 214.

forms used as criteria throughout the process of division (e.g. *Plt.* 267a8-c3) which can then be baptised with the name of the εἶδος whose extension this final class exhausts.<sup>1</sup>

### 2.6.3 The Long-held Principle

What is unusual about the application of this method at the beginning of the *Sophist* is that, rather than apply it directly to sophistry, EV applies it to angling first. This decision is justified with the invocation of that EV describes as a long-held principle: that if an ‘important issue’ (‘τῶν μεγάλων’, *Sph.* 218c7) needs to be comprehensively analysed, it is necessary to first practise the analysis on ‘unimportant, easier issues’ (‘σμικροῖς καὶ ῥάοισιν αὐτὰ’, *Sph.* 218d1). This is followed with the more specific claim that since it is difficult to ‘hunt down’ (‘δυσσθήρευτον’, *Sph.* 218d4) the genus of the sophist,<sup>2</sup> they ought to practise their *method* on an easier topic (*Sph.* 218d4-5).

### 2.6.4 The Exercise and Resemblance Functions of Paradigms

The infusion of the preamble to the angler paradigm with the metaphor of hunting exacerbates the inherent ambiguity of this use of ‘μέθοδος’ at 218d5, leaving it unclear (to continue the metaphor) whether the benefits that the analysis of angling is supposed to yield for the analysis of sophistry result from the fact that both forms of prey can be expected to leave an overlapping divisional track (ὁδός), or merely from the skills honed by following a separate but easier divisional track left by the angler.<sup>3</sup> As a result, the use of ‘μέθοδος’ in the preamble fails to indicate whether the practical value offered by the dialectical analysis of an

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<sup>1</sup> This process is actually omitted for both weaving and statesmanship.

<sup>2</sup> See also: ‘ὄραξ οὖν ὡς ἀληθῆ λέγεται τὸ ποικίλον εἶναι τοῦτο τὸ θηρίον καὶ τὸ λεγόμενον οὐ τῆ ἑτέρα ληπτόν;’ (*Sph.* 226a6-7). Compare the description of the sophist’s own method of exploiting equivocation ‘to hunt’ their interlocutor in the *Euthydemus*: ‘βουλόμενός με θηρεῦσαι τὰ ὀνόματα περιστήσας.’ (295d2); Heitsch (1972) 39-41. On the many literary and philosophical intricacies of this use of the hunting metaphor in relation to the paradigm of the angler, see Classen (1960, 39-44).

<sup>3</sup> See also *Sph.* 226b1-2.

easier topic is the result of a substantive or a purely methodological similarity with the analysis of the more difficult object of inquiry.

This ambiguity typifies a tendency in both the *Sophist* and the *Statesman* to conflate what Goldschmidt refers to as the ‘exercise’<sup>1</sup> and ‘resemblance’<sup>2</sup> functions of the paradigmatic method, the former being the preparatory application of a dialectical method on the paradigm in order to demonstrate how that method operates, and the latter involving the exploitation of similarities between the paradigmatic divisional framework and that of the more difficult object of inquiry to provide a heuristic aid specific to these divisions.<sup>3</sup>

### 2.6.5 Paradigms and Pre-dialectical Understanding

Lacking a better alternative to EV’s proposal, Theaetetus agrees to his suggested course of action (218d5-7) and EV’s subsequent use of ‘παράδειγμα’ at 218d9 as well as the eventual division of sophistry make it clear that the practice analysis performed on an easier and less

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<sup>1</sup> Goldschmidt (1947) 9, 12. Close precursors to this exercise function can be found in the *Meno*, where ‘παράδειγμα’ is used for the definitions of shape and colour which are offered as general frameworks to instruct the development of a correct definition of virtue (*Men.* 77a9-b1, 79a10). A similar case can be found in the *Theaetetus*, where although the term ‘παράδειγμα’ is not used, incorrect definitions of clay (described as ‘some commonplace, everyday thing’, 147a1-2. trans. Levett (1990)) are used as foils to demonstrate what is demanded from a correct definition (Goldschmidt (1947) 10). However, whereas these precursors provide a demonstration of correct definitions, the exercise functions of the paradigms of angling and weaving serve to provide examples of a dialectical method which can then be used as a ‘research framework’ (Delcomminette (2000) 231) for the application of the same method to a more difficult topic.

<sup>2</sup> Goldschmidt (1947) 16.

<sup>3</sup> For example, not only do the details provided in the *Sophist* during the preamble to the paradigm of the angler apply equally to both the formal demonstration of the method of division and the analysis of the angler as something whose resemblance to the sophist may result in salient divisional similarities, but in the *Statesman*, the justification of the division of weaving at 285c9-286b1 makes no distinction between the paradigm’s role as an exercise in pure method and its ability to directly assist with the division of statesmanship due to divisional similarities. Plato’s tendency to conflate the two functions can be explained at least in part by the fact that both the exercise and resemblance functions depend for their utility on topics which are easier. Favouring explanatory parsimony, Plato therefore gives explanations applying to both roles. Additionally, since this generic exercise function serves to improve the interlocutors’ understanding of a dialectical method subsequently employed on the main object of inquiry, its most immediate benefit is the interlocutors’ improved ability to apply the method practised to the object whose resemblance to the paradigm is presumed to result in divisional similarities. The purpose of the exercise and resemblance functions are therefore similar in their capacity to make the division of the main object *easier* for the interlocutors, with the former offering a warm-up exercise in the method itself, and the latter ensuring that this practice exercise actually resembles the structure or genus-species relationships of the division of the main object of inquiry.

important thing is not therefore merely an exercise in pure method, but derives much of its value from similarities between it and the more important object of inquiry:

‘Do you want us to focus on something trivial and try to use it as a pattern for the more important issue?’

‘βούλει δῆτα περί τινος τῶν φαύλων μετιόντες  
πειραθῶμεν παράδειγμα αὐτὸ θέσθαι τοῦ μείζονος;’ (*Sph.* 218d8-9)

After Theaetetus’ reaffirms his commitment to this course of action (218e1), EV continues:

‘What might we propose that’s unimportant and easy to understand [εὐγνώστον μὲν καὶ μικρόν], but can have an account given of it just as much as more important things can? For example, *an angler*: isn’t that recognisable to everybody, but not worth being too serious about? [καὶ σπουδῆς οὐ πάνυ τι πολλῆς τινος ἐπάξιον;]’ (*Sph.* 218e2-5)

Since the interlocutors’ pre-dialectical understanding of the meaning of ‘σοφιστής’ does not allow them to produce a dialectical account that they can agree upon without great difficulty, it is suggested that they practise their method on the easier topic of angling first. The underlying implication is that both interlocutors are more likely to possess a pre-dialectical understanding of angling which converges on the same ‘thing’, and that this therefore makes its dialectical analysis less prone to errors – a feature that manifests itself in the swift and unproblematic way in which its division is carried out.




Figure 2

EV's remarks also carry the implication that the pre-dialectical means by which this more reliable prior understanding of angling has been gained are unavailable for sophistry. Thus, although the cause of this more reliable pre-dialectical understanding of angling is not explained, the hypothesis that it may be due to differences in empirical accessibility mentioned above is consistent with angling's status as a practical or manual art as defined in

the *Statesman* (§1.9). Since, unlike the sophist, the angler must make use of their hands and body,<sup>1</sup> crucial details about this art (such as the nature of its object and the means by which it is acquired) can be gained through observation of its particulars.<sup>2</sup> And the pre-dialectical beliefs so attained can therefore act as a reliable guide in any verbal analysis of angling, and in the case of the application of the method of division, furnish the interlocutors with criteria that can be used to make decisions about which forms should be used to make the divisions.

Further evidence for this thesis can be found in the fact that from the division of fishing onwards it is empirically accessible features of angling (such as the nature of the tools and physical movements used) which help guide the divisions. Similarly, in the prior divisions of the genus of hunting of living things and of aquatic hunting, it is beliefs about the empirically accessible object of angling's expertise which informs the divisions. It should also be added that, as with Plato's simple heuristic paradigms, not only are reliable beliefs about angling more forthcoming due to the empirical accessibility of angling's instances, but its commonplace nature also ensures that the interlocutors (and reader) are likely to approach its division with a good stock of true pre-dialectical beliefs.

#### 2.6.6 Paradigms and Lack of Seriousness

Ignoring for now the lack of rigour invested in the search for what turns out to be a promising paradigm, in addition to the ease of understanding and wide recognition of angling familiar from many of Plato's simple heuristic paradigms, we can extract one additional feature which is also implicit in the *Statesman*: it should be unworthy of seriousness (a product of its lack of importance mentioned at *Sph.* 218d1). The motivation for the former two requirements is easier to infer, with the need for the paradigm to be easier to understand than the main object

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<sup>1</sup> 'χερσὶ καὶ σύμπαντι τῷ σώματι' (*Plt.* 259c6-7).

<sup>2</sup> Marten (1965) 132.

of inquiry helping it to fulfil its role of supplying true beliefs which can be leveraged to improve the interlocutors' understanding of the more difficult topic, a role it would be unable to fulfil if true beliefs concerning the paradigm were less forthcoming than for the main object of inquiry; and at least for the sake of expediency, the paradigm ought to be widely recognised in order to ensure that the interlocutors (and reader) already possess a good pre-dialectical understanding of the paradigm, thus precluding the need for any prior description of the features which make it relevant to the main object of inquiry (or where the greater ease of understanding is a product of its empirical accessibility, an ostensive definition).

However, the reasoning behind the need for the paradigm to fail to inspire zeal is less clear, and the opposite condition might even seem more beneficial. No explanation is found in the *Statesman*, where the condition is not repeated in such clear terms.<sup>1</sup> But a potential rationale is easy to construct. Although indifference towards a paradigm risks a lackadaisical approach to its analysis,<sup>2</sup> it may also result in increased objectivity, as the interlocutors' lack of interest in the paradigm is likely to inspire an equal lack of emotional or moral commitment to the pre-dialectical beliefs they have about the topic and hence a greater willingness to revise and abandon beliefs which might otherwise unconsciously cloud their reasoning. For the same reasons that challenging one's beliefs about how the fish on one's plate was caught may be a less inspiring activity than challenging one's beliefs about whether one engages in sophistry or philosophy, one's pre-dialectical beliefs concerning the former are also likely to be less firmly held than those concerning the latter.<sup>3</sup>

#### 2.6.6.1 *Paradigms and Lack of Seriousness: The Achievement of Morally Weighted Ends*

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<sup>1</sup> The condition is however implicit in the description of paradigms as relatively insignificant (278e8) and small (278e6, 279a8, 286b1), and of weaving as being unworthy of analysis for its own sake (285d8-9). But there is no implication that being an uninspiring topic might directly contribute to a paradigm's efficacy.

<sup>2</sup> A possibility EV warns against at *Plt.* 266d7-10 and *Sph.* 227a7-c6.

<sup>3</sup> See Goldschmidt (1947, 14-5, 20-1, 30).

The source of this attitudinal difference can most likely be traced to angling's status as a purely technical skill, the product of which carries no moral weight in itself. This conjecture is supported by Plato's description of angling as small or unimportant (σ μικρός, 218d1, 218e2-3) in direct contrast with the greater or greatest things (' τοῖς μεγίστοις', 218d2; ' τῶν μειζόνων', 218e3), thus mirroring the language used in earlier dialogues to contrast activities which are unable to contribute to the moral betterment or detriment of persons with those which can contribute to or detract from the attainment of truly moral ends.<sup>1</sup>

For Plato, the ability of this latter category of activities to attain morally weighted ends helps explain the status conferred upon them in the popular imagination, resulting in a popular desire to be associated or disassociated with such activities. Hence, in the *Republic*, we find a description of those with small and stunted natures ('σ μικρὰ δὲ φύσις', *R.* 495b5; 'ἀτελεῖς μὲν τὰς φύσεις', *R.* 495d7) who practise the manual arts ('τὰς βαναυσίας', *R.* 495e2) pursuing philosophy in an effort to benefit from its reputation, thus giving birth to sophistry instead.<sup>2</sup> As a result of this popular prestige, not only is there a risk that the interlocutors themselves have an irrational attachment to their pre-dialectical beliefs about such topics, but these beliefs are also liable to be infected by the proliferation of beliefs resulting from a popular desire to be associated or disassociated with the names of the greater things. As a result, the pre-dialectical beliefs associated with the greater topics are at an increased risk of being inaccurate or contradictory. It is therefore natural to infer that the honorific and pejorative attitudes inspired by the referents of 'sophist', 'statesman', and 'philosopher', that were previously proposed as a cause of their exceptional propensity to be confused with one

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<sup>1</sup> *Ap.* 30d1-5, *La.* 192e1-2; Vlastos (1994) esp. 111-3. See also *Lg.* 631b6-c1.

<sup>2</sup> *R.* 496a2-9. The zeal angling fails to inspire need not therefore be read as referring exclusively to a philosophical desire for the truth, nor as making any normative claim about the motivation behind the heightened interest sophistry inspires. If the argument here is correct, then one reason the σπουδή inspired by the 'greater' things creates dialectical issues is that their association or disassociation with moral status results in a plethora of contenders appropriating the term for their own ends, many of whose motivations are impure (see use of 'σπουδαί' at *Th.* 173d4).

another, are a result of their membership of the greater or greatest things, with the resulting popular interest this inspires causing their marked tendency for doxastic chaos and conflation.<sup>1</sup>

The use of a purely technical activity as a paradigm would therefore help strip such grand subjects of the ‘dazzling prestige’<sup>2</sup> which affords so much emotional resonance to the pre-dialectical beliefs formed about them, allowing the paradigm to illuminate features in the main object of inquiry otherwise concealed by the mind’s remarkable capacity for self-deception in matters close to the heart. Its banality also ensures that it comes without the bewildering variety of popular beliefs that surround the ‘greater’ topics as a result of their moral status, thus cleansing the interlocutors’ pool of pre-dialectical beliefs of those which result purely from the ego and avarice of others.

### 2.6.7 *The Paradigm of the Angler and the Method of Division*

So far, the explanation in the *Sophist* overlaps with many of Plato’s simple analogical referents of ‘παράδειγμα’, which also tend to have pre-dialectical means of reliably obtaining true beliefs, as well as being commonplace, and unlikely to inspire zeal.<sup>3</sup>

The methodological basis of the paradigm of the angler also shares simple heuristic paradigms’ reliance on the existence a similarity with the object it is used to clarify, specifically a similarity in the relation between each art and its object. But unlike simple heuristic paradigms, this presumption is used to infer that a definition of angling can be

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<sup>1</sup> See page 17, n. 1.

<sup>2</sup> ‘prestige éblouissant’ (Goldschmidt (1947) 24). Since at this stage of the dialogue the nature of sophistry is yet to be determined, the implication that sophistry is among the greater or greatest things may be taken as resulting from the popular or pre-dialectical beliefs about it which may falsely associate it with the procurement of moral wisdom, and not therefore as implying that it necessarily has any such ability. Sophistry is therefore considered a legitimate candidate for such a categorisation, as evidenced by the definition of the noble sophist (‘ἡ γένηται γενναία σοφιστική’, 231b8). However, its implicit inclusion among the greater things may also be an allusion to the fact that rather than merely being impotent in relation to the achievement of moral ends, sophistry can actively detract from their achievement by making someone more likely to commit an immoral act.

<sup>3</sup> E.g. the composition of the human face, the properties of gold (*Prt.* 329d5-8 with 330b2), and the relationship between letters and syllables (*Tht.* 202e6-7 with 202e4).

derived using a divisional pathway that overlaps with one that can be used to derive a definition of the sophist. And the basis of this inference is a presumption that the arts of sophistry and angling are both coordinate forms of the same genus of acquisitive art, a fact which is apparently presumed to result in a high probability that their divisions also share forms corresponding to more refined sub-genera.

As a result, each attempted definition of sophistry begins from the presumption that sophistry and angling are both acquisitive arts (*Sph.* 221d5-6, 222a2-3), with the second, third, and fourth divisions of sophistry branching off immediately into the genus of acquisition by exchange (*Sph.* 223c7), the fifth attempt following the route carved out for angling until the genus of capture before branching off into the genus of open combat (*Sph.* 225a2), and the first attempt offering the greatest refinement of the analogy by proceeding down to the genus of animal hunting (*Sph.* 222a5-7) before branching off into the genus of the hunting of land animals (*Sph.* 222a9-11). And in each case there is therefore a presumption that angling and sophistry bear a relationship to the objects of their art in an analogous way that can be expressed as a shared genus of acquisition at varying levels of refinement.<sup>1</sup>

### *2.6.8 The Failure of the Paradigm of the Angler*

It is unclear exactly how and why the attempted divisions of sophistry based on the paradigm of angling fail, and a full analysis is beyond the scope of this study. But the divisions appear to offer adequate classifications of different varieties or aspects of sophistry, with each definition being too specific to encompass the art of sophistry as a whole. The positive role of the divisions has thus been read as a form of collection, allowing for the new genus of image-

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<sup>1</sup> Which may still be expressed as a verbal proportionality, e.g. Division I: sophist as acquirer by hunting of land animals (angler:fish::sophist:rich young men); Divisions II, III, IV: sophist as acquirer by exchange (angler:fish::sophist:profit); Division V: sophist as acquirer by combat (angler:fish::sophist:profit).

making to be selected.<sup>1</sup> Hence, although the paradigm was intended to offer a means by which to directly derive an appropriate set of divisions to act as the starting point for the analysis of the sophist, the nebulous nature of the sophist results in multiple definitions being arrived at, none of which encompass sophistry as a distinct *ιδέα*.<sup>2</sup>

But no matter the exact cause of the failure of each of the divisions, the method of overlapping divisions employed for the paradigm of angling suffers from a general defect which ensures that it could only ever lessen the difficulty of performing a division of sophistry, whilst never entirely removing the basic difficulties which motivated the use of a paradigm in the first place. As mentioned previously, the ease with which angling's acquisitive capacity can be understood is most likely a product of the fact that it is a manual or practical art and thus has clear perceptible particulars. However, if sophistry has any acquisitive capacity at all, then this is achieved through non-manual means which is not as clearly perceptible in its particulars. The paradigmatic divisions and their ease of completion are therefore the result of a stock of reliable empirically informed pre-dialectical beliefs, the likes of which cannot be accumulated for sophistry. The method of overlapping divisions is therefore only helpful up to the genus at which the division of sophistry branches off from the paradigmatic division, after which the division of sophistry cannot benefit from the stock of reliable pre-dialectical beliefs which guide the division of angling. Additionally, after the divisions have branched off from one another, the dialectician must then contend with the prejudices affecting their pre-dialectical beliefs about sophistry, as well as the competing and unreliable pre-dialectical beliefs resulting from sophistry's honorific or pejorative connotations which the paradigm is intended to nullify.

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<sup>1</sup> Cornford (1960) 186-7, Philip (1966) 342, Bluck (1975) 58, Wolff (1991) 31, Sayre (2006) 39, 45-6, 65.

<sup>2</sup> See *Plt.* 258c3-7; Goldschmidt (1947) 17. Since there is a theoretical possibility that a concept might be reachable by multiple divisions (for both the intensional and extensional readings), one cannot entirely rule out the alternative hypothesis that each of the divisions of the sophist based on the paradigm of angling are equally correct (Moravcsik (1973a) 332-3, 344-5, (1973b) 166, 172).

This would not be an issue if the point at which the division of sophistry branched off from that of angling landed immediately upon sophistry as a distinct genus without the need for any further divisions. But in addition to being an improbability in itself, this would seem to be precluded by the semantic distance between sophistry and angling's acquisitive capacities that is demanded by the disparity in ease of understanding discussed above (§2.4). If the division of sophistry is to reach a distinct genus which corresponds to the *ἰδέα* of sophistry alone, then this will need to exclude manual or practical arts. But since the genera shared by angling and sophistry must encompass both manual and non-manual arts, it is difficult to see how a dichotomous division of any such genus could land immediately upon sophistry as a non-manual art in all its specificity.<sup>1</sup> As a result, the division of sophistry is fated to reach sub-genera which exclude angling and all manual arts (just as the division of angling eventually excludes all non-manual arts from the division of fishing onwards) – divisions which could not therefore be directly informed by the interlocutors' pre-dialectical beliefs about angling's (manual) acquisitive activity.

The broad *Bedeutungsfeld* demanded by the disparity in ease of understanding between the acquisitive capacity of angling and sophistry therefore implies that the pre-dialectical beliefs about angling that assist with its own division could not be used to specify many important features about sophistry's purported acquisitive capacity (such as its object or means of acquisition) which might in turn be used to provide it with a unique definition.

### 2.7 *Paradigms and Division in the Sophist and the Statesman*

Although the use of the method of division in the paradigm of angling represents a clear difference from the use of simple heuristic paradigms, the way in which the paradigm is used

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<sup>1</sup> In fact, to do so would seem to betray the principle explained at *Plt.* 262a9-263a1: that divisions should proceed by cutting through the middle of a genus in order to maximise the possibility that the divisions will not be arbitrary ('καὶ μᾶλλον ἰδέαις ἂν τις προστυγχάνοι', 262b7-8) and will result in divisions into classes corresponding to εἶδει or γένει rather merely μέρος.

in conjunction with the method of division also differs in key respects from how this divisional aspect is used with respect to the paradigm of weaving in the *Statesman*. Unlike in the *Statesman*, where the division of weaving and statesmanship are separate, in the *Sophist*, the attempted definitions of the sophist use the divisions made in the analysis of angling as their starting point.<sup>1</sup> The use of the paradigm of angling therefore begins with a full division of angling which is subsequently used as a partial blueprint or ‘platform’<sup>2</sup> for a division of the sophist, with it being presumed that the arts of angling and sophistry share at least one genus. As a result, the division of angling is used *intra*-generically, thus contrasting with the *Statesman*, where the division of weaving is used *inter*-generically, with the divisions proceeding from a different genus, resulting in divisions that do not overlap.<sup>3</sup>

Thus, rather than using a similarity in the relationship between each art and its object as the basis of the presumed similarities between their divisions (as represented by angling and sophistry’s acquisitive nature), in the case of the divisions of weaving and statesmanship, it is the presumption of similarities between the relationships of weaving and statesmanship to other arts in the same technical field that forms the main motivation for their comparison. Although this comes at the expense of being much less informative when it comes to individual divisions, this avoids the basic defect of the method of *intra*-generic and overlapping divisions just described in relation to the divisions of angling and sophistry, as although this relationship to other arts is a product of a similarity between weaving and statesmanship (the shared activity or capacity of intertwining (συμπλοκή)), this is not used to select genera of which statesmanship and weaving are both members.

## 2.8 The Paradigmatic Method in the *Statesman*

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<sup>1</sup> Cornford (1960) 171, Sayre (2006) 55-65.

<sup>2</sup> Bluck (1975) 54.

<sup>3</sup> Brisson and Pradeau (2011) 46.

Proceeding to the use of ‘παράδειγμα’ in the *Statesman* itself, the term is used to describe three separate dialectical tools:<sup>1</sup>

(1) *The Paradigm of the Herdsman*. Introduced during the first failed division of statesmanship (261d3-268d4; designated as a paradigm retrospectively at 275b4).

(2) *The παράδειγμα παραδείγματός* (277d9). Used to explain the operation of a paradigms themselves.

(3) *The Paradigm of Weaving*. Which can be further divided into the two separate purposes that weaving is put to:

(3a) *The Methodological Purpose of the Division of Weaving*. Involving a demonstration of how the division of weaving mirrors that of statesmanship, most importantly by enabling statesmanship to be distinguished from other forms of expertise which might stake a claim to the role of caring for the city, something which the initial attempt at a definition of statesmanship fails to do (267e7-268a3, 279a1-5).<sup>2</sup>

(3b) *The Metaphorical Purpose of the Division of Weaving*. Involving a series of reflections upon the results of the division of weaving and statesmanship at

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<sup>1</sup> There is also an ambiguous use at 277b4. Since this encompasses both the herdsman paradigm and the myth of Cronus, it appears to have a generic meaning, as conveyed by Rowe’s translation as ‘illustrations’ (see also Lane (1998, 123)).

<sup>2</sup> See Dixsaut (2001, 246), Ricken (2008, 166).

the end of the dialogue to highlight the fact that the activity of combining is of central importance to both forms of expertise (305e2-311c8, esp. 309a8-b7).

### *2.8.1 The Methodological and Metaphorical Uses of the Paradigm of Weaving*

This distinction in the uses of the paradigm of weaving in the *Statesman* highlights one of the dialogue's most intriguing details: that no mention is made of how the similarities drawn by the metaphorical use relate to the methodological use of the paradigm. In fact, EV gives the impression that the metaphorical use has been tagged on as a series of passing observations as a neat way to tie up the dialogue, with the underlying similarity it expresses between the activities of the weaver and statesman being coincidental to their divisional similarities. And indeed, the metaphorical use is later referred to as an εἰκών (309b5), in the same language used for the images of the doctor and steersman,<sup>1</sup> suggesting that this is nothing more than a reversion to the type of simpler analogical paradigms discussed above. However, elsewhere the methodological and metaphorical uses are referred to apparently indiscriminately, with the introduction of the methodological use of the paradigm of weaving being preceded by an indiscriminate reference to the need for the paradigm to involve 'the same activities as statesmanship [ἔχον τὴν αὐτὴν πολιτικὴν πραγματείαν]' (279a7-8), despite the fact that the methodological use does not directly compare the activities of the weaver and the statesman. The remark would therefore appear to apply more to the metaphorical use of the paradigm of weaving, which involves a series of direct comparisons between the weaver's essential activity of interlacing or intertwining and the political duties of the statesman. In addition to explaining the function of the inter-generic mode of divisional comparison used for the methodological function of the paradigm of weaving, one additional interpretive problem

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<sup>1</sup> See page 36, n. 2.

raised by the use of ‘παράδειγμα’ in the *Statesman* is this conflation of the paradigm of weaving’s apparently distinct purposes.

## 2.9 Conclusion

Plato’s use of the paradigmatic method therefore appears to have been inspired by the use of simple heuristic paradigms. In both cases, the paradigms appear to offer greater ease of pre-dialectical understanding, are quotidian in nature, and lack prestige. The cause of this disparity in ease of pre-dialectical understanding also seems to stem primarily from the ability to clearly identify features of the paradigm from the perception of its particulars which cannot be so easily identified in the particulars of the object of inquiry. Since this will be a product of certain features of the paradigm which do not apply to the object of inquiry (e.g. the practical or manual nature of an art), the resemblance identified by the process of comparison must be broad enough to encompass these differences. When paradigms are first applied to divisions in the *Sophist*, angling is used to identify a starting genus, with the differences between the paradigm and object of inquiry, and more specifically, any differences which entail their disparity in ease of pre-dialectical understanding, being accounted for in subsequent divisions. This represents a basic limitation of this method of overlapping divisions, as once the divisions have branched off from one another, the more reliable set of beliefs about the paradigm will not be able to directly inform the division of the object of inquiry. The division of weaving, which does not employ a series of overlapping divisions, may therefore represent an attempt to overcome this limitation. However, before proceeding to an analysis of the paradigm of the herdsman and the myth of Cronus which may partly expose this basic limitation, it is worth examining why Plato considered it necessary to resort to the use of the paradigmatic method in the first place. Part of the answer

to this question appears to lie in what I refer to as ‘the methodological interlude’, an analysis of which is offered in the following chapter.

### 3. *The Methodological Interlude*

Much of Plato's justification for resorting to the paradigm of weaving is to be found in the brief passage which forms an interlude from the discussion of excess and deficiency. In this chapter I attempt to provide an analysis of the explanatory power of this passage in relation to the methodological value of the division of weaving, arguing that it is intended to show how a basic epistemological problem can be overcome using the paradigmatic method: the inability to form true judgements about certain things prior to their dialectical analysis.

Whilst for certain things one can form reliable judgements on the basis of clear empirically given images or likenesses, for other things, no equivalent mode of reliable pre-dialectical belief-formation is available. And for this latter set of topics, dialectical analysis relying only upon the interlocutors' pre-dialectical beliefs about the topic will therefore be less reliable, if not impossible. The paradigmatic method is intended to overcome this problem by performing a dialectical analysis on a topic about which one can form reliable pre-dialectical beliefs and which bears salient resemblances to the object of inquiry, with this analysis then acting as a paradigm for the analysis of the more difficult object of inquiry.

I should add that since the interlude's opacity of expression and density of philosophical content combine to obscure the meaning of almost every element, understanding its purpose requires a considerable degree of speculation. The main support for the reading proposed here is its ability to make sense of the internal coherence of the passage, especially in terms of its argumentative structure. But it also fits with potential developments in Plato's thought at the time of writing the *Sophist* and *Statesman* which would provide a broader explanation of Plato's use of the paradigmatic method.

Since this chapter deviates from the otherwise chronological order of this study, the dialogue leading up to the introduction of the methodological interlude can be summarised as follows. After failing to provide a definition of statesmanship using the paradigm of the herdsman (261c6-268c10), and the corrected division in light of the myth of Cronus (269a7-275c8), EV formally introduces the paradigmatic method with the *παράδειγμα παραδείγματος* of pupils learning their letters (277d9-278d6). EV and YS agree that they should apply the method to statesmanship again using: ‘something of the same sort from smaller things somewhere’ (278e8). The ‘smaller’ thing chosen is weaving, which is in turn subjected to a meticulous division that provides the interlocutors with key insights into how a successful division of statesmanship can be completed and results in a definition of weaving as the intertwining of woof and warp (279c7-283a8). Anticipating some bemusement on YS’s part as to why in their effort to understand statesmanship they have ventured into a lengthy analysis of the nature of clothes-washing, woof and warp spinning, and other associated arts, shortly after the division, EV offers a digression on excess and deficiency. After an allusion back to the *παράδειγμα παραδείγματος* (285c8-d7), EV abruptly enters into an interlude on methodology that provides an explanation of why a division carried out on a separate ‘smaller’ topic of inquiry is able to assist in the search for a definition of statesmanship (285d8-286b2).

### *3.1 285d8-286b2*

The interlude reads as follows:

‘I certainly don’t suppose that anyone with any sense would want to hunt down the definition [*λόγον*] of weaving for the sake of weaving itself. But I think the majority of people don’t recognise that for some of the things that are, there are, naturally,

certain perceptible likenesses which are there to be easily understood [ῥαδίως καταμαθεῖν αἰσθηταί τινες ὁμοιότητες πεφύκασιν], and which it is not at all hard to point out [ἄς οὐδὲν χαλεπὸν δηλοῦν], when one wants to make an easy demonstration to someone who asks for an account [λόγον] of one of these things, involving no trouble and without recourse to verbal means [χωρὶς λόγου]; conversely, for those things that are greatest and most valuable [τοῖς δ' αὖ μεγίστοις οὔσι καὶ τιμιωτάτοις], there is no image [εἶδωλον]<sup>1</sup> at all which has been worked in plain view for the use of mankind, the showing of which will enable the person who wants to satisfy the mind of an inquirer to satisfy it adequately by fitting it to one of the senses. That is why one must practise at being able to give and receive an account [λόγον] of each thing; for the things that are without body, which are finest and greatest [τὰ γὰρ ἀσώματα, κάλλιστα ὄντα καὶ μέγιστα], are shown clearly only by verbal means [λόγῳ] and nothing else, and everything that is now being said is for the sake of these things. But practice in everything is easier in smaller things rather than in relation to the greater.<sup>2</sup>

‘ἢ που τὸν τῆς ὑφαντικῆς γε λόγον<sup>A</sup> αὐτῆς ταύτης ἔνεκα θηρεῦειν οὐδεὶς ἂν ἐθελήσειεν νοῦν ἔχων: ἀλλ’ οἶμαι τοὺς πλείστους λέληθεν ὅτι τοῖς μὲν τῶν ὄντων ῥαδίως καταμαθεῖν αἰσθηταί τινες ὁμοιότητες πεφύκασιν, ἄς οὐδὲν χαλεπὸν δηλοῦν, ὅταν αὐτῶν τις βουλευθῆ τῷ λόγον<sup>B</sup> αἰτοῦντι περὶ τοῦ μὴ μετὰ πραγμάτων ἀλλὰ χωρὶς λόγου<sup>C</sup> ῥαδίως ἐνδείξασθαι: τοῖς δ’ αὖ μεγίστοις οὔσι καὶ τιμιωτάτοις οὐκ ἔστιν εἶδωλον οὐδὲν πρὸς τοὺς ἀνθρώπους εἰργασμένον ἐναργῶς, οὗ δειχθέντος τὴν τοῦ πυνθανομένου ψυχὴν ὁ βουλόμενος ἀποπληρῶσαι, πρὸς τῶν αἰσθήσεων τινα προσαρμοτῶν, ικανῶς πληρώσει. διὸ δεῖ μελετᾶν λόγον<sup>D</sup> ἐκάστου δυνατὸν εἶναι δοῦναι καὶ δέξασθαι: τὰ γὰρ ἀσώματα, κάλλιστα ὄντα καὶ μέγιστα, λόγῳ<sup>E</sup> μόνον ἄλλῳ δὲ οὐδενὶ σαφῶς δείκνυται, τούτων δὲ ἔνεκα πάντ’ ἐστὶ τὰ νῦν λεγόμενα. ῥάων δ’ ἐν τοῖς ἐλάττωσιν ἢ μελέτη παντὸς περὶ μᾶλλον ἢ περὶ τὰ μείζω.’ (285d9-286b1)

### 3.2 *The Purpose of the Interlude: Clearing up Confusions*

There is a tendency in the literature to treat the concluding statement on the disparity in ease of dialectical analysis between the smaller and the greater things (286a8-b1) as an

<sup>1</sup> I make the presumption throughout that ‘εἶδωλον’ and ‘αἰσθηταί...ὁμοιότητες’ at 285e1 are coextensive (see Rowe (1995a) 211).

