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# Democratisation and the British Empire

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**ABSTRACT**

This article responds to the statistically established finding in democratisation studies that British rule seems to have been good for the survival of democracy in its former empire, and that the longer a nation spent under British rule, the likelier it is to have sustained democracy since independence. This is a finding which puzzles political scientists because they think of democracy and empire as opposites. The article considers the uses made of democratic innovation by the British and the responses anti-colonial nationalists made to the offer to 'lead them to democracy'. It places democracy and empire in a different, more complex relationship. It also considers the contribution of anti-colonial protest to the working of democracy.

**KEYWORDS**

Empire; Great Britain; democracy; democratisation; anti-colonialism; protest



It has only been recently that attempts have been made to decolonise the concept of democracy. Some writers have suggested that democracy has a neglected or suppressed pre-history in countries that were colonised, although on closer inspection some of the examples they provide are arguably instances of consultative decision-making and collective deliberation rather than popular rule.[1] Democratic theory, others have proposed, has taken certain contingent features of the western societies where democracy was first established to be immutable preconditions of its success. However, democracy has flourished in some places in spite of the lack of these preconditions. India – the main example – has shown how democracy can not only survive but thrive in the absence of western-type civil society, secularism, and equality of social status. India is neither a 'western' democracy, nor a 'failed' democracy, nor even a 'developing' democracy. It just has a workable but different system of popular self-government.[2]

During the colonial era, however, democracy was generally believed, by coloniser and colonised alike, to be a western invention and export. The point at issue was its suitability for the colonised world. To understand its relationship with empire, we have to start by examining the complex use that imperialists made use of democratic devices and innovations. After doing so, I will then examine how anti-colonial nationalists responded to the perverse offer of

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imperialism to 'lead them to democracy', before turning to consider how their anti-colonialism, if not their nationalism, fostered a different set of democratic virtues, above all those concerned with protest, which have been under-developed in the British system.

## Q1 Democracy and Empire: The Puzzle

The idea that empire could be a source of democracy now seems counter-intuitive. If democracy is self-government, imperialism is surely its opposite: government by someone else. Democracy entails free, open, and competitive election. But in much of their empire – and arguably wherever they could since direct rule was so expensive and alienating – the British ruled indirectly through traditional, undemocratic authorities.[3] In some places, they supported personal rule by princes, emirs, sheikhs, and sultans, overriding them only in the most egregious cases of misrule. They sometimes urged such rulers to consult their subjects, but hardly ever to make themselves accountable to them. True, where they ruled directly themselves, the British established representative councils, but they stocked them with government officials and their nominees as well as elected members. Even where they conceded elected majorities to these councils, they bolted more conservative upper chambers on top, or locked them into federations designed to slow them down.

The colonial franchise, where it existed, was scarcely democratic. It used not only the gender, property, and residential qualifications employed in Britain before 1928, but also racial tests either explicitly, or implicitly through literacy or educational qualifications. Special electoral rolls and plural voting overweighted the votes of the white communities. Compliant candidates and parties were sponsored by officials, while the less compliant were hampered. The underpinnings of democracy – mass education, a free press, and freedom of association – were policed for political content and subjected to censorship, bans, and prosecutions.

Above all, the British empire failed the most basic democratic test: *responsibility*. Colonial constitutions gave the unelected executive reserve powers to legislate alone 'in council', regardless of the legislature. The acts of the legislature were subject to executive ratification. The legislature could neither remove the executive, nor hold it properly to account. In some cases, it was not even permitted to ask it questions.[4] Elections, where held, did not alter who governed, but only who represented the colonised. Colonial civil services, mostly closed to the colonised at the higher levels, saw little need to explain themselves, or even to be civil, to those they governed.

Some British democrats, such as J.A. Hobson, worried that these undemocratic practices might poison the liberty tree at home, by empowering those hostile to democracy – imperial proconsuls, financiers, the military, and the aristocracy.[5] But if anything, the opposite was true. Empire overseas helped to define

and bolster democracy (at least for some) at home. From the start, democracy has been defined by those that it excludes: slaves and foreigners in ancient Greece; 'barbarians' in early modernity; women more or less anywhere before the late nineteenth century; and the migrants, asylum seekers, and homeless of the present day. In the modern history of British democratisation, colonised 'others' were the largest defining exclusion. J. S. Mill's liberty and responsible government were *by definition* not (or not *yet*) for 'barbarians' or the uncivilised.[6] Debates on the extension of the domestic franchise defined the political nation against colonised others.[7]

However, there are three puzzles to consider before we position democracy and empire as opposites. The first is the paradox that the countries which have arguably done most to develop democratic theory –ancient Greece, France, Britain, America – have all maintained colonial empires. The second is the strong evidence that – unlike contemporaneous empire-makers in France, Germany, Belgium, and Holland – the British did not rule out self-government for their dependencies. On the contrary, they pledged it, in some cases much earlier than it was demanded by the colonised, and increasingly and publicly justified their empire in terms of its capacity to build democracy. This was not just rhetoric. It is hard to ignore the sustained and elaborate effort of constitution-making that the British undertook before their departure: the legal research, specialist consultation, investigations, commissions, and reams of legislation.[8]

The third puzzle is that British rule seems to have been good for the establishment and survival of democracy in its former colonies. This claim is sometimes made by sleight of hand: democratic survival is credited to the British presence, and democratic collapse to the British departure. But it has a well-established statistical grounding in 'large-n' studies of democratisation.[9] As Myron Weiner observes, '[e]very country with a population of at least 1 million (and almost all the smaller countries as well) that has emerged from colonial rule since World War II and has had continuous democratic experience is a former British colony'.[10] Indeed, the *longer* a colony spent under British rule, the likelier it is to have sustained democracy since independence.[11]

Why was this? Some identify the skills and human capital the British developed in their colonial populations through education, and conversionary protestant missionary work.[12] Others favour an indirect explanation: the economic development created by colonial rule, despite its exploitative purposes, meant better infrastructure, basic education, literacy, higher standards of living, and international connectedness: all the elements that help democracy survive.[13]

But the dominant explanations point to the 'democratic innovations' the British established before they left. Power was transferred to elites used to elections and experience of 'training ground' legislatures. Britain left locally recruited, trained bureaucracies, independent judiciaries, military forces under civilian control, and constitutions that established the parliamentary rather

than presidential system of government, with its propensity for a broadly based, negotiated politics.[14] Such an argument, however, sounds dangerously close to the Whiggish history against which John Darwin has so often warned us.[15] The main objection to it is that the 'democratic innovations' the British introduced were not designed to lead to democracy, but, on the contrary, to shore up British rule and to preserve British strategic and economic interests.

