Militarised cities? Housing and garrisoning the French Empire's troops in the Napoleonic Kingdom of Italy

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Submitted for examination for DPhil in History, Michaelmas 2020

This thesis examines military accommodation in the Republic/Kingdom of Italy, the main satellite state of France in the north of the peninsula throughout the Napoleonic Wars. Military accommodation, in the form of billeting in civilian homes and barracksing, rekindled long-term problems of army presence in a deeply upset geopolitical context; studying it helps understanding the logistical response to intense fluxes of large-scale military mobility, the hallmark of Napoleonic warfare. Such a response needed contact zones between army, institutions and society to function, challenging notions of militarism and total war applied to this conflict that do not adequately take logistics into account, and the levels of civil-military cooperation and negotiation that logistics had to entail.

The research starts by looking at the French Napoleonic war administration and its regulations on military accommodation, as the template on which Italian institutions and laws were modelled in their specific context. This highlights the importance of the Napoleonic imperial integration for military mobility, where the Kingdom of Italy was a hub of military corridors and *étapes*. To keep barracks supplied along the *lieux d'étape*, the Italian government shifted from general contracts to municipal management, while a network of custodianship staff oversaw the edifices and the supply materiel. Devolution of garrison barracksing services to the municipalities also involved barracks infrastructures and maintenance, shared uneasily between the military engineer corps and the municipalities. Space was shared, too, in the barracks and the billets between military and civilians, investing contested usages of the buildings and rising concerns over domestic privacy. The same happened with regard to terrains used for troop manoeuvres, as the military claimed land from agricultural profit and unwittingly pitted the war effort against the interests of the landowning élites on whose support the regime sought to base itself.

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This thesis examines military accommodation in the Republic/Kingdom of Italy, the main satellite state of France in the north of the peninsula, throughout the Napoleonic Wars. Such a response needed contact zones between army, institutions and society to function, in order to procure and maintain spaces and supplies on a more sustainable and stable scale than through the recourse to requisitions, a task where the contractor state and its public-private partnerships met only limited success. The result was a devolution of the military accommodation services to the municipal level, for garrison troops as well as for troop in transit and Gendarmerie; this highlights the logistical importance of the locality, as an ensemble of institutions and suppliers, to a level that histories of logistics tend to underplay. Military accommodation, furthermore, never entailed a complete self-separation of the army from civil society, on which it often intruded and was intruded upon in return. Consequently, this research challenges notions of militarism and total war applied to this conflict, which do not adequately take logistics into account in order to focus on the culturally radicalising aspects of war.

Military administration is the first aspect that this research analyses, looking at France and Italy respectively in the first two chapters. It highlights the development of the war ministries, war economy, and the war administration organs, from ministerial level to the war commissariat and the intendancy in the field. These institutions interfaced with contractors and local authorities to the point of a fundamental osmosis of roles, in order to procure and allocate resources and keep notice of materiel, as part of the effort to manage army mobility in an efficient fashion. Military accommodation, in the form of billeting in civilian homes and barracksing, rekindled long-term problems of managing army presence, which the area of the Po plain had to deal with throughout the early modern age as the military revolution led to the growth of standing armies and the region became a fault-line of international rivalry between Spain, France and Austria. Coming at the end of fifty years of peace, which only made the war seem more intense and destructive, the Napoleonic

hegemony redefined the geopolitics of the region and shaped the Kingdom of Italy as a hub of military corridors, centred on protecting metropolitan France and project her power towards Austria and the Mediterranean. Studying military accommodation helps understanding the logistical response to intense fluxes of military mobility in large numbers, the hallmark of Napoleonic warfare.

Literature on logistics has devoted more attention to food, equipment and the livestock of Napoleonic armies, than to provisions for barracks. Although not as vital as food, such supplies were important in ensuring the good conduct of troops and preventing requisitions from the populace. Supply contracts for garrison troops swung between privatisation and nationalisation in the government's quest for efficient service, in order to appease the military, and as part of the ongoing struggle of the state against corruption and fraud. This research connects the Italian case to studies of the Napoleonic contractor state, from the Directory to the late empire, underscoring the dependence of the kingdom on the private sector and the peculiarity of the barracks supply sector, which in its nation-wide contracts became a loss-making venture due to high costs and difficult management. The communes were eventually called in to make up for the general contracts' failure, creating their own networks of contracts in turn.

In addition to supply and procurement, the barracks supply sector needed scores of staff to preserve and mobilise materiel, updating the war commissariat on troop movements and what they consumed. This research devotes considerable space to the middle-to-lower ranks of the barracks administration and to how they were recruited, where micro-level patronage ties, informal recognition of skills, and personal relations with political power and army commanders intersected with the Napoleonic professional ethos of "career open to talent and merit". Thus, this research sheds light on a virtually unknown facet of Napoleonic administration, uncovering the extent of patterns that have so far been observed with regard to the upper echelons of the civilian and military administration. The supply apparatus needed capable, hard-working clerical personnel at departmental and municipal level to monitor the items and their movements, coordinating with the army commands in order to prepare for the arrival of troops.

The material conditions of barracks and buildings used for military accommodation were part of the logistical apparatus; formal responsibility for their maintenance, and its related expenses, was a constant point of

contention between central and local government, largely involving the military engineer corps in surveys, reconstruction and re-adaptation works. This responded not only to needs of repairing the inevitable wear-and-tear, but also to repurpose buildings that were originally not meant to host soldiers and had to be made habitable for the mass armies of conscripts, healthy, and secure against desertion attempts. Often, barracks were former religious houses, a result of the revolutionary expropriation of Catholic Church property, which in turn sank its roots in late 18th century reformist policies; they presented specific problems of structural stability, health and safety, but came in large quantities enough as to be the most convenient additions to the military patrimony, especially in urban centres. Historiography has long since challenged the myth of omnipotent Napoleonic state centralisation. From this analysis, the state further emerges as fundamentally unable to overcome the long-term issues of maintenance, due to the mutual squabbling between institutions and the plague of insufficient funding, but also more concerned about troop welfare and the "public relations" aspect of conscription than it is usually credited for.

Barracks were assigned the role of "schools of the nation" in later conscription armies, but they did not yet seem to carry this symbolic dimension in the Napoleonic age. Nor did they mutually seal military and civilians off for good. For one, this thesis shows that the army sought internal separation, too, as letting units mix in the same living space sparked competition over resources and potentially degenerated into indiscipline; mixing was only accepted in the regulated forms of military sociability, mostly concerning the officers. Civilians lived and worked in barracks, more or less legally, attempting to profit off the troops or exploiting empty barracks for industry and shop-keeping; occasionally, they were also tolerated on grounds of charity, although the official *condicio sine qua non* to their presence in barracks was usefulness. Billeting was an obvious, unhappy consequence of the scarcity and poor maintenance of barracks and officers-specific accommodation, creating a domestic contact zone that forced civilians and soldiers to live together. This research draws on research on house and domesticity, which has been done fruitfully with regard to the American Revolutionary War, to look at how the age-old race to billet exemption functioned among Italian civilians, in a context where traditional protections and institutions to appeal to were gone. Significantly, the analysis shows that billeting, however heavy, never sparked revolts in the Kingdom of Italy, unlike conscription and taxation, pointing to a deep-seated shared

understanding of it as a burden to be regulated and negotiated rather than revolted against.

The final part of this research moves just outside the barracks to another contested and negotiated contact zone: the drill grounds. The Napoleonic conscript armies needed training spaces along with residential spaces, especially when garrisons were comprised of regimental depots; this led to lease agreements with the landowners, in order for the military to use civilian land for their field exercises, in a balancing act between the necessities of agriculture and those of the war effort. This research shows how the military spectacle of drills, while less solemn and acknowledged as a means of propaganda than public festivals, could attract a long-term audience, restoring a modicum of transparency between civilians and the army. It was a spectacle with quite a heavy footprint, however. Prolonged military usage reduced the soil to unproductiveness, leading to clashes with the growing military demands for larger and better training areas. Unwittingly, the creation of drill grounds infringed upon the other pillars of Napoleonic social order – the protection of private property, and the vested interests of land-owning élites.

Through these analyses, the thesis concludes that Napoleonic military accommodation is best understood as a complex series of contact zones, conditioned by logistics and its solidly early modern means of procurement and allocation, rather than as sites of militarism or as total institutions facilitating the radicalising cultural trend of total war.

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Abbreviations

AN = Archives Nationales, Paris

ASBG = Archivio di Stato di Bergamo

- PS = Prefettura del Serio

ASCMI = Archivio Storico Civico di Milano

- LM = Località Milanesi

ASCMO = Archivio Storico Civico di Modena

- AAM = Atti Amministrazione Municipale

ASCO = Archivio di Stato di Como

- Atti 1800-1850

ASCMB = Archivio Storico Civico di Monza

- FRC = Fondo Repubblica Cisalpina

ASMI = Archivio di Stato di Milano

- CL = Consiglio Legislativo
- MVP = Melzi, Vice-presidenza
- MGC = Ministero della Guerra, Carteggio
- MGDM = Ministero della Guerra, Disposizioni Ministeriali

ASMN = Archivio di Stato di Mantova

- PAP = Prefettura dell'Alto Po
- PM = Prefettura del Mincio

ASNO = Archivio di Stato di Novara

- PA = Prefettura dell'Agogna

ASPD = Archivio di Stato di Padova

- PB = Prefettura del Brenta

SHD = Service Historique de la Défence, Paris

Introduction

Eyewitnesses of the Napoleonic Wars often borrowed the terminology of military accommodation to describe wartime: towns and villages had become "one great camp",[1] turning the houses of wealthy citizens, subject to troop billeting, into barracks.[2] By the time these impressions were written down in the 1810s, barracksing had been a growing trend for a long time, if temporally and geographically uneven,[3] in parallel with the consolidation of standing armies.[4] Although barracksing and billeting during the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars has been a historiographical blind spot, this era was crucial in the consolidation of military accommodation patrimony and practices, within the context of military administration under the pressure of providing for numerous and movable mass armies, raised through conscription and trained at garrison depots. Such pressure involved supplying the barracks, regulating non-military presence, selecting inspection and caretaking personnel, managing billets in civilian homes. This thesis will attempt to partly fill the gap, focussing on the management of barracks in the Napoleonic Kingdom of Italy and its consequences on civil-military relations, in order to question notions of total war and militarism.

The Napoleonic Kingdom of Italy

Over the past three decades, the "new Napoleonic history" has analysed the complexities of the Napoleonic system as it spread across post-revolutionary France and to an ever-expanding empire, leaving a multifaceted legacy of collaboration, resistance, reforms and legal-administrative instruments that far outlived the empire as a political and dynastic entity.[5] French expansion took place through various geopolitical conjunctures and reached diverse levels of integration; a widely accepted general classification distinguishes an inner empire (old France, western Germany, northern Italy, Low Countries), intermediate zones (Kingdom of Naples, Switzerland, Poland),

[1] German pamphleteer cited in M. Hewitson, "Princes' wars, wars of the people, or total war? Mass armies and the question of a military revolution in Germany, 1792–1815", *War in History*, 24/2 (2013), p.488.
[2] A. Arnaldi Tornieri, *Memorie di Vicenza* [www.napoleoneavicenza.it/], 2 February 1814.
[3] J. Black, *European warfare, 1660-1815* (London, 1994), p.225.
[4] Ibid., p.94.
[5] M. Broers, "Introduction: Napoleon, his empire, our Europe and the 'New Napoleonic History'", in M. Broers, P. Hicks, A. Guimerá (eds.), *The Napoleonic empire and the new European political culture* (Basingstoke, 2012), 1-16.

and outer empire (Tuscany, Papal States, Illyria, north-eastern Germany, Spain).[6] Contemporary terminology distinguished *pays réunis* (annexed to France and automatically subject to French administration and law), *pays conquis* (non-annexed satellite states), and *pays alliés*, allies ruled by their own native sovereigns.[7] Client states shielded France from her neighbouring enemies and provided staging points for campaigns,[8] realising several long-term French geopolitical goals: the expulsion of Austria from Italy, and the removal of the Piedmontese stumbling block on the Alps; hegemony over the German states, keeping the traditional Bavarian, Swabian and Saxon-Polish allies, at the expense of Prussia and Austria; footholds in eastern Europe, Balkans and the Mediterranean islands to check Russian ambitions; incorporation of Holland, the Low Countries and Rhineland; alliance with Spain against Britain, although this unravelled tragically.[9]

The *pays allié* in northern Italy encompassed the pro-French provisional governments that were created in the area of the central Po plain between 1796 and 1799; firstly the Cisalpine, then Italian, Republic, then the Kingdom of Italy (1804-'14). The first Cisalpine Republic, established in June 1797, agglomerated territories that had belonged to several Ancien Régime states: Austrian Lombardy; the land provinces of the Republic of Venice, from Bergamo to the river Adige; the Duchy of Modena in the lower Po plain; the Papal Legations; the Duchy of Massa in Tuscany; Valtellina, a point of contention with neighbouring Switzerland.[10] Governed by a Directory modelled after the French one, but which concentrated decisional power in Napoleon's hands, the republic's life was fraught with military expenses, economic hardships, and subordination to France.[11] The Austro-Russian conquest of northern Italy in 1799, combined with anti-French uprisings,[12] pushed the French back and ended the republic; several Cisalpine officials, politicians and military fled to France, or faced sacking, confiscation of their properties, arrest, deportation.[13] After the French secured again their acquisition of northern Italy in 1800, a second Cisalpine

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[6] M. Broers, *Europe under Napoleon, 1799-1815* (London, 1996), p.181.
[7] A. Grab, *Napoleon and the transformation of Europe* (Basingstoke, 2003), p.25; G. Ellis, "The nature of Napoleonic imperialism", in P.G. Dwyer (ed.), *Napoleon and Europe* (Harlow, 2001), 104-5.
[8] F. Schneid, "Kings, Clients and Satellites in the Napoleonic Imperium", *Journal of Strategic Studies*, 31/4 (2008), 571-604.
[9] Ibid.
[10] A. Grab, *Napoleon and the transformation of Europe*, p.5.
[11] C. Zaghi, *L'Italia di Napoleone dalla Cisalpina al Regno* (Turin, 1986), 177-230,
[12] A.M. Rao, *Esuli. L'emigrazione politica italiana in Francia (1792-1802)* (Naples, 1992), 129-32.
[13] Zaghi, *L'Italia di Napoleone*, 234-7.

Republic was created. The peace treaties of Lunéville and Amiens stabilised international relations, and in early 1802, a congress of deputies from all Cisalpine departments gathered in Lyon to deliberate on the institutional form of the new state. While France's approval was an unbreakable glass ceiling to real political autonomy, the Lyon congress resulted in the proclamation of the Italian Republic, with Napoleon as the president and Milanese moderate nobleman Francesco Melzi d'Eril as vice-president and head of the government.[14] Melzi's tenure was devoted to culling "extremists", both reactionary and "Jacobin", from the state administration, and implementing reforms imported from France, such as setting up prefectures, a national army and a Gendarmerie corps.[15] This state-building process put the republican government at odds with the French commanders, who resented restrictions on their powers and those of their client networks spanning the war administration and supply business.[16] Eventually, the vice-president's staunchly moderate political project, in addition to complicating prefectoral selections,[17] weakened his position vis-à-vis Napoleon's plans for Italy in the years leading up to the imperial coronation. At that point, the emperor changed the institutional form of the Italian Republic, turning it into a kingdom in 1805, with Napoleon as the king, and his trusted stepson Eugène de Beauharnais as viceroy. Melzi, whom Napoleon suspected of working towards the autonomy of the republic from France, was side-lined.[18] Eager to prove his worth and under as tight a control as Napoleon could exert from afar,[19] Eugène reaped the benefits of the republican government's work in setting the kingdom on a path of functioning administration within the policies of *ralliement* and *amalgame* – cooperation bringing together skilful civil servants from all political paths, overcoming the revolutionary factiousness.[20] The viceroy could count on the expertise of state secretary Antonio Aldini, whose reputation as a radical in the years 1796-'99, which had put him at odds with Melzi, strengthened his commitment to the

[14] D. Gregory, *Napoleon's Italy* (London, 2001), 57-8.
[15] On the development of the armed forces: F. Della Peruta, *Esercito e società nell'Italia napoleonica. Dalla Cisalpina al Regno d'Italia* (Milan, 1988), 9-130.
[16] L. Antonielli, *I prefetti dell'Italia napoleonica* (Bologna, 1983), 193-8.
[17] Ibid., 59-101.
[18] M. Broers, *Napoleon. Soldier of destiny* (London, 2014), p.507.
[19] An example among many in the published edition of Eugène's correspondence deplored his rashness to act without waiting for Napoleon's answers to his inquiries on state matters, and reminded the viceroy that "[q]uand un ministre vous dira: cela est pressé, le royaume est perdu, Milan va brûler, et que sais-je, moi? il faut lui répondre: Je n'ai pas le droit de le faire, j'attendrai les ordres du Roi." *Mémoires et correspondance politique et militaire du prince Eugène* (Paris, 1858), i, 227-31, Duroc to Eugène, 31 July 1805.
[20] Broers, *Soldier of destiny*, 155-6.

Napoleonic regime against the risk of counterrevolution.[21]

Renewed war meant near-constant mobilisation; combat returned to the kingdom's territory in the 1805-'06 and 1809 campaigns. As a result of war, the kingdom ceded Massa to the Principality of Lucca and incorporated the ex-Venetian lands beyond the Adige river (reaching in to Dalmatia until the Illyrian Provinces became a French protectorate), the ex-papal ones south of the Romagna, including the Adriatic port of Ancona, and southern Tyrol following the repression of Andreas Hofer's uprising. In the kingdom's last five years of existence, its army participated to the campaigns in Spain, Germany and Russia,[22] while at home stability rested on shaky foundations. After a wave of revolts coinciding with the Tyrol uprising and the spring campaign in Venetia in 1809, a larger and more unsettling one erupted later that year. Its causes lay in a heady mixture of discontent at draft and taxation,[23] exacerbating long-lasting rural misery under agrarian capitalism and an unfavourable conjuncture in climate, harvests and economy.[24] These multiple local crises threw into sharp relief the ineffectiveness of large tracts of the state administration to control dissent, especially in the newer departments.[25] Internal crises, however dire, did not bring the kingdom down alone; the fatal blow came in 1814, as the Napoleonic empire unravelled everywhere in Europe. While the Austrian army advanced through the Po plain, a complex diplomatic struggle took place among the factions of the royal Senate and the foreign powers racing to secure a deal with Eugène. Persuaded by secret negotiations with the Austrians and news of Napoleon's own abdication, Eugène left Italy, with no guarantee about the kingdom's sovereignty.[26] The Milanese municipal leadership nominated a provisional regency, abolishing the most unpopular taxes and attempting to favour the conservative noble élites in the regime transition. However, the Austrians put an end to the regency, concentrating power into their own plenipotentiary and only gradually dismantling the Napoleonic bureaucracy, until the

[21] Ibid., 508-9.
[22] A. Grab, "Army, state, and society: Conscription and desertion in Napoleonic Italy (1802-1814)", *The Journal of Modern History*, 67/1 (1995), 25-54.
[23] A. Grab, "State power, brigandage and rural resistance in Napoleonic Italy", *European History Quarterly*, 25 (1995), 39-70.
[24] L. Mocarelli, "Clima e vita economica nello Stato di Milano tra metà Settecento e Restaurazione", in G. Alfani, L. Di Tullio, L. Mocarelli (eds.), *Storia economica e ambiente italiano (ca.1400-1850)* (Milan, 2012), 129-42.
[25] Zaghi, *L'Italia di Napoleone*, 627-36.
[26] A. De Francesco, *Storie dell'Italia rivoluzionaria e napoleonica (1796-1814)* (Milan, 2016), 221-44.

creation of the Kingdom of Lombardy-Venetia in 1815.[27]

The Republic/Kingdom of Italy occupies a prominent place in Napoleonic history, as the theatre of Napoleon Bonaparte's first breakthrough campaign and apprenticeship to statecraft, and a treasured possession in the literal sense of financial and logistical resources to extract for the French war effort.[28] It has been an oft-visited place for scholarship on the reception of the Napoleonic institutions in satellite states and societies outside France, since far longer than the *départements réunis* of Piedmont, Liguria and central Italy.[29] Likewise, in the 19th and early 20th century, it was easier for Italian historiography to fit the kingdom into the dominant Savoy-centric, liberal nationalist frameworks than the Kingdom of Naples.[30] Until after the Second World War, the debate on the origins of the Italian national movement fostered an uneasy relationship with the French Revolution and the Napoleonic hegemony that focussed on political history and the creation and functioning of institutions modelled after their French counterparts.[31] This focus survived even after the teleological conceptualisation of Ancien Régime and Napoleonic era as the "prologue in Heaven" to the Risorgimento, as Carlo Capra suggestively put it, was overcome and nuanced.[32] Within the rich "institutional" research track, we can place Livio Antonielli's pioneering work on the prefects of the kingdom,[33] Carlo Zaghi's large-scope monograph encompassing politics, institutions and socio-economic background,[34] and the enduring interest in conscription and the national army.[35] The focus extends to the consolidation of bureaucracy that the Kingdom of Italy inherited from 18th century Habsburg Lombardy,[36] an interest which recently has branched from the central (and Milan-centric)

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[27] R.J. Rath, *The provisional Austrian regime in Lombardy-Venetia, 1814-1815* (Austin/London, 1969), 54-63.
[28] Broers, *Soldier of destiny*, 147-63, 402.
[29] On the annexed departments: M. Broers, *The Napoleonic empire in Italy, 1796-1814. Cultural imperialism in a European context?* (Basingstoke, 2005).
[30] A. De Francesco, *L'Italia di Bonaparte. Politica, statualità e nazione nella penisola tra due rivoluzioni, 1796-1821* (Turin, 2011), p. xvii.
[31] A.M. Rao, "Il giacobinismo italiano nell'opera di Carlo Zaghi", *Studi Storici*, 45/1 (2004), 47-82.
[32] C. Capra, *Gli italiani prima dell'Italia. Un lungo Settecento, dalla fine della Controriforma a Napoleone* (Rome, 2014), p.16.
[33] Antonielli, *I prefetti*.
[34] Zaghi, *L'Italia di Napoleone*.
[35] P. Crociani, V. Ilari, C. Paoletti, *Storia militare del Regno Italico (1802-1814)*, i-ii (Rome, 2004). Della Peruta, *Esercito e società*. Grab, "Army, State, and Society". F. Schneid, *Soldiers of Napoleon's Kingdom of Italy. Army, state, and society, 1800-1815* (Boulder, 1995).
[36] C. Capra, "'Il dotto e il ricco ed il patrizio vulgo…' Notabili e funzionari nella Milano napoleonica", in F. Della Peruta (ed.), *I cannoni al Sempione. Milano e la "Grande Nation" (1796-1814)* (Milan, 1986), 37-74.

institutions to municipalities.[37] Works of broader scope, looking at Italy as a whole, acknowledge the complexity and conflicts of the Napoleonic age, its timings of conquest and assimilation, which were diverse for each state in the peninsula.[38] For the Kingdom of Italy, so do studies on the élites of the ex-Venetia and their transition into a new state,[39] and on the shorter, turbulent integration of Trentino, where the bulwark of continuity and functioning of the state apparatus was the stability of the clerical staff.[40]

Analysing the military accommodation system allows observing how the new state reacted to a centuries-old problem, amplified by the ways of mass warfare and its needs of mobility, safety, training. It can also show little-known fault-lines in the Napoleonic integration of people within the regime institutions, specifically the idiosyncrasies of war commissariat staff, the shifting roles of the private and public sector in the supply management, and civil-military encroachment in each other's spaces. It opens a new window to the burdens and opportunities of the Napoleonic Wars, hitting the Italian territories with an intensity[41] that clashed not quite with a "limited" nature of 18th century war, but rather with the half-century of peace between 1748 and 1796, lightening mobilisation burdens but engendering drives to reform and rearmament.[42] Thus, the study of barracks questions current notions of militarisation and total war in Napoleonic historiography.

Total war

"Total war" is as apparently self-explanatory a term as it is actually nebulous. It sinks its roots in the Clausewitzian "absolute war" and was popularised between 1918 and 1939, when French and German writers argued for mobilisation of all society for war, and subordination of the state to the military, carrying a fight that should not stop until the complete obliteration

[37] E. Pagano, *Il comune di Milano nell'età napoleonica: 1800-1814* (Milan, 1994); *Enti locali e stato in Italia sotto Napoleone. Repubblica e Regno d'Italia, 1802-1814* (Rome, 2007).
[38] De Francesco, *Italia di Bonaparte*. C. Cerreti, M.P. Donato, I. Dumont, V. Santini (eds.), *Atlante storico dell'Italia rivoluzionaria e napoleonica* (Rome, 2013).
[39] V. Dal Cin, *Il mondo nuovo. L'élite veneta fra rivoluzione e restaurazione (1797-1815)* (Venice, 2019).
[40] C. Nubola, "Propaganda e fedeltà politica nel corso delle guerre napoleoniche. Il caso trentino", in M. Bonazza, S. Seidel Menchi (eds.), *Dal leone all'aquila. Comunità, territori e cambi di regime nell'epoca di Massimiliano I* (Rovereto, 2012), 149-66.
[41] Acknowledging that modern definitions in the scale of conflict intensity are somewhat problematic and vague, "intensity" here means the surge in military-centred demand for men, materiel, labour, support services. C. Bellamy, "If you can't stand the heat... New concepts of conflict intensity". *The RUSI Journal*, 143/1 (1998), 25-6.
[42] A.M. Rao, "Il Settecento italiano e la guerra", *Studi settecenteschi*, 22/3 (2002) 132-3.

of the enemy.[43] The basic features of total war can be summed up as mobilisation of all resources for the war effort led by a centralised state, the aim of complete destruction of the enemy, and dismissal of the military/civilian and combatant/non-combatant distinction,[44] legitimising indiscriminate violence.

Zeitgeist has shaped the conceptualisation of total war and its historical evolution, culminating in the destructiveness and mobilisation that the world wars of the 20th century epitomised. Within this teleological and nation-centric framework, which tends to erase colonial warfare and the internal idiosyncrasies of mobilised societies,[45] historiography retraced the evolution of total war to the late 18th century. Writing in the thick of the Cold War, John Nef identified the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars as the break from the limited war of the 18th century in the European theatres of operations, restrained by the technological and productive pre-industrial means, and by the culture of aristocratic *politesse* and Enlightenment pacifism.[46] In this regard, the Napoleonic Wars were an aspiring total war, inhibited by the limits of production and industrialisation, particularly acute in the continent, lagging behind Britain in the race to resources and technical developments.[47] 20th century military histories of the Napoleonic Wars used the categories of total war and total mobilisation, opposite to the "indecisive" and "limited" campaigning of the 18th century, to define the increased scale of the armies' manpower, the harnessing of resources for the army, and the mobility that came from reliance on the territory for supply.[48]

In the 2000s, Jean-Yves Guiomar turned to strategy and culture to draw a red thread between the French Revolutionary/Napoleonic Wars and the age of Ludendorff, highlighting the unclear war aims borne out of ideology and politics, rather than out of realistic military considerations, and their repercussions on strategy.[49] Along Guiomar's lines, David Bell has made the

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[43] H. Strachan, "Essay and Reflection: On Total War and Modern War", *The International History Review*, 22/2 (2000), 348-9.
[44] B. Heuser, "Guibert: Prophet of total war?", in R. Chickering, S. Förster (eds.), *War in an Age of Revolution, 1775-1815* (Cambridge, 2010), p.65. P.H. Wilson, "Was the Thirty Years' War a 'Total War'?, in E. Charters, E. Rosenhaft, H. Smith (eds.), *Civilians and war in Europe, 1618-1815* (Liverpool, 2012), p.24.
[45] P.K. Saint-Amour, *Tense future. Modernism, total war, encyclopedic form* (Oxford, 2015), 57-8.
[46] J.U. Nef, *War and human progress* (New York, 1968).
[47] Ibid.
[48] D. Chandler, *The campaigns of Napoleon* (New York, 1966), 159-60. G. Rothenberg, *The Napoleonic Wars* (London, 1999), p.16.
[49] J.-Y. Guiomar, *L'invention de la guerre totale, XVIIIe-XIXe siècle* (Paris, 2004).

most articulate case for revolutionary and Napoleonic total war to date.[50] Much of Bell's arguments rest on escalating violence, insurgency and counterinsurgency, a preoccupation reflecting the context of the book's redaction in the wake of the American war on terrorism and military interventionism.[51] At the root of Bell's arguments lies "l'idée que la «guerre totale» se fonde moins sur un plan spécifique et physique de mobilisation et de destruction que sur une dynamique de radicalisation."[52] This approach draws on intellectual history to posit that changing Enlightenment understandings of war and peace at the end of the 18th century shaped the novel way the French revolutionary state élite viewed war, as an extreme event disjointed from politico-strategical goals. As enemies were assumed to wage a "war of extermination" against France and the Revolution, extermination should be paid back in kind, allowing demonization of opponents that justified violence, the abandonment of such restraints as sparing non-combatants, and conquest for self-protection's sake by overthrowing standing regimes and exporting the revolutionary reforms.[53] This produced an intensification of the conflict that Napoleon had no intention of de-escalating. While not entailing a military-led regime, his rise to power amplified a militaristic turn in French society, in which "militarism" and "militarisation" define a gap between the military and civilian sphere that had not been present in Ancien Régime society.[54]

Critical engagement with Bell's theses, although with many caveats owing to the diversity of war contexts,[55] has accepted at least in part their postulates. That means acknowledging, as Roger Chickering writes, "family resemblances" between the wars of the Age of Revolutions and the new features of later conflicts, namely the larger scale of armies, having a larger impact on society as a whole, achieved through popular mobilisation.[56] A common denominator to the Napoleonic total war narrative is the assumption of 18th century wars as the ideal-type non-total warfare, where violence found constraints not so much "in the broad cultural, artistic and religious

[50] D.A. Bell, *The first total war. Napoleon's Europe and the birth of modern warfare* (London, 2007).
[51] Ibid., 284-5.
[52] D.A. Bell, "Réponse et commentaire de David Bell", https://ihrf.univ-paris1.fr/fileadmin/IHRF/Centre_de_documentation/Controverses/Reponse_de_D._Bell.pdf (1 April 2020).
[53] Bell, *First total war*, 8-9.
[54] Ibid., p.191.
[55] For example the case studies analysed in Charters, Rosenhaft, Smith (eds.), *Civilians and war*.
[56] R. Chickering, "Introduction: A tale of two tales: Grand narratives of war in the Age of Revolution", in R. Chickering, S. Förster (eds.), *War in an Age of Revolution, 1775-1815* (Cambridge, 2010), p.17.

movements of the age, but in the traditional evolving code of the aristocratic warrior".[57] This argument is central to the Ancien Régime vs revolutionary warfare rupture, as the limited wars, fought by professional armies for limited dynastic purposes, did not conceptualise the extreme wartime/peacetime and military/civilian breaks that would widen from the French Revolutionary Wars onwards.[58] This somewhat idyllic picture clashes with historiography that, drawing from the debate on the military revolution, rather stresses continuities between 18th and 19th century war.[59] Even in the thick of the Napoleonic Wars, technology, economics and logistics constrained the destructive power of war and the means of mobilisation, which remained largely what they had been in the 18th century.[60] Although not particularly new, these economic and logistical processes created a home front[61] to optimise the sustainment of large, highly mobile conscript armies, and enabling, as Mark Hewitson has concluded for the German states, "a common conception of unending, burdensome 'national' or 'participatory' warfare".[62]

Logistics

Studies on the 20th century world wars have highlighted the importance of logistics as one multifaceted part of a nation's mobilisation,[63] encompassing all the services, procurements, administrative and economic means putting an army in the condition to fight, emphasising the movement and allocation of materials.[64] The Napoleonic Wars saw the expansion in scope of operational art, therefore of the logistical capacity supporting the pursuit of decisive victory.[65] They were a watershed in the definition of logistics as a

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[57] A. Starkey, "War and Culture, a Case Study: The Enlightenment and the Conduct of the British Army in America, 1755–1781", *War and Society*, 8/1 (1990), p.22.
[58] Bell, *First total war*, 11-2.
[59] J. Black, "Eighteenth-century warfare reconsidered", *War in History*, 1/2 (1994), 215-32. Chickering, "Tale of two tales", p.7.
[60] M. Broers, "The Concept of 'Total War' in the Revolutionary–Napoleonic Period", *War in History*, 15/3 (2008), p.259.
[61] Chickering, "Tale of two tales", p.16.
[62] Hewitson, "Princes' Wars", p.459.
[63] A. Gropman (ed.,) *The Big 'L'. American logistics in WWII* (Washington, 1997). R.P. Patterson, *Arming the nation for war. Mobilization, supply, and the American war effort in World War II* (Knoxville, 2014). R. Chickering, S. Förster (eds.), *Great War, total war. Combat and mobilization on the Western Front, 1914-1918* (Washington/Cambridge, 2000).
[64] H. Eccles, "Logistics—what is it?", *Naval Research Logistics Quarterly*, 1/1 (1954), 5-15.
[65] M. Howard, "Prologue", in M. van Creveld, J.A. Olsen (eds.), *The evolution of operational art. From Napoleon to the present* (Oxford, 2010), ix-x.

branch of military art, distinct from strategy and tactics. Carl von Clausewitz conceptualised logistics as the "maintenance of the armies" subordinated to the purposes of the war, a necessary pre-condition to combat, functioning through its own logic in daily operations.[66] Antoine Jomini summarised logistics as the preparation and management of army movements, hinging on general staffs to implement the commander-in-chief's strategical thinking.[67]

The Revolutionary/Napoleonic Wars saw armies ballooning in size, moving quickly, seeking battle with the intention of destroying the enemy fighting force. To do so, it was paramount to apply a high degree of mobility to large armies, articulated in *corps d'armée*, concentrating at the right time and place to invest the enemy.[68] The French army travelled light; bivouacking along the road instead of pitching camp saved time and baggage space, and enabled the French to out-march the Prussians in 1806.[69] Resource to survive and move should be sourced from the campaign area, sticking to the principle of "war feeding war".[70] According to Martin van Creveld's pioneering study, Napoleon's contribution to the progress of logistics was precisely that he freed warfare from the dependence on sieges and the apparatus of magazines and baggage trains they required. Thus, the army could focus on advancing fast and seeking battle, relying on its surroundings for its sustainment.[71] Although there are no explicit contact points with total war literature, this fits well with Bell's description of the Grande Armée as the culmination of the revolutionary tactical doctrine: attack-oriented, hard-marching, relinquishing the measured manoeuvring of Ancien Régime armies and the limited warfare it underpinned.[72] This interpretation of Napoleonic logistics does not sufficiently consider what allowed this *ante litteram* "weapon of mass destruction"[73] to move unfettered. John A. Lynn's criticism to Creveld's narratives of 1805 and 1812 has pointed out that living off the country is more complex than just requisitioning around a set area in order to achieve self-sufficiency.[74]

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[66] E.E. Duarte, D. Proença Júnior, "The concept of logistics derived from Clausewitz", *Journal of Strategic Studies*, 28/4 (2005), 645-77.
[67] A. Jomini, *Précis de l'art de la guerre* (Paris, 1838), ii, 147-8.
[68] B. Colson, *Napoleon: On war,* tr. G. Elliott, (Oxford, 2015), p.171.
[69] C. Telp, "The Prussian army in the Jena campaign", in A. Forrest, P. Wilson (eds.), *The bee and the eagle. Napoleonic France and the end of the Holy Roman Empire, 1806* (Basingstoke, 2009), 160-2.
[70] Colson, *On war*, 244-6.
[71] M. van Creveld, *Supplying war. Logistics from Wallenstein to Patton*, 2nd edn (Cambridge, 2004), 40-74.
[72] Bell, *First total war*, p.234.
[73] Ibid.
[74] J.A. Lynn, "The history of logistics and supplying war", in J.A. Lynn (ed.) *Feeding Mars. Logistics in western warfare from the Middle Ages to the present* (Boulder/Oxford, 1993), 15-9.

The means of Napoleonic logistics were early modern; historians of 18th century warfare have highlighted the uneasy relationship armies had with their own means of subsistence. The narrative has stressed the central role of foraging, closely associated with light cavalry, and monetary contributions exacted from the populace, to provide immediate support for the army on campaign, primarily food and fodder.[75] Aware of how easily foraging expeditions could blur into pillage and distribute booty unequally, officers were expected to regulate the troops' behaviour while soldiers created their own moral economy of pillage.[76] Foraging, however, was not the whole world of logistics. Nor was it enough to support armies, even in the context of "limited" warfare. That was certainly true for Germany during the Seven Years' War, called to sustain the British-German coalition armies fighting against the French.[77] Recent scholarship on the British war effort during the American Revolution shows clearly how foraging was a short-range and short-term technique,[78] unavoidable *faute de mieux* but unable to sustain an army on its own unless safe and efficient lines of communication were set up, and the commissariat had cash to purchase or reimburse supplies.[79] Breakdowns in the British army commissariat increased reliance on foraging, which alienated local sympathies and undermined loyalty to the crown, whereas Cornwallis' success story in Virginia was due to a scrupulous regulation of confiscations and to a rich, productive country.[80]

Early modern means were more far-reaching than living off the land. In the wake of the debates on the military revolution, the growth of European standing armies and the efforts to manage and maintain them through the fiscal-military state, the concept of "contractor state" encompasses the synergies of public administration and private sector accessing credit and resources on the market, and allocating them for war.[81] Studies on Britain, from the mid-18th century throughout the Napoleonic Wars, have been particularly attentive to the logistical effort that went into providing for the

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[75] C. Duffy, *The military experience in the age of reason* (London/New York, 1987), 122-3.
[76] A. Starkey, *War in the age of Enlightenment, 1700-1789* (Westport, 2003), p.96.
[77] S. Conway, "Provisioning the combined army in Germany, 1758-1762: Who benefited?", in R. Harding, S. Solbes Ferri (eds.), *The contractor state and its implications, 1659-1815* (Palmas de Gran Canaria, 2012), 77-98.
[78] M.H. Spring, *With zeal and with bayonets only. The British army on campaign in North America, 1775-1783* (Norman, 2008), p.36.
[79] Ibid., 33-6.
[80] G.J.W. Urwin, "'To bring the American Army under strict Discipline': British Army Foraging Policy in the South, 1780–81", *War in History*, 26/1 (2019), 4-26.
[81] H.V. Bowen (ed.), "Forum. The Contractor State, c. 1650-1815", *International Journal of Maritime History*, 25/1 (2013), 239-74.

navy and, generally, fighting wars on multiple fronts on a global scale.[82] The framework is useful to situate the Napoleonic Wars, and the emphasis on logistics has informed fresh perspectives on campaign histories, such as Rory Muir's biography of Arthur Wellesley[83] and Dominic Lieven's seminal work on Russia.[84] The Napoleonic administration was also steeped in the contractor state, to an extent that has emerged indirectly but powerfully in the literature. Howard Brown's work on the French ministry of war throughout the Revolution and the Directory has been pivotal, tracing the evolution of the bureaucratic apparatus and the several links between bureaucracy, party politics, and the army supply entrepreneurship, giving the lie to long-standing assumptions about the nexus of corruption and private sector in the Directory.[85] Historiography on the administration-entrepreneurship nexus during the empire is less solid, and the Napoleonic ministry of war administration stands understudied, relying on a merely descriptive monograph.[86]

Recent research on the economic history of the empire, re-centring imperial finances from the shortcomings of the Continental Blockade, has highlighted the role of war and military supply in shaping the business landscape and its complex relationships with state administration proper. This is evident in Pierre Branda's work of synthesis[87] and in case studies on administration and financial networks involved in the army supply business, such as Levati on the Kingdom of Italy and Oliveira on financier networks linking Paris to the economic powerhouse of northern France.[88] The focus on people and careers in an imperial dimension, continuing the line of research on the Napoleonic "integration of Europe" and its instruments of *amalgame* and *ralliement*,[89] helps understanding the empire as a collective effort and experience, rather

[82] R. Knight, M. Wilcox, *Sustaining the fleet, 1793-1815. War, the British Navy and the contractor state* (London, 2010). R. Knight, *Britain against Napoleon. The organization of victory, 1793-1815* (London, 2013), MOBI edition.
[83] R. Muir, *Wellington. The path to victory, 1769-1814* (London, 2013).
[84] D. Lieven, *Russia against Napoleon. The battle for Europe, 1807 to 1814* (London, 2009).
[85] H.G. Brown, "A discredited regime: The Directory and army contracting", *French History*, 4/1 (1990), 48-76; *War, revolution and the bureaucratic state. Politics and army administration in France, 1791-1799* (Oxford, 1995).
[86] E. Dague, *Napoleon and the First Empire's ministries of war and military administration* (Lewiston, 2006).
[87] P. Branda, *Le prix de la gloire. Napoléon et l'argent* (Paris, 2007), ePub edition.
[88] S. Levati, *La «buona azienda negli eserciti prepara la vittoria... e genera l'economia». Appalti, commissari e appaltatori nell'Italia napoleonica* (Soveria Mannelli, 2010). M. De Oliveira, *Les routes de l'argent. Réseaux et flux financiers de Paris à Hambourg (1789-1815)* (Paris, 2011).
[89] S. Woolf, *Napoleon's integration of Europe* (New York, 1991), 109-10.

than a one-man creation centred on Napoleon.[90] Lignereux' studies on the Gendarmerie and state officials have been recent contributors in that regard,[91] as well as Levati's analysis of the Italian war commissariat and the supply contractors.[92] This thesis expands on these efforts, by lowering the gaze at the brushwood of officials, contractors and custodianship workers who directly watched over the barracks and their supplies. This can shed light on the extent of changes and continuities in the bureaucratic apparatus, subject to the new work ethics of talent and merit, in the wake of studies that traditionally focus on the ministries,[93] and contribute to challenging the nature of militarisation in the army support services.

Rather than an agent of militarisation and nationalisation, logistics emerges as a contact zone between the military and civilian sphere, public administration and private enterprise, the branches of the state, occupiers and occupied peoples. The term "contact zone", originating in literary theory and post-colonial studies, designates a spatial and social site of power struggle and negotiation, stemming from the encounters and clashes between different, asymmetrical social and cultural positions.[94] While the concept has been mostly applied to history of war in terms of cultural encounters,[95] struggle and negotiation also shaped logistics, in terms of materiel procurement and cooperation with the war effort, but also the rights to be exempt from that cooperation and to redressing unfair treatment. Participation to the logistical effort as providers (in the form of army contractors, state officials, or hapless owners of requisitioned goods) or, in the case of the soldiers, as consumers of materiel and services, allows to better connect logistics to the experience of war. This is another tricky concept, filtered by processes of mediation and reconstruction, through cultural factors and memorialisation, which allows a subject to organise the experiences with "narrative cohesiveness".[96] The works of Alan Forrest on

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[90] M. Broers, "Introduction: Napoleon, His Empire, Our Europe and the 'New Napoleonic History'", in M. Broers, P. Hicks, A. Guimerá (eds.), *The Napoleonic empire and the new European political culture* (Basingstoke, 2012) p.3.

[91] A. Lignereux, *Servir Napoléon. Policiers et gendarmes dans les départements annexés (1796-1814)* (Seyssel, 2012); *Les impériaux. Administrer et habiter l'Europe de Napoléon* (Paris, 2019), ePub edition.

[92] Levati, *Buona azienda*.

[93] C. Church, *Revolution and red tape. The French ministerial bureaucracy, 1770-1850* (Oxford, 1981). R. Kingston, *Bureaucrats and bourgeois society. Office politics and individual credit in France, 1789-1848* (Basingstoke, 2012).

[94] M.L. Pratt, *Imperial eyes. Travel writing and transculturation*, 2nd edn (London/New York, 2008), 7-8.

[95] J. Clarke, J. Horne (eds.), *Militarized cultural encounters in the Long Nineteenth Century. Making war, mapping Europe* (Cham, 2018).

[96] P. Dwyer, "War Stories: French Veteran Narratives and the 'Experience of War' in the Nineteenth Century", *European History Quarterly*, 41/4 (2011), 563-4.

primary sources, especially soldiers' correspondence, show the role of communicating experience was fundamentally a response mechanism to a life of deprivation and hardship.[97] Logistical conditions were the bedrock of soldiers' deprivation, whereas the civilian resources, drawn and channelled towards military use, entailed also civilian experience of logistics. Following Bell's lead of total war and Forrest's emphasis on ego-documents, as well as Jean-Paul Bertaud's arguments on the militarisation of French society,[98] Marie-Cécile Thoral has integrated military and civilian experiences of the wars, highlighting the centrality of war to the French public sphere and its fallout on daily life, affected by the consequences and demands of war economy.[99] However, even as all authors conscientiously remind readers that resource extraction passed through requisitions throughout the conflict, within France and outside, logistics remains an under-acknowledged presence in Napoleonic total war. Military accommodation can help us see it as an experience of war that was mediated through the lenses of business and institutions.

Military accommodation: Between administration and habitation

In contrast with the lack of interest of Napoleonic historiography, scholars of early modern war have often analysed military accommodation in a variety of contexts across Europe, usually within the wider frameworks of the military revolution and the rise of standing armies. It is possible to characterise historiographical approaches to military accommodation as running along two intertwined tracks of analysis, which we can term "administration" and "habitation", epitomised in the founding texts of military accommodation history.

It was a French artillery officer, André Navereau, who in 1924 published the main reference work on military accommodation in France from the end of the Hundred Years War to the eve of the Revolution.[100] Focussing on administration of the military presence and the institutions interacting among themselves and with the army commanders to regulate military presence and redress abuses, the approach of this early, exhaustive work was a blueprint

[97] A. Forrest, *Napoleon's men. The soldiers of the revolution and empire* (New York, 2002), p.52.
[98] J.-P. Bertaud, *Quand les enfants parlaient de gloire. L'armée au cœur de la France de Napoléon* (Paris, 2006).
[99] M.-C. Thoral, *From Valmy to Waterloo. France at war, 1792-1815* (Basingstoke, 2011), 147-208.
[100] A. Navereau, *Le logement et les ustensiles des gens de guerre de 1439 à 1789* (Poitiers, 1924).

for later case studies, fitting well within the framework of early modern military revolution. Army composition shifted from the late Medieval predominance of heavy cavalry to infantry in increasing numbers;[101] longer, frequent wars made it impractical for armies to disband at the end of the campaign season or even in peacetime, which meant an exponential recourse to winter quarters, adding to the strain that ordinary accommodation exerted through troop transit.[102] A permanent military presence was also necessary to garrison fortresses, which, depending on local arrangements and the quality of military administration and discipline, could be either a source of conflict between soldiers and townsfolk, or a beneficial cohabitation.[103] Over time, the concept of garrison expanded from the field of fortification, evolving to indicate either a group of soldiers manning a fortress, or a standing body of troops sojourning in a location for a prolonged period at the king's order.[104]

As David Parrott has shown, the apparatus sustaining these armies was not state-run, but rather derived from mercantile and financial networks in the private sector and the commanders' own networks, from recruitment to supply.[105] In such a context, redressing teleological views hinging on the nation-state and its supposed centralising effect, the role of local representative bodies and power networks played a capital role in negotiating the military presence on the territory. Military accommodation was one among many such services, and as subject as any other to negotiations between royal/state authority, specifically that of the Habsburg monarchies tied to the Holy Roman Empire (Spanish from 1556 to 1707, Austrian from 1714 to 1796) in the geographical area at the core of this study, and local actors with their own sets of powers, rights and legal privileges. Lombardy's place in the Habsburg imperial system entailed a prolonged military presence, even when no campaign was fought there; during the Eighty Years' War, control of Lombardy and the Valtellina secured the lower routes of the Spanish Road funnelling troops towards Flanders.[106] Studies by Mario Rizzo,

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[101] M. Mallett, C. Shaw, *The Italian Wars, 1494-1559. War, state and society in early modern Europe*, 2nd edn (London, 2018), p.310.
[102] M.P. Gutmann, *War and rural life in the early modern Low Countries* (Princeton, 1980), p. 16.
[103] M. t'Hart, *The Dutch Wars of Independence. Warfare and commerce in the Netherlands 1570-1680* (London, 2014), 81-3.
[104] Navereau, *Logement*, p.35.
[105] D. Parrott, *The business of war. Military enterprise and military revolution in early modern Europe* (Cambridge, 2012).
[106] G. Parker, *The army of Flanders and the Spanish Road, 1567-1659. The logistics of Spanish victory and defeat in the Low Countries' Wars* (Cambridge, 1972).

Alessandro Buono and Davide Maffi have analysed the troop accommodation in Spanish Lombardy as it was shaped by the needs of logistics, and illustrated the power relations between city and countryside, local élites and institutions, and the Madrid court.[107] The management of army accommodation had a fundamental role in co-opting local élites within the Spanish "composite monarchy", in which a fundamental impossibility of uniting all components of the Spanish hegemony into one common identity informed a policy-making line for the Italian provinces based on caution, *raison d'état* and rational government.[108] Within the latter category, fell the task of managing the entrepreneurial and political apparatus that made it possible to raise and organise an army. The fiscal burden increased, employing complex forms of taxation; the direct obligation to provide free-of-charge billets was converted into a monetary payment. Its repartition was a key point of contention as the more prominent cities used their privileges to obtain exemption from billets, and dump the obligations onto their surrounding rural areas (*contadi* or *corpi santi*). Rural communes and lesser towns canvassed for the crown to ensure that the military-free cities respected the fair practices known as *equalanze*.[109] Since 1662, with the system of *rimplazzo*, the maintenance and supply of military accommodation was contracted to an entrepreneur, under payment of wherewithal based on the lists of troops present in the region; local government bodies drew up the troops lists, administered military expenses and oversaw the repartition of billets.[110] These processes gradually weakened the cities' fiscal privileges vis-à-vis the *contado*.[111] Such privileges borne out of local particularism and élite clientele networks, which led to accommodation exemptions, were relentlessly renegotiated, in Lombardy as in Sicily or in the Venetian

[107] D. Maffi, "Alloggiamenti militari e comunità locali: Pavia e il suo contado nel '600", *Annali di storia pavese*, 27 (1999), 325-38. M. Rizzo, *Alloggiamenti militari e riforme fiscali nella Lombardia Spagnola fra Cinque e Seicento* (Milano, 2001). A. Buono, *Esercito, istituzioni, territorio. Alloggiamenti militari e «case herme» nello Stato di Milano (secoli XVI e XVII)* (Florence, 2009). A. Buono, M. Di Tullio, M. Rizzo, "Per una storia economica e istituzionale degli alloggiamenti militari in Lombardia tra XV e XVII secolo", *Storia economica*, 1/19 (2016), 187-218

[108] G. Muto, "L'impero come impossibile identità comune", in A. Musi (ed.), *Alle origini di una nazione. Antispagnolismo e identità italiana* (Milan, 2003), 371-94.

[109] M.M. Rabà, "Alloggiamenti militari e difesa territoriale autogestita: le comunità rurali del Ducato di Milano. Ripartizione del carico fiscale e dinamiche contrattuali nella seconda fase delle guerre d'Italia", *Rivista di studi militari*, 4 (2015), 59-104.

[110] A. Dattero, *Soldati a Milano. Organizzazione militare e società lombarda nella prima dominazione austriaca* (Milan, 2014), 50-1.

[111] Maffi, "Alloggiamenti militari".

terraferma.[112]

Billeting brings up "habitation", which relates military accommodation with urban and household history; a prelude to this approach can be found in Werner Hegemann's urban history of Berlin, published in 1930.[113] Historiography is unanimous in describing barracks as the exception rather than the norm throughout the early modern and Ancien Régime period.[114] As André Corvisier sums up, "[l]es fortresses urbaines devenues insuffisantes ou mal entretenues, le logement des gens de guerre était à la charge des habitants."[115] The first purpose-built barracks, in Spanish Flanders between 16th and 17th century, hosted no more than four to eight men per allotment, improving little on the *barracas* that soldiers built themselves with whatever materials they found.[116] Late 17th century fortifications allocated more spaces for garrison soldiers' accommodation,[117] and Vauban himself designed a model barracks that ought to be replicated in fortress cities across France.[118] However, lodging troops in taverns, empty houses rented from their owners, or buildings purchased by the municipality, was a far more widespread solution, from late 16th to most of the 18th century. In the processes of selection and rent, the municipalities were the main actors, devising their solutions to the emergency of troop arrivals; in 17th century France, the royal intendants provided a certain degree of oversight on the *étapes*, their supply and the management of the troops' influx, but did not allocate accommodation.[119] Leases and supplies could turn into a profitable business, as it did for the wealthier rural families, merchants and innkeepers in the Venetian mainland communes studied by Giulio Ongaro.[120] There was a strong link between margins of profit and efficient fiscal redistribution; this was most evident when the system malfunctioned, as belated payments on rent and damage compensation were serious problems.[121] The soldiers had an incorrigible tendency to break and pillage property, even in friendly

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[112] V. Favarò, "Sugli alloggiamenti militari in Sicilia tra Cinque e Seicento", *Mediterranea. Ricerche storiche*, 20 (2010), 459-78. G. Ongaro, *Peasants and soldiers. The management of the Venetian military structure in the Mainland Dominion between the 16th and 17th centuries* (London/New York, 2017).
[113] W. Hegemann, *Das steinerne Berlin. Geschichte der grössten Mietskasernestadt in der Welt* (Berlin, 1930).
[114] Buono, *Esercito*, 143-6.
[115] A. Corvisier, *Armées et sociétés en Europe de 1494 à 1789* (Vendôme, 1976), p.92.
[116] Parker, *Army of Flanders*, p.140.
[117] J.A. Lynn, *Giant of the Grand Siècle. The French army, 1610-1715* (Cambridge, 2006), p.159.
[118] F. Dallemagne, *Les casernes françaises* (Paris, 1990), 42-5.
[119] Navereau, *Logement*, p.38-9.
[120] Ongaro, *Peasants*, p.142-4.
[121] Favarò, "Sugli alloggiamenti".

country, and bully their civilian hosts for extra provisions.[122]

The idea of separating troops and populace was rooted in attempts at preventing military abuses, from frauds to violence. Civilians were not just passive victims; burghers could go up in arms against the soldiers, and innkeepers exert surveillance to ensure soldiers respected their curfews.[123] The civil-military relations of standing armies in the urban environment of Ancien Régime German states have been a favoured field of investigation for 18th century historians. These case studies show that the permanent peacetime garrisons, largely billeted even in Frederician Prussia under the *Kantonsystem* (where barracks were reserved for married professional soldiers with family),[124] posed problems of urban public order and cohabitation over the usage of domestic spaces, but also helped stimulate the local economy as consumers and labourers.[125] Rather than leading to a militarisation of society, military presence occasioned a bourgeoisation of the soldier, as Ralf Pröve writes,[126] therefore increasing military-civilian separation was not necessarily desirable; the high costs of building and provisioning barracks, along with concerns over the impossibility of controlling the soldiers, deterred the city council of Göttingen from building one in 1723.[127]

In Britain, the distrust of a standing army made it so that troops were commonly accommodated in inns and houses, whereas barracks were the preserve of garrisons policing Ireland and Scotland. There, the stress was on the defensive aspect, both in the constructions on new barracks that had to stand as fortifications and in the repurposing of castles, but also on controlling the territory through improvements on the road infrastructure that connected the garrisons.[128] Sabina Loriga's study of the army in the Kingdom of Piedmont-Sardinia makes a strong case for a high permeability of the military-civilian threshold;[129] there, barracks construction plans began in the 1730s and continued for decades, often doing nothing more than

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[122] Buono, *Esercito*, 92-7. Ongaro, *Peasants*, p.68.
[123] Navereau, *Logement*, p.44.
[124] K. Möbius, S. Möbius, *Prussian army soldiers and the Seven Years' War. The psychology of honour* (London, 2020), p.26.
[125] S. Kroll, *Soldaten im 18. Jahrhundert zwischen Friedensalltag und Kriegserfahrung. Lebenswelten und Kultur in der kursächsischen Armee 1728-1796* (Paderborn, 2006). R. Pröve, *Stehendes Heer und städtische Gesellschaft im 18. Jahrhundert. Göttingen und seine Militärbevölkerung 1713-1756* (Munich, 1995).
[126] Pröve, *Stehendes Heer,* p.323.
[127] Ibid., 231-3.
[128] V. Henshaw, *Scotland and the British army, 1700-1750. Defending the union* (London, 2014), 149-80.
[129] S. Loriga, *Soldati. L'istituzione militare nel Piemonte del Settecento* (Venice, 1992).

appropriating extant buildings, but never moving all soldiers out of billets and taverns, nor excluding civilians from the military quarters.[130] In France, for all that several royal ordnances concerning barracks constructions remained dead letter,[131] François Dallemagne's architecture-focused chronological study of French barracks counts 69 plans for barracks constructions between 1717 and 1789.[132] French barracks construction and urban models inspired Frederick II of Prussia's own building programme for Berlin, where eight barracks were built after the Seven Years' War.[133]

Local case studies across Europe indicate that billeting was, overall, falling out of favour. In Stéphane Perréon's study of Brittany, significant prompting towards barracksing came from urban homeowners who resented leaving their property empty and unprofitable for long periods in which the troops were absent; conversely, when the troops were present, they were often very destructive tenants, adding to the tally of restoration costs.[134] Additionally, attitudes towards the house and domesticity were changing, engendering a more marked concern for privacy of the home and the family, which heightened the gendered understanding of household spaces as primarily women's spaces.[135] Connecting history of domesticity to the history of military billets has been a successful avenue of research on the Quartering Acts of the British army in pre-revolutionary America, where "the advent of a large, professional army, first in England and then in America, initiated a dialogue on billeting from which people concluded that soldiers should be barred from domiciles."[136]

Thus, the military accommodation system that the revolutionary/Napoleonic era inherited was stepping towards an understanding, if not a practical application, of barracks as the designated ideal military space, intended to meet certain criteria of construction, safety, healthiness. Selection, maintenance and supply of military accommodation was intrinsically linked to the contractual nature of the early modern states and their ways of mobilisation. A more sinister implication lurked on the horizon of late

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[130] Ibid., 17-23.
[131] Lynn, *Giant of the Grand Siècle*, p.159.
[132] Dallemagne, *Casernes*, 70-5.
[133] Hegemann, *Steinerne Berlin*, p.163.
[134] S. Perréon, *L'armée en Bretagne au XVIIIe siècle. Institution militaire et société civile au temps de l'intendence et des États* (Rennes, 2005), 248-9.
[135] J. Flanders, *The making of home. The 500-years story of how our houses became our homes* (New York, 2014), ePub edition.
[136] J. McCurdy, *Quarters. The accommodation of the British Army and the coming of the American Revolution* (Ithaca, 2019), p.48.

Ancien Régime: barracks as a symbol of royal despotism. In the scathing description by Vittorio Alfieri, Frederician Berlin appeared as the epitome of the army swallowing up a whole society: "la continuazione di un solo corpo di guardia … quella universal caserma prussiana".[137] Jean-Paul Marat's attack to to the *armée de métier* did not spare barracksing, which separated people and army to snuff out the people's independency.[138] During the Revolutionary/Napoleonic Wars, the rapid construction of barracks in Britain responded to a logic of controlling the interior not only as protection against foreign invasion, but also as means to maintain public order and prevent the dispersion of armed forces in the face of civil unrest;[139] local propertied classes often lobbied mayors and the Home Secretary for barracks construction.[140] In France, despite the interest of historiography in civil-military relations as a complex, conflictual system in which contacts between populace and soldiers were viewed as suspicious and at risk of spreading sedition,[141] the role of military accommodation in containing these issues stands unexamined. This thesis helps in bridging the gap between late Ancien Régime and the latter 19th century, when the presence of conscription armies, building blocks of the nation state with an educational as well as military mission, took place in industrialised urban contexts, which the military presence was to aid in controlling and repressing while being shielded from subversive influences.[142]

Sources

The overwhelming majority of the primary sources for this thesis has come from institutional archives, the lion's share belonging to the *Fondo Ministero della Guerra* in the State Archive of Milan, the capital city of the kingdom and seat of the ministries. Albeit damaged during the Second World War,

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[137] V. Alfieri, *Vita di Vittorio Alfieri, scritta da esso* (Florence, 1834), p.89.

[138] B. Gainot, "La critique de l'armée professionnelle comme armée privée du despote, à partir des contributions de Jean-Paul Marat", in J.-C. Romer, L. Henninger (eds.), *Armées privées, armées d'état. Mercenaires et auxiliaires d'hier et d'aujourd'hui* (Paris, 2010), 92-3.

[139] Knight, *Britain against Napoleon*, chapter 2, par.65-8.

[140] T. Hewitson, *A soldier's life. The story of Newcastle barracks* (Newcastle-upon-Tyne, 1999), 9-10.

[141] C. Rougier, "Au service du maintien de l'ordre. L'armée et la surveillance politique des départements: le cas de la Gironde (1800-1814)", in H. Drévillon, B. Fonck, M. Roucaud (eds.), *Guerres et armées napoléoniennes. Nouveaux regards* (Paris, 2013), 367-80.

[142] For analyses regarding Italy, Germany and France, see: G. Antonelli (ed.), *Esercito e città dall'Unità agli anni Trenta. Atti del convegno di studi, Spoleto 11-14 maggio 1988*, i-ii (Rome, 1989). U. Frevert, *A nation in barracks. Modern Germany, military conscription and civil society,* tr. A. Boreham, D. Brückenhaus (Oxford, 2004). O. Roynette, *Bons pour le service. La caserne à la fin du XIXe siècle* (Paris, 2000.

this fonds was spared from the re-ordination interventions that "dismembered" the Milanese state papers series between 18th and 19th century.[143] Documentation regarding military accommodation encompasses papers on the contractors and war administration, maintenance of military edifices at the hand of the engineer corps, and selection of the supply inspection and custodianship staff, which allows to shift the perspective from the institution to that of the individuals and analyse how they related to the Napoleonic state.

Municipal and prefectoral archives, while highly variable in the quality of preservation and type of documents available in each location, helpfully integrate the top-down perspective of the ministry and de-centre the focus from the capital city. This documentation allows observation of how the local administrations managed military accommodation, negotiating billets with homeowners, overseeing their own staff and local supply contracts, and keeping track of unit transits.

On a "macro" and supranational level, the archives of the Service Historique de la Défense in Paris, while not concerned with the administrative side of the Kingdom of Italy, sets the Italian barracksing policies within the broader context of military mobility, enabled by the integration of the empire. On the "micro" level, ego-documents, in the form of military memoirs, as well as diaries and correspondence not produced for publication,[144] have been useful to help reconstruct the war experience with regard to military accommodation for ministerial employees, officers, and civilians.

Chapters

The first chapter situates Napoleonic military accommodation within the institutions that dealt with it, the context of mobility logistics and war economy, and the legislation that regulated its functioning in France and the empire proper. It highlights the contractor-state nature of supply, the problematic idea of services militarisation, and the devolution of the barracksing services to the municipalities. The second chapter applies these frameworks to the Kingdom of Italy, a *pays de guerre* serving as springboard

[143] E. Lodolini, *Storia dell'archivistica italiana*, 6th edn (Milan, 2010), 155-7.
[144] For a recent perspective on Napoleonic war literature: M. Grieg, "Accidental authors? Soldiers' tales of the Peninsular War and the secrets of the publishing process", *History Workshop Journal*, 86 (2018), 224-44.

for military mobility during campaigns and drafts. The third chapter looks at the supply system and its troubled history between private and public management, connecting Napoleonic business history to the framework of the contractor state, as supply attempted to move from requisition to a more organised, long-term system. The fourth chapter looks at the people who personally oversaw the supply system and the buildings, their interaction with the institutions and their strategies of employment and work practices, highlighting the surviving links to the Ancien Régime. Buildings are at the centre of chapter five; the acquisition and adaptation of non-military (usually religious) buildings for military accommodation entailed a long-term maintenance effort, contested between the military engineers and the municipal offices, keeping the units safe from disease, desertion, and dispersion. The last two chapters are devoted to military-civilian encroachments and permeability within the same spaces: barracks and billets in the sixth, drill grounds in the seventh.

Chapter 1: Logistics

When the poet Alessandro Manzoni evoked in *Il cinque maggio* an exiled Napoleon reminiscing about his halcyon days, the imagery of choice was the pitched battle, the astonishing speed and the wide reach of the campaigns.[1] This illustrates well the traits of the Napoleonic Wars that impressed contemporary observers, and have done so ever since: the large scale of the conflict, the role of decisive battle, the mobility of the armies. Less poetic was the ensemble of services that made it possible to have so many troops trained, armed, clothed, fed, housed, ready to march, entailing a logistical infrastructure of materiel and services, sustained through state structures that attempted diffusion into societies at unprecedentedly deep levels. This chapter aims to situate military accommodation within the Napoleonic war administration and logistical apparatus.

I.1 War administration

Throughout the early modern period, European states implemented increasingly sophisticated fiscal and financial policies in order to maintain standing armies and navies; to do so, administrative changes gradually brought under public control the offices dealing with war and finances.[2] Ministries, in the sense of state departments wielding executive power, evolved from royal private secretariats playing a role of intermediary bodies between the king and the powerful nobility.[3] Ancien Régime princely civil service, in the bureaux and in the for-profit quasi-public institutions that enjoyed monopolies and protection, came with privileges and perquisites to a level unparalleled in private enterprise, municipal, religious and charitable institutions.[4] Administration replicated itself through a regime of patrimonial bureaucracy,[5] hinging on patronage networks and venal offices, a measure the French monarchy used systematically since Louis XIV's reign, to finance

[1] A. Manzoni, *Gl'inni sacri e Il cinque maggio*, ed. L. Valenti (Florence, 1877), p.105.
[2] J. Brewer, *The sinews of power. War, money, and the English state, 1688-1783* (Cambridge MA, 1990), 64-5.
[3] G. Rowlands, *The dynastic state and the army under Louis XIV. Royal service and private interest 1661–1701* (Cambridge, 2010), p.27.
[4] C. Capra, "The functionary", tr. L. Cochrane, in M. Vovelle (ed.), *Enlightenment portraits* (Chicago, 1997), 318-9.
[5] Rowlands, *Dynastic state*, p.29.

the treasury quickly in wartime hardships[6] and tap private corporate wealth without having to seek the consent of a representative body.[7] The *secretariat d'état de la guerre*, as of 1789, comprised five bureaux led by *premiers commis,* and staffed by a varying number of *commis*, classed by pension scale.[8] Most bureaux chiefs, born into families with a tradition of work in administration, entered service already knowledgeable in military matters and bookkeeping;[9] kinship networks were important instruments of patronage, pinned on the *sécretaire d'état* (minister) in charge.[10] *Premiers commis* formed an influential and privileged group, personally employed by the minister and assisting him in drafting military legislation;[11] the venal charge of *premier commis* conferred upon its holder the ennobling rank of *commissaire ordonnateur des guerre*,[12] while offices were located at Versailles, in close proximity to the king, the minister and the court.[13]

Efforts at reform and rationalisation were underway on the eve of the Revolution; the debate on "administrative science" in the 1780s-'90s advocated an improved division of competences, classification of responsibilities, office organisation, formalisation and precision of paperwork, transparency and accountability.[14] A renewed notion of civic professionalism took hold, centred on the needs of the public[15] and binding the employees' loyalty to the representative institutions.[16] At the Revolution's onset, the *premiers commis* lost their status and privileges when the ministry was made dependent on the National Assembly rather than on the king, and stripped of authority on military legislation, leading to the old *premiers commis* resigning.[17] As the Revolution evolved towards the de-legitimation of the monarchy, republicanism, war and factional struggle,

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[6] W. Doyle, *Venality. The sale of offices in eighteenth-century France* (Oxford, 1996).
[7] T.E. Kaiser, D.K. Van Kley, "Conclusion: From Old Regime to French Revolution", in T.E. Kaiser, D.K. Van Kley (eds.), *From deficit to deluge. The origins of the French Revolution* (Stanford, 2011), p.252.
[8] A. Buot de L'Epine, "Les bureaux de la guerre à la fin de l'Ancien Régime", *Revue historique de droit français et étranger*, 54/4 (1976), 533-7.
[9] Ibid., p.538.
[10] R. Mousnier, *The institutions of France under the absolute monarchy, 1598-1789*, tr. B. Pearce (Chicago, 1979) ii, p.213.
[11] Brown, *War*, 18-9.
[12] Buot de L'Epine, "Les bureaux", p.536.
[13] Ibid., p.539.
[14] R. Kingston, *Bureaucrats and bourgeois society. Office politics and individual credit in France, 1789-1848* (Basingstoke, 2012), 15-8.
[15] Ibid., p.19.
[16] C. Kawa, "Les employés du ministère de l'intérieur pendant la première république (1792-1800). Approche prosopographique de la bureaucratie révolutionnaire", *Annales historiques de la Révolution française*, 295 (1994), p.117.
[17] Brown, *War*, 21-2.

particularly in 1792-'93, political and personal patronage in ministerial appointments and personnel purges were inextricable.[18] The conflicts between the military and the ministry of war, reflecting the struggle for political supremacy in the Convention, crippled the institution's efficiency and caused a proliferation of administrative personnel.[19] To solve the problem, the Committee of Public Safety suppressed the six extant ministries and replaced them with twelve commissions, until the constitution of year III (1795) restored the ministries.[20]

By the time of the Directory, ministerial staff had been renovated several times, and increased proportionally to the swelling tasks of the administration.[21] The Directors mistrusted bureaucracy, and kept "hiving off functions which would normally have belonged to the War Ministry"[22] through external agencies for counsel and information-gathering.[23] The ministry of war and its bureaux chiefs changed several times during the Directory,[24] many former officials heading off to the army supply business.[25] Lower-grade employees' economic conditions deteriorated but, as meagre and delayed as salaries were, they bound employees to their posts, offering a somewhat secure occupation in insecure times,[26] and one that gave right to a pension.[27] Salaries and pensions were regulated in order to rationalise expenditures;[28] within this rationalising effort fell the massive recourse to contractors to supply the armies, the Directory's preferred route to saving public funds and tapping private credit.[29] Thus, contractors and high-ranking army officers were able to network within the ministry,[30] in which restructurings and personnel reshufflings took place again in 1797 and 1799, following the ebb and flow of political crises.[31]

Reorganisation and stabilisation came into full force under the Consulate, as

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[18] Ibid., p.38-97.
[19] Ibid., 63-4.
[20] Ibid., 95-6.
[21] Kawa, "Les employés", p.116, 118.
[22] Brown, *War*, p.188.
[23] Ibid., p.205.
[24] H.G. Brown, "A discredited regime: The Directory and army contracting", *French History*, 4/1 (1990), p.55.
[25] Ibid., 53-4.
[26] C. Church, "The Social Basis of the French Central Bureaucracy under the Directory 1795-1799", *Past and Present*, 36/1 (1967), p.68.
[27] Kawa, "Les employés", p.119.
[28] Ibid., p.117.
[29] Brown, *War*, p.210.
[30] Ibid., p.208.
[31] Ibid., 258-64.

part of the strategy of pacification and restoration of order that the consuls pursued after the 18 Brumaire coup. The ministry of war was organised in two secretariats, three divisions and four agencies, divided into bureaux;[32] the minister was Louis-Alexandre Berthier, the *armée d'Italie*'s chief of staff. Berthier relinquished his ministry to Lazare Carnot from April to October 1800, but was reappointed after relations between Napoleon and Carnot grew so strained as to force the latter out of office.[33] During his short tenure, Carnot replaced the divisional system with no less than twenty-six bureaux, presiding over all branches of military administration but requiring, by their sheer number, the minister's constant guidance to function.[34] This reorganisation implied a bureaucratic encroachment on the First Consul's power over the military administration,[35] which doubtlessly contributed to undermine Carnot's standing as Napoleon juggled the political manoeuvres of the Consulate from afar.[36] With Berthier on campaign and Carnot sent to General Moreau in Germany a month after his appointment, General Jean-Girard Lacuée acted as minister ad interim.[37] The divisional system was reinstated in the ministry of war with a few modifications: a general-secretariat and six divisions subdivided into bureaux.[38] The hierarchy of office chiefs and clerks processed incoming information through the most pertinent divisional channel to the subject matter, until the minister received the information in a collated and comprehensive format.[39] Throughout the rest of the Consulate and midway through the empire, the ministry of war remained structurally unchanged; what was subject to modification was personnel after Carnot left in 1800, and the creation of a ministry of war administration in 1802.[40]

Berthier resigned in 1807, replaced by Henri Clarke, a diplomat and former protégé of Carnot, dismissed in the staff re-haul of 1800.[41] The ministry's ordinary work consisted of a double stream of correspondence between the emperor on one end, and the commanders in the military divisions on the

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[32] Dague, *Ministries*, 51-3.
[33] I. Woloch, *Napoleon and his collaborators. The making of a dictatorship* (New York/London, 2001), p.106.
[34] Dague, *Ministries*, p.57.
[35] Ibid., p.58.
[36] Woloch, *Collaborators*, 96-7.
[37] J.R. Elting, *Swords around a throne. Napoleon's Grande Armée* (London, 1997), p.56.
[38] Dague, *Ministries*, 60-1.
[39] Kingston, *Bureaucrats*, 11-5.
[40] Dague, *Ministries*, p.61.
[41] V. Haegele, "Le général Clarke au ministère de la Guerre", *Revue historique des armées*, 251 (2008), 94-103.

other; *inspecteurs aux revues* updated the ministry on the implementation of imperial orders, starting the cycle again backwards through the dedicated offices that collated and transmitted information from the bottom up.[42] Conscription offices were augmented in preparation for the invasion of Russia; the engineers and the military judiciary bureaux became the seventh and eighth division; and in 1813, the chief of the finance bureau was in charge of a whole ninth division to process the expenses of the *armée d'Espagne*.[43]

To reduce the concentration of power into the minister of war, a ministry of war administration was instituted in March 1802, overseeing logistics, supply and healthcare;[44] it incorporated the war commissariat, in a subordinate position to the ministry of war's *inspecteurs aux revues*.[45] Alain Pigeard has summarised the difference between the two ministries as "[l]e ministère de la Guerre s'occupant principalement des «hommes» et celui de l'Administration de la guerre des «moyens»."[46] War administration had one division, split into seven bureaux; two general-directions oversaw clothing and hospitals, and a general-secretariat managed office proceedings.[47] Its first *ministre-directeur* was Jean-François Dejean, an inspector-general of the engineer corps who, since June 1800, had been serving as plenipotentiary minister in Genoa; barring minor incidents, inter-ministerial cooperation ran smoothly enough that Dejean could act as placeholder for Berthier when the latter went on an inspection tour of the coastlines in autumn 1803.[48] Since the autumn campaign of 1805, Berthier's absence from Paris left the ministry of war headless, and caused the ministry of war administration to become the leading institution in managing the army's resource replenishment.[49] Clarke's advent to the parent ministry, and his strict adherence to imperial orders (bolstered by the minister's constant presence in Paris), undermined the encroachment of authority that the war administration had unwittingly gained during Berthier's tenure. Dejean left the ministry in January 1810, allegedly due to an inability to remedy the funding shortages for the war

[42] V. Haegele, "L'administration de la guerre et son emprise", in Drévillon, Fonck, Roucaud (eds.), *Guerres et armées napoléoniennes*, 339-50.
[43] Ibid.
[44] T. Lentz, *Les ministres de Napoléon* (Paris, 2016), ePub edition, part 2, chapter 11.
[45] Dague, *Ministries*, 54-6.
[46] A. Pigeard, "Le service des vivres dans les armées du première empire (1804-1815)", *Annales historiques de la Révolution française*, 303 (1996), p.144.
[47] Dague, *Ministries*, 203-7. Lentz, *Les ministres*, part 2, chapter 11.
[48] Lentz, *Les ministres*, part 1, chapter 3, section "Vacances et interims", par.3.
[49] Dague, *Ministries*, 65-8.

administration;[50] in fashioning his resignation for public opinion, Napoleon emphasised Dejean's role in the planned works to the border fortifications.[51] His successor was Lacuée, whose ruthlessness and efficiency at the helm of the ministry of war's general direction of conscription had been the reason for his appointment to the ministry.[52] In his tenure, Lacuée attempted to eradicate squandering in the supply business,[53] and oversaw the preparations for the campaign in Russia; the new minister was one of many members of the imperial establishment who opposed the project,[54] eventually resigning in November 1813[55] while funding wastage and administrative inefficiency ran once again rampant, fuelled by an increasingly desperate military situation.[56] Another hard-working clerical expert immediately filled the vacancy, Pierre Daru, intendant-general of the Grande Armée,[57] who was the last office-holder; the ministry was suppressed in 1814, resurfacing as a department of the ministry of war during the Hundred Days.[58]

The Napoleonic ministries achieved a more rational and de-politicised management, compared to the revolutionary and Directorial administrations, although not devoid of idiosyncrasies, as the prolonged absences of Berthier and Napoleon gripped the centralised government from within.[59] The purpose, in terms informed by medical science, was to create a harmonious body politic in which organs gathered information and disseminated it across the office hierarchies; the administration was an intermediary between state and individual interests, ensuring their mutual advantage without party-political struggle.[60] The civil service became a streamlined, apolitical and controllable bureaucracy, executing orders through the chain of command without taking initiative.[61] Seniority, rather than merit or politics, determined career advancements and pensions, in a scientific fashion based on the

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[50] A. Rabbe (ed.), *Biographie universelle et portative des contemporains* (Paris, 1834), ii, p.1262.
[51] The text of Napoleon's letter (3 January 1810) was published, for example, on the French-language Badenese press: "Nouvelles politiques", *Nouvelles littéraires et politiques*, (10 January 1810), p.1 col. b.
[52] J. Morvan, *Le soldat impérial, 1800-1814* (Paris, 1904), i, p.161.
[53] C. Mullié, *Biographie des célébrités militaires des armées de terre et de mer de 1798 à 1850* (Paris, 1850), ii, 134-5.
[54] H.T. Parker, "Why did Napoleon invade Russia? A study in motivation and the interrelations of personality and social structure", *The Journal of Military History*, 54/2 (1990), 131-2.
[55] Lentz, *Les ministres,* chapter 4, section "Les douze ministères du Consulat et du Grand Empire".
[56] P. Cyr, "La logistique de la campagne de 1814. La France de 1814 avait-elle les moyens de poursuivre la résistance?", *Napoleonica*, 35/3 (2019), p.23.
[57] Elting, *Swords*, p.91.
[58] Dague, *Ministries*, p.187.
[59] Woolf, *Napoleon's integration*, p.38.
[60] Kingston, *Bureaucrats*, 19-23.
[61] Church, *Revolution and red tape*, p.282.

employees' personal files.[62]

Administration needed to source information from the provinces; this had been a recurring problem during the Revolution, as the new departmental institutions struggled to familiarise themselves with paperwork[63] and meet growing demand for information.[64] The implementation of laws and decrees in the 1790s had suffered accordingly, leading to the proliferation of *commissaires du conseil exécutif* and *répresentants en mission* during the Montagnard Convention, in particular with regard to military supplies.[65] The war ministries of the Consulate and empire interfaced with a civil-military double layer of territorial institutions. The civilian were the departments, administered by the prefectures. The military were the military divisions, spanning over groups of departments, with a general as governor and a network of inner subdivisions overseeing conscription, troop movements, and public order.[66] Enforcement of conscription and public order called for a military police force, the Gendarmerie, recruited from army veterans, and present with a legion in every canton.[67] Gendarmes, police and customs officials were important means of surveillance on the territory, feeding the information chain through the local military administrations, so that the government then returned directives to the departments.[68] However, their reputation for omnipotence and omniscience has been challenged and nuanced, by such works as those of Aurélien Lignereux on the Gendarmerie and Antoine Renglet on police institutions, underscoring the difficulties of control borne out of the European dimension of the empire, and the importance of interrelations with other institutions (often mayors or the army) to provide policing.[69]

The prefects relied on sub-prefects and mayors for accurate information, to monitor public opinion and draw up draft lists. That was possible because the revolution had secularised the record-keeping of *état civil*, transforming

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[62] Kingston, *Bureaucrats*, 65-72.
[63] Ibid., p.17-8.
[64] Woolf, *Napoleon's integration*, 86-90.
[65] Kingston, *Bureaucrats*, p.18.
[66] M. Roucaud, "De l'opérationnel au policier: les officiers de Napoléon face à la pratique du renseignement", *Napoleonica*, 27/3 (2016), 73-4.
[67] C. Emsley, *Gendarmes and the state in nineteenth-century Europe* (Oxford, 1999).
[68] C. Rougier, "Au service du maintien de l'ordre. L'armée et la surveillance politique des départements: le case de la Gironde (1800-1814)", in Drévillon, Fonck, Roucaud (eds.), *Guerres et armées napoléoniennes*, 367-80.
[69] Lignereux, *Servir Napoléon.* A. Renglet, "Ecrire pour contrôler? L'activité d'écriture d'un commissaire de police de Namur sous l'Empire", in L. Antonielli, S. Levati, *Controllare il territorio. Norme, corpi e conflitti tra medioevo e prima guerra mondiale* (Soveria Mannelli, 2013), 88-90.

it into a state-run civil registry under the mayors' care.[70] The prefect presided over the *conseil de recrutement*, the itinerant committee that carried out physical fitness inspections to every canton's conscripts and examined the draftees' requests for exemptions.[71] Even at the moment when the military inspected its human resources and took them over from the civilian authorities, the latter retained a leading role in the "pièce maîtresse du dispositif de la conscription".[72] Still, streamlining had limits; interlocking tasks sparked conflicts of competence between prefectures and military divisions, nor was there a unified chain of command, as each institution took orders from its own ministry.[73] Centralisation was highly conditioned from upstream, in communications subject to delays and mistakes as the ministries processed files from all the departments,[74] and from the administrators' own habitat. Governance required fostering positive relations between the prefect and the departmental notables, whom the prefect, coming as an outsider who by law could not hail from the department, was to "seduce" into benefitting the body politic,[75] enabling cooperation when response from the centre was insufficient or untimely.[76] Mayors and municipal councils could be the administration's weakest link precisely because they were the closest to the *administrés*, by failing to provide accurate information or not enacting repressive measures, shielding eligible men from conscription or covering up illegal activities.[77] Such cases did take place[78] out of sympathy and complicity but also for fear of retaliation.[79] Mayors were unpaid, often struggling to keep the paperwork stream flowing, subject to the influence of local notables and the infiltration of landowners into their ranks; thus, power

[70] G. Noiriel, "L'identification des citoyens. Naissance de l'état civil républicain", *Genèses. Sciences sociales et histoire,* 13 (1993), 3-28.
[71] F. Houdecek, "Du village à la caserne: les étapes de la conscription sous le Consulat et l'Empire" (2019), https://www.napoleon.org/histoire-des-2-empires/articles/du-village-a-la-caserne-les-etapes-de-la-conscription-sous-le-consulat-et-lempire/ (28 April 2020).
[72] A. Crépin, "Un département favorable à la conscription napoléonienne: l'exemple de la Seine-et-Marne", *Revue d'histoire du XIXe siècle*, 8 (1992), p.91.
[73] M. Broers, *Europe under Napoleon* (London, 2014), ePub edition, chapter 2 par. 13-4.
[74] Kingston, *Bureaucrats*, p. 29.
[75] F.-X. Martinschang, "Construction professionnelle et interactions sociales: le cas des préfets et sous-préfets lorrains au XIXe siècle (1800-1870)", *Page 19. Bulletin des doctorants et jeunes chercheurs du Centre d'Histoire du XIXe siècle*, 7 (2018), 13-23.
[76] G. Daly, *Inside Napoleonic France. State and society in Rouen, 1800-1815* (Aldershot, 2001), p.219.
[77] P. Horn, "Le mythe de l'obéissance de la Moselle napoléonienne (1811-1814)", *Revue Historique*, 662/2 (2012), p.425.
[78] M. Rowe, "Between empire and home town. Napoleonic rule on the Rhine, 1799-1814", *The Historical Journal*, 42/3 (1999), p.670.
[79] P. Horn, *Le défi de l'enracinement napoléonien entre Rhin et Meuse, 1810-1814* (Berlin, 2017), p.202, 267.

at commune level ended up shared between notables and civil servants.[80]

Such a wide-ranging experience of war through administration at central and local level is glaringly absent from any discussion of total war. Yet, war contributed to the expansion and formalisation of the administrative apparatus, crucial to gather and control resources, transmit information to the emperor, receive and execute orders. Administration also interfaced with the supply sector, which remained the main tap of production and resources.