<sup>2</sup> Following Thein (2013, 164 n. 1), ‘naturally’ is inserted into Rowe’s translation.

‘afterthought’<sup>1</sup> or as being ‘appended’<sup>2</sup> to the interlude. This results from reading the description of the availability of an ostensive mode of demonstration as explaining why one might be led to believe that the division of weaving is excessive. It is not clear what role the ostensive mode of demonstration might achieve that the division of weaving may be thought to exceed, but the interlude is said to address this potential misconception by highlighting the division of weaving’s exercise function in relation to statesmanship, and more broadly, as preparation for the analysis of the greatest and most valuable things as a whole.<sup>3</sup>

The availability of clear perceptible likenesses of weaving (and thus the possibility of the ostensive mode of demonstration) would therefore be introduced only to explain the cause of the misunderstanding which may lead to the false impression that its division is unnecessary. In other words, to set up an explanation of the need for a dialectical demonstration despite the possibility of providing an ostensive demonstration using a clear perceptible likeness. Presumably, the purpose of emphasising the lack of clear perceptible likenesses for the greater things would then be to highlight the fact that this ostensive mode of demonstration is not available for things such as statesmanship, thus explaining the need to practise dialectical accounts on the smaller things. However, not only would this seem to imply that *were* clear perceptible likenesses available for the greatest and most valuable things, their dialectical analysis would be unnecessary (being replaceable by the ostensive mode of demonstration), but from the fact that certain things lack clear perceptible likenesses, it does not automatically follow that one ought to practise their dialectical analysis on separate topics. To reach this conclusion, one must refer to the concluding statement on the greater relative ease of analysing smaller things. Under this reading, the interlude is therefore reduced to a series of assertions which fail to form any clear argument,<sup>4</sup> with the inability to provide a *non-*

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<sup>1</sup> Sayre (2006) 83.

<sup>2</sup> Lane (1998) 74.

<sup>3</sup> Lane (1998) 70-5, Sayre (2006) 82-5.

<sup>4</sup> - The division of weaving would be unnecessary if carried out for its own sake (285d9-10);

*dialectical* ostensive demonstration of the greatest and most valuable things bearing no direct relevance to the conclusion that one must practise *dialectical* demonstrations on other things.<sup>1</sup>

If one is to make sense of the explanatory connection between the lack of clear images of the greatest and most valuable things and the need to practise dialectical accounts on other things, the availability of clear perceptible likenesses should therefore be read as having some connection to the concluding statement on the disparity in ease of analysis between the smaller and the greater things. And this would suggest that the distinction between the things for which there are clear perceptible likenesses and the things for which there are no such likenesses overlaps with the distinction between the smaller things and the greater or greatest things (with weaving falling into the former category and statesmanship into the latter). My aim will be to see if such a connection can be established, and I assume that this overlap in categories is correct throughout.<sup>2</sup>

### 3.3 Non-dialectical Demonstrations and Ease of Dialectical Analysis

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- An explanation of why one might be led to believe that the division is carried out for its own sake with the description of the *non-dialectical* ostensive demonstration of some things (285d10-e4);
  - The claim that for other things no such method of *non-dialectical* demonstration is available (285e4-286a4);
  - The claim that one must practise giving *dialectical* accounts for each thing (286a4-8);
  - The addendum that this is easier on ‘smaller’ things (286a8-b1).

<sup>1</sup> A similar consequence occurs under a reading proposed by Dixsaut (2001, 277-84), who interprets weaving as belonging to the same class of things that lack images as statesmanship. The claim made at the end of the interlude that: ‘practice in everything is easier [ῥᾶρον] in smaller things [τοῖς ἐλάττοσιν] than in the greater [τὰ μείζω].’ (286a7-b2) is therefore interpreted as drawing a distinction *within* the class of things which have no image, with the comparatives ‘τοῖς ἐλάττοσιν’ (286b1) and ‘τὰ μείζω’ (286b2) being indicative of the fact that the difference between weaving and statesmanship is one only of degree (Dixsaut (2001) 281; see also 278e8). But by reading weaving as among the things lacking an image, Dixsaut deprives these perceptible likenesses of any explanatory role in the relationship between smallness and ease of dialectical practice. The justification for the division of weaving therefore rests solely upon the distinction between smaller and greater things and the unexplained correlation drawn between the smallness of an object and the ease with which one can use it to practise dialectic. And it is therefore odd that the passage should focus so heavily upon the availability of perceptible likenesses and images at the expense of its most salient point – that dialectic is easier on smaller subjects.

<sup>2</sup> 278e7-8, Goldschmidt (1947) 56 n. 16; cf. Stenzel (1940/1961) 134/94, (1966) 69, Dixsaut (2001) 277-84.

In order to understand how the ability to provide non-dialectical demonstrations of smaller things may help to explain their greater ease of dialectical analysis, it is necessary to understand the nature of the λόγος (**B**) requested by the hypothetical inquirer, as well as that of the λόγοι (**D**) whose provision and receipt must be practised on ‘each thing’.

### 3.4 *The Different Meanings of λόγος in the Sophist and the Statesman*

In both the *Statesman* and the *Sophist* there are two main variations in the usage of ‘λόγος’ that go beyond its more straightforward non-philosophical sense of ‘language’ or ‘verbal expression’.<sup>1</sup> On the one hand, ‘λόγος’ is sometimes employed to refer to a definitional method or the verbal process this entails. This can be seen most clearly where the method of division is referred to as a ‘τῶν λόγων μέθοδος’.<sup>2</sup> This use of ‘λόγος’ for a τῶν λόγων μέθοδος can be distinguished from its use for the type of definitional λόγος summarising the results of the method of division, an unambiguous instance of which is its use at *Plt.* 265c3 for the description of the results of the division thus far.

This contrast between a discursive and definitional sense of ‘λόγος’ is also found in earlier Platonic texts to refer to the elenctic process and the definition it aims to yield.<sup>3</sup> The distinction comes to the fore in the *Meno* when it is pointed out that arriving at a *definitional* λόγος of virtue would not automatically entail knowledge or understanding, with Socrates’ response implying that this would require the type of *discursive* λόγος demonstrated on the slave.

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<sup>1</sup> See Kucharski (1949, esp. 150-63).

<sup>2</sup> For example, at *Sph.* 227a7-8, where the phrase is used for a method whose role is to determine whether different arts belong to the same kind or not (227a10-b2), and similarly at *Plt.* 266d7, where EV uses the phrase for the method EV and YS are currently engaged in.

<sup>3</sup> e.g. *Men.* 75c3 vs. 99e4. Referred to as the ‘dynamic’ vs. ‘static’ senses by Lafrance (1981, 37-8 n. 12).

In the *Sophist* and *Statesman*, however, we find that the definitional use of ‘λόγος’ is often used more ambiguously for both the definition attained at the end of the application of the method of division as well as for the process of division itself.<sup>1</sup> This ambiguity results from the fact that the definition achieved at the end of a division simply summarises its results by weaving together the succession of forms used throughout,<sup>2</sup> with Plato therefore often using ‘λόγος’ to refer at once to the definition attained via this method as well as to the definitional process itself.

As argued later, the reason for this increased ambiguity in the meaning of ‘λόγος’ is that at the time of writing the *Sophist* and *Statesman* Plato seems to have developed the view that the kind of simple elenctic definitions sought in earlier dialogues cannot form the content of true judgements for certain things, or at least not without entailing knowledge. For these things, a true judgement can only be formed after dialectical analysis, hence Plato’s tendency to merge the definitional and discursive senses of ‘λόγος’ in the *Sophist* and *Statesman*.

#### 3.4.1 The Different Meanings of ‘λόγος’ in the Methodological Interlude

With this distinction in mind, the initial appearance of ‘λόγος’ (**A**; 285d9) in relation to the division of weaving can be rendered as ‘definition’,<sup>3</sup> a reading supported by the use of ‘θηρεύειν’ at 285d9 which portrays it as the prey attained at the end of a dialectical hunt.<sup>4</sup>

Its second occurrence (**B**) at 285e2, which is the object of the initial hypothetical request for a ‘λόγος’, is more puzzling, especially as the subsequent use of ‘λόγος’ (**C**; ‘χωρίς λόγου’, 285e3) results in a nominal contradiction.<sup>5</sup> However, one can start by ruling out a dialectical τῶν λόγων μέθοδος as its intended meaning.

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<sup>1</sup> E.g. *Plt.* 267a2, 267c9, d11, *Sph.* 221b1, 223b5, 231b7.

<sup>2</sup> E.g. *Sph.* 268c8-d4; Stenzel (1940) 93-4.

<sup>3</sup> As translated by Diès (1935), Skemp (1952), Taylor (1961), and Rowe (1999). Cf. Bates (2004) 109 (‘verbal analysis’).

<sup>4</sup> See also *Sph.* 218d3-4; Campbell (1867) 13 n.2, 14-5 n. 10.

<sup>5</sup> Stenzel (1940/1961) 133/93, Kucharski (1949) 152, Rowe (1995a) 212.

### 3.4.2 λόγος and the Ostensive Mode of Demonstration

The legitimacy of this dismissal is justified by the fact that the ease with which a perceptible likeness is able to satisfy this request implies that it consists of a demand for a λόγος which confers a more modest (i.e. sub-epistemic) grasp of the thing in question than an explanatory account.<sup>1</sup> Hence, although it seems highly unlikely that Plato would mean to suggest that the demand for a dialectical or explanatory λόγος might be met ostensively, it would not be unreasonable for him to think that the demand for a more modest grasp of the object might be met in this way (e.g. a true judgement whose content is more akin to a description or simple definition of the object).<sup>2</sup>

### 3.4.3 χωρίς λόγου

The nominal contradiction should therefore be taken as stating that a perceptible likeness can be offered in lieu of the type of verbal λόγος (**B**) which might also satisfy such a request.

But if it is to somehow follow from the lack of clear perceptible likenesses of the greater things that one must practise giving and receiving λόγοι (**D**) on the smaller things, then this would seem to imply that there is no other non-ostensive mode of demonstration available which might also adequately satiate the ψυχή (286a3) of the person asking for a λόγος (**B**) (such as the provision of an isolated description or simple definition). But since a simple description or definition could be provided readily even if the speaker does not possess knowledge,<sup>3</sup> the implication cannot be that it is impossible to utter descriptions or definitions of the greatest and most valuable things without the use of division or any other dialectical method. Instead, EV must be implying that the provision of a description or isolated verbal

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<sup>1</sup> With ‘μη μετὰ πραγμάτων’ (285e3) presumably encompassing both the ease of response it offers to the person performing the demonstration, as well as the ease of understanding on the part of its beneficiary.

<sup>2</sup> E.g. *Men.* 76a4-7, *Tht.* 147c4-6. See also *Plt.* 283b2; Denyer (2008) 74-5.

<sup>3</sup> *Tht.* 206d1-e2.

definition of one of the greatest and most valuable things could not instil a similar understanding in the hearer to that which can be provided by a perceptible likeness of one of the smaller things, as this would require the type of μέθοδος τῶν λόγων which the division of weaving provides practice of. Thus, although a descriptive or definitional λόγος of one of the greatest and most valuable things could be given, it could not be properly received by the hearer in the sense of improving their understanding of the object to the degree required by the request for a λόγος (**B**) (at least from a state of ignorance).<sup>1</sup> And we are thus left with the unexplained implication that for the greatest and most valuable things, a description or definition cannot meet whatever epistemic or doxastic state is implied by the demand for a λόγος (**B**) from a state of ignorance without the use of dialectic.

The nominal contradiction can therefore be resolved by reading ‘χωρίς λόγου’ (**C**) as referring not to the use of language *per se*, but to a τῶν λόγων μέθοδος, i.e. a process of dialectical analysis.<sup>2</sup> A particular strength of this reading is that the nominal contradiction can be understood as making an epistemic point which coheres with the remainder of the passage. For EV’s intention would not be merely to highlight the fact that the more modest grasp of the object implied by the demand for a λόγος (**B**) may be furnished in someone without recourse to language,<sup>3</sup> but that since one cannot satisfy this request by any other non-ostensive means, this requires either an ostensive demonstration using a perceptible likeness or the use of a definitional method. The important logical implication of this is that for things which lack clear perceptible likenesses one cannot even gain the modest grasp of their nature

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<sup>1</sup> ‘ἀποπληρώσαι’ (286a3) or ‘ικανῶς πληρώσει’ (286a4) ‘τὴν τοῦ πυνθανομένου ψυχὴν’ (286a2-3).

<sup>2</sup> See also *Sph.* 218c5; Kucharski (1949) 152.

<sup>3</sup> The reading of ‘χωρίς λόγου’ as referring to a τῶν λόγων μέθοδος underdetermines whether the ostensive method of definition is meant to be achieved without any verbal input whatsoever. Despite the later claim that the demand may be satisfied ‘just by fitting it [sc. the perceptible likeness] to one of the senses’ (286a3-4), a reading which allows for some verbal input could still be made consistent with the text. For as it would not be the verbal input itself which is responsible for the required doxastic or epistemic effects upon the person making the request, EV’s descriptive emphasis on perception may be a result of the fact that it is only this perceptual aspect which directly instils any positive understanding of the object in the interlocutor, with any verbal aspect merely supplying the correct terminology without any rational or argumentative function.

required to meet the demand for λόγος (B) without working through a τῶν λόγων μέθοδος, as the ostensive mode of demonstration is precluded, and the use of any other non-ostensive means would be impotent.<sup>1</sup>

#### 3.4.4 λόγοι Given and Received

Proceeding to the fourth and possibly most overlooked variation in meaning, we find λόγος used at 286a5 (D) for that which one ought to practise giving and receiving on ‘each thing’ (286a5) in preparation for providing a clear demonstration of the greatest and most valuable things (something which can be achieved ‘λόγῳ μόνον’ (286a6; E), i.e. by dialectic alone). Since this is a reference back to the doubt thrown upon the purpose of the division of weaving at the beginning of the passage, the λόγοι (D) given and received as preparatory exercises must refer to the type of τῶν λόγων μέθοδος employed during the division of weaving. And it is important to emphasise that this type of λόγος is not necessarily distinct from the type of explanatory λόγος that can also be used to explain the truth of a definition from a position of knowledge. The interlude therefore contains an important switch in the meaning of ‘λόγος’ from ‘definition’ at 285d9 (A), to ‘definition’ or ‘description’ at 285e2 (B), to ‘method’, ‘argument’, ‘explanation’, or ‘grounds’ at 285e3 (C; ‘χωρὶς λόγου’), 286a5 (D), and 286a6 (E; ‘λόγῳ μόνον’).<sup>2</sup>

The practice of giving and receiving λόγοι on smaller things must therefore refer to the type of dialectical λόγος that can be used to derive a definition, fitting neatly with the fact that the passage is introduced with a reference to the division of weaving. And since, by implication,

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<sup>1</sup> This reading can also be used to make sense of *Sph.* 218c4-5 (§2.3.1) just prior to the introduction of the paradigm of angling, where EV claims that he and Theaetetus will be unable to agree on the referent of ‘σοφιστής’, or at least the ἔργον or πρᾶγμα of sophistry, ‘χωρὶς λόγου’ (218c1-5). The passage may therefore be taken as implying that in the absence clear perceptible likenesses, the community of speakers has no clear and uncontroversial shared criteria for the application of the term, a fact exacerbated by sophistry’s popular prestige (or lack thereof). See also 216c7-d2; Broadie (2016, 107-10).

<sup>2</sup> An equally deceptive switch in the meaning of ‘λόγος’ occurs in the *Theaetetus* (201d8-c5): ‘before 202b8 logos appears to mean ‘statement’, not ‘grounds’; and after it, logos appears to mean ‘grounds’ and not ‘statement’.’ (Runciman (1962) 42).

the greatest and most valuable things do not have clear perceptible likenesses via which they might be demonstrated ostensively, there is no pre-dialectical means of satisfying the demand for a λόγος (B) for these things. And it is therefore practice in giving and receiving these types of dialectical accounts on the smaller things which prepares the interlocutors for inquiries into the greatest and most valuable things.

### *3.5 Plato's Eschewal of the Additive Model of Knowledge*

As argued, an implicit premise in the passage's argument is that, in the case of the greatest and most valuable things, one cannot satisfy the modest demand for a λόγος (B) without the provision of a dialectical account. In other words, not only are clear perceptible likenesses which can satisfy the demand for a λόγος (B) unavailable for the greatest and most valuable things, but even the provision of a basic verbal definition or description would be unable to satisfy this demand. The justification for the application of dialectic to weaving thus centres not only on the relative ease with which an understanding of a λόγος (B) of weaving can be instilled due to the availability of clear perceptible likenesses, but also on the fact that it is apparently impossible to attain an equivalent understanding of one of the greatest and most valuable things without the application of dialectic.

One possible explanation for why Plato may have thought that the type of pre-dialectical understanding conferred by meeting the demand for a λόγος (B) is precluded in the absence of clear perceptible likenesses can be found in the *Theaetetus*, whose aporetic conclusion may signal an abandonment not of the third definition of knowledge as: 'δόξαν ἀληθῆ μετὰ λόγου' (*Tht.* 202c8-9) as such, but of an additive model of knowledge in which the possession of a true judgement about X *precedes* the development of an account and thus knowledge of X.<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> This hypothesis is made textually coherent by the fact that the language used to reject the third definition of knowledge involves only the *addition* of an account ('λόγος προσγιγνόμενος', 210b2) rather than merely its copresence (Broadie (2016) 104-5).

Hence, whereas under this additive model, a true judgement about X can be held without knowledge of X, and can subsequently be converted into knowledge by the addition of an account, the aporetic conclusion of the *Theaetetus* may be intended to imply that in some cases the chronological sequence of progressing from a true judgement to knowledge with the subsequent addition of an account is impossible. For some things, the development of an account of X is a precondition of the possession of a true judgement about X, and as a consequence, a true judgment about X could not be held without entailing knowledge of X.<sup>1</sup>

If this is correct, then it would offer a natural explanation of the implication in the *Statesman* that the provision of a description or simple definition of one of the greatest and most valuable things could not satisfy their request for a λόγος (B). For although it would be possible for a description or definition of one of the greatest and most valuable things to be provided to someone who asks what something is, if the additive model has been rejected, then this would not be sufficient to furnish a true judgement in its recipient (provided that the recipient is asking from a state of ignorance).

The implication in the *Statesman* that a simple definition or description of any of the greatest and most valuable things could not satisfy the request for a λόγος (B) from a state of ignorance could thus be adequately explained as a product of Plato's eschewal of this additive model, with the paradigmatic method being developed as a means of overcoming the lack of pre-dialectical true judgements about things for which there are no perceptible likenesses. Since an accurate definition or description could not form the content of a new true judgement for a person demanding a definition of one of the greatest and most valuable things from a state of ignorance, the greatest and most valuable things must be demonstrated through dialectic. However, without a good source of pre-dialectical true judgements about

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<sup>1</sup> 'There are many things such that we can recognise them and reliably identify them without understanding what they are or being able to explain them. But it cannot be simply taken for that, for every type of object *O*, true judgements (in the present sense) are available even to those who lack understanding of *O*.' (Broadie (2016) 100-1)

the greatest things, the application of dialectic will be unreliable, hence the need to practise dialectic on smaller things first, thus allowing them to act as heuristic aids in the division of the greater things via the capacity of recognition.<sup>1</sup>

One point to note about this reading is that it implies that the concept of δόξα that is precluded in the absence of an account in the *Theaetetus* is much more demanding than the contemporary concept of true belief, the content of which can be accepted for any number of irrational reasons.<sup>2</sup> Plato is evidently not interested in beliefs which might simply happen to be true or which are accepted irrationally on the basis of hearsay, but in statements whose truth is accepted for fairly good reasons. To anglicise this point, the reading implies that the provision of any non-dialectical demonstration of one of the greater things could not furnish the hearer with a good enough understanding of X for it to qualify as a true *judgement*, although its acceptance by the hearer might still qualify as a true *belief* in the contemporary sense.<sup>3</sup> By implication, true beliefs would not therefore be sufficient to reliably guide a dialectical inquiry, and this is presumably because they are not reliable enough to act as a guarantee that the interlocutors are agreeing upon the correct ‘thing’ (*Sph.* 218c2, 218c4) when conducting their analysis. By contrast, the type of doxastic grasp conferred by a clear perceptible likeness does at least provide a reliable set of judgements about the nature of a smaller thing by grounding the judgement in informative empirical experiences.

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<sup>1</sup> This would therefore imply that since the swift series of initial divisions at the start of the *Statesman* (§1.9) are not informed by any paradigm, these may be a product of EV’s prior knowledge of statesmanship. But it is worth emphasising here that the lack of pre-dialectical true judgements about the greater things need not entail that dialectical analysis is impossible without the use of a paradigm, only much more difficult and inefficient than for the smaller things (see Broadie (2016) 110).

<sup>2</sup> Broadie (2016) 102-3.

<sup>3</sup> This more demanding concept of δόξα as something rationally assented to is evident in the *Theaetetus*’s description of δόξα as the product of an internal dialogue, thus involving some deliberation (*Th.* 189e4-190a8); Broadie (2016) 95-6, 101, see also Stenzel (1940/1961, 123/85-6). As Broadie points out (2016, 103), the fact that the second definition of knowledge as true judgement is considered gainsayable and given a fair hearing also strongly suggests that Plato’s use of ‘δόξα’ in the second and third definitions of knowledge refers to a form of assent that has some rational basis.

Hence, since in the case of the greatest and most valuable things the recipient of a descriptive or simple definitional λόγος has no way of verifying its truth pre-dialectically, these will be unreliable.<sup>1</sup> This contrasts with the practical arts detailed during the initial division of knowledge where their physical activity, tools, and product allows for a basic understanding of their nature to be derived from observation of their particulars. The implication is that, in the absence of perceptible likenesses, there is no non-ostensive means of acquiring reliable pre-dialectical information that could be used to guide a dialectical inquiry. And although an accurate description or simple definition of one of the greatest and most valuable things could be given, in the absence of any easy way of verifying its truth, it must be accepted on the basis of hearsay, thus rendering it unreliable.

If this is correct, then the purpose of the paradigmatic method would be to exploit the presence of pre-dialectical true judgements instilled by perceptible likenesses of the smaller things to produce a dialectical account which bears salient similarities to the object of inquiry. And in virtue of the resemblance between the smaller paradigm and object of inquiry, this can be used as a paradigm to guide the production of a dialectical account of the greater object of inquiry in the absence of reliable pre-dialectical true judgements about it. And since it is true judgements relating to the smaller paradigm which guide this process, the interlocutors need not possess true judgements about the object of inquiry prior to the application of a μέθοδος τῶν λόγων.

### *3.6 Smallness and Perceptible Likenesses*

Hence, if one is to offer a textually coherent interpretation of the interlude which avoids sidelining the references to perception, weaving must be included among the things described as having an εἶδωλον capable of satisfying the hypothetical request for a λόγος (**B**). Given that

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<sup>1</sup> Brodie (2016) 102-3.

the interlude provides no further explanation of why there is a correlation between the smallness of something and the ease with which dialectic can be practised on it, it is natural to read the availability of εἶδωλα as filling this explanatory gap. And if the availability of εἶδωλα for the smaller things is intended to overcome the impossibility of obtaining pre-dialectical true judgements about the greatest and most valuable things, this raises the question of what exactly these images or clear perceptible likenesses are.

### 3.6.1 *The Nature of Perceptible Likenesses*

One way of understanding their nature is to read them as sensible particulars such as an expert weaver in the act. These would then be perceptible likenesses or images of weaving itself, considered as an abstract intensional entity.<sup>1</sup> Thus, if someone were to ask what weaving is, one could point to a skilled weaver in the act and thereby satisfy their demand.

This reading would also offer some coherence with the passages in the *Phaedrus* discussed previously (§2.6.1), where certain words such as ‘iron’ and ‘silver’ are said to be less prone to pre-dialectical equivocation than other words such as ‘just’, ‘good’, or ‘love’ (*Phdr.* 263a6-b1, c7-12). Elsewhere in the text, justice, prudence, and ‘the other things which are of value to souls’ (250b2)<sup>2</sup> are also said to lack clear images (‘ὁμοιώμασιν’, 250b3), with the images (‘εἰκόνας’, 250b4) they do offer being described as extremely obscure.<sup>3</sup> It is unclear whether the smaller and the greatest and most valuable things described in the

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<sup>1</sup> The metaphysical status of weaving itself in the *Statesman* is unclear, and may be read referring only to the concept, without any of the metaphysical baggage carried over from the theory of Forms. The issue of whether weaving or statesmanship are Platonic Forms is discussed extensively in Owen (1973), where it is argued that the theory of Forms as paradigms is not retained in the *Statesman* (cf. Dixsaut (2001) 270). For a defence of reading the interlude as referring to paradigmatic forms, see Cherniss (1957, 248), Skemp (2002, 241-2); see also Brisson (1997, 103-4), Thein (2013, 170-2). For the view that the *Statesman* alludes to Platonic Forms, but that the text does not determine whether Plato retains the theory of Forms as paradigms, see Roggerone (1990, 294). Since weaving must in some sense resemble its perceptible likenesses, the question of whether this entails a paradigmatic theory of Forms will depend largely upon whether a unitarian, developmental, or isolationist reading is adopted (on the latter, see Gill (2002, 153-61)).

<sup>2</sup> Trans. Rowe (1986).

<sup>3</sup> See also Brisson (1997, 103-4), Thein (2013, 170-2).

methodological interlude overlap with these categories in the *Phaedrus* perfectly, but they may at least provide the seed or mode of thought which inspired their development.<sup>1</sup>

A second option, propounded by Owen,<sup>2</sup> is to read the sensible likenesses as human artefacts such as statues, vase paintings, and drawings which depict sensible things.<sup>3</sup> Before examining these interpretations, it is necessary to address one prominent criticism which applies to both.

### 3.6.1.1 Weaving as a τέχνη

A frequent criticism of any attempt to interpret weaving as among the things which can be demonstrated ‘χωρίς λόγου’ is that while sensible depictions such as statues and portraits or sensible things such as skilled weavers in the act are able to portray the actions undertaken by a weaver, they cannot portray the τέχνη of weaving itself.<sup>4</sup> This is because the practice of the τέχνη of weaving is based upon the intellectual activity of the weaver when drawing upon their knowledge of the τέχνη, something which cannot be sensibly portrayed.<sup>5</sup> Thus, although the practical expertise of the weaver is acquired through sensible experience,<sup>6</sup> the theoretical knowledge of the τέχνη of weaving sought by EV and YS cannot be acquired by observing a master weaver at work.

However, as argued above (§3.4.2), the interlude is not intended to imply that the cognitive or epistemic state achievable via the presentation of an image is equivalent to that which EV and YS attain by completing a successful division of weaving. There is therefore no need to

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<sup>1</sup> One issue with such a reading is that although statesmanship is concerned with concepts such as the just or the good (Rowe (1995a) 212), it is unclear whether all theoretical arts would be. Hence, there would seem to be many arts which lack clear perceptible likenesses, but which are not concerned with the most esteemed things described in the *Phaedrus*.

<sup>2</sup> (1973), preceded by Apelt (1914) 130 n. 73. See also Lane (1998, 71-5).

<sup>3</sup> For an apt example, see: <https://www.metmuseum.org/art/collection/search/253348> [last accessed: 17/09/20].

<sup>4</sup> Dixsaut (2001) 276-8, Ricken (2008) 164-5. See also Goldschmidt (1947, 59).

<sup>5</sup> See *Crat.* 389a6-b4, *Grg.* 503d6-504a5, *Rep.* 596a10-b9 all of which involve τέχνηαι with corporeal products being described in intellectual terms. See also Dodds (1959, 328-9).

<sup>6</sup> See Gill (2003, 172).

infer that images must be capable of portraying the τέχνη of weaving itself in all its rational details. Instead, a sensible image must provide a set of true judgements which act as an anchor for the division of weaving, and due to weaving's resemblance with statesmanship, can also assist with the division of the latter, thus overcoming the inability to attain pre-dialectical true judgements about the greatest things. It would therefore not be unreasonable to think that true judgements about physical nature of the weaver's activity as well as the tools and materials used would suffice for this purpose.<sup>1</sup>

### 3.6.2 Images as Man-made Depictions

The main textual support for Owen's claim that the images referred to in the interlude are human artefacts designed to depict sensible things comes from the claim that there is indisputable textual symmetry between methodological interlude and an earlier passage I shall refer to as '(Q)', where the use of human artefacts as a method of demonstration is also mentioned:

'and our account, just like a portrait [ζῷον], seems adequate in terms of its superficial outline, but not yet to have received its proper clarity, as it were with paints and the mixing together of colours. But it is not painting or any kind of handicraft, but speech and discourse [λέξει καὶ λόγῳ], which constitute the more fitting medium for exhibiting every kind of living creature [πᾶν ζῷον],<sup>2</sup> for those who are able to follow; for the rest, it will be through handicrafts [χειροουργιῶν].' (277b7-c6)

The similarity of the contrast drawn between the ease with which man-made depictions of objects can be followed over 'speech and discourse' with the contrast drawn in the interlude leads Owen to conclude that: 'when Plato speaks in P [the methodological

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<sup>1</sup> It should be added that this applies as much to each of the arts comprising the entire technical field of weaving as to the art of wool-weaving itself.

<sup>2</sup> This must be read as having a wider field of reference than living things (see Campbell (1867) 80 n. 2). Its use is probably motivated by the resulting pun on the earlier occurrence at 277c1 to refer to a portrait (Rowe (1995a) 201).

interlude] of perceptible likenesses and images fashioned in a clear way for men he means to be understood literally'.<sup>1</sup>

However, there is an important disparity between the two passages which undermines Owen's argument. For whereas (Q) draws a distinction between those capable of following accounts and those who cannot, claiming that for the latter group the medium of handicrafts must be resorted to in lieu of the 'more fitting medium' of 'speech and discourse', the interlude argues that the existence of clear perceptible likenesses of some things allows one to meet the hypothetical interlocutor's demand 'χωρίς λόγου' (285e3), i.e. without resorting to an account (and thus providing a set of pre-dialectical judgements to guide its dialectical division). Thus, whereas in the interlude EV is claiming that perceptible likenesses have an essential dialectical role due to the inability to acquire pre-dialectical true judgements about the greatest things, in (Q) handicrafts are treated as a less fitting medium resorted to only in cases where an interlocutor is a member of the group of people incapable of following an account.<sup>2</sup>

In addition to the lack of strong textual support,<sup>3</sup> Owen's reading also fails to integrate the interlude into its immediate context, giving no direct explanatory role to the availability of

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<sup>1</sup> (1973) 353

<sup>2</sup> Another disparity between the two passages is that 'λόγος' is used in (Q) in the sense of the medium of speech (*Tht.* 206d1-5), whereas the term is used in the interlude at 285e2 (**B**) and 286a5 (**D**) in relation to the perceptible likenesses as 'definition' and 'account'. Dixsaut (2001, 271) argues from this that (Q) is contrasting mere verbal expression with the use of 'handicrafts', yet if Owen's interpretation were correct, it would need to be a distinction between dialectical accounts and handicrafts in order to match his interpretation of the interlude. The fault in Dixsaut's argument lies in the fact that EV says nothing about the content which is to be expressed by the medium of speech in (Q), thus allowing it to refer to a dialectical account. The use of 'λέξις' ('λέξει και λόγῳ', 277c4) would appear to support this reading, as it suggests that Plato may have been concerned that 'λόγος' on its own could fail to convey the discursive nature of dialectic (see Campbell (1867) 80 n. 2, cf. Dixsaut (2001, 271) who draws the opposite conclusion).

<sup>3</sup> The need for strong textual support and philosophical coherence is all the greater in light of the fact that Owen's interpretation depends upon an unorthodox reading of 'πεφύκασιν' at 285e1 as equivalent to εἶναι and therefore devoid of its natural connotations (Owen (1973) 350 n. 3, 354-6, Rowe (1995a) 211; cf. Skemp (2002) 241-2, Thein (2013) 166-8). One might respond that a similar textual difficulty is confronted by an interpretation of images as sensible things in dealing with the claim that the images in question are 'worked in plain view for the use of mankind' (286a1-2). However, given the earlier discussion of the divine craftsman in the myth of Cronus (see esp. 269c4-270a8) and the reference to sensible things as the products of divine workmanship at *Rep.* 530a3-7 and *Soph.* 266b2-c6, it is not unnatural to read this as a reference to sensible things rather than their man-made sensible depictions (see Rowe (1995a) 212, Dixsaut (2001) 272).

sensible depictions in the justification of the division of weaving.<sup>1</sup> Thus, *contra* Owen, rather than providing context for the methodological interlude, the purpose of (Q) is simply to remove any possibility of a literal reading of the portraiture metaphor by reminding the reader of the superior capacity of the medium of language to provide dialectical accounts for those who are capable of receiving them.