## The Call: Imperial Uses of 'Democratic Innovation'

The case for 'democratic innovation' begins in the colonies of British settlement.[16] Canada (1848), Australia (1855–59, 1890), New Zealand (1856) and the Cape Colony (1872) enjoyed responsible government. On almost all domestic questions the Governor acted not on orders from Britain, but on the advice of a Cabinet drawn from the majority party in the legislature. These legislatures were also elected on a wider franchise than Westminster itself, at least for the white population. A disappointed British Chartist who emigrated to Australia in the 1870s would have found most of the six Chartist demands had already been met. There was manhood suffrage, the secret ballot, the abolition of the property qualification for MPs, and the payment of MPs.[17] Manhood suffrage also arrived in New Zealand in 1879 and in Canada (except Nova Scotia and Quebec) by 1900. Women's suffrage was introduced in New Zealand in 1893, in Australia between 1895 and 1908, and the Canadian provinces in 1916, years earlier than Britain (1918 and 1928).[18]

Indeed, British democracy grew as a direct consequence of empire migration. In the two-year period 1913–14, 424,000 migrants of British and Irish nationality moved from Britain to the empire: 269,000 to Canada, 111,000 to Australia and New Zealand and 43,000 elsewhere, including South Africa. My rough estimate, based on the migration, census, and electoral registration data, suggests that around 250,000 of them thereby acquired the vote.[19] As a consequence of these suffrage arrangements, labour relations, industrial legislation, state welfare, and social democracy in general were further ahead in the settlement colonies than they were at home.[20]

However, the reasons that had impelled the British to favour responsible government had little to do with democracy. To them a 'responsible' government was primarily one *charged with responsibilities*. Executive decisions – taxation, imperial contributions, regulation – would often be unpopular, but still necessary. Reliable support for these decisions required a satisfactory working relationship with a legislature representing taxpayers. The executive was therefore made *answerable* – 'responsible' in a second sense – to the legislature. This strengthened the executive because it acquired a popular governing mandate. But the legislature was made responsible too. It was required to create and sustain an executive, scrutinising it, and, *in extremis* but only then, refusing it a legislative majority or dismissing it, while never losing its obligation to create a

replacement from its own resources. It would never do this casually (or 'irresponsibly') because the defeat of the executive meant the defeat of the legislative majority. The purpose of British responsible government was the *reduction of tension* between legislature and executive to enable government to be carried on. Its opposite was *irresponsibility*: either that of an executive that failed to win legislative consent for its work; or that of a legislature which merely obstructed the executive, while shirking its duty to produce and support a government.

Whether this could be repeated elsewhere turned on an interlocking pair of considerations: white loyalty and the balance sheet. In the settlement colonies, British settlers had come to dominate numerically. Here imperialism could base itself, as Gladstone believed it had for the Greeks, on the transplanted loyalties of men of a common race, building 'so many happy Englands'.[21] One sign of this preoccupation with white loyalties was that in the settlement colonies such as New Zealand, Canada, and Australia, indigenous peoples (and indeed non-white immigrants) were racially disenfranchised even when they posed little numerical threat to white expansion.[22]

Another sign was that where loyalties came into doubt, the responsibility might be taken away. This happened in Jamaica in 1866 when its planter-dominated House of Assembly abolished itself and chose colonial rule by a Governor appointed from London over self-government to avoid becoming responsible to a growing electorate of black peasant proprietors. [23]

In the tropical dependencies, there was no one to rely on. Poor climate, disease, large, ineradicable, or hostile populations had made permanent settlement unattractive. Rather than displacing the indigenous population from lands that the settlers wished to occupy themselves, the British were interested in trade, extraction and military recruitment. In the settlement colonies, British understandings of government could be *transplanted* by successive waves of loyal settlers. In the dependencies, where the British did not settle in large numbers, or where the population mostly survived their arrival, white loyalties were lacking. Here the British gradually developed the Crown Colony model. A Governor was sent from Britain, with instructions to appoint a council of local powerholders sufficiently strong, if not representative, to make British rule tolerable. The Governor remained answerable to British ministers in London, not the council. Although he might offer a wary respect for local law and customs, there was little willingness to assume loyalty. The governing ideals were to be *implanted*, through the Roman method, not the Greek one: authoritarian rule.[24]

The sign on the balance-sheet also mattered. If a settlement colony was both loyal and could bear its own expenses, then responsible government was a good way of making sure it did. But loyalty was not sufficient on its own, if settlers threatened to be a burden on British taxpayers. Where the settlers were too few in number, or too poor to be able to cover their own costs, or too weak to

coerce or persuade other local populations to do so, responsible government was withheld, no matter how loyal the settlers were. This occurred, for example, in the West Indies after the collapse of the slave-based plantation economy. This reluctance did not only apply to *declining* settler communities. It was also evident when settlers were too *energetic*. Their desire to 'open up the interior' might upset agreements with other colonising powers, or set off border conflicts with indigenous people, to whom British ministers had sometimes made promises. This could lead to awkward questions in Parliament and the missionary churches, or, worse still, calls for the dispatch of British troops. In Hong Kong, the British traders were thought to be too rapacious, too impermanent, and too likely to provoke treaty conflicts with the Chinese, or rival European powers, to be given responsible government. In the Cape Colony, the British settlers were at odds with Dutch Afrikaners, and engaged in border wars with African communities which they could not afford themselves without British help. British ministers therefore only seriously considered the possibility of responsible government in the Cape Colony when, with the discovery of diamonds in neighbouring regions in the 1860s, it was plausible to suppose that the settlers might be able and willing to pay for the responsibilities their actions might incur. In this respect, India differed again. It was worth *too much*. India paid for an imperial garrison of around a third of the British army as well as sustaining its own colonial army, almost as large. India was paying in, and not drawing out, and too valuable to hand over to local control without the strongest assurances of loyalty.

Representative institutions therefore came to work quite differently across the British Empire. In Britain, they functioned as a way of controlling the arbitrary power of the state. In the settlement colonies, they secured consent for self-reliant government by white loyalists. In India and the dependencies, however, they were meant to strengthen the state, and stabilise its rule against disloyalty from below. Representative institutions were not intended to *discover* the popular will. They were constructed to *manage* the popular will so that it could not challenge British rule.

'Democratic innovation' needs to be considered against this background. When the British introduced elections in India, for example, their purposes differed from those in the colonies of white settlement. So long as India had seemed politically dormant, British rule had meant identifying the 'natural leaders' and drawing them into collaboration by nominating them to positions of local authority. Even where local politics showed signs of life, the British had established municipal boards but rarely (except in Calcutta and Bombay) through election. Places were filled by the resident British official according to prescribed formulae designed to balance competing elite interests. The advantage of ruling in this way was that if the balance were calculated precisely enough, only a small weight was needed to tip it one way or the other. In the last quarter of the nineteenth century, however, greater

intervention in Indian economic life, needed to increase the agricultural land revenues that paid for the army and the administration, threatened to provoke unrest. Older allies were too detached from these developments to build consent for them, so new collaborators were required to shoulder the burden of taxation, and make the intrusions seem less foreign. Elections identified such collaborators, because the candidates competed precisely on their ability to persuade others. Better still, the electoral victors were drawn closer to the work of government. They became acculturated to its workings, and their involvement left them at least partly implicated in unpopular outcomes. Elections, indeed, did not only summon *support* for British rule. They also summoned *opposition* to it, drawing resistance out of the conspiratorial shadows, to see and shape it.

