

Dusty Roads to Madrid: Allied Logistics During the War of the Spanish Succession, 1700-1714



Rob Tildesley

A thesis submitted for the degree of

Doctor of Philosophy

Wolfson College

Department of History

University of Oxford

Acknowledgements

I want to thank all those who have helped throughout this project. I want to thank my supervisor Peter Wilson for all his invaluable support and advice throughout. Also, David Parrott for his kind words and motivation for the project.

I would like to thank the staff at the British Library and National Archives for their assistance in finding material throughout the research. I particularly want to thank Bridget Cameron for allowing me access to the Peterborough family papers.

I want to thank my parents for their enduring support, advice, and love through every step and always being the most supportive of all my endeavours. Without their belief I am sure that I would have not reached this stage. I also want to provide my eternal thanks to Malina whose support and love I have cherished and who has been there for the worst and best days, without you I would not be the person I am today.

Finally, I want to thank the students and staff at both Wolfson and New College for making Oxford feel like home and giving me the opportunity to feel comfortable in what could be difficult days.

List of Abbreviations:

TNA- The National Archives

BL- British Library

JSAHR- Journal of Army Historical Research

CP- Cameron Papers

Table of Contents:

List of Maps and Tables	6
Principle Chronology of Events	7
Abstract	10-12
Introduction	13-24
Chapter 1: Supplies and Finances: Army Logistics and Organisation	35-71
Section 1: Practical Concerns and Methodology	41-49
Section 2: Creating an Iberian Model	50-61
Section 3: Conclusions	62-69
Appendix: Charts and Tables	70-71
Chapter 2: The Home Sector Fulcrum of the Fiscal-Military State	72-117
Section 1: Recruiting an Army	76-82
Section 2: Marshalling and Directing Forces	83-90
Section 3: Supply and Material	91-100
Section 4: Transportation and Supply Management	101-106
Conclusions	107-117
Chapter 3: A Life on the Ocean Waves, Allied Army Supply in the At Sea Sector	118-165
Section 1: Supply at Sea	120-126
Section 2: Iberian Supply	127-138
Section 3: Coastal Landings	139-145
Section 4: Coastal and Transitional Supply	146-161
Conclusions	162-165
Chapter 4: Bases and Advances: Allied Armies on the Coast	166-207

Section 1: Relationship with the Navy	172-181
Section 2: Funds and Leadership	182-193
Section 3: The Logistical Train	194-205
Conclusions	206-207
 Chapter 5: Dusty Roads: Advances on Madrid and the Inland Sector	 208-254
Section 1: Preparing to March: Transition from Coastal Supply	214-222
Section 2: Along the Line of Advance: Creating and Expanding the Supply Train	223-231
Section 3: The Officer Corps and the Internal Credit System	232-237
Section 4: Supply on the Retreat: Extricating from the Inland Sector	238-245
Section 5: Prisoners and Organisation	246-251
Conclusions	252-254
 Conclusion:	 255-278
 Bibliography:	 279-308

List of Maps and Tables:

Map 1: Major Locations and Battle in Iberia	9
Map 2: Geographical Sectors within Iberia	29
Table 1: Total British Paid Forces in Iberia	50
Table 2: Estimates of Non-British Paid Allied Forces	53
Table 3: Supply Weights by Transportation Options	54
Table 4: Average Supply Weight for Feeding 10,000 Men	55
Table 5: Approximate Total Costs of Iberia and Low Countries	70
Table 6: Iberian Subsistence and Pay Costs	70
Table 7: Reappraised British Forces	71-2
Chart 1: British Government and Logistics Hierarchy	73
Chart 2: State Actors and Relevant Sectors	256

Principle Chronology of the Campaigns in Iberia.

1700

7th October: Carlos II of Spain signs his new will providing the Spanish inheritance in its entirety to Phillip Duke of Anjou.

1st November: Carlos II dies in Madrid.

4th December: Phillip leaves Paris for Madrid.

1701

18th February: Phillip V enters Madrid.

18th June: King Pedro of Portugal signs a treaty with France and Spain.

7th September: Treaty of Alliance agreed between England, Dutch Republic and Austria.

1702

12th May: Negotiations open to bring Portugal into the alliance.

15th May: Declaration of War between Bourbon and Allies.

26th August: Cadiz Operation landings.

26th September: Final allied withdrawal from Cadiz.

22nd October: Battle of Vigo Bay.

1703

16th May: Anglo-Dutch-Portuguese Treaty Signed.

27th December: Commercial treaty between Britain and Portugal agreed.

1704

11th March: Charles arrives in Lisbon.

30th May: Failed attempt to take Barcelona.

4th August: Allies capture of Gibraltar.

24th August: Battle of Malaga.

29th October: Bourbon forces besiege Gibraltar.

11th of November: Relief of Gibraltar.

1705

20th March: Second Relief of Gibraltar.

13th June: First attempt on Badajoz.

14th October: Fall of Barcelona to the allies.

16th October: Second attempt on Badajoz.

11th December: Fall of Valencia to allies.

1706

3rd April: Bourbon's besiege Barcelona.

3rd May: Capture of Almaraz.

27th June: Fall of Madrid.

4th August: Allies retreat from Madrid.

8th September: Alicante fall to Allies.

1707

25th April: Battle of Almanza.

May: Fall of Aragon and Valencia to Bourbon's barring Denia.

August: Failure of Toulon expedition.

14th November: Fall of Llerida to Bourbons.

1708

30th April: Arrival of first Imperial forces in Catalonia.

29th August: Fall of Minorca to allies.

16th November: Fall of Denia to Bourbons.

1709

7th May: Battle of Val Gudina.

1710

27th July: Battle of Almenara.

20th August: Battle of Saragossa.

11th September: Second fall of Madrid.

1st October: Second retreat from Madrid.

10th December: Battles of Brihuega and Villavicosia.

1711

22nd September: Charles leaves Barcelona to become Emperor.


1712

2nd October: Suspension of hostilities in Catalonia.

3rd November: Suspension of arms in Portugal.

25th November: Last British forces leave Catalonia.

Map 1: Major Locations and Battles in Iberia



Abstract

The War of the Spanish Succession marked one of the most dramatic conflicts of the 17th and 18th centuries. It required huge funds to be raised which nearly bankrupted several of the great European powers. It is a vital conflict to study from a wide range of sub-disciplines, marking the decisive point when the shift to sovereign nation states acting on an equal balance of power occurred. It also marked the conclusion of over thirty years in developments in warfare and trends throughout the bureaucracy of the Early Modern state with the growth of state agents and interference within a variety of economic and social sectors. The goal of this study is to contribute to the central debates about the nature of state power which can be attained through the prism of military logistics.

This research utilises an innovative spatial approach to logistics and the Iberian campaigns. By separating the logistical phases of the campaign into four distinct categories; defined by the geographical requirements of each stage rather than the chronological progression of the campaigns. These geographical locations are home, at sea, coastal and inland, each representing a distinctive and separate approach to the practice of logistics for the armies operating in Iberia. This research adds to the discourse of early modern state power projection, especially focusing on state finance, and contractor networks.

This focus provides a fresh appraisal, using a structure that is designed to highlight and separate logistics from the main narrative of the campaigns and battles. It argues that military campaigns can be divided into geographical sectors each closer to all the campaigns carried out within them than to the campaigns immediately preceding and following them chronologically. By separating out the geographical sectors, the full scope and practise of allied logistics can be observed. Following the logistical network as it reached its culmination of extension also brings debate back to the core themes of the thesis, namely power projection and the fiscal-military and contractor states. The chapters explore the implementation of logistical networks within each sector, how they progressed

and the difficulties and solutions that were proposed over the length of the conflict in Spain. They also look at wider issues which in turn impacted logistics in the sector, notably communications and the relations between the military and the local populations. Each chapter leads directly on from the preceding one, with the themes and details relating to one directly correlating to the next geographical sector throughout the conflict.

By examining the financial throughput of the logistics network, a light is shed on the mechanisms for financial transactions, debt and credit, and the links between early modern government and military effectiveness. It has demonstrated the significance in contractual and personal relationships which were prevalent in all aspects of military organisation at the beginning of the century. It highlights the various forms of personal relationship which existed within the logistics network, from the personal ties between administrators and merchants, to the internal credit network which existed between army officers. Through this can clearly be seen the enduring significance of personal connections and the vital role they played in facilitating all forms of transactions through the logistical network. It also shows that the lack of clear and established relationships could be one of the leading causes of a complete breakdown of supply throughput within a logistics system. This study draws together the important themes of resource mobilization and the rise of Great Britain as a major power within Europe, assessing how effectively it could project power across great distances by its ability to successfully fight and supply armies.¹ It also highlights the issues inherent in expeditionary warfare of the period, to what extent there was an ability for Britain, the most successful fiscal state, to fix the issues as they presented themselves and what this shows about the development of logistics over the course of the century. Additionally, it also demonstrates the vital role that the civilian

¹ Richard Harding, 'Trans-Atlantic Operational Capability: State Resources and War 1739-1748, in, *Mobilising Resource for War: Britain and Spain at Work During the Early Modern Period*, ed. H.V. Bowen and A. Gonzalez Enciso, (Universidad de Navarra, Pamplona: 2006) p.62.

economy played in campaigning areas especially the relationship between these economies and the armies themselves, particularly the significance of trust as a factor in logistics.

Introduction: A Geographical Approach

The War of the Spanish Succession determined the fate of Spain's position in Europe and its global empire. The war marked a decisive shift to sovereign nation-states acting on an equal balance of power.² It also saw the end of the prospects of either a Bourbon or Hapsburg superstate. The war saw the vast mobilisation of resources across the major European powers to an with large loans floated on international credit markets, leading to rapid developments in terms of finance,³ credit and transactions, campaigns which defied and defined Vauban warfare across the continent leading to strategic and operational changes for the belligerent powers.⁴ It also marked the conclusion of over thirty years in developments in warfare and trends throughout the bureaucracy of the early modern state with the growth of state agents and interference within a variety of economic and social sectors.

The War of the Spanish Succession began in May 1702 between the allied powers of, primarily, Hapsburg Austria, The Dutch Republic, and of course, England, soon to be Great Britain, and the Bourbon powers of France and Spain. It was one of the last great dynastic wars of Europe, a throwback to the older conflicts that revolved around the lives of kings. The war itself had been on the minds of European statesmen for much of the preceding 30 years. The poor health and invalidity of the Spanish king Carlos II were well known amongst the courts of Europe but grew in urgency as he aged. Indeed, it is this monarch who even today remains a key example for geneticist students on the dangers of inbreeding. Attempts had been made amongst the great powers to prepare for his

² Michael Sheehan, *The Balance of Power, History and Theory*, (Routledge, London: 1996) pp.97-121.

³ Aaron Graham, 'The War of the Spanish Succession, The Financial Revolution, and the Imperial Loans of 1706 and 1710,' in *The War of the Spanish Succession, New Perspectives*, ed. Mathias Pohlig and Michael Schaich, (Oxford University Press: 2017).

⁴ The best definition of Vauban Warfare can be found in, C. Duffy, *The Fortress in the Age of Vauban and Frederick the Great, 1660-1789*, (London: 1985), for period warfare see Jamel Ostwald, *Vauban under Siege: Engineering Efficiency and Martial Vigour in The War of the Spanish Succession*, (Leiden: 2007).

eventual heirless death and the resulting reorganisation of his realms.⁵ Whilst the passage of smaller polities in Europe may have gone without such diplomatic fury, the realms of Spain were a major consideration. Though Spain had, arguably, been suffering from a period of decline, it was nevertheless one of the major European states, with large territories in Iberia itself alongside those in the Low Countries. In addition to this, the vast domains of the Spanish empire comprising much of South and Central America alongside numerous possessions in East Asia were a significant addition to the riches and power of any monarch who controlled them. As a result, agreements had been made to establish a power balance upon the death of Carlos. However, Carlos offered, unexpectedly, the entire Spanish inheritance to one claimant, the grandson of Louis XIV, Phillip. Upon his acceptance, the powers of France and Spain were inevitably drawn into a conflict with the allied states, who supported the claim of Charles of Austria. The conflict raged on a global scale for 12 years exhausting all the states involved, with fighting across four primary land fronts, Flanders, Rhineland, Northern Italy, and Iberia, each with their own fronts within each area. At the Peace of Utrecht a power sharing compromise was reached, leaving Philip with Spain itself but detaching her other European possessions to Austria, now ruled by Charles.⁶ One of the major outcomes from the conflict was Britain's relative power to both its allies, primarily the Dutch, and its opponents. The war highlights Britain's growing importance and global position and given its financial role within the conflict has been the primary focal point of this study.

The major historiographical questions that will be investigated are the nature of British state power in the early modern period, the state's ability to translate financial muscle into the projection of power across state boundaries and at great distances. It also brings forward an important discussion on the nature of state officials and contractors during this period, how they functioned, interacted

⁵ David Onnekink, 'Anglo-French negotiations on the Spanish Partition Treaties (1698-1700) a Re-evaluation', in, *The Contending Kingdoms: France and England 1420-1700*, ed. Glenn Richardson, (Ashgate, Aldershot: 2008) pp.161-179.

⁶ Some minor territorial losses were also seen by France such as Acacia, Ragnhild Hatton, *Louis XIV and is World*, (Thames and Hudson, London: 1972. The overall conduct of the war shall be addressed subsequently.

and worked in tandem to project power over the course of a military conflict. It also will contribute to current discussions on logistical theory, finance and Britain as a fiscal-military and contractor state. By combining campaign history approaches with wider historiography, the applicability of these theories will be addressed and placed within the context of specific case studies. The focus upon Britain is important given that state's development over the century. Britain arguably emerged much stronger from the outcome of the war. The balance relative to its primary ally, the Dutch, shifted decisively in its favour.⁷ The war underscored Britain's growing importance, both in Europe but also on a global scale. However, its full emergence as a global power would occur in the conflicts of the mid-century. Examining its performance at this early point allows us to comment on its longer-term development as a great imperial power, whilst also engaging with a range of important debates on war and state formation. However, much of the relevant discourse has remained bound within conceptual theory and the institutions which implemented this. Recent work to return to more grounded approaches has been vital yet has often focused upon the business and financial sides of the fiscal-military structure. Work by historians such as Aaron Graham and Michael Martoccio have provided vital insights into the practical applications of these historiographical theories upon contractors and other state actors through the application of relevant case studies.⁸

The relationship between war and state formation is one of the defining debates within Early Modern History, investigating the development of state structures and machinery during the 17th and 18th centuries, but also the nature of warfare and army management during the period. The analysis of financial systems and the development of monetary policy in this time has been very well charted. Work like Dickinson's on the development of the fiscal state in England showed the growth of tax revenues, the development of a stronger bureaucracy administering these sources of income

⁷ An important consideration given the Dutch's potentiality as a rival.

⁸ Aaron Graham, *Corruption, Party, and Government in Britain, 1702-1713*. (Oxford University Press: 2015), Aaron Graham, "Connoisseurship, Consumption, Company, and James Brydges, First Duke of Chandos, 1705–13." In, *The Huntington Library Quarterly* 80.4 (2017), and, Michael Martoccio, *'A Man of Particular Ability': A Jewish-Genoese Military Contractor in the Fiscal-Military System*, (Taylor and Francis, London: 2021).

and a stronger partnership between the collectors and the state authority with a reduction in practices such as tax farming.⁹ He also highlighted the financial revolution in England, demonstrating the process of the commercialisation of state debts. O'Brien added to these discussions focusing on fiscal powers and the political economy, how the development of taxation and tariff measures acted as an extension of the growing position of state control within the economy and the reduction of previous forms of income such as the crown lands and demesne revenues.¹⁰ It was on discussions on the perceived 'weak hand',¹¹ of the English state that led John Brewer to publish his major work, *The Sinews of Power*,¹² focusing on the administration of the British fiscal system but also, importantly, developing a discussion on the purpose for this growth in administration and income gathering. Brewer sought to integrate the previous studies with a theory on why and how this expansion of fiscal powers occurred, this has since developed into the term fiscal-military state. His focus was upon the developing role of parliamentary oversight over the British taxation system and how that placed Britain in a unique position. This engaged with an older debate on the fiscal strengths of authoritarian states, in this case absolute monarchies, as opposed to their "democratic" counterparts. Brewer's work re-energised the debate and expanded it with new ones works which sprung directly from Brewer's thesis, the renewal led to important works on representative government and the nature of credit arrangements.¹³

⁹ P.G.M. Dickson, *The Financial Revolution in England: A Study in the Development of Public Credit, 1688-1756*, (London: 1967).

¹⁰ Patrick, O'Brien, 'The Nature and Evolution of an Exceptional Fiscal State and its Possible Significance for the Precocious Commercialisation and Industrialisation of the British Economy from Cromwell to Nelson', *Economic History Review* 64, (2011), pp. 408-446, O'Brien and Phillip A. Hunt, 'The Rise of a Fiscal State in England, 1485-1815', *Historical Research* 66, (1993) pp. 129-176, and, Bartolome K, Yun-Castilia, Patrick O'Brien, and Francisco Comin, (eds.) *The Rise of Fiscal States: A Global History, 1500-1914*, (Cambridge: 2012).

¹¹ Michael Mann, 'State and Society, 1130-1815', An analysis of English state finances', in M. Zetlin, (ed.) *Political Power and Social Theory*, vol 1, (Greenwich: 1980) pp.165-208.

¹² John Brewer, *The Sinews of Power, Money and the English State, 1688-1783*, (London: 1989).

¹³ P.T. Hoffman, and K. Norberg, (eds.) *Fiscal crises, liberty and representative government* (Stanford: 1994), and David Strasavage, *States of Credit: Size, Power and the Development of European Politics*, (Princeton: 2011).

Brewer's development of the fiscal-military state concept has been crucial. He noted that rather than royal expenditure or civil administration, the rise in fiscal powers was driven by the need to successfully wage ever more expensive wars and to fund the expansion of military power, both on land and at sea. His main argument that Britain was a unique case, becoming a major power in the European theatre through its organised and legitimised proliferation of tax powers and tariff collection. This allowed the British state to fund wars and subsidise its allies, giving it a more elevated position in continental warfare than it otherwise might have been reasonable to assume it could hold. Since Brewer's original thesis, the entire debate on the fiscal-military state has brought in numerous historians with a wide range of interests. Aaron Graham and Patrick Walsh's recent edited volume, for example, has shown the number of scholars working on this debate, especially on the different forms that the fiscal-military state took in Britain and that it was not an all-encompassing singular process.¹⁴

The idea of the British fiscal-military state within Brewer's timeframe has seen some challenges, especially from scholars who work within the 17th century, widening the timeframe of the original concept.¹⁵ Similarly, Braddick's research showed that British incomes were continually rising through Parliamentary expansion of the fiscal system rather than royal revenues.¹⁶ In addition, Brewer's focus on British exceptionalism has received criticism,¹⁷ the subsequent debate has expanded into a discussion about alternate models that can be seen amongst other, primarily European, polities. This expansion of geographical scope has a parallel of a widening timeframe, used to analyse and discuss the concept of a fiscal-military state. Jan Glete's work on a comparison between the Dutch Republic,

¹⁴ Aaron Graham and Patrick Walsh, (ed.) *The British Fiscal-Military States, 1660-c.1783*, (Oxford: 2016).

¹⁵ J. S. Wheeler, *The Making of a World Power, War and the Military Revolution in Seventeenth Century England*, (Sutton: 1999).

¹⁶ Michael Braddick, *The Nerves of State: Taxation and Financing of the English State, 1588-1714*, (Manchester: 1996), and, Michael Braddick, *Parliamentary Taxation in 17th Century England*, (Boydell, London: 1994).

¹⁷ L Prados De La Escosura, (ed.) *Exceptionalism and Industrialisation. Britain and its European Rivals, 1688-1815*, (Cambridge:2004).

Sweden and Spain, all within the 16th and 17th centuries is a prime example.¹⁸ Glete argues that Spain, as a fiscal-military state, was already in decline by 1700.

This debate has seen numerous state and polities all brought in, with attempts to bring the development timescale back into the 17th-century, with the 18th century portrayed as the expansion of already established structures.¹⁹ This has led recently to attempts to return the debate to the eighteenth century and reassess the major powers both comparatively and individually. Storrs' edited volume developed ideas about the long 18th century and work by contributors brought together varied but comparable experiences of state development, taxation and the widening scope of warfare.²⁰ This has further been added to by recent studies by Torres Sanchez,²¹ on Spain, a major power unfortunately missed by Storrs' study, Sanchez like many scholars, agrees that the 17th century saw the major foundations of fiscal-military state construction, but in Spain the real developments came in the latter half of Felipe V's reign and onwards. There have also been attempts to change the terms in other ways, shifting the focal points and redefining the parameters.²² Altogether, the historiography of the fiscal-military state has moved quite dramatically and in many regards the term fiscal-military state has become diffused amongst varied national models and time periods.

¹⁸ Jan Glete, *War and the State in Early Modern Europe: Spain, the Dutch Republic, and Sweden as Fiscal-military States, 1500–1660* (London: 2002).

¹⁹ Stephen Conway, and Rafael Torres Sanchez, (eds.) *The Spending of the States: Military Expenditure during the Long Eighteenth Century: Patterns, Organisations and Consequences, 1650-1815*, (Saarbrücken: 2011).

²⁰ Christopher Storrs, (ed.) *The Fiscal-Military State in Eighteenth Century Europe, Essays in Honour of P.G.M. Dickson*, (London: 2009).

²¹ Ibid, and Rafael Torres Sanchez, *Constructing a Fiscal-Military State in Eighteenth Century Spain*, (Basingstoke: 2015).

²² See, Patrick Karl O'Brien, 'The Security and Stability of an Island Realm and The Long-Term Growth of The British Economy, 1453-1805', XXVI, *Encontro da Associação Portuguesa de Historia Economica e Social, APHES*, (Universidade dos Açores: 2006), N.A.M. Rodger, 'From Military Revolution to Fiscal-Naval State, *Journal of Maritime Research*, 13, (2011) pp.119-28, and P. Harling, and P. Marder, 'From Fiscal-Military State to Laissez Faire State, 1760-1850', *The Journal of British Studies*, 32, (1993) pp. 44-70 as examples of these shifts.

Whilst scholars disagree with the timeline of the fiscal-military state, there are defined key features that comprise a successful fiscal-military state. These being, the growth of taxation revenues above and beyond the growth of the tax base, the state centralisation of the tax collection,²³ the growth of other revenues and state finances, all coupled with rising army expenditures and a growth in state capacity to wage war.²⁴ This has also seen development from an economic history basis and ties into research regarding the creation of new revenue sources throughout the 18th and latter half of the 17th centuries. Work on the development of the Bank of England and international credit systems coupled with a growing tax base and further financial revenues available to the British crown have been highlighted by several scholars, particularly Jones in his major work on economy and warfare in the period.²⁵ Jones has shown how a unique blend of factors placed England in a commanding position to develop its financial resources and that despite difficulties was able to provide the funds necessary to pay for the new developing wars of the period.²⁶

There have however been specific issues with the idea of the fiscal-military state, the leading one is that it focuses heavily upon the financial aspects of state development and uses the availability of resources as a yardstick for measuring the strength of one state against another. This has led, recently to the use of the term contractor-state with a primary focus on looking at the other side of the fiscal-military state relationship, namely military expenditure and resources. The term itself was coined by Roger Knight and Martin Wilcox regarding, how Britain turned its new revenues into the collection of military resources.²⁷ This work drew similar conclusions as David Parrott's study on the

²³ Whether by state agents or simply the state's growing control over a contractor system.

²⁴ Rafael Torres Sanchez, (ed.) *War State and Development, Fiscal-Military States in the 18th Century*, (Pamplona: 2007) and Huw Bowen and Agustín González Enciso, (eds.) *Mobilising Resources for War: Britain and Spain at Work During the Early Modern Period*, (Pamplona: 2006).

²⁵ D.W. Jones, *War and Economy in the Age of William III and Marlborough*, (Oxford: 1988).

²⁶ Ibid, pp. 308-318.

²⁷ Roger Knight, and Martin Wilcox, *Sustaining the Fleet, 1793-1815: War, The British Navy and the Contractor State*, (Woodbridge: 2010).

early modern period,²⁸ namely that the only methods available to states during periods of intense warfare was to turn to the local merchants and credit institutions to ensure the arrival of military supplies timely and of sufficient quality to sustain long attrition based field campaigns. The idea of the contractor's role has been vital to the contractor state debate. The width of their networks and to what extent they and the role of state actors overlap or even replace each other forms an important distinction in the research, with contractors often acting as state employees.²⁹ These studies have seen a reappraisal of the idea of military contractors, almost inevitably viewed as a corrupt and inefficient blockage on growing bureaucratic states. Recent scholarship on the contractor has shown that while corruption was prevalent it needs to be reinterpreted and indeed the presence of a contractor market allowed states to go further than the still-developing state machinery would allow.³⁰ These works have also adopted a new approach, focusing on the social and personal relationships inherent in these networks and their wider significance rather than merely contractors as military enterprisers.³¹ The work of Torres Sanchez and also Solbes and Harding have all helped to illuminate the contractor networks that were developing and prevailing across much of Europe, importantly alongside the growth of state machinery.³² This is the most important movement of the contractor state debate in recent years, this being that rather than offering an alternative model of European state development in the early modern era it better interprets the

²⁸ David Parrott, *The Business of War: Military Enterprise and Military Revolution in Early Modern Europe*, (Cambridge: 2012).

²⁹ Guy Rowlands, *The Dynastic State and Army under Louis XIV: Royal Service and Private Interest, 1661-1701*, (Oxford: 2012).

³⁰ Sergio, Solbes, 'The Spanish Monarchy as a Contractor State in The Eighteenth Century: Interaction of Political Power with the Market', *Business History*, Vol 60(1), (2018) pp.72-86, Aaron Graham, *Corruption, Party and Government in Britain, 1702-1713*, (Oxford University Press: 2015), and, Aaron Graham, 'Auditing Leviathan: Corruption and State Formation in Early Eighteenth Century Britain', in *English Historical Review* 128, (2013).

³¹ See, Fritz Redlich, *The German Military Entrepreneur and his Work Force*, 2 vols, (Wiesbaden: 1964-5) and for newer views, Guy Rowlands, *The Financial Decline of a Great Power: War, Influence and Money in Louis XIV's France*, (Oxford: 2012).

³² Rafael Torres Sanchez, *Military Entrepreneurs and The Spanish Contractor State in the Eighteenth Century*, (Oxford: 2016), and, Richard Harding, and Sergio Solbes, (eds.) *The Contractor State and its Implications, 1659-1815*, (Gran Canaria: 2013), see also Jeff Paul-Flynn, (ed.) *War, Entrepreneurs and the State in Europe and the Mediterranean, 1300-1800*, (Leiden: 2014).

fiscal-military state discussion that has been illuminated by other scholars. The work has demonstrated that as state machinery developed, and the growth of fiscal mechanisms used by the state became more sophisticated this pattern was facilitated in many areas by the use of contractors. Particularly this has been shown through looking at army supply where the monopoly of contractors even late into the 18th century can be observed as an integral part of the growth of the early modern state and its ability to use new financial revenues to wage war.³³

The contractor state debate has shown that although there was the continuous growth of state apparatus, this did not mean a reduction in the role or importance of the contractor in facilitating state functionality, rather, that contractors provided the necessary networks that could be employed and financed by new state raised revenues which kept the ability to wage war an option for developing polities. However, one area that is only beginning to pick up within the scholarship on the contractor state and still needs significant attention is the use of contractors in specific military campaigns. Much of the work that has been done has looked at home contractors and how armies were supplied within what was either home or friendly territory. The work of Jones and Knight and Wilcox have focused on contractors within a home supply system or, in the case of Jones, on contractors within an allied home region.³⁴ While this does provide a useful discussion on how contractors operate, it does not explain what occurs when armies move out of their standard supply systems into foreign territory. This is where the Iberian theatre marks an essential addition to our understanding of contractors for military supply, allied forces that operated in the region had to construct a supply network from scratch upon arrival which, as they moved further inland, removed them further and further from the contractors that traditionally supplied military forces. By looking at this critical area of military logistics, the construction of short-term but functioning logistics networks can be evaluated and added to the wider discussions on the nature of the contractor state

³³ Gordon Bannerman, *Merchants and the Military in Eighteenth Century Britain: British Army Contracts and Domestic Supply, 1739-1763*, (London: 2008), and, Torres Sanchez, *Contractor State*, pp.43-96.

³⁴ Jones, *War and Economy*, and Knight and Wilcox, *Sustaining the Fleet*.

and the role of military contractors within the finance and warfare of the period. While contractors' function will be assessed, data will also be drawn to add to existing discussions regarding the models used for understanding military logistics from a strategic studies perspective. Furthermore, the ability to supply armies from beyond home territory highlights a major test in state capacity, for Britain to emerge as a great power as an island bound nation it had to succeed in projecting power and influence overseas through the application of military force.

Where there has remained, limited attention has been upon the military campaigns themselves. Campaign history has remained one of the most popular historical fields for the casual reader, conflicts such as the Napoleonic, First, and Second World Wars receive new campaign narrative histories every year. The academic campaign histories, however, have in recent decades been limited. It can be argued, that campaign history has a great deal to offer wider historiographical debate. By looking closely at the actions of military commanders and their logistical organisation, the significance of fiscal-military and contractor theories can be investigated in practice. Campaign histories in the main have struggled to fully address the subject of logistics unless it has impinged directly upon the outcome of a particular campaign and it is important therefore that the reintegration of campaign history utilises more closely the study of logistics.

The concept of military logistics is one of the fundamental aspects that encompasses all elements of military studies. Despite this and a smattering of texts written by military theorists, there have been very few attempts to truly bring the field of logistics into a distinctive area of historical study.³⁵ The dominant texts for the Early Modern Period have been Van Creveld and Perjes who provided major starting points for most subsequent discussions.³⁶ Much of their work has relied upon the use of

³⁵ See Jurgen Luh, *Ancien Regime Warfare and the Military Revolution, A Study*: (Groningen: 2000).

³⁶ Martin Van Creveld, *Supplying War: Logistics from Wallenstein to Patton*, (Cambridge: 2004), and, G. Perjes, 'Army Provisioning, Logistics and Strategy in the Second Half of the 17th Century, in *Acta Historica Academiae Scientiarum Hungaricae*, 16 (Budapest: 1970) pp. 1-51.

contemporary military treaties rather than the archival record of armies in the field. Other scholars such as Lynn and Chandler have been valuable contributors to the study of military logistics from a basis in these texts using more archival sources, however, still utilising Van Creveld and Perjes' calculations.³⁷ Both attempted to distil a mathematical formula that can be used as a model for armies operating in this era. This involves highlighting all the supply aspects for military necessities and therefore creating an average base set of numbers from these varied factors to provide scholars with supply intake, consumption and speed of march. By utilising greater quantitative data we can reappraise these models and provide greater insight into the fiscal-military state and contractor state debates.

Van Creveld's theory focuses on drawing together several major factors as a theoretical model, taking a theoretical army with approximated amounts of men and horses. From this, he distils a hypothetical march distance and supply consumption rate for a force of the period. Van Creveld's thesis, however, suffers from several factors which undermine its effectiveness as a concurrent model for examining logistical methods and warfare during the period. The main issues are constant in both Van Creveld's theory and Perjes. Perjes' article focuses much more closely on a set of numerical patterns and variables which need to be considered when drawing together models for early modern logistical systems. He reduces many of the wider theoretical numbers, many of which are later used to form the framework for Van Creveld's work. This is primarily working out calorific intake of food, hypothetical weights and a lengthy discussion on the methods of transportation for army supply. While they provide an excellent starting point for discussion, the works do leave several issues out. Primarily this is due to both writers wanting to use the intricacies of a hypothetical numerical supply system to draw wider conclusions regarding the nature of warfare in this period. This is the major and long-running debate on limited war. The concept of limited war is

³⁷ John Lynn, (ed.) *Feeding Mars, Logistics in Western Warfare from the Middle Ages to the Present*, (Oxford: 1993), John Lynn, *Giant of the Grand Siecle, The French Army 1610-1715*, (Cambridge: 1997) and David Chandler, *The Art of War in the Age of Marlborough*, (London: 1976).

counterposed to more modern theories on total war,³⁸ while there is a debate regarding recent conflicts on whether they follow a limited pattern, much of the scholarship has painted pre-revolutionary warfare as inherently limited, suffering from small scale objectives both tactical and strategic.³⁹ There have been attempts to show this to be false and instead warfare in this period must be understood in relation to the time rather than modern standards, particularly the work of Black and Heuser.⁴⁰ Furthermore, Tallet points out that the only constraint on armies of the period was indeed the use of logistics,⁴¹ hence the importance of analysing Van Creveld and Perjes.

Both Van Creveld and Perjes use the topic of logistics as a lead into this debate citing the logistic network's unwieldiness as one of the primary factors, along with the growth of fortifications, for the slowing down of warfare and a perceived lack of decisiveness. These contributions, however, have caused some issues in the use of their models for understanding a logistical system. Because they are looking to lead onto a discussion on limited war, they have used theoretical sources from the period along with some other periods to build their model. To create an accurate model of a logistics network, it is necessary to draw data from sources much closer to an actual campaign, such as documents produced by the army itself or the contractor networks that they built up around them over the course of their operations. This allows scholars to assess multiple aspects of the supply system, from its consumption, cost, complexity and continuity.

Despite its significance as an era shaping conflict, the conduct of the War of The Spanish Succession itself has received little scholarly attention. Indeed, the few significant texts which deal directly with

³⁸ Peter Wilson, 'Was the Thirty Years War a "Total War"? in Eve Rosenhaft, Erica Charters and Hannah Smith, (eds.) *Civilians and War in Europe 1640-1815*, (Liverpool: 2012), pp. 21-35, see also, Stig Förster and Jörg Nagler, (eds.) *On the Road to Total War: The American Civil War and the German Wars of Unification, 1861-1871*, (Cambridge: 1997).

³⁹ Michael Howard, *War in European History*, (Oxford: 1976).

⁴⁰ Jeremy Black, *European Warfare, 1453-1815*, (Basingstoke: 1999), and Beatrice Heuser, *The Evolution of Strategy, Thinking War from Antiquity to the Present*, (Cambridge: 2010).

⁴¹ Frank Tallet, *War and Society in Early-Modern Europe, 1495-1715*, (London: 1992).

the war also make a note of this fact. Despite this, however, a few texts have shaped our understanding of the period and the war itself. Most major works that discuss Iberia in any detail all rely heavily on Francis' *The First Peninsular War*,⁴² and Hugil's *No Peace Without Spain*.⁴³ These are major campaign histories that draw a chronological narrative from some of the major sources from the government and army. However, they also suffer from several drawbacks which have impacted it and subsequent works. They rely heavily upon a small range of mainly higher chain of command and state papers. Issues with supply, for example, are alluded to in the state sources but not followed up to check the proof, and therefore in many cases, the views of London on the campaign become the views that are projected to scholars using the text. This military focus and approach is also used in James Faulkner's work, although Faulkner attempts to cover all major European theatres.⁴⁴ He avoids however, much of the organisational elements of the conflict, preferring to stick to the words of figures such as Methuen and Peterborough. The divisiveness of Peterborough both as a commander and a political decision maker has received significant discussion in each of the major texts, though the issue remains unresolved in the debate.⁴⁵ These general histories are joined by some more specialist works focusing on military and strategic aspects of the period.⁴⁶

Kamen's works by contrast have developed our understanding of the diplomatic and administrative situations, especially Spanish, during the war.⁴⁷ Kamen focuses heavily on Spanish language sources, and we can observe some useful observations particularly through his attention to the

⁴² D. Francis, *The First Peninsular War*, (London: 1974).

⁴³ J. Hugil, *No Peace Without Spain*, (Kensal Press, Oxford:1991).

⁴⁴ James Faulkner, *The War of the Spanish Succession, 1701-1714*, (Barnsley: 2015).

⁴⁵ See, Bridget Cameron, *This Master Firebrand, A Life of Charles Mordaunt 3rd Earl of Peterborough, 1658-1735*, (Norwich: 2009), for a detailed discussion of the Peterborough debate, one of the other few positive texts on him is Colin Ballard, *The Great Earl of Peterborough*, (Skeffington and Son, London: 1929). There were also a limited number of supporters at the time, *Barcellona. A poem. Or, the Spanish expedition, under the command of Charles Earl of Peterborough*, (London: 1710), and, *Remarks upon Dr. Freind's Account of the Earl of Peterborow's conduct in Spain*, (Eighteenth Century Documents Online: 1708) [link.gale.com/apps/doc/CW0104870485/ECCO?u=oxford&sid=bookmark-ECCO&xid=e883a31a&pg=1].

⁴⁶ R. E. Scouller, *The Armies of Queen Anne*, (Oxford: 1966) for an excellent discussion on the structure of the British army, and, John Hattendorf, *England and the War of the Spanish Succession: A Study of the English View and The Conduct of Grand Strategy, (1702-1714)*, (New York: 1987).

⁴⁷ H. Kamen, *The War of the Succession in Spain*, (London: 1969).

contemporary memoirs of San Felipe.⁴⁸ Kamen's attention to Spanish sources illuminates the actions that were going on from the Bourbon perspective. There have been some excellent focused studies on certain aspects of Bourbon organisation often linked to affairs in France.⁴⁹ In addition to this, there have been some excellent specialist texts focusing upon the diplomatic affairs of the conflict.⁵⁰ Onnekink has made significant contributions regarding the Anglo-Dutch diplomatic endeavours.⁵¹ Many of the bigger historiographical issues have been approached in the recent edited volume by Pohlig.⁵² There has also been significant work on the conflict within Spanish historiography, especially with the recent tercentenary, that has brought many aspects of the Spanish side into sharper relief. Particularly, the military contributions of Spain's national forces and the major battles, such as Almansa, that they participated in.⁵³ The Spanish historiography has also seen significant regional studies especially placing the role of Catalonia within a bigger context.⁵⁴ The low quantity of secondary studies on aspects of this period however do not fully do justice to the wide and detailed panoply of archival sources which are available for research.

The War of the Spanish Succession retains a wealth of primary source material, from printed sources and official reports to direct letters and correspondence. The official army returns and state papers provide an excellent starting point for discussion.⁵⁵ These provide the institutional side of logistical organisation,

⁴⁸ Kamen, *War of the Succession*. p. 10.

⁴⁹ Carmen Sanz Ayan, 'Administration and Resources for the Mainland War in the First Phases of the War of the Spanish Succession, in, *Mobilising Resource for War: Britain and Spain at Work During the Early Modern Period*, ed. H.V. Bowen and A. Gonzalez Enciso, (Universidad de Navarra, Pamplona: 2006).

⁵⁰ See D. Coombs, *The Conduct of the Dutch, British Opinion and the Dutch Alliance During the War of the Spanish Succession*, (Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague: 1958) and M. Turner, *Anglo-Portuguese Relations During the War of the Spanish Succession*, (Oxford PhD Thesis: 1953), for strong diplomatic studies.

⁵¹ David Onnekink, 'Anglo-Dutch Diplomatic Cooperation during the Opening Years of the War of the Spanish Succession, 1702-1704', in, *Anthonie Heinsius and the Dutch Republic, 1688-1720, Politics, War, and Finance*, ed. Jan A.F. de Jongste and Augustus J. Veenendall Jr. (Institute of Netherlands History, The Hague: 2002).

⁵² Matthias Pohlig, (ed.) *The War of the Spanish Succession, New Perspectives*, (Oxford: 2017).

⁵³ See, Joaquim Albareda i Salvadó, *La Guerra de Sucesión de España, 1700-1714*, (Barcelona:2010), Antonio Alvarez-Ossorio, Garcia J. Bernardo, and, Virginia León Garcia, *La Périda en Europa, La Guerra de Sucesión por la Monarquía Española*, (Madrid: 2007), and for the battle itself, José Torrejón Cervera, *La batalla de Almansa*, (Episodis De La Historia, Barcelona: 2000).

⁵⁴ Xavier Rubio Campillo, (ed.) *God Save Catalonia: England's Intervention in Catalonia During The War of the Spanish Succession, (1705-1711)*, (Calafell: 2010), and Joaquim Albareda i Salvadó, *Catalunya en un conflicte europeu: Felip V i la pèrdua de les llibertats catalanes, (1700-1714)*, (Barcelona: 2001).

⁵⁵ These include TNA SP 41 series and WO 24 series.

demonstrating the efforts that were taken to organise all the main resources for military operations. Furthermore, these sources allow for the discussion of the institutional understanding of operational events in Iberia and the institutional memory of the British state in future conflicts. The state documents range in type and scope from financial returns and treasury papers to organisational documents from several of the relevant bodies which governed much of the logistical system.⁵⁶ Of these, some of the primary sources which have been utilised have been the financial returns produced by the treasury showing the costs that were expended on military forces. These documents provide an excellent frame of reference for understanding the costs linked to active campaigning.⁵⁷ Through these it is possible to observe the total costs in a more complete sense. This is due to delays in accounting and communication, causing costs for previous years to show up in subsequent returns. These have been supplemented with a wide range of state papers, from the Ordnance Office, Transport and the Secretaries of State for War and the Southern Department. These documents provide a wide range of scope for investigation into logistical organisation, allowing data to be gathered on all aspects of the logistical chain from around the home sector. However, in order to fully bring into focus the complexity of the allied logistical operations, it is necessary to make use of a wider range of sources than simply those produced directly within Whitehall. This is particularly the case when investigating direct operations within Iberia which, due to a variety of factors, resulted in limited effective communication on several matters and much of the organisation remained in the hands of those on the ground. The combined letters of many of the key administrators and commanders are available and have been utilised. Men such as Methuen, Stanhope, Galway, and Peterborough all were engaged in significant correspondence regarding all aspects of the war effort and often in particular they focused upon parts of the logistical network. Their collected letters have provided a backbone for much of this research with statements made by them regarding supply situations and organisation.⁵⁸

⁵⁶ Some of these include TNA AO 1 and SP 94.


⁵⁷ The significance of arrears was noted in the calendar papers but has not been taken fully into account in subsequent works. Atkinson, C. T. 'The Cost of Queen Anne's War' *Journal of the Society for Army Historical Research*, xxxiii, (1955), p.175.

⁵⁸ These include BL Add MS 61500 series.

In addition to these core sources, a large number of smaller records have been utilised. These come from a variety of different writers and sectors. They range from small-scale independent account books such as those for single garrisons, to the account books for the campaign artillery train. Furthermore, there are some letter books from naval contingents and diplomats which help to create a full picture of the organisation and, importantly, administration of the allied logistical situation within Iberia itself. While these sources are not comprehensive in their coverage, they do provide insight into particular sectors of allied logistics, contracts, and life on campaign. Together, therefore, that material which has been accessed for the purposes of this study have allowed not only for qualitative research into the organisation of allied logistics, but importantly, the data has presented the opportunity to carry some quantitative work into the structure of logistics within the Iberian Peninsula during The War of the Spanish Succession.

To approach the primary research questions, it is vital at this juncture to layout a different approach to handling the campaigns than that which has been used in much of the historiography. This method is to separate the logistical phases of the campaign into four distinct categories; these categories are based on the geographical requirements of each logistical network rather than the chronological progression of the campaigns, although in some respects these topics overlap. These geographical locations are home, sea, coastal and inland, each representing a distinctive and separate approach to the practice of logistics for the armies operating in Iberia. The Iberian sectors are demonstrated on Map 2.

Map 2: Geographical Sectors within Iberia



The issue that has always persisted with the study of logistics is to understand the various steps which are taken both in the creation of logistical networks but also their operation and maintenance. Allied forces were required to take numerous organisational decisions during each stage of their logistics. These steps do not follow a chronological model requiring action throughout the conflict. Furthermore, the conflict was a highly complex one in terms of Britain's financial role. The conflict from the allied side was a coalition war where, given Dutch difficulties, Britain emerged as the major funder. It subsidised both allied and auxiliary forces that were engaged across all theatres. As a result, they assumed responsibility for a vast array of logistical aspects from pay and supply, to transport. A model is required to organise analysis on such a varied conflict, taking a geographical model, which has been designed specifically with this topic in mind, each of the aspects can be analysed separately across the conflict, highlighting trends and shifts. While each of the

sectors shall be given more detail in their relevant chapters, it is important to highlight the scope of each.

The home sector represented resource raising and organisation within the British Isles themselves. It was within this sector that the majority of troops and funds were raised for transportation to Iberia. It is also within this sector that the interaction between the institutions of the British fiscal-military state were in closest interaction with the active operations of the campaign. This sector focuses upon recruitment, resource organisation, and the thought process behind many of the decisions regarding the allocation of resources. From the home sector, allied forces and resources would transition to the sea sector. This sector saw the interaction between the army and the navy and merchant marine. The main issue within this sector was the organisation of transportation for sending troops and supplies to Iberia. It also marked the point where the extent of Britain's financial strengths were given their first significant test. Certain aspects of the conflict within Iberia have been kept within this sector. The reason for this is the strong naval involvement in certain operations and the creation of the first stages of logistical chains within the Iberian Peninsula itself. Once allied forces began to reduce their reliance upon naval involvement, has been made as the delineating line between the sea and coastal sectors. The coastal sector focuses upon the transitional phase of allied logistics as they created their own magazines and contracts within Iberia. The territory of the coastal sector itself extends from the coasts to encompass most of the area which was nominally loyal either to Charles or to the Portuguese crown as there are similarities in the logistical organisation of these territories which differ from the final sector. The main focus of the coastal sector is the management of relations with the various competing pressure groups within the logistical system, the creation and maintenance of a full supply network, and the preparations required to make the final shift into enemy territory. The inland sector represents the territories nominally controlled by the Bourbon forces or loyal to Phillip for the majority of the conflict. The focal points of the inland

sector are handling the difficult terrain of Iberia, managing the long supply convoys, and providing enough material to keep allied forces operational in the field.

This innovative structure is designed to allow for the reappraisal of logistics within a prism which highlights the decision-making and administration which is required to operate such a system during the early 18th century, without the narrative chronology of the conflict itself inhibiting the discussion. The research highlights that this structure can be used for assessment in other conflicts as the process of logistical chains remain closely linked to geographical sectors and are not in themselves dictated by the chronology of the era in question. This focus is also to provide a fresh appraisal of allied logistics in a structure that is designed to highlight and separate logistics from the main narrative of the campaigns and battles. This approach will open out discussion into several wider questions that are important to our understanding of military logistics, state development and the nature of warfare in history. A focus will be placed upon the financial arrangements of the logistical networks from the home departments through to its use in the campaign. This focus draws from the question to what extent were funds raised in England able to translate into an effective logistics supply for the armies operating in Iberia? This question examines several layers of state machinery and highlights the uses that logistics can provide as a field of study for wider disciplines than just military and campaign history. By examining the financial throughput of the logistics network, a light will be shed on the mechanisms for financial transactions, debt and credit, and the links between early modern government and military effectiveness. This study also importantly seeks to reintegrate operational history with social and economic military history. By utilising an operational theatre as a prism for discussing wider themes and integrating data gathered from networks in the field with studies on government and state networks will produce a study which brings the field of military history and especially logistics back into modern academic study. This study draws together the important themes of resource mobilization and the rise of Great Britain as a major power within

Europe, assessing how effectively it could project power across great distances by its ability to successfully fight and supply armies.

In addition to the 4 chapters taking a geographical approach, there is a further chapter which takes a quantitative approach to allied logistics. The importance of this chapter is to provide a discussion on the conflict and logistics throughout and attempt to provide a model for looking at military operations within theatres such as Iberia. The main focus of this chapter is the historiographical questions raised by Perjes and Van Creveld and seeks to provide new information to reappraise and bring forward their models for applicability in other theatres. Furthermore, it aims to answer some of the wider questions of the fiscal-military state and its vivacity, particularly the different costs that were faced when engaging within several theatres simultaneously, something which was of continual relevance throughout the 18th century for a global power such as Britain.

The main supply goals which are constant throughout all the are the principles of securing, storage and utilisation. The securing of relevant resources whether through contractors or interactions with civilian bodies or from already established networks. The safe storage of these resources in manners which allow them to be tapped and finally, the utilisation of these resources to successfully prosecute the military campaigns. These three elements underpin the process of logistical network construction in all the major supply sectors and have formed a basis from which the chapters have been researched.

Sometime should be taken in order to highlight and discuss the range of sources that have been utilised during the research of this project. The War of the Spanish Succession retains a wealth of primary source material, from printed sources and official reports to direct letters and correspondence. The official army returns and state papers provide an excellent starting point for discussion. These provide the institutional side of logistical organisation, demonstrating the efforts that were taken to organise all the main resources for military operations. Furthermore, these sources allow for the discussion of the institutional understanding of operational events in Iberia and the institutional memory of the British state in future

conflicts. The state documents range in type and scope from financial returns and treasury papers to organisational documents from several of the relevant bodies which governed much of the logistical system. Of these, some of the primary sources which have been utilised have been the financial returns produced by the treasury showing the costs that were expended on military forces. These documents provide an excellent frame of reference for understanding the costs linked to active campaigning.⁵⁹ Through these it is possible to observe the total costs in a more complete sense. This is due to delays in accounting and communication, causing costs for previous years to show up in subsequent returns. These have been supplemented with a wide range of state papers, from the Ordnance Office, Transport and the Secretaries of State for War and the Southern Department. These documents provide a wide range of scope for investigation into logistical organisation, allowing data to be gathered on all aspects of the logistical chain from around the home sector. However, in order to fully bring into focus the complexity of the allied logistical operations, it is necessary to make use of a wider range of sources than simply those produced directly within Whitehall. This is particularly the case when investigating direct operations within Iberia which, due to a variety of factors, resulted in limited effective communication on several matters and much of the organisation remained in the hands of those on the ground. The combined letters of many of the key administrators and commanders are available and have been utilised. Men such as Methuen, Stanhope, Galway, and Peterborough all were engaged in significant correspondence regarding all aspects of the war effort and often in particular they focused upon parts of the logistical network. Their collected letters have provided a backbone for much of this research with statements made by them regarding supply situations and organisation.

In addition to these core sources, a large number of smaller records have been utilised. These come from a variety of different writers and sectors. They range from small-scale independent account books such as those for single garrisons, to the account books for the campaign artillery train. Furthermore, there are

⁵⁹ The significance of arrears was noted in the calendar papers but has not been taken fully into account in subsequent works. Atkinson, C. T. 'The Cost of Queen Anne's War' *Journal of the Society for Army Historical Research*, xxxiii, (1955), p.175.

some letter books from naval contingents and diplomats which help to create a full picture of the organisation and, importantly, administration of the allied logistical situation within Iberia itself. While these sources are not comprehensive in their coverage, they do provide insight into particular sectors of allied logistics, contracts, and life on campaign. Together, therefore, that material which has been accessed for the purposes of this study have allowed not only for qualitative research into the organisation of allied logistics, but importantly, the data has presented the opportunity to carry some quantitative work into the structure of logistics within the Iberia peninsula during The War of the Spanish Succession.

Chapter 1: Supplies and Finances: Army Logistics and Organisation

Throughout many books runs the old adage 'An army marches on its stomach'; this, though it contains a kernel of truth, can never fully represent the requirements of an army, nor what dictates its ability to wage warfare. In addition to simply bread there are all the other accoutrements of military operations, meat, drink, waggon, tents and camp equipage, furthermore there is also production, preparation, transport, storage, disbursement, accounting, and record keeping. All of these form integral parts of a logistics network. Without these in a steady and functional supply system, military campaigns became dictated by the acquisition of resources rather than the completion of the polity's strategic objectives. A wide range of requirements can be a complex mechanism to understand, and, therefore, certain elements need to be categorised to be analysed effectively.

Firstly, it is important to delineate what is to be understood as foodstuffs for the purposes of analysis. Throughout most of military history, the staple crops for European military forces have been grain. Able to be effectively transported either in raw or milled form and grown in almost all areas of the western world,⁶⁰ it formed the basis for all military supply through the Early Modern period.⁶¹ However, it should be noted that wheat was not the only food supplied to military forces. Meat was an essential and desired staple for armies during the Early Modern era and was often a focal point for the attention of soldiers when the option came for the acquisition of supplies from local populations. Furthermore, there was also the need for vegetables, where available, to improve the health of soldiers and, the greater priority for the soldiers themselves, alcohol, which, although it

⁶⁰ It should be noted here that other major cereal crops fulfilled much the same function in other parts of the world. The significance of European grain markets can be observed in, Karl Gunnar Presson, *Grain Markets in Europe, 1500-1900: Integration and Deregulation*, (Cambridge University Press: 1999), See, David Gentilcore, *Food and Health in Early Modern Europe, Diet, Medicine and Society, 1450-1800*, (Bloomsbury, London: 2016), for the development of an understanding of healthy diets (while understood not heavily integrated into the army but starting to be seen in the navy).

⁶¹ John A Lynn, *Giant of the Grand Siecle, The French Army 1610-1715*, (Cambridge University Press: 1997) p.108 and D.W Jones, *War and Economy in the Age of William III and Marlborough*, (Blackwell, Oxford: 1988) p.30.

caused numerous issues regarding discipline, was seen as an integral part of army life and a highly effective motivator for soldiers. The bread was acquired through specific contracts, whilst the rest of the army's food supplies were purchased in a more ad-hoc manner when the need arose.

There have been numerous scholarly works on the supply systems of various armies throughout history.⁶² However, while many of these have demonstrated how particular armies and nations supplied themselves during conflicts, there has only been a few attempts to distil this into an applicable numerical model for supply. Van Creveld and Perjes have made the two most significant scholarly attempts at this.⁶³ These scholars created a mathematical formula to explain the requirements of armies that were campaigning during the period. By calculating the average consumption of troops whilst on campaign, they created a model which can be applied to armies operating during the Early Modern Era. Whilst very significant in the development of Early Modern historiography, their models are not applicable when investigating allied armies in Iberia. There are several reasons why this is the case. Firstly, their models do not fully consider the supply situation for military forces during the period. It is important to note that some of the calculations Van Creveld and Perjes made regarding the usage of supplies are only partially accurate when investigating an active army in the field. Whilst there are several aspects which link closely to evidence from allied forces in Iberia, such as calorie content and the average size of rations, there are other elements from their studies which need to be recalculated to accurately create a model for Iberian warfare.

⁶² Some excellent examples include, Lynn, *Giant of the Grand*, Jones, *War and Economy*, John Lynn, *Feeding Mars: Logistics in Western Warfare from the Middle Ages to the Present*, (Routledge, London: 2018), and, Earl J. Hess, *Civil War Logistics: A Study of Military Transportation*, (LSU Press: 2017). Some texts focusing on Iberia have struggled to order some quantitative data based upon issues with understanding aspects of the financial sources, Xavier Rubio Campillo, (ed.), *God save Catalonia: England's intervention in Catalonia during the War of the Spanish Succession (1705-1711)* (Calafell: 2010).

⁶³ Martin Van Creveld, *Supplying War: Logistics from Wallenstein to Patton*, (Cambridge University Press: 2017), and, G. Perjes, 'Army Provisioning, Logistics and Strategy in the Second Half of the 17th Century', in *Acta Historica Academiae Scientiarum Hungaricae*, Vol. 16, (1970).

One key aspect which is not fully accounted for in Perjes' methodology is population per square km relating to the production of foodstuffs.⁶⁴ The calculation of Iberia takes into account the estimated population vs the total size of the area. However, this presupposes an even population spread across the entire country.⁶⁵ For Iberia, this was simply not the case, with a majority of the population living along the most fertile areas of the country and vast swathes of land remaining almost uninhabited.⁶⁶ As a direct result, it is necessary to change the approach when working out grain levels of the region for military supply. Since the lines of advance for forces in Iberia were to link the main population centres, as adequate supplies could not be acquired in wilderness areas, then it seems fruitful to make use of studies looking at total grain output for Iberia rather than cross-referencing this with population and area.

Another of the key aspects where the models need to be reappraised is regarding their anticipated usage of supplies whilst on campaign. The availability of supplies, the presence of magazines, and transportation networks that are stated as integral to their models do not apply to campaigning within Iberia.⁶⁷ Firstly, there is the availability of resources. The resources which both models attribute to armies being capable of raising out with their own carried supplies, either through forage or contributions, are only capable of being maintained in certain regions within Europe.⁶⁸ The levels of grain production which would have been required to maintain the armies that developed over the conflict were only possible in those parts of Europe where there was a highly developed rural economy coupled with a high proportion of interconnected market towns. The reason for this is twofold; firstly, the rate of supply for large bodies of troops required significant throughput over a

⁶⁴ Perjes, 'Army Logistics', p.4.

⁶⁵ This was even noted by some writers at the time see, *A Compleat History of the Late War in the Netherlands*, (London: 1713) p.210.

⁶⁶ Gonzalo Anes, 'The Agrarian "Depression" in Castile in the Seventeenth Century', in *New Perspectives on the Economic and Social History of Seventeenth-Century Spain*, ed. Bartolome Yun Casalilla and I.A.A. Thompson, (Cambridge University Press: 1994) p.70.

⁶⁷ Perjes, 'Army Logistics', p.25, and, Van Creveld, *Supplying War*, pp. 20-25.

⁶⁸ *ibid*

longer time span. Individual magazines that were present in towns could meet the immediate supply requirements of an army during campaign, and if the conflict required their continual deployment in the locality, then the available resources would be quickly expended.⁶⁹

Furthermore, within the towns themselves, there was a requirement for enough capital to maintain the army's financial needs, whether that be in the form of credit or hard currency, which could be transferred in contribution agreements.⁷⁰ In the less heavily populated and developed parts of Europe during the 17th and 18th centuries, these levels of finance were only present in small quantities and could not be maintained. Whilst the Portuguese and Spanish internal markets were something of an anomaly in Europe, given the continual presence of New World bullion these were not available for armies fighting in the region. Both states over the war exported most of this bullion upon arrival to pay for the supplies and assistance of their northern allies. Therefore, to continue the pattern of warfare predicated in their works, armies operating within these regions would have needed to import additional supplies which have not been factored into the expected models. This is significant as it creates added levels of costs which would impact all aspects of the logistical chain, reducing the availability of resources and finances to quickly rectify operational deficiencies.

In addition to this, there are the issues present within the communication and transit networks. To achieve the expected movement of supplies, there was a requirement for a robust transportation network within the areas in which armies were operating. This would need to consist of a combination of well-maintained roads and/or waterways, availability of mounts and waggons, and well-placed magazines and other supply collection points. The first critical element of these is a well-

⁶⁹ Over the course of the war there was also an expansion of war industries, *The Taxes not grievous, and therefore not a reason for an unsafe peace*, (London: 1711), p.10.

⁷⁰ Lynn, *Giant of the Grand*, p.141.

maintained road network. To achieve the highlighted speed of transit of 16km per day, waggons with supplies, or often simply mules, would need to move consistently and not be too encumbered by mud or other road conditions.⁷¹ If road networks were not well constructed or were not functional due to weather constraints, then a collapse of potential speeds would result in a breakdown in logistics and a complete change in the quantities of supplies required and the dynamic of transportation.

Furthermore, vital to the transportation of any quantity of supplies was the availability of waggons and mounts in the local area. In order to maintain a functional logistical network, there needed to be an initial and subsequent supply of both waggons and transportation animals. Armies did not bring all of their logistical equipment with them when entering a campaigning area. This was particularly the case with British forces, given their need to add a significant naval component to their campaign logistics. As a result, it was commonplace for military forces to acquire many of the waggons upon arrival into a campaigning area, as there was no army transportation corps prior to mobilisation, either contracting with locals or making use of the contracts that were being utilised for allied forces.⁷² There was no maintenance of a peacetime transport corps and waggons needed to be sourced for all units in addition to the transportation of heavier equipment such as artillery. Once an initial logistical convoy had been established, then it was necessary throughout the campaign to supplement this with additional waggons and mounts. These were brought into the logistical network to facilitate transportation due to several factors, such as new forces being brought into the campaigning area. Additionally, there was a requirement to replace losses that had occurred throughout the active campaign, either through enemy action or simply general attrition,⁷³ which

⁷¹ Van Creveld, *Supplying War*, p.34.

⁷² BL Add MS 61509, Paul Methuen to Earl of Sunderland, Lisbon 8th December 1707, and, BL Add MS 61516, Earl Rivers to Secretary Hedges, Lisbon Harbour 6th June 1706.

⁷³ BL Add MS 61313, Col Wiffard to Unknown, Brussels 13th May 1710, and, BL Add MS 61509, Methuen to Sunderland, Lisbon 7th October 1707.

was to be expected. As a result, military forces needed a constant supply of waggons and mounts within the local area. To provide for an army of many tens of thousands required a large agricultural area that possessed the types of mounts and waggons that could facilitate transportation, though the requisition of so many men and animals could severely impact on levels of agricultural production. In less heavily populated parts of Europe and those with a different agrarian structure where there was less reliance upon waggon transportation, these numbers simply were unavailable for military forces. It can be argued that for several areas of Europe, the differences in aspects of logistical infrastructure have more in common with colonial warfare zones than traditional western European warfare.

Finally, the other central aspect of logistical networks that are required for a functional system is the presence of large magazines. Magazines were vital to an effective supply situation, as Perjes has raised. Without the presence of magazines, armies were forced to rely upon foraging in combination with long waggon supply trains from those magazines that were available. Magazines were for stockpiling to allow logistical support in the event of the concentration of forces for any length of time. The storage of food and importantly gunpowder were a key component of early modern warfare and a focal point for administrators, particularly regarding resource preservation. A lack of available magazines,⁷⁴ therefore, would shift the supply dynamics and create a different rate of supply exhaustion. In order to utilise models for understanding the logistical patterns of armies operating within Iberia therefore, it is necessary to reappraise Perjes and Van Creveld's existing models in light of evidence from the supply sources of armies within Iberia where minimal magazines existed and there remained long distances between urban centres.

⁷⁴ Magazines were the primary method of enabling logistical support in a given region, allowing for the concentration of forces for major operations

Section 1: Practical Concerns and Methodology

One of the important aspects demonstrated by the tables in this chapter, is the differences that are present when investigating warfare in developed European regions such as the Low Countries and France when compared to Iberia.⁷⁵ This therefore raises two important questions, firstly what is the cost per fighting man in each of these combat theatres? Secondly, what is the value of each pound raised in the home logistical sector compared to each pound spent within the Iberian theatre? The first number appears on paper to be easy to calculate, however, there are some additional sources that need to be correlated in order to reach it effectively. Because the normal method of calculating would be to take the military estimates for the army that are produced in Whitehall and divide that by the total projected financial costs, which, missing some extraneous, would form a fair estimation of the total cost per man in any given year of the conflict.⁷⁶ However, military estimates were calculated on the basis of the average operational effectiveness of regiments rather than their actual field strength.⁷⁷ Sickness and attrition rates are very hard to arrive in any concrete sense as the relevant source material is missing. However, drops of up to 40% were not uncommon and have been factored in when calculating the overall army sizes for the region.

Much of early modern record keeping and administrative practises were related wholly to accounting and recording money spent in a given period. There was only limited attention given to the principles of estimation and budgetary planning. Furthermore, what estimates were made were based upon per capita cost which had been present in existing regulations giving very little allowance for potential wastage. Commanders in the field would often need to dissolve regiments

⁷⁵ Schryver has argued that even the Low Countries were exhausted during the conflict for supplies, Reginald De Schryver, 'Warfare in the Spanish Netherland 1689-1714, Remarks on Conquest and Sovereignty, Occupation and Logistics, in, *Anthonie Heinsius and the Dutch Republic, 1688-1720, Politics, War, and Finance*, ed. Jan A.F. de Jongste and Augustus J. Veenendall Jr. (Institute of Netherlands History, The Hague: 2002) pp.140-143.

⁷⁶ Calendar of Treasury Books, Vols-16-29, ed. William A. Shaw (British History Online)

⁷⁷ *ibid*

where losses had been too extreme and amalgamate those units with other existing formations.⁷⁸ These changes to the army structure were made after the funds for the campaign had been estimated, as a result, the actual logistical costs and make-up of the army does not in each year always match the estimates prepared in Whitehall. Furthermore, estimates were calculated using average operational effectiveness. In practise, this meant that administrators, and in some cases commanders, would list their operational effectiveness of individual regiments at a fixed rate rather than their actual field strength.⁷⁹ This practice causes significant complexities for calculating the costs of supply usage and creating an accurate figure for the cost per man for the forces in Iberia. Therefore, in order to calculate this number, additional sources, need to be taken into account. Fortunately, some of the letters and papers from both commanders and administrators during the conflict make reference to the active fighting strength of certain regiments within the army operating in Iberia.⁸⁰ If we take those active fighting strengths and compare them against the estimates provided in the returns, we can create an average that can be applied to regiments out with the source material. Utilising this average of fighting strength and applying it to the models discussed previously, a closer estimation of the costs for the army can be established.⁸¹ It is additionally prudent at this juncture to discuss some of the additional numbers which should be taken into account when calculating the cost per man for those forces operating within Iberia. Firstly, there is the finances that went to the miquelet and militia forces.

One aspect of finance which did not fall into the general accounting for the military forces operating within Iberia was those of the Miquelet and militia forces which had been raised, or volunteered, to supplement the professional armies of the allies. In many histories, these are referred to as the Catalan militia units, who were raised in support of Charles and mostly fought under their own

⁷⁸ TNA SP 94/78, James Stanhope to Lord Dartmouth, Barcelona 28th March 1711.

⁷⁹ TNA WO 24/31-80, Force returns and estimates, 1703-1712.

⁸⁰ See Bibliography for full list of sources.

⁸¹ See table 3.

leadership.⁸² However, the sources also appear to indicate that Miquelets were the name given by allied commanders to any local forces from eastern Spain that joined the fighting. Troops from Aragon, Valencia and Murcia are all referred to as Miquelets by allied officials in the source material.⁸³ There are significant indications that the bodies of Miquelets were controlled by the allied command hierarchy to a greater extent than has hitherto been attributed.⁸⁴ However, their financing needs to be discussed as it has relevance to later financial tables which shall be included. Financing for miquelet units was developed through existing relations within Catalonia and Valencia and the raising of those units was in part paid for by the local nobility who would fund the units raised in their local areas, either through direct funds from their own purse or upon their own credit.⁸⁵ Much of this funding, provided by the local Spanish nobility, was predicated upon the expectation that the imminent victory of Charles to the throne of Spain would provide them with ample opportunities to recoup their expenses. Charles' own funds are somewhat of a complex issue which has received attention in other scholarly works.⁸⁶ In the simplest terms, however, Charles received funds from those territories from which he was able to extract legitimate taxation and donations throughout the period of his control. In addition to this, Charles also received a direct subsidy of on average £150,000, from these funds Charles could utilise for the retention of his court, and importantly maintaining the some of the Austrian and Spanish regular forces raised for the eastern Iberian campaigns, alongside any other costs which may have presented themselves.⁸⁷ As a result, a significant percentage of the costs of Miquelet forces was met through the application of

⁸² See Nuria Sales, *Senyors bandolers, miquelets i botiflers : estudis d'història de Catalunya (segles XVI al XVIII)*, (Empuries, Barcelona: 1984) pp.140-170.