### *3.6.3 Images as Sensible Things*

The main alternative to Owen's reading is to view the images mentioned in the interlude as referring to sensible things. Owen dismisses this possibility on the basis of what he refers to as the 'Schoolmaster's Objection'<sup>2</sup>: that it is highly unlikely that sensible instances or tokens of the object of inquiry would be at hand to allow one to satisfy an interlocutor's demand for an account. But although this objection would be legitimate if images fulfilled the role of didactic tools employed to assist an ongoing dialectical division – as in this case the images would need to be called upon with some immediacy – there is no need to interpret the methodological role of sensible things in this way.

### *3.6.4 The Pre-Dialectical Value of Sensible Things*

Instead, the potential for smaller things such as weaving to be demonstrated sensibly should be read as explaining why a higher success rate is attributed to dialectical division on these smaller things due to the resulting capacity to furnish a dialectician with pre-dialectical true judgements about a paradigm. As the Schoolmaster's Objection shows, a reading of sensible things as didactic tools used for ostensive definitions would rely upon the false assumption that the sensible thing would always be available within the interlocutors' immediate

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<sup>1</sup> See Dixsaut (2001, 277), Rowe (1995a, 211), Lane (1998, 72).

<sup>2</sup> (1973) 357.

environment. The explanatory power of the claim that smaller things have perceptible likenesses in the form of sensible things must therefore centre not on the actual use of εἶδωλα to meet the demand for an account either prior to or during the process of dialectic, but rather on the theoretical potential of smaller things to be demonstrated by sensible experience. The important point isn't that an understanding of a paradigm can be furnished by sensible things ostensibly in response to a demand, but that in the absence of such an express demand, the pre-dialectical experience of these sensible things in everyday life can also furnish such an understanding of what something is.

This would explain why EV implies that the definition of weaving as πλεκτικὴ κρόκης καὶ στήμονος could have been given prior to its division (283b1-2), as the pre-dialectical perception of clear sensible likenesses could furnish an understanding of smaller things themselves sufficient to enable the articulation of a definition. Thus, unlike for the greatest and most valuable things such as statesmanship, the pre-dialectical experience of the images or sensible particulars of smaller things allows a simple definition to be produced without the need for a complete division to be undertaken.

Since it allows the dialectical division to get off to a good start, as well as assist in the understanding of the relationships between things with sensible likenesses and thus ensure greater accuracy in the process of separating and combining them during the process of division, this pre-dialectical grasp would also explain why a division is easier on smaller things.<sup>1</sup>

### *3.6.5 Smallness and Pre-Dialectical Sensible Experience*

The theoretical capacity of sensible things to furnish a basic understanding of smaller things themselves not only shows how sensible things might assist the process of division without

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<sup>1</sup> See Goldschmidt (1947, 59), Roggerone (1990, 258).

falling foul of the Schoolteacher's Objection, but also helps to explain why smallness is associated with ease of dialectical practice.

Since the division of weaving is no less complex than that of statesmanship,<sup>1</sup> the lesser stature of weaving is not a product of its relative simplicity. Instead, under this interpretation, what makes something 'smaller' can be read as its familiar quotidian nature,<sup>2</sup> and this is a product of the fact that it has images which can be encountered in everyday life.<sup>3</sup> Smallness thus makes it highly likely that an interlocutor will have a pre-dialectical grasp of an object and this in turn makes the practice of dialectic on it easier than for the greatest and most valuable things. Since there is a strong implication in the *Phaedrus* that moral properties and things closely related to them have no clear perceptible likenesses, this would also mean that the availability of perceptible likenesses overlaps with the lack of zeal paradigms are said to inspire (§2.6.6.1).

Thus, whereas for the greatest and most valuable things, only the verbal exercise of giving and receiving an account can furnish someone with both true judgements and knowledge of what something is, for smaller things the availability of clear perceptible likenesses and the likelihood that these will be experienced in everyday life ensures a good stock of pre-dialectical true judgements which can be used to assist with their division. And due to the resemblance between the smaller paradigm and greater object of inquiry, these true judgements can be used to assist in the division of the greater object of inquiry, thus

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<sup>1</sup> Cf. Delcomminette (2000) 251.

<sup>2</sup> Ricken (2008) 164, Seeck (2012) 101.

<sup>3</sup> It is notable that EV expresses the correlation between smallness and ease of practice in generic terms, stating that 'practice in everything is easier in smaller things rather than in relation to the greater.' (286a7-b2). The universal nature of the correlation between smallness and an activity's rate of success would most naturally be read as implying that smallness refers to simplicity. However, it would not be incoherent for the EV to be claiming everyday familiarity confers a greater rate of success in 'everything', whatever exactly this encompasses, and given that the relative ease with which dialectic can be practised on weaving is not a product of relative simplicity, this reading is to be preferred.

overcoming the problems resulting from the abandonment of the additive model of knowledge.<sup>1</sup>

### 3.7 Conclusion

If one is to read the interlude as having a clear argumentative structure, the lack of clear perceptible likenesses of the greatest and most valuable things ought to be read as explaining why their dialectical analysis must be practised on smaller things. This in turn requires some connection to be read between the availability of perceptible likenesses and ease of dialectical analysis. But if it is to follow from the fact that the request for a λόγος (B) can be met by the ostensive mode of demonstration for things which have clear perceptible likenesses that dialectical analysis on smaller things is easier, this would suggest that there are no non-ostensive non-dialectical means of meeting this request. It would therefore follow that for things which lack clear perceptible likenesses, even the modest grasp conferred by the ostensive mode of demonstration can only be achieved via a definitional method. An explanation of why Plato may have taken this position can be found in his abandonment of the additive account of knowledge, as indicated by the aporetic conclusion of the *Theaetetus*. If this is correct, the perceptible likenesses referred to in the interlude would be sensible things or particulars which can help to ground true judgements, a reading which also gains some support from the weaknesses of main alternative to this reading proposed by Owen, especially its reading of (Q).

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<sup>1</sup> See also 278d8-e2.

#### 4. *The Paradigm of the Herdsman*

Continuing the division of knowledge that began the inquiry into statesmanship (§1.8.1), EV offers a series of divisions leading to the definition of statesmanship as ἀνθρώπων κοινοτροφική ἐπιστήμη (267d12-3; 267a8-c3). When criticising the results of this division, the statesman’s role of caring for a human herd is compared to the role of the agricultural herdsman, variously referred to with both generic and species-specific terminology.<sup>1</sup> The purpose of these comparisons is clarified later in the text when EV states that they were seeking a definition of the statesman: ‘in accordance with the paradigm of the shepherd or cowherd [κατὰ τὸ παράδειγμα ποιμένων τε καὶ βουκόλων]’ (275b4-5), implying that this set of divisions were informed by the paradigm of agricultural herd-rearing – (referred to as ‘the paradigm of the herdsman’ throughout).<sup>2</sup>

In this chapter I offer an analysis of the series of divisions informed by this paradigm and argue that the failure to reach an adequate definition is intended to demonstrate two methodological points:

- (1) The need to take into account the results of prior divisions;
- (2) The limitations of offering overlapping divisions of the paradigm and object of inquiry.

By using the paradigm of the herdsman to select the genus referred to as ‘κοινοτροφική’, EV ignores (1). This in turn allows the remainder of the division to overlap with that of agricultural herd-rearing, with the inadequacy of the resulting definition helping to

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<sup>1</sup> νομεύς (267e1, 268b6), τῆς ἀγέλης σύντροφος (267e5), βούκολος (268a7), βουφορβός (268a8).

<sup>2</sup> The selection of herd-rearing was likely influenced by its use as a metaphor for leadership by Plato’s predecessors (e.g. the frequent use of ‘ποιμένα λαῶν’ in Homer, *Il.* 2.243, 10.73, 14.23, *Od.* 3.469, 4.532; Hes. *Sc.* 41, Xen. *Mem.* 3.2.1-3, Louis (1945) 162-3, Miller (2004) 40-1; see also E. *Supp.* 191, Hes. *Th.* 1000).

demonstrate (2). And by demonstrating the limitations of the method of overlapping divisions, this initial division helps to explain the switch to the use of a series of non-overlapping divisions during the paradigmatic division of weaving.

Hence, rather than representing a sincere attempt at applying dialectic, the error-laden divisions informed by the paradigm of the herdsman are offered primarily as an example of the poor execution of dialectical method. EV is complicit in this exercise, with his exploitation and open condescension of YS's dialectical naivety highlighting this insincerity for the reader.<sup>1</sup> However, beyond this pedagogical purpose, the initial division does make one lasting positive contribution to the final division of statesmanship – the selection of the genus of caring for a herd (*ἀγελαιοκομική/θεραπευτική/ἐπιμελητική*), which is used to restrict the scope of the final division to those arts which may lay claim to this role.<sup>2</sup>

#### *4.1 The Division of Knowledge Continued*

Having already classified statesmanship as a kind of *αὐτεπιτακτική* (260e6-9), it is agreed that the products of this directional expertise must be either animate or inanimate:

‘EV: All those in control of others that we can think of as employing directions – we shall find them issuing their directions, won't we, for the sake of something's coming into being? [*πάντας ὁπόσους ἂν ἄρχοντας διανοηθῶμεν ἐπιτάξει προσχρωμένους ἄρ' οὐχ εὐρήσομεν γενέσεώς τινος ἔνεκα προστάττοντας;*]

YS: Of course

EV: And it's not at all difficult to separate into two all of those things that come into being.

YS: How?

EV: I imagine that, of all of them taken together, some are inanimate and some are animate.’ (261a10-b8)

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<sup>1</sup> As evidenced by his reframing of YS's carelessness as a sign of courage or eagerness (*‘προθυμότατα και ἀνδρειότατα’* (262a5), *‘μάλα προθύμως’* (263c5), *‘ὅ πάντων ἀνδρειότατε’* (263d3)) as well as his praise of YS's natural talent (*‘τῆς σῆς φύσεως’*, 262c3-4).

<sup>2</sup> ἢ περὶ τὰς πόλεις ἐπιμέλεια (279a2).

EV then attributes the activity of ‘rearing’ (τροφή, 261d3) as well as ‘caring’ (ἐπιμέλεια, 261d5) to statesmanship:

‘EV: Now, as one can observe, either the production and rearing of living creatures is done singly, or it is a caring for creatures together in herds. [τήν γε μὴν τῶν ζῴων γένεσιν καὶ τροφήν τὴν μὲν τις ἂν ἴδοι μονοτροφίαν οὖσαν, τὴν δὲ κοινήν τῶν ἐν ταῖς ἀγέλαις θρεμμάτων ἐπιμέλειαν.]

YS: Correct

‘EV: But we’ll certainly not find the statesman rearing individual creatures, like some ox-driver or groom, but rather resembling a horse-breeder or cowherd. [ἀλλ’ ἵποφορβῶ τε καὶ βουφορβῶ μᾶλλον προσεικότα.]

YS: It certainly seems so, now that you say it.

EV: Well then: when it comes to rearing living creatures, are we to call the shared rearing of many creatures together a sort of “herd-rearing” or “collective rearing” [ἀγελαιοτροφίαν ἢ κοινοτροφικὴν]?’ (261d3-e3)

It should be noted here that since it is later revealed that only ἐπιμέλεια is practised by both the statesman and the agricultural herdsman, EV’s interchangeable use of ‘rearing’ (τροφή, 261d3) and ‘caring’ (ἐπιμέλεια, 261d5, 267d9) appears to represent a deliberate sleight of hand.<sup>1</sup>

#### 4.2 *The Herdsman as a Paradigm*

The paradigm of the herdsman is therefore introduced at the selection of the genus of herd-rearing (ἀγελαιοτροφικὴ/κοινοτροφικὴ), apparently guiding the division under a similar presumption to that of the divisions of angling and sophistry: that a similarity between agricultural herd-rearing and statesmanship’s relationship to the objects of their art can be used to yield a genus or part encompassing both arts, and that this comes with a high probability that the two arts will also belong to more refined sub-genera.<sup>2</sup> However, although

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<sup>1</sup> See Rowe (1995a, 181, 198-9).

<sup>2</sup> It also possesses the features previously identified as allowing a paradigm to act as a heuristic tool. It is quotidian, in the sense that the interlocutors are likely to have encountered its particulars, has a product and activities that are observable (e.g. feeding, providing bedding, calving/lambing, driving the herd/flock, shearing,

the paradigm of the herdsman appears to resemble the paradigm of the angler in being used to make a series of divisions which overlap with the parts of the division of the main object of inquiry, there are important differences in how each paradigm is used which throw some doubt on the sincerity of the former's paradigmatic function.

#### *4.2.1 The Paradigm of the Herdsman: Combined Divisions*

Unlike the paradigm of angling, no separate division of agricultural herd-rearing is carried out prior to the division of statesmanship. Instead, the paradigm is introduced after a number of divisions have already been completed. Not only does this prevent it from fulfilling the exercise function of paradigms, but the lack of prior divisions of agricultural herd-rearing means that its inclusion in the genus referred to as 'κοινοτροφική' relies on the implicit assumption that the preceding divisions also apply to this art.

#### *4.2.2 The Paradigm of the Herdsman: The Switch to the Type of Animal Reared*

The division of statesmanship also branches off from the division of the herdsman much later than any of the attempted divisions of sophistry – presumably at the division of two and four-footed animals (266b1-7). This overlap is sustained by making divisions exclusively in terms of the habitat and physical features of the animal reared once the paradigm is introduced. Not only does this prolong the overlap between the divisions, but given the lack of any disparity in pre-dialectical doxastic alacrity between the physical or habitual characteristics of humans and other animals, it also means that the paradigm of the herdsman offers no heuristic value

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culling), meaning that whatever pre-dialectical understanding of agricultural herd-rearing the interlocutors possess is likely to be clearer and less controversial than for statesmanship, and its achievement of a morally unweighted end ensures that their stock of pre-dialectical beliefs is unlikely to have been affected by their own θυμός or moral prejudices, nor infected by the claims of any pretenders influenced by a strong popular desire to be associated or disassociated with it (the herdsman's lowly status is confirmed by its dramatic portrayals (see Haubold (2009, 16)), hence the dramatists' proclivity for using the isolated and unassuming figure of the upland herdsman as a plot device, e.g. Hdt. 1. 112, S. *OT* 1026ff., Men. *Epit.* 26, 40; Heitland (1921) 63-4).

beyond its use to select the genus referred to as ‘κοινοτροφική’. As a result, not only does the paradigm of the herdsman fail to fulfil any exercise function, but its resemblance function in relation to the division of statesmanship is also limited to a single division.

#### 4.3 *The Methodological Digression: Cutting Through the Middle*

Having identified the genus of herd-rearing (ἀγελαιοτροφική/κοινοτροφική), EV presses YS to divide it into two:

‘Do you see how by showing the collective rearing of herds to be twin in form one will make what is now being sought in double the field then be sought in half of that?’

‘τὴν δὲ ἀγελαιοτροφικὴν ἄρ’ ἐννοεῖς πῆ  
τις δίδυμον ἀποφύνας τὸ ζητούμενον ἐν διπλασίοισι τὰ νῦν  
ἐν τοῖς ἡμίσεσιν εἰς τότε ποιήσει ζητεῖσθαι;’ (261e8-262a2)

YS then hesitantly suggests that the rearing of humans would appear to form one of these halves, with the rearing of animals (‘θηρίων’, 262a4) forming the other (262a3-4). This provokes a methodological digression in which EV stresses the importance of avoiding lopsided divisions ‘without reference to real classes [μηδὲ εἶδους χωρίς]’ (262b1). Instead, one must cut through the middle (‘διὰ μέσων’, 261b6), thus increasing the possibility of encountering ‘real classes’ (‘ιδέαις’, 262b7). As EV himself seems to admit,<sup>1</sup> the claim that equitable divisions maximise the possibility of encountering ‘real classes’ is obscure, a matter compounded by the quantitative connotations of the language used to explain this principle.<sup>2</sup>

##### 4.3.1 *The Methodological Digression: A Literal Reading*

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<sup>1</sup> ‘ἐν τῷ μὲν οὖν παρεστηκότι τὰ νῦν δηλῶσαι μηδὲν ἐνδεῶς ἀδύνατον’ (262c4-5).

<sup>2</sup> ‘μὴ σμικρὸν μόριον ἐν πρὸς μεγάλα καὶ πολλὰ ἀφαιρῶμεν’ (262a9-b1), ‘λεπτοουργεῖν οὐκ ἀσφαλές, διὰ μέσων δὲ ἀσφαλέστερον ἰεῖναι τέμνοντας’ (262b6-7).

A literal reading of these remarks would only seem to make logical sense if taken as referring to the chance of the *final* division reaching an *ιδέα* that captures the unique nature of the division's object in the most epistemically rewarding way. If nothing else, cutting classes with a more equitable extension when one could simply single out the final class corresponding to the division's object would at least tend to increase the number of forms used throughout the division.<sup>1</sup> Hence, although YS's suggested division in accordance with humans and all other animals may arrive at the part being sought, this is not as informative as layering more forms into the division by cutting the preceding part in accordance with forms that result in the widest possible extensions.<sup>2</sup>

#### 4.3.2 *The Methodological Digression: Humans and Animals, Greeks and Barbarians*

However, the examples of sound and unsound divisions used to flesh out the consequences of this principle seem to tell a different story. For example, the problem with the division of humanity into a Greek race and a remaining part consisting of all non-Greek races ('βάρβαρον', 262d5; 262c10-e3) is that the latter is arrived at only by the privation of the race of Greeks from the genus of human beings, resulting in a division made in accordance with a Greco-centric linguistic convention rather than an independent form.<sup>3</sup> The implication is that

<sup>1</sup> E.g. a part divided in accordance with the property of being a theoretical art (as opposed to a manual art) could be further divided in accordance with the property of being directive (as opposed to critical) in an informative way, but not *vice versa*. Similarly, a part divided in accordance with hornlessness (as opposed to the property of having horns) could be further divided in accordance with bipedalism, but dividing a part previously cut in accordance with bipedalism using the property of hornlessness would leave the extension unchanged (§4.5; fig. 3, page 105).

<sup>2</sup> It should be added that provided that 'διὰ μέσων' is context-bound and thus replaceable with a similar principle of equity for non-dichotomous divisions, this literal reading could also accommodate the types of non-dichotomous division employed during the division of weaving and final division of statesmanship (see 'δεῖ γὰρ εἰς τὸν ἐγγύτατα ὅτι μάλιστα τέμνειν ἀριθμὸν αἰεί.', 287c4-5).

<sup>3</sup> 'διὰ ταύτην τὴν μίαν κλήσιν καὶ γένος ἐν αὐτὸ εἶναι προσδοκῶσιν' (262d5-6); Miller (1980) 20-1, 24-5, Joly (1992) 86-9, Delcomminette (2000) 109-12, Sayre (2006) 219-20, Ricken (2008) 101, El Murr (2014) 124-5. Since the divisions of the herdsman and statesman are conducted concurrently, YS's erroneous division of herd-rearing into animal and human rearing may result as much from the failure of the paradigm of the herdsman to fulfil the function of stripping statesmanship of its pre-dialectical prestige as from the misleading linguistic convention represented by 'θηρίον' (262a4). If the moral status attached to statesmanship results in a pre-dialectical belief that the rearing of animals is incomparable to the loftier and more prestigious role of the statesman's care of the human herd, then YS may be under the assumption that the rearing of humans and that of

the dialectician should not simply presume that the existence of a name implies the existence of a corresponding form,<sup>1</sup> especially where a name refers to the part of a genus left over after the privation of another part (262d6-e3). In practice, EV's exhortation to cut through the middle therefore seems to amount to the prescription that divisions must only be made in accordance with forms which can be defined independently of one another, with its quantitative connotations having some indefinite metaphorical meaning.

#### 4.3.3 *The Methodological Digression: The Shorter and Longer Divisional Pathways*

The matter is further complicated by the fact that the shorter divisional route demonstrated later (§3.5.2) – which is said to not truly practise cutting through the middle (265a2-5) – does appear to make divisions in accordance with independent forms.<sup>2</sup> EV's exhortation may therefore consist of the claim that one must cut the most equitable division with the largest possible extensions which is *also* consistent with cutting in accordance with independent forms. This would then allow it to have a similar effect to the literal reading in its tendency to increase the number of forms that the final class has been cut in accordance with. However, the text is simply too obscure to allow for a conclusive reading.<sup>3</sup>

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animals must form immediate classes of their own. That this assumption is unjustified is illustrated with the image of a crane dividing its own species into a genus and then placing humans and all other living creatures into a coordinate genus it refers to dismissively as 'animals' ('θηρία', 263d8; 263d3-e2). El Murr ((2014) 125-6, 137-8 (2016) 127-8) frames this point in terms of the risk of the 'auto-glorification' enabled for humans by their capacity for self-definition, with the switch from a division in terms of the activity of rearing to a division in terms of the animal reared being motivated by its provision of a 'lesson in humility' ((2014) 126, 138, (2016) 127). Although neither of these points are inconsistent with the readings offered here, the desire to provide a lesson in humility would have to be secondary to the pedagogical intent of the switch from divisions made in terms of the activity of herd-rearing to ones in terms of the animal reared explained below (§3.7.2, i.e. EV's deliberate mismanagement of the division in order to sustain the overlap between the divisions of the paradigm and object of inquiry).

<sup>1</sup> *Sph.* 267d5-9; Miller (1980) 24-5, De Pinotti (1995) 156.

<sup>2</sup> This is a particular problem for Sayre's interpretation (2006, 235-40), which involves reading this section as stating that dividing through the middle is more likely to reach forms because a form is what determines the middle between qualitative extremes. Although this rids EV's remarks of their quantitative connotations, the reading is forced to regard the properties used during the shorter divisional route as failing to qualify as independent forms (22), despite their overlap with those used during the longer divisional route (i.e. τετράπους/δίπους, 266a-b, 266e).

<sup>3</sup> Perhaps the most charitable reading would be to take EV's remarks at 262c4-5 as Plato's assurance that a comprehensive explanation will be provided in the *Philosopher* (Apelt (1914) 122 n. 17).

#### 4.4 Wild and Tame Animals

After correcting and then ridiculing YS's attempt to divide herd-rearing into the rearing of humans and the rearing of animals, EV proceeds to correct this division. Following a summary of the divisions made prior to reaching the genus of herd-rearing (263e9-10), EV points out that since rearing a herd presupposes that the animal cared for is already tame, the genus of herd-rearing already excludes wild creatures (264a1-6) and cannot therefore be divided into any parts that relate to non-domesticated animals.<sup>1</sup> The correction therefore highlights the fact that that prior divisions determine the extension of the genera subsequently divided.<sup>2</sup>

Although the overt purpose of bringing this principle to light is to point out that YS's flawed division of humans and non-human animals is already precluded by the implicit division of tame and wild creatures, it also demonstrates to the reader that YS should have balked at EV's assumption that both statesmanship and agricultural herd-rearing could be included within the same part ('κοινοτροφική') after the divisions into 'γνωστική', 'ἐπιτακτική', and 'αὐτεπιτακτική'.<sup>3</sup> For if not a practical art (πρακτική), agricultural husbandry at the very least is not a theoretical (γνωστική) or self-directive art (αὐτεπιτακτική).<sup>4</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Delcomminette (2000) 119, cf. Diès (1935) 18 n. 1.

<sup>2</sup> 'Si nous voulons diviser correctement, nous devons commencer par examiner les articulations naturelle du genre lui-même; or ce genre ne s'identifie pas purement et simplement au membre droit de la dernière différence invoquée, mais il résulte de l'entrelacement d'une série d'Idées dont les caractéristiques propres se modifient au cours du processus, en fonction des divers rapports de participation qu'elles entretiennent les unes avec les autres.' (Delcomminette (2000) 119-20; see also 74-8 with n. 135).

<sup>3</sup> As well as the inclusion of the rearing of any type of domesticated animal within this part, e.g. schools of fish (264c1-4), gaggles of geese, and herds of cranes (264c6-8).

<sup>4</sup> Compare 'καὶ γὰρ ἀρχιτέκτων γε πᾶς οὐκ αὐτὸς ἐργατικὸς ἀλλ' ἐργατῶν ἄρχων' (259e9-10) with 'ἀλλ' αὐτὸς τῆς ἀγέλης τροφὸς ὁ βουφορβός, αὐτὸς ἰατρός, αὐτὸς οἶον νυμφευτὴς καὶ περὶ τοὺς τῶν γιγνομένων τόκους καὶ λοχείας μόνος ἐπιστήμων τῆς μαιευτικῆς.' (268a8-b2).

#### *4.5 The Longer and Shorter Routes*

A series of divisions then follow, with the part referred to as ‘κοινοτροφική’ being divided into the rearing of animals living on water and those that live on dry land (264b11-e1); the latter then being divided into the rearing of winged animals and those that travel by foot (264e6-10). At this stage EV pauses to offer YS two divisional pathways:

‘one of them quicker, dividing a small part off against a large one, while the other more closely observes the principle we were talking about earlier, that one should cut in the middle as much as possible, but is longer.’ (265a2-5)

YS fails to apply the earlier lesson and asks to follow both paths (265a7-b1), to which EV agrees, taking up the longer route first.

##### *4.5.1 The Longer Route*

This involves dividing the rearing of creatures that travel by foot into the rearing of horned and of hornless animals (265b8-c8); the latter genus then being divided into the rearing of animals that interbreed and the rearing of those that are unmixed in breeding (265d9-e8). The division is concluded by distinguishing between the rearing of four and of two footed animals, a division achieved jokingly (266a1-d2).<sup>1</sup>

##### *4.5.2 The Shorter Route*

The shorter route replaces the earlier division of the rearing of animals that live on dry land into the rearing of winged animals and those that travel by foot with a division into the rearing of four and of two footed animals (266e4-5). Recognising that this would allow the

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<sup>1</sup> See Ricken (2007, 102-3), Brisson and Pradeau (2011, 287-8 appendix 3).

rearing of humans to be in the same category as the rearing of birds, this is followed by a division into the rearing of feathered and featherless bipeds (266e5-11).<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> D.L. 4.40.




Figure 3 (adapted from Lukas (1888) 235)

#### 4.6 EV's Criticism of the Definition

After summarising the definition of statesmanship achieved via the longer route (267a8-c3), EV explains how it fails to adequately define statesmanship by highlighting a key difference between herdsmen and statesmen – the fact that many others would lay claim to sharing the role of rearing or caring for the human herd:

‘EV: Then let us look at the difference between all herdsmen, on the one hand, and kings on the other.

YS: What’s that?

EV: Let us see if in the case of any other herdsman anyone who has the title of another expertise claims or pretends to share the rearing of the human herd with him.

YS: How do you mean?

EV: Like this: that merchants, farmers, millers, and bakers, all of them, and gymnastic trainers too, and doctors as a class – all of these, as you well know, would loudly contend against the herdsman concerned with things human whom we called statesman that *they* care for human rearing [ὡς σφεῖς τῆς τροφῆς ἐπιμελοῦνται τῆς ἀνθρωπίνης], not merely for that of human beings in the herd, but for that of the rulers as well.’ (267e1-268a4)

This contrasts with the agricultural herdsman, who has no such contenders:

‘but what we know is that with a cowherd [βουκόλω] no one will dispute about any of these things, but the herdsman [βουφορβός] is by himself rearer of the herd, by himself its doctor, by himself its matchmaker, as it were, and sole expert in the midwife’s art when it comes to the births of offspring and confinements. Again, to the extent that the nature of his charges allows them to partake in play and music, no one else is more capable of comforting them and soothing them with his incantations, performing best, as he does, the music that belongs to his flock with instruments or with unaccompanied voice. And it’s the same way with all other herdsmen [νομέων]. True?’ (268a6-b7)

EV therefore concludes that in order to provide a complete account of the statesman, they must remove those who ‘crowd around’ (268c8) him by pretending to share his herding

function. And for this they must take a different path which incorporates an element of ‘play’ (παιδία, 268d8).

#### *4.7 The Contribution of the Paradigm of the Herdsman to the Discovery of Statesmanship*

##### *4.7.1 The Need to Take into Account the Results of Prior Divisions*

Since agricultural herd-rearing is not a theoretical art, it is excluded from the parts resulting from the division of ἐπιστήμη into γνωστική, ἐπιτακτική, and ἀτεπιτακτική. And by positing a part referred to as ‘κοινοτροφική’ under the pretence that it includes agricultural herd-rearing, EV therefore fails to take into account the results of previous divisions.

##### *4.7.2 The Limitations of Offering Overlapping Divisions*

This allows EV to present the divisions of statesmanship and agricultural herd-rearing as though they overlap. Once combined with EV’s use of physical and habitual characteristics of the animal reared to make subsequent divisions, this allows EV to avoid the basic limitation confronted by the method of overlapping divisions mentioned previously: that in order to account for their distinct nature, the division of the paradigm and the object of inquiry must eventually branch off from one another, thus rendering the interlocutors’ superior pre-dialectical understanding of the paradigm of no use in the remainder of the division.

With the initial division, this switch to divisions in terms of characteristics of the animal reared is achieved at the expense of further detail on statesmanship’s nature as a form of ἀτεπιτακτική – a problem which helps to highlight the basic limitation of using overlapping divisions. For if a paradigm is to be used to offer a division which overlaps with that of statesmanship, the preceding divisions of ἐπιστήμη into γνωστική, ἐπιτακτική, and

αὐτεπιτακτική must also apply to this art. Since this implies that the paradigm must also be a theoretical form of expertise, it is difficult to see how it might offer a more reliable stock of pre-dialectical true judgements which render its own division easier. Hence, if a paradigm is to assist in the provision of more detail on the statesman's epitactic function, the nature of this art cannot be theoretical, but of a kind that offers greater ease of pre-dialectical understanding (e.g. a kind of πρακτική).

#### *4.7.3 The Positive Contribution of the Paradigm of the Herdsman*

This may help to explain why in the remainder of the inquiry EV abandons the method of overlapping divisions. Most notably, with his use of weaving as a paradigm. However, the first occurrence of the use of a paradigm to assist in the definition of statesmanship without the intention of forming overlapping parts actually comes from the paradigm of the herdsman itself. This occurs after the corrective effects of the myth, when the division into 'κοινοτροφική' is replaced by the part referred to as 'ἀγελαιοκομική/θεραπευτική/ἐπιμελητική' which is selected using the activity of ἐπιμέλεια on the basis that it applies to both the paradigm and the object of inquiry without implying that this part includes agricultural forms of herd-rearing (which is precluded due to the preceding divisions of ἐπιστήμη into γνωστική, ἐπιτακτική, and αὐτεπιτακτική). A form which applies to the paradigm is therefore used to cut a distinct part in the division of statesmanship, a technique which recurs when forms used in the paradigmatic division of weaving (αἰτία and συναίτιος) are used to divide a distinct part in the final division of statesmanship.

Other than its pedagogical effect as a demonstration of the limitations of overlapping divisions (as well as of the poor application of dialectic in general) the paradigm of the

herdsman does therefore make one lasting positive contribution to the final definition of statesmanship: the selection of the genus of caring for a herd (ἀγελαιοκομική/θεραπευτική/ἐπιμελητική), whose methodological role in the final division is obscure, but which at the very least is used to restrict its remit to those arts which may lay claim to this role.<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> τέχνην κατὰ πόλιν αὐτὴν (287b6).

## 5. The Myth of Cronus

To avoid disgracing their argument by allowing other arts the pretence of sharing the statesman's role,<sup>1</sup> EV insists that it is necessary to introduce 'a large part of a great story [μεγάλου μύθου]' (268d8-9). In what follows, Plato borrows heavily from Hesiod to construct what is perhaps his most unusual myth.<sup>2</sup> We are given fantastical descriptions of men being born from the earth and ageing backwards, of humans consorting with animals, and of a natural world so providential that its inhabitants have no need to even produce bedding or clothing for themselves, sleeping naked on the soft and abundant grass. The peculiarity of much of the myth's finer details make it tempting to dismiss the bulk of it as gratuitous, perhaps being inspired by nothing more than Plato's desire to offer his own rendition of a well-worn mythical framework.<sup>3</sup> However, it does serve an important corrective function by demonstrating a number of points that the initial definition of statesmanship failed to take into account.

In this chapter I offer an analysis of this corrective function and argue that the myth is intended to demonstrate two main points:

- (1) The need for a division of mortal labour into distinct τέχναι;
- (2) The need for the statesman's responsibilities to extend beyond those covered by the concept of τροφή.

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<sup>1</sup> 'εἰ μὴ μέλλομεν ἐπὶ τῷ τέλει καταισχνᾶναι τὸν λόγον' (268d2-3).