In 1882, therefore, the British introduced elected municipal councils and rural district boards across British India. Ten years later, they allowed these bodies to nominate a minority of the seats on the Provincial Councils, and a central Legislative Council in turn allocated a minority of its seats to the nominees of the Provincial Councils. However, all the bodies above the local level still had official majorities and few powers. Even in 1909, when the British removed the official majorities on the Provincial Councils, it denied any intention of responsible government either locally or at the centre. In India and the colonies, 'democratic innovation' was not in the least about popular rule, but about strengthening the colonial state to deal with its self-appointed tasks of preserving order.

The other 'democratic innovation' in India was the use of widened but contrived franchises to fill the elected places. Here too 'democratic innovation' was intended for purposes of tightening control. Elections shape demands through the manner in which they elicit them. In Britain, constituencies were defined territorially, and parties were created largely through free association, each defining its own interests. In the colonial setting, however, voters were summoned to the polls as members of state-defined communities. Franchises were a logical extension of the way that the British had used censuses to number and categorise their colonial subjects the better to divide and rule them. No one could speak for any interest other than that to which the colonial power had assigned him or her. Moreover, since all the interests defined were partial and particular ones, they silenced anyone other than the colonial rulers speaking for the whole.[25] The arrangements in India in 1909 included separate electorates and reserved seats for Muslims and for the large landowners, as well as indirect election to ensure the representation of various special interests: trade associations, business interests, and universities. 'Democratic innovation', then, was not intended to foster consensual deliberation, let alone aggregation of demands into a general will. It was rather meant to divide up society and force it to represent itself as divided, particularistic, and perhaps antagonistic, in need of a colonial sovereign to preserve its peace and unity.

### Colonised Responses Before 1914

How was the colonised world to respond to these 'democratic innovations'? It seemed racially excluded from responsible government. But there were two reasons for hope. First, the colonial state's primary concern was the perpetuation of British influence. That ruled out responsible government for the present, but it did not do so indefinitely or unconditionally. Where the British did not settle, they could not hope to govern alone, but had to share power. If and when sharing power *assisted* British influence it might be viewed very differently. Ultimately, colonialism was more concerned with loyalty than racial capacity. The colonised might be granted powers, regardless of their supposed unfamiliarity with modernising, democratising projects, provided they acquiesced in British sovereignty, and could reliably deliver the loyalties of others.

For example, the Indian princes through whom the British governed much of India were frequently ignorant, selfish, and corrupt. But they were nonetheless fit to rule because they were generally loyal allies who could deliver what the British needed. The sophisticated educated lawyers of the Indian National Congress (INC) would have made more competent legislators than most British MPs. But there was little chance of India being handed over to them partly because their loyalties were in doubt – their first move would have been to apply higher tariffs against British imports, and challenge the costs of administration and the army – and partly because no one believed that such an unrepresentative minority opinion could win the wider consent needed to hold India together, defend its borders, and deliver its riches for British purposes. In this light, the supposedly craven declarations of loyalty made by the INC look quite strategic and hard-headed.

Second, liberalism qualified the naked pursuit of imperial interests. For liberals, it was not acceptable that responsible government should be ruled out in perpetuity. Mill, after all, did not define India and other 'uncivilized' places as *eternal* exceptions. His theory provided a destination and a scale to define the direction and extent of progress, with pre-requisites, stages, and tests. The pre-requisites were drawn overwhelmingly from the British examples now carried globally by white settlers. Communal, unchanging forms of identity and ascriptive belonging would dissolve in favour of voluntary, dynamic interests and associations. Electoral choice would evolve as it had in Britain from being a semi-corruptly traded commodity to an autonomous expression of modern civic duty. Classes of voter would qualify for the franchise as they exhibited the rational judgement, independence, industry, and public-mindedness needed to undertake these responsibilities. If the colonised set off on this path, then responsible government might eventually follow.

In India, this created a dilemma. If British colonialism had been simply coercive, Indians could have fought it. If it had been serious about sharing power, they could have co-operated with it. But it was neither. It held self-government

out as a temptation, conditional upon the satisfaction of certain pre-requisites. The problem was that there were really two pre-requisites in one, and they pulled in different directions. Indian politicians had to seek depth, to put down roots in civil society and show they could command support. At the same time, their mode of engagement with voters was expected to develop along familiar western lines.

However, Indian politics were different and unfamiliar in all sorts of ways. Shallow mobilisation of the educated elites could take the prescribed form, and indeed in the larger Indian towns there was associational life of a recognisably western kind.[26] But mobilisation in depth, though possible, was bound to look unfamiliar. Primary loyalties were aligned with pre-ordained communities of religion and caste, not voluntaristic associations that could be joined or left at will. The higher 'civic virtues' and the active force of the 'better argument' were less forceful than the demands made by extended family, village, and ascriptive community. Politics consisted not of the dynamic upwards construction of associational demands, but of static obstacles roused by grievances against misrule. How could this develop in the prescribed fashion? Indian politicians could pursue depth or familiarity, but not both.

Some prioritised familiarity. The 'British Indian' leaders of the early INC, such as Surendranath Banerjea, Pherozeshah Mehta, and G. K. Gokhale, accepted the path that the British had set but argued that the pre-requisites for self-government, which they acknowledged were either absent or decayed in India, should be built up more quickly. The colonial state spent too little on education, offered few avenues for educated Indians to share power, and invested too little in developing the economy. This had the strengths and weaknesses of an insiders' critique. At best, it turned the British commitment against the British, using the pre-requisites as a checklist of progress, revealing the inconsistencies between practice and pledges.[27] It made much of the 'un-Britishness' of British colonialism.[28] But for precisely the same reason, it surrendered itself to British judgements of pace and progress. At most it could only hold the British to standards they had set themselves.

