

Greeks outside the πόλις in the
Fourth Century B.C.



Thesis submitted for the degree of Doctor of
Philosophy by Paul McKechnie, University College.

January 1985.

Abstract of
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D.Phil. thesis: University College, Hilary Term 1985

This thesis examines Greeks who in the fourth century B.C. did not live in the sovereign city- and town-sized communities in which most inhabitants of South Greece spent their lives. In it I argue that the number of Greeks living outside these communities increased very significantly during this period.

I examine what Greek cities were destroyed and what Greek cities were founded in the fourth century, considering wherever possible how many Greeks are likely to have been added to or taken from the number of stateless Greeks by these destructions and foundations. I argue that until Alexander the Great and Timoleon began large programmes of settlement in the East and West respectively, there were probably many more Greeks losing their city homes than finding new ones (and that this is in contrast to the position before 400 B.C.).

I consider the increasing numbers of Greek mercenaries, pirates, skilled workers and traders. Though people of widely differing kinds entered these occupations, I suggest that the way in which they all grew simultaneously in the fourth century indicates that the movement towards living outside cities was not entirely a response to difficult political circumstances in cities. Though some who were outside cities were so perforce, nevertheless an ideology which treated loosening of city ties as normal was being developed and was contrary to the established ideology whereby πόλις life was definitive of normal Greek life.

I suggest that the availability of a large number of people with specialist skills from soldiering to diplomatic and literary skills created a world fit for Hellenistic Kings to live in. They could easily

find recruits for their armies and courts. This contributes to explaining how Alexander and his Successors managed to conquer and subdue all Greece, which no power had previously done.

Abbreviations

Abbreviations of periodical titles are given either in Année Philologique form or an expanded version of it. These abbreviations for standard works are used.

- CAH VI, (Cambridge, 1927) Cambridge Ancient History.
VII² Part I, (Cambridge, 1984)
- Syll.³ W. Dittenberger Sylloge Inscriptionum Graecarum³ I-IV
(Leipzig, 1915-1924).
- Tod II M.N. Tod A Selection of Greek Historical Inscriptions II
(Oxford, 1948).
- SEG Supplementum Epigraphicum Graecum.
- FGrHist F. Jacoby Die Fragmente der Griechischen Historiker I-
(Berlin, 1923-1929; Leiden, 1940-).
- P-W A. Pauly et al. Paulys Real-Encyclopädie der classischen
Altertumswissenschaft I- (Stuttgart, 1894-).
- IG Inscriptiones Graecae (Berlin, 1873-).
- Lewis & Short C.T. Lewis and C. Short A Latin Dictionary (Oxford, 1879).
- OLD P.G.W. Glare Oxford Latin Dictionary (Oxford, 1982).
- LSJ H.G. Liddell and R. Scott A Greek-English Lexicon⁹ (Oxford,
1968).
- OGIS W. Dittenberger Orientis Graeci Inscriptiones Selectae I-II
(Leipzig, 1903 and 1905).
- APF J.K. Davies Athenian Propertied Families (Oxford, 1971).
- Koerte A. Koerte Menandri quae supersunt; reliquiae apud veteres
scriptores servatae edidit A. Koerte (Leipzig, 1959).
- ML R. Meiggs and D.M. Lewis A Selection of Greek Historical
Inscriptions to the End of the Fifth Century B.C. (Oxford,
1969).

- Nauck TGF² A. Nauck Tragicorum Graecorum Fragmenta² (Leipzig, 1889).
- P.Oxy. Oxyrhynchus Papyri (London, 1898-).
- P.Tebt. I-IV Tebtunis Papyri London, (1902-[1976]).
- P.Eleph. O. Rubensohn Elephantine Papyri (Berlin, 1907).
- Kock T. Kock Comicorum Atticorum Fragmenta I-III (Leipzig, 1880-1888).
- HCT A.W. Gomme, A. Andrewes and K.J. Dover A Historical Commentary on Thucydides I-V (Oxford, 1945-1981).

Preface

I have received help from many quarters in the time in which this thesis has been in preparation.

Financial help is the most important. It came from the Department of Education and Science, who gave me a Major State Studentship. There was also some from the Electors to the Prendergast Studentship (Cambridge University). I thank both.

