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Thesis

Ethics and humanity in (post-)Kantian philosophy

Abstract:
Bringing together work in ethics, political philosophy, and history of philosophy, the thesis examines the normative implications of the concept of humanity, arguing for a critical, egalitarian humanism that opposes hierarchies of moral standing among human beings while acknowledging our obligations to non-human animals. In the Introduction, I argue for a broad understanding of ‘humanism’ that captures a variety of different views, each with a different conception of the normative relevance of the notion of the human being. I then elucidate two problems for historically influential forms of humanism, namely that they have instituted unacceptable hierarchies among human beings and perpetuated a damaging anthropocentrism. I argue that instead of embracing anti-humanism, we should reform or rethink humanism in such a way that it avoids these difficulties. I then critically examine ethical conceptions of ‘the human’ in the work of four philosophers from apparently disparate traditions – Immanuel Kant, Martin Heidegger, Judith Butler, and Ludwig Wittgenstein. I argue that while neither Kantian humanism nor Heidegger’s anti-humanism can convincingly overcome the two problems explained in the Introduction, resources from Butler and Wittgenstein’s work can provide a new basis for a more attractive form of humanism that gives central place to the notion of bodily vulnerability and the need to acknowledge it.

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Division:
HUMS
Department:
Philosophy Faculty
Oxford college:
St John's College
Role:
Author

Contributors

Institution:
University of Oxford
Role:
Supervisor
Institution:
University of Oxford
Division:
SSD
Department:
Politics & Int Relations
Role:
Supervisor
Institution:
University of Oxford
Division:
HUMS
Department:
Philosophy Faculty
Role:
Examiner
Role:
Examiner


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Funder identifier:
http://dx.doi.org/10.13039/501100000267
Funding agency for:
Wearing, J


DOI:
Type of award:
DPhil
Level of award:
Doctoral
Awarding institution:
University of Oxford


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