<sup>2</sup> Hes. *Op.* 109-26. It may also incorporate some Empedoclean, Pythagorean, and Orphic doctrines (DK B. Fr. 17, 21; Campbell (1867) xxii-xxvii, 57 n. 5, 59 n. 10, 63 n. 3, 66-7 n. 9, Frutiger (1930) 242, 256, Diès (1935) xxxii-iii, Skemp (1952) 90-1, Taylor (1961) 211, Bollack (1965) 133-6). 'Un assemblage original d'emprunts divers, les uns philosophiques, les autres fabuleux: telle pourrait être la définition du mythe du *Politique*, qui compte parmi les plus étranges de Platon.' Frutiger (1930) 241.

<sup>3</sup> The basic storyline of the myth is often thought to have archaic, possibly even pre-hellenic origins (Schuhl (1934) 77 n. 4, Gatz (1967) 7-27, El Murr (2009) 284).

(1) is achieved via an examination of certain *a posteriori* facts about the universe – the lack of any earthly abundance of food, drink, and safety from physical harm; and (2) is demonstrated by the absurdity and undesirability of Cronus’s reign.

The main result of the myth’s corrective effects is the use of the activity of caring (ἐπιμέλεια) for a herd instead of the activity of rearing (τροφή) a herd in the division of the production of animate things, resulting in the replacement of ‘κοινοτροφική’ with a part referred to as ‘ἀγελαιοκομική’, ‘θεραπευτική’, or ‘ἐπιμελητική’. However, since the ‘outline’ (περιγραφή, 277c1) resulting from the revised division still fails to provide adequate detail on how the statesman achieves his caring function, EV concludes that it still must be filled in with ‘paints and the mixing together of colours’ (277c2) using the paradigm of weaving.

### *5.1 The Cosmological Details of the Myth*

The mythical universe EV constructs in order to demonstrate the inadequacy of the initial definition oscillates between a divinely-driven motion under Cronus’s reign, and an opposite atheistic motion (the reign of Zeus).<sup>1</sup>

#### *5.1.1 The Motion of the Universe*

The explanation for this oscillation is as follows. As the universe partakes in the material, it must be subject to change (269d5-e1). Since a continuous unidirectional motion would be unbecoming of this material status, the universe is subject to reversals in its motion after a set period of time (269c4-d3; e3-6).

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<sup>1</sup> The Hesiodic reference to Zeus (272b2) representing only a difference in the main divinity’s level of engagement with the universe (Brisson and Pradeau (2011) 41 n. 1, 232 n. 136).

Movement in one direction is caused by a divinity, whilst its backwards reversal is the result of this divinity withdrawing its influence. At which point:

‘it goes on its own way under its own power, having been let go at such a time [κατὰ καιρὸν] as to travel backwards for many tens of thousands of revolutions because of the very fact that its movement combines the effects of its huge size, perfect balance, and its resting on the smallest of bases.’ (270a5-8)<sup>1</sup>

But as with the forward motion, this reversal is not permanent, and is subject to a counter-reversal which re-establishes its former divinely-guided motion. Most life in the universe does not survive this counter-reversal, which represents ‘the greatest and most complete turning of all’ (270c1-2). Humans survive only in small numbers (270c7-d1), age backwards, grow smaller, and eventually disappear (270d6-271a11).<sup>2</sup> Humans then emerge again from the earth, being put together from the dead (271a4-c7).

### 5.1.2 *The Reign of Cronus*

At this point we are presented with a description of the condition of humans under the divinely-guided forward rotation. Just as mortal herdsmen are specialised by the type of

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<sup>1</sup> Schuhl (1968, 82-4) hypothesises that Plato is drawing an analogy with a mechanical apparatus representing the movement of the stars. The device, being suspended by a thread, could be spun in one direction and then let go to spin back in the opposite direction of its own accord, thus representing the sequence of guided motion and autonomous reversal. Although the claim that such an analogy is being drawn is tenuous, relying partly upon the reference to ‘manual crafts [χειροουργίῳν]’ at 277c6, the idea nonetheless offers a useful framework for understanding the reversal in the movement of a body that is said to be unable to turn by itself, yet whose reversal is not the work of a deity (see also Diès (1935, xxxi), Skemp (1952, 101-2), Delcomminette (2000, 178-9)).

<sup>2</sup> Some interpreters see this as a third intermediate stage of the myth (Rowe (1995a) 13, (2009), Brisson (1995) 249-52, Brisson and Pradeau (2011) 41-5; cf. Ferrari (1995) 394 n. 17, Lane (1998) 103-5, Delcomminette (2000) 210-1, Ricken (2008) 132-5, El Murr (2009) 287-8, (2014) 148). Under this reading, the myth posits three separate stages in the cosmic cycles of the universe: a divinely-induced forward motion (east to west; the reign of Cronus); a reversal (west to east; humans age backwards and grow smaller); and the restoration of the forward motion (east to west; the reign of Zeus), in which the cosmos is now either entirely autonomous and atheistic (Rowe) or monotheistic and forsaken of all the divine influences of the reign of Cronus except the maintenance of its forward rotation (Brisson and Pradeau). Part of the motivation for abandoning the orthodox two-stage interpretation is that it fails to correlate with its Hesiodic counterpart (Rowe (2009) 300-6). But it is unclear why Plato would be duty-bound to show complete fealty to the original, especially as absurdist adaptations of the myth were a trope in the Old Comedy of Plato’s era (El Murr (2009) 283-7).

animal they rear (271d6-7), different parts of the cosmos and species of animal are overseen by separate gods ('δαίμονες', 271d7). But as for humans:

'A god tended them, taking charge of them himself [θεὸς ἔνεμεν αὐτοὺς αὐτὸς ἐπιστατῶν],<sup>1</sup> just as now human beings, themselves living creatures, but different and more divine, pasture other kinds of living creatures more lowly than themselves; and given his tendance, they had no political constitutions, nor acquired wives and children, for all of them came back to life from the earth, remembering nothing of the past. While they lacked things of this sort, they had an abundance of fruits from trees and many other plants, which grew not through cultivation but because the earth sent them up of its own accord. [οὐχ ὑπὸ γεωργίας φουμένους, ἀλλ' αὐτομάτης ἀναδιδούσης τῆς γῆς.] For the most part they would feed outdoors, naked and without bedding; for the blend of the seasons was without painful extremes, and they had soft beds from abundant grass that sprang from the earth. What you are hearing about, then, Socrates, is the life of those who lived in the time of Cronus; as for this one, which they say is in the time of Zeus, the present one, you are familiar with it from personal experience.' (271e5-272b3)

EV and YS then reflect on the eudaemonic ramifications of this cosmic era, with EV arguing that this depends entirely upon whether they use their leisure to practise philosophy and to converse with animals, asking them whether they might have some special capacity for gathering wisdom (272b8-c5).<sup>2</sup>

EV insists upon withholding judgement on this matter:

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<sup>1</sup> The text is ambiguous as to whether it is the main deity himself who oversees the human herd (Vanhoutte (1954) 336), or whether this responsibility is instead delegated to one of his lesser δαίμονες, as is unambiguously the case for other species of animal (Solmsen (1960) 187-8, Brisson and Pradeau (2011) 41). Since it is the ζῷα (271d6) that are divided 'κατὰ γένη καὶ ἀγέλας' (271d6) among the δαίμονες, the later switch to 'θηρία' (272c7) to describe non-human animals implies that 'ζῷα' has a wider extension that includes humans (Solmsen (1960) 187 with n. 1; see also 264a1). But equally, the switch from 'θεῖοι...δαίμονες' (271d6-7) to 'θεὸς...αὐτὸς' (272e5-6) suggests first-hand responsibility is taken by the main deity, with humans being placed under a direct theocracy that would befit their status as more divine than other creatures (271e4-5). The later use of 'τῷ μεγίστῳ δαίμονι' (272e7-8) to refer to the main deity also allows for the possibility that the δαίμονες among which the ζῷα are divided could include the main deity. It would therefore seem that the main deity apportions himself the responsibility of maintaining the forward motion of the universe as well as overseeing the human herd, while the 'regions' ('τόπους', 272e7) of the universe and herds of other animals are overseen by the lesser gods. Further support for this comes from the fact that the ζῷα are said to be divided into species and then subdivided into herds, a subdivision which is not applied to the human herd (cf. Rowe (1995a) 193). Instead, humankind is treated as one herd with a single deity overseeing it, which would be in keeping with the main deity's superior power.

<sup>2</sup> There may be a hint of self-deprecation in this passage – the extraordinary means taken in the *Statesman* to gather wisdom being the butt of the joke. That the process of gathering wisdom for humans through philosophy may not be enjoyable is made explicit at 286d4-6, and EV's image of humans asking animals hopefully for a more effective alternative thus seems to ridicule their current philosophical plight from within, whilst offering a humorous nod to the reader.

‘until such time as someone appears who is qualified to inform us [ἔως ἂν ἡμῖν μηνυτῆς τις ἰκανὸς φανῆ] which of the two ways the desires [τὰς ἐπιθυμίας] of men of that time were directed in relation to the different varieties of knowledge and the need for talk [περὶ τε ἐπιστημῶν καὶ τῆς τῶν λόγων χρείας]’ (272d2-4).<sup>1</sup>

But EV’s legalistic tone (likely adopted for ironic effect)<sup>2</sup> does little to conceal his pessimistic assessment.<sup>3</sup> And we are left with the conclusion that the earth-born race squanders their leisure on food and drink and the telling of tales (‘μύθους’, 272c7).<sup>4</sup>

When this divinely-ordered reign inevitably comes to an end and the ‘steersman of the universe’ (272d3-4) withdraws his influence to allow a reversal, destruction is wrought again (272d6-273a4). But having watched the universe feralise from afar, the divinity intervenes and ‘takes his position again at the steering oars’ (273e1), lest the universe destroy itself completely. Setting the universe back on its forward rotation, the cycle is repeated, and the reign of Cronus starts anew (273e2-4).

### 5.1.3 *The Reign of Zeus*

EV finally reveals the myth’s salience with a description of the conditions of living things during the reign of Zeus, which we now live under, and whose cause and entropic effects have just been described in the account of atheistic backwards movement:

‘Since we had been deprived of a god who possessed and pastured us [τῆς γὰρ τοῦ κεκτημένου καὶ νέμοντος ἡμᾶς δαίμονος ἀπερημωθέντες ἐπιμελείας], and since for their part the majority of animals – all those who had an aggressive nature – had gone

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<sup>1</sup> Since ‘ἐπιστημῶν’ must be read as the antithesis of 272c5-8, ‘the need for talk’ is probably too loose a construal of ‘τῆς τῶν λόγων χρείας’; cf. ‘...dans quel esprit les hommes de ce temps recherchaient les sciences et le commerce de la pensée.’ (trans. Diès (1935) 26); ‘ob die damaligen Menschen den Trieb zu Wissenschaft und zur Dialektik hatten.’ (trans. Apelt (1914) 47); ‘se quelli d’allora avevano o no inclinazione per le scienze e per l’utilità dei ragionamenti’ (trans. Roggerone (1990) 243). The context demands that the ‘ἐπιστημῶν καὶ τῆς τῶν λόγων χρείας’ be taken as including dialectic, but the phrase also allows for any of the forms of ἐπιστήμη or τέχνη which do not contribute to the material needs of humans, such as astronomy, pure mathematics, music, and painting (Rowe (1995a) 194).

<sup>2</sup> Apelt (1914) 127 n. 46, Frutiger (1930) 186, Solmsen (1960) 188, Giorgini (2005) 206 n. 110.

<sup>3</sup> Frutiger (1930) 188, Herter (1958) 115, Solmsen (1960) 186, Ricken (2008) 123; cf. Rodier (1957) 34.

<sup>4</sup> It is notable in this respect that Plato never refers to the reign of Cronus as a ‘golden’ race or age (‘χρῦσεον...γένος’, Hes. *Op.* 109, *Cra.* 397e5-398a6). Cf. Baldry (1952) 84.

wild, human beings, by themselves weak and defenceless, were preyed on by them, and in those first times were still without resources and without expertise of any sort; their spontaneous supply of food was no longer available to the [ἄτε τῆς μὲν αὐτομάτης τροφῆς ἐπιλελοιπυίας], and they did not know yet how to provide for themselves, having had no shortage to force them do so before. As a result of all this they were in great difficulties. This is why the gifts from the gods, of which we have ancient reports, have been given to us, along with an indispensable requirement for teaching and education: fire from Prometheus, crafts [τέχναι] from Hephaestus and his fellow craftworker, seeds and plants from others. Everything that has helped to establish human life has come about from these things, once care from the gods, as has just been said, ceased to be available to human beings, and they had to live their lives through their own resources and take care for themselves, just like the cosmos as a whole [ἐπειδὴ τὸ μὲν ἐκ θεῶν, ὅπερ ἐρρήθη νυνδὴ, τῆς ἐπιμελείας ἐπέλιπεν ἀνθρώπους, δι' ἑαυτῶν τε ἔδει τὴν τε διαγωγὴν καὶ τὴν ἐπιμέλειαν αὐτοῦς αὐτῶν ἔχειν καθάπερ ὅλος ὁ κόσμος]' (274b5-d6)

Unlike under the reign of Cronus, human needs must be met using mortal labour, with the limitations of mortals necessitating specialisation into different arts (as represented by the gift of τέχναι from Hephaestus and Athena).<sup>1</sup>

### 5.2 *The Corrective Power of the Myth*

Since the initial division classified statesmanship as a kind of ἐπιτακτική, the conclusion that it must be revised does not follow directly from the myth's demonstration of the need for a division of labour into τέχναι. Instead, this relies upon the premise that meeting the trophic needs<sup>2</sup> of humans is insufficient to create and maintain the ideal πόλις.

Although no positive argument is offered for this premise, it would help to explain two passages in the discussion of the myth's corrective effects: the description of the scale of the initial definition's mistake as being both greater and lesser; and EV's assertion that the term 'θεραπευτικός' cannot be applied to any mortal art.

<sup>1</sup> *Prt.* 321c3-322a2, *R.* 369e2-370c5, 374a4-c2.

<sup>2</sup> As represented by the needs met by the agricultural and divine herdsman (such as medicinal care, matchmaking, and midwifery (268a9-b2), as well as feeding the herd, and providing shelter and bedding (272a3-b1)).

### 5.2.1 Errors Greater and Lesser

At 274e9-275a3, EV states that the fact that the initial definition applies only under the reign of Cronus carries the unacceptable implication that the statesman is divine rather than mortal. This represents the greater error of the initial definition. However, since it correctly implies that the statesman rules over the city in its entirety, but without specifying in what manner (τρόπος, 275a4) this is achieved, it contains an element of truth (275a3-6). And in this respect the magnitude of its error is lesser than its sacrilegious implications.

EV subsequently implies that the need for a division of mortal labour into τέχναι ('τὰ νῦν', 275b3) leaves the attribution of herd-rearing (ἀγελαιοτροφία, 275b2) to the statesman vulnerable to disputation by others (275b1-3). Consequently, no such vulnerability affects the divine herdsman, who alone is worthy of this attribution 'κατὰ τὸ παράδειγμα ποιμένων τε καὶ βουκόλων' (275b4-5).

The argument here is unclear, but presuming that 'ἀγελαιοτροφία' is meant in a generic (i.e. non-directive) sense, EV would appear to be implying that it could only be indisputably attributed to an art that is able to fulfil each and every trophic need of humans. Since an epitactic art might achieve this in the reign of Zeus by directing other kinds of expertise, it is further implied that an epitactic art that practises ἀγελαιοτροφία does not exist in our current era. Given the context, this can be taken in a normative or evaluative sense (i.e. it has no essential role in the creation and maintenance of the ideal πόλις), hence why the mythical deity the initial definition *does* apply to presides over herds of humans in a primitive, apolitical condition.<sup>1</sup> An epitactic kind of ἀνθρώπων κοινοτροφικὴ ἐπιστήμη therefore applies only to a mythical form of expertise which can direct the universe and its laws,<sup>2</sup> but fails to apply to the art that rules over the ideal city.

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<sup>1</sup> See Solmsen (1960, 186-7).

<sup>2</sup> Although the main deity delegates at least some responsibilities to the lesser δαίμονες, it is ultimately his influence over the movement of the universe which makes him the rearer of the human herd ('οἱ τρώφιμοι τοῦ Κρόνου' (272b8); Campbell (1867) 60 n. 9, Brisson (1995) 358 n. 32, Jinek (2013) 109-10).

### 5.2.2 'θεραπευτικός' and Mortal Arts

Further support for this reading can be found later in the discussion of the myth's corrective effects, where EV's asserts that no art 'ἐν ἡμῖν' (276b3) deserves the title 'θεραπευτικός' (276a9-b6). Since the immediate context demands that 'θεραπευτικός' be taken as referring to the possessor of ἀνθρώπων θεραπευτικὴ τέχνη, EV's assertion may refer only to the type of self-directive θεραπευτικός posited by the initial definition – thus reaffirming its failure to apply in the ideal πόλις. Alternatively, 'θεραπευτικός' may refer not to the possessor of the specifically *epitactic* form of ἀνθρώπων θεραπευτικὴ τέχνη posited by the initial definition, but of ἀνθρώπων θεραπευτικὴ τέχνη understood in a more generic sense – a reading supported by the claim that those who practise the non-epitactic arts of the merchant, farmer, baker, gymnastic trainer, and doctor (267e7-9) have a better claim on 'θεραπευτικός' than the statesman (276b4-6). The remark would then be stating that ἀνθρώπων θεραπευτικὴ τέχνη does not describe *any* mortal art, directive or otherwise. And it follows that in order to qualify as a kind of θεραπευτικὴ τέχνη, an art would have to be able to meet each and every trophic need of a herd.<sup>1</sup> Since, in principle, this might be achieved for humans by a kind of ἐπιτακτική that organises and directs the labour of others, it is implied that there is no need for a kind of κοινοτροφική to direct the πολλοί (276b4) in the ideal city.

### 5.3 The Need for the Statesman's Responsibilities to Extend Beyond Those Covered by the Concept of Rearing (2)

The myth does not supply a clear explanation for this conclusion. For this, one must appeal to (2): the need for the statesman's responsibilities to extend beyond those covered by the concept of τροφή. Although (2) is mainly demonstrated by the discussion of the statesman's

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<sup>1</sup> Hence the implicit inclusion of the arts of agricultural herd-rearing under θεραπευτικὴ τέχνη (275d8-9).

responsibilities after the final division, it is also indicated by at least one aspect of EV's account of Cronus's reign. Namely, the lack of any social conflict.<sup>1</sup>

### 5.3.1 *τροφή and the Prevention of Conflict*

That the lack of any social conflict under the reign of Cronus is intended to provoke the reader's incredulity,<sup>2</sup> and thus highlight one of the most obvious limitations of defining the statesman's role in terms of ἀγελαιοτροφία (275b2) 'κατὰ τὸ παράδειγμα ποιμένων τε καὶ βουκόλων' (275b4-5), is confirmed during EV's discussion of the statesman's role in preventing social conflict later in the text. Here it is stated that in order to prevent ἔχθρη and στάσις (308b4) between the courageous and the moderate elements of the citizenry, the statesman must cultivate a true belief in the soul of each citizen about what is 'fine, just, and good' (309c5), thus harmonising the eternal part of their soul with a divine bond (309c1-2).<sup>3</sup> A civic culture which encourages cooperation must also be created via shared beliefs, honour, dishonour, reputation, and pledges (310e9-11), creating a 'smooth and "fine-woven" fabric' (310e11-311a1) from the varied temperaments of the citizenry. The prevention of conflict does not therefore follow automatically from human comfort, but must be achieved by

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<sup>1</sup> (2) is also weakly implied by the subtext of EV's refusal to discuss the eudaemonic ramifications of Cronus's reign, with the implicit premise that human happiness requires philosophy, and EV's evident lack of faith in humans' innate desire to pursue it, suggesting that a philosophical education must be provided for those suited to it. It is unclear whether this should be taken as implying that εὐδαιμονία is the preserve of an exclusive class, but the description of a moral education later in the text, and the statesman's concern for the city as a whole (311b7-c3; *R.* 519e1-520a4), suggest that at least in the case of the citizenry, their confused desires ('τὰς ἐπιθυμίας', 272d3) 'περὶ τε ἐπιστημῶν καὶ τῆς τῶν λόγων χρείας' (272d3-4) must be overridden, if not permanently corrected, during their formative years (see also Rowe (2020) 317 n. 33, 322-3).

<sup>2</sup> Since the cause of the lack of war or conflict is ascribed to the divine herdsman's provision of his charges needs ('αὐτάρκης εἰς πάντα ἕκαστος ἑκάστοις ὧν οἷς αὐτὸς ἔνεμεν', 271d7-8) – the other effects listed being the prevention of savagery, predation, and cannibalism (271d8-9) – the reader is expected to infer that social cooperation would follow naturally from the material comfort of the human herd (cf. Gill (1979) 156, 159). Another possibility is that EV's harmonious portrayal of the earth-born race is a product of an unmentioned divine instilment of a just moral disposition and uniformity of temperament. But as the discussion of the propensity for conflict later in the *Statesman* shows, the incredulity of the reader should then extend to the possibility of these harmonious conditions carrying over to the reign of Zeus. Cf. the genealogical explanation of social cooperation in Hesiod ('ὡς ὁμόθεν γεγάασι θεοὶ θνητοὶ τ' ἄνθρωποι.' (*Op.* 108), 'οἱ δ' ἐθελήμοι ἦσυχου...' (118); Neschke-Hentschke (1990, 37-9)).

<sup>3</sup> Those subject to an irredeemably evil nature having been executed, exiled, and punished (308e9-309a3).

providing the correct education and moral upbringing as well as the promotion of appropriate civic norms.

### 5.3.1.1 *The Athenian's Rendition in the Laws*

That Plato did not think social cooperation could follow automatically from the provision of the citizenry's material needs finds additional support in the Athenian's rendition of the myth in the *Laws*.<sup>1</sup> Here, the positive eudaemonic effects of divine rule are left in no doubt (*Lg.* 712b2-3, 713e3). But the basis of this assessment is the ἀφθονία δίκης, along with εἰρήνη, εὐνομία, and αἰδώς (*Lg.* 713e1-2) resulting from divine care (‘ἐπιμελούμενον ἡμῶν’, 713e3), with no indication that this is a natural consequence of the ἀφθονία καρπῶν (*Plt.* 272a2-3) implied by 713c3-4.<sup>2</sup> In fact, since δίκη, εἰρήνη, εὐνομία, and αἰδώς should be read as moral dispositions of individuals as much as social conditions attaining in the cities themselves,<sup>3</sup> it is reasonable to assume that they are divinely instilled in each citizen as a gift from the gods.<sup>4</sup> Hence, although the Athenian's rendition serves a different purpose – emphasising the moral limitations of mortals more than the physical and intellectual limitations that necessitate a division of mortal labour – there is an underlying recognition that meeting the material needs of the citizenry is an insufficient condition of optimal rule.

### 5.3.2 *κοινοτροφική and the πόλις*

The statesman's role cannot therefore be reduced to breeding and fattening a herd for his own benefit like an agricultural κοινοτροφικός,<sup>5</sup> nor to the provision of the human herd's every

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<sup>1</sup> See Solmsen (1960, 189-95).

<sup>2</sup> δίκη, εἰρήνη, εὐνομία, and αἰδώς may even be preconditions of material abundance (Schöpsdau (2003) 184-5).

<sup>3</sup> Schöpsdau (2003) 184, 190-2; see also Solmsen (1960, 192) and Denyer (2008, 108) on ‘αἰδώς’.

<sup>4</sup> *Prt.* 322c2-4; Schöpsdau (2003) 183-4.

<sup>5</sup> *R.* 343b1-d1.

material need under the pretence of freeing them up for revelry and the telling of tales.<sup>1</sup> Instead, it must extend beyond the responsibilities covered by the agricultural and divine herdsman by providing a suitable moral and educational environment, and, as revealed later in the text, by enforcing marriages on the basis of moral temperament rather than physical characteristics, and making decisions on the basis of their moral rather than purely material benefits through the unique capacity to judge the ἐγκαίρια in relation to the onset of the most important matters in the city (‘τῶν μεγίστων ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν’, 305d3-4).

#### 5.4 Rearing vs. Caring for a Herd

##### 5.4.1 EV’s Verbal Sleight of Hand

EV addresses the points raised by the myth by correcting EV’s verbal sleight of hand during the initial division, where ‘rearing’ (τροφή, 261d3) and ‘caring’ (ἐπιμέλεια, 261d5) for a herd were introduced without any attempt to assess any potential differences in meaning (§4.1).

Having used the two terms interchangeably, EV now takes issue with the attribution of herd-rearing to the statesman:

‘EV: Then let’s go back by the following route. The sort of expertise we said was “self-directing” in the case of living creatures, but which took its care [ἐπιμέλειαν] for them not as individuals but in groups, and which we then went on immediately to call herd-rearing [ἀγελαιοτροφικήν] – you remember?’

YS: Yes

EV: Well, in a way we missed our aim at this expertise; for we did not at all succeed in grasping the statesman along with the rest or name him, but he eluded us in our naming, and we did not notice.

YS: How so?

EV: All the other sorts of herdsman, I think, share the feature of rearing [τρέφειν] their several herds, but although the statesman does not we still applied the name to him, when we should have applied to them one of the names that belongs in common to them.’ (275c9-e2)

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<sup>1</sup> See also *R.* 372a3-d5; Campbell (1867) 59 n. 10, Frutiger (1930) 52 n. 4, Herter (1958) 115, Brisson and Pradeau (2003) 231 n. 130.

Since no mortal art can directly meet every material need of the human herd, and there is no need for an epitactic art of ἀνθρώπων κοινοτροφική in the ideal city, herd-rearing by mortals can only apply to agricultural herdsmen capable of meeting the material needs of a herd through their own labour.

#### 5.4.2 *Caring for a Herd*

EV then concludes that an alternative definition of the statesman's art is required:

‘And how would – perhaps – “looking after” [θεραπεύειν] not have been common to them all, without any specification of it as “rearing” [τροφή] or any other sort of activity [πραγματείας]? By calling it some sort of expertise in “herd-keeping” [ἀγελαιοκομικήν] or “looking-after,” [θεραπευτικήν] or “caring for,” [ἐπιμελητικήν] as applying to them all, we could have covered the statesman too as well as the rest, given that this was the requirement our argument indicated.’ (275e3-8)

Although no mortal art deserves the title ‘θεραπευτικός’ (276b2-4), nobody could rightly claim that ‘caring’ (‘ἐπιμέλεια’, 276b2) for humans as a whole does not belong to a single kind of expertise (276a9-b5),<sup>1</sup> with EV concluding that the initial genus informed by the paradigm of the herdsman (‘κοινοτροφική’) should have been classified in accordance with ‘caring for things’ (‘τὴν ἐπιμέλειαν’, 276d1; 276c11-d3) rather than ‘rearing’ (‘τὴν τροφήν’, 276d1-2).

#### 5.5 *The Modified Division*

EV then suggests that the remainder of the division could have been made in accordance with the same set of forms used during the initial division (276a3-7). Recognising that these divisions come at the expense of further detail on the nature of the statesman's caring activity

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<sup>1</sup> i.e. an ἐπιμελητικός. “But there is none (i. e. no art: τέχνη is understood from what follows) “which rather and sooner than kingcraft, would claim to be a mode of tendance of human society as a whole, and to be an art of sovereignty overtaking all men.” (Campbell (1867) 75 n. 12)

in relation to cities, EV argues that further divisions are required (276d2-3). EV then states that the resulting genus of self-directive ‘herd-keeping’ (ἀγελαιοκομική, 275e6, 276a6, a9) of ‘footed, wingless, non-interbreeding and hornless’ (276a4-5) animals could have been divided into a divine genus of care on the one hand,<sup>1</sup> and a mortal genus of care on the other (276d5-6). The latter may then have been divided into enforced and voluntary human care (‘τῷ βιαίῳ τε καὶ ἐκουσίῳ’, 276d11), thus distinguishing the tyrant from the statesman (276d8-e13).<sup>2</sup>

Despite YS being satisfied with this exposition (277a1-2), EV disagrees:

‘We took upon ourselves an astonishing mass of material in the story we told, so forcing ourselves to use a greater part of it than necessary; thus we have made our exposition longer, and have in every way failed to apply a finish to our story, and our account, just like a portrait, seems adequate in its superficial outline, but not yet to have received its proper clarity, as it were with paints and the mixing together of colours.’ (277b4-c3)

### 5.5.1 *The Failure of the Modified Division*

An indication of exactly how the revised definition fails is given later in the text, after the παράδειγμα παραδείγματος:

‘Then we must take up once again what we were saying before,<sup>3</sup> to the effect that since tens of thousands of people dispute the role of caring for cities with the kingly

<sup>1</sup> In keeping with the main divinity’s ability to direct the universe to fulfil every function of a θρεπτικός (273b7-c4), the divine herdsman would therefore qualify as a theoretical (i.e. self-directive) form of herd-rearing. See also *Sph.* 265e3-4.

<sup>2</sup> By ‘ἐκουσίῳ’, Plato could not have been alluding to democracy, which is divided off as an illegitimate form of government along with tyranny at 291d-e. Instead, this may be intended to convey only the legitimacy of political coercion without regard to the moral beliefs of the citizenry (see 293b1-2, 8-9). The argument may therefore be a corollary of the Socratic theory of ἀκρασία; in the same way that one could never commit an injustice voluntarily, one could never obey a just government involuntarily (*Lg.* 860c7-861a2, Brisson and Pradeau (2011) 235; cf. Skemp (1952) 16-7, 57 n. 3, Delcomminette (2000) 221). An alternative explanation is that ‘ἐκουσίῳ’ may relate only to full citizens under the presumption that once those with uncivil natures are executed, expelled, or enslaved (308d9-309a6), the consent of those remaining is guaranteed. This would explain the emphasis on the importance of ‘ῥητορεία’ in persuading people of what is just at 303e10-304a2 (Ricken (2008) 242-3, Rowe (2020) 318), as well as the discussion of the statesman’s role in the provision of an appropriate education.

<sup>3</sup> 268b9-c3; Campbell (1867) 85 n. 7.

class, what we have to do is to separate all these off and leave the king on his own; and it was just for this purpose that we said we needed a model.’

‘πάλιν δὴ τὸν ἔμπροσθε λόγον ἀναληπτέον, ὡς  
ἐπειδὴ τῷ βασιλικῷ γένει τῆς περὶ τὰς πόλεις ἐπιμελείας  
ἀμφισβητοῦσι μυρίοι, δεῖ δὴ πάντας ἀποχωρίζειν τούτους  
καὶ μόνον ἐκεῖνον λείπειν καὶ πρὸς τοῦτο δὴ παραδείγ-  
ματος ἔφαμεν δεῖν τινος ἡμῖν.’ (279a1-5)

The implication is that, although ἐπιμέλεια in relation to the city depends upon a mortal kind of ἐπιτακτική,<sup>1</sup> this is still insufficient to explain the superior scale of the statesman’s care for the city in comparison to other arts.

### 5.5.2 *The Causes of the Modified Division’s Failure*

At least one of the causes of the failure of the modified division is therefore its inability to adequately explain statesmanship’s care for the city as a whole in light of the contribution of a wide array of other arts to ἡ περὶ τὰς πόλεις ἐπιμέλεια.

The distinction between αἰτία and συναίτιος during the final division provides at least part of the solution. For although the trophic needs met by other τέχναι in the age of Zeus may be a necessary condition of the statesman’s achievement of ἐπιμέλεια in relation to cities, if the products of these arts are to contribute to the care of cities, they must be subject to the ultimate control of an art capable of making moral judgements. In this sense, ἡ περὶ τὰς πόλεις ἐπιμέλεια can be said to be dependent upon a single type of expertise (ἐπιμελητικός), with trophic arts being distinguished from statesmanship in terms of their products making no direct contribution to the care of a city in themselves.<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> See 292b3-10.

<sup>2</sup> See use of ‘ἔργον’ at 287d4-5, 288e6-7, and ‘ἔργασθῆν’ at 287e8-288a1. It is important to emphasise that ἐπιμέλεια does not necessarily carry any moral connotations, but is simply less restrictive than τροφή (hence why the form κοινοτροφική excludes statesmanship whilst still applying to agricultural and divine herd-rearing, yet ἀγελαιοκομική/θεραπευτική/ἐπιμελητική is broad enough to include all of these arts) and bears a closer association with specifically civic responsibilities (e.g. *Lg.* 758e1-2, *R.* 374e2, 451d8; Brisson and Pradeau (2011) 234-5; cf. the use of ‘τρέφω’ for the keeping of slaves or servants, e.g. *Men* 85e5, Aeschin. *Ep.* 1.187). By reducing the purposes of a ruler to those of the agricultural herdsman, the myth of Cronus therefore ridicules the idea that ἐπιμέλεια in relation to humans could follow immediately from the satisfaction of trophic needs (as

Hence, although the division of labour into τέχνηαι precludes the possibility of a kind of ἀνθρώπων κοινοτροφική ἐπιστήμη in the ideal πόλις, the same conclusion does not apply to the statesman's role, as the various arts resulting from the division of labour are dependent upon his executive capacity to contribute to the care of the city, and hence, the creation and maintenance of the ideal πόλις.<sup>1</sup>

### 5.6 Conclusion

In a convoluted and somewhat disorderly way, the myth therefore helps to demonstrate the need to correct the division into 'κοινοτροφική' by cutting a new part using a form that applies to both the agricultural herdsman and the statesman (ἐπιμέλεια). However, the need for a division of labour demonstrated by the myth still creates issues for the revised definition. In particular, it makes it difficult to explain how the statesman can be said to rule over the city as a whole. As mentioned, part of the resolution of this problem depends upon forms introduced during the division of weaving (αἰτία and συναίτιος). But before proceeding to this division, EV offers an explanation of the purpose of the paradigm of weaving (the παράδειγμα παραδείγματος) which is intended to explain how it can be used to correct the shortcomings of the revised division.