I.2 War finance

A striking difference between the wars of Napoleon and those of the Bourbon kings was the fact that, despite the length and intensity of the Napoleonic Wars, even in economic warfare, France never went bankrupt. More efficient taxation and collection, integrated with contributions levied on defeated and conquered countries, allowed France to finance its wars without borrowing, which had been the Bourbon monarchs' sore point.[81] The Convention had tried to finance war by issuing paper money (*assignats*) paid through the sale of *biens nationaux*, land and real estate confiscated from the Church; the yield was too meagre, and hyperinflation, coupled with a tax collection breakdown, precipitated a permanent crisis.[82] Constant state of war meant also constant military expenses. The Directory privatised the supply services that had been brought under the control of the Convention representatives during the Terror,[83] in order to make them more efficient, less corrupt and less expensive for the national treasury,[84] damning the economic dirigisme of the Montagnard Convention as the root cause of mismanagement.[85] There was an osmosis between the public and private sector, as officials and clerks of the Montagnard and Thermidorian Executive Committees, after leaving the civil service, simply entered the supply enterprises, keeping the trust of the government thanks to their experience in the business and political reliability.[86] To exert administrative control, a Committee to Examine

[80] J. Dunne, "Napoleon's 'mayoral problem'. Aspects of state-community relations in post-revolutionary France", *Modern & Contemporary France*, 8/4 (2000), p.487.
[81] J. Gabillard, "Le financement des guerres napoléoniennes et la conjoncture du Premier Empire", *Revue économique*, 4/4 (1953), p.551.
[82] G. Ellis, *The Napoleonic empire* (Basingstoke, 2003), p.35.
[83] J.-P. Bertaud, *The army of the French Revolution. From citizen-soldier to instrument of power,* tr. R.R. Palmer (Princeton, 1988), 241-9.
[84] Brown, "Discredited regime", p.51.
[85] Kawa, "Les employés", p.116.
[86] Brown, "Discredited regime", p.53.

Contracts was set up, and contracts were validated in the presence of a notary and subject to the payment of sureties.[87] Contracts were awarded through negotiation behind closed doors,[88] where widespread lobbying contributed to restricting access and transparency in the ministerial offices;[89] public tenders, introduced in August 1798, largely failed to attract participants due to the strict specifications.[90] Open, public tendering for supply contracts in Britain, by contrast, worked well and ensured mostly reliable services without entrenching monopoly regimes.[91]

Reliance on private enterprise caused more problems than it solved and exposed the Directory to a widespread perception of corruption, which, coupled with the political instability of the neo-Jacobin and royalist insurrections of 1795, prepared the terrain for 18 Brumaire. Paying the contractors was one such problem. Due to lack of treasury funds, contractors were paid in *biens nationaux*; their preferential treatment on the market infuriated middle-class smaller buyers in France,[92] while attempts at reselling *biens nationaux* in French-occupied Italy attracted few auctioneers,[93] confirming the difficulty of profiting off confiscated land in conquest zones that Louis XIV's *premiers commis* had experienced in the 1690s.[94] Another payment option, funnelling the long-established practice of war contributions[95] towards the contractors, was to allow them to levy taxes in occupied countries;[96] the Compagnie Flachat, supplier of the *armée d'Italie* in 1796, thus appropriated the war booty in Livorno and Lombardy.[97] Power in the occupied territories was polycentric: contractors, generals, and the *commissaires aux armées*, government emissaries sent in 1795-'96 and 1798-'99 to control the military, manage the captured resources and act as the Directory's deputy-diplomats. Their success was limited at best. With the only partial exception of Italy, the *commissaires aux armées* failed to send booty to the French treasury, and all was spent to provide for the army *in situ*.[98] As generals and *commissaires aux armées* accused each other of

[87] Ibid., p.52.
[88] Ibid., p.56.
[89] Kingston, *Bureaucrats*, 31-51.
[90] Brown, "Discredited regime", p.59.
[91] Knight, *Britain against Napoleon*, part 2, chapter 6, par. 15-8.
[92] Brown, "Discredited regime", p.66.
[93] M. Lyons, *France under the Directory* (Cambridge, 1975), p.62.
[94] Rowlands, *Dynastic state*, p.77.
[95] Wilson, "Was the Thirty Years War", p.27.
[96] Lyons, *France under the Directory*, p.60.
[97] J. Godechot, *Les commissaires aux armées sous le Directoire* (Paris, 1937), i, 470-1.
[98] Ibid., p.651.

corruption, the Directory chose to recall the *commissaires* and assuage the commanders of the pro-republican armies of Sambre-et-Meuse and Italy to ensure their loyalty to the regime.[99]

Military supply contracts and *biens nationaux* speculation could make such fortunes as those of infamous financier Gabriel-Julien Ouvrard.[100] The big businesses closely networked with the Directors, members of the Council of Five-Hundred, and the Bonaparte milieu, most notably Joséphine.[101] Wealth, luxury and politicking tarnished the contractors' reputation, and by association that of the Directorial government; accusations of corruption and speculation, while reflecting real experiences, were convenient to weaponise politically by the Consulate to legitimise itself.[102] Nevertheless, the system more or less worked once the services were grouped into conglomerate companies, easier to exert surveillance on;[103] complicity between contractors and generals, including Napoleon himself, was instrumental in enabling military operations and avoiding strict Directorial supervision.[104] The contractors' ties to the administrative and political establishment may assist them in securing contracts, but did not grant them immunity from prosecution if the services failed to meet expectations or fraud was suspected.[105] Neither financial success nor long-term profit were guaranteed,[106] but the context was one where war dominated the market, disrupting other economic activities than the supply business, impeding the diversification that made entrepreneurs resilient.[107] French merchants reached Brumaire VIII with a common interest in the end of the war, so that business could thrive unhindered again.[108] The mercantile world's hopes (and support for the new regime) soared after the peace of Amiens,[109] only for the financiers to lobby the Consulate into repressing the Haitian

[99] Ibid., 652-4.
[100] Lyons, *France under the Directory*, p.61.
[101] M. Broers, *Napoleon. Soldier of destiny* (London, 2015), p.400.
[102] Lyons, *France under the Directory*, p.2.
[103] Brown, "Discredited regime", p.65-7.
[104] P. Branda, *Le prix de la gloire. Napoléon et l'argent* (Paris, 2007), ePub edition, chapter 9, section "Concussion généralisée", par. 2.
[105] Brown, "Discredited regime", p.57. G.D Homan, "Jean-François Reubell, Director", *French Historical Studies*, 1/4 (1960), p.425.
[106] Lyons, *France under the Directory*, p.62.
[107] G. Ongaro, "Military food supply in the Republic of Venice in the eighteenth century: Entrepreneurs, merchants, and the state", *Business History*, (2018), DOI: 10.1080/00076791.2018.1520211
[108] M. de Oliveira, "Les négociants face à Brumaire. Recherche sur l'état d'esprit du monde des affaires devant le changement de régime", in J.-P. Jessenne (ed.), *Du Directoire au Consulat 3. Brumaire dans l'histoire du lien politique et de l'État-nation* (Lille, 2001) [http://books.openedition.org/irhis/2604]
[109] Ibid.

revolution and restoring colonial trade.[110] That disastrous expedition consolidated Napoleon's mistrust of the trade élites in France, and marked his later mercantilist politics against Britain.[111] Economic warfare played an important role into the "totality" of the war, not only with regard to the mutual naval blockades, culminating in the Continental System, but also in underpinning the diversity of the two great belligerents in Napoleon's conception of the conflict.[112]

Administrative anti-corruption, although effective and a powerful propaganda tool,[113] could not sustain military expenditure alone. To increase and optimise tax revenue, the Consulate and empire substituted revolutionary taxation on personal and business income with *octrois* and direct taxes. The land tax was the main source of revenue; its assessment required renewed instruments and better information, chiefly a new cadastre whose redaction continued after 1814.[114] Collection was restructured, with offices and receivers in each *arrondissement*.[115] Even with these improvements, taxation was less capable of sustaining war expenses than in Britain, which counted on the revenues from a wartime income tax investing a larger and wealthier pool of payers.[116] The creation of the Bank of France, in 1800, initially boosted state credit, but massive preparations for the invasion of the British Isles in 1803-'05 pushed military expenses up again, and the country's attractiveness for investors vanished.[117] The treasury was financed through the Négociants Réunis, a conglomerate of businessmen tied to Ouvrard, entrusted with placing state bonds. On the treasury's behalf, Ouvrard concocted an unsuccessful scheme to import Spanish silver from Mexico, failing to secure specie to back the banknotes.[118] In autumn 1805, a chain of bankruptcies and a decrease in cash circulation, as uncertainty over the result of the war encouraged saving, depreciated the paper money and

[110] Broers, *Soldier of destiny*, p.371.
[111] Ibid., p.383.
[112] M. Broers, "The Napoleonic empire", in A. Forrest, P.H. Wilson (eds.), *The bee and the eagle. Napoleonic France and the end of the Holy Roman Empire, 1806* (Basingstoke, 2009), p.75.
[113] Broers, *Soldier of destiny*, 320-1.
[114] Ibid., 318-9.
[115] Grab, *Transformation of Europe*, p.54.
[116] I.-D. Salavrakos, "A Reassessment of the British and Allied Economic and Military Mobilization in the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars (1792-1815)", *Res militaris*, 7/1 (2017), 6-7 [http://resmilitaris.net/index.php?ID=1025453]
[117] Broers, *Soldier of destiny*, 435-6.
[118] F. Schneid, *Napoleon's conquest of Europe. The War of the Third Coalition* (London/Westport, 2005), 78-9.

nearly brought the Bank of France down.[119] What was worst, Vanlerberghe, one of the Négociants and army foodstuff supplier, had anticipated 43 million francs as of October, and if the syndicate failed, it would annihilate military supply.[120] Coupled with wage delays, this created a risk of Napoleon's best-trained army descending into unregulated pillage, wrecking discipline and unit cohesion,[121] until contributions levied in the successful campaign saved the situation.[122] 1805 marked a turning point in Napoleon's handling of war finances and suppliers; it cemented his distrust of bankers, financiers and merchants, perceived as fundamentally alike to Britons in their cunning and thievery,[123] and consolidated the use of military conquest as financial instrument.

The role of a "total" economic mobilisation is evident in mechanised warfare, whose logistical needs hinge on industry and its speedy conversion from civilian to military-centred aims, engendering complex competition between strategical planning, state agencies, private sector, military and civilian markets.[124] Instead, war economy and the military supply apparatus fall to the wayside in assessments of the Napoleonic total war.[125] Of course, there are solid factual reasons for not projecting hyper-modern capabilities onto proto-industrial Europe, not least of all to avoid the false equivalence of "modern" war with total (or unlimited) war.[126] The armament playing field was roughly even among the belligerents,[127] with local variations in quality, materiel availability and production techniques.[128] The French armament industry remained traditional in techniques, albeit increasing production,[129] while protecting the manufacturer entrepreneurs' interests by keeping labour cheap.[130] Productive reconversion to meet the army's demands could be a

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[119] M. Broers, *Napoleon. The spirit of the age* (London, 2018), ePub edition, chapter 2, section "The cost of victory", par.2.
[120] Branda, *Prix de la gloire*, chapter 18, section "Une compagnie de négociants ruiné", par. 3.
[121] Morvan, *Le soldat*, i, p.371.
[122] Branda, *Prix de la gloire*, chapter 18, section "Le retour du «dieu de la Guerre»", par. 2.
[123] Broers, *Spirit of the age*, chapter 2, section, "The cost of victory", par.12.
[124] T. Imlay, "Preparing for Total War: The Conseil Supérieur de la Défense Nationale and France's Industrial and Economic Preparations for War after 1918", *War in History*, 15/1 (2008), p.45. On war industry planning in the USA during the Second World War, see A. Gropman, "Industrial mobilization", in Gropman (ed.), *The Big 'L'*, 1-97.
[125] See the little space given to the Continental System in Bell, *First total war*, 249-50.
[126] Strachan, "Essay", 351-2.
[127] P.J. Haythornthwaite, *Weapons and equipment of the Napoleonic Wars* (London, 1996), p.22.
[128] Lieven, *Russia against Napoleon*, 28-31.
[129] W.H. McNeill, "The industrialization of war", *Review of International Studies*, 8/3 (1982), 203-4. Salavrakos, "Reassessment", p.22.
[130] J.-L. Viret, "L'industrie des armes portatives à Saint-Étienne, 1777-1810. L'inévitable mécanisation?", *Revue d'histoire moderne & contemporaine*, 54/1 (2007), 189-91.

good business bet, but the cash-strapped war administration had a poor track record in paying contractors.[131] Countermeasures to the loss of maritime control, culminating in the Continental Blockade, dislocated the trade and manufacturing axes in Europe, and impacted upon the internal markets and on the routes to and from colonial markets.[132] French protectionism on the long run helped the nascent industry in some areas,[133] but geopolitical uncertainties and the enforcement of the blockade disrupted trade hubs and routes, while boosting smuggling and engendering hostility among impoverished populaces.[134] Napoleon's mercantilist economic policies contradicted the property-based organisation of society and paved the way for state intervention in the market, running against the liberal principles espoused by Enlightenment thinking and the revolution.[135] Interventionism did not so much mean dirigisme, as rather an economy "soumise à une conjuncture de guerre".[136]

Campaigns were pre-financed at the start, in which myriad contractors provided materials and services; during the campaign, requisitions and billeting led to the issue of receipts, payable at the campaign's end through the money that flowed into the state coffers with the imposition of indemnities in peace agreements with the defeated countries.[137] Napoleon's financial thinking hinged on hard currency and cash payments rather than credit instruments, even for army suppliers.[138] The relation between liquidity and crisis was a vicious cycle. In France, war encouraged saving especially at the onset of the campaigns when uncertainty about victory or defeat peaked, which meant less currency circulation when the government most needed liquidity.[139] The financing system resisted until the yields of conquest decreased. The definitive crisis struck in the 1810s, between failure to tame Spain, the over-stretch of enforcing the Blockade, the disaster in Russia, the loss of Germany and the invasion of France. In the campaign of 1813-'14, the deal-breaker in many supply sectors was the impossibility of the war

[131] Thoral, *From Valmy*, 172-3.
[132] F. Crouzet, "Wars, blockade, and economic change in Europe, 1792-1815", *The Journal of Economic History*, 24/4 (1964), 567-88.
[133] R. Juhasz, "Temporary protection and technology adoption: Evidence from the Napoleonic Blockade", *American Economic Review*, 108/11 (2018), 3339–76.
[134] K. Aaslestadt, J. Joor (eds.), *Revisiting Napoleon's continental system. Local, regional and European experiences* (Basingstoke, 2015).
[135] Woolf, *Napoleon's integration*, 134-55.
[136] J. Tulard, *Napoléon ou le mythe du sauveur* (Paris, 1987), ePub edition, part 3, chapter 3, par. 1.
[137] Gabillard, "Financement", p.558.
[138] Ibid., p.563.
[139] Ibid., 563-4.

administration to pay for the services.[140] Some depleted resources, such as conscripts or horses,[141] simply could not be replenished anymore. However, clothing and food provisions crashed not because of absolute shortages in the country, but because the war administration could not pay the contractors.[142] Mobilisation for a total war did not go far without logistics.

I.3 An integrated empire

Imperial integration was a crucial contributor to logistics, as the military was not moving, staying, and supporting itself only on enemy/conquered country. In France herself, the process of administrative standardisation levelled the institutional, financial and fiscal fragmentation that had frustrated attempts under Louis XIV at speedy, cheap circulation of army materiel from the interior to the theatres of operations.[143]

Client states fielded their own armies, easing the burden of conscription for France, and hosted French army corps at their expense.[144] These troops bolstered garrisons,[145] and removing them from their home turf discouraged desertion.[146] On campaign, Napoleon could count on the empire to provide soldiers, accommodation and supplies, covering expenses through requisitions and contributions from the theatre of operations and, eventually, the defeated enemy. This was safer for unit cohesion than letting the soldiers roam and pillage, and more sustainable than leaving all at the discretion of military commanders in the provisional regimes they set up immediately after a successful conquest.[147] Requisitions and contributions were means to "make war pay for war", but in different ways and flowing into different coffers. Requisitions were "ordinary contributions" (*saisies ordinaires*), managed by the war commissariat, paying the army and providing for it on-

[140] Cyr, "Logistique", 20-41.
[141] J.-F. Brun, "Le cheval dans la Grande Armée, Revue historique des armées", 249 (2007), 3-5.
[142] Cyr, "Logistique", p.40.
[143] G. Rowlands, "Moving Mars. The logistical geography of Louis XIV's France", *French History*, 25/4 (2011), 511-2.
[144] P. Branda, "Did the war pay for the war? An assessment of Napoleon's attempts to make his campaigns self-financing", *Napoleonica*, 3 (2008), [https://www.cairn.inforevue-napoleonica-la-revue-2008-3-page-2.htm], 7-8.
[145] A. Zanoli, *Sulla milizia cisalpino-italiana: cenni storico-statistici dal 1796 al 1814* (Milan, 1845), ii, 31-2.
[146] Elting, *Swords*, p.400.
[147] P.M.R. Stirk, "The concept of military occupation in the era of the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars", *Comparative Legal History*, 3/1 (2015), 71-4. On unit cohesion and discipline against pillage: Lynn, "History of logistics", 23-5.

site, while "extraordinary contributions", levied on states and cities as post-war indemnities, went to the treasury until 1805, then to a special fund administered by the imperial crown and used for army rewards.[148]

The advantages of the imperial logistical set-up were evident during the Grande Armée's march into central Europe in 1805. Rather than only letting the troops forage, which would have alienated the populace and slowed the advance, Napoleon reached agreements with the German princes from the Rhine to the Danube, informing them ahead of time about the supplies they were to prepare, and where to store them in magazines.[149] Of course, regulated foraging was an important measure to support troops on rapid move, but, nuancing Creveld's and Lynn's assertions about its predominance,[150] the overall system is, rather, better understood a long-range network of *étapes*. Jomini argued openly in these terms, positing cities as supply stopovers that protected the army's lines of communications as it advanced from its bases, on a larger scale than ever.[151] Army corps moved in columns, usually three or four, operating and provisioning themselves independently of each other, and could be concentrated or separated with relative ease.[152] Moving in orderly fashion these large bodies of troops, animals and carriages depended on timely, regular information on strength and positions of the units, through daily, weekly and bi-monthly *états de situation* and regimental documentation.[153] General headquarters processed information, then issued marching orders indicating routes, departure times, stopovers; copies of the itineraries were sent to the war commissariat and, through the ministry of war, to the ministries of allied countries where French troops were to transit, so that the information chain could continue there. Marches were divided into *étapes* of an average 24 km length,[154] with a grid of stopovers where the war administration gave soldiers free bread and lodging, and a money indemnity to buy forage and meat.[155] This system was not a novelty by any means. *Étapes* had been a major cause of disagreement between army and towns throughout the Ancien Régime, investing the services (*in natura* or through money indemnities) that localities had to provide to soldiers, exemption privileges, reimbursements, repartition of

[148] Branda, "Did the war pay", 5-6.
[149] Schneid, *Napoleon's conquest*, 106-9.
[150] Creveld, *Supplying war*, p.58. Lynn, "History of logistics", p.24.
[151] Jomini, *Précis*, ii, 166-7.
[152] Elting, *Swords*, 58-9.
[153] Ibid., 96-7.
[154] Ibid., p.463.
[155] P.-N. Quillet, *État actuel de la législation sur l'administration des troupes* (Paris, 1808), iii, 132-4.

contingents.[156] Between 17th and 18th century, the *routes et étapes* had evolved into a system of itineraries and halting places which a royal *ordonnance* fixed every year; the average length of the itineraries between *étapes*, around 20 km, roughly matched that at *pas ordinaire* during the Napoleonic Wars.[157] Itinerary planning was fundamental to ensure the units got their due supplies and no clogging happened; too many incoming troops at the same time could easily overwhelm an *étape*, deplete its stocks and leave several men and animals without accommodation, crippling the effectiveness of the combat force. Clogging of this sort happened in June 1812, as the Grande Armée concentrated in the poor borderlands of Prussia and Poland.[158]

Such a system of imperial *routes et étapes* was in line with long-term trends between early modern and modern age in states' growing control of space through efficient use of communication routes and the flows of goods, people and information;[159] not by chance, the network of military roads was extended to the *départements réunis* from 1805.[160] The incorporation of Piedmont and Switzerland to the French orbit allowed improving carriage roads across the Alpine passes at Mont-Cenis, Mont-Genèvre, Simplon, aiming to overcome winter travel constraints[161] on fundamental routes into Italy and ensure year-round open pipelines for goods and armies, including the artillery.[162] Diplomacy and a growing pull towards territorial continuity ensured that French military transit would be unhindered in the satellite states, such as the Valais where the Simplon and Saint-Bernard passes were located. To prevent transits from impinging on the independence of the Helvetic Republic, as per the conditions of the Lunéville peace treaty, the canton was turned into an independent sister-republic in 1802,[163] and eight years later annexed as a department to better control the France-Italy route.[164] Public works privileged outbound military roads over internal ones, continuing into the neighbouring satellite states and new departments with the explicit purpose of cementing imperial unity as well as facilitating army

[156] Lynn, *Giant of the Grand Siècle*, 132-9.
[157] Navereau, *Logement*, 73-4.
[158] Lieven, *Russia against Napoleon*, p.139.
[159] J. Meyer, "States, roads, war, and the organization of space", in P. Contamine (ed.), *War and competition between states* (Oxford, 2000), 99-128.
[160] Ellis, "The nature", p.104.
[161] Meyer, "States, roads", p.102.
[162] M. Blanchard, *Les routes des Alpes occidentales à l'époque Napoléonienne (1796-1815)* (Paris, 1920).
[163] P. von Deschwanden, "Der Simplon in der napoleonischen Strategie", *Blätter aus der Walliser Geschichte*, 29 (1997), 24-7.
[164] Lignereux, *Les impériaux*, part 1, chapter 1, section "Consolider l'édifice", par. 5.

movements first, and commercial traffic second.[165] The classification of French roadways, codified in 1811, ascribed maintenance of the *routes de première classe* to the state, hence control over the main military routes that linked Paris to the key coastal defence points and the imperial territories in Holland, Germany, Italy, and Spain.[166] Safety of the roadways was paramount, and achieved through the Gendarmerie.[167] Waterways were to be improved, too, following expertise honed across the empire; in planning troop transport barges down the Saône and Rhône rivers in 1805, Napoleon had in mind the measures undertaken for navigation on the Po in northern Italy.[168] In occupied Andalusia, improved river transport on the Guadalquivir, in 1811, gave Marshal Soult a safer route for provisions, correspondence and materiel transport than insurgents-infested land routes.[169]

Imperial territories were made and remade to suit strategical and geopolitical considerations. Rule of satellite states was entrusted to Napoleon's family members, a government practice where Napoleon was an anomaly not so much in relation to his Jacobin-affiliated past vis-à-vis the dynastic turn, but to his readiness to remove his own relatives from office if they underperformed.[170] Friendly or annexed territory provided a base of resources and free movement that Napoleon could rely on to facilitate his campaigns, and a convenient set of locations to place French armies without burdening the French treasury with their upkeep; French army corps were stationed in Italy, Naples, Westphalia and Hanover between 1803 and 1813. Logistics bound the empire together more than economic markets did; that integration bred internal competition, within the inherent inequalities of a protectionist market geared to favour France, especially during the Continental Blockade.[171] The importance of logistical integration is evident if one compares the success of another large land empire of early 19th century Europe, Russia during the invasion of 1812. The Russians had the advantage of a huge, collaborative home front, where regional administration lay in the

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[165] F. de Dainville, J. Tulard, *Atlas administratif de l'Empire français d'après l'atlas rédigé par ordre du Duc de Feltre en 1812* (Geneva/Paris, 1973), 16-7.
[166] A. Beyer, "La numérotation des routes françaises. Le sens de la nomenclature dans une perspective géographique", *Flux*, 1/55 (2004), p.18.
[167] J.-O. Boudon, *Histoire du Consulat et de l'Empire* (Paris, 2000), p.299.
[168] *Correspondance générale,* v, n. 10114, Napoleon to Dejean, 23 May 1805.
[169] J.-M. Lafon, *L'Andalousie et Napoléon* (Paris, 2007), 407-11.
[170] Broers, *Spirit of the age*, chapter 9, section "The imperial family desiccated".
[171] Horn, *Défi*, 254-5. A. Jourdan, "French representations of the Continental Blockade: Three kinds of narratives for and against", in Aaslestadt, Joor (eds.), *Revisiting Napoleon's continental system*, p.48.

hands of a local nobility safely loyal to the monarchy, allowing the army to transit through, and draw resources from, regions untouched by war.[172]

The imperial *étapes*, when organised well, proved their worth. In autumn 1808, as the situation precipitated in Spain following the defeat at Bailén, Napoleon had to move about 100,000 men from their winter quarters in eastern Germany to Spain.[173] The itinerary of the French corps, leaving quarters and camps in Berlin, Glogau and Liegnitz, crossed the friendly micro-states of the Rheinbund and the Kingdom of Westphalia with perhaps unparalleled efficiency, which won praise from the military itself. Memoirists agree that the *étapes* in Germany were organised with food and carriages requisitioned from the civilian populace;[174] the carriages covered 16-18 leagues a day[175] and were changed at every *étape*.[176] The importance of the Rheinbund's cooperation for the logistics of troop transit is highlighted by the Austrian high command's preparations to attack the French forces in Germany the following year, in the belief that their presence would incite the Rheinbund princes to defection, and that the French (by then fighting on the three fronts of Spain, Italy and Germany) would not field enough troops and fast enough to fight back.[177] Napoleon was able to respond with the combined resources of quick mobilisation through conscription, directly from France, and the quick transport of the Guard regiments from Spain.[178]

The logistical means, ultimately, remained early modern; a successful transit breakthrough was in the order of magnitude of keeping a mountain road open in winter. The empire, especially in its "inner" areas directly connected to France, optimised these means.

I.4 Intendancy

The massive, fast-moving Napoleonic armies could not be managed in a wholly centralised way, least of all from Paris. While within France the

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[172] Lieven, *Russia against Napoleon*, 221-7.
[173] D. Chandler, *The campaigns of Napoleon* (London, 1967), p.630.
[174] A.-H. Hautpoul, *Mémoires du général marquis Alphonse d'Hautpoul, pair de France, 1789-1865* (Paris, 1906), p. 31.
[175] J.-P. Dellard, *Mémoires militaires du général bon Dellard sur les guerres de la république et de l'empire* (Paris, 1892), p. 260.
[176] N. Marcel, *Campagnes du capitaine Marcel, du 69e de ligne, en Espagne et en Portugal (1808-1814)* (Paris, 1913), p. 4.
[177] Broers, *Spirit of the age*, chapter 7, section "The coming of war", par.2.
[178] Ibid., par.3.

ministry of war administration was in charge of the supply tasks, the army on campaign had the Intendancy. The army's Intendant-General held no military rank, but commanded the supply personnel and managed acquisitions and requisitions of supply materials, as a deputy-minister of war administration;[179] there was osmosis between the roles, as Pétiet, the Grande Armée intendant in 1805, had been minister of war during the Directory, and Daru became minister of war administration.

The Intendancy was structured into a hierarchy of *commissaires de guerre*. These administrative bodies were the last offshoot in the long history of commissaires and intendants, handling the administrative aspects of the army and militias, on a provincial basis, throughout the Ancien Régime.[180] The revolutionary commissariat, stripped of venality, drew from the pool of army quartermasters and citizens of proven *civisme* who had military or military administration experience.[181] The main innovation that the Napoleonic restructuring of the service introduced in 1800, was the separation of the reviews inspectorate from the war commissariat proper, in charge of the "fieldwork" administrative and supply tasks.[182] To the requirements of age and previous military experience, the selection process for commissaires added a mathematics and "science of administration" exam, with promotions by seniority and by direct appointment.[183] Despite these attempts at standardising employment criteria, patronage networks kept exerting influence onto recruitments and careers.[184] The commissariat was organised into five sections according to the provisions it procured (bread, meat, forage, firewood and candles, clothing), and framed into a hierarchy of *commissaires ordonnateurs*, *commissaires ordinaires*, *inspecteurs*, *régisseurs*, *commises*, *gardes-magasins*, and assorted employees in services that ranged from bread-baking to repairs.[185] Importantly for the army mobility, the *commissaires de guerre* transmitted to units the *feuilles de route* detailing their itinerary and what supplies they were entitled to receive at each stopover.[186]

Common understanding is that the Napoleonic army centralised the supply

[179] Elting, *Swords*, p.91.
[180] R. Stiot, "Le Commissariat des guerres: Son organisation - Son évolution - Ses attributions", *La Revue administrative*, 10/59 (1957), 454-63.
[181] Ibid., p.461.
[182] Ibid., 461-2.
[183] Ibid., p.462.
[184] J. Tulard, *Napoléon, chef de guerre* (Paris, 2012), p.33.
[185] Elting, *Swords*, p.553.
[186] Quillet, *État actuel*, ii, p.181.

service through the Intendancy, in order to eradicate problems and abuses caused by the recourse to contractors.[187] The militarisation of the artillery train in 1800 and of the supply train in 1807 are assumed to epitomise this tendency,[188] to which even Napoleon's adversaries made recourse in order to optimise services.[189] Reality was less neat than any rigid civilian vs military or business vs military contraposition, reproducing the "moralising or sensationalising" interpretations which Howard Brown deconstructed for the contractors of the Directory.[190] The Compagnie Breidt, responsible for the service from 1803 to 1807, was a public-private partnership (*régie*), and militarisation brought it no practical change: personnel was maintained,[191] company finances already depended on public funds to pay up growing expenditures,[192] and company structure was already modelled on military structure.[193] Despite formal militarisation, the armed forces held a deep-seated contempt for *commissaires* and Intendancy personnel, regarded as inefficient, thieving, cowardly, and profiting off the soldiers' toils and sacrifices.[194] This feeling should not be ascribed too much to the Napoleonic militaristic culture; the perception of *commissaires* and contractors as belonging to the same corrupt ilk, exploiting public interest and the miseries of war, was widespread in Europe well before the Napoleonic Wars, to the point of becoming a satirical literary trope.[195]

The French army's very strength, mobility, was the greatest impediment to an effective supply transport. The breadth of the conflict and the armies' mobility made it difficult for the supply system to stay apace, not just due to marching speed but also to sudden changes in itinerary;[196] furthermore, personnel and equipment left much to be desired below the rank of commissar.[197] Apparent centralisation interacted strongly with local resources. In 1807, local investors provided carriages for the French train in Poland, organised in auxiliary brigades; the *commissaires* in the halting

[187] J. Abel, *Guibert. Father of Napoleon's Grande Armée* (Norman, 2016), p.191.
[188] B. Roger, "Les équipages militaires dans la campagne de Pologne (1807) – Un exemple napoléonien de transfert de l'entreprise à l'État", in J.-C. Romer, L. Henninger (eds.), *Armées privées, armées d'état. Mercenaires et auxiliaires d'hier et d'aujourd'hui* (Paris, 2011), p.112.
[189] Lieven, *Russia against Napoleon*, p.104.
[190] Brown, "Discredited regime", p.50.
[191] Roger, "Les équipages", p.113.
[192] Ibid., 110-1.
[193] Ibid., p.114-5.
[194] Elting, *Swords*, p.555.
[195] R. Alonge, *Goldoni il libertino. Eros, violenza, morte* (Bari, 2010), p.106. Knight, Wilcox, *Sustaining the fleet*, 1-2.
[196] Tulard, *Napoléon, chef de guerre*, p.34.
[197] Pigeard, "Service des vivres", p.146.

places coordinated convoy traffic.[198] The lion's share in local logistical support during this campaign in inhospitable country were Jews, who were also able to bring in resources inter-regionally, importing grains from Austrian Galicia,[199] highlighting how international purchase power was an important asset for merchants in wartime.[200] This cooperation between Intendancy and local suppliers was a lifesaver in Poland. Conversely, the lack of help from Russian Jews in 1812[201] deprived the Grande Armée's logistical support system of a convenient pillar right when it was trying to combine the usual speed with supply by unusually cumbersome convoys, and failed most tragically to cope with distance, mobility, and skilful resource deprivation by the enemy.[202]

An army that did not move and lived off the same land for a long time was no less of a problem, especially if the lines of communication were unsafe. The French VII Corps was stationed from 1808 in Catalonia, a region with few natural resources, difficult to provision by sea due to the British naval blockade, and by land because of guerrilla attacks.[203] This was a stringent problem in Spain, as the Gendarmerie could not effectively police the countryside and the roadways.[204] Requisitions exasperated the populace, while guerrilla bands weaponised subsistence by targeting everyone who brought food into Barcelona.[205] While local suppliers were contracted for more minute provisions, French merchants dealt with supply runs; risk was remarkable, and bigger firms were better equipped to face it than smaller ones.[206]

The failures of the commissariat were symptoms of a systemic problem: applying early modern means to too complex an effort, constantly pulling the sinews of logistical power to breaking point. The administrative science applied to war failed to recognise the problem as systemic. Instead, like for

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[198] N. Renard, "La Grande Armée et les Juifs de Pologne de 1806 à 1812: une alliance inespérée", *Napoleonica*, 34/2 (2019), 24-5.
[199] Ibid., 22-7.
[200] Ongaro, "Military food supply", p.9.
[201] Renard, "Grande Armée et les Juifs", p.29.
[202] Chandler, *Campaigns*, p.771.
[203] J. Morgan, "War feeding war? The impact of logistics on the Napoleonic occupation of Catalonia", *Journal of Military History*, 73/1 (2009), 83-116.
[204] G. Lepetit, "«La manière la plus efficace de maintenir la tranquillité»? La place de la gendarmerie impériale dans le dispositif français du nord de l'Espagne (1810-1814)", *Annales historiques de la Révolution française*, 348 (2007) p.98.
[205] Morgan, "War feeding war?", 113-4.
[206] Ibid., p.110.

ministerial staff, the individual official was blamed,[207] weakening the quality of personal initiative among Napoleon's subordinates and staff when he was not personally supervising every phase of operations.[208]

I.5 Military quarters

In the Clausewitzian conception of logistics as preparations for war, with its own internal logic, functional to the conduct of war,[209] quartering serves the multiple purposes of presiding over a position, controlling an area, providing a halting place for army movements or, simply, to rest and train troops.[210] Within the integrated logistics of the Napoleonic empire, little is known about army accommodation, whereas it is possible to follow its development throughout the early modern age. Barracks (in the wide sense of soldier-specific accommodation) spread to France from Flanders since the late 16th century, starting from the former-Spanish regions of Roussillon and Low Countries, reinforcing the extant trend, in several cities, of assigning empty civilian homes to the soldiers.[211] On their own initiative and with the revenues from their taxes,[212] *étape* cities built barracks to accommodate transient troops,[213] often by buying up and merging houses.[214] *Étapes* were central to the development of military accommodation; the Midi and Languedoc reached an advanced level of barracksing by the 1690s because they were high-transit *étapes* between Italy and Spain.[215] After the War of the Spanish Succession, the Languedoc model was transposed into the royal *ordonnance* of 25 September 1719; this vast building programme aimed to establish barracks in every garrison or *étape* city,[216] but it soon floundered due to costs, shortages, the discontent of the military, and the opposition of the townsfolk who profited off garrison consumptions.[217] The French military argued that barracksing reduced civilians' familiarity with army life

[207] Kingston, *Bureaucrats*, p.29.
[208] Chandler, *Campaigns*, 763-4.
[209] Duarte, Proença, "Concept of logistics", p.673.
[210] Ibid., p.662.
[211] Dallemagne, *Casernes*, 29-32.
[212] Navereau, *Logement*, 104-6.
[213] Dallemagne, *Casernes*, 46-7.
[214] Navereau, *Logement*, p.106.
[215] Dallemagne, *Casernes*, p.55.
[216] Navereau, *Logement*, 132-3.
[217] C.C. Sturgill, "Changing garrisons. The French system of 'étapes'", *Canadian Journal of History/Annales Canadiennes d'Histoire*, 20/2 (1985), p.196.

and jeopardised recruitment.[218] On a more practical note, reflecting the growing interest in the soldiers' welfare and health, soldiers arriving in an empty barracks, tired from the march, would have to cook instead of changing out of wet clothes and resting.[219]

The supply and maintenance of barracks distinguished between *places fermées* and *non fermées*. The state was in charge of the former, through the local *commis* or intendant; the latter were at the city's charge.[220] Supply and maintenance were contracted out to entrepreneurs, who participated in inspecting barracks when a body of troops arrived or left.[221] As longer peacetime increased the importance of garrisons,[222] barracksing intensified, but billeting persisted, and with it the problems of distributing billets among homeowners. Local and corporative rights to exemptions and privileges interlocked with each other; Boulogne-sur-Mer, the capital of a frontier region with a special fiscal regime, was exempt from providing men to the provincial militia but accommodated troops in transit.[223] Exemption privileges were not set in stone; they could go up for sale, or simply be ignored,[224] and in 1768 they underwent a revision that abolished locality-bound exemptions.[225] Personal exemption remained; so did entrenched inequalities favouring clergymen, nobles, officials, and the wealthy in general,[226] and an excess of privileged increased the pressure on the others. Pre-revolutionary *cahiers de doléance* were replete with complaints about military accommodation, which the Third Estate felt as a disproportionate weight, the best solution to it being either barracksing all troops, or the abolition of all exemption privileges.[227] The decree of 23 January 1790 took that step: all citizens without exception were subject to billeting whenever needed.[228]

Revolutionary and imperial barracksing in France is a highly understudied

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[218] Navereau, *Logement*, 132-3.
[219] Ibid.
[220] Ibid., p. 65.
[221] Navereau, *Logement*, p.137.
[222] Ibid., p.123.
[223] A. Joblin, "La guerre comme facteur d'organisation et de production d'institutions. L'exemple du Boulonnais à l'époque moderne", in C. Desplat (ed.), *Les villageois face à la guerre, XIVe-XVIIIe siècle* (Toulouse, 2002), p.95.
[224] Navereau, *Logement*, p.37.
[225] Ibid., p.128.
[226] Ibid., 82-3, 91.
[227] Navereau, *Logement*, 156-7.
[228] *Collection complète des lois, décrets, ordonnances, réglemens, avis du Conseil d'état* (Paris, 1824), i, p. 95, "Décret qui assujétit tous les citoyens au logement des gens de guerre", 23 January 1790.

field; a glance at legislation allows us to understand, at least, the continuities and novelties in barracksing and barracks management, reflecting the changes in military administration. Features of centralisation and rationalisation marked the laws and *réglements* on barracks promulgated in the early 1790s,[229] which formed the legal framework throughout the empire. Centralisation and rationalisation hinged on the national property of all military buildings, terrains, earthworks and furniture in strongholds and garrisons of the interior, streamlining maintenance expenses on the ministry of war and militarising the custodianship staff (*caserniers*) as *gardes de fortification* under the military engineer corps.[230] Like ministerial employees, the new *gardes de fortification* had their service perquisites abolished,[231] but there was no personnel purge as the service organisation changed.[232] Job requisites were "activité" and basic mathematical literacy, acknowledged by the engineer officers who proposed their hiring[233] and drew up the lists of indispensable employees from which the ministry of war decided on personnel cuts.[234] It is unknown what effect these efforts at rationalisation and militarisation had on the custodianship staff in France; the later example of the militarised transport train, as well as the custodianship staff in the Kingdom of Italy that chapter 4 will describe, might suggest a higher level of complexity than the letter of the law.

Practical dispositions for troop accommodation did not discard Ancien Régime practices, such as renting empty houses to serve as impromptu

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[229] *Bulletin annoté des lois, décrets et ordonnances: depuis le mois de juin 1789 jusqu'au mois d'aout 1830* (Paris, 1834), ii, n. 336, "Décret concernant la conservation et le classement des places de guerre et postes militaires", 10 July 1791. *Collection complète des lois, décrets, ordonnances, réglemens, avis du Conseil d'état* (Paris, 1824), iii, 426-7, "Décret relatif à l'établissement d'une masse destinée à diverse dépenses de l'armée", 10 October 1791. *Collection complète des lois, décrets, ordonnances, réglemens, avis du Conseil d'état*, (Paris, 1834), iv, 167-74, "Décret relatif au logement et casernement des troupes et des fonctionnaires militaires", 23 May 1793. *Legislation militaire ou, Recueil methodique et raisonné des lois, decrets, arretes, reglements et instructions actuellement en vigueur sur toutes les branches de l'état militaire* (Paris, 1812), i, n. 337, "Réglement concernant le maintien de l'ordre et de la propreté dans les bâtimens militaires à l'usage des troupes", 30 Thermidor II/17 August 1794; n. 338, "Réflement concernant la garde et la conservation des places de guerre", 22 Germinal IV/11 April 1796; n. 339, "Réglement concernant l'administration et entretien des bâtimens militaires", 22 Germinal IV/11 April 1796; n. 342, "Instruction portant réglement sur la manière dont il sera procédé par les directeurs du genie, ceux de l'artillerie et les commissaires ordonnateurs, à l'assiette du casernement et de tous les établissemens militaires relatifs au logement des troupes, et à toutes les autres partes dépendantes de l'administration de la guerre", 29 Floréal VII/29 May 1799.

[230] "Décret concernant la conservation", 10 July 1791, title 1, title 4.

[231] Ibid., "Suite au titre 1", art. 11.

[232] Ibid., "Suite au titre 1", art. 7.

[233] "Réglement concernant la garde et la conservation", 22 Germinal IV/11 April 1796, art. 6.

[234] "Réglement concernant l'administration et entretien", 22 Germinal IV/11 April 1796, art. 12.

barracks or stables if no other suitable building was available,[235] or billeting, on the one egalitarian condition that billets were allocated "sans distinction de personnes".[236] Maintenance, furnishing and rent expenses were further brought under government control through the *masse,* a fund established through deductions from the pays of the entire army.[237] The ministry paid indemnities for officers and military officials who had to find their own quarters, and to civilians billeting garrison troops.[238] Accommodation for transient troops was entrusted to the municipalities, without indemnities.[239] There was continuity in the contractual methods, too. A general contractor provided beds to the garrison in the whole empire, through the Delfosse-Laurent company; its owner, *négociant* Delfosse, had been in the business of barracks bed from 1785 to the last contract, signed in 1807 and valid until 1816.[240]

The response of the accommodation system to mass mobilisation and to the growth of the conscript army is, overall, unknown. The creation of the National Guard surely put pressure on private houses, as these units, keen to remark their alterity from the line army, were billeted rather than barracksed.[241] This arrangement probably fitted well the *villes de l'intérieur* where National Guards and the army garrisoned together,[242] splitting billets and barracks between the two corps. The nationalisation of Church property, in November 1789, freed a quantity of *biens nationaux* for potential use as barracks, especially as speculations deflated the price of the properties and reduced the sales gain.[243] Municipalities had to survey the buildings at their disposal, to know exactly what they had in case of barracks shortages.[244] Having ready-made real estate disincentivised building new barracks,[245] although the reuse of *biens nationaux* was linked to contentious religion politics[246] that could exacerbate hostility: in Spain, turning expropriated

[235] "Décret concernant la conservation", 10 July 1791, title 5, art.8.
[236] Ibid., title 5, art.9.
[237] "Décret relatif à l'établissement d'une masse", 10 October 1791.
[238] "Décret relatif au logement et casernement", 23 May 1793, "Réglement sur le logement et casernement".
[239] Ibid., art.7.
[240] Oliveira, *Routes*, p.19.
[241] T. Hippler, *Citizens, soldiers and national armies. Military service in France and Germany, 1789-1830* (London, 2008), p.58.
[242] "Décret concernant la conservation", 10 July 1791, title 3, art. 45.
[243] P. Sagnac, "Les ventes de biens nationaux d'après des recueils de documents et des travaux récents", *Revue d'histoire moderne et contemporaine*, 7/10 (1905), p.760.
[244] "Décret relatif au logement et casernement", 23 May 1793, "Réglement sur le logement et casernement", art.25.
[245] Dallemagne, *Casernes*, p.103.
[246] N. Aston, *Christianity and Revolutionary Europe, 1750-1830* (Cambridge, 2002), 211-97.

religious houses into barracks, churches into stables, and confession boxes into guardhouses, stoked anti-French feelings.[247]

Shortages of materiel as the pressures of war increased might have invested military accommodation, as the *réglement* of May 1793 allowed transport of barracks bed from their current location to another that needed more, under the ministry's order.[248] Indiscipline was stigmatised as contributing to shortages; a consular *arrêté,* in June 1800, lamented that the 1791 and 1792 rules were systematically ignored, and imposed to have the articles about damage compensations should be read aloud to all soldiers arriving in a new garrison.[249] Appealing to the troops' goodwill was no substitute for the interventionism of military administration; the barracksing *réglements* instituted a crosscheck system hinging on the *commissaires*, warehousemen and corps quartermasters, and on the documentation they produced as proof of good service and anti-squandering control.[250] The war commissariat held an important role of communication between commanders and municipalities, informing the latter of incoming troops and providing data that allowed municipalities to prepare the *billets de logement* and group companies in as much proximity as possible so that it was easier and quicker to gather them,[251] as had been common sense also for the royal army.[252] Billet exemptions were were reduced to houses that contained public coffers, or were inhabited by widows and young girls.[253] Gone were urban privileges and provincial particularisms; the only distinction stood between *places fermées* (any stronghold able to withstand a siege) and *non fermées*.[254] The *masse de logement et casernement*, financed by the ministry of war at yearly 3 francs per man, paid for beds, utensils, and sentry accoutrements.[255] It was a far cheaper *masse* than the bakery fund, standing at 51 francs,[256] but the

[247] Lafon, *L'Andalousie*, p.363.
[248] "Décret relatif au logement et casernement", 23 May 1793, "Réglement sur le logement et casernement", art.36.
[249] *Legislation militaire ou, Recueil methodique et raisonné des lois, decrets, arretes, reglements et instructions actuellement en vigueur sur toutes les branches de l'état militaire* (Paris, 1812), ii, n. 343, "Arrêté qui rappèle les autorités à l'observation des lois et réglemens relatifs à la conservation des casernes, quartiers, pavillons, etc", 27 Messidor VIII/16 July 1800.
[250] "Réglement concernant le maintien de l'ordre et de la propreté", 30 Thermidor II/17 August 1794, section 2 "Des lits militaires".
[251] Ibid., art.10.
[252] Navereau, *Logement*, p.130.
[253] "Décret relatif au logement et casernement", 23 May 1793, "Réglement sur le logement et casernement", art. 11.
[254] "Instruction portant réglement sur la manière dont il sera procédé par les directeurs du genie", 29 Floréal VII/29 May 1799, title 1, art.1.
[255] T. Crowdy, *Napoleon's infantry handbook* (Barnsley, 2015), p.128.
[256] Ibid., p.127.

point was that it formalised the age-old custom of companies pooling resources and brought it under state control[257] to reduce reliance on suppliers.[258]

The system changed in the 1810s, when direct state control was partly devolved to the municipalities. A decree, in April 1810, handed a group of barracks to the municipalities, moving the maintenance to civilian engineers and architects, while the military engineers remained in charge of the *places de guerre*; the communes could not dispose of the buildings without the emperor's permission.[259] The timing of this decree matched the prolonged presence of Napoleon in France during 1810, which marked a spell of administrative changes unhindered by the usual issues of distance communications.[260] The *gardes de fortification* of the engineer corps were to be substituted by head-custodians and porters chosen by the municipalities.[261] Hiring methods hardly changed between militarisation and "civilisation", as the municipal custodians wore a uniform and preferably came from among demobilised veterans, like the *gardes de fortifications* in the state barracks.[262] Finally, municipalities were always in charge of accommodating transient troops, with no claim to indemnities; many municipalities requested to furnish the barracks at their own expense so as not to pay the beds rent.[263]

From January 1811, the lease price of military beds was entrusted to those municipalities that could impose duties on the commodities the troops brought in.[264] Assuming that "les consommations de la troupe ajoutent aux revenus de la commune, et y favorisent le commerce et l'industrie",[265] this

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[257] Ibid., p.126.
[258] Branda, *Prix de la gloire*, chapter 15, section "Priorité au soldat", par.8.
[259] *Legislation militaire ou, Recueil methodique et raisonné des lois, decrets, arretes, reglements et instructions actuellement en vigueur sur toutes les branches de l'état militaire* (Paris, 1812), ii, n. 347, "Décret impérial portant donation aux villes, de casernes et autres bâtimens militaires à la charge de les entretenir", 23 April 1810.
[260] Woolf, *Napoleon's integration*, p.39.
[261] *Legislation militaire ou, Recueil methodique et raisonné des lois, decrets, arretes, reglements et instructions actuellement en vigueur sur toutes les branches de l'état militaire* (Paris, 1812), ii, n. 350, "Décret impérial qui règle le mode d'administration des bâtimens militaires appurtenant aux communes, ou à l'état, dans les places de guerre et dans les villes non fortifiées", 16 September 1811, title 3, art. 28.
[262] Ibid., title 3, art. 21, 39-40.
[263] *Legislation militaire ou, Recueil methodique et raisonné des lois, decrets, arretes, reglements et instructions actuellement en vigueur sur toutes les branches de l'état militaire* (Paris, 1812), ii, n. 348, "Avis du conseil d'état relatif au loyer d'occupation des lits fournis par l'habitant aux troupes en garnison", 29 May 1811.
[264] *Collection complete des lois, décrets, ordonnances, réglemens et avis du Conseil d'État* (Paris, 1826), xvii, p.152, "Décret concernant les lits militaires", 7 August 1810.
[265] Ibid.

was a return to the local for-profit management of garrisons in the Ancien Régime.[266] However, several fortress cities in coastal areas, Nord-Est and Midi[267] received tax relief,[268] as the revenues could not cover the rents and it was impossible to raise the *octroi* duties.[269] These cities were located in areas affected by the maritime blockade and its associated economy downturn;[270] other, like Briançon, lay on military and commercial roadways of lesser importance.[271] The relief decrees, although concerning only 17 cities out of 280, were now adding to the ministry of war administration's budget deficit.[272] The timing coincided with growing resistance to indirect taxation[273] and the post-1812 crisis of soaring expenses and depleting treasury, which made army supply unaffordable for the state in 1813-'14.[274] Against such mind-boggling shortfalls as the monthly 1,6 million francs eaten up by the clothing supply in 1813,[275] the 118,419.72 francs[276] of the tax relief were a small loss. However, it demonstrates the difficulty to sustain the military presence during the late empire's economic breakdown.

Conclusion

In order to embrace an approach based on radicalisation dynamics, the literature making the case for the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars as origins of total war and militarism tend to exclude logistics, administration and economics. These elements are crucial to understand how the empire sustained war, and how rationalised, depoliticised executive institutions faced the war effort and the strife for centralisation and mobility at the same time. Imperial integration served vital logistical functions to replenish, support and move the armies, being a point of constant civil-military,

[266] Sturgill, "Changing garrisons", 196-7.
[267] AN 138AP/133, "Tableau de pertes que font éprouver à l'administration de la guerre les différens décrets qui ont déchargé les villes de tout ou partie de la dépense d'occupation", 20 July 1813.
[268] AN 138AP/133, Daru to Napoleon, 28 July 1813.
[269] AN 138AP/133, Montalivet to Napoleon, 30 August 1813.
[270] M.P. Fitzsimmons, *From artisan to worker. Guilds, the French state, and the organization of labor, 1776–1821* (Cambridge, 2010), 195-6. A. Forrest, "Experiencing the Continental System in the cities of the French Atlantic", in Aaslestad, Joor (eds.), *Revisiting Napoleon's continental system*, p.207.
[271] M. Crubellier, "Le Briançonnais à la fin de l'Ancien Régime", *Revue de Géographie Alpine*, 36/3 (1948), p.355.
[272] AN 138AP/133, Daru to Napoleon, 28 July 1813.
[273] M. Lyons, *Napoleon Bonaparte and the legacy of the French Revolution* (New York, 1994), p.158.
[274] Gabillard, "Financement", p.562-3.
[275] Cyr, "Logistique", p.23.
[276] AN 138AP/133, "Tableau de pertes que font éprouver à l'administration de la guerre les différens décrets qui ont déchargé les villes de tout ou partie de la dépense d'occupation", 20 July 1813.

private-public contact and contrast in the supply sector. Militarisation of supply services retained continuities in practices, personnel, and contracting.

Military accommodation is part of logistics' own functioning rather than of the conduct of war. As a practice that consolidated over centuries in the *pays de guerre* of Europe and shaped the territorial asset of France, it always directly affected civilians, needed their cooperation to function, and engendered strategies to lessen the obligation. Royal power had to negotiate with cities and attempt to discipline the armies. As such, military accommodation is an integral part of the experience of war, influencing perceptions of total war.

Chapter 2: The Kingdom of Italy's military administration

Six months into the War of the First Coalition, physician Lazzaro Spallanzani, professor at the university of Pavia and devoted subject of the Habsburg monarchy, was writing about the academic diatribes *du jour* to his colleague Leopoldo Caldani at Padua. Off-handedly, Spallanzani warned Caldani that postal censorship might intercept his letters in Milan, "giacchè per questi benedetti o piuttosto maledetti Francesi si aprono di frequente le lettere."[1] The war disappeared from the two scientists' correspondence until 1796. On the same day of the Cherasco armistice, Spallanzani lamented being unable to plan a research trip "in conseguenza dei Francesi minaccianti una vicina irruzione nella Lombardia austriaca. Iddio benedetto ce la mandi buona, ma noi tutti siamo in grandi e ben giusti timori."[2] The imminent French invasion directly affected daily life; as Spallanzani specified in the post-scriptum, the university had been closed for the emergency.[3]

It had been half a century since the last time war had hit Lombardy; after the end of the War of the Austrian Succession in 1748, which reaffirmed the Austrian Habsburgs' hold on the duchies of Milan and Mantua,[4] no war was fought there until the French Revolutionary Wars. The Seven Years' War was a catalyst of intellectual discussion and political consensus-making among the cultured élites that made up a public opinion of increasing importance,[5] but military participation was as indirect as it was limited; even Italians serving in foreign armies were in waning numbers.[6]

War and French rule forged a new state in northern Italy, centred on ex-Austrian Lombardy, ex-Papal Romagna and ex-Venetian territories, which, between 1796 and 1814, became the Cisalpine Republic, Italian Republic, and Kingdom of Italy.[7] This area corresponds exactly to the southern boundary of the "German isthmus", one of the large-scale north-south axes of European-Mediterranean communication identified by Fernand Braudel;

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[1] *Leopoldo M.A. Caldani – Lazzaro Spallanzani: Carteggio (1768-1798)*, ed. G. Ongaro (Milan, 1982), n. 116, Spallanzani to Caldani, 29 October 1792.
[2] Ibid., n. 141, Spallanzani to Caldani, 28 April 1796.
[3] Ibid.
[4] M.S. Anderson, *The War of the Austrian Succession, 1740-1748* (Harlow, 1995), p.214.
[5] D. Tongiorgi, "«Fan dunque guerra ancora i poeti?». Versi per la Guerra dei Sette anni", *Diciottesimo Secolo*, 1 (2016), 169-91.
[6] G. Hanlon, *The twilight of a military tradition. Italian aristocrats and European conflicts, 1560-1800* (London/New York, 1998), p.312.
[7] Grab, *Transformation of Europe*, 155-65.

it was an area of converging routes, convoyed through the mountain passes of the Alps and Apennines into the lowlands towards the Tyrrhenian and Adriatic seaports.[8] By dint of its position, Lombardy had been an intensely militarised logistical platform[9] for the Spanish Habsburg, for the sake of the long war in Flanders that, not unlike the Napoleonic Wars, Madrid only wished to conclude with total victory.[10] The Dutch war weakened Spain just as France recovered from the Wars of Religion in the first half of the 17th century; competition between the Bourbon and Habsburg powers reopened the Italian theatre of operations[11] until the end of the 18th century wars of succession. Managing the army prompted institution-building processes in the *Milanesado*, balancing interests between Madrid, Milan, and local representative bodies.

For Napoleonic France, the Kingdom of Italy was a strategic asset in the ownership of space; possession of the Po plain meant holding the river defence lines against invasion from Austria, as well as ways southward and eastward to encroach into the British-dominated Mediterranean.[12] Hosting French and Italian corps in garrisons and conscript depots, the Kingdom restored northern Italy as a hub of military corridors. The system of accommodation and supplies had to be organised within the new state administration on the French model, in turn drawing on the expertise of Habsburg Lombardy. Therefore, it is useful to focus on the Lombard administration to understand how the Napoleonic system functioned.

This chapter will outline the early modern *pays de guerre* until the late 18th century, and the evolution of military accommodation institutions between the Spanish and Austrian Habsburg rule. It will analyse it as hub of troop transits within the Napoleonic edifice, a role harking back to its early modern position in the Spanish Habsburg war effort, but on a larger and more invasive scale. To understand how it managed the fluxes of this larger-scale mobilisation and mobility, it will outline the evolution of the ministry of war and the institutions of the war administration.

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[8] F. Braudel, *The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean world in the age of Philip II,* tr. S. Reynolds (New York, 1973), i, 203-6.
[9] L. Ribot García, "Las provincias italianas y la defensa de la monarquía", *Manuscrits. Revista d'història moderna*, 13 (1995), p.100.
[10] G. Parker, "If the Armada had landed", *History*, 61/203 (1976) p.367.
[11] G. Hanlon, *Italy 1636: Cemetery of armies* (Oxford, 2019), 15-33.
[12] G. Rothenberg, "Prologue: Italy, wars, and geography", in F. Schneid, *Napoleon's Italian campaigns, 1805-1815* (Westport, 2002), xv-xviii.

II.1 The Lombard *pays de guerre*, 16th-18th century

Within the Spanish Habsburg crown from 1535 to 1707, Italy was host to a prolonged military presence; during the Eighty Years' War, control of Lombardy and the northward routes through Savoy first, later Valtellina, secured the lower routes of the Spanish Road funnelling troops towards Flanders.[13] The Spanish *presidios* in Lombardy, Naples and Sicily, each hosting a *tercio* of 3000 infantry and 500 cavalry, served as training centres for the troops destined to Flanders.[14] The military presence in Lombardy grew over time; from the mid-16th to the 17th century, muster rolls show a range from 5,000 to 15,000 troops, rising to 40,000 in wartime.[15] A system of troop accommodation developed to ensure the upkeep of this military presence and limit abuses. As monetary contributions and tax relief increasingly replaced direct accommodation,[16] the *Milanesado* undertook a long process of fiscal equalisation among its constituencies through the *equalanze*,[17] aimed at redistributing billets and fiscal burdens,[18] chiefly the *mensuale*, the monthly tax that financed army salaries through provincial revenues.[19] By the mid-17th century, representation of the *Milanesado* at court, resistance to unfavourable changes in the military apparatus, and control over the correct application of military-related regulations and reliefs, centred on the *Congregazione dello Stato*, whose driving force was the Milanese ruling class.[20] The apogee of the *Congregazione*'s negotiation power coincided with the decade of peace, which reduced the garrisons in Lombardy, between the Treaty of the Pyrenees (1659) and the rekindling of the Franco-Spanish Wars in the late 1660s.[21] Since 1662, the maintenance and supply of quarters (*rimplazzo*) in the whole state was contracted to an entrepreneur, covering "ordinary" (garrison) and "extraordinary" (field army and transient) troops.[22] Throughout the century, military accommodation in specific, separate spaces from civilian homes proceeded unevenly.

[13] Parker, *Army of Flanders*, 70-4.
[14] Ibid., 32-3.
[15] M. Maffi, "El peso de Marte. El sistema del «remplazo» militar y la «Congregazione dello Stato» en el Milanesado español (1662- 1700)", *Chronica Nova*, 40 (2014), p.54.
[16] Buono, Di Tullio, Rizzo, "Per una storia economica", p.195.
[17] Rabà, "Alloggiamenti militari".
[18] Buono, Di Tullio, Rizzo, "Per una storia economica", p.197-8.
[19] Buono, *Esercito*, 25-6.
[20] Buono, Di Tullio, Rizzo, "Per una storia economica", p.209. Maffi, "El peso de Marte", 61-3.
[21] Ibid., p.63.
[22] Buono, Di Tullio, Rizzo, "Per una storia economica", p.215.

Municipalities took it upon themselves to acquire and adapt buildings,[23] repurposing extant ones (usually empty civilian homes, but also ex-religious houses,[24] initiating a trend that would become predominant in the Napoleonic age) as military quarters. The term *case herme*/*casas yermas* originally indicated the type of accommodation in a specific structure that was not a civilian home, later becoming conflated with the physical location in the modern sense of the word *caserma* (barracks).[25] Mid-century plans to barracks all the troops never came to fruition, as the army bureaucracy and the resupply system could not keep up with units in fast transit and the damages they inflicted on the buildings.[26]

From 1715 to 1796, Lombardy was part of the Austrian Habsburg empire. During this century, under the pressure of war on multiple fronts, the House of Habsburg reconfigured its territorial claims and its imperial self by identifying the dynasty with the Austrian hereditary lands, Bohemia, and Hungary.[27] Warfare shifted towards troop mobility and command centralisation, standardising the organisation of the monarchy's army;[28] the most illustrious Habsburg commander and head of the *Hofkriegsrat*,[29] Prince Eugene of Savoy, attempted to improve army efficiency and administration.[30] Taxation paying for the upkeep of a growing army was part of these efforts; in 1707, Eugene introduced the *diaria*, a daily contribution investing the whole province, collected and subdivided among the taxpayers by the *Congregazione dello Stato*.[31] The *diaria* aimed to provide prompt reimbursements, regulated through a calendar for the submission of receipts, while the fixed maximum for expenses spared the sovereign from losing money and alienating the *Congregazione* by curtailing its administrative

[23] Buono, *Esercito*, p.170-8.
[24] Ibid., p.154.
[25] Ibid.
[26] Ibid., p.193.
[27] A. Wess Mitchell, *The grand strategy of the Habsburg Empire* (Princeton, 2018), 54-5.
[28] A. Dattero, "Un aspetto del riformismo austriaco: caserme e mondo urbano nella Lombardia del Settecento", in C. Donati, B. Kroener (eds.), *Militari e società civile nell'Europa dell'età moderna (secoli XVI-XVIII)* (Bologna, 2007), p.403.
[29] For an overview of this institution and Austrian military administration: M. Hochedlinger, *Austria's wars of emergence. War, state and society in the Habsburg monarchy, 1683-1797* (London, 2003), 118-21.
[30] R. Bassett, *For God and Kaiser. The Imperial Austrian army* (New Haven, 2016), 73-6.
[31] S. Agnoletto, "All'origine dei processi riformatori nello Stato di Milano: dal fallimento del progetto Pras alla nomina della Giunta Miro (1711-1718)", in R. Canetta, A. Carera, M. Taccolini (eds.), *Temi e questioni di storia economica e sociale in età moderna e contemporanea. Studi in onore di Sergio Zaninelli* (Milan, 1999), p.78.

supremacy.[32]

After 1748, the lines of communication shifted eastward, hinging on Mantua as the main stronghold, to facilitate transit to and from Austria.[33] The management and provisioning of a larger[34] army prompted improvements in administrative control from Vienna regarding unit strength and military expenditures.[35] Transits outside the duchies of Milan and Mantua entailed diplomatic agreements with the neighbouring states, two of which (the Prince-Bishopric of Trento and the Republic of Venice) interrupted the territorial continuity between the Habsburg hereditary lands and Lombardy.[36] Within Italy, the balance of powers and the dynastic ties of the Habsburgs allowed compensating the diminution of the Austrian standing army during the Seven Years' War; in the war years, troops from the Duchy of Modena manned the Lombard garrisons.[37] The Lombard situation in the second half of the 18th century resembled that of another *pays de guerre*, the Netherlands, at the opposite end of the old Spanish Road. Like northern Italy, this area was a recurring theatre of operations along the Franco-Habsburg fault-line, subject, after the War of the Spanish Succession, to a special garrisoning regime involving the "Barrier", a group of fortresses within the Austrian Netherlands, manned by Dutch troops, intended to block invasion from France.[38] The Barrier failed this strategic task during the War of the Austrian Succession and became obsolete with the Franco-Austrian alliance of 1756, leading to its partial dismantlement in the 1780s.[39] Less frequent wars in the first half of the century allowed the region to accumulate resources and recoup better after 1748; still, the growth of armies ensured that upkeep burdens would never disappear, although a more efficient military administration prevented abuses and looting.[40] Civil-military

[32] A. Dattero, "«Con un nuovo incanto è da sperarsi un ribasso maggiore nel prezzo». Progetti di riordino degli appalti militari nella Lombardia austriaca del XVIII secolo", *Società e storia*, 139 (2013), 46-7.
[33] Dattero, "Un aspetto", 410-1.
[34] On the numerical growth of German armies in the 18th century: Hewitson, "Princes' wars", p.479. The standing army in Lombardy fluctuated over time, depending mostly on the state of war and peace, peaking during the Polish and Austrian wars of succession at around 80,000 men. P. Crociani, V. Ilari, *Bella Italia militar. Eserciti e marine nell'Italia pre-napoleonica (1748-1792)* (Rome, 2000), 386-90.
[35] Dattero, "Con un nuovo incanto", p.74.
[36] A. Dattero, "Percorrere il territorio nel Settecento: militari asburgici in marcia tra Domini ereditari e Stati italiani", in C. Donati (ed.), *Alle frontiere della Lombardia: politica, guerra e religione nell'età moderna* (Milan, 2006), p.207.
[37] A. Menziani, "L'esercito estense ed austro-estense (1598-1859)", in A. Spaggiari, G. Trenti (eds.), *Lo Stato di Modena. Una capitale, una dinastia, una civiltà nella storia d'Europa* (Rome, 2001), 713-4.
[38] H. Sonkajärvi, "Aperçu sur l'économie de la désertion dans les Pays-Bas autrichiens", *Histoire, économie et société*, 3 (2011), p.51.
[39] D. Beales, *Joseph II. Against the world, 1780-1790* (Cambridge, 2009), p.165.
[40] Gutmann, *War and rural life*, p.71.

cohabitation between burghers and Dutch regiments posed, with the exception of more sensitive matters of religious antipathy, nothing more than "problèmes ordinaires de cohabitation entre civils et militaires dans les places de guerre au XVIIIe siècle."[41]

The power relation between Vienna and Milan tended, gradually under Maria Theresa's rule and far more markedly under Joseph II, to erode local particularisms in self-governance and privileges of nobles and clergy, fostering the long-term transformation of the Lombard crown lands into a proper region of the empire.[42] Although Lombardy, like Hungary, was not involved in the reforms to the political-administrative structures of the German-Bohemian dominions in the 1740s-'50s,[43] local institutions underwent a gradual change into executive offices of the sovereign.[44] The *Congregazione* was subject to a severe power curtailment under Joseph II; its self-management of fiscal revenues ended in 1772, when fixed military revenues were rerouted to a coffer administered directly by the *Hofkriegsrat*, which also managed the accommodation contracts through the military commander of Lombardy.[45] In 1786, the *Congregazione* was abolished, only to be reinstated by Leopold II in 1791, and abolished again by the French five years later.[46] Joseph II replaced the *Congregazione* with eight provinces, with an intendant in each of them overseeing government matters in ways somewhat foreshadowing Napoleonic prefects,[47] including the handling of military accommodation.