⁸³ BL Add MS 61516, Earl Rivers to Unaddressed, 31st October 1706. *An exact and full account of the siege of Barcelona, by way of journal, from the 2d of April to the 11th of May, 1706. containing many particulars never yet publish'd. With Previous Remarks. By an officer who was in the place all the time*, (Eighteenth Century Collections Online: 1706)

[link.gale.com/apps/doc/CW0100671942/ECCO?u=oxford&sid=gale_marc&xid=8434c2a2&pg=1] p.12.

⁸⁴ James Falkner, *The War of The Spanish Succession, 1701-1714*, (Pen and Sword, London: 2015) p.96.

⁸⁵ Antonio Lopez Espino, *Miquelets I sometents al front de l'ebre Durant la Guerra de Successio, 1705-1714*, (Rafael Dalmau: Barcelona: 2009), and, BL Add MS 61510, Alvaro Cifuentes to Thomas Milner, Undated Unaddressed.

⁸⁶ David Francis, *The First Peninsular War, 1702-1713*, (Ernest Benn, London: 1975) pp.215-217.

⁸⁷ Calendar of Treasury Papers

these two sources. However, in addition, there were other costs which fell directly upon the finances of the allied armies. Firstly, there were the arming and ammunition costs which Miquelet forces incurred when they were fully attached to the allied armies. In addition to these there were also any costs which the army would be forced to make due to breakdowns within the general finances, of either the local nobility, or Charles' own financial enterprises.⁸⁸ Allied commanders were eager to ensure that miquelet forces remained on hand during campaigning seasons and given their less formalised military structure, a lack of finances would have facilitated a far greater reduction of their combat effectiveness than the main body of the army.⁸⁹ Due to the instability of the wartime economy, particularly in Eastern Iberia, it was a common occurrence that the army needed to provide funds for miquelet forces from the general war chest. These costs in terms of accounting fell either within the extrinsecences and emergency funds or, more commonly, were drawn from the existing funds for those specific purposes. For example, supplies would be drawn from those funds earmarked for subsistence within the army's finances.⁹⁰

Whilst many miquelet units were mustered with whatever locally produced arms could be acquired, either from the depots within Catalonia and Valencia or often in combination with hunting and personal weapons from the soldier's homes, there was a need over the length of a campaign to provide them with more standardised arms and ammunition. These supplies inevitably came from the logistical networks of the allied armies. Whilst there was some limited local arms production within the regions,⁹¹ this was insufficient to respond to the consumption rates that were taking place as the conflict progressed. Depletion of resources when compared to localised production was

⁸⁸ The difficulty in handling matters in Barcelona can be seen in, James S Amerlang, *Honoured Citizens of Barcelona: Patrician Culture and Class Relations 1490-1714*, (Princeton:1986) p.110, TNA SP 94/78, Count of Orgas to James Stanhope, 20th July 1711, this highlights some of the challenges Charles was facing financially.

⁸⁹ BL Add MS 61504, Galway to Lord Sunderland, Valencia 6th March 1707.

⁹⁰ *Mr. Stanhope's answer to the report of the commissioners sent into Spain, together with an extract of so much of the said report, as concerns him*, (London: 1714), p.3.

⁹¹ See chapter 5.

particularly acute in regards to ammunition. These costs were absorbed onto the main accounts of the allied forces and were not accounted for separately.⁹² This creates a difficult situation in order to assess the overall costs of the miquelets independently from the rest of the allied logistical apparatus. However, given the aforementioned reduction in field forces when compared to on paper unit strength it is possible to account for some of the disparity in resources. If we take an estimate on the total strength of miquelet forces and the level of draw upon army resources, given their own independent operating parameters, it is possible to come to some conclusions regarding the total expenditure costs of miquelet forces directly upon the British logistical finances.⁹³ By observing the sources which allied commanders produced regarding miquelet deployments, it is evident that only a small proportion of the total numbers were actively on campaign with allied forces, the rest being either in garrison or engaged in defensive operations in other provinces.⁹⁴ Therefore, when calculating the supply presence of miquelets upon allied logistics, an estimated number of those actively drawing upon the direct army chain has been used. The logistics of miquelet forces and how they interact with the communities with which they operated within is a fascinating and, in English, understudied topic and would warrant attention within a separate study.

Alongside the Miquelets are the regular Spanish regiments that were raised to serve, ostensibly as the beginning of the new Spanish army, to these are also added the units of Portuguese and Spanish who were commanded by French officers on half pay.⁹⁵ These units were raised to be under the control, and importantly, the pay, of the Kings of Spain and Portugal, however, given both those government's financial difficulties especially by the latter stages of the war,⁹⁶ these forces were

⁹² For example in 1710, £158,981 was expended for the transportation of soldiers and additional ammunition. 'Declared Accounts: Army' in, *Calendar of Treasury Books, Volume 24, 1710*, ed. William A Shaw, (London: 1952).

⁹³ See table 2.

⁹⁴ BL Add MS 61509, Paul Methuen to Lord Sunderland, Lisbon 31st October 1707.

⁹⁵ BL Add MS 61504, Earl of Galway to Lord Sunderland, Lisbon 8th June 1708.

⁹⁶ BL Add MS 61509, Paul Methuen to Lord Sunderland, Lisbon 29th December 1707.

often left under the pay of British officials. Mostly these units were utilised in garrison roles, filling the gaps when British and Dutch units were drawn out to form the campaigning army, however they were also sometimes employed for fighting in the campaigns particularly the units of Spanish horse.⁹⁷ These units did require consideration from allied officials, especially in terms of raising and deployment.⁹⁸ The final force of troops that comprised a regular part of the allied military forces, during the campaigns in Iberia, were the Imperial troops. Though arriving in the latter years of the war, much later than the British and Dutch contingents,⁹⁹ they nevertheless formed an important component of the allied forces in the eastern theatre.¹⁰⁰ Imperial forces would, in fact, be the last allied foreign force to leave at the end of the war, as they were attached more to the person of Charles rather than their own government.¹⁰¹ However, given the Austrian's need for subsidies similar to Portugal, and their focus upon other theatres of the war, particularly Bavaria and Italy,¹⁰² these imperial units were often paid for by Britain and had to be integrated into the supply network. Indeed, some units arrived in Barcelona with not even enough coin or credit to purchase basic bread supplies, let alone develop their own network.¹⁰³

Another area of the logistical framework which needs to be addressed is the pattern of military forces and total costs. Over the course of the entire War of Spanish Succession, the commitments of the British government, vis a vis the levels of finances that they were willing to press into military matters changed due to a variety of factors. These numbers have been given a great deal of attention by historians who have demonstrated the amounts and direction of funds through the

⁹⁷ Add MS 61505, Earl of Galway to Lord Sunderland, Lisbon, 9th August 1708.

⁹⁸ Add MS 61505, Earl of Galway, Undated Unaddressed.

⁹⁹ Note: First imperials arrive 1708.

¹⁰⁰ Note: Namely the area around Catalonia and Valencia

¹⁰¹ Francis, D, *The Peninsular War*, p.369.

¹⁰² James Falkner, *The War of The Spanish Succession, 1701-1714*, (Pen and Sword, London: 2015) p.114.

¹⁰³ BL Add MS 61527, John Chetwynd to Lord Sunderland, Turin 25th April 1708.

war, most notably Jones and Hattendorf.¹⁰⁴ However, there is some crossover in terms of applicable funds when attempting to understand the logistics related to allied forces operating in Iberia. Firstly, there are those supplies which were provided by accompanying naval forces, the organisation of which shall be covered in chapters 3 and 4. Whilst not comprising a vast amount of the total expenditure of the naval vessels on supply, those supplies which were utilised by army forces, either directly during the transportation of military forces whilst at sea or provided during joint operations which were part of the landings and formed an integral part of the coastal sector. Regardless, it should be noted that while a small percentage of the total, some part of the military funding which was allocated to naval operations did play a direct part in the logistical processes of the army operating in Iberia.

An important sector which needs to receive some attention is the subsidy payments which were made by Britain. Being the largest fiscal economy within the allied states, the British government endeavoured to bring more states into that alliance and keep them within the war. To that end the British government created a number of subsidy treaties with the majority of the other polities which would comprise the alliance. These treaties varied in scope but would usually comprise of a yearly sum of money provided by Britain. These treaties and the subsidies that were provided, were the backbone of the allies' war effort. Without the funds Britain was providing to the allied polities they would be unable to continually field forces throughout the campaigns, likewise without these forces, British troops alone would have been unable to provide any substantial military obstacle to the large Bourbon forces arrayed against them. There has been substantial work carried out on the networks of alliances and the treaties which were formed through the actions of British

¹⁰⁴ D.W. Jones, *War and Economy in the Age of William and Marlborough*, (Blackwell, Oxford: 1988), and, John B Hattendorf, *England in the War of the Spanish Succession: A Study of the English View and Conduct of Grand Strategy, 1702-1712*, (Garland, New York: 1987).

diplomacy.¹⁰⁵ Additionally, it has been highlighted how the subsidy treaties were not an ironclad guarantee of military support.¹⁰⁶ Indeed, allied nations were unable in many cases to field the required forces despite the financial support provided to them. This greatly hampered the allied war effort in several key areas. There were allied forces and additionally there were auxiliary forces which comprised allied armies.¹⁰⁷ These need to be taken into account when attempting to investigate the financial commitments that Britain made to the war in Iberia. In addition to the directly accounted funds which were allocated to British forces as part of their logistical network in Iberia, there was also the continued presence of soldiers from other allied polities who were present within the subsidy treaties. Those with a direct connection to Iberia were accounted for in some of the same charts, these being the Portuguese and Spanish troops with Portuguese forces being funded through a subsidy treaty and many of the Spanish forces either receiving direct funding from British accounting or from Charles' treasury which was in part held up through subsidy. In addition to these, however, was the presence of German auxiliaries, alongside national forces of Austrians, and Dutch.¹⁰⁸

These forces were present in varying capacities, within the armies operating in Iberia. Due to the issues with their logistical and pay systems, which are detailed in subsequent chapters, these forces were also forced to draw upon the finances and resources of the main British funded allied army

¹⁰⁵ See, *Grand Strategies in War and Peace*, ed. Paul M. Kennedy, (New Haven, Yale: 1992), and recently, Caleb Karges, *"So Perverse an Ally": Great Britain's Alliance with Austria in the War of the Spanish Succession*, (PhD Thesis, St Andrews: 2015).

¹⁰⁶ Douglas Coombs, *The Conduct of the Dutch: British Opinion and the Dutch Alliance during The War of the Spanish Succession*, (Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague: 1958), p.168.

¹⁰⁷ The organisation of Europe's auxiliary military system has been clearly demonstrated in, Peter Wilson, 'Foreign Military Labour in Europe's Transition to Modernity', in, *European Review of History*, Vol. 27, No 1-2, (2020), pp.12-32, Peter Wilson, 'Mercenary Contracts as Fiscal-Military Instruments', in, *Subsidies, Diplomacy, and State Formation in Europe, 1494-1789*, ed. Erik Thomson and Svante Norrhem, (Lund University Press: 2020), pp.68-90, and, Peter Wilson, 'Subsidy Treaties and Troop Contracts, A Study in Europe's Transnational Political Culture', in, *Gender, Materiality and Politics, Essays on Making Power*, ed. Anna Hammar, David Nystrom and Martin Almbjar, (Nordic Academic Press, Lund: 2022), pp. 359-381.

¹⁰⁸ These numbers were not consistent and fluctuated over the course of the conflict, for example while Dutch forces formed a key element of the early years of the war they were effectively replaced by German and Austrian troops in the later years.

within Iberia. The additional draw upon finances was not a planned expenditure and thus there are additional costs over and above those of the government accounted costs of Iberia. The presence of the Mutiny Act impacted financial organisation of military forces, forcing the financial estimates for the army to be approved annually by parliament. This was irrespective of diplomatic movements that were occurring. It is reasonable to argue costs of the subsidy treaties need to be accounted in reaching final military expenditure calculations. In addition to this however, there are also the additional costs which were often borne on the credit of the British forces when the subsidy troops were unable to cover the costs of their subsistence. This varied depending on the force involved, and the chronology of the war, alongside the location with, for example, Portuguese troops operating within Catalonia least able to fund their subsistence.¹⁰⁹ Whilst these therefore represent additional costs of the British purse, they do not impact calculations for working out the average cost per man as these were to cover costs of troops already engaged in the theatre. The inability of the allies to pay was more often the cause of backlogs and issues within the credit and payment system and the increased costs of food within the Iberian sectors.

¹⁰⁹ *Mr. Stanhope's answer to the report of the commissioners sent into Spain, together with an extract of so much of the said report, as concerns him.* (London: 1714), p.53.

Section 2: Creating an Iberian Model

A number of factors need to be highlighted when assessing the requirements of an army in Iberia.¹¹⁰

Firstly, an average army size needs to be established in order to have a benchmark from where other logistical calculations can be taken. Throughout the war the allied army in Iberia fluctuated greatly, as has already been noted some of the official figures need to be reappraised to take into account the way in which those numbers were acquired compared to the often on the ground reality.¹¹¹ The composition of forces also changed greatly over the course of single campaigns, for example the Regiment of Brigadier Lepell was stated as 845 men at the commencement of the 1710 campaign but had been reduced to only 350 men by the November of that year.¹¹² Furthermore, there are additional troop numbers that need to be accounted for, particularly the miquelet and other Spanish forces. Once we unify these numbers as in Table 1, we can create a baseline army size for the Iberian campaigns.

Table 1: Total British Paid Forces in Iberia.

Year	Infantry	Cavalry	Dragoons	Miquelets	Total	Total Reappraised
1705	8760	418	1032	2000	10,410	7287
1706	14,868	418	1032	4000	20,318	14,226
1707	16,753	418	2138	4000	23,309	16,316
1708	23,734	402	2971	4000	31,107	21,744
1709	26,667	418	2767	4000	33,852	23,696
1710	33,664	418	5576	4000	43,658	30,560
1711	29,800	820	5576	4000	40,196	28,137
1712	26,550	0	720	4000	31,270	21,889

In terms of logistical throughput, it is important at this juncture to split the average army size into two distinct categories, those of field forces and garrisons. The long 17th century was one of the

¹¹⁰ The tables present in this chapter represent a wide range of sources. The main army returns were utilised when arriving at the starting point number. From here

¹¹¹ This has been noted in later conflicts, for example, Stephen Conway, *War and State in Mid-Eighteenth Century Britain and Ireland*, (Oxford University Press: 2006), p.58.

¹¹² TNA WO 24/58, Army Establishment in Spain 1710, and, TNA SP 94/78, Col Lepell to Stanhope, Barcelona 21st November 1710.

most prevalent for siege warfare.¹¹³ With the advantages that were presented to the defender and the presence of fortifications within many of the strategically important towns and cities within Iberia it was vital, therefore, that allied forces retain a large body of their army for duty in garrisons. Garrison forces accessed the logistical network in a different manner to those that were on campaign in the field. Men in garrison were able to make use of local markets and stored supplies without the additional costs that were required as part of logistical chains whilst on the march. Furthermore, due to their often-small numbers, with the garrison at Tortosa being 200 men in 1710 and the garrison at Denia in 1707 numbering 80 men,¹¹⁴ they were able to amalgamate with the local food economy, something which was impossible for large field forces. As a result, forces that were in garrison were overall, experiencing a smaller cost for their logistics than the soldiers out in the field. Therefore, when making the calculations for the total costs of the average soldier in Iberia, costs will be separated out into field forces and garrison utilising averages of some of the numbers which have been acquired as part of this study. The garrison numbers closely relate also to the costs that were experienced by soldiers during time spent in quarters. The Iberian front of the War of the Spanish Succession differed when compared to most of the other fronts in Europe due to the fact that soldiers went into quarters twice a year instead of once.¹¹⁵ The extreme weather and temperatures of Iberia meant that it was difficult to campaign during the winter and additionally in the high heat of the summer. As a result, soldiers spent between 4 and 6 months of each year in quarters. In these quarters as already mentioned, logistical costs were similar to those of soldiers in garrison. Indeed, it should be noted that for many of the forces that went into quarters one of the

¹¹³ The seminal work on this is, Christopher Duffy, *Siege Warfare: The Fortress in the Early Modern World, 1494-1660*, (Routledge, London: 1979). See also, James Faulkner, *Marshal Vauban and the Defence of Louis XIV's France*, (Pen and Sword, Barnsley: 2011).

¹¹⁴ Even during the siege this number was not increased above 100, *Memoirs of the British fleets and squadrons in the Mediteranean, Anno 1708 and 1709. Wherein an account is given of the reduction of Sardignia, Minorca, the late Sieges of Port Maon, Alicant and Denia. With Descriptions Of the most unfrequented Places touch'd by the Fleets, of the Court of Barcelona, their Majesties residing in it, and of our Neighbouring Royal Allies their Majesties of Portugal. To which is annex'd, a cursory view of Naples, the Curiosities near Baiæ and Cardinal Grimani's Reception of the Officers belonging to the British Fleet. By the Revd. Mr. Nathaniel Taubman, Chaplain in the Royal Navy*, (London: 1710), p.101.

¹¹⁵ Avoiding the summer months as well as the winter.

most common places to locate them was within existing garrison structures.¹¹⁶ The logic behind this move has several clear advantages. Firstly, soldiers were able to tap into the existing supply magazines that were set up within garrisons reducing the administration required to store or transport additional supplies during their time in quarters. Secondly, there was the advantage that garrisons in larger towns were often the staging ground for supplies that were to be sent out for the campaign, as a result the organisation of supplies was smoother by combining the quarters with the depots for the upcoming campaign and reduced the time required before forces were able to recommence campaigning. Finally, garrison's defensibility ensured the protection of both forces and supplies if raiding occurred by enemy forces during the season when forces were in quarters. There are some cases of raids being carried out by both forces, particularly in the weeks immediately around the entrance and exit into quarters.¹¹⁷ These raids were focused mainly upon logistical disruption and the capture of equipment rather than any strategic advances or the acquisition of territory. By disrupting supplies raids could create precarious situations for the logistics of forces in quarters, especially if they were able to capture significant quantities of supplies during periods where they would be difficult to reacquire. As a result, placing a majority of troops into garrison negated the risks of enemy raids and created a smoother logistical system for the period of quarters.

Garrisons which were subject to some of the more continual attention of the campaigns, such as Denia and Llerida had to, on several occasions, gather large quantities of supplies on short notice, in order to prepare for possible sieges.¹¹⁸ Additionally, they had to provide supplies for forces which were involved in relief efforts and the general conflict around the position of the garrison. These

¹¹⁶ BL Add MS 61510, J Milner to Mr Pringle, Lisbon 10th January 1710, and, TNA SP 94/78, Colonel M(V)eyell to Lord Dartmouth, January 13th 1711.

¹¹⁷ BL Add MS 61508, Paul Methuen to Lord Sunderland, Barcelona 27th March 1706, and BL Add MS 61508, Paul Methuen to Galway, 27th February 1705.

¹¹⁸ BL Add MS 61516, Captain Richards to Lord Sunderland, Alicante 9th August 1707, and, TNA SP 89/20, Galway to Lord Sunderland, Valencia 13th February 1707. Francesc Serra, *Cardona (1705-1714), La Resistencia a l'interior*, (Barcelona: 2014), pp.77-80.

constantly fluctuating costs in these garrison locations would need the attention of a dedicated study, therefore, cost documents have been utilised from more stable garrisons such as Gibraltar.¹¹⁹

Table 2: Estimates of Non-British paid allied forces.

Year	Portuguese	Dutch	Spanish/Catalan	Hapsburg/Imperial	Total
1705	22,000	2800	600	0	25,400
1706	22,000	2500	7700	0	32,200
1707	12,500	4000	10,600	0	28,900
1708	13,500	2500	8300	9800	34,200
1709	19,500	2000	8000	11,000	40,500
1710	17,000	2000	10,500	12,500	42,500
1711	15,000	500	7000	10,000	32,500
1712	16,000	500	5000	9000	30,500

One of the most vital factors for logistical costs of any army in the field during campaign is their waggon train. The details behind the usage and difficulties with waggon trains during the war in Iberia are addressed in subsequent chapters. However, the financial cost and logistical usage of these waggons needs to be addressed. Both Perjes and Van Creveld take some time to address the presence of waggons within their calculations for early modern armies.¹²⁰ The calculations that they produce for the early modern armies need to be reappraised when investigating Iberian campaigns. As will be demonstrated in subsequent chapters, the supply situation in Iberia resulted in far fewer waggons being available for utilisation. Solutions were organised, primarily through the conscription of mules and small pack horses. However, overall, throughout the campaigns there were continual

¹¹⁹ TNA WO 24/1177, Journals of Gibraltar, TNA WO 24/69, Returns from Gibraltar garrison, and, TNA WO 24/75, War Office returns.

¹²⁰ Perjes, *Army Logistics*, p.10, and, Van Creveld, *Supplying War*, pp. 27-29, these have seen reappraisal in H.G.W Davie, 'The Economics and Logistics of Horse-Drawn Armies, in *British Journal for Military History*, vol. 7, iss. 1, (2021), pp.21-45.

complaints relating to an inadequate supply chain of waggons and mounts.¹²¹ Therefore, when attempting to calculate logistical consumption for armies operating within Iberia it will be taken that these issues were a continual issue of warfare in the region,¹²² and readjust consumption rates accordingly. The two main transport types of small waggons,¹²³ and fourgons,¹²⁴ could on average carry 450kg and 907kg respectively, these could be pulled by any of the available pack animals in the case of the small waggons though the heavier fourgons were most often oxen driven. Where these were not available then it was necessary to rely upon pack animal backs for transportation. Mules could conservatively carry 90-130kg,¹²⁵ though there have been some sources that give the carry range in the 200-300kg region, these are much later and rely upon an extremely well-bred and fed animal, which was not the case in Iberia from source descriptions. Likewise pack horses could carry in the region of 130-180kg though those that were available were most often engaged with the waggons. Finally, oxen up to 400kg on their backs. Whilst mules and pack horses did eat a far lower total forage weight than oxen or draft horses per animal in Iberia, the overall number of animals was higher per the total weight of supplies being transported than was the case in other European military theatres. As a result, Table 4 demonstrates these variances and based upon an average number of animals it is possible to calculate the total weight of the supply train during a campaign.

Table 3: Supply Weights by Transportation Options

Carried	5kg
Pack Animals	110kg
Small Waggons	450kg
Fourgons	907kg

¹²¹ Examples include, BL Add MS 61506, Galway to Lord Sunderland, Camp at Caia 16th May 1709, BL Add MS 61516, Montandre to Lord Sunderland, Unaddressed, 28th January 1707, and, BL Add MS 61510, J Milner to Unknown, Lisbon 10th December 1706.

¹²² There is evidence to suggest that these issues persisted in other campaigns in the peninsula during the century.

¹²³ A term used by some commanders, clearly referring to the varied local general use waggons which could vary in size and have therefore been averaged.

¹²⁴ Larger heavy-duty waggons often pulled by oxen and designed for heavy loads.

¹²⁵ John Shean, 'Hannibal's Mules: The Logistical Limitations of Hannibal's Army and the Battle of Cannae, 216BC, in, *Historia Zeitschrift fur Alte Geschichte*, Vol. 45, (2nd Qtr: 1996), p.170, and, K. Kauffman, 'The U.S. Army as a Rational Economic Agent: The Choice of Draft Animals During the Civil War, in, *Eastern Economic Journal*, (Summer: 1996), pp.333-43.

Table 4: Average Supply Weights for Feeding 10,000 Men.

Average Supply Weights for:	10,000 Men	1300 Horses	1022 Pack Horses	3145 Pack Mules	423 Oxen
1 Day	10,000kg	15400kg	8687kg	9435kg	5922kg
30 Days	300,000kg	468,000kg	260,000kg	283,050kg	177,660kg
Carry Weight	60,000kg	0kg	230,000kg(Small Waggons)	346,000kg (Pack)	192,000kg (Fourgons)

In addition to the supply weight the animals could bear, the costs of acquiring these animals is relevant. Whilst again, as with supply weight, the cost of animals was lower per animal, there are several other factors which affect the total costs. Firstly, there is the added costs to acquiring any form of mounts within Iberia. These presented significant difficulties for allied commanders and administrators throughout the conflict, and many were forced to request additional assistance from the home sector in order to rectify the chronic shortage of animals.¹²⁶ Likewise, this shortage had the knock-on effect of increasing the prices which armies were forced to pay to contractors in Iberia for the acquisition of mounts.¹²⁷ On average mounts were 3 times above those in the Low Countries and with difficulties in the transportation from the home sector, which is covered in chapter 3, administrators often had no choice but to pay the additional costs and additionally shorten their supply chains attempting to rely more upon food acquisition in the coastal and inland sectors.¹²⁸ Furthermore, the availability of forage was also lower in Iberia and with much of the shipping tonnage transporting supplies for the men rather than the animals from locations such as Italy this also increased costs for allied logistics within the theatre.

¹²⁶ Examples include, BL Add MS 61509, Paul Methuen to Lord Sunderland, Lisbon 29th December 1707, BL Add MS 61505, Galway to Lord Sunderland, Lisbon 19th January 1709, TNA SP 94/78, Thomas Stanwix to James Stanhope, Lisbon 12th May 1711, and, TNA SP 84/19, Methuen to Charles Hedges, Lisbon 16th June 1706.

¹²⁷ For example contracts for bread saw a rise of from 5 reales to 52 over the conflict.

¹²⁸ Taking costs from accounted examples in both theatres.

A combination of costs shown in Table 5 mean that the overall allied forces were facing a higher logistical cost than would have been the case in other campaigning theatres, these need to be factored into the equations for average allied costs per soldier in Iberia during the conflict. This raises the average costs per soldier from logistical matters. The other side of the issue with mounts and waggons is addressed fully within Chapter 2, namely the lack of mounts for cavalry formations and the need to import large numbers of horses from the home sector. This practise inevitably drove up logistical costs for allied forces, however the costs were born by the home sector accounts as opposed to directly upon the army finances within the Iberian logistical sectors.

One of the greatest factors affecting the progress and logistics of any army is its consumption of food stuffs. There have been numerous studies made upon the calorific intake that would be required by soldiers fighting in armies. General consensus amongst modern military strategists estimates that between 4500 and 6000 calories need to be consumed by soldiers when engaged in active duty and roughly 3500 calories for those engaged in light duties such as garrison. These calories should not be from a singular intake but rather from a balanced diet which keep soldiers in as healthy a condition as possible. For soldiers and civilians during warfare in the late 17th and early 18th centuries this was rarely possible. Firstly, calorie intake was lower overall for the general population. In general people were shorter and required less calories than today, however, there has been some research which has attributed much of this reduction in size to the fact that the lower quantities of food during childhood stunted growth.¹²⁹ Nevertheless, calorie intake was necessarily lower for soldiers as well as civilians. It was generally understood that soldiers needed a fixed and if possible varied diet. Some historians put the number of calories at roughly just over 2000,¹³⁰ it is also possible to calculate the general calorie intake from the general food rations which were set out by

¹²⁹ Hannaliis Jaadla, Leigh Shaw-Taylor and, Romola Davenport, 'Height and Health in Late Eighteenth-Century England', in *Population Studies A Journal of Demography*, Vol. 75, Iss. 3, (2021) p.382.

¹³⁰ Bruce Quarrie, *Napoleon's Campaigns in Miniature*, (Patrick Stevens, Yeovill: 1992) p.96.

military planners at the time. For example, the ration for navy personnel was greater in terms of volume and importantly consistency.¹³¹ Soldiers rations equated to a simple bread supply usually in the region of 1kg with the remainder of their diet expected to be purchased from commissaries or local merchants. Compared to naval rations in which meat, vegetables and drink was all provided for directly. These rations highlight the onus given by command that where possible foodstuffs should be a varied diet. However, for field forces, especially in areas of difficult terrain, there remained a continual reliance on bread to provide the main calorie intake for soldiers, which would only allow for 1500 calories per day.

As most soldiers were reliant on foraging to supplement their diets, the active supply obtained and transported by the army in Iberia was predominantly bread. Bread would be transported usually as grain or flour. This was dependent upon the organisation of mills along the routes of advance and the number of field mills which were present in the army's logistical train. Whilst field mills improved the overall flexibility of transportation, able to grind flour where the army was stationed, they were far less efficient than established mills in terms of their output.¹³² Overall, therefore the majority of the army's food supply was transported as grain or flour which retain their weight. It should be argued at this juncture that due to these complexities the calculations for the utilisation of resources for an army in Iberia on the march will be made with bread forming the calorie intake foodstuff solely. In part this is due to the difficulties that the army found in providing any other foodstuff in large quantities, the reasons for this are detailed in Chapter 5, and additionally, to keep calculations consistent. In order to take account of the subsistence supplies which were foraged during campaigns, a percentage of the total carry weight for soldiers will be subtracted from the available storage in order to represent these products.

¹³¹ The most complete study on naval food can be found in, Janet Macdonald, *Feeding Nelson's Navy, The True Story of Food at Sea in the Georgian Era*, (Chatham Publishing, London: 2004).

¹³² Perjes, *Army Logistics*, pp.8-9.

The other major factor impacting transportation is what was possible for the soldier to carry. When the transportation network was unable to provide adequate mounts or waggons then the onus fell upon the general soldiery to carry as much of their own supplies as they could. Modern military manuals state that even under the best conditions soldiers cannot be expected to carry more than 63kg whilst on the march and particularly in combat scenarios.¹³³ These calculations have been made with modern equipment and backpacks and the overall higher fitness levels which are expected for combat troops in modern warfare. These weights would not have been possible for early 18th century armies for several reasons. Firstly, was simply that a soldiers' backpacks and pouches only had a certain capacity which was not the equivalent of modern high-capacity military backpacks. On average soldiers' haversacks were capable of around 14kg which could be supplemented with additional bundles which were often attached to the straps.¹³⁴ These backpacks were inefficient, relying on carrying weight in difficult body positions.¹³⁵ The loose equipment that was carried in addition to the main haversack could weight up to 22kg.¹³⁶ Soldiers however would not be able to carry simply food when factoring weight into logistical calculations. The early modern soldier was expected to carry much of his equipment with him at all times alongside any personal items. Expected items included brushes and polishes for uniform, spares of essential clothing pieces and bedding and other camp accoutrement. These lead to a finite weight remaining for the purposes of logistical transportation. Therefore, soldiers could be expected to bare on average 5kg of food for transportation.

¹³³ *Fit the Fight, The New Role Fitness Test*, (MOD 2020), and, *The Soldiers Load: Historical Data*, (Government FOI Report: 2004).

¹³⁴ Major Tylden, 'The Accoutrements of the British Infantryman, 1640 to 1940', in *Journal of the Society for Army Historical Research*, Vol. XLVII, No. 189, (1969).

¹³⁵ Joseph J. Knapick, Katy L Reynolds, Everett Harman, 'Soldier Load Carriage: Historical, Physiological, Biomedical, and Medical Aspects', in *Mil Med*, Vol. 169, (2004). This highlights that every kilogram added to the hips for carrying increases energy expenditure 4%.

¹³⁶ Anthony Kemp, *Weapons and Equipment of the Marlborough Wars*, (Blandford Press, Poole:1980) p.127.

Table 4 demonstrates how the supply weights that are shown in Table 3 can be broken down into the various transportation options which were available to the army. These have been based upon average sources taken at the end of campaigning seasons. The reason for this is to take into account the wastage of particularly mounts but also in some cases waggons and other equipment. What this highlights is that the army was only capable of transporting an average total of 818,000kg in supplies for a consumption need of 1,488,660kg per 30 day campaigning period, in optimum circumstances. If we look at Table 4, highlighting potential consumption rates for men and animals, it can be demonstrated that allied forces could only transport 17 days of supplies from their magazines without resupply. The supply vulnerability of allied forces was a significant issue which hampered much of their operations within Iberia, forcing a reliance upon resupply and foraging for the necessary supplies. Inevitably, however, supply breakdowns reduced the availability of resources and can be attributed as one of the defining factors behind the high attrition rates in the theatre. These issues were further exacerbated at the end of each campaigning season where both the attrition of pack animals and the exhaustion of local foodstuffs, particularly in areas where the movement of armies had been minimal, resulting in attrition of soldiers and animals.

What can be observed as one of the greatest issues facing the entire supply system in Iberia during the War of the Spanish Succession is simply the availability of transport. The resultant inability of allied armies to transport their food supplies in adequate quantities reduced their operation effectiveness. Additionally, it drove up costs for allied forces and dictated much of their advance strategy. These supply difficulties could not be fully rectified as even the stop-gap measures such as the increase in mules and other animals drove up the total grain and forage supplies that were needed in a never-ending spiral. Without waggons and similar transportation supply costs were always a measure higher than those in other theatres of the war.

When calculating the costs of soldiers in Iberia alongside logistics, the other main cost which was born by the allied finances was the pay of the soldiers. Pay varied depending on the composition of the forces, with varying rates of pay for cavalry, dragoons, infantry, artillery and of course the varied finances of the additional non-British components of the army. Overall, for allied armies we can observe in Table 1 the average composition rates of each component within the British forces in Iberia.¹³⁷ When taken as a median for each we can set the average forces accounting for each component part of the allied forces at 20,000 men. With all the preceding elements that have been discussed it is now important to develop a model for analysing the total supply requirements of an army operating in Iberia. Utilising a base number of soldiers of 10,000 men,¹³⁸ therefore would require for an Iberian style supply chain 1022 horses and 3145 mules and 423 oxen in order to move their required supplies of 1,488,660kg for a period of 30 days. These animals would in turn require 144,090kg of dry fodder¹³⁹ to supply themselves which could be carried by 640 animals. This could be a continual spiral with diminishing returns which would allow for an optimum supply transportation, therefore, to avoid this it will be calculated with only a single iteration of supply animals for transportation animals. Therefore, using that stipulation, the total supply weight of grain/flour for an army in Iberia was 300,000kg. When the lowest total reasonable calorie intake for soldiers during this period was 1500 calories with flour giving an approximate 2/3rd to weight ratio for bread then the required weight of supplies needed per day would equal 6500kg in order to fulfil the supply requirements of the men. For the horses and pack animals it would have been required to provide 39,615kg of dry fodder and 198,075kg of grass.¹⁴⁰ These levels of supply daily were far

¹³⁷ These rates were taken with senior officer's pay removed which was usually accounted for separately in the accounts. This creates a better baseline as officer's earned far greater pay than those of the ranks.

¹³⁸ This is the average field force size in Iberia over the course of the war with the rest on garrison duties on in non-combative status.

¹³⁹ This would have been supplemented by grass which would have accounted for approximately 4/5th of the total calorie weight.

¹⁴⁰ Grass fodder was, depending on conditions, supplemented by wild oats and other natural drove plants, Erik A. Lund, *War for the Every Day, General, Knowledge, and Warfare in Early Modern Europe, 1680-1740*, (Greenwood Press, London: 1999 p.68.

beyond the availability of transportation to provide for an entire campaigning season. What can be clearly observed from this is the limited range that allied forces in Iberia would have been able to optimally operate from their bases and magazines if they had wished to maintain constant adequate supply levels. Whilst this range was further supplemented through the utilisation of animal flocks and large-scale foraging endeavours, sources highlight that supply remained a continual issue. Given Spain's low grain production and population density it could only reasonably produce on average 470kg per hectare.¹⁴¹ Given an average distance of 400km to transit for an army operating within Iberia,¹⁴² this would give an area of approximately 150,000 arable hectares in order to be realistically drawn on upon an advance.¹⁴³ With an average population of 192,000 along this line of advance,¹⁴⁴ this population would require more than 2/3rds of the produced grain in a given year. These levels of grain production leave a gap in supply for bread as they only just cover the bread requirements of the army for a single campaign of 3 months providing in that instance, only 50% of the necessary grain for the troops per annum. In addition to this there was also the dry fodder required for the horses and pack animals which further widens the area necessary to forage within. Finally, there is the additional army to consider, allied forces did not operate within a vacuum, the Bourbon forces were likewise drawing upon the same grain supplies for their own forces. Indeed, within the inland sector Bourbon forces were much better placed when it came to the acquisition of resources.

¹⁴¹ Carlos Santiago-Caballero, *Explaining wheat yields in Eighteenth-Century Spain*, Department of Economic History of Institutions, University Carlos III of Madrid, (June 2012).

¹⁴² Average distance from coastal sector starting distances (Llerida, Denia and Badajoz to Madrid).

¹⁴³ There are no firm figures for levels of Spanish fertility, Joseph Harrison, 'The Agrarian History of Spain, 1800-1960, in *The Agricultural History Review*, Vol. 37, No. 2, (1989) p.183.

¹⁴⁴ Janet Simpson, 'Spanish Agriculture in the Long Run, 1760-1936', in *Economic History and Institutions Series*, Vol 1 (December: 2000) p.1

Section 3: Conclusions

What is evident from these calculations is the limited effective range of a military force transporting its own supplies solely whilst operating within Iberia. Forces that were making the advance from their bases into the inland sector would therefore need to rely upon long convoys of supplies from their magazines and additionally, significant foraging, the details of both shall be addressed in Chapter 5. These supply vulnerabilities highlight one of the significant factors with logistics within the Iberian sector, this being additional costs. The lack of infrastructure, transportation and available crops drove up the costs of all logistical activities within the region when compared with more developed territories. Importantly these supply issues change key aspects which were at the heart of the logistical understanding for the period. Many of the supply calculations were based upon the expected costs. As highlighted the costs of the military drawn up by the administration in London and were based upon expected costs for operating within the region. These costs vary greatly from the increased costs which have been highlighted in Table 7. What is evident from this information is that allied forces faced a continual pressure to maximise their financial resources which were inadequate to cover the rising costs of campaigning within the region, these costs only continued to grow as Iberia became exhausted from the continual military campaigning of the rival forces.

The most important aspect of this statistical analysis of aspects of allied logistics in Iberia during the campaigns has been to demonstrate the gap between the funding that was prepared for the campaigns and the actual needed amounts for effective military operations. It is important to note that these gaps in funding did not fully translate into an equal percentage of missing resources, rather administrators and commanders in each of the geographical sectors were able to cope with parts of the missing resources through their own actions and changes in some of the normal methods of organisation. The details of these actions will be discussed in the subsequent chapters but what is clear in these charts are some of the significant issues faced by allied forces in Iberia.

Additionally, it widens the scope for an important discussion upon logistical history when it relates to geographical sectors. Much of the logistical history to date has focused upon the organisation of armed forces as a whole or upon more general threads such as the concepts of supply. However, when investigating British logistics in Iberia a new discussion can be brought to the fore. This being, the levels of central control and organisation when it came to campaign logistics, and additionally problems faced when campaigning in areas of lower development.

Significant attention has been directed towards the growth of administration and warfare as the driving forces of state development.¹⁴⁵ The creation of new departments and the growth of bureaucratic military organisation has been highlighted in states across Europe. These administrative bodies played significant roles in the logistical organisation of the growing armies across the continent. However, it is evident that this control only reached so far and campaigning at significant distances from the home sector necessitated a level of freedom within the command structure to allow for generals to make critical decisions regarding resource collection and financial arrangements. The Iberian sector saw a great deal of decision-making from commanders to find solutions to the difficulties which they were facing; these were made in lieu of organisation from the administration in the home sector. These shifts were not tacitly agreed upon once the problems began to materialise within the supply networks rather, they were the result of gaps in the provision of supplies from central administration. What is evident from the sources is that allied commanders in the field made many key decisions regarding their logistical organisation as a result of deficiencies in the supply rather than because of orders or usual practices. Whilst it was common for commanders to organise significant parts of their logistical operations, for example, Marlborough's organisation of his march into Germany,¹⁴⁶ these were in keeping with the generally understood

¹⁴⁵ See, Introduction.

¹⁴⁶ James Falkner, *Great and Glorious Days, Marlborough's Battles 1704-09*, (Spellmount, Staplehurst: 2002), pp.19-29, and, David Green, *Blenheim*, (Collins, London: 1974), pp.24-40.

practises of warfare and logistics and additionally to be kept within the existing finances of the army. By contrast, those in Iberia were forced to adopt a much more ad-hoc approach to supply and logistics, utilising available finance and resource sources to fill continuing gaps within their logistical network. These gaps were not consistent and the level and material which were required varied greatly over the course of the campaign. Officers and administrators were forced to create a system of supply which circumvented the normal methods of acquisition and procurement, utilising all available funds in order to maintain military forces in the face of extreme supply difficulties. Nevertheless, as will be demonstrated in subsequent chapters, these efforts still left allied forces in Iberia in an extremely precarious supply situation with limited funds and increased costs.

The evidence seems clear, therefore, that the single greatest factor affecting the costs of logistics for any army operating in a region was that region's grain productivity. Whilst there were other factors that created additional costs for armed forces, grain production marked the single greatest modifier of an army's total costs. Whether that be through the need to transport additional supplies from outside the sector, purchases of what available supplies were obtainable in the sector in question or making changes to the logistical network to make up for a lack of grain supply. Additionally, in the Early Modern agricultural economy, the production of grain also speaks to the general vivacity of that region's entire agricultural produce. The result of this in Iberia was a lower level of other staple crops and fodder for animals. Lower agricultural produce also reduced the number of animals available for service as pack animals or cavalry mounts. Despite the increases in grain markets and the speed of transportation, the levels of grain production remain a vital indicator for each individual state. It can be argued, therefore, that models for logistical costs in other campaign theatres can be developed from the grain production in a given region coupled with the expected costs from the army at a given time. Campaigns in significantly under-developed regions such as North America

would carry a comparably higher cost than those which were in the developed regions of Europe.¹⁴⁷

British military organisation at this time was predicated, as has already been discussed, on the expected costs drawn from previous military experiences. Given this administrative construct it therefore can be argued that British military spending can be separated from grain production in a given region.

The evidence seems clear from the sources and the charts prepared in this chapter that the costs of engaging in active warfare in an area of lower development such as Iberia was far higher than in regions of higher development. There were a multitude of factors which impacted these higher costs. Overall, costs per man were 70% higher on average than those in northern Europe and greater still for the average cost of cavalry. These factors raise the important discussion upon the very nature of warfare in lower developed parts of the world, even for advanced fiscal-military states such as Britain. Whilst it is commonly understood that areas of lower development would be more difficult to campaign within there has not before been a quantifiable difference between the varying regions of campaign. It has been demonstrated that the greatest financial impact upon any campaigning army is its food and forage costs, over and above those of pay and munitions. However, additionally it is clear that these costs were one of the areas most often neglected in terms of the pressures of financing an entire campaign. An absence of pay could cause significant control issues for military forces, likewise weapons and other military equipment were seen as a priority for many commanders in the field. However, as will be demonstrated in subsequent chapters, there were a variety of additional options available for commanders to maintain necessary stocks whilst on campaign which could help to negate some of the expected costs. Commanders operating in lower developed regions were therefore more often forced to take these decisions on a more regular basis

¹⁴⁷ See Daniel Baugh, *Global Seven Years War, 1754-1763*, (Routledge, London: 2014), and, David McCulloch, *1776, Britain and America at War*, (Simon and Schuster, New York: 2005).

than those who were in areas with plentiful food supplies. This raises a significant discussion point regarding warfare in these lower developmental regions. Many historians have noted that conflict in regions such as these see smaller armies and often aspects of significant manoeuvring. These movements appear to be closely linked to the need to rectify issues within supply chains without requiring additional financial investment. It can be argued that commanders did understand that there were limits to the financial support available from the fiscal-military state which would not match the costs that they were forced to cope with in low development regions, as a result aspects of warfare in these regions form a continuous cycle whereby commanders sought to attain additional funds from the home sectors whilst also attempting to mitigate costs through food and fodder.

To what extent, however, did administrators in the fiscal-military bureaucracy understand these additional costs? There is no evidence of studies undertaken nor of a direct correlation made by administrators of the difficulties that were particular to the Iberian theatre. Rather, administrators noted the individual issues that were being faced within the logistical chains in Iberia but not a focus upon the underlying issues.¹⁴⁸ Decision making, and organisation was based very firmly within a policy of immediacy. Supply issues and financial difficulties can be argued to have been understood as a simple binary cause and effect rather than taking into account many of the diverse issues behind which they were based. There are numerous examples within the sources, from food supply breakdowns to difficulties with pay and the reimbursement of credit, where administrators look towards immediate solutions to these issues.¹⁴⁹ In each of these examples, there is no mention made to the difficulties being a by-product of conditions within the nature of warfare within Iberia.

¹⁴⁸ Examples: TNA SP 89/19, Letter from Marquis Alegrete to Methuen, 26th May 1706, TNA WO 4/4, Letter from Secretary of War to Mr Warres, Whitehall 18th September 1705, and, BL Add MS 61526, Chetwynd to Earl of Sunderland, Camp at Laurent, 15th July 1707.

¹⁴⁹ Examples include: BL Add MS 61509, Methuen to Sunderland, Lisbon March 13th 1707, and, BL Add MS 9091, Cowper Diary 23rd July.

There are some mentions made to conditions outside of the immediate issue in question, for example, the issues with travel and supply due to weather and the overall exhaustion of food supplies in a given area. However, there is no direct link made between actions and solutions, decision making is carried out merely to rectify the gaps in supply rather than the cause of said gaps. In some respects, these thoughts were beyond the immediate bounds of decision-making for commanders, with more pressing concerns regarding the successful prosecution of the conflict. However, as the supply situation within Iberia became exacerbated, there remained no focus upon rectifying the underlying causes. It seems clear that for those involved in logistical operations, the singular concern was the flow of supplies from beginning to end of the chain rather than to effect significant improvements upon the throughput of the chain itself.

The models produced within this chapter have, additionally, provided an important framework for assessing conflict both within Iberia and wider early modern warfare. It has been demonstrated that the organisational structures of military forces within Iberia were reliant upon elements which were of a supply logistical network which was designed for use in other theatres. Some of the commanders and those in government had served in previous conflicts in administrative roles such as Lord Nottingham and Robert Harley who had raised forces during the Glorious Revolution. Funding and organisation of accounts were built upon these presupposed aspects of both financial and logistical operations. As a result, funding remained linked intrinsically to the expected fielded forces. As the evidence has shown, these forces were in actuality far lower than the paper strength observed by officials in Whitehall. Despite this however, the logistical pressures from all aspects within Iberia increased costs far above the extra capital that was available from the lower-than-expected strength even when reduced supply consumption is factored in. As a result, it can be observed that forces within Iberia were perpetually working from a significant supply deficit and much decision making can be seen attempting to rectify these supply deficiencies as will be

highlighted in subsequent chapters. Furthermore, the model produced in this section leads to an important discussion on the supply situation of forces in low development regions such as Iberia. Firstly, there is the link between funding and supply availability, one of the perpetual issues for allied forces engaging within Iberia was the added costs of that region which only continued to grow as the conflict progressed. These costs and the availability of resources themselves changed the dynamic at the heart of their logistical chain from those that might have been understood within other theatres of Europe as were the basis of Van Creveld and Perjes writings on the topic. Supply doctrine remained the same for forces in Iberia, but actions taken were primarily made filling the large gaps in the supply throughput and maximising the slim financial resources. Indeed, attempts to improve capital availability would lead to the disastrous attempt of Peterborough's loan in Italy.¹⁵⁰

In addition to this, the data prepared in this chapter highlight another important aspect of supply within underdeveloped regions. This being the link between link between agricultural production and military costs. Whilst other scholars have highlighted the connection between campaigning within agriculturally rich provinces and an effective logistical chain, there has been minimal efforts to fully quantify this into a workable model for armies within the period. By observing the work carried out by economic historians on the yields of crops for a given region a greater understanding of the availability of food supplies and the area which would be required for an army to operate within in order to provide itself with supplies. When linked to the existing bread contracts an accurate picture of the required funds to feed an army in a given region can be reached and a much greater understanding of the difficulties of logistical supply can be highlighted. By utilising certain key elements that have been brought forward by other historical research therefore, it is possible to develop models for armies campaigning within any given region and therefore to build a greater

¹⁵⁰ Bridget Cameron, *This Master Firebrand, A Life of Charles Mordaunt 3rd Earl of Peterborough*, (Michael Russell, Norwich: 2005), p.250, and BL Add MS 22200.

understanding of early modern warfare. Furthermore, these models go a great way to developing our understanding of the pressures of war both upon tactical decision making by commanders but also upon the vivacity of the state to maintain armies within different theatres.

Britain's strength as a commercial state cannot be called into question, nor is her highly developed fiscal-military apparatus. However, what is evident is the far greater financial resources that would have needed to be expended in order to successfully wage warfare in low-development regions whilst fielding armies of a size expected in the current climate of warfare. Whilst, these resources would have been available to the state it can be argued that their expenditure would have far outweighed the strategic advantages that would have been gained with a fully supplied army within the Iberian theatre. Furthermore, it can be argued that simply pouring additional finances into the area would only have succeeded in exacerbating already exorbitant costs compounding the difficulties which military forces were facing. As a result armies commanders and administrators would be forced throughout the campaigns to cope as best, they could in a theatre where they could never operate at full supply, and the organisational methods and processes which they would develop within each of the sectors would be a direct attempt to alleviate as best as possible the shortages they were facing.

Appendix: Charts and Tables.

Table 5: Approximate Total Costs of Iberia and Low Countries in £

Date	Low Countries	Iberia	Difference	Percentage Difference To Low Countries
1705	1,528,323	519,443	-1,008,880	-66%
1706	1,366,076	996,704	-369,372	-27%
1707	2,787,141	873,679	-1,913,462	-68%
1708	2,891,482	1,718,580	-1,172,902	-40%
1709	2,398,367	1,599,740	-798,627	-33%
1710	2,131,198	2,546,058	+414,860 ¹⁵¹	+19%
1711	2,199,227	1,527,929	-671,298	-30%
1712	3,993,453	1,525,564	-2,467,889	-61%

Table 6: Iberian Subsistence and Pay Costs in £

Year	Total Pay and Subsistence	Pay	Subsistence	Pay Recalculated for Troop Numbers	Subsistence Recalculated for Troop Numbers	Subsistence Recalculated for Added Costs	Total Pay and Subsistence Recalculated
1705	230,047	120,157	109,890	84,109	76,923	288,461	372,570
1706	387,158	204,296	182,862	143,007	128,003	480,011	623,018
1707	465,765	256,057	209,708	179,239	146,795	550,481	729,720
1708	583,247	303,285	279,962	212,299	195,973	734,898	947,197
1709	978,208	673,540	304,668	471,478	213,267	799,751	1,271,229
1710	1,550,505	1,157,583	392,922	810,308	275,045	1,031,418	1,841,726
1711	1,009,947	648,183	361,764	453,278	253,234	949,627	1,402,905
1712	543,462	262,032	281,430	183,422	197,001	738,753	922,175

Table 7: Reappraised British forces.

Year	Total Forces	Total Pay and Subsistence	Overall Average Cost Per Man	Total Army Costs	Total Average Cost Per Man
1705	7287	£372,570	£51	£519,443	£71
1706	14226	£623,018	£44	£996,704	£70
1707	16316	£729,720	£45	£873,679	£53
1708	21744	£947,197	£44	£1,718,580	£79
1709	23696	£1,271,229	£53	£1,599,740	£68
1710	30560	£1,841,726	£60	£2,546,058	£83

¹⁵¹ Mostly due to additional payments for costs of the preceding years.

1711	28137	£1,402,905	£49	£1,527,929	£54
1712	21889	£922,175	£42	£1,525,564	£69
Average Total	20,481	£1,013,817	£49	£1,413,462	£68

Chapter 2: Administration and Management, The Home Sector, Fulcrum of the Fiscal-Military State.


The Home Sector marked the starting point for all British and consequently much of the Allied military operations throughout the War of the Spanish Succession. It was from the Home Sector that the wealth of the fiscal-military state was extracted and formalised into the creation of supplies and military funds. This wealth included the already well-established resources of colonial goods which were liquidated through the utilisation of mechanisms such as customs dues.¹⁵² British finances were additionally aided by the trade carried out with export regions such as Iberia, which had been another factor leading to the decision to engage in the conflict.¹⁵³ Additionally, it was within the Home Sector that much of the long-term strategic decisions regarding, both the handling of logistics and importantly the proposed allocation of these resources were made. British forces were marshalled within the home sector and provided with much of the material that would be required throughout their campaigning prior to their transition into the At Sea sector, on route to Iberia. They were joined in this sector by some of the various auxiliary and subsidiary forces that were a key component of British strategy. It was within this sector that much of the resupply of the allied armies was organised and importantly funded from. Furthermore, by examining this sector, the role of contractors particularly colonels and administrators can be highlighted, demonstrating the blurred roles which existed between the public and private sectors. In this regard, the home sector, in order to be effectively analysed, requires to be split into certain supply chains. Firstly, there is the financial and political chain. This carried the decisions of Parliament out to those who administered the state apparatus in terms of revenue collection and in return passed said revenues back to the government, where it is allocated out to the various armed forces alongside all other government expenditure. Besides, this was the more physical supply chain of those forces that were raised,

¹⁵² Jones, *War and Economy*, p.170.

¹⁵³ Gary Stuart de Krey, *A Fractured Society, The Politics of London in the First Age of the Party, 1688-1715*, (Clarendon Press, Oxford: 1985) pp.149-153.

equipped, transported, and maintained, within this sector before entering into the other geographical sectors that form part of Iberian campaigning. Finally, there is the resupply chain which carries all the important quantities of supplies and men, from where they are sourced out to the transition point with the at-sea sector. Together, these three chains comprise the Home Sector decision making and handling in regards to logistics and by separating these a clearer picture can be derived of one of the most complex logistical operations in Early Modern Europe.

Chart 1: British Government Logistics Hierarchy



All British financial operations began with Parliament, ever since the loss of regal tax powers by convention in Magna Carta,¹⁵⁴ though, particularly in the actions surrounding the civil wars and reinstatement of the monarchy.¹⁵⁵ It was through the decisions laid down by parliament that additional tax revenues were selected, and the administration put into the place for these revenues to be collected. However, it should be noted that the vast majority of MP's had minimal

¹⁵⁴ *Challenges to Authority and the Recognition of Rights, From Magna Carta to Modernity*, ed. Catherine Macmillian and Charlotte Smith, (Cambridge University Press: 2018).

¹⁵⁵ J.S. Morrill, *The Impact of the English Civil War*, (Collins and Brown, London: 1991) and, Melinda Zook, *Radical Whigs and Conspiratorial Politics in Late Stuart England*, (Pennsylvania State University Press: 1999).

relationships with the government and only a few were office holders.¹⁵⁶ There have been several comprehensive works on the British tax and parliamentary systems,¹⁵⁷ which has developed into the historiography behind the fiscal-military state. Work by historians such as Jones and Brewer have demonstrated clearly how the British state was organised regarding revenue collection and much of the decision-making process, which was behind the increases in taxes, were seen particularly in times of warfare.¹⁵⁸ Brewer argued that the British establishment's decision to invite William as king bound them with the crown. Both had an interest in preventing a return of the Stuarts after the Glorious Revolution. Parliament was the forum for crown and elites to cooperate on these unified interests. Parliamentary approval for taxation lent it legitimacy, especially as the elite had an interest in ensuring efficient collection and expenditure. All this reduced the friction of tax collecting and credit raising, improving Britain's financial strength.

What is important, however, is the collection processes and how they related directly to the affairs that were occurring within Iberia. The costs of the War of the Spanish Succession spiralled for the British government over the years of the conflict reaching £28,796,006 in comparison to £6,900,000 which had been reached at the end of the Nine Years War.¹⁵⁹ As British politics began to align more towards the No Peace Without Spain policy, so too did parliament begin to scrutinise funding for the Iberian theatre more closely and attempt to raise additional funds to be funnelled towards Iberian logistical operations.¹⁶⁰ Parliamentary debates were focused around protecting British interests as

¹⁵⁶ Stephen Conway, 'Public and Private Contributions to the Mobilisation of Manpower in Mid-Eighteenth Century Britain and Ireland, in, *Mobilising Resource for War: Britain and Spain at Work During the Early Modern Period*, ed. H.V. Bowen and A. Gonzalez Enciso, (Universidad de Navarra, Pamplona: 2006) p.40.

¹⁵⁷ Henry Horwitz, *Parliament, Policy and Politics in the reign of William III*, (Manchester University Press: 1977), Geoffrey Holmes, *The Making of A Great Power, Late Stuart and Early Georgian Britain 1660-1722*, (Longman, London: 1993), and, Coward, B. *The Stuart Age*, (Longman, Harlow:1994).

¹⁵⁸ John Brewer, *The Sinews of Power, War, Money and the English State, 1688-1783*, (Unwin, London: 1989) p.89.

¹⁵⁹ Ann Carlos, Larry Neal, and Kirsten Wandschenider, *The Origins of National Debt: The Financing and Re-financing of The War of the Spanish Succession*, (National Bureau of Economic Research: 2005), p.10.

¹⁶⁰ Brian Hill, *Robert Harley, Speaker, Secretary of State and Premier Minister*, (Yale University Press: 1988) pp.134-137.

part of the conflict and were caught up with the internal debates within the House of Commons between the two opposing parties.¹⁶¹ Despite this, however, increases in funds were voted through as the overall scale of the conflict continued to ramp up.

In order to organise its administrative affairs England had a number of departments which handled elements of logistics in addition to the military commands. The cabinet positions alongside those of the treasury were the secretaries of state for the Northern and Southern departments. These were responsible for affairs abroad and therefore took a leading role in the administration of military affairs. Furthermore, there was the Secretary at War who was responsible with Army administration. In addition to these were subsidiary organisations, the Board of Ordnance, which was handled by Whitehall, and managed magazines, armaments and munitions. Alongside this were organisations such as the Board of Transport, which was a subsidiary of the Navy Board and handled the transportation of forces abroad. Chart 1 shows the interlinks and command structures which existed between these groups and also highlights the complexity of these groups with many decisions being split in jurisdiction. The main aspects which comprise the Home Sector are the recruitment of forces, their marshalling, supply and materials, and the organisation of transportation.

¹⁶¹ Ibid p.105. Parliamentary debate was particularly fraught over the Almansa affair, Angus McInnes, *Robert Harley, Puritan Politician*, (Victor Gollanz, London: 1970) p.91.

Section 1: Recruiting an Army

The establishment of a standing army in England had occurred during the Cromwellian Era but had remained small and heavily debated amongst parliamentarians. This small force was further split into several establishments which delineated the areas of operation for those forces during peacetime. The outbreak of war therefore involved not just the mobilisation of these units but required the creation of new forces which would be comprised of both native born contingents and foreign auxiliaries alongside the forces of allied nations, which were usually subsidised. These forces once raised also had to be maintained through replacement, recruiting for losses in battle or due to attrition.

The process of recruiting varied between regiments but overall remained consistent throughout the entire army. Recruiting came in two distinct forms during the conflict, these being raising and reinforcement. The raising of regiments took place most often within the opening months of each conflict, although there were regiments raised throughout as the requirements of the nation's military commitments became clearer.¹⁶² To that end, prominent nobles approached or, in communication with ministers, were requested to commence the forming of regiments.¹⁶³ Only limited parts of the military at this point were fully state-funded, rather, much of the material costs of raising and recruiting were fronted by the regimental colonel. These colonels would then be able to claim back military running costs from the government through agents or directly themselves.¹⁶⁴ The recruiting of these forces was carried out in the same manner as it had been for much of the previous century, however, certain aspects saw more centralisation. While some major nobles,

¹⁶² R.E. Scouller, *The Armies of Queen Anne*, (Clarendon Press, Oxford: 1966).

¹⁶³ TNA SP 41/3, Mr Johns to Secretary Hedges, Whitehall September 8th 1704, and, TNA SP 41/3, Mahoney to Granville, 13th March 1710.

¹⁶⁴ Ibid.

particularly Scottish lords, still recruited from their own estates,¹⁶⁵ for much of the army, recruiting parties were sent out to search for likely recruits in villages and towns. Some larger urban centres might see permanent recruiting stations made, this was particularly the case in Dublin and London, where the large population, coupled with the continual arrival of rural workers made them prime spots for recruitment. The recruiting party itself was part of the regiment but was designated permanently to remain within the home sector,¹⁶⁶ those remaining at home also included NCOs involved in training and additionally procurement contractors and officers for goods required by the regiment, such as uniforms.¹⁶⁷ Travelling recruiters in the norm moved between the various towns and villages within a region, setting up at an easily accessible location and remaining for a few days to carry out recruiting before moving on. The process would be repeated until a small group of soldiers had been recruited, whereupon those men would be sent onwards, either to encampments, where training and equipping could take place or, often, straight to the docks to be prepared for transport to the Iberian theatre.¹⁶⁸ Many recruiting parties had routes that they mapped out over time and preferred to repeat rather than randomly move from town to town.¹⁶⁹ Additionally, once arrived in a location there were the advantages of word of mouth as members of the recruiting party would visit many of the drinking establishments to locate likely recruits. The parties were further assisted in this process through the actions of local administrators and magistrates who worked out agreements to pass petty criminals and similar individuals onto the recruiting parties often in exchange for a fee.¹⁷⁰ Recruiting parties were never able to become a consistent method of acquiring soldiers, they were too variable in acquiring soldiers in each locality, reliant as they were

¹⁶⁵ Andrew Mackillop, *Military Recruiting in the Scottish Highlands 1739-1815: the Political, Social and Economic Context*, (Doctoral Thesis, University of Glasgow: 1995) pp. 249-252.

¹⁶⁶ Richard Middleton, 'The Recruitment of The British Army, 1755-1762' in *Journal for Army Historical Research*, Winter 1989, Vol 67, No. 272 (Winter 1989), pp. 238-268.

¹⁶⁷ For example, organisation of uniforms to be sent to forces at Nevis, TNA SP 42/67, Secretary George to Captain Lyle, Spithead November 1702.

¹⁶⁸ TNA SP 34/87, William Johns to Charles Hedges, Whitehall 3rd December 1705, and TNA SP 89/20, John Quellen to Henry St John, London March 11th 1706.

¹⁶⁹ Ibid.

¹⁷⁰ TNA SP 41/3, Colonel Garth to Charles Hedges, Transport Office 30th April Undated, and, TNA SP 41/3 Lord Granville to Lord Dartmouth, Whitehall 24th April 1711.

upon the voluntary disposition of the potential recruits or upon their own abilities of persuasion and coercion. There have been many accounts written regarding the king's shilling,¹⁷¹ the practice having been attributed to the English Civil War, however, sources from the period make much closer reference to the bounty and pay as being the tools by which recruiters were able to attract men rather than through trickery,¹⁷² though that practise did occur.

Much of the recruiting for the war was predicated on the receipt of bounties which acted as encouragement for the population to enlist. Bounties were, in general, a fixed and posted sum of money that would be awarded to each recruit who signed up to the army.¹⁷³ These sums were designed to be a sizeable amount in consideration of the average daily earning potential of many workers at the time.¹⁷⁴ The bounties usually posted were £3 though these were not always consistent.¹⁷⁵ Sources from the conflict indicate that there were occasional cases where the value of a bounty could be negotiable. These negotiable bounties were predicated both on the acquiescence of the recruiting party's leaders but also on the relevant experience of the recruit in question. Those soldiers who had previous experience in combat were often recruited with additional incentives through an increased bounty. Though this would never be a sizeable increase, it did nevertheless indicate the importance that the military establishment placed upon experienced veterans being reacquired to the army. The other possibility for increased bounties lay in the persuasiveness of the recruits, arguing that given previous commitments, such as debts, in order to be able to join

¹⁷¹ Arthur Gilbert, 'Why Men Deserted from the Eighteenth-Century British Army' in *Armed Forces and Society*, Vol.6, No. 4 (Summer 1980), p.554.

¹⁷² Unknown Author, *Essay on the most effectual way to recruit the army, and render it more serviceable, by preventing desertion, Humbly offer'd to the consideration of the Parliament of Great Britain, By a Lover of his country and the army.* (London: 1707).

¹⁷³ Gilbert 'Why Men' p.555. and Middleton 'Recruitment of the British' p.228.

¹⁷⁴ See Jan Van Zanden, 'Wages and the standard of living in Europe, 1500-1800, in *European Review of Economic History*, Vol. 3, No. 2, (August 1999), pp.175-197 and Robert Hume, 'The Value of Money in Eighteenth-Century England: Incomes, Prices, Buying Power and Some Problems in Cultural Economics, in *Huntington Library Quarterly*, Vol 77, No. 4, (2014), pp. 373-416.

¹⁷⁵ Arthur Gilbert, 'An Analysis of some Eighteenth Century Army Recruiting Records', in *Journal of the Society for Army Historical Research*, Vol. 54, No. 217, (Spring 1974), p. 40.

immediately they required a higher-than-average bounty. There is very little evidence of this being a common practice outside the writings of colourful characters such as Captain Drake,¹⁷⁶ however, it is important to note that Drake's accounts do demonstrate some of the aspects of negotiable factors within the army, and therefore need to be raised when understanding bounties.

Additionally, there was the other major issue for the utilisation of bounties for recruits, this being bounty hopping. The process of bounty hopping was in itself a straight-forward abuse of the still-developing bureaucracy on personal identification. Men would simply arrive at an area of recruitment, sign up under an assumed name and leave before the unit marched onto their next location. Following this, men would then move on to another recruiting party and repeat the process. The presence of bounty jumpers was viewed as being a common and regrettably difficult practise to prevent.¹⁷⁷ Certain measures were taken by different recruiting parties to attempt to reduce the risks to military finances that these men represented. Firstly, there was the communication of the most prolific bounty jumpers through the recruiting system. Individuals that were the most frequent offenders became known through word of mouth between the various recruiting areas and as a result, were often turned away when they were suspected.¹⁷⁸ These men however only appear to have represented a small minority of the total number of those that fled recruitment after receipt of the bounty. In order to protect the investment that the bounty represented, therefore, recruiters took more drastic measures to ensure that bounty jumping was reduced to as low as possible. The most common method employed was that of securing the recruits immediately upon their joining the army. In cities, this practice was achievable as recruits were often taken immediately to the town barracks or similarly sequestered.¹⁷⁹ These structures were intended

¹⁷⁶ Captain Peter Drake, *Amiable Renegade, The Memoirs of Capt. Peter Drake, 1671-1753*, (Stanford, Stanford University Press: 1960).