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is the case for ἀγέλαι θηρίων). For this to be true, the moral condition of the herd would have to be as irrelevant to the statesman as it is to the agricultural herdsman.

<sup>1</sup> 'σμπάντων τῶν κατὰ πόλιν ἐπιμελουμένην καὶ πάντα συνυφαίνουσιν ὀρθότατα, τοῦ κοινοῦ τῆ κλήσει περιλαβόντες τὴν δύναμιν αὐτῆς, προσαγορευόμεν δικαιοτάτ' ἄν, ὡς ἔοικε, πολιτικὴν.' (305e2-6)

## 6. παράδειγμα παραδείγματος

After providing an explanation of the inadequacy of the first account of statesmanship using the myth of Cronus, YS asks EV to show him how the results of the divisions have been a failure (277c7-8). EV responds with the claim that: ‘it’s a hard thing, my fine friend, to demonstrate [ἐνδείκνυσθαί] any of the greater subjects without using models [παραδείγμασι].’ (277d1-2). Upon further questioning, EV explains that the purpose of *παραδείγματα* must itself be demonstrated with a *πaráδειγμα*: ‘It has turned out, my dear fellow, that the idea of a model itself in its turn also has need of a model to demonstrate it [παραδείγματος, ὃ μακάριε, αὐ̣ μοι καὶ τὸ παράδειγμα αὐτὸ δεδέηκεν].’ (277d9-10). EV then proceeds to describe the experience of pupils who are able to recognise certain letters in simple syllables yet become perplexed when confronted with larger syllables containing the same letter. Since this involves the use of a paradigm to demonstrate the philosophical purpose of paradigms themselves, this section of the text shall be referred to as the ‘*πaráδειγμα παραδείγματος*’.<sup>1</sup>

In this chapter I give a brief overview of how the *πaráδειγμα παραδείγματος* helps to explain the function of the division of weaving and argue that it is intended to explain how the resemblance between weaving’s relationships to other arts involved in the production of woollen clothing and statesmanship’s relationship to other arts involved with the care of

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<sup>1</sup> Although this pedagogical procedure possesses many of the features previously identified as being required for the success of a paradigm – such as relative ease of pre-dialectical understanding (in virtue of the perceptible or quasi-perceptible nature of the pedagogical procedure), being a quotidian topic, and achieving ends which are morally unweighted, its use as a paradigm differs from the use of angling in the *Sophist*, and agricultural husbandry and weaving in the *Statesman*, in its failure to include a division of either the *illustrans* or *illustrandum*. Instead, we are provided with a succinct description of the basic similarity between the letter learning process and the paradigmatic method (278c3-6), followed by a summary of how this property of producing a ‘single true judgement [μίαν ἀληθῆ δόξαν]’ (278c6) applies in the case of the paradigmatic method (278c8-d6), in addition to an important concluding remark (278d8-e2). Given the absence of a division, the *πaráδειγμα παραδείγματος* should therefore be read as more akin to a simple heuristic paradigm, cohering with the fact that rather than being intended to produce an account of the main object of inquiry, the *πaráδειγμα παραδείγματος* relates to a more peripheral issue in the text.

cities is used to help differentiate statesmanship from other closely related arts as well as explain its unique role in caring for the city as a whole. Two other interpretive issues are also addressed: EV's use of the dreaming analogy; and the question of how the paradigmatic method could be presumed to have a broad enough scope to be considered a useful dialectical method. In relation to the former, I argue that the image of dreaming and waking refers to the empirical nature of the interlocutors' pre-dialectical understanding of weaving. In relation to the latter, I argue that the paradigmatic method must depend upon a theory of reality which Plato chose to never fully expound.

### *6.1 The Pedagogical Procedure in the παράδειγμα παραδείγματος*

The focal point of the παράδειγμα παραδείγματος is a description of the perplexity of pupils who are in the process of learning their letters (στοιχεῖα). Having reached a stage where they are capable of distinguishing letters in shorter syllables, the pupils still make mistakes and become uncertain when confronted with the same letters in larger and more complex syllables.<sup>1</sup> After describing the pupils' ability to recognise letters in simpler arrangements, EV describes a pedagogical procedure which offers the 'easiest and best way of leading them on to the things they're not yet recognising' (278a5-6):

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<sup>1</sup> See also *R.* 402a7-b3, *Th.* 202e6-203a4, 206a1-b3. It is not entirely clear why this asymmetry in ease of understanding applies in the case of letters in different syllabic contexts. The most likely answer is that the sensible representation of syllables is not restricted to visual representations, with syllables being treated as phonetic rather than purely graphological units (see Ammon. *In Int.* 23. 17, quoted in Diels (1899, 59-60 n. 3), on the use of 'στοιχεῖον' for the spoken over the written word; see also the ambiguity of 'ἠσυχῆ' at *Chrm.* 159c4 and c9, and 'ἐν τῇ ἀκοῇ' at *Th.* 206a6; Menn (1998, 292, 296 n. 8), El Murr (2015, 4-5)). In fact, it seems implausible that having grasped certain letters in simpler syllables, the pupils would become overwhelmed with confusion when confronted with visual replicas of these same letters simply because they are surrounded by more letters than before (Ryle (1971) 61, Jirsa (2013) 142). Nor that these misunderstandings, and consequently the process of rectifying them, could occur with such consistency that EV is able to simply presume familiarity with them on the part of YS (see 277e3-278a4, esp. use of 'ἴσμεν' in 277e3-4). Instead, the pupils' confusion would be easier to explain if the problem involves recognising the sound of a letter in different syllabic contexts and of understanding changes in its enunciation when combined with other letters. This creates the much more feasible scenario of pupils struggling to correctly identify the sound of a letter when preceded and followed by letters it has not been combined with before in more complex arrangements, especially when such an arrangement results in a new sound such as a diphthong.

‘To take them first back to those cases in which they were getting these same things right [ὀρθῶς ἐδόξαζον], and having done that, to put these beside what they’re not yet recognising [μὴπω γινωσκόμενα], and by comparing them demonstrate that there is the same kind of thing with similar features [τὴν αὐτὴν ὁμοιότητα καὶ φύσιν] in both combinations, until the things that they are getting right [δοξαζόμενα ἀληθῶς] have been shown set beside all the ones that they don’t know, and once they have been shown like this, and so become models, they bring it about that each of all the individual letters is called both different, on the basis that it is different from the others, and the same, on the basis that it is always the same and identical to itself, in all syllables.’ (278a8-c1)

From the description of this pedagogical procedure one can derive the following four stages in the process of rectifying the pupils’ confusion:<sup>1</sup>

- (1) The drawing of the pupils’ attention back to the simple syllable in which they were able to correctly distinguish the letters which recur in the more complex syllable.
- (2) The juxtaposition of the original simpler syllable and the more complex syllable.
- (3) The demonstration of the shared identity of the letters in both syllables by a process of comparison.
- (4) The repetition of this process of comparison for all syllables in which the children fail to distinguish the constituent letters.

The result is that the pupils advance from only being able to recognise letters within the context of certain shorter syllables to being able to differentiate letters from one another and identify their recurrence in the context of any syllable they are confronted with.

## 6.2 *The Need for a παράδειγμα*

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<sup>1</sup> See Delcomminette (2000, 228).

Although the ‘παράδειγμα παραδείγματος’ is presented as a demonstration of the purpose of paradigms in general, it must be understood in the context of the dialectical difficulties faced thus far in the dialogue. This is reiterated when the failure of the revised division which defined statesmanship as a form of ‘herd-keeping [ἀγελαιοκομικήν]’ (275e6) is referred to after the παράδειγμα παραδείγματος as being the main justification for the paradigm of weaving (279a1-5; §5.5.1). In order to distinguish statesman from the other arts that dispute his role, the scale of statesmanship’s caring function must be accounted for in its definition:

‘But care of the whole human community together – no other sort of expertise would be prepared to say that it had a better and prior claim to being *that* than kingly rule, which is over all human beings.’

‘ἐπιμέλεια δέ γε ἀνθρωπίνης συμπάσης κοινωνίας  
οὐδεμία ἂν ἐθελήσειεν ἕτερα μᾶλλον καὶ προτέρα τῆς  
βασιλικῆς φάναι καὶ κατὰ πάντων ἀνθρώπων ἀρχῆς εἶναι  
τέχνη.’ (276b8-c2)

By failing to account for this superior scale, statesmanship is reduced to one of the many other arts that contribute to the citizenry’s care. The purpose of the paradigm of weaving is therefore to understand how, given the need for a division of labour, ἡ περὶ τὰς πόλεις ἐπιμέλεια can be achieved by distinct τέχναι in such a way that the statesman’s role of caring for the entire city (‘ἐπιμέλεια δέ γε ἀνθρωπίνης συμπάσης κοινωνίας’, 276b8) can be explained.

The dialectical context therefore suggests that the παράδειγμα παραδείγματος is primarily intended to illustrate the importance of identifying properties which allow something to be distinguished from other closely related things, thus explaining the emphasis in the παράδειγμα παραδείγματος on the children’s need to properly *differentiate* the letter in question from other letters (‘ικανῶς διαισθάνονται’, 277e7).<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> *Sph.* 253d7, El Murr (2014) 50-1. See also Couloubaritsis (1995, 124).

The main purpose of the *παράδειγμα παραδείγματος* can therefore be read as demonstrating the shared ability of the pedagogical procedure and the use of dialectical paradigms to assist in the differentiation of something in a more difficult context by leveraging an existing capacity to differentiate the same thing in a simpler context.<sup>1</sup> However, beyond this basic similarity, it is unclear how many of the features of the pedagogical procedure are supposed to explain the purpose of the paradigm of weaving. Most importantly, it is unclear what the ‘letters’ (‘στοιχεῖα’, 278d1) and ‘syllables’ (‘συλλαβὰς’, 278d5) are intended to signify.

### 6.3 Letters and Syllables

One possibility is that the syllables in the *παράδειγμα παραδείγματος* represent the arts of weaving and statesmanship themselves, with the letters being identified with the activity or *πραγματεία* of combination or intertwining (*συμπλοκή*) shared by weaving and statesmanship.<sup>2</sup> Some support for this reading comes from the claim that the discovery of statesmanship requires a paradigm which has the same *activities* as statesmanship:

‘So what model, involving the same activities as statesmanship [ἔχον τὴν αὐτὴν πολιτικὴν πραγματείαν], on a very small scale, could one compare with it, and so discover in a satisfactory way what we are looking for?’ (279a7-b1)

And it would therefore be natural to interpret the activities referred to here as being the equivalents of the letters in the pedagogical procedure.<sup>3</sup>

However, this results in an inaccurate representation of how the paradigm of weaving is actually used. For rather than comparing the arts of weaving and statesmanship directly, EV

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<sup>1</sup> ‘Il s’agit, on l’a vu, du *processus même de discrimination et de reconnaissance* d’une réalité simple dans une structure complexe, bref de la découverte des ressemblances petit et grand sujet.’ (El Murr (2014) 68-9)

<sup>2</sup> Guthrie (1978) 176, El Murr (2010) 121-2.

<sup>3</sup> ‘just as a given letter is the common element in a simple syllable and a more complex one comprising this same letter interrelated with others, interweaving is the common element between two *tekhnai*, a simple and easily recognizable one (the art of weaving), and a complex one, difficult to grasp (the art of statesmanship).’ (El Murr (2010) 121-2).

compares their technical fields as a whole. This comparison allows for the differentiation of statesmanship from other arts that contribute to the care of cities in virtue of the use of the forms of contributory and direct causation, and, importantly, in terms of their positive relationship to other arts in these fields in virtue of the activity of συμπλοκή which explains statesmanship's architectonic function in bringing the products of these various arts together, thus portraying its nature as an art concerned with the expert use of the products of other arts in the city.<sup>1</sup>

The differentiation of statesmanship from other arts is not therefore achieved by selecting a genus which may be used as a starting point for its division, but by identifying features expressing statesmanship's relationship to other arts which contribute to ἡ περὶ τὰς πόλεις ἐπιμέλεια (which has already been identified as the product or purpose of statesmanship during the initial division). And since it was already implied during EV's discussion of the revised division that the statesman contributes to this purpose as the ultimate ἐπιμελητικός, the final division consists of an attempt to understand what this role entails in the context of a division of labour in the city.

The heuristic effect of the comparison of the technical fields of weaving and statesmanship can therefore be reduced to the identification of properties which allow the nature of statesmanship to be differentiated from related arts as well as accounting for the unique scale of the statesman's caring function, something which must be achieved by placing it in relation with other arts in its technical field. Hence, although the στοιχεῖα of the pedagogical procedure exhibit an ambiguity in keeping with its role as an analogy, their foremost analogates in the divisions of weaving and statesmanship are best understood as the arts of weaving and statesmanship themselves (with the συλλαβαί representing their technical fields).

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<sup>1</sup> Pradeau (2010) 115-6, 118-9.

Part of the reason for this treatment of weaving and statesmanship as components of larger fields is that neither of these arts can be said to produce anything on their own. The use of letters to illustrate weaving and statesmanship therefore allows EV to illustrate the impossibility of fully understanding their roles in isolation. In this respect, the arts that contribute to ἡ περὶ τὰς πόλεις ἐπιμέλεια must be understood as ἀρχή or components of a συλλαβή in the same way that each letter cannot be considered as a forming a component of the syllable in themselves but only in relation other letters in the syllable.<sup>1</sup>

#### 6.4 *The Dream Analogy*

One important disparity between the παράδειγμα παραδείγματος and the use of weaving as a paradigm for statesmanship, is that the ability to identify the directly causal nature of weaving and its activity of συμπλοκή more easily is a product not of its simplicity, but the ability to observe the activities and products of other arts in the technical field of weaving as well as the weaver's own use of these products in the physical act of intertwining.

As I shall argue, the empirical basis of the interlocutors' superior pre-dialectical understanding of weaving can be seen in the use of the familiar Platonic image of dreaming which accompanies the παράδειγμα παραδείγματος:<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> In this respect, the relationship between στοιχεῖα and συλλαβαί in the παράδειγμα παραδείγματος resembles the description during the story of Theuth in the *Philebus* (18b6-d2) of consonants as φωνή, 'though they could not be called articulate sounds' (18c1; trans. Hackforth (1958) 28; Menn (1998) 294). Menn (1998, esp. 295-8) sees a strong similarity between the story of Theuth and the παράδειγμα παραδείγματος – especially in terms of explaining the possibility of recognising a genus and instance concurrently. Although this is correct (to the extent that the pupils do not themselves choose the syllables compared), it is important to emphasise that whereas the process described in the παράδειγμα παραδείγματος is heuristic and describes the didactic exploitation of a pre-existing capacity to differentiate a letter in one context in order to allow for the recognition of the same letter in a new context, the story of Theuth describes the foundation of γραμματικὴ τέχνη (18d2) via the process of classifying letters from undifferentiated speech (Menn (1998) 298, El Murr (2014) 47-8).

<sup>2</sup> See Gallop (1971) for an overview of its use by Plato.

‘It’s a hard thing, my fine friend, to demonstrate any of the more important subjects without using models. It looks as if each of us knows everything in a kind of dreamlike way, and then again is ignorant of everything when as it were awake.’

‘χαλεπόν, ὦ δαιμόνιε, μὴ παραδείγμασι χρώμενον  
ικανῶς ἐνδείκνυσθαί τι τῶν μειζόνων. κινδυνεύει γὰρ  
ἡμῶν ἕκαστος οἷον ὄναρ εἰδὼς ἅπαντα πάντ’ αὖ πάλιν  
ὥσπερ ὕπαρ ἀγνοεῖν.’ (277d1-4)

#### 6.4.1 The Dream Analogy and Recollection

Many have interpreted the dreaming analogy used at 277d1-4 as a deliberate allusion to the use of the same image in the *Meno* to describe the process of recollection during Socrates’ geometrical discussion with Meno’s slave.<sup>1</sup> This interpretation is dependent upon reading the use of the analogy in the *Meno* as referring specifically to the latent source of the beliefs attained by the slave,<sup>2</sup> from which it is argued that its use in the *Statesman* can be read in a similar way. The use of the dream analogy could therefore be read as placing the paradigmatic method in the same role as the method of Socratic questioning partially demonstrated by the geometrical discussion in the *Meno* – that of provoking the recollection of our prenatal knowledge about the main object of inquiry.

The problem with this reading is that the use of this image in the *Meno* does not relate to the latent source of the true beliefs attained by the slave, but to the deficiency of the cognitive state of true belief in comparison with knowledge.<sup>3</sup> This puts it in line with other uses of the dream image in Plato, where it is used to portray a deficient understanding of something which can be alleviated by the practice of dialectic.<sup>4</sup> Hence, the use of the dream image in the

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<sup>1</sup> *Men.* 85c9-d1. Robinson (1953) 212, Rodier (1957) 55, Scodel (1987) 112, cf. Kato (1995) 167, Delcomminette (2000) 226-7. Note also the apparent reference to the global nature of this knowledge (‘ἅπαντα’, 277d3) and its similarity to ‘πάντα χρήματα’ at *Meno* 81c6-7.

<sup>2</sup> Ricken (2008) 146.

<sup>3</sup> Bluck (1961) 312, Thompson (1961) 140, Gallop (1971) 189.

<sup>4</sup> *Lys.* 218c7-8, *Sym.* 175e3-4, *Phdr.* 277d10-e3, *R.* 476c4-8, 533b8-c3, 534c5-7; Brisson and Pradeau (2011) 235. See also Gallop (1971, esp. 187-92).

*Meno* does not provide a textual precedent for reading its use in the *Statesman* as an allusion to the theory of recollection. Nor does recollection adequately capture the most pertinent feature of the dream image in the *Statesman* and the *Meno*: the capacity to take the experiences in a dream as real.<sup>1</sup>

Since the deficient, illusory nature of the dreamlike knowledge does not refer to a latent form of knowledge which might be stirred up to the clarity of wakefulness by the process of recollection, a more natural reading of ‘οἷον ὄναρ’ at 277d3 is to take it as referring to the deficient epistemic status of pre-dialectical beliefs as well as the pre-dialectical lack of awareness that this is a state of ignorance and not knowledge at all.<sup>2</sup>

#### 6.4.2 *The Dreamlike Nature of Intelligible Knowledge: The Philosopher’s Return to the Cave*

One explanation of this dreaming/waking dichotomy and its relation to the paradigmatic method which draws upon this basic framework is to read the dreamlike, illusory nature of knowledge as a product of the fact that it is purely intelligible, with its dreamlike quality being a reference to the difficulty of applying this knowledge to the contingencies of empirical reality. This line of interpretation is adopted by Delcomminette, who argues that the achievements of dialectic in the form of λόγοι reached through a division can vanish when the dialectician awakens to the facts of the empirical world.<sup>3</sup> Hence it is argued that the dreaming/waking dichotomy should be read as referring to the inability of the dialectician to directly apply the results of a purely intelligible division in the context of the limitations imposed by the empirical world. The paradigmatic method thus overcomes this by transferring true beliefs formed as a result of dialectical method to empirical experience.<sup>4</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Couloubaritsis (1995) 120.

<sup>2</sup> Ricken (2008) 146-7, Seeck (2012) 79, El Murr (2015) 18-20, see also Campbell (1867, 80 n. 9).

<sup>3</sup> Delcomminette (2000) 235.

<sup>4</sup> Delcomminette (2000) 235. See also Vanhoutte (1956, 101) ‘Le reve dans lequel nous nous trouvons, est la connaissance abstraite et théorique. Pour passer du songe à la veille, en d’autres mots, pour obtenir une connaissance réelle et pratique, il est nécessaire de se servir d’un exemple.’

Delcomminette compares this process to that of the philosopher's return to the cave in the *Republic*, where the philosopher is perplexed by the descent from light to darkness, representing a descent from the clarity of intelligible knowledge to the contingencies of the empirical world.<sup>1</sup>

In the case of the *Statesman* it is specifically the λόγος of statesmanship in accordance with herd-rearing or herd-keeping which is said to be unable to furnish the dialectician with an ability to differentiate statesmanship in the empirical world. This failure to adequately differentiate statesmanship from other rival τέχναι is due to the detachment of this dialectical division from the *a posteriori* facts of the empirical world (represented in the myth by the reign of Zeus). The knowledge achieved by pure dialectical division wholly detached from empirical reality is not therefore incorrect, but restricted to its intelligible domain, and the dialectician will therefore struggle to apply their findings to the empirical world with any immediacy.<sup>2</sup> And a paradigm is therefore required to assist with this application.

#### 6.4.2.1 *The Dreamlike Nature of Intelligible Knowledge: The Paradigm of Weaving*

Under this reading, the facts of the empirical world determine the τέχναι which happen *de facto* to be involved with the activity of weaving.<sup>3</sup> However, although the divisions which must be made are contingent upon the facts of the empirical world, the process of making these divisions is still rational or purely dialectical. The usefulness of weaving as a paradigm lies in the fact that weaving's relations with other arts are said to be less numerous than for statesmanship, and it can therefore be used as a simpler paradigm which allows for an effective division of statesmanship in relation to the rival τέχναι.<sup>4</sup> The most crucial outcome

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<sup>1</sup> Delcomminette (2000) 235-6. See *R.* 516e3-517a4, 517d4-518b4.

<sup>2</sup> Delcomminette (2000) 235.

<sup>3</sup> Delcomminette (2000) 251.

<sup>4</sup> Delcomminette (2000) 251.

of this process being the distinction it makes between direct and contributory causes.<sup>1</sup> And the hierarchy of causes which results from this distinction is read as the element (στοιχείον)<sup>2</sup> shared with the division of statesmanship in virtue of which it qualifies as its paradigm, thus enabling a successful λόγος of statesmanship to be found.<sup>3</sup>

#### 6.4.3 *The Dreamlike Nature of Empirically Derived Beliefs*

However, the implication that weaving's utility as a paradigm can be reduced to simplicity of its relationships to other arts in its technical field seems incorrect. In particular, it seems incomprehensible that the division in accordance with contributory and direct causation is easier in the division of weaving purely due to having less numerous parts. An alternative explanation of the relationship between the dream analogy and the παράδειγμα παραδείγματος is to interpret the illusory nature of the dreamlike state described in the dream analogy as relating to the fact that the dialectician has an empirically derived set of pre-dialectical judgements about the object which could enable a division of the paradigm to be carried out with relative ease. The wakeful ignorance can then be read as referring to the fact that the dialectician is unaware that this set of judgements can also be used to facilitate a division of the object of inquiry, despite the fact that the dialectician would not have a stock of reliable pre-dialectical true judgements about this object. This would help to retain the textual symmetry with the παράδειγμα παραδείγματος, since the dreamlike state of knowledge can be read as corresponding to the epistemic state of the pupils who can successfully identify a letter in a simple syllable at the beginning of the παράδειγμα παραδείγματος.

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<sup>1</sup> Delcomminette (2000) 253.

<sup>2</sup> See *Plt.* 277e6, 278b5, d1.

<sup>3</sup> Delcomminette (2000) 252, 302.

The pupils' initial partial understanding of the function of the letters in shorter syllables (1) can therefore be understood as a result of their capacity to differentiate them in the context of the simplest syllables possible,<sup>1</sup> a process which would need to be assisted by some pedagogical input from the teacher to explain which letter is designated by which character or sound, as well as its relationship to other types of letter. And this can be considered analogous to the interlocutors' prior experience of the use of the name of weaving (as well as other arts involved in the production of woollen clothing) which helps to fix their understanding of its referent. Since this pre-dialectical understanding is backed by clear empirically accessible particulars which can be used to verify its meaning (as well as a lack of prestige and thus of any popular desire to try to appropriate the name of the paradigm) the conditions of the interlocutors' superior pre-dialectical understanding of the paradigm and the increased tendency for this understanding to converge on the same thing do not apply to statesmanship, an asymmetry which is analogous to the failure of the pupils to immediately identify letters in more complex syllables.

### *6.5 στοιχεῖα*

Perhaps the most important disparity emerging from EV's use of the terminology of 'letters' and 'syllables' to describe the function of the paradigmatic method is that whereas the limited number of letters in the alphabet guarantees that there will always be a plentiful supply of simple syllables, there is no explanation for why the myriad "letters" [στοιχεῖα] of everything' (278d1; 278c8-d6) should also necessitate a plentiful supply of divisional symmetries to be exploited by the paradigmatic method. As Robinson notes, it is an unspoken belief of Plato's that:

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<sup>1</sup> See El Murr (2015, 6).

“analogies’ or ‘geometrical equalities’ are frequent in reality and basic to its structure, and this Pythagorean conviction indicates one simple but important rule of method: ‘look for proportions in reality, for they are there and you will find them.’<sup>1</sup>

The scope of the paradigmatic method therefore depends upon the ubiquity of similarities in how otherwise unrelated things can be divided from other things within their field. If the paradigmatic method is to have a wide range of use, the fact that disparate things such as weaving and statesmanship have the requisite similarities allowing one to be an *illustrans* for the other cannot therefore be considered coincidental. To guarantee that the method can be used in a wide variety of cases, a theory of reality is therefore required which explains why the things for which there is no reliable source of pre-dialectical judgements are at the very least more likely than not to have an easier analogue mirroring the structure of its own division. Without this, the scope of the method would be too indeterminate to be worthy of such a detailed examination and demonstration.

### 6.5.1 A Simple Solution

A simple, but ultimately anti-philosophical solution to this explanatory gap is to claim that there are no specific similarities inherent to the paradigm and object of inquiry in virtue of which the former can act as an *illustrans* for the latter. Instead, it is the very act of picking something and dialectically analysing it in relation to the object of inquiry which makes it an effective paradigm.<sup>2</sup> One might support this view by citing the way EV ostensibly picks

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<sup>1</sup> (1953) 209. Although not an instance of the paradigmatic method, the use of the metaphor of offspring (*ἐκγονος*, R. 506e3, 507a3, 508b13) to describe the existence of similarities between the sun and the good is indicative of this attitude.

<sup>2</sup> El Murr appears to hold this view: ‘it seems to follow that nothing constitutes a paradigm *a priori*.’ (2015, 9) and later: ‘weaving is not a paradigm *per se* of statesmanship, any more than the arts of grammar and music are obvious paradigms for dialectic. It is the *comparison* that the dialectician makes between these two fields of expertise, weaving and statesmanship, or grammar and dialectic, that makes the first an adequate paradigm for the second.’ (2015, 9). But it is unclear whether he is making the ungainsayable point that dialectical comparison is a necessary condition for something to become a useful paradigm, or the more radical view that it is a necessary *and sufficient* condition for such.

This ability for myriad paradigms to explain an object of inquiry equally well with no objective standard to decide between them is also one consequence of Lane’s (1998, 85-9) comparison of Plato’s paradigmatic

angling, agricultural husbandry, and weaving out of thin air, implying that no rational decision procedure is involved in their selection and hence no criterion by which one might pick one thing over another as a candidate for a suitable paradigm. However, EV's apparent nonchalance in choosing weaving is misleading, as it is used to conceal an act of authorial or dialectical *καρπός*. In reality the process would be much more iterative. But a more fundamental problem with this reading is that it denies the specificity of weaving's relationship to other arts in its field and how its resulting division resolves the difficulties faced thus far in the division of statesmanship.<sup>1</sup> The reading therefore fails to acknowledge that there are similarities inherent to weaving and statesmanship which, if not unique to them alone, at least cannot simply be manufactured in any random object by the mere gaze of a dialectician.

It also seems unreasonable to simply read the ellipsis in explanation as indicating a legitimate lack of concern by Plato for how and why these similarities can be expected to exist, or even a failure on Plato's part to recognise that reality cannot be expected to deliver a sufficient supply of these similarities unless it is subject to some underlying order which makes this possible.

Plato must therefore have been committed to a theory about the nature of reality which results in an abundant supply of the similarities required for successful paradigms. In other

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method with Kuhnian scientific paradigms. Since multiple scientific paradigms can explain a narrow set of phenomena with no objective standard to decide which is more accurate, they are instead justified by their ability to theoretically explain and predict a wider range of phenomena (Kuhn (1996) esp. 97-8). However, wider explanatory scope and predictive capacity are not epistemically relevant criteria for Platonic paradigms – only their heuristic power in relation to the object of inquiry. If a Platonic paradigm is to provide the theoretical background in which to understand the object of inquiry analogous to the way theoretical assumptions in Kuhnian paradigms assist in the scientific understanding of phenomena, then it is difficult to explain why the herdsman paradigm is a failure, but weaving is a success. To her credit, Lane does list this difference in the scope of Kuhnian and Platonic paradigms as one of the many disanalogies resulting from this comparison (1998, 87-8), but it does somewhat undermine the purpose of the comparison in the first place.

<sup>1</sup> How specific this relationship is is unclear. The specialised nature of the division of weaving and statesmanship rules out the omnipresence of these similarities. But there are also reasons to believe that weaving may not be unique in its ability to act as an effective paradigm for statesmanship. Since the efficient division of labour under the reign of Zeus may naturally follow some basic principles which apply to more than two technical fields, the fallout from the myth might be read as naturally resulting in an abundance of nonunique paradigmatic symmetries.

words, a theory implying that for any of the ‘greater’ things it is likely that another smaller and more quotidian thing has the salient similarities and relations to other objects in its field such that both have a very similar set of divisions.

### 6.5.2 *The Kinship of Nature*

Despite the explanatory ellipsis in the *Statesman*, there are a number of areas of Plato’s thought which may provide clues as to why Plato was confident in the ubiquity of such similarities.

One possible vein of interpretation is pursued in passing by Goldschmidt,<sup>1</sup> who appeals to the claim made in the *Meno* that:

‘As the whole of nature is akin... [ἅτε γὰρ τῆς φύσεως ἀπάσης συγγενοῦς οὐσης]’  
(81c9-d1)<sup>2</sup>

However, the reading is left undeveloped and appears highly optimistic on closer inspection.

For the passage continues:

‘and the soul has learned everything, nothing prevents a man, after recalling one thing only – a process men call learning – discovering everything for himself, if he is brave and does not tire of the search’ (81d1-4)<sup>3</sup>

Thus, although the passage implies that there are relationships between disparate aspects of reality,<sup>4</sup> it does not imply the existence of discrete and relatively specific relationships of similarity between otherwise unrelated things. It does not therefore provide us with an

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<sup>1</sup> Goldschmidt (1947) 82-3.

<sup>2</sup> Trans. Grube (1997) 880.

<sup>3</sup> Trans. Grube (1997) 880.

<sup>4</sup> *Phd.* 73c1-e3. For evidence that this is a reference to Presocratic or Pythagorean ideas, see Thompson (1961, 125-6).

explanation of why one should expect each of the greater things to have an appropriate analogue with the requisite paradigmatic similarities.

### 6.5.3 Geometrical Equality

An alternative, also mentioned by Goldschmidt,<sup>1</sup> is to look at Plato's belief in an underlying order in the world expressed in the *Gorgias* as a form of 'geometrical' or 'proportionate' equality.<sup>2</sup> The geometrical connotations of the phrase need not restrict its extension to an order expressed purely mathematically. And some support for giving the phrase a broader reading than its geometrical connotations might suggest can be drawn from the fact that elsewhere Plato refers to theories of cosmic proportion with the more generic expression 'ἀνὰ λόγον'.<sup>3</sup>

However, although the belief in an underlying order *may* be the source of Plato's faith in the scope of the paradigmatic method, without forcing additional assumptions onto Plato's remarks they can provide only a rudimentary idea of why an abundance of the required similarities might be expected to exist. At best, we might say that disparate things' compliance with this order or sense of proportion might lead them to manifest the type of symmetries which allow for dialectical paradigms, in particular, in their relationships to other things from which they must be divided by the dialectician. But it would be difficult to flesh out this explanation any further without straying too far from the texts.

Since the concept of a rational λόγος pervading everything and manifesting itself in very similar ways in otherwise unrelated things is not alien to Greek philosophy, one can't help but surmise that the lack of justification for this unspoken rule may simply not have worried

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<sup>1</sup> Goldschmidt (1947) 82-4

<sup>2</sup> 'ἡ ἰσότης ἢ γεωμετρικὴ' *Grg.* 508a6, trans. Irwin (1979, 86) and Dodds (1959, 339) respectively. The passage may alternatively refer to a form of political equality (see Dodds (1959) 339-40 and Irwin (1979) 226), but the immediately preceding reference to the order of the universe (508a3-4) supports a more general reading.