Even when no war was fought in the Milanese territory, small communes struggled to cope with occasionally intense transits; thousands of garrison soldiers were sent from Lombardy in Germany in 1757, and billeting in civilian homes was often the only option en-route.[48] The formal distinction between garrison army and field army had ended in 1752,[49] although the operational distinction between garrison and transient troops was to remain in the Napoleonic age. Reform also invested the municipal reimbursements

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[41] C. Denys, "Les relations entre Pays-Bas du Nord et Pays-Bas du Sud autour du problème de la Barrière au XVIIIe siècle, une proposition de révision historiographique", *Revue du Nord*, 359/1 (2005), p.136.
[42] M. Meriggi, *Breve storia dell'Italia settentrionale dall'Ottocento a oggi* (Rome, 1996), p.13.
[43] Hochedlinder, *Austria's wars*, 267-70.
[44] Dattero, "Un aspetto", 412-3.
[45] Dattero, "Con un nuovo incanto", 74-6
[46] Ibid.
[47] C. Mozzarelli, "Le intendenze politiche della Lombardia austriaca (1786-1791)", in R. De Lorenzo (ed.), *L'organizzazione dello Stato al tramonto dell'Antico Regime* (Naples, 1991), 61-118.
[48] Dattero, "Percorrere il territorio", 215-6.
[49] Dattero, "Un aspetto", p.406.

for transient troops in 1779-'80, establishing a revision of price rates every twenty years.[50] The number of troops, reaching a high ratio to the civilian populace in the main garrison cities,[51] was not overwhelming as long as peace lasted and intense transits were a temporary inconvenience. The paper strength of the Austrian standing army in Lombardy as of April 1791, when conflict with revolutionary France was not a concrete risk yet, was set at 12-15,000 men;[52] five years later, on the eve of the *armée d'Italie*'s breakthrough, Austrian forces had risen to around 30,000.[53] Both French and Austrian troop presence kept growing during 1796-'97; as of February 1797, the *armée d'Italie* numbered around 80,000 men.[54] As even contemporary observers noticed, the barracksing and billeting system, tailored for the peacetime Austrian garrisons and their few *étape* routes, was unprepared for wartime.[55] Furthermore, the *pays de guerre* had to face this onslaught with new institutions, undergoing unsettling changes since 1786. The French authorities maintained the *Congregazione* along with the municipality of Milan, albeit subject to member changes, under the aegis of the *Agenzia militare di Lombardia*, created immediately after the entrance of the French in Milan and led by three French officials.[56] The *Congregazione*'s authority, strictly limited to an executive role facilitating resource extraction for the French *commissaires aux armées*,[57] had but a shadow of the negotiating weight it once wielded.[58] At the same time, the geopolitical system that the *Milanesado* had been framed within since the end of the Italian Wars changed dramatically under Napoleon's push.

II.2 The Napoleonic *pays de guerre* (1796-1814)

Between 1796 and 1801, the Lombard *pays de guerre* was chiefly a terrain of economic exploitation, which influenced the perception of war through the shock of economic depredation. As Albert Pingaud noticed, the Lombards were not used (anymore, we might add) to these levels of

[50] Dattero, "Percorrere il territorio", 217-8.
[51] Dattero, "Un aspetto", 435-8.
[52] Dattero, "Un aspetto", p.431.
[53] Chandler, *Campaigns*, p.38.
[54] Broers, *Soldier of destiny*, p.132.
[55] S. Bobbi, "Il soldato in casa. Alloggi militari, istituzioni e proprietari nella Lombardia napoleonica", in A. Robbiati Bianchi (ed.), *La formazione del primo stato italiano e Milano capitale, 1802-1814* (Milan, 2007), p.530.
[56] Godechot, *Commissaires*, i, 284-5.
[57] Ibid., 371-7
[58] Zaghi, *L'Italia di Napoleone*, p.125.

contributions, coming at the end of a half-century that had promoted material wealth.[59] For the French Directory, it made great sense to try gaining possession of "richesse … aisément transférable",[60] and the primary motivation for the campaign of 1796 had been financial. The aim was to intimidate the Italian states into peace and cooperation (chiefly the Genoese bankers whom the French were negotiating loans with, and the court of Turin, allied with Austria and Britain because the republic could not afford to "lui fournir les mêmes secours qu'elle reçoit de ses alliés actuels") and chase the Austrians out of Lombardy,[61] making up for the scarce contribution revenues from occupied Holland, Belgium and Germany.[62] Resources to sustain and pay the army would be drawn from the theatre of operations, on the conditions of "maintenir une discipline sévère, et à épargner aux habitants toutes les vexations et les désastres que le fléau de la guerre entraîne si souvent après lui, et que l'ordre et de bonnes administrations peuvent seuls réprimer."[63] The conquest of Italy, from Piedmont to the Papal Legations, yielded 45,706,493 francs in contributions;[64] supplies, animals, food, forage, precious items and artworks were also subject to requisition.[65] Lombardy, after having paid hefty war contributions to the Austrians,[66] imposed a war tax of 20 million francs, to be paid off by the wealthiest citizens, and whose apportionment was entrusted to the Military Agency.[67] The municipality of Milan, with renewed offices (structured in the *Dicastero centrale di polizia*), leading personnel and repartition of urban administration,[68] cooperated with the military commander in the upkeep of the French army and the levy of contributions.[69] These added to 300,000 *lire* in wealth tax, and supplies of fabric, food and forage for the army.[70] The shock that these massive military expenses produced, was not just due to the sheer amount of money and materiel, but to the traumatic methods of collection. The seizing of religious objects and artworks from churches, often

[59] A. Pingaud, *Bonaparte président de la République italienne* (Paris, 1914), i, 137-8.
[60] A. Fugier, *Napoléon et l'Italie* (Paris, 1947), 8-9.
[61] *Recueil des actes du Directoire exécutif: procès-verbaux, arrêtés, instructions, lettres et actes divers* (Paris, 1910), i, "Instructions pour le général en chef de l'armée d'Italie", 2 March 1796, 717-22.
[62] Branda, *Prix de la gloire*, chapter 9, section "La feuille de route de Bonaparte", par. 2.
[63] *Recueil des actes du Directoire exécutif*, i, p.722.
[64] Branda, *Prix de la gloire*, chapter 9, section "La terreur s'amplifie, la razzia continue", par. "Contributions perçues par l'armée de Bonaparte en 1796".
[65] Ibid., chapter 9, section "La terreur s'amplifie, la razzia continue", par. 2-3.
[66] Godechot, *Commissaires*, i, p. 292.
[67] Branda, Prix de la gloire, chapter 9, section "La terreur s'amplifie, la razzia continue", par. 2.
[68] Pagano, *Comune di Milano*, 21-2.
[69] Ibid., 15-7.
[70] Godechot, *Commissaires*, i, p.292-3.

through ruthless and blackmailing methods, offended piety.[71] In past wars, plundering had hardly spared religious buildings, be it Protestant or Catholic soldiers who carried it out.[72] The anti-Catholicism of the *armée d'Italie*[73] fuelled popular hatred against the French and the Italian "Jacobins", politicising the early modern view of the French soldiers as irreligious vis-à-vis the pious Spaniards,[74] both of whom had been the last non-Habsburg troops to occupy Lombardy in the 1740s. The Russians in 1799 hardly got better publicity; lurid stories boomed on the violence, looting and sacrilegious crimes of the exotic irregular troops, the Cossacks, said to grease their boots with holy oil and engage in cannibalism.[75]

The French-Cisalpine treaty of alliance, signed in February 1798, established in the Cisalpine Republic a French army corps of 22,000 infantry, 2500 cavalry and 500 artillery, whose upkeep was charged to the republic through a monthly contribution of 18 million *lire*.[76] The Cisalpine Republic would provide hospitals, billets and barracks, while the French Republic was responsible for the soldiers' pay, clothing, victualling and equipment.[77] Additionally, the republic was to recruit its own army. The provisional republics prior to the Cisalpine had recruited volunteer units and National Guards in the major cities; the volunteer units were brought together into a roughly 8000-strong army in summer 1797.[78] By the end of the year, its paper strength had reached 15,000 thanks to the incorporation of Polish units, political refugees from other Italian states, and a hussar regiment conscripted from the scions of wealthy urban families.[79] Exploitation and spoliations in 1800-'02 were worse than during the first Cisalpine Republic. The 45,000-strong French army costed the Republic between 4 and 6 million *lire* per month in summer 1801, inclusive of accommodation and supplies expenses, while the war contribution to France amounted to 75 million (against total

[71] Branda, *Prix de la gloire*, chapter 9, section "Les premiers millions", par.5.
[72] Hanlon, *Italy 1636*, 156-8.
[73] Broers, *Soldier of destiny*, p.135.
[74] Starkey, *War in the Age of the Enlightenment*, p.81.
[75] Zaghi, *L'Italia di Napoleone*, p.233. The claim about cannibalistic Cossacks might have spread from Germany during the Seven Years' War: M. Füssell, "'Féroces et barbares?' Cossacks, Kalmyks and Russian irregular warfare during the Seven Years' War", in M.H. Danley, P.J. Speelman (eds.), *The Seven Years' War: Global views* (Leiden, 2012), p.250.
[76] *Raccolta delle leggi, proclami, ordini ed avvisi pubblicati in Milano nell'anno VI Repubblicano* (Milan, 1798), v, "Traité d'alliance entre la République Française, et la République Cisalpine", 3 Ventôse VI/21 February 1798, art.5.
[77] Ibid., art.6.
[78] F. Frasca, "L'esercito del primo tricolore", *Informazioni della difesa*, 6 (2001), p.50.
[79] Ibid.

incoming revenues of 40 millions) between 1800 and 1801.[80] Administrative chaos and corruption created a widespread climate of lawlessness, fear and uncertainty in public opinion, while prices of basic commodities skyrocketed and taxation increased.[81]

The return of northern Italy to being a *pays de guerre* meant an increase in the raw military presence. The Italian forces, between 1801 and 1814, sent corps to Switzerland, southern and central Italy, the Atlantic French coastline, Germany, Istria and Dalmatia, Austria and Hungary, Tyrol, Spain, Russia, Germany again.[82] The French forces that crossed the Alps into Italy in summer 1800 amounted to about 54,000 effectives.[83] In the wake of the Lyon congress and the start of recruitment for the national army, the *armée d'Italie* was put on peacetime footing in January 1801, reducing it to the 25,000 men established by the 1798 Cisalpine-French treaty of alliance.[84] As the Italian army enacted a conscription drive that doubled its effectives in summer 1803,[85] the amount of French troops in the republic went further down than the terms of the 1798 treaty; the ratio in early September 1803 was of 12,134 French, 14,710 Italians, 614 Poles and 405 Swiss.[86] When the resumption of continental war from 1805 pushed up again the French military expenditures, the creation of a system of satellite states allowed the empire to offload the armies and their upkeep costs, as well as easing conscription for the French populace by recruiting contingents in the satellite states.[87] The Kingdom of Italy fully responded to this logic; military expenses soared, while the constant state of war never allowed proper budget planning.[88] In 1805, prior to the campaigns on the Adige during the War of the Fourth Coalition, the main group of the *armée d'Italie* in northern Italy stood at roughly 50,000 men, while 10,000-strong *corps d'observation* in central Italy watched the Neapolitan border, and 2000 national guards, from Piedmont to the Kingdom of Italy, provided internal security.[89] At the onset of the campaign of 1809, the *armée d'Italie* and the army in Dalmatia

[80] Ibid., 250-4.
[81] Zaghi, *L'Italia di Napoleone*, 254-6.
[82] On the operational history of the Italian troops: Zanoli, *Sulla milizia*, ii.
[83] Chandler, *Campaigns*, p.299.
[84] Crociani, Ilari, Paoletti, *Storia militare del Regno*, i, p.43.
[85] Ibid., p.44.
[86] SHD GR4 C95, state of troops in Italy, 15 Fructidor XI/2 September 1803.
[87] Branda, "Did the war pay", 7-8.
[88] Crociani, Ilari, Paoletti, *Storia militare del Regno*, i, 62-5.
[89] Schneid, *Napoleon's Italian campaigns*, p.4.

counted around 75,000,[90] reaching 100,000 in 1811.[91] In January 1813, as Napoleon began rebuilding the army for the spring campaign in Germany,[92] a raw total of 33,176 men (including reformed and refractory soldiers, medical personnel, technical and support corps, Gendarmes) was stationed within the kingdom, and 45,782 outside.[93]

In geostrategic terms, the northern Italian satellite state, after the anti-monarchist turn of the revolution destroyed the Bourbon-Habsburg dynastic alliance that had quelled French claims over Italy, was a platform for French offensives against the Austrian hereditary lands, and a bulwark shielding access to France through annexed Piedmont.[94] A solid base encompassing the whole Po plain allowed setting up lines of defence along the Mincio and Adige, guarded by the fortresses of the Quadrilateral, while gaining the mountain passes in the Alps secured lines of communication, as well as access to Austria and southern Germany through Tyrol.[95] Further to the east, after the peace of Pressburg, the French sealed Austria off the Adriatic and hoped to challenge British maritime power by dominating that sea from both coastlines,[96] as well as securing the route from the Tarvis pass into Carinthia, guarded at its inlets to the Italian plains by the fortresses of Osoppo and Palmanova.[97] The strategic disadvantage to holding the Alpine arc was its vast geographical spread, requiring a large number of troops to guard it;[98] the French empire solved the western side of this problem by annexing Piedmont and Liguria, and bringing Switzerland tightly under control. The kingdom also pronged towards the centre and south of the peninsula, securing a base for the French to descend through the Adriatic side of the Apennines into the Papal States and the Kingdom of Naples, the main ally of the British in the Mediterranean.[99] To the northeast, the Republic of Venice after 1797 followed the fate of Piedmont and Genoa as a removed buffer to direct French-Austrian confrontation;[100] integrating the whole Po plain meant

[90] Ibid., p.60.
[91] Ibid., p.103.
[92] Lieven, *Russia against Napoleon*, 306-8.
[93] SHD GR4 C14, "Regno d'Italia. Stato di situazione delle truppe di terra", 1 January 1813.
[94] Schneid, "Kings, clients", 576-9.
[95] On the military geography of northern Italy: C. Mini, *Geografia e storia militare dell'Italia* (Florence, 1850), i, 47-82.
[96] A. Cattaruzza, "Les provinces Illyriennes: Une perspective géopolitique", *Историјски записи*, 82/3-4 (2009), 157-164.
[97] A. Fara, *Napoleone architetto nelle città della guerra in Italia* (Florence, 2006), 128, 135.
[98] Mini, *Geografia*, i, 28-9.
[99] Schneid, "Kings, clients", 593-5.
[100] Ibid., p.577.

unimpeded military transit. In this sense, ensuring relatively free movement for the army united the empire more than economic integration in the Continental Blockade, as Napoleon's customs policies expressly prevented the Kingdoms of Italy and Bavaria from continuing their historical trade links.[101]

The French held the capital cities of Turin and Milan from which the main roads departed, and the waterway networks on the rivers and lakes.[102] Lombard roadways were in a state of grace, owing to the maintenance and organisation that developed between the late 1770s and the 1780s, at the peak of the Josephinian centralising and rationalising of government.[103] In peacetime, Austrian troop transits occurred when regiments rotated garrisons (far more infrequently as the century progressed, with the exception of unhealthy locations such as Mantua);[104] itineraries interested particularly the Milan-Mantua route, and were pre-planned[105] according to seasonality, state of peace, and state of war.[106] The Austrian classification divided roads into provincial, communal and private,[107] largely anticipating the French classification. Napoleonic roads and waterways responded to a logic of centralisation upon the main city, at international, national and departmental level; thanks to the improvements on the Sempione pass and the Alpine roads between France and Italy, two *routes nationales* connected Paris to Rome, one via Simplon and Milan, the other via Turin and the Mont-Genèvre.[108] Of course, Napoleon and his military administration did not invent the routes per se. The routes through Savoy, Simplon, Valtellina and Tyrol had all been corridors of the Spanish Road,[109] kept in use for military traffic throughout the wars of the 18th century as well as for peacetime transits, culminating in the fixed Lombardy-Austria route plan established in 1785.[110] Nor were the itineraries into central and southern Italy a novelty. The route of the Adriatic coastline, using the main cities of the Marche and Romagna as stopovers,

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[101] M. Broers, *The Napoleonic Mediterranean. Enlightenment, revolution and empire* (London, 2017), p.19.
[102] Mini, *Geografia*, i, p.30.
[103] C. Mozzarelli, "Strade e riforme nella Lombardia del Settecento", *Quaderni storici*, 21/61 (1986), 117-45.
[104] Dattero, "Percorrere il territorio", p.205.
[105] Mozzarelli, "Strade e riforme", 132-3.
[106] Dattero, "Percorrere il territorio", 223-4.
[107] D. Da Rios, P. Villani, "Le strade di Napoleone", *Strade e autostrade*, 3 (2009), p.5.
[108] G. Simoncini, "Aspetti della politica napoleonica dei lavori pubblici in Italia", in *Villes et territoire pendant la période napoléonienne (France et Italie). Actes du colloque de Rome (3-5 mai 1984)* (Rome, 1987), 12-4.
[109] Parker, *Army of Flanders*, p.71.
[110] C. Boeri, V. Ilari, C. Paoletti, *La corona di Lombardia. Guerre ed eserciti nell'Italia del medio Settecento (1733-1763)* (Ancona, 1997), 106-11, 120-1. Dattero, "Percorrere il territorio", 205-7, 221.

had been last used in the northwards march of the Neapolitan-Spanish army advancing into Lombardy in 1745;[111] given the Habsburgs' renunciation of Naples after the War of the Austrian Succession, this itinerary had fallen into disuse. Geography was not the only factor, as creating military corridors in early modern era and Ancien Régime required diplomatic work and transit agreements.[112] The Napoleonic imperial integration exploited the Kingdom of Italy as a friendly, territorially contiguous springboard of military corridors to funnel troops safely, which explains the harshness of counter-insurgency measures when revolts threatened the army's lines of communication,[113] and without having to negotiate passages. Conquest and remodelling of states made it possible, as the kingdom came to encompass the inlets and outlets to the main troop pipelines at every corner of the Po plain. Vienna did not lag far behind, as long as it held the post-Campoformio Venetia east of the Adige as a staging point for further encroachment in Italy.[114]

Imperial continuity opened up more and more *étapes*, using stations close to borders, such as Turin and Novara between the empire and the Kingdom of Italy,[115] or Innsbruck when marching north from Trento,[116] as relay points for troops to await further marching orders. Diplomatic agreements still regulated passages outside state borders and could be crucial to ensure effective logistics, as we saw for the campaigns through the German states in 1805 and 1808 in the previous chapter. Similarly, the convention of 16 April 1806, ensuring the French troops passage through the Austrian-held strip of land between the Kingdom of Italy and Istria, replicated the transit rights that had existed under the Republic of Venice, setting limits to the number of contingents and a fixed line of *étapes*.[117] Although France could negotiate from a position of force, as long as annexation was not completed, diplomatic context could at least influence troop transits, as was the case

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[111] L.A. Muratori, *Annali d'Italia dal principio dell'era volgare sino all'anno 1750* (Munich, 1764), xii, p.300.
[112] Parker, *Army of Flanders*, p.50. Dattero, "Percorrere il territorio", 207-11.
[113] Such was the case of the revolts at Verona and on the mountains of the Sette Comuni in 1797; G. Candela, "La genèse du sytème de guerre napoléonien (1792-1797)", in Drévillon, Fonck, Roucaud (eds.), *Guerres et armées napoléoniennes*, 43-58. Significantly, the revolts of 1809 blocked the highways connecting main cities: Grab, "State power", p.58.
[114] Hochedlinger, *Austria's wars*, p.444.
[115] SHD GR4 C42, general headquarters of the armée d'Italie to the municipality of Como, 22 July 1806.
[116] SHD GR4 C14, itinerary for the 2nd battalion of the Italian transport corps travelling from Verona to Augsburg, 12 March 1812.
[117] M. Kerautret, *Les grands traités de l'Empire (1804-1810). Documents diplomatiques du Consulat et de l'Empire* (Paris, 2002), ii, n.33, "Convention avec l'Autriche (16 avril 1806)".

during the Franco-Spanish appeasement following the treaty of Aranjuez in 1801. The treaty made no provision for military corridors,[118] and the prohibition of transit through the Duchy of Parma, Piacenza and Guastalla, a likely measure to appease the Bourbons of Parma and Spain,[119] remained unclear.[120] Therefore, the funnel through the south bank of the Po to lower Piedmont via Piacenza was blocked, diverting to the nearby Cisalpine ford at Brescello[121] the units of the *armée d'observation du Midi,* recalled from central Italy and headed to France for demobilisation.[122] The Kingdom of Etruria, weak in governance under Maria Luisa of Spain and a hotbed of anti-Napoleonic public opinion and espionage,[123] in early 1804 protested over a corps of Italian troops that marched into its territory unannounced and without any arrangements for their accommodation.[124]

The fluidity that war and state-remaking brought to the territories under French hegemony often hampered administrative consolidation, forcing officials and institutions to readapt to constant changes responding to their own logic of administrative rationalisation;[125] while the geography of itineraries did not really change, the territorial jurisdiction over them did as the republic/kingdom expanded. The plan of *étapes* in the first Cisalpine Republic connected Milan, at the time the army headquarters[126] and closest military station to the border with French-occupied Piedmont on the Ticino, to the main garrisons:[127]

Stopovers	Destination
Cassano, Chiari, Brescia, Lonato	Peschiera
Lodi, Pizzighettone, Cremona, Bozzolo	Mantua
Lodi, Pizzighettone, Cremona	Casalmaggiore
Lodi, Orzinuovi, Brescia, Sabio	Rocca d'Anfo
Cassano	Bergamo
Barlassina, Como, by boat on the lake to Colico	Sondrio
Barlassina, Como, by boat with provisions for two days on the lake to Riva	Chiavenna
Lodi, Pizzighettone, Cremona, Casalmaggiore, Gualtieri,	Massa

[118] *Tratados, convenios y declaraciones de paz y de comercio* (Madrid, 1843), "Tratado entre el rey de España y la república francesa, concluido en Aranjuez el 21 de marzo de 1801" 697-8.
[119] Fugier, *Napoléon et l'Italie*, p.134.
[120] ASMI MGC 641, minister of war to the minister of interior, 4 Vendémiaire X/26 September 1801.
[121] ASMI MGC 641, General Charpentier to the minister of war, 27 Brumaire X/18 November 1801.
[122] Ibid.
[123] Fugier, *Napoléon et l'Italie*, 212-4.
[124] ASMI MGDM 31, minister of war to Tordorò, 15 February 1804.
[125] For example, on the ex-Venetian departments of the Kingdom of Italy: Dal Cin, *Mondo nuovo*, 121-2.
[126] A. Pillepich, *Milan capitale napoléonnienne, 1804-1814* (Paris, 2001), p.74.
[127] ASMI MGC 600, "Marcie rotte stabilite per il passaggio delle truppe cisalpine, da Milano su diversi punti della Repubblica", 15 Floréal VI/4 May 1798.

Reggio, Sassuolo, Paullo, Pievepelago, Castelnuovo Garfagnana	
Lodi, Pizzighettone, Cremona, Bozzolo, Borgoforte, by boat on the Po to Ostia, by boat to Stellata	Ferrara
Lodi, Pizzighettone, Cremona, Casalmaggiore, Brescello, Reggio, Modena, Bologna, Imola, Forlì, Cesena	Rimini and Pesaro

In 1803, the general-headquarters of the *armée d'Italie* produced a chart of the *étapes* in the Italian Republic, divided into three classes of routes by the maximum capacity of the stopovers:[128]

1st class: three infantry battalions or one cavalry regiment		
Novara	Vigevano, Pavia, Lodi, Codogno, Cremona, Bozzolo, Mantua, Villafranca	Verona
Milan	Lodi, Codogno, Cremona, Casalmaggiore, Brescello, Reggio, Modena, Bologna, Imola, Forlì, Cesena	Rimini
Mantua	San Benedetto, Novi	Modena
2nd class: one infantry battalion or one cavalry regiment		
Lodi	Orzinuovi, Brescia, Lonato, Peschiera	Verona
Novara	Magenta, Milan, Cassano, Chiari	Brescia
Novara	Arona, Gravellona	Domodossola
Milan	Desio	Como
Como	Desio, Cassano	Lodi
Como	Lecco, Bergamo, Palazzolo	Brescia
Brescia	Pontevico, Cremona	Piacenza
Brescia	Castiglione, Mantua, Sanguinetto	Legnago
Mantua	Governolo, Rovere d'Ostiglia, Stellata	Ferrara
Ferrara	Malalbergo	Bologna
Bologna	Lojano	Barberino (Etruria)
3rd class: four infantry companies or one cavalry squadron		
Novara	Busio, Como, Bellano (by boat on the lake), Morbegno, Sondrio, Tirano	Bormio
Bergamo	Lecco, Bellano (through the Val Sabbia or by boat on the lake)	Morbegno
Brescia	Sabbio	Rocca d'Anfo
Verona	Isola Rizza, Legnago, Trecento	Ferrara

These charts did not exhaust all the possible combinations of roads, nor were these itineraries fixed as the only options, as the administrative geography of the kingdom shifted and demand for accurate information grew, in accordance with the principles of French administrative science, setting a flurry of statistical and topographic inquiries into motion.[129] The cartographic office (*Deposito generale della guerra*) of the Italian ministry

[128] ASMI MGC 164, General Charpentier to the Italian minister of war, 17 Prairial XI/6 June 1803.
[129] Woolf, *Integration of Europe*, 87-8. On administrative statistics in the Kingdom of Italy: G. Favero, *Le misure del regno. Direzione di statistica e municipi nell'Italia liberale* (Padua, 2001), 22-30.

of war mapped the military roads and stations in Italy in 1804, 1806 and 1808,[130] indicating the usability of routes for the artillery[131] as well as alternative stopovers depending on the season, crowding in an *étape*, type of travel (if in a contingent or isolated, regular troops, detainees, convalescents).[132] The combinatory possibilities, as well as the military administration's effort to strike the best balance between preparedness and flexibility, are perhaps most evident in the guidebook of military and post stations published in 1811, listing 1517 itinerary permutations.[133]

Unlike the military corridors of the Spanish Road, used once a year or every two years,[134] these *étapes* had to be ready at any time, all year round. This was important as the campaigns' dependence on seasonality decreased somewhat and operations could take place in winter, even in the extreme conditions of mountain warfare practised by the great adversary of the *armée d'Italie* in 1799-1800 and "devout believer in rapid mobility and the total destruction of enemy forces",[135] Aleksandr Suvorov. The Alpine roads are perhaps the clearest example; commercial traffic across the passes never came to a complete wintry standstill,[136] but the novelty was that roadworks the likes of making the Simplon, Montgenèvre and Mont-Cenis carriageable in winter optimised French military access to Italy.[137] The Mont-Cenis line of *étapes* in 1809 could sustain a maximum of 7-800 soldiers per passage, so that they would find accommodation, wine and soup in the hospice at the summit of the pass, and the conscripts would not get too tired.[138] Less spectacularly but no less usefully than the Alpine arteries, alternative routes in the Po plain allowed bypassing *étapes* that got flooded by the nearby rivers in wintertime.[139]

Wartime transits brought quick and intense successions of numerous

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[130] F. Frasca, "Il Dépôt Général de la Guerre e la cartografia italiana nelle guerre della Rivoluzione e dell'Impero", *Nuova antologia militare*, 1/1 (2020), p.104.
[131] "Carta delle stazioni militari in Italia eseguita per ordine del Ministro della Guerra della Repubblica Italiana" (Milan, 1804) [http://arks.princeton.edu/ark:/88435/vm40xv09p].
[132] "Carta delle stazioni militari, navigazione, e poste del regno d'Italia: Eseguita nel deposito generale della Guerra per ordine del ministro della guerra" (Milan, 1808) [gallica.bnf.fr/ark:/12148/btv1b531029854].
[133] *Itinerario delle stazioni militari e delle poste del Regno d'Italia e degli stati limitrofi* (Milan, 1811).
[134] Parker, *Army of Flanders*, p.87.
[135] Bell, *First total war*, p.254.
[136] Braudel, *Mediterranean world*, i, p.207.
[137] *Correspondance générale*, v, n. 11168, Napoleon to Crétet, 13 December 1805.
[138] SHD GR4 C10, report to the emperor, 2 February 1809.
[139] For example, the road between Modena and Mirandola, coasting the Panaro river, was subject to floods that made it impracticable in winter; L. Ricci*, Corografia dei territori di Modena, Reggio, e degli altri stati già appartenenti alla casa d'estei stati* (Modena, 1788), p.89. Soldiers were instructed to reach Mirandola through Carpi, farther to the west; *Itinerario delle stazioni militari*, 382, 390-3.

contingents to the *lieux d'étape*, especially near the zones of operations. Between late summer and early autumn 1805, prior to the French breakthroughs at Verona and Caldiero, the Austrian army concentrated around Vicenza, a crossroad between the routes of Tyrol and Carinthia;[140] according to a civilian diarist, as of mid-September the Austrians had marched 29,956 Austrian troops through Vicenza,[141] usually in daily contingents of about 3000.[142] Farther from the front, transit could be still frequent, but with less extreme daily numbers. This was the case for the transits through the stopover districts on the Simplon route, between January and May 1813, when troops in Italy were organised into a new *corps d'observation* and moved to the *Grande Armée* reforming in Germany.[143] From 1 January to 29 March, the district of Arona recorded the total passage of 3333 men in corps, mostly heading east to the Venetian departments, concentrated in the second half of February and first half of March, while soldiers and officers travelling alone transited almost daily.[144] As draft operations accelerated, hasty conscript transits[145] made up the majority of transits through the Domodossola district between April and May. The transits list for 15-30 April show 2301 men, of which 2261 conscripts; daily repartition shows an intense temporary troop presence over a short timespan:[146]

Number of troops	**Day of arrival/sojourn**
311	15 April
310 + 13 horses	16
449	18-19
498	19-20
340	21
393	25
Military travelling alone	
189 from Italy; 103 from France	Entire month

These bursts of intense transits alternated with lulls when the army was fully deployed in a distant theatre of operations; in September 1813, the district of Domodossola only recorded passages of a few officers and around 200

[140] Schneid, *Napoleon's Italian campaigns*, 18-9.
[141] Tornieri, *Memorie di Vicenza*, 12 September 1805.
[142] Ibid., 6-11 September 1805.
[143] M. Gioannini, G. Nafziger, *The defense of the Napoleonic kingdom of Northern Italy, 1813-1814* (Westport, 2002), p. xxii.
[144] ASNO PA 1752, list of corps in transit through the Arona district, 29 March 1813.
[145] C. Rousset, *La Grande Armée de 1813* (Paris, 1871), 61-2.
[146] ASNO PA 1752, list of corps in transit through the Domodossola district (15-30 April 1813), 3 May 1813.

soldiers travelling alone, mostly coming from the Simplon.[147] Transits pressure varied depending on the bigger strategic picture, but it never subsided completely, due to conscripts mobility. Recruits travelled from departmental capital cities to their unit depots,[148] then from there to the *batallions de guerre* (the bulk of the regiment going to the frontlines); in January 1811, nine contingents of trained conscripts converged from their unit depots in the departments of Piedmont and Liguria to Bologna, from where they would be sent to their regimental *battalions de guerre*.[149] Depot battalions were also mobile, as no depot location was fixed, nor were garrison rotations established regularly. The French 84th line infantry regiment garrisoned in Bergamo, with all its five battalions, from 1810 to 1812;[150] in May 1811, its conscripts travelled through the Agogna department, coming from Dijon and Toulouse.[151] Back to Italy after the Russian campaign, in 1813, the regiment had its depot in Padua, then Bergamo and Verona, receiving conscripts from the imperial departments of Leman (Geneva) and Arno (Tuscany).[152] The depot of the 1st light infantry regiment changed location seven times between 1805 and 1812: Parma, Ancona, Rimini, Vicenza, Verona, Novara, Alessandria.[153]

Information also travelled. Let us trace the movement of the 2nd Swiss demi-brigade in winter 1802. Firstly, Napoleon ordered Berthier to move the demi-brigade, from its current station in Switzerland,[154] to Italy.[155] The ministry's *bureau de mouvements*[156] would transmit the orders to the local commanders. In the leisurely timing of peacetime, the 2nd Swiss reached Vercelli by early December; from there, it was to proceed to Forlì in the Italian Republic, and the chief of general-staff of the *armée d'Italie*, General Charpentier, completed the information cycle from the ground up by transmitting the detailed transit itinerary to the Italian ministry of war.[157] Once the ministry in Milan received the information, it transmitted it to the chief of the war

[147] ASNO PA 1752, vice-prefect of Domodossola to the prefect of Agogna, 7 October 1813.
[148] M. Merega, "Il servizio militare nella Repubblica Ligure e nei dipartimenti liguri dell'Impero francese 1797-1814", *Atti della Società Ligure di storia patria*, 23/97 (1983), p.349.
[149] SHD GR4 C10, General Porson to Clarke, 11 January 1811.
[150] L. Loÿ, *Historiques du 84e régiment d'infanterie de ligne "Un contre dix," du 9e régiment d'infanterie légère "L'incomparable," et du 4e régiment de Voltigeurs de la Garde* (Paris, 1905), p.178.
[151] ASNO PA 1751, lists of corps in transit by the commune of Novara, 26 May 1811, 28 May 1811.
[152] Loÿ, *Historiques du 84e*, 191-2.
[153] P.-C. Duthilt, *Mémoires du capitaine Duthilt*, ed. C. Lévi (Lille, 1909), 256-7.
[154] *Correspondance générale*, iii, n. 7147, Napoleon to Berthier, 21 Fructidor XI/8 September 1802.
[155] Ibid., n. 7269, Napoleon to Berthier, 20 Brumaire XI/11 November 1802.
[156] Lentz, *Les ministres*, chapter 10, section "Administration centrale", par.6.
[157] ASMI MGC 158, Charpentier to the minister of war, 11 Frimaire XI/2 December 1802.

commissariat, *commissario ordinatore* Giovanni Tordorò,[158] whose office issued the *feuilles de route* to the units[159] and passed the itinerary details on to the authorities on the ground: prefects who would alert the municipalities, and the barracks supply contractor who would alert his local agents.[160] Prefects, as hierarchical superiors of *podestà* and mayors, had the authority to distribute appropriately the troops in the municipalities where they lodged overnight.[161] From 1805, Eugène became the relay point for information and enactment of military movements.[162] As head of the army in Italy, orders of movement and garrison repartitions went from him to the general headquarters to the generals in the kingdom's military divisions;[163] they had no authority to alter the itineraries, as General Bisson regretfully informed the undersupplied municipality of Bozzolo pleading with him through the prefecture to send an incoming battalion to Mantua instead.[164]

Although not always possible, especially during campaigns, marches were organised by battalions, spreading the *étapes* over one or more days to give time to the earlier units to leave before the others followed, and to the barracks to be resupplied accordingly.[165] This was military common sense and had been the standard operating practice for transits in Austrian Lombardy already.[166] Units on the march and military travelling alone had their itinerary planned out in *feuilles de routes*; quartermasters travelled ahead of the regiment, warning military and civilian authorities in *étape* stopovers to prepare quarters and victuals.[167] Supplies and accommodation were to be inspected and catalogued at a body of troops' arrival and departure, to verify their conditions and set damage compensations.[168] The main overseers of this phase were the personnel of the war administration, the *commissari di guerra*, inspectors, custodians and warehousemen,

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[158] Levati, *Buona azienda*, p.104.
[159] ASMI MGDM 31, minister of war to Tordorò, 15 January 1804; minister of war to Tordorò, 23 June 1804.
[160] ASMI MGC 158, Tordorò to the prefects of Mella and Serio, 31 July 1802.
[161] ASMI MGDM 31, administrative war council to Tordorò, 24 December 1804.
[162] *Mémoires et correspondance politique*, i, Eugène to Napoleon, 23 September 1805, p.388; Eugène to Napoleon, 26 September 1805, p.390.
[163] SHD GR4 C65, general headquarters of the armée d'Italie to General Bisson and Marshal Macdonald, 14 January 1810.
[164] ASMN PM 670, General Bisson to the prefect of Mincio, 5 July 1811.
[165] ASMI MGC 158, itineraries of the 70th and 99th demi-brigade departing from Mantua (24-25 Floréal) to Turin, 22 Floréal X/14 May 1802.
[166] Dattero, "Percorrere il territorio", p.208.
[167] Crowdy, *Infantry handbook*, p.248.
[168] *Leggi e decreti per le province venete unite al Regno d'Italia* (Venice, 1806), n. xviii, "Regolamento sulle caserme", 6 June 1804, titles v, vii, viii.

reporting to the ministry.

II.3 The Italian ministry of war: Habsburg legacy, Napoleonic structure

Throughout the republic/kingdom's history, the institution overseeing military affairs was the ministry of war; it was created in June 1797,[169] right after the establishment of the Cisalpine Directory. As per the constitutions of 1797 and 1798, the ministers were to be members of the Directory.[170] Following the French model of executive power, ministerial action was restricted to administration rather than policy-making, which was in the hands of the Directory and ensured compliance with the French authorities.[171] The novelty of the institution and the political upheaval, driving away part of the experienced clerks of the Austrian offices[172] and taking in inexpert new staff, translated into a difficult birth for the Cisalpine ministry of war. The first minister, Ambrogio Birago, like most of his new employees, had no knowledge of military matters,[173] unlike his successors, the French general Martin Vignolle and the engineer officer, formerly in Habsburg service, Giovanni Battista Bianchi d'Adda. Improvements began from the second Cisalpine Republic onwards, as the employees gained experience, including actual military service; future ministerial secretary Vincenzo Lancetti started out, in 1796, as completely blank in military matters, fled to France in 1799, and joined the Italian Legion, serving in the corps' administration until his return to Italy in 1800.[174] General Vignolle was instrumental in organising the ministry[175] and defining its composition along the lines of office hierarchy, bureau rationalisation, selection of personnel.[176] Nevertheless, the ministry was vulnerable to jostling among patronage networks and business interests, both Italian and French, vying for power and influence. The most honest and reform-minded post-holders of

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[169] Zanoli, *Sulla milizia*, i, p.77.
[170] H. Dippel, *Constitutions of the World from the Late 18th Century to the Middle of the 19th Century. Sources on the Rise of Modern Constitutionalism. National Constitutions / Constitutions of the Italian States* (Berlin, 2009), "Costituzione della Repubblica Cisalpina (1797)", art. 148-52; "Costituzione della Repubblica Cisalpina (1798)", art. 153-7.
[171] M. Scazzoso, "Il Ministero della guerra nella Repubblica cisalpina", *Amministrare*, 1 (2006), p.55.
[172] Mozzarelli, "Modelli amministrativi", p.174.
[173] Levati, *Buona azienda*, 36-7.
[174] V. Lancetti, *Memorie intorno alla mia vita, studi ed impieghi. Le vicende autobiografiche di un erudito cremonese ed intellettuale milanese, tra antico regime e restaurazione, 1766-1851*, ed. E.C. Vantadori (Cremona, 1998).
[175] Crociani, Ilari, Paoletti, *Storia militare del Regno*, i, p.110.
[176] Scazzoso, "Repubblica cisalpina", 63-5.

the ministry, generals Pietro Polfranceschi and Pietro Teulié, resigned one after the other in 1801.[177]

The structure of the ministry changed little between first and second Cisalpine Republic, articulated in an overseeing secretariat (from 1800) and three divisions with their internal bureau, variably termed subdivisions, sections, offices.[178] The ministries under the Kingdom of Italy accentuated the technical character of bureau, replacing subdivisions with sections divided into offices.[179] The political environment in 1800-1802 influenced markedly the composition of the public administration. Most patriots of the *triennio rivoluzionario*, cowed into *ralliement* to Napoleon by the devastating experiences of 1799, were willing to cooperate with the consular regime.[180] Melzi obstructed their participation, preferring to reintegrate staff from the pre-revolutionary Austrian administration, and co-opt moderates with no ties to the revolutionary government.[181] Demand for office jobs was high among the "democrats" whom Melzi wished to marginalise,[182] forcing them to re-fashion their credentials according to criteria of selection that valued, instead of public and political *civisme*, the private virtues of honesty and competence.[183] Such criteria facilitated the pre-eminence of Milanese employees, reinforcing the continuity of Melzi's political project with the pre-revolutionary Lombard administrative past, albeit without any political restoration.[184]

Staff reshuffles took place in 1802 and 1804, as, respectively, ministers Alessandro Trivulzio and Domenico Pino entered office. Among the employees whom Trivulzio fired in 1802 were the French and Polish ones, but the overall staff reduction to 81[185] does not seem to have been very drastic, although figures reported in secondary literature are unclear.[186] Another round of personnel cuts in 1804 struck 34 employees;[187] it is unclear

[177] Crociani, Ilari, Paoletti, *Storia militare del Regno*, i, 114-5.
[178] Ibid., 110, 113, 117.
[179] M. Scazzoso, "Il Ministero della guerra tra Repubblica italiana e Regno d'Italia (1802-1813)", *Amministrare*, 1 (2008), p.76.
[180] De Francesco, *Storie*, 101-12.
[181] L. Antonielli, "Milano capitale napoleonica", in F. Della Peruta (ed.), *Storia illustrata di Milano* (Milan, 1993), v, p.1566.
[182] Ibid.
[183] Mozzarelli, "Modelli amministrativi", 174-5.
[184] Ibid.
[185] Crociani, Ilari, Paoletti, *Storia militare del Regno*, i, 117-8.
[186] According to Scazzoso, "Repubblica Cisalpina", p.65, the ministry had 99 employees in the spring of 1802, while Crociani, Ilari, Paoletti, *Storia militare del Regno*, i, p.117, claim that the fired employees were 22.
[187] Ibid., p.123.

whether this cut had anything to do with the personal and political discord between Trivulzio and Pino,[188] but the staff reshuffles, as well as changes in internal organisation, continued through the following years at every change of minister. During his visit to Milan for coronation as king of Italy in May 1805, Napoleon appointed a commission of state councillors to draw up regulations for the personnel and administration of the Italian armed forces.[189] Spring 1806 brought to the Kingdom of Italy a French minister of noble birth and solid military curriculum, Auguste Caffarelli du Falga.[190] This choice contributed to the creation of the royal court,[191] as exemplified by Napoleon's recommendation of Caffarelli's wife to Eugène's spouse, Princess Augusta of Bavaria.[192] Caffarelli's task was to reorganise and economise, given the ministry of war's disproportionate expenses in the context of the otherwise satisfying public expenditures for 1805-'06.[193] Nevertheless, the reorganised ministry in 1807 had grown larger in offices and staff, and curbing office costs proved impossible.[194]

During the latter half of the kingdom's life, its problems of personnel and costs had become a chronic affliction. The ministerial post was subject to long interims in-between the formal appointment of a new minister,[195] since ministers and secretaries who were also army officers left the role vacant as soon as they re-entered active military service.[196] Military and administrative careers were permeable also at lower levels; officers who could not endure active service anymore often sought jobs in the administration.[197] Informal recruitment processes continued, facilitating amalgam but also favouring employees who resided in Milan and could access the ministries easily; a proposal to standardise selection of secretaries and office supervisors by educational qualifications was rejected in 1810, although the ministry of war was the only one expressing approval for it.[198] Staff reshuffles elsewhere in the Italian public administration tended to preserve personnel; in Trento during Austrian and French regime changes, middle-level officials stayed at

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[188] Ibid., p.122.
[189] Zanoli, *Sulla milizia*, i, p.79.
[190] On Caffarelli's early military service: T. Crowdy, *Incomparable: Napoleon's 9th Light Infantry Regiment* (Oxford, 2012), 19-20.
[191] A. Pillepich, *Napoléon et les italiens* (Paris, 2004), 90-3.
[192] *Correspondance générale,* v, n. 11761, Napoleon to Eugène, 23 March 1806.
[193] Ibid., n. 11965, Napoleon to Eugène, 25 April 1806.
[194] Crociani, Ilari, Paoletti, *Storia militare del Regno*, i, p.125-6.
[195] Ibid., 112, 127, 132.
[196] Ibid., p.124.
[197] Scazzoso, "Regno d'Italia", p.73.
[198] Mozzarelli, "Modelli amministrativi", p.178.

their posts, protecting continuity of services by cultivating professionalism and political neutrality.[199] Even the Napoleonic government authorities were aware that "turncoats" in the Venetian local élites they co-opted were an unavoidable consequence of the ex-Venetian departments being a war zone, subject to invasion and uprising.[200] Within an insecure socio-political situation, the military and bureaucratic structures, which the Cisalpine Republic and its successors inherited from the Ancien Régime, ensured that the state continued to function,[201] mobilising and allocating resources for the war effort.

In fact, the performance of the ministry was a mixed picture, in no small measure due to the frequent organisational changes and the weight of patronage on the workplace, as a self-styled long-serving employee claimed in an anonymous report from the Caffarelli ministry.[202] This instrument of information harked back to the practice of anonymous individual denunciation, which confirmed and construed the French administrators' most negative perception of Italian societies.[203] Still, there was external evidence for such claims, as Napoleon rebuked Eugène for the inaccuracy and imprecision of the Italian ministry of war's status reports, compared to the French documentation.[204] Other problems were similar to the ones faced by the French war ministries, inherent to the strictly executive nature of Napoleonic ministries. While they relied on the central figure of authority (the viceroy in Italy) for orders and guidance, his absences on campaign slowed bureaucratic processes and hampered swift reactions to crises, as the Italian revolts of 1809 showed[205] at the same time as Clarke struggled to cope with the emergencies in Spain and at Walcheren.[206]

In addition to the lower output and quality of documentation, the Italian military administration differed from its French counterparts in that a ministry of war administration never developed past initial, albeit successful, stages. An administrative council of war was established in July 1802, responsible for supply and military administration with the minister of war

[199] Nubola, "Propaganda e fedeltà", 152-3.
[200] Dal Cin, *Mondo nuovo*, p.338.
[201] Scazzoso, "Repubblica cisalpina", p.40.
[202] Crociani, Ilari, Paoletti, *Storia militare del Regno*, i, p.126.
[203] Broers, *Napoleonic empire in Italy*, p.159.
[204] Crociani, Ilari, Paoletti, *Storia militare del Regno*, i, 126-7.
[205] Pagano, *Enti locali*, p.215.
[206] Haegele, "Le général Clarke", 96-8.

as its president, structured in three directions.[207] Despite its competent directors[208] scoring a moderate success in curbing the most rampant abuses and forcing suppliers and staff to work better, the administrative council of war suffered from its fundamental dependence on the minister of war,[209] never became an autonomous ministry, and was abolished in March 1805.[210] The logistical functions, thus, centred on the ministry of war, specifically its 2nd division; within it, the office responsible for barracks supply was the 2nd section.[211] Maintenance of the buildings was partly managed by the military engineer corps, which was under the responsibility of the 2nd division[212] until the reorganisation of 1807, when the engineers and artillery were sorted into the 4th division.[213]

The Italian war commissariat, in cooperation with the municipalities, inherited the management and bureaucratic tasks over army transports, supply and accommodation, which the commissars and the intendants appointed by the Habsburg sovereigns had had in the second half of the 18th century.[214] From 1796, the Cisalpine/Italian commissariat followed the French organisation of the service, and its separation, since 1800, from the *inspecteurs aux revues*, hence the separation of "personnel" and "materiel" services.[215] Stationed in the national territory, the Italian commissaries acting as a transmission chain between their area of operations and the ministry of war; ties were tight even politically, as the *commissaire ordonnateur* in 1797 was also chief of the ministerial 2nd division.[216] Throughout its history, the commissariat suffered from issues of personnel selection and under-staffing, often due to the changes of the country's geopolitical configuration. For early selection processes in the first Cisalpine Republic, departmental administrations were to filter candidates, in the hope of creating an amalgam from the newly accreted parts of the republic; *civisme*, honesty and technical skills were the requisites, but lacking common guidelines for examinations, recommendation ended up playing an important role of political and

[207] *Bollettino delle leggi della Repubblica italiana, dalla Costituzione proclamata nei Comizi in Lione al 31 dicembre 1802* (Milan, 1802), n. 46, "Decreto che crea un Consiglio d'Amministrazione della Guerra", 3 July 1802.
[208] Levati, *Buona azienda*, p.79. Zanoli, *Sulla milizia*, i, p.78.
[209] Crociani, Ilari, Paoletti, *Storia militare del Regno*, i, 119-20.
[210] Levati, *Buona azienda*, 101-2.
[211] Crociani, Ilari, Paoletti, *Storia militare del Regno*, i, 125, 127.
[212] Ibid., p.117.
[213] Ibid., p.126.
[214] Dattero, "Un aspetto", 416-7.
[215] Levati, *Buona azienda*, p.155.
[216] Crociani, Ilari, Paoletti, *Storia militare del Regno*, i, p.135.

competence-based guarantee.[217] Between the second Cisalpine Republic and the early years of the kingdom, the service fared well considering the very difficult conditions under which it operated, and its constant under-staffing compared to the expansion of the kingdom after 1806; under-staffing was partly remedied by appointing *facenti funzioni* among mayors or municipal officials.[218] Later, appointments were restricted to mayors and, from 1809, to prefects and vice-prefects, who resented having to add the military commissariat tasks to their ordinary workload, and allowed the informal practice of mayors as *facenti funzioni* to continue unrepressed for years.[219] The military administrative organisation of the territory influenced the presence of the *commissari di guerra*; as of April 1809, the kingdom was divided into six military divisions, grouping the departments together like in the French arrangement and establishing each division's headquarters in Milan, Brescia, Mantua, Bologna, Ancona and Venice.[220] Staff rose from twenty-four *commissari* in 1806 to forty in 1811,[221] through the massive use of adjuncts, assistant *commissari* who were promoted to the commissarial position, while provisional adjuncts were hired to aid the senior *commissari*.[222] The increased demand for *commissari* brought in a fresh intake of Frenchmen, since minister Caffarelli's tenure, and the practice of *facenti funzione* continued well into the 1810s.[223] At the head of the commissariat, holding the post of *commissario ordinatore in capo*, was Giovanni Tordorò, whose career in the upper echelons of the military administration, including a tenure as interim minister of war, spanned the entire Napoleonic period.[224]

The trend of devolution from military administration to the peripheral civil administration, which is observable in the permeability of roles between *commissari* and *facenti funzione*, marked the evolution of the military accommodation supply and maintenance service. Accommodation for troops in transit was under municipal responsibility; conversely, the sector for garrison troops alternated between public management, two general contracts between 1802 and 1805, temporary management through a

[217] Levati, *Buona azienda*, 143-4.
[218] Ibid., 150-61.
[219] Ibid., p.166.
[220] Scazzoso, "Regno d'Italia", p.62.
[221] Levati, *Buona azienda*, 162, 169.
[222] Ibid., 169, 173.
[223] Ibid., 170-1.
[224] Ibid., p.176.

ministerial delegation, and, from 1809, devolution to the communes.[225] Municipal offices apportioned billets, which was not a politically neutral task; in Cisalpine Milan, billeting was loaded with connotations of factional struggle against patricians under the Jacobin municipality.[226] While municipalities had been a traditional bastion of local élites' powers, privileges and representation, the Napoleonic administrative revolution imposed juridical and functional uniformity, as well as an empowerment of the executive power (*podestà* and mayors, chosen respectively by the viceroy and the prefect[227]) to the detriment of conciles and legislative organs.[228] Through documentation and inspections, the prefectures controlled the municipal executives.[229] A crucial instrument of this tight top-down control were budgets and expenses, which conditioned the communes' spending to government approval; spending itself grew, as the municipalities were invested with new or heavier items of expenditures: roads and infrastructures, public health, welfare, schooling, and military obligations.[230] Working relationships between the departmental top of the hierarchy (prefectures and sub-prefectures) and the municipalities were fraught with problems, which the prefects blamed on mayoral incompetence; while taking this indictment at face value is problematic,[231] municipal performance as parts of the military accommodation administration fitted within this line of criticism.

Various reasons can explain such issues; firstly, local administrations had to (re)learn how to deal with an overflow of military presence, in a context of deep insecurity and dislocation, as well as coming from a long time of no direct experience. Let us consider an example from the Papal States. Its last, unsuccessful attempt at large-scale mobilisation had been in 1708-9, during the War of Comacchio against the Holy Roman Empire; although the Papal States stayed neutral during the later wars of succession, the geography of its Legations in the lower Po plain and on the Adriatic coast made them a natural transit area and reservoir of military victuals for any army heading into central and southern Italy.[232] The Vatican's way to war management was

[225] Crociani, Ilari, Paoletti, *Storia militare del Regno*, i, p.198
[226] Bobbi, "Soldato in casa", p.536-7.
[227] Dal Cin, *Mondo nuovo*, p.97.
[228] M.A. Caffio, "Comune", in L. Mascilli Migliorini (ed.), *Italia napoleonica. Dizionario critico* (Turin, 2011), 15-6.
[229] Antonielli, *I prefetti*, p.448.
[230] Pagano, *Enti locali*, 111-270.
[231] Dal Cin, *Mondo nuovo*, p.346.
[232] Crociani, Ilari, *Bella Italia militar*, 233-4.

to reinforce the main urban and fortress garrisons, and regulate foreign military transits through diplomatic negotiations.[233] For the communes impacted by the military presence during the Polish and Austrian succession wars, requisitions, upkeep and quartering costs were a heavy burden to shoulder;[234] in turn, these expenses affected the overall military budget of the Papal States,[235] making costs balloon while the papacy attempted to curtail military expenses.[236] By the Revolutionary Wars, expertise in responding to troop movements had to be gained anew. Young count Monaldo Leopardi, sitting in the municipal council of his native town of Recanati, recounted how the main French force transiting through Recanati in 1797, had been preceded by a patrol of dragoons and an envoy from the nearby municipality of Loreto, already in French hands, asking for supplies for the troops there.[237] Within an hour, Recanati received the devastating news that 5000 French troops were on their way to spend the night in town. Since "nella città nostra non erano alloggiati mai duecento soldati", nobody in the municipal council knew how many troops the buildings could take in, or in what state the stables were.[238] Ultimately, the French officers lodged in houses, the finer the better, while the soldiers camped in the streets.[239] After this initial panic, Leopardi grew adept at managing troop transits over the following days, noting the wastage that ensued when numbers of incoming soldiers were grossly inflated, and attributing the incorrect information to "uno strattagemma per tenere le popolazioni in timore, ma questo strattagemma costò ventimila razioni di pane che ammuffirono nei magazzini."[240]

Municipalities learned their lesson quickly. The task was enshrined in a specific municipal office for *alloggi militari*.[241] New institutions meant new paperwork, requested in mounting amounts and with which officials must familiarise themselves. The principles of statistical knowledge and up-to-date information, on which the imperial administration relied, inevitably ran up against a series of obstacles, as a few snapshots from the Adda department

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[233] L. Giangolini, "Le armi del papa. L'esercito pontificio tra burocrazia curiale e nobiltà (1645-1740)" (PhD thesis, Università di Roma-La Sapienza, 2017-18), p.325.
[234] Ibid., p.326.
[235] Crociani, Ilari, *Bella Italia militar*, p.234.
[236] Giangolini, "Le armi", p.324.
[237] M. Leopardi, *Autobiografia* (Rome, 1883), p.72.
[238] Ibid., p.73.
[239] Ibid., p.74.
[240] Ibid., p.75.
[241] M. Vena, "Il dipartimento del Tronto nelle sue modificazioni amministrative", *Quaderni storici delle Marche*, 2/6 (1967), p.546.

show over time. The departmental administration, in 1798, admitted to not understanding the forms sent from Milan that should detail the conditions and quantity of the barracks supplies.[242] Reports on scarcity of supplies and space led the departmental authorities to suspect the communes of downplaying their barracks capacity, to avoid increases in garrison allotments.[243] These complaints against municipalities, widespread in the whole empire,[244] were not limited to departmental authorities shifting the blame towards their subordinates, as even the ministry of the interior accused the municipalities of "neglecting" the paperwork on which barracks repairs funding depended.[245] We can at least glimpse that there was more to that than simple negligence, and point to the systemic problem of a gap between the army and its administrative apparatus as a whole, investing not just the imperial Intendancy,[246] but also the local offices involved in the military administration. The military clinging to its utilitarian, self-serving vision of resources[247] exacerbated the problem of coordination with the *commissari* and the civilian authorities. In May 1810, at a time when no particular emergency threatened the kingdom, the war commissariat deprecated the inability of the Adda's *facenti funzioni* to provide timely updates on troop movements, owing to their scarce knowledge of army regulations and a desire to avoid angering unit commanders.[248] Tellingly, the commanders themselves often did not contact the war commissariat to notify movements across the departments, unless they needed something.[249]

Conclusion

The Napoleonic Wars plunged the *pays de guerre* in northern Italy, encompassing the Lombard heartland and the greater Po plain region pronging eastward to Istria and south into Adriatic central Italy, back into a

[242] ASMI MGC 611, central administration of the Adda-Oglio department to the minister of war, 20 Floréal VI/9 May 1798.
[243] ASMI MGC 611, government delegate Mazzoni in the Adda-Oglio department to the minister of war, 24 Fructidor IX/11 September 1801.
[244] J. Tulard, *Napoléon et 40 millions de sujets. La centralisation et le Premier Empire* (Paris, 2014), ePub edition, chapter 25, par.10-8.
[245] ASMN PM 670, minister of the interior to the prefect of Mincio, 18 May 1811.
[246] Morvan, *Le soldat*, i, 511-2.
[247] J. Hantraye, "Le rapport à l'espace des soldats et officiers de l'armée impériale", in Drévillon, Fonck, Roucaud (eds.), *Guerres et armées napoléoniennes*, 297-314.
[248] ASMI MGC 2719, general report on the administrative services of the war commissariat in the 1st division, May 1810.
[249] ASMI MGC 2719, general report on the administrative services of the war commissariat in the 4th division, May 1810.

resource-demanding, prolonged conflict after several years of peace and stability. Removed from Austrian control and brought firmly into the French imperial system, the Kingdom of Italy was a hub for military mobility, as it had been under the Spanish monarchy. Military transits took the war everywhere, at any time, enabling far more frequent army mobility than the slow-paced garrison rotations to which the Austrian peacetime army had accustomed Lombardy and its neighbouring states. Italian institutions, rocked by the reforms of the 18th century and the backlash against them, were unprepared for conflict on this scale and intensity, adding to the shock and discontent that the war effort generated. Local officials had to relearn military administration and constantly take part in it to make up for insufficient institutional reach, under huge pressure and in the climate of rupture and uncertainty that characterises total war as a subjective, rather than objective, experience.

The war administration that developed in the Cisalpine/Italian state attempted to respond consistently to the needs, and manage the burdens, of this ever-present, large and mobile mass army. The changes to the military administration in early-to-mid-18th century Lombardy responded to similar challenges under the pressure of war, and lay a background for the implementation of the French Napoleonic systems. Century-old institutions were refashioned to the new state's standards, to which methods of institutional co-optation had to adapt as demand for staff grew in quantity, skill requirements, geographic spread. Administrative upheaval created a new class of officials in the Kingdom of Italy no less than in France. Professionalism allowed most of them to continue working through the upheavals and the regime changes that the fortunes of war brought forth, as they were necessary to ensure that a functional state sustained the army, its lines of communication, basins of recruitment, victualling and accommodation. Their lives and careers intertwined at intimate levels; when Vincenzo Lancetti's wife, ill and depressed after the death of their child, died in the summer of 1814, Lancetti blamed the deterioration of her health on the regime change, as she was "affezionatissima ai francesi", whom she credited for her husband's career.[250]

[250] Lancetti, *Memorie*, 173-4.

Chapter 3: The contractor state and the barracks supply service

Private enterprise played a vital role in mobilising people and resources for war throughout the early modern age, providing more efficient and flexible options than direct state control.[1] Recent scholarship analysing military supply and mobilisation in the long 18th century has suggested "contractor state" as the term that best encompasses the relationship between state bureaucracy and private enterprise for the purpose of procuring means for war and translating them into military efficiency.[2] The concept highlights the necessity of public-private cooperation and the role of negotiation between state and market.[3] While all European states made recourse to contractors, some succeeded more than other in building relations of confidence with the market, ensuring a functional supply system.[4] As Knight and Wilcox argue for the British war mobilisation during the Napoleonic Wars,[5] the key to success was the synergy between entrepreneurs and state agencies, ensured by the state's long-term commitment to developing the navy and the reliability of public funds raised through Parliament-approved taxation.[6] Reliability built confidence, as it offered reasonable protection for the entrepreneurs from the unpredictability of demand that characterised war production.[7] The climate was very different in France, as chapter 1 showed. Given the importance of procurement, resource extraction and mobilisation to sustain war, it is useful to situate the barracks supply within how the contractor state functioned in the Kingdom of Italy, which forms the object of this chapter.

Supplying military quarters is rooted in the *longue durée* of the contractor state; incorporation of Lombardy into a composite monarchy at war had been crucial to establish a tradition in that sense, as the 17th century Spanish governors introduced the system of logistical contracts developed in the Low Countries. The first supply enterprise for the garrison quarters in the

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[1] Parrott, *Business of war*.
[2] For an overview of the literature: R. Torres Sánchez, *Military entrepreneurs and the Spanish contractor state in the eighteenth century* (Oxford, 2016), 7-9.
[3] S. Solbes Ferri, "The Spanish monarchy as a contractor state in the eighteenth century: Interaction of political power with the market", *Business History*, 60/1 (2018), p.73.
[4] Ibid., p.82.
[5] Knight, *Britain against Napoleon*. Knight, Wilcox, *Sustaining the fleet*.
[6] S. Conway, R. Harding, H. Paul, "Eighteenth-century Britain: The quintessential 'contractor state'?", in Bowen (ed.), "Forum. The Contractor State", p.252.
[7] P. Brandon, M. t'Hart, R. Torres-Sánchez, "War and economy. Rediscovering the eighteenth-century military entrepreneur", *Business History*, 60/1 (2018), p.14.

Milanesado was established in 1605, taking its common name, "Porrone", from the surname of its first contractor.[8] *Porrone* paved the way for *rimplazzo*, later into the 17th century and throughout the 18th; logistical services represented an opportunity for the Italian ruling classes, who had the financial capacity for lending, investing, and providing effective services, to gain revenues and political power from the incessant war needs of the Spanish monarchy.[9]

The key players of the early modern contractor state to mobilise and manage resources were local élites fostering their interests through representative bodies, such as the Lombard *Congregazione*, but also the British Parliament, providing the most effective example of the "alliance between the state and commerce",[10] or the Estates of Lower Austria in the Habsburg hereditary dominions.[11] The state acknowledged their political weight in a power relation alternating between conflict and cooperation,[12] along with financial middlemen and their mercantile networks.[13] In the *Milanesado*, the contracts of the *rimplazzo* became a springboard for wealth-based social mobility, making the long-term fortunes of entrepreneurs from modest background who had the means to invest in the military supply business and deftly networked with the Milanese ruling factions, even marrying into the aristocracy, to secure remunerative contracts at advantageous terms.[14]

Recourses to one general contract or a series of smaller ones, however, was a logistical choice that was always open to army commanders in wartime. During the 1730s, the Austrian military governors changed the regulations of the *diaria* and bought provisions through single contracts, which lowered provision costs; the *Congregazione* opposed such changes, as smaller contracts at lower prices were linked to the vested interests around the supply enterprises, thriving under the *Congregazione*'s fiscal self-management and recouping expenses through local taxation.[15] When war came, supply depended on the entrepreneurs' reach in mercantile networks and expedient

[8] Buono, *Esercito*, 56-7.
[9] A. Buono, "Guerra, élites locali e monarchia nella Lombardia del Seicento. Per un'interpretazione in chiave di compromesso di interessi", *Società e storia*, 123 (2009), 17-8.
[10] Knight, *Britain against Napoleon*, chapter 16, par. 25.
[11] W.D. Godsey, *The sinews of Habsburg power. Lower Austria as a fiscal-military state, 1650–1820* (Oxford, 2018).
[12] A. Buono, "Amministrazione militare e gestione dell'esercito in uno Stato 'pre-amministrativo'. Il caso della Lombardia spagnola (sec. XVII)", *Archivio storico italiano*, 167/3 (2009), p.525.
[13] P. Brandon, "The Dutch Republic as a contractor state", in Bowen (ed.), "Forum. The Contractor State", 244-5.
[14] Buono, "Guerra, élites locali", 19-22.
[15] Dattero, "Con un nuovo incanto", 51-2.

procurement;[16] the War of the Polish Succession (1733-'38) overwhelmed the small contracts system, unprepared to supply an unquantified influx of troops over the whole state.[17] The War of the Austrian Succession (1740-'48), after a brief recourse to small contracts while the Austrian army fought to regain Lombardy, reconfirmed the general contract and the fixed *diaria*;[18] the preponderance of large mercantile conglomerates in the *rimplazzo* forced smaller businesses into sub-contracts.[19] Ancien Régime *negozianti* developed into a cohesive milieu, bound by professional and familial ties, highly diversified in their land-owning and financial investments (encompassing the military supplies sectors as well), and able to speculate on the public works contract tenders with the consent and participation of the Habsburg authorities.[20] The Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars removed the checks and balances on speculations, fragmenting logistical services into small, localised contracts until ministerial power was able to exert control. As the previous chapter showed, the Josephinian reforms had uprooted the *Congregazione di stato* and shifted supply procurement from the local representative bodies to the *Hofkriegsrat*. Unlike the Lower Austrian Estates, which had the time to rebound from Joseph II's reforms and fulfil their functions as credit lenders and services procurers to the Habsburg crown during the Napoleonic Wars,[21] Austrian Lombardy had its government institutions wholly remodelled from 1796 onwards, including the traditional representative organs interfacing with the crown.

The barracks service included maintenance of the buildings and procurement of the supplies and furniture, collectively known as *casermaggio*.[22] Private enterprise participated in this business so that the state could save expenses, following the logic of the Directorial regime, which found fertile ground in Italy while war systematically depleted state coffers. The barracks supply service in the Italian Republic/Kingdom was privatised initially, but it was far more complicated to make the system work in the flux of the conflict and keep it under scrutiny. Then, it was devolved to the peripheral ganglia of

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[16] On the supply for the Venetian fortresses: Ongaro, "Military food supply", p.7.
[17] Dattero, "Con un nuovo incanto", 50, 55.
[18] Ibid., 72-3.
[19] Ibid., p.73.
[20] S. Bobbi, *La Milano dei Fé. Appalti e opere pubbliche nel Settecento* (Soveria Mannelli, 2006). S. Levati, *La nobiltà del lavoro. Negozianti e banchieri a Milano tra Ancien Régime e Restaurazione* (Milan, 1997).
[21] Godsey, *Sinews of Habsburg power*, 360-92.
[22] The word apparently means the same as the French *casernement*, although F. Sponzilli, *Della lingua militare d'Italia* (Naples, 1847), ii, p.187, suggests that *casernamento* indicated the quality of accommodation, *casermaggio* that of the supplies.

public administration. This progression shows the difficulty of perfecting a state-run alternative system and the enduring presence of entrepreneurs, nuancing the shift from military enterprise to state control of the mobilisation processes.[23]

III.1 Early contracts

Napoleon's first Italian campaign offered a great occasion to make money for the contractors victualling the *armée d'Italie*. Although, in the spring of 1796, Napoleon and the *commissaire aux armées* Saliceti had attempted to curb the contractors' depredations, dismissing employees suspected of corruption,[24] the general contractor companies (first Flachat, later Bodin) enriched themselves with the collection of war taxes[25] and no amount of threats to arrest the company managers could fix the issues permanently, thanks to their connections to members of the Directory.[26] The power and pervasiveness of contractors across conquered Italy reflected the Directorial regime's policy of "trying to make supply companies effective extensions of executive power"[27], in which Napoleon encroached with the nomination of Emanuel Haller to administrator of the *armée d'Italie*'s finances and the management of the spoils of war to create his own client network.[28] This political-financial backdrop, as well as the state of war and the uncertain territorial organisation of the conquered country, enshrined dependence on requisitions and local contracts. Even the first attempts at nation-wide general contracts, in 1797, dumped the responsibility to fill in the general contractors' shortages onto the municipalities.[29] Contractors reimbursed the communes for the set price of the supplies they had failed to procure, a price that was vastly inferior to the costs the municipalities faced for providing the actual materiel.[30]

The massive presence of troops created a proportionate demand for accommodation with beds and furniture. A regular supply chain removed arbitrariness from requisitions, which were to become a safe and regulated

[23] Parrott, *Business of war*, p.320.
[24] Godechot, *Commissaires*, i, p.289.
[25] Lyons, *France under the Directory*, p.60.
[26] Godechot, *Commissaires*, i, 544-6.
[27] Brown, "Discredited regime", p.50.
[28] Branda, *Prix de la gloire*, chapter 10, par. 1.
[29] Levati, *Buona azienda*, 34-5.
[30] Ibid., p.40.

matter. When ordering a requisition beds in the San Vittore barracks, the Milan municipality reassured the owners that "questo prestito sarà solo di alcuni giorni."[31] For the Italian supporters of the new regime, accusations of dishonesty and unfairness when organising requisitions, specifically the failure to bring the stuff back, could carry heavy political connotations; such was the case of a dispute in Pavia where the Jacobin leader Teodoro Barbieri[32] received accusations over the loss of requisitioned beds.[33] Barbieri's insistence on clearing his name[34] might be linked to an accusation by the radical democratic *Giornale senza titolo*,[35] regarding his failure to condemn the lack of patriotism of his own brother, who worked with remarkable financial success in an administrative service.[36]

Once the Cisalpine ministry of war was in place, it became the main interlocutor for supply contracts, seeking to provide materials in bulk, assigning contracts through public tenders. One such tender, in March 1798, called for a supply of 16,000 beds for the French army,[37] while a separate contract would cover the maintenance of the beds.[38] In January 1798, the ministry of war reported that direct purchase of winter blankets had been finalised on paper in Venice two months earlier, but the blankets had not been delivered yet, leading to a shortage of 4000 items for the Milan garrison and military hospital.[39] While a public tender was called for the entire supply,[40] minister Vignolle sought to negotiate with potential suppliers, with little success; only three contractors responded, offering low-quality blankets at inflated prices.[41] Vignolle even attempted vainly to persuade a former supplier to renew a contract dating back to 1794.[42] Similar informal consultations took place for the project of bed contracts and, although the aspiring contractors accepted the whole amount of the supply, none of them

[31] ASCMI LM 426, municipality of Milan to casermiere Gio. Maria Cermelli, 11 Messidor V/29 June 1797.
[32] Presumably the same Teodoro Barbieri listed as a prominent Jacobin in Pavia around 1796 in G. Lumbroso, *I moti popolari contro i francesi alla fine del secolo XVIII* (Florence, 1932) p.18, which reports him as killed by the insurgents in the revolt of that year, erroneously it seems.
[33] ASMI MGC 156, Teodoro Barbieri to the Cisalpine Directory, 13 Prairial VI/1 June 1798.
[34] Ibid.
[35] G. Santato, *Il giacobinismo italiano. Utopie e realtà fra rivoluzione e restaurazione* (Milan, 1990), 46-7.
[36] "Da Pavia", *Giornale senza titolo* (s.d. around November 1797), p.1 col a.
[37] ASMI MGC 156, call for tender, 13 Ventôse VI/3 March 1798.
[38] ASMI MGC 156, note to the public, 18 Pluviôse VI/6 February 1798.
[39] ASMI MGC 156, minister of war to the Executive Directory, 22 Nivôse VI/11 January 1798.
[40] ASMI MGC 156, call for tender, 21 Nivôse VI/10 January 1798.
[41] ASMI MGC 156, minister of war to the Cisalpine Directory, 22 Nivôse VI/11 January 1798.
[42] Ibid.

wanted to shoulder the maintenance contract.[43]

The list of supplies for the Sant'Eustorgio barracks in Milan, as of October 1798, shows a variety of suppliers providing materials in smaller batches, and a share of items on loan from other barracks:[44]

Material	Supplier
300 blankets	Giuseppe Gemelli
300 straw beds	Used items
193 white woollen blankets, 192 used straw beds	Custodian Monticelli
14 benches, 1 large table, 8 small tables	Carpenter Baroggi
18 straw bundles	Giacomo Lainati from Cormano
17 straw bundles	Giovanni Allevi from Cusano
13 straw bundles	Giuseppe Terzaghi from Brusoglio
57 straw bundles	Luigi Piatti from Ponte Vetro
18 ½ straw bundles	Andrea Ghioni from Cormano

Four of the straw suppliers were from the narrow area of Cormano-Cusano-Brusuglio, which might point to a networking effort, perhaps to raise the price of the materiel by forcing the government to sign multiple contracts instead of a collective one. Significantly, one Milanese merchant alone could provide more than double the amount than each of his competitors from the villages; this merchant, Luigi Piatti, moved his investments from straw supplies for barracks to the silk farming business.[45] The "used" items came from the main city depot of the barracks supplies; when they were due for restitution, the government postponed returning the blankets until a supply contract for these items was secured.[46]

Even as the second Cisalpine Republic and its subsequent incarnations went decidedly down the road of general contracts, the supply of officers' accommodation remained an opportunity for local contracts. The administrative council of war forbade sub-contracting[47] and negotiated directly with the aspiring suppliers rather than calling for tenders. This arrangement sped up proceedings; while defining furniture purchases for the Milan garrison officers' accommodation in October 1802, one of the suppliers could not provide all the materials on time due to the short notice,

[43] ASMI MGC 156, minister of war to the Cisalpine Directory, 9 Ventôse VI/27 February 1798.
[44] ASCMI LM 343, report of casermiere Antonio Ferrario to the Dicastero centrale, 20 Vendémiaire VII/11 October 1798.
[45] "Annunzj ed avvisi", *Il corriere milanese* (16 February 1813), p.4 col b.
[46] ASCMI LM 343, Dicastero Centrale to the minister of war, 3 Brumaire VII/24 October 1798.
[47] ASMI MGC 165, contract between the administrative council of war and Giulio Agazzini, art.12, 26 September 1802.

and another contractor, Marianna Giambelli, provided the missing portion of the batch.[48] These contractors could be well-established people in the mercantile milieu, like Giulio Agazzini, presumably related to the Agazzini firm that had held the monopoly of transports across the Engadina road in the late 18th century.[49] Around 1802-3, Giulio Agazzini was a supplier of military accoutrements[50] and later on would again participate in the barracks supplies business.[51] Very little is known about Marianna Giambelli, including how rare a female contractor was in this business context, although case studies from elsewhere in Ancien Régime Europe show women did take part in the contracts business.[52]

III.2 The Papounau company (1801-3), the Martini company (1803-5)

The barracks supply service underwent serious changes after 1800, when the second Cisalpine/Italian Republic began a process of stabilisation following the peace treaties of Amiens and Lunéville. Melzi preferred general contracts through public tenders instead of direct negotiation, to guarantee fairness, save public money, and end abuses that had been going on unpunished for years, especially due to the lack of control (when not the complicity) from local administrations.[53] The latter, in fact, bypassed departmental administrations when interacting with contractor agents who acted as government delegates in handling sales and purchases of materiel,[54] replicating the executive devolution to the entrepreneurs that Brown observed in the French Directorial regime.[55] Prosecution of dishonest contractors was also attempted; a *cause célèbre* targeted subsistence contractors Romagnoli and Borsi for their disastrous performance in the Basso Po department.[56] Milanese entrepreneurs had a long tradition of tendering for public works, so expertise was far from lacking in forming conglomerates and networking to secure the most advantageous contracts, maximise profits and contain expenses.[57] The entrenchment of French

[48] ASMI MGC 165, report of the 1st section to the administrative council of war, 1 October 1802.
[49] P.E. Taviani, *Michele Agazzini, ignorato economista italiano dell'Ottocento* (Florence, 1966), 3-4.
[50] Levati, *Buona azienda*, 81, 87.
[51] See III.4.
[52] Brandon, "The Dutch Republic", p.244.
[53] Levati, *Buona azienda*, p.94.
[54] Pagano, *Comune di Milano*, p.59.
[55] Brown, "Discredited regime", p.50.
[56] Levati, *Buona azienda*, 67-71.
[57] S. Bobbi, "Nascita della speculazione edilizia moderna e ruolo dei materiali da costruzione nella Milano riformista del secondo Settecento", *Mélanges de l'École française de Rome*, 119/2 (2007), 238-9.

financiers led to partnerships as well as competition against the Italians, for example, when the Hamelin company secured the victuals contract over its Italian rival Borrella.[58] Hamelin's patronage network extended far up the echelons of French high society, as he was a friend and *créole* compatriot of Joséphine Bonaparte.[59] As commander of the *armée d'Italie* between 1801 and 1803, Joachim Murat protected the interests of the *fournisseur* networks, and by extension of the Bonaparte family network,[60] at least until his mutual hostility with Melzi created enough rivalry for Napoleon to order his brother-in-law to a post away from Milan.[61] The Cisalpine suppliers were hardly more honest. Powerful interests linked them to personalities who had made their political and financial fortunes in the time between the first Cisalpine Republic and the Lyon congress. Chief among these people was Giovanni Battista Sommariva, a lawyer from an affluent but obscure landowning family of the Lombard province, who rose to prominence as a moderate reformer in the early 1790s and then as member of the Cisalpine Directory.[62] Sommariva had good personal relations with Napoleon and Murat, ties he strengthened during his stay in Paris between 1799 and 1800,[63] and diversified investments, from art commissions and gemstone collections[64] to speculations on military supplies.