Others, notably the so-called Indian 'extremists', such as Bal Gangadhar Tilak, Bipin Chandra Pal, and Lala Lajpat Rai, pursued depth. They based themselves not on the new terrain of representative politics but on the more defensive organisations that had grown up to protect Indian social practices from colonial intrusions.[29] Because these organisations appealed to the concerns of much larger groups, they found it easier to rally support. But their methods remained troubling to those with western models of democratic participation in mind. They used the social pressures that landlord could bring to bear on tenant, or creditor on debtor, or the higher castes on the lower. Their reliance on pre-modern mobilisation was certainly effective, but hardly satisfied the liberal's pre-requisite tests.[30]

The 'double bind' pre-requisite was extraordinarily difficult to resolve. On the one hand, the colonised were told that they had to follow the path to democratic

responsibility set by their colonisers. On the other, and not altogether consistently, they were told that they had to find a path of their own, that democratic politics was not easily copied across cultures, and that, as it was frequently put, politics could not be learned from a textbook, but had to be practised. When the Indians seemed to copy too closely, they were condemned as shallow and inauthentic. When they departed too much, they failed the pre-requisite tests.

It is important to note that in neither case did the Indians counterpose *democracy* to the entrapping reforms of imperialism. The 'British Indians' found little in India's indigenous traditions to give them confidence in the masses. Eventually, a modern nation-state on British lines would have to have democracy in the same way that it would need industrial capitalism, free trade, and a navy. But this would take time because whenever the Indian peasantry encountered modernity they found it incomprehensible or threatening. They would need enlightened leadership from an alliance of the most modern-minded Indians and Britons.

The 'extremists' favoured mass pressure rather than alliances. But their resistance also took a strongly elite form. It based itself on the duty of the privileged, higher castes to defend Indian culture against the assaults of colonialism, and to set an example that might inspire a mass movement to follow them. This was probably necessarily true of the conspiratorial terrorists, such as the Yugantar in Bengal and the Savarkar group based in Europe before 1910.[31] But even those who worked openly expected little of the Indian masses, whom they argued had fallen into a hopeless servile torpor.

Against the colonial 'democratic innovation', the Indian anti-colonialists counterposed not enfranchisement or democracy, but nationalism. The 'British Indians' argued that Indian elites needed greater freedom so that their nation might take its proper place in the world. The 'extremists' argued that the Indian nation and its ancient civilisation were in danger from colonialism and must be freed, as of old, by the heroism of the sons of Mother India. But in neither case was there much that the downtrodden Indian masses could contribute. Around the edges of the nationalist movement, there were episodes of 'subaltern' protest, such as peasant insurrections, labour strikes, caste protests, and anti-tax revolts. These remained distinct from the concerns of elite nationalists, who nonetheless managed to co-opt some of their energy into campaigns to pressure the colonial state. Moreover, although such movements were often populist and even sporadically egalitarian, they tended to prophesy the return of kings, righteous rule, and the old ways, rather than speak a language the elites could regard as modern and democratic.[32]

## *Call and Response, 1914–1945*

A fresh phase of 'democratic innovation' began during the First World War. In 1917, the British promised India the 'progressive realisation' of responsible

government, and in 1929 they confirmed that the 'natural issue' of this would be 'dominion status', the full self-government within the empire adopted for the white settlement colonies in 1926. This was partly a consequence of the growing international normalisation of political progress as the justificatory end-state of colonialism. Much more, however, it was a matter of mobilising the consent that the colonial state needed to operate in the new, unpopular conditions of war and depression. At first, India was offered *semi*-responsible government (or diarchy). Official majorities were abolished, but the most important powers were kept back. But in 1935 full responsible government in the provinces was conceded, and in 1937, Indian ministers took up all the main portfolios. The British also held out the possibility of responsible government at the centre, subject only to imperial safeguards concerning defense and foreign relations, and a federal arrangement involving the notionally independent princely states.

Once again, however, the appearance of 'democratic innovation' was deceptive. Even in 1935, the provincial legislatures could not remove or replace the executive, but only refuse to staff it themselves, thereby obliging the Governor to rule without them. At the centre, the Viceroy and his officials remained immovable, and capable of governing without Indian participation at all if necessary.

Furthermore, the elected, Indian-dominated bodies were subjected to wider and more varied franchises designed to prevent the formation of majorities that might press for full independence. Indian politicians were to be made accountable to an electorate not in order to facilitate their capacity to govern, but to hamper them. It was explicitly an objective of the widening franchise and the diversification of the electorate that it would break-up of the 'unnatural' coalition of opponents assembled by Congress to end British rule. Each visiting British delegation was now met by innumerable Indian deputations bearing communal, local demands and hoping to extend the categories the British had devised.[33] In 1919, the separate electorates and reserved seats already given to Muslims were extended to include Sikhs, Indian Christians, Anglo-Indians, and Europeans. There were even reserved seats for *majorities* – for non-Brahmins in Madras and Marathas in Bombay – ostensibly to prevent their being dominated by Brahmin minorities.[34] In 1935, the electorate was further enlarged, and even more groups, including industrial labour, tribal communities, and the 'scheduled' castes, were awarded special protection. Widening the franchises and seeking a fuller representation of Indian diversities could be justified as 'democratic innovation'. But it was also an anti-majoritarian trap, designed to divide the nationalist movement by fragmenting its electorate. Each extension of the franchise made its task harder.

The concession of 'responsibility' was also intended to have the same effect. Responsible government in India was designed to address not the problems created by irresponsible British autocrats but those created by irresponsible Indian politicians. Indians, the British insisted, must not be allowed to resort

to irresponsible speechifying against the government. On the contrary, '[t]hey must have real work to do: and they must have real people to call them to account for their doing of it'.[35] But to take responsibility in straitened circumstances was certain to split the nationalist movement on precisely those questions on which the colonial state had already divided its electorate. The nationalists therefore faced a hard choice. The powers were *locally* significant and could not lightly be surrendered to political rivals. If nationalists refused to 'take responsibility', either by being obstructive inside the councils, or non-co-operative outside them, they seemed unready to make the hard choices that governments had to make, perhaps even afraid of democracy, and therefore unmodern. On the other hand, to take responsibility risked splitting the national movement, distracting it from the task of pushing the British out for good. In such ways, 'democratic innovation' was turned against them.

The question this provokes is why Indian nationalists were so unable or unwilling to oppose their own version of democracy to the contorted trap offered by the colonial state? It is undeniable that there was less invocation of democracy than we might expect among anti-colonialists. They spoke of freedom, of course, and the nation, but the word democracy was rare. Why was a movement of *mass mobilization* so unwilling to insist on the logic of numbers?