<sup>3</sup> *Ti.* 29c2, 37a4, 53e4, also as 'ἀναλογία' at *Ti.* 31c3. See also *Phd.* 110d5-6. Note also the similar reference to the 'friendship [φιλίαν]' of the world at both *Grg.* 508a2 and *Ti.* 32c2.

Plato.<sup>1</sup> It is therefore tempting to write the problem off as an anachronism rather than a legitimate interpretive issue, but it nonetheless results in a large explanatory gap for the modern reader. As a result, one can only conclude that the utility of the paradigmatic method relies upon strong assumptions about the nature of reality which are far from self-evident (at least to the modern mind) but which are never fully justified in the *Statesman* or elsewhere.

### 6.6 Conclusion

The παράδειγμα παραδείγματος therefore offers an illustration of how the comparison of the technical fields of weaving and statesmanship can be used to identify forms or properties which explain statesmanship's relationship to other arts concerned with the care of the city. In particular, it helps to emphasise the fact that the paradigm of weaving must account for statesmanship's role within the context of a division of labour into arts that each make some contribution to the care of cities, none of which can be said to achieve this in isolation. The dream analogy appears to support this explanation by alluding to the greater pre-dialectical doxastic alacrity of weaving in comparison to statesmanship as a result of having perceptible particulars which allow for the formation of true judgements. The παράδειγμα παραδείγματος also highlights the fact that the utility and scope of the paradigmatic method is dependent upon an unexplained abundance of proportionalities between disparate aspects of reality of the kind that attain between weaving and the rest of its technical field and statesmanship and other arts involved with the care of cities. However, if this is dependent upon an underlying theory of reality, it does not appear to have been clearly expressed anywhere in the Platonic corpus.

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<sup>1</sup> For example, the principle is evident in Heraclitus, for whom an underlying feature of reality is the ubiquity of proportionalities of the type  $a:b::b:c$  (e.g. DK 36, 79; see Fränkel (1955)) and is fundamental to Pythagorean thought (e.g. 'δοκεῖ δ' αὐτῷ πάντα ἀνάγκη καὶ ἁρμονία γίνεσθαι.', D.L. 8.85 (DK32 1); see also DK32 2, 6).

## 7. *The Division of Weaving*

Having explained the need for a paradigm with the παράδειγμα παραδείγματος, EV proceeds to offer weaving as a suitable paradigm and then subjects it to a division. As the discussion of excess and deficiency which follows the division of weaving shows, the division's paradigmatic value in terms of both its resemblance to the division of statesmanship, and ability to offer an exercise in method subsequently employed on the object of inquiry, is not apparent when the division is considered in isolation. Consequently, this chapter consists primarily of an exposition of the main elements of the division. However, the paradigm of weaving's haphazard mode of introduction does give rise to one important philosophical issue which I also address in this chapter.

### 7.1 *Feigned Serendipity*

In a flourish of irony familiar from the paradigm of angling,<sup>1</sup> weaving is introduced with a nonchalance designed to protect EV's pretence of ignorance:

‘By Zeus,<sup>2</sup> Socrates, what do you think? If there isn't anything else to hand, well, what about weaving? Do you want us to choose that? Not all of it, if you agree, since

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<sup>1</sup> *Sph.* 218e2-5; Delcomminette (2000) 239.

<sup>2</sup> A possible reference to Zeus's status as the cosmogenic weaver (Scheid and Svenbro (1996) 23 with 181 n. 73), as recounted by Pherecydes (DK B3; Schibli (1990) 59, Scheid and Svenbro (1996) 65). That this may have had some influence upon Plato's depiction of the statesman as weaver of the city is made more likely by the fact that 'κόσμος' can be used to refer to a political constitution (e.g. 'πόλεων κόσμοι' *Prt.* 322c3; Burnyeat (2009) 185-6), and perhaps, tangentially, Pherecydes' description of a marital πέπλος or φᾶρος gifted to Chthonie to represent Zeus's cosmogenic role (DK A11, B2; Schibli (1990) 51, 56). It is also worth noting in this connection that Pherecydes' philosophical influence likely extended to the Pythagoreans (Scheid and Svenbro (1996) 64). Further cultural influences upon Plato's choice of weaving can be attributed to the use of the πέπλος of Athena to represent of the unity of the πόλις in the Panathenaea (Scheid and Svenbro (1996) 18-21, El Murr (2002) 59-60, Blondell (2005) 49-50, 59, O'Meara (2013) 151-5, 158-9) as well as Aristophanes' use of the processes involved in making woollen cloth as a metaphor for the creation of a well-functioning πόλις in the *Lysistrata* (567-86; Scheid and Svenbro (1996) 21-22, 32-3, Lane (1998) 164-6, El Murr (2014) 191, Blondell (2005) 57-8, O'Meara (2013) 158-9). If it weren't for the wealth of nonextant literature that Plato (and Aristophanes) may have been drawing upon, the striking similarities between Aristophanes' and Plato's uses of weaving would count as firm evidence of a direct influence (Scheid and Svenbro (1996) 21-22; cf. El Murr (2002) 59-66).

perhaps the weaving of cloth from wool will suffice; maybe it is this part of it, if we choose it, which would provide the testimony we want.’ (279b1-5)

Not only does weaving offer greater relative ease of pre-dialectical understanding (in virtue of its status as a manual art), a quotidian topic,<sup>1</sup> and one which achieves ends which are morally unweighted, but it also turns out to have salient similarities with statesmanship which assist in its eventual division.

From an authorial point of view, the alacrity with which EV stumbles upon weaving is justifiable. Since the dialectician’s success rate in finding an effective paradigm would be imperfect, this feigned serendipity avoids a lengthy demonstration of the iterative decision procedure by which an effective paradigm would eventually be arrived at.<sup>2</sup> But although EV’s misrepresentation of this decision procedure can be justified in terms of authorial expediency, there still remains the question of what the process might look like starting from a position of mutual ignorance. While EV’s success rate is unrealistic, if the decision procedure is entirely random, then the indeterminate number of attempts it would take to find a successful paradigm would render the method useless. Thus, although the success rate from a position of mutual ignorance would be imperfect, it must be good enough to ensure that the utility of the paradigmatic method is not undermined by inefficiency.

One obvious way to explain the dialectician’s reasonable success rate without an excessive amount of trial and error would be to appeal to the latent knowledge posited by the theory of recollection.<sup>3</sup> But although an obvious candidate, Plato makes no explicit or implicit appeal to the theory here. Additionally, there is some textual evidence suggesting that Plato could be quite comfortable with allowing the success of the faculty of judgement to be beyond rational

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<sup>1</sup> ‘technique artisanale sans cesse sous les yeux des habitants d’Athènes’ (Gaudin (1987) 123).

<sup>2</sup> Although it might be argued that the failure of the herdsman paradigm provides some of this (Lane (1998) 68, Gill (2012) 188 n. 27), its inclusion is not motivated by the need for a realistic portrayal of this imperfect decision procedure, nor would a 50% success rate be an accurate reflection of the iterative nature of this process.

<sup>3</sup> Bluck (1975) 36-8.

explanation.<sup>1</sup> The lack of a discussion of the process by which successful paradigms are found may not therefore be motivated by a belief that there are no rational decision criteria by which a paradigm can be selected, but rather that the dialectician's access to these criteria in a state of ignorance defies rational explanation.

Plato may also have been aware that any discussion of the faculty of judgement might run into deeper problems. For example, having access to the criteria by which an effective paradigm of something could be identified still presupposes the ability to accurately recognise when these criteria are satisfied by something.<sup>2</sup> And even if one could rationally explain how the criteria are recognised without simply presupposing the accuracy of the faculty of judgement, the fact that a good paradigm would be more likely to occur in one's thoughts than any other thing would also go unexplained. EV's feigned serendipity in selecting weaving as a paradigm therefore not only avoids an accurate but inefficient demonstration of the process leading to a successful paradigm, but also neatly avoids the need to offer a theoretical explanation of its success rate and the problems this would entail.

## *7.2 The Division of Preventives*

Having apparently stumbled upon an appropriate paradigm, EV begins its division by cutting the genus of things that are produced or acquired into those that are for the sake of doing something, and those which are intended to prevent something from happening to us (279c7-

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<sup>1</sup> See *R.* 443b7-c2, where Socrates claims that it is 'with the help of some god' (Trans. Grube and Reeve (1997) 1074) that they hit upon the successful analogy of the city and the soul (see also Lloyd (1966, 402)). It should be added that this would not preclude the need for the accuracy of the judgement to be tested by a rational method (Robinson (1953) 65, Carter (1967)). One might argue that Plato's philosophical use of *ἀνάμνησις* shows that he wasn't entirely comfortable with this lack of explanation. But presuming that *ἀνάμνησις* is a sincere expression of Plato's philosophical beliefs (cf. Ebert (2004), (2007)), the ultimate source of the capacity for correct judgement is still not itself rational, as it must be attributed to an initial prenatal divine instilment of knowledge if a regress is to be avoided.

<sup>2</sup> 'If intuition is an inner voice – how do I know *how* I am to obey it? And how do I know that it doesn't mislead me?' (Wittgenstein (2001) §213, see also §201)

9). The latter genus is then divided in quick succession into a series of parts ranging from defences, to barriers, protection against cold and hot weather, to coverings, and then garments (279c9-d7). Garments are then divided into a composite part, then those which are perforated or unstitched, then those made from hair, and of those made from hair, a final part of those bound together with themselves without adhesives concludes the division (279d7-e3). This part is baptised as ‘clothes’ (279e3-5), with the art most concerned with the care of clothes being baptised as ‘clothes-making’ (280a2). Since weaving represents the largest part of this art, EV concludes that it differs from clothes-making in name only (280a3-5).<sup>1</sup>

After reiterating the division (280b6-e5), EV demonstrates its inadequacy by arguing that arts such as carding, fulling, clothes-mending, and the arts concerned with manufacturing tools for the weaver will all qualify as looking after and producing clothes (280e7-281c5).

‘So will our account of that part of the art of weaving that we selected be sufficiently definite, if we proceed to set it down as finest and greatest of all those sorts of care that exist in relation to woollen clothing? Or would we be saying something true, but not clear or complete, until such time as we remove all of these too from around it?’ (281c7-d3)

The division therefore resembles the initial division of statesmanship in terms of herd-rearing, and the subsequent altered division in terms of the more generic concept of herd-keeping, which failed to adequately define the statesman’s monopoly over the care of the entire city.<sup>2</sup> And as with these initial divisions informed by the paradigm of the herdsman, there is a focus on the product of the expertise of weaving rather than its relation to this product. But given the division of labour necessitated by our divinely forsaken era, any definition focusing on a product of mortal labour will likely fail to correlate to one type of expertise.

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<sup>1</sup> See El Murr (2014, 198-9).

<sup>2</sup> El Murr (2014) 197.

The division of preventives also illustrates one positive aspect of the initial divisions of statesmanship: their delimitation of a set of arts working in the same technical field of caring for the human herd.<sup>1</sup> Just as the initial division of preventives delimits the arts working in the sphere of producing or caring for woollen clothing, the initial divisions of statesmanship delimit a technical field of arts contributing to the care of the human herd.

### *7.3 The Division of Weaving in Earnest*

EV then proceeds to offer a division in terms of each art's relationship to the product of weaving, beginning with the selection of a genus in accordance with the things that people do (281d8-9), which is subsequently divided in accordance with contributory and direct causes of production (281d11-12).<sup>2</sup> The former contributory part includes the arts that produce the tools necessary for the execution of the arts classified in terms of principal or direct causation:

‘Those that do not make the thing itself, but that provide tools for those that do – tools which, if they were not present, what has been assigned to each expertise would never be accomplished : these are what I mean by contributory causes, while those that bring the thing itself to completion are causes.’ (281e1-5)

The part divided in accordance with direct causation is then divided in accordance with the art of preparation (κοσμητική, 282a2-3), with the resulting part being uniquely named as ‘the art of the fuller’ (κναφευτική, 282a4), with its parts having previously been identified as clothes washing (πλυντική, 282a1), clothes mending (ἀκεστική, 282a1), and looking after

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<sup>1</sup> El Murr (2014) 202-5.

<sup>2</sup> The results of the division of preventives suggests that the division in earnest implicitly begins with the genus of the care or production of woollen clothing, with the subsequent genera just mentioned being parts of this genus divided in accordance with the properties of doing things and being contributory or direct causes. However, given Plato's proclivity for referring to the parts of a division with the name of the form or property it is divided in accordance with, the text itself is indeterminate.

clothes (θεραπευτική, 282a2). The genus of direct causes is then divided into another part in accordance with the production of clothing itself ('πάντα αὐτὰ περὶ τὴν ποιήσιν αὐτὴν τῆς ἐσθῆτος ἧς λέγομεν μέρη', 282a6-7), yielding a genus named 'wool-working' (ταλασιουργική, 282a8-9), which is further divided in accordance with the arts of combination (συγκριτική, 282b7) and separation (διακριτική, 282b8). The latter part is then divided into carding (ξαντική, 282b4) and the art of the shuttle (κερκιστική, 282b4), with the part that is 'simultaneously a part of combination and of wool-working' (282c5-6) being divided into parts defined in accordance with twisting (τὸ στρεπτικόν, 282d4-5) and intertwining (τὸ συμπλεκτικόν, 282d5). The twisting part is then divided into warp-spinning (στημονονητική, 282e9) and woof-spinning (κροκονητική, 283a1),<sup>1</sup> whilst the intertwining part is referred to as 'weaving' (ύφαντική, 283a8):

'When the part of combination that is contained in wool-working produces something intertwined, by the regular intertwining of woof and warp, the whole product of the intertwining we refer to as a piece of woollen clothing, and we refer to the expertise that is over this as weaving.' (283a4-8)

The division therefore relates weaving to a network of arts whose products it employs using the activity of intertwining. And it is this act of bringing together the many products of these arts which allows its status as the 'finest and greatest [καλλίστην καὶ μεγίστην]' (281d1) of the multitude of arts involved with the care or production of woollen clothing to be not only true, but 'clear [σαφές]' and 'complete [τέλειον]' (281d2). Weaving is therefore differentiated from the other arts involved in the care or production of woollen clothing in terms of its status as a direct cause which makes expert use of the products of other arts involved in wool-working (ταλασιουργική) by manufacturing woollen clothing.

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<sup>1</sup> 'The *warp* runs lengthwise and is held in tension, while the *weft*, or woof, passes over and under the warp. Warp and weft must link coherently, or the fabric will divide in two and not hang together.' (Martin (2007) 10).



Figure 4

#### *7.4 Conclusion*

Since the purpose of this division only becomes apparent during the final division of statesmanship, at this stage in the inquiry, its role remains obscure. In order address this, EV enters into a long digression on the nature of excess and deficiency.

## 8. *Excess and Deficiency*

At various points in the dialogue, it is made clear that the pace of much of the *Statesman* is intentional rather than a symptom of aimlessness or bad composition.<sup>1</sup> This self-awareness concerning the style and pace of the discussions is first evidenced in passing at 277a3-c6, where EV describes the inquiry thus far as being crude. And later the opinion that the paradigmatic division of weaving is aimless and overly detailed is described as a ‘malady [νόσημα]’ (283b3) that is likely to afflict YS later in the dialogue (283b1-c1). Inoculation is offered in the form of a digression, the discussion of excess and deficiency (283a10-286d2), whose length and detail don’t necessarily help quell claims that the main thread of the discussion is becoming intolerably frayed by wanton prolixity.<sup>2</sup> Yet although EV suspends the direct pursuit of statesmanship to undertake this digression, its value to the inquiry should not be underestimated.

The division of weaving is cited as the digression’s main impetus (286b7-c3) and is singled out again later along with the myth of Cronus and discussion of non-being in the *Sophist* as a discussion whose length the digression is intended to justify (286b7-10). It therefore offers one of the dialogue’s most direct accounts of the purpose of the division of weaving, being motivated by concerns about how its peculiarly long-winded style might be received.<sup>3</sup> In

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<sup>1</sup> Cf. Taylor (1961) 250-1.

<sup>2</sup> As Couloubaritsis (1995, 143) notes: ‘À première vue, cette explicitation paraît bizarre, car elle est introduite comme une sorte de digression pour justifier la longueur que prend le propos’. Stenzel (1959, 154) describes it as being ‘apparently randomly inserted’ (‘scheinbar zufällig eingefügte’) and its relevance to the inquiry is often questioned (Ryle (1966) 26-7, Sayre (2006) 139 n. 1; cf. Notomi (1999) 37, El Murr (2014) 40).

<sup>3</sup> There is evidence to suggest that one of these concerns is that the discussions thus far might lead to suspicions of sophistry and that Plato therefore uses the digression as an opportunity to distinguish aspects of Platonic dialectic from sophistic rhetoric. Since Gorgias appears to have employed the concept of excessive or deficient analyses of topics as part of his use of variation and opposition – censuring what had previously been praised, making light of what had previously been dealt with in earnest, speaking at length on topics worthy of brevity, and *vice versa* (*Phdr.* 267a6-b5, *Arist. Rh.* 1419b3, Süß (1910) 18; see also *Grg.* 449b9-8) – a concern that the length of the discussions thus far might be falsely associated with sophistic techniques would be understandable. Further support for this reading can be inferred from the similarities between the language used in the digression and that of many extant accounts of sophistic doctrine. For example, the sophistic redolence of *καίρος* (284e6, D.H. *Comp.* 12, D.L. 9.52, Philostr. *VS* 1.praef.; Süß (1910) 18-20, Kerferd (1981) 82, Tordesillas (1995) 104-5, Delcomminette (2000) 266-7) and EV’s repeated use of the expression ‘praise and censure’ (283c4, 286c6,

particular, it is the seemingly excessive attention paid to arts other than weaving and the suspicions of aimlessness this might provoke which forms a main motivation for the digression. These suspicions are couched in the terminology of a hypothetical critic, with EV describing this extensive division of the various arts in the wool-weaving industry as ‘going around in a circle defining a whole collection of things to no purpose’ (283b2-3).<sup>1</sup> EV addresses this allegation of purposelessness by detailing two distinct types of measurement (283c11-285c2) and subsequently uses this distinction to clarify the correct criteria by which ‘we may distribute praise and censure’ (283c4) in relation to the length of a discussion in the *Statesman* (286b4-287b2). At the authorial level, the digression can therefore be seen as representing a formal apology to the reader by way of an explanation. However, it is not a self-criticism, but a clarification of the purposes of the inquiry. In an effort to ensure that ‘praise and censure’ can be fairly attributed to the lengths of the discussions entered into in the *Statesman*, Plato explains that the enjoyability of the dialogue has been sacrificed not out of carelessness or incompetence, but in order to advance other ends – namely, to improve the dialectical skills of the ‘hearer [τὸν ἀκούσαντα]’ (286e1).<sup>2</sup>

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287a5; *Phdr.* 267a3-5, Cic. *Brut.* 12.47) suggest that Plato is offering a pastiche of sophistic terminology in an effort to target readers with a sophistic education who are most liable to draw a comparison between the length of the discussions and sophistic rhetoric (see *Men.* 75c7-d7). It is therefore notable that the insistence on the connection between *καρπός* and expertise in EV’s account of how to judge the appropriate length of a dialectical discussion directly contradicts extant accounts of Gorgiastic rhetoric in which *καρπός* is a purely doxastic skill (284a5, 284d4, 284c2; D.H. *Comp.* 12).

<sup>1</sup> See also 286e5.

<sup>2</sup> See esp. 286d4-6 where EV describes pleasure as an ‘incidental consideration [*πάρρηγόν*]’ in their discussions. Given the many instances of playful digressions throughout the dialogues, EV presumably means that although playful and humorous asides are permissible, pleasure alone could never justify significant elongations of otherwise productive discussions. Thus, enjoyability’s dismissal as an ‘incidental consideration [*πάρρηγόν*]’ (286d6) should be taken as implying that it is unworthy of justifying a significant digression from the main topic of inquiry such as to render it a discussion in itself.

It should be noted at the outset that the digression's use of dialectical improvement to justify the length of the division of weaving is obscured somewhat by the insertion of the methodological interlude on its paradigmatic function (285c4-286b2),<sup>1</sup> which serves an important supportive function in relation to the rest of the digression by explaining that the division of weaving is not motivated purely by its capacity to foster dialectical improvement, but due to its potential to make an important contribution to the discovery of the main topic of the dialogue.

### 8.1 *EV's Initial Question*

The digression on excess and deficiency is provoked by a question EV poses immediately after the definition of weaving:

‘Good; so why ever, then, didn't we immediately reply that weaving was an intertwining of woof and warp, instead of going around in a circle defining a whole collection of things to no purpose? [εἶεν: τί δὴ ποτε οὖν οὐκ εὐθὺς ἀπεκρινάμεθα πλεκτικὴν εἶναι κρόκης καὶ στήμονος ὕφαντικὴν, ἀλλὰ περιήλθομεν ἐν κύκλῳ πάμπολλα διοριζόμενοι μάτην;]’ (283b1-3)

As the utility of the digression relies partly on the plausibility of the criticism it addresses, it implies a certain amount of sympathy for the sentiment it aims to correct. And underlying EV's question is the perfectly reasonable assumption that the division of weaving ought to fulfil some rational aim.

### 8.2 *The Opacity of the Division of Weaving's Role*

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<sup>1</sup> Plato's failure to clearly express the separate role played by the methodological interlude supports Ryle's (1966, 26-7) conjecture that it was shoehorned into the text as a late addition, although more likely as a late edit than the *post hoc* addendum required by his own unique interpretation. This may also help explain the interlude's opacity of expression, with the passage possibly receiving little in the way of any editing. See Campbell (1867, 110), Thein (2013, 165).

Since the most obvious candidate for such an aim would be the discovery of statesmanship, EV's question reflects the understandable confusion YS (or the reader) might suffer concerning the role of the division of weaving in this regard, whose paradigmatic function in relation to the division of statesmanship does not become evident until later in the dialogue.<sup>1</sup> Since the divisions of weaving and statesmanship do not involve overlapping genera and are undertaken as separate divisions, at this stage of the inquiry the resemblance between the division of weaving and the division of statesmanship is opaque, leaving it unclear how the division of weaving might contribute to the *Statesman's* epistemic aim.

The lack of any precedent for this type of 'trans-generic'<sup>2</sup> paradigm also helps explain why it is not the definition of weaving as the intertwining of woof and warp itself which is placed under suspicion by EV's question but rather the definition of 'a whole collection of things to no purpose'. This reflects the fact due to a combination of the opacity of the method of division's paradigmatic role at this stage and the fact that simple analogies are common heuristic tools, YS is liable to infer by a process of elimination that it must be the definition of weaving alone that fulfils weaving's paradigmatic role. The use of 'ἐὸς' therefore implies that EV is setting up an explanation for the series of divisions made prior to the

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<sup>1</sup> Since the demonstrations of dialectic we find in other dialogues are prone to digressions whose relation to the main topic is often tangential, another obvious candidate for the division of weaving's purpose is that it offers a digression from the main topic of inquiry into an inherently interesting topic. Most notably, there are occasions where tangential topics are pursued (e.g. *Thet.* 172c3-177c5) or where arguments are extended in nonsensical ways for their comedic value or enjoyability (e.g. *Plt* 266a1-267a3, *Thet.* 165b2-d1; Runciman (1962) 13, Cooper (1990) 68-70). But whereas digressions into topics with no direct relevance to the main aim of an inquiry might be excused by their inherent interest, this is clearly not the case with the division of weaving – a point EV emphasises with his remarks at the beginning of the methodological interlude (285d8-9). It should also be added that although the discovery of the main topic of inquiry tends to govern the course of the dialogues, it is rarely achieved very efficiently – the salient point being that efficiency is always portrayed as the interlocutors' intention. The *Statesman* itself is peculiar in providing one of the best examples of how this inefficiency can be productive, whilst also abandoning any pretence of being an inquiry starting from a position of mutual ignorance. But although at the dramatic level this has the strange consequence that the meandering nature of the *Statesman* must be partly manufactured by EV, it does provide an important lesson on both the purgative benefits of definitional failures (see also *R.* 394d8-9) as well as the necessity of varied dialectical tactics in the acquisition of knowledge (see use of *πάθος* in *Plt.* 277d6-7 and *παθήματα* in *R.* 511d6-8; Dixsaut (2013a) 17, 23, Brisson and Pradeau (2011) 20).

<sup>2</sup> Brisson and Pradeau (2011) 46.

definition of weaving rather than the definition of weaving itself – whose potential as a simple heuristic paradigm is in fact exploited at the very end of the dialogue.

### *8.3 The Possibility of Providing a Definition 'Immediately'*

The presumption of definitional alacrity conveyed by 'εὐθὺς' also implies that the definition of weaving as the intertwining of woof and warp could have been given without being derived using the method of division. The reasoning behind this premise can be traced to an important epistemological point made during the methodological interlude: the claim that it is possible to demonstrate certain things 'χωρὶς λόγου' (285e3) by simply pointing out one of their 'perceptible likenesses' (285e1).

Since this type of ostensive demonstration could meet the demand for a λόγος (**B**; 285e2), it is natural to suppose that it must also furnish the ability in the perceiver to produce such a λόγος themselves. It therefore follows that for certain things such as weaving one can demonstrate their nature to some degree without the use of any dialectical method via the observation of clear perceptible likenesses, either through the ostensive method of demonstration, or by encountering such likenesses in ordinary experience. EV's use of 'εὐθὺς' can therefore be explained as a product of the fact that a simple definition or description of weaving could have been provided on the basis of pre-dialectical judgements furnished by perceptible likenesses (hence the ease with which the division of weaving is carried out).

### *8.4 The Pedagogical and Methodological Purposes of the Division of Weaving*

EV's response to any potential doubts concerning the length of the division of weaving is twofold, relying upon the methodological interlude's cryptic explanation of the division's

paradigmatic function, as well as the introduction of dialectical improvement as a legitimate criterion by which to determine a discussion's length. The former corrects the impression that the division of weaving plays no methodological role in relation to the discovery of statesmanship, whilst the introduction of dialectical improvement is intended to show that the achievement of an inquiry's main epistemic aim is neither the only criterion by which a dialectician can determine the appropriate length of a discussion, nor one that should be given absolute priority.

#### *8.4.1 The Pedagogical Function of the Division of Weaving*

The main purpose of the digression is therefore to demonstrate that in addition to their basic epistemic aim dialectical inquiries have another rational purpose – dialectical improvement – that is usually concealed by the fact that it can be advanced concurrently with the main aim of an inquiry. Hence, although the division of weaving does assist in the discovery of statesmanship through its paradigmatic function, its length is still said to exceed this role.

Before introducing dialectical improvement as a valid criterion by which to assess the appropriate length of a dialectical discussion and providing an explanation of the division of weaving's paradigmatic role, EV offers an analysis of 'excess and deficiency in general [*πᾶσαν τὴν τε ὑπερβολὴν καὶ τὴν ἔλλειψιν*]' (283c3-4).

#### *8.5 Excess and Deficiency in General*

In order to address EV's hypothetical concern about the purpose of 'going around in a circle', EV proposes the following course of action:

'First, then, let's look at excess and deficiency in general, so that we may distribute praise and censure proportionately on each occasion, when things are said at greater

length than necessary and when the opposite occurs in discussions like the present one [πρῶτον τοίνυν ἴδωμεν πᾶσαν τὴν τε ὑπερβολὴν καὶ τὴν ἔλλειψιν, ἵνα κατὰ λόγον ἐπαινῶμεν καὶ ψέγωμεν τὰ μακρότερα τοῦ δέοντος ἐκάστοτε λεγόμενα καὶ τάναντία περὶ τὰς τοιάσδε διατριβάς.] (283c3-6)

The lens through which excess and deficiency are examined is the art of measurement (μετρητική). And the first stage of EV's response to the suspicions of aimlessness provoked by the length of the division of weaving consists of a division of this art into two parts.

### 8.5.1 *The Division of the Art of Measurement*

The first type of measurement measures the greater and the lesser in relation to one another (283d7-8, 284a1-3) and includes 'all those sorts of expertise that measure the number, lengths, depths, breadths, and speeds of things in relation to what is opposed to them' (284e4-5).<sup>1</sup> EV then asserts that were statesmanship and many other forms of expertise to rely upon this type of measurement it would be impossible for them to exist, rendering the current inquiry futile (284a5-b5). Using the implicit premise that statesmanship and other forms of expertise with 'knowledge of practical subjects' (284c2) do in fact have an indisputable existence as distinct forms of expertise (284b9-c4),<sup>2</sup> a second type of measurement is posited. This measures the greater and the lesser<sup>3</sup> in relation to 'what is in due measure [πρὸς τὸ

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<sup>1</sup> Examples are not provided, but from what is said later in the digression about the second type of measure (see 286d4; Rowe (1995a) 213) it is implied that any variation in the purposes these arts are put to does not affect how praise and censure is distributed in regard to the quantities they measure. This would explain why their product is assessed in purely quantitative terms, presumably against a precedent, average, formula, or physical measure. Lafrance's (1995, 94) suggestion that this type of measurement includes mathematics and astronomy would therefore seem correct, since the correctness of the 'number, lengths, depths, breadths, and speeds of things' (284e4-5) as measured in these disciplines cannot be altered by the purposes to which they are put (see also Skemp (1952, 78)).

<sup>2</sup> The premise is made explicit at 284d4. The description of statesmanship as among those arts with knowledge of practical matters ('τινὰ τῶν περὶ τὰς πράξεις ἐπιστήμωνα', 284c2) would seem to contradict the earlier classification of statesmanship as a form of theoretical rather than practical knowledge (258d4-e7; Sayre (2006) 17). However, although this earlier classification of practical knowledge uses 'πρᾶξις' (258d5, 258d9) in the sense of the production of material things through physical activity, here it may be taken in a much broader sense for the knowledge required to accomplish something (see Apelt (1914, 121 n. 9), Pradeau (2010, 122), Brisson and Pradeau (2011, 29)). For further evidence that Plato freely exploits the versatility of 'πρᾶξις' throughout the dialogue and does not allow its essentially manual sense during the initial division to restrict its meaning, see 289d1 with 305d1-10 (cf. Sayre (2006) 103).

<sup>3</sup> 'τοῦ μεγάλου καὶ τοῦ μικροῦ' at 283e8-9 being essentially comparative (Rowe (1995a) 207).

μέτριον]’ (283e11; 283e8-12) and includes those forms of expertise which judge: ‘in relation to what is in due measure, what is fitting, the right moment [τὸν καιρὸν], what is as it ought to be’ (284e6-7). It is implied by the motivation for the digression on excess and deficiency that dialectic is classed as among these forms of expertise along with statesmanship, the latter fact being reiterated by EV when explaining why the statesman’s expertise could never be codified into a set of laws (293e6-294b6).<sup>1</sup>

The result of this division and dialectic’s implicit membership of the second type of measurement is that the dialectician is furnished with an expert capacity to judge how much time to dedicate to a discussion. Once combined with EV’s status as an expert philosopher, and thus dialectician,<sup>2</sup> the implication is that the length of the foregoing discussion of weaving was not gratuitous, but informed by a rational decision procedure which measures ‘in relation to what is fitting [πρὸς τὸ πρέπον]’ (286d1-2). It becomes clear at the end of the digression that this decision procedure must take into account the purposes to which this second type of measurement is put and that these purposes can vary (286d4).<sup>3</sup> Consequently, praise and censure can only be fairly attributed to the length of a dialectical discussion by taking account of these purposes.

The dialectician’s expertise does not therefore judge the correct length of a discussion in relation to other discussions nor by reference to any other quantitative measure but instead involves the employment of the dialectician’s expert faculty of judgement (furnished by their expert knowledge) to make the correct decisions about the length of discussions in relation to their purpose. And it is therefore on this basis alone that the length of the division of weaving can be rightfully assessed.

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<sup>1</sup> See also 299b2-300a7.

<sup>2</sup> *Sph.* 216a4.

<sup>3</sup> Rowe (1995a) 213.

## 8.6 The Prioritisation of Purposes

Later in the digression EV builds upon this division of measurement by detailing what the purposes of the discussions that constitute the *Statesman* are and how they are prioritised in relation to one another (286d4-b2). There it is said that:

‘And again, as for what contributes toward the inquiry into the subject set before us, what we have said commits us to making a second and not a first priority of the question how we might find it most easily and quickly, and to give by far the greatest and primary value to the pursuit itself of the ability to divide by classes [πολὸν δὲ μάλιστα καὶ πρῶτον τὴν μέθοδον αὐτὴν τιμᾶν τοῦ κατ’ εἶδη δυνατὸν εἶναι διαιρεῖν].’ (286d6-9)

This prioritisation scheme is also briefly illustrated immediately after the division of the two types of measurement with an analogy between the letter learning example used in the παράδειγμα παραδείγματος and the value of statesmanship as a topic of dialectical inquiry:

‘EV: What if someone put the following question about our pupils sitting together learning their letters. When one of them is asked what letters make up some word or other, are we to say that for him on that occasion the inquiry takes place more for the sake of the single question set before him, or for the sake of his becoming more able to answer all questions relating to letters? [πότερον αὐτῷ τότε φῶμεν γίνεσθαι τὴν ζήτησιν ἑνὸς ἔνεκα μᾶλλον τοῦ προβληθέντος ἢ τοῦ περι πάντα τὰ προβαλλόμενα γραμματικωτέρῳ γίνεσθαι;]’

YS: Clearly for the sake of his being able to answer all.