In this context, the government decided to contract out the supply service for the garrison barracks in the republic, following the French system, which left the departments in charge of transit and Gendarmerie barracks,[65] while the administrative council of war negotiated directly for the officers' accommodation contracts.[66] General contracts allowed the government to concentrate suppliers, thus eliminating the abuses and waste resulting from fragmented contracts, as had been the rationale not just under the Directory,[67]

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[58] Levati, *Buona azienda*, p.63.
[59] J. Georgel, *Chateaubriand, dix-neuf femmes et un fils américain* (Paris, 2004), p.205.
[60] V. Haegele, *Murat. La solitude du cavalier* (Paris, 2015), 320-3.
[61] R. De Lorenzo, *Murat* (Salerno, 2011), 81-2.
[62] S. Levati, "Giovanni Battista Sommariva: avvocato, politico e affarista (1757-1826)", in G. Ericani, F. Mazzotta (eds.), *Committenti, mecenati e collezionisti di Canova. VI Settimana di Studi Canoviani* (Bassano del Grappa, 2008), 267-92.
[63] Ibid.
[64] G. Tassinari, "Incisori in pietre dure e collezionisti a Milano nel primo Ottocento: il caso di Antonio Berini e Giovanni Battista Sommariva", in M. Buora (ed.), *Le gemme incise nel Settecento e Ottocento: continuità della tradizione classica. Atti del convegno di studio, Udine, 26 settembre 1998* (Rome, 2006), 27-50.
[65] Crociani, Ilari, Paoletti, *Storia militare del Regno*, i, p.195.
[66] See III.1.
[67] Brown, "Discredited regime", 65-6.

but also in the military *asientos* of 18th century Spain.[68] Two firms, Galli and Papounau, responded to the call for tender in October 1801, followed by a third one, Borsa.[69] The chosen contractor was the Papounau company, its titular person being French citizen François Papounau. The contract was valid for three years, starting on 1 January 1802[70] although the actual starting date of the service varied from department to department.[71] According to Vincenzo Lancetti, the tender had been rigged in Papounau's favour from the start. In Lancetti's memoir, Giuseppe Galli presented his offer according to form, but the senior ministerial staff, including then-minister Tordorò, first refused to register it because it lacked the guarantees of any high-profile banker, then, after Galli returned with the surety documents, claimed time had run out for new offers and only agreed to register the papers at Galli's insistence.[72] The morning after, at the set time for the tender, Galli was informed the other company had already received the contract and the tender was cancelled; all he could do was leave indignantly, lamenting the "intrigue" that had dominated the procedure and the betrayal of public trust.[73]

Five months later, Galli petitioned Melzi for a re-examination of the contract in his favour, protesting the choice of an "estero, e nullo possidente"[74] who asked for more money than Galli's offer (after the minister negotiated to reduce the prices, Papounau offered two *soldi* nine *denari* per day for each bed, while Galli, two *soldi* cinque *denari* per day/bed).[75] Galli also claimed that minister Tordorò had blatantly favoured Papounau,[76] corroborating Lancetti's later account. The minister of war admitted that the French General Staff had endorsed Papounau's appointment and urged the Cisalpine ministry of war to sign the contract as soon as possible;[77] the municipalities, overwhelmed with hosting troops at their expense, also insisted in that sense.[78] Lastly, the guarantors of the Papounau company had ties to Sommariva and, if we are to fully believe Lancetti, they had bribed Tordorò

[68] A. González Enciso, R. Torres Sánchez, S. Solbes Ferri, "Eighteenth-Century Spain as a Contractor State," in Bowen (ed.), "Forum. The Contractor State", p.254.
[69] ASMI MGC 165, minister of war's report to the government committee, 7 Frimaire X/28 November 1801.
[70] Crociani, Ilari, Paoletti., *Storia militare del Regno*, i, p.195.
[71] ASMI MGC 158, minister of war to Paponeau, 15 May 1802.
[72] Lancetti, *Memorie*, 144-6.
[73] Ibid.
[74] ASMI MVP 15, petition of Giuseppe Galli to Melzi, 15 March 1802.
[75] Ibid.
[76] Ibid.
[77] ASMI MGC 165, minister of war's report to the government committee, 7 Frimaire X/28 November 1801.
[78] ASMI MVP 15, Papounau to Melzi, s.d. (around March 1802).

and other officials.[79] The Galli company was not without blemishes either; the main guarantor was Milanese merchant/shopkeeper Cristoforo Martelli, possibly less well-connected than the Papounau company members, but not as "insignificant" as the rival company claimed.[80] The other guarantors were problematic in the context of *ralliement* in the Italian Republic, where Napoleon's policy of allowing anyone to rally to the regime clashed with Melzi's hostility towards the Italian foreigners in the republic, whom he viewed as politically suspicious "democrats".[81] For all Galli had tried to pull the nationality card on Papounau, members of his company included a Neapolitan and a Piedmontese, formerly involved in the food supplies business in the Agogna department where they had profited off the impoverishment of the municipalities.[82] The fact that Galli's guarantors were not all Cisalpine-Italian might have played against them as much as the accusations of malpractice did. The government agreed to check whether the current contract could pass on to Galli in case the attribution procedure was deemed irregular.[83] Meanwhile, Galli changed tactics and, rather than asking for a contract alteration, stated he would give up his claims if Papounau agreed to pay him a share of his profits.[84] Unsurprisingly, Papounau refused, threatening to take the dispute to court.[85]

Galli may have offered lower prices, but the decisive factor was the solidity of the guarantors, and in this regard even the Borsa company offered a better solidity than the Galli company.[86] Papounau had the best of both worlds, in terms of prices and acceptable solidity.[87] It contributed to build up trust among the military administration that some of the guarantors and associate members had occupied public offices;[88] no conflict of interest was perceived, similarly to the effortless passage of state-run supply agencies managers and

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[79] Lancetti, *Memorie*, p.146.
[80] ASMI MVP 15, Papounau to Melzi, s.d. (probably late May-June 1802). A mention of Martelli and his business in S. Levati, "Il negoziante a Milano tra Ancien régime e Restaurazione (1750-1850)", in M. Morandi (ed.), *Formare alle professioni. Commercianti e contabili dalle scuole d'abaco ad oggi* (Milan, 2013), 44-63.
[81] N. Del Bianco, *Il coraggio e la sorte. Gli italiani nell'età napoleonica dalle Cisalpine al Regno Italico* (Milan, 1997), p.199.
[82] ASMI MVP 15, minister of war to Melzi, 17 March 1802.
[83] ASMI CL 595, session of the Legislative Council, 3 June 1802.
[84] ASMI MVP 15, councilman Cicognara to Melzi, 29 May s.d. (presumably 1802).
[85] ASMI MVP 15, Papounau to Melzi, s.d.
[86] ASMI MGC 165, minister of war's report to the government committee, 7 Frimaire X/28 November 1801.
[87] Ibid.
[88] ASMI MGC 156, Captain Rivara, inspector of the barracks in the Serio department, to the minister of war, 23 Frimaire X/14 December 1801.

personnel to the private sector or vice versa under the French Directorial regime.[89] The company had a share capital of 576,000 *lire*[90] and its guarantors were Giuseppe Antonio Bonfiglio, the Beretta-Finardi company, Luigi Rainoldi, Antonio Sega, Carlo Sanquirico, Giovanni Malacarna, Abram Levi Minzi.[91] Bonfiglio and the Beretta-Finardi company would, in the following years, cooperate and alternate in the role of contractors for the military provisions.[92] Merchant Antonio Sega, representative agent and banker of the company, had been listed among the richest citizens of the Olona department, subject to extraordinary taxation;[93] as of 1806, he was still active in financial speculation.[94] Both he and Giovanni Malacarna were holding public offices at the time of the Papounau contract, respectively in the departmental finance office of Mincio and Olona.[95] Luigi Rainoldi was a lawyer and, for a time, sat in the Milanese municipal council.[96] Little is known about Abram Levi Minzi, but he participated in the sale of *beni nazionali* in the area of Ferrara like other Jewish entrepreneurs;[97] a clue in that sense is the mention of Levi Minzi as the buyer of a portion of the alienated terrains at Novellara in September 1800,[98] formerly belonging to Arch-Duchess Maria Beatrice d'Este, purchased by an Italian buyer[99] who resold it to French speculator François Raymond, he himself an agent of a supply contractor company.[100] Carlo Sanquirico was, according to Lancetti's memoir, the real mastermind of the company;[101] while his exact trade is unknown, it is possible he was the brother of Alessandro Sanquirico, a scenographer who rose to prominence in the 1800s, realising the stage settings for Napoleon's coronation as king of Italy in 1805.[102] The Sanquirico family could start off from the solid position of their father, the owner of a

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[89] Brown, "Discredited regime", 53-4.
[90] Levati, *Buona azienda*, p.222.
[91] Ibid.
[92] Ibid., p.106.
[93] *Raccolta delle leggi, proclami, ordini ed avvisi pubblicati in Milano dal 12 messidoro anno 9. (1 luglio 1801) sino a tutto il giorno 10 nevoso anno 10. (31 dicembre 1801)* (Milan, 1802), iii, p.187, announcement 1 Pluviôse X/21 January 1802.
[94] Levati, "Il negoziante a Milano", p. 53.
[95] ASMI MGC 165, minister of war's report to the government committee, 7 Frimaire X/28 November 1801.
[96] *Descrizione storica dello Spedale Maggiore di Milano* (Milan, 1829), p.16.
[97] U. Marcelli, *La vendita dei beni nazionali nella Repubblica Cisalpina* (Bologna, 1973), 175.
[98] *Contratti del francese Francesco Raymond* (Reggio Emilia, 1815), 6-7.
[99] Ibid., p.2, and Marcelli, *La vendita*, p.107.
[100] Ibid., p.17-8.
[101] Lancetti, *Memorie*, p.146.
[102] "Sanquirico, Alessandro", *Dizionario Biografico degli italiani*, http://www.treccani.it/enciclopedia/alessandro-sanquirico_(Dizionario-Biografico) (29 October 2019).

cafe in the city centre that procured them "non comune agiatezza".[103] The third brother, Antonio, was active in the antiquary trade in Venice, exploiting the market in antique artefacts that boomed after the suppression of religious congregations.[104] Even Carlo invested in the arts, like Sommariva and Antonio Sega;[105] as of the late 1830s, he owned a large deposit of paintings and antiques next to the Ambrosiana library.[106] Nothing is known about François Papounau's background before coming to Italy; it is likely he was one of the many front-men for powerful Milan-based bankers and merchants who dominated the army contracts market,[107] with enough success as to settle in the capital city long after the failure of this barracks supply business, being a "negoziante e possidente" in 1830.[108]

Fulfilling the contract was a daunting task. It began before the peace of Amiens, which meant the war at sea drove up the prices of wool bought in the ports of Trieste, Ancona, Genoa and Venice,[109] while the government lagged behind on reimbursing the daily rental price due for the usage of supplies belonging to the company. As of May 1802, it had only paid an advance of 150,000 *lire* at the time the contract was signed, leaving an immediate outstanding debt of 240,000 *lire* to pay the employees' salaries, while the company's overall expenses were already over one million *lire*.[110] In addition to unforeseen initial costs, several features of the service drove up the company's expenses: its pool of employees was large (around 400,[111] although the ratio between office staff, custodians, warehousemen etc. is unknown), passing onto it precisely the issue the government wished to avoid through the recourse to contracts, that is, hiring and paying a large staff.[112] All these people carried an expensive array of clerical and practical tasks:

> "[L]e spese di bureau, di trasporti di effetti, di trasportazione di paglia ogni sei mesi, di spurgo di lenzuola ogni venti giorni; egli [the contractor] ha a suo carico tutte le dilapidazioni, che può accagionar la truppa, tutti i danni derivanti da incendi o ruberia; e finalmente è

[103] F. Regli, *Morti e vivi. Biografie artistiche pel nuovo anno 1850* (Turin, 1850), p.81.
[104] C.A. Levi, *Le collezioni veneziane d'arte e d'antichità dal secolo XIV ai giorni nostri* (Venice, 1900), p.129.
[105] M. Carminati, *Cesare da Sesto, 1477-1523* (Milan, 1994), p.176.
[106] *Otto Giorni a Milano ossia guida del forestiere alle cose più rimarchevoli della città e suoi contorni divisa in 8 passeggiate* (Milan, 1838), p.72.
[107] Levati, *Buona azienda*, 226-36.
[108] "Foglio d'annunzj", *Gazzetta Privilegiata di Milano* (18 June 1830), p.1 col. c.
[109] ASMI MVP 15, Papounau to Melzi, 14 May 1802.
[110] Ibid.
[111] Ibid.
[112] Levati, *Buona azienda*, p.96.

> obbligato a tener un deposito di effetti in ogni Dip.o oltre quelli, che sono in attività di servizio presso le caserme."[113]

The founding members of the company were actively involved in the trade operations, for example travelling to Venice with promissory notes worth 90,000 *lire* to buy wool, but unable to finalise the payment because of insufficient credit.[114]

A dangerous consequence of the government's outstanding debts was the loss of reputation for the company's guarantors,[115] who directly oversaw the purchase and management of materials in the departments. Their reputation was shaky from the start, given the rumours of corruption surrounding the tender, and a widespread belief that army suppliers robbed the vexed, impoverished populace. In November 1800, the grains supplier Giuseppe Manara was threatened and forced to flee during a bread riot in Milan,[116] reiterating the early modern popular hatred for grain hoarders.[117] The barracks supply contractor hardly garnered a better perception, not least of all because raking up barracks supplies targeted beds and bed linen, expensive household items that often were the most valuable items in peasant homes, as their centrality to the composition of marriage dowries shows.[118] The complaints filed by the Arona municipality, shortly after the Papounau contract began, framed the contractor's behaviour in the moral terms of greed and exploitation against innocent civilians who had selflessly helped the war effort by renouncing their furniture. While residents had been forced to give their beds to the soldiers and sleep on straw, the contractor, "le di cui mire sono sempre di gravitare sul popolo per trarne il proprio profitto", was trying to appropriate the beds loaned by the townsfolk.[119] Adding insult to injury, the "bugiardi appaltatori" defamed the honest inhabitants of Arona in front of the ministry of war, blaming on them disservices for which the contractor was responsible.[120] The exasperated inhabitants, eventually, broke into the contractor's magazine and regained their furniture by force, taking advantage of a moment when the garrison troops had transferred out of the town and

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[113] ASMI MVP 15, minister of war to Melzi, 17 March 1802.
[114] ASMI MVP 15, Papounau to Melzi, 14 May 1802.
[115] Ibid.
[116] L. Mantovani, *Diario politico-ecclesiastico di Milano, 1796-1802*, ed. E. Larsimont Pergameni (Milan, 1968), p.29.
[117] C. Invernizzi, "Condizioni annonarie dello Stato di Milano nel secolo XVIII", *Vierteljährschrift für Sozial- und Wirtschaftsgeschichte*, 17 (1924), 170-1.
[118] R. Sarti, *Vita di casa. Abitare, mangiare, vestire nell'Europa moderna* (Bari, 2006), 49-51.
[119] ASNO PA 1027, municipality of Arona to government commissar Lizzoli, 14 Nivôse X/4 January 1802.
[120] ASNO PA 1027, municipality of Arona to Lizzoli, 17 Pluviôse X/6 February 1802.

could not be summoned to disperse the crowd.[121]

Papounau defended the company against what he claimed were unsubstantiated slanders, spread by unspecified "enemies" (perhaps alluding to disgruntled rival Galli), and pervasive enough to ill-dispose government officials against the company.[122] After Amiens and Lunéville, the Melzi government took advantage of the peace to make a clean sweep of long-standing abuses. Even the moderate vice-president remarked, when a few outstandingly corrupt and ineffective contractors were put on trial, that "chi non vuol ravvedersi" among them would face the "vendetta pubblica".[123] Vengeance was a loaded term. Throughout the French Revolution, it signified the transfer of sovereignty and legitimate use of violence from the king to the people, whose will the government interpreted and acted for against the enemies of the nation,[124] from counterrevolutionaries real and imagined to aristocrats plotting with profiteers to starve the people of Paris.[125] Melzi's "public vengeance" was not "the people's vengeance"; it took place in a context of restored legality, prosecuting those who persisted in abusing the nation's resources and refused the sovereign offer of clemency. This notion harked back to the enlightened despotism of Maria Theresa and Joseph II, in line with Melzi's deep-seated distrust of popular sovereignty and any form of politicisation in the obedient administrative cadres.[126] More broadly, anti-corruption crackdowns in public administration were instrumental in the Consulate's political self-construction as a counterweight to the Directory's malpractice, fostering public trust in the government by bringing army contractors under control.[127] British institutions underwent a similar process of no lesser effectiveness under the Earl of St Vincent's tenure as First Lord of the Admiralty (1801-'04).[128]

Papounau maintained that his associates were doing their part for the nation, risking their fortunes in a lossmaking venture, and their very lives in business

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[121] ASNO PA 1037, municipality of Arona to Lizzoli, 20 March 1802.
[122] ASMI MVP 15, Papounau to Melzi, s.d. (probably around June 1802).
[123] Levati, *Buona azienda*, p.72.
[124] S. Wahnich, *In defence of the Terror. Liberty or death in the French Revolution*, tr. D. Fernbach (London, 2012), 42-5.
[125] D. Andress, "'Horrible plots and infernal treasons': conspiracy and the urban landscape in the early Revolution" in P. Campbell, T. Kaiser, M. Linton (eds.), *Conspiracy in the French Revolution* (Manchester, 2007), 85-105.
[126] Zaghi, *L'Italia di Napoleone*, 314-15.
[127] Broers, *Soldier of destiny*, 315-22.
[128] Knight, Wilcox, *Sustaining the fleet*, p.25.

trips abroad during the winter season when the contract had started.[129] Sourcing materials from inside the republic presented fewer dangers. The company received all the extant supplies in the barracks, under an obligation to return them at the end of the contract;[130] the municipalities provided these supplies,[131] while transport operations depended on the *commissari*' information on troop movements to direct the flow of supplies.[132] This arrangement provided the company with a stock of materiel but caused shortages for the municipalities who had to accommodate troops in transit, officers, and military travelling alone, who were forced to billet troops for which it had neither space nor supplies to spare.[133] This created friction with the departmental institutions. For example, the Alto Po department systematically refused to allow the company to take its items and move them from city to city.[134] Company delegates and military administration personnel also had a hard time persuading departing military units to surrender the items, so supplies were often lost because "le Truppe partendo qualche distaccamento, ritengono gli effetti, che le furono già consegnati, in modo, che un soldato si trova avere il letto ove parte, e dove arriva."[135] In theory, communication from the military authorities and the ministry of war to the company ought to be smooth and quick; in practice, they were often far from that, and the service lagged consequently. Papounau was supposed to receive troop itinerary updates every ten days, but those updates arrived with months of delay or not arrived at all.[136] Accurate knowledge on the troops was not only a matter of resources allocation, as the payment due to the company depended on these updates.[137]

Confidence in the contractors was a hard sell, then, and the military administration of the *armée d'Italie* soon informed Dejean that "la

[129] ASMI MVP 15, Papounau to Melzi, s.d. (possibly late May-June 1802).
[130] ASMI MGC 156, "Condizioni del contratto Papounau", 14 Frimaire X/5 December 1801.
[131] ASMI MGC 158, "Stato dell'ammontare degli effetti di casermaggio consegnati dalle sotto descritte comuni all'appaltatore generale Papounau; come risulta dai rispettivi processi verbali costrutti dal principio dell'appalto fino all'epoca 30 aprile 1802."
[132] Both Papounau and the barracks inspector of the Basso Po department complained about the commissario di guerra in Ferrara barely providing information on troop movements, necessary to organize the handling of supplies (ASMI MGC 158, Captain Moreschi to the minister of war, 31 July 1802). On the other hand, the commissario in Pavia faced the arrival of a hussar regiment from Novara and was able to providing a timely quantity of supplies and forage, as well as procuring alternative transportation for the regimental baggage when bad weather made the waterways impracticable (ASMI MGDM 109, report to the administrative council of war, 5 October 1802).
[133] ASNO PA 1037, municipality of Arona to Lizzoli, 8 May 1802.
[134] ASMI MGC 158, inspector Captain Tordo to the minister of war, 20 February 1802.
[135] ASMI MGC 158, the Papounau company to the minister of war, 8 August 1802.
[136] ASMI, MGC 158, Papounau to the minister of war, 14 August 1802.
[137] ASMI MGC 158, minister of war to inspector-general Polfranceschi, 21 August 1802.

Compagnie a peu fait pour justifier la confiance qu'on lui avait donnée."[138] Papounau's lingering fears of a sudden cancellation of the contract[139] contained a grain of truth. In summer 1802, the legislative council discussed grouping together the general contracts for barracks supplies and forages: the separate contracts caused a higher administrative expense for the contractor, it was argued, who then demanded higher prices from the government, and since the contractors made good profits from sub-contracts, the nation should make that profit too.[140] The council rejected the proposal because "la Nazione non può subire i pericoli di un Impresario, e che il profitto che questo percepisce in un subappalto è il prezzo della sua esposizione."[141] On 18 October 1802, the administrative council of war forced the company to decrease the rental prices with immediate effect, otherwise the contract would become void.[142] Between late October and November, the administrative council of war laid down the basis for a reform of the barracks supply system, beginning with a nation-wide inquiry on the conditions and quantity of the barracks and their supplies.[143] Departmental inspectors would provide commissar ordinator-general Tordorò with information updates every ten days, and the company and municipalities would compile the inventories together.[144]

Mutual distrust between company delegates and other officials, and between company directors and the government, hampered these operations. Papounau warned the administrative council of war that changing the accounting methods to estimations based on items inventories instead of the corps' paper strength would expose his delegates to the disfavour of individuals with whom they had had "vivissime dispute".[145] One such spat in April-May 1803 led to the house arrest of Antonio Sega and Carlo Sanquirico, allegedly over the company's poor service in Rimini.[146] They were not the only inept or dishonest contractors and employees who ended up in the administrative council of war's crosshairs,[147] but it is also true that, throughout 1802, the departments of the lower Po plain had been a

[138] ASMI MGC 158, chief commissar-ordinator Boinod to Dejean (extract), 24 Floréal X/14 May 1802.
[139] ASMI MVP 15, Papounau to Melzi, s.d. (possibly late May-June 1802).
[140] ASMI CL 595, session of the Legislative Council, 24 July 1802.
[141] Ibid.
[142] Levati, *Buona azienda*, p.81.
[143] Ibid., p.91.
[144] Crociani, Ilari, Paoletti, *Storia militare del Regno*, i, p.195.
[145] ASMI MGC 158, Papounau to the administrative council of war, s.d.
[146] Levati, *Buona azienda*, p.84.
[147] Ibid., 84-5.

problematic area requiring massive efforts to restore public order and manage the cumbersome presence of the French army.[148] The Papounau company contributed to the normalisation effort by providing barracks supplies for the transit troops as well as the garrisons;[149] immediately prior to the arrest of Sega and Sanquirico, their agent in Faenza had filled vacancies in the local supplies thanks to stocks transported from Rimini.[150] The authors of the *Storia militare del Regno Italico* attribute the arrest of Sega and Sanquirico to a higher-level political dispute, stemming from the criticism Murat levelled to Tordorò, holding him responsible for the company's poor performance due to the contract conditions he had negotiated, in an attempt to protect the Papounau company's reputation by blaming the other party.[151] Given that Murat and the Papounau company's founding members had a common friend in Sommariva, an intervention in their favour through the client network is not implausible; however, if Tordorò had truly been instrumental in rigging the tender as Lancetti claimed, an indirect revenge seems more difficult to speculate. Tensions with the institutions and staff at the local level might offer another explanation, as mutual distrust escalated and the eighteen-month deadline of the contract neared; departmental administrations had refused to cede items to the company before, and the Papounau company retaliated in kind. In April 1803, the prefect of the Rubicone department reported that no barracks supplies were available in the cities of Cesena and Faenza, overcrowded with billeted troops, because the Papounau company would not give them back the supplies to face the emergency.[152]

Against this backdrop, it is unsurprising that, at the end of the contract in May 1803, the Papounau company rebuffed the government's attempts to mend the rifts through an advantageous offer for the next tender, and refused to participate in it altogether.[153] The debts toward the company stood for years afterwards, slowly paid up through the alienation of national domain properties.[154] After Papounau's refusal, the government briefly entertained the idea of dividing the national contract into multiple ones at department

[148] A. Varni, *Bologna napoleonica. Potere e società dalla Repubblica Cisalpina al Regno d'Italia (1800-1806)* (Bologna, 1973), 120-44.
[149] ASMI MVP 15, the Papounau company to its delegate in Forlì, 23 April 1803.
[150] ASMI MVP 15, procès-verbal at the vice-prefecture of Faenza, 26 April 1803.
[151] Crociani, Ilari, Paoletti, *Storia militare del Regno*, i, p.195-6.
[152] ASMI MVP 15, prefect of Rubicone to Melzi, 27 April 1803.
[153] Crociani Ilari, Paoletti, *Storia militare del Regno*, i, p.196.
[154] *Conto dell'amministrazione delle finanze del Regno d'Italia nell'anno 1809* (Milan, 1810), p.126.

level,[155] but the administrative council of war ruled the option out[156] and invited aspirants to offer tenders. Two potential contractors were accepted after a screening of their guarantors for any debts: Luigi Valenti, with guarantors Lorenzo Poullet and Francesco Azimonti,[157] and Andrea Martini, with guarantor Andrea Briche.[158] The winner of the tender, Andrea Martini, showed once again the deep-rooted reach of the French business ventures in Italy. Briche was a former deputy in the National Assembly,[159] *commissaire aux armées* attached to General Brune's staff in Lucca,[160] and a well-connected businessman involved in all sorts of speculations between Venice, Milan and Bologna, where he married an Italian woman and associated himself with army supplier Ferratini.[161] Briche would take up a military horses contract in 1808,[162] so his role in the barracks supply contract seems like a perfectly consistent investment. The other member of the Martini company was its representative agent Amato Loiselet,[163] a Frenchman with American citizenship active in the maritime trade at Livorno around 1800.[164]

Once again, the contract was a massive venture. The supply of beds, bed linen, blankets, benches and tables, estimated at a value of one million *lire*, ought to suffice for at least 50,000 soldiers and NCOs.[165] Martini's daily rental price stood at two *soldi*, seven and a half *denari* per bed,[166] a slightly cheaper price than the first contractor's initial set price, but more expensive than the price the government had been able to force upon the Papounau company in October 1802. Since Papounau refused to return to the contract, there was nothing to do but settle down with the new company for three years, starting on 1 September 1803.[167] That left a narrow timeframe for Martini to collect the items of the Papounau company[168] and place his

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[155] ASMI MGC 165, national legal commission to the administrative council of war, 27 April 1803.
[156] ASMI MGC 165, administrative council of war to the national legal commission, 6 May 1803.
[157] ASMI MGC 165, national legal commission to the administrative council of war, 31 May 1803.
[158] ASMI MGC 165, national legal commission to the administrative council of war, 31 May 1803.
[159] *Dictionnaire des parlementaires françaises* (Paris, 1889), i, p.487.
[160] C. Minutoli, G. Tommasi, *Sommario della storia di Lucca dall'anno MIV all'anno MDCC* (Florence, 1847), p.623.
[161] A profile of Briche's life and career is in V. Dal Cin, "Une émigration composite? Les Français dans la République de Venise: communauté, relations, opportunités", *Émigration, exil et innovation*, LUHCIE-Université Grenoble Alpes (2016) [https://luhcie.univ-grenoble-alpes.fr/publications-travaux/emigration-exil-et-innovation/] (1 November 2019).
[162] Levati, *Buona azienda*, p.223.
[163] Ibid., p. 257.
[164] A. Baldasseroni, *Delle assicurazioni marittime* (Florence, 1802), ii, 299-300.
[165] ASMI MGC 165, Martini contract, section A, contract clauses, 9 August 1803.
[166] ASMI MGC 165, Martini contract, section B, 9 August 1803.
[167] Ibid.
[168] Ibid.

personnel across the barracks and warehouses of the republic. The daily rental was calculated starting from the day when he proved the service had begun in a municipality,[169] an arrangement that required punctual documentation to prevent irregular, out-of-schedule updates such as those provided by Papounau.[170]

Between the end of the old contract and the start of the new one, the prefectures and the municipalities temporarily took up the barracks supply and custody services. Prefects were to appoint a delegate who, together with the company delegate, would compile an inventory of the extant supplies, and manage their usage under the direction of the *commissari di guerra* while the municipalities appointed a custodian.[171] Finding a *commissario*, sometimes at very short notice, was the first issue; in Monza, the municipality scrambled to appoint a temporary one after receiving orders for the supplies passage of property the following day, as none of the municipal officials wanted to take up the task in addition to his own office.[172] Meanwhile, Martini was to liaise with the commissar-ordinator in chief and arrange the items delivery from the prefectures to his company;[173] the issue date of this order, at 13 August 1803, means that preparations for the contractor's service were already behind schedule. Less than a month from the start of the contract, it was yet unclear how the Martini company was going to receive the supplies. The administrative council urged Martini to hurry up and appoint the company delegates, since they were to receive the supplies from the prefectoral/municipal ones.[174] To speed up this process, Martini personally oversaw the supply reception in five departments.[175] Personal involvement in the company operations extended to the contractor's father, Giuseppe Martini. He had been one of the witnesses to the signature of the contract[176] and became company delegate for the departments of Reno and Rubicone.[177] Perhaps this appointment reflected a special attention for the ex-Papal departments, prone to insurrection both in the early and late

[169] Ibid.
[170] ASMI MGC 158, minister of war to Papounau, 15 May 1802.
[171] ASCMB FRC 105, administrative council of war to the prefect of Olona (instructions on the temporary barracks service), 2 July 1803.
[172] ASCMB FRC 105, municipality of Monza to the prefecture of Olona, 13 August 1803.
[173] ASMI MGC 172, administrative council of war to Martini (minute), 12 August 1803.
[174] Ibid.
[175] ASMI MGC 172, Martini to the minister of war, 12 August 1803.
[176] ASMI MGC 165, Martini contract, section B, 9 August 1803.
[177] ASMI MGC 172, Andrea Martini to Giuseppe Martini, 11 August 1803.

1800s,[178] poorly administered by the first prefects,[179] massively hit, between 1800 and 1802, by the wartime crises of subsistence and commerce, lengthy military occupation, public unrest and ruthless French repression.[180]

Trust was on thin ice for the administrative council of war, which imposed its approval of each candidate delegate or supply custodian.[181] The only concession to urgency was that Martini had permission to nominate his delegates and only later inform the council of who they were.[182] Despite this background check, officials raised a few serious complaints regarding certain delegates. *Commissario* Locatelli in the Serio department informed Tordorò that the delegate Castiglioni had shown up in Bergamo without papers certifying the administrative council's approval of his nomination:

> "A termine pertanto dell'articolo 21 del Capitolato D'appalto il detto Commis.io ricusò di riconoscerlo, e tanto più perché, essendo egli lo stesso Delegato che aveva la Compagnia Papounau, ha potuto riconoscerlo di una condotta tale, che il Commissario ha avuto più volte motivo di lagnarsene, e fin anche di addomandare la di lui destituzione."[183]

Nevertheless, according to the minister, Castiglioni's papers were fine, and the burden of proof regarding Castiglioni's dubious conduct fell on the *commissario*.[184] In October 1803, a municipal official from Cervia in the Rubicone department, Carlo Bessi, wrote a concerned letter to the minister of war about the custodian chosen by the Martini company for the commune, Battista Paci. Despite the approval of the minister and the clean criminal record certificate being requirements for these employees, Paci "è stato processato, e riconosciuto per truffatore del pubblico denaro, allorché ebbe una comissione nell'amministraz.e delle Saline Nazionali di Cervia, e quindi con Decreto del Tribunale Criminale del Dipartimento è stato riconosciuto reo, ed inabilitato a qualunque impiego."[185] The municipal officials were about to dismiss him, but the company delegate had stepped in and

[178] Grab, "State power", p.48.
[179] L. Antonielli, "Alcuni aspetti dell'apparato amministrativo periferico nella Repubblica e nel Regno d'Italia", *Quaderni storici*, 13/37 (1978), p.208.
[180] Varni, *Bologna napoleonica*, 70-1, 122-4.
[181] ASMI MGC 172, Tordorò to the administrative council of war, 7 September 1803.
[182] ASMI MGC 172, minister of war to Tordorò, 15 September 1803.
[183] ASMI MGC 172, Tordorò to the administrative council of war, 14 September 1803.
[184] ASMI MGC 172, minister of war to Tordorò, 17 September 1803.
[185] ASMI MGC 172, Carlo Bessi to the minister of war, 10 October 1803.

confirmed Paci's nomination.[186] In pointing out this miscarriage of justice to the minister, Bessi asked for his name to remain anonymous from any other public authority the ministry may request to confirm the accusations.[187] The municipal official thus reproduced the practices of anonymous denunciation that had dominated early modern information-gathering for judiciary and Inquisitorial purposes in the Italian states, and survived well into the Napoleonic regimes.[188] Even the prefect of the Rubicone, Bartolomeo Masi, an inexperienced official who struggled with imposing himself in factional power struggles within his department,[189] seemed to accept the informal common knowledge about Paci's criminal conduct. The prefect confirmed that Paci had been found guilty of "truffa di denaro pubblico" and his conduct characterised him as "immorale, capopopolo, ed indegno della privata, e pubblica confidenza."[190] The prefect had not taken the trouble to produce a verbal process detailing Paci's well-known misdeeds and misconduct, because he had "stimato inutile provare ciò che è noto a chiunque."[191] The ministry pressured Martini to fire Paci and not forget about his obligation to submit the candidates' names for approval before allowing them to work;[192] Martini explained that Paci had been hired temporarily in order to receive the barracks supplies, but given his criminal record, the contractor would replace him immediately.[193]

After these missteps, nominations increasingly arrived with police certificates attached, attesting to the candidate's clean criminal record. Foreigners were frequently in the crosshairs of Cisalpine police surveillance;[194] reflecting this enduring bias, a tighter control on the company personnel was important when hiring French employees, since many Frenchmen on the Italian Republic's territory tried to escape police vigilance by claiming to work in the administrative services.[195] Evaluating and confirming the candidates' good conduct was a task for the municipal authorities and the police *preture*, formalising the powers of surveillance and action that outraged municipal officials like Bessi had to exert through direct

[186] Ibid.
[187] Ibid.
[188] Broers, *Napoleonic empire in Italy*, 150-2.
[189] Antonielli, *I prefetti*, p.171.
[190] ASMI MGC 172, prefect of the Rubicone to the administrative council of war, 1 November 1803.
[191] Ibid.
[192] ASMI MGC 172, note in the back of the document countersigned by the minister of war, 9 November 1803.
[193] ASMI MGC 172, Andrea Martini to the administrative council of war, 10 November 1803.
[194] Varni, *Bologna napoleonica*, p.105.
[195] ASMI MGC 172, police prefect of the Olona to the minister of war, 12 May 1804.

complaint and semi-private denunciation. Thus, when Martini appointed Constant Bregue (former secretary of the garrison commander, resident in Bergamo for over a year) as delegate in the Serio department in October 1804, the nomination also carried a certificate of good conduct, issued by the municipality.[196] In addition to honesty and a clean record, the certificates proved the candidates' political suitability, in order to avoid picking people who, like Battista Paci, might be accused of being rabble-rousers or worse. Another Frenchman hired by the Martini company, Bernard Pacquetet, received his attestation by the police delegate in the Rubicone prefecture regarding his "probità, e propensione al sistema repubblicano".[197]

Nevertheless, even employees with all the certificates in order could cause trouble; in December 1804, custodian Antonio Mandrini came under suspicion of conniving at a burglary in a barracks under his care.[198] Information-gathering to confirm or dismiss complaints weighed heavily in this case, too, as Mandrini "dalle informazioni prese, gode poco credito nella Città di Mantova, per la qual cosa sarei di subordinato parere, che egli dovesse essere dall'Appalt.e Martini licenziato".[199] The dynamics of trust and control between company personnel and public administration, on the other hand, could be framed as mutually positive and serving to consolidate good working relations. Delegate Agretti, about to move to Bologna after working in Bergamo, asked the Serio prefect (who at the time was Giuseppe Casati, one of the most capable prefects appointed by Melzi[200]) to "stendere alle Autorità del Reno di me quelle informazioni che vi detta la vostra bontà raccomandando me e la mia famiglia specialmente a quel Prefetto".[201] On his part, Agretti reassured Casati of his intentions to be as good as his word, reflecting positively on the prefect's recommendation.[202]

The practical quality of the service and the supplies was the great limit of these controls. The military complained that the company supplies in Forlì were "affatto scadenti, e giudicati inservibili",[203] and a large amount of supplies in Bergamo were too small or otherwise not up to the regulation

[196] ASMI MGC 172, certificate of the Bergamo municipality for Constant Bregue, 2 October 1804.
[197] ASMI MGC 172, certificate of the police delegate in the Rubicone prefecture for Bernard Pacquetet, 29 November 1804.
[198] ASMI MGC 172, Bianchi d'Adda to the minister of war, 7 January 1805.
[199] Ibid.
[200] Antonielli, *I prefetti*, p. 183.
[201] ASBG PS 1068, Giovanni Battista Agretti to the Serio prefect, 30 October 1804.
[202] Ibid.
[203] ASMI MGDM 14, administrative council of war to Tordorò, 19 November 1803.

standards.[204] The medical corps in Pavia demanded the belated change of the mattresses and straw supply for the garrison, in order to preserve the soldiers' health,[205] a delay that the Guards regiment in Milan reported as well.[206] The service quality was uneven, varying from fine in one garrison and lacking in another, as was the case respectively in Modena and Reggio.[207] The delegates had trouble cooperating with municipal officials when taking up the supplies,[208] not least of all due to unclear definitions of the supplies pertaining to the company in the contract articles,[209] and the administrative council rejected most of the company's documentation on damages due to procès-verbal irregularities.[210] Keeping up with troops that moved constantly, with information that came at short notice and could change at a whim of the divisional commands, persisted as an uneasy condition to run the service, as Tordorò reported to the ministry of war in February 1803:

> "[Martini] cita per esempio i movimenti che hanno avuto luogo ultimamente nel Mincio, ove aveva da diverse parti fatti pervenire gli effetti per assicurare l'alloggio in Mantova, quando un ordine improvviso del generale Gardanne fa muovere un battaglione da Mantova per Legnago, ed un altro da Verona per Peschiera, e sconvolge tutte le disposizioni che erano state prese dietro i primitivi movimenti, non senza mancanza del servizio, perché in simili casi non è possibile di far marciare gli effetti con quella velocità che si vorrebbe onde arrivassero alla destinazione contemporaneamente colle truppe."[211]

The practical consequences of such issues in procurement and deployment are well exemplified by a report from Mantua in late 1803. Most of the hay in the twelve barracks of the city was reduced to shreds, only very few mattresses had been cleaned, blankets and sheets were too short and worn thin, and the 101st infantry regiment had gone a month without a change of sheets because the contractor had none left in the magazines.[212]

Tordorò's recommendation to "stabilire di concerto collo stato maggiore generale i punti più centrali ai movimenti che potessero ancora accadere, ed

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[204] ASMI MGDM 15, report of the commissario, 26 March 1804.
[205] ASMI MGDM 14, administrative council of war to Tordorò, 23 December 1803.
[206] ASMI MGDM 15, administrative council of war to Tordorò, 3 January 1804.
[207] ASMI MGC 160, commissario Rebuffi to Tordorò, 7 November 1804.
[208] ASMI MGDM 75, circular letter to the prefects, 27 August 1803.
[209] ASMI MGC 160, Tordorò to the administrative council of war, 5 March 1804.
[210] ASMI MGDM 15, administrative council of war to Tordorò, 15 February 1804.
[211] ASMI MGDM 109, Tordorò to the minister of war, 7 February 1803.
[212] ASMI MGDM, 15, commissari di guerra in Mantua to the minister of war, 23 December 1803.

ivi obbligare l'appaltatore a tenervi dei magazzeni per provvedere più in tempo che fosse possibile alle occorrenze"[213] triggered another crisis of confidence between contractor and government. It developed in September 1804, as Martini asked to lower the rent that the company paid for use of the warehouses, and the administrative council of war refused.[214] Shortly afterwards, on grounds of verifying poor service reports, the ministry ordered the prefects to perform a round of controls on the barracks and the supplies,[215] repeating the clampdown that had heralded the end of the Papounau contract. In April 1805, the government put the company under the receivership of a ministerial delegation (*delegazione ministeriale al casermaggio*)[216] that administered the service until the set end of the contract in August 1806, drawing from Martini's funds and the investments of the Bignami-Vassalli company.[217] Briche cut ties with the barracks service, even refusing to approve the appointments and transfers of employees.[218] Martini, claiming to have fallen into poverty, petitioned the government for help in 1807, which Tordorò suggested might be a job in the general warehouse of barracks supplies in Milan.[219] In his petitions, he reminded the government that he had made no profit from the contract,[220] and claimed that the reason why he had waited for so long before asking for aid was evidence of his pride and moral strength, in addition to the honesty and industriousness shown during the contract.[221] If there was likely a level of exaggeration, intrinsic to the language of petitions,[222] to Martini emphasising his plight and the benevolence of the ministry, it is also true the ex-contractor could appeal to a shared understanding that his service had been, if anything, honest, and this contributed to the military administration taking his plea into account. Not all confidence, it seems, was lost, and as we will see, Martini remained involved in the barracks business, at a time when major financiers like Briche had retreated from it and concentrated on other, more profitable, branches of the army supplies.

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[213] ASMI MGDM 109, Tordorò to the minister of war, 7 February 1803.
[214] Levati, *Buona azienda*, p.89.
[215] ASMI MGC 160, circular letter to the prefects, 13 September 1804.
[216] Levati, *Buona azienda*, 107-8.
[217] ASMI MGC 172, ministerial circular letter to the prefects, 2 July 1806.
[218] ASMI MGC 172, Tordorò to the minister of war, 12 December 1806.
[219] ASMI MGC 172, Tordorò to the minister of war, 3 August 1807.
[220] ASMI MGC 172, Martini to Tordorò, 18 April 1807.
[221] ASMI MGC 172, Martini to Tordorò, 16 May 1807.
[222] See chapter 4.

III.3 From the ministerial delegation to the municipal system (1805-1814)

Initially, the new viceregal management was as adamant about using general contracts as the republican government. However, while the ministerial delegation ran the company in receivership state amidst the usual problems of items delivery and inventory between local administration and company personnel,[223] new calls for tender were unsuccessful; the government received a proposal from entrepreneur Giovanni Battista Bottoni, but its conditions were too favourable to the contractor and the government rejected it.[224] In the meantime, Eugène and minister Caffarelli rationalised on paper the number of national barracks through the decree of 24 March 1806 while outsourcing the supply management to the prefectures and municipalities,[225] for lack of any general contractor presenting acceptable offers once the Martini contract expired. The assumption that there would be another contract was so rooted that, in May 1806, the ministry of war allowed, as a temporary measure, "che si sborsino preventivamente de' fondi per acquisto d'effetti, ciocché non potrebbe essere che di sommo danno al Regio Erario".[226] The incorporation of the ex-Venetian territories into the Kingdom of Italy, after the campaign of 1805, further strained the precarious system. The few usable supplies the Austrians had left were passed onto the Italian administration, but stayed in custody of the municipalities "fatto condizione però che non si proceda per ora ad alcuna loro riparazione. Questa misura non è che interinale, ed in pendenza di un appalto pel casermaggio, e con essa m'intendo di evitare una vistosa, ed incalcolabile spesa di appositi delegati per conto del mio ministero."[227] Paying the *commissari* to oversee such a vast area or reimbursing prefectoral delegates was too expensive, and the minister confirmed his "precisa intenzione, che le autorità francesi stabilite nelle comuni ove esistono gli effetti da cedersi consegnino gli effetti stessi alle autorità locali, mediante un regolare processo verbale di stima contraddittoria."[228] The situation in the new departments remained dire for several months; shortages of beds forced the troops garrisoning the poor region of Istria to sleep on hammocks,[229] with blankets in dramatically short

[223] ASMI MGDM 75, ministerial circular letter to the commissari, 16 August 1806.
[224] Levati, *Buona azienda*, 108-10.
[225] Ibid., p.111.
[226] ASMI MGDM 18, minister of war to Tordorò, 10 May 1806.
[227] ASMI MGDM 18, minister of war to Tordorò, 27 May 1806.
[228] ASMI MGDM 18, minister of war to Tordorò, 13 June 1806.
[229] ASMI MGDM 18, minister of war to Tordorò, 20 September 1806.

supply and unavailable on the local market.[230]

The impasse of the general contract normalised direct purchases, much to the financial loss of the ministry, and administrative chaos at all levels.[231] Partial purchases had already taken place before the end of the Martini contract, such as that for a supply of blankets, concluded in March 1806, between *commissario* Rebuffi and the Barozzi company, in which the role of the Martini company delegate seemed limited to a *pro forma* consent.[232] *Commissari* and prefectures were in charge of selecting the contracts that the ministry would evaluate and conclude, then sending mandates for anticipation sums and reimbursements;[233] this paved the way for prolonged business ties with those entrepreneurs who had the means to fulfil the demand. In the Reno department, the Lolli brothers secured a first contract for 3000 bed sheets at 13 Milanese *lire*,[234] then a second a month later at the same rate of pay for the same amount of bed sheets.[235] A merchant of the same surname and same city, Luigi Lolli (it is unknown if he was one of the Lolli brothers, a simple homonym, or a family relation), in December 1806, was contracted to supply fabric[236] and 500 straw beds,[237] which shows a diversification of the offer in a short time-span from the same entrepreneur. Continuous business ties also meant the entrepreneurs were able to meet the standards set by the military administration, such as providing sheets of the right size[238] and respecting all the conditions of the contract before they were paid in full.[239] Another supplier, Pietro Soulier (or Solier), was contracted for 6000 bed sheets in September 1806,[240] woollen blankets in October[241] and, in December, another stock of bed sheets.[242]

One contractor often could not cover all the demand, and the purchases multiplied accordingly,[243] along with the opportunities for companies and

[230] ASMI MGDM 18, minister of war to Tordorò, 27 October 1806.
[231] Levati, *Buona azienda*, p.112.
[232] ASMI MGDM 73, Tordorò to the minister of war, 14 March 1806.
[233] ASMI MGDM 18, minister of war to Tordorò, 26 December 1806, approving the purchase contract for 6000 quintals of straw between the Adriatico prefect and suppliers Antonio Labia and Gerolamo Berti.
[234] ASMI MGDM 18, minister of war to Tordorò, 15 September 1806.
[235] ASMI MGDM 18, minister of war to Tordorò, 31 October 1806.
[236] ASMI MGDM 18, minister of war to Tordorò, 10 December 1806.
[237] ASMI MGDM 18, minister of war to Tordorò, 20 December 1806.
[238] ASMI MGDM 18, minister of war to Tordorò, 15 September 1806.
[239] ASMI MGDM 18, minister of war to Tordorò, 15 November 1806.
[240] ASMI MGDM 18, minister of war to Tordorò, 11 September 1806.
[241] ASMI MGDM 18, minister of war to Tordorò, 31 October 1806.
[242] ASMI MGDM 18, minister of war to Tordorò, 24 December 1806.
[243] An example is the list of suppliers between October 1806 and July 1807 in ASMI MGC 161, "Etat général des effets de Casernement existant dans les Départements ci après désignés au 1er Juillet 1807":

merchants with a consolidated presence in the supply sector. The Bignami-Vassalli company, a business venture at the forefront of the army transports and victuals management,[244] provided 3500 sheets to the warehouse in Milan as of August 1807.[245] The straw beds Luigi Lolli sold to the government were a fraction of a larger batch, comprising 2000 items from one Mazzuchelli, 1000 from Agazzini (likely the same merchant of the Foro Bonaparte contracts), and a stock of fabric from the Beretta-Finardi company.[246] There were, also, materials that the prefectures provided. The prefect of the Adriatico department gathered 3600 bed frames, 7200 planks, 1250 straw mats, 4150 sheets and 1176 blankets,[247] of which 3000 sheets, 926 blankets and 605 straw mats had come from requisitions for the service in Venice and the lagoon islands.[248] These requisitions were often part of a wider business cycle, as the Austrians had sold off part of supplies requisitioned by the French to Jewish merchants in Venice.[249] This cycle fits the commercial role of Venetian Jewish merchants during the Austrian occupation, which favoured mercantile maritime traffic under the protection of British vessels,[250] as well as their subjection to wartime requisitions across Italian cities.[251]

The invasion of the Papal States, in 1808, added the three new departments of Tronto, Musone and Metauro to the Kingdom of Italy, between the Apennines and the Adriatic coast. To organise the barracks supply service in

Solier	21,205 bedsheets, 5010 blankets, 1377 straw mats
Braida	324 bedframes, 636 planks, 162 straw mats, 162 mattresses, 162 bolsters, 648 bedsheets, 162 blankets
Lolli	2404 straw mats, 9396 bedsheets
Montanari	3000 bedframes, 6000 planks
Faini	4780 bedframes, 9400 planks, 2390 straw mats, 2390 bolsters, 9560 bedsheets, 2390 blankets
Mazzuchelli	2233 straw mats
Agaretti	7200 straw mats, 198 bedsheets
Beretta	220 bedsheets
Savoja	10000 planks, 200 tables
Focchi	3000 bedframes, 200 tables, 400 benches
Fandi	50 tables, 50 benches

[244] Levati, *Buona azienda*, 231-2.
[245] ASMI MGC 161, Tordorò to the minister of war, 20 August 1807.
[246] ASMI MGDM 18, minister of war to Tordorò, 20 December 1806.
[247] Ibid.
[248] ASMI MGDM 18, minister of war to Tordorò, 20 December 1806.
[249] ASMI MGC 161, commissario Simonetti to Tordorò, 21 February 1807.
[250] M. Berengo, "Gli ebrei veneziani alla fine del Settecento", in I. Scandaliato Ciciani (ed.), *Italia Judaica. Gli ebrei in Italia dalla segregazione alla prima emancipazione* (Rome, 1989), p.12.
[251] F. Cavarocchi, *La comunità ebraica di Mantova fra prima emancipazione e unità d'Italia* (Florence, 2002), p.21.

these newly annexed territories, the ministry opted for a mixed system of contracts and municipal management, with the government reimbursing whoever was the supplier.[252] A prominent one was the Marinelli company, that provided 1500 half-supplies and 140 mattresses in Ancona, but the great majority of the supplies in the lower Adriatic departments were requisitions or municipal half-supplies for the transit troops.[253] Lacking precise regulations and information on the ownership of the supplies, the ministry proposed entrusting directly the entire service to the municipalities.[254]

The national legislation soon moved in this direction. A new decree on the barracks system, on 6 January 1809, sanctioned this shift from a centralised supply management, both public and private, to tasking officially the communes with the garrison barracks service, under reimbursement from the government.[255] In preparing the decree, the minister of war took care of laying down "quelques dispositions générales tendantes à faire connaitre aux communes leurs droits et leurs devoirs dans les circonstances extraordinaires, et à leur imposer l'obligation de presenter régulierement leurs comptes."[256] The municipal officials had to acquire and inventory the extant supplies in the presence of the *commissari*, calculate their amounts on the set strength of the garrison, and send the excess quantities to the capital city of the department.[257] Should the communes have to accommodate more troops than their set number, or host a garrison in a place not singled out as garrison town, they would receive a reimbursement;[258] nothing changed for transit troops, under municipal charge.[259] The reimbursements, to which the communes were entitled, were calculated upon the completed beds: seven centimes per bed during the summer months, eight centimes during the winter, and eight cents all-year round for the cavalry troops.[260]

Not submitting regular updates and orderly paperwork exposed the communes to losing the reimbursement. Less than one year since the 6 January 1809 decree, the ministry of war informed the general administration of the municipalities that, according to complaints from the military administration officials, almost all the communes drew up their status

[252] ASMI MGC 162, minister of war to General Charpentier, 30 July 1808.
[253] ASMI MGC 162, commissario Barss to Tordorò, 22 July 1808.
[254] ASMI MGC 162, deliberation of the 2nd division of the ministry of war, 26 July 1808.
[255] ASMI MGC 162, "Decreto di S.A.I. il principe viceré sul casermaggio", 6 January 1809.
[256] ASMI MGC 161, minister of war to Eugène de Beauharnais, 22 December 1808.
[257] ASMI MGC 162, "Decreto di S.A.I. il principe viceré sul casermaggio", 6 January 1809, art.1-5.
[258] Ibid., art.13.
[259] Ibid., art.14.
[260] Ibid. art.36.

updates poorly and belatedly.[261] Even in the garrison towns of Lodi, Pizzighettone, Cremona, Codogno and Crema, located in the kingdom's oldest departments, the municipal offices failed to send in account reports and monthly status updates, losing their claims to reimbursements.[262] As Emanuele Pagano points out, the size and costs of the military presence overburdened the budgets of these municipalities.[263] Entrepreneurs took advantage of the situation to negotiate privately with the communes rather than participating in calls for tenders, raising the prices for their services. The *podestà* of Bergamo, in 1810, was forced to do that after the failure of two calls.[264] At other times, shortages in the magazines and lack of funds for purchases forced municipal authorities to requisition supplies from the civilians, as the podestà of Vigevano had to do, in February 1809, to procure straw, "colla semplice promessa di pagarne l'ammontare tosto che mi sieno dal governo rimessi i corrispondenti fondi."[265] For the ex-Papal departments, as one of their prefects declared,[266] it was crucial that their barracks supply system was put on a par with the rest of the kingdom, transplanting the national regulations and expertise into the regions. However, the practical situation was one of dramatic materiel shortages in the garrison towns (Ascoli, Fermo and Portofermo) and San Benedetto, "continuamente soggetta ad aver truppa stazionata per guardar la costa, oltrediché è esposta ai continui passaggi".[267] Similarly, the communes in the ex-Venetian Passariano department, annexed in 1806, ignored the prefectoral dispositions on receiving and inventorying the barracks supplies.[268]

The devolution to the communes was set to extend to the fiscal side. Plans were discussed[269] to introduce into the kingdom the French praxis, which had completely outsourced to the communes the purchase and maintenance of the barracks beds, ceasing to fund the municipalities for that purpose.[270] The revenues of customs duties would pay for the barracks service, in the logic that the presence of troops generated higher consumption and stimulated

[261] ASMI MGC 162, minister of war to the general director of the municipal administration, 18 October 1809.
[262] Ibid.
[263] Pagano, *Enti locali*, 142, 164.
[264] ASBG DS 1067, podestà of Bergamo to the prefect of Serio, 8 March 1810.
[265] ASNO PA 1050, podestà of Vigevano to the prefect of Agogna, 11 February 1809.
[266] ASMI MGC 162, prefect of Tronto to the minister of war, 29 August 1809.
[267] Ibid.
[268] ASMI MGC 162, general director of the municipal administration to the minister of war, 15 April 1809.
[269] ASMI MGC 162, report of the 2nd division of the ministry of war, 19 December 1811.
[270] "Décret concernant les lits militaires", 7 August 1810.

commerce, balancing out the supply expenses.[271] These plans were not implemented, perhaps owing to the shortfalls of the scheme in France, as chapter 1 showed. The ministry of war remained indebted to the municipalities for the reimbursements of their barracks supply and maintenance expenses, which the municipal budgets paid for in advance.[272]

Seasonal changes and cleaning of bed linen and mattresses had been part of the general contracts, and it was such during the municipal management as well. That meant a long-term chance of municipal employment for a washer, such as Michele Rosso in Como, who was in the municipality's payroll from at least 1810,[273] occasionally collaborating with other washers to process large amounts of materials. In August 1811, Rosso washed 200 sheets, his colleague Francesco Grisoni 148,[274] and in September of the same year, the ratio between Rosso and the other washer was 198 to 168.[275] Cooperation was not without issues, mainly due to the municipality not paying its debts for months; funds were available for Rosso to pay Grisoni his share, for a job done in October, only in December 1811.[276] The post and Rosso's ability to cover it were secure enough that not even the end of the Napoleonic Wars spelled its end; Rosso was still the municipal washer in 1817.[277]

After the abandonment of the general contract system, contracts persisted locally. In the Agogna department throughout the 1810s, the contractor that the Vigevano municipality worked with was none other than the former general contractor Andrea Martini.[278] His wife Giuseppa had an active role in the supply company[279] and, after his death sometime in 1812 or 1813, she stayed in charge of its affairs and negotiated compensations for damages to company property in the municipal magazine.[280] Such an enterprise was a remarkable downgrade from a general contract, which was only possible with major investors and capitals, neither of which had any interest left in dealing with barracks supplies. The powerful *fournisseurs* knew better than to get involved with a barracks general contract, too constrained by pre-conditions the government would not budge from, as the refusal of the

[271] ASMI MGC 162, French minister of the war administration to the prefects, 16 May 1811.
[272] Pagano, *Enti locali*, p. 141.
[273] ASCO Atti 1800-1850 755, barracks service accountant Giusti to the podestà of Como, 4 August 1810.
[274] ASCO Atti 1800-1850 755, barracks delegate Sironi to the podestà of Como, 31 August 1811.
[275] ASCO Atti 1800-1850 755, warehouseman Sironi to the podestà of Como, 27 September 1811.
[276] ASCO Atti 1800-1850 755, podestà of Como to the barracks accounting office, 6 December 1811.
[277] ASCO Atti 1800-1850 755, podestà of Como to the accounting office, 7 November 1811.
[278] ASNO PA 1050, podestà of Vigevano to the prefect of Agogna, 5 January 1811.
[279] ASNO PA 1050, prefect of Agogna to the podestà of Vigevano, 11 August 1811.
[280] ASNO PA 1050, Giuseppa Martini to the prefect of Agogna, 23 July 1813.

Bottoni proposal had demonstrated. The entrepreneurs were also aware of the growing investment risks as the situation of the French imperial bloc worsened. In the year and a half after the Russian campaign of 1812, the failure of several military supplies companies weakened the Italian government's financial credibility, and negotiating new general contracts became more difficult, fragmenting the contracts once again.[281]

The crisis of confidence was evident when the Royal Velites regiment, a unit of the kingdom's Royal Guard whose *casermaggio* was administered by the royal magazines instead of the municipalities,[282] pawned part of its barracks supplies to the Luraschi-Guaita company, owner of a prominent woollen mill in Como.[283] As security for a supply of fabric worth 14,769.84 *lire*, in November 1813 the major of the Velites gave Luraschi-Guaita 259 mattresses, 208 bedsides, 259 woollen blankets, 600 iron bed frames, 180 straw mattresses.[284] Unless the debt was paid within six months, the company would claim these items as its own.[285] The matter continued throughout the transition from the Napoleonic kingdom to the provisional Austrian government. Although the terms of the agreement clashed with the order of the Imperial Regency to deliver to the Olona prefecture all the barracks supplies of the now-disbanded Royal Guard,[286] the judiciary experts deemed it would be disadvantageous to forcefully retake the items as the ministry of war suggested, since no criminal offence had been committed.[287] The government, while trying to reason with the company, felt there was a risk in insisting on the moderate ways of the civil procedure, since Como was a "paese piccolo, ove facilissime sono le pressioni, ed i maneggi" that influential industrialists could impose on a local legal appointee.[288] For its part, the company stated they had not been the only creditors to pawn barracks supplies from the Velites,[289] pointing to a widespread pattern of behaviour, borne out of prior knowledge, attentive to the changing political-

[281] Levati, *Buona azienda*, 133-4.
[282] E. Pigni, *La Guardia di Napoleone re d'Italia* (Milan, 2001), p.61.
[283] G. Rovelli, *Storia de' principali avvenimenti dopo l'ingresso de' francesi in Lombardia* (Como, 1808), 78-9.
[284] ASMI MGC 165, declaration of the Luraschi-Guaita company, 9 November 1813.
[285] ASMI MGC 165, joint declaration of the Luraschi-Guaita company and government inspector delegate Marchesini, 29 August 1814.
[286] ASMI MGC 165, notice of the 1st division of the ministry of war, 4 July 1814.
[287] ASMI MGC 165, public prosecutor for the Lario department court to the minister of justice, 21 July 1814.
[288] ASMI MGC 165, legal auditor to the extraordinary commission of war (pro tempore ministry of war), 21 September 1814.
[289] ASMI MGC 165, Luraschi-Guaita to the prefect of Lario, 28 June 1814.

military situation and its effects on business:

> "Ognuno com'è notorio si affrettava allora a sistemare i propri affari col Governo di cui vedevasi imminente la caduta, e ciò allo scopo di assicurarsi de' propri diritti collo sfuggire tutti quegl'intralci, che l'esperienza aveva dimostrato incontrarsi in simili circostanze di politici cambiamenti."[290]

Conclusion

Managing barracks supplies in the Republic/Kingdom of Italy entailed providing resources for a large number of highly mobile soldiers, in a fluid and volatile geopolitical situation. The state could not provide the service directly, since it was too expensive and beyond the bureaucratic power of the fledgling satellite state. Thus, following the well-established, Europe-wide praxes of the contractor state, as well as replicating the attitudes towards privatisation as a way to ensure effectiveness and accountability that had dominated the Directorial regime, the logistics of barracks supply rested on procurement and deployment through private enterprise. Financiers and entrepreneurs had the road paved ahead of them to step in, solidifying pre-extant fortunes or amassing new ones. Relationships of trust and accountability (or lack thereof), as well as the practical preoccupation with curbing corruption for the good of the service and the soldiers' welfare, formed between state and contractors and influenced the behaviour of both, along with the client networks emerging around the political leaderships. Without cooperating with these civilian actors, it would have been impossible to meet the needs of "total" war; this cooperation mirrored the pre-revolutionary organisation of contracts, albeit in a context of deeply unsettled institutions and geopolitical conditions.

When the failures of the general contracts thrust the system into disarray and the business interests grew reluctant to invest in the barracks supply sector, the state had to find a third way between the impossible dirigisme and new privatisations. Transferring the service to the municipalities became the standard practice, since a truly centralised management was unsustainable. Constant war and territorial changes required rapid responses that came more easily through a local management, albeit one subject to regular and

[290] ASMI MGC 165, Luraschi-Guaita to the minister of war, 23 September 1814.

thorough checks from *commissaires*, prefectures, ministry offices; centralisation lay in the information flow rather than in direct management. Furthermore, the barracks supply system was supposed to self-sustain through local taxes and a local cycle of purchases and maintenance. This intention, however, never matched the Italian reality, where expenses for barracks maintenance and supplies weighed heavily on municipal budgets. The one positive aspect in this regard was that the presence of troops created long-term placements for works of maintenance, continuing after the kingdom's fall.

Chapter 4: The barracks caretakers

The personnel who inspected and maintained the barracks is an unstudied topic in its organisation, composition, and experience of war. As part of the war administration, they were the first non-military responders to soldiers' misbehaviour, the eyes and ears of *commissaires* in individual barracks, and the first link in the chain of information that kept logistics up-to-date. Their history shows points in common with the wider patterns of Napoleonic public administration, usually analysed in its upper echelons.[1] One such point is the apparent process of militarisation and centralisation concealing an actual heterogeneity of people and praxes, which, similar to what recent studies have highlighted for the police institutions,[2] significantly nuances Napoleonic centralisation.

Custodianship was hard work, demanding long shifts to oversee supply deliveries, mobility to carry out inspections, and courage to stand up to soldiers. Not even the presence of Austrian troops rather than French or Italian brought radical changes; rather, what varied was the administrative response to the challenges, swinging between general contractors, nationalised management, and delegation to the municipalities. For the *casermieri* (the catch-all term for barracks custodians), this was a matter of which institution appointed the personnel, and how it oversaw their actions. The government painstakingly checked the profiles of *casermieri*, accruing knowledge about them through institutions and patronage links. Formal selection criteria emerged only after part of the service passed to the military engineer corps (Genio), but as the Kingdom of Italy devolved the barracks service to the communes, the formalisation did not affect municipal employees.

Thus, it is useful to look at the hiring procedures and at the self-presentation tactics of the *casermieri*, made possible by the well-preserved archival series, containing employees' petitions as well as government correspondence, at the Archivio di Stato in Milan. Through these sources, it is possible to observe how the Napoleonic notions of talent and merit, and

[1] For example Lignereux, *Les impériaux*, or Antonielli, *I prefetti*.
[2] A. Lignereux, "Un empire policier en trompe-l'œil: les commissaires de police dans les départements réunis, 1800-1814", in J.-O. Boudon (ed.), *Police et gendarmerie dans l'Empire napoléonien* (Paris, 2013), 75-90. A. Renglet, "Un système policier impérial? Le commissaire général et la police municipal d'Anvers (1808-1814)", *Crime, Histoire & Sociétés/Crime, History & Societies*, 20/1 (2016), DOI:10.4000/chs.1643

acknowledgment thereof, imbued the old discursive practices through which these skills were presented as useful and desirable for the public good. The interlocking of talent and patronage in the choice of Napoleonic administration has been at the centre of analyses mostly concerning the army, of course, and local élites of the empire at the upper ranks of the civil administration.[3] Looking at the *casermieri* allows observing these dynamics at a lower level, in a sector that was particularly permeable to changes in private to public, civilian to military, state to municipal, character. A common trend emerging from this analysis is the importance of talent intended as practical competence, gained through experience, which fits James C. Scott's notion of *mētis*, the pragmatic and informal know-how enabling high modernist schemes of social and productive reform to succeed,[4] not unlike the *coup d'œil* so precious to Napoleon's art of war.[5] In this regard, the vicissitudes of the *casermieri* match not only the backdrop of heterogeneity underpinning centralisation, but also the "incorrigible improvisation" presiding over military administration.[6]

IV.1 History of the service, 1: The first Cisalpine Republic

The time around 1798, following the peace of Campoformio, provided a brief respite from open war fought in the newly created Cisalpine Republic. The sources point to this period as the beginning of most *casermieri*'s careers. After the wild months of conquest and requisitions, the barracks supply service attempted to run through more normalised channels; an inspector, appointed by the departmental administration,[7] led the service at department level and prepared, as counterparts to the corps quartermasters, the procès-verbaux of supplies in use for the troops moving in or out.[8] Sub-inspectors, *casermieri* and custodians varied in numbers, depending on the town's capacity for troops. In small communes that had less than 200 beds in their barracks, there was to be one *casermiere* and the inspection service lay in the hands of the municipality; between 200 and 500 beds, the *casermiere* would also serve as warehouseman and a sub-inspector would be

[3] Woolf, *Napoleon's integration*, p.175.
[4] J.C. Scott, *Seeing like a state. How certain schemes to improve the human condition have failed* (New Haven, 1998), 309-41.
[5] Colson, *On war*, p.43.
[6] G. Lefebvre, *Napoleon*, tr. H.F. Stockhold, J.E. Anderson (New York, 2011), p.182.
[7] ASMI MGC 611, administration of the Adda-Oglio to the minister of war, 20 Floréal VI/9 May 1798.
[8] *Raccolta delle leggi, proclami, ordini ed avvisi pubblicati in Milano nell'anno VII repubblicano* (Milan, 1798), vi, p. 153, order of the day of General Suchet, 16 Frimaire VII/6 December 1798.

present.[9] Legal requirements were in place to ensure the quality of their work; the departments collected the sureties of the *casermieri* from the municipalities and forwarded them to the ministry.[10] Lacking activism was good grounds for replacement. In November 1798, the minister told the Adda-Oglio departmental administration that its pick of inspectors and *casermieri* lacked "una certa pratica", which was a liability to the service during the winter season. Therefore, it recommended that they were replaced "da altre più intelligenti, ed attive."[11]

Safety was a key concern for appointing custodians, constantly present and available to protect buildings and supplies. At the Sant'Eustorgio barracks in Milan, in autumn 1798, the request for a government-appointed custodian originated from the prior of the friars still living in the ex-religious house:[12] "senza custode, senza guardia, senza abitatori, sarà un miracolo se si troveranno infine i muri."[13] The syndic of another expropriated and militarised religious house, Santa Maria delle Grazie, organised on his own initiative a night watch[14] and had his servant double as custodian[15] to ward thieves off, while the *casermiere* could not do much but corroborate the syndic's complaints;[16] since one custodian was not enough to watch "quel vasto edificio", the Milan municipality asked the garrison commander to place a sentry.[17] Thus, the lesson that the municipality learned throughout the first Cisalpine Republic was that capillarity in custodianship was crucial, that is, every barracks must have a custodian.[18] The learning experience had been tough; when the *casermiere* overseeing the Milan barracks at San Vittore had to split his work between his post and the San Girolamo barracks, he could not be present when troops came in at San Girolamo, or when the

[9] ASMI MGC 171, minister of war to the Rubicone central administration (minute), s.d.
[10] ASMI MGC 171, central administration of the Reno to the minister of war, 29 Frimaire VII/19 December 1798.
[11] ASMI MGC 171, minister of war to the central administration of the Adda-Oglio, 6 Frimaire VII/26 November 1798.
[12] M. Caffi, *Della chiesa di sant'Eustorgio in Milano* (Milan, 1841), p. xvii.
[13] ASCMI LM 344, prior of Sant'Eustorgio to the Ufficio degli Alloggi, 24 Fructidor VI/10 September 1798.
[14] ASCMI LM 188, syndic Giuseppe Domenico Corbetta to the Dicastero Centrale di Polizia, 15 Nivôse VII/4 January 1799.
[15] ASCMI LM 188, syndic Corbetta to the Dicastero Centrale di Polizia, 12 Nivôse VII/1 January 1799.
[16] ASCMI LM 188, Dicastero Centrale di Polizia to the garrison commander and the minister of the interior (minutes), 14 Nivôse VII/3 January 1799
[17] Ibid.
[18] ASCMI LM 353, municipal official Zuccoli to delegates Pirovano and Piccaluga, 11 Germinal VII/30 March 1799.

Austrian POWs detained there laid waste to their quarters.[19]

It was not a problem if a *casermiere* had honed his expertise and moral qualities in the Ancien Régime; *casermieri* Giovanni Battista Brevi and Rocco Brevi owed their post in Bergamo to their honesty and trustworthiness, which the former had demonstrated during his previous years of service under Venetian rule.[20] Likewise, regime changes did not seem to affect the *casermieri* too much during the Austro-Russian occupation of 1799-1800. Several *casermieri* who had begun working under the Cisalpine Republic stayed at their posts after its fall, facing the same problems; barracks custodians, in 1799, were too immediately useful and, possibly, not regarded as politically sensitive enough to warrant a purge. This stood true at the return of the French in 1800, in a similar vein to the few and half-hearted purges of pro-Austrian personnel in the second Cisalpine municipality of Milan.[21] Thus, during the Austro-Russian interregnum, Cisalpine-appointed *casermiere* Ferrario remained at Sant'Eustorgio, reporting on the Russian troops' attempts at stealing firewood, hay and garden produce from the houses around the barracks.[22] *Casermiere* Fasanotti worked at San Vittore in early 1799,[23] then at Santa Maria delle Grazie under the Austro-Russians;[24] he remained there until at least 1801,[25] without anyone taking issue with his continued service. The *casermiere* in Monza, Domenico Burocco, started his job in 1798 until June 1799, and regained it in 1802.[26] He stayed in Monza during the Austro-Russian occupation, without a trace of political persecution; the municipal office that took over the barracks service had nothing but praise to bestow on his diligence and hard work.[27]

[19] ASCMI LM 353, municipal official Villa to the Olona central administration (minute), 13 Germinal VII/2 April 1799.
[20] ASMI MGC 169, central administration of the Serio to the minister of war, 16 Germinal VI/5 April 1798.
[21] Pagano, *Comune di Milano*, p.46.
[22] ASCMI LM 344, Casermiere Ferrario to the provisional administration, 21 May 1799
[23] ASCMI LM 353, municipal adjunct Martelli to the Dicastero Centrale, 2 Ventôse VII/20 February 1799.
[24] ASCMI LM 188, "Nota degli effetti esistenti nella caserma delle Grazie", signed "Genaro Fasanotti casermiere", 31 July 1799.
[25] ASCMI LM 188, report to the central administration on the Grazie barracks, 10 Frimaire X/5 October 1801.
[26] ASCMB FRC 113, certificate of the municipal administration of Monza for Domenico Burocco, 29 May 1807.
[27] ASCMB FRC 163, Deputazione all'Estimo in Monza to the Regio Cancelliere of the 22nd District, 15 August 1799.