Teaching, discussion and guidance are next. My supervisor David Lewis has been the main source of all three, and it is to him chiefly (though at an earlier stage also to John Crook) that I owe the most important feature of this piece of work: its subject. My ideas, such as they were, would certainly have been fruitless without his direction. He has been an ideal supervisor, leaving me to work, sometimes for months, without manifesting any worry; and giving full comment and guidance when I have shown work to him.

Simon Hornblower is another who has shown a great deal of helpfulness and interest. I wish to thank him, and George Cawkwell, who read and commented on drafts of some parts of the thesis, and many more classicists and others who have been of help. My mistakes, as custom and reason require, I acknowledge as only mine. Dorothy Palmquist, whose work is evidence that she is one of Oxford's top thesis-typists, has typed for me with a persistence which I can only admire.

Jenny McKechnie I thank last and most gratefully. Her help has been to me rather than the thesis, and all the more welcome for that.

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Chapter 1 - Introduction

1. An Outside World

City-state life, to most Greeks of the fourth century B.C., was the normative pattern of human existence.¹ Values connected with it were applied in all fields of activity. As A. Momigliano remarks about one particular - highly significant - field of Greek endeavour: 'if we exclude the Cynics, whom nobody except themselves considered wise, the Greek image of wisdom was a higher form of civic virtue.'² The city is so central to the Greek consciousness of what being Greek was that it may perhaps seem perverse to make a study of the people who lived outside it. Superficially, there was little in common between the exiles, mercenaries, raiders, physicians, builders, sculptors, courtesans, cooks and traders with whom parts of this thesis will deal; or between the routes by which they had come to enter on their particular ways of life.³

The central contention of this thesis is that the phenomena it seeks to describe are related to each other and that together they represent an important aspect of the change which occurred in Greece between the Classical and Hellenistic periods. A particularly important thing for the reader to understand, therefore, is who is in question when the title speaks of 'Greeks outside the πόλις', and why these Greeks are treated not indeed as a homogeneous group (they were people of radically differing sorts) but as a group who ought to be studied in one enquiry.

The criterion which has been applied throughout, with as much rigour as the sources allow, is that the Greeks under examination should be Greeks who had no settled home in a πόλις; that either they should have been living outside any city (physically, as a mercenary on campaign would do - at any rate for a part of a given year⁴) or they should be people who might live in a city for periods of time (days, months, even years) but would expect, during their stay in a given place, that at some

time they would move to another place.⁵ Greeks of the latter kind are less obviously outside the πόλις than those who habitually slept outside city walls,⁶ and there might be a temptation to consider the difference between them and other metics unimportant; but the approach used in this study is much encouraged by the work of D. Whitehead on metics:

Whitehead, who stresses the idea of being a 'home-changer' and argues for the use of the English word immigrant as a good translation of μέτοικος,⁷ speaks of non-citizen scholars and itinerant craftsmen becoming 'true "home-changers"' when they abandoned their 'esprit de retour'.⁸

The feature common to all the Greeks defined here as 'outside the πόλις' was that (whatever the differences in their skills, their earning power and the lengths of their stay within the city walls) they derived their incomes from occupations which required or permitted mobility. In all the areas of wage-labour or business examined in this enquiry, there is evidence showing growth during the fourth century in the numbers of people making incomes from these mobile occupations. In some areas there was growth beyond recognition between 400 and 300 (for example, the area of mercenary service⁹), in others more modest growth (for example, the area of long-distance trading¹⁰), and in some occupations growth was accompanied by very significant advances in techniques¹¹ or in forms of recruitment.¹² The combined growth in many areas amounted to the rise of a world outside the πόλις as a new and influential aspect of the whole Greek world.

The 'world outside the πόλις' was as differentiated socially and economically as the remainder of the Greek world. A rich, successful philosopher bringing his teaching and his disciples from another city to Athens¹³ and an unemployed mercenary waiting at Taenarum¹⁴ were as different as Plato and a poor Athenian; but as the political and economic fortunes of a city affected both rich and poor, so all sections of the less clearly identifiable community outside the cities were affected by

events throughout the Greek world. Things which affected only one or two cities would usually have little effect (at least as far as can be discerned now) on the whole community of Greeks outside the πόλις; but things which involved large movements, such as the troubles of Greek Sicily and Italy under the Dionysii, or the conquest and settlement of Asia by Alexander,¹⁵ had a more immediate effect, probably, on the numbers and lifestyles of the Greeks outside the πόλις than they would be likely to have on the population and life of any particular city.