Some nationalists were simply uninterested in democracy. Their anti-colonialism was concerned with expelling the foreign occupier, not with popular rule. Liberals and socialists were interested in democracy, but they were too steeped in western democratic theory to work out how democracy could function with populations that were largely illiterate and intensely religious. Although they paid lip service to universal suffrage, they privately thought the peasantry were superstitious, communal, and conservative. Others simply feared what the masses might do to property and order if their expectations of social transformation got over-stimulated. So, although, under Gandhi's leadership, the INC acquired a mass following, it also developed disciplinary rules to ensure the masses were restrained by elite commands, or, as Gandhi hoped, exercised *self*-restraint.[36]

It was also difficult for nationalism to accommodate communal difference. Whether the British had made it so or not, India was now a plural society in which ethnic and religious minorities had deeply-felt fears of majority rule. *Majorities* could be justifiably fearful if they were less fully enfranchised than minorities, as were Muslims in Bengal and Punjab. If nationalists acknowledged the claims of disadvantaged communities to separate electorates and reserved seats, they made it harder to build the national unity that would enable them to win freedom. This was why the INC rejected separate electorates for the Muslims in 1928 and the 'scheduled castes' in 1932. On the other hand, if they insisted on majoritarianism and a rapid transfer of power, they seemed insensitive to one of democracy's pre-requisites: the need to make special provision when majorities were permanent and entrenched, rather than transient and challengeable.

### Call and Response After 1945

After 1945, in the final phase of colonialism, the British strategic use of 'democratic innovation' altered once more. It was intensified to cope with new and pressing constraints: overstretched government budgets, the ideological pressures of the cold war, and the growing international unacceptability of colonial rule. The British made pledges to 'guide the colonies towards self-government within the empire' (1943), later qualified by the pre-requisite that self-government must be achieved in conditions that guaranteed 'a fair standard of living and freedom from oppression from any quarter' (1948).[37] However, they remained inconsistent in their use of 'democratic innovations', neither exactly refusing nor granting them, but using them selectively to control the pace and terms of decolonisation.

In Africa, the strategies used in India were applied afresh. The old, inefficient, native authorities had to be replaced by local government, and once again the British tried to design arrangements that ensured that the educated, westernised, vocally critical young urban nationalists who stood to capture the council seats were balanced by traditional, less vocal forces.[38] '[D]emocracy under tuition' in Africa was intended, as it had been in India, to slow nationalists down, so that they would engage in depth with their own societies and win consent for modernisation and development under British auspices.[39]

In the same spirit, the British also refined their techniques of constitutional design. Diarchy, which put nationalists into a position of power without responsibility, had proved disastrous, not only in India, but also in Ceylon and Cyprus.[40] Instead, the British developed a much more finely geared mechanism of devolved constitution making. Colonial legislatures, starting as bodies dominated by officials, would begin by admitting nominated, and then elected, non-officials. More seats could be given to these non-officials, creating first a non-official majority, and later a non-official elected majority. The governing executive council, in origin a wholly appointed and advisory body, could increasingly draw its members from among the elected non-officials, assigning more significant ministerial portfolios to them. Responsible government would arrive when the Governor was bound only to choose ministers (and a minister) who could retain confidence in the legislature. In the last days of British rule, the civil service and the armed forces portfolios would be transferred to elected ministers, the executive council would meet as a cabinet without the Governor, now expected to act on the advice of ministers. The colony would thereby achieve independence within the Empire-Commonwealth, subject only to a treaty to guarantee residual British interests.[41] More significant even than the numerous gears was the convention that in the event of a breakdown of co-operation, it was better for British interests to suspend the arrangements altogether than permit elected ministers to govern without responsibility. For these reasons, in several instances the brakes were applied, and government carried on without

elected ministers at all, (Cyprus in 1931, British Guiana in 1953) and in one case (Malta in 1936) the machine was put into reverse.[42]

Elections were employed as selectively as ever to maximise co-operation. In some cases, such as the Malay sultans or the sheikhs of the Persian Gulf, the British protected loyal allies from the electoral competition that might weaken them. In other cases, however, elections on a widened franchise were used to distract and split radical nationalist challengers. Rather than being left to make trouble in the legislatures, such radicals were forced out into the countryside to encounter slower-moving parts of the polity. If the colonial state got its calculations wrong, such elections got used to build mass support and confront it with a harder bargain. But if it got them right, its radical opponents might return humbler, more fractured, and willing to co-operate. If radicals could be tamed by elections, moderates could be frightened by them. Sometimes the rough and tumble of electoral politics revealed not slower but faster rivals, especially if communists had won supporters. Moderate nationalists placed in this position, such as those in Malaya in the 1950s, had a strong interest in working with the British to prop up their own position.

Indeed, the British could show a startling enthusiasm for elections when they knew what the result might be. In the Sudan, for example, they were very insistent that the Sudanese be allowed to determine their own future democratically, in the knowledge that a free Sudan would opt for independence rather than absorption into Egypt. On the other hand, where it was clear that colonised peoples might vote the wrong way – black Africans in Nyasaland or Northern Rhodesia against the Central African Federation, for example, or the inhabitants of Borneo and Sarawak against being handed over to Malaya – voting was avoided in favour of 'consultations' or 'expressions of opinion'. Where, as in Nigeria, challengers in some regions threatened to win power at the expense of Britain's allies elsewhere, the British urged the conservative elements to get electorally organised and secure regional autonomy to defend themselves. But where conservative elements threatened to block a transfer of power to a successor capable of uniting the country behind a programme of modernisation in partnership with Britain, the colonial state was keener than anyone for quick elections before they did so.

Federations were another much-tried democratic technique of late colonialism.[43] If rapidly developing single territories could not easily be given freedom as they were, perhaps they could be pushed together with other more reliable elements to make up a federation which could. In Central Africa in the 1950s, the British constructed a federation of Nyasaland and the Rhodesias in the hope of showing how moderate African nationalism, moderate white settlerdom, and imperial interests could all be satisfied. In Malaysia in 1963 they tried to bolt together Singapore, commercially and militarily valuable but politically vulnerable, with the more stable and pro-western Malaya and the political backwaters of Borneo and Sarawak. In Southern Arabia, they bundled together

their violently unstable military base at Aden with its conservative interior of backward pro-British sheikhdoms. All these experiments ultimately failed – the fond hope was that they would stabilise at the speed of the slowest element politically, and the fastest economically – but the enthusiasm for federation suggested that the British had not despaired of using 'democratic innovation' for imperial purposes.

The same could be said of multiracialism and partnership. Encouraging communal politics in plural societies for the purposes of dividing and ruling had ended badly in India. To preserve their influence elsewhere, the British needed stable successors, not partitioned states in a permanent state of tension and military over-preparedness. In plural societies, they therefore now favoured 'qualitative' rather than 'quantitative' democracy.[44] This ruled out both majoritarianism, which was unacceptable to entrenched minorities, and also minority rule under the most politically enfranchised community, either in the form of the 'internal partition' of apartheid, or the semi-permanent white minority rule favoured in southern Rhodesia. Only where there was a real fear of partition – as in Cyprus – were communal electorates reluctantly adopted. Elsewhere – in Ceylon, Kenya, and Central Africa – the preference was for multi-racial politics. Franchises were manipulated to favour candidates and parties who could win cross-communal support (e.g. the United Tanganyika Party against TANU). Where, as in Kenya, white and other minority communities insisted on separate electoral rolls, the British sought out parties prepared to share power in multiracial 'partnership' (e.g. KADU and the New Kenya Party).