EV: What then about our inquiry now about the statesman? Has it been set before us more for the sake of that very thing, or for the sake of our becoming better dialecticians? [ἔνεκα αὐτοῦ τούτου προβέβληται μᾶλλον ἢ τοῦ περι πάντα διαλεκτικωτέροις γίνεσθαι;]

YS: That’s clear too – for the sake of our becoming better dialecticians generally.’ (285c8-d7)

The purposes of the discussions in the *Statesman* therefore consist of the dialectical improvement of the interlocutors, or more specifically: ‘the ability to divide by classes’, as

well as the pursuit of ‘the subject set before us’, with the former being given priority over the latter.

### *8.7 The Letter Learning Analogy and Methodological Interlude*

The role of the use of this letter learning analogy and the prioritisation scheme it expresses is obscured by the fact that it is abruptly followed by the methodological interlude, which EV opens with the following denigration of the topic of weaving: ‘I certainly don’t suppose that anyone with any sense would want to hunt down the definition of *weaving* for the sake of weaving itself.’ (285d8-9).<sup>1</sup> EV therefore switches without notice from an illustration of the value of the inquiry’s ability to foster dialectical improvement *in general* (285c4-d7) to a discussion relating specifically to the value of the division of weaving as a methodological paradigm for the dialectical analysis of statesmanship (285d8-286b2). The abrupt nature of the transition and the lack of any signposting for the reader to distinguish the role of the interlude from that of the letter learning analogy therefore gives the impression that both topics lack the degree of inherent interest required to justify an analysis for their own sake.

But the claim that statesmanship has been chosen primarily ‘for the sake of our becoming better dialecticians generally’ (285d3) should not be read in the same way as EV’s denigration of weaving as a topic beneath the interests of a sound mind (‘θηρεύειν οὐδεὶς ἄν ἐθελήσειεν νοῦν ἔχων’, 285d9). For if statesmanship were unworthy of interest and merely a vehicle by which dialectical improvement can be achieved, the nature of the ideal ruler would not have formed a topic of such enduring interest to Plato.<sup>2</sup> EV’s remarks should not

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<sup>1</sup> Since Plato’s detailed knowledge of the process of producing woollen cloth likely arose from an inherent interest in the field of wool-weaving and manual crafts in general, there may be a hint of self-deprecation here. As Schuhl notes (1952, xi and 1960, 77-8), Plato’s atypical interest must have led him to spend time observing these crafts in action and learning their technical vocabulary ostensibly (see also Burford (1972, 130)).

<sup>2</sup> See Skemp (1952, 18). Such a reading would also ignore the use of ‘μᾶλλον’ at both 285d1 and 285d5 to indicate that the value of discovering statesmanship and that of being better able to discover the nature of any

therefore be read as implying that neither weaving nor statesmanship offer any value as topics of inquiry beyond their capacity to foster general dialectical improvement,<sup>1</sup> as to do so would both obscure the distinct methodological purpose of the interlude, as well as ignore the philosophical value Plato attached to the question of the nature of the ideal ruler.

### 8.7.1 *Digression Within a Digression*

Furthermore, the distinct explanatory role of the methodological interlude is confirmed by the fact that in contrast to the letter analogy which is used to express the value of *general* dialectical improvement, the interlude's content (particularly its reference to 'perceptible likenesses' (285e1)) does not apply to the discussion of non-being or the myth of Cronus mentioned immediately after it (286b7-c3). And the interlude therefore offers a digression from the discussion of excess and deficiency rather than a continuation of it, thus serving a separate explanatory purpose.<sup>2</sup>

The sudden but nonetheless *apropos* interlude into the paradigmatic function of the division of weaving is therefore inserted in order to explain that the division of weaving is not digressive (and thus unjustified due to weaving's lack of inherent interest) but is intended to help advance the main aim of the dialogue.<sup>3</sup> As discussed previously, EV achieves this by providing an explanation of the epistemic role of paradigms based on the availability of 'perceptible likenesses'. The interlude thus provides a partial justification for the division of the uninspiring topic of weaving by explaining that it is neither a digression nor a direct analysis of statesmanship, but a paradigm through which an accurate division of statesmanship can be achieved. Hence, although weaving is unworthy of consideration for its

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dialectical topic are not mutually exclusive, and that the priority of the latter is a matter of degree (see also Rowe (1995, 210)).

<sup>1</sup> Diès (1935) ix, Rowe (1995a) 210; cf. Skemp (2002) 242-3, Dixsaut (2013b) esp. 23-6.

<sup>2</sup> Or a 'digression within a digression' ('Exkurs im Exkurs', Seeck (2012) 99).

<sup>3</sup> Cf. Notomi (1999) 35, Dixsaut (2013b) 25.

own sake, its division derives at least part of its justification from its ability to directly contribute to the understanding of a topic that is of inherent philosophical interest.

Without the methodological interlude, the distinct role that the division of weaving plays in relation to the discovery of statesmanship could be easily obscured, with the division at risk of being mistaken for a purely pedagogical digression whose sole purpose is dialectical improvement.

### *8.7.2 The Paradigm of Weaving as an Analogy for Dialectical Improvement*

Thus, rather than taking statesmanship in the same vein as weaving in being unworthy of analysis for its own sake, a more coherent reading of the EV's use of the letter analogy to disparage statesmanship as a philosophical topic is that its discovery cannot surpass the total value offered by becoming a better dialectician, as the resulting increase in the success rate of dialectical inquiries will necessarily lead to greater potential epistemic gains than what can be offered by any individual dialectical inquiry.<sup>1</sup> At the same time, EV's remarks on the primacy of dialectical improvement in the analysis of statesmanship need not be discounted as hyperbole. Since the pursuit of any inquiry's epistemic aim through dialectical method automatically provides an example of dialectic as well as opportunities for the interlocutors to practise it, dialectical improvement can be advanced concurrently with an inquiry's epistemic aim. Equally, although a notoriously nebulous term, 'dialectic' must at least aim to discover what something is.<sup>2</sup> As a result, since the pursuit of dialectical improvement necessitates the sincere pursuit of knowledge of what something is, for the most part, any priority given to dialectical improvement is rendered inconsequential. The aim of dialectical improvement is therefore balanced against the epistemic aim of the *Statesman*, which is not only of inherent

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<sup>1</sup> The claim therefore implies a certain level of philosophical humility – that they are at the beginning rather than the end of a long dialectical process (see Goldschmidt (1947, 15-6)).

<sup>2</sup> Hackforth (1952) 135, Robinson (1953) 70-1.

interest and worthy of pursuit in itself, but supplies the cohesive topic and framework required to provide an authentic demonstration of dialectic.

The pedagogical aim of dialectical improvement should therefore be understood as having *relative* rather than *absolute* priority over the epistemic aim of discovering the nature of statesmanship. This would explain why brevity is actively favoured at a number of instances in the *Statesman* where dialectical improvement might otherwise have been advanced to the exclusion of the dialogue's epistemic aim. For example, during the digression on excess and deficiency itself it is said that its task is greater than that of the discussion of non-being in the *Sophist*, despite their similar length (284c6-8).<sup>1</sup> Immediately after this we are told that a more comprehensive analysis involving the 'precise truth' (284d2) must be postponed, since the current less precise account offers an analysis sufficient for the matter at hand (284d2-3).<sup>2</sup> Since any lengthening of the discussion to provide this more precise account would automatically lead to some general dialectical improvement by providing additional theoretical content on the nature of dialectic as well as a further demonstration of dialectical method, the digression is curtailed in a way that is antithetical to fostering general dialectical improvement. Yet this curtailment is perfectly consistent with the efficient achievement of the dialogue's epistemic aim.

Thus, although Plato might attach more overall value to dialectical improvement, this does not mean that statesmanship has been chosen solely for its advancement. Instead, Plato

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<sup>1</sup> Given that the discussion of non-being is cited for its length, the reference likely encompasses the discussion of false statements and beliefs and thus covers more than half of the text (236d-259d, Sayre (2006) 32 n. 11, Seeck (2012) 97 n. 40), making it considerably longer than the digression on excess and deficiency. But even the most conservative demarcation of its length gives it a similar size to the discussion of excess and deficiency (e.g. *Sph.* 236d-239b vs. *Plt.* 283a-286d)

<sup>2</sup> It has been suggested that the 'precise truth' is an allusion to the form of the good, in which case it is likely a forward-reference to the *Philosopher* (Campbell (1867) 105, Apelt (1914) 129 n. 69; cf. Rowe (1995) 208, Effe (1996) 206-7). But if the discussion of excess and deficiency is a greater task than that of non-being in the *Sophist* yet occupies a similar number of Stephanus pages, then whether or not a more accurate account of excess and deficiency requires an analysis of its relation to the form of the good, the implication is still that the account in the *Statesman* must have been curtailed for reasons of insufficient relevance to the main topic of the dialogue and not purely in regard to whether it might improve the general dialectical skills of the hearer.

exploits the dialectician's ability to foster general dialectical improvement whilst simultaneously examining topics of inherent philosophical interest, thus representing a union of outcomes which rarely needs to be decoupled. However, one unfortunate effect of this natural marriage of outcomes is that it risks concealing any prioritisation given to general dialectical improvement. And it is therefore understandable that when it comes to the fore in the *Statesman* Plato decides to provide an explanation of this prioritisation scheme.

The methodological interlude must therefore be understood as fulfilling a distinct but analogous purpose to that of the letter model, with Plato placing the analogy with the παράδειγμα παραδείγματος in such close proximity in order to convey the fact that the use of weaving as a dialectical paradigm for statesmanship is analogous to statesmanship's role in providing dialectical practise for 'all subjects' (285d5).<sup>1</sup> In the same way that the division of weaving assists in the division of statesmanship through its resemblance function, the inquiry into statesmanship as a whole assists with the discovery of any potential topic of dialectical inquiry by fostering general dialectical improvement.

#### *8.8 The Dialectical Improvement of the 'Hearer' (286b4-287b2)*

In the final stage of the digression EV explains how to fairly judge the lengths of the discussions thus far by applying the principles governing the second type of measurement to their inquiry. In the course of this explanation, EV is keen to reiterate that their aim of discovering the nature of statesmanship must be mediated by the need to improve the dialectical skills of the 'hearer',<sup>2</sup> and as a result, that they should not prize dialectical efficiency above all else:

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<sup>1</sup> I.e. weaving:statesmanship::statesmanship:all subjects.

<sup>2</sup> From an authorial point of view this can be read as the reader of the dialogue, but in the literary context of the *Statesman* it includes EV's passive interlocutor as well as the dialogue's audience: Theodorus, Theaetetus and older Socrates (Sayre (2006) 34-5, 99-100). In addition to this ostensive method of dialectical training, the use

‘In particular, if an account is very long but renders the hearer better at discovering things [τὸν ἀκούσαντα εὐρετικώτερον ἀπεργάζεται], our business is to take this one seriously and not feel at all irritated at its length’ (286d9-e3)

Later in the same passage EV responds to the censure of the hypothetical critic, arguing that claims of excessive length are insufficient, as he must also:

‘demonstrate, in addition, that if it had been shorter it would make the partners to the discussion better dialecticians and better at discovering how to display in words the things there are [γενόμενα τοὺς συνόντας ἀπηργάζετο διαλεκτικωτέρους καὶ τῆς τῶν ὄντων λόγῳ δηλώσεως εὐρετικωτέρους]. We shall take no notice at all of other sorts of censure and praise, relating to some other criteria, nor even seem to hear such things at all when they are said.’ (287a1-6)

Thus, in addition to the epistemic aim of discovering what statesmanship is, EV repeats his earlier claim that the inquiry also has a pedagogical aim: to try to improve the dialectical skills of the ‘hearer’ and the ‘partners to the discussion’. The implication is that, at certain stages of the inquiry, progress towards achieving an account of statesmanship is highly inefficient, but that to censure the discussion’s length on this basis relies on the false assumption that the inquiry should always give absolute priority to the discovery of its main topic. Since both the division of weaving (278e4-283a9) and the myth of Cronus (268d5-274e3) are singled out as discussions liable to unfair censure due to their length (286b7-9), yet both discussions make contributions to the discovery of what statesmanship is, the digression implies that these are prolonged in ways which improve their educational value for

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of the phrase ‘partners to the discussion’ (287a2-3) allows for the possibility that dialectical improvement may be achieved by providing additional opportunities for the interlocutors themselves to practise their dialectical skills. However, since YS’s involvement in the discussions is minimal and EV’s description as an expert philosopher implies that he is already a competent dialectician (providing ample evidence to support this attribution throughout the dialogue), most of the educational value of the inquiry into statesmanship is demonstrative rather than participatory.

the hearer, but in such a way that their contribution to the epistemic aim alone could have been achieved with greater brevity.

### 8.8.1 *EV's Influence*

This must be understood in relation to the fact that the discussion is ultimately a quasi-monologue, expertly led by EV using his dialectical expertise and prior knowledge of statesmanship.<sup>1</sup> Rather than present a dialectical analysis of statesmanship in the most straightforward and efficient manner, EV orchestrates an authentic portrayal of an inquiry starting from a position of mutual ignorance conducted by inexperienced dialecticians. The point is not therefore that elements of the discussion are motivated by the pursuit of dialectical improvement without regard to the inquiry's epistemic aim, but that had EV been wholly unconcerned with dialectical improvement, the inquiry would have taken a much smoother course. While much of the myth and division of weaving offer valuable dialectical exercises for a novice dialectician, they are otiose for expert dialecticians such as EV. This includes the exercise function of the division of weaving, as well as the myth's mockery of the dialectical naivety and lack of rigour which led to the first failed definition.

It is not therefore that the natural overlap in the epistemic and pedagogical purposes is insufficient to meet the need for dialectical improvement, such that the latter is at times being pursued independently of the former, but that the pursuit of statesmanship exhibits a contrived inefficiency manufactured by EV. This can be seen not only in the fact that both the myth and division of weaving offer dialectical lessons which contribute to the achievement of the final definition of statesmanship and which would be precluded had these discussions been curtailed, but that given the array of demonstrations of philosophical method throughout the Platonic corpus, if EV were to offer demonstrations of dialectic *per se* without any regard

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<sup>1</sup> See Robinson (1953, 214-5), Crombie (1963, 382-3), Scodel (1987, 103-4).

to the epistemic aim of the inquiry, such passages would be barely worth the wax Plato drafted them on, let alone the precious papyrus and ink expended on the final edition. The appeal to dialectical improvement to explain the division of weaving's length is therefore at least partly a red herring, as the discussion only exceeds what is necessary to achieve a dialectical account of statesmanship if judged in relation to EV's own dialectical aptitude and prior knowledge of statesmanship.

At this stage, the digression can therefore be summarised as follows. Its very inclusion carries the implication that the aim of discovering the subject of an inquiry determines the length of most dialectical discussions and that the deviations from this aim we find in the *Statesman* are therefore in need of an explanation. However, since the pursuit of any inquiry's epistemic aim automatically offers opportunities for dialectical improvement, the specific epistemic aim of a dialogue and its general pedagogical aim of dialectical improvement naturally overlap. As a result, although the epistemic aim is used to determine the length of most dialectical discussions, this does not imply that it is given priority, as the hypothetical critic is wrongly led to believe. The inquiry in the *Statesman* deviates from this coupling of aims by using dialectical improvement to justify extending the length of some of its discussions beyond what is necessary for the most efficient discovery of statesmanship. However, this tendency to elongate discussions in this way only comes at the expense of the inquiry's basic epistemic aim if assessed in relation to EV's own prior knowledge and abilities, as they are still of value to those with a weaker grasp of dialectic. Any censure of the length of the division of weaving based on the fact that it exceeds its core resemblance function as a paradigm is therefore misplaced, as it relies upon the false assumption that the division should be determined solely in relation to the most efficient discovery of statesmanship.

### 8.9 *Dialectical Improvement and Leftward Division*

As it must offer an exercise in dialectic which helps with the achievement of the dialogue's epistemic aim for a less experienced dialectician but would be of minimal value and could thus be avoided or curtailed for an expert dialectician such as EV, this therefore raises the question of how the division of weaving is elongated beyond its core paradigmatic function in order to advance the dialectical skills of the 'hearer'. As already mentioned, it is not the definition of weaving as the intertwining of woof and warp itself which is placed under suspicion but rather the definition of 'a whole collection of things to no purpose' (283b3) leading up to this definition. And EV's question is therefore being used to set up an explanation of the series of divisions made prior to the definition of weaving. The methodological interlude offers a partial justification for these divisions by reiterating the paradigmatic function of the division which, as revealed later in the text, is fairly modest, yet overcomes the main stumbling block that has hindered the inquiry's progress thus far by introducing the distinction between contributory and direct causes and arriving at a definition in terms of the activity of intertwining (συμπλοκή) which is analogous in important respects to the statesman's own architectonic role.

Since the use of συναίτιος and αἰτία could be demonstrated via series of efficient dichotomous rightward divisions as practised throughout most of the *Sophist* and *Statesman*,<sup>1</sup> and the latter use of συμπλοκή would not appear to depend on a formal division of other arts involved in wool-weaving,<sup>2</sup> which, by virtue of their practical and quotidian nature, are also already well-understood prior to the division of weaving, it would seem to be the aspects of the division that deviate from the most efficient process of dichotomous division that are

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<sup>1</sup> A detailed account of which is provided at the beginning of the *Statesman* (262a8-263b10). See also 279b7-c3, *Sph.* 264e1.

<sup>2</sup> i.e. the forms of clothes washing, carding, or woof spinning are not themselves relevant to the resemblance between the weaver and statesman's activity of συμπλοκή. Instead, this signifies a positive relationship between the weaver to other arts in the same technical field.

presented as being justified by dialectical improvement. This reading gains some *prima facie* credence from the fact that the division of weaving contains a number of divisions on the leftward branches of the divisional tree which do not directly lead to the definition of weaving, and thus seem superfluous to its discovery (such as the divisions of clothes-washing, carding, and the art of warp spinning). One of these leftward embellishments also employs non-dichotomous division with the division of the art of the fuller into three kinds (282a1-5), thus offering a more overt break with the method described earlier in the dialogue.

This reading would also have the advantage of fitting quite naturally with the language used to pose EV's question, with the phrase 'going around in a circle defining a whole collection of things to no purpose' seeming to imply a reference to the parts of the division whose contribution to the final definition of weaving is most suspect.<sup>1</sup> The phrase would then refer to the embellishments added to the leftward branches of the divisional tree, none of which lead directly to the definition of weaving. But perhaps most crucially, since the detailed leftward and non-dichotomous divisions are also a feature of the subsequent division of statesmanship,<sup>2</sup> reading EV's question as primarily placing the leftward aspects of the division under suspicion also helps explain why EV suggests that YS is likely to have similar concerns about the pace of the discussions later in the dialogue (283b1-c1). Hence, although the scope of EV's hypothetical doubts encompass every aspect of the division of weaving, with EV questioning the purpose of the division in its entirety, EV uses language that places a special emphasis on the leftward divisions resulting from its more holistic approach.

### *8.9.1 Leftward Division and the Exercise Function of Paradigms*

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<sup>1</sup> Sayre (2006) 110.

<sup>2</sup> As EV highlights at 287b10-c5.

The use of leftward division can thus be justified on the basis that it furnishes the inexperienced 'hearer' with dialectical skills which contribute to the achievement of the epistemic aim of the inquiry. Since leftward division is also used in the division of statesmanship later in the dialogue, its demonstration during the division of weaving provides a research framework that can directly assist in the analysis of the main topic of inquiry. We thus find a more specialised use of the exercise function that was a feature of the paradigm of the angler, with weaving offering an easier and more insignificant topic on which to practise an innovative method that is not only of general pedagogical benefit as a form of dialectical training, but acts as preparation for the analysis of statesmanship. Hence, although the elongation of the division through leftward division exceeds the paradigmatic resemblance function of the division of weaving, it still assists in the discovery of statesmanship indirectly (for an inexperienced dialectician) by providing practice in a method that will also be applied during its final analysis – a fact which tends to be obscured by Plato's decision to focus on the division of weaving as an example of the *general* value of dialectical improvement along with the myth of Cronus and the analysis of non-being in the *Sophist*, rather than on its status as a preparatory exercise for the analysis of statesmanship *in particular*.

### 8.9.2 The Authorial Motivation for Leftward Division

An additional strength of this reading is that if it is these leftward aspects of the division that are being placed under suspicion, then the elongation of the division of weaving can be framed as a necessary means of demonstrating a dialectical method which, although not entirely novel,<sup>1</sup> receives its most extensive demonstration in the *Statesman*. This element of novelty is crucial, as if the division of weaving were elongated beyond its paradigmatic function in order to demonstrate the method of division *per se* without any significant

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<sup>1</sup> *Phdr.* 265e1-266b1; Sayre (2006) 52-5.

innovations, Plato's motivations for doing so at an authorial level would be less clear, as the extensive demonstration of the dichotomous method pursuing only the rightward genera in the *Sophist* and during the first divisions of statesmanship would seem to obviate any such need.<sup>1</sup> In addition to naturally filling the exercise function of paradigms by providing practice in a novel method on an easier and less significant topic than the main object of inquiry, the provision of an extensive demonstration of leftward and non-dichotomous division would therefore offer a level of novelty that would make the resulting elongation of the division of weaving of much greater general pedagogical value for the reader.

### *8.9.3 Leftward Division and the Statesman's Architectonic Function*

In addition to its potential to fulfil the exercise function of paradigms, there is another (albeit more conjectural) potential relationship between the demonstration of leftward division we find during the division of weaving and the main epistemic aim of the inquiry which makes its inclusion more palatable from an authorial point of view. This is the fact that there is a strong possibility that leftward division would form an essential component of the statesman's training or education. Whereas dialectic works on the basis that there is an underlying order to be deciphered, statesmanship is aimed at creating and maintaining this order using its directive skill.<sup>2</sup> If the statesman is to direct others competently and delegate authority effectively, he must have a clear understanding of how each art contributes to the

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<sup>1</sup> There is evidence that Plato's Academy did busy itself with divisions of mundane subjects and thus possibly not just for the purpose of demonstrating a novel method. In particular, the comic fragment from Epicrates depicting the Academy attempting to define a vegetable is interpreted by many as containing a kernel of truth (Athenaeus 2.59d, quoted in Diès (1935) xxvii-iii; see Usener (1907, 83), Apelt (1914, 7), Diès (1935, xxvii-xxix), Goldschmidt (1947, 14 n. 3), Stenzel (1959, 17), Philip (1966, 336)). But disregarding the fact that the enthusiasm shown for the fragment seems to ignore the very real possibility that it is nothing more than humorous apocrypha (Cherniss (1962) 63, El Murr (2014) 36), even if Plato encouraged practising dialectic on mundane topics where this did not involve any methodological novelty or innovation, the idea that Plato would have such an exercise inscribed into a philosophical text warrants a great degree of scepticism.

<sup>2</sup> See Delcomminette (2000, 268).

care of the city, including how they relate to others in the same technical field.<sup>1</sup> The meticulous divisions of the arts associated with wool-weaving as well as the political realm of the statesman, and especially the bias toward leftward division they display, may therefore represent a skill that that the statesman himself would benefit from.

The method of leftward and non-dichotomous division demonstrated during the division of weaving is therefore not only fairly novel and thus informative for the reader, but offers both a preparatory exercise for the final division of statesmanship along with a potential insight into how the skills of the statesman depend on those of the philosopher.

#### *8.9.4 Dialectic and Leftward Division*

If the pursuit of the leftward branches during the division of weaving is to act as a vehicle for general dialectical improvement, and more specifically, as an exercise in a method that will be employed on the more difficult main topic of inquiry, the leftward divisions must represent part of a general dialectical method whose exercise can be of use to an inexperienced dialectician. Since the paradigmatic method is introduced to separate those arts which ‘crowd around’ (268c8) the statesman, it is not surprising that we should find this new emphasis on defining the arts to which weaving is closely related. One fairly obvious function of the leftward divisions would therefore be to help prevent the confusion of the object of inquiry

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<sup>1</sup> This point is touched upon by Pradeau (2010, 118): ‘Décidant de toutes les activités en gouvernant leur usage, la politique deviant en effet la science de tous les usages. Elle est bien dialectique, au sens où la connaissance des forms, mais elle est aussi connaissance de toutes les pratiques et techniques qui lui sont subordonnées.’; Brisson and Pradeau (2011, 243): ‘le gouvernant savant doit posséder l’aptitude qui définit le dialecticien; comme l’indique la fin du dialogue, la politique elle-même suppose un savoir étendu de ce que sont les autres sciences et activités techniques dans la cité’; and Miller (2013, 180): ‘If the Visitor continued to bifurcate, he would leave the left-hand sides of his dichotomies undifferentiated, and so even while we might succeed in isolating the statesman, we would fail to discern the other kinds of art that the statesman recognises as his collaborators. And since recognition is essential to the statesman’s work, to fail to discern these kinds would be to fail to understand statesmanship itself.’. See also Maier (1913, 59-60), who suggests that Xenophon’s claim (*Mem.* 4.5.12) that ‘διαλέγοντας κατὰ γένη’ was thought to foster excellence in leadership (‘ἐκ τούτου γὰρ γίγνεσθαι ἀνδρας ἀρίστους τε καὶ ἡγεμονικωτάτους καὶ διαλεκτικωτάτους.’) is a reference to the *Statesman*, thus providing some additional evidence that Plato may have thought that statesmanship must involve the use of the method of division.

with other objects in the same field, something a more direct division would be unable to achieve.<sup>1</sup> Thus, although the more direct rightward route to a definition may be just as successful at developing an accurate definition, its results may not be as epistemically robust, as the understanding of the definiendum it confers is more liable to result in confusion and conflation with other closely related things.<sup>2</sup>

### *8.9.5 The Positive Epistemic Function of Leftward Division: The Interrelation Model of Knowledge*

Leftward division may therefore be intended to overcome one of the main deficiencies of true belief – the tendency for its holder to become uncertain of its truth, as represented by the image of Daedalus’ footloose statues in the *Meno*.<sup>3</sup> Since the resolution of this deficiency offered in the *Meno* is to tie down a true belief with an account,<sup>4</sup> leftward division may play a positive role in developing an account that confers the type of robustness that befits the status of knowledge. Thus, although the leftward divisions may be superfluous to the dialectical derivation of a definition of weaving as well as the fulfilment of its paradigmatic resemblance function, they may nonetheless be a necessary condition for providing a full account of it which can in turn act as a complete methodological framework for the division of statesmanship. And the use of leftward division may therefore serve an important epistemic

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<sup>1</sup> A good example of the potential value of this method is the first failed definition of statesmanship as a form of herding-rearing. If the leftward branch of practical arts in the division at 258e had been pursued, it could have included a division of herding and thus avoided the (albeit slightly contrived) confusion concerning the difference between the practical function of rearing a herd and the more generic function of looking after or caring for a herd. Herding as a practical art could therefore take its proper place as being *analogous* to statesmanship, in the sense that herdsmen and statesmen look after a herd, with the former achieving this through practical expertise and the latter through theoretical expertise.

<sup>2</sup> The importance of epistemic resilience is presumably one of the reasons for the description of synoptic knowledge at *R.* 537b8-c7 as ‘μάθησις βέβαιος’ (537c4).

<sup>3</sup> 97e2-98a8.

<sup>4</sup> ‘αἰτίας λογισμῶ’ (98a3-4).

purpose, which could not be achieved using the more efficient form of exclusively rightward division.

This would be consistent with Fine's interpretation of the aporetic conclusion of the *Theaetetus* as implying that knowledge requires a true judgement with an account that relates the object of inquiry to other associated objects:<sup>1</sup>

'In presenting his interrelation model of knowledge, Plato argued that one knows a given object o just in case one can properly relate o to other objects in the same field. One never knows just one object in isolation from others to which it is connected; knowledge always requires the ability systematically to interconnect the elements covered by a particular discipline via a series of interlocking true accounts. Thus, a person P knows an object o just in case o belongs to a single discipline such that P has the ability properly to relate each of the objects contained in the discipline to all the others.'<sup>2</sup>

The holistic division of weaving may therefore offer a demonstration of a method which, although less efficient than a more direct rightward division, is nonetheless more epistemically rewarding. By relating the object of inquiry to other closely related objects, the leftward divisions furnish a more comprehensive understanding of the object which may also be a necessary condition for providing an account of its nature, thus potentially providing the dialectician with knowledge of the object of inquiry. As the leftward divisions are much less thorough and extensive than those found in the division of statesmanship, whether the use of leftward division can be said to provide a full account of weaving is unclear. But it may at the very least provide a dialectical demonstration whose employment of leftward division can be used as both a research framework by which knowledge of statesmanship can be achieved, as

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<sup>1</sup> The force of the implication being carried by its ability to resolve the apparent circularity of the definition of knowledge as a true judgement with knowledge of the differentness of its object (*Tht.* 209d8-210b2). Since under the interrelation model this knowledge of the differentness requires an understanding of the object's relations to other associated objects, the definition does not presuppose what it is attempting to define. Further textual support for the model is discussed in Bostock (1988, 246-9).

<sup>2</sup> Fine (2003) 249. See also Miller (2013, 180), Broadie (2016, 110 with n. 52). Cf. Ferrari (2011, 138-42; 2013, esp. 410-5) for the view that the aporetic conclusion of the *Theaetetus* implies that the additive or tripartite model of knowledge is impossible as true judgements can never form the basis of knowledge.

well as a dialectical exercise whose general pedagogical value to a novice dialectician helps to justify its inclusion.<sup>1</sup>

The division of weaving does not therefore offer a demonstration of dialectic that is detached from the inquiry's epistemic aim, but one which helps demonstrate a method which is subsequently used on the main object of inquiry and which a dialectical novice is unlikely to be well versed in.

### 8.10 Conclusion

Rather than suggest that the divisions of both statesmanship and weaving can be reduced to exercises in dialectic, the digression on excess and deficiency helps to demonstrate how the division of weaving in particular exceeds its contribution to the discovery of statesmanship in the pursuit of dialectical improvement. However, since this should only be judged in relation EV's own dialectical abilities, the exercise in dialectic it provides is still of essential value to any novice dialectician pursuing statesmanship from a position of ignorance. In particular, it offers a demonstration of leftward division, which although not required to fulfil weaving's

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<sup>1</sup> A similar function has been attributed to the discussion of non-being in the *Sophist* by Broadie (2016, 110), which is listed as a discussion whose length might also be considered superfluous (286b10). This would suggest that its justification in terms of dialectical improvement may also be something of a red herring, as the discussion helps to discover sophistry in virtue of its interrelations to other concepts which may be unnecessary for a more advanced dialectician. It is worth briefly mentioning here how EV's statement that the myth of Cronus is not 'superfluous as well as long' (286c1-2; 286b7-10) might be explained. The digression offers no explicit justification for this elongation, but the context strongly implies that the reason that the myth is not 'superfluous as well as long' is the same as for the division of weaving, namely, that the extension of the myth has the potential to improve the dialectical skills of the hearer. A full analysis is beyond the scope of this study, but it seems that if the myth is to be given any value as a tool for dialectical improvement, it is cautionary rather than exemplary. Textual evidence for such a reading is found in EV's description of the (non-philosophical) tales ('μύθοις') that humans exchange amongst themselves and with other species of animal, described as being of the same kind that are told now about their mythical recounters and audience (272c6-d1). This would suggest that the tales told by humans and animals under the reign of Cronus are similar in tone or substance to the myth itself, a point well recognised by Ricken: 'Der Mythos spricht über sich selbst, und er ironisiert sich selbst; er sagt von sich selbst, dass er Unterhaltung und Spiel ist.' (2008, 123). And the purpose of at least some of the myth's embellishments which make no obvious contribution to its corrective effects would therefore be to provide an example of the sort of leisurely and overindulgent tales told by those with no serious interest in philosophy (it is noteworthy in this respect that the Athenian's rendition in the *Laws* does without the *Statesman's* cosmological framework).

resemblance function, offers practice in a method subsequently employed on the main object of inquiry.

## 9. *The Division of Statesmanship*

Upon concluding the digression into excess and deficiency, EV suggests that they now apply the paradigm of weaving to statesmanship: ‘let’s go back again to the statesman, and bring the model of weaving, which we talked about before, to bear on it.’ (287a7-b2). Since it is primarily the elements of this division which resemble that of weaving which are germane to this study, the exposition and analysis offered here is restricted to these aspects.