The existence of a large and vigorous non-πόλις element in the life of the parts of Greece whose culture had developed in the patterns implied by πόλις organization was an aspect as well as a cause of social change in Greece: it was a development which arose from Greek politics and in general from Greek civilization, so that it would be misleading to apply to the fourth-century Greek world the category (mutatis mutandis) of 'Un-Roman Activities' used by R. MacMullen to describe the phenomena discussed in his book Enemies of the Roman Order.¹⁶ MacMullen's picture is of 'Un-Roman Activities' becoming more pervasive until 'there was little "Roman" left in the Roman empire ... the "Un-Roman" elements ... now controlled the world in which they lived.'¹⁷ This study has points of similarity with MacMullen's: both consider the effects which people as disparate as philosophers and brigands had on society,¹⁸ and both assess governmental reactions to the problems caused by outsiders.¹⁹ But whereas MacMullen argues that 'the drift of directing power outward and downward from the Roman aristocracy is well-known; its corollary is the simultaneous movement of anti-Establishment impulses in the same direction,'²⁰ this study suggests that in fourth-century Greece the society which grew up outside the states, because it was outside the states' control and so less subject than the rest of society to the conservative impulses of city-state thought,²¹ was an important factor in the social and political changes

which made up the beginning of the Hellenistic age.

The relationship between the cities and the Greeks outside them is important in this enquiry. Since it is being argued that the state of things in the cities multiplied the number of people outside them, it is necessary to be specific about where Greeks outside the cities were coming from and for what reasons,²² and where possible to examine how some of them became settled again. More generally, attention is given in this study to the expected nature of transactions between city-state communities and their mercenaries, the raiders who came into contact with them, their doctors, the traders who brought imports to them, and the other representatives of the outside world.

2. Themes in Modern Explanations

It has been argued in Section 1 that large events and general trends in the fourth-century history of Greece affected, and were affected by, the community of Greeks outside the cities; and that the genesis and development of this community as a large new element in Greek society was a significant step on the path out of the Classical age into the Hellenistic age. The implications of this argument require discussion.

The questions why Greece came to be ruled by Macedonian kings and whether the πόλις as an institution was in decline in some sense in the fourth century have been exciting speculation for a long time. This little introduction could not begin to summarize the views which have been put forward. But perhaps it will not seem too much to select three themes present in modern attempts at explanation of the phenomena, and to suggest how the findings of this thesis affect the implications of these explanatory themes. The themes chosen are intended to represent contrasting lines of thought in explanation of the history of ancient Greece. They are: first, the theme of the necessity for Greek unity; second, the theme of the

overwhelming power of the Macedonian monarchs; and third, the theme that Macedonian rule and the decline of democracy were consequences of the success of the ruling class in Greece in class struggle with the lower classes.

Authors who have mentioned the necessity for Greek unity have in general evinced a measure of regret at its imposition by the might of the Macedonian kings. E. Barker, arguing that the fourth-century political thought of Greece was one of unity (he draws attention to hegemonies and federations), states that the effect of this political thought was limited by the persistence of ideas giving a high importance to the autonomous city.²³ The necessity of unity is stated with a sigh ('the free city-state is not built for long endurance in the world of politics ... and who ... can feel otherwise about the great State than that it was a "cruel necessity"?'²⁴). A few pages later, Barker points to the need for colonial expansion and settlement to make provision for 'men who ... were falling into a life of roaming vagrancy'²⁵ as a justification for the 'new monarch' of the fourth century B.C.²⁶

Other authors make statements about the difficulties of the world of city-states and the advantages of the Macedonian kings with less display of disappointment. A. R. Burn, in his book The Warring States of Greece, says:²⁷ 'the fourth century B.C. ... in political history ... reveals the moral bankruptcy of the city-state world.' W. W. Tarn, arguing for another form of this approach, characterizes Alexander as superseding the Athenians as the standard-bearer of intellectual progress:²⁸ 'if we feel - and justly feel - that during Alexander's lifetime Greece has lost importance, that depends, not on military defeat or on Alexander's conquests in Asia, but simply on the fact that Athens had, for the moment, lost to Alexander her primacy in the world of ideas; it was Alexander who was now opening up new spheres of thought.'