Elections were no longer intended to impede nationalists, but to confirm their mandate sufficiently to warrant the inheritance of power. For the purposes of a rapid affirmative handover, irresponsible mutually suspicious local leaders were no use. The British now needed unifiers, not dividers, capable of welding divided nations into cohesive, pro-British, units. The list of democratic pre-requisites was sharply reduced to a single item: the capacity to deliver this succession. The same features which had hitherto made it impossible to leave certain radical nationalists at liberty – their ability to unite the nation – now made it vital to get them into power. This explains the otherwise bewildering reversals of fortune enjoyed by those who moved practically overnight from a colonial prison cell to Government House. Democracy now had to be accelerated to confer upon them the necessary authority to unite the nation and deal with their internal opponents. These opponents included British allies from earlier 'democratic' projects. Hence the reverse trajectory – from Government House to prison cell – was followed by regional and minority leaders, separatists, and oppositional figures. Valued in the earlier projects for their ability to offset unitary nationalist parties, they were now a nuisance. Thus the Kabaka of Buganda, the Biafrans in Nigeria, numerous 'moderates', and other refractory opponents of 'nation-building' followed the Indian princes into exile or oblivion.

Few nationalists missed the sudden offer to dismiss their rivals and transfer power into their hands. They sensed the attractions of a swift and undemocratic deal that traded an early exit for the securing of residual British interests. The parliamentary Westminster system, though lacking some of the authoritarian possibilities of presidential rule, did, after all, confer sustained governing authority on executives, by minimising the friction they might encounter in the legislature and concentrating rather than separating power. As a system which relied as much on conventions as on constitutional law, it was also open to informal amendment to reflect local needs. Postcolonial governments could tailor the Westminster system to accommodate the 'African personality' and its supposed preference for 'big men' to lead the nation; or 'Asian democracy' and its claim that human rights were not locally understood; or the Islamic republics which accepted the definitive power of elections but rejected the alien, democratic values that went with them.

## Conclusion: Protest and Democratisation

The struggle to end colonialism pitted imperialists against nationalists. Both invoked democracy. The imperialists did so because the last viable justification for imperialism, once the civilising mission ceased to convince, was its value as a framework for producing popular rule. That claim was not entirely hypocritical. Responsible, accountable government was not just one imperial technique among others, but one with a special significance for Britain, with its own history of restraining arbitrary rule. For their part, the nationalists endorsed democracy because they felt obliged to speak in the name of the whole people and not just elites. Nor was this claim spurious. Anti-colonial nationalism mobilised historically unprecedented numbers of participants, from among groups whom few had thought to consult, and fewer still regarded as political actors in their own right. It made the fundamental democratic demand: that everyone be counted.

Yet neither side unequivocally endorsed democracy, and this was substantially for the same reason. Imperialism and nationalism were both finally about power and not popular rule. Their dispute was over sovereign territory not the sovereignty of the people. Imperialism's rationale lay in securing British strategic and commercial interests, which were global and not confined to the formal empire. This needed consent, which in turn could most cheaply and efficiently be delivered by consultation and representation, and in some instances even responsible government. The resulting arrangements could look quite progressive, especially as deeper intervention in their empire drove the British to consult more widely and seek out the most dynamic elements in their colonies. It was not in British *interests* to prop up dying or declining allies, who could not deliver the loyalties they needed. This was why they could be so brutal to former collaborators who had lost influence, and so keen

to secure the next generation of collaborators. Seeking out loyalty could thus mimic democracy, but only as a means and not as an end.

For nationalists, also fundamentally concerned with power, mobilisation did not – perhaps could not – always observe democratic proprieties. Some – in Cyprus, Kenya, Malaya or Northern Ireland – were engaged in revolutionary agitation and could not play by democratic rules. But even those working within more open systems could not easily tolerate splitters and defectors. Nationalism, in its formative stages, is a universalising, normalising discourse with a tendency to regard difference as its enemy. Anti-colonial movements struggled with the distinctness of the demands of women, of different classes (subalterns, peasants, industrial workers, intellectuals), and of ethnic minorities. In their urge to unify and win power, they could seek to crush regional variations in the name of nation-building, repress linguistic variety in the name of a national culture, or flatten out religious difference in the name of secularism. They readily constructed a single, national narrative, often dominated at the top by heroic leaders validated permanently and retrospectively by their services in the freedom struggle, not conditionally and prospectively as is supposed to occur under democracy.

It is, therefore, hard to see how Britain's strategic use of 'democratic innovation', or the responses it prompted among nationalists, can provide a powerful explanation of democratic survival in its former empire. Such theories need to be reconsidered, with historians' help. It may be that institutional explanations matter less than the economic ones. Or it may be that, paradoxically, hampering democracy serves to stabilise it. Or it may be that democratic survival is attributable not to the British, but to *fighting* the British. Perhaps *anti-colonialism* develops certain values, habits and practices which help democracy function well, more so than imperial rule or nationalism.

Imperialism and nationalism teach obedience; anti-colonialism teaches protest. The moment of anti-colonial resistance precedes the formation of a national consciousness, in the unwillingness to submit to the coloniser's gaze, the refusal to answer his interpellation (summons), or in acts of defiance and disobedience. This moment of dissent is not always easily prolonged into the nation-building struggle. But it is never entirely lost. It survives as a dissident tradition, and a historical commitment made at the foundation of the nation. The right to protest is a stubborn presence in the politics of post-colonies, which even the most authoritarian cannot disavow without abandoning something of their own history. In the academy, anti-colonial protest flourishes in the disruptive practices of post-colonialism, a form of intellectual intervention intended to challenge western academic disciplines' reliance on unquestioned colonial ways of thought, which draws deeply on the practices of the anti-colonial liberation struggles.[45]

There are several ways in which the anti-colonial tradition of protest might be said, actually or potentially, to have contributed to post-colonial

democratisation. Anti-colonialism is, first of all, a politics of *self-reliance*. It thinks of democracy as a mobilisation of indigenous resources. Its breakthrough, in many historical contexts, has been the realisation that it did not have to stumble in the wake of western traditions of protest, or force its own distinctive problems and solutions into the shapes that these traditions expected. Politically, this has meant a refusal to submit to the authority of others' descriptions. It has insisted on the irreducibility of the colonial experience, and on the autonomy of its own struggle as one which cannot be boiled down to anyone else's.[46] Anti-colonialism has contested – to borrow Deleuze's description of the intellectual contribution of Foucault – *l'indignité de parler pour les autres* [the indignity of speaking for others].[47] This has been visible in postcolonial reworking of western political theory and in the distinct paths defined by Gandhism, négritude, and many other variants of self-reliance.