¹⁷⁷ Unknown Author, *Essay on the most* p.24. and, Gilbert, *Why Men Deserted*, p.555.

¹⁷⁸ TNA SP 41/3, William Wogan to Mr Lawn, Unlocated, 23rd April 1711.

¹⁷⁹ TNA SP 41/3, J. Johns to Secretary of War, Whitehall, 5th April 1711, and TNA AO 3/223, Accounts of Chester garrison, 1692.

to be defensible often in the case of civil unrest and as a result, could easily double as buildings which could prevent the escape of the recruits. New recruits therefore often found themselves in a proto imprisonment almost immediately upon joining.¹⁸⁰ While the policy was an extreme measure it did prevent numbers of men from bounty jumping. For those recruited in rural regions, attempts were made to place the recruits under guard and as soon as possible march them towards more urbanised areas with sufficient infrastructure. This process can be observed in part through the small parties that were being directed from rural regions towards the towns, which could sometimes be as small as 15 men.¹⁸¹ It can, however, be argued that these small numbers are also the result of the difference in population density and the requirement to efficiently move as many men as possible towards the ports for transport, which shall be detailed later.

The recruitment bounty was not a gift from the state in the purest sense, administrators ensured that most if not all the funds were recouped from the recruits. Bounties while directed towards the recruitment of soldiers were also quickly expended upon entry into army service. The reason for this was the military policy of equipment purchases. Soldiers were expected to pay for the vast majority of their camp equipment upon joining the army, and likewise any clothing replacements that would be necessary throughout their term of service.¹⁸² Upon signing up and reaching the first available depot of military equipment, dependant on the location from which they had enlisted, men were required to purchase a large number of items from their own pocket. Items included all the various parts of their uniform along with satchels and boots. Much of the remaining sum would often be spent very quickly either on foodstuffs within the local area or from the military commissaries and

¹⁸⁰ Drake, *Journal*, p.10.

¹⁸¹ TNA SP 42/67, Cloudersly Shovell to Unaddressed, Mayplace April 17th 1703, and TNA SP 47/22, Order for Alcock, 24th July 1705.

¹⁸² Peter Way, "'The Scum of every country, the refuse of mankind'" Recruiting the British Army in the Eighteenth century,' in, *Fighting for a Living, A comparative study of Military Labour, 1500-2000*, ed. Erik-Jan Zürcher, (Amsterdam University Press: 2013) p. 294, and, Colin Jones, 'The Military Revolution and the Professionalism of the French Army under the Ancien Regime', in, *The Military Revolution and the State 1500-1800*, ed. Michael Duffy, (University of Exeter: 1980) p.39.

supply system itself.¹⁸³ As a result, much of the funds while acting as an incentive also quickly were recovered by the financial systems. The practice of requiring soldiers to purchase much of their required equipment had its roots much earlier within military history.¹⁸⁴ There had always been very little in the manner of state involvement within the equipping of soldiers outside of the development, over the previous century, of artillery corps and guard forces.¹⁸⁵ Most formations were drawn either from state initiatives directly leading to recruitment or, as discussed, from the utilisation of local nobility to part-fund the creation of regiments. It was, therefore, a practice with a long history and was not viewed as being strange by those who were involved within the system. However, there is some evidence to show that there were variations in the total percentage of the bounty that went directly back into the army's war chest. The dissatisfaction with which the nameless author, discusses the bounty system,¹⁸⁶ coupled with references from recruiting parties on the effectiveness of bounties upon recruitment demonstrate that the bounty system was not an unassailable edifice but rather part of a flowing and changeable system. The logic behind the return of funds directly to the war chest was an established part of the military recruitment process and stemmed directly from the expected structure of contractors within the British fiscal-military state.

Military recruitment was built around a system of colonels, nobles and those of the gentry were expected to raise regiments in times of war.¹⁸⁷ These forces would often be named after their regimental colonel, and it was that individual's responsibility to provide much of the equipment for the foundation of the regiment.¹⁸⁸ Under this funding arrangement, there was an expectation that

¹⁸³ Victoria Henshaw, *Scotland and the British Army, c.1700-c.1750*, (University of Birmingham Doctoral Thesis: 2011) p.90.

¹⁸⁴ See, Maarten Prak, 'Citizens, Soldiers and Civic Militias in Late Medieval and Early Modern Europe', in *Past and Present*, No. 228, (August 2015).

¹⁸⁵ Frank Tallet, *War and Society in Early Modern Europe: 1495-1715*, (Taylor and Francis, London: 1997), pp.188-192.

¹⁸⁶ Unknown, *Essay to Recruit*, pp.5-6.

¹⁸⁷ John Mears, 'The Emergence of the Standing Professional Army in Seventeenth-Century Europe', in, *Social Science Quarterly*, Vol. 50, No. 1 (June, 1969) p.107.

¹⁸⁸ TNA SP 41/4, Lord Portmore to William Wyndham, Whitehall 23rd March 1712.

these individuals would be able to make at least a return, if not a profit, upon their investment into the fiscal-military state. The costs incurred by these men would then be returned to the government usually through the exchange of receipts received later into the conflict or in the years following.¹⁸⁹ The length of time that the return of funds occurred was related to the credit systems available to each nobleman, an aspect that had direct impacts upon battlefield logistics which will be addressed later. Though the recruitment system's use of bounties was problematic at times, it was widely viewed as the accepted practice by those who were responsible for its administration. There were limited calls for changes to be made and those mostly revolved around the variations that could be made to the level of the bounty itself.

¹⁸⁹ 'Declared Accounts 1707: Army,' in *Calendar of Treasury Books, Volume 22, 1708*, ed. William A Shaw (Her Majesty's Stationary Office, London: 1952).

Section 2: Marshalling and Directing Forces

Recruitment for the army was both geographically and socially uneven. The size of units before they began the process of marshalling varied due to several factors. Firstly, there was the location of the recruiting party, those parties that were in large urban centres or very close to embarkation ports for transport to Iberia, could gather far greater numbers of men in each detachment than those who were recruiting in rural parishes.¹⁹⁰ The evidence demonstrates that this change in the size of the party before it was dispatched was primarily due to a mixture of recruitment density and time availability.¹⁹¹ Areas of greater urban density had two positive impacts upon the rate of recruitment for the army. Firstly, within the urban areas there remained simply a larger number of potential recruits without the party having to move, which was the most time-consuming part of the recruitment process. Secondly, there was the larger quantity of transient and low skilled workers who formed the bulk of army recruits within urban areas. The late 17th and early 18th centuries were part of a widening trend in urbanisation across Europe, but in particular in England. There were a growing number of industries that pulled young men away from the countryside to the cities, coupled with shifting dynamics within the rural economy, thus providing army recruiters with a large number of potential recruits to entice during their operations.¹⁹² Furthermore, unemployment within the urban areas was not seasonal which was the case in rural areas. As a result, there was a far larger pool of available men to draw upon throughout the year to fulfil the needs of the armies within Iberia. Accounts from some of the recruiting parties demonstrate that much of the recruitment for urban areas was predominantly men with no, or irregular, employment and additionally, many were newly arrived workers from rural areas. Rural migratory workers were one

¹⁹⁰ TNA WO 4/4, William Johns to Trelawny, Whitehall, 8th November 1705, and, TNA WO 47/22, Order for Blackheath, 18th April 1705.

¹⁹¹ TNA SP 41/4, Daniel Carrol to Secretary of State, Whitehall, 10th November 1711, TNA SP 41/4, William Johns to Secretary Hedges, Whitehall, 23rd April 1705, and, SP 42/67, Mr Boyle to Secretary of State, Donegall, 7th March 1707.

¹⁹² Adrian Green, 'Durham Ox: Commercial Agriculture in North-East England, 1600-1800', in *Economy and Culture in North-East England, 1500-1800*, (Boydell and Brewer, London: 2018), pp. 47-49, and, Mark Overton, *Agricultural Revolution in England, The Transformation of the Agrarian Economy 1500-1850*, (Cambridge University Press: 2010) pp. 8-9.

of the main sources of urban growth through the latter half of the 17th and early 18th centuries. Economic depression and new techniques and patterns of farming were fuelling a movement of individuals, particularly young men, to the growing urban centres. Between 1600 and 1700 cities such as Bristol and London grew by 10,000 and 175,000 respectively.¹⁹³ Within the cities, however, there remained limited opportunities for advancement, and many found themselves working transitory jobs. As a result, the work offered to them by the recruiting parties of the army and navy appeared extremely tantalising with the offer of regular pay, food, and the bounty.

In addition to these urban transitory workers, there were another large group of men that were particularly sought after by recruiting parties and were most often concentrated within the urban centres. These being men who had experience fighting in previous conflicts. The British army establishment maintained, during peacetime, a very small standing army but had engaged in several larger conflicts in the preceding years. As a result, the nation had been often raising and disbanding large bodies of troops for continental warfare. Very few of these forces were maintained at the end of Britain's engagement on the continent, and the army quickly began a process of demobilisation, returning those soldiers into the civilian population.¹⁹⁴ The result of this was, that there remained amongst the population a large corps of men who had military experience and training but were not still within active service for the army when the War of the Spanish Succession broke out. The return of so many men to the labour force in such a quick fashion invariably overloaded the available employment within the main disembarkation centres. As a consequence of this, men who had previously served as soldiers often became part of the unemployed within urban centres.¹⁹⁵

¹⁹³ *Merchants and Merchandise in Seventeenth-Century Bristol*, ed. Patrick McGrath, (Bristol Record Society, Bristol: 1955), p.ix, Roger Finlay, *Population and Metropolis, The Demography of London, 1580-1650*, (Cambridge University Press: 1981), p. 51.

¹⁹⁴ For example British forces at the end of the war of Spanish Succession in the low countries dropped from (49,266) to (7149) in a year.

¹⁹⁵ J.E.O Screen, 'The Eighteenth-Century Army at Home as Reflected in Local Records', in *Journal of the Society of Army Historical Research*, vol. 88, (2010), p.231.

Inevitably, these men became prime candidates for recruitment back into the army. Not only did they represent a body of unemployed, but importantly, their previous military experience reduced the requirements for training and created more reliable forces. Indeed, it was this military experience that created a corps from which many regiments could be formed, ensuring that recruitment was not wholly of green men. As a result, there were attempts made within urban recruiting parties to seek out and encourage these men to join, either through direct persuasion or by the usage of bounties with a higher total.

Within rural areas employment was often seasonally based. The rural agricultural economy was dominated by the presence of smallholdings and additionally, a seasonal transitory workforce. Much of the planting and harvesting was carried out by day labourers who would work on certain farms for a season or less and then move elsewhere, depending on the labours that were required. Day labourers had been the mainstay of the agricultural system for much of the preceding centuries.¹⁹⁶ However, in terms of the consistent labour force, the simple nature of seasonal labour meant that within rural areas there often remained a large body of those on minimal funds or unemployed. Changing weather patterns were in part the cause of this, with increasing warm temperatures at the turn of the century during the cyclic little ice age.¹⁹⁷ Furthermore, there was the pressure which was caused by changes in farming technology and the demands of agricultural products within the changing market. Improvements in the availability of farming equipment and particularly fodder for farm animals reduced the need that was felt for a wide labour pool even in those traditionally intensive farming periods such as the autumn.¹⁹⁸ Whilst large numbers were still required within the agricultural population there had been significant urbanisation and a reduction of the availability of

¹⁹⁶ Overton, *Agricultural Revolution*, p.160.

¹⁹⁷ Brian Fagan, *The Little Ice Age, How Climate made history 1300-1850*, (Basic Books, New York: 2000) , p.110, and John A. Matthews and Keith Briffa, 'The Little Ice Age: Revaluation of an Evolving Concept, in *Geografiska Annaler*, 87 A (2005), p.21.

¹⁹⁸ Overton, *Agricultural Revolution*, p.5.

work for agricultural labourers. These shifts in technological developments were exacerbated by changing patterns within the wider European grain market which saw marked increases in the grain production within eastern Europe. Coupled with Britain's growing financial strength, the financial advantages of importing grain reduced the need to have so much cultivated land within Britain available. Resultingly, there were shifts towards livestock and less labour-intensive crops.

Consequently, there was a larger body of men who were out of work or who had seen a reduction in the availability of the common short-term labour jobs and were enticed to sign up for service abroad with the army as it provided consistency of employment and on the face of it pay and food.

Once forces had been brought to an acceptable level through the process of recruitment, or, if the need was particularly pressing, they would commence the next stage of the process for the transition towards the at-sea sector. The vast majority of military transportation for much of the century was based around contractors as opposed to state managed.¹⁹⁹ Forces would be gathered into groups made up of either part of the original recruiting party or, in urban centres, by available officers and from there begin the process of transiting towards embarkation points.²⁰⁰ For forces that were being recruited near the main fleet rally points, on the southern coast of England and Ireland, this was a fairly straightforward exercise, but for forces being recruited further north there were additional measures that needed to be put in place in order to facilitate these movements. Clerks in London would normally write to the party in question and provide direction for them to proceed towards a nearby port.²⁰¹ As for most of human history, the fastest method of transit was still by sea, as a result, it was logical to transit the new recruits to the staging areas by sea. To that

¹⁹⁹ Conway, *Public and Private*, p.45.

²⁰⁰ Examples include, TNA SP 42/67, Admiral Benbow to James Vernon, Carlisle Bay, 27th July 1702, TNA SP 42/67, Earl Rivers to Charles Hedges, Portsmouth 30th July 1706, and, BL Add MS 22264,

²⁰¹ TNA SP 41/3, James Ranleigh to Lieut Hanning, 11th April 1710. For detailed studies of British naval logistics and transport see, David Syrett, *Shipping and the American War, 1775-83: A Study of British Transport Organisation*, (Athlone Press, London: 1970), Bernhard Pool, *Navy Board Contracts 1660-1832*, (Longmans, London: 1966), and for more recent studies, Roger Morriss, *The Foundations of British Maritime Ascendancy: resources, logistics and the State, 1755-1815*, (Cambridge University Press: 2011).

end, administrators sought out appropriately sized ships which could carry the parties towards their destinations.²⁰² Captains were contracted to carry the soldiers south to the ports where the gathering transportation ships bound for Iberia would be. Individual ships would not solely be contracted for every small recruitment party, which could often be as low as twenty men in some localities, rather parties would be given instructions to all make it to a certain port by a particular date in order to be transported on the same vessel which could also be engaged in additional mercantile activities or chartered specifically for the transportation.²⁰³ Supplies for the forces that were engaged in these activities also were an important factor which preoccupied administrators. Whilst on the march from their place of recruitment, soldiers were either fed from parts of their bounty or from funds available to the recruiting party.²⁰⁴ As most recruiters tended to follow a fixed pattern of routes, they had developed amongst many of them a network of contacts who could provide low-cost bedding and supplies,²⁰⁵ which could be utilised to facilitate the movement of their party throughout the period of recruitment operations. For transit via ship, however, supplies had to be purchased in advance. It was in this regard that the advantages of the home sector and the British fiscal-military state can be demonstrated.

Administrators in London would write to captains of merchant vessels that they knew to be docked in a particular port or on route to one where the message could be delivered.²⁰⁶ These were often small coastal craft whose routes most commonly followed a relatively fixed seasonal pattern, and thus could be predicted to coincide with the arrival of correspondence from administrators. Captains

²⁰² TNA WO 47/77, Unknown to Abraham Rodgers, March 10th 1705, and, TNA WO 47/77, Mr Gibson to John Allen, April 27th 1705.

²⁰³ TNA SP 41/3, Board of Ordnance to Mr Cooper, Whitehall, May 17th 1710, TNA SP 41/3, William Johns to Unknown, Whitehall, 19th April 1706, and, TNA WO 4/4, Commissary for Transport, Whitehall 13th September 1705.

²⁰⁴ TNA WO 4/4, William Johns to Col Villiers, Scotland Yard, 19th September 1705, and, TNA WO 4/4, William John to Lt General Chomondely, Whitehall, 13th March 1706.

²⁰⁵ TNA WO 54/678, Col Michael Richards to Unknown, August 14th 1706.

²⁰⁶ TNA WO 47/72, Admiralty Orders for Storekeepers, March 10th 1705, and, TNA WO 47/22, Orders for David Willis in Newcastle, 1st June 1705.

would be provided with instructions of which port they were expected to make speed towards and the intended date of arrival. Additionally, they would be informed of the number of men that they were expected to carry to the destination.²⁰⁷ The communication between the central administration and the relevant recruiting parties was quick and efficient, with only minimal delays usually observed for the arrival of the vessels to the correct ports. The organisation was clearly understood by those coordinating from London. Additionally, important for the transit of forces as part of the recruiting system was the need to provide supplies for the soldiers whilst they were in transit aboard the merchant vessels.²⁰⁸ Ostensibly these were to be provided at army rates, however, merchant captains were not always willing and there are accounts of some soldiers arriving at destinations ill and fatigued.²⁰⁹ As has already been demonstrated, the recruiting parties had their own supply procurement measures whilst they were marching inland, however, it was deemed more efficient and effective that the contracted captains should be involved in the organisation of supplies for troop transit on their vessels. There were three methods in which this manifested, all driven through the logistical systems of the administrators in London. The first was to allocate supplies from existing military stores for the merchants to have access to upon their arrival in the port. The allocation of supplies was possible in a great many of the large ports within the home sector, as they were possessed of military garrisons and magazines which could be directly drawn upon. Administrators would write directly to both the captains and to the store officers informing them of the dates when supplies would be required and requesting that they make all necessary provisions for the swift transit of the recruits to their assembly point.²¹⁰

²⁰⁷ Ibid.

²⁰⁸ As the majority of these vessels were merchant owned the rations for the soldiers whole following a naval fare, were not up the same quantity or quality as naval ratings.

²⁰⁹ TNA SP 41/3, William Johns to Secretary Hedges, Whitehall 2nd March 1705.

²¹⁰ TNA WO 47/72, Ordnance Orders to Mr Bateman, Whitehall, 11th April 1705, and TNA WO 47/77, Surveyor General to Cap. Fairman, Unaddressed, 15th April 1705.

The second method that administrators were able to employ was to utilise well-known local merchants or magistrates for the purposes of credit for the vessel's captain to make use of. Much of the British fiscal-military state's apparatus was built upon networks of known individuals, who were able to provide credit to state officials within each locality.²¹¹ The relations between these merchants and administrators had been long established, thus merchant captains could be confidently provided with the details of who to contact at the relevant port on the knowledge that credit would be available.²¹² While this process was slower than that of direct supply from the relevant magazines, as the captains still needed to purchase the supplies on credit after they arrived, it still ensured that good quantities of supplies would be available for the forces that were being transported without the need of a magazine. The final option was to request that the merchant captains make purchases themselves and then to seek reimbursement from the relevant authorities, usually an agent or credit merchant, at their final destination.²¹³ This process ensured that regardless of the situation at the port in question, supplies could be located and provided for troops quickly without causing unnecessary strain upon the financial system.

The small-scale marshalling of forces raises several interesting points regarding the organisation of British military logistics and the machinery of state. The strength of the home sector and British fiscal-military apparatus is clearly visible. Administrators had many options available to them for organising the movement of military forces and the finding of potential recruits for the army. Additionally, communication moved swiftly when needed and administrators were able to maintain

²¹¹ Gordon Bannerman, *Merchants and the Military in Eighteenth-Century Britain*, (Pickering and Chato, London: 2008) p.13. This was a period of high trade in government debt and growth of finances prior to the South Sea Bubble. Anne L Murphy, *The Origins of English Financial Markets, Investment and Speculation before the South Sea Bubble*, (Cambridge University Press: 2009) pp.222-224.

²¹² TNA WO 47/72, Letter to Thomas Butcher, June 1705.

²¹³ TNA WO 47/72, Surveyor General to John Phipps, June 1705, and TNA WO 47/72, Clerk of Surveyors to Mr Ogbourne, April 1705.

usually close connections with their relevant agents at the ports,²¹⁴ to facilitate quick changes to plans and organisation. It is important as well to discuss the levels of organisation that can be observed in official correspondence from high-ranking officials. When compared to the actions of administrators in the other geographical sectors, the home sector contains a large focus upon the minutia of logistical organisation. High-ranking officials filled out significant correspondence on very small numbers of men and their logistical well-being. By contrast, those in the latter logistical sectors' administration were focused upon much greater numbers. It can be argued therefore that the levels to which British military and logistical operations were organised within the home sector were much more highly optimised and staffed than those which would be established over the course of the conflict. The greater density of administrators and the longevity of the established relations highlight the long-term impact of logistical development in a region compared with newly established lines, the issues with which shall be discussed in subsequent chapters.

²¹⁴ Whilst there is limited evidence in official documents of the return communication from these agents, the level of detail to which it appears administrators were informed demonstrates that it must have existed in some form.

Section 3: Supply and Material

One of the largest parts of the home sector logistical network was the supply of material for the war effort, rather than the supply of men. The army required a vast array of supplies which other than some food stocks, which will be addressed later, had to be almost entirely produced within the home sector and shipped out. One of the largest of these was uniforms and other clothing. Whilst uniforms were not a vital military component in terms of the actions of fighting and improving soldier's health, they were nevertheless incredibly important tactically but also politically. Tactically, uniforms reduced battlefield confusion and allowed commanders greater clarity whilst on the battlefield. It had been these battlefield issues which had driven the development of bright and distinct uniforms over the preceding century.²¹⁵ Additionally, uniforms had become important to distinguish different classes of soldiery with the more elite and royal regiments being garbed in far more gaudy attire than the common line regiments.²¹⁶ However, there was a third social component of uniform design that impacted the acquisition of uniforms for the army during the conflict. As has already been intermated, much of the British recruitment system was dominated by regimental colonels. It was left to these colonels to decide upon the uniforms of the men under their command and pay, though they did need to follow certain parameters.²¹⁷ Colonels were at liberty to embellish their soldier's uniforms how they saw fit, and additionally, it was entirely their discretion which tailors were selected for the provision of these uniforms. Many colonels, therefore, took their stylistic control of their regiment very seriously, and there were certainly some attempts at competition between the various regiments in terms of uniform. The ability to field a regiment with an expensive and well-designed uniform demonstrated the wealth and power of the nobles in question. Furthermore, it cemented their position within the social fabric of the upper classes within

²¹⁵ Brian Lyndon, 'Military Dress and Uniformity 1680-1720', in *Journal of the Society of Army Historical Research*, Vol. 54, No. 218 (Summer 1976), pp. 108-109.

²¹⁶ Nicholas Dorrell, *Marlborough's Other Army, The British Army and the Campaigns of the First Peninsular War, 1702-1712*, (Helion, Warwick: 2019) p.16.

²¹⁷ Brian Lyndon, 'Military Dress', p.110.

Britain during the period. As a result, there was a great deal of correspondence pertaining to the acquisition of uniforms during the establishment of these formations.²¹⁸ Discussion of Uniforms did not end at the initial creation of the regiment, there was also a need to ensure that fresh uniforms were provided throughout the campaign, both for the arrival of new recruits and additionally, the general wear and tear of the uniforms through the rigours of campaign. Funds for the creation and continued supply of uniforms came in some cases directly from the colonel in question through relevant agents.²¹⁹ It was these agents that would often be the source of information for directing the selection of the relevant tailors. These contractors were often selected based upon the existing contacts held either between the noble or more commonly the agent and the relevant tailors. These relationships highlight the importance of connections that were critical in ensuring a supply of clothing for the armed forces. Additionally, they demonstrate the operational patterns that existed within the home sector supply network, this being that much of the contractual process defaulted to those with prior connections to the administrators or nobles that were in possession of the funds.

In addition to these clothing requirements, there was the production of arms and munitions which needed to be supplied throughout the conflict. Whilst there were manufactories for gunpowder and muskets within the Iberian Peninsula, these were small and could not handle the supply of so many additional men, both allied and bourbon, that deployed throughout the war.²²⁰ Therefore, the necessary steps were taken within the administration to ensure that supplies were also produced and sent from the home sector. Britain, and in particular southern England, had a well-developed and productive arms industry by the turn of the century. This industry had provided much of the

²¹⁸ Examples include, TNA SP 41/3, Sam Lynn to Unknown, Whitehall, 7th October 1710, TNA SP 94/79, Thomas Wytham to Lewis Pertis, Whitehall 8th February 1712 and, TNA WO 47/22, Treasury note, Unaddressed, 28th July 1705.

²¹⁹ TNA WO 47/22, Charles White notes, Gravesend, March 31st 1705.

²²⁰ J. Clayburn La Force, 'The Supply of Muskets and Spain's War of Independence', in *The Business History Review*, vol. 43, No. 4, (Winter 1969) p.525, Sergio Solbes Ferri and Eduard Marti Fraga, 'Military Supply Without the Military? Supplying the Spanish Army in the 18th Century', in *War and Society*, vol. 40 (2020) p. 70.

equipment of Britain's previous military conflicts and was further strengthened by a wide range of arsenals, where produced materials were stored until required. Much of the production of arms within Britain was built around regular large contract orders, as stocks of arms and munitions degraded or were used up.²²¹ Additionally, these regular orders were supplemented in times of conflict with other contracts which were used to assist in the recruiting and equipping of regiments.²²² Most regiments that were formed were equipped directly from their nearest arsenal or, magazine, with the regimental officers organising the transfer of those materials. However, additional contracts were signed to organise the resupply of those arsenals that were directly in the highest recruiting areas. Furthermore, administrators endeavoured to ensure that there were more than the usual peacetime levels in the arsenals.²²³

The reason for this is due to the role that home sector supplies directly played in conflict in Iberia out with recruiting practices. As has already been mentioned, Iberia had limited levels of production for materials, furthermore, much of this production was located in territories under Bourbon control and therefore unavailable for allied forces to leverage as part of their logistical network during the campaign.²²⁴ As a result, only the facilities in Portugal and slightly later into the war Catalonia, alongside those in Italy, could be consistently used to provide additional arms and munitions for the soldiers already dispatched during the campaign. These limited facilities could not cope with the requirements of equipping all the allied armies entering the Iberian theatre. As a result, the home sector was forced to commence a process of production and transportation in order to fulfil the requirements of the armies. The production of arms was a straightforward process, the facilities

²²¹ TNA WO 54/59, Ordnance Office Returns, April 1705, and, TNA WO 54/61, Ordnance Office Returns, May 1704.

²²² TNA WO 54/678, Orders and Accounts from Spain, 1707.

²²³ TNA AO 3/223. Accounts of William Robson, Chester, 1692.

²²⁴ The Gipuzkoa valley where much of the arms production was located was firmly within Bourbon control for the entirety of the conflict.

were already founded and had long-established relationships with the contracting agents.²²⁵ As such, orders could be quickly placed, and payments made.²²⁶ However, delays could occur with the supply of raw materials from the wider home sector economy which also often constrained the supply of powder in many instances. Powder production was reliant on the supply of key raw materials, however, importantly some of these materials saw the direct attention of senior administrators, particularly saltpetre.²²⁷ The use of saltpetre collectors within cities was a common practice, however, powder shortages resulted in delays to the overall preparation of arms already planned to be transported to the allied forces.²²⁸ These constraints localised however, with supplies usually being available to leverage within other cities throughout the home sector. Administrators were, therefore, able to utilise the overall supply network and many of the same ship captains already discussed to transport powder and arms alongside their contracts for the transportation of men.²²⁹ These supplies could then be supplemented by captured powder sourced either from facilities in Bourbon held territories or captured directly from enemy forces within both the coastal and inland sectors. Overall, the organisation of powder and arms was handled effectively by the administration of the home sector without much delay in the organisation from request to final supply.²³⁰

Another vital aspect of the home sector supply network was the provision of certain foodstuffs, both for the transition to the at-sea sector, but also to the later sectors when supplies were short. The issues with the supply of food within the other logistical sectors shall be discussed later, however, the impact of low food supplies within Iberia led administrators to look to raising and transporting

²²⁵ TNA SP 34/11, William Johns to Secretary Hedges, Whitehall, 5th May 1705.

²²⁶ It should be noted however that these payments were not made necessarily in short order, there remain claims for payments even within the home sector remaining for some years after the conflict.

²²⁷ TNA WO 54/60, Ordnance Office Returns 1702-3, and WO 47/22, Instructions to Carlisle Arsenal, 29th May 1709.

²²⁸ TNA SP 41/4, Transport Office to William Morgan, Whitehall, 6th April 1711.

²²⁹ Ibid.

²³⁰ The limited number of complaint letters can be highlighted as a sign that operations were running smoothly.

large quantities of goods as part of the war effort.²³¹ While shipped goods from the home sector could never fully replace those that were sourced within the campaigning localities, they were nevertheless a vital part of the supply network and kept the army operating during some of the most difficult parts of the campaign. The greatest of these supplies that were required by the campaigning armies was that of grain. Grain had been the lifeblood of Europe for almost all of recorded history, many of the rebellions which occurred across Europe in times of strife were brought about due to grain shortages.²³² While it could often be supplemented by other supplies, which could be acquired in a number of ways, it was bread which always formed the basis for the entirety of the supply system, without it early modern armies would cease to function. While all European states produced grain in some quantities, there was an active trade system at play across Europe. The development of the grain trade had been expanding over the course of the 17th century fuelled by the growth of large estates, particularly in Eastern Europe. Parts of Prussia and Poland-Lithuania had been greatly benefiting from an expansion and development of the practice of serfdom, coupled with shifting weather patterns had seen a great expansion in the export of grain despite downturns during the 17th century.²³³ Within Northern Europe, much of this grain trade was carried out by Dutch shipping operating through the Baltic Sea in concert with the Scandinavian powers, who also were vital in the shipping of naval stores.²³⁴ Within England itself, there had been a growth in the development of their agricultural productivity over the preceding two decades with annual harvests up, supplying population growth in London.²³⁵ Thus, within the British home sector, there were the resources

²³¹ BL Add MS, 61515, Instructions to Earl of Peterborough, Unaddressed, 2nd May 1705.

²³² Victor Magagna, *Communities of Grain, Rural Rebellion in Comparative Perspective*, (Cornell University Press: 1991), and, Victoria Bateman, 'The Evolution of markets in Early Modern Europe, 1350-1800: a study of grain prices' in *Department of Economic Discussion Paper Series*, no. 350, (University of Oxford: 2007) p.20.

²³³ Robert Frost, *After the Deluge, Poland-Lithuania and the Second Northern War, 1655-1660*, (Cambridge University Press: 2009) p.21, and, Marten Seppel, 'Feeding the motherland: grain exports from the Swedish Baltic Provinces during the Great Famine of 1696-1697', in *Scandinavian Economic History Review*, vol. 63, No. 3 (2015), p.216.

²³⁴ Roger Morriss, *The Foundations of British Maritime Ascendancy: resources, logistics and the State, 1755-1815*, (Cambridge University Press: 2011) p.171, and, Milja van Tielhof, *The "Mother of All Trades": The Baltic Grain Trade in Amsterdam from the Late 16th to the Early 19th Century*, (Brill, Leiden: 2002), p.68.

²³⁵ Stephen Hipkin, 'The Coastal Metropolitan Corn Trade in Later Seventeenth Century England', in *Economic History Review*, Vol. 65, (2012) p.221.

available to gather and store grain for the creation of bread for military purposes, additionally, reserves existed to be purchased for transport out to campaigning armies once campaigns within other logistical sectors had commenced. One of the most important considerations regarding this logistical structure was the mechanisms and relationships that were in place within the British home sector in order to facilitate the purchase and transportation of these supplies.

Much of the British internal market was based upon local connections and relationships. Local stores and government agents had connections within their localities, which they would draw upon in order to fill their stores and carry out the normal operations of the home sector military establishment.²³⁶ Garrisons and magazines each had allocated masters of stores, these men were responsible for the purchase of supplies, utilising funds from the establishment's allocation. In turn, these funds came from the parliamentary allocation to the home sector establishments. The store masters developed networks of connections on their own terms, liaising with local merchants and brokers in order to secure a regular supply of grain, similar to how they managed much of their other regular supplies.²³⁷ The only areas of military supply which remained more closely tied to the state apparatus was that of munitions and armaments. These, for reasons of civil obedience, were not procured on a local level but were instead contracted for by state officials. When garrisons and other stores required additional supplies of these, they would send a request to agents in Whitehall who would, in turn, allocate the arms and powder from the relevant arsenals across the country.²³⁸ Storekeepers endeavoured to keep supplies of grain to adequate levels where possible within their area, and there were regular inspections of accounts and audits of equipment carried out on the more vital stores, particularly in Southern England, to ensure supplies remained satisfactory.²³⁹ The post of storekeeper was one which had an immense amount of power, managing resources, there

²³⁶ TNA WO 54/60, Accounts for Ordnance Office, 1702-3.

²³⁷ Ibid.

²³⁸ TNA SP 41/3, Sam Wytham to Mr Lynn, 17th December 1710.

²³⁹ TNA SP 41/3, Accounts of Commissioners for Debts due to the Army, November 1702.

are certainly cases of these men selling off resources, either to soldiers or to the local population in order to accrue additional profits for themselves.²⁴⁰ Nevertheless, these actions were never in large enough levels to threaten the overall strength and continuation of the internal logistical network.

When supplies were needed to be transported to other sectors the communication was usually passed from the Southern Department to the relevant department in Whitehall. These would often consist of, rather than a direct number of supplies requested, several letters pleading for additional unspecified foodstuffs, to rectify issues that were being encountered within the other logistical sectors.²⁴¹ It was upon the auspices of the administrators if these complaints were viewed as critical enough to warrant the preparation of funds and the commencement of a process of accruing the supplies. It is unclear what drove administrators to judge whether the requests for supplies were necessary to be fulfilled or not. There is clear evidence that not all of the requests for additional supplies were met by the home sector, with only the organisation for certain additional supplies being handled directly or handed over to the officials in Italy. Given the wealth of information available to officials in Whitehall, it is likely that they were able to better weigh the state of the logistical networks and determine if it was feasible to send additional resources within a reasonable timeframe. These decisions, however, were not only related to the logistical network in Iberia but additional concerns. It is important to note that there was not always a growing surplus of grain within the home sector despite agricultural developments. Poor harvests and urban population movement reduced the volume of grain within the domestic markets. The monitoring of grain was always of primary importance for the British establishment, as has already been intimated, when grain stocks began to reduce then social unrest began to develop. In cases where the administrators were unable to find adequate resources from within the home sector, they had an additional

²⁴⁰ TNA SP 94/80, Marquis De Bedmal to Lord Lexington, Madrid, Undated.

²⁴¹ BL Add MS 61506, Earl of Galway to Earl of Sunderland, Camp at Caia, May 1st 1709, BL Add MS 61504, Earl of Galway to Lord Sunderland, Valencia 22nd February 1707, and, BL Add MS 61509, Methuen to Lord Sunderland, Lisbon August 5th 1707.

possibility within the network to make use of. Agents in Italy could be called upon to locate grain stocks and send them onwards towards the Iberian sector.²⁴²

Italy marked an excellent staging point for British logistical operations, particularly for the transit of grain supplies. Firstly, Italy was a major producer of grain within Europe, producing large amounts of relatively cheap grain.²⁴³ Furthermore, it was the centre of a highly developed trade network. The Italian coastal cities particularly Genoa and Venice had been the centres of vast trading empires for much of the preceding centuries. While the days of these cities as the centres of wide and powerful trading empires had already passed, they were still were some of the largest commercial centres within Europe.²⁴⁴ Additionally, they were extremely well placed to take advantage of the grain trade within the Mediterranean. While the developments in Eastern Europe had led to flourishing grain trades within the Baltic Sea, there had likewise been developments within the Mediterranean basin that strengthened the role which the Italian cities played as facilitators of grain shipments and trade. Particularly along the north African coast and in the Levant, there remained a growing trade in grain. These areas greatly benefited the shipment of supplies to Iberia due to their close proximity and the easier sailing climate of the Mediterranean, rather than the difficult Bay of Biscay and Atlantic which prevented safe shipping for parts of the year. Britain had long understood the value that the Italian cities represented, not just in terms of the grain trade but also in all mercantile activities in the Mediterranean. Additionally, the cities were vital for Britain to remain active within the geopolitics of much of Southern Europe. To that end, Britain maintained several officials in the region, particularly around Genoa. These varied from formal positions such as ambassadors and envoys to

²⁴² BL Add MS 61526, John Chetwynd to Earl of Sunderland, Turin 7th December 1707.

²⁴³ Frederick Ljungqvist, 'The significance of climate variability on early modern European grain prices', in *Climatologica*, Vol. 16, (2022).

²⁴⁴ Michael Martocchio, "The Place for Such Business": The Business of War in the City of Genoa, 1701-1714', in *War in History*, Vol. 29, (Sage Publications, London: 2022), pp.302-322.

soft positions such as mercantile agents.²⁴⁵ While they had several duties that they had to perform in times of conflict,²⁴⁶ additional responsibilities could be passed onto them from Whitehall to secure the needed additional supplies for the campaigning armies. Men who had been assigned to duties in Italy would be informed of the requirements either from Whitehall or directly from Iberia through intermediaries, depending on the speed of transport at the point in that campaign.

The position of British agents within Italy for acquiring grain followed a mostly similar initial procedure to that in Britain. Individuals within Italy were well acquainted with the yields and main purveyors of various supplies within the region. While they did not have access to all the various Italian state documents on productivities, they were often proactive in surmising their own figures from information that they had available.²⁴⁷ Therefore, they were able to, just as in the home sector, quickly connect with the relevant merchants and commence the process of transporting grain to areas where it could be loaded for transport to Iberia. Where the logistical process in Italy differed from that of Britain was in terms of payment. While financial resources were amply available in Britain, with government credit having deep reserves, by contrast, in Italy, agents had very limited resources with greater time delays on regular usage.²⁴⁸ Much of the financial transactions that agents made were either directly out of their own pocket, or through a well-known broker with credit. In turn, restitution would arrive from England once the bills had been received.²⁴⁹ Having the resources of only a few trusted individuals within Italy reduced the freedom with which agents could

²⁴⁵ Formal positions such as those held by John Chetwynd can be contrasted with less formal positions such as Richard Jones who was an oft turned to merchant operating in Southern France.

²⁴⁶ One of the principle tasks was the exchange of currency which was closely monitored, *The Answers of several persons concerned in the report of the commissioners sent into Spain. With the replies of the said commissioners. Taken upon oath before the commissioners for taking, examining, and determining the debts due to the army*, (Eighteenth Century Collections Online: 1714) [link.gale.com/apps/doc/CB0126280661/ECCO?u=oxford&sid=gale_marc&xid=36836fb0&pg=1] p.5.

²⁴⁷ BL Add MS 61526, John Chetwynd to Earl of Sunderland, Turin 15th February 1708.

²⁴⁸ A Tumath, 'The Conduct of the British Army in Catalonia after the Battle of Brihuega, 1710-1712', *JSAHR*, (2013), p.186.

²⁴⁹ BL Add MS 61526, John Chetwynd to Mr Richards, Turin 28th August 1708, and, TNA SP 94/80, Joseph Primado to Lord Lexington, Valencia, 27th February 1713.

quickly make and process payments for shipments of grain. If there was no credit available within the normal chain, then agents were forced to either delay the acquisition of the resources or fall back upon the open credit market within Italy. There were cases where this was the only option available to agents, who, as a result, had to pay the rates that were asked from the credit brokers.²⁵⁰

²⁵⁰ BL Add MS 61527, John Chetwynd to Earl of Sunderland, Vado 8th July 1708.

Section 4: Transportation and Supply Management

Once the payment for grain supplies had been organised, the next issue for the logistical chain was to ensure that it was safely transported to the ports in order to be loaded onto vessels bound for Iberia. Administrators had two options for the transport of grain, either direct or hired. Direct transportation could be handled from magazines. These magazines often had waggoneers on retainer that were involved in the movement of supplies to and from the magazine.²⁵¹ Given the turnover of resources within larger magazines, it was common practice to maintain waggoneers who would often be in heavy use by the magazine. These would not always be fully employed by the magazine but received a regular fee from the budget in addition to maintaining additional commercial activities.²⁵² Therefore, when the decision was made by administrators to commence the process to move goods from the magazines, these retained waggoneers could be employed to facilitate this transportation. More often, however, the contractors in question would facilitate the hiring or utilisation of waggons for the transportation of grain stocks towards the ports.

The process of transportation varied depending on the availability of resources and additionally, the mechanisms that the contractor had in question to acquire the grain, and from there transport it. Contractors in certain parts of the country held relations with local farms and suppliers, and therefore would often make use of individual waggons or waggoneers to collect and transport the goods piecemeal. Those with relations more closely associated with grain market hubs would often make use of larger convoys in order to transport the goods to the ports, operating within the regular patterns of trade and commerce of the local area. Some of the larger contractors had within their own resources, waggons and oxen in order to move the goods themselves. Other smaller contractors especially those who were needed on short notice, such as with the emergency

²⁵¹ TNA WO 54/678, Account regular payment for Theo Leverly conductor of horses, 1708.

²⁵² TNA SP 41/4, Daniel Carroll to Secretary of State, Unaddressed, 6th October 1711.

acquisition of grain supplies in Italy, needed to sub-contract out, either small wagoning groups or make use of freelance waggons for hire.²⁵³ Given the safety of the home sector, particularly Britain but once French forces were pushed west of the Alps, Italy too, there was not a need to provide a military escort for the waggons, such as would be needed in the Inland sector, as such, waggons could move with relative freedom and there was not such a pressing need to group waggons together for transit.²⁵⁴ The cost of financing these waggons was factored into the costs of the contracts, however, there were remaining issues with the transit of goods even when the financial agreements had been made.

Another major area of provision for the home sector, and one which saw a great deal of attention throughout the conflict was that of horses. While allied forces were able to cope with much of the transportation animal requirements, to a certain extent, on the campaign itself, there remained a constant draw on the number of horses required. Many of these horses were required to provide remounts for the allied cavalry formations that were operating within Iberia. Cavalry formed one of the key component parts of any Early Modern Army, providing not just important battlefield roles but also one of reconnaissance. During the campaigns in Iberia, they remained a relatively small body only representing between 5% and 10% of the total field forces. Additionally, they were the arm that received much of the attention of the aristocracy who formed the command structure of the army in the field. There has been much discussion, from varied historians, as to the reasons for the continued importance of cavalry in the eyes of much of the nobility. Some have likened it to the continuation of the medieval concepts of chivalry, and the significance provided to the armoured knight.²⁵⁵ Regardless of the reasoning, however, the need to have a fully equipped and mounted contingent in Iberia remained a pressing concern for the allied administrators attempting to organise

²⁵³ BL Add MS 61527, John Chetwynd to Earl of Sunderland, Turin 8th December 1705.

²⁵⁴ Ibid.

²⁵⁵ D.J.B. Trim(ed), *Chivalric Ethos and the Development of Military Professionalism*, (Brill, Leiden: 2002).

the resources of the Home Sector for resupply. The requirements and decision-making process which led to the need for horses shall be addressed subsequently, however, the end result was that there was a near-constant demand from commanders in Iberia for the sourcing of large cavalry mounts. England at the time was a state with large horse breeding areas, the requirements of the agricultural industry alongside an active and wealthy nobility had led to a wide range of horse breeds and active trading enterprises.²⁵⁶ However, not all of these breeds were suitable to combat in the traditional manner, Iberian mounted combat was very different, and as such this greatly reduced the available territories from where new mounts could be sourced by administrators. Much of the attention was drawn to central Ireland where many of the large cavalry mounts were common amongst the equine trade. Ireland had been highlighted by Lord Sunderland as a location where horses could be sourced.²⁵⁷ This may in part also have been due to the relations which Iberian commanders such as Oremond and Galway had in the area, which could facilitate easy access to the horses. These mounts would suffer greatly due to the varied conditions in Iberia which is discussed in Chapter 4.

The financing for the purchase of horses was carried out through the same contractor system as that which handled much of the allied supply efforts within the home sectors. Orders were sent out from Whitehall to the relevant local agents based in Ireland. These agents were part of the local horse-trading markets, which were commonplace throughout the major towns at all times of the year. Additionally, some had direct connections with larger breeders and merchants who could assist them in the acquisition of the relevant mounts.²⁵⁸ Finally, the contractors would also sometimes put out direct calls for horses for purchase amongst the local population, they would offer a suitably

²⁵⁶ Idoia Grau-Sologestoa, Umberto Albarella, 'The "Long" Sixteenth century: a Key Period of Animal Husbandry Change in England', in *Archaeological and Anthropological Sciences*, Vol. 11, (2019) p.2782.

²⁵⁷ BL Add MS 61587, John Chetwynd to Lord Sunderland, Turin 20th March 1707.

²⁵⁸ TNA SP 94/78, James Stanhope to Col Darmer, Unaddressed, 2nd January 1710.

enticing offer of recompense in the hopes of acquiring the horses.²⁵⁹ Because of the very diffuse nature of the horse trade, with many varied merchants and traders providing the mounts for the contractors, there were delays with the acquisition of the relevant mounts. Additionally, this diffuse trading network meant that contractors were unable to acquire all of the contracted mounts at the same rate. While horses remained overall at average rates set by the horse-trading community, the need to acquire some at short notice did in some cases drive costs up for contractors who were forced to request assistance from the government.²⁶⁰

Throughout the conflict, the provision of horses fluctuated in several ways. All of this was driven by the unexpectedly high demands for mounts from the Iberian theatre. However, what needs to be addressed is the reasons behind fluctuations in the supply of horses, and the conclusions that can be drawn from this regarding the ability of the British logistical system to maintain forces abroad. The first and largest factor behind the difficulties was the unexpected requirements of the Iberian sector. Allied administrators and commanders had expected a theatre similar to those that they had engaged in during preceding conflicts. In particular, to the fore of many commanders' minds had been the recent military endeavours in Northern Europe as part of the Nine Years War. When this proved not to be the case, as demands for additional mounts continued and indeed increased from the Iberian theatre, there was significant confusion on the part of administrators as they struggled to reorganise the supply of mounts to Iberia. Initially, it appears that the requirements of the Iberian theatre were simply unexpected and there was a scramble to direct a response to these requests.²⁶¹ Administrators attempted to send out requests to local merchants and regular contractors, requesting additional information regarding the number of available horses that could be acquired

²⁵⁹ TNA WO 47/22, Admiralty orders to Mr Griffith and Mr Howes, May 1705.

²⁶⁰ BL Add MS 46552, John Fyles to Francis Butler, London August 30th 1712.

²⁶¹ BL Add MS 61505, Earl of Galway to Lord Sunderland, Lisbon 5th August 1707, BL Add MS 61504, Earl of Galway to Lord Sunderland, Belpuig 5th March 1706, and, BL Add MS 61526, Earl Rivers to Unknown, River of Lisbon 29th October 1706.

at short notice and what prices might be offered if they needed to be acquired.²⁶² It is clear from the sources that unlike with the previous organisation of mounts for the army, this information was not ready to hand and clearly demonstrates the surprise felt within the administrative system, that their expectations of the requirements for horses in the Iberian theatre were not reality.

Once the additional horses were beginning to be located, additional difficulties presented themselves as the unexpected requirements began to stretch the system. The acquisition of any resources at short notice always taxed logistical systems for several reasons. Firstly, there was the allocation of credit and financial resources which needed to be organised. While much of the aforementioned financial resources were in place before supplies needed to be acquired, the requirements that were over and above the regular expected levels led to difficulties in the transit of resources. The availability of credit was lower as the previous costs for the initial supplies had not been met before the additional quantities were needed. As such, administrators had to make additional promises to credit suppliers on the security of their investments in order to ensure that supplies continued to flow. These messages, although they did delay the organisation of supplies, were quickly implemented and the initial surprise was able to be overcome. The ability of administrators to organise such large-scale shifts in the normal supply pattern of warfare is one of the strongest examples of the inherent capacity of the home sector fiscal-military system. The availability of capital within the economic system meant that despite the initial confusion, resources could be allocated if so chosen. Furthermore, what is also clearly demonstrated by the organisation of horse shipments, post confusion, is the connectivity of the contractors within the home sector logistical system and, additionally, the speed of decision-making communications. There is clear evidence that communication between officials and contractors was well established and that the

²⁶² TNA SP 94/79, J Hoffman to Lord Sunderland, London 3rd April 1712.

interconnectivity between the component parts of the trading networks within the home sector could be tapped quickly to ensure the transit of material.

However, as the war progressed, and the needs of the Iberian sector did not reduce after the initial confusion, the additional costs of maintaining supply became an issue. Whilst additional resources were mobilised for the payment and collation of horses for transport for Iberia, it was determined after the first years of the war that these levels could not be fully maintained.²⁶³ Much of the allied war effort was based upon expected budgetary costs and the expectations of warfare. As has already been discussed, these expectations were drawn into the budgets that were developed for each financial year and these remained linked intrinsically to the pre-war projected costs for military expeditions.²⁶⁴ The evidence is clear that the increasing budgets for the war, as it progressed, did so levelly across the board and did not see a direct large increase in funds directed towards the Iberian theatre.²⁶⁵ These increases, therefore, can be argued to be unrelated to the rising costs of financial transfer occurring in the Iberian sector, and only linked to the expanding scope of the conflict. The impact of rising costs not equating to the added demands for supplies raises an important discussion point when discussing the logistical system and the understanding that administrators had of the conflict in Iberia.

²⁶³ BL Add MS 61509, Methuen to Lord Sunderland, Lisbon 9th December 1708.

²⁶⁴ See chapter 1

²⁶⁵ Ibid.

Conclusions

To what extent did administrators and commanders appreciate that the costs of waging war in Iberia were a higher cost per military resource than they were in other theatres that allied forces were operating? What has been demonstrated is that allied leadership did recognise that there were additional costs that were needed in order to keep their military forces operating within the theatre. However, it appears that administrators were unable to correlate these increased costs as a permanent fixture of warfare in Iberia, as opposed to a temporary rise in costs due to other factors. There remains a historical precedent for this attitude, previous conflicts had seen spikes in the costs of particular resources that were experienced by British armies during campaigns. However, these increases were often temporary impacts of general campaigning factors. For example, the military exhaustion of local farm resources, or the replacement of lost material following the battle, or costly winter campaigns. The attitude amongst those responsible for the organisation of material for the war was that problems which were arising within Iberia represented a similar form of event, that being temporary resource exhaustion.²⁶⁶ This attitude, in part, explains those actions taken in the home sector to provide horses and other material. Further compounding the perception of temporary resource exhaustion was the nature of the campaigns within Iberia. Iberia represented a campaign covering a significant geographical area over a wide chronological span. As a result, the conflict often saw allied forces operating in a variety of locations in any given campaigning season. Therefore, it can be argued that allied administrators understood the messages coming from commanders within the coastal and inland sectors as a continuation of the temporary supply interruptions seen in previous conflicts. Allied commanders' communications to the home sector mostly discussed supply shortages without a detailed attempt to discuss the possible cause for the

²⁶⁶ Examples include, BL Add MS 61515, Extract letter from Mr Bennett, Camp at San Salvador, 20th May 1705, BL Add MS 61507, Earl of Galway to Mr Boyle, Lisbon 8th October 1708, and, BL Add MS 61510, Muaro Cifeutes to Galway, Camp at Beja, 10th September 1706.

difficulties. There can be observed within the Home Sector some evidence of changes and improvements within the management of military affairs.

The interconnections between the various merchants, administrators, and depots highlight the strengths available to Britain through the development of the fiscal-military and contractor states. Much of this development had occurred through the Nine Years War which had spurred rapid improvements in the infrastructure of the Kingdom. Furthermore, many of those involved in the War of the Spanish Succession had seen their first duties as parts of the Boyne campaign and Nine Years War.²⁶⁷ Henri de Massue being the prime example alongside James Butler of these commanders, both saw action during those earlier campaigns and went on to take significant roles in Iberia as the Earl of Galway and Duke of Orléans. Resultingly, there were many well-established relationships throughout the British Home Sector, these greatly eased the facilitating of contracts and the transition of financial resources into war material. What can be clearly observed within the Home sector is the smooth transition from finance to physical. The presence of a strong financial economy ensured that there remained a willingness from politicians to finance the requests coming from Iberia for more men and material. These finances were able to be translated effectively due to the large networks of contractors and magazines that had developed across England in the preceding decades. Additionally, the strength of the British financial institutions led to a strong sense of trust between merchants and administrators. As a direct result, there was a regular and large supply of credit available within the Home Sector which further smoothed the acquisition of resources, as there was not a requirement to await the arrival of cash before transactions could be carried out. This strong financial situation was further enhanced by the long-term developed relations that existed within much of the home sector's logistical networks. The long-term relationships which had developed between many of the contractors and administrators resulted in a situation where there

²⁶⁷ John Childs, *The Nine Years' War and the British Army 1688-97*, (Manchester University Press:1991) p.69.

was not a requirement to seek new contractors as often, reducing the time that was necessary for requests to be transitioned into material. Within the British home sector, there was the advantage of decades of infrastructural development. Well established magazines, storehouses, and road networks allowed for administrators to quickly direct much of the necessary supplies to where they were needed with ease, and only extreme weather usually held up the organisation of these resources. However, there were certain issues with the home sector network which did impact upon the efficiency of the overall allied supply network.

Firstly, there was the issue of the division of the resources between the two main combat theatres. As has already been demonstrated, there remained within the allied financial organisation, a favouring of the conflict in the Low Countries to supplying Iberia. While this had justified reasoning, it did impact the allied efforts to provide effective supply to Iberia from the Home Sector. Rather than delays to the acquisition of resources, which occurred in Italy, within the British Home Sector, there were simply larger gaps between making the decisions that additional resources needed to be sent to Iberia to assist in the logistical operations of the allied armies. There were a consistent number of requests for food supplies and additional men and material from the commanders who were leading the armies in the inland and coastal sectors, these requests were either directly related to the relevant government ministers or given the continual difficulties in communication with the armies in the field, which will be discussed in a subsequent chapter, they were often passed on through relevant administrators in the coastal sector. Despite these consistent requests for additional supplies, the decisions to focus on providing additional material were more intrinsically linked to the financial and political situation which was present within the home sector when these messages arrived. Officials were forced to keep the conflict continuing across multiple fronts and the difficulties in providing adequate resources to Iberia often resulted in longer gaps between large

scale resources being organised.²⁶⁸ These delays were an aspect of the home sector supply system which highlights the weaknesses inherent in the British fiscal-military system and its limits which were clearly reached throughout the War of the Spanish Succession. Furthermore, the issues with the allocation of resources, in some cases, led to commanders taking drastic measures in order to attempt to secure what was needed. The largest and most dramatic of these is of course the Earl of Peterborough's attempt to raise loans in Italy in order to finance additional parts of his campaigns throughout the eastern coastal sector. Peterborough's appointment and actions in the coastal sector have been a major source of debate amongst historians. Most have viewed his handling of affairs negatively and certainly, his decision to attempt to raise massive loans in Italy on government credit has been demonstrated to have had drastic impacts upon allied financial reputations.²⁶⁹ Despite the number of detractors, it is important to place Peterborough's actions within a wider logistical context. While the actions that Peterborough undertook were extreme and certainly overall detrimental to British financial strength, sources demonstrate that they were born out of a genuine desire to rectify the issues that he foresaw within the allied military logistical network. Despite many letters to both administrators and politicians, Peterborough saw that there would be no major increase in the resources passing from the home sector to the Iberian theatre.²⁷⁰ This was due to the aforementioned issues with the organisation and distribution of resources given Britain's numerous commitments across multiple theatres. Given Peterborough's erratic leadership style, his eventual course of action, though extreme, can be argued to have been simply an extension of the actions taken by other commanders pushed to its extreme. Certainly, Galway, Stanhope and Chetwynd all took efforts to raise additional funds whilst on campaign, though none to the extent that Peterborough went to, always remaining much more localised. However, all were faced with the

²⁶⁸ For example, the issues with the acquisition of resources which are highlighted in Chapter 5.

²⁶⁹ David Francis, *The First Peninsular War, 1702-1713*, (Ernest Benn, London: 1975) p.173.

²⁷⁰ Cameron Papers, Letter to Lady Peterborough, 1707, and Bridget Cameron, *This Master Firebrand, A Life of Charles Mordaunt 3rd Earl of Peterborough, 1658-1735*, (Michael Russel, Norwich: 2009) pp.276-7.

same difficulties and took varying levels of action in order to attempt to alleviate the missing resources that they were experiencing.

It is important at this juncture to highlight that while there were deficiencies in some aspects of the fiscal-military home sector, it was not wholly to blame as a top-down pattern. As will be highlighted in other chapters, supplies within the Iberian theatre were problematic for numerous reasons and a direct correlation of additional resources from the home sector would not always lead to the same outcome at the end of the chain either in the quantity or quality. However, it is clear that priorities were taken within the home sector and potential resources were withheld from Iberia in favour of other parts of the commitments of the British state.

The British home sector however was not limitless in its total supply capacity and important decisions had to be made every year of the war regarding the organisation and direction of the available resources. Chief amongst these was the prioritisation of the various combat theatres and which was to receive greater attention in terms of military material. Britain had, by taking a leading role in the organisation of the Grand Alliance, committed to conflict across Europe, and as the war expanded in scope, needed to make greater contributions directly to the various combat theatres. Initial plans from the government had focused upon the Low Countries being the primary fighting area, both in support of the Dutch, who were in a weaker position than they had been during the Nine Years War, but also to prevent French control over the economic centres and ports which in turn could be used to threaten England. As such, the early years of the war saw a determined focus upon the allied war effort in Flanders under Marlborough. In part, this cause was also furthered by Marlborough's position within the court, ensuring the favoured arrival of materials over and above those that would have been allocated to other fronts, especially the subsidies that were bound to Austria. However, Marlborough was one of the proponents of an expansion of English, later British,

efforts in other parts of the continent, particularly he was drawn by the urgings of Prince George of Hesse-Darmstadt for a military expedition into Iberia and the attempt to place Charles directly onto the throne of Spain.²⁷¹ As has already been discussed, this required several obstacles to be surmounted and financial commitments made to create a viable theatre for operations. Once this had been achieved, however, and Britain was making a full military commitment to operations in Iberia, then the issue of the allocation of resources became more acute.

As the conflict in Iberia expanded, with fighting occurring all around the coastal sector and plans for expeditions into the inland sector being made, then there was a need for far greater resources than had been needed in 1705. Allied military commitments in the region began to grow to meet the demands of the continued fighting in the region, seeing an expansion of both men and the material needed to supply them being required to be provided by the home sector, especially when the region itself became unable to sustain the level of fighting. This expansion of fighting was not met by a reduction in the intensity of the conflict in the Low Countries and thus it became a much greater discussion amongst parliament as to the allocation of available funds and resources, and which British force should be prioritised. Overall, the Low Countries did still receive the majority of funds throughout the war, however, the conflict in Iberia did see some years where it received a parity of resources. These correlate to the years when the allied forces were in ascendance and able to make their major advances into the Inland sector. Some important discussion should be placed at this point as to if the additional resources preceded or followed the success. The evidence appears to demonstrate something of a cascade effect, with a large increase in resources correlating to military

²⁷¹ Promises regarding Spanish support were also made by individuals such as the Almirante, Francis, D. *The Methuens and Portugal, 1691-1708*, (Cambridge University Press: 1966), p.227. see also, *The Almirante of Castile's manifesto: containing, I. the reasons of his withdrawing himself out of Spain, II. the intrigues and management of the Cardinal Portocarrero ..., III. the government of Cardinal Portocarrero, &c. ..., IV. the designs of France against Spain, V. the manner of the admirals making his escape into Portugal, VI. and his proceedings at Lisbon*, (John Nutt, London: 1704) pp.1-33.

success and therefore requiring additional resources, both to control captured areas and also to exploit the successes that had been made. While these increases were able to make defined successes for allied forces within Iberia, what can be demonstrated from the evidence is that there was a distinct reduction in the effectiveness of financial increases in Iberia when compared with the Low Countries. As a result, any setback or delay in the success of a campaign saw the pattern of resources shift back towards the Low Countries as a more effective use of the material in the eyes of Parliament. Furthermore, the nearness and political importance of the Low Countries, particularly in holding the alliance together, was always going to preclude its attention in the forefront of planners' minds. Nevertheless, this debate of resources is important when investigating both the home sector and the British fiscal-military state. It highlights that the resources of the state were finite, and vital decisions had to be taken by the commanders and administrators to facilitate conflict across the continent. As the idea of No Peace Without Spain began to lose its significance as the war drew on,²⁷² it was inevitable that resources would reduce for the Iberian sectors, especially given their aforementioned inefficiency in terms of translating financial power into war material.

The home supply sector raises several important aspects to expand our understanding of British financial and logistical operations, and in particular how they coped with the changing patterns of warfare in Iberia. Firstly, it is clear that as the scope of the war across Europe expanded, there remained energy to ensure that British commitments were met, both in terms of the subsidies which they provided to the other nations that comprised the alliance, but also importantly to the military forces which they were directly responsible for. As a result, funds for the conflict were increased to match the rising commitments that were being made across the continent. Decision making within

²⁷² Much of this collapse was due to the shifting inheritance of the Hapsburgs, Linda Frey, and, Marsh Frey, *A question of Empire: Leopold I and the War of the Spanish Succession*, (Colombia University Press, Boulder: 1983) pp.85-87.

the home sector was clearly delineated, with administrators, politicians, and suppliers having made many of the same decisions in previous conflicts, and the institutional organisation long established. Furthermore, the long-standing relationships between administrators and contractors allowed an unprecedented level of supply organisation and above all trust when compared with other geographical sectors. What can be observed is the fiscal-military contractor state fully entrenched and operating as expected with minimal interruption in operations. The home sector demonstrates how the established patterns of supply functioned within a war scenario. It highlights how the funds voted by parliament were transferred, either directly or through credit, passing along chains of administrators, to transform into a variety of supplies bound for Iberia transiting through the other logistical sectors. The wide range of supplies which are provided by the home sector is also clear. The home sector maintained, for the Iberian theatre, one of the primary sources for all material throughout the conflict as opposed to those more northerly combat theatres. This provision, and the arguments which resulted from the lack of supply transitional strength highlights the rigidity within the fiscal-military state. Financial and logistical apparatus were predicated on expectations and past organisation. While certain deficits within the logistical system could be forced through using the judicial application of additional funds, there appears to have been a disconnect in the understanding of the causes behind issues. The evidence shows that information passed from the later logistical sectors to the home sector saw a practical response which did not take into account the unique causes which had led to the shortages. This information disconnect was one of the main causes of the high wastage levels of supplies which were observed transitioning from home to latter sectors. However, despite these issues the system still functioned, providing large quantities of supplies for transportation and above all finances for the war effort. It is of paramount importance to stress this financial strength, that the home sector provided to British and by extension allied logistical operations. The home sector marked a financial centre, which provided the funds to translate to resources and maintain the armies of allied nations within the conflict. Without the financial strength which the home sector imparted, Britain would have been unable to maintain the

network of alliances, which were critical in the successful prosecution of the ongoing conflict.

Furthermore, it was the financial strength of the home sector that underpinned all other aspects of resource generation and supply procurement, not just within the sector itself, but additionally on all subsequent logistical sectors. The ability to attract men to serve in the army was predicated on the understanding that their wages would continue to be at an acceptable level and regularly paid.

Additionally, the resources which were used by the army in all logistical sectors were either raised in the home sector or funded from there. Even though military commanders did have the ability to raise additional funds abroad, these pale in comparison with the total funds which the home sector provided for the forces operating abroad. Many of the financial transactions carried out by those forces operating in the latter logistical sectors eventually made their way back to the home sector as credit payments and reimbursements, often long after the conflict had ended. Without the British financial strength and security, therefore, the entire edifice upon which was constructed the British logistical, and through that allied, system was unable to proceed. It was upon this financial strength that much of the decision making of the logistical system was therefore predicated. Administrators within the home sector clearly understood the level of resources that were available to be directed towards the logistical needs of the army as it progressed with the campaigns. Whilst there were attempts to keep costs as low as possible it is clear that the financial system could be stretched to cover losses whether expected or otherwise and there was a depth provided by this financial security which ensured the operation efficiency of allied forces which was far greater than could have been possible if Britain was operating with a tighter public purse. However, the evidence also demonstrates that there were limits to how far even these financial resources could be leveraged in the successful prosecution of the conflict.

The financial resources of the home sector were the subject of several discussions in parliament and amongst the logistical administration. While significant, the rising costs of the war resulted in critical

decisions being made which impacted the flow of supplies and men. As has been discussed, the flow of resources was primarily directed towards the low countries as opposed to Iberia. It is clear that the political will was present to carry out the conflict and expand it in order to achieve victory. However, what is also clear is the strong presence of politics within the home sector which directed the flow of resources. The changing nature of politics within Britain, coupled with the motives that individuals within the governing party had with military sectors, ensuring that decisions were not purely taken in the interests of military success. Politics has always made itself a present factor in military campaigns from the earliest times. However, the progression and expansion of warfare alongside the development of professional armies has, it can be argued, reduced the extent to which political leaders could influence the patterns of warfare.

Furthermore, the development of the fiscal-military state reduced the direct connections between the political leadership and general logistical operations of the army. The increased scale of warfare which had predicated the creation of an administrative class kept politicians and leaders removed from directly interfacing with much of the financial and contractual systems which operated in order to supply the army, both in peacetime and at war. What is demonstrated by the home sector's logistics however is that political decision making still played a major role. Whilst it did not interfere with general supply operations, politics did however impact where resources were sent and to what extent they were increased as required. It is through this dimension that can be observed one of the weakest aspects of the allies' logistical system. When the political will was absent to increase the resources that were viewed as necessary by commanders then the only option which remained was for those commanders to find the resources within their own logistical sectors and additionally, to stretch the resources that they were in possession of, this evidently was not possible in many instances within Iberia and greatly hindered the allied military endeavours in the latter geographical sectors.

Overall, therefore, the home sector marks the crux of the allied logistical networks. It is from this point that the logistical network commences, with military forces, finances, and a large quantity of supplies being sourced and transported throughout the conflict. It was the home sector that held the well-developed fiscal-military state that England had constructed in the preceding decades and where it was focused, resultingly it was from this sector that the chains of logistics to Iberia follow on from. Therefore, without the home sector, allied forces would have been unable to make any significant progress in military operations abroad. The home sector demonstrates the financial strength and logistical organisation of allied forces and the progress which had been made over the years in creating a robust and above all efficient system of contractors and financial arrangements which were flexible when responding to the ever-changing demands of warfare on the continent. Whilst it did struggle in some regards due to a mixture of political and organizational factors, it still was able to rise and adapt to most of the logistical challenges which the allied forces were facing to a certain extent. It was only the changing political dimensions of the war coupled with the unique supply situation which Iberian was facing which resulted in the supply issues allied forces were forced to cope with over the course of the war.

