Thesis
Logic and modality
- Abstract:
- In this thesis I consider and argue against various versions of the view that logical truth and necessity are identical. I criticise purely modalist accounts of logical consequence, according to which consequence is just necessary truth-preservation, and I also criticise views on which necessity is identified with some prior understanding of logical truth (as semantic validity, or substitutional validity, or as syntactic derivability). In the process I develop various systems of modal semantics in detail and investigate the logic of logical truth under various alternative hypotheses.
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(Preview, Dissemination version, pdf, 1.5MB, Terms of use)
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Authors
Contributors
+ Paseau, A
- Institution:
- University of Oxford
- Role:
- Supervisor
+ Williamson, T
- Role:
- Supervisor
+ Arts and Humanities Research Council
More from this funder
- Funder identifier:
- http://dx.doi.org/10.13039/501100000267
- Programme:
- Open-Oxford-Cambridge DTP
- DOI:
- Type of award:
- DPhil
- Level of award:
- Doctoral
- Awarding institution:
- University of Oxford
- Language:
-
English
- Keywords:
- Subjects:
- Deposit date:
-
2023-05-24
- ARK identifier:
Terms of use
- Copyright holder:
- Bevan, M
- Copyright date:
- 2022
- Licence:
- CC Attribution (CC BY)
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