Anti-colonialism is also a struggle from *below*: not among equals, but from the margins, and from underneath. It therefore assigns a special importance to the perspectives and involvement of the disempowered. In a fight between unequals, it had to develop its own techniques, to find power where there was no power. It therefore developed specific modes of activism which enable the weak to be powerful on their own account, without needing to rely on elites for resources or leadership. These included revolutionary peasant struggles 'on a human scale', strikes, mutinies, boycotts, go-slows, foot-dragging, insubordination, and the many 'weapons of the weak', as well as the techniques – the sit-down strike, the protest march, acts of Gandhian non-violent resistance – which have become part of the arsenal of civil rights struggles across the world. While some of these actions were instigated by elites, they have necessarily relied for their force on being carried out by very large numbers of people, often among the poorest and least powerful.

Gandhi's contribution in this regard suggests another feature of anti-colonialism: the use of the symbolic act of personal defiance. Gandhi believed colonialism was held in place not only by material power, but also mental acquiescence on the parts of the colonised. It could be challenged through the most individual of refusals. Anyone could behave as though they were already free by refusing to comply, in a seemingly tiny singular act of defiance – making salt against the colonial tax laws, burning government passes or imported cloth, or the spinning and wearing of *khadi* (homespun cotton).

Anti-colonialism therefore has an individual, yet participatory view of politics. This was not only because large numbers were needed to displace entrenched and well-armed colonial rulers. It was also because anti-colonialism was contesting massive historic disempowerment: the trivialisation of vast tracts of human experience by the most powerful nations. A movement with this ambition in mind continually encounters the new and the unexpected. It cannot afford to dismiss anyone's knowledge or perspectives on the grounds that they do not presently seem to make sense, because it is precisely the world's

common sense that anti-colonialism disputes. Anti-colonialism therefore pays attention to everyone's views, because there is no saying where newness might emerge next. For the same reasons, it is also anti-hierarchical, suspicious of claims to superior insight, of assumptions about who leads and who follows, and insistent on accountability, questioning, and challenge.

Alert to newness and contestation also implies anti-colonialism's openness to multiple voices and a pluralist view of the truth. Colonialism assigned fixed identities for the purposes of rule. So did nationalism for the purposes of challenging it. Anti-colonialism could mean exploiting or rejecting the assigned identities, but could also involve playing creatively with the fixity of identity itself. Colonialism wanted, so far as possible, to confine those it ruled to one place. It could therefore be opposed by refusing to stay put. Anti-colonial politics often had recourse to legal or illegal border-crossing, literally and figuratively. It was well-served not only by the grounded, national struggle, but also by diasporic activism, the creative use of exile and migration, and the construction of fluid, temporary, strategically effective, mixed-up hybrid identities.

Not the least significant aspect of this hybridity of identity was the intertwining of colonial and anti-colonial identities. What anti-colonialism rejected was not something external and alien, but something that had become part of the colonised. This was not just because some collaborated, willingly or unwillingly, explicitly or implicitly. It was because colonialism became part of the mental landscape of the colonised, through learned languages, colonial education, and the impact of the coloniser's 'civilised' culture. It was, as Ashis Nandy terms it, an 'intimate enemy'.[48] The fight against it was therefore neither the rejection of foreignness, nor a domestic quarrel among those who shared a common or shared culture. It entailed decolonisation of the self. Opposing colonialism required anti-colonial activists to undergo a process of change, both as precondition and consequence of their activism. Although nationalism might require its disciplined army of foot-soldiers awaiting orders, the dominant figure of anti-colonialism was the self-freed individual – Gandhi's *satyagrahi*, Fanon's 'whole man' – the active maker of his or her own dissent, the experimenter, able to develop contestatory politics that spoke to the local conditions they encountered.

These are all significant democratic virtues. It therefore seems quite possible that democratic survival in former British colonies can partly explained not so much by the institutions and practices established by the colonisers, as by those developed in fighting them.

Many of them also address democratic weaknesses in the British system of government. The Westminster system was designed to minimise conflict in the business of government. It secured legislative majorities for the government through a disproportional electoral system, made them dependable through disciplined parliamentary parties, and brought minority opposition inside the system (literally in the designation of a paid leader of Her Majesty's Opposition). Responsible government has meant just what it meant in the colonial setting:

that government must be carried on, that it needs reliable support to do so, that it must therefore consult and explain itself, but that there is no good reason why there should be regular (let alone structural) friction between legislature and executive. Their functions are complementary, and when they work properly, they are supposed to reduce tensions, not to allow them full expression. Electoral competition in Britain has usually assumed that there is no *essential* conflict between the parties, that on most issues there is a discernible national interest, and that the important choice is therefore one of technique and personnel. There is little sense, as there was in the colonies, of radical disagreement, or of an agonistic clash of interests to be fought out. Involvement in electoral politics is mostly confined to the infrequent and formal selection of a government, rather than direct and participatory involvement in self-government. It would be wrong to say that the British system exhibits low participation, but the quality of the participation is still comparatively deferential and unassertive. Protest – the great anti-colonial strength – is notoriously low.[49]

We must note how different British democratisation has been. It has occurred under elite control, not from below. It has been a lengthy process of gradual sluice-like adjustments as excluded groups have gained admittance to an inner core of power which pretends not to change much. Majorities have been partially admitted and turned into minorities among those already inside, an experience that often over-awes them, and deprives them of the moment of suddenly acquiring majority status. Britain has not, at least in recent history, experienced breakthrough irruptions of self-realisation, like those which took place in the anti-colonial freedom struggles in India in the 1920s and 1930s, or in Africa in the 1960s. This may be why the irruption of unspoken, unheard dissatisfactions over 'Brexit' has so disrupted the normal operating procedures of the Westminster system.