Chapter 3: A Life on the Ocean Waves, Allied Army Supply in the At Sea Sector

The Iberian Campaigns were one of the focal points for allied forces and especially significant allied naval resources. The campaign's very success was predicated on continuing allied naval superiority, and the supply chain. The chain was created through the use of these resources and was often stretched to its very limits. Once the initial plans had been made for attempts on Spain, forces were dispatched with the fleets to assault coastal targets of strategic significance. The selection of these locations became a point of debate amongst the leadership, between their logistical strengths, strategic significance, and the divergent interests of the army and navy. Once allied forces had taken these positions, they would need to create a secure and effective logistical base for the advance into Spain itself, commencing the transition between the at sea and coastal sectors. Upon securing these landing points, the role of the navy for the existing forces shifted from one of leading assault to one of support.²⁷³ However, the navy also maintained another role for allied logistics. That of bringing additional forces for the campaigns from the allied nations to Iberia. This chapter focuses upon the transport of allied forces, how they were supplied whilst at sea, and the role that naval forces played in facilitating the landings themselves.

Naval command structure (in regards to operations) was based upon a council of captains overseen by their fleet commander, usually the senior expedition admiral. Critical strategic decisions were communicated to army commanders in the form of a joint declaration from all the present captains of the fleet.²⁷⁴ While these councils were at times attended by army commanders if they were present in the fleet, there is little evidence to show that there was much in the way of consultation between army commanders and naval officers regarding the decisions of the fleet. There was an ad

²⁷³ Covered in Chapter 4

²⁷⁴ BL Add MS 61504 Council on board HMS Berwick, Lisbon Bay 14th June 1708.

hoc system of joint command however, within the naval powers who oversaw fleet expeditions over the course of the conflict. The two maritime powers, Britain and the Dutch, provided ships for the transportation and protection of the larger bodies of troops bound for Iberia.²⁷⁵ When the two fleets were gathered, decisions were made by a joint council of captains and admirals. However, in the event of disagreements between the two nations on objectives and strategy, the forces could separate and continue along their own national lines. This occurred most prominently at the end of the initial Barcelona assault in 1705. During the campaign, Dutch commanders were concerned about the timescale of the plans as they had orders from their leadership to return their ships to port before the change in the prevailing winds anticipated in the autumn. While attempts were made by British naval officers to persuade them to stay on campaign in disregard of their orders, they were unsuccessful, and the result was that army commanders were informed that their attempts on Barcelona either had to succeed within two weeks or they would be returned to Portugal until the return of the ships the following year.²⁷⁶

²⁷⁵ John B. Hattendorf, "To Aid and Assist the Other", *Anglo-Dutch Cooperation in Coalition Warfare at Sea, 1689-1714*, in, *Anthonie Heinsius and the Dutch Republic, 1688-1720, Politics, War, and Finance*, ed. Jan A.F. de Jongste and Augustus J. Veenendall Jr. (Institute of Netherlands History, The Hague: 2002).

²⁷⁶ TNA SP 89/18/193 John Milner to Sir Charles Hedges, Lisbon 9th November 1705.

Section 1: Supply at Sea

One of the leading factors when discussing military logistics, regarding its relation to at sea sector travel, is the unusual position of food supply when compared to land campaigning. Food on board ship was an isolated form of supply, it was also much more highly controlled and monitored than anything that could be achieved within land based logistical operations. Once ships left port,²⁷⁷ there was very little in the way of additional supplies whilst at sea. Only those that could be shared amongst the ships of the fleet could move easily between the closed environments of the vessel's holds, and this was almost an impossibility whilst in open water and could only really be achieved in sheltered coastal areas.

The only supply which did reach troops other than the allocated rations was in the form of bomb boats.²⁷⁸ This was the name given to small craft, usually fishing boats and other coastal vessels, which upon the approach of a naval vessel would leave the coast and sail alongside offering local goods and produce for sale. The presence of these boats was not an organised system in any regard but instead an opportunistic attempt by local residents to sell to sailors and soldiers, therefore raise funds for themselves.²⁷⁹ The principle was similar to that of the impromptu markets which occurred at army camps on land, though usually on a much smaller scale.²⁸⁰ Bomb vessels would carry mostly locally produced foodstuffs, though occasionally luxury goods were also available (although this did not become common until later in the century). These foodstuffs were then purchased by the sailors and soldiers on board as a supplement to their existing rations, but not purchased in large quantities for the ship's stores. Bomb boats are a very understudied and unknown aspect of the logistical chains. While there is certainly evidence to suggest that they existed as a common enough

²⁷⁷ R.D. Merriman, *Queen Anne's Navy 1702-1714*, (Naval Records Society, London: 1961). p.249

²⁷⁸ A confusing spelling used in some sources, not to be confused with bomb boats used for naval bombardment.

²⁷⁹ William Todd, *The Journal of Corporal Todd, 1745-1762*, (Sutton Publishing, London: 2001).

²⁸⁰ Richard Holmes, *Marlborough, England's Fragile Genius*, (Harper Press, London: 2008) p.262.

practise,²⁸¹ they are seldom mentioned, and there has been little evidence of them in official correspondence. Nevertheless, the enterprising spirit which drove the actions of many local populations when armies passed through provides clear evidence that if the opportunity arose, bomb boats would attempt to trade with passing army transport vessels. Although bomb vessels were not a substantial source of supply for the army at sea, they were a noted presence whenever the fleet was near coastal areas of population.

With the exception of bomb vessels, the army at sea were part of a closed supply network. Once troops embarked on the ships at port the only available resources for their supply would be those on board the ship, or in extreme circumstances, within the holds of the rest of the transport flotilla.²⁸² Therefore, it remained pivotal for captains to ensure that there was an adequate supply on board for the duration of the voyage. These calculations often went awry, though not through a lack of preparation on the parts of the captains. The sources clearly demonstrate that in preparation for a voyage, there were clearly understood acceptable levels of food to be brought on board for a voyage of a particular length.²⁸³ Although these supplies could spoil over the course of a journey, or could be of a sub-standard quality, the transport vessel endeavoured to take on enough supplies to mitigate those factors. If voyages were completed according to the predicted timeframe, then the supply chain functioned fairly smoothly with the total amount of supply available. However, the issue arose when these voyages were delayed, or circumstances extended the original operation, then the food supply became a critical problem. Furthermore, victuallers who had attempted to make additional profits also could lead to supply issues.²⁸⁴ These changes to the original timescale were extremely

²⁸¹ The familiarity with which soldiers named them in letters.

²⁸² BL Add MS 61587, Cloudersly Shovell to Secretary Hedges, Association Lisbon Bay 20th October 1706.

²⁸³ Roger Morriss, *Foundations of British Maritime Ascendancy: Resources, Logistics and the State, 1755-1815*, (Cambridge University Press: 2010).

²⁸⁴ *The Answers of several persons concerned in the report of the commissioners sent into Spain. With the replies of the said commissioners. Taken upon oath before the commissioners for taking, examining, and determining the debts due to the army*, (Eighteenth Century Collections Online: 1714) [link.gale.com/apps/doc/CB0126280661/ECCO?u=oxford&sid=gale_marc&xid=36836fb0&pg=1] p.42.

common for sea transport in the period. There are numerous reasons for this, each of which could significantly damage supply levels within the expedition. The first of these, which often occurred as forces moved between the home sector and the at sea sector, was the issue of embarkation. The process of collating vessels and forces together at a port were handled by several different individuals.²⁸⁵ Troops coming from either recruiting areas or those already billeted or in garrison were handled by their respective officers and NCOs with orders to arrive at the ports usually in a given period of a few weeks.²⁸⁶ These forces were to meet with the vessels which had been allocated for their transportation. These ships were provided through agreements with the contracted captains that they complete their mercantile activities and empty their holds in preparation for the arrival of the troops.²⁸⁷ These two groups, however, struggled to match each other's timeframes, and this led to significant delays with embarkation.²⁸⁸

There were several reasons for this, mostly created by logistical difficulties in the ports themselves, or problems with the component forces arriving by the required date. Transport and infrastructure, as already noted, was notoriously difficult during the 18th century across much of Europe. The slow movement of troops from recruitment to barracks was clear throughout the conflict. However, transport at sea also struggled. Much of the organisation of the troop transports from northern Europe to Spain had to be conducted during the autumn or winter, so as to allow for forces to be in position in Iberia for the coming campaign seasons.²⁸⁹ Reinforcements were usually expected to arrive either in March or November.²⁹⁰ However, the period leading up to these months were ones

²⁸⁵ BL Add MS 61527, Chetwynd to Sunderland, Genoa 28th October 1708, TNA WO 40/27, Orders for Gosport, 1705.

²⁸⁶ TNA SP 41/4 Wyndham to Lord Bollingbroke, Whitehall 2th July 1712, and, TNA WO 47/22, Orders for supplies at Spithead.

²⁸⁷ Morriss, *Martime Acendency*, p. 322.

²⁸⁸ TNA Add MS 61527, Chetwynd to Sunderland, Genoa 4th November 1708.

²⁸⁹ TNA Add MS 621509, Galway to Sunderland, Lisbon 6th September 1709.

²⁹⁰ *ibid*

of difficult weather for shipping in the channel and along the French Atlantic seaboard.²⁹¹ Poor weather and adverse wind was often blamed in the sources for vessels being unable to make it into port in time to collect forces or to rendezvous with the gathering transport fleet, it would also cause numerous delays to the fleet setting sail for Spain once it had been assembled.²⁹² These delays caused knock-on impacts for the preparation of supplies for these ships. Those that had arrived early to the ports were loaded with available supplies. These supplies, which had already been paid for out of the planned finances for the expedition, were then eaten by the sailors and soldiers who had already arrived to be allocated to that vessel.²⁹³ The using of supplies while preparing the ship was the preferred method rather than leave them within supplied billets in the port which was viewed as being prohibitively expensive.²⁹⁴ While this system reduced costs in the short term, it also had longer term impacts which further complicated the co-ordination of the expedition's resources. By using up the budgeted resources to cover the breaks within the transportation system, army administrators were then required to cover the costs of the purchase of additional supplies for the transport of forces.²⁹⁵ Once these supplies were acquired, and the component parts of the fleet assembled there were still delays which presented themselves before the expedition was able to set sail for Iberia.

Chief amongst these delays was the loading of the ships themselves. The varied supplies that were required for the subsistence of forces whilst on board, alongside those that would be used once landings had been made, were sourced from numerous different contractors.²⁹⁶ While much of these supplies were available in warehouses in and around the port, there were also other supplies

²⁹¹ BL Add MS 61587, Shovell to Hedges, Lisbon River 20th October 1706, and, TNA SP 89/19, John Methuen to Charles Hedges, Lisbon 16th June 1706.

²⁹² Ibid.

²⁹³ BL Add MS 61587, Council on Board Lennox, Lisbon River 27th October 1706.

²⁹⁴ BL Add MS 61526, Chetwynd to Sunderland, Turin 22nd February 1708.

²⁹⁵ TNA SP 42/63, W.J Johns to Secretary Hedges, London 2nd October 1704, and, BL Add MS 61526, Chetwynd to Sunderland, Turin 11th February 1708.

²⁹⁶ BL Add MSS 61508, Extract from letter to Secretary Hedges, December 1704. BL Stratford Papers, Notes on payments made to Spain 1704.

which needed to be brought into the area before loading.²⁹⁷ Coupled with the disorganised nature of warehouses as private domains, where the owner of the warehouse could control access even if the supplies were already the paid property of the military, this led to significant delays in accruing all supplies before departure.²⁹⁸ These delays compounded the already challenging problems which were faced by captains to coordinate the supply of the ships and to make ready for departure. The preparation of ships for transport, whether in the form of larger flotillas or, as the war went on, smaller convoys of reinforcements, was one of only marginal interest to administrators handling the affairs of the war.²⁹⁹ This does not seem to have been due to a lack of the recognition of the importance of preparing the convoy for transport but instead the system which existed in English ports at this time.

Most active ports for war vessels and ships of the line had a firm and fixed system of contractors, who supplied all the goods, from food to rigging, that would be required when the vessels were in harbour.³⁰⁰ These contractors were often long established and varied wildly in scope of product range though also appear to have been in the main merchants trading throughout peacetime as well. Some had detailed contracts such as particular elements of rope or barrels, while others were suppliers covering a wide range of goods on a single contract.³⁰¹ The men who took these contracts were, as a rule, locally based merchants, therefore, varied from port to port. Many of the contracts were linked to long standing relationships between local administrators and the merchant. In addition, there was often much more lenient timescales on the day-to-day business of contractual

²⁹⁷ *ibid*

²⁹⁸ BL Add MSS 61509, Methuen to Sunderland, Lisbon 28th November 1707.

²⁹⁹ BL Add MSS 61313, Methuen to Sunderland, Lisbon 20th June 1708., and, BL Add MS 61509, Methuen to Sunderland, Lisbon 8th March 1709.

³⁰⁰ BL Add MSS 61526, Chetwynd to Sunderland, Turin 14th March 1708, and TNA WO 47/22, Payments made to Mr Ogden, 28th October 1705.

³⁰¹ *Ibid*

supply to the port.³⁰² Without heavy administrative oversight and lacking high pressure timeframes for much of the life of the contract, there was a reduction in the flexibility of contractors to cope with the large-scale supplying that became required for the transport of forces to Iberia. For example, the fleet which sailed with Shovell was 50 men of war and 70 merchant vessels, the one which went with Leake comprised of 42 men of war and 68 merchant vessels.³⁰³ Most of these vessels were refitted and supplied from only a hand full of ports along the coasts of England and the Netherlands. Even the Dutch vessels took on the majority of their supplies from the English ports.³⁰⁴ There is evidence within the sources that the refitting of vessels for the purpose of transportation was variable. Soldiers were able to travel in merchant vessels with little adjustment, however for the transportation of horses the holds needed to be readjusted. There are some sources which highlight these changes but providing only short periods of time to make the necessary changes.³⁰⁵ Given the issues with the health of arriving horses which allied forces faced it appears that this remained an issue which was not closely addressed.

This large concentration of transport vessels was over and above that which the British state and its contractual systems had, had to prepare for in previous conflicts. The movement of troops to the parts of the colonies had not been carried out on such a scale, and the movement of troops to the continent had usually only required landings in Flanders or Holland and therefore had not required such large intakes of supplies. Much of the delay which faced the assembling of fleets for the expeditions was caused by this unusual supply situation and the unpreparedness of the contractors to locate and supply the quantities required. The lack of contractual stability in the supply chain to fulfil the requirements of the large expedition forces also exacerbated issues regarding the resupply

³⁰² BL Add MSS 61504, Alegrate to Galway, Lisbon 10th July 1708, and, BL Add MS 61527, Chetwynd to Sunderland, Genoa 17th October 1707.

³⁰³ James Faulkner, *The War of the Spanish Succession, 1701-1714*, (Pen and Sword, Barnsley: 2015) p.38.

³⁰⁴ Ibid.

³⁰⁵ TNA SP 42/67, Letter to Captain of Hanleigh, London, 17th June 1710, and, Letter from James Johns to Secretary Hedges, London, 11th March 1705.

of troops abroad. The forces required for reinforcement for the armies operating in Iberia were far higher than the administrators of the allied forces had initially expected. The supply situation in Iberia³⁰⁶ resulted in higher supply usage than had been perceived initially by military planners.

³⁰⁶ Covered in chapters 4 and 5

Section 2: Iberian Supply

Once the expeditionary fleets had arrived on the coasts of Iberia, their first main goal was the reorganisation and selection of a landing zone.³⁰⁷ During the early stages of the war, these were usually offensive operations rather than merely resupply. The most pressing issue for the fleets was to ensure that all vessels were accounted for. As discussed earlier, voyages across the Mediterranean and particularly the Bay of Biscay could be precarious at certain times of the year and the nature of shipping of the period meant that upon arrival in Iberia not all expedition ships were present.³⁰⁸ Furthermore, there remained throughout the war the risk of engagement by Bourbon fleets hence the continual use of a convoy system. Information reached fleet and army commanders usually by small coastal craft if one of the vessels had been forced into port prior to its destination.³⁰⁹ For transport ships, this often meant the loss of their cargos, though not through damage. Ships landing at especially French and Spanish ports outside of allied control were sometimes subjected to conditions placed upon them by the local inhabitants.³¹⁰ There are numerous cases of merchant transport vessels being forced to sell their cargos at [a] loss to the locals in order to be allowed to leave.³¹¹ There are even some cases of merchant vessels simply being overrun in French towns by locals who simply removed the supplies and held the crew to ransom with those supplies stored in a local armoury or similar structure.³¹² There were no available forces to rectify these situations, and so usually the supplies had to be given up as a loss. Administrators did not consider these losses as unexpected; there were cases throughout the period of locals seizing control of poorly protected contracted supplies, which were noted as an inconvenience

³⁰⁷ BL Add MSS 61587, Council on Board Lennox, Lisbon River 27th October 1706.

³⁰⁸ BL Add MSS 61587, Shovell to Unknown administrator, Association Lisbon River 9th November 1706.

³⁰⁹ BL Add MSS 61526, Chetwynd to Sunderland, Turin 8th February 1708.

³¹⁰ BL Add MSS 46552, Petition of Henry Neale and James Lacy, Undated, Unaddressed.

³¹¹ BL Add MSS 46552, Richard Barry to Lord Lexington, Bayonne 4th December 1712.

³¹² BL Add MSS 46552, Petition of Merchant of Galicia, Bayonne 8th January 1713.

rather than a drastic problem.³¹³ Nevertheless, these supplies would then need to be replenished by other means, either requiring additional costs or simply reducing the operating capacity of the army's logistics within Iberia. Both approaches did have severe negative long-term repercussions on allied forces logistical structures.

The vessels which became lost as part of the larger expedition fleets, especially those which carried military forces were more of a concern for commanders. Those that were missing at sea needed to be found and returned to a safe port. To that end, fleet commanders usually detached frigates from their available ships to seek the vessels in possible directions.³¹⁴ Commanders and administrators clearly understood the need to ensure that these vessels were found and safely reached port to ensure the success of any subsequent military operations. In both Rooke and Shovell's letters, there can be seen a clear urgency to dispatch the frigates to locate missing transports.³¹⁵ Their concern was clear both in terms of the timeframe of the operational season and the safety of the troops on board. Though losses were, of course, inevitable given the nature of sea travel during this period, the loss of an entire vessel was something which was viewed as often worth risking naval vessels in order to secure its continued service. What was not however seen as a priority issue, was wastage on board the transport vessels themselves.

The early 18th century was only the beginning of a major trend within the navy in the improvement of both quality and quantity of food products. Improvements were made in a bid to reduce the high mortality rates which occurred during long voyages from illnesses such as scurvy and malnutrition.³¹⁶ This process was pushed forward by particularly the Victualing Board but was still in its infancy by

³¹³ BL Add MSS 61526, Chetwynd to Sunderland, Turin 28th March 1708.

³¹⁴ BL Add MSS 61587, Council on Board Lennox, Lisbon River 27th October 1706.

³¹⁵ Ibid.

³¹⁶ Bernhard Pool, *Navy Board Contracts 1660-1832: Contract Administration under the Navy Board*, (Longmans, London: 1966) p.66.

the time of the War of the Spanish Succession.³¹⁷ On board naval vessels there were certain controls in terms of food by this point, quality control of ingredients and an expected list of what supplies should be onboard for any length of voyage. These included such items as fresh produce, certain types of alcohol and adequate quantities of both meat and biscuit. Certainly, the allocated fare for men aboard naval vessels was far greater and more consistent than those serving in the army. However, the same was not the case aboard the contracted transport vessels. There was a lack of direct oversight over the produce that was expected to be loaded onto the vessels, instead contracted merchants loaded quantities of the normal foodstuffs that they usually would use for their crews and would bulk these up with additional basic supplies, rather than adhering to the supply sources which would have been expected aboard naval vessels. There seems to have been a direct impact of the actions of certain contracted captains wishing to reduce costs for themselves from the funds that they were provided by the state.

The contractual agreement made with merchant captains for the transport of men was very similar to that which was provided for merchants providing bread to the army. It was calculated from the 5000 men that needed to be supplied or transported and an agreed upon fee for the service within certain parameters.³¹⁸ This fee would be higher than the expected costs of the contract so as to incentivise merchants to take the contract as it would provide a profit on the venture. The contracts were usually paid with a combination of upfront payment and the ability to claim costs back with bills from the government at a later date. However, contracts were not specifically tailored to costs, and if a merchant was able to cut costs in any regard, then those funds became direct profit for themselves. This incentivised captains to seek to reduce costs where possible and the most obvious

³¹⁷ Ibid.

³¹⁸ Morriss, *British Ascendancy*, p.322.

point of call was to reduce the costs and food by seeking low quality and/or limited amounts of supplies.

This attitude, though sometimes lamented by administrators, was not approached as an area which needed to be fixed.³¹⁹ The interpretation, from many of those concerned with the issue, was that transportation via merchant ships, whose captains would skim funds to the degradation of the health of the men was an inevitability. Attempts were made both in England and Italy for the transportation of men to ensure that there were large, stocked magazines at the main port sites.³²⁰ This removed the issue of quantity at least. However, as discussed earlier, ships were a closed supply system and therefore if captains did not load supplementary produce before setting sail, then there would be no opportunity during the voyage for soldiers to add those items to their diets. This fix provided by administrators only partially improved the condition of the troops arriving for the campaigning seasons in Iberia. While it is unfair to paint all captains and ship owners as partaking in this practise, it was clearly prevalent enough not to be seen as surprising by admirals and administrators.³²¹ The issue which primarily faced administrators was to minimise, if possible, the total risk for the entire force and not to overhaul the systems which could have been precarious to replace and improve upon.

One of the biggest discussion points for the fleets and one which saw the incompatibility of logistics compared with political strategy was that of landing points for the armed forces. There were significant discussions amongst the commanders of the expedition forces as to where the landings should be made.³²² This hinged upon three main factors, firstly targets that needed to be taken to

³¹⁹ *ibid*

³²⁰ BL Add MSS 61526, Chetwynd to Sunderland Turin 7th March 1708.

³²¹ BL Add MSS 61509, Methuen to Marquis de Alegrete, Pallace 22nd October 1707.

³²² BL Add MS 61313, Council of Admirals, Lisbon River 12 June 1708.

win the war to the benefit of the forces involved. Secondly, targets which had the best chance of success to be taken and thirdly, targets which provided the best strategic positioning for the fleets. The conflict, though ostensibly couched in the political frameworks of the war, that being the prevention of Philip's accession to the throne of Spain, was conducted in many theatres to the benefit of the allied forces. For the British this was primarily to gain both economic benefits through improved access to Spanish trading circles and if possible additional harbours around Iberia. The main part of the strategy to obtain trading privileges was based upon the previously closed nature of the Spanish empire and fears that it could be further monopolised between French and Spanish traders, which in fact was the plan of the French administrators and diplomats in their initial arrangements with Philip. For the British, and to a lesser extent the Dutch, it was clear that even if the whole of Charles' claim could be pressed in its entirety, there was an expectation of trading concessions and the control of at least a port for the engaged parties.³²³ If Charles could not be placed upon the throne, either through a negotiated settlement or the loss of the entire conflict, then the allies were determined to secure control of a secure anchorage preferably one which could allow them access to commercial opportunities in the Mediterranean.³²⁴ As early as 1702 discussions were underway as to which of these ports were the preferred targets. Initially, they were to be Cadiz and Mahon. Mahon was often viewed as being of particular interest as a purely naval base acquisition for the British given the significance of its natural harbour. Often viewed as the finest harbour in the Mediterranean, naval commanders were keen to acquire the port from the earliest stages of the war.³²⁵ Cadiz, by contrast, was much more of an economic concern. Having surpassed Seville as the main port for the arrival of trade from the Americas, Cadiz was a prime target for British acquisition. Even if it was handed back in subsequent treaties it would allow for British

³²³ See, *A proposal for putting a speedy end to the war by ruining the commerce of the French and Spaniards, and securing our own, without any additional expence to the nation*, (Eighteenth Century Collections Online) [link.gale.com/apps/doc/CW0105050937/ECCO?u=oxford&sid=bookmark-ECCO&xid=a9872c0f&pg=1] pp. 14-15. See also, *Translation of the Treaty of Commerce, made and sign'd at Barcelona, between the Queen of Great Britain, and Charles III, on the 10th day of July 1707*, (R. Burleigh, London:1715).

³²⁴ Faulkner, *War of Spanish*, p.83.

³²⁵ TNA SP89/19, Methuen to Hedges, Lisbon 16th June 1706.

merchants to acquire a stronger foothold in the trade by having a military conquest of Cadiz as a period of supportive control would allow for the establishment of warehouses and trading houses.³²⁶ There was thus a great deal of pressure upon the initial allied advance to capture the port and secure it. The details of how the logistics of these landings will be discussed in greater depth later. However, additional priorities from those within Charles' court, once he joined the expeditions, changed the strategic requirements of the campaigns.

Although British and Dutch forces were still planning to acquire suitable ports for their own interests, there was also growing pressure during 1704/5 for landings to be made in locations where it was believed that there would be a strong support for Charles. This had initially been thought to be Cadiz when those landings had been organised. However, support in Andalucía never materialised, partly due to a successful Bourbon administration in the region. The main reason though appears to have been the allied conduct during the Cadiz campaign.³²⁷ Following that campaign's collapse, it was the urging of George of Hesse-Damstadt who took over the control of the liaison for Charles. Having spent many years in Iberia, particularly Catalonia, in his previous roles, George had developed a wide range of contacts through whom he believed he could check the pulse of popular opinion within the Spanish population.³²⁸ Upon this information was predicated the shift in allied strategy towards expeditions into Catalonia and Valencia.³²⁹

³²⁶ These did not actually appear in any scale until the end of the century, Maria del Carmen Lario Onate, *Lo Colonia Mercantil Britanica E Irlandesa*, (Universidad de Cadiz: 2000), p.132.

³²⁷ Ibid.

³²⁸ There were other voices that were under the belief in Britain that much of Spain would rise for Charles. A *full and impartial history of the expedition into Spain; in the year 1702. Extracted from the journals and memoirs of the generals; and from which it will be easie to draw Rational Conjectures, about the present Enterprize, to settle the Most Serene Charles III, on the Spanish Throne. To which is added, an account of Monsieur Chateaurenault's expedition, from his first sailing from Brest, in Sept. 1701, to his putting into Vigo, in Sept. 1702. In a Letter from Monsieur de Gatines, Intendant of the Navy of France, to a Minister of State at Paris; which Letter was taken at Redondella among Monsieur Chateaurenault's Papers*, (Eighteenth Century Collections Online)

[link.gale.com/apps/doc/CB0126877024/ECCO?u=oxford&sid=gale_marc&xid=673564ef&pg=1] p.64.

³²⁹ Francis, *Peninsula War*, p.175.

Catalonia had always, under the Spanish Hapsburgs, had an independent streak, primarily born out of their strong *Fueros* which they had established and maintained since the succession of the Kingdom of Aragon into the Kingdom of Spain. As such, the centralising nature of absolutist rule which had been governing France for the previous 50 years was a threat to their autonomy.³³⁰ Though Phillip's fledgling government had not embarked upon any upheaval to the *Fueros* system,³³¹ in fact, there is some argument that they would not have impinged upon the rights of the Catalonians if they had not sided with Charles, it was full initially of French ministers who had propagated similar policies when they had been in France. This fear led many of the Catalanian nobility and burghers to show an interest in Charles and allied intervention which worked its way back to George.³³² With the probability of these Catalonians rising to support Charles the allies were encouraged to focus upon military landings there. These landings were planned to work in co-ordination with forces from the local areas, the only landings of the war which had this pre-determined supportive force in the target area.³³³

A mention must be made here of Portugal, while not being part of naval military landings it was a primary supply and co-ordination point for the entirety of the Iberian campaigns. Portugal had initially been allied, though reluctantly to the Bourbon monarchs, primarily due to successful French diplomacy and the waning health of Portugal's monarch.³³⁴ However, through the successful application of pressure from the British fleet and diplomatic overtures from the British consul in

³³⁰ Ibid.

³³¹ They were able to persuade financiers to assist them independently of requesting taxes which would have required upholding the *fueros*. Santiago Aquerrata, 'La Participacion de Los Financieros Nacionales en la Guerra de Sucesion: El Abastecimiento de Viveres al Ejercito', in, *Capitalismo Mercantil en la Espana Del Siglo XVIII*, ed. Rafael Torres Sanchez, (Eunsa, Pamplona: 2000) pp.273-315.

³³² TNA PRO 30/24/45/80, Letter from Shaftesbury to Court, Undated, and, Joaquim Albareda i Salvadó, *Catalunya en un conflicte europeu : Felip V i la pèrdua de les llibertats catalanes (1700-1714)*, (Generalitat de Catalunya, Barcelona:2001), pp-48-60.

³³³ Ibid.

³³⁴ Francis, *Peninsula War*, p.36

Lisbon, Paul Methuen, Portugal signed the treaty which brought it over to the allied side and was asked to provide a standing force for the fighting in Iberia.³³⁵ This move changed dramatically the at sea sector supplies for the allies. Giving them a firm base for fleet action and from where they could reposition for additional attacks along the coasts. Having the port at Lisbon was also of paramount importance for the maintenance of the fleet resources providing a consistent point of resupply. However, relations with Portugal were always tenuous, and there were numerous cases where these relations broke down and impacted the ability of the at sea resupply to continue at a satisfactory rate.³³⁶

Firstly, there was the perpetual issue of the supply itself both in terms of cost and of space. As was normal practise in many ports, supplies were contracted beforehand and then set aside for the use of naval forces.³³⁷ These supplies were usually collected by administrators operating in the port itself as they were possessed of greater local connections than incoming captains. However, there was an expectation amongst particularly British leadership that their vessels, and the supplies for these, should be given preferential prices in comparison to even their Portuguese counterparts.³³⁸ To that end, administrators made great strives to drive down prices from the contractors. Actions such as these often met with resistance from Portuguese contractors who would either not agree to these low contracts or bring their complaints to the Portuguese court.³³⁹ There is evidence of the souring of relations in Lisbon through this policy and can be observed to have slowed the throughput of supplies to naval vessels.³⁴⁰ Many of these cases became diplomatic flashpoints between British and

³³⁵ TNA SP 108/133, Treaty of Alliance between Great Britain, the Emperor, Portugal and The States General, (July 19th 1703), and, W.A. Speck, *The Birth of Britain, A New Nation 1700-1710*, (Blackwell, Oxford: 1994), pp.54-55.

³³⁶ David Martin Marcos, *Peninsula de Recelos, Portugal y Espana, 1688-1715*, (Institutio Universitario de Historia Simancas:2014) p.187.

³³⁷ BL Add MS 61526, Chetwynd to Sunderland, Genoa 18th December 1707.

³³⁸ BL Add MS 61587, Letter from Shovell, Lisbon River 20th November 1708.

³³⁹ BL Add MS 61509, Methuen to Sunderland, Lisbon 14th October 1707.

³⁴⁰ *ibid*

Portuguese officials. As the war continued the availability of supplies within Lisbon and Portugal itself diminished and these complaints lessened as any available funds had to be pushed through in order to secure the limited resources.³⁴¹ This however led to a further issue in the relations between the main allies and Portugal. Specifically, the allocation of limited resources to the military forces. Having already been providing significant subsidies to Portugal and, from as early as 1705, covering the missing subsidies from the Dutch, the British had the financial muscle needed to gather available resources for her own forces especially her naval vessels. While this was lamented in certain quarters of Lisbon there were benefits provided by having well supplied British naval presence which will be outlined later.

For the contracted merchant ships, however, the issue of supply was much more tenuous. They were not included in many of the official supply requirements and instead were expected to purchase their resupply out of their contractual payments. What this caused was elements of disruption to the contracted transport fleets, as their captains sought resupply in Portugal for the best price.³⁴² The resultant slow-down in supply availability inflated costs which often could not be achieved by contracted vessels. While administrators would endeavour to ensure that the shortfall did not land upon the health of the troops, many captains returned to Britain at a loss and were unwilling to take additional transportation contracts further slowing down the process of flotilla organisation in Britain.³⁴³

One of the other continual difficulties which occurred to the at sea sector supply was born out of the agreements that Britain made with Portugal in order to gain their agreement to join the allied side in

³⁴¹ BL Add MS 61509, Marquis de Allegate to Methuen, Pallace 22nd October 1707.

³⁴² BL Add MS 61587, Shovell to Unknown, Lisbon 29th November 1706.

³⁴³ Ibid.

the war. British vessels would provide additional escorts to Portugal's colonial supply fleets.³⁴⁴

Portugal's colonial empire was critically important to the economic vitality of the country; particularly in terms of military supplies. The empire provided large amounts of Portugal's available credit, much as it had done for the Spanish empire for the previous century. Portugal was especially insistent that the supply of gold from the Brazil treasure fleets continued to flow throughout the conflict.³⁴⁵ This was part of the agreement which the British used in order to gain Portugal's acceptance into the allies, with much of the rest of the agreements taking the form of military land support. Over the course of the war, allied war vessels were detached from the task forces and used to escort Brazil treasure fleets. This created additional logistical difficulties for operations in the Iberian at sea sector. Vessels were attached to the fleet sent from Britain with the express purpose of then being seconded onto the Brazil trade fleets.³⁴⁶ However, Portuguese officials often felt that the vessels provided by Britain were insufficient to guard the trade fleets. The result was that they often lobbied British commanders in Lisbon to send additional ships from the fleet to be assigned to the protection of incoming trade fleets.³⁴⁷ The need for these vessels placed commanders in difficult positions regarding the transport of supplies through the at sea sector. They could refrain from attaching additional ships for the protection of the treasure fleets, but this would damage the already frayed relations with the Portuguese, or they could risk the success of future ventures within the at sea sector by reducing the available naval resources for operations and the available transport capacity.

Overall, throughout the conflict, the British practised a policy of minimal resource reallocation for the protection of the trade convoys. This policy saw the allocation of small frigates and other light

³⁴⁴ TNA SP 108/133, Treaty of Alliance between Great Britain, the Emperor, Portugal and The States General, (July 19th 1703).

³⁴⁵ BL Add MS 61587, Shovell to Hedges, Lisbon 9th November 1706.

³⁴⁶ BL Add MS 61587, Shovell to Hedges, Lisbon 9th November 1706.

³⁴⁷ BL Add MS 61587, Shovell to Mendoca, Lisbon 27th November 1706.

warships once the trade fleet was at sea and nearing Iberia. This reduced the loss of the vessels for the extended period of time that would have occurred had they been required to make the full trip from Lisbon to Brazil and return. Also, by only sending smaller combat vessels, naval commanders ensured that they did not lose large amounts of transport capacity and had their main battle fleet of ships of the line on hand for any offensives that needed to be made.

One issue which saw significant issues for the at sea sector was the transport of particular supplies around the sector. Allied vessels were often required to act as transport vessels between ports within Iberia once they had brought their main cargos from Britain and Holland. These would often be transporting military supplies and messages between ports within Portugal or to the military forces operating in other parts of Iberia.³⁴⁸ However, many captains were unwilling to have their planned voyages derailed by Portuguese requests to act as transports. As a result, they often ignored Portuguese requests and simply sailed out of the ports early before officials could arrive to organise the loading.³⁴⁹ This came to a head in 1706 when Portuguese forts opened fire on allied vessels attempting to vacate harbours in Lisbon and Porto.³⁵⁰ Although these engagements shocked allied commanders and brought about immediate discussions with Portuguese officials, they did not cause any lasting damage to the vessels in question.³⁵¹ In most cases, they simply returned to the port while discussions carried on regarding the incident and the best course forward. However, what they do highlight is the issues with logistics for many of the vessels operating within the at sea sector; the lack of clear and consistent instructions for the vessels.

³⁴⁸ BL Add MS 61509, Methuen to Don Diego de Mendoca, Lisbon 31st October 1707.

³⁴⁹ BL Add MS 61587, Shovell Log, Association in Wares Bay, 15th December 1706.

³⁵⁰ *ibid*

³⁵¹ BL Add MS 61587, Diego de Mendoca to Shovell, Lisbon 27th December 1706.

The multi-layered diplomatic relationships and conflicting supply objectives of the allied nations in the at sea sector meant that for many vessels, the chain of command for their duties was not clear. This led to both confusion for the captains themselves as they needed to navigate this maze of interests in order to fulfil their duties. However, it also disrupted the flow of supplies in certain areas throughout the campaigning period. With ships often caught between conflicting orders and requests, a smooth transit of supplies could never be guaranteed despite British financial resources.

Section 3: Coastal Landings

Once a naval landing site had been selected, whether for political or strategic reasons, the next step for at sea logistics was the co-ordination of resources in preparation for a landing on the shore. A council of captains was usually (weather permitting) held once the fleet was at anchor at the proposed landing point or within a day's sailing. The landing point itself was also an area of discussion during these councils.³⁵² Landing points were another common area of contention between army and navy interests in the at sea sector. Landing points for the navy or merchant vessels required certain things which were intimated by captains at these councils. Firstly, they required a good location to anchor and to be able to hoist out the ship's boats for landings. The area in question also had to be able to be secure from swells and strong winds which could carry the ships into dangerous positions. Finally, the landing area also had to be safe from possible retaliation either from enemy ships or from coastal fortifications. This required bays which were a comfortable distance from the target city in question and which had been adequately scouted prior to the landing operations commencement.³⁵³

From the army's perspective, landing points also required certain elements to be in place in order to be of maximum strategic effectiveness for the military forces. The landing place had to be close to the nearest strategic objective. This would often be a local port town or other urban centre. To ensure that the allied forces would have access to a base from which they can operate once it had been captured.³⁵⁴ A town also acted as an important staging ground for the storing of supplies and linking with contractors to provide food and other goods to the arriving forces. Secondly, the landing

³⁵³ BL Add MS 61587, Diego de Mendoca to Shovell, Lisbon 27th December 1706.

³⁵⁴ BL Add MS 61510, Muaro Ciunfuegos to Juan Milner, 20th September 1706.

area had to be in a position that was not too heavily defended.³⁵⁵ The nature of military landings in this period was a slow process, usually taking 2-3 days to land all the forces. While initial numbers of infantry could be landed on boats on the first day, the landing of horses and artillery (which shall be addressed later) could take significantly longer. Therefore, if there was determined opposition from enemy forces, they could easily prevent any sizable landing force from successfully organising a beachhead. Finally, army forces needed physical conditions to be suitable, many beaches and promontories across Iberia were not suitable for the unloading of heavy equipment, supplies and particularly cannon. Either the beaches were too soft that landings could not be completed before a change in the tides or there were significant elevations which prevented easily unloading heavy equipment.

These differing issues meant that many of the proposed landings were not acceptable to one of the army or navy and compromise had often to be made, the requirements for each of the two groups had to be overlooked in order to acquire a workable landing point for the operation. In most cases, these concessions were made on the military side of things. The need for the captains to have their vessels safe for unloading and then able to pull away from the shore coupled with their overall control over their vessels resulted in landing arguments usually being settled to the naval advantage.³⁵⁶ This can be observed most closely in the landings at both Cadiz and Barcelona. The Cadiz operation saw the landing site at a lengthy distance from the city itself of 12 miles which upset the operations of the forces once they landed. At Barcelona, the landing point was on the far side of

³⁵⁵ Given the slow progression of transport fleets and the need to take areas of supply it was unlikely that landings could be achieved with any great surprise.

³⁵⁶ Allen, Douglas W. 'The British Navy Rules: Monitoring and Incompatible Incentives in the Age of Fighting Sail' *Explorations in Economic History* 39, (2002), p. 204. And, BL Add MS 61516, Council on board Lennox, Lisbon River October 27th 1706.

the city from the proposed objectives and required a full circumvention of the city in front of enemy observers allowing the Bourbon forces to more adequately prepare their defences.

Overall, the military operations and landings were dictated by naval arguments over and above those of the army. There were merits to this approach however, these were primarily drawn from the overall weakness of the military forces involved vis a vis the allied naval forces. The naval forces which the allied forces were able to commit to the operations in Iberia compared with that of their opponents were of a much greater quality. With a force of men of war equal to the strength of the Toulon fleet and the ability to replace lost vessels which far exceeded that of their French counterparts, allied fleets were in a dominant position in the Western Mediterranean and Iberian coasts for the majority of the war.³⁵⁷ This was despite their efforts to take Toulon which failed during the 1707 campaign.³⁵⁸ By contrast, however, the military forces of the allied war effort were of a much smaller number in relation to their opponents. As has already been remarked upon, allied military forces which were sent to Iberia comprised only a fraction of the total forces that were operating in the region. Coupled with Portuguese and Hapsburg forces however, these army units did not equate to a sizable force when compared with the Bourbon forces arrayed against them. Often the allies were operating with up to 25% fewer forces than their Bourbon counterparts.³⁵⁹ Although Bourbon forces had greater garrison requirements, given the ability of the larger allied sea forces to land at any point allied armies were still of a secondary importance compared with their naval counterparts. There does appear to be an element of relegation of the allied armies that were being brought to Iberia from the allied forces operating in Northern Europe. While never overtly referred to as such, this secondary position does appear to have been acknowledged by allied generals in their dealings with the navy. Naval forces were able to dictate much of the operational

³⁵⁷ J. Hugil, *No Peace Without Spain*, (Kensal Press, Oxford:1991) p.281.

³⁵⁸ Nicholas Henderson, *Prince Eugen of Savoy*, (Phoenix Press, London: 2002), pp.136-150.

³⁵⁹ See. Establishments discussion in Chapter 1.

strategy in terms of landings and were only considering the fleets protection along with the political considerations for landings rather than the strategic needs of the army. While the issue of landing points remained one which caused arguments amongst the senior command staff, there was a consistent pattern which remained for all landings within the at sea sector. The preference was always to favour the protection of the naval forces. Therefore, if the smaller army units were forced to retire and head back to safer ground, then that option was still available to them.

The process of a landing operation was a complex one and one which stretched the operational logistical capacity of both the army and navy involved. The issue was how to maximise the speed of unloading as many men in as little time as possible. The reason for this speed was dictated by two factors mentioned previously, those being the changeability of the weather conditions preventing the continuation of landing and the arrival of enemy forces which would prevent the creation of a beachhead. To that end, the naval forces provided significant help to the army units in ensuring that this speed was maintained, and the landings were made in quick succession. Most of the significant operations that were carried out over the course of the conflict, these being Barcelona(1705), Mahon(1708), Denia(1707), Gibraltar(1704) and Cadiz(1702) were all successfully completed within a few days. Because transport ships were carrying a proportion of seaboard personnel as part of their transport capacity, the numbers of troops that were involved in the landing did not make a drastic impact upon the speed of operations. The same can also be observed in the supplies that the military forces were bringing with them. As has already been established, there was a level of supplies that was deemed appropriate for a body of men by administrators, and it was unusual for military forces to have supplies greater than their need for the predicted landing period. Since operations were always planned for a few weeks, the level of supplies for forces being landed by the navy were usually at a constant level, and fluctuations in the total tonnage of supplies being

unloaded did not make any significant shift upon the speed at which forces could be landed. The area which did greatly impact the speed on landings was the final goal of the operation.

Landings throughout Iberia fell into two main categories, these being the seizure of territory and the seizure of ports. The seizure of territory were landings which were designed to allow marches into the interior of the coastal sector to take control of smaller towns and market hubs. Increasing territorial gains expanded the reach of Charles' control and ensured a wider range of supply options for the military units. By contrast, ports were needed for the long-term arrival of fresh troops and the landing of greater quantities of supplies. Ports historically had always received a greater amount of protection in comparison to inland towns simply because of their significance economically as well as strategically.³⁶⁰ This for the allied forces added some significant logistical difficulties in regards to the coastal landings. The increased levels of fortifications required the landing of greater quantities of cannon in order to breach the defences.

Armies committed to major operations in Flanders often travelled with a large siege train, comprised of waggons pulling heavy guns along with the large quantities of specialised equipment that were needed in order to conduct successful siege operations.³⁶¹ These siege trains were usually semi-autonomous with their own commanders and would advance at the tail of the army given the slow speed of their heavy equipment.³⁶² However, major investment for a siege train was not made for the allied forces operating in Iberia. The Portuguese were in possession of a small number of siege guns, and British forces did create an artillery train which had dual purpose guns under Colonel

³⁶⁰ Jamel Ostwald, *Vauban under Siege: Engineering Efficiency and Martial Vigour in The War of the Spanish Succession*, (Brill, Leiden: 2007).

³⁶¹ J. S. Wheeler, *The Making of a World Power, War and the Military Revolution in Seventeenth Century England*, (Stroud, Sutton: 1999).

³⁶² Ibid.

Jeffries.³⁶³ Overall, these guns were not of an adequate quantity to invest the considerable defences which were placed around ports. The solution for these issues, however, was present in the naval taskforce itself. For the sieges at Mahon, Barcelona and Cadiz, crews and cannon from the naval vessels were landed alongside the military forces.³⁶⁴ The reasons for this were twofold, firstly that the crewmen could be utilised as a source of labour for the army, able to help construct the trenches and artillery emplacements which were required in the taking of major fortifications. Secondly, the ships also temporarily unloaded cannon from their own armaments in order to assist the army's guns with the work of breaching fortifications. Guns were usually taken equally from across the support vessels rather than strip the armament from the main men of war and also so as to not denude the armament of any one ship to a greater extent.³⁶⁵ The practise was clearly not an agreed tactic before the commencement of landings, but rather was sought as a compromise between army and naval commanders. Naval commanders were willing to assist the army in the hope that the speed of the operations and landings would be improved.³⁶⁶ For the naval strategy to work, the faster the army had established themselves and moved from the at sea sector to the coastal sector, the faster the navy would be able to resume its usual role of coastal patrol and prevention. This can be observed in some of the notes from the various captain's meetings called prior to the commencement of naval landings.³⁶⁷ Captain's expressly allowed for the use of their crews for the purposes of improving speed. In the case of contracted merchant ships which were also expected to provide manpower in order to improve the efficiency of landings, crews were offered minor monetary incentives in order to encourage fast and efficient work.

³⁶³ Francis, *Peninsula War*, p.136.

³⁶⁴ Ricardo Garcia Carcel, 'La Guerra De Sucesion En America', in *La Guerra De Sucesion En Espana Y La Batalla De Almansa*, ed. Francisco Garcia Gonzalez, (Universidad de Castilla-La Mancha) p.57, and, Simon Harris, *Sir Cloudesley Shovell, Stuart Admiral*, (Spellmount, Staplehurst: 2001), p.287

³⁶⁵ TNA SP 89/18/193, John Milner to Charles Hedges, Lisbon 9th November 1705.

³⁶⁶ *ibid*

³⁶⁷ BI Add MS 61587, Council of War onboard Lennox, October 27th 1706.

Overall, the process of naval landings from the allied logistical perspective was one of the smoothest and most organised parts of the campaign. There was a clear and logical transition between the resources which were present on board the naval vessels and their final destination, that being the targeted settlement. The ability to coordinate the resources between the two groups even if it was for the benefit of fleet integrity showed a willingness on both sides to engage in combined arms operations. However, what landings did fully realise was the priorities of the British fiscal-military state. Many arguments have been made by historians of the favoured position that the navy received in British political life ever since the Tudor reorganisation of the navy.³⁶⁸ Certainly, in terms of financial resources the navy receive the greater part of investment. The significance of Britain's position as a maritime nation, of course, cannot be understated, and it was a logical decision for the prioritisation of resources in favour of the state's primary defensive arm.³⁶⁹ However, what this does demonstrate is that there were limits to the fiscal-military state's reach. While there were significant resources financially to be attributed to campaigns, the distance from Britain coupled with the potential loss of costly vessels meant that the onus was always upon the protection of naval assets even if that resulted in additional difficulties for the allied forces transitioning from the on sea to the coastal sectors. These difficulties were not a disputed matter of affairs for the commanders involved, indeed there is clear evidence that army commanders accepted this state of affairs and only sought to gain the maximum assistance available within the parameters of protecting naval assets.³⁷⁰ The fiscal-military state's resources were finite, and there was a clear focus upon the maximum retention of resources, thus a process of favouring the protection of naval equipment even if that made the task of securing a logistical and strategic position for the army a more arduous task.

³⁶⁸ N.A.M Rodger, *The Command of the Ocean: A Naval History of Britain, 1649-1815*, (Penguin, London: 2005).

³⁶⁹ John Hattendorf, *England and the War of the Spanish Succession: A Study of the English View and The Conduct of Grand Strategy, (1702-1714)*, (New York: 1987).

³⁷⁰ Ibid

Section 4: Coastal and Transitional Supply

Once military forces had landed, they were faced with two main objectives, these being the securing of the strategic target of the operation and secondly, commencing the construction of a logistical network independent of that which they had utilised whilst on board ship. These two objectives were not synonymous with each other and steps needed to be taken by army commanders to ensure that both were accomplished. The reason for the disconnect between the two objectives stemmed from a number of factors. Firstly, and perhaps most critically of all was the destruction of supplies by action. The seizure of coastal positions was one which often required the use of siege weapons and large-scale bombardments. As has already been mentioned, especially in the case of Iberia, coastal fortifications were often the largest and most prepared in the region. These bombardments and sieges could cause significant destruction of warehouses and other buildings which contained many of the supplies that allied forces were eager to obtain.³⁷¹ In addition to this, if a siege became a drawn-out affair, then there also arose the issue of supplies in the local area being used up. Military manoeuvres in this period were not carried out in secret, there was often plenty of forewarning for towns which were about to be invested to prepare.³⁷² As a result, with sufficient forces, Bourbon commanders often were able to collect large quantities of supplies from the surrounding villages and then store them within the fortifications.³⁷³ Not only did this reduce the amount that was available for allied forces to seek to collect, the process of which will be discussed later, but also if sieges became long investments then the remaining supplies in the region alongside the supplies which had been secreted by the garrison would slowly be whittled away. This issue with the availability of supplies dictated specific tactics upon allied forces. They required the rapid seizure of the target in order to prevent using up the available supplies, but they also were required to do so

³⁷¹ For example in the taking of Barcelona, BL Add MS 61516, Letter from Peterborough, October 17th 1705.

³⁷² Jeremy Black, *European Warfare, 1453-1815*, (Routledge, Basingstoke: 1999)

³⁷³ BL Add MS 61509, Methuen to Sunderland, Lisbon 17th August 1707.

without causing widespread damage to the town so that the supplies within could be preserved as much as possible. There was a second reason as to why allied forces sought to preserve the coastal towns as much as possible which was to turn these into hubs for transition into the coastal sector. Large port towns were filled with warehouses and also were hubs for the connection with local contractors. As such any major damage would greatly hamper any additional efforts to organise the transitional logistical network. Finally, there was the added political dimension which had to be taken into account.

While these towns were enemy territory in the eyes of commanders, this was not a clear-cut distinction politically. Under the reasons for entering the war one of the allies' key objectives was the acquisition of the crown of Spain for Charles over and above that of Phillip. Over the course of the war this became one of the leading debates within Britain about the continuation of the war, the 'no peace without Spain' argument.³⁷⁴ In the future post-conflict Spain, if Britain maintained its war goals as they currently stood, these towns would be a constituent part of Charles' Spanish kingdom. The political situation within Spain presented several difficulties for the allied forces. Firstly, that facilities and defences that were damaged by allied action instead of Bourbon activity would need to be repaired and replaced after the conflict through allied funds. Secondly, and certainly a more complex situation for the allied commanders was how to treat the local populations of the towns that they were engaged in taking. Populations were often used to great effect in the acquisition of additional resources through the process of contributions. The system's use will be discussed in

³⁷⁴ J. Hugil, *No Peace Without Spain*, (Kensal Press, Oxford:1991). Opposition to the mounting costs of the war was one of the leading factors behind the eventual abandonment of this policy, Daniel Defoe, *Reasons why this nation ought to put a speedy end to this expensive war; with a brief essay, at the probable conditions on which the peace now negotiating, may be founded. Also an enquiry into the obligations Britain lies under to the allies; and how far she is obliged not to make peace without them*, (Eighteenth Century Documents Online) [link.gale.com/apps/doc/CB0126280010/ECCO?u=oxford&sid=gale_marc&xid=35639106&pg=1] p.24, and, *The allies and the late ministry defended against France, and the present friends of France. Part IV. Containing a Vindication of the late M-y in relation to the Management of the War on the part of England; with an Answer to the Author of the Conduct's five Reasons for making a Peace without Spain and the Indies. To which is added a Postscript, in Answer to his Remarks on the Barrier-Treaty*, (J. Baker, London: 1711) p.34.

greater detail when discussing the inland sector of the campaigns. However, the transitional phase of the at sea sector; the taking of coastal fortifications also ran into this issue from another angle. While within the inland sector the population was by and large supportive of Phillip's claim to the throne, those on the coasts were much more receptive of the allied cause and Charles' claim. The reasons for this were twofold, firstly there was the independence desire amongst the parts of the Kingdom of Aragon. In addition to this however, there was also the added aspect of a self-preservation streak amongst the coastal populations.³⁷⁵

Given the allies' aforementioned naval superiority when it came to matters in the western Mediterranean, there was always the possibility that any part of the Iberian coastlines could become a target for allied attacks. Of course the naval advantage was part of the primacy of allied strategy in the region as only a handful of possible targets could maintain larger defences in those areas and given the logistical need for rapid advances during landings this would have become a serious impediment for the allied war effort. The result of this naval superiority was that local populations, regardless of their opinions on the matter of succession within the Spanish kingdom, would be much more well-disposed to allied forces or at least seem so compared with inland populations. The support presented for allied forces a dilemma when commencing the construction of localised logistical networks to replace those that they had been utilising whilst at sea. Allied commanders were unsure of the loyalties of many of the local Spanish populations and as such struggled at times in creating an approach.³⁷⁶

³⁷⁵ John Lynch, *Bourbon Spain, 1700-1808*, (Blackwell, Oxford 1989), pp.37-45.

³⁷⁶ James D. Alsop, 'The Age of the Projectors: British Imperial Strategy in the North Atlantic in the War of Spanish Succession', *Acadiensis: Journal of the History of the Atlantic Region*, 21, (1991), pp. 31-32, and, Cameron Papers, Peterborough Letter, Undated.

As a result, the local populations could not be treated as purely enemy citizens and subjected to full contribution networks, nor could they be fully trusted as loyal citizens of Charles and therefore fully offered all available contracts for the gathering of resources. The end result for allied commanders was a hybrid approach which varied according to the regions that they were transitioning within. Within Catalonia and Portugal, local populations were treated mostly as allied citizens.³⁷⁷ This in the case of Catalonia was because of the overt position taken by the local leadership towards allied forces and Charles' cause. The result from this was that allied administrators and commanders were especially careful about how their taking of ports in this region would affect local civilian bodies. While this did cause certain aspects of their landings to be slowed down, for example the attack on Montjulich rather than an investment of the whole of Barcelona, it would in the long run appear to be extremely beneficial for allied logistical elements. It gave them a supportive local population which was willing to supply goods and enter into contracts with allied forces for further supply as they full transitioned to the coastal sector.

The protection of local assets would be in complete contrast to the events which transpired following the Cadiz campaign. The actions of the allied forces, especially as they advanced upon the port, were vastly different when compared to their later conduct on the approaches to Barcelona.³⁷⁸ Reports from commanders alongside the later investigations which were carried out into the campaign identified widespread looting and seizure of local supplies.³⁷⁹ Many of these were not required for the military success of the campaign or a transition to a self-sufficient coastal logistical network but were merely morale boosting for the forces involved. Most critically of all were the events in a major wine warehouse on the outskirts of Cadiz. Here allied forces not only took large quantities of wine without payment but additionally the ensuing drunken forces also commenced

³⁷⁷ BL Add MS 46552, Colonel Tomson to Lord Lexington, Seville 19th February 1713.

³⁷⁸ PA HL/PO/JO/10/6/36/1833, Spanish Expedition Papers, 1705.

³⁷⁹ *ibid*

looting other warehouses, alongside private residences.³⁸⁰ The drunken looting led to an immediate set of consequences for allied logistical networks in the region. Firstly, there was a contraction of support in terms of the resources available for the allied expedition. When operating armies were prompt in their payment for supplies that were acquired from warehouses, local merchants were mostly willing to take no additional measures to protect their produce, leaving them in warehouses, and villagers were willing to offer foodstuffs and other products to passing soldiers. However, once this unwritten contract had been broken, with large and public cases of looting from the advancing army, then locals began to hide foodstuffs and other goods from approaching forces.³⁸¹ Warehouses were locked or cleared, with goods being sent further away from the conflict zone. Additionally, villagers would begin to secrete their food in the woods and fields around their homes or to hide it inside, out of the fear that they would not be given fair recompense for any supplies which the army seized as it advanced.³⁸²

Additionally, it compromised the seeking of contractual suppliers for the transition to the coastal sector. Contractual supply in new territory often required the use of merchants and suppliers who were unknown to allied administrators. As such, a network of trust had to be established between the allied forces and those who would now be providing the required supplies for the army.³⁸³ While there was a preference amongst administrators to keep supply amongst British nationals, even abroad, this was not possible in many parts of the Iberian theatre.³⁸⁴ As such local merchants had to be relied upon with the promise of reimbursement and upfront payments from the allied forces. In many campaigns over the period, enterprising local merchants would often approach allied forces to open in a dialogue about the possibility of taking over supply contracts.³⁸⁵ However, affairs at Cadiz

³⁸⁰ *ibid*

³⁸¹ BL Add MS 61509, Galway to Stanhope, Camp at Ponte de Olivenca 15th May 1709.

³⁸² *Ibid.*

³⁸³ BL Add MS 61509, Galway to Sunderland, Valencia 6th March 1707.

³⁸⁴ BL Add MS 61509, Methuen to Sunderland, Lisbon 31st October 1707.

³⁸⁵ *Ibid.*

shattered the willingness of many of the merchants in Andalucía for doing business of any kind with the allied forces.³⁸⁶ There was a belief, fanned by additional materials produced by the Bourbons, that allied forces could not be trusted to pay for anything and that they were seeking merely to exploit and destroy the livelihoods of the population.³⁸⁷ As a result, there was a lack of any key local contractors in Andalucía to take allied armies' logistical operations and to create the transitional phase which would have allowed them to establish themselves within the coastal sector.

The retraction of support was almost immediate following the actions at Cadiz and had significant impacts upon the allied logistical planning for the remainder of the war. Campaigns into Andalucía would become extremely difficult and would be reliant on continual naval support alongside large baggage trains. The only advances made into the region were either from Portugal using already constructed overland supply or the attack and seizure of Gibraltar. The taking of Gibraltar was important for the acquisition of the harbour but the forces there never fully transitioned into the coastal sector supply network.³⁸⁸ There was too little in the way of local support to provide any supply contracts and the naval resupply, which is discussed later, was often too precarious as a method.³⁸⁹ As such the military forces were kept small at Gibraltar and it remained for much of the conflict merely the land extension for the protection of naval assets in the harbour rather than a staging post for advances into the interior.³⁹⁰ Despite efforts from British commanders to offer financial incentives to merchants and contractors in Andalucía, they were never able to fully repair

³⁸⁶ Bel Bravo, María Antonia. *La Guerra de Sucesión en la provincia de Jaén : desde la perspectiva de la nueva historia cultural*, (Diputacion Provincial, Jaen:2002), pp. 111-122.

³⁸⁷ TNA SP 89/19, Galway to Methuen, Salamanca June 7th 1706.

³⁸⁸ TNA SP 89/19, Council on board Ranelagh, Gibraltar Point April 6th 1706.

³⁸⁹ TNA SP 89/20, Milner to Methuen, Lisbon 5th August 1707.

³⁹⁰ Garrison forces that were there were often forces passing along the coastal sector by sea, Jose Pla, *Gibraltar*, (Hollis and Carter, London: 1955) p.35.

the damage done during the Cadiz campaign to the potential logistical networks which could have been established in the region.³⁹¹

The affairs of Cadiz and their aftermath lead into two key discussions about logistical networks of the period and importantly the strength of the British fiscal-military state. Firstly, it highlights the paramountcy of trust within the logistical system, and how easy the perceptive relationships within the logistical system could shift. All logistical systems were based upon the relations between the army administrators and the merchants and contractors in question. While contracts were signed to be a legally binding document, they were not a guarantee of supply.³⁹² Firstly, there was no force present other than financial incentive and personal encouragements to bring a contractor to the table in order to forge an agreement for supply. Merchants were encouraged to take contracts on the expectation of being able to turn a profit from the outcome of the contract.³⁹³ This forms the first part of two levels of trust which exist within a contractual agreement. This first layer of trust is between the contracting individual and the state requiring the supply contract. Different states throughout the period had different records of being able to fulfil contracts and other outstanding obligations, often this was due to their latent wealth but there were other factors such as their handling of debt policy and the forms of contract which they preferred to take. If a state for any reason was unable to fulfil its end of the obligations of contracts then it would often become more difficult to find merchants and financiers who were willing to enter into these agreements. For example, the Spanish crown's early bankruptcies throughout the 17th century caused a shattering of trust for the state's ability to continue to pay its obligations, and merchants either were unwilling to enter into contracts with the state, or they would charge much higher rates.³⁹⁴ The reason for these

³⁹¹ BL Add MS 61527, John Mead to Chetwynd, Barcelona 31st March 1708.

³⁹² BL Add MS 61509, Galway to Sunderland, Saccavin 14th May 1710.

³⁹³ BL Add MS 61509, Galway to Sunderland, Lisbon 4th March 1710.

³⁹⁴ See, Mauricio Drelichmann and Hans-Joachim Voth, *Lending to the Borrower from Hell, Debt, Taxes and Default in the Age of Phillip II*, (Princeton University Press: 2014), and, Christopher Storrs, *The Resilience of the Spanish Monarchy, 1665-1700*, (Oxford University Press: 2006) p.54.

higher rates was that the longer a contract was upon the books, the higher the likelihood that the state's financial situation could change rendering them unable or unwilling to fulfil their end of the obligation, that being repayment. Therefore, by paying higher rates upon the contract, merchants hoped to be able to recoup the majority of their losses prior to any change in the financial fortunes of the state.³⁹⁵ Of course, the result was often difficulties for the state in question particularly if administrators were under instructions to keep costs low regarding supply contracts.³⁹⁶ However, if there was no agreement that could be reached between the state and merchants this was often because of the collapse in trust between the merchant classes and the financial solidity of the state.³⁹⁷ The second layer of trust has been discussed briefly prior, this being the connections between the merchants and the administrators in the locality in question.

While the state's financial liquidity was important for creating a culture of trust amongst merchants there also had to be a level of trust established between the financial administrators and the contractors themselves. There were two important factors relating to how this trust effected the creation and maintenance of contracts for military supply. Firstly, there was the trust created by the actions of the administrator. Being given the control of the coin purse from the government, administrators were almost in complete independence when it came to their ability to make contracts and supplies for the area within their remit. As such, there was a great scope present for mismanagement of funds either in terms of corruption or just financially reckless practises. Certainly, there always needs to be an element of care taken when using the word corruption when discussing early modern finances.³⁹⁸ There was an expectation that contracts were made for the profit of the individual as well as the state, and the significance of personal relationships cannot be

³⁹⁵ BL Add MS 61527, Chetwynd notes, Turin 21st April 1708.

³⁹⁶ BL Add MS 46552, Richard Barry to Lord Lexington, Bayonne 4th December 1713.

³⁹⁷ P.G.M. Dickson, *The Financial Revolution in England: A Study in the Development of Public Credit, 1688-1756*, (Macmillan, London: 1967).

³⁹⁸ See chapter 2

understated. However, there were figures within the Iberian theatre who can be argued to be guilty of financial mismanagement. The most glaring example, of course, would be the actions of Peterborough in his capacity as allied commander during the early stages of the war. Peterborough's handling of finances, especially his issues with repayment and the haemorrhaging of the funds available to him were particularly damaging. His infamous loss of credit and the raising of a major loan in Italy were the actions which led to his dismissal.³⁹⁹ Actions like these caused clear worries amongst possible contractors as there was a fear that with individuals such as Peterborough, in charge of administering the contracts, there was a likelihood that the money that should be used to pay for the contract would be squandered even if the credit of Britain itself were in good standing.⁴⁰⁰ Furthermore, because Peterborough and other officers preferred to work through certain merchants who they had established relations with, this in some cases reduced the number of contractors who were willing to work with the allied forces.⁴⁰¹

However, the personal relationship between the administrator and contractor was also significant in determining the structure of the logistical network, and it was often during the transitional phase from sea to coast that these early relations were cemented. Some administrators had established these relations through correspondence, usually through a mutual intermediary prior to their arrival in the region.⁴⁰² This had been especially the case for Prince George and Methuen, whose previous connections prior to the outbreak of war meant that they already had extensive networks of contacts both for themselves to use and to act as intermediaries for other administrators taking on the duties of supply within different parts of the Iberian network. These relations were built out of personal trust between the two individuals, with the administrator trusting that the merchant will

³⁹⁹ Bridget Cameron, *This Master Firebrand, A Life of Charles Mordaunt 3rd Earl of Peterborough, 1658-1735*, (Norwich: 2009), Jeremy Black, *British Diplomats and Diplomacy 1688-1800*, (University of Exeter Press: 2001).

⁴⁰⁰ Francis, *Peninsula*, p.204.

⁴⁰¹ TNA SP 94/81, Lexington to Dartmouth, Madrid 6th June 1713.

⁴⁰² Ibid.

fulfil the contract for supply effectively and completely while the contractor trusted that the administrator would pay for the contract in full. Once these relations had been effectively established, they would lead to a much smoother and functional supply system. The reason for this is consistency, once an administrator had a contractor they trusted as a reliable transporter, then they were willing to extend new contracts to the same individuals at the termination of the previous contract. Likewise, merchants who trusted the administrator and state would be more inclined to complete contracts to the best of their ability and not to cut corners at their end of the transaction, maintaining as consistent a supply network as was possible given the supply difficulties which abounded in the coastal sector. However, over the course of the war as trust was worn down through the actions of individuals such as Peterborough along with issues with the availability of funds from London saw a breakdown in the relations between the administrators and the contractors in Iberia.⁴⁰³ This is because the personal relationship which was maintained between administrators and contractors was the baseline for contractual interactions and the differing objectives of the administrators and contractors driven by external factors slowly reduced the number of contractors who were willing to do business with the allied forces. Despite Britain's financial resources there was a continual struggle to locate contractors for the allied war effort.