IV.2 History of the service, 2: Hiring the *riformati*, 1801-1803

The barracks inspection service of the second Cisalpine Republic continued with the same organisation of an inspector and an array of *casermieri*. Their tasks and modes of appointment were outlined in regulations published in November 1800.[28] In addition to collaborating with the quartermasters to draw up procès-verbaux, the inspectors were to visit the barracks thrice in ten days, while the *casermieri* made daily inspections in their barracks.[29] The later regulation for the barracks service, approved in October 1801, stated that the contractor would be in charge of appointing the custodians and warehousemen,[30] whereas the government would appoint an inspector per department and a sub-inspector in every commune that had barracks, drawing them from the ranks of captains and lieutenants (adjuncts were to be sub-lieutenants).[31] The minister clarified that "gli Ispettori, sotto Ispettori ed i loro aggiunti debbano essere tratti dalla classe degli ufficiali militari riformati".[32] This selection system fished from a basin of unemployed officers, either unfit for active service and put on half-pay[33] or waiting for their unit to be formed, a common occurrence while the national army was just beginning to reorganise.[34] Employing officers on half-pay had economic motivations, saving on public expenses and aiding financially struggling soldiers: "questa misura fu presa per rendere meno gravose le spese di casermaggio e per rendere meno infelice lo stato dei detti ufficiali."[35] This openly moral and duty-driven aspect echoes the appointment of returned Cisalpine exiles and victims of political persecution to public offices after 1800, which the government of the Italian Republic discontinued for the sake of efficiency and of excluding "democrats" from the administrative apparatus.[36]

On 30 October 1801, the ministry of war sent out the circular letters

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[28] *Raccolta delle leggi, proclami, ordini ed avvisi pubblicati in Milano dal giorno 13 Pratile anno VII* (Milan, 1800), i, p.170, "Istruzioni per la manutenzione, e conservazione delle Caserme, e loro effetti approvate dal Comitato di Governo con decreto 14 Brumale anno IX".
[29] Ibid., art.6-7.
[30] ASCMB FRC 177, "Regolamento concernente l'accasermamento della truppa", 23 Vendémiaire X/15 October 1801, "Appalto", art.10.
[31] Ibid., "Obblighi del governo", art.1-2.
[32] ASMI MGC 171, minister of war to the government committee, 3 Brumaire X/25 October 1801.
[33] The term "riformato" is a calque of the French word, already in the 18th century indicating an officer on half-pay, "qui étant réformé, ne laisse pas de tirer la paye & l'appointement de Lieutenant, de Capitaine, de Colonel, mais moindre que la paye, que l'appointement de celui qui est en pied" in F. d'Alberti di Villanuova, *Nouveau dictionnaire françois-italien* (Paris, 1771), ii, p. 739.
[34] Schneid, *Soldiers*, 26-7.
[35] ASMI MGC 171, minister of war to the government committee, 3 Brumaire X/25 October 1801.
[36] Antonielli, *I prefetti*, 59-61.

appointing inspectors and sub-inspectors. The letter to the inspectors invested twelve inspectors, one for each department, and thirty-three sub-inspectors.[37] These men had been chosen, the circular letter explained, on the basis of their well-attested merits and experience: "Le buone testimonianze che mi furono rese sulle qualità vostre, e sui lumi che possedete in oggetti di militare amministrazione mi hanno determinato a nominarvi Ispettore alle caserme del dipartimento."[38] A copy of the 23 Vendémiaire regulations accompanied the circular letter, to serve as the inspector's vade-mecum in every matter of service; if need be, "[i]n tutti i casi difficili il ministero col quale vi terrete in relazione vi darà delle successive istruzioni."[39] Lastly, the appointment was considered as provisional "fintanto che non risultino col fatto avverate le informazioni avute."[40]

These fortunate officers were but a fraction of the applicants. Since October 1801, the minister of war received several petitions from jobless officers presenting their credentials for posts as sub-inspectors or adjuncts, for whom there remained a strong demand once the inspectors and sub-inspectors discovered how much work there was to do with a disproportionately small staff. Information played an important role in the selection process; since these posts were sought-after, applicants were all too keen to provide the government with information about themselves, their merits and skills, and mobilise their connections to substantiate their claims. This stress on verifiable, confirmed merit reflects the applicants' awareness of what the Napoleonic state expected from them, and their ability to internalise its semantics of merit, competence and relevant experience within a context of growing professionalism among public officials.[41] Their instruments to reach out to the minister were heavily indebted to Ancien Régime petitions and supplications; the new values of professional merit and patriotic zeal imbued a traditionally paternalistic and personalised communication with power. Although these practices characterised the "old corruption" that had come under fire from European reformists since the 1780s-1790s within a wider criticism of Ancien Régime,[42] the petitioners wielded them as tools of

[37] ASMI MGC 171, circular letter to the inspectors, circular letter to the sub-inspectors, 8 Brumaire X/30 October 1801.
[38] Ibid.
[39] Ibid.
[40] Ibid.
[41] Antonielli, *I prefetti*, p.70.
[42] J.-I. Engels, "Corruption and Anticorruption in the Era of Modernity and Beyond", in G. Geltner, R. Kroeze, A. Vitória (eds.), *Anti-corruption in history. From antiquity to the modern era* (Oxford, 2017), 168-80.

knowledge and assurance to prove their suitability to work.

Materially, the situation of many *riformati* was not easy. Service in the barracks inspection, while hardly glamorous, represented for the applicants an unmissable opportunity for a fixed job in times that were just beginning to stabilise with peace, like the French ministerial clerical staff and *fonctionnaires* had clung to their posts throughout the economic crises of the Directory.[43] Lack of active service deprived several junior officers of their main source of income, sometimes the only job they felt fit for. The problem was all the more acute if the officers had a family. After the peace of Amiens, wrote one, "il sudetto Belloni Sotto Ten.te ritrovasi rifformato a metà soldo, cui atesa la Carezza de viveri tutti, non puo assolutamente essere quella bastevole al necessario sostentamento della di lui Consorte e figlio".[44] Another officer, Sub-Lieutenant Pontoglio, waiting for his demi-brigade to be recruited, needed money "per far fronte alle limitate spese di numerosa mia famiglia, per cui trovandomi sin a quest'ora ridotto al semplice mezzo soldo, costretto m'azzardo di inviarvi o Citt.o Ministro il presente foglio" and ask to be considered for an appointment as adjunct of a sub-inspector in the vacant places of the Alto Po and Mincio departments.[45] Pontoglio's language strikes chords of humility and self-effacement, describing himself as "forced" to "dare" contact the minister. In fact, contacting the minister was less of a dare than Pontoglio's semantics of humility claimed; information was readily available on the days when the minister received visitors.[46] The pathetic accents underscore the minister's symbolic role as the "good father" providing for his military family, righting the wrongs of poverty and forced idleness; this translated onto the minister a key feature of the prince that Ancien Régime petitioners invoked as *paterfamilias* of the state,[47] than an example of the "Napoleonic friendship" as a set of solidarity and affection between soldiers and officers.[48]

Throughout the *riformati*'s petitions, a general awareness emerges that some officers were more successful than others in securing employment. This

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[43] Church, "Social basis", p.68.
[44] ASMI MGC 171, Sub-Lieutenant Belloni to the minister of war, 23 Frimaire X/13 January 1802.
[45] ASMI MGC 171, Sub-Lieutenant Pontoglio to the minister of war, 25 Brumaire X/16 November 1801.
[46] A slightly later guidebook informed visitors that the minister of war held audience every Thursday and Friday. *Il fiacre, ossia guida pratica della città di Milano considerata e come centrale della Repub. Italiana e capo luogo del dipartimento di Olona, ed in se stessa* (Milan, 1804), p.12.
[47] C. Nubola, "Supplications between politics and justice: The northern and central Italian states in the early modern age", *International Review of Social History,* 46 (2001), 35-56.
[48] B.J. Martin, *Napoleonic friendship. Military fraternity, intimacy and sexuality in nineteenth-century France* (Durham, 2010).

awareness seems to be simultaneously a cause of anxiety and a rhetorical tool to lend urgency to the petitioner's claim. Writing sometime between November and December 1801, Captain Giuliani decried his current idle state of *riformato* after four years of "vita attiva al servigio della Repubblica".[49] He had previously spoken to the minister in person; this letter was a follow-up to that meeting, and to the minister's promises of employment that had failed to come true, leading Giuliani to fear the minister had forgotten about him.[50] He drew comparisons between his situation and his comrades', appealing to the minister's sense of fairness: "Ma tutto spero nella v.a giustizia, e son certo, che mi sarete benefico, come lo foste con tanti altri dandomi occupazione, ed impiego. Il Capitano Gislanzoni fù piazzato come Aggiunto all'Ispettore Dipartimentale delle Caserme; Cittadino Ministro, perché non potreste anche a me un simile impiego appoggiare?"[51]

The reference to the collective plight of these veterans forced into idleness is even stronger in the words of Sub-Lieutenant Giovanni Costantini. His letter starts off with an emotionally-charged description of his present condition, all the more painful for a good patriot: "È inesprimibile quello, che soffre un cuore Repubblicano, attaccato per principi, e per educazione alla gran Causa, ed accostumato ad una vita attiva qual è quella del Militare in Campagna, il vedersi ora nell'Ozio miseramente languire, quantunque senza sua colpa."[52] The polemical potential of this complaint, however, was immediately dampened in the certainty that the minister, out of his "innata … Giustizia e bontà", would help Costantinit and his peers out "con qualche impiego onorato, e dovuto alle nostre fatiche, con impiegarci come Aggiunti ai Sotto Ispettori alle Caserme."[53]

Despite the collective dimension of the *riformati*'s hardships, the petitions were strictly individual; the *riformati* never organised to present their grievances as a group, nor would it have been legally possible, as the Cisalpine constitution sanctioned every citizen's right to petition as long as the petition was individual.[54] The only collective effort in the examined

[49] ASMI MGC 171, Captain Giuliani to the minister of war, s.d. Frimaire X.
[50] Ibid.
[51] Ibid.
[52] ASMI MGC 171, Sub-Lieutenant Costantini to the minister of war, 27 Frimaire X/18 December 1801.
[53] Ibid.
[54] "Costituzione della Repubblica Cisalpina (1797)", art.365. For an analysis of the right to petition and the ideological and legal debates about it in the context of another French satellite state: J. Oddens, "The greatest right of them all. The debate on the right to petition in the Netherlands from the Dutch Republic to the Kingdom (c. 1750-1830)", *European History Quarterly*, 47 (2017), 634-56. Like the 1797 Cisalpine

corpus of letters comes from the initiative of two wounded lieutenants who had lost their lodgings and their pay, and dabbled in the book-printing business, publishing works of evident ideological value such as a translation of the Batavian Republic's constitution and an account of the 18 Brumaire coup.[55] Their book-printing activity was presented as contiguous to their military effort for the republic, and as a way to put their forced idleness to productive use ("dall'ozio abbiam ritratto vantaggio"[56]). This petition clearly illustrates how, for men of often precarious means, the barracks inspection service was a window of opportunity like any other; several petitioners presented themselves as eager, if not desperate, to take up any kind of work. Sub-Lieutenant Biffi, a *riformato* whose half-pay went to settle debts he had accumulated during a spell of illness, put forward his good character and his basic mathematical skills to beg the minister for "l'impiego come più vi aggrada",[57] without any specific request. Other petitioners admitted openly that the barracks inspection service was a back-up plan due to lack of qualifications for more prestigious posts.[58]

In addition to making their own case, the *riformati* made recourse to letters of recommendation if they could count on a contact in a position of any power to appeal to the ministry. This was in line with the relational nature of employability in the 19th century, conditioning interpersonal ties to matter more than formal attestations of skills in a candidate's curriculum.[59] Rather than dismantling these practices, the empire created new basins of recruitment and employment, through amalgam policies, territorial annexations, and multifarious institutions.[60] Such practices were normal in the military, generating consternation and resentment only when they failed to produce results[61] or led to the advancement of less deserving men over more deserving ones.[62] Recommendation sometimes helped protégés

constitution, the Dutch constitutions of 1798 and 1801 prohibited collective petitions unless they bore the names of all their signatories.

[55] ASMI MGC 171, Lieutenants Paolo Germano and Giuseppe Gallucci to the minister of war, s.d.

[56] Ibid.

[57] ASMI MGC 171, Sub-Lieutenant Giuseppe Biffi to the minister of war, s.d.

[58] ASMI MGC 171, Lieutenant Gaetano Bolis to the minister of war, 20 Brumaire X/11 November 1801.

[59] M. Gribaudi, "Le savoir des relations: liens et racines sociales d'une administration dans la France du xixe siècle", *Le mouvement social*, 228 (2009) p.14.

[60] Lignereux, *Les impériaux*, chapter 1, section "Une politique de recrutement?".

[61] Italian army officer Francesco Baggi recounted in his memoirs how General Fontanelli helped his fellow countrymen from Modena in their careers, but failed to do so in the case of Baggi and his brother. F. Baggi, *Memorie di Francesco Baggi*, ed. C. Ricci (Bologna, 1898), p.84.

[62] Emblematic is the discontent of Colonel Montmarie, a veteran of the Egypt campaign and commander of the 28th dragoon regiment in 1807-1810, at the attempts of young, noble-born Lieutenant Eugène de Roussy to be recommended for promotion to captain over older and more experienced officers. F. Houdecek,

overcome bureaucratic obstacles; Colonel Ordioni wrote the minister to aid his brother-in-law, Lieutenant Neri, who had been appointed as sub-inspector but had not yet received his papers. "I doveri di parentela mi obbligano a raccomandarvelo", Ordioni candidly explained.[63]

Recommendation was not limited to family ties. In the case of Sub-Lieutenant Barrera (2nd light demi-brigade), the recommender was the chief of the 1st division of the ministry, General Achille Fontanelli; writing to the chief of the 3rd division, he forwarded Barrera's petitions and his own judgment: "Io non so dispensarmi dal raccomandarvelo caldamente, onde, se vi è luogo, lo vogliate proporre per un impiego di aggiunto ad un sotto ispettore alle caserme, a cui la sua morale, i suoi lumi, e le sue famigliari convenienze gli accordano un diritto."[64] Fontanelli intervened again to recommend Captain Pastorio and Lieutenant Locatelli, on grounds of "la conosciuta loro morale" and in a context where the recommendation would remain "sempre però nei termini di giustizia."[65] He was then appealed to by a French officer in the Cisalpine army, Lieutenant Castan; discharged while on leave, Castan, now seeking employment, reminded the minister of the letters praising his conduct in war from Fontanelli, several other generals of the republic, and the French minister of war.[66] Fontanelli was an important testimony to Castan's self-presentation, given "l'amitié que vous avez pour le chef de brigade Fontanelli; de qui j'ai l'honneur d'être particulierement connu."[67] The friendship between Fontanelli and the minister, and Castan's acquaintance with the general, was presented as a guarantee of the lieutenant's merits, verifiable through the personal links of a trusted source. The role of personal interactions between recommenders and authority emerges also in the case of Lieutenant Roncaglia; *commissario di guerra* Guizzardi vouched for him with Ignazio Banfi, the chief of the 3rd ministerial division, in a letter on openly friendly terms, addressed "all'amico Banfi" and using the informal pronoun "tu".[68]

Despite this flood of petitions from a large pool of potential employees,

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"Introduction", in C. de Loth and F. Houdecek (eds.), *De l'empereur au roi: Correspondance d'Eugène de Roussy (1806-1830)* (Paris, 2012), 37-38.

[63] ASMI MGC 171, Colonel Ordioni to the minister of war, 29 Brumaire X/20 November 1801. Bad luck with work seemed to run in the family, as another letter of Ordioni to the minister in the same date reveals that Ordioni was in financial trouble and urged for the payment of his monthly wage.

[64] ASMI MGC 165, chief of the 1st division to the chief of the 3rd, 26 Frimaire X/17 December 1801.

[65] ASMI MGC 171, chief of the 1st division to the chief of the 3rd, 4 Nivôse X/25 December 1801.

[66] ASMI MGC 171, Lieutenant Castan to the minister of war, 3 Nivôse X/24 December 1801.

[67] Ibid.

[68] ASMI MGC 171, Guizzardi to Banfi, 21 Nivôse X/11 January 1802.

militarising the service did not proceed quickly enough. In November 1801, the ministry sent a circular letter to the department administrations, urging them to have the civilian inspectors and sub-inspectors fired and replaced by the military ones, and blaming the "autorità locali" for allowing these irregularities.[69] The problem seemingly persisted, as three months later the government commissar in the Serio department issued a reminder to the municipality of Bergamo, in case it was employing civilian inspectors and sub-inspectors.[70] A further source of uncertainty was the inception of the general contract for the barracks supply. As the Papounau company would appoint its *casermieri* and warehousemen, until the official start date of the contract (1 January 1802) the Cisalpine government oversaw the collection, inspection and custody of supplies on its own. The regulations of 23 Vendémiaire already considered the contractor in active service, so his absence in this interim stage led to confusion as to how to apply the articles the inspectors were to observe. Tordorò offered some guidelines to the inspectors and the department administrations, reminding them to forward regularly updated inventories, and to keep watch against damages to the items and the buildings.[71] Even with the contractor's personnel in place, cooperation was not always smooth. The military character of the ministerial appointments influenced the behaviour of the inspectors and sub-inspectors, which the Papounau company decried as arrogant and threatening towards its delegates, overstepping the boundaries of their task to appropriate company materiel and distribute it at their whim.[72] Thus, despite careful attention to staff selection, a militarised inspection service proved not to be a definitive solution in terms of professionalism, adding to the problems of the contract. Nor could it be sustainable as the Italian army grew in size, and needed officers back in the ranks; in early 1803, part of the *riformati* were ordered to converge to Cremona and Modena and await instructions there,[73] as their demi-brigades were finally recruited and entering service.[74] With the end of the first general contract looming, too, the service began reorganising.

[69] ASMI MGC 171, minister of war to the department central administrations, 7 Frimaire X/28 November 1801.
[70] ASBG PS 1068, government commissar to the Bergamo municipality (copy of letter), 15 Pluviôse X/4 February 1802.
[71] ASMI MGC 171, circular letter to the department central administrations and the inspectors, 4 Frimaire X/25 November 1801.
[72] ASMI MGDM 14, administrative council of war to Tordorò, 13 October 1802.
[73] ASMI MGC 172, administrative council of war to the chief of the 1st section, 3 March 1803.
[74] ASMI MGDM 109, report to the minister of war, 2 June 1803.

IV.3 History of the service, 3: Towards municipal management

At the end of the Paponeau contract and before the next contract, the communes and prefectures took over the barracks inspection service until August-September 1803. In this interim period, the communes had to choose, as the vice-prefect of Vigevano instructed his municipality in late July 1803, "un probo, ed abile sogetto che sotto la sua responsabilità esercita in avvenire, e sino a nuovo ordine le funzioni di casermiere"[75]; the vice-prefect even suggested a candidate, shopkeeper Pietro Paolo Lolli, recommended to him by the departmental administration.[76] In the Lario department, the prefecture similarly tried to influence the choice, but in far milder terms; in confirming for another month the current *casermiere*, Cipriano Zerboni, the prefect asked the municipality of Como "se in di lui concorso siavi un altro soggetto forse più attivo, ed idoneo al retto, e pontuale adempimento dell'incumbenza che gli è affidata."[77] That was not the case, the municipality replied; Zerboni was the ideal man for the job, combining personal bravery, expertise borne out of long service, "e la cognizione delle lingue che sono in uso attualmente presso il Militare stazionato nella Rep.a Italiana".[78] A decree issued in December 1803 allowed the prefectures to pay the employees who had served in the interim between the two contracts,[79] through the funds allocated by the administrative council of war for the barracks expenses.[80]

While the contractor remained in charge of his own personnel, new regulations for the military accommodation came into force on 6 June 1804. The new regulations established, as caretakers of the state-owned garrison barracks, the *guarda-fortificazioni* of the Genio (the military engineer corps), or, lacking them, by *conservatori*[81] (equal to *guarda-fortificazioni* and allowed to wear their uniform[82]) and three classes of custodians, depending on the capacity of the barracks.[83] The Italian regulations clearly reprised the French system of *gardes de fortification*, which had militarised the service in 1791-'92.[84] Candidates to the role of *conservatori* had to sign a register,

[75] ASNO PA 1049 bis, vice-prefect of Vigevano to the municipality, 25 July 1803.
[76] Ibid.
[77] ASCO Atti 1800-1850 760, prefect of Lario to the municipality of Como, 4 July 1803.
[78] ASCO Atti 1800-1850 760, municipal delegate Sebregondi to the prefect's letter of 4 July, 19 July 1803.
[79] ASBG PS 1068, administrative council of war to the prefect of Serio, 17 March 1804.
[80] ASBG PS 1068, prefect of Serio to the chief accountant, 23 March 1804.
[81] "Regolamento sulle caserme", 6 June 1804, art. 10.
[82] Ibid., art. 18.
[83] Ibid., art. 15.
[84] See I.5.

which the prefectures would later forward to the Genio to evaluate each applicant.[85] Requisites were literacy, good conduct, and "qualche mezzo di sussistenza, non essendo lo stipendio, che verrà accordato bastante da se solo al proprio mantenimento."[86] Seeking candidates with their own means of subsistence beside the meagre salary was a way to ward corruption off, reminiscent of the arguments for choosing personnel to sit in prefecture councils with either a well-to-do financial situation so they would need no salary, or a substantial pay supposed to make them unsusceptible to bribery.[87] Local influence was a liability in that regard, not just for corruption but also when clashing regulations hindered the service; the municipalities refused to hand the barracks and supplies over to the new *conservatori*, "asserendo di non essere officialmente invitate a far tali consegne, e tampoco a rilasciare i materiali."[88] Lack of respect for the regulations, for which custodians "non dipendono altrimenti che dai conservatori, ed i conservatori dagli uff.li del Genio, e dai commissari di guerra",[89] went hand in hand with the danger that municipally appointed custodians were exposed to "un certo dominio".[90] The influence of municipalities on custodians could extend to personnel in the contractor's service. Domenico Burocco was *casermiere* in Monza for the Martini company,[91] but when the municipality had to organise the barracks for the Gendarmerie garrison[92] and was asked to send a delegate to the prefecture to retrieve the barracks supplies,[93] the chosen delegate was Burocco.[94]

The June 1804 regulations, as well as the news spreading of upcoming reorganisation plans for the barracks,[95] opened new windows of opportunity for employment, and petitions again flooded the ministry of war. The type of work did not appear to matter much to the applicants; aspiring employee Giuseppe Manini, a forty-five years-old family man in Cremona, begged for "l'impiego di Conservatore, o qualche altro che più v'aggrada per la

[85] ASMN PM 665, prefecture of Mincio department to the commander of the Genio (minute), 20 February 1805.
[86] ASMN PM 665, minister of war to the Mincio prefect, 19 January 1805.
[87] Antonielli, *I prefetti*, 48-9.
[88] ASMN PM 665, minister of war to the Mincio prefect, 6 February 1805.
[89] Ibid.
[90] Ibid.
[91] ASCMB FRC 24, Martini to the municipal administration of Monza, 22 February 1804.
[92] ASCMB FRC 107, prefect of Olona to the municipal administration of Monza, 3 April 1804.
[93] ASCMB FRC 107, prefect of Olona to the municipal administration of Monza, 7 July 1804.
[94] ASCMB FRC 107, minute of the municipal administration, 10 July 1804.
[95] Probably referring to what would become the lists of barracks that the state retained as per the 29 March 1806 decree; *Bollettino delle leggi del Regno d'Italia* (Milan, 1806), vii, "Decreto relative alle caserme", 29 March 1806.

manutenzione delle Caserme, che a presentito debbansi tra poco aprire in questa Città."[96] Although the regulations required the *conservatori* and custodians to be Italian citizens,[97] foreigners who had moved to the Italian Republic and served in the military also petitioned the government for a right to work in the barracks service. That was the case of Ciro Sanfelice,[98] who, in his appeal to the commander of the Genio, General Bianchi d'Adda, stressed the precariousness of his position without trying to aggrandise his average talents, while directing the general for reference to the network of his fellow Neapolitan exiles.[99] Another Neapolitan, Carlo Zevaglios, petitioned the minister twice between November and December 1804;[100] the significant difference that Zevaglios made over Sanfelice, was that he had papers to back his claims, as well as testimonies that could vouch for his past service as medical officer, his moral standing, and his skills.[101] He was hired as *conservatore*,[102] and the ministry did not even bring up his citizenship.

Some petitioners viewed this recruitment drive as an opportunistic chance to trade provisional (although prolonged) employments for a more stable post. This held true for Francesco Paganini, who petitioned Bianchi d'Adda for a place as *conservatore*, after working for two years as an assistant of the engineer corps.[103] Similarly, Giuseppe Noè from Pavia (who had left the first Cisalpine army to care for his family and get a university degree in land surveying[104]) showcased a year-long collaboration with the Genio on the fortification works as relevant work experience for a post as *conservatore* in his hometown. For Noè, the attractiveness of being a *conservatore* was the permanent job, as opposed to the temporary appointment at the fortifications. Again, the petitioner fashions himself as a long-term patriot who suffered for his unwavering loyalty and needs stable means to support his family[105],

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[96] ASMI MGC 169, Giuseppe Manini to Bianchi d'Adda, 24 December 1804.
[97] "Regolamento sulle caserme", 6 June 1804, art. 13.
[98] His name appears in a list of subjects banned from the Kingdom of Naples: *Filiazioni dei Rei di Stato condannati dalla Suprema Giunta di Stato, e da' Visitatori Generali, in vita, e a tempo ad essere asportati da' Reali Dominij* (Naples, 1800), p.17.
[99] ASMI MGC 170, Ciro Sanfelice to Bianchi d'Adda, s.d.
[100] ASMI MGC 170, Carlo Zevaglios to the minister of war, 13 December 1804.
[101] ASMI MGC 172, certificate of service for Carlo Zevaglios by commissaire-ordonnateur Lenoble, 16 Ventôse X/7 March 1802; certificate by commissaire de guerre Bois, 15 Floréal X/5 May 1802; certificate by commissaire-ordonnateur Lenoble, 30 Germinal XI/20 April 1803.
[102] ASMI MGC 172, Bianchi d'Adda to the minister of war, 26 May 1806.
[103] ASMI MGC 170, Francesco Pagani to Bianchi d'Adda, 9 December 1804.
[104] ASMI MGC 170, Giuseppe Noè to Colonel Rossi, 20 November 1804.
[105] ASMI, MGC 170, "Stato che subordina il Cittadino Giuseppe Noè tutt'ora soprastante provvisorio ai lavori del Genio nella Comune di Pavia sotto la direzione del Capitano del Genio Sacco", 9 November 1804.

appealing to the justness of the higher authority and the prestige of his certificates. These credentials and the endorsement of Colonel Girolamo Rossi, the commander of the Genio division in Milan,[106] bore long-term fruits, as Noè kept serving in Pavia as a *guardia del Genio* into the 1810s.[107]

Other candidates placed their hopes in the hands of their contacts in the armed forces. While campaigning in southern Italy, General Severoli wrote from his headquarters in Taranto to the minister of war in Milan, in order to vouch for a relative:

> "Il Cittadino Sebastiano Baccanini di Faenza desidera di essere impiegato in qualità di conservatore dei stabilimenti militari a norme dell'ultimo regolamento pubblicato su questo particolare. Egli ne presenta la sua dimanda formale, ed i richiesti recapiti. Io mi prendo la libertà di raccomandarlo, Cittadino Ministro alla vostra Bontà. Egli mi apartiene per parentela, giacché è il fratello di mia cognata, e le circostanze della sua famiglia lo obbligano a tirare qualche profitto dalla sua industria. Mi lusingo, che le informazioni, che prenderete sovra di lui, vi faranno conoscere, che non vi propongo un giovane indegno della vostra protezione."[108]

Severoli's letter of reference for his relative encapsulates the inherent ambiguities of the candidate's and the regime's professional ethos, dependent as it was on the mediatory role of patrons within the notables to build its professional ranks.[109] Personal ties and the usual appeal to means of subsistence for the candidate's family came into the plea, only to buttress his potential usefulness and his merits, certified by formal documentation.

With regard to *casermieri* and custodians, after the end of the Martini contract in April 1805, custodianship personnel crossed from the contractor into the state-run management in bulk; they made up the staff ranks well into later years in the heartland departments of the Kingdom, while the ex-Venetian departments east of the Adige recruited local personnel through the prefectures.[110] The transition caused salary problems as the ministerial delegation decided to charge the contractor with the last month of salary due to the employees at the central magazine in Milan; three years later, these

[106] Crociani, Ilari, Paoletti, *Storia militare del Regno*, i, 791-2.
[107] ASMI MGC 702, Colonel Galateo to Noè, 31 August 1813.
[108] ASMI MGC 169, Severoli to the minister of war, 4 September 1804.
[109] Woolf, *Napoleon's integration*, p.188.
[110] ASMI MGC 172, Tordorò to the minister of war, 21 December 1807.

employees were still creditors.[111] The expansion of the kingdom did not make administrative matters easier. Especially in the departments across the Adige, the minister believed there were too many employees, wasting money and supplies.[112] In order to remedy this, Tordorò had demanded status reports on all the barracks employees in the new departments, but prefects and commissari had not always replied.[113] Tordorò suggested concentrating the supplies in the departmental capital cities, appointing one delegate per department with a sufficient number of warehousemen and *casermieri*, paid the same as the personnel in the old departments.[114] He implemented this reduction of employees and rationalisation of their tasks by springtime 1807,[115] but for the time being it remained unfeasible to even out the wage differences between the old and new departments, since the employees in the latter were provisional.[116] In the old departments, 77 employees of the ministerial delegation (departmental delegates, adjuncts, warehousemen, *casermieri*) survived the redundancy, not including the office of the delegation itself and the local custodians, *conservatori* and *casermieri* at the service of the municipalities.[117] Out of them, 63 started their work under the Martini contract, and 13 under the ministerial delegation; the Crostolo department was the only one where the delegate and three *casermieri* were all appointed under the ministerial delegation. The majority of these employees were Italian, including one Jewish Italian; the exceptions were one Swiss, one Roman, three Frenchmen, and five Corsicans (two of whom, the delegate and warehouseman in Bologna, being father and son).[118]

At the lowest level of the staff hierarchy, the ranks of the demobilised or wounded veterans provided at least part of the barracks custodians, similar to how the upper levels of the service (inspectors and sub-inspectors) had employed jobless officers. Echoing the imperial policy of reserving such places in public administration like forestry service to veterans,[119] as well as the practice of preferring veterans for employment as *gardes de fortification* in the French barracks,[120] the Italian ministry of war appointed "dei

[111] ASMI MGC 172, ministerial delegation to the minister of war, 23 March 1809.
[112] ASMI MGC 172, Tordorò to the minister of war, 20 January 1807.
[113] Ibid.
[114] Ibid.
[115] ASMI MGC 172, Tordorò to the minister of war, 9 April 1807.
[116] ASMI MGC 172, deliberation of the 2nd ministerial division, 1st section, 30 December 1807.
[117] ASMI MGC 172, "Stato nominativo del personale conservato dietro le disposizioni contenute nel Dispaccio dell'11 Febbraio 1807 n. 63385", 5 April 1807.
[118] Ibid.
[119] Bertaud, *Quand les enfants*, 151-2.
[120] See I.4.

meritevoli soldati invalidi, e veterani"[121] as custodians, although not in every barracks.[122]

In January 1809, a new decree devolved the entire garrison barracks supply, custodianship and maintenance service to the municipalities.[123] The municipalities made their calls for applicants, under presentation of surety bonds and subject to approval from the prefecture, for posts of *commesso contabile* and warehouseman/custodian, whose pay would be determined by the municipalities themselves.[124] In Como, this reduced the employees in the service, from seven under the ministerial delegation, to three: "un contabile coll'incombenza di conservatore delle caserme, un magazziniere faciente anche le veci di casermiere, e custode di dette caserme, ed un uomo da magazzeno o facchino."[125] In Padua, given "le vaste distanze del Circondario interno, in cui sono situate le varie Caserme, e per le molte, e differenti località delle stesse Caserme", the *podestà* decided to employ two *casermieri* in addition to the warehouseman and the accountant.[126] In the documentation produced by the *commissari* regularly since 1810, across the departments of Adriatico, Passariano, Brenta, Piave and Tagliamento, the barracks personnel were the only "delegati e custodi particolari a conto delle comuni" in a cadre of employees of the military administration, or of the supply contractors.[127]

With regard to the appointments that did not depend on the municipalities, in November 1808 *conservatori* and *guarda-fortificazioni* were grouped under the term of *guardie del Genio*; literacy was a basic requirement, while the higher the *guardie*'s class, the more refined their technical and accounting skills had to be, verified through an examination.[128] Even long-standing, hard-working employees like Domenico Burocco in Monza, by then old and in poor health, were expected to sit the examination.[129] Although the fate of the *conservatori* remained unclear[130] in the face of the

[121] ASMI MGC 169, Bianchi d'Adda to the minister of war, 3 November 1808.
[122] ASMN PM 665, Lieutenant-Colonel Motta to the minister of war, 11 January 1806. ASMI MGC 169, Colonel Galateo to the minister of war, 11 February 1809.
[123] *Raccolta delle leggi, decreti e circolari che si riferiscono alle attribuzioni del ministero dell'interno del Regno d'Italia* (Milan, 1809), iv, "Decreto di S.A.I il principe viceré sul casermaggio", 6 January 1809.
[124] ASMN PM 665, notice of the Peschiera municipality, 20 May 1809.
[125] ASCO Atti 1800-1850 760, podestà of Como to the Lario prefect (minute), 12 April 1809.
[126] ASPD PB 26, podestà of Padua to the Brenta prefect, 6 March 1809. ASPD, PB, 26.
[127] ASMI MGC 2719, "Rapporto generale sui servizi amministrativi dipendenti dal commissario di guerra durante il mese di luglio 1810 nella sesta divisione".
[128] Ilari, Crociani, Paoletti, *Storia militare del Regno*, i, p. 797.
[129] ASMI MGC 169, Rossi to the minister of war, 5 May 1809.
[130] Ibid.

new decree, the stricter approach to advancement requirements tried to bring a certain degree of rationalisation. Many custodians had nothing but "semplici antiche commissioni di varj uffiziali del Genio, delle quali essi non hanno tenuto gran conto, e le hanno per gran parte smarrite".[131] While bureaucratic professionalism seemed to make slow progress into the barracks caretaking service, rationalising practices coexisted with informal evaluation processes. For the new regime, the key to accepting these practices, contradictory to the principles of formalised professionalism, was that they resulted in a good service and transmitted skills within the kinship network. Professionalism intended as good-level service was the end justifying the means of patronage throughout the Napoleonic administration.[132] The substitution of *casermiere* Burocco captures this duality; in 1808, the long-time *conservatore* suffered an apoplectic attack and became bed-ridden. When the minister of war requested information, Colonel Rossi waited for four months before replying, in the hope that Burocco's health would improve, but also because Burocco's concerned family had prevented him from making a "disgustoso rapporto". The service had not even dropped in quality during Burocco's illness, since it was taken over by the *conservatore*'s son and son-in-law, "ambedue probi ed esperti soggetti."[133] Widespread among the French public administration as well, this assumption was that the professional *mētis* was learned on-field, "à travers la pratique et la fréquentation assidue d'un milieu."[134] This justified the Burocco family's collective effort to stay in the service and its ability to carry it out effectively, acknowledged and approved by the Genio officer.

In fact, when another candidate tried to seize the opportunity and petition the minister to take over the sick man's post, Rossi expressed scepticism:

> "Quanto poi concerne la persona di Francesco Barozzi di Monza, che chiede replicatamente all'E. V. di essere nominato Conservatore mentre tuttora vive un povero padre di numerosa famiglia il quale ha prestato al Governo degli utili servigi, io sono affatto all'oscuro tanto rapporto alla di lui abilità che moralità, né io saprei per verità dove rivolgermi per avere dei lumi in proposito se non alle autorità locali, ciò che peraltro non mi par regolare."[135]

[131] ASMI MGC 169, Bianchi d'Adda to the minister of war, 3 November 1808.
[132] Woolf, *Napoleon's integration*, p.124.
[133] ASMI MGC 169, Rossi to the minister of war, 9 June 1808.
[134] Gribaudi, "Savoir des relations", p.14.
[135] ASMI MGC 169, Rossi to the minister of war, 9 June 1808.

Aside from the acknowledgment of Burocco's troubled circumstances, what emerges as crucial in Rossi's judgment is the knowledge that he, and the military administration by extension, could trust Burocco, his skills and his morality. His mistrust of Barozzi stemmed from a lack of reliable information about him. The ministry ruled in Burocco's favour; since he was still alive and the barracks service was doing well, there was no reason to hire a substitute for the current *conservatore*.[136] The Burocco family's hold on the inspection service in Monza did not last long afterwards. By 1811, Burocco's son and son-in-law had left their jobs in Monza. Since at least June 1809[137] there had been a *guardia del Genio* originally from the Agogna department,[138] Gaetano Alemanni, who later worked as provisional warehouseman.[139] In July 1813,[140] the municipal council appointed as *conservatore* Gaetano Sassi, a former adjunct secretary in the municipal office who had recently been laid off and was searching for a new employment "[l]usingandosi egli essere bastantemente nota a questa Municipalità la propria idoneità, e zelo nel servizio della Comune".[141] In addition to the pre-extant knowledge of his skills by the municipality, kinship again came in to bolster the appointee's credentials; the guarantor of Sassi's surety bond was his own brother.[142] His service in the same capacity would continue until at least 1818.[143]

Sassi was not an isolated case. Employees who had mastered the art of marketing themselves during the Napoleonic age understood quickly what skills were most desirable for the new government. In Como, during the final days of the kingdom, Cipriano Zerboni recalled his long service since 1796 "ora dipendente dalla Municipalità, ora dalla Prefettura ora dal Corpo del Genio"[144] and showcased his experience in the service and knowledge of the German language, all of which "potrebbe forse essere di qualche opportunità in queste circostanze politiche."[145] On the other hand, paternalistic connotations remained; as attested by the police commissary and the local parish, Zerboni had ten children, only one of whom old enough to work and

[136] ASMI MGC 169, deliberation of the ministry's 4th division (Genio), 15 June 1808.
[137] ASCMB FRC 115, conservatore Gaetano Alemanni to the podestà of Monza, 13 June 1809.
[138] ASNO PA 1043, minister of war to Agogna prefect, 6 June 1808.
[139] ASCMB FRC 119, minute of the podestà's office, 13 April 1812.
[140] ASCMB FRC 119, podestà of Monza to Gaetano Sassi, 21 July 1813.
[141] ASCMB FRC 119, Gaetano Sassi to the municipality of Monza, s.d.
[142] ASCMB FRC 119, surety bond act for Gaetano Sassi, signed by Luigi Sassi, 14 August 1813.
[143] ASCMB FRC 129, Gaetano Sassi to the municipal congregation of Monza, 16 June 1818.
[144] ASCO Atti 1800-1850 760, Cipriano Zerboni to the municipality of Como, 26 April 1814.
[145] Ibid.

support himself.[146]

IV.4 In-field work

A post in the barracks service was not a comfortable and undemanding job. The work of custodians required a constant presence within or in close proximity to the barracks, so that they could reach the soldiers and the materiel in their care as quickly as possible; the downside was exposure to the soldiers' violent behaviour. There remained a constant friction between the regulations and the difficulty of applying them when dealing with the army, in its turn experiencing increased professionalisation that translated into contempt for the civilians and overbearing behaviour as its logical consequence.[147] In a sense, two different spheres of new professionalism ended up clashing.

The first Cisalpine Republic offers perhaps the most striking examples of how restless troops could be when living with a chronic shortage of supplies. Antonio Ferrario, the *casermiere* at Sant'Eustorgio in Milan, braved a crowd of Piedmontese soldiers ripping off and burning the wooden fixtures of the barracks for firewood.[148] "[E]ssendo io accorso per ritenere almeno la d.ta feriata mi percossero un braccio, come pure ruppero la testa ad un uomo che travagliava con me".[149] Such life-threatening aspects of the job made compelling cases when demanding wage arrears.[150] Poor material conditions in the barracks triggered the soldiers' ire and resourcefulness alike, as Ferrario reported in January 1799; lacking straw and firewood, the soldiers threatened to burn the barracks doors.[151]

The presence of multiple civilian and military authorities with insufficient coordination and unclear boundaries to their powers generated confusion on the *casermieri*'s chain of command, hindering efficiency. In December 1798, the municipal office for military accommodation in Milan complained that the *casermiere* at Sant'Eustorgio "di mala voglia si è prestato a molti altri

[146] ASCO Atti 1800-1850 760, imperial-royal police commissar of Como to the podestà, 21 September 1814.
[147] J.-P. Bertaud, "Le regard des civils sur les militaires sous l'empire", in Drévillon, Fonck, Roucaud (eds.), *Guerres et armées napoléonniennes*, 325-38.
[148] ASCMI LM 344, Ferrario to the Dicastero Centrale, 4 Nivôse VII/24 December 1798.
[149] Ibid.
[150] ASCMB FRC 163, casermiere Giovanni Battista Pirovano to the imperial commissar Cocastelli, s.d. (registered 1 May 1800).
[151] ASCMI LM 343, Ferrario to the Dicastero Centrale, 18 January 1799.

nostri inviti, asserendo ricevere esso gli ordini dal Comandante la Piazza."[152] When dealing with the regimental officers in order to get the supplies checked for damages and the paperwork in order before a unit departed, an uncooperative captain and an absentee quartermaster easily threw a spanner in the works.[153] To be fair, it was not always the fault of military commanders. When they were on a tight schedule, they could not waste time trying to get a hold of the employee responsible for receiving back the supplies; the commander of the conscript depot in Como in 1812, one day before departing for another station, decried the behaviour of the warehouseman who had failed to return his receipts for the depot supplies.[154]

In calmer circumstances, *casermieri* recorded the weekly movements of troops through their barracks[155] (so that the *conservatore* would prepare a general summary for the *commissario*[156]) and oversaw the day-to-day management of supplies in large quantities from warehouses to barracks and back, or to a barracks from another, at the behest of the departmental inspector who authorised the operations.[157] Materiel transfers out of town were out of the *casermieri*'s remit. When the municipality of Milan had to send a batch of blankets from the San Girolamo warehouse to the village of Busto Arsizio, it charged one of its civic commissars to pick up and deliver the supplies.[158] *Casermieri* had to live in the barracks and ensure vigilance even at night. Aware of this duty and right, *casermiere* Galli, working in San Girolamo in early April 1799, asked for a bed and a desk like his colleagues had in the other barracks.[159] The regulations of 1804 explicitly made this provision for the *casermieri*, allocating them a ground-floor single room by the entrance.[160] Since no such stipulation regulated the accommodation of *conservatori*, some municipalities refused to provide it, as the minister of the interior warned the Mincio prefecture in February 1805;[161] should there not be enough space for the *conservatori* in the barracks, municipal

[152] ASCMI LM 343, Ufficio degli Alloggi Militari to the Dicastero Centrale, 24 Frimaire VII/14 December 1798.
[153] ASCMI LM 343, Ferrario to the Dicastero Centrale, 14 March 1799.
[154] ASCO Atti 1800-1850 764, commander of the conscript depot (unreadable signature) to the podestà of Como, 25 January 1812.
[155] "Regolamento sulle caserme", 6 June 1804, art.28.
[156] Ibid., art.30.
[157] ASCMI LM 148, inspector for the Olona department to delegate warehouseman at the Crociferi, 23 Messidor IX/12 July 1801.
[158] ASCMI LM 353, chief of the Ufficio Commissariatico to civic commissar Frattini, 9 April 1803.
[159] ASCMI LM 353, Filippo Galli to the Dicastero Centrale di Polizia, 14 Germinal VII/3 April 1799.
[160] "Regolamento sulle caserme", 6 June 1804, art.17.
[161] ASMN PM 665, minister of the interior to prefect of Mincio, 15 February 1805.

administrations would accommodate them elsewhere through a monthly payment from the government.[162] Therefore, in Monza, *guardia del Genio* Alemanni lived in a rented room for lack of space in the barracks.[163]

Casermieri sometimes became involved with public sales of materiel left in barracks; from January to April 1800, *casermiere* Pietro Caspani oversaw the sale of manure gathered in the San Girolamo barracks of Milan.[164] They also organised the work of casual labourers for the more menial tasks, such as cleanings, and for the handling of supplies. *Casermiere* Cermelli at the San Marco barracks presented receipts to pay a man who worked an entire afternoon to receive the barracks supplies used by a company of Polish artillery, then another man with the same task during the night.[165] Temporary workers hired by Cermelli also had to move a batch of badly damaged straw beds to the barracks courtyard, unstitch and empty them, and load them onto a cart; this operation required a day's work of three men and one "altro giovinotto" who received a lower pay.[166] Cleaning was a more long-term effort, but the San Marco barracks did not have a fixed cleaner; one was hired for six days to collect bed frames for the furniture and clean the rooms.[167] This cleaner, Felice Brambilla, was illiterate and signed the reimbursement slip with a cross in the presence of two witnesses. Through these practices of temporary employment, aimed at local unskilled labourers and exerted at his discretion, the *casermiere* became the centre of a work network that hinged on the barracks, not unlike his near-contemporary master-builders recruiting daily labourers for work in the thriving construction sites of late 18th century.[168]

If custodians needed to be a fixed presence in the barracks, inspectors and their helpers were expected to be mobile, in order to undertake inspection trips across the departments or transfer to a new location. Inspections were a part of the work for other officials in the Napoleonic empire; disposition to mobility was a necessary mark of professionalism and effectiveness, requiring prefects to tour their department of assignation, and public

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[162] Ibid.
[163] ASCMB FRC 117, Gaetano Alemanni to the podestà of Monza, 12 June 1811.
[164] ASCMI LM 353, delegate congregation of Milan and province to ragionato generale Luigi Tordorò, 1 May 1800.
[165] ASCMI LM 368, Giuseppe Cermelli to the general inspector of barracks and public buildings, 9 Prairial IX/29 May 1801.
[166] ASCMI LM 368, Cermelli to the general inspector of barracks and public buildings, 10 Prairial IX/30 May 1801.
[167] ASCMI LM 368, Felice Brambilla to the inspector of barracks, 29 Fructidor IX/16 September 1801.
[168] Bobbi, "Nascita della speculazione", p.239.

prosecutors to make the rounds of *juges de paix*. For a generation of French officials, this represented an unmissable chance to shine in the civil service all across Europe, bringing its most disorderly lands under the rule of law.[169] Inspection trips, however, were highly subject to funding issues. In order to save money, the Cisalpine ministry advised against general inspections if there were few troops in a department.[170] The inspector for the Adda-Oglio department in March 1799, on top of unpaid travel expenses he had amassed over time, needed "un'anticipazione di qualche somma, onde sostenere le spese relative alla nuova commissione datagli", that is, a general inspection of the barracks in the department, ordered by the war commissariat.[171] The ministry approved the payment of a small anticipation sum, saying nothing about the arrears, but clarified that the inspector should not take the trouble of visiting every commune, focussing instead of main garrisons needing more attention; in small, garrison-less communes, municipalities would take care of "il servizio, e la polizia delle caserme."[172] Thus, economic preoccupations, possibly as well as insufficient personnel, engendered a tendency towards entrusting on-field controls to officials residing as close as possible to the barracks; department-wide inspections seemed to become rarer, as the government rather relied on the chain of information that linked custodians, *conservatori* and *commissari*. Inspections sometimes resurfaced as extraordinary measures. Inspector Contaretti accompanied General Majnoni on a trip across the Agogna department in June 1802, visiting communes all the way to Domodossola to scrutinise the Papounau company's work.[173] In the interval between the general contracts, the government sent provisional delegate Ripamonti in the Rubicone department to oversee the transition period; this exhausting work trip caused the zealous delegate to fall sick and resign.[174]

If the French prefects in the Tuscan and Roman departments largely shared this outlook, their colleagues in the Italian Republic did not so much when the prefectures were established in 1801-1802. Melzi attempted to draw the

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[169] M. Broers, *Napoleon's other war. Bandits, rebels and their pursuers in the age of revolutions* (Oxford, 2010), 85-104.
[170] ASMI MGC 611, 1st sub-division of the 1st ministerial division, 1 Complémentaire VI/1 September 1798.
[171] ASMI MGC 611, central administration of the Adda-Oglio to the minister of war, 13 Ventôse VII/3 March 1799.
[172] ASMI MGC 611, minister of war to the central administration of Adda-Oglio (copy), 29 Ventôse VII/19 March 1799.
[173] ASMI MGC 171, Contaretti to the minister of war, 20 June 1802. ASMI, MGC, 171.
[174] ASMI, MGC 172, legal auditor Lonati to the minister of war, 6 September 1803.

prefects from the politically moderate land-owning classes, but since a prefect could not come from the same department where he operated, the management of one's own property and local client networks made land-owners unwilling to move elsewhere and start a career as professional civil servant, with only their salary in exchange.[175] Moving was not a problem for the unemployed officers that staffed the inspection service. The first step was reaching their destinations, not just out of zeal to display their usefulness but also because their payroll started from the day they presented themselves to the local authorities.[176] The *riformati* who travelled to take up their posts in winter 1801 had to do so at short notice in bad weather, which severely delayed their journeys.[177] In this readiness to brave flooded rivers and bad roads, there is perhaps a glimpse of the construct of glory so important to the Napoleonic military culture, centred on bravery and desire for battle;[178] willingness to perform their duty in difficult circumstances, duly certified and demonstrated,[179] cast a positive light on these half-pay officers, confirming their merits. The inspector assigned to the Rubicone department, Captain Biscioni, despite recovering from a long illness, assured the minister he was ready to leave for his post in a few days.[180] A communications delay could turn into a further opportunity to demonstrate willingness; Lieutenant Nighersoli provided the minister with a certificate from the courier who had belatedly delivered him the circular letter appointing him sub-inspector in Lodi, and declared he would leave for his post the day after, "non'ostante la dirotta pioggia."[181]

Dedication to professionalism had its limits. Unlike for prefects, there never was a prohibition against inspectors, *conservatori, guardie del Genio* or even *commissari* serving in their native departments, and some men preferred staying close to home. They did internalise the language of professionalism even in this kind of demand, however. In his petition to Bianchi d'Adda for

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[175] Antonielli, *I prefetti*, p.70.
[176] ASBG PS 1068, commissario Dall'Oglio to the minister of war, 11 Pluviôse X/31 January 1802.
[177] For example: ASMI MGC 171, Captain Contaretti to the minister of war, 1 Frimaire X/22 November 1801; Captain Labrano to the minister of war, 27 Brumaire X/18 November 1801; Lieutenant Pozzani to the minister of war, 26 Brumaire X/17 November 1801; Lieutenant Bony to the minister of war, 5 Frimaire X/26 November 1801.
[178] M.J. Hughes, *Forging Napoleon's Grande Armée. Motivation, military culture, and masculinity in the French army, 1800-1808* (New York, 2012) 117-118.
[179] Lieutenant Bony, travelling from Forlì to Morbegno, presented certificates for such misadventures as remaining stuck in Brescello for five days due to the Po flood. ASMI MGC 171, Bony to the minister of war, 5 Frimaire X/26 November 1801.
[180] ASMI MGC 171, Captain Carlo Biscioni to the minister of war, 11 Brumaire X/2 November 1801.
[181] ASMI MGC 171, Lieutenant Nighersoli to the minister of war, 23 Brumaire X/14 November 1801.

a post as *conservatore*, Giovanni Battista Bastianini presented himself as meeting the criteria of "incorrotta condotta" and "attività senza limiti",[182] but also ventured to ask that his appointment be to the barracks of either Modena or his native Mantua, couching that request in humility towards himself and flattery towards the general: "Il chiedervi di essere impiegato o in Modena od a Mantova, mia presente stazione, forse sarà troppo; ma la vostra bontà che cerca di sollevare gli afflitti allor quando questo può combinare coll'interesse, e la regolarità del Servizio spero che essa se lo potrà vorrà esaudirmi."[183] The key to Bastianini's request was that it was beneficial to the service. It was an important point to get across since, beyond practical usefulness and its recognition through a patron, the contractual power of a *conservatore* or a custodian was non-existent. Unless there was an alternative use for the employee, refusal to accept a transfer meant losing the job opportunity. In 1808, custodian Luigi Mollo refused to move out of Ravenna to take up a vacancy elsewhere, "per il che venne ragionevolmente dismesso dall'impiego."[184]

Office work also came in spades, and it was often too much for one man to handle. Inspector Francesco Monti, in September 1798, operated in an area close to the Cisalpine-Helvetic border, heavily subject to troop transits towards Valtellina, and hired out provisional custodian to assist him in his work trips to transport beds from Pizzighettone.[185] As a reward for the good service, and perhaps to secure a helper, Monti proposed permanently confirming Gerosa in his post as custodian.[186] Keeping accounts and daily formwork up-to-date, to let administrative information flow and minimise the danger of wrecking the logistic apparatus, could also prove to be too much for a single man. In the department of Panaro, inspector Montanari asked "che gli venga accordato l'ajuto di uno Scrittore non potendo da solo disimpegnare le moltiplici incombenze, di cui è caricato, particolarmente riguardo ai Registri necessarj alla contabilità degli Effetti di Casermaggio, che il buon ordine esige siano tenuti in giorno, e colla dovuta esattezza."[187] Montanari's appeal to good order struck the right chord with the departmental administration, which vouched in his favour with the minister;

[182] ASMI MGC 169, Giovanni Battista Bastianini to Bianchi d'Adda, s.d.
[183] Ibid.
[184] ASMI MGC 169, Bianchi d'Adda to the minister of war, 3 November 1808.
[185] ASMI MGC 169, Francesco Monti to the central administration of the Montagna, 1 Complémentaire VI/17 September 1798.
[186] Ibid.
[187] ASMI MGC 169, central administration of Panaro to the minister of war, 13 Thermidor VI/31 July 1798.

Montanari already had a candidate in mind, "certo cittadino Savelli soggetto fornito di abilità, e patriottismo", for whom he proposed a monthly salary of forty-five Milanese lire.[188]

Suggesting suitable helpers whom an inspector knew and could trust was a common practice, even to fill in the ranks of adjuncts to sub-inspectors; Captain Rivara, inspector in the Mella department, proposed for one such role Sub-Lieutenant Sonier, who could count on a recommendation of General Lechi and was currently unemployed in Modena.[189] The location of the work counted; the capital city of the Mella department, Brescia, had over twenty barracks (as sub-inspector Olini reminded the minister in an earlier entreaty to get an adjunct[190]) and its inspection personnel needed more men; Olini, too, proposed a suitable candidate, Sub-Lieutenant Lecler, whom he described as "giovane morale".[191] In doing so, like the *casermieri* with their daily labourers, the inspectors and sub-inspectors created their own networks from which to draw help, generating a circle of dependency on the military administration and, and by extension, to the Napoleonic regime that set up and reshuffled the military establishment.

Conclusion

Caretakers were the men on the field for the military administration in barracks. Organised hierarchically from inspectors down to custodians, and closely present in barracks to the point of living in them, they were the first point of contact for the war commissariat and the ministry, or the municipalities, to gain almost real-time information on troop movements and the conditions of barracks. Their role was crucial in handling supplies and monitoring the buildings, thus helping save public money and containing disorderly behaviours of the military.

Custodianship and inspection posts proliferated through the organisational changes of the supply service and the military administration, repeatedly initiating processes of personnel selection. These processes show the extent of the imperial bureaucratic replication at a relatively low and little-known administrative level, combining Ancien Régime practices of networking and

[188] Ibid.
[189] ASMI, MGC 171, Captain Rivara to the minister of war, 9 Frimaire X/30 November 1801.
[190] ASMI MGC 171, Sub-Lieutenant Olini to the minister of war, 24 Brumaire X/15 November 1801.
[191] Ibid.

new professional criteria. As in the upper levels of Napoleonic bureaucracy, patronage mattered for the appointments of *casermieri* and barracks inspectors; skills transmission passed through practical learning, gained through diverse life experiences, and even family trade. The benchmark for recruitment was competence and effectiveness in providing a good service, certified by sureties, patronage, and direct knowledge of the employee from the administration. Looking at the careers and recruitment of *casermieri* allows a perspective from below on the Napoleonic ethos of talent and administrative professionalism, how people interpreted and appropriated its tenets to have their talents recognised and rewarded, highlighting the traditionalism of acknowledgement methods but slowly building a new professional class, made to last. The pervasiveness of war allowed *casermieri* to transcend strict political affiliation and continue working throughout French and Austrian rule. They were a remarkably resilient and ubiquitous category of employees, for as long as there were troops in barracks, they were needed to watch over the buildings and the supplies.

Chapter 5: Infrastructures

Increased troop presence generated constant demand for barracks in the Kingdom of Italy, as the best housing solution to prevent desertion and ensure the soldiers' welfare. Demand was not limited to fortress cities, undergoing complex processes of urban defortification;[1] in this regard, the Italian context was one of infrastructural reorientation across the *pays de guerre*, pushed by geopolitical change, as a northern Italy wholly under French hegemony meant that the fortresses of Ancien Régime states now served no strategic purpose. The forts on the Piedmontese Alps, erected by the Savoyard monarchy to keep the French out, were slated for dismantlement after the annexation to France;[2] isolated Fenestrelle was maintained as a prison,[3] whereas the citadel of Alessandria, controlling access to the Po Valley, underwent massive renovations.[4] Shifting borders influenced the usefulness of fortifications; an emblematic case was Rocca d'Anfo, protecting the way in to the Kingdom of Italy from Tyrol, right above Brescia and its arms manufactures. After years of work and money spent on potentiating the Rocca, the annexation of Trentino to the kingdom in 1809 made it useless as a border stronghold until the Austrians advanced into southern Tyrol and posed a threat of invasion in 1813.[5]

In urban contexts, the quest for public buildings, including military edifices, led to the reuse of extant real estate to host the Napoleonic administrations,[6] spreading the spatial model of clearly identifiable public offices that had taken the revolutionary ministries in Paris out of Versailles and noble residences, and into *hôtels administratifs*.[7] The reuse of expropriated Church real estate, Ancien Régime institutional seats and nationalised property was a common choice; however, as the case study of Namur shows, repurposing was not always practical and maintenance became a long-term problem, due to changed administrative practices for which the buildings were structurally

[1] Y. Mintzker, *The defortification of the German city, 1689–1866* (Cambridge, 2012).
[2] V. Comoli Mandracci, "Progetti, piani, cultura urbanistica tra Rivoluzione e Impero", in G. Bracco (ed.), *Ville de Turin. 1798-1814* (Turin, 1989), i, p.191.
[3] P. Bianchi, *Andare per fortezze e cittadelle* (Bologna, 2019), p.101.
[4] Ibid., 111-2.
[5] Fara, *Napoleone architetto*, 72-5.
[6] Simoncini "Politica napoleonica", 20-1.
[7] Kingston, *Bureaucrats*, 31-3.

unsuited, and to insufficient investments from central and local authorities.[8] The same issues manifested in the management of barracks in Italy. The military engineers played a pivotal role, along with municipal experts, in planning repairs and adaptation works, but actual maintenance required cooperation between the Genio and the municipalities, even as funding shortages sparked squabbles and paralysed regular care. Repairs affected not just the soldiers' health and quality of life, but also civilian livelihoods. Contractors and labourers performed the work, and pestered the ministry of war to receive their due; people living near barracks and fortifications often ended up evicted, or their houses damaged. Acquiring, adjusting and preserving these infrastructures was a commitment that the military administration never had the resources to face on its own, creating a constant point of contact with the civilian administration and private citizens, in line with recent views of the Napoleonic state that challenge its image of power and pervasiveness.[9]

V.1 The Genio and the communes: Maintenance and repairs

Throughout the Napoleonic period, both the French and the Italian military engineers operated in the satellite states and *départements réunis* of the peninsula. Their tasks ranged widely, from siege warfare to map-making, reflecting the complexity not only of military infrastructure but also of harnessing knowledge on the territories of the empire.[10] Like their artillery counterparts, engineer officers acted as intermediaries between the state and the entrepreneurs who carried out public works,[11] an aspect that stood particularly true with regard to barracks repairs.

The Italian engineer corps, the "corpo del Genio", had a far shorter and more troubled life than its French counterpart. Reflecting the novelty of the Cisalpine/Italian state, it lacked the centralised management tradition of the French *arme du génie*, at least in Lombardy where, under the Austrian rule, fortifications personnel and military engineers took their orders from Vienna

[8] A. Renglet, "La préfecture, le tribunal et la gendarmerie. L'aménagement des bâtiments des institutions publiques à Namur (1795-1814)", in S. Auspert, P. Bragard, V. Bruch, B. Colson, D. Douette, C. Istasse, J. Marchal, A. Renglet, M. Ronvaux (eds.), *Namur de la conquête française à Waterloo (1792-1815). Armées, société, ordre publique et urbanisme* (Namur, 2015), 123-31.
[9] Ibid., p.131.
[10] F. Frasca, "La cartografia in Francia dall'Ancien Régime all'età napoleonica", *Informazioni della difesa*, 5 (2003), 47-54.
[11] L. Cuccoli, "Gli ingegneri militari nell'Italia napoleonica", *Storicamente*, 6 (2010), https://storicamente.org/cuccoli_ingegneri_militari (20 October 2019)

instead of Milan.[12] Furthermore, the Austrian military engineers in Lombardy in the years after 1748 were few, only sixteen in 1754;[13] they were controllers rather than builders, giving specialist supervision to the maintenance works contracted out to private firms.[14] Neighbouring states fielded their own armies and therefore their own military technical corps.[15] The Napoleonic reorganisation of northern Italy brought about a merger of these foreign corps; when the Cisalpine Genio was first formed in 1797, Milanese and Venetian engineers converged into one corps, each group forming its own patronage network but collaborating with the other. The Milanese centred on Giovanni Battista Bianchi d'Adda,[16] an older officer who had started his career in the Habsburg army.[17] The Venetians, educated at the *Militar Collegio* in Verona,[18] made up the network of the director of the academy (later moved to Modena) Leonardo Salimbeni.[19] The command posts of the Genio were located in the key territorial commands for the artillery, the *direzioni* of Milan, Mantua and Ferrara, and *sottodirezioni* of Pizzighettone, Brescia and Rimini.[20] The head of the corps was inspector-general Bianchi d'Adda, and an accounting office (*ragionateria*) handled the corps' financial matters.[21] Recruitment for the sappers, bridge-builders and miners companies bore meagre fruits, making up just two companies of sappers and two of miners at the end of the first Cisalpine Republic.[22] After 1800, the Genio was reconstructed with roughly the same superior officers but even smaller cadres than in the previous republican regime,[23] probably because the loss of the Venetia to Austria had removed that recruitment base. The corps adopted the French regulations in 1804, and its territorial distribution changed between 1806 and 1808, when the *direzioni* were

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[12] E. Brambilla, "Tra acque e 'fabbriche', cascine e canali: gli ingegneri e gli architetti lombardi dalla fondazione del Collegio al primo Settecento", in A. Ferraresi, M. Visoli (eds.), *Formare alle professioni. Architetti, ingegneri artisti (secoli XV-XIX)* (Milan, 2012), 59-72.
[13] Ibid., p.67.
[14] M.M. Rabà, "Mobilitare risorse per la guerra", in P. Bianchi, P. Del Negro (eds.), *Guerre ed eserciti nell'età moderna* (Bologna, 2018), p.232.
[15] W. Barberis, *Le armi del principe. La tradizione militare sabauda* (Turin, 1988), 203-32. L. Porto, *Una piazzaforte in età moderna. Verona come sistema-fortezza (secc. XV-XVIII)* (Milan, 2009), 272-7.
[16] See for example the biography of Milan-born Genio colonel Antonio Caccianino, penned by one of his former colleagues and fellow countrymen, hence member of the same network: C. Vacani, *Biografia del colonnello Caccianino* (Milan, 1841).
[17] Crociani, Ilari, Paoletti, *Storia militare del Regno*, i, p.785.
[18] Zanoli, *Sulla milizia*, i, p. 3.
[19] Crociani, Ilari, Paoletti *Storia militare del Regno*, i, p.785.
[20] Zanoli, *Sulla milizia*, i, p. 4.
[21] Ibid.
[22] Crociani, Ilari, Paoletti, *Storia militare del Regno*, i, p.789.
[23] Ibid., 789-90.

reorganised following the kingdom's expansion: they stood at Milan, Mantua, Bologna, Venice as of 1806, plus Palmanova and the Illyrian fortresses of Zara and Ragusa in 1808, then Ancona, Palmanova, Venice, Mantua, Milan and Zara until 1809, when France took over the Illyrian Provinces.[24]

French engineer officers of the *armée d'Italie* were responsible for planning and carrying out the works on major fortifications. Their commander-in-chief, General Chasseloup-Laubat, was responsible for renovating the defensive system of Napoleonic Italy, from Alessandria to Taranto.[25] With regard to managing the barracks, French predominance was a feature of fortresses, while Italian officers were to be the first choice for "open" garrison towns.[26] There was no rigid separation on a task basis; a Genio officer working in such a post could be transferred to the frontlines at any moment.[27] Repairs and maintenance resulted from joint evaluations among engineer officers, *commissari*, town commanders and their adjuncts.[28] Due to the insufficient coverage of the officers' posts, the June 1804 regulations allowed civilian engineers to oversee and maintain the buildings, under orders of the ministry of war and the supervision of the fortifications director.[29] The Genio was responsible for both inhabited and empty real estate,[30] and its opinion was a requirement for any use (military or otherwise) of the buildings.[31] The decree of 29 March 1806 issued a list of barracks to be preserved and one of barracks to be abandoned; the finance ministry would sell off relinquished barracks belonging to the state,[32] whose preferential buyers should be municipalities interested in using the buildings to accommodate transient troops[33] or gendarmes.[34] Garrison barracks remained under the care of the *direzioni* and *sottodirezioni* of the Genio until

[24] Ibid., p.792.
[25] Fara, *Napoleone architetto*, 286-95.
[26] SHD GR4 C42, General Charpentier to the minister of war (copy), 23 June 1806.
[27] Captain Domenico Colella, commander of the Genio in Pizzighettone and referent for the area barracks, in summer 1813 left for Spain, taking the time to introduce to the podestà of Monza the lieutenant who would replace him. ASCMB FRC 120, Colella to the podestà of Monza, 14 July 1813.
[28] "Regolamento sulle caserme", 6 June 1804, art.40.
[29] Ibid., art.1.
[30] Ibid., art.7.
[31] Ibid., art.8.
[32] "Decreto relativo alle caserme", 29 March 1806, art.7.
[33] Ibid., art.8.
[34] The small municipality of Budrio asked for a preferential position in the purchase of the dismissed barracks in order to lodge the Gendarmerie there. ASMI MGC 611, minister of finances to the minister of war, 6 October 1806.

the 6 January 1809 decree.[35] According to these new regulations the Genio, through a series of major works ("grandi riparazioni"), would bring the garrison barracks to a pristine condition before handing them over to the communes, which would then be in charge of further major and minor works ("piccole riparazioni").[36]

Understaffing was a recurring issue for the Genio throughout the corps' history, partly counterbalanced by the intake of foreign officers (mostly French, Neapolitans and Venetians) while the military school in Modena slowly formed the Italian cadres.[37] This translated into frequent recourse to civilian experts. The need to find such experts was already urgent in the first Cisalpine Republic, carried out through local candidatures to general inspector of the military edifices on the Genio's behalf.[38] In Mantua shortly after the 1796-'97 siege, the municipality tasked Giuseppe Balestrazzi, on grounds of honesty and republican virtue, with overseeing the repairs to the city's barracks, which were underway without the municipality knowing exactly what was being done with the materials it was paying for.[39] Balestrazzi was a carpenter by trade[40] and an expert of some success in milling technology,[41] but barracks repairs required more specialist skills; shortly after his appointment, the municipality recommended that an architect survey the works in progress.[42]

The case of the barracks adaptations in Lecco, 1798, further highlights the importance of such criteria as honesty, competence, and economy. Soldiers in Lecco had always been billeted during past wars, so the town had no barracks; the municipality provided the vacated monastery of the Capucine friars at Pescarenico, but there was no military engineer in the department to plan the adaptation works.[43] The ministry of war allowed the municipality to have a civil engineer carry out the evaluation, as long as he was honest and intelligent.[44] In October, engineer Luigi Ravasi submitted a report, including

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[35] Crociani, Ilari, Paoletti, *Storia militare del Regno*, i, p.792.
[36] "Decreto di S.A.I. il principe viceré sul casermaggio", 6 January 1809, art. 31-2, 34.
[37] Crociani, Ilari, Paoletti, *Storia militare del Regno*, i, 791-2.
[38] *Raccolta di tutti gli ordini e proclamazioni del presente governo tanto dello stato maggiore francese che della municipalità di Verona* (Verona, 1801), iii, 155-6, 21 October 1797.
[39] ASMN MM 74, municipality of Mantua to Giuseppe Balestrazzi (minute), 28 Germinal V/17 April 1797.
[40] ASMN MM 74, municipality of Mantua to the 1st committee, 12 Thermidor V/30 July 1797.
[41] "L'artiere mantovano", *Il Folengo* (5 May 1866), p.3 col. b.
[42] ASMN MM 74, municipality of Mantua to the 1st committee, 12 Thermidor V/30 July 1797.
[43] ASMI MGC 646, central administration of the Montagna, 3 Vendémiaire VII/24 September 1798.
[44] ASMI MGC 646, minister of war to the central administration of the Montagna (minute), 8 Vendémiaire VII/29 September 1798.

the repair cost estimation.[45] The ministry approved the most cost-cutting proposal,[46] while a public tender would select the construction firm; the departmental administration would draw up the contract, subject to ministerial approval, and a military engineer would inspect the finished barracks.[47] A few weeks later, Bianchi d'Adda criticised the whole procedure: since Ravasi was a civil engineer, the ministry of the interior should have assessed the fees he had presented; the quality of the drawings Ravasi had submitted was not proportional to the payment he demanded; he was based in Milan, which meant the travel expenses to and from Lecco drove the bill further up.[48] Bianchi d'Adda deprecated "[i]l contegno ben poco economico tenutosi dalla cessata Centrale della Montagna"[49] in hiring a Milan-based engineer instead of one more geographically close "od almeno un buon Agrimensore di Campagna", who could have done a better job at half the cost.[50] This criticism sheds light on the fact that allowing the departments to select their own civilian engineers did not automatically translate into choosing local experts. At the same time, while taking the chance to push for more resources funnelled towards the Genio (in this case, travel reimbursements to allow a lieutenant of the corps to survey the barracks in Pescarenico[51]), Bianchi d'Adda recognised the convenience of a civilian expert *in situ*, as long as he was competent and asked for a fair price.

Civilian engineers, as a professional category, during the Napoleonic period underwent a sweeping effort at co-optation into state-driven public works and homologation of educational curricula, modelled after the French *Direction de ponts et chaussées*.[52] In the Kingdom of Italy, the insufficient competency of the civilian engineers was an oft-remarked problem, which the founding of an engineering school in Milan, in 1807, came too late to solve.[53] It is then unsurprising that, in 1805, Bianchi d'Adda lamented that the commander of the third Genio division, Colonel Galateo, for lack of

[45] ASMI MGC 646, evaluation report by Luigi Ravasi, 25 Vendémiaire VII/16 October 1798.
[46] ASMI MGC 646, minister of war to the central administration of the Serio, 15 Frimaire VII/5 December 1798.
[47] Ibid.
[48] ASMI MGC 646, Bianchi d'Adda to the minister of war, 29 Frimaire VII/19 December 1798.
[49] Ibid.
[50] Ibid.
[51] Ibid.
[52] R. De Lorenzo, "Les ingénieurs des ponts et chaussées en Italie: un parcours de modernisation institutionnelle dans un état national en construction", *Quaderns d'història de l'enginyeria*, 10 (2009), 295-327. L. Blanco, "Amministrazione, ingegneri e territorio nell'Italia napoleonica", in R. Delle Donne, A. Zorzi (eds.), *Le storie e la memoria. In onore di Arnold Esch* (Florence, 2002), 171-93.
[53] Ibid.

military engineers in the departments under his care, had turned to civilian ones, who did a very unsatisfactory job "chi per poco zelo nel pronto disimpegno delle incombenze affidategli, e chi per incapacità."[54] Despite such grumblings, enlisting the help of civilian engineers remained unavoidable. In 1805, civilian engineer-architects carried out surveys and plans for the realisation of barracks in Faenza and Rimini.[55] Engineer Righini from Forlì spent 38 days in Faenza, examining and mapping extant barracks for the Gendarmerie and the troops,[56] as well as overseeing and paying for the works.[57] Lacking sufficient Genio personnel in the Agogna department, in the same year civilian engineer Paolo Falcone surveyed the military buildings.[58]

The participative nature of the barracks system was, of course, not limited to involving civilian engineers. The rights to usage and property of the barracks, as well as the duty to provide maintenance, swung between national and municipal management. Applying the laws on the matter took time and adjustments. The decree of 29 March 1806 put the commune of Brescia in an awkward position according to a petition to the viceroy penned by local moderate notables Marc'Antonio Fé[59] and Francesco Martinengo Cesaresco,[60] whom the commune delegated to plead Brescia's case in the capital city.[61] They argued that the decree had lumped municipal and garrison barracks together, which meant the commune could neither buy them nor use them for transit troops, who would have to be billeted.[62] The petitioners asked to return those barracks to the municipality, not least of all to "percepire dalla Nazione quel congruo affitto mai contrastato, e più volte ricercato, che meritano per l'uso che ne ha fatto la Nazione medesima."[63] While they were there, they also begged for the construction of an officers' hall of residence, like those in Milan and Bologna, in the ex-religious house

[54] ASMI MGC 600, Bianchi d'Adda to the minister of war, 1 July 1805.
[55] ASMI MGC 691/692, Galateo to the minister of war, 17 June 1807.
[56] ASMI MGC 691/692, "Quadro delle competenze dovute al Sig. Ingegnere Architetto Righini di Forlì per gl'incarichi addossatigli con ordine della Direzione in sussidio dell'Ufficiale del Genio durante il primo, e parte del secondo trimestre dell'anno. (1805)"
[57] ASMI MGC 691/692, "Memoria postillata delle spese di casermaggio eseguite in Faenza…"
[58] ASNO PA 1043, Paolo Falcone to the prefect of Agogna, 20 April 1807.
[59] "Fé, Marco Antonio", *Dizionario Biografico degli Italiani*, http://www.treccani.it/enciclopedia/marco-antonio-fe_(Dizionario-Biografico)/ (10 July 2019).
[60] *Nuova raccolta di leggi e carte pubbliche promulgate per ordine di S.M. Imperatore, e Re nel Veneto Stato* (Venice, 1799), iii, p. 166, 23 April 1799.
[61] ASMI MGC 648, podestà of Brescia to commissario Persiani, 9 December 1807.
[62] ASMI MGC 648, Marc'Antonio Fé and Francesco Martinengo Cesaresco to Viceroy Eugène, 7 May 1806.
[63] Ibid.

of Santa Giulia,[64] another building that the decree had reserved for the garrison.[65] Over 1806 and 1807, the barracks were not returned to the municipality, but rather, while the ministry of war's engineers examined the documentation proving the municipality's property rights, the Genio granted it permission to use "le solite caserme", a total of seven out of twenty-three, for the transit troops.[66] All repairs were at the expense of the municipality.[67] Sound and practical as this arrangement was, it stood as an exception to the law. The commune had to remind the local *commissario* of the whole situation, when he tried to forbid the municipal *casermiere* to use those that were, technically, still garrison barracks.[68] Regularisation happened only in 1808, as the ministry of war ceded some of the barracks to the municipality; the cession was not a perpetual return, but a lease in which the municipality agreed to maintain the buildings, chosen by the *direzione del Genio* in Mantua, and eventually return them to the nation in good conditions.[69]

Brescia was not the only case where the barracks list set by the viceregal decree was subject to changes. Cantù was a much smaller commune, located in the Lario department; although the 29 March 1806 decree had not established any barracks in this town, a later one, issued in July 1807, set a garrison barracks in the ex-religious house of Santa Maria.[70] The colonel of the *direzione* in Milan, Rossi, entrusted first the civilian departmental engineer for bridges and waters to survey the building, then sent a Genio lieutenant.[71] The latter, after making his survey and reporting to the municipality, travelled to Como to meet up with the civilian engineer and decide on the most urgent works, so that the barracks may be ready to host troops within a week.[72] Such a collaboration and information exchange shows how civilian engineers had not only a say in repair works and in chances to cooperate usefully with their military counterparts, but also contributed to alter the details of the decree.