The point which Barker hints at and which these latter authors, concentrating on the city-states and considering their political eclipse, seem to miss, is that the advent of the Macedonian kingdoms represents the inauguration of a dominant political structure outside the πόλις, and over and above them, just at the moment when trends in the development of the Greek world had led to the availability of colonists to settle cities, mercenaries to fight wars, an expanding community of traders to undertake distribution and exchange in areas newly settled by Greeks, and (fewer in number but of as great importance) the specialist builders, artists, philosophers, doctors, cooks and hetaerae who were needed to make the difference between a community of settlers and a Greek city.²⁹ Important elements of a cultural infrastructure for Greek expansion were available to Alexander and the Successors from the world of Greeks without city attachments. The Macedonian states found that the human resources for the establishment of a new kind of Greek government (for filling courts, camps and capital cities³⁰) were at their disposal even though talented Greeks in the city-state tradition still lived in their homes and concentrated on the life of their own communities.³¹

This is a positive argument: that Hellenistic kingdoms could not have been founded much earlier than they were because the Greek elements in their power and culture were crucial and were not in general recruited from among the settled Greeks of the powerful city-states. If it is accepted, the suggestions of moral or intellectual decline in the cities become unnecessary.³² The argument contains no provision to the effect that 'Greek Unity' or 'the Great State' had become inevitable as well as practicable by 338;³³ this is another point in its favour.

The theme of the overwhelming power of the Macedonian monarchs is not usually presented by modern authors as the whole explanation for the eclipse of the power of the Greek cities. But it appears in many places, often as

a more or less unstated assumption. T. T. B. Ryder, commenting on the appearance of Isocrates' Philippus in the period after the Peace of Philocrates, says:³⁴ 'it is doubtful whether Philip would ever have stopped short of being the dominant partner in any alliance, and probable that he always intended to establish some sort of control in Greece.' It would not be possible to say this if Philip's power were not regarded as so overwhelming that it would have been unreasonable for Philip to doubt his ability to subdue Greece. Similarly J. K. Davies' chapter on 'The Opportunists' explains Philip's success in relation to the resemblances and differences between him and the other monarchs and quasi-monarchs influenced by Dionysius I,³⁵ and answers affirmatively the question 'whether we can explain Philip's transformation from regional dynast to master of Greece purely in terms of his having been able to add a second role, as mercenary commander, to that of traditional king.'³⁶ He succeeded, and Jason of Pherae and the rest succeeded much less well, because of the differential in the military and economic power controlled by Philip and by each of the others.³⁷

This is attractive as an explanation why Greece fell under Philip's power; but it does not begin to explain the Hellenistic state. Without the development of a form of state allowing for government of the world of city-states, the Macedonians' hegemony over Greece would have gone the same way as the hegemonies of the Athenians, the Spartans and the Thebans. A good deal of the change involved in arriving at the Hellenistic state came about as a result of the needs of Alexander's Asian expedition, and many of the initiatives involved were taken by individuals;³⁸ but if it had not been the case that Hellenistic government could achieve things which Classical government found it problematic to achieve, such as control of piracy and the problem of exiles,³⁹ then its potential rivals would have had more chance of flourishing. And this new form of government was emphatically

not only an application to a wider sphere of the traditional Macedonian forms.⁴⁰ Those were forms very like ones which most of Greece had abandoned in the Archaic age. Hellenistic government, which cemented the victories of Philip, Alexander and Antipater over the city-state Greeks, was a form of Macedonian kingship deeply influenced by the problems and opportunities present in fourth-century Greece on account of Greeks without cities.

Both the 'Greek Unity' theme and the 'Macedonian Power' theme assume that the restriction of the scope of Greek city governments for independent action was the most important consequence of the rise of Macedonian power in Greece. But G. E. M. de Ste. Croix disputes this and asserts that the disappearance of democracy was more important than the general circumscription of the powers of Greek governments. He says:⁴¹ 'modern historians have shown little concern with this aspect of the destruction of democracy; and when they have noticed the disappearance at all, their interest in it has been submerged by attention to the supersession of "city-state" or "republican" forms of government (which of course may be either democratic or oligarchic) by the monarchy of the Hellenistic Kingdoms or the Roman Principate.' The implication of this statement is that the death of democracy, though it took a very long time in the dying, was the significant event which was happening at the times when the surface symptoms included the rise of the Hellenistic kingdoms or of the Roman Principate.⁴² A secondary implication is that modern historians have been too anti-democratic to acknowledge this fact.⁴³