The anti-colonial tradition of protest may also have something useful to contribute to contemporary re-examinations of democracy. Its insistence that everyone must be heard perhaps has affinities with the concern of 'deliberative democrats' that western models of democracy based on a bourgeois 'public sphere' may miss the exclusions of those speaking in unfamiliar ways. The power of hybrid identities, formed through migration and borrowings, improvisation and experiment, are staples of the literature on multiculturalism and the politics of difference. The problematising of the activist self, and the notion that activist and activism create each other through performance are a significant theme in radical democratic politics. The anti-colonialist validation of protest and disobedience is especially visible in recent French post-structuralist work on democracy, especially its proposal that democracy should be understood not as a method of governance – e.g. 'the Westminster system' – but a process by which the smooth working of the governing order is disrupted by subjects whom that order does not recognise: the 'demos' – those seemingly unqualified to govern.[50] The anti-colonial tradition could perhaps help to reinvigorate or supplement Westminster democracy through a 'counter-democracy' of protest, vigilance, and

denunciation.[51] In Britain, as Raymond Williams once suggested, 'we do not get enough practice in the working of democracy, even where its forms exist'.[52]

## Notes

1. Sen, "Democracy".
2. Chatterjee, *Lineages of Political Society*; Kaviraj, *Enchantment of Democracy*.
3. Gallagher and Robinson, "Imperialism of Free Trade".
4. The Indian Central Legislature, before the Morley-Minto reforms of 1909, was not allowed to question the Finance Member about the Indian budget.
5. Hobson, *Imperialism*.
6. Sartori, "The British empire"; Pitts, "Political Theory of Empire".
7. Hall et al., *Defining*.
8. Madden et al. *Select Documents*.
9. Bollen and Jackman, "Economic"; Barro, "Determinants"; Przeworski et al., *Democracy*; Lipset et al., "Comparative Analysis"; Lange et al., "Colonialism".
10. Weiner, "Empirical".
11. Bernhard et al., "Legacy".
12. Glaeser et al., "Institutions"; Woodberry, "Missionary"; Lankina and Getachew, "Mission".
13. Acemoglu et al., "Colonial Origins"; Acemoglu et al., "Reversal"; Fails and Krieckhaus, "Colonialism".
14. Lipset et al., "Comparative Analysis. of the social requisites of democracy".
15. Darwin, "Imperialism in Decline", and "British Decolonization since 1945: a Pattern or a Puzzle?".
16. Bridge and Federowich, "Mapping".
17. Full manhood (i.e. over 21) suffrage for adult male British subjects was introduced in South Australia in 1856, and later in New South Wales (1858), Victoria (1857), Queensland (1872), Western Australia (1893) and Tasmania (1896). The secret ballot was adopted in Victoria, Tasmania and South Australia in 1856, and later in New South Wales (1858), Queensland (1859), and Western Australia (1893). It was introduced in New Zealand in 1870, although not in the Maori reserved seats until 1939.The Australian Constitutional Convention decided in 1891 that Federal MPs would be paid, as they already were in Victoria from 1870, and an annual salary of £400 was written into the constitution in 1901. In New Zealand, MPs' pay was agreed at the first session of the General Assembly in 1854.
18. Women's suffrage was introduced for women over 21 in South Australia in 1895, and later in Western Australia (1899), New South Wales (1902), Tasmania (1903), Queensland (1905), and Victoria (1908).
19. The figures are from Constantine, "Migrants", tables 7.2, 7.3, and 7.4. The data on occupational distribution of migrants relates to 1912–13. Some of the men might have been qualified voters at home. Around half (57 per cent) were in skilled trades or the professional or commercial middle class, but almost as many (43 per cent) were agricultural or industrial labourers. The data on the gender of migrants comes from Plant, *Oversea settlement*. Carrier and Jeffrey, *External Migration*. The data on the UK franchise (59 per cent of adult males were registered to vote in 1911) comes from the 1911 census, cited in Blewett, "Franchise" and Lawton, *Census*. This effect may have been larger in the case of Ireland, since Irish enfranchisement was lower and Irish migration higher. See Rosenbaum, "General Election of January, 1910".

20. Beatrice Webb to Catherine Courtney, 17 Sep 1898, in Webb, *Letters*, ii, 82.
21. Matthew, *Gladstone*, 74.
22. In New Zealand, four seats in a legislature of seventy were reserved for the Maori in 1868, but it was not until 1975 that they could register to vote in the general constituencies. In Australia, Aboriginal Australians and Torres Strait Islanders were effectively excluded from the vote until 1962, and registration and voting did not become compulsory as it was for others until 1984. In Canada, Native Indians and Inuit – and Asian Canadians in British Columbia and Saskatchewan – were effectively disenfranchised until 1960 unless they had completed military service. At the inception of the Union of South Africa in 1910, black Africans were barred from standing for election, and disenfranchised entirely in the former Afrikaner republics (Transvaal and the Orange Free State). In Natal six Africans managed to meet the property and literacy qualifications. Only at the Cape did non-white electors make up a significant, though small, fraction of the electorate (15 per cent).
23. Holt, *Problem.*
24. The terms 'transplanted' and 'implanted' are borrowed from Rhodes, *Comparing Westminster*, 11.
25. Metcalf, *Ideologies*, 188.
26. Seal, *Emergence.*
27. Bayly, *Recovering.*
28. Matikkala, *Empire*.
29. Chatterjee, *Nationalist*.
30. Owen, "British Progressives".
31. Owen, "Soft Heart of the Empire", Ghosh, *Gentlemanly Terrorists.*
32. Amin, "Gandhi as Mahatma".
33. Montagu, *Diary*; Mansergh et al., *India.*
34. Indian Statutory Commission, *Report*, 144–45, 167–68.
35. India Office, *East India*, 69.
36. Guha, *Dominance*, 135–50.
37. Oliver Stanley, speech, 13 Jul 1943, *Parliamentary Debates* ("Hansard"), 5th series, vol. 391, cols. 47–151.
38. Arthur Creech Jones, "Local Government: Despatch to African Governors", 25 Feb 1947, in Hyam, *Labour Government*, i, 119–29.
39. Madden et al., *Select Documents,* vi, 48–51.
40. For the failures in Cyprus, see Colonial Office minutes on Cyprus, 23 Apr 1929, in Ashton and Stockwell, *Imperial Policy*, i, 45. The failures in Ceylon are explained in De Silva, *Sri Lanka*, xxxvi–xxxix.
41. De Smith, *New Commonwealth.*
42. For Cyprus, see Colonial Office minute, 23 Apr 1929; for Malta, see Cabinet memorandum, 18 Apr 1934, in Ashton and Stockwell, *Imperial policy*, i, 249–58, 287–91; for British Guiana, see Cabinet memorandum and discussion, 30 Sep–2 Oct 1953, in Goldsworthy, *Conservative Government*, ii, 362–64.
43. Collins, "Decolonisation and the 'Federal Moment'".
44. Quoted in Goldsworthy, *Conservative Government*, i, xlviii.
45. Young, *Postcolonialism*.
46. Owen, *Other People's Struggles.*
47. G. Deleuze et M. Foucault, "Les intellectuels et le pouvoir", in Foucault, *Dits et écrits*, ii, texte 106.
48. Nandy, *Intimate Enemy*.

49. The European Values Survey in 1999 found that only 13 per cent of the British had been on a lawful public demonstration, the lowest figure in (democratic western) Europe. See European Values Study 1999 (release 3, 2011), 3rd wave, Integrated Dataset. GESIS Data Archive, Cologne, Germany, ZA3811 Data File Version 3.0.0 (2011-11-20).
50. Rancière, *Hatred of Democracy*.
51. Rosanvallon, *Counter-Democracy*.
52. Williams, *Long Revolution*, 336.

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