The 6 January 1809 decree formally put the municipalities in charge of barracks maintenance; the Genio was to carry out the initial major repairs, after which it would hand the barracks over to the communes. This procedure

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[64] Ibid.
[65] "Decreto relativo alle caserme", 29 March 1806, table A.
[66] ASMI MGC 648, podestà of Brescia to commissario Persiani, 9 December 1807.
[67] Ibid.
[68] Ibid.
[69] ASMI MGC 648, minister of war to Colonel Morlaincourt (minute), 19 March 1808.
[70] ASMI MGC 646, minister of war to the minister of interior (minute), 15 July 1809.
[71] ASMI MGC 646, Rossi to the minister of war, 19 January 1809.
[72] Ibid.

could take a long time depending on the single building's features, usefulness, expensiveness, and unclear property rights. In the villages of Motta and Sacile, near Pordenone in the Tagliamento department, negotiations over the cession of the barracks dragged on until 1812-13. The 1809 decree had entrusted the barracks to the Sacile municipality, but the public domain agency owned the building and the municipality paid a yearly rent to it, so the prefecture "opina o che il municipio debba acquistare il locale, o che il demanio debba ripararlo a sue spese salvo il corrispondente compenso dell'annuo canone suddetto."[73] The minister of the interior refused to approve the buyout, as the decree did not bind the garrison communes to provide for the buildings from their own pocket.[74] Local authorities, such as the vice-prefect of Domodossola in April 1809, refused to take up the barracks from the Genio until the latter had carried out the repairs, because they cost "una somma poco minore di quella, che si dovrebbe spendere per erigerle di nuovo, né una spesa di tanta importanza può essere sostenuta da una comune povera come questa, il cui territorio dedotte le spese di coltura frutta appena £15/m annue".[75]

War complicated matters. During the campaign of 1809, fought in the ex-Venetian departments, the military accommodation system experienced bouts of overcrowding and overuse, with disastrous consequences for the infrastructures. The *podestà* of Vicenza denounced this situation for the badly damaged town barracks, which risked being burned down "dell'andirivieni delle armate, che per cinque volte si succedettero … truppe, che a vicenda, e senza disciplina v'entravano."[76] Delays in the major works the Genio should have carried out, as per the January 1809 decree, made these barracks uninhabitable, worsening the congestion in the garrison.[77]

The kingdom's territorial expansions extended the barracks management laws to new locations, and set in motion a long phase of evaluations preceding the application of the rules. The 6 January 1809 decree assigned strong garrisons to the ex-Papal departments of Tronto, Musone and Metauro, in order to safeguard the Adriatic coastline. In Senigallia, host to a garrison of 600 men and 200 horses, the initial pick of barracks (the former episcopal see and the palace of the Albani princes) were too small and distant

[73] ASMI MGC 605, minister of the interior to the minister of war, 26 March 1812.
[74] Ibid.
[75] ASNO PA 1035, vice-prefect of Domodossola to the prefect of Agogna, 8 April 1809.
[76] ASMI MGC 635, podestà of Vicenza to the general director of the municipal administration, 16 January 1810.
[77] Ibid.

from each other, forcing the troops in excess to billet.[78] To gather the garrison in one barracks, the municipality signed a rent contract with the Albani family in 1811, and received orders from the prefect to contain expenses by adapting only the sections that were strictly necessary.[79] Immediately after the Alto Adige department was instituted in June 1810, the *direzione del Genio* began ordering surveys and carrying out onsite inspections, evaluating the most suitable buildings (all ex-religious houses) for barracks in Trento beside the city castle.[80] As of 1812, the castle was the only building the Genio retained, because a viceregal decree had included it among the kingdom's defensive strongholds.[81] Much remained to be done for the barracks before they were passed on to the municipality, especially in the ex-religious houses of San Francesco, a massive adaptation of an infantry barracks into a cavalry one,[82] and Orsoline, partly refitted in a rush in late 1811, prior to the arrival of 600 conscripts.[83]

It fell upon the municipalities, as the main actor of the barracks service from 1809 onwards, to negotiate with contractors, proprietors and surveyors. Municipalities procured the money for maintenance through the daily reimbursements per occupied bed by the ministry of war,[84] as well as through local taxation,[85] usually tendering the works off after having surveyed the buildings.[86] The Genio maintained its supervisory role, calling the communes to order when they fell behind on their maintenance tasks or failed to go through the proper procedures. The communes carried out major repairs and only afterwards asked for money to fund them, without informing the minister first; they should rather, according to the central government, anticipate money to the Genio to carry out the repairs or at least notify the military engineers about the planned works.[87] The *direzioni* dispatched junior officers to make the rounds in garrison towns and inspect the barracks. A *guardia del Genio di terza classe*, Ottoni, inspected the three barracks in Monza in May 1813, and reported his findings to the *podestà*, who was in

[78] P. Formiconi, G. Santoni, *Senigallia, il Borgo della Posta* (Senigallia, 2019), p.36.
[79] Ibid., p.37.
[80] ASMI MGC 624, Motta to the minister of war, 29 August 1810.
[81] ASMI MGC 624, Motta to the minister of war, 17 January 1812.
[82] Ibid.
[83] ASMI MGC 624, minister of war to Motta, 18 December 1811.
[84] "Decreto sul casermaggio", 6 January 1809, art.36.
[85] Pagano, *Enti locali*, p.164.
[86] ASCMB FRC 179, public tender announcement, 12 July 1812.
[87] ASMN PM 670, general director of the administration of the communes to the prefect of Mincio, 28 November 1810.

charge of the repairs.[88] These were more urgent due the imminent return of the viceregal court and its Royal Guards, as even the municipal *casermiere* pointed out in his own report on the minor, but necessary, repairs.[89] Viceroy Eugène had come back from Germany precisely in mid-May to reorganise the Guards after the campaigns of 1812-13 had decimated its ranks, and the units travelled home from Germany throughout the summer.[90] By August, the Genio prodded the municipality of Monza again, as no repairs had been undertaken yet.[91] In September, as war loomed closer to the kingdom's borders,[92] Lieutenant Milani asked the *podestà* of Monza about the funds to repair the city barracks,[93] prompting the reply that, even though no funding had been allocated yet, the *podestà* had already ordered the most urgent repairs.[94] One year earlier, Genio lieutenant Lorenzoni and a municipal expert had calculated the expenses together, totalling at 6850 *lire* for major repairs and 2870 *lire* for minor repairs, but the costs had likely increased in the meantime.[95] Prompted by the ministry, the prefect of Olona issued a reminder aiming to speed up barracks repair works;[96] the communes would carry out the repairs, even directly through their offices ("in via economica") in case of small expenses, for both minor and major repairs, with the Genio supervising surveys, plans, and results.[97] Overall, the garrison commander at Peschiera, in 1813, summarised the effects of prolonged, cumulative neglect, when he informed the ministry "che le piccole riparazioni occorrenti alle caserme non sono state fatte da che esse sono state consegnate alla comune; e le degradazioni divengono sempre maggiori."[98]

V.2 Repairs

Barracks maintenance was not a militarised service, nor was it strategically sensitive enough to warrant recourse to requisitioned labour, as was the case in fortification works such as those carried out at Hamburg and Lübeck in

[88] ASCMB FRC 121, Ottoni to the podestà of Monza, 20 May 1813.
[89] ASCMB FRC 121, Gaetano Sassi to the podestà of Monza, s.d., filed 26 May 1813.
[90] Pigni, *Guardia*, p.243.
[91] ASCMB FRC 121, Lieutenant Milani to the podestà of Monza, 9 August 1813.
[92] Gioannini, Nafziger, *Defense*, 37-102.
[93] ASCMB FRC 121, Milani to the podestà of Monza, 12 September 1813.
[94] ASCMB FRC 121, podestà of Monza to Milani, 17 September 1813.
[95] Ibid.
[96] ASCMB FRC 121, prefect of Olona to the podestà of Monza, 28 September 1813.
[97] Ibid.
[98] ASMI MGC 656, 3rd ministerial division to the 2nd division, 8 June 1813.

1813.[99] Rather than sieges and artillery fire, barracks had to withstand depredations, either man-made or caused by nature, but always aggravated exponentially by neglect. Natural causes ranged through a broad spectrum of calamities: floods in lakeside[100] and riverside[101] towns, earthquakes,[102] rain and hailstorms.[103] The daily wear-and-tear of soldiers' life, as well as graver incidents, also affected the buildings. At the barracks of San Domenico in Cremona, the latrine roof rotted away from the garbage that the soldiers threw on it from the windows.[104] In Mantua, at the San Sebastiano barracks in Mantua, a keystone cracked in the cellar because the soldiers habitually chopped firewood upstairs in correspondence to that point.[105] Animals produced damage as well, more so with frequent and repeated use; as of January 1809[106] and August 1810, horses' hooves had broken down to splinters several floorboards in the cavalry barracks of San Simpliciano in Milan.[107] Domestic incidents threatening the infrastructures were associated with fires; the troops' carelessness in leaving lit candles in their sleeping quarters,[108] cooking without minding the fireplace,[109] smoking indoors or bringing torches inside,[110] were the main culprits in these cases. The barracks' wooden fixtures and straw bedding supplies, susceptible to catching fire with even a spark, added up to the hazard.[111]

The Genio and the civilian engineers were controllers, while the work was carried out by contractors and craftsmen. During his stay in Faenza on behalf of the Genio in spring 1805, engineer Righini oversaw the maintenance and adaptation process of three former religious houses (Servi, San Domenico, Sant'Agostino), managing the work of several professionals, such as the measurer who sketched out the floor plans[112] and the masons, carpenters,

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[99] K. Aaslestad, "Paying for war. Experiences of Napoleonic rule in the Hanseatic cities", *Central European History*, 39/4 (2006), p.666.
[100] ASMI MGC 645, prefect of Lario to the minister of war, 9 July 1805.
[101] ASMI MGC 634, procès-verbal of the podestà of Pizzighettone on flood damages to the Caserma Grande in Gera, 25 July 1810.
[102] ASMI MGC 641, prefect of Crostolo to the minister of war, 26 February 1806.
[103] ASMI MGC 681, survey of custodian Giovanni Burocco, Captain Carlo Fé and commissario Brenni, 5 November 1807. ASCMB FRC 114, survey of commissario Brenni, 3 July 1808.
[104] ASMI MGC 626, report of commissario Galbiati and conservatore Scudieri, 26 June 1808.
[105] ASMN PM 670, Lieutenant Carandini to Major Perriola, 26 March 1811.
[106] ASMI MGC 677 bis, Rossi to the minister of war, 16 January 1809.
[107] ASMI MGC 677 bis, Rossi to the minister of war, 14 August 1810.
[108] ASNO PA 1043, damage and repairs procès-verbal, 17 April 1807.
[109] ASMI MGC 623, Rossi to the minister of war, 19 April 1811.
[110] ASMI MGC 626, report of the garrison commander in Cremona, 30 December 1807.
[111] ASMI MGC 623, Rossi to the minister of war, 19 April 1811.
[112] ASMI MGC 691/692, bill for the engineer's measurer, 30 May 1805.

glaziers and painters.[113] Barracks maintenance works were an opportunity for local artisans and labourers, more convenient than fortifications works where entrepreneurs external to the territory secured the contracts, local authorities had little to no decisional power, and the construction sites drove up the cost of labour in the area.[114] Repairs were contracted through tenders held by the municipalities and the prefectures, even in the case of garrison barracks that fell under the nation's care.[115] Payments, however, came at an outrageously slow pace. Allocated funds for barracks works all too easily turned out to be insufficient, and the ministry of war spiralled into debts that drew out for as long as further funds were unavailable, reducing resources for new repairs to pay for the older ones. That was true for engineers, as Righini and Falcone were still waiting for their bills to be paid in 1807,[116] and for craftsmen, who, as one urged the prefect of Agogna, had to support their family but also to pay their own creditors.[117] The lack of state creditworthiness, thus, had an avalanche effect spanning networks of employment down to highly localised levels, worsening the uncertainty of the wartime job market.

War removed funds or changed the authorities that artisans interfaced with; in Trento during the Bavarian occupation, the Bavarian government commissar hired, in January 1809, master-builder Caminada and six other artisans to work on the four barracks in the city, but the outbreak of the war blocked the payment of their final dues.[118] After the annexation of Trentino to the Kingdom of Italy, these creditors contacted the Italian prefecture and the Bavarian court, but both institutions denied responsibility.[119] Despite this unhappy experience, Caminada agreed to carry out the urgent repairs at the Orsoline barracks in December 1811, prior to the arrival of a conscript contingent.[120] If Caminada hoped the urgency would translate to the financial realm, he was wrong; a ministerial dispatch from January 1812 had stated

[113] ASMI MGC 691/692, bill for master-builder Giacomo Benvenuti, 31 March 1805; bill for wood merchant Agostino Duranti, 31 March 1805; bill for painter Salvatore Canetti, 15 April 1805; bill for glazier Filippo Benini, 6 April 1805; bill for carpenter Giuseppe Signori, 15 April 1805.
[114] Thus in the construction site at Rocca d'Anfo between 1802 and 1808. G. Marchesi, "La Valle Sabbia rivoluzionaria e napoleonica", in L. Giarelli (ed.), *Napoleone nelle Alpi. Le montagne d'Europa tra rivoluzione e restaurazione* (Tricase, 2015), 63-81.
[115] ASMI MGC 695, public tender announcement for repairs to six garrison barracks in Bergamo, 18 October 1803.
[116] ASMI MGC 691/692, note of the accounting and liquidation office, 14 December 1807. ASNO PA 1043, engineer Paolo Falcone to the prefect of Agogna, 20 April 1807.
[117] ASNO PA 1043, master-builder Gio. Calastreti to the prefect of Agogna, 29 May 1808.
[118] ASMI MGC 624, Gio. Antonio Caminada to the viceroy, 3 March 1812.
[119] Ibid.
[120] ASMI MGC 624, Motta to the minister of war, 16 December 1811.

that the municipality should pay for those repairs, but all the claims he presented to the commune and the prefecture over the year failed to yield results.[121] The workers refused to finish their job if they were not paid, and unfinished repairs endangered the soldiers' accommodation. The Genio officer overseeing works to the Trento castle alarmingly informed his superiors that builders were not coming to work until their credit for past jobs was paid, compromising the works when three infantry battalions were soon due to arrive and relieve the two battalions currently stationed there.[122]

Unpaid labourers were caught in the web of buck-passing between Genio and municipalities. In January 1811, the barracks of Santa Paola in Mantua needed major repairs, due also to anti-epizootic sanitation measures in the stables.[123] The *podestà* protested that such repairs should be charged to the Genio rather than the commune, which had no money to pay the workers anyway.[124] Refusal to perform unpaid work, then, did not depend on whether it was the Genio, the prefecture or the municipality to employ them. Sometimes it was interpreted as malice, exploiting the emergency; the Genio officer reporting on the hurried repairs at the barracks of Crema, in March 1805, had only three days between one regiment leaving their accommodation and another coming in, "ne' quali si è lavorato giorno e notte senza riposo. Inoltre scarsezza somma di operai, i quali anche infingardi ed altieri, e che tuttavia per averne in numero sufficiente si è dovuto ricorrere a Cremona, e ad altri luoghi circonvicini."[125] As much as the Genio grumbled, the awareness of being indebted to contractors and artisans was acute, as Colonel Rossi acknowledged while badgering the minister for funds:

> "Mi spiace, Eccellenza, che ogni mese io sia costretto di porle sott'occhio la dolorosa situazione in cui ci troviamo per non indifferente debito, e il sacro dovere di pagare tanti somministratori ed artisti che altamente riclamano ciò che loro è dovuto. La cosa è così, e non avvenga che cadiamo di male in peggio."[126]

V.3 Safety and welfare

[121] ASMI MGC 624, Motta to the minister of war, 24 October 1812.
[122] ASMI MGC 624, Motta to the minister of war, 29 April 1811.
[123] ASMN PM 670, podestà of Mantua to the minister of war, 16 January 1811.
[124] Ibid.
[125] ASMI MGC 628, Galateo to the minister of war, 27 March 1805.
[126] ASMI MGC 600, Rossi to the minister of war, 14 August 1805.

Barracks had a double function in the preservation of the troops, hence of a regiment's combat effectiveness: they had to keep the soldiers from deserting, and to keep them healthy. Conscripts in particular ought not be barracksed in "locali abbandonati … mal sicuri, mal riparati",[127] as unfortunately they often were. Desertion prevention was a matter of preserving not just human resources, but also the logistical investments that went into supplying the troops,[128] and the hegemony of the state imposing the duty to enlist.[129] The key measure was to remove the soldiers from the tempting influence of civilians,[130] avoiding billeting as much as possible;[131] barracks, however, had to be escape-proof as well, to a level that studies on Napoleonic desertion have overlooked.

Such a structural requisite, in fact, is most clearly observable when the barracks failed to meet it. Deserters took advantage of transits to make themselves scarce and reach home or hide in the countryside, seeking help from sympathetic local people or joining bands of brigands.[132] Herding the soldiers in a barracks in the middle of an urban centre, with sentries outside and NCOs inside, already reduced this risk, but some barracks could not even meet this basic requirement. The Santa Teresa barracks in Como lay in a remote location out of town and on the route towards Switzerland,[133] almost an invitation to run for the border, an area towards which deserters naturally gravitated.[134] Infrastructural weaknesses plagued the Ciceri barracks on the lakeside Piazza Jasca, reflecting the inadequateness of some Ancien Régime quarters, originally civilian homes, to meet the needs of the mass conscript army; in addition to other serious issues such as proneness to flooding and cramped rooms, the windows of this barracks were so low that deserters could easily climb down.[135]

Window bars were an obvious solution. *Conservatore* Alemanni in Novara suggested installing bars on seventeen windows of the San Paolo barracks to block that escape avenue for deserting conscripts, an idea the Genio eagerly

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[127] ASNO PA 1036, circular letter of the minister of war to the prefects, 27 August 1813.
[128] Forrest, *Conscripts*, 171-3.
[129] Ibid., 178-9.
[130] Ibid., p.185.
[131] See chapter 6.
[132] Grab, "Conscription and desertion", 37-9.
[133] ASMI MGC 645, report of the podestà of Como on the garrison barracks, s.d., attached to letter of the general director of the municipal administration to the minister of war, 30 June 1811.
[134] S. Franscini, P. Peri, *Storia della Svizzera Italiana dal 1797 al 1802* (Lugano, 1864), 2-5.
[135] ASMI MGC 645, report of the podestà of Como on the garrison barracks, s.d., attached to letter of the general director of the municipal administration to the minister of war, 30 June 1811.

applied for ministerial funds to implement.[136] Unlike the San Paolo barracks, an early modern civilian *casa herma*,[137] barracks formerly belonging to enclosed religious orders had the advantage of coming with windows already barred, albeit vulnerable to a lucrative black market of stolen fixtures if the buildings were left unguarded.[138] On the other hand, this measure evoked the imagery of imprisonment, a staple of the horror stories on military life circulating among the populace and the draftees, such as the rumour that conscripts at the depot were shackled up.[139] The image damage from this association of conscription with captivity was perceived so markedly that the military found it unacceptable to accommodate detainees, even on a brief transit, in the same barracks that conscripts also used.[140] This consideration might have braked the spread of window bars, keeping them at ground floor level[141] where they were most useful anyway.

Attentiveness and quick response seemed to work best in apprehending aspiring deserters. In Novara, three ingenious conscripts used a bedframe to climb through a window and on the rooftop of a neighbouring house; they were caught because the sentry heard them, and the officers immediately chased after the escapees.[142] Even so, the military authorities urged the prefecture and the municipality to improve the infrastructure through repairs, to discourage desertion.[143] Separating the barracks and their non-military surroundings was key to make them escape-proof, but also to protect the property of the civilian neighbours from damage, as was the case for the civilian home next to the barracks in Novara, whose rooftop received "un certo ancor considerevole guasto".[144] In Pavia, the proprietor and the government jointly financed the restoration of a wall separating the barracks of Santa Maria delle Cacce from a garden, "in quanto che questa garantisce l'interesse del sig. Pini, e nello stesso tempo quello del governo coll'impedire la diserzione del militare che vi potesse essere alloggiato, e

[136] ASMI MGC 622, Colonel Rossi to the minister of war, 2 April 1806.
[137] Buono, *Esercito*, p.172.
[138] In Vigevano, 1805, the Dominican friars themselves illegally sold off window bars and other fixtures as they left the religious house, which the government intended to use as officers' residential hall. ASMI MGC 623, garrison commander in Vigevano to the minister of war, 31 July 1805. On handling of stolen fixtures: Buono, *Esercito*, p.156.
[139] Forrest, *Conscripts*, p.185.
[140] ASPD PB 26, Genio Captain Sicuro to the prefect of Brenta, 19 January 1809.
[141] View of the San Francesco barracks, Milan, 1820, Civica Raccolta delle Stampe "Achille Bertarelli", Milan http://graficheincomune.comune.milano.it/GraficheInComune/scheda/Albo+F+31,+tav.+22 (20 September 2020).
[142] ASNO PA 1043, commander of the reserve to the prefect of Agogna, 19 June 1807.
[143] ASNO PA 1043, the commander of the reserve to the prefect of Agogna, 19 June 1807.
[144] Ibid.

garantirsi il proprietario del suo fondo."[145]

Barracks had to be both escape-proof and well-kept to protect the troops' health; this double purpose of infrastructural maintenance was spelled out clearly. Repairs at the castle of Sondrio in 1798 were necessary to prevent desertion and shield the soldiers from winter weather.[146] Growing interest in the armies' physical welfare, linking the control of disease outbreaks to the quality of discipline and order,[147] stressed the importance of hygiene in military quarters.[148] Although the Napoleonic regime holds a reputation for sacrificing soldiers' welfare to the ruthless pursuit of victory on a tight budget,[149] the preoccupation of the Italian authorities and the demands of the military in this sense emerge constantly in the insistence on barracks repairs as prophylactic measures. Well-repaired barracks kept soldiers in and miasmas out, especially at night, following the principles of Hippocratic medicine.[150] Epidemics and endemic maladies in garrisons were attributed to the cumulative effect of bad nutrition, humidity, filth, exhalations, and overcrowding,[151] understood to perniciously affect air quality in at-risk places such as barracks, theatres, hospitals, prisons and courtrooms.[152] In January 1812, the commander of a cavalry regiment garrisoned in Padua commissioned a medical survey on a typhoid outbreak in the regimental barracks;[153] this report pointed to a combination of causes spanning contamination of air, soil and water from the miasmas of uncollected waste, the cumulative effect of fatigue on the soldiers' bodies, temperature differences between the rooms, overcrowding, proximity to the horses, and broken windows letting cold air in at night.[154] Given the prophylactic importance of daytime ventilation, prescribed by the barracks rulebooks,[155] fixtures were of paramount importance to preserve the soldiers' health. The

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[145] ASMI MGC 680, Colonel Galateo to the minister of war, 19 September 1813.
[146] ASMI MGC 611, central administration of the Adda-Oglio department to the minister of war, 19 Pluviôse VI/7 February 1798.
[147] E. Charters, "The caring fiscal-military state during the Seven Years War, 1756-1763", *The Historical Journal*, 52/4 (2009), p.927.
[148] S. Sabbatani, "Il tifo petecchiale. Storie di uomini, eserciti e pidocchi", *Le infezioni in medicina*, 3 (2006), 167-8.
[149] C. Jones, "The welfare of the French foot-soldier", *History*, 65/214 (1980), 207-10.
[150] M. Coluzzi, G. Corbellini, "I luoghi della mal'aria e le cause della malaria", *Medicina nei secoli*, 7 (1995), 582-3.
[151] Loriga, *Soldati*, 29-35. On the nexus between disease spread, overcrowded spaces and air quality: A. Corbin, *The foul and the fragrant. Odour and the French social imagination*, tr. M. Kochan, (Leamington/New York, 1986), 46-7.
[152] Ibid., p.51-2.
[153] ASMI MGC 640, Colonel Banco to the minister of war, 1 January 1812.
[154] ASMI MGC 640, report of Professor Pietro Sografi, 30 December 1811.
[155] "Regolamento sulle caserme", 6 June 1804, art.33.

Novara garrison commander, in 1804, complained that draughts of cold nightly air seeped in through jamb-less windows, making the soldiers fall ill.[156] As winter 1811 approached, municipalities received reminders to fix the barracks windows, to safeguard the soldiers' health and with it "l'interesse del governo".[157]

The relation between quarters and soldiers' health depended heavily on location. This was dramatically evident in the Caribbean garrisons, where the ravages of the yellow fever engendered practices of barracks construction in supposedly healthier, ventilated locations on higher grounds, while reinforcing racialised notions of disease resistance.[158] Like yellow fever in the Caribbean, malaria in European wetlands was not yet linked to mosquitoes, and stagnant water exhalations were held responsible for the noxiousness of the place. Diseases could potentially annihilate garrisons holding vital positions before any military action even took place;[159] the best remedy was to limit exposure by housing troops elsewhere, and paying attention to seasonal patterns when the troops moved out of garrison and started camping.[160] In water-rich northern Italy, where the large tracts of wetland allowed rice farming and hemp pulping,[161] Napoleon reminded Eugène to keep as few troops as possible in the unhealthiest garrisons, overseeing the military commanders who neglected these measures.[162] To avoid crowding Mantua in seasons when the risk of malaria was higher, the garrison troops spread over to nearby Bozzolo.[163] Malaria was also endemic in Ferrara, surrounded by wetlands despite the land reclamation works that had taken place between 17th and 18th century;[164] the city and its fortress were home to a garrison of about 3700 men and over 800 horses in maximum paper strength.[165] A civilian diarist, in 1802, observed how a demi-brigade, transferred from Modena to Ferrara and back to Modena, went from "una

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[156] ASMI MGC 622, town commander of Novara to the general commanding the Agogna department, 16 August 1804.
[157] ASNO PA 1036, director of the general administration of the communes to the prefect of Agogna, 19 October 1811.
[158] R.N. Buckley, *The British Army in the West Indies. Society and the military in the revolutionary age* (Gainesville, 1998).
[159] Morvan, *Le soldat*, ii, 299-300.
[160] Ibid.
[161] S. Sabbatani, A. Sandri, "La malaria a Bologna fra XVIII e XIX secolo. Vicende ambientali e ruolo dell'intervento umano", *Le infezioni in medicina*, 1 (2000), 43-6.
[162] Elting, *Swords*, p.293.
[163] ASMI MGC 656, General Charpentier to the minister of war, 6 Brumaire XII/29 October 1803.
[164] T. Menzani, "La bonifica fra cultura economica e ambientale. Il caso delle valli emiliano-romagnole (secc. XVII-XVIII)", *Storicamente*, 6 (2010) [DOI:10.1473/stor447].
[165] "Decreto relativo alle caserme", 29 March 1806, "Caserme da conservarsi pel servizio militare".

delle più belle qui passate" to undermanned due to the several sick it had left behind in hospital or lost to the diseases caused by swamp air, compounded by gruelling marching under inclement weather.[166]

V.4 From civilian to military dwellings

Most of the Napoleonic barracks were repurposed religious houses, but not all. Transit troops and gendarmes were a frequent cause for haphazard allocations, with the crucial difference that the latter were a fixed presence;[167] the Gendarmerie was entitled to accommodation arrangements that were peculiar to its functions, such as single-room sleeping quarters, officers living close to their subordinates, and a cell or a spare room for holding suspects.[168]

City castles that had served as pre-Napoleonic military quarters still stood, where possible. The Renaissance castle of Vigevano, under the Austrians and the Piedmontese throughout the 18th century, sufficed for the cavalry garrisons despite frequent repair works; the pattern hardly changed during the Napoleonic Wars.[169] Other citadels had an actual military role besides accommodation. The Milanese citizens endured, in May-June 1796, the siege of the Austrian garrison in the castle; afterwards, a petition circulated attempting to have the citadel torn down, but it failed due to insufficient signatories, who feared a forced payment to rebuild the castle if the Austrians returned.[170] The demolition of the castle's outer walls began in 1801, but the project for the Foro Bonaparte, the new seat of the government, surrounded by shops, gardens and leisure places, soon proved unrealisable in full due to high costs.[171] Meanwhile, the castle remained a barracks until the restorations of late 19th century;[172] repairs to the castle façades were supposed to increase accommodation for the military, but also to harmonise the building with the rest of the Foro.[173]

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[166] ASCMO, "Cronaca Rovatti", 24 March 1802.
[167] Emsley, *Gendarmes*, p.172.
[168] *Bollettino delle leggi della Repubblica Italiana* (Milan, 1805), ii, "Decreto per l'aumento, completamento ed organizzazione definitiva della Gendarmeria Nazionale", 14 October 1804, art.61-3.
[169] A. Ferruzzi, "Il castello di Vigevano: una antologia delle caserme italiane (1499-13 marzo 1968)", in Antonelli (ed.), *Esercito e città*, ii, 759-83.
[170] C. Casati, *Vicende edilizie del castello di Milano* (Milan, 1876), 52-3.
[171] C. Pighetti, *A Milano nell'Ottocento. Il lavoro scientifico e il giornalismo di Carlo Cattaneo* (Milan, 2010), p.19.
[172] L. Robuschi, "Luca Beltrami e il restauro del Castello Sforzesco di Milano", *Confronti*, 3 (2012), p.165.
[173] Zanoli, *Sulla milizia*, i, p.123.

Lacking pre-existent infrastructures, the municipalities or the government made recourse to the time-honoured solution of purchase/rent from private citizens or institutions. Historically, such rentals had been a source of profit, and some Lombard aristocrats had turned the imposition of military presence, which families like the Borromeo of Arona in the mid-17th century had the authority to apportion thanks to their roles in the Spanish Habsburg military administration, into an instrument of local power.[174] The Napoleonic period, conversely, made barracks rental an unprofitable business. The Ciceri noble family had rented one such house in Como to the municipality as barracks in 1756; between 1796 and 1810, the homeowner did not receive his rent, while the municipality and the government squabbled over who should pay.[175] The marquis della Rosa, resident in Parma, owned a palace rented out as barracks in Mantua throughout the first Cisalpine era and the siege, during which the cannon balls destroyed the roof;[176] on top of repair expenses in Mantua and taxes on his lands around Parma, the marquis had had his rent paid in depreciated paper money.[177] In Monza, May 1806, the infantry of the Guard was accommodated in a portion of count Durini's house, and although the Genio was supposed to receive ministerial funds to adapt and repair it,[178] when a section of the roof collapsed in August the proprietor paid for the repairs out of his own pocket.[179] Senator Alvise Mocenigo, a successful product of Napoleonic amalgam policies,[180] was able to shield the castle at Este, in possession of his family for four centuries.[181] Mocenigo used most of the castle as grain depot, and two garrison companies found accommodation in portions of it; further military encroachment was discouraged, as it "pourrait occasionner des reclamations de la part de M. le Senateur Moncenigo".[182]

Accommodation for gendarmes, too, used rentals in private properties. The Gendarmerie was to be a pervasive corps in the countryside and along the main routes where armies and merchandise travelled, which they had to

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[174] Buono, *Esercito*, 268-9.
[175] ASMI MGC 645, Alessandro Pedroni on behalf of Carlo Ciceri to the minister of war, s.d. (registered 29 March 1811).
[176] ASMN MM 74, Dionigi Amadei (administrator for the marquis Della Rosa) to the delegate congregation of Mantua, 8 October 1799.
[177] P. Cuccia, *Napoleon in Italy. The sieges of Mantua, 1796-1799* (Norman, 2014), p.132.
[178] ASMI MGC 681, Tordorò to the minister of war, 18 May 1806.
[179] ASMI MGC 681, Rossi to the minister of war, 13 August 1806.
[180] Dal Cin, *Mondo nuovo*, p.341.
[181] Touring Club Italiano, *Guida d'Italia – Veneto (esclusa Venezia)* (Milan, 1997), p.521-2.
[182] ASMI MGC 639, report on the cantonments in Este, Monselice and Montagnana for the 5th line regiment, 2 November 1811.

patrol and keep safe. The Gendarmerie had units, for example, in the villages of Correggio and Novellara, to the east of the main military road towards the Adriatic coast halfway between the stopovers of Guastalla and Reggio, and a unit to the west of the road at Sant'Ilario, close to the border with Parma.[183] Gendarmerie barracks from 1804 to May 1806 were rented out to the state, then that task passed to the municipalities, while the ministry remained responsible for paying its rent arrears to the homeowners.[184] Barracksing the Gendarmes was important to keep them apart from the communities where they were stationed,[185] to ensure impartiality in the service and to protect the men from retaliation;[186] billeting would have diluted the ethos of the corps by allowing fraternisation with the populace, which was strongly discouraged.[187] If the small size of the six-man brigades simplified finding accommodation in a private house, housing arrangements in remote communes did not necessarily match the corps regulations. The alpine commune of Chiavenna claimed, in May 1806, that they could not find "in quella Comune alcun Locale né di sua proprietà, né di particolari, adattabile con altrettanti stanzini, e camino ad uso d'ogni gendarme giusto il regolamento 13 ottobre 1804, giacché gli stessi abitanti per la maggior parte dell'anno si servono in questo paese di stuffe, e mancano assolutamente di Locali con camino."[188] Remoteness was also a problem for engineers, who asked for higher payment to cover travel expenses and lengthy stays to oversee the works.[189] Securing accommodation for the horses was also a complex matter; in Vigevano, the commander suggested placing the horses at the ex-religious house of San Pietro Martire and the soldiers in rented rooms at landowner Giuseppe della Croce's house.[190] Ideally, San Pietro Martire should have been wholly at the Gendarmerie's disposal, but adaption works were too expensive.[191] The gendarmes stationed at Pernate, in 1806, were luckier; the municipality there had some money to spend on readapting the Cascina Riotta farmhouse for their use.[192] In Ostiglia, Mincio department,

[183] ASMI MGC 699, prefect of Crostolo to the minister of war, 11 April 1806.
[184] ASMI MGC 699, ministry of war office of accounting and liquidation, 16 August 1807.
[185] Emsley, *Gendarmes*, p.58.
[186] Ibid., p.71.
[187] Lignereux, *Servir Napoléon*, 163-4.
[188] ASMI MGC 611, municipality of Chiavenna to the prefecture of Adda, 10 May 1806.
[189] Such was the case for the architect sent by the Crostolo prefecture to survey the realisation of the Gendarmerie barracks in Castelnovo de' Monti. ASMI MGC 641, departmental engineer to the prefect of Crostolo, 13 December 1804.
[190] ASNO PA 1050, prefect of Agogna to the vice-prefect of Vigevano, 26 August 1813.
[191] Ibid.
[192] ASNO PA 1037, tribute councillor in the Novara canton to the prefect of Agogna, 30 November 1806.

a local citizen rented out on a yearly contract[193] four rooms, a stable and a barn to four gendarmes and a brigadier.[194] Two brigades stationed in Vigevano stayed, from 1802 to 1805, in a *rustico* (a farmhouse or depot for grains and agricultural tools) of the local episcopal palace, regularly rented and under permission from the ministry of cult for as long as the palace remained vacant;[195] in late 1805, a new archbishop was due to move in,[196] by which time the vice-prefecture had already carried out location surveys to transfer the gendarmes to the ex-religious house of the Dominican nuns.[197] Municipal property was not the end of all financial and spatial woes, either; the only barracks in the village of Trecate, shared between the transit troops and the Gendarmerie brigade, had been bought by the commune in 1720, and as of 1812, the municipality was still paying a yearly interest to the original proprietor's heirs.[198]

V.3 Religious houses

The Napoleonic expropriation of Church property and the transformation of religious houses in barracks had a long-term history. In early modern Lombardy, municipalities buying buildings from religious orders for use as barracks had been an attested practice.[199] In the 1750s, accommodating soldiers in religious houses evolved from emergency measures to consolidated policy, following the monastic suppressions during the rule of Joseph II.[200] Other pre-Napoleonic Italian states had plans for reducing the monks and nuns in their territories, concentrating them in the larger religious houses. The Savoyard monarchs began the rationalisation, taxation and eventual incorporation of the ecclesiastic patrimony only in the 1790s, in a bid to refill the exhausted state coffers.[201] In Venice, the republic tried to pass a decree in 1768 to reduce the number of monks and nuns by 45% over twenty years.[202] State appetite for patrimony to put to military and public use found a further intellectual outlet in the democratic criticisms levelled at

[193] ASMI MGC 656, minister of war to the prefect of Mincio, 8 July 1806.
[194] ASMI MGC 656, prefect of Mincio to the minister of war, 17 June 1806.
[195] ASMI MGC 623, prefect of Agogna to the minister of war, 12 October 1805.
[196] ASMI MGC 623, minister of cult to the minister of war, 20 December 1805.
[197] ASMI MGC 623, vice-prefect of Vigevano to the prefect of Agogna, 5 November 1805.
[198] ASNO PA 1036, podestà of Trecate to the prefect of Agogna, 9 February 1812.
[199] Buono, *Esercito*, p.161.
[200] Dattero, *Soldati a Milano*, 123-6.
[201] A. Pennini, "La soppressione degli 'ordini regolari' nel Piemonte napoleonico", *Historia et jus*, 13 (June 2018), http://www.historiaetius.eu/num-13.html (14 July 2019).
[202] B. Bertoli, *La soppressione di monasteri e conventi a Venezia dal 1797 al 1810* (Venice, 2002), 5-7.

monastic institutions, emphasising the often coercive, unspontaneous nature of vows, within a vaster rejection of Ancien Régime practices.[203] The suppressions of the Napoleonic age exacerbated the trend. If turning a religious house into a barracks was not a novelty, interventions took place on a far larger scale and with a deeper involvement of the military engineers. Thus, although perpetually stretched thin, the Genio became an instrument of information and control on the real estate, and what the peripheral administrations did with it.

Religious houses and barracks differed in their internal arrangements. If the former favoured single-person cubicle-like cells, occasionally resorting to multiple-bed files in times of overcrowding,[204] the latter always required communal but subdivided spaces for soldiers and NCOs, married men and wives, regimental artisans and medical personnel. Communal bedrooms were divided into sub-sections of companies, marked with a sign on the door, and inner discipline micro-managed by the squad sergeant, corporal and drummer sleeping in the same room as the soldiers.[205] Engineers were aware of the spatial arrangement soldiers required, keeping them within reach of their officers but without mixing upper and lower ranks. The civilian engineer who evaluated the barracks of Sant'Ignazio in Bologna, a former religious house (originally bought from a local family in the 1730s)[206] requisitioned by the French in 1797,[207] assessed that the rooms could contain eight to twelve soldiers for a total capacity of 1000 infantrymen, "con sufficienti appartamenti per porzione dell'ufficialità."[208] At the ex-religious house of San Francesco in Milan, a bloc of ten cells could be readapted into a dormitory for sixty soldiers.[209]

A significant difference was the presence of horses, which engineers must account for when adapting a religious house into cavalry-accessible barracks.

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[203] E. Strumia, *"Rivoluzionare il bel sesso." Donne e politica nel Triennio repubblicano* (Naples, 2011), 218-32.

[204] For a description of a Dominican religious house's interior between Medieval and early modern era: P. Lippini, *La vita quotidiana di un convento medievale* (Bologna, 2003), 87-95. However, the French nunnery of the Pauvres-Claires in Lille, expropriated in 1792 and turned into a military magazine, had communal dormitories; C. Cercy, C. Gardais, "Le couvent des Pauvres-Claires de Lille", *Revue du Nord*, 368/5 (2006), 33-68.

[205] "Regolamento sulle caserme", 6 June 1804, art. 50-1.

[206] G. Guidicini, *Cose notabili della città di Bologna: ossia Storia cronologica de' suoi stabili* (Bologna, 1872), iv, p. 31.

[207] C.M., *Ai cittadini di Bologna. Compendio storico de' diversi governi di sua patria dalla fondazione di essa fino al presente* (Bologna, 1798), p. 82.

[208] ASMI MGC 691/692, engineer Martinetti to the minister of war, 10 Ventôse VI/28 February 1798.

[209] A. Calderini, "Documenti inediti per la storia della Chiesa di S. Francesco Grande in Milano", *Aevum*, 14, 2/3 (1940), p.218.

A report from September 1798, on four religious houses in Bologna, analysed the proposed changes to the Dominican friars' religious house; the departmental engineers had suggested turning a wing of the building into stables for around 240 horses.[210] The Genio officer disagreed with this plan, proposing instead to leave the wing as it was, keeping the rooms in it available for other uses, and build larger stables. "Questo stallone," Major Rossi explained, "che sarà della Lunghezza di circa 75 Tese, potrà contenere circa 300 cavalli, e non importerà certamente più di quanto costerebbe l'adattamento delle scuderie progettato sulla pianta".[211] Additional areas of the religious house had become free for military use since the friars had left the building, bringing its capacity to 500 horses.[212] A good placement for the stables of a cavalry barracks in an ex-religious house was, if large enough, the refectory; in the San Francesco barracks at Crema, such a stable accommodated thirty horses.[213]

The underground of religious houses and churches posed a unique issue: the human remains that had accumulated over centuries of traditional Catholic burials within the perimeter of the holy edifice. This practice had drawn increasing hygiene concerns throughout the second half of the 18th century;[214] medical understanding regarded unhealthy odours, such as the miasmas exhaling from putrefying bodies, as a pathogen[215] spreading diseases through stagnant air or by permeating and corrupting the soil.[216] In the German lands of the Habsburg monarchy, Joseph II forbade burying corpses in crypts and *intra muros*, and prescribed the use of quicklime to accelerate putrefaction and prevent miasmas.[217] Regulations against church burials for hygienic reasons in Ancien Régime France were rarely applied,[218] whereas the Napoleonic government pursued these policies more vigorously; the edict of 12 June 1804 forbade burials in churches and within urban

[210] ASMI MGC 691/692, Major Rossi's report, 28 Fructidor VI/14 September 1798.
[211] Ibid.
[212] Ibid.
[213] ASMI MGC 628, Galateo to the minister of war, 27 March 1805.
[214] M. Vovelle, *La mort et l'Occident de 1300 à nos jours* (Paris, 1983), 461-7.
[215] J. Strauss, *Human remains. Medicine, death, and desire in nineteenth-century Paris* (New York, 2012), p.92.
[216] Ibid., p.97.
[217] V. Grubhoffer, "La morte tra le discussioni settecentesche e il culto della memoria. Il caso della nobiltà presso la corte asburgica: gli Schwarzenberg (1780-1900)", *IN_BO. Ricerche e progetti per il territorio, la città e l'architettura*, 4 (2012), p.233.
[218] Strauss, *Human remains*, p.3.

boundaries, relegating the dead to *extra muros* cemeteries.[219] Even monks who lived in odour-infested religious houses prior to the Napoleonic conquests had voiced hygiene concerns,[220] and soldiers were no exception. When a group of conscripts in Verona was temporarily accommodated in the ex-church of San Michele in Porta, the prefect noted that several of them had fallen sick after a few days due to the mixture of unhealthy local air and "mephitic exhalations" from the tombs they had stirred up.[221] Infrastructural risk went hand-in-hand with miasmas, as constantly digging new tombs over the centuries disjointed the floor inside the churches and loosened the soil outside.[222] Such instability hampered military uses of the buildings; carts transporting supplies for the Sant'Agostino barracks of Bergamo inside the deconsecrated church adjacent to the ex-religious house risked sinking, if the floor collapsed because of the tombs underneath, for a long time until the municipality carried out fill-up works.[223]

Expropriating religious houses and churches also meant seizing the artworks inside them, useless for any military purpose except contributing to finance the war effort or lining a general's pockets;[224] among the Italian generals, the Lechi brothers amassed remarkable collections through purchases and requisitions.[225] The cultural politics of the Directory and the empire aimed to create prestigious museums in the capital cities, grouping the finest artworks from the conquered countries.[226] Such "Napoleonic thefts" played a central polemical role in the *légende noire* of the empire, leading an early commenter to liken Augereau, Masséna and Lechi to Attila and Theodoric.[227] It was only natural that turning a religious house into a barracks meant removing not just the monks, but also the valuable artefacts. Freeing up space for the troops was a powerful rationale; in 1798, the *casermiere* at

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[219] *Collection des lois, senatus-consultes, décrets impériaux et avis du Conseil d'Etat relatifs aux cultes, publiés depuis le concordat, jusqu'au 1er janvier 1813 inclusivement* (Paris, 1813), 180-5, "Décret imperial sur les sépultures", 23 Prairial XII/12 June 1804.
[220] D. Stefanutto, "La morte disciplinata. Storia del cimitero di Treviso (1790-1890)", *Rivista di Storia Contemporanea*, 15/3 (1986), 351.
[221] ASMI MGC 612, prefect of Adige to the minister of war, 29 September 1807.
[222] R. Marsetič, "Questioni igienico-sanitarie relative alle sepolture urbane a Pola tra la fine del XVIII e la prima metà del XIX secolo", *Acta Medico-Historica Adriatica*, 10/1 (2012), p.272.
[223] ASMI MGC 695, prefect of Serio to the minister of war, 12 December 1812.
[224] D. Chandler, "Napoleon and his marshals", in D. Chandler (ed.), *Napoleon's marshals* (New York, 1987), p. xliv.
[225] S. Bracca, "La 'nota di quadri' per i Lechi di Brescia. Una tentata vendita di Davide Antonio Fossati", *Civiltà bresciana*, 2 (2010), 95-108.
[226] P. Rosenberg, *Dominique Vivant-Denon: L'œil de Napoléon* (Paris, 1999). S. Sicoli (ed.), *Milano 1809. La Pinacoteca di Brera e i musei in età napoleonica* (Milan, 2009).
[227] C. Govion Broglio Soleri, *Venice under the Yoke of France and of Austria* (London, 1824), ii, p.196.

Sant'Eustorgio informed the municipality that the library of the ex-religious house could host 400 soldiers and its fixtures were in excellent states, but

> "per accidente tale Libreria si trova ancora ripiena di Libri, e già da un mese a questa parte venne avvisato il Padre Superiore del convento dal Ministro dell'interno, che avrebbe mandato il suo segretario Borsieri, per far l'inventario de' Libri, e farli trasportare altrove".[228]

Fine books in monastic libraries met the same fate as antiquarian war spoils such as paintings and sculptures,[229] and the library of Sant'Eustorgio, a former seat of the Inquisition, boasted 797 volumes in its 15th century catalogue.[230] In the meantime, the troops and the cultural assets had to be kept separate to ensure the safety of the latter. Measures to preserve Leonardo da Vinci's *Last Supper* in the refectory of Santa Maria delle Grazie consisted in walling up the windows and main door of the refectory, making it accessible only through the backyard kitchen door; the *casermiere* was to prevent soldiers from trespassing inside.[231] On the other hand, proceedings from the sale of artefacts or precious materials could help pay for repairs; such was the plan for the marbles covering a shaky terrace, due for demolition, in the San Francesco barracks of Crema.[232] Profit was not fail-safe, depending on piecemeal availability of items that might not even sell at all, as was the case with the failed auction of sixteen granite columns from the demolished church of San Francesco in Milan.[233]

V.5 New constructions

Renovations of urban defence systems dwarfed barracks constructions in terms of expenses, scale of the works, and repercussions on the daily lives of town dwellers. Houses and terrains had to be bought off from their owners to make room for the new fortifications. Palmanova underwent an emblematic renovation programme in spring-summer 1806, leading to the

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[228] ASCMI LM 343, Ferrario to the Dicastero Generale di Polizia, 11 October 1798.
[229] A. Rita, *Biblioteche e requisizioni librarie a Roma in età napoleonica. Cronologia e fonti romane* (Vatican City, 2012). D. Camurri, *L'arte perduta. Le requisizioni di opere d'arte a Bologna in età napoleonica (1796-1815)* (Bologna, 2003), p.68.
[230] M. Tavuzzi, *Renaissance Inquisitors. Dominican Inquisitors and inquisitorial districts in northern Italy, 1474-1527* (Leiden, 2007), p.58.
[231] S. Righini Ponticelli, "La nascita del convento", in M. Frassineti (ed.), *Santa Maria delle Grazie* (Milan, 1998), 48-117.
[232] ASMI MGC 612, Bianchi d'Adda to the minister of war, 30 October 1806.
[233] ASMI MGC 670, commissario Zanoli to the minister of war, 17 April 1811.

construction of the third wall screen around the city.[234] It caused several houses to be requisitioned and demolished, eliciting the citizens' protests for exemption as the demolition would run against the property laws of the Code Napoleon unless it was fully reimbursed,[235] or deprive small proprietors of the possibility of eking out a living through sublets.[236] Landlords had to host their homeless tenants, with the meagre consolation that they were exempt from military billets and allowed to keep the demolition debris.[237] These works caused the disappearance of three villages lying within the planned esplanade around the fortress.[238] While the villagers scattered, the presence of civilian workers, transporters and army sappers, as well as a larger garrison,[239] congested the town and the surrounding villages.[240] The project of the third screen included barracks that were both accommodation for the troops and part of the defence compound, capable of 3500 men spread over nine barracks, only three of which were built.[241]

Excluding fortifications, urban barracks built *ex novo* were few and far-between compared with adaptations of pre-existent buildings. A partial exception was Milan, perhaps the Italian city that benefitted the most from Napoleonic urbanism,[242] whose programmes centred on the area of the castle. The capital city was garrisoned by the army élite, the Royal Guards and the Velites; their quarters would have to be suitable to the prestige of the corps and their training needs.

The Guards barracks was established at San Simpliciano, a prestigious former church and religious house. Interventions, between 1806 and 1810, added a riding hall and a new wing.[243] The contractors described them as building a new "grandiosa caserma" in and of itself,[244] underlining the scale of the works as they petitioned the ministry for payment. The grandiosity of San Simpliciano did not stand in a vacuum. Towards the end of Napoleonic

[234] Fara, *Napoleone architetto*, 127-9.
[235] ASMI MGC 703, municipal representatives of Palma to General Léry, 7 November 1806.
[236] ASMI MGC 703, municipal representatives of Palma to Léry, 25 September 1806.
[237] ASMI MGC 703, prefect of Passariano to the municipal representatives of Palma, 27 November 1806.
[238] S. Perini, "Le 'orribili demolizioni'. Palmada e la spianata del 1797", *Quaderni del Civico Museo Storico della città di Palmanova*, (1996), http://www.comune.gonars.ud.it/fileadmin/user_palmanova/demolizioni.pdf (5 April 2020).
[239] Fara, *Napoleone architetto*, p128.
[240] ASMI MGC 703, municipal representatives of Palma to Léry, 30 November 1806.
[241] M.P. Gatti, G. Russo, L. Zecchin, "The Palmanova cantonments. Conservation, value-enhancement and transformation for an integrated and overall regeneration", *Journal of Civil Engineering and Architecture*, 11 (2017), 559-70.
[242] Fugier, *Napoléon et l'Italie*, p.244.
[243] Pigni, *Guardia*, p.78.
[244] ASMI MGC 677 bis, Giuseppe Ramelli to the minister of war, 31 August 1813.

rule, something of a military base began to form in this area at the northern access route into the city, close to the customs barrier between the gates of Porta Comasina and Porta Nuova. The area was the location of the state tobacco manufacture, increasing in size and efficiency during the Napoleonic and Restoration period;[245] the San Simpliciano barracks lay about one kilometre south of the customs barrier. Thus, the area was an important district in the industrial, fiscal and military sense. One of the main streets running across it underwent the symbolically significant name change of Strada di Santa Teresa into Strada della Moscova, honouring the Italian troops who had fought at Borodino in 1812.[246] The gate it stemmed from, the old Porta Tenaglia, was slated for renovation and rechristening as Porta di Mosca, victory permitting.[247] Name changes of such commemorative value for the army suited the growing, more rationalised presence of the military in the area through the enlargement of San Simpliciano and the planned construction of a cavalry barracks, with the goal of linking them.[248] Construction operations for the new barracks began in 1812, their first stage being negotiations between Colonel Motta and the materials suppliers to lay down the foundations and start raising the outer walls.[249] Motta aimed to save money on the cost of the stone and its transport, since the slabs could be shipped over through the canals of Milan[250] from the quarries on the Lake Lario.[251] The construction site required 1,900,000 bricks, supplied through four contractors, and a daily delivery of 20 m^3 of sand; one of the brick contractors was able to fetch a higher price due to the transport costs to the site from his furnace, located off the Porta Marengo at the other side of the city.[252] The barracks was unfinished at the fall of the kingdom the following year, and under the Austrians it housed the military bakery.[253]

The barracks of the Royal Velites was the only completed new barracks in the city, erected on the grounds of the expropriated San Francesco church, whose lifetime under the Napoleonic rule had been a standard fare of

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[245] A. Castellano, "La Manifattura Tabacchi di Milano: note per un'antropologia storica di un luogo di lavoro", in P. Chierici, R. Covino, F. Pernice (eds.), *Le fabbriche del tabacco in Italia* (Turin, 2012), 87-100.
[246] C. Spellanzon, *Storia del Risorgimento e dell'unità d'Italia* (Milan, 1951), i, p.447.
[247] C. Cantù, *Milano e il suo territorio* (Milan, 1844), ii, p.316.
[248] Zanoli, *Sulla milizia*, i, p.123.
[249] ASMI MGC 677 bis, Motta to the minister of war, 26 December 1812.
[250] ASMI MGC 677 bis, Motta to the minister of war, 26 December 1812.
[251] M. Uboldi, "Le cave del 'marmo nero' e i marmisti di Varenna (LC) dall'Antichità all'età contemporanea", *Archeologia Postmedievale*, 17 (2013), 127-30.
[252] ASMI MGC 677 bis, Motta to the minister of war, 16 February 1813.
[253] Cantù, *Milano*, ii, p.394.

expropriation and reuse as a military warehouse;[254] a proposed reconversion into an orphanage was abandoned due to its costs.[255] Since the barracks was insufficient for the Velites, a complete reconstruction was tendered off in late 1806.[256] Materials from the demolition of the church were sold off[257] or, if in acceptable condition, reused in the new constructions, on site and elsewhere wherever the city barracks needed it.[258] The contractor was Giuseppe Ramelli, the same who would take up the works at San Simpliciano and had to petition the ministry repeatedly to receive his payment, at last, in 1813.[259] Another contractor for both construction sites, wood supplier Luigi Beretta, complained that his creditors were threatening to sue him.[260] The works taking place in the capital city, close to the centres of military administration and the main projects of urban renovation, then, gave no safeguard against lossmaking. The awareness that barracks constructions were the very opposite of quick money ran so deep that the indebted ministry had to make do with the few contractors who accepted the risk, as was the case for the demolitions and constructions at the San Francesco site in 1809.[261]

For the people who lived near the construction sites, works meant damages to their houses (and claims to reimbursement)[262] if not loss of the house itself, although on a mercifully smaller scale than in Palmanova. One of these houses, belonging to one Bartolomeo Cominetti, was bought by the ministry in order to be demolished, and the tenants living in it were forced to move out at the traditional date of Saint Michael's day, even if their tenancy was not over yet, without any compensation.[263] The inhabitants also complained about the contractors' carelessness in demolishing the old walls, without regard for where the debris fell in the narrow street separating the church from the neighbouring houses, or for the demolition quakes cracking window frames.[264] Such behaviour, pointed out Alfonso Castiglioni in his petition,

[254] ASMI MGC 670, Captain Lucini to the commander of the Genio, 13 Fructidor VI/30 August 1798.
[255] ASMI MGC 670, general superintendant to the national buildings to the minister of war, 11 October 1802.
[256] Calderini, "Documenti inediti".
[257] ASMI MGC 677 bis, procès-verbal of commissario Zanoli, 10 May 1807.
[258] ASMI MGC 677 bis, Rossi to the minister of war, 30 July 1807.
[259] ASMI MGC 677 bis, Motta to the minister of war, 19 October 1813.
[260] ASMI MGC 677 bis, Luigi Beretta to the minister of war, s.d. (received 22 October 1813).
[261] ASMI MGC 670, Rossi to the minister of war, 27 March 1809.
[262] See the cases briefly outlined in Calderini, "Documenti inediti".
[263] ASMI MGC 670, legal auditor at the minister of finance to the minister of war, 29 July 1808.
[264] ASMI MGC 670, declaration of Alfonso Castiglioni (s.d.), attached to letter of the prefect of Olona to the minister of war, 28 August 1807.

violated the contract articles, but the contractors shrugged protests off by promising reimbursements sometime in the future.[265] Proximity to the barracks construction site, then, was a source of discomfort if not of danger. Outrage was not directed at the military presence per se, but at the "nuova, e strana foggia di demolire in mezzo ad una popolata città".[266] These complainants had acquired their houses thanks to monastic suppressions. Sometime between 1798 and 1802, Bartolomeo Cominetti had bought the oratory of the Immacolata, a portion of the old San Francesco religious house,[267] in all likelihood the same house[268] that was vacated in 1808, and due for demolition. Alfonso Castiglioni, a member of the Milanese nobility with remarkable real estate assets and no sympathy for the Napoleonic regime,[269] in 1786, had purchased the terrain of the demolished church of the Ritiro di Santa Valeria (a nunnery suppressed at Joseph II's orders) and built a house there.[270] By blaming the contractors rather than the military presence in the neighbourhood, and doing so only as it affected his property, Castiglioni aimed a subtle criticism to the regime's *modus operandi* (emphasising the "novelty" and "strangeness" of the construction methods) within acceptable limits, in line with his own political non-commitment.[271]

Conclusion

The use of religious houses for military accommodation had recent precedents, for the Italian states, in the wars of the 18th century; the Napoleonic age continued the trend on a larger and more organised scale, turning an occasional occupation into permanent garrisons or *lieux d'étape* for units on the march. Even if ex-religious real estate was not the only resource, it was the most frequent solution to the problem of accommodation outside of older castles and fortifications, which were insufficient on their own, and the dreaded recourse to billeting. Repurposing and maintaining all these new barracks added a massive task to the military engineers, a newly

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[265] Ibid.
[266] Ibid.
[267] *Quadro storico di Milano antico e moderno* (Milan, 1802), 226-7.
[268] Calderini, "Documenti inediti".
[269] "Castiglioni, Alfonso", *Dizionario Biografico degli Italiani*, http://www.treccani.it/enciclopedia/alfonso-castiglioni_(Dizionario-Biografico)/ (22 October 2019).
[270] A. Ratti, "Del monaco cisterciese Don Ermete Bonomi milanese e delle sue opere", *Archivio storico lombardo*, 22/6 (1895), 303-82.
[271] A. D'Ancona, G. Gallavresi (eds.), *Carteggi del conte Federico Confalonieri ed altri documenti spettanti alla sua biografia* (Milan, 1913), p.27.

instituted corps suffering from shortage of officers, which required the support of civilian engineers via the prefectures. Cooperation was not without issues, but it was a necessity.

Infrastructural interventions on the buildings tended to isolate the military quarters from the outside in order to prevent desertion and disease. Maintenance and repairs were an important part of ensuring soldiers' welfare, correcting long-held assumptions on the Napoleonic regime as relatively corner-cutting in this regard. By their very position within the city, barracks complicated escape and simplified repression of breakout attempts; surveillance seemed to work better than physical enclosure, which was nevertheless enforced to respect neighbouring civilians' property.

In fact, complete militarisation of formerly civilian edifices was not self-reclusion for its own sake, and priority to military needs was not automatic. Compromises with proprietors were the order of the day, while repair works in conditions of near-constant financial strictures led to problems of cumulative neglect. Contractors, artisans and workers reclaimed their due and had no qualms about refusing to work until their credit was satisfied, to which the military administration could offer no remedy but procuring workforce elsewhere. Maintenance was eventually entrusted to municipal administrations, although the process was long and tortuous, leaving barracks in a limbo of unclear competences until the kingdom's final years.

In light of these circumstances, then, it is possible to redress the view that the Napoleonic era, or more widely the age of the democratic revolutions, marks the birth of modern militarism, i.e. "separate, and potentially opposed military and civilian spheres, each possessing its own distinct set of values and practices".[272] The military in the Kingdom of Italy simply could not, and neither did particularly want to, dispense with civilian assistance and labour in maintaining its soldiers' dwellings.

[272] D. Bell, "The Birth of Militarism in the Age of Democratic Revolutions", in A. Forrest, K. Hagemann, M. Rowe (eds.), *War, Demobilization and Memory. The Legacy of War in the Era of Atlantic Revolutions* (Basingstoke, 2016), p.31.

Chapter 6: Cohabitation

The rise of a separate military culture and sphere of society in opposition to the civilian, as well as their framing in this terminology,[1] plays an important role in the argument for total war in the Napoleonic era, as the shared experience of war created a military community with its own subculture, sociability and codes of behaviour, perceiving itself as distinct from civilian society.[2] However, the rigidity of this separation, exemplified by the reclusion of the army in barracks, is questionable. As Sabina Loriga shows for the Ancien Régime Piedmontese army, despite a programme of barracks construction, throughout the century the garrison and transient troops were often billeted in civilian homes or inns, while the new barracks did not prevent civilians from dwelling or working in the military quarters, or simply to visit them.[3] The situation did not change drastically in the Napoleonic Wars. Segregation was a tool to achieve discipline and *esprit de corps*, between different units and between troops and civilians, but the barracks often emerge in the primary sources as shared spaces rather than as enclosed total institutions.

Officers were accommodated in halls of residence, or billeted in civilian houses suitable to their rank. Troop billeting kept happening, as the Italian barracks could not fully keep up with logistical demand; it was unpopular among the civilians and potentially disruptive for military discipline, as scattering troops increased the risk of desertion. At other times, soldiers and civilians cohabited in barracks. This could happen when civilians lived, legally or illegally, within the military spaces, or when they opened shops inside military installations or in their immediate proximity. Civilians negotiated their place through formal complaints, networks of power and influence, and alternative forms of contributions. Private citizens, in fact, negotiated with the state through a web of local and central authorities and shifting legal frameworks.[4] For the government, the rationale behind allowing civilians into military spaces was the constant scramble for saving or making money out of their presence. The history of barracks thus

[1] Bell, *First total war*, p.11.
[2] Thoral, *From Valmy*, 215-6.
[3] Loriga, *Soldati*, 17-20.
[4] That was also true for the nuns throughout the monastic suppressions: L. Lehtsalu, "Rethinking monastic suppressions in revolutionary and Napoleonic Italy: how women religious negotiated for their communities", *Women's History Review*, 25/6 (2016), 945-64.

intertwines with history of labour and of poor relief in Napoleonic Italy, once the Catholic Church was largely divested of this traditional task, now concentrated into the hands of the state.

VI.1 Military cohabitation

In the mass conscript army that the Napoleonic Wars first tested on a large scale, the barracks were the place where soldiers underwent the rite of passage from civilian to military life, growing accustomed to discipline, hardship, violence, and internalising the values and habits of the army.[5] The construction and affirmation of military identity was strongly tied to regimental *esprit de corps*, expressed down to the details of uniforms[6] and spearheaded by the elitism of the Guards regiments.[7] Instilling and preserving comradeship and discipline went hand-in-hand with the mobility of conscripts and depots across various garrisons, which chapter 2 showed. Within the regiment, the material conditions of life in barracks thrust *camaraderie* upon the soldiers, who slept two to a bed.[8] The small, tightly-knit groups of *camarades* providing for each other in the unit's micro-logistics became a substitute home[9] for the young Frenchmen displaced to distant depots abroad, and, in the Italian army, the roughly evenly split rural and urban men that conscription gathered from across the new state.[10]

Ties of *camaraderie* needed time to consolidate; viceroy Eugène estimated average acclimatisation to military life lasted little more than one year, and this timeframe was the golden hour for desertion attempts.[11] Distance also played a role in facilitating desertion: *réfractaires* who remained close to home could hide more easily than deserters already far into unfamiliar country.[12] Within the kingdom's borders and in its own army, desertion remained widespread throughout the wars, aggravating social insecurity and sapping military resources.[13] Locking conscripts literally behind bars in barracks, as chapter 5 showed, was one solution; to avoid escapes and properly instil comradeship and discipline, another widely accepted principle

[5] Roynette, *Bons pour le service*, 219-369.
[6] Elting, *Swords*, p.447.
[7] Thoral, *From Valmy*, 142-4.
[8] Forrest, *Napoleon's men*, p.135.
[9] Thoral, *From Valmy*, 102-6.
[10] Schneid, *Soldiers*, 79-89.
[11] Ibid., p.95.
[12] Forrest, *Conscripts*, p.99.
[13] Grab, "Conscription and desertion", 37-9.

was that conscripts ought not to be billeted. In Verona, loaded with a massive garrison due to its position on the Austrian-Italian border in 1805-'06, and defensive role as one of the fortresses of the Quadrilateral, the municipality feared that if the incoming conscripts were billeted, as the barracks were full, they would descend into disorder because they were "truppe non per anco conoscitrici dell'ordine militare."[14] The commissar-ordinator in chief of the *armée d'Italie* echoed the disciplinary preoccupation during the draft of autumn 1806: billeting the conscripts would discomfort the inhabitants, and be "infiniment préjudiciable à la discipline et à l'instruction des nouveaux soldats."[15] The amount of troops far outstripped the barracks allotted by the March 1806 decree, and billeting conscripts, in addition to overburdening citizens already billeting transient troops, facilitated desertion by scattering the men.[16] We find the same arguments against scattering conscripts in billets four years later in Bergamo, where major repairs to the garrison barracks were lagging behind and space barely sufficed for two regimental depots, the departmental depot, and frequent troop passages.[17]

Even after the soldiers had acclimatised to the regiment, commanders disapproved of mixing different units together within the same barracks, as an obstacle to discipline and efficiency. Shortage of supplies could trigger strife among units sharing the same barracks. The tight timing of outbound-inbound traffic made the availability of supplies a matter of restocking in the nick of time, as, when a regiment left the barracks in the morning and the next arrived on the same day, *casermieri* had to gather or quickly launder bed linen for the incoming guests.[18] In February 1797, French troops did not vacate the Sant'Eustorgio barracks on time before the arrival of the Polish Legion, and the situation did not degenerate because only a few Polish troops had shown up yet.[19] Cohabitation of different units, and men of different rank, branch and nationality, was acceptable as long as spaces were internally separate. The Santa Maria delle Grazie barracks, in March 1799, accommodated small detachments of French wagon drivers, Cisalpine Genio soldiers, Polish soldiers, and one Cisalpine officer; the *Dicastero Centrale* intended to transfer them and reorganise the barracks "in modo che dovesse servire in una parte per l'alloggio separato d'ufficialità, nell'altra per

[14] ASMI MGC 612, municipality of Verona to the prefect of Adige, 23 December 1805.
[15] ASMI MGC 612, Joubert to the minister of war, 25 October 1806.
[16] ASMI MGC 612, prefect of Adige to the minister of war, 15 November 1806.
[17] ASMI MGC 695, prefect of Serio to the minister of war, 12 January 1810.
[18] ASCMI LM 426, casermiere Fasanotti to the barracks inspector, 5 messidor IX/24 June 1801.
[19] ASCMI LM 343, military committee of Milan to the municipality, 30 Nivôse V/18 February 1797.

cavalleria, e nell'ultima per infanteria."[20] In the same vein as separation, the municipal engineer overseeing repairs at the San Vittore barracks remarked that the planned repairs would open several breaches within the building, potentially causing disorders as the living quarters of the French and Cisalpine cavalry would be communicating.[21] The sense of superiority that the French felt toward the Italians[22] might have played a role in accentuating their insistence on separation and claiming the barracks for themselves,[23] but internal discipline issues arising between troops of different, albeit allied, armies were not exclusive to French and Italians; in 1799-1800, the Russians allegedly stole from the Austrians with whom they were barracksed together at the abbey of San Zeno in Verona.[24]

The real threat to discipline, when units mixed in the same barracks, was competition over space and materiel. This is eloquently expressed by Colonel Millo of the Italian horse artillery regiment, when his men were garrisoned in Pavia in 1811. Millo urged the local authorities to allow his three companies and two-hundred horses to lodge, all in one place, in the San Francesco barracks.[25] The responses were too tepid for the colonel's taste: the *podestà* postponed the move until the French dragoon regiment occupying the barracks vacated it; the garrison commander refused to resolve the dispute and offend either commander,[26] perhaps knowing Millo's fire-breathing temper.[27] Then, Millo explained to the minister of war his reasons for securing the barracks for the horse artillery:

> "1. Perché essendo capace di contenere circa cinquecento uomini, e 400 cavalli, quando il reggimento fosse completo sarebbe precisamente il locale, che ci vorrebbe né più né meno per alloggiarlo tutto, ed intanto occupandolo ora insieme con una compagnia treno avrei almeno l'avvantaggio di avere la poca gente, che comando riunita, mentre è ora divisa in due caserme. 2. Perché restando nelle caserme Calchi e Salimbeni capaci di contenere circa 900 uomini e 400 cavalli se anche

[20] ASCMI LM 188, engineer Fontana to the Dicastero Centrale, 23 Ventôse VII/13 March 1799.
[21] ASCMI LM 426, engineer Carminati to the central administration of Olona, 29 Germinal IX/18 April 1798.
[22] Thoral, *From Valmy*, p.129.
[23] ASCMI LM 426, Carminati to the central administration of Olona, 29 Germinal IX/18 April 1798.
[24] R. Fasanari, *L'armata russa del generale Suvorov attraverso Verona (1799-1800)* (Verona, 1952), 65-74.
[25] ASMI MGC 163, Millo to the minister of war, 1 July 1811.
[26] Ibid.
[27] G. Lombroso, *Vite dei primarj generali ed ufficiali italiani che si distinsero nelle guerre napoleoniche dal 1796 al 1815* (Milan, 1843), 215-6.

> il reggimento venisse completato non potrei mai sperare di occuparle esclusivamente ed all'opposto il treno è sicuro d'averle sempre da sé solo per la forza maggiore che ha in uomini e cavalli, vantaggio che il treno dovrebbe calcolare. 3. Finalmente perché la caserma di S. Francesco è suscettibile se vi fosse una compagnia del treno accasermata coll'artiglieria a cavallo, di separazione tale a non lasciare nulla di comune tra li due corpi, cosa che riparerebbe ai tanti inconvenienti, che ne nascono stando mescolati assieme; come furti, malproprietà della caserma, dispute, e guasti, che un corpo getta a carico dell'altro."[28]

This reasoning was such widespread common sense that a viceregal decree, from October 1810, had endorsed it officially, allowing commanders, upon arrival in a municipality, to choose the most apt barracks and concentrate their corps there, to keep them as united as possible.[29] Concentration of men and horses by company in the same quarters simplified regrouping when it was time to march,[30] and it was vital to the efficiency of corps responsible for maintaining public order, such as the Gendarmerie and the National Guards. Gendarmes billeting one away from the other lost precious time to gather, alerting suspects who could more easily avoid arrest, as the brigadiers of the Adige department complained in August 1805.[31] Similarly for the National Guards, the *podestà* of Modena, in July 1809, planned to gather all the companies in one barracks to facilitate discipline and mustering, especially at night, quickly and without alarming the populace.[32] Furthermore, these National Guards, in the *podestà*'s intentions, would be concentrated in the same barracks as the conscription depot,[33] ready at hand to watch against desertion.

Conversely, inter-unit contact thrived in the acceptable, regulated, and most importantly temporary, form of sociability. Celebrating public festivals, with food and drinking, served to cement political allegiances to the regime, commemorate or celebrate victories, and reaffirm the corps' identity.[34] On a more intimate level, meeting old friends, or relatives from one's native *pays,* was a reason to celebrate and reconnect for the individual soldier, helping

[28] ASMI MGC 163, Millo to the minister of war, 1 July 1811.
[29] ASMN PM 670, minister of war to the prefect of Mincio, 10 November 1810.
[30] "Regolamento sulle caserme", 6 June 1804, art. 296-7.
[31] ASMI MGC 612, prefect of Adige to the minister of war, 29 August 1805.
[32] ASMI MGC 684, prefect of Panaro to the minister of war, 13 July 1809.
[33] Ibid.
[34] Thoral, *From Valmy*, p.144.

morale and offering respite in a harsh life.[35] A tradition of courtesy exchanges developed between officers of regiments who came and went, tied to the *esprit de corps* of units belonging to the same branch. Lieutenant Eugène de Roussy described the custom to his sister, including the preparation of barracks and horse fodder in the rites of inter-regimental sociability:

> "Nous attendons après-demain le 23e dragons qui vient de Rome et va je ne sais où. Nous nous préparons à les traiter. Les politesses d'un régiment à l'autre ne te sont sans doute pas connues. Voici les principales: d'abord le corps d'officiers donne un dîner au corps d'officiers arrivant. On fait préparer les casernes, les vivres et on va chercher le fourrage pour les chevaux ; voilà qui est le dernier degré de politesse et c'est ce que nous ferons."[36]

Sociability could help processes of *ralliement*, as was the case during the celebrations for Napoleon's coronation to king of Italy. Velite chasseur Jean-Baptiste-Auguste Barrès related, in his memoir, the welcome given to his regiment on the day of its arrival to Milan in March 1805, by the chasseurs of the Italian Presidential (soon to become Royal) Guard. The regiments dined together splendidly in the Italian chasseurs' barracks (unnamed in the text, although it is known it was located at the ex-religious house of San Simpliciano[37]), in the presence of high-ranking civilians.[38] Shortly before repatriating, the French chasseurs repaid this happy dinner to their hosts in kind.[39] In addition to the two élite regiments meeting like twin units, Barrès framed the soirée as an event *inter pares*, where the space of military sociability was partly opened to civilian presence on a common upper-class basis, contributing to the alliance of the two peoples and the *ralliement* of the Italian notables that the French sought to emphasise through the coronation ritual.[40]

On the opposite end of the social spectrum to the élite regiments' fine dining, cohabiting with the troops in barracks were also military families and sutlers, male and female. While attracting a doubtful reputation owing to the

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[35] Forrest, *Napoleon's men*, p.137.
[36] Roussy, *De l'empereur*, n. 97, Roussy to Fanny de Guichard, 28 February 1809.
[37] Pigni, *Guardia*, p.78.
[38] J.-B.-A. Barrès, *Souvenirs d'un officier de la Grande Armée* (Paris, 1923), p.24.
[39] Ibid.
[40] A. Caiani, "Ornamentalism in a European context? Napoleon's Italian coronation, 26 May 1805", *English Historical Review*, 132/554 (2017), 41-72.

disorderly social mores and gender roles associated with camp followers, these people performed a wide variety of logistical functions for the soldiers' welfare and sustainment.[41] According to the main book-length study on French army *cantinières*, the Napoleonic Wars saw a *de facto* professionalisation of the camp followers, owing to the length and intensity of the conflict setting the long-serving *cantinières* apart from civilian life as much as their soldier husbands.[42] At least in the garrisons of the Italian interior, the professionalism seems more blurred. At the conscription depot of Como in 1807, the sutlers were NCOs of the reserve troops, an occasional civilian substitute, and the female servant of a corporal, replacing the custodian's wife whom the *casermiere* had ordered to relocate.[43]

Military wives expected a dwelling place in the barracks, in case they had to settle in a garrison town and fend for themselves; legitimate marriage was a criterion for obtaining such rights as accommodation.[44] In late 1803, the grenadiers of the Presidential Guards left Milan for Paris, to serve as the First Consul's bodyguards along with the French *Gardes Consulaires*;[45] a few NCOs' and grenadiers' wives remained stranded in Milan with a monthly allowance withheld from their husbands' pay.[46] They lived in the Sant'Angelo barracks, and without the accommodation provided by the military administration to legitimate spouses of soldiers, "sarebbero esposte alla maggior miseria."[47] The same applied to wives of soldiers who had served in pre-Napoleonic armies. In 1808, Angiola Turrini, widow of a musician in the Foot Guard of the Duke of Modena, petitioned the minister of war for accommodation in one of the city barracks, "come a tant'altre infelici sue eguali".[48] Turrini did not have to go far to find the "other unhappy women" sharing her predicament. The Genio had precise information on the military families in the Modena barracks:

> "oltre al caporale de' veterani con soldo di ritiro Domenico Zanfi, e dalle vedove de' veterani con viveri, e paga Leonora Crespi e Maria Ghedini, le quali per aver diritto ad alloggio furono stabilite dal

[41] H.A. Mayer, "Bearing arms, bearing burdens. Women warriors, camp followers and home-front heroines of the American Revolution", in K. Hagemann, G. Mettele, J. Rendall, (eds.), *Gender, war and politics. Transatlantic perspectives, 1775-1830* (Basingstoke, 2010), 176-80.
[42] T. Cardoza, *Intrepid women. Cantinières and vivandières of the French army* (Bloomington, 2010), p.60.
[43] ASMI MGC 645, police deposition of Lieutenant Bonheim, 13 August 1807.
[44] Cardoza, *Intrepid women*, 85-7.
[45] Pigni, *Guardia*, p.41.
[46] ASMI MGDM 15, administrative council of war to Tordorò, 15 February 1804.
[47] Ibid.
[48] ASMI MGC 684, Angiola Turrini to the minister of war, 2 October 1808.