Once the main forces had fully transitioned to the coastal sector the at sea sector did not diminish but changed in focus. As has already been discussed there was the utilisation of fleet resources in a reinforcement role, transporting forces from the home sector in smaller numbers to make up for casualties in the conflict. The other major area however which engaged naval resources and contracted merchant vessels was the transportation of supplies. Coastal sector supplies, which will be discussed in greater depth in the following chapter, were precarious at best. Therefore, there was a need for administrators in the coastal sector to locate supplies elsewhere and to ship them into

⁴⁰³ BL Add MS 61509, Galway to Sunderland, Camp at Gesumhena 28th May 1709.

the area, alongside the additional forces. It was these transportation missions which comprised the bulk of the transportation requirements of the at sea sector for the majority of the war. The resupply operations can be divided into three main sections, these being grain, horses and men. The resupply of men was handled jointly by administrators in the coastal sector and the home sector, with requests for reinforcement being sent from the coastal sector and the organisation of recruits being taken by military officials and administrators in the home sector.⁴⁰⁴ The process of bringing forces to the Iberian theatre through the at sea sector was very similar to that which had been employed for the larger expeditions, however there were subtle yet significant differences. Firstly, and most critically was the prioritisation of resources. The resupply efforts were naturally of a much smaller quantity than those of the original expeditions. Less forces were required; however, this also created a lax approach when it came to the organisation of supplies. Without the need to organise large flotilla which would need to sail together under significant escort, the window for departure was much more flexible for contracted vessels. Usually, they would be sailing under a small naval detachment which would be tasked with the defence of the cargo.⁴⁰⁵ While a more flexible timeframe would negate some of the issues in coordinating departure, it did however create a relaxed attitude when it came to transportation. With vessels able to travel more at the whim of the captains in the flotilla, supply became reliant upon the personalities of those involved, as such the timetable of reinforcement became disjointed.⁴⁰⁶ Commanders in the field in Iberia expected forces to arrive upon particular dates in order that they can be prepped for the next active campaign.⁴⁰⁷

The practise of readying forces usually only meant that they would be allocated to their commander's units, and their additional baggage would be organised upon or immediately prior to

⁴⁰⁴ BL Add MS 61527, Chetwynd to Sunderland, Sezane Dauphine 5th August 1708.

⁴⁰⁵ BL Add MS 61526, Count of Cifuentes to Chetwynd, Savonna 27th December 1707.

⁴⁰⁶ BL Add MS 61507, Galway to Boyle, Lisbon 8th October 1708.

⁴⁰⁷ BL Add MS 61507, Thomas Leffren to Sunderland, Lisbon 5th August 1709.

their arrival.⁴⁰⁸ However, the reinforcement timeframes had several knock-on impacts for the logistical networks. Firstly, the lack of any fixed timeframe meant that there were often issues with preparing adequate supplies for the forces that were boarding the transportation vessels. As has already been detailed, there had been attempts made by administrators in both England and Italy to ensure that there were adequate supplies in place for troops to subsist while at sea in an attempt to lessen reliance upon the goodwill and purchases of the contracted captains. However, by having an extended timeframe where loading of vessels could take anything up to two months, factoring in arrival and loading, these supplies could be used up by forces which arrived early in the timescale.⁴⁰⁹ This forced additional expense from the administrators of the magazines to resupply them which often could not be done until the next season dependant on grain availabilities.⁴¹⁰ The subsequent impact of these supply difficulties was felt particularly upon the arrival of reinforcements to Iberia and the commencement of their transition into the Coastal sector network. Forces often arrived in very poor condition, lacking basic equipment and severely underfed.⁴¹¹ The poor food situation also led to significant outbreaks of disease amongst the forces which required time to deal with.⁴¹² This meant that administrators in the coastal sector had to expend a higher proportion of resources than would have been required if food supplies and timetables had been kept within the at sea sector. There also appears to have been a greater acceptance of damaging supply practises used by the contracted captains. Several cases from the transportation of troops from Italy, particularly, to Catalonia saw that the forces that arrived were in a much poorer condition than when they had departed.⁴¹³ The cases can be attributed to two major factors, the supplies that the captains provided and the preparation of the vessel itself. As has been discussed previously, contracted captains were often prone to loading their ships with substandard quantities of provisions for the

⁴⁰⁸ BL Add MS 61527, Chetwynd to Sunderland, Vado 19th June 1708.

⁴⁰⁹ Ibid.

⁴¹⁰ BL Add MS 61509, Galway to Sunderland, Lisbon 5th May 1710.

⁴¹¹ BL Add MS 61509, Methuen to Sunderland, Lisbon 24th October 1707.

⁴¹² Ibid.

⁴¹³ BL Add MS 61526, Chetwynd to Sunderland, Turin 21st January 1708.

forces which they were transporting. With the loss of supplies from the magazines, due to the widened timeframes employed for resupply procedures, this removed the only failsafe for the health of the forces being transported by unscrupulous captains. While there were numerous cases accounted of this by administrators, very little in the way of solutions were proposed in order to deal with this other than seeking more reputable captains.⁴¹⁴ For administrators there was no impetus to change the system of seeking contractors and therefore they must make the best of the situation. Likewise, there was little offered to deal with the second shipping reason for the poor quality of reinforcements. That, being that the ships were not correctly converted to transport men. While the larger convoys that had been established to transport the expedition, forces had placed regulations and checks to ensure that transport ships were correctly converted to transport men, the ad-hoc reinforcement transportation schedule did no such thing. Captains were only required to attend for the collection of forces at the end of their mercantile endeavours and therefore there was little time available for the conversion of holds in order to carry men.⁴¹⁵ This was partially to reduce costs as the contracts were designed to only provide costs of the time that they would not be engaged in their normal practises.⁴¹⁶ This meant that the time at either end of the contract for reconverting the ship for goods transport was avoided. However, the lax timeframes of the reinforcement contracts also prevented even the more conscientious captains from engaging in conversion of their vessels. These vessels when they were not designed for the transport of men, led to lower standards of health during the crossings and coupled with the food issues may have been an integral factor behind the poor health of troops arriving and transitioning from the at sea to the coastal sector.

The other main area of transportation which presented challenges throughout the conflict was the movement of horses. The reasons behind the critical need for horse transportation will be covered

⁴¹⁴ Ibid.

⁴¹⁵ BL Add MS 61527, Chetwynd to Sunderland, Turin 14th April 1707.

⁴¹⁶ Ibid

within the coastal sector discussions. However, what also needs to be discussed is the organisation of horse transportation within the at sea sector. For allied administrators there was a determination to bring as many horses as possible as cheaply as possible to Iberia regardless of their suitability for the theatre. The best location for British administrators to source horses was in Ireland. As discussed earlier, these were sourced by local contractors and brought to southern ports for transportation.⁴¹⁷ However, there were continual issues throughout the war regarding their health during transportation. The transportation of large numbers of horses long distances was not a common occurrence within early modern maritime campaigns.⁴¹⁸ When it was taken it was usually in the form of a single large-scale transportation expedition. Reinforcement horse transportation would most commonly be represented by only a handful of animals often brought with new officers for the troops.⁴¹⁹ This was born out of the expectation that the additional mounts would be easily located within the campaign theatre. This had been the normal recourse for mount resupply throughout the preceding periods. The prevalence of the horse for both farming and the mainstay of transportation necessitated their presence in large numbers among the rural populations through which most campaigning armies marched. As such, army commanders and administrators expected horse supply to remain in similar organisational systems as had been previously seen in conflicts.⁴²⁰ When this proved not to be the case, for a variety of factors, it provoked a scramble by administrators in order to find additional mounts. Once sourced, these mounts then had to be transported to the Iberian theatre. Over the course of the conflict the wastage rates of horses in the coastal and inland sectors were exceedingly high and as a result the transportation of horses proved to be a continual requirement. However, problems with their transportation persisted and compounded the issues which the allied forces were facing.

⁴¹⁷ See chapter 2.

⁴¹⁸ For example, Wolfe's force at Quebec contained no cavalry.

⁴¹⁹ BL Add MS 61526, Chetwynd to Sunderland, Genoa 28th November 1707.

⁴²⁰ BL Add MS 61509, Methuen to Sunderland, Lisbon 5th August 1707

While as previously stated, horse transportation was not uncommon, it was created out of both the distance and the availability of suitable vessels, alongside which the perennial issue of the captains themselves proved difficult to circumvent. The first of these issues, that being the distance that the animals had to be transported, caused severe difficulties for their health upon arrival. The long voyages confined to ship being locked into place to prevent them breaking loose in storms meant that many of the animals that arrived were in very poor condition which could only be rectified with good food and rest, neither of which were available in the coastal sector. There are some sources that indicate that it was not only the transportation of the horses which led to the degradation of the animals but that it was compounded by some of the low quality mounts being passed on by contractors in the home sector.⁴²¹ However, the long voyages certainly took their toll heavily on the horses which even if they had been of high quality when they arrived at loading ports, could not be expected to remain ready for combat service upon their arrival in the coastal sector. Of the numbers of horses transported over the course of the war, given the sources evidence of wastage this meant that upwards of 50% of the mounts transported were not ready for service.⁴²²

While horses were suffering on the long voyages which were often during difficult transport months, they also needed to be transported in vessels which were suited for the task at hand. This involved a process of wholesale conversion of parts of the ship's hold in order to accommodate the animals, along with ropes and chains to prevent them getting loose in the swells while at sea. Due to the aforementioned loose time frames that were available at the time for the arrival of the transport ships to the marshalling areas for the collection of horses from contractors, there was often not adequate time to fully convert the holds of these vessels.⁴²³ Furthermore, many captains that had been contracted for horse transportation were expecting to return to their normal business at the

⁴²¹ BL Add MS 61509, Methuen to Sunderland, Lisbon 11th September 1707.

⁴²² TNA SP 89/19, Unknown to Charles Hedges, Lisbon 16th January 1706, and, TNA SP 94/78, Mr Lepell to Earl of Dartmouth, Barcelona 2nd January 1710.

⁴²³ BL Add MS 61587, Shovell to Hedges, 25th November 1706.

end of the transportation contract. As a result, they were reluctant to fully convert their holds and instead took only temporary measures.⁴²⁴ However, this often resulted in the horses being in cramped conditions than would have been the case had the measures been adhered to, further degrading the health of the animals for their arrival and transfer to the coastal sector which led to greater wastage and required administrators in the region to request additional mounts.

⁴²⁴ Ibid.

Section 5: Conclusions

Despite Britain's significant financial resources, these did not impact upon the transportation of troops. Transportation was by and large handled in methods similar to previous conflicts. Administrators highlighted these difficulties and recognised that there were difficulties in the transportation and care for horses during the at sea sector. However, the only definitive steps taken by the logistical organisation was the allocation of additional resources for the purchase and sending of additional horses. Rather than seeking to rectify the problems prevalent amongst the transportation system, administrators simply attempted to increase throughput.⁴²⁵ There is clear evidence that despite the substantial resources available to the British state they could not rectify some of the major deficits which were persistent within their transportation at sea network. In many cases however, attempts were not made to rectify this and instead simply additional resources were marshalled to be sent, organising further supplies. This marks one of the issues but also highlights a strength of the fiscal-military system when it came to at sea transportation. While the system was unable to shift to changing circumstance, its rigidity making it unable to quickly adapt to potential changes in the logistical network, it was however able to maintain this if certain conditions were met. In areas with abundant resources, the financial strength that had been developed through the fiscal-military state and the wide range of contractors that were available allowed them to push through despite difficulties in their chain of supply. Over-abundance was the core mechanic at play when it came to providing both reinforcements and additional supplies through the at sea sector to the conflict in Iberia. The wastage that was being observed by administrators throughout the system was controlled through increased throughput rather than attempts to rectify some of the difficulties that were highlighted. This demonstrates an underlying strength of the system, that in an established and resource rich state like Britain, additional men, material and above all money could

⁴²⁵ BL Add MS 61526, Italy Accounts, Turin 14th January 1708.

be located and through the contractual system pressed into service for transportation abroad overcoming defects in overall logistical operations.

The at sea sector did, however, have certain difficulties which were not rectified by the financial strength of the British state. The issues which have been highlighted about the difficulties in communication, both between the naval forces and the Portuguese government and additionally the communication between the naval forces and the army command caused continual difficulties for the allied logistical networks. The tensions with the Portuguese government continued to plague allied operations for the entirety of the conflict. These reallocations of resources and diplomatic protests which occurred due to the cross purposes of the allied forces caused several continuing issues for the allied logistical network. The Portuguese requests for naval assets to be utilised for their commercial protection and the ramifications which they caused for allied forces regarding shipping, use of ports and supply, reduced the naval forces' ability to both satisfy their objectives and additionally to fulfil their role in providing support for the logistical network. Furthermore, the communication difficulties which were faced, organising the fleet and receiving information from the coastal sector as to where and what levels of supplies were needed also hampered the supply effectiveness of the logistical network. Without clear communication, supplies were only handled by the individual vessels and contractors with a lack of overall supply planning that would have been the case amongst the armies themselves, particularly in the case of the resupply initiatives. The result was a disparate approach to resupply, and which often forced the later geographical sectors to take on additional responsibilities for the handling of supplies. However, despite these issues which could have crippled many supply networks, the Allied supplies through the at sea sector continued throughout the conflict in Iberia. There were adequate funds available to always source additional contractors to fill in the gaps caused by the instability of the system, even if the material funds were not available in a locality then the financial strength and trust inherent in the fiscal-

military system ensured that in times of need credit could always be adequately acquired in or nearby to the resource marshalling areas for the captains and contracted ships.

Despite these advantages however, the system was still inherently inflexible. Most keenly demonstrated with the problems which arose with the reinforcements of both men and material, and above all horses. These situations, both of the levels of wastage for the animals and the slow and irregular arrival of men to recoup the losses which they were suffering on the campaign were although noted by administrators, were only sought to be rectified in one manner. This being that additional sending of reinforcements, the process of over-supply. By utilising their larger capital base and stronger network of trusted contractors within the shipping network the allies were able to maintain, however tenuous, their supply lines to Iberia throughout the conflict without having to go through the process of wholesale changes to their networks. This throughput advantage provided a malleability to logistical operations but at its heart it was still dominated by administrative inertia repeating already established practises. The strength of the fiscal-military system demonstrated by the at sea logistical network was in essence its very inflexibility. By not making greater and greater demands upon their contractors, these vessels were maintained in good relations with the Allied military ensuring continual adherence to the specified contract and future dealings, alongside this it also ensured that additional administration was not required from the allies in order to force through any changes that they could have made. This reduced overall upkeep of the system and kept a simplicity in the logistical network which belied the effective financial workings behind it. Because these supplies were being purchased from the home sector, they were completing a cycle of financial revenue raising which has been addressed in several economic texts. Funds raised through the extraction of additional taxes were re-entering the internal economy through the payments made to the contractors. These in turn could then be re-raised in taxation in subsequent years. By maintaining their strong at home network, Britain was able to negate problematic aspects

within its logistical network without unduly straining its financial resources which would have been the case if it had been forced to conduct the majority of these resupply measures abroad.

Overall, despite the issues which were faced by the allied supply networks and their at sea transportation the strengths inherent in the fiscal-military state were able to supply and maintain their forces in Iberia providing that the armies were also at work creating their own additional supply networks. While there was a reduction in the translation of monetary investment to supplies in the region the allied forces were still able to push through by utilising additional funds to bypass these difficulties while still maintaining good relations with their contractors and maintaining the networks which would be vital for both subsequent years and future conflicts. Had there not been the resource laden British and Dutch territories to draw upon coupled with the substantial financial resources however the approach adopted by the allies for supply in Iberia and the additional difficulties which they faced could have derailed their logistical network.

Chapter 4: Bases and Advances: Allied Armies on the Coast.

The coastal sector, as previously defined, is one of the most complex and fluid geographical zones which this study addresses. This complexity stems from its high propensity for conflicting interests and volatile supply arrangements. Taking the whole zone, one can observe greatly varied supply levels and organisation across the region, yet all still faceted by the core aspects which define it as a distinct supply area. The complexity of the zone needs to be addressed and set out in a framework prior to any full analysis. Firstly, the coastal sector itself is hybrid in nature and it is from this that much of the initial supply complexity, especially for contemporaries occurred.

Unlike the preceding supply zones, or indeed the following inland sector, the coastal sector was built upon three distinct supply principles. These were combined by administrators in order to supply military forces operating throughout the theatre. The supply principles were to secure, store, and utilise. These, although not fully stated as the lead objectives, were those which held the attention of the administrators and commanders of the allied forces. It is in the storage principle where we can observe a major deviation from the supply objectives of other sectors. This is mainly due to two aspects of the campaign, one being the geopolitical background of the conflict in the region. The second being how this sector fitted into the wider supply network. The geopolitical background has, in some regards, been discussed earlier, but there are certain elements that need additional attention. This is in order to clarify why storage became a priority in the coastal sector, over and above other sectors. For much of the conflict, the main goal for allied politicians and commanders was the acquisition of Madrid.⁴²⁶ Additionally, much of the coastal region of Iberia, barring Andalucía and the northern coasts, had declared for Carlos III against Philip V. The result was that politically,

⁴²⁶ J.A.C. Hugill *'No Peace Without Spain'*, (Kensal Press, London: 1991) p.222.

the coastal sector became akin to a home sector and, by virtue of its position, a forward base for advances against Madrid. The result was that strategically the region was one which needed defence and, that required the construction of fortifications and magazines which could also double as rendezvous locations for the construction of a supply line into central Spain, for the inevitable advances upon Madrid. The primary reason that the sector was only akin to a home sector and, is not treated as a home sector in its own right, is because of its position within the allied armies supply chain. It was as a sector more akin to the relationship with Portugal, that of allied territory over which Britain had no direct or legal jurisdiction.

The sources for the coastal sector come from a variety of positions within the organisation of military logistics. For the official government view on matters, there are the papers for the Secretary of State for the Southern Department,⁴²⁷ Lord Sunderland, who was the main contact for both of the armies campaigning within Iberia itself. There are also the War Office Papers, Establishment Returns and other official documentation which informed the decisions within the home sector organisation. While these documents were not always accurate, they do portray the prevailing viewpoints and, articulate what the leadership perceived to be the best approach for successful logistical operations. In addition to these sources, there are also the letters and papers of the administrators and diplomats who held positions throughout the campaign theatre proper. These are primarily Methuen and Chetwynd, who acted as government conduits, receiving funds from the state apparatus and translating that into logistical material, then reporting the issues and needs of the armies back to London.⁴²⁸ Their papers represent one of the most important sets of sources, where observations on the translation of the fiscal state into the military arm can be seen. These are supplemented by the letters and dispatches from the commanders in the field. Individuals such as

⁴²⁷ Most commanders and administrators send at least a portion of their total correspondence to Lord Sunderland.

⁴²⁸ The roles that they carried out were common amongst all the major powers. William Roosen, *The Age of Louis XIV, The Rise of Modern Diplomacy*, (Schenkman, Cambridge: 1976) pp.87-107.

Galway, Peterborough, Stanhope and the naval officers such as Shovell, give clear indications on how military strategy was shaped by logistical necessity. They also show what methods were to be employed on location to allow for the translation of capital to supply. Finally, there are the papers of the men at the forefront of logistics, regimental commanders and contractors such as Col Jeffry, who had to turn the commands from the generals into a reality and ensure that the units, they were responsible for, maintained organisation even in the most adverse of circumstances. The majority of these sources are outgoing, having been sent from the individual in question to somebody else rather than being a personal account such as a diary or logbook. The sources possess an absence of detail, the source is only created if events have transpired positively or negatively. A greater understanding of how the logistical system operated can be garnered by reading between the lines. This absence can be used to provide greater clarity upon the perceptions of logistics at the time. The sources highlight the issues and solutions that were perceived as pressing by those writing, rather than what was theoretically proposed latterly by logisticians and historians. The sources are varied in nature, most are letters, however there are also returns, bills of exchange, council reports and establishment lists. Overall, the coastal sector possesses the highest variation of sources, and it was from this sector that much of the logistical throughput of the entire campaign theatre can be mapped.

The coastal regions of Iberia were not agriculturally viable for the large-scale, manpower intensive warfare of the period. Its low population density, luxury goods market and sparse arable land⁴²⁹ resulted in it having a low net output of the vital goods required for military enterprises, namely cereal crops, pack animals and munitions. The region did not have the supply throughput, nor adequate facilities to act as a home network for any large military force. The result was that

⁴²⁹ I.A.A. Thomson and Yun Casalilla Bartolome, *The Castilian Crisis of The Seventeenth Century: New Perspectives on the Economic and Social History of Seventeenth-Century Spain*, (Cambridge University Press: Cambridge: 1994) pp.4-6.

administrators were forced to change how supplies were organised within the sector, compared with how supplies would be handled in a home sector. The immediate task was the securing of what local resources were available, and then additionally importing and storing large quantities of supplies from abroad. The storage had a twofold purpose for logistics within the coastal sector. Firstly, it created a supply safety net for campaigns within the region, when crop outputs were lower, and enemy action or weather conditions prevented the seaborne transport, magazine storage allowed supply levels to be maintained. Secondly, they could be drawn from the magazines and utilised to supply military columns headed into the inland sector creating their initial supply impetus. In addition to the acquisition and utilisation of supplies, much of the coastal sector's administration was also focused upon the storage of supply.

The coastal sector, as discussed earlier, encompasses much of the Iberian Peninsula in terms of conflict zones, only the central Castilian plateau and parts of Aragon were combat areas within the inland sector. The coastal sector also differs dramatically from the sea sector in several key areas. For the first time in the campaign supply became an unknown quantity, while the home and sea sectors had fixed supply locations and easily quantifiable requirements, the coastal sector supply had less guaranteed supply security. This, coupled with the removal of naval support in many immediate cases, led to a scenario where administrators could never be sure of what was required. While naval supplies were still brought in, the long-term nature of the campaign meant that fleet support was often driven away by weather and wind conditions in addition to the wider strategic needs of the war.

In terms of logistics, only the inland sector was not in continuous use, but it was the coastal sector where most of the campaigning took place and in terms of the allied war effort saw the most rigorous procurement and utilisation. The coastal sector was the chief destination for the arrival and

consumption of supplies for allied forces. It was in this sector that the resources of Britain's fiscal-military state were put into their most quantifiable aspect, where the money that flowed out of the Treasury became the supplies and succours that would make or break each campaigning season. This logistical area was also the main transitional point in the supply chain. Prior to this point, most of the supply was handled directly by agents of the government. Parliament and the Queen's ministers had easy and detailed access to the data that was needed to accurately pre-empt supply needs, items such as predictions of harvest yields, the average cost of bread and the availability of horses were at the fingertips of the British bureaucratic system.⁴³⁰ Likewise for much of the period, at sea supply was also tightly regulated and therefore many of the issues which plagued allied attempts at supply in Iberia were not a consideration. It is only upon the arrival in Spain that this lack of information and control began to become an issue. There were not pre-constructed magazines in many of the towns along the coast, and allied commanders had no real understanding of the levels of agriculture or how the rural economy of the provinces functioned. There was also a pressing need to find merchants who would be willing to enter into contracts with the allied forces to supply bread and other resources for the campaign.

The logistics of these campaigns were handled in a similar manner to that of other parts of Europe. Contractors were sought from amongst those who had connections to the officers organising the supply chain, campaigns were continued along seasonal plans that were predicated on the armies entering quarters during the unseasonal months,⁴³¹ and supply was to be organised through a mixture of constructed magazines and supply trains when the troops were on the march. In Iberia, just as with other areas of the continent, supply was gathered in two main ways. In allied, or ostensibly allied territories, supply was gathered in paid markets and through contractors, or if this

⁴³⁰ John Brewer, *The Sinews of Power: War, Money and The English State, 1688-1783*, (Routledge, London: 1989) pp.64-74.

⁴³¹ Paul, E.J. Hammer, *Warfare in Early Modern Europe, 1450-1660*, (Aldershot, Ashgate: 2007).

was not possible, either through a lack of crops or the reluctance of the markets to provide, then it was gathered from more fertile regions and brought to the campaigning area. The second method was for areas accounted as enemy or hostile territory, where supply could also be gathered through contributions laid upon the local population.⁴³² This was supplemented through what could be procured from captured enemy magazines, although in many cases given the major drain on supplies that a siege represented,⁴³³ it was often the case that the supplies remaining in a captured magazine would only recoup some small part of those already expended. Supply in the Coastal Sector was, therefore, a conglomeration of different supply methods put together and organised by officers on the ground, through contracts handled by the administration further afield. If these systems did not function as intended or had elements that had not been accounted for, then the supply structure could fail.

It should be noted that any major discussion into the supply system of allied forces, particularly those operating in the coastal region, is impossible without relation to the Portuguese forces. Under the treaty that Pedro II entered into with the allies,⁴³⁴ Portugal was to provide 15,000 men as field forces for the campaigns in Iberia. In return, these 15,000 men would be supported by subsidies paid by Britain and the Dutch.⁴³⁵ Initially, Portugal was tasked with maintaining supplies for these troops and paying in full any Portuguese forces which exceeded 15,000. Therefore, Portuguese troops represented upwards of 50% of allied field forces for most of the campaigns and took up much of the attention of the British administrators, for reasons to be discussed later.⁴³⁶ In addition, much of

⁴³² For example, Guadalajara offered sums of 10,000 pistoles to Peterborough to avoid looting by soldiers, *An account of the Earl of Peterborow's conduct in Spain, : chiefly since the raising the siege of Barcelona, 1706. To which is added the campagne of Valencia. With original papers*, (Eighteenth Century Collections Online: 1708) [link.gale.com/apps/doc/CW0102599763/ECCO?u=oxford&sid=bookmark-ECCO&xid=98dc3f95] p.151.

⁴³³ Note: Magazines were usually placed in fortified towns.

⁴³⁴ TNA SP 108/133, Treaty of Alliance between Great Britain, the Emperor, Portugal and The States General, (July 19th 1703).

⁴³⁵ At the rate of 2/3 to 1/3 respectively.

⁴³⁶ Francis, D, *The First Peninsular War*, (London: 1974) p.75.

the campaign took place on Portuguese soil resulting in the supply situation, and that of the Portuguese army, being of paramount importance in understanding how the varying logistics methods slotted together. Alongside these Portuguese troops and allied forces from the Dutch Republic and Britain, the armies were also joined by three other bodies that varied over the course of the conflict in size but had to be accounted for, most often at British expense.

Section 1: Relationship with the Navy.

The organisation of the coastal region was handled from a variety of sources, some were formal and constant such as the Secretary of State for the Southern Theatre and the supreme allied commanders.⁴³⁷ Others were more informal and ad hoc systems that needed to be implemented at times of need but were not institutionalised as part of the official supply network. Individuals such as Chetwynd in Italy, for example, would be called upon in times of hardship to collate additional resources or handle the arrival of men and material to meet with convoys headed for Spain. On the campaign itself, supplies were organised in several ways, the general supply of ammunition bread was usually handled by contract, additional supplies would then be organised by the military officers who were directly responsible for their own forces, such as a particular garrison or unit.⁴³⁸ If larger quantities of supply were needed above the normal amount calculated for that season, then it would be up to the generals to organise,⁴³⁹ this would often be for cases such as the resupply of magazines or if wastage of the entire army had been much higher than had been calculated before the commencement of the campaign.⁴⁴⁰ The artillery train handled its own supplies separately, usually under the oversight of a more senior officer, who would use their additional contacts, especially in the procurement of pack animals, during times of scarcity.⁴⁴¹ Troops were expected to pay for additional supplies themselves from their own wages when they were passing through the villages or in quarters.⁴⁴² Usually this would not take up the concerns of administrators or become part of the main supply chain. However, one of the overriding factors that becomes a continual issue for the allied armies in Iberia is pay. Without an adequate and reliable pay system the ever-

⁴³⁷ Note: Galway, Peterborough, Stanhope and Schoenberg.

⁴³⁸ John Lynn, *Giant of the Grand Siecle: The French Army, 1610-1715*, (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge: 2008) p.124.

⁴³⁹ BL Add MS 61507, Earl of Galway to Lord Sunderland, Camp at Ponte de Olivenca 15th May 1709, and BL Add MS 61510, Letter from Mr Bennet, Camp at St Salvador, 5th May 1705.

⁴⁴⁰ BL Add MS 61509, Paul Methuen to Lord Sunderland, Lisbon 13th December 1707.

⁴⁴¹ TNA WO49/225, Accounts of Col Jeffries Train.

⁴⁴² Sometimes referred to as cantonment when staying for a length of time. *A Treatise of Military Discipline; in which is laid down and explained the duty of the officer and soldier, thro' the several branches of the service. By Humphrey Bland, Esq; Lieutenant-Colonel of His Majesty's Own Regiment of Horse*, (Buckley, London: 1727) p.149.

important subsidiary food supply network breaks down, with soldiers unable to purchase the food to bulk out their diet or importantly, subsist on when official supplies fail.

Most forces entering the coastal sector did so from one of four main locations. These being Barcelona, Gibraltar, Alicante and Lisbon, while troops did land in other places particularly along the Valencian coastline (and there were plans made for campaigns launched from Cadiz and Galicia) they did not represent a high proportion of the total numbers of troops landed. Initial landings marked the transition point between the 'at sea' and coastal sectors. Forces landed with supplies that had been earmarked for their units and not consumed during the sea voyage, to which was added supplies that could be spared from existing fleet stores.⁴⁴³ Once landed and establishing themselves inland, military commanders were forced to make important decisions regarding the creation of their supply networks.

The first of these decisions was to solve the immediate lack of resupply. This was predicated on several factors, firstly, was there a nearby magazine or other source of supply that had been used by the enemy which could be seized? The same was also true for nearby warehouses and other supply sources which could provide a quick stop-gap, allowing commanders time to begin to construct the necessary networks, this can be seen in both Cadiz and Barcelona.⁴⁴⁴ In Portugal this situation did not arise, though instead of using existing supply magazines, Portuguese authorities set up additional warehouses just for the arriving allied forces.⁴⁴⁵ The main impetus after the initial coastal landings was to eliminate reliance upon naval supply. There were several reasons for this, some based upon practicalities and others upon more esoteric reasons. The major practical reasons were

⁴⁴³ BL Add MS 61587, Association in Lisbon Bay 20th October 1706.

⁴⁴⁴ TNA HL/PO/JO/10/6/36/1833, Orders to the Duke of Oremond, and, BL Add MS 61587, Cloudersly Shovel to J Morriss, Ranleigh, 1705.

⁴⁴⁵ BL Add MS 61509, Don Francisco to Earl of Galway, (Translated) Lisbon 25th November 1709.

twofold. Firstly, that by developing a land-based supply network it gave commanders a more secure situation from whence to begin expanding their area of control, creating a situation where bases could be constructed prior to an advance inland. During the early landings these constructions were done tentatively, there was no certainty amongst commanders and officials that the locations would become permanent bases and thus there was no need to establish major year-long contracts.⁴⁴⁶

The second reason regarding establishing a strong network was the unreliability of naval supply. The fleets that brought allied forces to Iberia were tasked by the crown to transport the military units, however they also had orders to avoid any damage that might occur to their vessels.⁴⁴⁷ Furthermore, the fleets were bolstered by large numbers of contracted merchant ships who were eager to return to their own business ventures elsewhere.⁴⁴⁸ As has been discussed earlier, captains were much more concerned with the protection of their vessels and were also conscious of the time that would be required to return home to friendly waters, rather than the strategic needs of the army.⁴⁴⁹

This combination of factors created a situation which necessitated fast decisions and often resulted in overall poorly planned logistical networks. The fleet could only stay for a limited period and usually would need to retire before the commencement of the autumn campaign, either taking the army with them or if that could not be facilitated, they were forced to leave anyway. This dilemma during the initial years of the war caused numerous discussions amongst commanders with the landings at Cadiz, Barcelona, Alicante and Gibraltar concerned about the timeframes needed to

⁴⁴⁶ BL Add MS 61587, Association in Lisbon Bay 20th October 1706, and, BL Add MS 61504, Galway to Unknown, Portsmouth 4th January 1705.

⁴⁴⁷ BL Add MS 61515, Extract of Letter from Methuen to Cloudersly Shovell, 16th May 1705.

⁴⁴⁸ BL Add MS 46552, Letter from John Megher to Lord Lexington, Undated, and, BL Add MS 61587, Shovell to Sunderland, Association at Tolone, 10th August 1707.

⁴⁴⁹ TNA SP 106/572, Commissioner Anthony Hammond to Sir Richard Haddock.

establish sufficient logistics.⁴⁵⁰ These timeframes pressured commanders to not only achieve a quick beachhead with significant military successes but also to establish at least a basic supply system that could last until the return of the fleet, usually the following year. During the initial stages of the war, notably the Cadiz operation in 1704 and the Alicante operation in 1705, it was this lack of initial success and concerns about the throughput of supplies in the local region which saw the forces re-embarked and manoeuvred to other parts of the coast, where they could attain a stronger position.⁴⁵¹

Once a beachhead was properly established then the fleet moved to a supportive role of large-scale seasonal resupply. There are several reasons why this role was deemed necessary by administrators over and above the use of the fleet to open new fronts. The first and clearest role was to provide an additional supply of recruits to the forces that were operating in Iberia. This took two forms, firstly it was the resupply of recruits for the existing formations. The initial regiments that were sent out to Iberia retained, like many other units of the period, a recruiting branch at home who were constantly finding new men to join. These recruits were usually collected in small numbers by the relevant recruiting sergeants and then brought (as demonstrated earlier) to ports where they would be allocated onto shipping already bound for Iberia. Reinforcement of the Dutch and British units still active in Iberia were further supplemented by larger bodies, that being those which were raised from 1708 onwards to expand the existing forces. These units comprised either new British and Dutch forces or also frequently the bodies of Imperial forces that began to arrive in the Peninsula.⁴⁵² Resupply of troops to Iberia, however, was never the main focus of any of the allied governments' priorities, forces that were meant to be allocated for transport were often cut down dramatically in favour of campaigns in other parts of Europe. The favouring of military units was especially true in

⁴⁵⁰ Examples include, BL Add MS 61504, Galway to Unknown, Portsmouth 2nd January 1704, and, BL Add MS 61516, Earl Rivers to Methuen, River of Lisbon, 29th October 1706.

⁴⁵¹ BL Add MS 61509, Earl of Galway to Lord Sunderland, Lisbon 6th September 1709.

⁴⁵² BL Add MS 61526, John Chetwynd to Lord Sunderland, Turin 21st January 1708.

Belgium, and Italy and often a reduction of more than half can be observed between the expected forces and those that were actually released for duty in Iberia.⁴⁵³

Relations between the navy and allied land forces remained mostly cordial for the majority of the war, but despite these good relationships, the two arms of the military often followed totally different and often counterposed strategies. One of the most significant difficulties which allied armies faced was one of communication. Messages were slow to pass between towns across the whole of Europe, however, there were added issues that needed to be surmounted in Iberia. The first and largest was that of distance, the allied armies were operating far from their home states and from the decision-making machinery they relied upon. This distance often created long delays between decisions being made and being enacted, it also meant that rapidly changed circumstances in northern Europe could take a campaigning season to impact upon the coastal sector in Iberia. A clear example was the siege of Lille, plans had been made for a large body of up to 12,000 men to be brought from Belgium to create a new field army operating out of Portugal.⁴⁵⁴ However, the decision of Marlborough to invest Lille in 1708 was taken without consultation with allied forces in Iberia, and as such the expected forces were tied up in the siege.⁴⁵⁵ This took several months to be communicated, and the entire upcoming planned campaign needed to be shelved, and the supply arrangements that were being set up needed to be dismantled.⁴⁵⁶

The issue of distance was compounded by the fact that all officials were reliant on packet boats,⁴⁵⁷ contracted merchant vessels, for the transmission of letters. These ships arrived irregularly and

⁴⁵³ BL Add MS 61526, John Chetwynd to Lord Sunderland, Turin 18th February 1708, and, BL Add MS 61504, Galway to Sunderland, Gibraltar Bay 28th February 1708.

⁴⁵⁴ BL Add MS 61505, Earl of Galway to Lord Sunderland, Lisbon 18th November 1708.

⁴⁵⁵ BL Add MS 61505, Earl of Galway to Lord Sunderland, Lisbon 15th September 1708.

⁴⁵⁶ BL Add MS 61505, Earl of Galway to Lord Sunderland, Not addressed, 7th December 1708.

⁴⁵⁷ Original spelling used here.

often to their own schedules, rather than meeting the specific needs of the army's communication.⁴⁵⁸ The financial strength of the British state did afford some advantages that were employed with regards to packet ships. Administrators in Iberian ports were able to hold packet boats for a few weeks with the promise of higher payments while they awaited news from other parts of the campaign theatre, so as to make a fuller report back to Britain.⁴⁵⁹ The financial strength and the resources available to British administrators allowed them to negate some of the communication issues that were prevalent within the coastal sector. This ability would not translate to the Inland sector. However, despite some negation, it was only a jury rig rather than a permanent solution. The ability to hold ships at port for a time to await messages from other parts of the sector was still reliant on those messages arriving before the packet ship was forced to return, regardless of the sums offered.⁴⁶⁰ The greatest flaw of the packet message system was its lack of consistency, at times packet boats could arrive every few weeks, and at others, there could be months between correspondence.⁴⁶¹ This was especially true for messages coming from Valencia and Catalonia. Partly due to the lack of packet boats which travelled between there and Lisbon. These vessels were more likely to make for Genoa and other Italian ports than for Lisbon, which saw more Atlantic and western European vessels. Furthermore, there was also the added issue of fears from packet boat captains of being taken while at sea. There were numerous French patrols along the coast of Valencia, due to the proximity of the French naval base at Toulon, and additionally, there were barbery raiders who were known to capture ships and enslave the crews.⁴⁶² There was, over the early 1710s, continuous British diplomatic pressure to free sailors who had been enslaved in Morocco, partially so that they could return to duties and increase the number of ships in transit along the coast.⁴⁶³

⁴⁵⁸ BL Add MS 61505, Earl of Galway to Lord Sunderland, Lisbon 6th May 1708.

⁴⁵⁹ BL Add MS 61505, Paul Methuen to Lord Sunderland, Lisbon 5th March 1708.

⁴⁶⁰ BL Add MS 61509, Paul Methuen to Lord Sunderland, Lisbon 9th July 1707.

⁴⁶¹ BL Add MS 61509, Paul Methuen to Lord Sunderland, Lisbon 14th October 1707.

⁴⁶² BL Add MS 46552, Roger Paddon to Lord Lexington, Ruby, Gibraltar Bay, 13th April 1713.

⁴⁶³ BL Add MS 46552, Undated Unaddressed.

These issues remained throughout the entire war, and plagued attempts to organise logistical communication across the coastal sector. Letters in Lisbon were often delayed in returning to England, as they were awaiting additional information from Catalonia. In addition, these letters often were sent but could only represent the needs of the allied forces in Portugal, as information from the eastern theatre had not arrived, and as such there was less support from the British state than required. One of the continual complaints from allied leadership was the poor transit of information and the need to improve the ability of vessels to bring letters around the coasts of Spain. Given the naval superiority which the allied forces enjoyed for much of the conflict, there was limited risk in the eyes of field commanders and administrators in requiring the fleet not to be always fully devoted to combat.⁴⁶⁴ Many requests were made that naval frigates should be allocated to the use of the army, to act as regular patrol and message carriers around the coasts of Spain.⁴⁶⁵ It was requested to have two operating out of Barcelona down to Gibraltar, and another two prepared to travel between Gibraltar and England.⁴⁶⁶ There were available ships to achieve this, fleet lists for operations around Iberia show that resources were available to allocate several frigates from naval duties to being dedicated carrier ships for the army's correspondence.⁴⁶⁷ This, however, was never implemented, the only times that naval vessels carried messages was when the fleet itself was moving between ports, at the same time as a letter was to be sent or from direct orders from naval command. Limited reasoning in the sources has been given for this, there are mentions of threats to coastal vessels, though these would be the same as those that were faced, to a greater extent, by packet boats.⁴⁶⁸ The main reason appears to have been power struggles, that naval commanders were unwilling to sequester their vessels to the orders of army commanders and civilian administrators.⁴⁶⁹

⁴⁶⁴ BL Add MS 61505, Earl of Galway to Lord Sunderland, Lisbon 18th November 1708.

⁴⁶⁵ BL Add MS 61586, Earl Rivers to Don Medoca, Lisbon 2nd December 1706, and, BL Add MS 61587, Council of War, Lisbon Bay March 13th 1707.

⁴⁶⁶ BL Add MS 61505, Earl of Galway to Lord Sunderland, Lisbon 9th January 1709.

⁴⁶⁷ TNA SP 42/67, John Jennings to Secretary of State, Lisbon River, August 1709.

⁴⁶⁸ Add MS 61587, Sir Cloudersly Shovell to Admiral Byng, Lisbon Bay 14th February 1706.

⁴⁶⁹ Add MS 61526, Count of Cifuentes to John Chetwynd, (Translated) Savonna 27th December 1707.

The split between the needs of the two armed forces, severely constricted the ability of the logistics network in the coastal sector to operate efficiently. Despite many pleas, there was no move to improve the communication situation and as such the efficiency of supply from England lessened. Without regular updates on the needs of the military forces throughout the coastal region, the allocation of resources from England, which had a significant rate of decay, were even less than was required. Administrators found that forces were often left with supplies wholly inadequate for the task that they needed to perform. The resources were available, but without sufficient communication, this could not be demonstrated. At times the communication problems became so acute that letters travelling overland from Genoa to Brussels could then be passed on to London, before a letter leaving Barcelona on the next available ship.⁴⁷⁰ The communication difficulties also disrupted the planning of operations, the inability of officers at either side of the coastal sector to know what the other is planning for the next campaigning season meant that many plans were made without consultation, and attempts to proceed inland had to be shelved, reducing the number of advances made over the war. Since part of the logistical plan rested upon successful advances into the inland sector, the lack of proper communication had a twofold impact upon the logistics of the allied forces. Communication breakdowns were never properly handled, and the issue was never resolved, and the situation remained for the entirety of the conflict.

The relationship with the navy was one which perpetually stretched resources within the coastal sector, the inability of the two sides to coalesce into one stratagem continually impacted negatively on the ability of the army to carry out its main strategic goals. With discussions often at loggerheads only major logistical decisions, which carried the weight of the Secretaries of State in London, were eventually translated into a reality. Smaller actions which could have both reduced wastage and improved the transit of logistics were never fully realised. While the navy was wholly integral to the

⁴⁷⁰ BL Add MS 61526, John Chetwynd to Lord Sunderland, Turin 24th March 1708.

allied campaigns and the coastal sector, the full flexibility of naval forces was never entirely exploited. This left the army logistically in severe distress at times, and the government perpetually out of pocket. The onus that was placed upon the protection of naval assets and the primacy given to naval strategic decisions at Whitehall meant that changes seldom appeared, despite pushes from Iberian administrators. The navy did provide the vital resupply that otherwise would have made army operations wholly untenable, however, this was implemented in large bursts rather than encompassing the whole campaign, reinforcements came in when requested along with bulk supplies of cereal crops for the men and horses. Not just for the British and Dutch units but also for all the troops which comprised the composite allied forces.

Section 2: Funds and Leadership

The navy although providing additional forces were not the only source of men available to the armies operating in the coastal region, it was only in the inland sector that allied armies were unable to gain any additional substantive forces. In the coastal sector however, as discussed earlier, there were forces that were available for recruitment. These different units required variable levels of logistical organisation and different approaches in order to use them effectively. The first and in terms of numbers the largest group was the Miquelets. This force had been extant especially in the Catalonia region for at least 60 years prior to the outbreak of war⁴⁷¹ and were expected even prior to the landings.⁴⁷² George of Hesse-Darmstadt laid significant groundwork, through his agents, to have prepared forces of Miquelets ready for when allied forces made for Barcelona.⁴⁷³ This resulting activity led to the arrival of a force which greatly improved the ability of allied forces turning the landings into a bridgehead; these forces arrived with their own arms, and with enough supplies for the initial engagements.⁴⁷⁴ Furthermore, these equipped forces did not have to receive initial recruitment pay which perennially hampered allied efforts in early establishment.

Miquelet forces however, once arrived and formed into a rough association with allied forces, needed to be supplied and that came from, in the main, British paymasters. Miquelets drew their ammunition supplies from the allied supply convoys but usually preferred to acquire their rations from local sources.⁴⁷⁵ To purchase their sustenance required hard currency from the army's supplies.⁴⁷⁶ There are clear cases that Miquelets were unwilling to take bills of exchange or other

⁴⁷¹ See, Antonio Lopez Espino, *Miquelets I Sometents al Front de L'Ebre Durant La Guerra De Successio, 1705-1714*, (Rafael Dalmau, Barcelona: 2009).

⁴⁷² Ibid.

⁴⁷³ TNA SP 88/19, Letter from Earl of Galway to Paul Methuen, Camp at Salamanca 7th June 1706.

⁴⁷⁴ Ibid.

⁴⁷⁵ CP 002, Earl of Peterborough to Lady Peterborough, Undated Unaddressed.

⁴⁷⁶ Ibid.

forms of credit and required hard currency to pay for their supplies locally.⁴⁷⁷ This need for physical sources of cash disrupted the normal method of supply that the army was used to, it also led to a greater focus from commanders to ensure that there was an adequate war chest on site, with the troops, to keep Miquelets on side in addition to the normal payments that the army would have to make.⁴⁷⁸ Peterborough's escapades in Italy occurred partially from a need to rebuild the existing army war chest, and he took parts of the loan in physical currency.⁴⁷⁹ These increased demands upon the war chest resulted in armies in Valencia and Catalonia requiring higher supplies of currency than other parts of the coastal sector, or indeed the other geographical sectors. Miquelet forces were organised into small bands which followed local leaders,⁴⁸⁰ each leader would normatively follow orders from allied commanders as to their objectives, but it was often not possible to split soldiers from the bands into more manageable units. These units were relied upon to guard positions or to fill larger town garrisons, rather than act as a full and dedicated field force.⁴⁸¹ Miquelet local leaders would treat and receive orders separately from allied commanders,⁴⁸² and on some occasions could see orders countermanded by other sources.

Money was also one of the biggest supply elements which needed to be controlled and organised before it could be turned into succours. It is through monetary supplies that the organisation and projection of the British fiscal-military state can be observed. The usual method of money transfer was to set up a system whereby credit is extended from a local merchant to the army and then claimed back from the government through bills of exchange. This was usually handled by local

⁴⁷⁷ BI Add MS 61504, Earl of Galway to Lord Sunderland, Tarrega 22nd October 1707.

⁴⁷⁸ BI Add MS 61504, Strength of Spanish Regiments in British Pay, Undated Unaddressed, and, BI Add MS 61506, Galway to Unknown, 31st January.

⁴⁷⁹ CP 004, Earl of Peterborough to Lady Peterborough, Undated Unaddressed.

⁴⁸⁰ Francis, *First Peninsula*, p.96.

⁴⁸¹ BL Add MS 61504, Earl of Galway to Lord Sunderland, Tortosa 27th May 1707.

⁴⁸² Ibid.

agents, and once set up the organisation would then be passed onto local military commanders.⁴⁸³

The system when it was used for British campaigns in Flanders in previous wars had established a network of known and trusted individuals, who fulfilled the role of sources of credit for the army each campaign and would also facilitate the bread contracts when they were established.⁴⁸⁴ These established contacts were not available for the campaigns in the coastal region of Iberia and as such, trusted individuals needed to be located through a system of mostly trial and error.⁴⁸⁵ The only individuals who could be trusted were the officials already in place, and it was from them that the network had established, acting as a base line. In Iberia, the only individual in place at the outbreak of the war was Methuen; it was through him that the initial contractors were located.⁴⁸⁶ Methuen had connections across much of Portugal and to a lesser extent into Spain, these contacts were in the main British merchants who had approached him as part of his role in Portugal, and through that, he had established a rapport.⁴⁸⁷ In Valencia and Catalonia these pre-existing officials were not present, the only British official had been the appointed emissary to Madrid,⁴⁸⁸ as a result there became a need to rely upon contacts from those who were marching with the campaigning forces and trust that these individuals would be able to manage the system.

The initial bread contracts and exchange systems were proposed by George of Hesse-Darmstadt, who had significant connections due to his time in Eastern Spain, resulted in him suggesting many of the initial individuals who should be approached to handle supplying the army at its various landing places. The departure from the normal methods employed by the army, to make contracts with only trusted British individuals, was one of the defining features in the Iberian war and particularly the

⁴⁸³ BL Add MS 61504, Earl of Galway to Lord Sunderland, Lisbon 8th May 1708, and, TNA SP 94/78, Stanhope to Secretary of State, Gibraltar 1710.

⁴⁸⁴ D.W. Jones, *War and Economy in the Age of William III and Marlborough*, (Oxford: 1988) pp.28-34.

⁴⁸⁵ TNA SP 88/19, Paul Methuen to Charles Hedges, Lisbon 16th January 1706.

⁴⁸⁶ *ibid*

⁴⁸⁷ BL Add MS 46552, John Farrell to Lord Lexington, Madrid 1st December 1713.

⁴⁸⁸ BL Add MS 46552, William Shuntford to Lord Lexington, Pontedora 31st August 1713.

coastal sector. The contracts were honoured during 1704/05, but George's untimely death during the siege of Barcelona in 1705 meant a severing of the links between the army and its contractors before it has really been established.⁴⁸⁹ This led to difficulties in the subsequent years, where commanders were unable to organise supplies as efficiently as in previous conflicts.⁴⁹⁰

The result was clear confusion on the part of commanders and administrators as to whom they should rely upon regarding bread contracts, could they stay with the original contractors or should they change? The army was forced to renege on some contracts which the contractors were unable to fulfil satisfactorily.⁴⁹¹ Despite the failure of these contractors to fulfil the contract, the ambiguity of their expectations meant that it was the army that became the reneging party rather than the contractor, and as such would have greatly harmed their reputation amongst suppliers in the region. If it had become public, then it would be more difficult for the army to seek new contracts elsewhere amongst the merchants of Iberia.⁴⁹² By 1707 it had become necessary to pay off contractors who were unable to complete their contract. Doing so maintained secrecy on the reneging, while the army sought out new contacts to fulfil the contract.⁴⁹³ Overall, the army was met with far higher costs than they normally would have faced, with the addition of paying off the existing contract, starting a new contract, and having to purchase additional supplies on short notice. Contractual obligations ramped up the main costs for the army above and beyond the pre-campaign expectations, and therefore they were often not provided with enough currency and credit to achieve their logistical objectives.

⁴⁸⁹ BL Add MS 61509, Letter from Mr Holden to Methuen, Taro 20th December 1707.

⁴⁹⁰ BL Add MS 61505, Earl of Galway to Lord Sunderland, Lisbon 8th March 1709, and, TNA SP 94/78, Extract on situation near Gibraltar 1710.

⁴⁹¹ BL Add MS 61504, Earl of Galway to Lord Sunderland, Barcelona 29th December 1707.

⁴⁹² Ibid.

⁴⁹³ Ibid.

Short notice resupply was especially expensive in the coastal sector, Spain itself, as has been mentioned already had low grain production and as such, it was a struggle to provide large quantities of grain on short notice, those supplies that could be procured could only be bought at very high prices. The average price was 37 Rees per pound of grain, this, when transferred into pounds sterling, would equate to 6d which is approximately 25% above that which would normally be expected as a price for grain during campaigns.⁴⁹⁴ The resulting costs led to officials often seeking to acquire grain at lower prices from abroad, rather than pay the high local costs, if supplies could be attained at all.⁴⁹⁵ There were continual complaints from officials, even during the early stages of the conflict, that all the grain supplies in the coastal region had been consumed.⁴⁹⁶ The aim then became to locate supplies from abroad; these would usually be sought either from Italy or from Barbary.⁴⁹⁷ These supplies were usually handled by officials in Italy who could contract easily with merchant vessels involved in the grain trade in the western Mediterranean. Chetwynd in Italy was chiefly tasked with the organisation of these emergency supplies, but there was always the added issues of time and cost.⁴⁹⁸ Chetwynd often was forced to send the supplies piecemeal rather than his preferred method of collating all the supplies and shipping them in bulk.⁴⁹⁹ The piecemeal shipping of supplies, while it allowed for some supplies to arrive earlier, also meant that army commanders had to make important decisions about the allocation of the grain once it arrived in Spain.

It was the mixed command structure which acted as a major impediment on allied military and logistical efforts in the coastal sector. The presence of five state actors which comprised the allied armies meant that much of the command decisions were either taken separately or by compromise.

⁴⁹⁴ BL Ad MS 61505 Earl of Galway to Lord Sunderland, Lisbon 8th March 1709.

⁴⁹⁵ BL Add MS 61504, Earl of Galway to Lord Sunderland, Lisbon 13th April 1708.

⁴⁹⁶ BL Add MS 61509, Paul Methuen to Lord Sunderland, Lisbon 9th July 1707, TNA SP 42/67, Morris to Earl of Sunderland, Ranleigh, 10th June 1710, and, BL Add MS 61510, Count de Cifuentes to Milner, 28th September 1706.

⁴⁹⁷ BL Add MS 61527, John Chetwynd to Lord Sunderland, Turin 11th April 1707.

⁴⁹⁸ Ibid.

⁴⁹⁹ BL Add MS 61527, John Chetwynd to Lord Sunderland, Turin 21st April 1708.

Upon the allied army's arrival in Portugal in 1704 they opened discussions with the court as to the arrangements for how the army would be commanded,⁵⁰⁰ and who should fulfil the chief command roles. The initial arrangement stated that the army would be split equally between three commanders, all of whom would hold the same rank to prevent arguments over seniority.⁵⁰¹ These would be the senior ranking Dutch and British commanders (Baron Fagel and the Earl of Galway respectively) and a senior Portuguese commander selected by the court (initially the Duke of Das Minas). These commanders would handle the logistics of their own units unless the money was being sourced from a different location.⁵⁰² The funds and credit provided by their own governments would be used to pay for the supplementary supply costs of the campaign with the bread contract having been arranged by administrators prior to the campaign beginning.⁵⁰³ As the funds of the Portuguese and Dutch forces became less regular (the States General was unwilling to send funds away from Holland and the Portuguese suffering fiscal exhaustion) over the course of the war it became more and more necessary, for logistical integrity for Britain to pick up the additional costs.⁵⁰⁴ It created a situation whereby forces from the composite armies needed to be paid by one British paymaster. Many methods were discussed as to how this should be resolved.⁵⁰⁵ It was generally accepted by officers that their soldiers would not accept funds, especially pay, from the hands of a foreign officer, even though this might be the most expedient method for dealing with falsified bookkeeping. It would be viewed as completely unacceptable for soldiers of especially the Portuguese army to be paid by officers that were not their own.⁵⁰⁶

⁵⁰⁰ Francis, *First Peninsula*, pp.75-77.

⁵⁰¹ Ibid.

⁵⁰² BL Add MS 61527, John Chetwynd to Lord Sunderland, Undated, BL Add MS 61510, John Henning to Earl of Sunderland, Maderia 13th June 1707.

⁵⁰³ BL Add MS 61527, John Chetwynd to Lord Sunderland, Turin 26th May 1708.

⁵⁰⁴ BL Add MS 61526, John Chetwynd to Lord Sunderland, Turin 7th December 1707.

⁵⁰⁵ BL Add MS 61509, Earl of Galway, Undated Unaddressed, also BL Add MS 61509, Marquis de Alegreate to Methuen, Palace 28th March 1707.

⁵⁰⁶ Ibid.

Discussions were launched between the commands as to the best method for rectifying this issue with the transit of money and its translation into supplies on the ground. The Portuguese and Dutch had both suggested that increased funds from Britain should be directly turned towards either the existing subsidies or provided as an additional direct payment to the command of the various units of the composite army.⁵⁰⁷ The British administrators however, did not trust the Portuguese and Dutch with these funds directly. They saw it as a detriment on their credit, given those nations financial difficulties. Given the propensity for British subsidies to not materialise into forces on the ground when provided to their allies, they wanted to keep a firm hand on all transactions.⁵⁰⁸ By 1708 however, an agreement was finally reached, whereby the British would pay for forces raised above those of the existing subsidy payment agreements but that these forces would be paid by an officer of the appropriate force, in the presence of a British officer who was seconded from the paymaster.⁵⁰⁹ The agreement was never able to be fully enforced and complaints and arguments about the arrival and distribution of pay continued for the rest of the war. It does, however, highlight some important aspects of the financial chain and how it translated into military resources in the coastal sector, and the wider Iberian campaigns. The joint nature of the enterprise and the conflicting styles of organisation resulted in a diffused approach to pay and financial transactions. Money moved from the Treasury into the hands of officials from each of the five main units which comprised the allied forces, once under their control however its use varied wildly.

Portuguese forces, for example, divided pay amongst their officers, to allocate to their men on the basis of reported strength from the establishments.⁵¹⁰ Dutch or British forces used the figures obtained from the last review of the unit to allocate pay.⁵¹¹ This meant that Portuguese pay was

⁵⁰⁷ BL Add MS 61505, Earl of Galway to Lord Sunderland, Lisbon 9th August 1708.

⁵⁰⁸ BL Add MS 61505, Earl of Galway to Lord Sunderland, Lisbon 19th October 1708.

⁵⁰⁹ BL Add MS 61505, Earl of Galway to Paul Methuen, Undated Unaddressed.

⁵¹⁰ BL Add MS 61508, Methuen to Sunderland, Lisbon December 1707.

⁵¹¹ BL Add MS 61505, Earl of Galway to Lord Sunderland, Lisbon 9th August 1708.

often highly inflated compared with their actual strength, far more men were unaccounted for, and the excess pay was diverted into the hands of the officers.⁵¹² Even amongst the British and Dutch forces, pay did not equate man for man, and there was as much as 45% wastage, dependent on when pay was allocated during the campaigning season.⁵¹³ The narrowing effectiveness of funds raised in Britain to translate into buying power in Spain was clearly demonstrated. In addition, administrators noticed that pay was often inflated above its actual value, it became one of the funds diverted first to cover costs instead of other sections of the logistics network such as supply. However, this only compounded the issue of its lack of impact. With less funds and a more irregular arrival schedule, troops were paid less, sometimes going as much as eight months between payments.⁵¹⁴ With their pay often still in transit, this pushed up desertion rates which meant that funds were arriving but having less impact than previously intended.⁵¹⁵ Furthermore, pay was vital in order to keep the army's secondary food network operating, and when it failed to materialise this network had to be subsidised, initially from officer's pockets, but when that too failed other sources of finance in the region needed to be tapped (often pay).⁵¹⁶

The secondary food network being partially supplied by officers was a common practise in many armies of the period. Officers were possessed of greater funds and an access to credit that was beyond the common soldier.⁵¹⁷ Diligent officers would often take it upon themselves to furnish a unit with credit to purchase supplementary, and in some cases primary, supplies. More often upon a unit's arrival in the coastal sector, before they had been taken into the formal supply network, this credit became necessary. There are cases of units arriving with little to no supplies, and officers

⁵¹² BL Add MS 61505, Earl of Galway to Lord Sunderland, Lisbon 8th August 1708.

⁵¹³ Ibid.

⁵¹⁴ BL Add MS 61509, Paul Methuen to Mr Addison, Lisbon 11th September 1707.

⁵¹⁵ BL Add MS 61509, Paul Methuen to Lord Sunderland, Lisbon 28th November 1707.

⁵¹⁶ BL Add MS 61526 John Chetwynd. Unaddressed, Turin 22nd February 1708.

⁵¹⁷ TNA SP 109/1, Notes from Inspectors to the Army 1707, and, TNA 94/78, Stanhope to Dartmouth, Camp at Cifuetes 1711.

being forced to make emergency purchases or request to administrators for credit lines.⁵¹⁸ What this has highlighted especially is that the variable arrival times of troops, and the very nature of the supply system meant that it was often not feasible to arrange short term supply. Where magazines could be constructed, this could be rectified for a time. For example, the magazines in Italy and in Barcelona covered the initial needs of arriving forces.⁵¹⁹

However, one of the overriding issues with the logistics of the coastal sector overall was its fragility. The coastal logistics sector was built on limited stocks of supplies; the primary goal was to store in magazines enough food stocks for three months of campaigning, which was the usual length of the season. However, this strategy left no flexibility; there was no money provided in the budgets set for the year, or in the subsidies to allow for stockpiling beyond this amount.⁵²⁰ Any losses to the overall supply total were complete, and could not be replaced without either making cuts elsewhere, locating new funds, or borrowing against existing credit. The fragility of this system remained a continual problem for its construction and maintenance throughout the war. With only the finances to maintain a three month stockpile any losses incurred were immediately felt and since the reasons behind losses were also impossible to predict, forward planning never became a viable option. Fragility can be observed in several events throughout the conflict, the loss of supply convoys in Portugal and Catalonia during the initial campaigns,⁵²¹ the retreats into fortifications following the defeat at Almansa,⁵²² even the arrival of fresh forces which had been delayed by storms.⁵²³ All of these events broke aspects of the fragile supply system, there was no surplus to draw upon, and administrators had to scramble to find additional supplies.

⁵¹⁸ BL Add MS 61526, John Chetwynd to Lord Sunderland, Turin 18th February 1708, and, BL Add MS 61515, Diary of Unknown Passage (translated), 1706/7.

⁵¹⁹ BL Add MS 61526, John Chetwynd to Lord Sunderland, Turin 28th March 1708.

⁵²⁰ BL Add MS 61509, Marquis de Alegrete to Paul Methuen, (Translation) Lisbon 27th November 1707.

⁵²¹ BL Add MS 61587, Report from Catalonia, Lisbon Bay, 9th October 1706, and, BL Add MS 61515, Report from Peterborough, Albuquerque May 21st 1705.

⁵²² BL Add MS 61586, George Carpenter to Sunderland, Barcelona 15th March 1709.

⁵²³ BL Add MS 61504, Earl of Galway, Unaddressed, Alcyra 16th April 1707.

The second major issue which perpetually impacted the coastal sector's supplies and further added to the precarious and fragile logistical network that allied forces created in the region was crop availability. The coastal sector contained much of Iberia's primary growing regions, (65% of arable land in Iberia was within the confines of the coastal sector) yet despite this there was limited productivity compared with other parts of Europe.⁵²⁴ The vast majority of the population lived through subsistence agriculture, and supplementary agricultural incomes were derived primarily through the growth and sale of luxury and cash crops such as olives and oranges. As such, the region did not have high wheat production, which could sustain military forces operating in the area. While some commanders noted, upon their initial postings to Iberia, that the army itself could not create a vast shift in the economics processes of the region.⁵²⁵ Rather, decisions were made to attempt to maximise existing resources and then supplement them with supplies brought in from abroad. A strategy such as this emphasised large foraging parties and a push towards feeding as much as possible upon the enemy's expense.⁵²⁶ It aimed to negate some of the scarcity of grain supplies in the coastal region but impacted upon strategic planning and further logistical organisation.

By 1707 it became clear amongst the allied leadership that the coastal region had become completely exhausted. It was at this juncture that a significant shift was made towards the import of supplies from abroad.⁵²⁷ There was an expansion of grain supplies sought from the Baltic and Ireland. The shipping destinations for these were extended to Portugal as well as the Spanish coastlines.⁵²⁸ There was also a decision made by Galway to have the army only go into quarters in

⁵²⁴ See, Mats Olsson, *Growth and Stagnation in European Historical Agriculture*, (Turnholt, Brepols: 2011).

⁵²⁵ BL Add MS 61505, Paul Methuen to Lord Sunderland, Lisbon 16th July 1709.

⁵²⁶ BL Add MS 61509, Earl of Galway to Lord Sunderland, Lisbon 5th May 1710.

⁵²⁷ BL Add MS 61505, Paul Methuen to Lord Sunderland, Lisbon 16th July 1709, and, BL Add MS 615236, Chetwynd to Sunderland, Turin 23rd September 1707.

⁵²⁸ BL Add MS 61504, Earl of Galway to Paul Methuen, Valencia 19th March 1707.

towns with magazines, rather than spread amongst the villages and towns of a province.⁵²⁹ The reasoning behind this was twofold, firstly, that the troops would be able to receive supplies throughout their time in quarters from the magazine, which could be stocked in anticipation of their arrival. Secondly, the troops would be able to be quickly recalled to service at the end of the quarters season, organised, and brought into the field allowing for offensive campaigning. The strategy brought both strategic and logistical advantages for allied forces. The army could react and go onto the offensive far faster than the Bourbon forces, who would need the early campaigning season in order to organise their forces which had spent their quarters in small villages across the region.⁵³⁰ Allied forces could make offensives against strategic targets of their choosing prior to the enemy being able to reinforce the garrisons in those towns. Logistically there were also advantages from the same strategic manoeuvres. By being in the field earlier, allied forces could collect supplies from the local population and seize poorly defended enemy magazines, improving their food surplus to the detriment of the enemy. Galway pushed for this strategy to be adopted in 1708 despite receiving significant opposition, from the Portuguese court in particular.⁵³¹ For the remainder of the major campaigns where the allied forces were in a position to go on the offensive at the end of the quarters season, this was the strategic and logistical strategy employed by their forces.

The desire of commanders to feed at their enemy's expense manifested in two ways which had major impacts upon the logistical network. The first was the plan, for much of 1705-1709, to have winter quarters within the inland sector. The strategy itself was sound and had been cited by military planners that it was far better to be using up the supplies of your enemies than of your own population. It was especially the case of winter quarters, where long periods were spent with no strategic operations but with a constant need for food. Winter quarters were also the time when

⁵²⁹ BL Add MS 61504, Earl of Galway to Lord Sunderland, Vinbodi 16th November 1707.

⁵³⁰ Ibid.

⁵³¹ BL Add MS 61504, Earl of Galway to Lord Sunderland, Lisbon 12th 1708.

there were the lowest total amounts of food supplies in each region. This strategy meant that much of the coastal sector's planning for the autumn campaign was predicated on attempts to pull enemy forces away from certain areas and make expeditions over the borders, in order to be in a settled position for the end of the campaign. It also required allied forces to be the last to go into quarters in order to prevent Bourbon units from employing the same technique and taking their quarters in allied territory. It put more strain upon the bread contract supplies; however, as the army was forced to remain in the field longer and could not place itself upon the resources of the major regional towns. Furthermore, if army manoeuvres were unable to take them into enemy territory and the inland sector, then they were forced into winter quarters in the coastal sector without planning ahead for this eventuality.