The division draws upon two main resemblances with the division of weaving:

- (1) The use of contributory and direct causation to make the first cut in the division;
- (2) The use of weaving’s activity of combination or intertwining to explain the statesman’s positive relationship to other arts in the city, thus helping to explain his care for the city as a whole.

(1) results in a division into a set of arts that are distinct from those divided during the division of weaving and helps to differentiate the role of the statesman from arts concerned primarily with products required to meet the material needs of the citizenry.<sup>1</sup> However, in the case of (2), rather than being used to divide any specific arts in the divisions of weaving or statesmanship, the shared activity of intertwining is applied after the divisions have completed. This is because it relies upon the recognition of a proportionality between weaving’s relationship to other arts in its technical field and statesmanship’s relationship to other arts concerned with the care of cities which only become apparent after the completion of the division. The interlocutors’ superior understanding of the weaver’s practical activity of intertwining can therefore only come into effect once the various arts in the city (including

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<sup>1</sup> ‘ὅσα ἔχεται κτήσεως’ (289a7).

statesmanship) have been differentiated. Although this allows the weaver's activity of intertwining to be compared with that of the statesman after the divisions have been completed, since intertwining is not used to classify any parts within each division, its application comes at the expense of any specification of the differences between the practical activity of the weaver and the theoretical or directive activity of the statesman. In order to make these differences clear, EV offers a series of comparisons between the weaver's activity in relation to the use of the products and labour of other arts and the statesman's own activity. In a sense, this acts like a partial, informal division of the statesman's activity of intertwining, with EV comparing the statesman's own activity of intertwining with that of weaving in the context of their products and materials in order that the essentially theoretical and directive nature of the statesman's activity can be recognised.

### *9.1 The Series of Divisions*

#### *9.1.1 Contributory and Direct Causation*

Having divided statesmanship off from other forms of herding, EV begins the division by dividing the original genus in accordance with contributory and direct causation, and after a direct comparison with the division of weaving (287b4-9), proceeds to a division of the former part into a series of arts defined in terms of their product. Thus, we are presented with a classification of tool-making (287d1-5), then vessels (287e4-288a1), vehicles (288a3-10), defences (288b1-8), playthings (288c1-10), natural resources (288d2-e7), and finally objects related to nurture (288e9-289a5).

Next the part divided in accordance with direct causes is divided into a genus of arts that are 'subordinate to others' (289c4), described as being akin to the differentiation of the art of separating from that of the weaver (289c7-8). This part is divided into slaves (289d11-e2),

who are ‘subordinate to the greatest degree’ (289d7). Then a series of parts consisting of free men are also divided off from this genus of subordinate arts, including those arts involved in the exchange of products (289e4-290a2), and a part which includes heralds, clerks, ‘and certain others who are very clever at working through many different tasks relating to public offices’ (290b2-4). The final part divided off from the subordinate arts includes priests and is described as a subordinate form of expertise relating to divination (290c3-d3).

### *9.1.2 The Greatest Magician of all the Sophists*

Next, a part introduced as ‘the greatest magician of all the sophists’ (291c3-4) is described as being extremely difficult to differentiate from those who truly possess statesmanship. This part is divided into sophistic forms of government, including kingly monarchy (291c1-2, e5), aristocracy (291d4-5, e7-8), democracy (291d7-8, 291e10-292a3), tyranny (291e4-5), and oligarchy (291e7-8).

### *9.1.3 The Precious Arts*

After an excursion into the utility and disutility of laws involving an implicit division of insubordinate arts into expert rule (303b8-c1), EV continues the division by forewarning YS that there is a part that is more akin to statesmanship and thus even more difficult to remove than the sophistic forms of government (303d4-6). In contrast to the types of government that are ‘hostile and alien’ (303e8) to statesmanship, these are ‘precious and related to it.’ (303e9-10).

By implication, this therefore forms a part of insubordinate expert rule, in contrast to the sophistic forms of insubordinate rule just cast aside. However, these arts are nonetheless subordinate to the statesman (304d11-e1, 305a8-9, 305c6-8), with EV making a point of

emphasising the statesman's self-directive role in relation to them.<sup>1</sup> Each of these arts is therefore a subordinate directive form of expertise that issues directions under the auspices of the statesman, and whose distinct nature in comparison to the self-directive expertise of the statesman was expressed during the initial division using the analogy of retailers and self-sellers (260c1-e9). The parts of this insubordinate directive art include a special part of rhetoric concerned with the education and persuasion of the citizenry (304b1-d3),<sup>2</sup> generalship, which decides upon military strategy (304e5-6), and the art of the judge, which makes decisions in relation to the law (305b1-c5).

#### *9.1.4 Statesmanship*

Statesmanship is then divided off on the basis of its self-directive executive capacity, with a special emphasis on its expert use of the products and labour of other arts being expressed in terms of the activity of intertwining or weaving:

‘EV: For this reason, then, the sorts of expertise we have just examined control neither each other nor themselves, but each is concerned with some individual practical activity of its own, and in accordance with the individual nature of the activities in question has appropriately acquired a name that is individual to it.  
YS: That seems so, at any rate.

EV: Whereas the one that controls all of these, and the laws, and cares for every aspect of things in the city [καὶ συμπάντων τῶν κατὰ πόλιν ἐπιμελουμένην], weaving everything together in the most correct way [καὶ πάντα συνυφαίνουσιν ὀρθότατα] – this, embracing its capacity with the appellation belonging to the whole, we would, it seems, most appropriately call statesmanship’ (305d7-e6)

The scale of the statesman's caring function is therefore defined in terms of its unique activity of weaving, or intertwining (συμπλοκή, 306a), thus determining its insubordinate

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<sup>1</sup> See Gaudin (1987, 129-30). The implicit cut between subordinate and insubordinate arts is therefore one of degree, with the former being subordinate to other citizens, the latter allowing for subordination to the statesman alone.

<sup>2</sup> See Campbell (1867, 168 n. 1), El Murr (2014, 218-20).

status and role as an art which makes use of the labour and products of other forms of expertise.




Figure 5

## 9.2 *The Legacy of the Initial Division*

Before looking at how this division relates to the division of weaving, it is worth mentioning how it might relate to the initial divisions partly informed by the paradigm of the herdsman. Since EV begins the division by reminding YS that the different kinds of agricultural husbandry have already been divided off from statesmanship (287b4-6), this would suggest that the division begins with a specifically theoretical and directive genus of caring for a human herd. However, the inclusion of practical arts in the subsequent divisions precludes this possibility.<sup>1</sup> The results of the initial division informed by the paradigm of the herdsman would therefore appear to be all but abandoned, except for the identification of the genus of the art of herd-keeping in relation to humans, which is used to identify the starting genus (τέχναι κατὰ πόλιν αὐτήν, 287b6).

Since the statesman's nature as a theoretical and self-directive form of expertise failed to capture the scale of the statesman's care for the city, this partial abandonment is unsurprising. However, as is made clear by EV confirmation of statesmanship's theoretical and directive nature at 305d1-5,<sup>2</sup> even if they do not actively inform its final division, the results of the initial division still apply to statesmanship.

By starting the division anew, Plato does not therefore entirely abandon the theoretical and self-directive nature of statesmanship,<sup>3</sup> with its positive results being implicit throughout. Instead, the theoretical and self-directive properties of statesmanship are not deemed sufficient on their own to determine its nature as an art which cares for the city in its entirety.

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<sup>1</sup> E.g. tool-maker (287d1-5), tree-feller (288d8), basket-weaver (288d9), farmer (289a3). In fact, the part divided in accordance with contributory causation seems to consist exclusively of practical arts, with the corresponding part divided in accordance with direct causation consisting only of theoretical arts concerned with caring for the human herd (Delcomminette (2000) 286).

<sup>2</sup> 'For what is really kingship must not itself perform practical tasks, but control those with the capacity to perform them, because it knows when it is the right time to begin and set in motion the most important things in cities, and when it is the wrong time; and the others must do what is prescribed for them'; see also 292b9-c3.

<sup>3</sup> Cf. Bluck (1975) 36, Sayre (2006) 103, 121.

The main reason for this is that by dividing off many arts in the city with the division of ἐπιστήμη into theoretical and practical arts, the initial division was unable to explain how statesmanship's contribution to the care of the city is distinct from other arts also necessary for the achievement of this aim. This therefore requires a different divisional framework involving a series of divisions in accordance with forms which divide arts which contribute to the care of the city specifically in relation to other arts also required to achieve this end. And it is not clear whether this could be achieved in a single division which incorporates γνωστική, ἐπιτακτική, and ἀτεπιτακτική as well as συναίτιος and αἰτία in an equally informative way.<sup>1</sup> The interesting implication of this is not only that there may not be some single divisional route via which one can arrive at a definition of something,<sup>2</sup> but that this may even demand more than one attempt. In fact, since the extensions of the parts of a division are determined by preceding divisions, there is a possibility that certain forms necessary for a definition of an object are precluded by particular divisional routes (especially if one is to cut parts through the middle). EV therefore seems to carry over some of the forms used in the initial division which, due to the need to select forms in terms of the contribution of various arts to the care of cities in the context of a division of labour, are excluded from its divisional framework.

It is worth mentioning here that one of the effects of the failure to use the forms of γνωστική, ἐπιτακτική, and ἀτεπιτακτική in the final division is that it leaves EV's use of the activity of intertwining to define the statesman's activity in relation to other arts in the city unclear. Since the identification of intertwining in statesmanship is the result of a comparison

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<sup>1</sup> For example, were the division to use τέχνη κατὰ πόλιν αὐτὴν as the starting genus, then the use of συναίτιος and αἰτία after the divisions according to γνωστική, ἐπιτακτική, and ἀτεπιτακτική would fail to distinguish the role of practical arts (in accordance with συναίτιος). However, if συναίτιος and αἰτία were used before the divisions according to γνωστική, ἐπιτακτική, and ἀτεπιτακτική, then it is unclear how the subordinate arts (or sophisticated forms of rule) might fit into this division, nor how these divisions could comply with the principle of cutting through the middle.

<sup>2</sup> Moravcsik (1973a) 332-3, 344-5, (1973b) 166, 172.

with weaving's activity in relation to the labour and products of other arts involved in the production of woollen clothing (about which the interlocutors also possess a superior pre-dialectical understanding), without demonstrating that the activity of intertwining is found in statesmanship only in combination with the forms of γνωστική, ἐπιτακτική, and ἀτεπιτακτική, this resemblance between weaving and statesmanship is left highly analogous. As addressed below, this may form part of the motivation for the metaphorical use of the paradigm of weaving after the final division has been completed.

### *9.3 The Resemblance Function of the Division of Weaving*

#### *9.3.1 The Deficiencies of the Intra-generic Method Revisited*

The paradigmatic method employed on statesmanship differs from both the paradigm of angling and the paradigm of the herdsman in the lack of any shared parts between the paradigmatic and main divisions, with the intra-generic nature of the divisions exhibited by the paradigms of angling and agricultural husbandry involving the use of a resemblance to select a shared genus from which the divisions of the paradigm and object of inquiry both proceed.<sup>1</sup> Since this is combined with an unexplained assumption that this resemblance will also allow for some overlap in the forms used to divide its subsequent parts 'κατ' εἶδη', the intra-generic method results in divisions of the paradigm and object of inquiry whose parts overlap. The resemblance between the paradigm and object of inquiry is therefore used primarily to select an initial genus to be divided, which apparently comes with a high likelihood that the object of inquiry will also possess many of the same properties that are used to cut this genus into parts during the paradigmatic division. The intra-generic method

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<sup>1</sup> In the case of the paradigm of angling this is also the starting genus (acquisitive arts). In the case of the paradigm of the herdsman, this is the genus of rearing or caring for a herd that is introduced part-way through the initial division. However, since EV effectively ignores the preceding divisions, this in effect acts as an original starting genus for the divisions of both agricultural husbandry and statesmanship.

therefore works on the basis that the division of the object of inquiry can simply piggyback on the superior ease with which appropriate forms can be selected in relation to the paradigm on the basis that the resemblance used to select the shared original genus is likely to allow for a more specific similarity or some further resemblance between the paradigm and object of inquiry that can be captured by more refined sub-genera of this original genus.

Thus, whereas the paradigm of angling and the paradigm of the herdsman both use a resemblance between the paradigm and object of inquiry to select a shared genus for both of their divisions, this does not occur in the case of the paradigm of weaving, with the resulting parts divided off from its distinct original genus therefore being different from those identified during the division of weaving.

The use of the division of weaving as a paradigm therefore avoids the main issue with the intra-generic mode of the paradigmatic method resulting from the fact that the original genus must be broad enough to allow for the disparity in doxastic alacrity between the paradigm and object of inquiry – a result of which is that the shared original genus expresses only a highly analogous resemblance between the paradigm and object of inquiry (i.e. manual vs. non-manual modes of acquisition; manual vs. theoretical modes of caring for a herd). Hence, if the original genus is to be divided into final unique parts corresponding to the extensions of the paradigm and object of inquiry, these parts must be divided in accordance with forms which account for these differences. And the division of the paradigm and that of the object of inquiry must therefore eventually branch off from one another into separate parts which are united only in the analogous sense expressed by their inclusion within the same original genus.

While Plato may have thought that the exercise function of paradigms compensates somewhat for this deficiency in the intra-generic method, the deliberate mismanagement of the paradigm of the herdsman suggests some awareness of this issue. There, the division

according to the type of animal reared prevents any branching off of the divisions starting from the genus of ‘κοινοτροφική’, whilst also preventing this genus from being divided in accordance with forms which may provide further detail on the holistic or architectonic function of the statesman’s essentially *theoretical* and self-directive expertise.

Hence, the movement away from this intra-generic method with the division of statesmanship would appear to be deliberate, representing an attempt to overcome the faults identified with the intra-generic use of the paradigmatic method. However, it should be added that this does come at a certain cost to the final division. In particular, by failing to overtly identify the other forms that intertwining is found in combination with, the differences between the nature of this activity in weaving and statesmanship are left unclear.

### *9.3.2 The Inter-generic Method*

Given the lack of a shared original genus from which the divisions of both weaving and statesmanship proceed, the parts of the paradigmatic division are distinct from the parts divided during the division of statesmanship. As a result, both the extensions of these parts and corresponding forms or intensional properties that uniquely express their meaning are also distinct. The heuristic value of the paradigmatic division is therefore inter-generic, rather than intra-generic, in the sense that the comparison of the divisions yields a set of analogous relationships between weaving and the other arts within its technical field on the one hand, and statesmanship and the other civic arts on the other.

The heuristic function of this aspect of the paradigm therefore resides primarily in a set of proportionalities between weaving and its relations to other arts in its technical field, and statesmanship and the many arts that are also concerned with the care of the citizenry. Hence, in the case of the paradigm of weaving, rather than using the similarity between the paradigm and object of inquiry to select an original genus in the hope that this will allow for subsequent

divisions into shared parts, the paradigm of weaving offers a comparison of the relationships between entire technical fields of weaving and statesmanship. And this comparison yields two important insights into the relationship between statesmanship and the many other arts concerned with the care of the citizenry.

#### *9.3.2.1 Contributory and Direct Causation*

The most obvious heuristic effect of the resemblance of relationships between the arts in the technical field of weaving and the civic arts related to the care of the citizenry is the identification of the forms of contributory and direct causation. Their use to divide the original genus of ‘arts in the city itself’ therefore yields parts that have a relationship to the rest of statesmanship’s technical field that is analogous to the relationship between the contributory causes of tool-making and rest of the technical field of arts concerned with the care and production of woollen clothing. In the same way that the latter contribute to the production of woollen clothing but are not wool-weaving itself, the contributory τέχνη κατὰ πόλιν αὐτήν are necessary for the creation and maintenance of the ideal city, yet cannot directly contribute to its achievement. And as previously mentioned (§5.5.2), this is due to the products of their expertise making no contribution to ἡ περὶ τὰς πόλεις ἐπιμέλεια without the practise of statesmanship (or ἀνθρώπων ἐπιμελητική ἐπιστήμη).<sup>1</sup>

#### *9.3.2.2 Intertwining*

An additional proportionality is the resemblance between weaving’s relationship to the other directly causal arts classified in terms of wool-working (ταλασιουργική), and the relationship

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<sup>1</sup> In the case of both weaving and statesmanship, the dependence of other arts on these forms of expertise in order to make a contribution to the production of woollen clothing or the care of the city can be attributed to their expert capacity to judge the καιρός or due measure (§8.5.1).

between statesmanship and the arts described as precious and related to statesmanship.<sup>1</sup> This is expressed as the property of intertwining in the final definition of both weaving and statesmanship.<sup>2</sup> Much like the genera of acquisitive arts identified using the paradigm of angling, and rearing or caring for a herd identified using the paradigm of the herdsman, the resemblance between weaving and statesmanship expressed by this shared activity of intertwining is therefore analogous, being used to denote the essentially manual activity of the weaver as well as the essentially theoretical and self-directive executive capacity of the statesman. Since weaving and statesmanship are already treated as implicitly manual and theoretical arts,<sup>3</sup> there may be nothing preventing the analogous nature of this comparison from informing the final stages of the division of statesmanship. However, the use of weaving in series of metaphorical comparisons suggests that wanted to make the differences between the two activities clear.

#### *9.4 The Metaphorical Function of the Paradigm of Weaving*

Hence, although the analogous resemblance between these activities of intertwining necessitated by their distinct nature as manual and directive capacities does not appear to interfere with the heuristic function of this property in relation to the division of statesmanship, it does nonetheless come at the expense of some specificity.<sup>4</sup> Some of this is

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<sup>1</sup> ‘πάντα’ at 305e3 would allow for the possibility that this helps to define the statesman’s relationship to the contributory and subordinate arts as well, and ‘γινώσκουσιν τὴν ἀρχὴν τε καὶ ὁρμὴν τῶν μεγίστων ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν ἐγκαίριος τε περὶ καὶ ἀκαίριος’ (305d2-4) suggests that control over the labour and products of these arts would often be necessary (e.g. in a war effort). However, this would still only be achieved by the statesman’s direction of the precious arts.

<sup>2</sup> πλεκτικὴ κρόκης καὶ στήμονος (283b2); ‘πάντα συνυφαίνουσιν ὀρθότατα’ (305e3-4), ‘τὴν δὲ βασιλικὴν συμπλοκὴν’ (306a1).

<sup>3</sup> In the case of weaving, it is unclear whether its classification as a practical art is a product of the division according to the form of arts related to doing things (‘πάντα τὰ δρώμενα’, 281d8-9) or whether it is simply taken for granted throughout the divisions. However, in the case of the division of statesmanship, its theoretical and self-directive properties identified during the initial divisions are simply presumed to apply, despite not being used overtly during the divisions themselves.

<sup>4</sup> See §2.4.

compensated for by EV's emphasis upon the directive role of statesmanship throughout its division. However, it is presumably the analogous and thus partly equivocal nature of the resemblance it expresses which motivates Plato's decision to flesh out the distinctively directive nature of statesman's activity of intertwining through a series of metaphors immediately after the completion of the division of statesmanship.<sup>1</sup> And the purpose of these comparisons therefore appears to be to bridge the semantic distance between the two types of intertwining by clarifying the differences between the role of the weaver and the statesman.

#### *9.4.1 The Royal Weaver*

After formulating a definition of statesmanship at 305e2-6, EV states that:

‘At this point we’ll want, won’t we, to pursue it further by reference to the model [παράδειγμα] of the art of weaving, now that all the classes of things in the city have become clear to us?’ (305e8-10)

It is then explained that this will involve an examination of how statesmanship shares the same kind of activity as weaving:

‘Then it seems that we should discuss the intertwining [συμπλοκήν] that belongs to kingship – of what kind it is, and in what way it intertwines [συμπλέκουσα] to render us what sort of fabric’ (306a1-3)

EV then proceeds to describe the statesman's role as the interweaver of the opposing qualities of ‘courage [τῆς ἀνδρείας]’ (306e7) and ‘orderliness [τῆς κοσμιότητος]’ (307b2), with EV explaining that these can be found in the souls of different people, resulting in hostility

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<sup>1</sup> ‘L’emploi systématique du paradigme devait arracher le tissage à la métaphore, à la puissante métaphysique des liens, des fils, des tissus, des textures etc. Or Platon joue désormais sur les possibilités métaphoriques.’ (Gaudin (1987) 130)

(307b5-d4).<sup>1</sup> If either of these character types becomes predominant, the city risks enslavement either through an unwillingness to drive away enemies in war, or conversely, by being too keen to make enemies (307d6-308a9).<sup>2</sup>

Part of the solution is to establish a ‘divine bond [θείω...δεσμῶ]’ (309c2) within the eternal part of the soul, which is identified with a true and guaranteed belief (‘ἀληθῆ δόξαν μετὰ βεβαιώσεως’, 309c6-7) concerning ‘what is fine, just, good, and the opposites of these’ (309c5-6). This process is attributed to ‘τῆ τῆς βασιλικῆς μούσῃ’ (308d2-3)<sup>3</sup> and is achieved only after the completion of a formal education (308d3-4).

The second part of the solution to the described tendency for excess in the moral character traits of the citizenry is inter-generational. Arguing that the tendency for people to associate with and ultimately marry persons within their character group eventually leads to severe psychological problems for their progeny, EV argues that the solution is to interweave the separate groups of courageous and orderly persons through intermarriage and interbreeding (310b2-e3).

### *9.5 Metaphors and Semantic Contexts*

In addition to addressing the broader scope of responsibilities the statesman must assume in comparison to the agricultural and divine herdsman (§5.3, 5.5), this comparison of the activities of intertwining helps to emphasise the differences between the practical and self-directive nature of the weaver and the statesman’s expertise. Plato achieves this by

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<sup>1</sup> 306b9-c1 implies that these cannot be virtues (compare also ‘ἦθος ἀνδρείου καὶ σώφρονος ὅσα τε ἄλλα ἐστὶ τείνοντα πρὸς ἀρετῆν’, 308e9-309a1), but nor will either be possessed to the exclusion of the other (308e5-309a3). ‘Neither mere natural virtues, then, nor fully developed *andreia* and *sôphrosunê*, but something in between’ (Rowe (2020) 317).

<sup>2</sup> Plato’s interest in this problem may stem from its presence elsewhere in the Greek corpus (see Dixsaut (1995, 260-1), Rowe (2020) 321).

<sup>3</sup> Perhaps a reference to the work of the just rhetorician (Rowe (2020) 317-8).

contrasting the semantic contexts of the practical and directive activities of intertwining, thus not only providing an illustration of the key differences between the activities of the weaver and the statesman, but also distilling the elements of its meaning that are germane to the comparison.

This is achieved by transposing the term into a new semantic context in which certain aspects of its meaning are carried over, but others are excluded, thus creating a metaphor. The explanation for this partial transfer of meaning is that the semantic contexts of the literal and the metaphorical use of 'weaving' or 'intertwining' consist of a set of implications about the use of the word.

#### *9.5.1 The Nature of Metaphor*

Metaphors result when a word is used in a new semantic context which has a similar predicate scheme to the word's more literal use in another context.<sup>1</sup> The uses are therefore equivocal, with the literal meaning being improper or incorrect in the new context. This impropriety is a product of the predicate scheme in the literal use implying certain relations which are excluded from the new context. For example, 'Socrates interwove warp and woof' implies the production of something from the binding or unifying of different, opposing things (the implied presupposition). The semantic context makes it clear that this is achieved manually with the use of the body (the implying presupposition). However, while 'Socrates interwove the brave and the meek' permits the implied presupposition (that something is produced via the unification of opposites), as this cannot be achieved manually, it excludes the implying presupposition of the literal meaning (the use of the body).

These presuppositions resulting from the differing semantic contexts are a product of the semantic or syntagmatic contrasts which impose limitations on what can be combined into an

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<sup>1</sup> In what follows, I am heavily indebted to Ross's analysis (1981).

acceptable sentence. ‘Socrates wove with his *hands*’ is syntagmatically allowable but carries with it certain semantic presuppositions which mean that the sentence can only retain the same meaning if completed with a term from the same semantic field (e.g. ‘loom’, ‘fingers’, ‘arms’). Terms outside of this field are thus syntagmatically excluded. For example, ‘Socrates wove *by issuing a written command to a delegate*’ cannot have the same meaning and is semantically unacceptable. The syntagmatic relations are ones of presupposition between words – in this case between a verb (wove) and a noun (hands) in an instrumental relationship. The noun and verb are interdependent to the extent that the verb *to weave* could not be given a semantic analysis without expressing its syntagmatic relationship to nouns referring to the of the parts of the body used in the process of weaving, or any tools or materials used. These build the contextual environment of the use of a word which creates the presuppositions which determine what is semantically acceptable.

As a result, placing a term in a new semantic environment creates a new set of presuppositions which are therefore context-dependent and defeasible due to semantic contagion from words used in the same context. Thus ‘Socrates wove with his hands’ makes no sense in a linguistic context determined by political or moral terms such as ‘citizens’, ‘mores’, ‘courage’, ‘timidity’, ‘intermarriage’, etc. These terms create a new semantic environment and the verb ‘to weave’ thus acquires a new set of presuppositions via semantic contagion which exclude presuppositions to other words from the original predicate scheme. This new environment is thus a presupposition *cancelling* environment. For example, ‘Socrates interwove with his hands’, ‘Socrates interwove warp and woof’, or ‘Socrates interwove a tartan pattern’ all make no sense in a linguistic context determined by political or moral terms such as ‘citizens’, ‘mores’, ‘courage’, ‘timidity’, etc. And ‘hands’, ‘warp’, ‘woof’, and ‘tartan’ are therefore all scheme *intransigent*. This semantic environment therefore imposes the presupposition that weaving is not carried out via some manual skill

using the body, but by political, non-manual means such as education and rules concerning intermarriage which are achieved directive. Conversely ‘Socrates interwove the brave and the meek’; or ‘Socrates interwove a harmonious society’ makes no sense in a semantic environment containing terms related to woollen cloth, such as ‘warp’, ‘woof’, ‘tartan’, ‘loom’, or ‘hands’.

Hence, rather than using division to determine the contrast between the manual activity of the weaver and the theoretical activity of the statesman, Plato instead achieves this through a series of metaphors which allow the reader to distinguish the elements or presuppositions carried over from one semantic context to the next (i.e. the production of something via the unification of opposites) and those which are excluded in the new semantic context (the use of the body and manual tools). The result is that any ambiguity in the application of intertwining to statesmanship is removed by a sort of informal division which makes the essentially directive nature of the statesman’s activity of intertwining clear.

### *9.6 Conclusion*

The division of statesmanship therefore appears to represent an attempt to overcome the problems confronted by the method of overlapping divisions. To the extent that this is true, the failure to overtly use forms from the initial division in the final division itself comes at the expense of a failure specify the differences between the practical nature of weaving’s activity of intertwining and statesmanship’s own directive activity. Hence, from a methodological point of view, the series of (often implicit) metaphorical comparisons between statesmanship’s activity of intertwining in relation to the citizenry acts as a kind of informal division. This is achieved by allowing for the differences resulting from the forms identified at the start of the initial division to be identified by placing the activity of

intertwining in a semantic context which cancels many of the presuppositions relating to the weaver's own practical activity.

However, the application of the paradigm of weaving must also be understood in relation to the failure of the initial division. In this context, it can be seen as an attempt to identify forms which differentiate statesmanship from other arts in the city, as well as explain its positive role as the art which must have ultimate executive authority over the labour and products of other arts. The comparison of the entire technical fields of the production of woollen cloth and the care of cities in order to reveal proportionalities between weaving and the other arts involved with weaving woollen cloth and statesmanship and other arts concerned with the care of cities is therefore perfectly suited to this purpose, as each of these proportionalities is indicative of features which define their relationships to other closely related arts.

## 10. Conclusion

In this study I have attempted to answer the following basic question:

- (S) *Why is wool-weaving introduced and subjected to a dialectical analysis within an inquiry concerning the nature of statesmanship?*

### 10.1 The Epistemological Limitations that the Paradigmatic Method is Intended to Overcome

(SI)

I have argued that the use of the paradigmatic method is motivated by a general epistemological problem indicated by the aporetic conclusion of the *Theaetetus*: the inability to form reliable true judgements about certain topics. This would explain the methodological interlude's implication that the only way of providing even a simple demonstration of one of the greater things is via the use of dialectical method. This contrasts with the 'smaller' things, which have particulars whose perception allows for the formation of true judgements, resulting in dialectical analysis of these topics being easier. In particular, forms can be more easily identified to classify the parts of its division and its relationships to other closely related things. Where these forms are shared between a smaller thing and a greater thing, these can also be applied to the division of the latter as a result of the capacity for recognition. The paradigmatic method would therefore help to overcome the an epistemological limitation indicated by the *Theaetetus* by leveraging the availability of clear perceptible particulars of certain 'smaller' things to help guide divisions of things for which no such likenesses are available, thus resulting in more efficient divisions of the latter.

The paradigm of weaving in particular is also motivated by concerns that may have been specific to the dialectical context.<sup>1</sup> In particular, the need to differentiate other arts that contribute to the care of cities and to provide a positive account of the statesman's unique capacity to care for the city as a whole seem to have directly influenced the choice of weaving as a paradigm as well as its application. More specifically, the comparison of the entire technical fields of weaving and statesmanship in order to reveal proportionalities in their relationships to other arts. I have argued that this explains the illustrative role of the *παράδειγμα παραδείγματος*, especially in terms of representing weaving and statesmanship as arts that are dependent upon a division of labour for the practise of their expertise.

### *10.2 The Nature and Genesis of the Paradigmatic Method (S2)*

The initial inspiration for the paradigmatic method appears to have been Plato's use of simple heuristic paradigms. Since these are not used to assist with a division, their similarities with the object they are introduced to clarify are insufficient to form the basis of a definition. In fact, given that these paradigms also depend upon some disparity in pre-dialectical doxastic alacrity, they will tend to be very different in nature to the illustrandum (at least where his results from a difference in the empirical accessibility of their particulars). As a result, the shared feature recognised by their comparison with the illustrandum must be referred to with a predicate that is analogous in meaning. In Platonic terms, this means that the differences in the combination of forms across the paradigm and illustrandum would need to be identified if

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<sup>1</sup> The answer to this question depends largely upon the exact relationship between the initial division(s) and the final division of statesmanship, which has not been fully explained in this study, and remains one of the more important unanswered questions. In particular, it is unclear whether the final division could have been achieved via a single division, with the failure to incorporate the useful elements of the first division representing a failure in the application of dialectical method, or whether it may in fact be necessary in most cases to identify forms applying to the definiendum using more than one divisional route.

either is to be properly defined. When the paradigmatic method is first employed by Plato to identify a shared starting genus and a series of forms used to make subsequent divisions into overlapping parts this leads to a basic limitation. For the forms which differentiate the paradigm and illustrandum, and thus explain why the nature of their similarities are analogous, must be employed in each of their divisions. This entails that the divisions must branch off from one another in order to account for these differences, thus rendering the paradigm of no value in identifying forms in the remainder of the division of the main object of inquiry.

### *10.3 The Application of the Paradigmatic Method in the Analysis of Statesmanship (S3)*

Since, during the use of the paradigm of the herdsman, EV forces an extended overlap of the divisions of agricultural herd-rearing by ignoring the results of preceding divisions and making further divisions exclusively in terms of physical and habitual characteristics of the animal reared, it appears that Plato may have been aware of this limitation, using the initial division to highlight this issue. The abandonment of the intra-generic paradigmatic method in the remainder of the dialogue adds some support to this hypothesis. For in the case of the paradigm of weaving, its resemblance to statesmanship is not used to identify a starting genus from which a series of overlapping parts can be divided on the basis of further forms shared by the paradigm and object of inquiry. Instead, the features shared by weaving and statesmanship are used to divide distinct parts in each division (using direct and contributory causation) and at the end of the division of statesmanship to explain its positive relationship to other parts of the division (intertwining). The latter is therefore able to inform the final stages of the division of statesmanship, or at least help to provide further detail on statesmanship's relationship to its preceding parts. However, by comparing weaving and

statesmanship's activity of intertwining at the end of their divisions, this comparison confronts the same problem as heuristic paradigms, in that the distinct nature of weaving and statesmanship which allowed intertwining to be more easily identified in the former's particulars, as well as the lack of any overt use of the forms of γνωστική/πρακτική to differentiate the weaver's activity from that of the statesman, means that this resemblance remains analogous in important respects. Plato's use of a series of metaphors to provide further detail on these differences by comparing the activity of intertwining practised by weaving and statesmanship therefore acts like an informal division. By placing each activity in its practical and theoretical contexts, the form of intertwining can be implicitly combined with forms not shared by the paradigm and object of inquiry (in the case of statesmanship, particularly the form ἀτεπιτακτική identified during the initial division).

In conclusion, the paradigmatic method (if it should actually be referred to as such) represents an often unsystematic attempt to ground dialectical analysis in true judgements. Evidence in later texts suggests that this attempt was aborted, or at least sidelined by Plato. And its use in the *Statesman* may therefore be considered experimental (perhaps fittingly given the unique nature of the dialogue). However, I hope to have shown why it should remain a source of intrigue for any committed Platonist.

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