> commissario di guerra nel locale annesso alle carceri militari, trovandosi in quelle caserme le seguenti persone, cioè: Nella caserma di S. Eufemia certa Barbara Bassoli vedova d'un quartiermastro dell'ex duca di Modena con quattro figlie. In quella di S. Paolo Luigia Fantini con tre picciole figlie vedova d'un sergente del treno d'artiglieria, la quale però abita col custode, e fa parte della sua famiglia. Nella cittadella due vecchie vedove militari una delle quali non ha che due figli, andò all'armata. (Esse però alloggiano unitamente nelle stesse camere delle sunnominate Crespi, e Ghedini.) In una cameretta del padiglione di S. Vincenzo certa signora Michelina Zabloschi donna d'età avanzata, e moglie d'un capitano del 1° reggimento polacco che trovasi all'armata. A questa fu accordato dal sig. tenente Carandini un alloggio momentaneo finché potesse mettersi in viaggio per raggiungere suo marito, ma essendo l'infelice caduta inferma d'una malattia, che tutt'ora l'affligge non poté più mettersi in cammino."[49]

This report, in addition to the essential information the ministry was interested in to evaluate the supplications, summarises the micro-networks of solidarity and familiarity among the civilian barracks-dwellers, the veterans and their families, and the caretaking personnel. Some wives shared quarters together, while one became part of the custodian's family, along with her children, and the report's reticent wording may indicate that she had become the custodian's non-marital partner. Michelina Zabloschi, stranded in a foreign land and ill, had been granted her accommodation on a longer term than the temporary permission which the legislation for foreign women allowed.[50] The widows of pre-Napoleonic military personnel, even well into the new regime, looked at the army administration as a welfare provider, which did not show a brilliant track record in that regard. The Genio had already ordered the eviction of these people from the barracks, barring counter-orders from the minister in consideration of the wintry season, and of the fact that "trattandosi di persone tutte in qualche modo adette al militare creda potersi loro, o no continuare l'alloggio di cui godono".[51] Even though *cantinières* and soldiers' families perceived themselves as part of the military, they were not viewed as such by the administration, neither in France (where *cantinières* were not entitled to retirement income except for

[49] ASMI MGC 684, report of the ministerial 4th division, 26 November 1808.
[50] E. Pagano, "Soldati, mariti e padri. La disciplina del matrimonio nell'esercito italico", in M. Canella (ed.), *Armi e nazione. Dalla Repubblica Cisalpina al Regno d'Italia (1797-1814)* (Milan, 2009), 370-1.
[51] ASMI MGC 684, report of the ministerial 4th division, 26 November 1808.

widowhood pensions[52]), nor in Italy; in February 1809, the ministry of war confirmed the eviction orders.[53]

VI.2 Civilians in barracks: Business

In February 1805, the minister of interior addressed a circular letter to the prefects on behalf of the ministry of war, regarding the news that "alcune municipalità abbiano appiggionato a diversi particolari per varj usi gran parte dei caseggati di ragione nazionale, che servono di caserme, e che in passato erano interamente affidate all'amministraz.e delle medesime."[54] It ordered information-gathering rather than eviction; the minister of war wanted to know, with as much precision as possible, "se sussistano tali affitti e quanto da cadauno de' medesimi venga o sia stato percepito dalle municipalità".[55] On the other hand, the following year, in the wake of the murder of a French officer in a barracks in Bologna, Eugène prompted the ministries to exert strict surveillance on the people who visited and inhabited the barracks; nobody should be allowed to dwell in barracks except for the military "et les individus qui appartiennent au service."[56] This dichotomy summarises the attitude of the Napoleonic government towards civilians in barracks; they were not chased off outright, and if their presence was regulated and beneficial to the troops and the ministerial coffers, barracks became an opportunity for business.

Making money off the presence of troops was not an exclusive prerogative of nation-wide supply contractors; in 18th century France, the yearly garrison changes of the Royal Army's regiments were an occasion for the denizens of *étapes* cities to sell them victuals and rent them rooms.[57] These economic activities took place outside of barracks, but shops also existed inside the barracks if the latter were large enough. This was the main legal way in for civilians in barracks. They catered to a clientele of soldiers and officers, providing them wih simple supplies, food and drinks. The government collected revenues from the rents, and tenants were tasked with carrying out reparation works at their expense, as the administrative council of war

[52] Cardoza, *Intrepid women*, p.86.
[53] ASMI MGC 684, minister of war to Galateo, 4 February 1809.
[54] ASMN PM 666, circular letter of the minister of interior, 15 February 1805.
[55] Ibid.
[56] ASMI CL 652, Eugène to the minister of interior, 4 October 1806.
[57] Sturgill, "Changing garrisons", p.196.

explained in January 1803:

> "In tutte le comuni in cui i locali destinati ad uso delle caserme saranno superiori al bisogno della truppa potranno venir affittati a beneficio della nazione. Il ministro della guerra col mezzo de' commissari di guerra o loro ff. o di speciali delegati determina il caso, e provvede. I fondi che ne provengono sono specialmente affetti alle spese di riparazione delle caserme istesse."[58]

This move overrode similar initiatives of local authorities, turning it to the government's advantage; around the same time, the municipality of Arona had illegally rented out part of the ground floor rooms in the local barracks, to grain merchants and innkeepers.[59] The crucial argument was that revenues from these rentals could pay for repairs to the dilapidated barracks without using public funds.[60]

Usefulness guided the case of a contractor for the repairs at the Caserma Grande barracks in Bozzolo, Giovanni Busi, who examined two run-down rooms in the barracks, formerly used to lodge army sutlers and currently a magazine for cavalry fodder.[61] Since no soldiers had ever used the rooms,[62] the municipality allowed Busi to set up a shop in one of them.[63] Although the deal with Busi was presented to the prefect as bringing economic advantage for the nation,[64] the prefect vetoed the project because the barracks did not belong to the municipality of Bozzolo, but to the nation[65] (a fact the municipal officials were aware of when they approved Busi's proposal). The rationale for the prefect's decision was not the presence of Busi's shop per se, but rather the municipality overstepping the boundaries of its authority at a time when the overall ramshackle state of the barracks would soon call for a repair works contract, which the minister of war ordered shortly thereafter.[66] For their part, the municipality and Busi had proceeded with their project under the condition that the shop would not interfere with military activities, understanding that, should the army need the room, Busi

[58] ASMI MGC 600, administrative council of war to the ministerial 2nd division, 22 January 1803.
[59] ASMI MGC 623, Major Scipione Ferrante to the administrative council of war, 20 January 1803.
[60] Ibid.
[61] ASMN PAP 6, expert's report commissioned by Giovanni Busi, 13 December 1802.
[62] Ibid.
[63] ASMN PAP 6, deliberation of the Bozzolo municipality, 3 February 1803.
[64] ASMN PAP 6, cancelliere censuario of the Casalmaggiore district to the prefect of Alto Po, 17 January 1803.
[65] ASMN PAP 6, prefect of Alto Po to the vice-prefect of Casalmaggiore, 12 February 1803.
[66] ASMN PAP 6, minister of war to the prefect of Alto Po, 19 March 1803.

would relinquish it immediately.[67]

In a massive military installation such as the Foro Bonaparte, nine shops served the garrison's needs in May 1802; most of them had also served the Austrian garrison,[68] which highlights the continuity of logistical needs and civilian services despite the changes in regime and underlying military culture. Only one shop was a new addition dating to the French conquest; the innkeeper Julien had replaced a vintner who had been previously working in the same spot and left after the Austrians abandoned Milan.[69] The French commander's permissiveness in renting out rooms to civilian shopkeepers did not elicit praise from the Genio, as several rooms were "luoghi attissimi, anzi necessari a cambiarsi in alloggi d'ufficiali".[70] Later reports attributed this poor management to malice rather than to mistake. As the Genio planned to review the rent prices of the rooms in the Foro, in line with shop rents elsewhere in the city, it accused Commander Revel of deliberately failing to prevent the shopkeepers' speculations, selling poor-quality and overpriced goods, which the soldiers bought solely because of the proximity to the barracks.[71] The new management of the barracks was to be entirely in the hands of Italians, in the context of the struggle for power between the government of the Italian Republic and the French generals, accustomed to doing what they wanted in Italy since the heydays of 1796.[72] A veteran of the first Cisalpine army, Marco Marcello Vandoni, replaced Revel as the fortress commander in May 1802[73] and the Genio set the reviewed rents, taking into account the circumstances of each trader and keeping the average prices in line with those paid under the Austrian and French command.[74] Annual rates slightly increased the former, and significantly so the latter:[75]

Shop and shopkeeper	**Rent under the Austrians**	**Rent under Commander Revel**	**Current rent**
Sant'Antonio inn (Carboni and Proserpio)	£360	£150	£500

[67] ASMN PAP 6 deliberation of the Bozzolo municipality, 3 February 1803.
[68] ASMI MGC 667, "Stato delle botteghe che hanno sempre esistito in Castello di Milano co' loro rispettivi stati di pigione che pagavano al general comando austriaco", attached to a letter of the Direzione Generale del Genio to the minister of war, 25 May 1802.
[69] Ibid.
[70] ASMI MGC 667, Direzione Generale del Genio to the minister of war, 25 May 1802.
[71] ASMI MGC 667, Direzione Generale del Genio to the minister of war, 4 August 1802.
[72] Antonielli, *I prefetti*, 193-5.
[73] ASMI MGC 667, Direzione Generale del Genio to the minister of war, 25 May 1802.
[74] ASMI MGC 667, Bianchi d'Adda to the minister of war, 26 September 1802.
[75] ASMI MGC 667, "Stato delle botteghe, osterie etc che esistono in questo castello di Milano e Foro Bonaparte, colle rispettive pigioni…", 20 July 1802.

Coffeehouse (Proserpio)	£360	£180	£550
Food grocer (Rognoni)	£348	£45	£350
Greengrocer (Lucia Beretta)	£60	£25	£80
Haberdasher (Carboni)	£87	£36	£120
Baker (Ronchi)	£180	£90	£280
Restaurant (Colombo)	£120	£60	£190
Liqueur trader (Perini)	£120	£60	£190
Inn and vintner (Julien)		£160	

The degree to which businesses sold necessary goods or not was a factor of assessment. When coffeehouse owner Antonio Proserpio asked for a reduction in his rent, the Genio noted that the coffeehouse "non vende generi di prima necessità pel soldato, e per conseguenza il suo soggiorno in castello non è così necessario come per gli altri"[76], so Proserpio ought to pay the full rent, and free up the rooms if he found it too expensive.[77] There was more leniency towards his widowed wife Maria three years later; too old to work, she was unable to sell the shop because the lease would be auctioned anyway.[78] The Genio and the ministry allowed her to use the shop at the same rent conditions for another year, "per un singolare favore poiché si potrebbe tuttora licenziarla dal proseguire l'affitto."[79] The widow had pointed out to the minister how the coffeehouse had been there for several years, surviving three sieges of the castle,[80] but it seems unlikely that the Genio and the fortress commander were unaware of Proserpio's long-time service when he had asked for a rent decrease. It is also hard to believe this "singular favour" was due to a higher unwillingness to evict a woman who found herself in a typical position for a female shopkeeper, that is, a widow taking up the dead husband's business.[81] More probably, the reason simply lies in the fact that Maria Orsaniga's presence ensured a profit; Antonio Proserpio's request would decrease it.

The government never wanted to chase the shopkeepers away from the Foro, as long as they had a right to stay there. In 1802, grocer Angelo Rognoni wrote a panicked letter to the minister when he realised his small house and shop, where he had worked for forty years, might undergo a reduction to carve up larger officers' accommodations, depriving his business of storage

[76] Ibid.
[77] ASMI MGC 667, Bianchi d'Adda to the minister of war, 26 September 1802.
[78] ASMI MGC 667, Maria Orsaniga Proserpio to the minister of war, 22 May 1805.
[79] ASMI MGC 667, Colonel Rossi to the minister of war, 27 May 1805.
[80] ASMI MGC 667, Maria Orsaniga Proserpio to the minister of war, 22 May 1805.
[81] J. Morris, *The political economy of shopkeeping in Milan, 1888-1922* (Cambridge, 1993), p.43.

space for rice, pulses and other foodstuff.[82] Vandoni approved his request, knowing Rognoni's honesty and pointing out the Genio's instructions were to readapt as officers' accommodation the rooms that Commander Revel had illegally given to "persone intruse di loro emolumento"[83], instead of taking space from legitimate dwellers who had been working there for a long time.[84]

Rognoni's death, later in 1802, and the fate of his shop sparked a quarrel among shopkeepers, fighting each other for spaces and profits. Maria Colombi, "non moglie, del defunto Rognoni, ma per pubblica voce e fama sua concubina da quattro anni",[85] inherited his shop[86] at a time when the ministry of war had agreed to assign it to another shopkeeper, Pietro Carboni,[87] in exchange for Carboni's original shop, earmarked for military usage as rifle storage room.[88] In addition to facing eviction and the loss of her merchandise,[89] Colombi complained that Carboni's competition against her bid for auction pushed up the annual rent price she would have to pay, in 1804, from 350 to 2015 *lire*.[90] Trying to invalidate his claim, Colombi brought up to vice-president Melzi her forty years of diligent work in the castle, the need to support her family, her legal right to inherit Rognoni's shop, and Carboni's dishonesty, as she attributed his acquisition to the favour of some employees in the ministry of war who obstructed her appeals and deceived the minister.[91] Colombi's arguments were staples of grievance language when approaching the state, especially the idea that the benevolent powerful person could not possibly want to damage the petitioner, therefore dishonest advisors must have misled him.[92] This traditional rhetoric attached itself to present-day concerns about the networks of financiers, suppliers and profiteers around the ministry, accessible to wealthy merchants like her rival. For his part, Carboni took care to present himself as risking destitution, claiming, in 1802, that he needed Rognoni's shop to better provide for his children and nephews, all depending on him.[93] Eventually, so that Colombi could pay the debt she had incurred due to the competition-inflated rent, she

[82] ASMI MGC 667, Angelo Rognoni to the minister of war, s.d.
[83] ASMI MGC 667, Vandoni to the garrison commander General Severoli, 10 June 1802.
[84] Ibid.
[85] ASMI MGC 667, minister of war to Melzi, s.d., May 1803.
[86] ASMI MGC 667, Maria Colombi to the commander of the Foro Bonaparte, 30 December 1802.
[87] ASMI MGC 667, minister of war to Melzi, s.d., May 1803.
[88] ASMI MGC 667, Pietro Carboni to the minister of war, 2 July 1802.
[89] ASMI MGC 667, Maria Colombi to the commander of the Foro Bonaparte, 30 December 1802.
[90] ASMI MGC 667, Maria Colombi to Melzi, 11 June 1804.
[91] ASMI MGC 667, Maria Colombi to Melzi, 6 May 1803.
[92] Y.-M. Bercé, *Revolt and revolution in early modern Europe* (Manchester, 1987), 28-32.
[93] ASMI MGC 667, Pietro Carboni to the minister of war, 12 December 1802.

was allowed to stay in the shop for four more years.[94] Rents kept rising in the meantime, straining the apparently good relations between Carboni and the military administration; Colonel Rossi wrote to the minister, in July 1805, that Carboni had been persuaded with difficulty to accept an increase of 50 *lire* to his latest bid for the Sant'Antonio inn.[95] Military demand, as well, was overriding business considerations. Increasing demand for accommodation propelled the military to reclaim the shops, which by the end of the rent contracts for 1806 were down to two: the bakery, still managed by baker Ronchi, and Maria Proserpio's café.[96]

Barracks did not attract only shopkeepers selling goods to the soldiers; some of the productive activities taking place in barracks had, in fact, nothing to do with the army. The ministry allowed such activities as long as his permission was granted beforehand,[97] and military usage was not hindered. Johann Adam Kramer, the leading entrepreneur of the textile manufacture sector in Austrian and Napoleonic Lombardy,[98] opened up a technologically advanced cotton-printing factory in a portion of the ex-religious house of Santa Maria della Pace,[99] using rooms "inutili al magazzino generale perché estremamente umide, ed altronde a lui necessarissime per perfezionare il metodo di tintura in bleu".[100] Conversely, at Morbegno, in June 1812, the *casermiere* reported to his superiors that all the rooms and washhouses of the Sant'Antonio municipal barracks were filled with silkworm cocoons, proving the municipality had done nothing to apply its instructions about the usage of the barracks, "lasciandola impiegare a tutt'altr'uso che quello del ricovero delle truppe."[101] The non-military use was highly profitable sericulture, one of the leading productive sectors of Lombardy that thrived even in the difficult conditions of the Continental Blockade and the economic subordination of the kingdom to France.[102] Specifically to this case, sericulture had spread more successfully in the area of Morbegno and

[94] ASMI MGC 667, minister of war to Colonel Rossi, 17 November 1804.
[95] ASMI MGC 667, Rossi to the minister of war, 19 July 1805.
[96] ASMI MGC 668, Rossi to the minister of war, 5 June 1806; minister of war to Rossi, 28 June 1806.
[97] "Decreto sul casermaggio", 6 January 1809, art.33.
[98] M. Poettinger, "Crises and merchant networks in the nineteenth century. The case of German networks in Lombardy", *The Historical Review/La Revue Historique*, 10 (2013), 24-5.
[99] Ibid., p. 25.
[100] ASMI MGC 707, minister of war to Rossi, 21 September 1808.
[101] ASMI MGC 611, Colonel Motta to the minister of war, 24 June 1812.
[102] W. Panciera, S. Russo, "Economia", in C. Cerreti, M.P. Donato, I. Dumont, V. Santini (eds.), *Atlante storico dell'Italia rivoluzionaria e napoleonica* (Rome, 2013), 165-201.

Sondrio than anywhere else in Valtellina.[103] The barracks caretaking staff may sometimes participate in such activities, allowing producers to set up workshops in the barracks under their care, in exchange for a rent. The *guardia del Genio* and the *commissario* in Domodossola set up one such system in 1811, renting out the usable portion of the San Francesco and Castello barracks without informing the vice-prefecture.[104] To protect their investment, they went as far as to try to arrest the buyer of the dismissed San Francesco barracks; the Gendarmerie and National Guard had to invervene to de-escalate the situation.[105] As it turned out, the long-serving *casermiere* Zerboni "permise a certo sig. Gaspare Guglielminetti di far costruire nella chiesa di S. Francesco in Domodossola varie tine per lavorare corami contro la percezione di lire sei milanesi, somma che venne poi retrocessa dal Zerboni al suddetto individuo quando seppe che quella vice prefettura voleva fargli un carico di averle ricevute."[106]

VI.3 Civilians in barracks: Poverty

The presence of poor civilians in barracks had one point in common with that of revenue-generating traders: the condition of making themselves useful, in exchange for accommodation. It was not a criterion set in stone. In 1801, prior to the reform of the Church-based poor relief institutions, the Grazie barracks in Milan hosted "diversi abitanti miserabili", which the departmental administration allowed to reside, purely "a titolo di carità", in a wing of the expropriated religious house.[107] Charity, however, might not have been the only factor at work, since these destitute dwellers could report damages or thefts to the building, contributing to its structural safety.[108]

In the Italian states, poor relief had traditionally been a task of the Catholic Church. Already the Counter-reformation had engendered ideas of moral redemption through labour;[109] in early modern Venice and Florence, notions of class and artisans' solidarity shaped the selection of alms receivers and

[103] A. del Majno, "Memoria sull'agricoltura del dipartimento dell'Adda", *Annali dell'agricoltura del Regno d'Italia*, 18 (1813), 248-9.
[104] ASMI MGC 623, vice-prefect of Domodossola to the minister of war, 2 November 1811.
[105] Ibid.
[106] ASMI MGC 623, minister of war to Motta, 7 December 1811.
[107] ASCMI LM 188, barracks inspector Pavia to the departmental administration of Olona, 17 Prairial IX/6 June 1801.
[108] ASCMI LM 188, casermiere Fasanotti to the barracks inspector, 15 Vendémiaire X/7 October 1801.
[109] B. Pullan "Support and redeem: charity and poor relief in Italian cities from the fourteenth to the seventeenth century", *Continuity and Change* 3/2 (1988), 177-208.

membership of aid confraternities tied to parishes, excluding people who owed their poverty to "idleness".[110] More radical hypotheses of segregating the poor in workhouses were debated, sometimes realised with the creation of *alberghi dei poveri*, and sometimes not; in Bologna, the workhouse that was supposed to alleviate urban indigence and unemployment opened only in 1808.[111] The Napoleonic dismantlement of religious orders disrupted the social services they provided, such as education and poor relief,[112] which had to pass on to the state. In the Kingdom of Italy, poor relief activities and institutions were incorporated in the state-run congregations of charity, inspired by principles of social rehabilitation.[113] In the *département réuni* of Taro, across the southern border from the Kingdom of Italy, the French authorities dealt with social marginality in a perspective of forging social usefulness, steering beggars towards productive work and raising foundlings to enlist in the armed forces.[114]

In early 1805, complaints from the Genio about municipalities renting out parts of garrison barracks to private citizens[115] sparked an inquiry from the ministry of war to the prefectures.[116] No cases were reported in the Alto Po department[117] and the district of Adige,[118] whereas in the district of Asola, Mincio department, an unspecified number of poor people had been allowed to dwell in municipality-owned barracks "col debito di accommodare il locale destinatogli a loro spese".[119] Most of the barracks were also rented out to clerks and police guards.[120] In Ferrara, "gl'individui dimoranti nelle stanze delle caserme stesse non pagano alcuna corrisposta, e vi sono tollerati per mera caritatevole connivenza, stante l'estrema loro miseria."[121] It was but a temporary accommodation, as they were to vacate their rooms in the city

[110] Ibid.
[111] D. Menozzi, "Pauperismo e assistenza nel triennio giacobino. Il caso di Bologna", in F. Della Peruta, G. Politi, M. Rosa (eds.), *Timore e carità. I poveri nell'Italia moderna* (Cremona, 1982), 297-315.
[112] M. Broers, *Politics and religion in Napoleonic Italy. The war against God, 1801-1814* (London, 2002), p.133.
[113] E. Bressan, "Eliminazione del controllo religioso sull'assistenza e creazione delle Congregazioni di carità in epoca napoleonica", V. Zamagni (ed.), *Povertà e innovazioni istituzionali in Italia. Dal Medioevo ad oggi* (Bologna, 2000), 441-453.
[114] A. De Luca, "La marginalità a Piacenza e nel suo circondario nella tarda età napoleonica (1810-1814)", *Diacronie*, 17 (2014) [DOI:10.4000/diacronie.1048].
[115] ASMI MGC 600, General Bianchi d'Adda to the minister of war, 23 January 1805.
[116] ASMN PM 666, circular letter of the minister of war, 15 February 1805.
[117] ASMI MGC 600, minister of the interior to the minister of war, 1 March 1805.
[118] ASMI MGC 600, government commissar in the circondario of Adige, 4 February 1805.
[119] ASMN PM 666, provisional secretary of Asola to the prefect, 6 March 1805. ASMN, PM, 666.
[120] Ibid.
[121] ASMI MGC 600, prefect of Basso Po to the minister of war, 16 February 1805.

barracks by the incoming Easter.[122] Such a charitable practice had had no place in Papal Ferrara, and it perhaps points to an informal solution to the financial issues that hindered the new congregations of charity during a historical conjuncture that increased poverty and decreased revenues for the charitable institutions, forcing them to vet aid requests through stricter criteria.[123] In Sabbioneta, Mincio department, both the barracks and the town orphanage, set to accommodate troops in transit, were sublet to civilians; the latter case had been an initiative of the porter residing in the unused building, in order to pay his own rent.[124] The four town barracks had been rented out to one Antonio Solazzi, who had sublet them to local poor and foreigners.[125] In the opinion of the municipal official who gathered these data, these sub-tenants were not just useless, but dangerous for the barracks, since destitution might lead them to burn wooden fixtures as firewood.[126]

The broader Napoleonic government policies directly fed the link between social change, impoverishment, and civil-military mutual encroachment in army accommodation. The suppressions of religious orders left scores of regulars destitute and homeless;[127] even after a religious house had been militarised, sometimes the religious people remained and shared the building with the soldiers and their families, albeit with internal separation, as was the case in the barracks of Santi Giovanni e Paolo and Santa Maria dei Servi in Venice.[128] While separation ensured at least tolerable levels of civil-military cohabitation, poor dwellers had occasionally tense relations with the *casermieri*. At Santa Maria delle Grazie in 1801, the *casermieri* blamed the poor for the wave of thefts occurring in the barracks, an accusation that the poor returned in kind, fearing eviction.[129] The ensuing court judgment acquitted the *casermieri*, who in turn sued for slander.[130] Notably, this dispute played out entirely among civilians, as by this time the *casermieri* were not hired from the ranks of the *riformati* officers yet. This reflected the

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[122] Ibid.
[123] P. Bellini, "'Pericolanti' e 'pericolate' a Ferrara in età napoleonica" (Università degli Studi di Ferrara, PhD thesis, 2010), 53-91.
[124] ASMN PM 666, "Nota delle caserme esistenti in Sabbioneta di ragione nazionale", attached to letter of the cancelliere censuario of the 19th departmental district to the prefect of Mincio, 2 March 1805.
[125] Ibid.
[126] Ibid.
[127] Broers, *Politics and religion*, 134-5.
[128] Bertoli, *Soppressione*, 40, 59-61.
[129] ASCMI LM 188, inspector of barracks Pavia to the departmental administration of Olona, 17 Prairial IX/6 June 1801.
[130] ASCMI LM 188, criminal tribunal to the departmental administration of Olona, 19 Nivôse X/9 January 1802.

fact that the caretaking staff of the military administration exerted surveillance and managed the space inside the barracks, rather than the troops or the officers.

VI.4 Billeting officers

Billeting was arguably the most evident and intrusive result of the war, creating forcefully a contact zone between military and civilians, which the latter were keen on avoiding. For officers' accommodation, billeting was the most common solution, since availability of officers-specific residential halls (*padiglioni*) was inferior to demand. It was not for lack of intentions, but rather, plans for the residential halls became stuck in the web of underfunding that paralysed repair works to suitable, but highly damaged, buildings.[131] The need to account for the officers' servants, more than doubling the number of guests, further reduced available places in the military edifices.[132] By April 1810, only the departments of Olona and Panaro had residential halls, concentrated in the garrisons of Milan and Modena.[133]

Officers expected their living quarters to be suitable to their rank, as a tangible expression of their merit, earned through the combination of bravery and technical skill that constituted talent and enabled career advancement.[134] Billets reflected rank, and Italian observers grasped the revolutionary merit-based egalitarianism as a factor in the officers' choice of accommodation. As the *armée d'Italie* advanced into Friuli in 1797,

> "Tutti gli uffiziali maggiori e minori … vollero accasarsi giusto li loro gradi nelle abitazioni dei cittadini, e così nelle case dei poveri e ricchi contadini delle ville. Onde i maggiori di grado, sebbene non di nascita, poiché la maggior parte di questi erano della più vil plebe e condizione, ma perché arditi e li meno onesti e cristiani, innalzati furono alli maggiori gradi militari, così vollero essere accolti e ben trattati di tola, letti e servitù, di 2 e 3, per le case dei nobili, ed a spese d'essi signori.

[131] ASMI MGC 623, garrison commander Calori to the minister of war, 31 July 1805.
[132] ASMI MGC 695, architect Luchini to the Sub-economato ai Beni Nazionali of Serio department, 27 December 1802.
[133] ASMI MGC 2719, "Rapporto generale sui servizj amministrativi dipendenti dal commissariato di guerra, durante il mese di aprile anno 1810 nella Ia divisione militare"; "Rapporto generale sui servizj amministrativi dipendenti dal commissariato di guerra, durante il mese di aprile anno 1810 nella 4a divisione militare".
[134] J.-P. Bertaud, "Napoleon's officers", *Past and Present*, 112 (1986), p. 93.

> Gl'inferiori poi per le case de sig.ri mercanti religiosi ed artieri furono, siccome figli di diverse madri, d'ineguali condizioni e paesi così di diversi umori".[135]

What officers did not want, however, was to live in a militarised space. They literally made themselves at home in their quarters, appropriating the domestic resources in order to replicate conditions of domestic comforts, rather than grandeur,[136] that reflected the mixed and relatively bourgeois composition of the *armée d'Italie*.[137] Thus, in 1796-'97, the French officers of the Milan garrison refused to lodge in the castle, as the Austrians used to do.[138] Demand from officers seeking civilian billets, and civilian employees who had even less reason to want to live in barracks, congested large garrisons, such as Bologna in spring 1802. In the past, the city could host the officers of a 15-20,000 strong corps, but its current capability had lowered to officers for a corps 2-3000 strong, for two reasons: "Il primo è, che quell'ufficiale a cui per lo passato bastava una camera, oggi non è pago di un appartamento. E il secondo, che un numero assai vasto d'impiegati civili, e militari inonda, ed occupa i migliori quartieri della comune."[139] In Bergamo, a report from late 1802 noted it was difficult, for officers who had grown used to billets, to accept a transfer to the Colle Aperto residential hall, a chilly, windswept location resembling more a country shack than a barracks.[140]

During the Italian Republic, the Melzi government set the goal of freeing the populace from all billets, as part of its strategy to gain credentials as the bringer of law and order in the eyes of moderate, property-holding public opinion.[141] Reality fell sorely short of such ambitions where availability of real estate was lower, nor could the regulations on barracks and military accommodation issued from June 1804 do more than regulate the billeting procedures.[142] Monthly indemnities, which the officer received to pay his landlord,[143] were standardised on a price scale by rank, detailing number and

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[135] G. Pieri, *Napoleone e il dominio napoleonico nel Friuli* (Udine, 1942), 202-3.
[136] C. Adams, *A taste for comfort and status. A bourgeois family in eighteenth-century France* (University Park, 2000), p.48.
[137] G. Candela, *L'armée d'Italie. Nice 1792-1796* (Nice, 2000), 48-62.
[138] Bobbi, "Soldato in casa", p. 536.
[139] ASMI MGC 165, departmental administration of Reno to the minister of war, 25 Germinal X/15 April 1802.
[140] ASMI MGC 695, architect Luchini to the Sub-economato ai Beni Nazionali of Serio department, 27 December 1802.
[141] Bobbi, "Soldato in casa", 540-4.
[142] Ibid., 547-9.
[143] "Regolamento sulle caserme", 6 June 1804, art. 281.

type of rooms the officer was eligible for.[144] Municipal offices apportioned billets, according to principles of fair repartition that replicated the basic provisions for billet exemption set by the French revolutionary regulations. The Italian regulations abolished privilege-based distinctions, imposed variety in the choice of billets to avoid burdening the same homeowners, and the only exemptions invested houses holding public coffers, widows and young girls; the separation, however, was set at the living quarters rather than the whole house.[145] The minister of the interior, in 1813, described billet allocation as relatively easy and straightforward, since transits were very brief and garrison officers should receive direct accommodation from the municipality only as a last resort if they could not provide by themselves with their allowance.[146] Accommodation was to bring the least possible discomfort to denizens, "distribuendo il peso con equità, ed in proporzione della capacità delle case eccedente il più assoluto bisogno di chi le abita indipendentemente dalla qualità di proprietario od affittuario."[147] Maintaining fairness was important to appease the public opinion of the *notabili* who would, inevitably, be targeted for officers' billets. In examining an exemption plea from the brothers Mandolino and David Formiggini, the municipality of Modena reasoned that, should the exemption be granted, "tutti gli aventi una possidenza minore od eguale, privi poi de' rami d'industria che hanno i Formiggini, chiederebbero d'essere liberati dal carico de' mentovati alloggi, e che non potrebbe negarsi a questi avendolo accordato a quelli."[148] Elsewhere, the crux of the matter was availability. In a far more rugged country than the urbanised Po plain, such as Dalmatia under Italian occupation in 1806, Governor Vincenzo Dandolo[149] vouched in vain for the retired ex-Venetian officers, burdened with billeting French officers.[150]

Civilians employed diverse tactics to dodge direct billeting; by paying for a major's accommodation in an inn, the marquises Campori were able to avoid billeting a general in their house.[151] In order to avoid billeting a captain, Margherita Dallara Colombo Quattrofrati claimed it cost her too much on

[144] Crociani, Ilari, Paoletti, *Storia militare del Regno*, i, p. 186-7.
[145] "Regolamento sulle caserme", 6 June 1804, art. 299-304.
[146] ASCMO AAM 197, minister of the interior to the prefect of Panaro, 7 May 1813.
[147] Ibid.
[148] ASCMO AAM 197, delegate for military lodgings to the podestà of Modena, 16 February 1813.
[149] On Dandolo's concern for the socio-economic conditions of Dalmatia: I. Pederzani, *I Dandolo. Dall'Italia dei Lumi al Risorgimento* (Milan, 2014), 105-7.
[150] ASMI MGC 165, Dandolo to the minister of war, 12 November 1806.
[151] ASCMO AAM 118, prefect of Panaro to the municipality of Modena, 3 February 1807.

top of partitioning the house inheritance among her children, plus the property tax eating up her revenue.[152] Health-based justifications frequently involved women, reflecting the heavily gendered understanding of physiology in late 18th century and its pathologisation of sensibility among the upper classes.[153] Marchioness Giustina Lambertenghi-Recalcati, a widow in her sixties as of 1804, requested an exemption from billeting a chasseur lieutenant and his valet in her house in Monza, where she came to take the country air.[154] Count Ignazio Cajmi opposed the release of *billets de logement* for a little house where he intended to take his ill wife who, as per the doctors' certifications, needed a change of air.[155] Giuseppa della Croce Brasca needed to live in the countryside to assuage the convulsive crises she suffered from; all her houses in Inzago and Saronno had been requisitioned to lodge troops, so she tried to save from that fate the unrented part of her house in Monza.[156]

Most odiously, billeting forced the homeowners to reconfigure the domestic sphere, at a time when the upper-class home was increasingly conceptualised as a place of privacy and familial intimacy, incompatible with public uses such as military accommodation,[157] around the needs of an unwanted and unpleasant guest, who could also turn into a violent bully. The Polish officers garrisoning Modena, between 1801 and 1802, demanded supplies they were not entitled to and threatened to set furniture and pictures on fire.[158] Italian officers were not without sin either; Lieutenant Buggia, billeted in the house of silk merchant Francesco Longhi, wanted the front door to stay open until late in the night when he came home, and threatened the house administrator if he did not comply.[159] For the officers' part, service needs might justify such a demand, as garrison work entailed plenty of night-time controls at sentry posts and prisons.[160] Other officers needed to move in and out of town, and made their own arrangements independently of the authorities. Carlo Vandoni, the commander of the Velites of the Royal Guard, left his billet in Monza at the house of the counts Pertusati in May 1806; even if another

[152] ASCMO AAM 197, Margherita Dallara Colombo Quattrofrati to the podestà of Modena, 7 May 1813.
[153] T. Broman, "Health in the Eighteenth Century", in P. Adamson (ed.), *Health. A history* (Oxford, 2019), 223-45.
[154] ASCMB FRC 109, Giustina Recalcati to the municipality of Monza, 25 July 1804.
[155] ASCMB FRC 109, Ignazio Cajmi to the municipality of Monza, 22 May 1806.
[156] ASCMB FRC 108, Giuseppa della Croce Brasca to the municipality of Monza, 27 September 1805.
[157] McCurdy, *Quarters*, p.55.
[158] ASCMO, "Cronaca Rovatti", 5 January 1802.
[159] ASCMB FRC 109, Cecilia Longhi to the municipality of Monza, 3 June 1806.
[160] Roussy, *De l'empereur*, n. 74, Roussy to his brother, 11 July 1808.

officer was already billeted there, Vandoni reserved a room in order to come and go from Milan at his convenience.[161]

Some officers had the tact to leave before relations with their host degenerated. Luigi Borsotti, commander of the Gendarmerie in the departments of Crostolo, Reno and Panaro, resided at the house of Francesco Montecuccoli, the *podestà* of Modena and a member of an ancient, prestigious household; in April 1807, Borsotti requested to swap billets with the garrison commander, because of the strained relations between him and Montecuccoli.[162] Albeit in a careful wording, Borsotti laid the blame on Montecuccoli, underlying his own "moderazione", promptness in notifying the municipality about the tensions with his host, and the danger that Montecuccoli's "vessezazioni [*sic*], che cagionano de' dispiaceri in Famiglia, … qualche volta potrebbero indurmi a dei passi disgustosi, e per me, e per il Sig. Montecucoli."[163] The "famiglia" was not necessarily a family of relatives in the modern sense, but rather the complex of masters and servants within a noble household.[164] The framework for these disagreements might not be just an intrusion upon intimacy but an issue of domestic resources control, especially if the landlords had to billet not just the officer but also many of his "figli e parenti e domestichi", as countess Aliprandi Pertusati complained.[165]

VI.5 Billeting troops

Due to insufficient, undersupplied or dilapidated infrastructures, as well as to the intensity of the military presence outstripping theoretical capacity for accommodation, it was impossible to barracks all troops in all localities of the kingdom. Thus, the troops in transit (or in garrison if they could not be barracksed) were billeted, following the June 1804 regulations.[166] Barracksing transient troops had been, in the government's view, the real novelty of Napoleonic military accommodation, breaking with "[q]uesto metodo che da secoli è tranquillamente seguito presso molte potenze, e più di tutto in Francia pareva scuotere alquanto l'opinione in alcune comuni".[167]

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[161] ASCMB FRC 109, administrator Francesco Bonalume to the municipality of Monza, 1 June 1806.
[162] ASCMO AAM 120, Borsotti to the municipality of Modena, 22 April 1807.
[163] Ibid.
[164] Sarti, *Vita di casa*, 32-3.
[165] ASCMB FRC 109, administrator Francesco Bonalume to the municipality of Monza, 1 June 1806.
[166] "Decreto di S.A.I. sulle caserme", 29 March 1809, art.5-6.
[167] ASMI MGC 162, project of report for the ministry of interior, 7 July 1808.

The reason was the peculiar situation of Italy, so different from that of France, where "il vigore de' regolamenti e delle leggi sostenuto dai sentimenti d'affinità e d'una patria, e lingua comune dee rimovere il disordine, e l'indisciplina."[168] The 18th century argument that barracksing damaged recruitment, discouraging direct civilian knowledge of military life,[169] was made obsolete by the conscription system and did not re-emerge even in Italy, for all the emphasis on the army as a building-block of national identity.[170]

Despite this theoretical reticence, troop billeting persisted and thrived, much to the civilians' discomfort and despite the administrators' paternalistic concern for the victimised populace. Transient troops stopping at Incino bullied their way to free food and accommodation, terrifying peasants "d'indole timida, e quieta."[171] Even in friendly country, it took just a little extra misery in a life of chronic poverty for soldiers to revert to pillage,[172] as did the 102nd demi-brigade in 1801, when its soldiers were left without pay and so badly provisioned as to almost mutiny.[173] Billeted across the villages of Cassano, Treviglio and Gromello, the 102nd left a trail of abuses in its wake, which not even the garrison commander managed to rein in.[174] The soldiers kicked the inhabitants out of their homes, beat up the municipal officials, and stole work tools[175] presumably to resell them on the black market associated with soldiers.[176] The soldiers perceived pillage as one of the "sad rules of war";[177] likewise, they were inclined to bear with the discomforts of the campaign only as far as their toils were rewarded, and decent accommodation was among their rights, to assert with force if necessary. In this sense, billeting could terrorise civilian authorities into supplying or repairing barracks. General Guillaume, in April 1798, threatened to billet his soldiers in civilian houses, should repair works to the barracks in Peschiera stop.[178] Other officers used the carrot rather than the

[168] ASMI MGC 158, minister of war to Melzi, 23 February 1802.
[169] Navereau, *Logement*, p.132-3.
[170] N. Del Bianco, "Francesco Melzi e il potere militare nella Repubblica italiana", in M. Canella (ed.), *Armi e nazione. Dalla Repubblica Cisalpina al Regno d'Italia (1797-1814)* (Milan, 2009), p.205.
[171] ASMI MGC 165, deputazione all'estimo of Incino to the minister of war, 12 April 1802.
[172] Forrest, *Napoleon's men*, 145-7.
[173] L.-M. Routier, *Récits d'un soldat de la République et de l'Empire* (Paris, 1899), 65-6.
[174] ASMI MGC 165, municipality of the Naviglio district to the government committee, 15 Ventôse IX/6 March 1801.
[175] Ibid.
[176] Forrest, *Conscripts*, p.174.
[177] Forrest, *Napoleon's men*, p.147.
[178] ASMI MGC 600, army commissar Monti to the minister of war, 25 Germinal VI/14 April 1798.

stick, offering to lobby the ministry for repairs funds[179] or even pay them out of their own pockets.[180] Lack of supplies also made barracks uninhabitable and forced garrison troops into billets, as was the case across several localities during the breakdown of the Martini contract and the transition to the ministerial delegation in 1805.[181]

Despite its unpopularity, billeting did not trigger revolts, unlike taxation and conscription. It did elicit fear of "disorders", such as when a body of French cavalry headed for the village of Gavardo in January 1812 risked evicting cattle from the stables,[182] and accusations of uncooperativeness, targeting municipal administrators rather than common folk.[183] It was a highly sensitive punitive measure when soldiers (*garnisaires*) were billeted in the homes of deserters' families, and the Italian military authorities made recourse very sparingly to it, knowing it often affected poor households.[184] The real danger billeting was perceived to pose for the military was potential enablement of desertion, as section VI.1 showed. Stirring revolt did not seem to even be considered, pointing perhaps to a shared notion, among administrators and civilian populace at large, of billeting as an age-old *corvée* to avoid through the equally age-old channels of exemption fees and negotiation. Compounding this *longue durée* awareness, there had to be an obvious unwillingness of civilians to mount a collective fight against armed troops, barring brawling incidents[185] and exceptional cases of generalised insurrection. Furthermore, cohabitation could also spark familiarity between soldiers and their landlords, even in flash points like Tyrol after Andreas Hofer's insurrection[186] or poor regions incorporated recently into the Napoleonic regime, like rural Friuli.[187]

Inevitably, movements and concentrations of troops during campaign operations led to an increase in billeting, which became the ultimate insult added to the injury of wartime. During the campaign of 1809 in Veneto, around the time of the battle at Pordenone and Sacile, Vicentine nobleman and staunch anti-Bonapartist Arnaldo Arnaldi Tornieri described troop

[179] ASNO PA 1049 bis, General Peyri to the vice-prefect of Vigevano, 25 Vendémiaire XI/17 October 1802.
[180] ASNO PA 1049 bis, Colonel Caracciolo to the vice-prefect of Vigevano, 18 September 1803.
[181] ASMI MGDM 16, administrative council of war to Tordorò, 19 July 1805; ASMI MGDM 14, administrative council of war to Tordorò, 7 February 1805, 15 December 1802.
[182] ASMI MGC 162, mayor of Gavardo to the prefect of Mella, 16 January 1812.
[183] ASMI MGC 163, minister of war to the prefect of Passariano, 14 October 1812.
[184] Della Peruta, *Esercito*, 291-2.
[185] Forrest, *Conscripts*, p.182.
[186] J. Walter, *The diary of a Napoleonic foot soldier*, ed. M. Raeff (New York, 1991), p.33.
[187] Pieri, *Dominio napoleonico*, p.372.

billeting as a domestic catastrophe:

> "una quantità di famiglie sono state in somme ristrettezze, perché due e tre alloggi tutti in un colpo, come anche qui in casa nostra. con gran consumo di letti e di biancheria, di cui la nostra casa è quasi sprovvista e non vi sono più modi di rimetterla. In casa Ferro fu necessario portar via dalla sua camera il bambinello Teodoro lattante con la sua nutrice e donne di servizio per cedere quella stanza al soldato."[188]

The problem of household resources is evident in this passage; bedlinen and beds were expensive, even for the upper classes,[189] and were lost to the soldiers' consumption. The troops who inconvenienced the Dal Ferro noble family had received a room befitting their social status, displacing the servants rather than the masters of the house, at a time when room arrangements were showing a long-term tendency towards separation between the two social classes, motivated by the masters' quest for privacy.[190]

On the other hand, short-term transits and wartime concentrations were relatively more sustainable for the destitute rural communes further east in the ex-Venetia, as the *podestà* of Cormons remarked in 1812, comparing the material difficulty of billeting the soldiers in wartime and peacetime, shaping different standards. In wartime, soldiers were more mobile, and "si accontentavano di dormire la più gran parte sulla paglia, ed alla meglio si uniformavano alle circostanze del padrone albergante. Ora presente che il soldato non è in tempo di guerra à tutto il diritto d'addimandare ciò che gli si compete per legge."[191] During the peace of Lunéville, the government commissar in Verona observed that troop billeting was an extraordinary demand, fit only for wartime: "non saprei qual temperamento adottare, non sembrando regolare, che in tempo di pace si debbino mandare i soldati ad alloggiare nelle case de' cittadini, che sono bastantemente gravati dal non piccolo numero di Officiali anche delle Guarnigioni di Mantova, Legnago, e Peschiera."[192] The area of Verona between the War of the Second and Third Coalition was a militarised border, but even there, the civilians' notion of wartime and peacetime was tied to an overall state of "tranquillity". As legal

[188] Tornieri, *Memorie di Vicenza,* 15 April 1809.
[189] C. Ferlito "Per un'analisi del costo della vita nella Verona del Settecento", *Studi storici Luigi Simeoni*, 56 (2006), [https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/67827/] 31-2.
[190] Sarti, *Vita di casa,* 178-84.
[191] ASMI MGC 163, podestà of Cormons to the prefect of Tagliamento, 28 September 1812.
[192] ASMI MGC 612, government commissar of Adige to the minister of war, 3 May 1804.

historian Mary Dudziak pointed out with regard to American history in the 20th century, war has a pervasive influence beyond the boundaries of wartime, decreasing and increasing citizens' rights according to the needs of national security[193] in a way that is easy to miss unless taking small-scale conflicts into account.[194] Similarly, the localised view of war from the civilian's perspective employed "tranquillity" and peace as legal and rhetorical tools to protect his rights against the army. Hence, in autumn-winter 1805, despite ongoing war in Germany and north-eastern Italy, an apothecary in Monza could ask for his stable to be spared from accommodating the dragoons' horses, since "nella tranquillità dei tempi in cui siamo" the military needed not demand emergency measures and should go through the normal procedures of authorisation.[195]

As with the distribution of officers' billets, fairness and lack thereof was an important rationale for civilians to accept military accommodation. Exemption tactics fostering unfairness and inequality abounded. Several denizens of Padua in early 1809, prior to the outbreak of the campaign, resided elsewhere and could not billet troops, reducing the available accommodation in civilian houses to enough for officers only, lest an unacceptable overcharge hit the remaining inhabitants.[196] Wartime could make this trick backfire; a closed house could simply be requisitioned, as it happened in Milan in 1796 and 1800, as many nobles fled to their country houses, aggravating the pressure of billets on those who had stayed.[197] Venetian nobleman Gasparo Gherardini's palace in Verona was occupied by French, German and Italian troops since 1796, and ruined to the point that, when Gherardini relocated to Verona, he was forced to live in an inn.[198] Influence in local institutions responsible for the repartition of quarters was a safer leverage. In February 1809, the municipality of Anguillara in the Brenta department invited Francesco Poletti, a minor landowner in the commune of Arre, to provide bed supplies for incoming troops in the commune of Bagnoli, since he could not billet them in his farmhouses.[199] When some soldiers were billeted in an inn, Poletti and a few other people who did not reside there were surcharged because, he claimed, the local

[193] M.L. Dudziak, *Wartime. An idea, its history, its consequences* (Oxford, 2012), 60-1.
[194] Ibid., p.31.
[195] ASCMB FRC 108, Antonio Mantegazza to the municipality of Monza, s.d. 1805.
[196] ASPD PB 26, prefect of Brenta to the general director of municipal administration, 19 February 1809.
[197] *Raccolta degli ordini ed avvisi stati pubblicati dopo il cessato governo austriaco* (Milan, 1796), i, 23 Fructidor IV/9 September 1796. Mantovani, *Diario politico-ecclesiastico*, p.29.
[198] ASMI MGC 612, Gasparo Gherardini to the minister of war, 2 May 1802.
[199] ASPD PB 26, chancellor of the Conselve canton to the prefect of Brenta, 3 March 1809.

administrators were in league with the "comunisti comodi e benestanti" to overcharge non-residents.[200] Such disputes pitted entire municipalities against each other. The row between the Lombard communes of Inzago and Cassano spanned the entire Napoleonic period, as the latter repeatedly tried to shift the burdens of accommodation and requisitions onto the former while its denizens profited off the supply magazine in the town.[201] Inzago struck back through the networking between mayor Dall'Orto, army supplier Giuseppe Maria Franchetti, and General Vignolle, whose friendship Franchetti cultivated in order to spare his house from billeting and advocate for reducing the military presence in Inzago.[202]

The dimension of profit was parallel to that of fairness in the repartition of lodgings, sometimes in opposition to it, sometimes as an incentive to play host. Interference with practices of cottage industry was a serious reason to exclude billeting; the overcrowded Verona garrison, in the spring of 1807, could not billet soldiers in the nearby villages because all the inhabitants depended on home-based sericulture for their subsistence.[203] Instead, being in the same area of town, close enough that the soldiers would have to shop near their barracks, was an acceptable golden rule. The *podestà* of Bergamo, in 1810, opposed a plan to relocate the troops from the upper city to the lower city because it would damage the business of shopkeepers in the upper city.[204]

Innkeepers were a category of civilian hosts who bore a large part of the troop accommodation in a way that was at least theoretically profitable. In fact, where the army accommodation depended on inns, friction rose between military obligation and profitable business, in a time when a somewhat standardised system of for-profit hospitality was emerging across Europe.[205] Thus, in Britain until the late 18th century, publicans complained of the provisions costs and the loss of profit from civilian guests who could not lodge because the troops and their horses occupied all the available space.[206] Non-military guests could, occasionally, be a reason for deflecting

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[200] Ibid.
[201] F. Alemani, "Inzago di piazza in piazza: Piazza Maggiore", *Storia in Martesana*, 7 (2013), [http://www.casadellaculturamelzo.it/storiainmartesana/numero07.html] 60-70.
[202] Ibid.
[203] ASMI MGC 612, municipality of Verona to Tordorò, 30 April 1807.
[204] ASMI MGC 695, podestà of Bergamo to the prefect of Serio, 25 June 1810
[205] F. Susini, "La nascita di un'industria ospitale europea nel XVIII secolo: locande, stazioni di posta, grandi alberghi e città turistiche", *Diciottesimo Secolo*, 3 (2018), 47-67.
[206] C. Emsley, "The military and popular disorder in England 1790-1801", *Journal of the Society for Army Historical Research*, 61/245 (1983), 19-20.

the military. Carlo Bergomi asked for exemption from lodging upcoming troops in his inn, located in a central square of Monza, because a theatre troupe was occupying all the rooms;[207] the municipality agreed to a temporary exemption for the duration of the theatre productions.[208] Commanders also showed sympathy towards the plight of their hosts; in June 1806, Colonel Viani of the Royal Guard in Monza made the case for the rent arrears payment of an innkeeper whose inn lay on the roadway towards the city, billeting four dragoons and a brigadier, and as many horses, for the correspondence service.[209] This billet offered a convenient position on the road, and the municipality added in a notice that this innkeeper was poor "ed è raccomandato anche dal suddetto sig. colonnello."[210] Stables were particularly important to stopovers for ordinary travellers as much as for an army on the march or its communications. Wartime, again, complicated matters, overcrowding accommodation as local resource struggled to cope with the influx. Due to the higher frequency of transits in October 1805, around the time of the military operations at Verona, all existing stables in Monza were congested to the point that horses had to be stabled under the arcades of buildings,[211] which dealt a severe blow to the innkeepers' business.[212] Uncertainty and occupation of space were the main problem, as the owner of the Albergo del Falcone post inn complained: the army horses occupied stables for several days, despite assurances that they would leave in a few days, forcing the innkeeper to turn down civilian guests.[213]

Conclusion

In spite of the growing trend towards civil-military separation, culturally and physically, that the Napoleonic Wars supposedly accelerated, the enforcement of this separation was uneven, over constantly contested spaces. The army had its own internal separations to take into account. Reinforcing discipline and *esprit de corps* required separation between different units, and concentration of troops belonging to the same unit, lodging as close together as possible, which for Gendarmerie and National Guards also

[207] ASCMB FRC 117, Carlo Bergomi to the podestà of Monza, 11 October 1811.
[208] Ibid.
[209] ASMI MGC 681, Tordorò to the minister of war, 21 June 1806.
[210] Ibid., note of the municipality of Monza.
[211] ASCMB FRC 108, Colonel Mazzucchelli to the municipality of Monza, 18 October 1805.
[212] ASCMB FRC 108, municipal administration to the prefect of Olona, 18 October 1805.
[213] ASCMB FRC 108, innkeeper of the Albergo del Falcone to municipality of Monza, s.d. (registered on 12 November 1808).

ensured efficiency.

Business and usefulness were a reason working against strong civil-military separation. Providing services to the military, around or even within barracks, offered opportunities for business, competition, and profiteering. Principles of usefulness and profitability shaped also the attitude towards poor tenants in barracks, regulating their presence in contrast with more informal agreements set up by municipal authorities or employees on their own initiative.

Despite the drive towards barracksing, even for transient troops, billeting persisted due to the material conditions of the barracks and the influx of troops. Lightening or avoiding this burden was attempted through a variety of appeals to the authorities, avoidance tactics, and networks of influence. Still, the billeting *corvée* remained and forced civil-military direct interactions to continue within an increasingly private domestic space, encompassing the compulsory (even imposed with violence) sharing of resources to cater to the billeted military.

Chapter 7: Manoeuvre grounds

Away from duty on campaign, the garrison soldiers' main occupation was to drill, and that of the officers and NCOs was to oversee the exercises. This could be achieved at training camps, the recourse to which had increased across the 17th and 18th century as armies became bigger and their efficiency more dependent on drill.[1] Training was crucial in building an efficient army out of raw conscripts from the French Revolution onwards, most evident in the camp at Boulogne-sur-Mer; although the planned invasion of the British Isles never happened, the army assembled there in 1803-1805 received intensive, daily training under Napoleon's watchful eyes, and the effort paid off spectacularly in the Austerlitz campaign.[2] Napoleon had Eugène try to replicate Boulogne in Italy, with the expensive realisation of a large training camp at Montichiari, near Brescia, and smaller ones at Majano and Cormons in Friuli, although these went little beyond the planning stage.[3]

This chapter will focus on a lesser-known aspect of Napoleonic military training: the drill grounds in use for garrisons in the Kingdom of Italy, how they were leased to the army, and how they affected the land by compromising its civilian usage. The military usage of these terrains complicated *ralliement*, by lowering the quality of land on which the intended supporters of the new regime had invested, and from which they drew revenues. Garrison drills were a daily event the civilian populace was a regular spectator to and a mandatory requirement to forge soldiers for the empire's constant wars; consequently, they took place over several days for several hours, consuming the same terrain. Although the scope of environmental damage from late 20th century military manoeuvres dwarfs its early 19th century counterpart,[4] prolonged use and modifications to meet military needs could reduce land to unproductiveness, crashing its value; that was a risk landowners presented to the ministry of war when they renegotiated leases and claimed compensations. This friction between landowners and the state took place over terrains that had been acquired, for

[1] J.A. Houlding, *Fit for service. The training of the British army, 1715-1795* (Oxford, 1981), 322-46. Lynn, *Giant of the Grand Siècle*, 522-4.
[2] Morvan, *Le soldat*, i, 288-95.
[3] A. Ardenghi, *Il campo militare napoleonico di Montechiaro. Approvvigionamenti e casermaggio dell'esercito italiano negli anni 1796-1814* (Montichiari, 2003).
[4] P.J.M. Vertegaal, "Environmental impact of Dutch military activities", *Environmental Conservation*, 1/16 (1989), 54-64.

the most part, through the sales of *beni nazionali*, affecting the whole range of land buyers, chiefly professional bourgeoisie and established local nobility;[5] thus, the military use encroached on the very process that was intended to secure support for the Napoleonic regime.[6]

VII.1 Soldier's school, military spectacle

Drills occupied most of a garrison regiment's time. Their purpose was to keep the army up to the standards set by the Grande Armée at Boulogne, as over the later years and campaigns, the fittest and most experienced men among the officers, NCOs and soldiers were gradually promoted out of the line regiments, moved to Guard units, died or became unfit for service.[7] The reorganisation of depots never fully kept up with the drain,[8] and the imperial army's drop in quality weighed heavily in the campaigns of 1813-'14.[9] Even at the lowest points of Napoleonic military might, however, training made a significant individual difference; better-instructed soldiers bore the hardships of the Russian campaign better than the conscripts of the 1812 class, hastily thrown into the corps with insufficient training, an issue that especially plagued the cavalry.[10] Aware that instructing draftees could make this sort of difference, the army defending the Kingdom of Italy in 1814 turned the slow advance of the Austrians to its advantage, training the young reinforcements for as long as it was possible.[11]

Drills set a gruelling routine to the soldiers' everyday life. They were intended to create group cohesion, instil discipline, exercise the men's bodies and maintain morale while the troops were not seeing action, but also nurtured a boredom that clashed with the culture of military glory that the empire fostered.[12] Material discomforts in barracks added to the fatigue of the manoeuvres and could easily sap a regiment's morale. *Commissario di guerra* Barss reported to the prefect of Agogna that the barracks of the Vigevano cavalry garrison was so undersupplied the straw had not been changed in several months: "i soldati dopo gli esercizi del giorno trovansi

[5] Capra, *Italiani prima dell'Italia*, 385-9.
[6] Woolf, *Napoleon's integration*, p.199.
[7] Morvan, *Le soldat*, i, 316-7.
[8] Ibid.
[9] Ibid., 339-52.
[10] Ibid., 336-7.
[11] Ibid., p.350.
[12] Forrest, *Napoleon's men*, p.154.

costretti di riposare le loro stanche membra sulle assi coperte di meri stracci. Egli è perciò, che è al suo colmo lo scoraggiamento di quei nuovi soldati nella forza de' quali trovansi cento volontariamente arruolati."[13] There was an awareness among the commanders that pulling conscripts about, at least in the early stages of implementing the draft, was a counterproductive teaching method. When 1380 conscripts from three regiments of foot and horse were training in 1803 at Modena, officers and NCOs received orders from the government "di usare la più possibile dolcezza verso i coscritti" throughout a schedule employing four hours a day just to teach them how to manoeuvre on the battlefield[14] (excluding, then, target practice and the handling of weapons). Different branches had different requirements; cavalry training took longer than infantry, was more complex as it involved teaching both horse and soldier to ride in formation,[15] and consequently, as the next section will show, it required large spaces on which it left a heavy footprint in terms of soil consumption.

Overseeing the manoeuvres was not a joyride for the officers, either. Lack of opportunity for action (and career advancement) fed boredom; Eugène de Roussy's correspondence from Carpi in autumn 1808 described a densely packed schedule of practical and theoretical lessons from five o'clock in the morning to the evening rollcall at seven.[16] Against the lacklustre backdrop of "la partie de l'Europe … la plus tranquille", the young chasseur officer felt jealous of the garrisons at Nîmes and Montpellier that had had the chance to repel a British landing attempt.[17] The mixed backgrounds of Italian officers, with varying levels of military experience, meant that they needed to be brought up to French standards; drills and parades were one such moment of truth. Italian officer Francesco Baggi recalled the scathing judgment Napoleon passed on his peers of the *Guardia Dipartimentale* in 1805: "mi sembra che dicesse che bisognava prima fare prima il soldato di guerra per meritarsi questo rango, incoraggiandoci però a volere prendere servizio nelle armate del Regno."[18] Service was sweet in this unit, tasked with escorting Elisa Bonaparte to the Kingdom of Etruria; after several days of galas, drinks and leisure in Tuscany, the final manoeuvre the escort

[13] ASNO PA 1050, commissario Barss to the prefect of Agogna, 28 August 1811.
[14] ASCMO, "Cronaca Rovatti", 10 July 1803.
[15] R. Muir, *Tactics and the experience of battle in the age of Napoleon* (New Haven/London, 1998), 111-2.
[16] Roussy, *De l'empereur*, n.81, Roussy to Fanny de Guichard, 18 September 1808.
[17] Ibid.
[18] Baggi, *Memorie*, p.8.

performed in front of the queen was a poor show.[19] The tune changed once Baggi enlisted in the Italian Honour Guards, based in Milan; manoeuvres on horseback took place in the morning and on foot in the afternoon, interspersed with theory lessons, and French instructors taught the recruits.[20]

Parades and reviews, held on special occasions, had a strong spectacular dimension, channelling the military values of control and discipline into the ascending bourgeois social order.[21] In a less rigidly top-down perspective, this trickle-down effect contributed to the construction of a popular military culture throughout the 19th century.[22] For the Napoleonic regime, public festivals were a tool to build consensus and legitimisation towards the state authorities involved in them.[23] Parades and reviews, held on Sundays after Mass with much theatrical and festive flair, contributed to what Jean-Paul Bertaud called "the militarisation of public imagery",[24] although they veered, even in Napoleon's opinion, more towards amusement than effective propaganda,[25] which also seems to be the case for civilian attendance to daily drills. They were a more mundane affair than parades, but still attracted an audience and held it, favoured by the proximity of the drill grounds to the city walls. The exoticism of certain troops tickled the inhabitants' curiosity; the populace of Piacenza in 1799, during the Russian occupation, crowded the city walls and the area immediately outside the gate to watch the Cossacks' afternoon manoeuvres, whose unusual horsemanship and martial music "divertiva moltissimo" the urban spectators, while in the countryside the same troops raped and pillaged wherever they could.[26] The phenomenon was not limited to watching a strange foreign corps from a safe distance, and the drills mustered an audience even well into the Napoleonic kingdom. In fact, spectators were so numerous that their presence had to be factored in when accounting for damage to the terrain. At Reggio in 1805, the "popolo spettatore, e curioso" spilled over to the fields neighbouring the drill ground, and came to see the manoeuvres daily, seeking the closest and most comfortable spot to watch without a care for the damage it caused to the

[19] Ibid., p.12.
[20] Ibid., 18-9.
[21] S.H. Myerly, "'The eyes must entrap the mind': Army spectacle and paradigm in nineteenth-century Britain", *Journal of social history*, 26/1 (1992), 105-31.
[22] J. Vogel, "Military, folklore, *Eigensinn*: Folkloric militarism in Germany and France, 1871-1914", *Central European History*, 33/4 (2000), 487-504.
[23] M.E. Omes, "Rappresentanti dell'autorità e agenti del consenso: il ruolo di prefetti, clero e militari durante le feste civiche nel Regno d'Italia napoleonico", *Società e storia*, 156 (2017), 235-68.
[24] Bertaud, *Quand les enfants*, 250-4.
[25] R.B. Holtman, *Napoleonic propaganda* (Baton Rouge, 1950), p.210.
[26] A.D. Rossi, *Ristretto di storia patria ad uso de' Piacentini* (Piacenza, 1833), iv, 219-20.

terrain.[27] Remarkably, this was not taking place during such events as Napoleon's Italian coronation, celebrated with massive public fetes that very year;[28] the audience, simply, went to see the routine daily manoeuvres, and the departmental engineer, in suggesting improvements to the drill ground, took into account good spots for the audience to "godere dello spettacolo".[29] This situation was still happening in 1810: "la gente … per giungere a vedere le evoluzioni lo attraverserebbero [the field] per ogni senso calpestandone il prodotto senza riguardo, come accadde purtroppo tante volte in eguali circostanze".[30]

Audience participation meant that teaching and showcasing military discipline, rather than only taking place in the secluded environment of the barracks, was a more public affair than interpretations of barracksing as a social discipline tool from Foucault onwards have assumed.[31] This publicity unwittingly restored shreds of the transparency that post-revolutionary institutions abandoned;[32] witnessing excessive brutality against soldiers could provoke the audience's ire and disgust.[33] Publicity also offered chances to reaffirm rejection of the military burdens, albeit in the grumbling, secretive dimension of anti-regime discontent which Italian public opinion had been cowed into.[34] Tornieri, who pointedly limited his personal attendance to hearing the gunshots of live-fire exercises from afar,[35] decried the decade-long occupation of the Campo Marzo park,[36] while the conscripts drilling offered a grim spectacle rather than an inspiring one:

> "Circa 3000 sono adesso i soldati in Vicenza tutti di fanteria tutti francesi e tutti di primo pelo. Mattina e sera si portano in Campo Marzo a far l'esercizio. Non ve ne è uno che abbia la faccia allegra, non ve ne è uno che non vada con la testa bassa, tutti mesti e mortificati dal primo all'ultimo."[37]

Tornieri's diary recorded fatal accidents as rare occurrences, limited to an

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[27] ASMI MGC 25, engineer Bolognini to the prefect of Crostolo, 25 May 1805.
[28] Caiani, "Ornamentalism", p.67.
[29] ASMI MGC 25, Bolognini to the prefect of Crostolo, 25 May 1805.
[30] ASMI MGC 25, Bolognini to the prefect of Crostolo, 23 May 1810.
[31] McCurdy, *Quarters*, p.54.
[32] Kingston, *Bureaucrats*, 31-51.
[33] Forrest, *Conscripts*, p.180.
[34] F. Barra, "Avvenimenti", in L. Mascilli Migliorini (ed.), *Italia napoleonica. Dizionario critico* (Turin, 2001), p.75.
[35] Tornieri, *Memorie di Vicenza*, 15 August 1811.
[36] Ibid., 5 July 1807.
[37] Ibid., 26 April 1807, 17 June 1813,

entry in 1809 and one in 1813,[38] and in moderate tones, ascribing the deaths of the young soldiers to mere disgrace without further comment. The publicity of the manoeuvres, including fatal accidents, did not seem to pose any serious trouble for the image of the military, and therefore for the political consensus it underpinned, unlike in sensitive areas where civilian access would be restricted, such as Spain at the onset of the French occupation.[39] Rather, militarising the space for the drills, spurred by the unceasing war effort, created a conflict of interests over the use of land, generating friction between the regime and the proprietors it most wished to rally to its cause.

VII.2 Bargaining for land

18th century training camps had many features in common with their Napoleonic successors and with the garrison drill grounds; land that met criteria of military usability (flatness, openness, ease of transport and supply) was rented out and, over time, optimised through the removal of physical obstacles to the exercises and the digging of drains.[40] Garrison drill grounds differed in that leases and rents took place in a hectic land market, following the expropriations of Church patrimony, and later in the context of the Napoleonic state rooting its power basis in the landowners.[41] Renting the army a relatively small plot out of several hectares in a landowner's possession might not bankrupt one, but it did amount to a loss making investment due to the ministry of war's insufficient creditworthiness and the damage to the terrains.

Identifying and securing land for military training was essential since the conclusion of hostilities in northern Italy with the treaty of Campoformio in 1797. Since part of the French troops stationed in the Cisalpine Republic would obviously be new recruits, refilling the ranks of the *armée d'Italie* after the intense campaigning of the previous two years, having them train during the lull in operations was an obvious choice. The French army planned to establish a training camp already in the spring of 1798; its first

[38] Ibid., 3 March 1809, 14 May 1813.
[39] Morvan, *Le soldat*, i, p.316. Napoleon ordered audience access restrictions on military exercises after the death of General Malher during a training accident at Valladolid in March 1808.
[40] J. Childs, "A short history of the military use of land in peacetime", *War in History*, 1/4 (1997), 95-6.
[41] F. Mineccia, "Patrimonio ecclesiastico e mercato della terra in Italia (secoli XVIII-XIX)", in G. Poli (ed.), *Le inchieste europee sui beni ecclesiastici (confronti regionali secc. XVI-XIX)* (Bari, 2005) 137-73.

location was to be Cantù, about 50 km north of Milan.[42] This project ground to a brusque halt when the Cisalpine Directory realised the damage it would cause to the fertile grounds around Cantù "con notabile pregiudizio dell'agricoltura, e dei rispettivi proprietarj."[43] Despite the fact that the troops were ready to move in as soon as the camp was supplied,[44] preserving the valuable agricultural area took priority. The Directory suggested moving the camp to the area of Gallarate "che abbonda di vaste, e men fertili pianure",[45] only to change their mind one day later and pick the "luogo della Canonica" in the Serio department.[46] Already in April 1798, the French had tried to swap a drill ground on the bank of the river Adda for a vast and inviting nearby flax field but, unsurprisingly, the owner of the field had refused to cede it to the French army.[47] All projects for camps were suspended from 10 May onwards;[48] the overall arrangement, rather than trying to gather a large number of troops into a single training camp, returned to the previous dispositions that grouped smaller detachments together "cosicché le rispettive Legioni vengano distribuite nelle principali comuni della Repubblica, all'oggetto di giornalmente esercitarle nell'entrante buona stagione."[49] The artillery needed open space, away from the city, for safety reasons; as the commander of the Cisalpine artillery wrote, the men had to hold live-fire exercises, requiring a "luoco nella campagna".[50]

There was a sense of urgency in the army's requests but no random land grabbing. The military asked for permission to use land as drill grounds, if anything because they expected the departments to foot the bill for rents. Therefore, it was in the departments' best interest to cooperate with commanders in choosing the least fertile plots, as the Adda administrators did along with General Beaumont for the garrison at Lodi.[51] They marked the limits of the drill ground to minimise disturbance to the neighbouring land, knowing that the preservation of "queste circondarie floride campagne"

[42] ASMI MGC 26, commissar-ordinator Giuseppe Mauri to the minister of war, 9 Floréal VI/28 April 1798.
[43] ASMI MGC 26, Cisalpine Directory to the minister of war, 11 Floréal VI/30 April 1798.
[44] ASMI MGC 26, Mauri to the minister of war, 10 Floréal VI/29 April 1798.
[45] ASMI MGC 26, Cisalpine Directory to the minister of war, 11 Floréal VI/30 April 1798.
[46] ASMI MGC 26, Cisalpine Directory to the minister of war, 12 Floréal VI/1 May 1798.
[47] ASMI MGC 26, central administration of the Adda department to the minister of war, 23 Germinal VI/12 April 1798.
[48] ASMI MGC 26, Cisalpine Directory to the minister of war, 21 Floréal VI/10 May 1798.
[49] ASMI MGC 26, Cisalpine Directory to the minister of war, 21 Floréal VI/10 May 1798.
[50] ASMI MGC 26, Major Guillaume to the minister of war, 22 Floréal VI/11 May 1798.
[51] ASMI MGC 26, central administration of the Adda department to the minister of war, 25 Thermidor VI/12 August 1798.

prevented "molto maggior dispendio, e danno del Pubblico interesse."[52] Cooperation was in the interest of expediency, too. The French general was aware that "faute de terrain ad hoc je serai obligé d'aller dans les campagnes où je causerai malgré moi des dommages, ayant l'ordre positif de suivre rapidement l'instruction des regiments sous mes ordres".[53] The estimated cost of the works to the selected plot of land stood at 7487.4.9 *lire*, plus a yearly rent of 410 *lire* for the field tenant.[54] Although we don't know what kind of works were planned, in the following autumn General Beaumont urged the departmental administration (now merged with the Alto Po department) to fill the swamps with gravel, since the horses could not cross over them unless the river Adda was at a very low level.[55] Likely, the earlier adaptation works had cleared a woodland area, since the departmental engineer reported that "essendosi scoperte ancora delle radici nel bosco estirpato, si devono svellere."[56]

A pattern is already visible. Manoeuvres were a seasonal matter, increasing in summer with the fairer weather; military use was incompatible with agricultural use, clashing directly with spring sowing, unfeasible and not recommended on productive plots, hence the search for the least productive areas; once a suitable field was identified, it was fitted for military service, especially for the passage of horses. The commanders were the prompters of such searches and adaptations, informed by parameters of space and healthiness; this also stood true for large-scale camps, as the plain of Montichiari was chosen as one such site due to its vastness, flatness, and lack of environmental features that endangered the soldiers' health, swampland and humid ground especially.[57] Negotiating with the owners of the manoeuvre land, or the tenants whose work the military takeover affected directly, was the responsibility of the prefectures who liaised with the ministry of war, providing reimbursements at its usually glacial pace. Administrative devolution to the communes did not mean a slacker administrative control. The French ministry of war, in 1808, decreed that "partout où il y a garnison, la Ville doit fournir un champ de manœvres", an obligation that was not permanent (subject to fluctuation in the presence and

[52] Ibid.
[53] ASMI MGC 26, General Beaumont to the minister of war, 30 Thermidor VI/17 August 1798.
[54] ASMI MGC 26, central administration of the Adda department to the minister of war, 25 Thermidor VI/12 August 1798.
[55] ASMI MGC 26, report of departmental engineer Dossena, 24 Vendémiaire VII/15 October 1798.
[56] Ibid.
[57] Ardenghi, *Campo militare*, 85-95.

size of the garrison) and excluded fortress cities that had esplanades for that purpose.[58] The cost of rents and indemnities for landowners was factored into the municipal budget for unforeseen expenses,[59] in the hands of the imperial prefectures which decided whether to approve municipal budgets.[60] The situation was no different in Italy. Preventive municipal budgets, including sums anticipated by the ministry of war for all military-related expenses, were subject to prefectoral control and, in the case of first-class communes (the bigger cities), to a special round of checks from the ministry of the interior and the general administration of the municipalities.[61]

In December 1812, the ministry of war instructed the prefectures and the *direzioni del Genio* to economise on drill ground leases by drawing up contracts for limited time only, so that the ministry would not have to pay rent when no troops were present.[62] In July 1813, a viceregal decree imported *verbatim* into Italy the French drill grounds system, stating they were provided by, and at the expense of, the municipalities listed as seats of garrisons, the only exception being fortresses with esplanades and other drill grounds already included in the military real estate.[63] The drill ground, chosen collaboratively by commanders and prefects, must be close to the town and proportionate in size to the garrison, so that in those where there was one regiment the field's capability stood at one battalion, and of one regiment in garrisons with multiple regiments.[64] Rent and indemnity costs went into the municipal budget for unforeseen expenses.[65] Even before this decree, the understanding was that garrisons were entitled to a manoeuvre terrain. During a controversy over the rent and repairs to a state-owned area off the Porta Castello gate in Brescia, which the troops used for drilling and the commune for holding the market,[66] the minister refused to pay anything, as the troops had the right to drill when the market was not being held, and if the terrain was sold, the municipality had to find another drill ground.[67] In March 1811, the conscripts of the Italian Royal Guard in Cantù lacked a drill ground, so General Fontanelli appealed to the French decree of March 1808

[58] ASMI MGC 26, extract from a circular letter of the French minister of war, 15 March 1808.
[59] Ibid.
[60] Daly, *Inside Napoleonic France*, p.63.
[61] Pagano, *Enti locali*, p.116.
[62] ASMI MGC 26, circular letter to the prefects, 3 December 1812; circular letter to the direzioni del Genio, 5 December 1812.
[63] ASMI MGC 26, viceregal decree, 20 July 1813.
[64] Ibid.
[65] Ibid.
[66] ASMI MGC 26, report of the ministerial 1st division, 7 August 1812.
[67] ASMI MGC 26, minister's reply to the report, 9 August 1812.

to justify the claim to a training area,[68] which, according to the proprietors of the land, the troops occupied of their own initiative, thus violating the principles of the Code Napoleon.[69] The drill ground remained in use until the conscripts left Cantù,[70] so it appears that the proprietors' appeal to the rule of law served more to spur the ministry to pay up indemnities than free up the fields.