Section 3: The Logistical Train

A key task of the Coastal Sector was to organise the supply train to enable the army to move from its landing sites inland. Most armies of the period campaigned by moving short distances between their magazines.⁵³² If strategic necessity dictated the need to march longer distances, then they would endeavour to use a mixture of horse and oxen drawn waggons in a train.⁵³³ The number varied in size and would usually be procured either by payment or contribution from local agricultural settlements along the army's route.⁵³⁴ In addition, if there were watercourses of sufficient size, then the army could also make use of horse drawn river barges. Each regiment was equipped with its own train of baggage which would include waggons and mounts. Each of these trains would transport not only food and ammunition but camp equipage and of course the personal baggage of the officers and other commanders of the force. Trains of animals and waggons presented enormous logistical difficulties but were paramount for achieving strategic goals. It was, however, in the coastal sector that these trains were constructed and organised. The arrival of new forces and the maintaining of existing forces required continual attention from the commanders and administrators in the field. The first and greatest difficulty, one which has been addressed already, is that of horses. The lack of heavy-duty horses, especially farm horses, in Iberia was a factor that had not come to the attention of the allies prior to their arrival in the peninsula. Despite having received warnings from the few figures of authority with experience of the region, namely Methuen and Prince George, there were few attempts to prepare baggage trains suited to the terrain prior to the army's arrival. Funds were not allocated to the pre-purchasing of horses in Portugal, which were instead bought up by the French ambassador to Lisbon, who had received instructions from his government to do so.⁵³⁵ It is unclear if the orders had been designed to deliberately immobilise allied efforts or were simply rectifying issues which were perceived for the organisation of arriving Bourbon forces, nevertheless

⁵³² Van Creveld, *Supplying War*. p.32.

⁵³³ BL Add MS 61504, Earl of Galway to Lord Sunderland, Lisbon 12th 1708.

⁵³⁴ Ibid.

⁵³⁵ BL Add MS 61504, Methuen to Galway, Lisbon 21st May 1704.

the end result was a initial conundrum for allied command. Allied commanders were confident that the horses they were bringing with them from Britain and Holland would be sufficient alongside the existing horses present in the Portuguese forces to supply their troops, both with cavalry mounts and with animals for the train.

This proved not to be the case; indeed, the initial supply of horses was so poor that by 1706 many cavalry units were fighting on foot.⁵³⁶ There were two main impacts which this state of affairs had upon the supply system in the coastal sector. Firstly, the difficulties that this placed upon the transit of supplies. The lack of strong animals meant that supplies could not be brought in large waggons; instead, it could only be loaded onto smaller carts and the rest needed to be brought on any available mules or other pack animals which could be acquired. The lamentations from many of the sources show that there were never enough of these pack animals to adequately supply the total tonnage required for the complete supply train.⁵³⁷ There were two knock on impacts upon the supply chain, firstly there became a higher reliance upon foraging to make up for the shortfalls within the supply transportation. As has already been shown, Iberia was not built for large scale foraging and this often-left troops without adequate supply. The second impact, caused using mules for the train, was that these animals ate a higher proportion of oats and other fodder. This has already been discussed in Chapter 2, that the total expended fodder was a higher proportion of the total transported than if horses and oxen had been employed. Administrators did note the difficulties of acquiring mules, but it was their only real option.⁵³⁸ Funding provided from Britain was focused upon other priorities and therefore despite pleas for additional funds to persuade horse traders, especially in Anatolia, to sell Iberian ponies to the army, which would have alleviated many

⁵³⁶ TNA SP 88/19, Paul Methuen, Undated Unaddressed.

⁵³⁷ BL Add MS 61504, Earl of Galway to Lord Sunderland, Lisbon 15th July 1708, TNA WO 4/10, Granville to Mr Southhall, Whitehall 8th December 1710, TNA WO 4/4, W St John to Col Morgan, Whitehall 6th June 1706, and, BL Add MS 61507, Col Leffevre to Sunderland, Lisbon 27th July 1709.

⁵³⁸ BL Add MS 61527, John Chetwynd to Lord Sunderland, Turin 25th April 1708.

of the difficulties, was never provided, partially due to the poor relations which early landings had caused by being overly aggressive in seeking contributions.⁵³⁹

The focus for the allied governments was to ensure their supply systems functioned as they did in other parts of Europe. There was a belief, evidenced by their actions, among allied leadership that the requisition of additional northern European supplies to be sent to Iberia would rectify the issues. To that end there were regular purchasing drives, often at great expense, to collect draught horses from Ireland and Holland, which could then be shipped to Iberia to replace those that perished from combat and attrition on the campaign.⁵⁴⁰ This process, which was persisted with throughout the main campaigns, proved to be not only increasingly expensive, but also in many regards utterly futile in its goals. In many ways it compounded the issues which allied logistics were facing in the coastal sector. The continual purchase of draught horses, especially in Ireland, reduced the existing stocks and drove up the prices for acquisition. These horses also faced exceedingly high rates of attrition both while they were being transported and once they arrived upon campaign.

The attrition rates for draught horses when onboard transport vessels were continually high, and as discussed earlier, there were struggles from naval leadership to create a workable solution. Rates could reach as high as 60% even before the horses were deployed into the coastal sector.⁵⁴¹ Those mounts that did survive the trip were then pressed into immediate service, with fodder provided usually from the magazines at Barcelona, Lisbon, and Alicante, with no opportunity for acclimatization. The process resulted in a high rate of attrition so that within 2-3 campaigning

⁵³⁹ Frances, *First Peninsula*, p.49.

⁵⁴⁰ BL Add MS 61526, John Chetwynd to Lord Sunderland, Turin 25th January 1708, and, TNA SP 34/11, Mr Webb to Granville, Whitehall 10th June 1710.

⁵⁴¹ BL Add MS 61509, Diego De Mendoca to Lord Sunderland, Palace 15th July 1707.

seasons these horses had been completely spent.⁵⁴² This is not to say that the army made no effort to care for their horses. The need to put them straight into the field was not taken lightly, and great efforts were made to ensure that there was adequate fodder available to strengthen them after their journey.⁵⁴³ However, the quality of fodder in the coastal sector was simply not sufficient to maintain such large animals;⁵⁴⁴ fodder brought in from abroad was only done so intermittently and would be quickly used up. Officers did attempt to send out wide foraging parties to collect fodder supplies but, during every major engagement of the war, at least a part of the cavalry was dismounted.

There were significant impacts upon the logistical organisation of the allied forces in the coastal sector. The focus on providing horses from northern Europe over and above seeking Iberian mounts or alternative animals was costly and diverted attention away from possible solutions. Partly, especially in the case of cavalry mounts, this seems to stem from a belief that British and Dutch troopers could not be effectively mounted on Iberian ponies.⁵⁴⁵ Thus the Iberian mounts that were purchased were only done so to equip either the supply train or to mount Portuguese, or French deserter units rather than seek to reduce the attrition of horses from Ireland.⁵⁴⁶ By focusing on Northern European horses this left only reduced funds available for the purchase of Iberian mounts or indeed of mules and other animals. The focus on strong northern European horses actually compounded the difficulties faced in maintaining the logistical networks of the allied armies in the coastal sector. Continual expenditure on horses which saw little effective service reduced the

⁵⁴² BL Add MS 61509, Paul Methuen to Lord Sunderland, Lisbon 14th October 1707, and, TNA SP 94/78, Major General Elliott to Granville, Gibraltar 8th October 1711.

⁵⁴³ BL Add MS 61527, John Chetwynd, Undated Unaddressed.

⁵⁴⁴ BL Add MS 61509, Paul Methuen to Lord Sunderland, Lisbon 14th October 1707.

⁵⁴⁵ BL Add MS 61527, John Chetwynd to Earl of Galway, Barcelona 4th April 1707.

⁵⁴⁶ Ibid.

amount of supplies that could be carried in the transport trains as it also stripped away the funds from the replacement animals.

Attempts were made by commanders to mitigate some of the difficulties that they faced, for example by contracting with individuals who could promise to bring in additional mules at below the normally expected prices.⁵⁴⁷ However, there was never a definitive drive to persuade Sunderland of the importance of changing to a more localised form of transportation, only to use the local animals as an addendum to more northern centric supply styles.⁵⁴⁸ This highlights the rigidity of the fiscal-military supply system. While funds could be generated in large quantities, when they did not meet the expected results, there was no flexibility to shift to another style of purchase. The existing long-term contracts and relationships which had been built up by many of the administrators produced a reluctance to sever those contracts in favour of ones that might have been more beneficial to the actualisation of the raised funds in an Iberian context. This rigidity was one of the main aspects which in many respects, reduced the power projection of the British fiscal-military state, the large sums of money which were expended on horses and other logistical transportation became in the coastal sector a collection of mules encompassing a fragile logistical train.

The narrative of campaigning in the coastal sector is one of repeat activities. Although over the course of the war there were advances and retreats before the withdrawal of the majority of allied forces prior to the fall of Barcelona.⁵⁴⁹ From a logistical standpoint, these events were repetitive, and each campaigning season began in the same way. The forces would be gathered from their billets into one or two field forces in each of the two theatres. Units would be detached from these field

⁵⁴⁷ BL Add MS 61509, Paul Methuen to Lord Sunderland, Lisbon 27th July 1708.

⁵⁴⁸ Ibid.

⁵⁴⁹ *La Resistencia Catalana: Barcelona, 1713-1714*, (Eumo Editorial, Barcelona; 2014), p.37.

forces and sent to the expected sites of sieges, that the Bourbon forces were likely to invest. Cities would also be selected in the Inland sector as targets. From that point, much of the campaigning would be carried out in an extended series of manoeuvres. These manoeuvres were predicated on the size and resupply throughput available from the logistical network that had been constructed. In preparation for the coming advance during the quarters season, small magazines would be constructed near the planned gathering site. This would then be used to fill the supply train once the army gathered, acting as a resupply point during the campaign. It should be noted however that these were not intended to be the single main source of supply for the campaigning army and there was an expectation, early on in the war, that much of the campaigning supplies would be gathered by foraging parties and through contributions. Likewise, while the forces which set out for garrison duty would also be provided with supplies from the rendezvous magazines, this was only intended to build up supplies in the fort for the possibility of a siege, and that purchasing supplies from the local populace would act as the day-to-day supply method. In emergency situations, contracts would be issued to local waggoneers to transport large quantities from the magazines to another location, this usually only occurred if the magazine itself was threatened or if another fort was likely to be invested by substantial enemy forces but could be held, such as Lerida.

The main goal of much of this logistical organisation was the protection of the existing supplies and to maximise their use. By 1707 commanders understood that the coastal region had become virtually exhausted as a main supply point, hence the shift to attempting to gather more from foraging parties. The two-season campaigning style allowed greater time to refill these magazines, but they were never converted into permanent supply posts. Despite often the same towns being used as the base for gathering troops following the end of the quarters season, the magazines were refilled each season, moving between hired warehouses in the town rather than dedicated

structures being acquired.⁵⁵⁰ These structures could have been stocked to greater levels and would reduce the risk of spoilage and also theft, which became common in some of the towns where the allies were quartered.⁵⁵¹ There are certain arguments in hindsight which could be made that more permanent supply bases with better longevity could have greatly improved the ability of the allied armies to effectively supply their forces. They would then not haemorrhage as much capital as they did having to buy bulk supplies on short notice. However, what is clear from the sources is that for the commanders and officers to make those decisions, a complete reappraisal of their approach to the coastal sector and ultimately, the war would have been required.

The coastal sector strategy was predicated on the idea and indeed the need to enter the inland sector, to take Madrid and to end the war. To that end, the philosophy was one of attack, that once parts of the inland sector began to rise for Charles, then these could instead be used as bases. It is what led to the organising of several expeditions towards Cadiz and southwestern Andalusia as part of the strategy.⁵⁵² Furthermore, there was pressure, both from certain high-ranking commanders and also from the government of Portugal and the court of Charles to reduce the high exhaustion of the land that they were governing. It was often an impossibility due to the lack of allied forces to successfully complete an advance into the Inland sector in a given year. Because of the many setbacks when they had advanced that forced them to retreat back into the coastal sector, this issue remained an overriding priority for allied commanders. As such, they made few attempts to create heavily defensive positions with long lasting supply bases, as were present in the Low Countries. The coastal sector was one built upon the idea of towns which could act as launching platforms for advances into the inland sector, and the logistical organisation was constructed with this factor at the fore. There were points certainly such as in 1708/9 where allied commanders and administrators

⁵⁵⁰ BL Add MS 61506, Paul Methuen to Earl of Galway, Lisbon 7th February 1708.

⁵⁵¹ Ibid.

⁵⁵² BL Add MS 61509, Earl of Galway to Paul Methuen, Camp at Torre Allegada 12th June 1709.

favoured a defensive policy which would allow them to remain in the coastal sector for the whole campaigning season. The policy had been drawn from the serious defeats suffered inland in the previous years and was expected to end upon the arrival of fresh imperial troops from Italy into Catalonia and British forces into Portugal. Once this situation had been rectified then the strategy remained that the renewed armies would advance inland. To that end magazines remained small and temporary in many places, and only those in the probable siege locations were heavily bolstered. Overall, the logistical organisation of any conflict is constructed not to be the most efficient in all scenarios but to suit the strategic needs of the army in question, and while there were obvious issues with the supply situation which allied forces did create in the coastal sector, it was always the opinion of allied commanders that this situation would be short-lived and the strategic plan would soon be fulfilled.

Another of the major logistical difficulties which faced allied leadership was how to organise and supply individual units. Forces were not fully combined and there remained throughout the war small individual forces which were tasked in operating in the large territories, furthermore, armies were further fragmented when in garrison and during quarters. As has already been discussed, units received their own supplies as part of the wider logistical network. However, difficulties began to arise once these units began to suffer casualties both from combat and from campaign attrition. Supplies could be sent to each dwindling unit separately, but this would be impracticable, forcing additional organisation of resources for minimal effectiveness. The units which had been raised in England and Holland were in the main kept on the books as extant units, and were fed recruits whenever the naval convoys returned from England. However, resources were spread between the units as needed on the campaign. For example, units of Portuguese horse were deliberately dismounted for part of the 1707 Valencian campaign in favour of a British unit as the Portuguese

force had become too disjointed and had too many wounded.⁵⁵³ While this caused some disquiet amongst the ranking officers, it was viewed by the command structure as the most expedient way of having units that were field ready. However, when it comes to the policy of establishment returns, there appears to be a very different system at work. In order to maximise the available funds for the units, returns were often forged to give an artificially high number of men still in-service.

Establishment returns which were sent back to Lord Sunderland and the Treasury often show all main foot regiments as having the same number of combat effectives ready for service.⁵⁵⁴ When compared with the internal establishments sent between individuals such as Stanhope, Galway and Methuen, this clearly was falsified information.⁵⁵⁵ What this shows, while debatably understood as corruption,⁵⁵⁶ is a clear understanding by commanders of how the functional fiscal-military state could be turned to suit the higher actual costs of the coastal sector campaigns. It appears from some of the bills and returns, that funds once they arrived in the coastal sector, were to be moved around to cover various costs rather than only for the task for which they had been appropriated.

Commanders and administrators understood the need to be able to move and reorganise existing funds, just as they did with existing units to meet the strategic and logistical necessities of the campaign.

One of the logistical detriments caused by the compromise of shared military leadership between the allied nations was in the organisation of a continual and reliable supply train. Part of the sharing arrangements for the forces operating in Portugal was that the leadership should pass between the senior commanders. This meant that over the course of a campaigning season, the army would have at least six changes of leadership. Each of the three national commanders in Portugal took decisions

⁵⁵³ Francis, *First Peninsular*, p.244.

⁵⁵⁴ TNA WO 54/59, Establishment returns 1705.

⁵⁵⁵ BL Add MS 61509, Earl of Galway to Paul Methuen, Lisbon 6th September 1709.

⁵⁵⁶ Alan J Guy, *Oeconomy and Discipline, Officership and Administration in the British Army, 1714- 63*, (Manchester University Press, Manchester: 1985), pp.162-168.

which greatly impacted the organisation of the train, and the continual shifting of these styles required a flexibility that was impossible in Iberian coastal logistics. The first issue which became a source of complaint for commanders at the time and brought up by later historical works, has been march order. Fagel, Das Minas and Galway all preferred to have units from their own national force at the head of the marching order of the army, as command changed regardless of position in the campaign then the entire supply column had to reorganise on short notice. Due to issues with communication, this was often impossible, and units in the vanguard were often left without tents and other equipment as their supply waggons and mules were further back down the line of march.⁵⁵⁷ The logistical train was greatly hampered by this, which caused supply shortages and reduced the speed of the march at points. This was especially true in the case of the Portuguese forces, a tradition established during the 17th century was that Portuguese forces marched with their artillery train in the vanguard rather than at the rear as most European armies practised.⁵⁵⁸ The tradition was maintained by Das Minas much to the chagrin of his other commanders. The result for the army was that the entire order of march had to be reorganised to allow for the artillery train to make it to the front. The knock-on impacts, especially due to the poor road quality in the coastal sector, reduced any possibility of a smooth-running logistical system. Indeed, the organisation of Portuguese forces is lamented by many of the administrators as one of the main reasons for the logistical failings that the allied forces were forced to endure during their campaigns within the coastal sector.⁵⁵⁹ While the reordering of the march did not collapse the logistical train in itself, it did cause significant disorder and on several occasions was a leading factor behind the delay of a march towards a strategic objective. While it seems clear that the compromise between the commanders was necessary to hold the multi-national force together, it caused additional strains upon the

⁵⁵⁸ Jeremy Black, *European Warfare, 1660-1815*, (New Haven, New York: 1994).

⁵⁵⁹ BL Add MS 61509, Earl of Galway to Lord Sunderland, Lisbon 20th November 1709.

logistical network than would have been experienced had the campaigns taken place in northern Europe.

While this command structure caused difficulties for the forces operating out of Portugal in the coastal sector, the army which operated out of Catalonia also had difficulties with organisation and command structure. This underlying issue stemmed from the personality of Charles and his court style of rule. It is too deep a discussion to fully cover Charles' style of kingship and the roots of the various aspects of his rule, however, his decisions did impact upon allied logistical operations in the region.⁵⁶⁰ While both Charles and Pedro II, and to a lesser extent John V, had the same authority to command their forces, and in accordance with some the agreements between the allies also the forces that were operating within their kingdoms, Pedro preferred to exert limited direct control over his armies. Partially this was due to illness and the court politics of Lisbon, but the end result was that instead the court appointed general of the Portuguese forces tended to have full authority.⁵⁶¹ This proved better for allied operations in the western coastal sector as the decision makers were all on hand and as a rule, focused upon the same goal; indeed Galway notes that he much preferred working with the generals in the field even if they were difficult rather than having to go to Lisbon for strategic meetings.⁵⁶² By contrast Charles took a much more active role in the command of his forces. General had to agree diplomatically and put in delicate work with Charles to avoid the strategically flawed aspects. The other added issue and the one which in the early campaigns of 1705-1707, before he retired to Barcelona for the majority of the rest of the war,⁵⁶³ was organising a logistical train around the needs of Charles. The king would often accompany the army on campaign requiring the accoutrements of a royal personage, this brought added stress upon

⁵⁶⁰ Patricia Dickson, *Red John of the Battles*, (Sidgwick and Jackson, London: 1973) p.138

⁵⁶¹ BL Add MS 61509, Earl of Galway to Lord Sunderland, Lisbon 16th January 1710, and, Francis, *First Peninsula*, p.153/154.

⁵⁶² BL Add MS 61505, Earl of Galway to Lord Sunderland, Lisbon 9th November 1708.

⁵⁶³ BL Add MS 61505, Earl of Galway to James Stanhope, Valencia 22nd February 1707.

the already poor waggon totals and lengthened the supply train by a sizable distance, as the king's baggage had to be placed to the fore of the train so that it could arrive at the camp. Furthermore, the need to await Charles when he was expected to join the army, delayed several campaign operations and threw some of the tight logistical organisation into disarray. Charles was prone to making sudden decisions, and the slow nature of communication in the coastal sector meant that for the military forces there were often significant delays before they knew he would not be joining them and they could continue with their objectives.⁵⁶⁴ While Charles did bring additional Spanish forces with him, they never amounted to any significant number, and the commanders in the eastern coastal sector did seem determined by 1706 to ensure that he remained in Barcelona as much as possible. Over the course of the conflict, Charles took less and less interest in the field operations and delegated more to the commanders, especially Schoenburg when he arrived from Austria, but his presence did impact the early campaigns quite significantly.

⁵⁶⁴ Ibid.

Section 4: Conclusions.

The coastal sector was the most varied of all the logistical sectors which the allied forces experienced during the War of the Spanish Succession in Iberia. They did construct a logistical network which was able to supply more than 30,000 men continually for almost ten years of fighting. It was built upon localised knowledge of the area combined with the powerful resources of the British fiscal-military state. Allied forces were able to build upon the landings, that they made at the end of the sea sector, and project their power deeper into the interior of Iberia. Despite the multi-national force, they established a culture of compromise regarding organisation and were able to maintain this force in continual field operations throughout the majority of the conflict. Contracts were established with local merchants and bases were constructed to allow for advance to the inland sector. Military operations and logistical organisation were guided upon the principles which had been established in earlier conflicts. It was these principles which were enacted by the commanders and administrators operating within the coastal sector. These operations were supported, both by local populations and military units, but also by naval forces with whom the continued long-term success of the expeditions was possible.

Despite this, however, the coastal sector gives significant insight into the issues which plagued the allied logistics in Iberia and demonstrates the weakness of the fiscal-military state to project the same level of power as it did nearer to home. The command structure struggled to find adequate solutions to many of the issues that were encountered. There was no satisfactory resolution with relations between the army and navy, which lead to communication difficulties, and which slowed the resources that the state could offer to the military forces. There were many examples of wastage and organisational difficulties, with a lack of dedicated magazines and large sums spent on the import of horses. Much of this was drawn upon preconceived ideas about campaigning logistics from

previous conflicts. Officers and the government did seek solutions for some of the issues, but they mostly were stop-gaps and that the main solution was to send additional funds and men. At times the Iberian conflict represented 40% of British military expenditure however this did not equate to 40% of military resources. The army in Flanders was far larger and better equipped than the forces in Iberia. The British fiscal-military state faced enormous issues projecting its power to Iberia; large funds did not translate into resources on the ground. The mixture of conflicting leadership and a lack of flexibility to seek solutions prevented the logistical structure from supporting the kinds of campaigns that the allied forces were expecting to conduct in the coastal sector. If the resources could have been converted to supplies efficiently, then the allied forces had already set up sufficient contacts to maintain an effective logistical train. There were adequate shipping resources to transport, and men available to carry this to fruition. However, allied leadership were unable to cope with the high levels of wastage and the government was unwilling to send a proportionally higher amount of resources than would have been expected on these campaigns.

What the coastal sector shows is that the British fiscal-military establishment always operated upon the expectations of the campaigns around which it had been formed. Despite having significant resources, the system was inflexible when presented with new scenarios. It always relied upon the same system of contracts, supply percentages and from that expected the same results. The solutions that were sought were always to deal with immediate issues and when these failed, due to the poor resource throughput, then the recourse was not to seek longer term solutions but to attempt to exert more direct pressure on the system sending additional funds and men but with the same rates of wastage. Overall, the coastal sector is where can be observed the fragility of British logistical practises, and it was these practises which underpinned much of the next phase of campaigning, that of the Inland sector.

Chapter 5: Dusty Roads: Advances on Madrid and the Inland Sector

The inland sector in Iberia marked the most difficult, turbulent and in many respects critical supply sector for the allied armies of the entire campaign. It marked the point of greatest contention between what some scholars have titled the tooth and the tail.⁵⁶⁵ Supply transition from the coastal sector required several additional factors to be taken into account for administrators, both geographically and politically. It marked the end goal supply network; if the allied armies were to succeed in their objectives of placing Charles upon the throne of Spain, then the interior of the country and, in particular, the capital of Madrid had to be seized and, above all, held. The inland sector also represented an area of long marches, relatively few urban centres and a hostile populace. As such, allied commanders who took the lead on the supply of this sector had to make decisions which differed from the handling of the preceding sectors and were forced in many cases to diverge from the planned supply to meet the changing circumstances. It was within this sector that most of the major military actions took place with the correlating reversals in fortune and as a result made this sector the most unpredictable. The inland sector is most strongly identified by its marches. Each allied attempt to gain control of the region was marked by a campaigning march aimed at Madrid or another key urban centre.⁵⁶⁶ It was the logistics of these marches and, importantly, the failure therein which was the defining factor behind the British failure to succeed in the Iberian Conflict. While each of these advances in central Spain were from different military campaigns, they were remarkably similar in their logistical operations and shared similar difficulties throughout the war. Therefore, they can be assessed jointly as a single logistical network. Unlike the preceding geographical sectors, the inland sector was not a continual set of logistics. Instead, it was a set of singular campaigns, each with its own logistics, developed from the established networks of

⁵⁶⁵ Kenneth Macksey, *For Want of a Nail, The Impact on War of Logistics and Communications*, (Maxwell, London: 1989) pp.1-5.

⁵⁶⁶ British ministers retained a constant interest in the capture of Cadiz by land. Basil Williams, *Stanhope: A Study in Eighteenth-Century War and Diplomacy*, (Clarendon Press, Oxford: 1968) p.87.

the coastal sector. The inland sector, due to the failings of the campaigns themselves, did not see the creation of a longer-term logistical network, although there were attempts made, which will be discussed further. Overall, it was in this sector that some of the most significant issues with British power projection can be seen, it being the furthest point of Allied military efforts.

Due to the campaigns being primarily only military expeditions, without the wider establishment of permanent bases, there was a much-reduced role for the civilian administrators who had handled the bulk of the supply up to this point. Once the resources that had been collated in the coastal sectors and placed within the military convoy system, the administrator's role became subsidiary, and the onus fell upon military commanders to organise the bulk of the supply system.⁵⁶⁷ This included sourcing supplies and finding methods of extending the supply network to last the campaign and making preparations for the possible creation of a longer-term supply network if the military advances were successful. Supply, therefore, was based much more on the patterns of warfare than in the administration of contracts and deserves some attention before continuing. Military supply in the absence of magazines that were readily supplying the army was based upon three aspects, convoy, seizure, and collation. Convoy was the basis for all military supply once forces left their rallying points within the coastal sector. The military supplies were organised into supply columns of available transports and marched with the relevant forces as they advanced.⁵⁶⁸ These supplies were a finite source, although additional supplies could be transported along the roads, these would only be in limited amounts, often due to procurement issues.⁵⁶⁹ Convoyed supplies were ponderous and difficult to manage for many armies, and in the vast majority of the preceding wars could not supply an army in isolation.⁵⁷⁰ As with the early transitional phases of the coastal

⁵⁶⁷ TNA SP 89/24, Henry Wooley to James Stanhope, Lisbon 18th January 1715, BL Add MS 61506, Galway to Sunderland, 10th June 1707, and, BL Add MS 61508, Galway to Sunderland, Lisbon 30th March 1709.

⁵⁶⁸ TNA SP 94/81, John Jennings to Lord Lexington, Barcelona Road, 10th June 1713.

⁵⁶⁹ BL Add MS 61509, Galway to Lord Sunderland, Lisbon 3rd August 1709.

⁵⁷⁰ Martin Van Creveld, *Supplying War: Logistics from Wallentien to Patton*, (Cambridge University Press: 2013) p.17.

sector, the goal for any army that had only convoyed supply was to expand and create additional sources of supply that were available in the surrounding campaigning territories. Seizure was the simplest method for the acquisition of large quantities of military supplies and was often linked with the strategic goals of the campaign. Seizure in its simplest form was the capture and use of the magazines of the opposing forces. As most campaigns were fought in the friendly territory of one of the combatants, then for the opposing force, hostile magazines were available for seizure. If taken, these supply sources could rapidly refill the requirements of the force and often give them a solid strategic base, as magazines were usually constructed in strategically significant settlements within the campaigning zone. However, enemy forces also understood the significance of their own supply magazines.

As a result, there were strong measures in place to ensure that seizure was not the most straightforward option for an advancing force.⁵⁷¹ Firstly, the magazines were constructed within well-defended settlements, most often those with fortresses that house the supplies in the case of attack.⁵⁷² These defences would force the advancing army to either invest the fortress, which could result in a protracted siege resulting in large quantities of the supply expended while their own supplies likewise dwindled, or they would be forced to engage in a costly assault in order to take the fortress and the magazines it defended.⁵⁷³ If they did not then there was a high probability they would be forced to abandon the siege upon the approach of additional enemy forces.⁵⁷⁴ Secondly, the advancing direction of any attacking army could be reasonably assumed given the slow pace of

⁵⁷¹ Examples include, BL Add MS 61505, Galway to Sunderland, Lisbon 8th August 1708, and TNA SP 89/19 Galway to Methuen, Camp at Salamanca 6th June 1706.

⁵⁷² TNA SP 89/19 Methuen to Charles Hedges, Lisbon 20th January 1706.

⁵⁷³ Jamel Ostwald, *Vauban under Siege, Engineering Efficiency and Martial Vigour in The War of the Spanish Succession*, (Brill, Leiden :2007) p.6.

⁵⁷⁴ *A detection of the Earl of Gallway's conduct at Almanza: in the following original letters writ by M. Schonenberg, the Dutch Ambassador at Lisbon, to the States. The Count de Noyelle, the Dutch General in Spain, to M. Schonenberg. Brigadier Drinborn (who was in the Battle) to Count de Noyelle. The Count of Cordona, Governour of the Kingdom of Valencia*, (John Morphew, London: 1711) p.10.

armies coupled with, particularly in Iberia, limited options to attack. Therefore, if the direction of an advancing army was noted to be towards an undefended magazine or one which could not receive relief in time, then the defending forces had measures that were enacted to prevent total seizure. Supplies could be extracted given enough preparatory time and transported away to another magazine;⁵⁷⁵ if this was not possible, then there was also the option to employ scorched earth tactics and destroy the supplies, either those in magazines or the fields that were in the vicinity of the magazine.⁵⁷⁶ Therefore, while seizure provided a strong resupply option for advancing armies, in order to be effective, it required either mistakes to be made by their opponents or an overexertion of force in order to be fully realised.⁵⁷⁷

The final area of resupply available to an advancing army was that of collation. This involved the collection of supplies from the sources available in the territory as they advanced. Supplies in this format took two main forms, either crop supplies from farmers or collected supplies from merchants and distributors. Collation of either of these supply groups could be carried out by purchase or by coercion. Purchase was the preferred method, especially in territories where it was hoped that the support of the local populace would further improve the war effort. This would involve the use of cash to incentivise markets to be set up along the line of advance, by offering good prices to offset the difficulties in setting these up, or by using agents ahead of the advance to purchase supplies and transport them to the next camp position. Examples of these markets being used to great effect can be observed during Marlborough's march along the Rhine.⁵⁷⁸

⁵⁷⁵ BL Add MS 61505, Galway to Sunderland, Lisbon 15th September 1708.

⁵⁷⁶ BL Add MS 61509, Methuen to Sunderland, Lisbon 15th July 1707.

⁵⁷⁷ Only a few magazines are mentioned as being taken, those at Ciudad Rodrigo and Almaraz, BL Add MS 61505, Galway to Sunderland, Valencia 9th March 1707, and, BL Add MS 61507, Galway to Boyle, Lisbon 22nd January 1708.

⁵⁷⁸ *Military Memoirs of Marlborough's Campaigns, 1702-1712*, ed. David Chandler, (Greenhill Books, London: 1998) p.30.

However, monetary incentives were problematic for an army on the advance. Firstly, and most crucially, they were expensive. Military forces most commonly only carried a limited war chest of cash which not only needed to fulfil the army's supply requirements but also, importantly, was utilised for troop pay.⁵⁷⁹ If bulk purchases were used too often and the war chest depleted, and a lack of good credit from amongst the local merchant classes, then there was a real risk of troops being unable to receive pay for long periods of time, with all the issues for discipline which this would then cause.⁵⁸⁰ The other option available for the collation of supply was the use of contributions. Similar in principle to that of seizure, the taking of supplies by force or threat of force from the local population.⁵⁸¹ Military forces could also demand supplies through negotiated agreements or in some cases take a promise of supplies in the future.⁵⁸²

While this provided an advancing force with an inexpensive option for the acquisition of supplies, there were issues that could present themselves over the course of the advance. Firstly, if it was used too often and too aggressively, then there was a risk that any resentment generated within the local populations could build-up to the point of violence against the military forces, such as occurred during the Thirty Years War.⁵⁸³ Even if this was not the end result, the use of forceful acquisition of supplies from the local populations led to the erosion of trust between the advancing army and the civilian body. This would lead to preventative actions taken by the locals to prevent the loss of their supplies to the army.⁵⁸⁴ Secondly, food would often be stashed or, if possible, transported away, and money would be hidden so as not to be acquired by the advancing army.⁵⁸⁵ Furthermore, any

⁵⁷⁹ TNA SP 94/78, Stanhope to Lord Dartmouth, Villadolid, 2nd January 1711, BL Add MS 61540, Galway to Sunderland, Valencia October 1706.

⁵⁸⁰ TNA SP 41/3 W.T John to Secretary Hedges, Whitehall, 8th September 1704, and, BL Add MS 61504, Galway to Sunderland, Lisbon 8th April 1708.

⁵⁸¹ TNA SP 94/78, Lepell to Lord Dartmouth, Barcelona 28th March 1711.

⁵⁸² BL Add MS 61505, Galway to Sunderland, Lisbon January 11th 1709.

⁵⁸³ Christopher Freidrichs, *The War and German Society*, in *The Thirty Years War*, ed. Geoffrey Parker, (Routledge, London: 1987).

⁵⁸⁴ BL Add MS 61516, Earl Rivers to Sunderland, River of Lisbon 29th October 1706.

⁵⁸⁵ BL Add MS 61509, Methuen to Sunderland, Lisbon 10th September 1707.

attempt to then switch to a payment system after this point would see fewer supplies reaching the markets, and it became increasingly difficult to rebuild those trust levels prior to the application of force.⁵⁸⁶ If territory could be taken, particularly centres of trade within a region, then military contractors could be acquired from amongst the local merchant classes. It was expected that these merchants could supply the army in the manner similar to that which they had been operating under in their previous supply sector.⁵⁸⁷ Although contractors could be brought over from the previous sector, they either needed to have contacts in the new sector to organise supplies closer to the army, or struggle with the same waggon convoys as the advancing army already had to contend with. Therefore, there were lots of supply options available to the army as it advanced into hostile territory; however, none of these were inviolate, there were difficulties from all of them and the longer an army spent in a hostile territory coupled with the further it advanced from its original bases without taking and successfully establishing a supply contract network, the more volatile their logistical operations would be.

⁵⁸⁶ BL Add MS 61504, Galway to Sunderland, Tarrega 22nd September 1707.

⁵⁸⁷ BL Add MS 61506, Galway to Sunderland, Camp at Ciuca 1st May 1709.

Section 1: Preparing to March, Transition from Coastal Supply

Sometime should be taken to discuss the situation within the Inland sector by the arrival of the first allied armies. Allied forces took the early years of the war consolidating their hold upon the coastal sector and developing their forces for the advance into the inland sector.⁵⁸⁸ The Bourbon forces, however, had recognised that an advance was inevitable, particularly after Portugal's full commitment to the conflict and Bourbon force's failure to make rapid advances.⁵⁸⁹ Furthermore, Phillip had made significant strides to solidify his rule in Madrid. One of the primary actions he had taken was the divestment of his French advisers and to adopt policies that were divergent from that of his grandfather.⁵⁹⁰ The Spanish government moved quickly to remove the fears that had been prevalent amongst the Castilian nobility of proxy French rule and vowed to uphold their rights and privileges as had been present under the Hapsburg monarchs, this coupled with the nature of Philip's court, worked effectively to reduce resistance in Castile to his rule.⁵⁹¹ This focus upon Castile, in particular, was a clever and effective strategy. Castile was the largest and most important part of the Kingdom of Spain, and any monarch who did not have the support of Castile could not hold the capital Madrid or the country.⁵⁹²

Additionally, building upon his growing support, Phillip also worked to rebuild the fractured Spanish military.⁵⁹³ Although the Spanish army was not in the state of total collapse that has been attributed to it by previous historians, it was, however, still a shell of its former glory.⁵⁹⁴ Poor Hapsburg fiscal policies coupled with a lack of successes in the final years of the reign meant that Philip had

⁵⁸⁸ Francis, *First Peninsula War*, p.222.

⁵⁸⁹ Ibid.

⁵⁹⁰ Henry Kamen, *Phillip V of Spain: The King who Reigned Twice*, (Yale University Press: 2001).

⁵⁹¹ Faulkner, *Spanish Succession War*, p. 172.

⁵⁹² Ibid.

⁵⁹³ Andújar Castillo, Francisco. 'Élites de poder militar: Las Guardias Reales en el siglo XVIII', in Juan Luis Castellano, Jean-Pierre Dedieu, and Maria Victoria López, eds, *La pluma, la mitra y la espada: Estudios de historia institucional en la Edad Moderna*, (Universidad de Burdeso, Madrid:2000), p.66.

⁵⁹⁴ Christopher Storrs, *The Resilience of the Spanish Monarchy*, (Oxford University Press: 2006) p.231

inherited an army in need of growth and improvement.⁵⁹⁵ Fortunately, the finances that arrived in the Bourbon treasury early in the conflict sped this process along. The war chest provided by Louis was further significantly supplemented by the successful unloading of the treasure fleet at Vigo, and much of this capital went into improving the armed forces and paying for the large numbers of French troops that were arriving in the Kingdom.⁵⁹⁶ Additionally, efforts were made by Phillip to increase support bringing in several Spanish officials to administer affairs.⁵⁹⁷ Furthermore, attempts were made at improving the fortifications of several of the key towns within the interior, such as Almaraz, in order to reduce the open risk of an unopposed march towards Madrid, which itself lacked anything in the way of formal defences.⁵⁹⁸ These works and the improvements made to the military meant that Castile was in a much better position defensively than it was in 1700 when Charles II died. However, the inland sector was not without its difficulties for the Bourbon forces. Despite their improvements to the military forces, particularly their size, they still did not have enough men to defend each part of the border, nor could they go on the full offensive on the two fronts opened by the allies after the advances in Catalonia.⁵⁹⁹ It was these military weaknesses that spurred allied forces into the offensive in the hope of removing Phillip from the throne before he could consolidate his position further.⁶⁰⁰ However, the allied forces had numerous difficulties that needed to be surmounted in order to succeed within the inland sector.

⁵⁹⁵ Ibid p. 60.

⁵⁹⁶ *A full and impartial history of the expedition into Spain; in the year 1702. Extracted from the journals and memoirs of the generals; and from which it will be easie to draw Rational Conjectures, about the present Enterprize, to settle the Most Serene Charles III, on the Spanish Throne. To which is added, an account of Monsieur Chateaurenault's expedition, from his first sailing from Brest, in Sept. 1701, to his putting into Vigo, in Sept. 1702. In a Letter from Monsieur de Gatines, Intendant of the Navy of France, to a Minister of State at Paris; which Letter was taken at Redondella among Monsieur Chateaurenault's Papers,* (Eighteenth Century Collections Online)

[link.gale.com/apps/doc/CB0126877024/ECCO?u=oxford&sid=gale_marc&xid=673564ef&pg=1] p.159.

⁵⁹⁷ One of the major figures being Uztariz, Reyes Fernandez Duran, *Geronimo De Uztariz, 1670-1732, Una Política Económica Para Felipe V*, (Minerve Ediciones, Madrid: 1999) pp.113-125.

⁵⁹⁸ John Lynn, *The Wars of Louis XIV 1667-1714*, (Longman, London: 1999) p.277. and, BL Add MS 61509, Methuen to Sunderland, Lisbon 9th July 1707.

⁵⁹⁹ BL Add MS 61509, Pedro Carle to Methuen, Unaddressed, January 1708.

⁶⁰⁰ BL Add MS 61509, Galway to Sunderland, Paco D'Arcos, 16th August 1709.

A continual issue for the allied armies and one which greatly hampered logistical preparations was communication and organisation. Allied commanders were eager to take advantage of the geographical position following the fall of Catalonia and Valencia and to advance on two fronts.⁶⁰¹ However, these two fronts were separated from each other by the inland sector. The only means of communication between the leading commanders was by ship, which although the journey from Lisbon to Valencia could be relatively short, with good winds,⁶⁰² there was also the distance that needed to be travelled to meet the advancing armies as they moved further away from the coast.⁶⁰³ The only other option available to the allied commanders for communication and positioning was to rely upon news as it passed through the inland sector. The region was not devoid of British agents, there were merchants still operating, and news could travel between the main urban centres.⁶⁰⁴ However, this news was often based upon hearsay and certainly was not up to date by the point at which it arrived.⁶⁰⁵ These communication issues greatly hindered allied forces in their logistical organisation for a number of reasons. Firstly, there was the issue of how to coordinate the direction of resources within the coastal sector. As previously discussed, once targets had been selected for the initial line of advance, supplies were then collated in border settlements near to the point of the march's commencement. However, the targets that were selected were based upon the prevailing disposition of the enemy forces, and if they were redeployed, then the line of advance, including at some points the starting point, would need to be changed.⁶⁰⁶ While this caused difficulties for a single army advancing, as the supplies would need to be moved to a new starting point and the units being brought together be forced to march elsewhere, for two armies trying to coordinate, it was often insurmountable. Given the previously discussed communication difficulties, it often proved impossible to bring news of a change in the line of advance to the other half of the army before they

⁶⁰¹ BL Add MS 61509, Galway to Sunderland, Lisbon, 9th August 1708, and, BL Add MS 61616, Earl Rivers to Sunderland, Lisbon October 7th 1706.

⁶⁰² For example, Letters between Galway and Methuen could see only a few weeks between receipt and reply.

⁶⁰³ BL Add MS 46552, Daniel Newton to Joseph Burch, Alicante, February 1713.

⁶⁰⁴ TNA SP 94/81, Lord Lexington to Earl of Dartmouth, Madrid 6th June 1713.

⁶⁰⁵ TNA SP 89/20, John Mooton to Galway, Undated, Unaddressed.

⁶⁰⁶ BL Add MS 61505, Galway to Sunderland, Lisbon, 8th August 1708.

had departed from their bases and commenced the campaign.⁶⁰⁷ This meant that the two armies were advancing at cross purposes and would be unable to strike at targets for maximum effect to continue the advance.

Furthermore, allied advances into the inland sectors were often wholly unable to coordinate between each other as they were reliant either on the variable sea communication or the unreliable overland communication.⁶⁰⁸ As a result, goals could only be vaguely set, and since there was little clear indication of where the second force might be at any given time, each army operated as a single logistical entity.⁶⁰⁹ For commanders attempting to begin the process of transition, this meant that there was double the number of contracts that would need to be made which greatly slowed down any attempts to successfully create magazines.⁶¹⁰ Due to the variable nature of the advance's direction, there was no guarantee that the magazine's location would be viable for the next stage of the campaign. Resultingly only limited attempts were made to create secure, filled magazines in the towns that were taken upon the line of advance.⁶¹¹ As a result, allied forces were more reliant on the other forms of army supply and the issues inherent within these.

Additionally, without formal magazines set up, it was difficult to find adequate contractors for the acquisition of supplies. Contractors preferred to send resources to a secure magazine and from there transport out, as supplies could be sourced from a number of locations, and it was inefficient to organise the transport of the waggons piecemeal from multiple directions to meet an army on the

⁶⁰⁷ TNA SP 94/78, Liam Cotton to Stanhope, Saragossa, February 1711.

⁶⁰⁸ TNA SP 94/78, Stanhope to Earl of Dartmouth, Valladolid, February 1711.

⁶⁰⁹ Francis, *First Peninsula War*, p.227.

⁶¹⁰ TNA SP 89/19, Methuen to Earl of Dartmouth, Camp at Salamanca, June 7th 1706.

⁶¹¹ Francis, *First Peninsula War*, p.231.

move. The communication difficulties further impacted allied logistics when their forces had achieved their initial goals.

While several campaigns were launched into the inland sector, many did not advance far past the border area with the coastal sector.⁶¹² Partly this was due to the issues already discussed and additionally, successful manoeuvres made by Bourbon forces which forced allied armies to pull away from the long advance into the interior.⁶¹³ However, two campaigns did successfully achieve their goals, and the allied armies entered Madrid.⁶¹⁴ Upon their withdrawal, the reasons for which shall be discussed later in the chapter, the communication and supply situation became even more precarious. On both occasions, the decision was made for the now unified forces to exit the inland sector along the same route rather than split and return to their initial starting areas. That decision made sound strategic sense, the armies had suffered losses throughout the campaign, and with limited reinforcements there was a substantial risk of them being defeated in detail if they remained separate. On the other hand, the logistics of their return routes were not adequately set up to supply this march. One of the leading reasons for this was communication, once the decision had been made that they could no longer remain in Madrid.

The combined forces created a different level of strain upon the logistical network than the singular force had upon its advance into the inland sector. The withdrawals from Madrid were planned with very short notice, and as a result, the slow nature of communications meant that there were minimal options for resupply for the forces involved. Given the pressing need for rapid resupply, the slow transit of communication of the army's route back along the logistics chain to the coastal sector

⁶¹² Ibid.

⁶¹³ BL Add MS 61509, Methuen to Sunderland, Lisbon, 6th December 1707, and, BL Add MS 61515, Extract from Earl of Peterborough Letter, Valencia, Undated.

⁶¹⁴ Falkner, *Peninsular War*. p. 142. Hugil, *No Peace*, p.245, and, Francis, *First Peninsula*, pp. 302-328.

centres where much of the convoy supply was set up, meant that only limited supplies from these areas could reach the withdrawing forces. Additionally, while advancing forces had successfully driven Bourbon forces aside during the advance on Madrid, the long period spent within the inland sector in both instances had allowed the Bourbons' sufficient time to bring forces in to threaten the logistics chain that had been established.⁶¹⁵

The sector, as has already been discussed, had seen significant changes in support driven by the proactive rule of Philip. This had led to rising levels of support not just amongst the nobility but additionally amongst the general populace.⁶¹⁶ Popular support was vital for any truly successful logistical system of procurement to take place. Allied forces advancing into the inland sector had to contend not just with support for the Bourbons but in many cases hostility towards themselves and Charles' cause.⁶¹⁷ There had been expectations early in the conflict that there would be significant popular uprisings in support of Charles wherever the allied armies advanced.⁶¹⁸ However, these failed to materialise, and as a result, allied commanders struggled within the inland sector to set up markets and acquire supplies in many instances.⁶¹⁹ While this lack of support spoke greatly towards the successes that the fledgling Bourbon regime had managed to achieve, it also had roots in the allies' logistical failings early in the campaigns. The attack on Cadiz and its impact upon Andalucía and transitional logistics in that region have already been discussed. However, the wider impact that it had on the inland sector greatly affected the ability of allied forces to organise markets for the purposes of resupply. Following the expedition to Cadiz, greater emphasis was placed on exploiting the events to solidify their control and reduce the risk of support switching to Charles. Pamphlets

⁶¹⁵ BL Add MS 61516, Extract from Peterborough Letter, Alicante 1706/7.

⁶¹⁶ See Juan Jose Iglesias Rodriguez, 'Bandolerismo y actitudes políticas en la Andalucía de la Guerra de Sucesión, in *Chronica Nova*, (2015) pp.211-239.

⁶¹⁷ Jose Calvo Poyato, *Guerra de Sucesión en Andalucía: Aportación al Conflicto de los Pueblos del sur de Córdoba*, (Servicio de Publicaciones, Córdoba: 1982).

⁶¹⁸ TNA 42/79, J Jones to Secretary Hedges, Whitehall, 26th April 1705.

⁶¹⁹ Examples include: BL Add MS 61504 Galway to Sunderland, Valencia 7th March 1707 and BL Add MS 61509, Methuen to Galway, Lisbon 14th July 1707.

were produced extolling the virtues of Bourbon rule and to greatly emphasise the actions of the allies during their attempts to gain logistical freedom during that campaign.⁶²⁰ Indeed, allied administrators did fear that there was a possibility of much of the population across Iberia becoming actively hostile. While support in the coastal region remained at worst for the allies ambiguous, the Andalusian abject dislike of allied military forces extended through into the inland sector population.

It is important to discuss at this juncture how supply convoys functioned in detail once the army was on the march. This was predicated by march order which has been covered in some detail previously. However, there are some supply aspects that need to be addressed. Firstly, there is how they were protected whilst on the march. Once supply convoys were moved into the hostile territory of the inland sector, it became an important concern on how and to what extent they should be protected.⁶²¹ Whilst military convoys in the coastal sector, particularly those comprising large finances or key military hardware, were given detachments for protection, the likelihood that they would be directly threatened was slim. Only far-ranging Bourbon cavalry expeditions could reach most convoys other than those close to the front lines.⁶²² By contrast, the geographical, military and political situation in the inland sector meant that convoys were at potential risk along much greater distances of their routes. The vulnerability of supply convoys forced commanders to make certain decisions regarding their protection. In other theatres, defence could have remained at a bare minimum as the convoys only had relatively short distances to make between either army camps or the fortified magazines.⁶²³ While the main waggons that formed the army supply train would be covered by various forces on the march, resupply from contractors had to be given protection details

⁶²⁰ BL Add MS 61509, Copy of Bourbon Pamphlets, 1709.

⁶²¹ BL Add MS 61504, Galway to Sunderland, Camp at Media, 13th September 1708.

⁶²² TNA SP 89/20, J Milner to Mr Addison, Lisbon 5th August 1707.

⁶²³ Martin Van Creveld, *Supplying War: Logistics from Wallenstein to Patton*, (Cambridge University Press: 2004) p.33.

of troops in addition.⁶²⁴ Where possible, commanders endeavoured to detach bodies of cavalry to act as protection, as they would be better prepared to deal quickly with threats.

Additionally, cavalry forces could act as an easing force on the supply throughput situation by making small forage forays while on the march and adding the accrued resources to the transporting waggons.⁶²⁵ The chronic shortage of cavalry was compounded by the need to keep most of what was available with the field army, thus reducing the forces available for convoy protection. The loss of cavalry within the field forces had a double impact upon their operational effectiveness, reducing both their ability to carry out reconnaissance, effectively blinding the army to enemy movements, and removing one of the major tactical tools available to them on the battlefield.⁶²⁶ Many prominent scholars have pointed to the lack of field cavalry proving to be instrumental in the allied defeat at Almansa, and this was despite directly deciding to keep what cavalry remained horsed with the army rather than sending them to cover the supply lines.⁶²⁷ Likewise, it can be argued that the lack of cavalry had proved pivotal in leading to Stanhope's surrender at Brihuega.⁶²⁸ Therefore, it was only in times of military ascendancy that allied commanders were confident that they could detach cavalry to cover supply convoys.

Instead, additional protection was usually sourced from below strength infantry and militia formations.⁶²⁹ Given the slow daily pace that most waggons progressed at, the lack of mounts for the men was not in itself a significant problem. However, infantry protection did leave the convoys

⁶²⁴ BL Add MS 61515, Earl of Peterborough Letter, Valencia, 18th February 1707.

⁶²⁵ BL Add MS 61507, Galway Instructions for Colonel Stannik, 27th July 1708.

⁶²⁶ BL Add MS 61509, Methuen to Sunderland, Lisbon, 9th July 1707.

⁶²⁷ José L. Cervera Torrejón, *La batalla de Almansa*, (Episodis De La Historia, Barcelona: 2000) p.75.

⁶²⁸ Ibid. The impact of Almansa has also been argued to have had political ramifications allowed Philip to further undermine the Fueros weakening the allied position, Francisco Javier Palao Gil, 'The Crown of Aragon in the War of the Spanish Succession', in, *Britain, Spain and the Treaty of Utrecht 1713-2013*, ed. Trevor J. Dadson and J.H. Elliott, (Legenda, Leeds: 2014) pp.26-27.

⁶²⁹ TNA SP 94/78, Duke of Argyl to Earl of Portland, Barcelona, 24th July 1711.

vulnerable in terms of reconnaissance and were unable to respond quickly to threats that might come if the convoy became strung out whilst on the march. Additionally, there was the added difficulty of the posting itself and the impact this had upon the troops. Protection of convoys was viewed by some soldiers as something of a double-edged sword, though it was a relatively safe posting and usually, depending on the supplies in convoy. In this posting, food would not be a major concern; it was, however, also a posting similar to garrison duty that was monotonous and had no access to some of the main perks of soldiery, such as loot.⁶³⁰ As a result, just as with garrisons, there was relatively high truancy and desertion rates among the soldiers posted onto these duties, particularly amongst the Portuguese troops, who were easily able to return home upon desertion.⁶³¹ The end result was that while commanders did endeavour to ensure that there were increased levels of protection for convoys in the inland sector, over and above that of the coastal sector, the impact that it had upon solidifying the logistical supply chain was minimal.

⁶³⁰ BL Add MS 61506, Methuen to Sunderland, Camp at Geurnhuea, 19th May 1709.

⁶³¹ BL Add MS 61509, Methuen to Sunderland, Lisbon 28th November 1707.

Section 2: Along the Line of Advance: Creating and Expanding the Supply Chain

The inland sector, particularly the Castilian plateau, was far removed from ideal geographical campaigning conditions. It encompassed a large part of the Iberian Peninsula which was difficult for campaigning for a number of factors. Firstly, there was the scarcity of urban centres within the Castilian plateau itself. Unlike other parts of Europe, which had been rapidly urbanising in the latter half of the 17th century, much of Spain had remained predominantly rural and underdeveloped.⁶³² This was rooted in several factors, particularly the depopulation caused by the efforts of the Spanish state during the early 17th century and few opportunities for trade expansion for the general population.⁶³³ Coupled with a minimal secondary production industry,⁶³⁴ there had been little incentive for the development of the small market towns to become larger urban centres. Besides Madrid, there were only two other towns above 10,000 inhabitants on the plateau itself, these being Valladolid and Salamanca. Additionally, the older fortified towns had smaller populations, such as Badajoz, Toledo and Ciudad Rodrigo.⁶³⁵ However, in comparison to much of the campaigning regions where allied forces had operated previously, this was a much lower density of urban settlement. This would significantly impact the allied logistical structure throughout the inland sector, which will be detailed later. In addition to this, there were also other significant core elements of the geography of the Castilian plateau, which greatly shaped the manner in which allied logistics had to be managed when they entered the inland sector.

⁶³² Klaus Weber and Antonio Irigoyen Lopez, Ports to 'New Worlds': Lisbon, Seville, Cadiz, in *The Power of Cities, The Iberian Peninsula from Late Antiquity to the Early Modern Period*, ed. Sabine Panzram, (Brill, Leiden: 2019) p.355.

⁶³³ Aragón Ruano, Álvaro and Angulo Morales, Alberto. 'The Spanish Basque Country in Global Trade Networks in the Eighteenth Century,' *International Journal of Maritime History* 25, (2013), p.161.

⁶³⁴ J.H. Elliott, *Imperial Spain, 1469-1716*, (Penguin, London: 1963), Antonio Aguilar Escobar, *Cañones de bronce para el ejército: Historia de la Real Fundición de Sevilla*, (Ministerio de Defensa, Madrid: 2010),

One of the core aspects behind much of the allied logistics in Flanders and northern Europe had been the utilisation of the river networks. Transportation along rivers was a highly effective method of supply for armies on the march. Significant quantities of supplies could be brought over longer distances and at a faster pace than waggon-based transportation. However, rivers in Iberia were not abundant and were not easily traversable for rafts or barges. Only two significant watercourses led in the general direction of the allies' ultimate target, that being Madrid. Both of these watercourses, the Duro and Tajas did not provide the form of river that was conducive for waggons along its entire length.⁶³⁶ Unlike the rivers in northern Europe, the main rivers in the inland sector were much closer to their sources. This meant allied commanders faced terrain that was difficult, even for the passage of waggons, during the best of seasons. Additionally, the roads that were present during the campaigning months were of poor quality, prone to turning into quagmires in the rains due to poor drainage. As a result, allied forces were, in many cases, forced to regress in their supply transportation methods to mule and oxen backs rather than towed waggons.⁶³⁷ Utilising these animals alone did alleviate some of the difficulties in maintaining the speed of an advance and logistical again. However, it added significant purchasing and, supply issues from other elements onto the heads of field commanders.

One of the attempts by the allied forces to circumvent the issues that they were facing organising supply within the inland sector was the reach out to British merchants within the sector to become conduits for contractor supply. The number of British merchants outside of the coastal sector always remained low. However, certain figures gravitated to the commercial opportunities offered within Madrid during the Hapsburg period such as Daniel Newland and Joseph Burch.⁶³⁸ Both worked in

⁶³⁶ BL Add MS 61504, Galway to Sunderland, Valencia, 6th March 1707.

⁶³⁷ BL Add MS 61509, Methuen to Galway, Lisbon, 27th July 1709, BL Add MS 61508, Diego De Mendoca to Methuen, January 26th 1707, and, TNA SP 109/1, Inspectors of the Army in Spain.

⁶³⁸ Examples of these men include Daniel Newland and Joseph Burch. See also J Everaert, 'Credit, argent et lettres de change. Le financement du commerce Flandres-Andalouise-Amerique', in, *Dinero, Moneda y Credito En La Monarquia Hispanica*, ed. Antonio M Bernal, (Marcial Pons, Madrid : 2000), pp.511-525

mercantile pursuits in the city with Newland seemingly most involved in cloth export. While these merchants had not been part of the official supply network previously, they were known to administrators who had Iberian connections owing to the low numbers of British merchants operating in the region. As such they were noted by prominent individuals in the coastal sector as potential conduits for the creation for a logistical network that could maintain allied forces from the central inland sector and reduce the risk of their long supply convoying with minimal magazines as they advanced towards Madrid.⁶³⁹ There were, of course, risks creating a supply system in advance of the army. Supplies accrued in any quantity would have easily been seized by Bourbon forces. Additionally, there was the issue of the loyalty of the population to the Bourbon regime, the population of the inland sector remained steadfastly loyal and opposed to almost all actions of allied citizens in the area. As a result, those that had been able to continue mercantile activities in the region had done so with the carefully built relationships with the local population. Should these contractors have been publicly aligned with allied forces, who were then driven back by Bourbon forces, then the retribution upon their business activities by the local population would have had a damming effect upon their ability to continue as businessmen in the area.⁶⁴⁰ It was these fears which explain the few and often tepid responses that the overtures to Madrid based British businessmen were returned with as the allied armies advanced into the inland sector.⁶⁴¹ During their advances, the allied forces were unable to persuade any significant merchants to take on responsibility for organising supply as they progressed into the inland sector. It was only upon the seizure of Madrid in 1706 that any significant supply could be marshalled that had not been organised within the coastal sector.

⁶³⁹ BL Add MS 61509, Methuen to Marquis Allegrate, Pallace 22nd October 1707.

⁶⁴⁰ BL Ad MS 46552, J Burch to Lord Lexington, Madrid 1st December 1713.

⁶⁴¹ Ibid.

Once the forces were on the march, they utilised two methods which were mainstays of campaigning during the early modern period, these being forage and markets. Forage was the longest established practice of military supply used by all armies since ancient times. Men would invariably seek out nearby food resources, especially in times of low supply. However, by the end of the 17th century, this system had become much more formalised.⁶⁴² Of course, there were still commonplace generalise foraging and looting. These were when the food supply or the line of march broke down, forces became separated from the organised camp systems or were beginning to feel the adverse effects of low food supplies. In these instances, parties of men would break away from the line of march and seek food amongst the local population either from homes or fields. This would be mostly in an unorganised manner,⁶⁴³ although it would be the case that officers and piquets were aware of the men slipping away in search of food, and many were deliberately acquiescent in allowing these men to return without repercussions for desertion.⁶⁴⁴ These small groups would seek out food sources, usually in one of two ways. Firstly, would be purchase from the local population. As has already been detailed, while there were shortages in the supply of pay to the troops on the front, when it was available, it was common to spend most of it on additional food. This has been highlighted in soldiers' memoirs from the time period. Many of the men who served in the armies of this period had begun to develop a feast and famine mentality. When there were local resources available and the money to purchase them, then they would spend all available funds on extravagant meals, overeating and even trading food away for favours. The process of food acquirement appears to have been perpetrated with the understanding that there would soon be periods where food supplies would be cut either due to supply difficulties or the exigencies of

⁶⁴² John Lynn, *Giant of the Grand Siecle, The French Army 1610-1715*, (Cambridge University Press: 1997) p.129.

⁶⁴³ Conway notes more organised aspects of economic destruction in later conflicts, Stephen Conway, *War and State in Mid-Eighteenth Century Britain and Ireland*, (Oxford University Press: 2006), p.87.

⁶⁴⁴ BL Add MS 61505, Galway to Sunderland, Lisbon 15th September 1708. Also known as bivouacs, *A military dictionary. Explaining all difficult terms in martial discipline, fortification, and gunnery. Useful (for all Persons that Read the Publick News, or serve in the Armies, or Militia) for the true understanding the Accounts of sieges, battels, and other warlike expeditions, which daily occur in this Time of Action. By an Officer, who served several years abroad*, (J. Nutt, London: 1702), p.18.

warfare. As a result, soldiers were prepared to take extremes when acquiring food on their own foraging journeys, expecting that times with limited supply would soon be upon them. Soldiers would often gather their pay together in small groups in order to strengthen their buying power when it came to acquiring supplies from the local population.⁶⁴⁵

One of the continual issues for the army throughout the Iberian theatre was always pay. The difficulties of ensuring regular payment for the troops have already been addressed. However, the inability of the army to provide regular pay shifted the dynamics between soldiers and local populations when they headed out to forage for food. While there were unscrupulous soldiers who, even with pay in their pockets, would still engage in looting and stealing when they were presented with the opportunity, the desperation of lack of funds increased the number of soldiers forced to take non-payment methods when gathering food.⁶⁴⁶ A commonplace method was simply to strip food from nearby fields or take unattended livestock and return with them to camp for slaughter.⁶⁴⁷ While this was the method that carried the least friction between the soldiers and the local population, it was only viable at certain times of the year and was very dependent on the composition of the army as it advanced. Food could only be taken from fields when the crops were ripe, and animals were often few and far between amongst many villages. Additionally, the size of the army vastly depleted the available resources in an area resulting in bands of soldiers having to come into contact with the local population who would have food in some form even when fields had been emptied or were still growing.⁶⁴⁸

⁶⁴⁵ Captain Robert Parker, *Memoirs*, p. 201

⁶⁴⁶ BL Add MS 61509, Alegrate to Methuen, Lisbon 28th November 1707.

⁶⁴⁷ Captain Peter Drake, *The Memoirs of Captain Peter Drake, Containing An Account of Maany Strange and Surprising Events, Which Happened to Him Through a Series of Sixty Years and Upwards*, (S. Powell, Dublin: 1755) p.81.

⁶⁴⁸ BL Add MS 61509, Galway to Unknown. Undated Unaddressed.

The inevitable conflict which arose between soldiers and civilians over the course of several campaigns became a self-perpetuating cycle that only continued to harm the vivacity of the allied supply network. After initial cases of soldiers looting and stealing supplies from civilians, the inevitable reaction from the populations of the region when faced with an advancing army was to retract and commence hiding food and becoming less forthcoming with markets and food availability.⁶⁴⁹ If the supply network was not strengthened by army commanders, then this would result in a downward spiral of significant food shortages leading to further instances of parties for soldiers forced to break away from the main force and look for supplies amongst the local population. Additionally, the added issues of maintaining a precarious supply chain meant that the army had to utilise greater amounts of their hard cash for the purposes of supply purchases which often left pay in arrears.⁶⁵⁰ The aforementioned lack of pay had the resulting impact of soldiers having more often to resort to stealing and looting in order to acquire supplies during their forays into the inland sector's civilian population. Thus, inevitably restarting the entire cycle of civilian reticence to provide supplies followed by heavy-handed responses and a destabilising of the logistical chain. It should be noted at this juncture that there were soldiers even in the most trying of times that would only seek to pay and only commence looting in the face of actual starvation though these would often be junior officers who were possessed of greater financial security through the credit which could be shared between officers.

Groups of soldiers could remain on these forage missions for some time though this was due to a number of factors. Firstly, the acquisition of supplies could not follow a strict timetable. Either formal or informal forage missions had to face several difficulties which impacted their ability to gather the resources in question, notably information regarding the landscape and available

⁶⁴⁹ Ibid.

⁶⁵⁰ TNA SP 89/19 Galway to Methuen, Camp at Salamanca, June 11th 1706.

resources within their collection area. The issues of the transit of information has already been in part addressed; however, another key area where that was impacted by the shifting patterns of information was the acquisition of adequate maps for the campaigning theatres. The field of accurate cartography was one which was still in development at the turn of the century. The finest and most accurate maps were presented as gifts to the crown and remained treasured possessions.⁶⁵¹ While these accurate renditions were often consulted by commanders before departure to the campaign theatre, they would not endanger them in the field. The result of this is that troops that were sent out on forage missions would, at best, have a limited understanding of the local geography.⁶⁵² On occasions, this could be supplemented through the use of local hired or volunteer guides which could provide knowledge of an area. However, there were two issues with the use of guides that hampered any attempt to have a complete understanding of the topography of an area. Firstly, local guides had similarly not had access to maps or an understanding of modern geography. The transit of knowledge and education was still very poor in Europe, and therefore directions and information provided by guides was based upon their understanding of geography and the local area rather than through a standardised language of cartography. As a result, distances could be misconstrued, and geographical details could often be open to interpretation. This was, of course, no fault of the guides in question but merely the ramifications of the developing understanding of maps and overall education across Europe.

Secondly, the other continual issue with the presence and utilisation of local guides for logistics was the support of the local populace. When there was limited local support, there was also a reduction in the number of guides ready to assist the army's foraging endeavours.⁶⁵³ A lack of reliable guides coming forward to assist the army compounded the issues that had already been established by the

⁶⁵¹ BL Add MS 61508, Galway to Secretary Hedges, Lisbon 1705.

⁶⁵² Norman Thrower, *Maps and Civilisation, Cartography in Culture and Society*, (University of Chicago Press, London: 2008).

⁶⁵³ BL Add MS 61507, Galway to Methuen, 13th June 1710.

lack of local support within the Inland sector. With limited numbers of civilians coming forward to provide supplies at locally organised markets or ad-hoc to the army on the march, commanders were forced to organise large forage missions, and smaller groups of soldiers would set off themselves in search of supplies.⁶⁵⁴ The lack of reliable guides resulted in these missions either taking longer, sometimes forces would be gone for several weeks,⁶⁵⁵ or returning with less than hoped for or often needed supplies. This undermined the stability of the inland sector logistics when compared to the coastal sector, where there was widespread support. For commanders in the field, there were few options available in order to improve the situation. Unable to win over the populace, their recourse was to resolve to offer larger financial incentives to guides which in turn further depleted the fragile war chest available.⁶⁵⁶ The issues with geographical knowledge continued to hamper foraging expeditions throughout the inland campaigns. There were attempts to encourage more local guides to come forward; commanders offered substantial payments to incentivise those locals who were willing to do business with the army.⁶⁵⁷

The strength of the British fiscal-military state allowed them to alleviate some of the difficulties they were facing when acquiring local guides. Galway does refer to these payments being effective in some regard, noting that it did bring some more locals forward to assist the army. However, the continual complaints about the lack of reliable information from commanders demonstrate that the leveraging of additional financial resources only reduced some of the army's difficulties.⁶⁵⁸ It can be argued that had these resources not been available at all, then the logistical situation could have been drastically worse and that arguably, the allied armies might have failed in their advances upon Madrid. However, it is also clear that financial resources could only carry allied forces so far within

⁶⁵⁴ BL Add MS 61507, Galway to Methuen, 29th March 1710.

⁶⁵⁵ Ibid.

⁶⁵⁶ BL Add MS 61509, Galway to Sunderland, Camp at Saccavin, 6th June 1710.

⁶⁵⁷ Ibid

⁶⁵⁸ Examples include BL Add MS 61507 Galway to Sunderland, Lisbon 13th May 1709 and BL Add MS 61509, Galway to Methuen, Undated Unaddressed.

hostile territory and that many Castilians were unwilling to provide assistance to allied forces as they advanced.

Section 3: The Officer Corps and The Internal Credit System

The officer corps of the allied forces were comprised, by and large, of the sons of gentlemen and the monied classes within Dutch, British and Portuguese social structure. While the artillery trains and, to some extent, the proto engineer detachments of western armies were beginning to be officered through meritocracy, the bulk of the infantry and cavalry command structure was a system of connections and wealth.⁶⁵⁹ Commissions were purchased for younger sons, and promotion through the ranks was often driven by familial connections, either within the army or at court, and additionally, furthered by the financial resources available to the individual's family.⁶⁶⁰ A large group of the officers for the army belonged to a connected class within British society. Many of the families of the officers were connected through current social and historic bonds, which translated into social links once those officers arrived in the theatre. Many of these connections were also exerted prior to their arrival in Iberia.⁶⁶¹ There has already been significant research into the nature of the British aristocratic system and how it functioned as a method of interpersonal relations as a facilitator for promotion with the armed forces.⁶⁶²

Many of the posts within the army and, in particular, the mid-tier command structure were the direct by-product of personal communications between family members and the army administration. A sizeable percentage of the communications received by individuals such as

⁶⁵⁹ Anthony Bruce, *The Purchase System in the British Army, 1660-1871*, (Royal Historical Society, London: 1980), and, Neil Sanghvi, *Gentlemen of Leisure or Vital Professionals? The Officer Establishment of the British Army, 1689-1739*, (Oxford DPhil: 2017) and, Matthew Smith Anderson, *War and Society in Europe under the Ancien Regime*, (Fontana, London: 1988).

⁶⁶⁰ I.P. Burton, 'The Committee of Council at the War Office, An Experiment in Cabinet Government under Anne', *The Historical Journal*, iv, (1961) p.82.

⁶⁶¹ Payments made to merchants for services rendered, TNA WO 54/61.

⁶⁶² See works such as, Martyn Bennett, 'The Officer Corps and Army Commands in the British Isles 1620-1680, in *Chivalric Ethos and the Development of Military Professionalism*, ed. D.J.B. Trim, (Brill, Leiden: 2003), Hannah Smith, 'The Army, Provincial Urban Communities and Loyalist Cultures in England, 1714-50' in *Journal for Early Modern History* (15), (2011). And Anthony Clayton, *The British Officer. Leading the British Army from 1660 to the Present* (Pearson, Harlow: 2006).

Methuen were directly related to the appointment of officer positions within the Iberian forces.⁶⁶³

While these familial connections were fully intertwined within the British and allied social and military systems, they formed an additional key layer, within Iberia, in influencing supply and logistics. Some officers with available funds would seek to provide for their men with additional supplies purchased ad hoc from the local supply area. As hard currency was a finite commodity whilst on campaign, this practice often led to officers being without the currency to maintain their standards of living. It was expected of officers to maintain a lifestyle becoming of their position within the social structures.⁶⁶⁴ As such, officers were to adhere to a number of social norms whilst on campaign, which, although beneath the standards of living, would have been the norm back in England but still far above the levels of the common soldiery. Officers were expected to maintain a number of servants or orderlies whose numbers usually correlated to their rank within the armed forces.⁶⁶⁵ These servants would be paid for from the officer's own pocket with wages and would be provided with supplies through that officer's allocation from the army's logistical train.⁶⁶⁶ These supplies were allocated on a uniform system according to rank, with army commanders provided with 100 ration allocations over and above that of the ordinary private soldier.⁶⁶⁷ If we take the ration allocation which was provided to officers for servants then there could have been upwards of 700 with the army at any one time. In addition to these servants and supplies, Officers on campaign were expected to maintain a standard of living in keeping with their station within society, although not at the level required at home. Nevertheless, it was a costly undertaking that peer pressure demanded. To that end, officers would usually attempt to travel with large personal baggage trains in addition to those of the main army logistical supply network.⁶⁶⁸ These trains would contain items such as expansive tents, a wide wardrobe of clothes for all occasions and other personal items to

⁶⁶³ TNA SP 42/67 Secretary Hedges to John Methuen, Whitehall, 1703.

⁶⁶⁴ TNA SP 41/3 H.T John to Secretary Hedges, Whitehall, 30th April 1705.

⁶⁶⁵ BL Add MS 61527, John Mead to Chetwynd, Barcelona, 31st March 1708.

⁶⁶⁶ Based upon the ration system

⁶⁶⁷ TNA SP 109/1, Inspections for Army Payments, 1708.

⁶⁶⁸ BL Add MS 61527, John Chetwynd to Sunderland, Genoa 16th June 1708.

provide comfort of living. These items could range from personal jewellery to heavy objects such as wardrobes and feather beds.⁶⁶⁹

These baggage trains were expected to be maintained, in part from the officer's own funds but also from the logistical supplies of the army (especially in regards to the supply of the pack oxen and horses).⁶⁷⁰ This expansive style of living for officers (particularly regimental colonels and above) could present a range of difficulties for the army. The added strain upon the baggage train itself has already been noted; however, it was upon the overall financial resources of the campaigning force that also were impacted through officers' style of life. The costs of maintaining social standing within the armed forces were often over and above the available capital of those individuals. In part, this was due to the nature of promotion and commission acquisition within the armed forces at this time. As has already been discussed, the system of commission purchasing often fell upon the 2nd or 3rd sons of the family rather than those who would be expected to inherit the majority of the familial holdings. These men would often be purchased commissions by the family as a means of accruing prestige and furthering their standing. The costs of maintenance for the rank scaled dependant on the seniority of that position, with higher ranks expected to maintain more servants. Resultingly men from families who had attempted to purchase a position that would have been over and above their expected financial level were often unable to easily maintain their standard of life expected from rank. While they were supported through allowances, these would often not be sufficient to provide for all the costs that they would face over the course of the campaign.⁶⁷¹

⁶⁶⁹ Ibid.

⁶⁷⁰ Ibid.

⁶⁷¹ BL Add MS 61527, John Chetwynd to Daniel Burch, Turin 27th February 1707.

The result of this was the presence of an internal credit system developing amongst the officer corps of allied forces. Officers who were in receipt of larger financial resources would provide loans to those officers who were facing difficulties in maintaining their servants or baggage train.⁶⁷² These loans would often be in the form of a credit extension rather than hard currency due to the volatility of that resource whilst on campaign. The lack of hard currency has already seen some discussion; however, it was one of the defining factors behind the creation of the internal credit economy. Whilst officers could draw on the war chest, using their position to receive advances on pay when needed,⁶⁷³ the war chest was often depleted, and the army would begin to offer pay in arrears and credit notes. To that end, those officers who were in possession of larger financial resources and, where possible, contacts within Iberia could seek to obtain credit for their own and others living costs from within the mercantile sector in Spain and Portugal. Merchants and bankers could provide the credit that was needed for officers' purchases, often directly to the contracted supplies rather than passing the notes back to the army in encampment and from there being sent on for exchange and purchase.⁶⁷⁴ While the internal credit system was not a constant nor dramatic aspect of allied financial arrangements, it does, however, raise some important discussion points regarding the fiscal-military and contractor state and the social history of the British army in particular.

Considering the social history of the British army, the internal credit network highlights some illuminating aspects of the social pressures and interpersonal relationships between officers of various ranks within the allied forces. While there has been significant research regarding the commission purchase system and of the social structures of the English gentry itself,⁶⁷⁵ in contrast, there has been little work carried out on how this system could come to impact the financial and

⁶⁷² CP, Earl of Peterborough to Lady Peterborough, Undated.

⁶⁷³ BL Add MS 61507, Galway to Officers General, January 1708.

⁶⁷⁴ BL Add MS 61507, Galway to Sunderland, Unaddressed, February 17th 1708.

⁶⁷⁵ See. A.P.C Bruce, *The Purchase System in the British Army, 1660-1871*, (Royal Historical Society, London: 1980).

social structures within the army itself. The presence of an internal credit system, however, ad hoc highlights the significance of social connections and interpersonal relationships between officers of all ranks within the army. Army officers demonstrated that much of the social strata of home society was mirrored within the military itself. Moreover, it is demonstrated the value of interpersonal relations between officers. If connections and contacts were not formulated and maintained whilst on campaign, then there would have been no apparatus in place to allow for the creation of credit and loans between officers to fund their existence within the army. By building from scratch or developing existing familial connections upon arrival in the campaign theatre, officers were able to create a network of contacts that provided fiscal security for the officers on campaign. Without this network of credit provided through social connections then, it is likely that officers would have faced destitution and have attempted to resign from their duties and return home.⁶⁷⁶ This was a common occurrence throughout the 18th century, where officers who could not finance themselves or did not like their postings (often this was due to being unable to maintain expected standards of life) would return home for extended periods of time.⁶⁷⁷ Although it was a common occurrence, it could have dramatic effects for the integrity of army command structure. Missing senior officers would need to be replaced by either their subordinates or by other commanders within the army itself.⁶⁷⁸ Either such outcome placed additional strains upon the energies of those remaining officers and required additional efforts on their parts to organise and prepare command and logistical structures in order to be at operational effectiveness for engagements. Whilst officers leaving to return home was more common in garrisons than within active campaigning forces, this was often due to the longer-term nature of garrison placements when officers would be more likely to burn through the resources at their disposal and received less regular pay.⁶⁷⁹

⁶⁷⁶ TNA, SP 41/4, List of Officers Absent and their Reasons. 1712.

⁶⁷⁷ Ibid, compared with TNA SP 41/3, 1707.

⁶⁷⁸ BL Add MS 61587, J Morriss to Early of Sunderland, Ranleigh at anchor, July 7th 1707.

⁶⁷⁹ BL Add MS 61509, Methuen to Sunderland, Lisbon July 19th 1707.

The presence of an internal credit network that was proactive and had liquid assets within the armies operating in Iberia, therefore, had a direct impact on the logistical functionality of the allied forces on campaign. Without its presence, there would have been much greater debts amongst officers, who unable to easily access home funds would be left destitute. The only recourse for these men was to return home, which was the action many officers took who were in significant debt. The presence of an internal credit system was therefore of paramount importance in maintaining the army's command structure. Additionally, the continued ability of officers to be able to purchase supplies ensured that the soldiers were in a better position than otherwise would have been the case; it also relieved some of the pressures that would have been felt upon the local population had soldiers been unable to obtain resources on forage missions.

Section 4: Supply on the Retreat, Extricating from the Inland Sector

One of the major supply requirements that were felt during the inland sector campaigns was the issue of supplying a retreating army. A full army retreat was never fully factored into most offensive and logistical plans when commanders were preparing for the advance during the spring or autumn campaign. During this period, one of the common features of warfare was the avoidance of decisive battles and a preference for small advances and withdrawals.⁶⁸⁰ In particular, this became why urban centres and depots formed the main preoccupation in the minds of both commanders and administrators. The result of a campaign strategy focused upon advances to and from depots within the operational sector was a logistical preparedness built around supply for only limited parts of the entire campaign and the requirement of a slow pace of advance or withdrawal to allow for the repositioning of the relevant supplies. This system made logical sense from a planning perspective, given the structured nature of warfare in the period. There were logical reasons for an avoidance of decisive battles, while sieges and manoeuvres could be planned, and the slow pace of armies in the period resulted in limited surprises due to poor reconnaissance, there were, however, little in the way of contingencies for drastic retreats almost or wholly out of a supply sector. These forms of retreats were what allied forces unfortunately faced during the inland sector, driven in part by their failings upon taking Madrid.

Allied commanders were faced with two options when selecting a route for retreat once that option had been selected by the high command. Firstly, there was the option of returning along the route

⁶⁸⁰ Ostwald Jamel, *The Decisive Battle of Ramillies, Prerequisites for Decisiveness in Early Modern Warfare*, (Journal of Military History Vol 64 Iss, 3, Lexington: 2000), see, *An impartial enquiry into the Duke of Ormonde's conduct, in the Campagne of 1712. With a plan of the situation of the Confederate and French armies when the Duke refus'd to fight, as it was drawn on the Spot by General C-n; and Remarks made thereon by Mr. Maynwaring*, (J. Roberts, London: 1715) p.7, as an example of commanders actually under orders to avoid, Russel F Weigley. *The Age of Battles: The Quest for Decisive Warfare from Breitenfeld to Waterloo*, (Indiana University Press, London: 2004).

that allied forces had initially advanced. Secondly, there was the possibility of retreating along new routes that could be selected and supplied similarly to the creation of the initial supply lines, though invariably on a much shorter timeframe. The first option, that of a return along the initial advance, possessed many advantages and hindrances for allied forces. In the first instance, there was the advantage of the allies existing supply network remaining in place from the advance. Magazines set up along the line of march had supplies that had been part of the transportation network to the army's current inland locale.⁶⁸¹

Furthermore, returning along the route shortened the distance for waggons, reducing the dissonance in the supply timelines that had been caused by the poor network of the roads and the hostile movements of the enemy. A reduced dissonance would smooth the allied retreat, which had been suffering from the longer distances required at the zenith of the inland advance. Finally, these routes allowed for the continued usage of contractors who might not have otherwise been able to create links through a new marching direction.

However, returning along the original line of march presented numerous challenges for allied forces. Firstly, and most prominently was the difficulty of land wastage. The passage of an army invariably damaged the availability of foodstuffs and many of the additional resources required for the army.⁶⁸² The limited self-sufficiency of most rural populations, especially those in Iberia, reduced the flexibility of local agricultural systems to handle the passage of an army in its first instance and certainly were incapable of acting as a supply draw point for the reinforcements and convoys which followed. As has already been discussed, military consumption whilst on the march was of a much

⁶⁸¹ An example being Gualahara, *Account of the Earl of Galway's conduct in Spain and Portugal*, (John Baker, London: 1711) p.71.

⁶⁸² BL Add MS 61507, Galway to Methuen, Lisbon, December 10th 1707.

higher calorie requirement than in garrison, and even when military forces brought large supply convoys with them on the march, it was still necessary for commanders to send out forage missions into the local area,⁶⁸³ alongside the general low-level foraging that would be carried out by the common soldiery. As a result, it was common for areas through which an army marched to become quickly exhausted of any surplus of available resources.⁶⁸⁴ Exhaustion of local areas was often commented upon by commanders in their letters, making reference to the impact it was having upon troops and the army's resources as a whole.⁶⁸⁵ Secondly, return along the same route also exacerbated relations with the local civilian population. Since relations with the civilian population were strained at the best of times within the inland sector, retreat along the same route would expose the army to the same civilians who had been reluctant to provide support during the initial advance. Additionally, the soldiers during a retreat were far more prone to engaging in hostile activities against the local civilians.⁶⁸⁶ In part, this was drawn out of frustration from the losses that had been the cause of the withdrawal in the first place. Furthermore, soldiers were in a much greater state of desperation for food during a retreat. As such, there was always going to be a sizeable increase in looting and desertion along the retreating route. Commanders were aware of the impact this would have upon the local population, whom they needed to be as assistive as possible given the difficulties they were already facing.⁶⁸⁷ A civilian population that was actively hostile due to the actions of the retreating army would only compound those issues. Overall, despite these issues, however, retreat along the original route was still a popular choice for commanders throughout the conflict. However, this was often only when the advances into the inland sector had only been relatively short distances; when faced with the full retreats from Madrid, the direction invariably shifted due to a number of factors.

⁶⁸³ BL Add MS 61505, Galway to Sunderland, Elveros, 16th April 1709.

⁶⁸⁴ Ibid.

⁶⁸⁵ See additionally, BL Add MS 61505, Galway, Camp at Elvas, 22nd April 1709, and BL Add MS 61504, Galway to Sunderland, Lisbon 15th June 1710.

⁶⁸⁶ BL Add MS 61507, Galway to Methuen, Camp at Bellping, 14th August 1707, and, BL Add MS 61504, Galway to Sunderland, Barcelona 11th February 1708.

⁶⁸⁷ BL Add MS 61504, Stanhope to Galway, Tarragona 13th January 1708.

Return along a different route to that which had been followed on the advance was usually taken because of a combination of two factors. Firstly, this was due to the direct actions of the enemy forces, which forced the decision to engage in a retreat in the first place and then impacted the route which would be taken. Following the captures of Madrid, Bourbon commanders did not become complacent. Many, notably the Duke of Berwick, spent the weeks in which allied forces were attempting to consolidate their position,⁶⁸⁸ actively raising additional forces and manoeuvring to threaten allied supply lines in the region. As has already been discussed, allied logistics by the time it reached the central inland sector were stretched and therefore highly reliant upon the long and poorly protected transport routes. Bourbon forces movements towards allied logistical lines precipitated the withdrawal. Once this had begun, however, allied forces were forced to divert away from their original route. Bourbon forces had been able to manoeuvre faster than expected and were causing the breakdown of logistics of the march,⁶⁸⁹ coupled with allied issues of movement, in part due to communication difficulties; allied commanders were forced to make the decision to retreat along a new line of march. Bourbon forces had the ability to strike along any part of the logistical chain, which, given its fragility, could cease to function, greatly curtailing allied forces' ability to continue with any operational effectiveness. This led to the logical step for allied commanders, notably Stanhope, to instead shift the line of retreat and quickly create logistical operations on short notice.⁶⁹⁰ Return by a new route not only solved the issue initially of threatening Bourbon movements but additionally, the exhaustion of supplies which would have impacted return along the original line of march. Furthermore, those commanders that had been defeated in battle were often limited in their choices regarding retreats.

⁶⁸⁸ Francis, *Peninsular*, p.233, and, Charles Petrie, *The Marshal Duke of Berwick*, (Eyre, London: 1953) p.195.

⁶⁸⁹ BL Add MS 61504, Galway to Sunderland, Tarragona 11th December 1707.

⁶⁹⁰ Francis, *Peninsular*, p.323.

Commanders were confident that they could make the return journey safely and effectively with additional support from the coastal sector.⁶⁹¹ The rapid organisation required certain decisions to be made and elements to be prepared while the army began its march. As a result, lines of march would be predetermined, and logistics would then be required to attempt to match as close as possible this route. Allied commanders firstly made urgent communications to administrators in the coastal sector detailing the major settlements they were intended to reach along the new line of march.⁶⁹² These supplies would be reorganised from the existing contracts where possible; however, administrators often struggled to find the necessary waggons and draft animals to shift supplies from the existing chain easily.⁶⁹³ In part, this was due to the requirement of emptying existing depots that had been set up along the transitional boundary between the two sectors and moving them towards border towns better situated to supply the armies' withdrawal. These new supply points would not have the time required to be transformed into entirely secure locales but rather were maintained in hastily hired warehouses.⁶⁹⁴ Additionally, some contractors were unable to take supplies along to the new locations, and additional capital had to be located alongside new contractors on short notice. In practice, despite available credit, it was not possible within the timeframes to achieve this, hence in part the supply difficulties faced by the withdrawing allied forces.

The allied commanders in the field also sought to create additional contracts to supply their initial line of retreat. These were often single-issue bulk purchases of supplies determined to reach a particular camp or town, as it was understood that once they have successfully withdrawn far enough through the inland sector, then their supply chain would once again be linked to that

⁶⁹¹ BL Add MS 61504, Galway to Sunderland, Camp at Alcya, 16th April 1707.

⁶⁹² BL Add MS 61504, Galway to Methuen, Tortosa 27th May 1707. TNA SP 89/19, Stanhope to Methuen, Alcya, 13th May 1707.

⁶⁹³ BL Add MS 61504, Methuen to Galway, Lisbon 12th June 1707.

⁶⁹⁴ BL Add MS 61526, Chetwynd to Sunderland, Turin 16th November 1707.

running from the coastal sector.⁶⁹⁵ Galway and Stanhope did make direct attempts to seek out contractors but had little success in this regard. There are certainly complaints from them regarding the lack of available resources to draw upon as part of the withdrawal. The reasons for this lack of contractors appears to mainly stem from the poor relations that allied forces already had in the region. These sour relations were amplified by the Bourbon forces' ascendancy as they withdrew. Those civilians and merchants who had been assisting the allied forces were reluctant to continue providing supplies and business, with the allies' successes appearing close to ending and being replaced by their opponents. There are several lamentations within the letters coming back from officers in the field of local civilian bodies who had been amenable to allied requirements during the advance, who were now either not responding to entreaties for aid from allied commanders or were actively now inhibiting allied attempts to gather supplies for the retreat.

Furthermore, the short timescale also impacted the ability of commanders to locate contractors. Partially, this was due to simple logistics; contractors were unable to gather the necessary supplies and transport them while the army was already in transit. As has already been demonstrated, contracts of the period required significant investment in time before becoming operational. The sudden movement of the armed forces and the pressing timescale resulted in limited local contracts being formed during the retreat. Additionally, the retreating forces also suffered from a lack of available credit. The extended advance into the inland sector had depleted much of the credit resources of the allied administrators and facilitators of supply. Bills had to be processed and passed along the chain, and similar to the issues that were being faced by the local civilian bodies, there was also the present threat of retreat, causing a lack of payment.⁶⁹⁶ As allied forces withdrew from the inland sector, their financial networks likewise were forced to contract. Having been extended

⁶⁹⁵ TNA SP 89/19, Methuen to Hedges, Lisbon 14th October 1707.

⁶⁹⁶ TNA SP 89/19, Methuen to Sunderland, Lisbon 1st November 1707.

through the towns seized along the line of advance, with administrators passing along credit bills and communications to those able to accept and translate them into effective funds and resources, these networks were buckled and split by rapid retreat.

As communication broke down, the retreat followed new lines driven either by immediate resource need or tactical necessity, the credit networks vital to the logistical network's continued integrity were unable to quickly adapt to the new reality.⁶⁹⁷ While administrators within the coastal sector were willing to raise additional funds and send them forward towards contractors operating the transitional areas between the coastal and inland sectors,⁶⁹⁸ these were never fully materialised into new contracts to supply the retreating forces.⁶⁹⁹ Despite attempts by administrators and the financial strength of the fiscal-military contractor system, it was not designed for rapidity and was inflexible to emergency situations. The result was that commanders were forced to fall back onto a much stronger forage and strip methodology. During both Stanhope and Galway's withdraws from Madrid, a much stronger focus was placed by senior command upon the organising of foraging missions.⁷⁰⁰ These were sent with the express purpose of gathering as much food and supplies as was possible in a short space of time, regardless of the impact that this would have upon local bodies.

⁶⁹⁷ Payments for contracts remained unfulfilled for several years after the allies had vacated the inland sector. *A report from the Commissioners appointed to take, examine, and state the publick accompts of the kingdom, and to determine the debts due to the army, with a state of the expence of the late war*, (Eighteenth Century Collections Online: 1714)

[link.gale.com/apps/doc/CW0104704453/ECCO?u=oxford&sid=gale_marc&xid=433624ee&pg=1] p.26.

⁶⁹⁸ BL Add MS 61526, Chetwynd to Sunderland, Turin 28th January 1708, and, TNA SP89/19, Methuen to Sunderland, Lisbon 18th July 1712.

⁶⁹⁹ BL Add MS 61504, Galway to Methuen, Tortosa 16th May 1707.

⁷⁰⁰ Ibid and BL Add MS 61509, Stanhope to Methuen, Caba de Visco 6th September 1710.

Retreats also saw a far more significant proportion of stragglers and unauthorised foraging ventures than had been present during the advances into the interior.⁷⁰¹ As the supply network invariably shattered under the pressure of the rapid withdrawal, soldiers more often were forced to abandon their reliance on the traditional supply methods and took matters into their own hands. The breakdown of army cohesion was particularly acute following the outcome of battles fought during the retreat. When armies began to draw up for battle, it was common practice to leave the majority of the equipment at a camp within easy travel distance from the proposed battleground. These would include the available supplies that they were currently transporting, alongside waggons and tents. Additionally, the camp would also contain, importantly, the baggage and personal possessions of the officers alongside the war chest used for pay and credit and the army's only firm supply of hard currency.⁷⁰² In the case of a rout following the end of a battle, it was common practice for enemy soldiers to attempt to reach the camp to loot these supplies and expensive items. This was particularly the case with cavalry forces, who were often prone to vacating the battle while it was still going on in order to acquire the lion's share of this loot.⁷⁰³ However, it caused additional difficulties within the inland sector that were not so impactful in other conflict theatres. The precarious supply situation became critical with the loss of supplies and currency from camp due to looting following battles.⁷⁰⁴ While these supplies did not directly improve the position for the Bourbon forces, their unavailability to allied forces as they regrouped and fell back in many ways led to the situation in which allied forces found themselves as they arrived back into the inland sector.

⁷⁰¹ Some accounts point to up to 8000 men being lost this way on the retreat to Valencia, though this is likely too high, *An impartial enquiry into the management of the war in Spain, : by the ministry at home, and into the conduct of those generals, to whose care the same has been committed abroad. Collected from many original letters and councils of war, never published before. Together with an account of the several embarkations, both of British and foreign troops, that have been sent to Spain or Portugal for the support of the present war. And a distribution of the annual sums granted by Parliament, and applied to those services*, (John Morphew, London: 1712) p.132.

⁷⁰² See Galway's concern regarding the presence of the war chest. BL Add MS 61504, Galway to Das Minas, 13th March 1707.

⁷⁰³ BL Add MS 61504, Galway to Methuen, Alcyrá 14th April 1707.

⁷⁰⁴ Ibid.

Section 5: Prisoners and Organisation

It is important to pay some attention to the forces that surrendered at both the major inland sector battles. It was common practice during this period to not imprison soldiers who surrendered. In part, this was because the facilities and logistical structures were not in place to take care of any large body of enemy troops that were captured.⁷⁰⁵ The ideas of nationalism becoming the driving factors for soldiers and the premise of the rights of prisoners for common soldiers were still only just starting to form within the European military thinking and certainly not that it was the duty of the captor to provide for them, rather the opposite was true.⁷⁰⁶ For senior officers, of course, there had been established principles that had been followed, within reason, since the late medieval period. Those that were taken prisoner would either be exchanged with men of similar rank that the opposing force had captured, or they would simply be ransomed back to their own side through some familial payments. The return of high-ranking officers from their own side or the option of large payments had always provided enough incentive for armed forces to usually follow the expected rules and to release those that had been captured with relatively little fuss. Lower-ranking officers were often returned following similar procedures to that of the common soldiery, where available payments would be made on an agreed rate between the governments in question.⁷⁰⁷ However, these finances and procedures were not always available and became complicated when faced with the multi-national make-up of allied armies.

Usually, soldiers who surrendered after a battle were presented with two choices by the opposing army. Firstly, there was the choice to change sides and to join with them to fight in the opposing army. Given the aforementioned only proto stirrings of nationalism, this was not an unreasonable nor often rejected option for many of the soldiery. Indeed, for many soldiers, factors such as religion

⁷⁰⁵ Aaron Graham, Huguenots, Jacobites, Prisoners and the Challenge of Military Remittances, in *Early Modern Warfare, War & Society*, 40:3, (2021), pp. 171-187.

⁷⁰⁶ Ibid.

⁷⁰⁷ Caleb Karges, 'Great Britain and Prisoners of War in the Spanish Succession', (Unpublished Conference Paper, Society for Military History 2019).

were far more important in determining allegiance.⁷⁰⁸ Similarly, soldiers were often drawn to the notion of better conditions than they would receive in comparison to that under their own forces. Particular effort was often made, when prisoners were taken in this manner, to provide them with food and drink provided and promises of regular pay.⁷⁰⁹ As a result, for many of the allied soldiers captured during the inland campaigns, particularly Irish and Portuguese soldiers, whose religion placed them with more in common with Bourbon forces, joining the army which had captured them was the logical route to take, and many selected this path.⁷¹⁰ The other option that was commonly available to soldiers captured following battles was release under oath. Many captured soldiers who either did not wish to join the opposing army or, more commonly, when there were not the resources to accommodate them would be released and marched back to their own territory within a short space of time following their capture.⁷¹¹ Both sides during The War of the Spanish Succession took part in this practice. There were two benefits to utilising this method of prisoner return. Firstly, for relatively little expense, it was possible to get captured soldiers removed from your own logistical network and passed back into the supply system of the opposing forces, practically reducing the costs and relieving difficulties that were currently being felt and would only be exacerbated had these prisoners remained within the logistical parameters of their captors. Secondly, the return of prisoners through this method reduced the total size of enemy forces while still preventing additional costs to be faced by their own logistical network. This was due to the oath that returning prisoners would be made to sign before the agreement came into effect. These varied depending on the circumstances, but in essence, took the form of a contractual agreement that the soldiers would be returned to their own territory, usually with some of their equipment intact, in return they agreed that they would not take up arms against their captors for a stated length of time.⁷¹²

⁷⁰⁸ Lotte Jensen, 'The Roots of Nationalism', in *The Roots of Nationalism, National Identity Formation in Early Modern Europe: 1600-1815*, ed. Lotte Jensen, (Amsterdam University Press, Amsterdam: 2016).

⁷⁰⁹ BL Add MS 61506, Report on Costs of Prisoners, 1707-1708.

⁷¹⁰ BL Add MS 61506, Stanhope to Methuen, Villa Costata, 6th December 1710.

⁷¹¹ BL Add MS 61504, Galway to Methuen, Valencia 7th March 1707.

⁷¹² Ibid.

The time that would be required for men not to take up arms against their captors would vary but appears on average to be at a minimum of 6 months and never appears to have been longer than two years.⁷¹³ These agreements would often be made under the stipulation that the capturing force returned the prisoners to their own lines, and for that period, they would subsist on the logistical chain of their captors. There is little evidence to demonstrate how effective these agreements were in preventing captured men returning as combatants for the duration of the contract. As has already been discussed during the Home sector, it was common practice amongst soldiers to split from agreed recruiting contracts for their own financial gain. As a result, it appears highly unlikely that soldiers remained out army service while under the contract for prisoner release. There are two main reasons why this would be very unlikely. Firstly, soldiers were reliant upon the wages that they were paid while in service. For many of the allied soldiery, it was the sole reason they had joined up with the recruiting parties, the promise of pay and regular food. The army was not willing to retain soldiers on the books for periods of years where they were not active within the combat zone, and as a result, those who would return to England would be forced, either to find gainful employment elsewhere or enlist with another regiment, which remained possible given the poor bookkeeping of the army recruiting services.⁷¹⁴ On the other hand, there is evidence to suggest that the army was willing to overlook the contract of exchange once the soldiers had returned to them. Men would be commonly redeployed into other formations and sent off on the next campaign. While this practice flew in the face of the agreement made between the two sides, it was however practised by both the Bourbons and the allies.

Prisoner release agreements lead to an important discussion upon the nature of contractual arrangements during the period. They demonstrate that it was economically and logistically impossible to maintain prisoners in any large numbers, as would become more common towards the

⁷¹³ Examples of discussions on these contracts include, BL Add MS 61527, Shovell to Methuen, Association, Lisbon River, 16th May 1706 and BL Add MS 61509, Methuen to Sunderland, Lisbon 6th December 1707.

⁷¹⁴ TNA SP 49/19 Granville to Queen Anne, Whitehall April 11th 1711.

end of the century. However, simply releasing was not an option, there needed to be some form of exchange made in order to legitimise their release. Even though there was an understanding that these agreements would not be kept in their entirety, it was viewed as being necessary to make the agreements before any release of prisoners could take place. It can be argued that many contracts that were put into place during the war were made to maintain the expectations of the warfare rather than be adhered to in any binding manner. It is unclear if this pragmatism was prompted by an understanding of the fragility of their logistical positions, with the arrival of additional prisoners of war, or if this was due to the early development of prisoners of war as a concept that will develop and come to fruition during the century. Despite this, prisoner contracts remained a limited focus of administrators throughout the Iberian theatre. With a lack of large scale battles, the limited numbers of prisoners taken were quickly passed back or absorbed into the relevant armies. However, another trend highlighted by this is the contractual nature of warfare during The War of the Spanish Succession.

The research that has been conducted throughout this project has demonstrated the prevalence of contracts as the basis for operations through all levels of the military during a conflict. All major decisions which were seen to have a transactional nature were expected to have a contract of some form. Alliances and subsidies were agreed via a contractual arrangement, so too were logistical supplies and prisoner exchange; even the surrender of fortresses was usually handled with a contract. During this period, it was clearly understood that the contract was the most viable and expected option to create and solidify any agreement. It was clearly viewed that interactions were always of a transactional nature, even those that were in the form of geopolitics. Alliances and prisoner surrender are excellent examples of this transactional requirement. It was understood that for anything to be agreed between various parties, both sides had to contribute to the arrangement. Even Britain's subsidy treaties were not performed out of purely altruistic intentions. Rather, funds

were transferred in yearly subsidies in exchange for fixed and contracted military formations made by the state receiving those subsidies. The early 18th century's warfare was dominated by these contracts in all forms and shows the prevalence of the contractor state as a means of state organisation, utilising contractual agreements for all aspects of the military. However, what is also demonstrated by these contracts, particularly those of prisoner exchange, is the understanding that while contracts were required, this was not because they were wholly reliable as a method for ensuring the stated outcomes of the agreement. The evidence shows clearly that the expectation with many contracts during the Iberian theatre was that the signatories would endeavour to follow them to a certain extent but that there was a reasonable leeway where parts of the contract would not be fulfilled. While administrators might complain about a lack of adherence to a particular contract, it was never to the extent that action needed to be taken in ramifications for those lapses. Instead, the parties need only be gently reminded of their obligations under the specific agreement. The early modern understanding of contracts and their expectations gives an important insight into the thought process behind the development of state and military mechanisms.

The notable rise in the usage of contractors for tasks and rising bureaucracy and financial procedures interconnects with the prevalence of the contract as the primary method of formal state interaction. Rather than being reliant on actions to be taken with a financial incentive, contracts allowed for a measure of forward planning that would have been otherwise impossible in much of the day-to-day operations of the Early Modern state. Furthermore, the move towards more contracts within military logistical planning is closely linked to the growth of fiscal-military institutions. The network established of revenue-raising and administration was better suited to contractual-based arrangements than direct cash payments. Despite larger revenue-raising capacity, there remained a consistent issue with low amounts of hard currency, particularly when armies were operating at such extreme distances from their home financial establishments. As a result, the fiscal-military state was best designed to operate through the medium of contracts for its logistical requirements. By utilising contracts, it allowed for time and organisation of credit and the payment of costs that

otherwise could not have been achieved through direct cash payments. Additionally, contracts allowed for preparation by placing existing and future commitments within a set cost; it allowed administrators to be better prepared in accessing the fiscal-military network that would otherwise have been the case if they had been reliant upon the fickler nature of market payments and direct costs.

Conclusions

Overall, the inland sector demonstrates several key components of the allied logistical network and how it operated at the greatest extent from home, especially under the most trying of conditions. Clearly, from the evidence, it can be seen that allied logistics were at their most precarious during this geographical sector. Many of these issues were drawn from the inherent difficulties within the Iberian inland sector itself. The more hostile populations prevented much of the normal logistical system to be effectively implemented. The inability to win over the support of the local populations restricted the access that allied commanders had to both the localised markets and resources that would have been expected during the march and the access to willing contractors for providing the longer-term resources that would have been needed for a successful advance and holding of the inland sector. Additionally, allied forces were then forced to rely heavily on the extended logistics chains that ran back into the coastal sector. During the planning phases prior to advances into the inland sector, commanders and administrators appeared confident that successful operations could still be carried out despite these issues, which were to an extent understood and highlighted. However, despite planning and preparation, allied forces were still unable to leverage these plans to the fullest extent due to numerous factors.

The marches themselves were plagued with difficulties that hampered many attempts to successfully take and hold territory within the inland sector. Firstly, there was the continual issue with communication which allied forces struggled to overcome. Communication between the two sections of the coastal sector prevented the split allied forces from easily operating in tandem, causing delays to advances and disruption to the organisation of magazines and transportation arrangements. Additionally, the communication between the armies once the march had begun also added to the difficulties compounded by the hostile county and geography. The geography of the campaign sector and the poor level of local knowledge and maps additionally placed restrictions on the effectiveness of the allied logistical network. With rough terrain and limited forage, allied

commanders were forced to follow very fixed routes on their advances which rapidly became exhausted, reducing the availability of supplies for the forces. Furthermore, the lack of terrain understanding hampered the larger foraging missions, which were required to be sent out to mitigate the issues that were being faced due to a lack of local support. Despite these issues, however, allied forces were able to create enough logistical throughput to successfully make significant forays into the inland sector and, on two occasions, successfully advance and take Madrid.

The period when allied forces were ostensibly in greatest control was also the most precarious. The distance from safe bases within the inland sector meant that supplies were constantly at low levels, and as a result, there were large amounts of wastage and desertion. While some of these were mitigated through the better political position that encouraged more contractors, the lack of any major civilian contractors to take up the army's requirements was not something that could be solved during the campaign. As a result, it became a pressing issue for commanders and administrators to attempt to solve, and when they were unable to do so, the only recourse was to prepare for a withdrawal. It was during these withdrawals that the full extent of the fragility of allied logistics was demonstrated. Once there was a requirement to reach a destination as soon as possible, which could not be planned in any great rush in advance, the allied forces were unable to maintain any logistical cohesion. The rapid retreat coupled with the engagements from enemy forces prevented the ordinary methods of supply and preparation that would have been needed in order to hold army supply together. Contractors were unable to be located on such short notice, and those carrying out the existing chain from the coastal sector could not make the necessary shifts to the supply system to meet the retreating army's needs.

Overall, the inland sector demonstrates the fragility and inflexibility of both the contractor and fiscal-military systems, which underpinned all allied logistics during the conflict. When presented with the inland's challenges, allied administrators and commanders struggled to find lasting and

effective solutions. The tendency remained to fall back upon the traditional methods of military supply, which in many respects only served to compound the issues they were already facing.


Conclusion

The War of the Spanish Succession marked an important event both in terms of the development of the British armed forces but additionally in the development of the warfare and European states. It was one of the seminal conflicts which led to the development of Britain's position as a world power. It was additionally a conflict which has, particularly in the case of Iberia, received limited attention given its significance.

The research carried out as part of this study has demonstrated several key aspects of the operational nature of allied logistical chains through the conflict. The focal point of this research has been directly investigating the logistical networks, how they were constructed, and functioned, and ultimately the limitations that even major states had to contend with when operating such networks, at distances from their home sector. It has, to this end, employed an innovative new model to deconstruct logistical networks and to place them within a context that can be analysed, and conclusions drawn. By separating the logistical chain into geographical sectors, looking at how it developed, was maintained, and the difficulties it faced, the model creates an environment whereby the focal elements of the logistic chain can be brought into sharper relief. Firstly, it has shown the general principles which were vital for allied logistical operations to function. Administrators utilised and expanded existing networks making use of a variety of material as the scope of the conflict increased. Supplies were predicated on the need of forces which were involved in the conflict. This need was based upon the expected requirements of the army over the course of each year of the campaign. These expectations were built upon the experience of previous conflicts which Britain had engaged in during the preceding decades. Within the home sector, the funds for military operations were clearly established, commencing in the funds allocated from parliament to the relevant departments which would handle military affairs. These funds were utilised by the administrators to organise the resources with relevant contractors and to pass those resources and mobilised forces to ports for transportation overseas. From here supply shifted to a focus around ports, shipping and

relevant naval matters. It has been demonstrated how supplies were organised and captains engaged to accompany naval convoys on the journey to Iberia. Additionally, the at sea sector highlights how transitional periods were vital in the functioning of effective supply networks. Supplies then enter the coastal sector, the first full campaigning sector for army forces. Within the coastal sector, relationships were established, and bases were constructed allowed for safe accumulation of supplies before they were engaged in the inland sector. The inland sector marked the final sector for supplies, attempting to wrestle control of the interior of Iberia from Bourbon forces. It was this sector that saw the highest level of challenges for allied logistics and ultimately within this sector that the war for Iberia was lost.

Chart 2: State Actors and Relevant Sectors



The home sector has been demonstrated to be the hub from which all logistical chains were constructed. Not just in terms of resources and men but crucially in terms of decision-making and command. It was from the home sector that the decisions which had the greatest single impact upon Iberian logistics were taken. Funding decisions stemmed from, as previously discussed, parliament

and the treasury in terms of the yearly allocation of resources. However, in addition to that, it has been demonstrated that decisions on resource allocation and importantly reimbursement for payments made in other logistical sectors were handled within the home sector. It was within the home sector that the letters and reports from administrators and commanders in the field were received and their requests for additional resources assessed. The home sector's strengths have been highlighted throughout, as have some of the difficulties which it faced, both in terms of organisation and deeper set structural issues. One of the greatest strengths of the home sector has clearly been established, that being its strong-rooted connections. The length of time in which supply operations had developed in the home sector had led to deep-seated connections between many of the major figures who were pivotal in the organisation and control of supply chains within the sector. These individuals were clearly able to draw upon these connections to maintain a smooth operation of supplies throughout the sector. It was the presence of these connections which provided the home sector with much of the flexibility that it needed to deal with the varied supply requests which made their way from Iberia. It has been demonstrated how these connections fit into the existing model of the fiscal state in England postulated by scholars such as Brewer. The long-term development of the financial institutions and the regular activities of the markets was clearly one of the main factors behind the strengthening of these relationships and was a key point of leverage for the acquisition of material for the logistic chains.

One significant element of the home sector and were missing in significant parts of the latter logistical sectors, were long term relationships and the trust which they engendered. The trusted connections which were held between administrators and the merchants and contractors throughout the home sector clearly had significant advantages for the acquisition of material. First and foremost, amongst them was the presence of strong credit arrangements which could be tapped for the acquisition of supplies. It has been demonstrated that the trust which existed

between the various actors of the home supply network allowed for a much greater availability of credit when acquiring supplies. The strengths of the British financial system coupled with the ensured that wherever necessary there was credit to make purchases. The availability of credit has been demonstrated across the home sector, with everything from small recruiting parties to purchases of horses. Merchants clearly believed that payments would be forthcoming for any costs they incurred facilitating the army's supply needs and that there would not be any great difficulties in receiving reimbursement from government officials. These trusted connections provided flexibility for supplies within the home sector, removing the pressing issue of the presence of cash at the point of purchase. Furthermore, the credit system allowed for administrators to place some of the payment responsibilities onto those in the localities sourcing material. By utilising the funds of agents in the field backed up by the previously mentioned credit system, payments could be made on very short notice where needed. Significantly whilst also adding to the flexibility of the home sector it also highlights the other major part of the home sector, that being its level of logistical detail.

The home sector has been demonstrated to be of the logistical sectors that Britain was engaged in during the War of the Spanish Succession the most detailed in terms of contracts and the levels of attention that was paid by administrators to the smaller matters of throughput. Sources highlight how administrators and contractors alongside recruiters were dealing in official correspondence for negligible numbers of the relevant acquisition materials. It can be argued that this practice was born out of the availability of resources and suppliers, allowing for material to be quickly acquired as needed rather than sourced on mass from singular contractors, as would become necessary in subsequent logistical sectors.

The sea sector is one area which has highlighted some of the unique difficulties which faced a state such as Britain when attempting to engage in any significant operations during the 18th century. The interaction between army and naval forces did not always move in concert. Particularly given Britain's predominance of naval authority and its privileged status within the corridors of power it clearly held precedence over army decision-making when it came to active campaigning. As a direct result, much of the decision-making for logistical operations were highly reliant upon the naval timetables. Whilst this did hamper the transitional phase between sea and coast it was a necessity that was unable to be worked around by commanders. The sea sector also shows how the organisation of troop and supply movements was managed. The contractor system with the transport of men and material demonstrates the close levels of communication and the interpersonal relationships which existed between Whitehall officials and contractors and merchant captains. Furthermore, it demonstrates as in the home sector, the layers of micro-management that were possible when fleets and transitions were being organised from the home sector. However, once resources moved fully into the sea sector, the level of command breaks down and as can be demonstrated from the sources could only be retained at a macro level.

Furthermore, the sea sector overall demonstrates the strength that naval presence can exert upon the logistics of a campaigning region. Allied forces were capable of rectifying many of their issues with their supplies due to a strong naval presence. Additionally, naval dominance provided them with a operational flexibility that was unavailable for Bourbon forces, enabling allied forces to threaten all parts of the coastal sector. However, despite this flexibility, the sea sector was not a panacea for the problems that were inherent within Iberian campaigning. Communication remained a constant issue, as did resupply particularly in the winter months when the active fleet presence reduced. Furthermore, the transport of supplies was never in quantities that could actively replace land supply from within Iberia. As a result, despite providing a safety net for allied forces, the sea

sector further highlights the fragility of long-distance supply networks. Additionally, it brings into focus the weaknesses of Britain's fiscal strength, that despite their large investment into a powerful fleet, this was unable to overcome the difficulties within their land-based supply and network management.

It has been highlighted the close interconnected links between the sea sector and the establishment of the coastal sector, with the coastal sector being in many respects the most integral of those within the Iberian supply network. The coastal sector was in many respects the most complex of those which allied forces were forced to operate within. The need to create and manage supply networks and contracts, coupled with the diplomatic necessities of relations with the Spanish and Portuguese often proved insurmountable. Further compounding the issues were communication difficulties and the unwillingness of the British government to provide higher funds to surmount the rising costs of campaigning. It has been demonstrated that whilst allied commanders did make significant attempts at rectifying issues that were presenting themselves, these attempts were focused upon managing the symptoms of logistical difficulties, and providing additional supplies and troops, rather than focusing on the causes of the supply issues. These causes which were centred around the management of supplies within the coastal sector, the relationships with contractors, and importantly the construction of robust networks were never the primary focus of administrators and commanders. The reasons for this appear to be drawn out of a lack of flexibility within the system, that despite having a degree of freedom to organise the coastal sector, commanders were not given the complete freedom to rectify the difficulties that were being faced. Furthermore, the reluctance amongst officials in Whitehall to recognise the additional costs that were inherent simply in campaigning in Iberia further compounded difficulties. This Whitehall decision-making was jointly predicated upon a focus upon the larger conflict in the low countries which allowed for the fielding of a greater military force closer to home, and additionally, upon the lack of understanding about

conditions upon the ground within Iberia. It has been demonstrated that in those letters from the coastal sector regarding difficulties were placed against the previous understanding of how costs for conflict were arrived at and there was little evidence of any great appreciation upon the level of extra funds that were required to field a man in Iberia in comparison to the low countries. Indeed, this thought processes has been demonstrated to have continued not just in the organisation of the coastal sector but additionally upon the management of the inland sector.

The inland sector was the area which most clearly can be argued to have cost the allies the war in Iberia. The inability of allied forces to surmount the operational and logistical challenges which they faced in the Inland sector, coupled with the poor relations which they were unable to cultivate with the local populations effectively curtailed any attempt at the successful prosecution of a campaign. The long-distance nature of the transportation through hostile and difficult territory was further exacerbated by the lack of strong magazines, poor contractor networks, and hostile actions from Bourbon forces. Overall, these issues were insurmountable for allied force. Similar to the coastal sector, there were attempts made to allow for the injection of additional resources to rectify some of the difficulties that were being faced. These letters between commanders and those in government did lead to some attempts to place additional resources at the behest of the Iberian logistical network. However, the resources that were made available were limited and arrived too late to make significant difference to the active campaigns.

The inland sector also demonstrated some of the interactions between various parts of the allied logistical operations, and the actions that were required to be taken when supply organisation became a serious detractor on operations. For example, the internal credit network that developed to provide officers with the means to maintain their forces with purchased local supplies. This network highlights the importance of credit and trust within logistical management, but it also

demonstrates in many regards the issues and extent of Britain's fiscal-military influence. Indeed, the ad-hoc nature of much of the management of the inland sector can be argued as direct evidence of the weaknesses of Britain's ability to project power overseas. Whilst some of these management decisions can be attributed to the personalities and command styles that were at play within the various forces, nevertheless, there is a clear trend amongst the sources of a lack of every kind of critical material for successful campaigning. Finally, the inland sector also has shown that in the presence of a hostile populace, the creation of any successful or even manageable logistical network was almost impossible. Despite the efforts of allied commanders and administrators they remained unable to greatly extend their contractor networks outside of the coastal sector, nor to improve their network of magazines. As a result, the close links between logistics and local politics are highlighted and it can be shown that regardless of levels significant influence and finances there was other significant factors at play in the creation and maintenance of military supply.

A significant area which has been raised by this study is the question of if British commanders, administrators, or indeed the institution of the army itself had learned from the experiences of the provision of logistics and financing during the War of the Spanish Succession. Certainly, several historians have argued that campaigns that the British engaged in during the early part of the century prepared them with stronger organisation present for the conflicts such as the Seven Years War and Peninsular Wars.⁷¹⁵ There is evidence that British logistical organisation improved from the beginning of the century, the armies that were fielded under Wellington were far larger and able to fight with greater success despite the geographical issues is demonstrated. Furthermore, Britain was able to launch larger expeditions abroad during the Seven Years War.⁷¹⁶ There was clearly an

⁷¹⁵ See, Daniel Baugh, *The Global Seven Years War, 1754-1763*, (Routledge, London: 2014), M.S Anderson, *The War of the Austrian Succession, 1740-1748*, (London: 1995), and, Charles Esdaile, *The Peninsular War*, (Penguin, London: 2003).

⁷¹⁶ Stephen Conway, *War State and Society in Mid-Eighteenth Century Britain and Ireland*, (Oxford University Press: 2006).

understanding of the scale of conflicts and what was necessary in order to procure and supply in difficult situations. The development of the ordnance office is one firm example with its growing influence and finances able to rectify some of the issues which were a constant in Iberia during the War of the Spanish Succession. Furthermore, the development of significant garrison presences within the Iberian theatre at Gibraltar and Minorca show that there was an understanding of the benefits of holding territory and supply bases within areas of potential campaigning.⁷¹⁷

However, there is another side to the reasons for the development of British military thought in regards to operations within Iberia. Prior to the commencement of the conflict, Britain had very little presence in the Peninsula. Whilst there were merchants and diplomats that were well established within both Spain and Portugal in the latter half of the 17th century there was little in the way of administration particularly military presence. However, one of the biggest ramifications of the end treaties of the conflict was British acquisition of two vital military sectors within Iberia, namely Minorca and Gibraltar. Both had undergone a period of development and deployment of forces during the war, but it was in the years immediately after that saw continual attention to those two areas. Fortifications were improved and officers and men from the regular forces saw duty in these regions. Furthermore, and in terms of long-term logistical development vitally so, these two garrisons had to create long standing financial and logistical relationships between themselves and the local populations alongside the home administration. As a result, soft information was passed into the organisational administration developing a wider understanding of operating in an area such as Iberia. These garrisons formed vital staging and organisational bases during subsequent British campaigns in the region. Furthermore, there were now a large number of trained professionals with experience operating in the region and thus could bring that experience to the logistical organisation of subsequent campaigns. Even with the loss of some of territories such as Minorca in the aftermath

⁷¹⁷ R Thurburn, 'The Capture of Minorca 1708', in, *JSAHR*, Vol. 55, No. 222, (1977).

of the Seven Years War this experience remained and the longer-term contracts established over the course of the preceding years could still be drawn upon. It can be argued that it was longevity of operations in a region which was required for institutional memory to develop to reduce some of the difficulties which early campaign attempts were faced with. Longer term military operations in a region provided a greater understanding of the requirements of creating logistical networks in these sectors as opposed to singular military campaigns. The reason being is that operations during a single campaign or conflict were always wrapped within the conflict itself. Whilst active military operations were in affect there remained a plethora of factors which were affecting logistical organisation. From manoeuvres by enemy forces to the redistribution of existing forces to other theatres there remained additional strains upon the commanders and administrators to organise. What is clear from the sources is that the geographical issues and supply problems in Iberia were only recognised to a certain extent by those tasked with its organisation. Whilst some of the issues of climate and some resources were highlighted, many more were omitted or blamed upon the actions of the enemy forces or upon the general course of the conflict. As a result, there could only be minimal learning of the factors that needed to be understood in order to operate effectively with the focus remaining upon the direct matters of the conflict itself.

There is certainly an argument to be made therefore that remaining active in an operational theatre was the key to providing institution memory and improvement rather than singular campaigns. Whilst some of the direct issues that allied armies faced in Iberia during the War of the Spanish Succession were clearly not repeated in subsequent conflicts, particularly the issues around the acquisition of mounts and supply horses and financing. However, other issues persisted, supply remained an issue. Furthermore, relations with the local civilian populations were an area which remained a constant area of difficulty, hampering attempts to acquire adequate logistics in times of conflict. The situation that developed on Minorca in the lead up to the French invasion in 1756 being

a prime example where British forces were alienated from the local Spanish population and struggled to receive any support from them.⁷¹⁸ Therefore, lessons were not fully learnt despite the long-term British presence in this region. Iberia remain a difficult theatre to operate within.

These difficulties were not an area that was the exclusive domain of the British military however, French forces also struggled logistically during operations in Iberia. Numerous historians have demonstrated the pressures which French forces were under even when operating in territory which was ostensibly friendly. Areas such as Iberia remain on the fringes of military campaigns and yet have the position of often remaining vital for overall strategic objectives.

The development of British logistics in difficult theatres and at the extremities of the reaches of the fiscal-military state continued in the years following the conclusion of the conflict. The growing strength of the financial institutions and the development and continuing professionalisation of the armed forces allowed for Britain to continue to expand and fight successful wars at a growing scale and distance. The campaigns in North American and India during the mid 18th century clearly highlight this pattern.⁷¹⁹ Although historians have pointed to some of the difficulties that these forces faced during these campaigns, it can be argued that these would not have been possible for the state at the end of the 17th century. The development of the administrative apparatus, coupled with improving military organisation are some of the significant factors behind British expansion over the course of the 18th century and their ability to wage successful wars far from the home sector. Whilst the complexity of logistical lines remained an issue for Britain and the need to pass resources along such wide-ranging sectors would present difficulties, they nevertheless were able to

⁷¹⁸ Rob Tildesley, 'Sun, Sea and Starvation: The Logistics of the British Garrison on Minorca, 1746-1756', in *Redcoats to Tommies, The Experience of the British Soldier From the Eighteenth Century*, ed. Kevin Lynch and Matthew Lord, (Boydell and Brewer, London: 2020).

⁷¹⁹ See, Matthew Dziennik, *The Fatal Land: War, Empire, and the Highland Soldier in British America*, (Yale University Press: 2015), Stephen Conway, *Britannia's Auxiliaries, Continental Europeans and the British Empire, 1740-1800*, (Oxford University Press: 2017), and, Erica Charters, *Disease, War and the Imperial State: The Welfare of the British Armed Forces During the Seven Years' War*, (University of Chicago Press: 2014).

develop successful logistical apparatus in order to further the projection of British power and their growing position as an imperial entity.

Looking at the subsequent campaigns which Britain fought in over the next two centuries there were certain improvements in some respects such as the size of forces able to be successfully campaigning abroad. However, to what extent were these developments born out of direct lessons learned or merely matching the other developing patterns of warfare over the 18th and 19th centuries.

Historians have brought many of these questions to the fore when discussing other aspects of military operations. Much attention has been placed upon the development of various aspects of warfare, such as fortifications, weaponry, and tactics.⁷²⁰ However, little work has been carried out regarding the nature of developments in logistics over time and how they could connect to wider shifts in warfare and the understanding of military affairs. This research has highlighted the need for subsequent research into logistics developments and it is clear that further work can bring to the fore questions over institutional memory regarding supply.⁷²¹

The fiscal-military state has been one of the dominant schools of thought within this body of work. The growth of British financial institutions has never been in doubt, however, one of the questions posited at the outset was to what extent Britain was able to exert its financial strength militarily in a theatre further from home and what questions this raises about the nature of Britain's power projection and the capacity of the early-modern state. What has been clearly demonstrated in the preceding chapters are the limits to the strengths and flexibility of the fiscal-military state. The British state was clearly one of the major financial powers of Europe and as a result had the capacity

⁷²⁰ Robert O'Connell, *Of Arms and Men: A History of War, Weapons, and Aggression*, (Oxford University Press: 1989), Ian Hogg, *The History of Fortification*, (Orbis, London: 1981), and, Brent Nosworthy, *The Bloody Crucible of Courage: Fighting Methods and Combat Experience of the American Civil War*, (Constable, London: 2005)

⁷²¹ Elizabeth Hamilton, *The Backstairs Dragon, A Life of Robert Harley Earl of Oxford*, (Hamilton, London: 1969) p.67.

to wage war and provide funds for allied forces on a large scale. Furthermore, the state was aided by Britain's extensive mercantile sector which could facilitate much of the contractors required to facilitate resource collection and transportation. Britain was able to marshal and operate a highly successful set of military campaigns in Northern Europe against significant opposition and the financial resources to keep the coalition of polities in the field for longer than any of these powers could have managed on their own. Though part of the impact of this upon peace negotiations was related to Britain's use of pamphlets to strengthen this view.⁷²² It also possessed the resources to fund and field forces for a multi-theatre war, utilising its significant advantages particularly in the realm of naval dominance. However, the conflict in Iberia has demonstrated that there were significant problems with British military logistics.

The continual issues that have been highlighted with pay, supply provision and resource allocation coupled with the issues of sufficiently maintaining armies in the field highlight the difficulties which the fiscal-military state faced at distance. The development of Brewer's concept of fiscal states by subsequent historians has shown the large financial resources that were available to Britain for the purposes of waging war. It is these financial resources and their allocation that has developed the entire discourse of the fiscal-military state. Clearly these issues highlight the issue at the heart of British power projection. Despite their significant financial strengths Britain could not easily translate them into power at a distance. The cumulative costs of waging war in Iberia caused additional strains upon available resources and there remained an unwillingness to expend the energy that would have been required to fight at full effectiveness in the region. Had Iberia been to only theatre in the conflict then within the system there was the resources to achieve these goals. However, importantly there remained the issues of expected returns and the British command understanding

⁷²² Lucien Bely, 'Behind the Stage, the Global Dimensions of the Negotiations', in, *Performances of Peace: Utrecht 1713*, R.E. Bruin (ed), (Brill, Leiden: 2015) p.48.

of the limits of their resources. The biggest drawback with the efficiency of the fiscal-military state can be argued that have been its successes. The widening financial and military establishments that Britain had been developing in the preceding years had greatly strengthened its position as a major European power. Politicians understood the financially dominant position that Britain held at the outbreak of the conflict having seen similar occurrences during the Nine Years War Britain's financial strength and confidence in the Bank of England had grown and relative to other powers, particularly the Dutch Republic. As a result, there was an expectation that subsidies provided to the allied nations would be necessary from the outset in order to fund additional forces to order the combat Bourbon forces on multiple fronts. However, much of the financial decisions were born upon expected costs. Both the subsidy treaties and the army budgets were drawn up in advance of the costs of the conflict being understood. When the war expanded to Iberia these expectations of costs remained and led to the funding that was allocated for the campaigns in that region. However, it has been demonstrated that in many regards these funds were not sufficient. Warfare in Iberia followed a different pattern of costs and requirements which were greater than those that were faced in Northern Europe. The overall higher per head costs of supplying a soldier in Iberia compared with expected costs highlights the great inflexibility at the heart of the fiscal-military British state. Financial power had been previously leveraged to great success and the expectation remained that Britain could continue to do so at the same levels regardless of the theatre in which they were operating. Due to this flaw within the understanding of administrators Britain was unable to project its power as effectively.

In essence the question of power projection becomes one of power throughput. As the Early Modern state exerts its power, the greater the distance the weaker that power becomes. In almost all aspects of military and logistical organisation the further from the home sector Britain needed to exert its power the less this power could be materialised. However, in tandem is the endpoint of this

power projection. Iberia was a difficult territory and required greater throughput than would have been the case between two far apart yet higher developed regions. The financial costs increased not just due to transportation elements but the requirements to create and maintain logistical networks in areas further away from the highly developed home sector. This issue is only further exacerbated if we observe logistical networks further afield than Iberia. Those that were created in North America to facilitate conflict there are a prime example. The low levels of available resources and the difficulty of the geography coupled with the issues of creating from scratch many of the logistical frameworks which were fully established in northern Europe led to a conflict which historians have demonstrated was expensive and difficult to manage. It is campaigns such as these which coupled with those in Iberia highlight the weakening extent of British power projection, requiring instead long-term state development and presence in those regions to make them more militarily viable for future campaigns reducing the difference in costs compared with more developed conflict regions.

However, there is an argument to be made that despite the reduction of power over distance, the ability to conduct military operations at all is a display of financial and military power. Britain had before this point could be viewed as a peripheral player amongst the European great powers.⁷²³ Only with the Nine Years War had they exerted any major influence on the combatants of a continental war. It was the major financial improvements discussed by numerous historians that placed Britain with the capacity to carry out these major continental engagements. Previously certainly in terms of military capacity, England had been fielding much smaller forces than their continental rivals. With usually only 30,000-40,000 troops in the field in addition to their region locked militia forces in comparison to double this for the other major polities. However, during the War of the Spanish Succession has been demonstrated through this study, forces in Iberia saw the fielding of 30,000 men at the height of the conflict in addition to the almost 60,000 men that were being fielded in the Low Countries. These forces were not those of allied nations but fully upon British establishments.

⁷²³ Phillipe Minard, 'The English military-fiscal state in the eighteenth century' in *Revue D'Histoire Moderne et Contemporanie*, 2018/4 (no. 65-4) pp. 162-177.

However, they were made up of auxiliary forces which had come from other regions, Britain itself did not have the public confidence to field forces of the scale of its continental rivals. Despite these smaller forces within Iberia they were in concert with large field forces elsewhere. Whilst it can be argued with the benefit of hindsight that some of these forces could have been better used to achieve the No Peace Without Spain goal they nevertheless matched Britain's geopolitical and strategic long-term interests for the conflict. Therefore, to conclude Britain was not able to effectively exert its financial strengths and project power in Iberia when compared to similar situations in and around the home sector. There were a multitude of factors reducing the throughput of resources and for the purposes of creating logistical networks resources directly correlate to power. It cannot be said that Britain was unable to project power; however, despite the difficulties they were able to at a distance conduct a conflict against the major land power in Europe at the time. It must be stated though, that this power could not be projected at the same rate as was the case for the campaigns in the Low Countries. Rather, the ability to conduct operations in the manner shown is in itself a form of power projection, though it can be argued that this may not have been seen in this form at the time.

On the longer-term historiography of logistical operations, this research has placed an important phase of development into greater context. The War of the Spanish Succession represents a staging point on the development of military logistics. As has been shown in this study, there remained a disconnect between the knowledge and organisation of officials and the commanders and administrators in the subsequent. Despite the growing administrative capacity of Britain's bureaucracy and its ability to raise and maintain larger military forces there remained limits upon the capability of this administration to manage all aspects of conflict overseas. The development of military administration was a slow but continual progression throughout the 18th and 19th centuries.

Whilst some commanders were still able to operate semi-independently,⁷²⁴ fewer conflicts saw commanders acting independently of direct orders from Whitehall. The War of the Spanish Succession, therefore, marks a key moment in this growing trend of administrative warfare. The level of direct correspondence between field commanders and administrators is much higher than in preceding conflicts. However, in subsequent conflicts commanders would not be provided with such free reign of command, either in strategic objectives or in the responsibility of the logistical organisation. Whilst this would continue to some extent in the field of colonial warfare, it can be argued that the War of the Spanish Succession marked a hinge point in European warfare, despite Iberia's debatable position within that category, where the growth of administrative warfare can be observed. The field of administration in war is one which has seen significant attention from historians, however, the link between administrative oversight and command operations remains an area which would require a dedicated study.

This research has demonstrated the expanded nature of logistical chains and their functionality in regards to expeditionary warfare. The 18th century saw an extended period of British operations at great distances from the home sector. Campaigns in the Mediterranean, North America and Asia all were saw British forces engaged and had to construct and maintain logistical networks in a variety of different environments and interacting with varied populations and resource chains. What this project has highlighted has been the strength and financial foundations which comprised the British fiscal-military state. It has demonstrated how the development of fiscal institutions and growing bureaucratic mechanisms had created a robust set of financial which administrators were able to draw upon when supplying the army whilst it was on campaign. Administrators were well established within many parts of the supply system and were able to extend their areas of operations as the army moved into the area of campaign. It is clear that numerous factors were at

⁷²⁴ For example, Lord Chelmsford at Isandlwana.

play within the logistical framework in Iberia which allowed for the mostly effective administration of allied forces over the course of the campaign. The presence of British merchants, to a lesser or greater extent, in all major global operational theatres and were vital in securing parts of the wider logistical network. Even in areas of greater wilderness such as campaigns in North America there were merchants and other contractors that were engaged to facilitate the construction of logistical networks. The significance of these relationships has been established, however there is still room for conclusion research on the interactions between contractors across the globe and the institutional memory of conflict.

The issue of institutional memory is another area which integrates with this project. It has been demonstrated how the organisation of allied logistics was built upon the expected consumption rates of resources for armies based upon previous conflicts. The question remains however, were lessons learnt from the difficulties faced by allied armies in Iberia and if so where these lessons implemented in subsequent conflicts in the region. The crux of the debate sits clearly within the continued British presence within Iberia. The sources have clearly demonstrated that there was limited understanding of the underlying factors, such as climate, agriculture and economics, behind the difficulties that allied forces were facing as they attempting to construct and importantly maintain their logistical networks. Previous conflicts in difficult regions were not mentioned within the source material and the focus remained solely upon the immediacy of raising and transporting additional resources to fix supply issues rather than rectify any of the wider issues that they were facing. Historians looking at Britain's latter campaigns in the 18th century in Iberia have noted that there were difficulties,⁷²⁵ however, they do not appear as acute as those faced by the armies during

⁷²⁵ Erica Charters, *Disease, war, and the imperial state: the welfare of the British armed forces during the Seven Years' War*, (Oxford: 2014) p.89, Roy Adkins, and, Lesley Adkins, *Gibraltar: The Greatest Siege in British History*. (Little, London: 2017)

the War of the Spanish Succession. It can be argued therefore, that the experiences of these earlier campaigns helped the shape allied decision making in the region and allowed for a change in supply policy. This concept remains the possibility of a major future study investigating the views of the administration towards difficult campaigning areas based upon preceding campaigns.