Purchasing the training grounds directly was not a favoured avenue. When the director of the royal domain proposed to the minister of war to buy up the drill ground of the Trento castle, citing the example of the artillery school shooting range in Verona, the minister politely refused and reminded the director that the shooting range, too, was a patchwork of rented-out plots belonging to multiple owners.[71] This preference for rent over ownership allowed a more flexible approach vis-à-vis the unpredictable changes in size and presence of the garrisons. More crucially, it allowed the ministry to avoid paying property taxes by dumping those expenses entirely on private owners, whereas it had to pay the taxes if the terrain was state-owned.[72]

Use of drill grounds was a long-term commitment, reflecting the nearly continuous wartime but extending also to peacetime, and needing to balance military and non-military functions. Likewise, neither the need for exercise nor the physical features of the terrains were a prerogative of the French-Italian armies; it is possible that the same plot of land at Lodi used by General Beaumont's troops was a training ground for the Austrian garrison in 1799-1800.[73] The commanders' insistence did not wane during the post-Amiens peacetime, either, and individual initiative of the commanders was a problem as much as an understandable need. In 1801, Antonio Gandolfi demanded compensation for the damages done to his field in the area around Castiglione d'Adda (a village close to the garrisons of Pizzighettone and Codogno) by the manoeuvres of the 8th French dragoon regiment; the minister called this a "delicate" case, since the damage had not come from war, but from "una semplice manovra, la cui esecuzione era arbitraria al

[68] ASMI MGC 26, General Fontanelli to the minister of war, 15 March 1811.
[69] ASMI MGC 26, reimbursement petition of Carlo Fioretti, Paolo Pogliani and Marianna Orombelli to the viceroy, 23 July 1813.
[70] ASMI MGC 26, declaration of proprietor Gio. Maria Pogliani, 18 April 1812.
[71] ASMI MGC 26, minister of war to the director of the royal domain, 25 May 1811.
[72] For example, the drill ground at Vigevano being state-owned, the ministry of war was to pay the land tax on it, standing at the rather modest arrears of 65.40 *lire* from 1810 to 1812. ASMI MGC 26, Colonel Galateo to the minister of war, 30 June 1813.
[73] ASMI MVP 15, report of the minister of war to Melzi, 26 March 1802.

Generale che l'ha ordinata."[74] Two months before the War of the Third Coalition began and one year before the area again became a theatre of operations, the general of the Verona garrison in March-April 1803, following instructions from the first consul and the vice-president, was pressing the case with the ministry of war for a larger drill ground, intended for use in summer.[75] Verona posed a series of space issues; although it used to be a fortress town under the Republic of Venice, it lacked a glacis around the walls,[76] so the troops could not drill on that strip of clear terrain "di pubblica ragione", and the rest of the terrains adjacent to the city fortifications were private property.[77] General d'Urre had thought of using, "e per la sua circoscritta situazione, e per la vicinanza alla città, … un fondo parte seminato e parte a prateria, che fuori della Porta Mantovana si estende in vicinanza dell'Adige; accennandomi che un tal fondo fu allo stesso oggetto occupato altra volta sotto il gen.le Augereau nel 1797."[78] Continued availability and convenience in line with recent past usage was a factor in the terrain choice, but so were proximity to the city and enclosure of the area. Although the government commissar would have preferred a completely infertile terrain, lack of options forced him to accept the general's pick, on the condition that experts estimated the potential agricultural damages and the amount of the reimbursements due to the land proprietor, the hospital of Santi Giacomo e Lazzaro.[79]

Damage to valuable and productive plots of land were precisely the reason why it cost so much to maintain fairness to the landowners and to the commanders at the same time. As the minister of war put it:

> "Quanto è necessario per una parte l'aderire alle loro domande, acciò il soldato non manchi d'istruzione, così è altrettanto gravoso il dover prendere in affitto dai particolari per quest'oggetto dei considerevoli spazi di terreno, e pagare benanche il deterioramento, che loro ne deriva dal calpestio del fondo, e dall'atterramento delle piante."[80]

The government made more and more recourse to negotiating with these citizens. After the drill ground at Lodi by the Adda became unusable, the

[74] ASMI MGC 26, minister of war to the national legal office, 15 Floréal IV/5 May 1801.
[75] ASMI MGC 600, government commissar in Verona to the minister of war, 5 April 1803.
[76] Ibid.
[77] Ibid.
[78] Ibid.
[79] Ibid.
[80] ASMI MGC 600, report of the minister of war to Melzi, 12 June 1803.

municipality relied on a terrain rented out from a local notable, Antonio Salamanca, to provide the cavalry with a manoeuvre ground.[81] This terrain had been in use as drill ground since around 1798,[82] but once it had become the only available one, overcrowding became unsustainable. Since the military occupied a larger swathe of land, and the soldiers spilled over the drill ground boundaries damaging the neighbouring cultivated areas, it was impossible to demand a lower rent from the proprietor.[83] Furthermore, should the contract (signed on 27 June 1804, with six-monthly payments backdated to start from 11 May[84]) not extend to the following year, if Salamanca were not warned ahead of time he would not be able to sow the terrain, losing all yearly profit from it.[85] Salamanca's terrain was not the only one; a parade ground had been established outside the city gate of Porta d'Adda, where the horse soldiers manoeuvred in the morning and the infantry in the afternoon, on terrains belonging to proprietors Colombano Bagatta and the Malacarne brothers.[86] These terrains had had a military use before, and the credit of the proprietors that the municipality accepted to pay went back to 1802,[87] implying there might have been older dues as well. It seems, however, that the manoeuvres were not taking place there anymore, and that the municipality was just ensuring through a notarial instrument that, in case of need, it could use again the Bagatta and Malacarne fields.[88] It seems that this happened between July and December 1810, with the reimbursement only coming through in 1812.[89]

The 29 March 1806 decree established a capacity of 3440 men and 1670 horses for the Lodi garrison,[90] which translated into six cavalry squadrons on a daily training field that was getting too small for all of them.[91] Facing demand for more space, Salamanca was willing to sell all the land to the municipality rather than continue the lease under the current conditions, since his unpaid credit towards the public debt agency already amounted to

[81] ASMI MVP 15, report of the minister of war to Melzi, 26 March 1802.
[82] ASMI MGC 26, survey of engineer Pavesi to the vice-prefect of Lodi, 13 September 1806.
[83] ASMI MGC 26, prefect of Alto Po to the minister of war, 12 July 1804.
[84] ASMI MGC 26, prefect of Alto Po to the minister of war, 14 November 1805.
[85] ASMI MGC 26, prefect of Alto Po to the minister of war, 12 July 1804.
[86] ASMI MGC 26, notarial instrument of Colombano Bagatta and Filippo Malacarne, 21 June 1805.
[87] Ibid.
[88] Ibid. The instrument set out a financial compensation in case the terrains were used for military manoeuvres again in the future.
[89] ASMI MGC 26, mandate of payment from the prefecture of Alto Po to the departmental receiver of the direct taxation, 28 May 1812.
[90] "Decreto relativo alle caserme", 29 March 1806, "Caserme da conservarsi pel servizio militare".
[91] ASMI MGC 26, report of the ministerial 2nd division to the minister of war, 13 June 1806.

two semesters.[92] An indication of the slow payment lies in the mandate for the May 1805 semester, issued from the ministry of war to the Alto Po prefecture only in late November.[93] When the municipality commissioned a survey of his land to assess the rent price, he reiterated his intention to sell instead of lease, as renting out the agricultural land neighbouring the drill ground would nullify without sufficient compensation the substantial investments he had made to transport fertile earth there.[94] Expanding the drill ground would cost the military the transport of gravel, which would make the soil infertile until the gravel was removed, at double the expense, once the army freed up the area again.[95] The municipal survey showed, along with unproductive strips of swamp or woodland, no less than four productive areas around the drill ground, whose planned enlargement would incorporate:[96]

Size in Lodi perches	**Cultivation**	**Estimated value per perch**
14.11	Corn, oat stubble	7 *lire*
9.1	Flax	8 *lire*
2.13	Oat stubble	8 *lire*
12.7	Meadow	13 *lire*

The conflict of interest between agricultural and military use is evident, as the terrain was intensely cultivated; its most valuable portion was undergoing crop rotation as meadow for more than three years (*prato vecchio*).[97] It is unknown whether Salamanca acquired all this land thanks to the monastic suppressions between the Josephinian and Cisalpine era, but still, his readiness to sell a sizable part of it was conditional on finding a suitable price to level out the costs of agricultural improvements. The ministry of war deemed Salamanca's sale price too high;[98] eventually the proprietor was persuaded to renew the lease the following year,[99] at the rate of payment set

[92] ASMI MGC 26, Salamanca to the municipality of Lodi, 29 May 1806.
[93] ASMI MGC 26, minister of war to the general accounting office, 27 November 1805.
[94] ASMI MGC 26, Salamanca to the vice-prefect of Lodi, 14 July 1806.
[95] Ibid.
[96] ASMI MGC 26, survey of engineer Pavesi to the vice-prefect of Lodi, 13 September 1806.
[97] E. Roveda, *Uomini, terre e acque. Studi sull'agricoltura della Bassa lombarda tra XV e XVIII secolo* (Milan, 2012), 55-6.
[98] ASMI MGC 26, report of the ministerial 2nd division to the minister of war, 13 June 1806.
[99] ASMI MGC 26, rent contract between Salamanca and the vice-prefecture of Lodi, 15 June 1807.

out by the municipal survey.[100] The contract continued at least until 1812, plagued by belated payments; the rent went unpaid in 1810[101] and 1811,[102] to which the minister declared it would settle the debt, amounting to the entire yearly rent for 1811, as soon as it had the funds.[103] In his complaint letters, Salamanca claimed the field was his only source of income and a heavily taxed one,[104] as municipal property taxes rose significantly throughout the kingdom's later years;[105] the Lodi municipality derived most of its income from land tax in this period.[106] Salamanca's other known occupation was that of substitute for the district justice of peace,[107] an occasional and unpaid role in the event the judge was indisposed or absent.[108] Salamanca retained other agricultural and woodland terrains close to the drill ground, areas where soldiers and horses must not trespass; to keep them separate, the survey of 1806 recommended digging a ditch between the drill ground and the woodland-agricultural plots.[109]

The pattern was similar when the drill ground belonged to an institution instead of a private citizen, such as the Santi Giacomo and Lazzaro hospital in Verona. The terrain was located on the Basso Acquar, an area outside the Porta Mantovana gate. During the first year of military manoeuvres there, thanks to an understanding garrison commander who tried to take up as little space as possible,[110] the cavalry started drilling on 20 May, giving the tenants enough time to harvest the hay.[111] Losses, however, involved such profitable cultures as mulberry, used for silk-farming, which took years and money to replace. On two wheat fields, managed by the same tenant but belonging one to the hospital and the other to a private citizen, the tenant lost part of the wheat harvest and three mulberry trees; on three meadows, two belonging to the hospital and another to the Compagnia della Madonna di Loreto, the entire harvest was ruined.[112] Moreover, the commander who substituted the

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[100] Ibid.
[101] ASMI MGC 26, Salamanca to the vice-prefect of Lodi, 20 May 1810.
[102] ASMI MGC 26, minister of war to the prefect of Alto Po, 1 October 1812.
[103] Ibid.
[104] ASMI MGC 26, Salamanca to the minister of war, 23 April 1812.
[105] A. Grab, "The politics of finances in Napoleonic Italy (1802-1814)," *Journal of Modern Italian Studies*, 3/2 (1998), 127-43
[106] See the municipal incomes table for 1810 in Pagano, *Enti locali*, p.161.
[107] *Almanacco reale per l'anno bisestile MDCCCVIII* (Milan, 1808), p.286.
[108] *Regolamento organico della giustizia civile e punitiva 13 giugno 1806* (Bologna, 1856), art.152.
[109] ASMI MGC 26, engineer Pavesi to the vice-prefect of Lodi, 13 September 1806.
[110] ASMI MGC 26, government commissar to the minister of war, 27 August 1803.
[111] ASMI MGC 26, engineer Berzacola to the administrators of the Santi Giacomo e Lazzaro hospital, 10 November 1804.
[112] ASMI MGC 26, engineer Berzacola to the government commissar, 25 September 1803.

lenient General d'Urre, Colonel Desgraviers-Bertholet, delivered to the government commissar the chilling news that the occupation of the drill ground "deve esser continua nella Primavera, Estate, ed Autunno, e per conseguenza io ritengo perduto ogni loro reddito a beneficio delli Proprietari."[113] Paradoxically, peacetime brought more military activity on the drill ground, as the garrison was there on a more permanent basis; the manoeuvres of 1804 began in early March and took up arable land that had been left untouched the year before.[114]

Army encroachment into the land often took the form of trespasses. Around 1808, the ministry fixed the measure and shape of the drill ground in Reggio; in order to prevent accidental trespasses into unrented land, it sought to occupy contractually the strips of land around the drill ground, for the most part already trampled-over.[115] The only problem, the surveyor argued, was "la gran moltiplicità dei proprietarj che vi sono interessati, il che porta una irregolarità straordinaria di confini".[116] In Verona, the troops trespassed into the possessions of count Bartolomeo Serenelli, who owned 560 hectares of land between Verona and Chiesanuova in the final years of the Venetian Republic.[117] Some of these terrains lay in the Basso Acquar off the Porta Mantovana; in August 1807, during the manoeuvres and live-fire exercises, the French troops trespassed onto three plots of Serenelli's land that neighboured with the drill ground, trampling over corn, barley and hay for a total loss of 158.57 Italian *lire*.[118]

Lease contracts often formalised pre-existent occupations, so that the proprietors could receive their due in case of damages and a balance of sort became possible between increasing military usage and what civilian profit could be made off the trampled fields. This was explicitly the case in the contracts for the meadows outside the walls of Modena.[119] These landowners had made considerable gains through the sale of *beni nazionali*[120] and held

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[113] ASMI MGC 26, government commissar to the minister of war, 27 August 1803.
[114] Ibid.
[115] ASMI MGC 25, engineer Bolognini to the prefect of Crostolo, 23 May 1805.
[116] Ibid.
[117] P. Gaspari, *Terra patrizia. Aristocrazie terriere e società rurale in Veneto e Friuli: patrizi veneziani, nobili e borghesi nella formazione dell'etica civile delle élites terriere (1797-1920)* (Udine, 1993), p.72.
[118] ASMI MGC 26, damage survey of engineers Vicenzi and Bosa, 29 August 1807.
[119] ASMI MGC 25, lease contract between the ministry of war and Luigi Rangoni and his brothers, 6 December 1806; lease contract between the ministry of war and Antonio M. Sertorio, 30 April 1807; lease contract between the ministry of war and Benedetto Boccolari, 14 August 1807.
[120] Buyers in the Crostolo and Panaro departments are listed in O. Rombaldi, "L'economia dei territori dei ducati estensi", in M. Berengo, S. Romagnoli (eds.), *Reggio e i territori estensi dall'Antico Regime all'età napoleonica* (Parma, 1979), i, 53-100.

significant roles in local society; Benedetto Boccolari was an elector in the merchants' college of the department[121] and a member of the municipal council,[122] investing his wealth in purchases of artefacts from suppressed religious houses.[123] The other proprietors involved in the meadows contracts were nobles: count Antonio Sertorio Nigrelli, resident in Vienna, whose meadow was managed and the contract for it signed through an agent;[124] and the Rangoni marquises, headed by Luigi, involved in the pro-French government and participating in the Lyon congress of January 1802.[125] They were not poor peasants with limited contractual power, but rather, notables who could negotiate effectively against the army.

The three meadowlands formed a total surface of 99.44 Milanese perches (around 6.44 hectares), the largest plot being Sartorio Nigrelli's, which stood at 59.11 perches. Second in size came the Rangoni brothers' meadow, 30.12 perches, while Boccolari's meadow amounted to just about 10.20 perches.[126] As per the decree of March 1806, this field should serve for the training of a garrison numbering 3000 men, the largest in the Panaro department.[127] The contracts were valid for nine years, renewable every three,[128] and the prefect represented the minister of war in signing the papers and acting as first port of call for matters of belated rents. At the end of the first three years, in autumn 1809, the choice of whether to renew or rescind the contract was the minister's, and the landowners urged a decision be made quickly "premendo loro di provvedere per tempo ai bisogni del Fondo in caso di rinuncia, e di ritrarne il più conveniente profitto."[129] The minister renewed the lease, foreseeing that the garrison would once again need the field in the fair season.[130] Despite forbidding the landlords to sign "alcun contratto di simile natura, od altro qualunque che possa rompere l'affitto medesimo"[131] during

[121] Ibid.
[122] C. Malagoli, L. Vandelli, *Il Consiglio comunale di Modena. Duecento anni di storia, 1802-2002* (Modena, 2002), p.122.
[123] C. Giovannini, P. Tollari, *Antichi organi italiani. La provincia di Modena* (Modena, 1991), p.223.
[124] ASMI MGC 25, lease contract between the ministry of war and Antonio M. Sertorio, 30 April 1807.
[125] L.F. Valdrighi, *Estratti di un carteggio famigliare e privato ai tempi delle Repubbliche cisalpina e italiana e specialmente de' comizii di Lyon del conte Luigi Valdrighi* (Modena, 1872), p.207.
[126] ASMI MGC 25, lease contract between the ministry of war and Antonio Sertorio, 30 April 1807; lease contract between the ministry of war and Benedetto Boccolari, 14 August 1807.
[127] "Decreto relativo alle caserme", 29 March 1806, "Caserme da conservarsi pel servizio militare".
[128] ASMI MGC 25 lease contract between the ministry of war and Luigi Rangoni and his brothers, 6 December 1806; lease contract between the ministry of war and Antonio Sertorio, 30 April 1807; lease contract between the ministry of war and Benedetto Boccolari, 14 August 1807.
[129] ASMI MGC 25, prefect of Panaro to the minister of war, 23 September 1809.
[130] ASMI MGC 25, minister of war to the prefect of Panaro, 18 October 1809.
[131] Ibid.

the three-year leases, the contracts did not prohibit sub-contracts for the harvest and sale of whatever produce the trampled-over fields may still yield. In 1808, the prefecture attempted calling an auction for the grass harvest on the drill ground; the only offer was that of one Paolo Rosa, who secured the cut and harvest of grass over a maximum of eight years.[132] The contract allowed Rosa to improve the field to increase its productivity, but the harvest was restricted to spontaneous grass, as ploughing was forbidden.[133] The income from Rosa's harvests contributed to paying the rent to the landowners[134] and, when the drill ground contract was rescinded on 31 October 1812, the prefecture confirmed that Rosa "ha regolarmente pagata la somma convenuta per l'erbe ritratte dal campo dal primo Maggio 1810 al 31 Ottobre suddetto".[135] Beyond helping the prefectoral coffers save money, these grass sales allowed the proprietors to keep using the field's produce; the buyer of the grass for 1807 was Antonio Bassoli,[136] the administrator of the Sertorio property.[137] The one significant problem arose, rather, over disrespect of contract conditions. Around February 1812, it emerged that Rosa had illegally ploughed and planted a portion of Boccolari's terrain, assuming it was superfluous to the military use.[138] What was worse, the colonel of the dragoon regiment training there at the time had used the ploughed-out earth to level the surface of the field.[139]

Similar issues and profitability tactics punctuated the existence of the garrison training grounds in the capital city of the nearby Crostolo department, Reggio. The city had a maximum barracks capability set at 2274 men and 427 horses in 1806,[140] lowered to 1200 men with the January 1809 decree.[141] Roughly the same drill ground served the garrison training needs since 1802.[142] In 1805, the prefecture asked the proprietors of the drill ground terrains if they wished to put to profit the potential produce of the fields, deducing the sum from the rent.[143] The answer was negative, borne out of business caution: nobody wanted to embark on a speculation dependent on

[132] ASMI MGC 25, lease contract between the prefecture of Panaro and Paolo Rosa, 1 May 1808.
[133] Ibid.
[134] ASMI MGC 25, note of the ministerial central office for accounting and payments, 11 March 1809.
[135] ASMI MGC 25, prefect of Panaro to the minister of war, 12 July 1813.
[136] ASMI MGC 25, note of the ministerial central office for accounting and payments, 11 March 1809.
[137] ASMI MGC 25, lease contract between the ministry of war and Antonio M. Sertorio, 30 April 1807.
[138] ASMI MGC 25, Colonel Galateo to the minister of war, 24 February 1812.
[139] Ibid.
[140] "Decreto relativo alle caserme", 29 March 1806, "Caserme da conservarsi pel servizio militare".
[141] Crociani, Ilari, Paoletti, *Storia militare del Regno*, i, p.199.
[142] ASMI MGC 25, prefect of Crostolo to the minister of war, 4 June 1813.
[143] ASMI MGC 25, engineer Bolognini to the prefect of Crostolo, 25 May 1805.

the whims of the troop whenever it returned from the grand review that took place in May-June at Montichiari.[144] The prefecture could still sell the produce on the government's behalf;[145] damage compensation already amounted to 1731.10.8 Milanese *lire*,[146] and every penny mattered. Knowing the troops would be needing a drill ground for years to come,[147] in 1806 the prefecture drew up contract clauses that greatly favoured the ministry of war over the proprietors of the terrains, all belonging to the city nobility.[148] Such clauses allowed the government to rescind the contract year by year, forbade the proprietors to manure the fields and collect the cavalry horses' dung, forbade grazing unless a specific contract with the government was stipulated, and forbade passage tolls through the terrains.[149] This shows the ministry of war's readiness to go against the interests of notables, to a level that prefects could not afford,[150] and perhaps not even the other ministries. Military necessity was the key factor in forcing the state to upset its most sought-after supporters. In 1807, the chief of general staff for the *armée d'Italie* deemed the Reggio drill ground too small and imposed an enlargement until an entire cavalry regiment could deploy and manoeuvre.[151] The number of creditors for 1807, whose property had been damaged by the manoeuvres, rose from six to sixteen, the small parcels of land forming a surface of 58.61 *biolche* (around 17.13 hectares).[152] The social composition of the proprietors reflected the overall state of land property in the department as outlined by economic history literature on early 19th century Italy: an entrenched solidity of the nobility coexisting with recent acquisitions of the bourgeoisie, and the permanence of Church charitable institutions weathering the storm of nationalisations thanks to their poor relief activity.[153]

Belated payments, trampling and other military modifications incapacitated a terrain beyond the immediate loss of harvests, damaging the interests of proprietors in the long run. As time passed and the renters urged the

[144] Ibid.; Ardenghi, *Campo militare*, 85-95.
[145] ASMI MGC 25, engineer Bolognini to the prefect of Crostolo, 25 May 1805.
[146] Ibid.
[147] ASMI MGC 25, prefect of Crostolo to the minister of war, 4 June 1805.
[148] ASMI MGC 25, list of creditors for the military manoeuvres terrains (1806 section), s.d.
[149] ASMI MGC 25, contract clauses drawn up by engineer Bolognini, 20 November 1806.
[150] G. Daly, "'Little emperors?' Investigating prefectoral rule in the departments", in P.G. Dwyer, A. Forrest (eds.), *Napoleon and his empire. Europe, 1804-1814* (Basingstoke, 2007), 51-2.
[151] ASMI MGC 25, minister of war to the prefect of Crostolo (minute), 13 May 1807.
[152] ASMI MGC 25, list of credit and creditors for the military manoeuvres terrains (1807 section), s.d.
[153] F. Spaggiari, "La distribuzione della proprietà fondiaria nella pianura reggiana (1791-1804-1814)", in Berengo, Romagnoli (eds.), *Reggio e i territori estensi*, i, 197-218.

prefecture and the ministry of war to pay them their growing arrears,[154] sub-renting the grazing rights for the little grass that had managed to grow on the drill ground was, here too, a tool for amassing a small amount of money. The amount of grass depended on the yearly rain precipitations and the intensity of the trampling.[155] The sale was going to be modest, as prolonged trampling turned the meadows into a dusty, sterile area[156] where the only fruitful plants as of 1811 were five mulberry trees, the income from whose yield was cashed in by the prefecture until landowner Cristoforo Munarini Sora petitioned the minister of war for its return.[157] Meanwhile, the first grass auction in July 1810 provided 80.50 *lire*;[158] between October and November the ministry approved the sale, remarking it was of the essence to conclude the contract before the cold season settled in, even if the offered price did not exceed the auction base.[159] Bidders in such auctions were often proprietors and administrators who wished to gain back the right to profit off their own land. The highest bidder in the auction of 27 May 1811 participated so that "il prezzo che viene da esso esibito gli sia rilasciato in conto del suo credito per l'affitto della parte di prato a lui spettante".[160] Proprietor Giuseppe Terrachini won the grass and grazing auction in August 1812.[161] Like many others, he had bought *beni nazionali* earlier on;[162] these purchases consolidated the ascent of the Terrachini family to land-owning bourgeois wealth and to a family tradition of liberalism,[163] starting with the political career of Giuseppe's nephew, Pier Giacinto, who participated in the Lyon congress and served as director of the royal domain in the Brenta department, fleeing to Paris during the Restoration.[164] Other members of this family, Francesco Terrachini and his sons, in demanding their arrears, lamented that their meadow had been reduced to sterility not just because of the trampling, but also because the soldiers had flattened the ground for cavalry manoeuvres, tearing down irrigation canals and a small bridge.[165] Thus, even

[154] ASMI MGC 25, prefect of Crostolo to the minister of war, 12 July 1810.
[155] ASMI MGC 25, engineer Grasselli to the prefect of Crostolo, 16 August 1811.
[156] ASMI MGC 25, prefect of Crostolo to the minister of war, 4 June 1813.
[157] ASMI MGC 25, minister of war to the prefect of Crostolo (minute), 13 November 1811.
[158] Ibid.
[159] AMSI MGC 25, minister of war to the prefect of Crostolo, 1 November 1810.
[160] ASMI MGC 25, auction minutes, 27 May 1810.
[161] ASMI MGC 25, auction minutes, 10 August 1812.
[162] Rombaldi, "L'economia dei territori", 88, 94-5.
[163] A. Ferraboschi, *Borghesia e potere civico a Reggio Emilia nella seconda metà dell'Ottocento* (Soveria Mannelli, 2003), p.58.
[164] "I Terrachini. Da Pier Giacinto di Cadelbosco cominciò l'ascesa di una famiglia", *Reggio democratica* (3 August 1949) p.3 col. d-e.
[165] ASMI MGC 25, Francesco Terrachini and sons to the minister of war, s.d. (received 23 December 1811).

if the manoeuvre damages, caused by the increased military presence and more pressing training urgency, were not enough on their own to cripple the fortunes and commitment of *rallié* élites, they still harmed the state's trustworthiness, contributing to the crisis of the kingdom's later years among the notables.[166]

Theoretically, the terrains were protected against intentional alterations; contractual clauses stated that the land ought to be returned in its original state at the end of the lease. To keep alterations under control, the ministry of war inhibited initiatives of garrison commanders in adapting manoeuvre grounds,[167] and ordered repair works when necessary. The case of the drill ground for the garrison at Novara in 1810 is one such example, for once not involving the occupation of agricultural areas. The garrison troops (Italian horse soldiers of the Dragoni Napoleone regiment) trained on a square in the *allea*,[168] a tree-lined avenue created in the 1770s for promenades and public celebrations.[169] Keeping the drill ground there discomforted the civilians' walks during the fair season,[170] and blocked access to a church.[171] The location was not ideal for training, either: the regiment was mostly composed of conscripts, who needed more space even if their training was subdivided by draft class.[172] The prefect immediately indicated as a replacement the old drill ground outside the Porta Mortara gate,[173] a state-owned square of land measuring 22816 m^2 that dwarfed the *allea* drill ground's 4312 m^2.[174] This terrain had been purchased in 1803 with the municipality's participation, but the *podestà*, rather than claim any indemnity for its repairs and usage, renounced any such claim as long as it replaced the *allea* drill ground quickly.[175]

The *piazza d'armi* was in very poor shape. Carriages and grazing cattle had crisscrossed the topsoil with furrows and rainwater-filled potholes, while the path that led to the *piazza d'armi* from the road to Mortara was so run-down that horses could not walk it.[176] The Genio officer sent to survey the *piazza*

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[166] Crociani, Ilari, Paoletti, *Storia militare del Regno*, i, 67-8.
[167] ASMI MGC 26, minister of war to the prefect of Alto Po, 20 June 1810.
[168] ASMI MGC 26, prefect of Agogna to the minister of war, 11 April 1810.
[169] C. Morbio, *Storia di Novara dalla dominazione de' Farnesi sino all'età nostra contemporanea* (Milan, 1834), 55, 75-6.
[170] ASMI MGC 26, prefect of Agogna to the minister of war, 11 April 1810.
[171] ASMI MGC 26, Lieutenant Ghezzi to Colonel Rossi, 14 May 1810.
[172] ASMI MGC 26, prefect of Agogna to the minister of war, 4 May 1810.
[173] ASMI MGC 26, prefect of Agogna to the minister of war, 11 April 1810.
[174] ASMI MGC 26, Ghezzi to Rossi, 14 May 1810.
[175] ASMI MGC 26, podestà of Novara to Lieutenant Ghezzi, 12 May 1805.
[176] ASMI MGC 26, Ghezzi to Rossi, 14 May 1810.

d'armi and the path estimated an expense of 750 Italian *lire*; the crucial works would involve digging water drains and a ditch around the drill ground, and levelling the surface with 400 m^3 of earth dug up from the ditch.[177] Another 174 *lire* would go to repair the road.[178] All this work had to be done fast, taking advantage of a pause in the daily manoeuvres while the regimental horses underwent a veterinarian treatment.[179] On the bright side, the estimation assuaged the prefect's worries regarding materials. The survey carried out by the prefectoral engineer of bridges and roads in April had advised gravelling the terrain, a costly procedure since gravel would have to be imported from far away, but advantageous long-term as it would make the drill ground usable even after the rain, all year round except for winter.[180] According to a survey by Genio Lieutenant Ghezzi, instead, it would not be necessary to gravel the terrain; having visited the *piazza d'armi* a day after a rainstorm, Ghezzi found the ground dry and compact enough as to allow infantry and cavalry exercises, so a layer of grass grown in autumn would suffice in place of the gravel.[181] Works began, supervised by the prefectoral engineer and financed through the minister of war's funds, continuing into the summer.[182] Unfortunately, one year later the commander of the Dragoni Napoleone belied Ghezzi's optimism; the renovated drill ground was located "in un terreno basso ed umido, come lo sono tutti i contorni di questa piazza" and, without gravel, it became unusable whenever it rained.[183] The most severe repercussion for the regiment was the impossibility to train its many conscripts.[184] At least, space was not an issue this time, as Bouchard did not ask for a replacement or enlargement of the drill ground. Health concerns associated with rice paddies were not even mentioned in this entire affair, although the Novara province was one of the main rice-growing districts in north-western Italy.[185] What protected the soldiers' health was the proximity of the drill ground to the city, within the safety distance that separated rice paddies and urban centre, a precaution enforced since the 17th century.[186]

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[177] ASMI MGC 26, Ghezzi's estimation of repair works and expenses, 13 May 1810.
[178] Ibid.
[179] ASMI MGC 26, prefect of Agogna to the minister of war, 4 May 1810.
[180] ASMI MGC 26, prefect of Agogna to the minister of war, 11 April 1810.
[181] ASMI MGC 26, Ghezzi to Rossi, 14 May 1810.
[182] ASMI MGC 26, Rossi to the minister of war, 2 July 1810.
[183] ASMI MGC 26, Major Bouchard to the minister of war, 9 March 1811.
[184] Ibid.
[185] L. Bulferetti, R. Luraghi, *Agricoltura, industria e commercio in Piemonte dal 1790 al 1814* (Turin, 1966), p.43.
[186] G. Andenna, *Una terra tra due fiumi. La provincia di Novara nella storia: l'età moderna (secoli XV-XVIII)* (Novara, 2003), p.165.

Elsewhere in the Agogna department, reusing old drill grounds presented the usual issues of trespass and collateral damage. The Vigevano garrison trained on a square field outside the city walls, purchased by the Piedmontese government for that very purpose; despite the columns marking its boundaries, accidental trespasses of troops into the surrounding privately owned plots had inevitably taken place back then, but it was a minor inconvenience for as long as the surrounding areas were uncultivated pastures.[187] Animal husbandry in Piedmont was a prosperous sector, but in wartime it experienced dramatic ebbs and flows, due to epizootics and increased military consumptions.[188] Moreover, the Napoleonic period accelerated the shift towards entrepreneurial management of farms and the erosion of traditional sharecropping contracts, prompting investments of capital in land property;[189] pastures, common land, meadows and uncultivated terrains were the most prominent victims of privatisation and agricultural profit maximisation, stimulated by the grains demand of the French market.[190] For the proprietors around the drill ground of Vigevano, exploiting the land more intensely to maximise profit served to fulfil this demand, balancing out taxation and rising prices; this set of reasons "indusse l'agricoltore ed il possessore a tirare il più vantaggioso partito de' loro possessi", therefore "furono li detti fondi ridotti a coltivo, e tali si conservano tuttora."[191] In this context, the troop trespasses short-circuited two irreconcilable usages of the land. The soldiers trampled over and devastated the sown fields, which the landowners rightfully protested, but it was impossible to demand the troops to stay within the boundaries without hampering them "nell'esperimento di que' movimenti, che le sono prescritti dalle Superiori istruzioni, e forse portati da un introdotta nuova tatica Militare."[192] When the land turned into an unsure or even failed investment because of the military, the proprietors showed readiness to part completely with it, as long as there was compensation; they were familiar with the land property business, as some of them had dealt with transactions over privatised ecclesiastical terrains already in the 1780s.[193] Thus, after several

[187] ASMI MGC 26, prefect of Agogna to the minister of interior, 31 October 1807.
[188] Bulferetti, Luraghi, *Agricoltura*, 14, 59.
[189] A. Barbero, *Storia del Piemonte. Dalla preistoria alla globalizzazione* (Turin, 2008), p.305.
[190] Ibid., p.379-80.
[191] ASMI MGC 26, prefect of Agogna to the minister of interior, 31 October 1807.
[192] Ibid.
[193] Alessandro Bonasegla, one of the landowners, bought up land for meadow usage from the religious order of the Conventuali della Misericordia in 1789. Società Storica Vigevanese, *Le antiche "corti" lombarde* (Vigevano, 1994), p.86.

attempts at asking the military to keep to their space, the landowners turned to the municipality to either persuade the commanders, or buy the plots of land around the square.[194] The vice-prefect of Vigevano deemed the purchase offer conveniently priced, with an option of exchanging those lands for other state-owned property elsewhere.[195] The military administration seemed less enthusiastic; in submitting the matter to the minister, the Genio office advised enlarging the drill ground only if it was too small for the manoeuvres, and only buy only portions of the surrounding fields.[196]

The principle of proportionality to the garrison's size also meant that, when the military had a suitable terrain that perfectly met the needs of the manoeuvres, it did its utmost to keep it. Discussing the matter of the Guard conscripts and their drill ground in Cantù, Fontanelli allowed the regiment's colonel to occupy three privately owned fields with the justification that educating the raw troops was the priority.[197] Even if a hasty occupation, before a survey was conducted, would lead to higher damage compensations, in the general's opinion it mattered more "che il Reggimento Coscritti vadi sottoposto allo sborso di una qualche piccola somma di denaro di quello che perdere dei mesi di tempo per l'istruzione."[198] Elsewhere, maintaining an exclusive claim to a drill ground meant blocking an avenue of profit for another branch of the state administration. In Trento, in 1811, the intendant of the royal domain received a private citizen's expression of interest in renting a vast state-owned meadow where the garrison had been holding its daily manoeuvres for the past three years, located in the agricultural *extra muros* neighbourhood of Centa not far from the castle.[199] The intendant tried to persuade the chief of the armed forces in the Alto Adige department, General Dembowski, arguing that the current rent stood at only 126.92.4 *lire*, while this unnamed citizen would pay 634.62.2 *lire*.[200] On the military side, he suggested the garrison use the castle garden instead, since the castle itself had become a barracks, and moreover, "il Prato in centa soggetto alle escrescenze dell'Adige specialmente nelle stagioni in cui si esercita la Truppa è diviso dal fiume, per cui si ha la communicazione col mezzo solo

[194] ASMI MGC 26, petition of Antonio Portaluppi, Vincenzo Portaluppi, Antonio Biffignardi and G. Alessandro Bonasegla to the podestà of Vigevano, 3 August 1807.
[195] ASMI MGC 26, prefect of Agogna to the minister of interior, 31 October 1807.
[196] ASMI MGC 26, report of the 4th ministerial division, 14 November 1807.
[197] ASMI MGC 26, Fontanelli to the minister of war, 22 April 1811.
[198] Ibid.
[199] ASMI MGC 26, royal domain intendant to General Dembowski, 12 April 1811.
[200] ASMI MGC 26, royal domain intendant to General Dembowski, 12 April 1811.

d'un ponte provvisorio, non sempre praticabile".[201] While referring to his superiors for a definitive answer,[202] Dembowski refused to give up the meadow, especially at the suggestion of swapping the "terrain très commode"[203] for the much smaller *place d'armes* in the castle, capable of accommodating no more than fifty men.[204] No other suitable terrain could be found around the city, so losing the Centa meadow would spell either the inability of performing the military exercises, or "des questions continuelles avec les autorités et les habitants".[205] The ministry of war sided with Dembowski and the meadow remained a drill ground,[206] but when the municipality tore down the bridge across the river Adige to rebuild it, the military was forced into the meadows of two private citizens.[207]

Like Fontanelli in Cantù, Dembowski, for all his tactful approach to his command in a newly annexed department fresh off the repression of the Tyrolean uprising,[208] did not hesitate to occupy the terrain first, and pass the landowners' claims for compensation on to the higher authorities later, with the underlying principle that the troops' exercises came first and foremost. The landowners were prominent citizens, particularly committed to the Napoleonic regime even. Gasparo Vigilio Bortolazzi, scion of a noble family, had commanded the National Guard of Trento in 1801-2,[209] while Tommaso Rungg became *podestà* of Trento in May 1812;[210] like the French *maires*, *podestà* were appointed by the government, unpaid but entrusted with powers that increased over time to the detriment of municipal councils.[211] Giving such powers to Tommaso Rungg was a safe choice according to the government, within the context of the Trentino region's incorporation into the Kingdom of Italy, an outcome that especially met the favour of the Italian urban élites, contributing to the formation of a

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[201] Ibid.
[202] ASMI MGC 26, Dembowski to Divisional General Bisson, 14 April 1811.
[203] Ibid.
[204] ASMI MGC 26, Dembowski to the royal doman intendant, 14 April 1811.
[205] ASMI MGC 26, Dembowski to Divisional General Bisson, 14 April 1811.
[206] ASMI MGC 26, minister of war to the general director of the royal domain, 1 May 1811.
[207] ASMI MGC 26, Dembowski to Bisson, 19 April 1811.
[208] S. Almini, "1811: un anno a Trento del comandante militare dell'Alto Adige (con l'appendice di una storia d'amore)", *Studi trentini - Storia*, 96/2 (2017), 399-427. On the insurrection, Broers, *Napoleon's other war*, 77-80.
[209] S. Weber, "La famiglia Bortolazzi: Il conte Bortolameo (1761-1850)", *Studi trentini di scienze storiche*, 36/3 (1957), 229-42.
[210] "Notizie interne", *Giornale italiano* (1 May 1812), p.3 col a.
[211] Pagano, *Comune di Milano*, 108-10. On the French municipal administration model: J. Dunne, "L'Empire au village: les pratiques et le personnel de l'administration communale dans l'Europe napoléonienne", in J.-C. Martin (ed.), *Napoléon et l'Europe* (Rennes, 2002), 45-54.

nationalist fault-line between Italian and German populace.[212] The occupation of the meadows did not effectively dent these supporters' consent to the regime, but their protests did not have an immediate effect either, for all that the ministry of war took due notice of them. The minister reassured Rungg and Bortolazzi that this arrangement was temporary, and the troops would retreat to their proper drill ground once the bridge was up again;[213] they would be compensated in case of damage, but the burden of proof fell on them ("s'ebbero la precauzione di farne rilevare regolare stima contraddittoria"[214]). Rungg and Bortolazzi renounced their claim to compensations precisely on grounds of the temporary character of the occupation,[215] for which the minister thanked their "generosa deliberazione" and "disinteresse a pro del militare servizio"[216]. Given the ministry's perpetual issues with paying up compensations, it might be that Rungg and Bortolazzi simply did not wish to start a drawn-out dispute of doubtful outcome. Nonetheless, the minister chose to see in their gesture a sign of patriotism, coming from the very kind of people the regime was keen on having on its side. Rungg and Bortolazzi were part of the consensus base in the capital city of a department that had recently seen a major uprising. The 1809 insurrection had received most of its support from the rural communes (German and Italian alike), threatened in their traditional ways of life by religious reforms and administrative novelties that, especially with regard to conscription, weighed heavily on the peasantry.[217] In Trento, patricians and public officials chose to wait and see through the regime changes that began with the first French occupation in 1796;[218] that does not mean coexistence with the foreign troops had been smooth, as fatal incidents of mutual dislike had happened and, at its core, public opinion remained hostile towards the French.[219] The gesture of Rungg and Bortolazzi, then, came at the end of a bloodstained road to the co-optation of Trentino into the Napoleonic system, favouring the armed forces that had made pacification possible.

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[212] L. Blanco, "Storia e identità culturale in una regione di confine: il Trentino-Alto Adige/Südtirol", *Scienza e politica*, 34 (2006), 123-6.
[213] ASMI MGC 26, minister of war to the prefect of Alto Adige, 4 May 1811.
[214] Ibid.
[215] ASMI MGC 26, prefect of Alto Adige to the minister of war, 20 June 1811.
[216] ASMI MGC 26, minister of war to the prefect of Alto Adige, 29 June 1811.
[217] Nubola, "Propaganda e fedeltà", p.159.
[218] Ibid., 152-8.
[219] Cecilia Nubola, "Gli eserciti francesi a Trento (1796-1801). Cronache e diari", in C. Nubola, A. Würgler (eds.), *Ballare con il nemico? Reazioni all'espansione francese in Europa tra entusiasmo e resistenza (1792-1815)* (Bologna/Berlin, 2010), 195-214.

Conclusion

The Napoleonic military use of land had precedents in the training camp terrains rented out to 18th century armies, with a long-term impact on the land to optimise it for military exercises. Drill grounds for garrisons in the Republic/Kingdom of Italy followed similar patterns, sustained by the need to train new intakes of conscripts and keep the rank-and-file from slacking off. The army encroached upon privately owned land, which in turn was a result of the landowning class expansion deriving from the sale of ex-Church property. Thus, the ministry of war negotiated the military use of land with the "masses of granite" on which support for the Napoleonic regime was supposed to rest. The trade-off for the landowners was often a loss: prolonged military use damaged the terrains to the point of unproductiveness, while it proved difficult to prevent the soldiers from trespassing outside the drill ground, or the civilian spectators from trampling all over nearby fields. Property rights were respected in that the terrains were not requisitioned but leased, allowing the ministry to avoid paying taxes on state-owned sites. This practice continued despite the landowners' complaints that the ministry and the military violated the Code Napoleon. Overall, drill grounds were too small to pose a fatal threat to the wealth of most landowners, therefore not seriously hampering the policy of *ralliement*. However limited in scope, this fault-line ran between two core tenets of the Napoleonic state: army and private property. The ministry of war prioritised the former over the latter, however, without any presumption of military moral superiority over civilians,[220] but rather in a logistics-minded outlook of allocating spatial resources. In doing so, the ministry tried to find compromise solutions between the demands of proprietors and commanders, while adhering to its own money-saving *modus operandi*.

[220] Bell, *First total war*, p.12.

Conclusion

The last phases of the Napoleonic Wars, between late 1813 and the spring of 1814, made the Kingdom of Italy a war zone again. The Austrian advanced into the ex-Venetian territories first, worsening the economic crisis there[1] and bringing a fresh stream of troops. A memoirist from Friuli recalled the Austrian troops marching through the small town of San Daniele "a più reggimenti a piene strade", arrogant and overbearing due to the language barrier and the lack of familiarity between the "Germans" and local populace, compared to the French, who had been billeted there before the retreat.[2] The end of the Napoleonic Wars did not free the Kingdom of Italy from military presence, even as the Congress of Vienna returned its territories to their pre-Napoleonic owners. According to John Rath's classic study of the provisional regime in 1814-'15, barracksing in spring 1814 was insufficient for the Austrians as long as the Italian troops occupied the barracks.[3] In Milan and its surroundings, about 6000 troops and 800-900 officers (plus their servants and horses) were billeted, eliciting complaints about the unfair repartition of the billets overburdening certain areas, with a marked urban-rural divide in favour of the city.[4] The situation improved when the Austrian high command in Italy scaled the army down to 70,000 men and forbade troop billeting;[5] as under the late Napoleonic kingdom, municipalities were to supply barracks, negotiating contracts if necessary, through municipal taxes or funding from the treasury.[6] Uncertain terms of service after the abolition of the Italian regulations, however, perpetuated problems of supply wastage and damage compensation when troops moved in and out of barracks, especially when the army mobilised again in the Hundred Days.[7] In the 1820s-'30s, the military interventions of the Holy Alliance funnelled troops from the Austrian-held Kingdom of Lombardy-Venetia to central and southern Italy, the hotbeds of *Carbonari* uprisings.[8]

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[1] R.J. Rath, "The Habsburgs and the Great Depression in Lombardy-Venetia, 1814-18", *The Journal of Modern History*, 13/3 (1941), 305-320.
[2] Pieri, *Dominio napoleonico*, p.374.
[3] Rath, *Provisional Austrian regime,* p.110.
[4] Ibid., 110-2.
[5] Ibid. p.112.
[6] Ibid.
[7] ASMN PM 669, podestà of Mantua to the prefect of Mincio, 29 April 1815, 15 August 1815.
[8] J.A. Davis, *Naples and Napoleon. Southern Italy and the European revolutions, 1780-1860* (Oxford, 2006), 295-314. D. Laven, "The age of Restoration", in J.A. Davies (ed.), *Italy in the Nineteenth Century* (Oxford, 2000), p.60.

The route ran along the line of Napoleonic *étapes* in the Duchy of Modena and Papal Romagna, heading south across the Apennines towards Tuscany.[9] Not only had this been a military route in the Napoleonic itineraries; the barracks, too, returned to active service. In Bologna, a main hub of transit for the Austrian contingents marching to the Kingdom of Naples and back, the troops used the same barracks that had accommodated the Napoleonic troops.[10]

The continuous presence of troops and the threat of occupation accompanied the Italian states throughout the nineteenth century. It ensured the survival of infrastructures and procedures for barracksing that had received the first powerful stimulus of the modern age in the Napoleonic era. This thesis has explored how the Kingdom of Italy faced the challenge of military accommodation, as part of an integrated empire optimising space for military mobility and replicating its administrative bodies across a network of annexed and satellite states. Providing accommodation was an important part of the kingdom's logistical effort to procure and manage resources, in terms of supplies, infrastructures, information, administrative and custodial staff. Logistics is central to understanding mobilisation for total war, a concept that, in its application by David Bell to the Napoleonic empire, has instead been framed through the prisms of violence, radicalisation, and militarism intended as the perceived superiority of the military over civilian society.[11] The changing dynamics of political culture articulating such a radicalisation are important to understand, but the policies they produced on the field should not be marginalised by discourse analysis, which is why the approach proposed by Bell becomes problematic for explaining policies and politics. Moreover, as historiography turns to the wider extent of the empire and the trajectories of imperial agents,[12] the Franco-centrism (and occasional German-centrism) of the total war argument seems in need of redressing. This case study of the Kingdom of Italy has tackled the debate on total war by re-inserting logistics into the framework. Logistics and administration show the practical complexity, as well as the myriad contingent factors, of

[9] M. Gavelli, "Il transito delle truppe austriache nelle terre bolognesi", Storia e memoria di Bologna, https://www.storiaememoriadibologna.it/il-transito-delle-truppe-austriache-nelle-terre-bo-348-evento (14 September 2020).

[10] "1821 – Gli Imperiali verso Napoli", https://www.bibliotecasalaborsa.it/cronologia/bologna/1821/gli_imperiali_verso_napoli (14 September 2020). Compare with the lists of preserved and dismissed barracks in "Decreto relativo alle caserme", 29 March 1806.

[11] Bell, *First total war*.

[12] Lignereux, *Servir Napoléon*; *Les impériaux*.

funnelling resources for the war effort in a centralised state. Thus, this thesis adds evidence to analyses of the Napoleonic administrative monarchy, spanning from Stuart Woolf's synthesis,[13] which challenges and nuances the notions of strong state centralisation, as the works of Gavin Daly and Marie-Cécile Thoral have done for the departmental administrations.[14] The militarisation of army support services is another long-held belief this thesis counters. The literature in this regard is still scattered and limited to single case studies,[15] but they point toward a relative similarity to the conclusions of historiography on civilian administration, arguing that militarisation entailed neither a radical change in practices and personnel, nor a break with the private sector.

Logistics responded to a fundamental shift in the geopolitics of northern Italy. Realising a long-standing goal of grand strategy, the French wrestled this area from Austrian control, securing the south-eastern borders of *la vieille France* and gaining a springboard towards the Habsburg hereditary lands and into the Mediterranean. During the coalition wars against Napoleon, the Cisalpine/Italian Republic/Kingdom became again a hub of military transit, in reverse from its traditional directions of traffic, subject to the tides of campaigns and conscription. The length and intensity of the conflict, expressed in recruitment through yearly mass drafting, added weight to the long-term issue of military accommodation, which the pre-Napoleonic Italian states had faced throughout the early modern military revolution and the growth of standing armies. The Lombard heartland of the kingdom, ruled by the Spanish crown until 1714, had been a hub of military corridors as part of the Spanish Road. The Habsburg-French conflicts, spanning from 16th to mid-18th century, meant constant military presence, and put army accommodation at the crux of political interactions between territorial representative bodies and the court. The balance of powers in Italy, following the end of the War of Austrian Succession in 1748, brought a half-century of peace in the peninsula. The Napoleonic Wars then shattered this peacetime balance, redesigning the geopolitical landscape constantly and sometimes permanently, creating new institutions, and forcing local administrations, unused to managing large armies, to learn or relearn relevant

[13] Woolf, *Napoleon's integration*.
[14] Daly, *Inside Napoleonic France*. M.-C. Thoral, *L'émergence du pouvoir local: le département de l'Isère face à la centralisation napoléonienne (1800-1837)* (Rennes, 2010).
[15] Brun, "Le cheval dans la Grande Armée". Renard, "La Grande Armée et les Juifs". Roger, "Les équipages militaires".

skills in a context of political flux and socio-economic hardships.

To support the military mobility that Napoleonic warfare demanded, information flow through the administrations was paramount. Troop itineraries along the lines of *étapes* that crisscrossed the Kingdom of Italy passed incessantly through the French and Italian ministries of war, and down to the war commissariat, the prefectures, the municipalities, and the barracks supplies contractors. The risk of communication breakdowns was high; short notice easily resulted in supply shortages that forced billeting or requisitions upon the unfortunate populace. Managing information and acting to keep the services running required skilful clerical staff at the ministry in Milan, and on site. Two recurring themes have emerged from this analysis of barracks administration. Firstly, the personnel selection, dependent on non-standardised processes to promote merit and talent. This left ample room for patronage and deep-seated Ancien Régime modes of expressing relation with power, even while expertise and honesty rose to prominence as the skills to emphasise in the policy context of amalgam, and markers of merit for which to expect a reward. Secondly, the role of local administrations, on which regulations increasingly offloaded the maintenance and restocking of barracks. The logistical importance of communes, particularly visible in the procurement of accommodation, offers a background to the similar role they played in the Restoration[16] and which general histories of logistics have completely overlooked.[17] Therefore, this thesis underscores the logistical importance of civil administration on the "ground zero" of territories, adding to studies that have analysed their role in the management of environmental resources[18] and the monitoring of public order.[19]

The Italian ministry of war capitalised on the expertise of the cadres who had enacted the reforms of Emperor Joseph II, and on the learning process that employees underwent from 1796 onwards. The trend during the Kingdom of Italy was one of growing professionalism and de-politicisation of office work, emphasising technical skills over *civisme* but retaining strong

[16] F. Botti, "La caserma italiana nei primi anni dell'esercito unitario (1861-1870): infrastrutture, disciplina, benessere, rapporti con l'esterno", in Antonelli (ed.), *Esercito e città*, i, 415-6.
[17] Van Creveld, *Supplying war*, 75-81. Lynn, "Modern Introduction", in Lynn (ed.), *Feeding Mars*, 183-9.
[18] M.-C. Thoral, "The limits of centralized administration in flood control measures in Isère from 1800 to the end of the 1830s", *Revue de géographie alpine*, 93/3 (2005), 119-28.
[19] M.-C. Thoral, "Les acteurs administratifs de la résolution des conflits sociopolitiques. Le cas de Grenoble, du Consulat à la monarchie de Juillet", in J. Caron, F. Chauvaud, E. Fureix, J. Luc (eds.), *Entre violence et conciliation: La résolution des conflits sociopolitiques en Europe au XIXe siècle* (Rennes, 2008), 139-49.

elements of patronage linked to the ministries in charge; attempts at standardising appointment criteria (such as vetting upper-level clerks by educational qualifications) were not enacted. The Italian ministry of war makes for an interesting parallel to the French war ministries, sharing with them the fundamental dilemma of a staunchly vertical organisation whose highest chief (Napoleon himself in France, Viceroy Eugène de Beauharnais in Italy) was often absent on campaign, complicating the executive role of the ministry. As Clive Church noted, the demands that organising the war placed on the administration were such that staff constantly swelled, and "[t]he larger the administration, the slower the correspondence and the greater the autonomy of the officials involved tended to be."[20]

On site, the war administration branch directly responsible for invigilating over barracks was the war commissariat; *commissaires* headed the peripheral staff of inspectors and custodians who relayed information on the state of supplies, damages, and troop movements in and out of barracks. To reinforce the undermanned ranks of the *commissaires*, the government had to dilute administrative power among external personnel, appointing mayors and prefects as surrogate *commissaires* and leading to a proliferation of adjunct-*commissaires*. At the most immediate level of contact with the troops, the barracks needed custodial staff, unstudied thus far: inspectors, sub-inspectors, *casermieri*, custodians and their networks of temporary unskilled workers. They were the first point of contact and control over troops, supplies and buildings, with a view of containing abuses and saving public money, managing materiel locally, updating and relaying information to the war commissariat and the municipal offices. Their recruitment and professionalization was a complex process, reflecting the shared control of barracks administration between the ministry of war, the supply contractors, and peripheral institutions (municipalities, prefectures). The analysis of their careers and petitions show their professional background; often demobilised military personnel, or employees continuing uninterrupted through regime changes, as well as their strategies of self-representation and their relationship with the state. Candidates and long-standing employees to barracks service posts showed awareness of the qualities and guarantees the government sought; their validation passed through channels of patronage, which had to emphasise competence and suitability for a post. The Napoleonic notions of talent, merit and professionalism, thus, remained

[20] Church, *Revolution and red tape*, p.272.

heavily imbued with Ancien Régime practices, which the ministry tolerated as long as the service functioned well, even in the face of militarisation as the *casermieri* were incorporated in the Genio through standardised recruitment by examination.

The procurement of barracks supplies had two purposes: to provide supplies of acceptable quality without being expensive for the state, and to avoid overreliance on requisitioning, unsustainable in the long run. It took place in a mixed private-public regime, firmly entrenched in the perspective of the contractor state, the partnership of public offices with private actors to tap resources and credit that the state alone could not mobilise.[21] Connecting exhaustive works on revolutionary and Directorial France[22] and Napoleonic Italy,[23] this thesis further stresses the dependency of the logistical services on the private sector, despite the growing drive towards public control of the military that, concomitant with the rise of national conscript armies, changed attitudes on military enterprise.[24] The barracksing contracts were not a success story. The two country-wide general contracts for the supply of garrison barracks struggled to provide an acceptable service, penalised at every step by a business landscape riven with high perceived corruption and a failure of competition, within the political, financial and military élites, to stimulate service quality. As the Milanese commercial milieu and its sub-contractors adapted quickly to diversify business activities and profit from the markets of army supply, the state's frail creditworthiness and limited ability to exert surveillance further disincentivised honest business practices. The demands of the military and the need to keep up with troop movements strained the allocation capacity of the contractor companies, often leading back to requisitions that targeted such important, expensive goods as furniture and bed linen, stoking public opinion against the contractors. Conversely, the state could not afford a truly centralised management, deeming it too expensive, and unresponsive in the critical times of campaign. The result was an offloading of the barracks supply service for garrisons to the municipalities, already tasked with accommodating the troops in transit and the Gendarmerie.

Devolution to municipalities was not a one-way process. Infrastructural

[21] R. Harding, S. Solbes Ferri, "Introduction", in Harding, Solbes Ferri (eds.), *The contractor state and its implications*, p.9.
[22] Brown, *War*; "Discredited regime".
[23] Levati, *Buona azienda*.
[24] Parrott, *Business of war*, 317-26.

maintenance was a shared task between the Genio and the municipalities, investing the former with major repairs and the latter with ordinary maintenance, co-opting engineers working in the prefecture offices, or just any civilian engineer available, to make up for the shortage in military engineers. This evidence falls within the participative aspects of Napoleonic governance, buttressing a growing but still undermanned administrative body,[25] an aspect which manifested most evidently in the municipal administrations, as Isser Woloch, Michael Rowe and John Dunne have shown[26] when observing more closely the "void" by which an older work by Jean Tulard described the municipal institutions.[27] "Void" and "anarchy"[28] might have been the rule at this level of administration in the eyes of a central government often struggling to keep its grip tight, but this void teemed with informal practices to get around the loss of representative organs, exert influence, and work out compromises.[29] Studying military accommodation sheds more light on municipal responsiveness to mobilisation, beyond conscription operations.

Management of spatial and infrastructural resources was crucial to ensure the barracks were up to construction and habitability standards for the prevention of diseases and desertion, suggesting a higher attention to the troops' welfare than the Napoleonic war administration is usually credited with. Threats to safety came from multiple angles: inclement and unhealthy climate, earthquakes, prolonged neglect due to scarce ministerial funding or the Genio and the municipalities squabbling among themselves to the point of being unable to attract workforce, and the troops' wear-and-tear effect. Making barracks desertion-proof was especially important for a conscript army, regularly swelling up the departmental and regimental depots in garrison cities; preventive measures, however, had little impact on infrastructures, at best adding bars to the ground-floor windows. The authorities were well aware that conscription was unpopular, and creating too many similarities between barracks and prisons was hardly a good

[25] Thoral, "Limits of centralized administration", p.127.
[26] J. Dunne, "Napoleon's 'mayoral problem': Aspects of state-community relations in post-revolutionary France", *Modern & Contemporary France*, 8/4 (2000), 479-91. Rowe, *From Reich*. I. Woloch, *The new regime. Transformations of the French civic order, 1789-1820s* (New York, 1994).
[27] J. Tulard, *La vita quotidiana in Francia ai tempi di Napoleone*, tr. M.N. Novelli (Milan, 1984), p.86.
[28] Tulard, *Napoléon et 40 millions*, chapter 25.
[29] A. Giovanazzi, "La Provincia in Stato. Istituzioni locali e rappresentanza informale nell'Impero napoleonico. Un approccio comparativo tra Francia e Regno d'Italia", in G. Ambrosino, L. De Nardi (eds.), *Imperial. Il ruolo della rappresentanza politica informale nella costruzione e nello sviluppo delle entità statuali (XV-XXI secolo)* (Verona/Bolzano, 2017), 175-92.

advertisement. Rather, they sought practical solutions further upstream, by potentiating police organs and surveillance during transits and around the buildings.

The Italian government recognised the mass barracksing drive in the kingdom as a novelty in military accommodation, although fully continuous to trends begun in the 18th century, when facilitating mobility became the key logistical feature.[30] In the face of the declining importance of fortifications, Katherine Aaslestad has characterised the Napoleonic era as one of "modern military urbanism", hinging less on infrastructures and more on civic engagement.[31] The underlying argument is that looking at infrastructures tells "little on the experience of war",[32] but this view risks dismissing the effect of material conditions on that very experience. In their turn, material conditions were shaped by logistical constraints and solutions. One such solution was the growth of urban military patrimony. The Napoleonic Italian government seldom built brand-new barracks but rather adapted extant buildings, carving out space for company dormitories and stables, as well as blocking avenues to the outside that deserters could use to escape. Former religious houses were the most frequent choice, taking advantage of the monastic suppressions that had led to the nationalisation and sale of Church property as *beni nazionali*, from which the bourgeois and aristocratic élites most benefited, accumulating capital through land purchases.[33] Historiography has highlighted the revenue-generating role of this transfer of property, as the sales of *beni nazionali* had the unenviable mission of financing public debt and state expenditure that war conditioned heavily,[34] and the social, cultural and political ramifications of the strife between Church and state.[35] Looking at the repurposing of religious houses into barracks allows us to pick up from after the confiscation and observe how the buildings were transformed to meet secular principles of public usefulness. This theme was crucial to Napoleonic administration, but it is usually analysed only with regard to religious orders engaging in care work

[30] Dattero, *Soldati a Milano*, p.138.
[31] K. Aaslestad, "Cities and war: Modern military urbanism in Hamburg and Leipzig during the Napoleonic Era", *German History*, 35/3 (2017), 381-402.
[32] Ibid., p.384.
[33] C. Capra, "Nobili, notabili, élites: dal modello francese al caso italiano", *Quaderni storici*, 13/37 (1978), p.28.
[34] A. Cova, "La vendita dei beni nazionali in Lombardia durante la prima e la seconda Repubblica cisalpina (1796-1802)", *Economia e storia*, 3/4 (1963), 355-412. Marcelli, *Vendita dei beni nazionali*. I. Pederzani, *Un ministero per il culto. Giovanni Bovara e la riforma della Chiesa in età napoleonica* (Milan, 2002).
[35] Broers, *Politics and religion*, 125-45.

and education,[36] leaving the buildings aside. Although cheap and relatively functional for army accommodation, religious houses posed unique structural problems; traditional Catholic indoor burials threatened floor stability and the health of the soldiers, in the medical understanding of the era, by emitting noxious odours. Artworks and valuable materials in former religious houses had to be preserved, or sold for money to reinvest in repairs.

Where civilians and soldiers were forced to live together, barracks history allows us to nuance the total war criterion of a blurred combatant/non-combatant and military/civilian divide.[37] Rather than conjoining the army and civil society into one nation in arms, or sealing both off from each other, barracks and billets emerge as contact zones where aggregation, separation and space usage were redefined constantly, shaped by the needs of logistics and the agency of dwellers (military and civilian alike). These findings correct the more oppositional interpretation of civil-military relations and the features of Napoleonic militarism that Bell outlined,[38] and nuance the arguments for militarisation of civilian society proposed by Jean-Paul Bertaud.[39] Instilling discipline, military culture and *esprit de corps* in the conscript regiments, for one, required separation within the army, while the unwritten rules of sociability regulated inter-regimental aggregation. Officers refused to have their units share barracks with others, in order to prevent indiscipline deriving from competition over spaces and supplies; moreover, keeping one unit as tight-knit as possible in one accommodation allowed to form up more quickly and safely. This was especially true for Gendarmes and National Guards, the corps taking care of public order.

Civilians found their way into barracks with relative ease. Selling goods to the soldiers was a profitable business for traders working close to or even within barracks, attracting sharp competition for shop-keeping space in the massive, money-spinning Foro Bonaparte in Milan, continuing a tradition of profit from the garrison castle ongoing since the Austrian rule, which the change of regime and military culture did not budge. The government was also willing to rent or sell barracks rooms to entrepreneurs who could generate revenue, on the incontestable condition that the military did not need and did not use the space. Utilitarian principles also inspired the charitable permissiveness towards local poor and stranded army wives to

[36] Pederzani, *Ministero per il culto*, 252-3.
[37] Thoral, *From Valmy*, p.3.
[38] Bell, *First total war*, 244-8.
[39] Bertaud, *Quand les enfants*.

reside in barracks, sometimes on the condition that they carried out small maintenance works, although these people's position was more slippery and often regulated informally.

Despite the overall push towards barracksing and the vested interest of people, government and military institutions in barracksing rather than billeting, the latter persisted, magnifying through frequency and intensity the discomforts it had always brought, but with a few conceptual differences. Firstly, it fell during a time of changing attitudes towards the home,[40] emphasising privacy and the feminisation of the domestic space; connecting history of domesticity to military history has proved to be a useful avenue of analysis in John McCurdy's recent research on the opposition to billeting in pre-revolutionary America.[41] Secondly, billeting took place in a historical conjuncture that, for the sake of revolutionary egalitarian principles, had formally eliminated the maze of exemptions and privileges that used to shield certain classes of citizens, albeit often just in theory. Since the only option left to homeowners was to lobby the authorities, they deployed a wide array of negotiation tactics, exploiting networks of influence and legal loopholes. Despite the obvious discomforts billeting created, it did not trigger revolts like conscription and taxation, the two main socio-economic war-related grievances of the Napoleonic regime. The reasons for that bear further investigation, but this thesis suggests that improved policing (especially easier in urban settings), fear of armed repression, a degree of familiarity developing between troop and hosts, and a tradition-bound shared understanding of billeting as an obligation to be negotiated away rather than rebelled against, all contributed to this outcome.

Officers showed a marked preference for billets over being barracksed in residential halls, which remained few and far-between across the kingdom. While inhabitants attempted to protect their domestic privacy, officers also sought it for themselves, to work unimpeded and live in as much comfort as possible. This outlook often degenerated into bullying their hosts, but it also made for reasonably peaceful cohabitation, as long as there was internal separation of living spaces. Troop billeting, on the other hand, was a quintessential scourge of wartime and an unfortunate consequence of logistical shortcomings the Napoleonic war administrations could never eradicate, leading to stridently uneven living conditions depending on local

[40] Sarti, *Vita di casa*, 178-83.
[41] McCurdy, *Quarters*, p.55.

resources.[42] Frequent troop transits with short-term warning overwhelmed barracks in *lieux d'étape*, during garrison changes or draft operations, and billeting was the only way to put a roof over the heads of soldiers and horses. The inhabitants' enduring fear was of being evicted, robbed, or having their cottage industry practices disrupted. Billeting fed into a wider context of uneasy civil-military relations, marked by mutual dislike, outbursts of violence, and the deviation of resources towards the military that had its foremost examples in requisitions[43] and foraging, a time-honoured micro-logistical scheme which overlapped easily with looting.[44] Whether they involved violence or not, early modern requisitions overlapped with forms of negotiation to tap into as many local resources as possible;[45] in this sense, it is possible to view the threat of billeting as a blunt negotiation tool from the military to the municipalities and the prefectures, so that they would hurry with preparing barracks. This shows how the new model of participatory warfare, which affected the institutional response to conflict and occupation, as recent historiography has shown for the German states,[46] relied on early modern methods for implementation.

Somewhat paradoxically for the era that heralded the national army as the benchmark for modern military institutions,[47] the Napoleonic regime did not treat barracks as "schools of the nation", a mission with which they were invested in conscription countries since the late 19th century[48] and until well after the Second World War.[49] The training that forged soldiers out of draftees took place on garrison drill grounds, in addition to the camps for yearly large-scale manoeuvres that hoped to replicate the success of the camp of Boulogne. There was continuity with the Ancien Régime in this military encroachment into open space, optimising the land for military use. This created an unexpected problem, at the crux of basing consensus to the Napoleonic regime in the land-owning classes. Drill ground terrains were often rented from private citizens, attempting to profit off the least productive parts of their property; however, drills reduced the soil to unproductiveness. It was also difficult to enforce respect of boundaries and

[42] Morvan, *Le soldat*, i, p.398
[43] Tulard, *Vita quotidiana*, 138-42.
[44] Duffy, *Military experience*, p.123. Forrest, *Conscripts*, p.183.
[45] Wilson, *Europe's tragedy*, 834-5.
[46] Hewitson, "Princes' wars", p.489.
[47] Parrott, *Business of war*, p.2. Rothenberg, *Napoleonic Wars*, p.27.
[48] Frevert, *Nation in barracks*, 170-82. Roynette, *Bons pour le service*, p. 188.
[49] D. Rizzo, *Vita di caserma. Autorità e relazioni nell'esercito italiano del secondo dopoguerra* (Rome, 2013).

prevent troops from trespassing into productive surrounding areas. The seasonality of usage pitted the military and agricultural calendar against each other, as sowing and manoeuvres began in spring. In the difficult economic conjuncture created by war and the Continental Blockade, the damages that manoeuvres caused to the main source of wealth in the kingdom, coupled with rising municipal land taxes, were a remarkable loss for proprietors, and a blatant violation of the right to property that the Code Napoleon enshrined. This adds a layer of complexity to historiography on landed property in Lombardy during the long 19th century, focussing on the rise of agrarian capitalism and the consolidation of the land-owning élites,[50] in a perspective that only considers war as a set of background socioeconomic conditions. The matter of drill grounds shows an instance where army needs and agrarian capitalism, which we can think of as epitomising militarism on one side and civil pre-eminence on the other, had to directly jostle against each other for a difficult compromise. The ministry of war did its best to negotiate with the proprietors, but the last word ultimately had to go to the military needs. The demand for trained regiments was incessant, and so was training, which filled the garrison lives of troops and officers in a gruelling routine that made it even more important to have clean, healthy, habitable barracks to come back to.

Drills were not primarily propagandistic events, and were not invested with the ritual significance of parades, reviews and public festivals, but they did attract an audience and held it. In doing so, they contributed to establish military culture as a fact of daily life for civilians (even critics of the new regime), with less pomp than public festivals, which form the main interest of literature on this type of propaganda and the civilian experience thereof.[51] The publicity of the drills may indicate a certain level of civilian scrutiny on the military, compelling commanders to mind their behaviour towards the soldiers in order to avoid reflecting poorly on military life, although further research is needed to confirm this hypothesis. With more certainty, evidence has shown that even the civilian cultural consumption of drills had a logistical dimension; redesigns of the manoeuvre areas accounted for the

[50] A. Cova, "Proprietà ecclesiastica, proprietà nobiliare, proprietà borghese: i cambiamenti tra il 1796 e il 1814", in S. Zaninelli (ed.), *La proprietà fondiaria in Lombardia dal catasto teresiano all'età napoleonica* (Milan, 1986), 224-63. C. Zaghi, "Proprietà e classe dirigente nell'Italia giacobina e napoleonica", in N. Raponi (ed.), *Dagli stati preunitari d'antico regime all'unificazione* (Bologna, 1981), 257-94. R. Zangheri, "Gli anni francesi in Italia: Le nuove condizioni della proprietà", *Studi Storici*, 20/1 (1979), 5-26.

[51] Bertaud, *Quand les enfants*. A. Forrest, "Propaganda and the Legitimation of Power in Napoleonic France", *French History*, 18/4 (2004), 435-8.

presence of spectators, so that their trespassing into private terrains did not add any more damage to that of troop trespasses. In the context of negotiations and contracts over the military and agricultural usage of the terrains and the fault-line they dug between the two pillars of the Napoleonic regime – army and property – even such details on a microscopic scale show the importance of not divesting logistics from analyses of military culture tending towards the paradigms of militarism and total war.

Ultimately, the Napoleonic barracksing drive in the Kingdom of Italy was an important part of the massive logistical response to an influx of highly mobile troops, which struck the Italian states for a long time at high intensity, after a similarly unusual long and "intense" peninsular peace. This experience points to the relativity of perception that shapes the "totality" of a war.[52] Logistical response accelerated long-term trends but faced them with early modern means, which would stay so throughout the smaller-scale armed interventions that punctuated the Restoration. An obvious limit of this investigation is the lack of a comparative analysis of military accommodation and its supply system in France and the rest of the inner empire. This would highlight similarities and differences – in legislation, administration, supply business landscape, barracks real estate, climate and healthiness, attitudes toward billeting vis-à-vis domestic conditions, urban and rural settings – across a variety of regional contexts, facing the same logistical challenge, albeit with different levels of pressure depending on the flows of army itineraries. Studies on public works in Rome, for example, show that barracks were part of the urban development policies carried out by prefect Tournon in the 1810s, sharing with the Kingdom of Italy the reuse of ex-religious houses and the intermittent pace of adaptation works, due to funding shortages.[53] A more in-depth look would assess these features against the tense political situation in the annexed Papal States derailing *ralliement*,[54] and the legacy of Ancien Régime barracksing interventions[55] in a relatively less militarised state. In Piedmont, the Napoleonic regime incorporated a standing army with a recently potentiated patrimony of barracks,[56] whose more efficient and better-financed upkeep under the

[52] Wilson, "Was the Thirty Years War".
[53] C. Nardi, "La prefettura romana e la politica napoleonica dei lavori pubblici (1811-1813)", *Mélanges de l'École française de Rome*, 113/1 (2001), 349-67.
[54] Grab, *Transformation of Europe*, p.172.
[55] P. Alpino, G. Tarantino, "La caserma Giacomo Acqua", *Notiziario storico dell'Arma dei Carabinieri*, 5/3 (2018), p.38.
[56] Loriga, *Soldati*.

Savoyard monarchy was bitterly remarked upon in Vigevano.[57] The case of Rome shows this problem was not limited to the Italian kingdom. In France, plans to make garrison cities financially self-sustaining through the excise duties were not failsafe. Still, the basic common notion that a garrison meant profit persisted across the municipal councils of 19th century Europe[58] and beyond, as reflected in the preoccupation over the economic impact of American military base closures at the end of the Cold War.[59]

In order to function with some semblance of efficiency, Napoleonic military accommodation had to make a wide array of interests and services converge, not so much by blurring the civilian-military divide under the aegis of state control, as by blending old practices into the new institutions. The logistical constraints of mobilisation influenced the experience of the war for all the people involved in providing those services; the men at the end of the supply chain deserve to have the last word on it. One conscript had a "miserable" time on the way to his depot in Metz, sleeping on straw at almost every *lieu d'étape*.[60] Another joyfully ate to his heart's content in his billet at Stettin in summer 1812, wishing he could just stay in this cosy garrison; as of November, this man had gone missing in Russia.[61]

[57] ASNO PA 1049, municipality of Vigevano to the government commissar, 27 February 1802.
[58] L. Cole, *Military culture and popular patriotism in late imperial Austria* (Oxford, 2014), 208-9. Botti, "La caserma", p.423. Roynette, *Bons pour le service*, 163-4.
[59] T.K. Bradshaw, "Communities not fazed. Why military base closures may not be catastrophic", *Journal of the American Planning Association*, 65/2 (1999), 193-206.
[60] B. Wilkin, R. Wilkin, *Fighting with Napoleon. French soldiers' letters, 1799-1815* (Barnsley, 2015), ePub edition, chapter 1, section "The journey to the regiment", par. 21.
[61] B. Wilkin, R. Wilkin, *Lettres de grognards. La Grande Armée en campagne* (Paris, 2019), ePub edition, n.134, Hubert Kalf to his parents, 23 June 1812.

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