However, based upon some preliminary work I believe that the most significant factor affecting improvements in British logistics was not an institutional memory amongst the military administration but rather it was the presence of British forces in those regions prior to the outbreak of hostilities. One of the most significant factors in the early creation of allied logistics has been shown to have been men such as Methuen and Prince George. These individuals were vital due to the connections that they already had within the region that they were able to connect with early army campaigns, creating the basis for the early logistical chains. Once commanders were more established in the region they took more of the decision making when it came to contractors, however, these early logistical arrangements were developed primarily from the existing contacts. The most important outcome of the end of the war from a British perspective was their acquisition of territory within Iberia and the creation of permanent military garrisons. The end of the War of the Spanish Succession saw Britain gain the island of Minorca and the spur of Gibraltar as part of the peace accords. In These two regions were militarily significant both with fortifications and vital natural harbours. As a result, there were significant resources placed towards improving the fortifications and garrisoning those acquisitions. Evidence shows the levels of resources allocated towards these two new garrisons particularly the construction and expansion of fort St Phillips on Minorca were high.

These fortifications and garrisons remained connected to the Iberian supply networks even after the main military forces had returned to their home sectors and the majority demobilised. As a result,

the administrators and military commanders managing these garrisons continued to be integrated into the contractor and to a wider extent mercantile situation within Iberia. The necessity to ensure supply and to ensure that finances remained well managed, commanders and quartermasters needed to cultivate strong relations with a variety of contractors and have a comprehensive understanding of the markets and local area in order to ensure that their supplies were well managed. Whilst relations with Spain during the next two decades reduced the work that administrators carried out with Spanish contractors they nevertheless maintained connections with a variety contractors and ensured that their garrisons were stocked as far as finances would allow. These relationships were far more vital in determining the future success of British military endeavours within the region than were changes in administrative thinking within the home sector.

Arriving forces in the region for future military campaigns were much better situated for the establishment of wider logistical networks. Firstly, the presence of these garrisons also provided a small magazine for initial supply collation and organisation. However vitally it is the connections between the garrison commanders and administrators to local contractors which made the greatest impact. The ability to have close connections already established, coupled with a comprehensive understanding of local populations, supply fluctuations and seasonal weather conditions placed these individuals in prime position to advise for upcoming military campaigns. Wellington's use of intelligence during the Peninsula campaigns has been remarked upon by many and studied in detail by historians such as Huw Davies.⁷²⁶ However, much of this intelligence was based upon local agents and local knowledge rather than the imposition of external operatives from Britain. Furthermore, the role of intelligence utilised by Wellington extended beyond simply the movement and positioning of enemy forces. Rather, information always was passed on of available food upon

⁷²⁶ Huw Davies, *Spying for Wellington: British Military Intelligence in the Peninsular War*, (Oklahoma University Press: 2018).

different lines of advance and of the presence of magazines and additionally, of individuals who could be relied upon to assist in the supplying of the army. The strength and advantages of British intelligence operations within Iberia were predicated therefore upon prior engagement within the region.

If this viewpoint is expanded upon it can be argued therefore that it was the acquisition of territory and the long term placement of British agents within the region which gave greater strength to British military and importantly logistical operations in Iberia rather than decision making and changing policy in Whitehall. The presence of British agents and vitally, active and continuing logistical chains meant that reliable information and contacts were available for arriving forces and for those preparing logistical operations for upcoming campaigns. While there is still a great deal of research that can be carried out to investigate this theory my own initial findings appear to give validity to the significance of retaining presence as opposed to institutional memory as the driving factor for future successful logistical organisation.

On the wider discussion on the nature of British logistical operations the actions that administrators and commanders took have raised an important contribution to our understanding of the role of individuals within government and importantly upon the transmission of knowledge. The sources clearly demonstrate the significant role played by individuals in all aspects of logistical operations. Much of the planning and creation of supply networks was left in the hands of singular individuals given a wide scope of authority. Men like Chetwynd and Methuen were responsible for handling the finding of financiers, contractors and linking these men to the army and home administration. Likewise, commanders in the Iberian theatre were given a vast amount of freedom when it came to the organisation and implementation of their logistical networks. Commanders were able to seek out their own connections to locate contractors and were in many cases solely responsible for the

allocation of the finances available to them. Decision making from Whitehall and oversight of army logistics was minimal. Though there were cases of direct intervention such as the audit of the army in (date) or the investigations made into Peterborough's loans, overall commanders and administrations held sole responsibility for the management of the entire logistical network. What can be observed from these elements is that individuals still remained at the apex of much of the organisation of warfare and that the machinery of state at these distances from the home sector was not encompassing. There have been several scholarly works which have highlighted the growth of state apparatus and the reduction of individual agency within decision making, though some have demonstrated that individuals still held significant roles within these new administrative bodies. The research has demonstrated that the lack of these bodies abroad and the inability for swift communication forced a focus onto individual agency creating an administrative system akin to that from decades earlier. The difficulties inherent in the nature of warfare in localities such as Iberia returned the administration of all matters both financial and logistical to the organisation of the preceding century before the growth of the British bureaucracy.

Furthermore, the other focal point of campaigning in Iberia was clearly the importance placed upon individual contractors. British organisation of their food supplies particularly in Iberia relied upon the trust developed with local contractors. Although it has been demonstrated that these contracts were not fully linked to best business practises. The creation of contracts for allied logistical matters was prioritised for British merchants operating within Iberia. Although there were some smaller contracts for local Spanish and Portuguese merchants, the major supply contracts remained in the hand of British merchants. The possible reasoning behind this has already been discussed, whether political or simply pragmatic. However, what these contracts also demonstrate is the powerful role of individuals and relationships within logistical structures. Through all of the major contracts that the British engaged with over the course of the conflict in Iberia it is clear that the preference was

for single large contracts rather than large numbers of smaller contracts as was the case in the Home sector. These contractors were given a great deal of initiative when it came to sourcing and transporting the required goods and providing that the basic provisions for the army. The contracts that were signed between allied forces and these individuals often gave a very open wording for the provision of the contract, simply requesting the relevant materials at an agreed price and that they be transported within given dates. This open contractual setting furthered the agency available to individual contractors to source and maintain contractual obligations even if additional circumstances prevented many of these contracts from being fully effective. It can be observed however, that the individuals held significant control within the British logistical structure. It has been demonstrated that these contracts were based very firmly upon trust and connections between army commanders and administrators and the relevant contractors and that there remained a blurred boundary between the private and public spheres.

This interrelationship of trust and existing social networks has demonstrated the significance placed upon individual operators during the conflict and how they were able to utilise the social fabric of the period in order to reach their objectives. These points tie into the work of several scholars on social structures and personal relationships during the Early Modern Period. This research has further highlighted the value of trust and interpersonal relationships in providing the bedrock upon which contractual arrangements could be based. It has highlighted that without trust between administrators and contractors many of the aspects which were relied upon in the contractual process could break down and that furthermore, difficulties arose in the creation of an further contracts. Significantly it has also been highlighted the importance of trust internally within the army itself. The internal credit networks between officers within the army during campaign has demonstrated the layered complexity of credit and debt obligations regarding logistical arrangements. That the financial organisation of logistics stretched from the large bread contracts

and agreements with bankers, to the small credit exchanges between individual army officers places into context the significance and prevalence of credit and furthermore, the significance of credit, trust and personal contracts to ensuring logistical operations.

Overall, there has been able evidence over the course of this study to provide an analysis of the effectiveness of allied logistical operations within Iberia over the course of the war. It is clear from the evidence available that whilst allied armies were able to engage in active conflict against Bourbon forces within the region, they suffered from a litany of difficulties in terms of their logistics which severely hampered and in some cases fully prohibited successful offensive operations. Operations which would have been crucial in securing Spain for Charles and providing a backdrop for successful peace negotiations. Despite these manifold challenges it has been shown that the allied logistical system in Iberia during The War of the Spanish Succession functioned. Troops were kept fed and clothed in most cases and there was not a complete collapse of supply and organisation such as would occur a century later at Corunna.

This study has shown the need for more detailed analysis on logistical operations across the Early Modern Period. They provide a vital basis for understanding the active role of Early Modern financial markets, the development of bureaucracy and importantly the growing power of the state. There remains work to be carried out regarding the War of the Spanish Succession but also other campaigns which have not seen detailed logistics studies such as the War of Jenkin's Ear. This research can interlink with other wider debates and themes, most directly upon those in Economic history but also the significance of trust that has been highlighted lends into themes within social history, particularly relating to societal trends for conducting business. Utilizing a prism of campaign logistics creates a great many themes to which valuable discussion can be brought and provides a different and important perspective to aspects beyond British history.

Bibliography:

Manuscript Sources:

The National Archives

Paymaster Rolls:

AO 1/316/1260

AO 1/319

AO 3/223

Privy Council

PC 1/13

State Domestic Papers

SP 34/2-28

Secretary of War Papers

SP 41/3

SP 41/4

Secretary of State Navy Papers

SP 42/67

SP 42/68

Secretary of State Papers Foreign

SP 47/22

SP 78/161

SP 78/162

Secretary of State Papers Foreign Portugal

SP 89/18-24

SP 90/1

SP 90/2

State Papers Foriegn Spain

SP 94/75-82

Commission and Audit Spain and Portugal

SP 109/1

War Office Establishments

WO 24/1177

WO 24/34-80

Secretary of War Letters

WO 4/3-13

WO 46/6

WO 47/22-29

WO 48/39-54

WO 49/225

WO 50/3-7

WO 54/59

WO 54/60

WO 54/61

WO 54/62

WO 54/63

WO 54/64

WO 54/65

WO 54/678

WO 78/419

WO 78/5834

British Library:

Peterborough Papers

Add MS 22200

Add MS 61515-8

Military Establishments

Add MS 22264

Add MS 16451-16468

Godolphin papers

Add MSS 28,056-58

Add MS 61121

Lexington Papers

Add MS 46552

Blathwayt Papers

Add MS 56247

Add MS 61133

Galway Papers

Add MS 61156-8

Add MS 61504-6

Mitchell Papers

Add MS 61164

Emperor Charles Papers

Add MS 61212

Blenheim Papers

Add MS 61337-61339

Methuen Papers

Add MS 61509

Stanhope Papers

Add MS 61511

Chetwynd Papers

Add MS 61526

Shovell Papers

Add MS 61587-8

Southern Department Papers

Add MS 61590

Alicante Papers

Add MS 74750 A-C

Army and Navy Papers

Add MSS 10,453-4

Harley Papers

Add MSS 12,099

Rooke Papers

Add MSS 15909

Printed Sources:

A detection of the Earl of Gallway's conduct at Almanza: in the following original letters writ by M.

Schonenberg, the Dutch Ambassador at Lisbon, to the States. The Count de Noyelle, the Dutch

General in Spain, to M. Schonenberg. Brigadier Drinborn (who was in the Battle) to Count de Noyelle.

The Count of Cordona, Governour of the Kingdom of Valencia, (John Morphew, London: 1711).

A full and impartial history of the expedition into Spain; in the year 1702. Extracted from the journals and

memoirs of the generals; and from which it will be easie to draw Rational Conjectures, about the

present Enterprize, to settle the Most Serene Charles III, on the Spanish Throne. To which is added, an

account of Monsieur Chateaurenault's expedition, from his first sailing from Brest, in Sept. 1701, to

his putting into Vigo, in Sept. 1702. In a Letter from Monsieur de Gatines, Intendant of the Navy of

France, to a Minister of State at Paris; which Letter was taken at Redondella among Monsieur

Chateaurenault's Papers, (Eighteenth Century Collections Online: 1702)

[link.gale.com/apps/doc/CB0126877024/ECCO?u=oxford&sid=gale_marc&xid=673564ef&pg=1]

A military dictionary. Explaining all difficult terms in martial discipline, fortification, and gunnery. Useful

(for all Persons that Read the Publick News, or serve in the Armies, or Militia) for the true

understanding the Accounts of sieges, battels, and other warlike expeditions, which daily occur in this

Time of Action. By an Officer, who served several years abroad, (J.Nutt, London:1702).

A report from the Commissioners appointed to take, examine, and state the publick

accompts of the kingdom, and to determine the debts due to the army, with a

state of the expence of the late war. (Eighteenth Century Collections Online: 1714)

[link.gale.com/apps/doc/CW0104704453/ECCO?u=oxford&sid=gale_marc&xid=433624ee&pg=1].

Account of the Earl of Galway's conduct in Spain and Portugal, (John Baker, London: 1711).

An Account of the landing in Spain of the forces under the command of His Grace the Duke of Ormond.

Published by authority, (Eighteenth Century Collections Online: 1702)

[link.gale.com/apps/doc/CB0126899676/ECCO?u=oxford&sid=bookmark-ECCO&xid=8b9e110a&pg=1].

An exact and full account of the siege of Barcelona, by way of journal, from the 2d of April to the 11th of

May, 1706. containing many particulars never yet publish'd. With Previous Remarks. By an officer who was in the place all the time, (Eighteenth Century Collections Online: 1706)

[link.gale.com/apps/doc/CW0100671942/ECCO?u=oxford&sid=gale_marc&xid=8434c2a2&pg=1].

An impartial enquiry into the Duke of Ormonde's conduct, in the Campagne of 1712. With a plan of the

situation of the Confederate and French armies when the Duke refus'd to fight, as it was drawn on

the Spot by General C-n; and Remarks made thereon by Mr. Maynwaring, (J. Roberts, London: 1715).

Atkinson, C. T. 'A Royal Dragoon in the Spanish Succession War', JSAHR, (1938).

Barrell, S. *Amiable Renegade, the Memoirs of Captain Peter Drake, 1671-1753*, (Stanford:1961).

Bladen, Martin. *An impartial enquiry into the management of the war in Spain, : by the ministry at home,*

and into the conduct of those generals, to whose care the same has been committed abroad.

Collected from many original letters and councils of war, never published before. Together with an

account of the several embarkations, both of British and foreign troops, that have been sent to Spain

or Portugal for the support of the present war. And a distribution of the annual sums granted by

Parliament, and applied to those services. (John Morphew, London: 1712).

Bland, Humphrey. *A Treatise of Military Discipline; in which is laid down and explained the duty of the*

officer and soldier, thro' the several branches of the service. By Humphrey Bland, Esq; Lieutenant-

Colonel of His Majesty's Own Regiment of Horse., (Buckley, London 1727).

Broderick, T. *A Compleat History of the Late War in the Netherlands*, (London: 1713).

By an officer of that army. *An account of the campaign of the Portugueze and Confederate Army, under the Marquis Das Minas and the Earl of Galway, in the year 1706*, (John Morphew, London: 1707).

Cabrera, Juan Tomás Enríquez de, duque de Medina de Ríoseco. *The Almirante of Castile's manifesto: containing, I. the reasons of his withdrawing himself out of Spain, II. the intrigues and management of the Cardinal Portocarrero ..., III. the government of Cardinal Portocarrero, &c. ..., IV. the designs of France against Spain, V. the manner of the admirals making his escape into Portugal, VI. and his proceedings at Lisbon*. (John Nutt, London: 1704).

Carleton, George. *The memoirs of Cap. George Carleton, an English officer, who served in the two last wars against France and Spain, and was present in several engagements both in the fleet and army. : Containing an account of the conduct of the Earl of Peterborough, and other general officers, admirals, &c. and several remarkable transactions both by sea and land. In which the genius, pride, and barbarity of the Spaniards, during the author's being a prisoner of war among them, are set in a true light. Together with a description of many of their cities, towns, &c. particularly Valencia, Barcelona, Molviedro, Saguntum, Alicant, Montserat, Denia, St. Clement de la Mancha, Madrid, Valadolid, Bilboa, St. Jean de Luz, Bayonne, Pont d'Espirit, Pampelona, Saragoza, &c. Their manners and customs, both religious and civil; observations on their monasteries and nunneries, and their manner of investing nuns. Likewise, their Bull-Feasts, and other publick diversions*. (Eighteenth Century Collections Online: 1743)

[link.gale.com/apps/doc/CB0126275000/ECCO?u=oxford&sid=gale_marc&xid=2bfcb22f&pg=1].

Chandler, D. 'A Journal of the Spanish Succession War', JSAHR, (1984).

Chandler, D. 'The Journal of John Wilson', Army Records Society, (2005).

Chandler, D. *Military Memoirs: Robert Parker and Comte de Merode-Westerloo*, (Longmans, London:1968).

Coxe, W. *Memoirs of the Duke of Marlborough*, 3 vols, (London:1820).

Coxe, W. *Memoirs of the Kings of Spain of the House of Bourbon*, 5, vols, (London:1815).

Dalton, Charles. *English Army Lists and Commission Registers 1661-1714*, 6 vols, (London: 1892-1901).

Defoe, Daniel. *A speech without doors: concerning the two and a half per cent. deducted from the foreign troops in her majesty's pay is publick money, and ought to be accounted for*, (London: 1712).

Defoe. Daniel. *Reasons why this nation ought to put a speedy end to this expensive war; with a brief essay, at the probable conditions on which the peace now negotiating, may be founded. Also an enquiry into the obligations Britain lies under to the allies; and how far she is obliged not to make peace without them*, (J. Baker, London: 1711).

Dennis, John. *A proposal for putting a speedy end to the war by ruining the commerce of the French and Spaniards, and securing our own, without any additional expence to the nation*, (Eighteenth Century Collections Online: 1703) [link.gale.com/apps/doc/CW0105050937/ECCO?u=oxford&sid=bookmark-ECCO&xid=a9872c0f&pg=1].

Farquhar, George. *Barcellona. A poem. Or, the Spanish expedition, under the command of Charles Earl of Peterborough*. (London: 1710).

Freind, John. *An account of the Earl of Peterborow's conduct in Spain, : chiefly since the raising the siege of Barcelona, 1706. To which is added the campagne of Valencia. With original papers*. (Eighteenth Century Collections Online: 1708) [link.gale.com/apps/doc/CW0102599763/ECCO?u=oxford&sid=bookmark-ECCO&xid=98dc3f95].

Hare, Francis. *The allies and the late ministry defended against France, and the present friends of France. Part IV. Containing a Vindication of the late M-y in relation to the Management of the War on the part of England; with an Answer to the Author of the Conduct's five Reasons for making a Peace*

without Spain and the Indies. To which is added a Postscript, in Answer to his Remarks on the Barrier-Treaty, British Library, (J.Baker, London: 1711).

Hare, Francis. *The management of the war: in a letter to a Tory-member*. (A. Baldwin, London: 1711).

Hargreaves-Mawdsley, W.N. *Spain under the Bourbons, 1700-1833: a collection of documents*, (Macmillan, London: 1973).

Horsley, W, *The Chronicles of an Old Campaigner, 1672-1717*, (John Murrey, New York: 1904).

Impartial remarks on the Earl of Peterborow's conduct in Spain. Written by a gentleman, who was an eye-witness of his lordship's transactions in that kingdom, (1707).

Murray, G, *Letters and Dispatches of the Duke of Marlborough*, (London: 1845) 5 volumes.

Remarks upon Dr. Freind's Account of the Earl of Peterborow's conduct in Spain, (Eighteenth Century Collections Online: 1708) [link.gale.com/apps/doc/CW0104870485/ECCO?u=oxford&sid=bookmark-ECCO&xid=e883a31a&pg=1].

Snyder, Henry Leonard. *The Marlborough-Godolphin Correspondence*, 3 vols, (Oxford: 1975).

Stanhope, J. *Mr. Stanhope's answer to the report of the commissioners sent into Spain, together with an extract of so much of the said report, as concerns him*, (London: 1714).

Swift, Jonathan. *The conduct of the allies and of the late ministry in beginning and carrying on the present war*. (John Morphew, London: 1711).

Taubman, Nathaniel. *Memoirs of the British fleets and squadrons in the Mediteranean, Anno 1708 and 1709. Wherein an account is given of the reduction of Sardignia, Minorca, the late Sieges of Port Maon, Alicant and Denia. With Descriptions Of the most unfrequented Places touch'd by the Fleets, of the Court of Barcelona, their Majesties residing in it, and of our Neighbouring Royal Allies their Majesties of Portugal. To which is annex'd, a cursory view of Naples, the Curiosities near Baiæ and*

Cardinal Grimani's Reception of the Officers belonging to the British Fleet. By the Revd. Mr. Nathaniel Taubman, Chaplain in the Royal Navy. (London: 1710).

The Answers of several persons concerned in the report of the commissioners sent into Spain. With the replies of the said commissioners. Taken upon oath before the commissioners for taking, examining, and determining the debts due to the army (Eighteenth Century Collections Online: 1714)
[link.gale.com/apps/doc/CB0126280661/ECCO?u=oxford&sid=gale_marc&xid=36836fb0&pg=1].

The Taxes not grievous, and therefore not a reason for an unsafe peace, (London: 1711).

Translation of the Treaty of Commerce, made and sign'd at Barcelona, between the Queen of Great Britain, and Charles III, on the 10th day of July 1707. (R. Burleigh, London: 1715).

Warburton, E, *A Memoir of Charles Mordaunt, Earl of Peterborough*, 2 vols, (George Drought, London: 1853).

Secondary Literature:

- Adamson, J. *The Princely Courts of Europe 1500-1750*, (London:1999).
- Adkins Roy, and, Adkins Lesley. *Gibraltar: The Greatest Siege in British History*. (Little, London: 2017).
- Aguilar Escobar, Antonio. *Cañones de bronce para el ejército: Historia de la Real Fundición de Sevilla en el siglo XVIII*, (Ministerio de Defensa, Madrid:2010).
- Albareda Salvadó, Joaquim. *La Guerra de Sucesión de España, 1700-1714*, (Barcelona:2010).
- Albareda i Salvadó, Joaquim. *Catalunya en un conflicte europeu : Felip V i la pèrdua de les llibertats catalanes (1700-1714)*, (Generalitat de Catalunya, Barcelona:2001).
- Alcalá-Zamora, José. *Historia de una Empresa siderúrgica española: los altos hornos de Lierganes y La Cavada, 1622-1834*, (Santander:1974).
- Alison, A. *Military Life of John, Duke of Marlborough*, (New York: 1860).
- Allen, Douglas W. 'The British Navy Rules: Monitoring and Incompatible Incentives in the Age of Fighting Sail', *Explorations in Economic History* 39, (2002) 204-231.
- Alsop, James D. 'The Age of the Projectors: British Imperial Strategy in the North Atlantic in the War of Spanish Succession', *Acadiensis: Journal of the History of the Atlantic Region*, 21, (1991) 30-53.
- Alvarez-Ossorio, Antonio, Bernardo J. Garcia Garcia, Virginia León. *La pérdida en Europa. La Guerra de Sucesión por la Monarquía de España*, (Madrid:2007).
- Amerlang, James S. *Honoured Citizens of Barcelona: Patrician Culture and Class Relations 1490-1714*, (Princeton:1986).
- Anderson, M.S. *The War of the Austrian Succession, 1740-1748*, (London: 1995).
- Anderson, M.S. *War and Society in Europe of the Old Regime 1618-1789*, (Stroud:1988).
- Andújar Castillo, Francisco. 'Élites de poder militar: Las Guardias Reales en el siglo XVIII', in Juan Luis Castellano, Jean-Pierre Dedieu, and Maria Victoria López, eds, *La pluma, la mitra y la espada: Estudios de historia institucional en la Edad Moderna*, (Universidad de Burdeos, Madrid:2000) 65-94.
- Andújar Castillo, Francisco. 'Guerra, venalidad y asientos de soldados en el siglo XVIII', *Studia histórica, Historia moderna* 35, (2004) 235-268.
- Andújar Castillo, Francisco. 'La Corte y los militares en el siglo XVIII', *Estudis* 27, (2001) 91-122.

- Andújar Castillo, Francisco. 'El fuero militar en el siglo XVIII', Un estatuto de privilegio', *Chronica Nova* 23, (1996) 11-31.
- Andújar Castillo, Francisco. *El sonido del dinero: Monarquía, ejército y venalidad en la España del siglo XVIII*, (2004).
- Ann Carlos, Larry Neal, and Kirsten Wandschenider, *The Origins of National Debt: The Financing and Re-financing of The War of the Spanish Succession*, (National Bureau of Economic Research: 2005),
- Aquerrata, Santiago. 'La Participacion de Los Financieros Nacionales en la Guerra de Sucesion: El Abastecimiento de Viveres al Ejercito', in, *Capitalismo Mercantil en la Espana Del Siglo XVIII*, ed. Rafael Torres Sanchez, (Eunsa, Pamplona: 2000) 273-315.
- Aragón Ruano, Álvaro and Angulo Morales, Alberto. 'The Spanish Basque Country in Global Trade Networks in the Eighteenth Century,' *International Journal of Maritime History* 25, (2013), 49-172.
- Arnade, Charles W. 'The English Invasion of Spanish Florida, 1700-1706', *Florida Historical Quarterly*, 41, (1962).
- Atkinson, C. T. 'The Cost of Queen Anne's War' *Journal of the Society for Army Historical Research*, xxxiii, (1955) 174-83.
- Ayan, Carmen Sanz. 'Administration and Resources for the Mainland War in the First Phases of the War of the Spanish Succession, in, *Mobilising Resource for War: Britain and Spain at Work During the Early Modern Period*, ed. H.V. Bowen and A. Gonzalez Enciso, (Universidad de Navarra, Pamplona: 2006), pp.135-159.
- Ballard, C. *The Great Earl of Peterborough*, (Skeffington and Son, London:1929).
- Bannerman, Gordon. *Merchants and the military in eighteenth-century Britain: British Army contracts and domestic supply, 1739-1763*, (London:2008).
- Bateman, Victoria, 'The Evolution of markets in Early Modern Europe, 1350-1800: a study of grain prices' in *Department of Economic Discussion Paper Series*, no. 350, (University of Oxford: 2007)
- Baugh, Daniel, *The Global Seven Years War, 1754-1763*, (Routledge, London: 2014).
- Bel Bravo, María Antonia. *La Guerra de Sucesión en la provincia de Jaén : desde la perspectiva de la nueva historia cultural*, (Diputacion Provincial, Jaen:2002).
- Bergamini, John D. *The Spanish Bourbons, A history of a tenacious dynasty*, (New York:1974).
- Black, Jeremy. *British Diplomats and Diplomacy 1688-1800*, (University of Exeter Press:2001).

- Black, Jeremy. *European Warfare, 1453-1815*, (Basingstoke:1999).
- Black, Jeremy. *Natural and Necessary Enemies: Anglo-French Relations in the Eighteenth Century*, (London:1986).
- Black, Jeremy. *The Origins of War in Early Modern Europe*, (Edinburgh:1987).
- Blockmans, Wim (ed.), *Fiscal systems in the European economy from the 13th to the 18th centuries* (Florence:2008).
- Boles, Laurence Huey. *The Huguenots, the Protestant interest, and the War of the Spanish Succession, 1702-1714*, (New York:1997).
- Bonney, R., 'Towards the comparative fiscal history of Britain and France during the "long" eighteenth century', in, *Exceptionalism and industrialisation: Britain and its European rivals, 1688-1815*, ed. L. Prados de la Escosura, (New York, 2004).
- Bonney, Richard. *Economic Systems and State Finance*, (Oxford:1995).
- Bonney, Richard. *The Rise of the Fiscal State in Europe*, (Oxford:1999).
- Borttineau, Y. *Les Bourbons d'Espagne, 1700-1808*, (Paris:1993).
- Bowen, H.V. 'The Contractor State, c.1650-1815', in *International Journal of Maritime History*, Vol,25(1), (2013) 239-274.
- Bowen, Huw and González Enciso, Agustín. *Mobilising Resources for War: Britain and Spain at Work During the Early Modern Period*, (Pamplona:2006).
- Braddick, Michael J. *The Nerves of State: Taxation and the Financing of the English State, 1558-1714*, (Manchester:1996).
- Braddick, Michael. 'English War Finance and Subsidies during the War of Spanish Succession', in Rauscher ed. *Kriegsführung und Staatsfinanzen*, (2010), pp.603-20.
- Brewer, J., and E. Hellmuth (eds.), *Rethinking Leviathan. The eighteenth-century state in Britain and Europe* (New York, 1999).
- Brewer, John. *The Sinews of Power, Money and the English State, 1688-1783*, (London:1989).
- Brian Lyndon, 'Military Dress and Uniformity 1680-1720', in *Journal of the Society of Army Historical Research*, Vol. 54, No. 218 (Summer 1976).

- Bromley, J.S. ed. *New Cambridge Modern History, The Rise of Great Britain and Russia, 1688-1715/25*, , (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge: 1979).
- Brown, B. *The Letters and Diplomatic Instructions of Queen Anne*, (London:1935).
- Bruce Anthony. *The Purchase System in the British Army, 1660-1871*, (Royal Historical Society, London: 1980)
- Bruin, R. E. de. (ed.) *Performances of Peace: Utrecht 1713*, (Brill, Leiden: 2015).
- Burton, I.P. 'The Committee of Council at the War Office, An Experiment in Cabinet Government under Anne, *The Historical Journal*, iv, (1961) 78-84.
- Calvo Poyato, Jose. 'La industria militar española durante la Guerra de Sucesión', *Revista de historia militar* 33, (1989) 51-72.
- Calvo Poyato, José. *Guerra de sucesión en Andalucía: aportación al conflicto de los pueblos del sur de Córdoba*, (Córdoba:1982).
- Campillo, Xavier Rubio (ed.), *God save Catalonia: England's intervention in Catalonia during the War of the Spanish Succession (1705-1711)* (Calafell: 2010).
- Carcel, Ricardo Garcia. 'La Guerra De Sucesion En America', in *La Guerra De Sucesion En Espana Y La Batalla De Almansa*, ed. Francisco Garcia Gonzalez, (Universidad de Castilla-La Mancha) 51-71.
- Cervera Torrejón, José L., *La batalla de Almansa*, (Barcelona: 2000).
- Chandler, D. 'The Siege of Alicante', *History Today*, (1972).
- Chandler, David. 'War and the Past: the Logistics of Military History,' in *History Today*, Vol.31(2), (1981).
- Chandler, David. *The Art of Warfare in the Age of Marlborough*, (London:1976).
- Charters, Erica, *Disease, War and the Imperial State: The Welfare of the British Armed Forces During the Seven Years' War*, (University of Chicago Press: 2014).
- Chatrand, R. 'The Recovery of British Colours lost in Spain, 1710' *JSAHR*, (1991).
- Childs, J. *The Army, James II and the Glorious Revolution*, (Manchester:1980).
- Childs, J. *The British Army of William III*, (Manchester:1987).
- Childs, J. *The Nine Years War and the British Army*, (Manchester University Press:1991).
- Clark, G. *The Later Stuarts 1660-1714*, (Oxford:1955).

- Clark, Sir G. 'The Nine Years War' and 'From Nine Years War to the War of the Spanish Succession', *New Cambridge Modern History*, vol. vi, (Cambridge:1970).
- Clayton, Tony. *Europe and the Making of England 1660-1760*, (Cambridge:2007).
- Contamine, Phillipe. *War and Competition between States*, (Oxford:2000).
- Conway, Stephen, and Torres Sanchez, Rafael. *The Spending of the States: Military Expenditure during the Long Eighteenth Century: Patterns, Organisations and Consequences, 1650-1815*, (Saarbruken:2011).
- Conway, Stephen, *Britannia's Auxiliaries, Continental Europeans and the British Empire, 1740-1800*, (Oxford University Press: 2017).
- Conway, Stephen. 'Public and Private Contributions to the Mobilisation of Manpower in Mid-Eighteenth Century Britain and Ireland, in, *Mobilising Resource for War: Britain and Spain at Work During the Early Modern Period*, ed. H.V. Bowen and A. Gonzalez Enciso, (Universidad de Navarra, Pamplona: 2006) 37-59.
- Conway, Stephen. *Britain, Ireland and Continental Europe, Similarities, Connections, Identities*, (Oxford:2011).
- Coombs, D. *The Conduct of the Dutch, British Opinion and the Dutch alliance during the War of Spanish Succession*, (Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague 1958).
- Coward, B. *The Stuart Age*, (Longman, Harlow:1994).
- Dadson, Trevor J. and Elliott, J.H. *Britain, Spain and the Treaty of Utrecht 1713-2013*, (Leeds: 2014).
- Darnell, Benjamin. *The Financial Administration of the French Navy during The War of the Spanish Succession*, (PhD Thesis, 2015).
- David Onnekink, 'Anglo-French negotiations on the Spanish Partition Treaties (1698-1700) a Re-evaluation', in, *The Contending Kingdoms: France and England 1420-1700*, ed. Glenn Richardson, (Ashgate, Aldershot: 2008) 161-179.
- Davie H.G.W. 'The Economics and Logistics of Horse-Drawn Armies, in *British Journal for Military History*, vol. 7, iss. 1, (2021) 21-45.
- Davies Huw. *Spying for Wellington: British Military Intelligence in the Peninsular War*, (Oklahoma University Press: 2018).
- De Bruin, Renger. *Performances of Peace: Utrecht 1713*, (Uitgeverij: 2015).

- De Jongste, Jan A. F. and Veenendaal, Augustus J. ed. *Anthonie Heinsius and the Dutch Republic 1688-1720: Politics, War and Finance*, (Institute of Netherlands History, The Hague: 2002).
- De La Escosura, L Prados. (Ed.) *Exceptionalism and Industrialisation. Britain and its European Rivals, 1688-1815*, (Cambridge:2004).
- de Onate, Lario, del Carmen, Maria, *La Colonia Mercantil Britanica e Irlandesa en Cadiz a Finales del Siglo XVIII*, (Universidad de Cadiz: 2000).
- Dee, Daryl. *Expansion and Crisis in Louis XIV's France: Franche-Comté and Absolute Monarchy, 1674-1715*, (Rochester: 2009).
- Díaz Ordóñez, Manuel. *Amarrados al negocio: Reformismo borbónico y suministro de jarcia para la Armada Real, 1675-1751*, (2009).
- Dickinson, H. T. 'The Capture of Minorca 1708' *Mariner's Mirror*, li (1965) 195-204.
- Dickinson, W. Calvin. *The War of the Spanish Succession 1702-1713: a selected bibliography*. (London: 1996).
- Dickson, G. M. 'War Finance', *New Cambridge Modern History*, vol. vi (Cambridge: 1970).
- Dickson, P, *Red John of the Battles, John 2nd Duke of Argyll and 1st Duke of Greenwich, 1680-1743*, (London: 1973).
- Dickson, P. G. M. *The Financial Revolution in England: A Study in the Development of Public Credit, 1688-1756*, (London: 1967).
- Dincecco, Mark, 'Fiscal Centralisation, Limited Government and Public Revenues in Europe, 1650-1913', *Journal of Economic History* 69, (2009). 48-108.
- Dodge, Theodore Ayrault, *Gustavus Adolphus : a history of the art of war from its revival after the Middle Ages to the end of the Spanish Succession War, with a detailed account of the campaigns of the great Swede, and of the most famous campaigns of Turenne, Condé, Eugene and Marlborough*, (London: 1996).
- Donaldson, David Whamond, *Britain and Menorca in the Eighteenth Century*, (Oxford History DPhil: 1994).
- Drelichmann, Mauricio. and Voth, Hans-Joachim. *Lending to the Borrower from Hell, Debt, Taxes and Default in the Age of Phillip II*, (Princeton University Press: 2014)

- Dubet, Anne (ed.) *Administrer les finances royales dans la monarchie espagnole, XVIe-XIXe siècles*, (Rennes : 2008).
- Dubet, Anne, *Un estadista francés en la España de los Borbones: Juan Orry y las primeras reformas de Felipe V, 1701-1706*, (Madrid: 2008).
- Duffy, C, *The Military Experience in the Age of Reason*, (London: 1987).
- Duffy, C. *Fire and Stone: the science of fortress warfare, 1660-1860*, (Newton Abbot: 1975).
- Duffy, C. *The Fortress in the Age of Vauban and Frederick the Great, 1660-1789*, (London: 1985).
- Dziennik, Matthew, *The Fatal Land: War, Empire, and the Highland Soldier in British America*, (Yale University Press: 2015).
- Ede, Mary. *Anglo-Portuguese relations and The War of the Spanish Succession*, (Oxford DPhil Thesis, 1952).
- Edwards, Paul N. 'Introduction: An Agenda for Infrastructure Studies', *Journal of the Association for Information Systems*, 10 (2009), 364-74.
- Ehrman, J. P. W. *The Navy in the War of William III*, (Cambridge: 1953).
- Elliott, J, *Imperial Spain, 1469-1716*, (Edwin Arnold, London: 1963).
- Enciso, González Agustín, *El negocio de la lana en España, 1650-1830*, (Pamplona: 2001).
- Escobedo Romero, Rafael, *El Tabaco del rey: la organización de un monopolio fiscal durante el Antiguo Régimen*, (Pamplona: 2007).
- Escolano, G. *Decedas de la Historia de la Ciudad de Valencia*, ed. J. B. Perales, vol III, (1880).
- Esdaile, Charles, *The Peninsular War*, (Penguin, London: 2003).
- Everaert J. 'Credit, argent et lettres de change. Le financement du commerce Flandres-Andalouise-Amerique', in, *Dinero, Moneda y Credito En La Monarquia Hispanica*, ed. Antonio M Bernal, (Marcial Pons, Madrid : 2000), 511-525.
- Fagan, Brian, *The Little Ice Age, How Climate made history 1300-1850*, (Basic Books, New York: 2000).
- Falkner, J, *Great and Glorious Days, Marlborough's Battles*, (Staplehurst: 2002).
- Falkner, J, *Marlborough's Wars, Eye-Witness Accounts*, (Barnsley: 2005).
- Falkner, J, *Marshall Vauban and the Defence of Louis XIV's France*, (Barnsley: 2011).

- Fernández de Pinedo, Emiliano, 'From the Bloomery to the Blast-Furnace: Technical Change in Spanish Iron-making, 1650-1850', *Journal of European Economic History* 17, (1988).
- Fernández Durán, Reyes, *Gerónimo de Uztaiz, 1670-1732: Una política económica para Felipe V*, (Minerva Ediciones, Madrid: 1999).
- Ferri, S. S. 'Territorial privileges in 18th-century Spain under the Bourbons: reform or consolidation', in *Melanges De La Casa De Velazquez*, Vol,46(1), (Paris: 2016) 49-59.
- Finlay, Roger, *Population and Metropolis, The Demography of London, 1580-1650*, (Cambridge University Press: 1981).
- Fit the Fight, The New Role Fitness Test*, (MOD 2020)
- Francis, A. D. 'Prince George of Hesse-Darmstadt and the Plans for the Expedition to Spain of 1702', *Bulletin of the Institute of Historical Research*, vol. xlii (London: 1969) 58-75.
- Francis, D, *The First Peninsular War*, (London: 1974).
- Francis, D. *The Methuens and Portugal, 1691-1708*, (Cambridge: 1966).
- Frey, Linda. Frey, Marsh. *A question of Empire: Leopold I and the War of the Spanish Succession*, (Colombia University Press, Boulder: 1983).
- Frey, Linda. Frey, Marsh. *The Treaties of the War of the Spanish Succession: an historical and critical dictionary*, (London: 1995).
- Frost, Robert, *After the Deluge, Poland-Lithuania and the Second Northern War, 1655-1660*, (Cambridge University Press: 2009).
- Gale, Iain. *Rules of war*, (London: 2008).
- García González, Francisco. *chetwyn*, (Madrid: 2009).
- Garrido i Valls, Josep-David. *La batalla d'Almansa*, (Episodis De La Historia, Barcelona: 2008).
- Gentilcore, David. *Food and Health in Early Modern Europe, Diet, Medicine and Society, 1450-1800*, (Bloomsbury, London: 2016),
- Gil, Francisco Javier Palao. 'The Crown of Aragon in the War of the Spanish Succession', in, *Britain, Spain and the Treaty of Utrecht 1713-2013*, ed. Trevor J. Dadson and J.H. Elliott, (Legenda, Leeds: 2014), 18-39.

- Gilbert, Arthur, 'An Analysis of some Eighteenth-Century Army Recruiting Records', in *Journal of the Society for Army Historical Research*, Vol. 54, No. 217, (Spring 1974) 38-47.
- Gilbert, Arthur, 'Why Men Deserted from the Eighteenth-Century British Army' in *Armed Forces and Society*, Vol.6, No. 4 (Summer 1980) 553-567.
- Glete, Jan., *War and the State in Early Modern Europe: Spain, the Dutch Republic, and Sweden as Fiscal-military States, 1500–1660* (London: 2002).
- Gómez Gascón, Herminio et al. *Almansa: un día en la historia de Europa* (2005).
- Gonzalez Enciso, Agustin. 'War contracting and artillery production in Spain', in *Business History*, Vol,60 (1), (Liverpool: 2018) 87-104.
- Graham, Aaron, 'Auditing Leviathan: Corruption and State Formation in Early Eighteenth-Century Britain' *English Historical Review* 128, (London: 2013).
- Graham, Aaron, *Corruption, Party and Government in Britain, 1702-13*, (Oxford: 2015).
- Graham, Aaron, *The British Fiscal-Military States, 1660-c.1783* (Abingdon: 2016).
- Graham, Aaron. "Connoisseurship, Consumption, Company, and James Brydges, First Duke of Chandos, 1705–13." In, *The Huntington Library Quarterly* 80.4 (2017) 539-557.
- Grant, James. *Battles of the Spanish Succession*, (Letchworth: 2014).
- Grau-Sologestoa, Idoia, Albarella, Umberto, 'The "Long" Sixteenth century: a Key Period of Animal Husbandry Change in England', in *Archaeological and Anthropological Sciences*, Vol. 11, (2019)
- Green, Adrian, 'Durham Ox: Commercial Agriculture in North-East England, 1600-1800', in *Economy and Culture in North-East England, 1500-1800*, (Boydell and Brewer, London: 2018) 44-67.
- Green, David. *Blenheim*, (Collins, London: 1974).
- Gregory, Desmond, *Minorca, the Illusory Prize: A History of the British Occupations of Minorca between 1708 and 1802*, (London: 1990).
- Hamilton, E, *The Backstairs Dragon, A Life of Robert Harley, Earl of Oxford*, (London: 1969).
- Hamilton, Earl J. 'Money and Economic Recovery in Spain under the First Bourbon, 1701-1746.], in *The Journal of Modern History*, Vol,15(3), (Chicago: 1943) 192-206.
- Harding Richard, and Solbes, Sergio (eds.), *The Contractor State and its Implications, 1659-1815*, (Gran Canaria: 2013).

- Harding, Richard, *Seapower and Naval Warfare, 1650-1830*, (London: 1999).
- Harding, Richard. 'Trans-Atlantic Operational Capability: State Resources and War 1739-1748, in, *Mobilising Resource for War: Britain and Spain at Work During the Early Modern Period*, ed. H.V. Bowen and A. Gonzalez Enciso, (Universidad de Navarra, Pamplona: 2006) 59-82.
- Harding, Richard. *The Emergence of Britain's Global Naval Supremacy: the war of 1739-1748*, (Woodbridge: 2010).
- Hargreves-Mawdsley, W.N. *Eighteenth-century Spain, 1700-1788: a political, diplomatic and institutional history*, (London: 1979).
- Harling, Philip/Peter Mandler, 'From "Fiscal-Military" to "Laissez-Faire" state, 1760-1815', *Journal of British Studies*, 32 (1993) 44-70.
- Harris, S, *Sir Cloudesley Shovell, Stuart Admiral*, (Staplehurst: 2001).
- Harris, T. *Politics under the Later Stuarts*, (London: 1993).
- Harrison, Joseph, 'The Agrarian History of Spain, 1800-1960, in *The Agricultural History Review*, Vol. 37, No. 2, (1989) 180-187.
- Hattendorf, J. *England and the war of the Spanish Succession, a study of the English view and the conduct of grand strategy, 1702-1712*, (New York: 1987).
- Hattendorf, John B. "To Aid and Assist the Other", Anglo-Dutch Cooperation in Coalition Warfare at Sea, 1689-1714, in, *Anthonie Heinsius and the Dutch Republic, 1688-1720, Politics, War, and Finance*, ed. Jan A.F. de Jongste and Augustus J. Veenendall Jr. (Institute of Netherlands History, The Hague: 2002) 177-199.
- Hatton, R, *Europe in the Age of Louis XIV*, (London: 1959).
- Hatton, R, *Louis XIV and His World*, (London: 1972).
- Hatton, Ragnhild. and Bromley, J.S. *William III and Louis XIV: Essays by and for Mark A. Thomson*, (Liverpool: 1968).
- Henderson, N, *Prince Eugen of Savoy*, (London: 1964).
- Henshaw, Victoria, *Scotland and the British Army, c.1700-c.1750*, (University of Birmingham Doctoral Thesis: 2011).
- Hess, Earl J. *Civil War Logistics: A Study of Military Transportation*, (LSU Press: 2017).

- Hill, Brian. *Robert Harley, Speaker, Secretary of State and Premier Minister*, (Yale University Press: 1988).
- Hipkin, Stephen, 'The Coastal Metropolitan Corn Trade in Later Seventeenth Century England', in *Economic History Review*, Vol. 65, (2012) 220-255.
- Hoffman, P.T., and K. Norberg (eds.), *Fiscal crises, liberty and representative government*, (Stanford: 1994).
- Hogg, Ian, *The History of Fortification*, (Orbis, London: 1981).
- Holmes, G. *The Making of a Great Power*, (London: 1993).
- Horwitz, H. G. *Parliament, Policy and Politics in the Reign of William III*, (Manchester: 1977).
- Hugill, J, *No Peace Without Spain*, (Kensal Press, Oxford: 1991).
- Hume, M, *Spain its Greatness and Decay, 1479-1788*, (Cambridge: 1935).
- Hume, Robert, 'The Value of Money in Eighteenth-Century England: Incomes, Prices, Buying Power and Some Problems in Cultural Economics', in *Huntington Library Quarterly*, Vol 77, No. 4, (2014) 373-416.
- Hurtado García Reyes, Manuel, *Soldados de la Ilustración: El ejército español en el siglo XVIII*, (2012).
- Jaadla, Hannaliis, Shaw-Taylor, Leigh, and, Davenport, Romola, 'Height and Health in Late Eighteenth-Century England', in *Population Studies A Journal of Demography*, Vol. 75, Iss. 3, (2021) 381-401.
- Jenkins, E, *A History of the French Navy*, (London: 1973).
- Jiménez Estrella, Antonio, and Andújar Castillo, Francisco, (eds.) *Los nervios de la Guerra: Estudios sociales sobre el Ejército de la Monarquía Hispánica, siglos XVI-XVIII*, (2007).
- Jones, Colin. 'The Military Revoltuion and the Professionalism of the French Army under the Ancien Regime', in, *The Military Revolution and the State 1500-1800*, ed. Michael Duffy, (University of Exeter: 1980) pp.29-49.
- Jones, D, *War and Economy in the Age of William III and Marlborough*, (Oxford: 1988).
- Kamen, H, *Phillip V of Spain, the King who Reigned Twice*, (London: 2001).
- Kamen, H, *Spain in the late Seventeenth Century*, (London: 1980).
- Kamen, H, *The War of the Succession in Spain*, (London: 1969).
- Kamen, Henry. 'The Destruction of the Spanish Silver Fleet at Vigo in 1702', *Bulletin of the Institute of Historical Research*, 39, (London: 1966) 165-173.

- Kamen, Henry. *Crisis and Change in Early Modern Spain*, (Aldershot: 1993).
- Kamen, Henry. *Spain, 1469-1714, A society of conflict*, (London: 2014).
- Karges, Caleb, “*So Perverse an Ally:” Great Britain’s Alliance with Austria in the War of the Spanish Succession*, (PhD, University of St Andrews, 2015).
- Kauffman K. ‘The U.S. Army as a Rational Economic Agent: The Choice of Draft Animals During the Civil War,’ in, *Eastern Economic Journal*, (Summer: 1996) 333-343.
- Kekewich, M, *Princes and Peoples, 1620-1714*, (Manchester: 1994).
- Kemp, Anthony. *Weapons and equipment of the Marlborough wars*. (Poole: 1980).
- Kenyon, J, *Stuart England*, (Harmondsworth: 1978).
- Knapick Joseph J. Reynolds Katy L. and, Harman Everett, ‘Soldier Load Carriage: Historical, Physiological, Biomedical, and Medical Aspects’, in *Mil Med*, Vol. 169, (2004) 45-56.
- Krey, G.S. de, *A Fractured Society: The Politics of London in the First Age of Party 1688-1715*, (Oxford: 1985).
- Kuete, Allan J, and Andrien, Kenneth J, *The Spanish Atlantic World in the Eighteenth Century: War and the Bourbon Reforms, 1713-1796*, (Cambridge: 2014).
- La Force, Clayburn J. ‘The Supply of Muskets and Spain’s War of Independence’, in *The Business History Review*, vol. 43, No. 4, (Winter 1969) 524-544.
- Lachmann, Richard. ‘Greed and Contingency: State Fiscal Crises and Imperial Failure in Early Modern Europe 1’, in *American Journal of Sociology*, Vol.115(1), (Chicago: 2009) 39-73.
- Lind, Gunner, ‘Beyond the Fiscal-Military Road to State Formation: Civil Society, Collective Identities and the State in the Old Danish Monarchy, 1500-1850’, *Balto-Scandia* 18, (2012) 1-11.
- Ljungqvist, Frederick, ‘The significance of climate variability on early modern European grain prices’, in *Climetrica*, Vol. 16, (2022) 29-77.
- López Losa, Ernesto, ‘The Legacy of Earl J. Hamilton, New Data for the Study of Prices in Spain, 1650-1800’, *Investigaciones de Historia Economica* 9, (2013) 75-87.
- Lund, Erik A. *War for the Every Day: Generals, Knowledge and Warfare in Early Modern Europe, 1680-1740*, (London: 1999).
- Lynch, J, *Bourbon Spain, 1700-1808*, (Blackwell, eOxford: 1989).

- Lynch, Kevin and Lord, Matthew ed. *Redcoats to Tommies, The Experience of the British Soldier From the Eighteenth Century*, (Boydell and Brewer, London: 2020).
- Lynn, J, *The French Wars, 1667-1714*, (Oxford: 2002).
- Lynn, John A. *Feeding Mars: Logistics in Western Warfare from the Middle Ages to the Present*, (Oxford: 1993).
- Lynn, John A. *Giant of the Grand Siecle: The French Army, 1610-1715*, (Cambridge: 1997).
- Lynn, John A. *The Wars of Louis XIV, 1667-1714, Modern Wars in Perspective*, (Longman, civil London: 1999).
- Mackillop, Andrew, *Military Recruiting in the Scottish Highlands 1739-1815: the Political, Social and Economic Context*, (Doctoral Thesis, University of Glasgow: 1995).
- Macksey, Kenneth, *For Want of a nail: the impact on war of logistics and communications*, (London: 1989).
- Macmillan, Catherine and Smith, Charlotte, ed. *Challenges to Authority and the Recognition of Rights, From Magna Carta to Modernity*, (Cambridge University Press: 2018).
- Magagna, Victor, *Communities of Grain, Rural Rebellion in Comparative Perspective*, (Cornell University Press: 1991).
- Mahan, A, *The Influence of Sea Power on History*, (London: 1890).
- Marti, Ricard, *Cataluna armería de los Borbones: Las armas y los armeros de Ripoll, Barcelona, Manresa, Igualada de 1714 a 1794*, (2004).
- Martín Marcos, David, *Península de recelos: Portugal y España, 1668-1715* (Institutio Universitario de Historia Simancas: 2014).
- Martinez Ruiz, Enrique, *Los soldados del rey: los ejércitos de la Monarquía Hispánica (1480-1700)*, (2008).
- Martoccio Michael. 'A Man of Particular Ability': A Jewish-Genoese Military Contractor in the Fiscal-Military System, (Taylor and Francis, London: 2021).
- Martoccio, Michael, "The Place for Such Business": The Business of War in the City of Genoa, 1701-1714', in *War in History*, Vol. 29, (Sage Publications, London: 2022) 302-322.
- Matthews, John A. and Briffa Keith, 'The Little Ice Age: Revaluation of an Evolving Concept', in *Geografiska Annaler*, 87 A (2005) 17-36.

- McCollim, Gary B. *Louis XIV's Assault on Privilege: Nicolas Desmartz and the Tax on Wealth*, (Rochester: 2012).
- McGrath, Patrick (ed), *Merchants and Merchandise in Seventeenth-Century Bristol*, (Bristol Record Society, Bristol: 1955)
- McInnes, Angus. *Robert Harley, Puritan Politician*, (Victor Gollanz, London: 1970).
- Mears, John, 'The Emergence of the Standing Professional Army in Seventeenth-Century Europe', in, *Social Science Quarterly*, Vol. 50, No. 1 (June, 1969) 106-115.
- Merriman, R. D. *Queen Anne's Navy 1702-1714*, (Naval Records Society, London: 1961).
- Meyer, William R. 'English Privateering in the War of the Spanish Succession', *Mariner's Mirror*, 69, (London: 1983) 435-446.
- Middleton, Richard, 'The Recruitment of The British Army, 1755-1762' in *Journal for Army Historical Research*, Winter 1989, Vol 67, No. 272 (Winter 1989) 226-238.
- Monson, Andrew, Walter Scheidel (eds.), *Fiscal Regimes and the Political Economy of Premodern States* (Cambridge: 2015).
- Morrill, J.S. *The Impact of the English Civil War*, (Collins and Brown, London: 1991).
- Morriss, Roger. *The Foundations of British Maritime Ascendancy: Resources, Logistics and the State, 1755-1815*, (Cambridge: 2011).
- Mullenbrock, Heinz-Joachim, *The Culture of Convention, a rhetorical analysis of the public controversy about the ending of the War of the Spanish Succession 1701-1713*, (Munich: 1997).
- Murphy, Ann. *The Origins of English Financial Markets: Investments and Speculation before the South Sea Bubble*, (Cambridge University Press: 2012).
- Nosworthy, Brent, *The Bloody Crucible of Courage: Fighting Methods and Combat Experience of the American Civil War*, (Constable, London: 2005).
- O'Brian, Patrick Karl, 'The Nature and Evolution of an Exceptional Fiscal State and its Possible Significance for the Precocious Commercialisation and Industrialisation of the British Economy from Cromwell to Nelson', *Economic History Review* 64, (London: 2011) 408-446.
- O'Brian, Patrick Karl, *The Political Economy of British Historical Experience, 1688-1914*, (Oxford: 2002).
- O'Brien, Patrick K., and Philip A. Hunt. 'The Rise of a Fiscal State in England, 1485–1815', *Historical Research*, 66 (London: 1993) 129–176.

- O'Connell, Robert, *Of Arms and Men: A History of War, Weapons, and Aggression*, (Oxford University Press: 1989).
- Onnekink, David, *War, Religion and Service: Huguenot Soldiering, 1685-1713*, (Aldershot: 2007).
- Onnekink, David. 'Anglo-Dutch Diplomatic Cooperation during the Opening Years of the War of the Spanish Succession, 1702-1704', in, *Anthonie Heinsius and the Dutch Republic, 1688-1720, Politics, War, and Finance*, ed. Jan A.F. de Jongste and Augustus J. Veenendall Jr. (Institute of Netherlands History, The Hague: 2002) 45-65.
- Onnekink, David. *War and Religion after Westphalia, 1648-1713*, (London: 2009).
- Ostwald, Jamel. 'The "Decisive" Battle of Ramillies, 1706: Prerequisites for Decisiveness in Early Modern Warfare', *Journal of Military History*, 64 (Virginia: 2000).
- Ostwald, Jamel. *Vauban under siege : engineering efficiency and martial vigor in the war of the Spanish Succession*, (Leiden: 2007).
- Overton, Mark, *Agricultural Revolution in England, The Transformation of the Agrarian Economy 1500-1850*, (Cambridge University Press: 2010)
- Parnell, A. *The War of the Succession in Spain 1702-1711*, (London: 1905).
- Parrott, David, *The Business of War: Military Enterprise and Military Revolution in Early Modern Europe*, (Cambridge: 2012).
- Parrott, David. *Richelieu's Army: War, Government and Society in France, 1624-1642*, (Cambridge: 2001).
- Paul-Fynn, Jeff, ed. *War, Entrepreneurs, and the State in Europe and the Mediterranean, 1300-1800*, (Leiden: 2014).
- Pérez Sarrión, Guillermo, *La península comercial: Mercado, redes sociales y Estado en España en el siglo XVIII*, (Madrid: 2012).
- Perjes, G. 'Army Provisioning, Logistics and Strategy in the Second Half of the 17th century,' *Acta Historica Academiae Scientiarum Hungaricae*, 16, nr. 1-2 (1970), 1-52.
- Pincus, Steven, 'Rethinking Mercantilism: Political Economy, the British Empire and the Atlantic World in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries', *William and Mary Quarterly* 69, (Williamsburg: 2012) 3-34.
- Pla, J, *Gibraltar*, (Hollis and Carter, London: 1955).

- Pohlig, Matthias. *The War of the Spanish Succession: New Perspectives*, (Oxford University Press, Oxford: 2017).
- Pool, Berhard, *Navy Board Contracts 1660-1832: Contract Administration under the Navy Board*, (Longmans, London: 1966).
- Prak, Maarten, 'Citizens, Soldiers and Civic Militias in Late Medieval and Early Modern Europe', in *Past and Present*, No. 228, (August 2015) 93-123.
- Presson, Karl Gunnar. *Grain Markets in Europe, 1500-1900: Integration and Deregulation*, (Cambridge University Press: 1999).
- Prestage, Edgar. *Portugal and the war of the Spanish Succession: a bibliography with some diplomatic sources*, (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge: 1938).
- Puig, Boderà, Edward. *La resistència catalana: Barcelona 1713-1714*, (Eumo Editorail, Bareclona: 2014).
- Quarrie, Bruce, *Napoleon's Campaigns in Miniature*, (Patrick Stevens, Yeovill: 1992)
- Ramos, Eduardo Pascual. 'The Royal Treasury of the Kingdom of Majorca during the War of the Spanish Succession (1701-1715)', in *Cuadernos Dieciochistas*, Vol.14, (2014), 199-232.
- Rennoldson, N, *Renaissance Military Texts, Warfare in the Age of Louis XIV*, (2005).
- Riley, Jonathan. 'Logistics and supply in renaissance armies' in *Arms and Armour*, Vol.8(2), (2011) 139-151.
- Rodger, N.A.M, *Command of the Ocean, A Naval History of Britain, 1649-1815*, (Penguin, London: 2004).
- Rodger, N.A.M., 'From the "Military Revolution" to the "Fiscal-Naval State"', *Journal of Maritime Research*, 13 (2011), pp. 119-28.
- Rodgers, Clifford, (ed.) *The Military Revolution Debate*, (Routledge: 1995).
- Rodríguez Hernández, Antonio José, *Los tambores de Marte: el reclutamiento en Castilla durante la segunda mitad del siglo XVIII, 1648-1700*, (Valladolid: 2011).
- Roosen, William James. *The Age of Louis XIV: The Rise of Modern Diplomacy*, (Schenkman, Cambridge: 1976).
- Rowlands, Guy, *The Financial Decline of a Great Power: War, Influence and Money in Louis XIV's France*, (Oxford University Press, Oxford: 2012).
- Rowlands, Guy. *Dangerous and Dishonest Men: The International Bankers of Louis XIV's France*, (Palgrave, Basingstoke: 2014).

- Rowlands, Guy. *The Dynastic State and the Army under Louis XIV: Royal Service and Private Interest, 1661-1701*, (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge: 2002).
- Russell, F, *The Earl of Peterborough*, (London: 1887).
- Sales, Nuria. *Senyors bandolers, miquelets i botiflers : estudis d'història de Catalunya (segles XVI al XVIII)*, (Empuries, Barcelona: 1984).
- Sanghvi Neil. *Gentlemen of Leisure or Vital Professionals? The Officer Establishment of the British Army, 1689-1739*, (Oxford DPhil: 2017).
- Santiago-Caballero, Carlos, 'Explaining wheat yields in Eighteenth-Century Spain', Department of Economic History of Institutions, University Carlos III of Madrid, (June 2012).
- Schryver, Reginald De. 'Warfare in the Spanish Netherland 1689-1714, Remarks on Conquest and Sovereignty, Occupation and Logistics, in, *Anthonie Heinsius and the Dutch Republic, 1688-1720, Politics, War, and Finance*, ed. Jan A.F. de Jongste and Augustus J. Veenendall Jr. (Institute of Netherlands History, The Hauge: 2002), 133-147.
- Scouller, R. E. 'The Peninsula in the War of the Spanish Succession', *Journal of the Society for Army Historical Research*, vol. liv, (1976) 35-53.
- Scouller, R.E. *The Armies of Queen Anne*, (Clarendon Press, Oxford: 1966).
- Screen, J.E.O, 'The Eighteenth-Century Army at Home as Reflected in Local Records', in *Journal of the Society of Army Historical Research*, vol. 88, (2010).
- Seppel, Marten, 'Feeding the motherland: grain exports from the Swedish Baltic Provinces during the Great Famine of 1696-1697, in *Scandinavian Economic History Review*, vol. 63, No. 3 (2015).
- Shean, John, 'Hannibal's Mules: The Logistical Limitations of Hannibal's Army and the Battle of Cannae, 216BC, in, *Historia Zeitschrift fur Alte Geschichte*, Vol. 45, (2nd Qtr: 1996) 159-187.
- Sheehan, Michael. *The Balance of Power: History and Theory*, (Routledge, London: 1996).
- Simms, Brenden. *Three Victories and a Defeat: The Rise and Fall of the First British Empire, 1714-1783*, (Penguin, London: 2007).
- Simpson, Janet, 'Spanish Agriculture in the Long Run, 1760-1936', in *Economic History and Institutions Series*, Vol 1 (December: 2000) 1-37.
- Solbes Ferri ,Sergio, and, Marti Fraga, Eduard, 'Military Supply Without the Military? Supplying the Spanish Army in the 18th Century', in *War and Society*, vol. 40 (2020) 64-81.

- Solbes Ferri, Sergio. 'The Spanish monarchy as a contractor state in the eighteenth century: Interaction of political power with the market', in *Business History*, Vol,60(1), (2018) 72-86.
- Speck, W. A. *The Birth of Britain: A New Nation, 1700-1710. A History of Early Modern England*, (Blackwell, Oxford: 1994).
- Stone, Lawrence, *An Imperial State at War: Britain from 1689-1815*, (Routledge, London: 1994).
- Storrs, Christopher, ed. *The Fiscal-Military State in Eighteenth Century Europe: Essays in Honour of P.G.M Dickson*, (Ashgate, London: 2009).
- Storrs, Christopher, *The Spanish Resurgence, 1713-1738*, (Yale University Press, New Haven: 2017).
- Storrs, Christopher. *The Resilience of the Spanish Monarchy, 1665-1700*, (Oxford University Press. Oxford: 2006).
- Syrett, David. *Shipping and the American War, 1775-83: A Study of British Transport Organisation*, (Athlone Press, London: 1970).
- t'Hart, Marjolein, Pepijn Brandon, Torres Sánchez, Rafael. 'Maximising revenues, minimising political costs – challenges in the history of public finance of the early modern period', *Financial History Review*, 25 (2018), pp.1-18.
- Tallet, Frank and Trim, D.J.B. *European Warfare 1350-1750*, (Cambridge: 2010).
- Taylor, Frank. *The wars of Marlborough, 1702-1709*, (Oxford: 1921).
- The Soldiers Load: Historical Data*, (Government FOI Report: 2004).
- Thomson, Janice E. *Mercenaries, Pirates, and Sovereigns: State-Building and Extraterritorial Violence in Early Modern Europe*, (Princeton: 1994).
- Thorburn, R, 'The Capture of Minorca, 1708', *JSAHR*, Vol. 55, No. 222, (1977), 65-72.
- Tielhof, Milja van. *The "Mother of All Trades": The Baltic Grain Trade in Amesterdam from the Late 16th to the Early 19th Century*, (Brill, Leiden: 2002).
- Torres Sánchez, Rafael, *Constructing a Fiscal-Military State in Eighteenth Century Spain*, (Basingstoke: 2015).
- Torres Sánchez, Rafael, *War, State and Development: Fiscal-Military States in the Eighteenth Century*, (Pamplona: 2007).

- Torres Sánchez, Rafael, *Military Entrepreneurs and The Spanish Contractor State in the Eighteenth Century*, (Oxford University Press, Oxford: 2016).
- Trevelyan, George Macaulay. *England under Queen Anne*, (Longman, London: 1934).
- Trim, D.J.B. (ed), *Chivalric Ethos and the Development of Military Professionalism*, (Brill, Leiden: 2002).
- Tumath, A, 'The Conduct of the British Army in Catalonia after the Battle of Brihuega, 1710-1712', *JSAHR*, (2013) 182-205.
- Tylden, Major, 'The Accoutrements of the British Infantryman, 1640 to 1940', in *Journal of the Society for Army Historical Research*, Vol. XLVII, No. 189, (1969) 4-22.
- Valdez-Bubnov, Ivan. 'Shipbuilding administration under the Spanish Habsburg and Bourbon regimes (1590-1834): A comparative perspective, in *Business History*, 06, (2017) 105-125
- Van Creveld, Martin, *Supplying War: Logistics from Wallenstein to Patton*, (Cambridge: 2004).
- Weigley, Russel F. *The Age of Battles: The Quest for Decisive Warfare from Breitenfeld to Waterloo*, (London: 1993).
- Wheeler J. S. *The Making of a World Power, War and the Military Revolution in Seventeenth Century England*, (Stroud, Sutton: 1999).
- Wilkinson, Clive, *The British Navy and the State in the Eighteenth Century*, (Woodbridge: 2004).
- Williams, Basil. *Stanhope: A Study in Eighteenth-Century War and Diplomacy*, (Clarendon Press, Oxford: 1968).
- Yun-Castilia, Bartolome K, O'Brien, Patrick, and Comin, Francisco, *The Rise of Fiscal States: A Global History, 1500-1914*, (Cambridge: 2012).
- Zanden, Jan Van, 'Wages and the standard of living in Europe, 1500-1800, in *European Review of Economic History*, Vol. 3, No. 2, (August 1999) 175-197.
- Zook, Melinda, *Radical Whigs and Conspiratorial Politics in Late Stuart England*, (Pennsylvania State University Press: 1999).
- Zurcher, Erik-Jan (ed), *Fighting for a Living, A comparative study of Military Labour, 1500-2000*, (Amsterdam University Press: 2013).