But the protection afforded to free poor Greek people by democracy had become (taking an overview of the whole Greek world) steadily more partial as the fourth century had progressed.⁴⁴ The increasing size, and economic and strategic importance, of the community of Greeks living outside the cities had created a mass of economically active people who had nothing to gain from the continuance of the system of making political

decisions by a majority vote of all citizens.⁴⁵ Once there was a significant number of free people outside the systems of democratic government (some of them the educated, articulate men who could have been influential if they had been in a position to be involved in government), the nature of citizen bodies as private clubs became a hindrance to their acceptability as governing bodies, at least at the intellectual level. 'Cynic monarchism', for example, can be considered as a theoretical expression of the frustration with which some philosophers regarded the democratic transactions of the cities in which they sojourned.⁴⁶ And de Ste. Croix has an idealized view of metic status as affording protection against economic exploitation, which ought to be treated with reservation;⁴⁷ so that it must seem doubtful whether it is right to minimize the importance of the point that democracy protected a privileged minority (those who were not slaves, women, children, free non-citizens or non-Greeks) in democratic cities. Democracy was restricted to cities: no ancient Greek political unit more comprehensive than a city-state was governed by a constitution which de Ste. Croix would be likely to recognise as democratic.⁴⁸ So that the establishment in the fourth century of governments over and above the 'city-state' or 'republican' governments must be regarded both as interesting in itself and as no less valuable an object of constitutional analysis and speculation than the decline over several hundred years of democratic forms in (what was from 338) local government in Greek areas.

A. Lintott sums up the politics of Greek cities in the fourth century when he says:⁴⁹ 'it is almost too easy to draw a moral or deduce a necessity from the history of the Greek cities in the fourth century: their perpetual external and civil wars left them at the mercy of a new power, the ruthless and single-minded Philip of Macedon. Yet it is not immediately clear how far political behaviour in the cities had declined from what it had been in the fifth century, their supposed zenith, nor is

it easy to pick out significant changes in their social and economic conditions.' The three themes considered in this Section are in effect attempts to get at the causes of the change in Greek society in the fourth century, which involved the Greek states' becoming subject to Macedonian kings: the Greek Unity theme treats the change as a (sad) illustration of the power and importance of large states in an ancient civilization; the Power of Macedon theme yields inescapable analysis of why Philip, Alexander and Antipater beat the Greeks; and the Decline of Democracy theme treats Philip as the lucky find of the ruling classes in Greek states. It is the intention of this thesis to suggest that an identifiable community existed outside the πόλεις, whose influence on the course of change was great enough to make necessary a reconsideration of previous modern explanations of fourth-century history.⁵⁰

Notes

1. de Ste. Croix, p.9, though mentioning the πόλις/χώρα division in the Archaic and Classical periods, talks of the common culture of groups living in both areas. As p.10 adds, Greek culture was city culture in a still more marked way in areas where Greek settlement began in the Hellenistic period. Cf. below, pp. 23-25.

2. A. Momigliano Essays in Ancient and Modern Historiography (Oxford, 1977), p.22.

3. This is an appropriate place to mention a previous study. T. R. Glover Greek Byways (Cambridge, 1932) has a chapter titled 'The Wandering Greek' (pp.78-100). It attempts a synchronic treatment, examining the aptitude to wander as a facet of the Greek temperament. It is intended as an essay rather than a research paper.

4. On mercenaries cf. below, pp. 146-176.

Virtually all Greek traders must have lived in cities in winter, whether as metics or as citizens (but here cf. below, pp. 289-290), but in summer they formed a very important part of the world outside the πόλις: clearly they could not sensibly be excluded from this enquiry.

5. Cf. below, pp. 235-236.

6. Citizens and other settled country-dwellers also slept outside walls. But the point should not be obscured by this.

7. Whitehead, p.7.

8. Whitehead, p.18; the point is also made that any foreigner staying even a fairly short period in Athens (cf. Whitehead, p.9) became a μέτοικος.

The case of potters in the late fifth century is apposite here: many of them moved out of Athens (B. R. MacDonald 'The Emigration of Potters from Athens in the Late Fifth Century B.C. and its Effect on the Attic Pottery Industry' AJA 85 (1981), pp.159-168; and cf. below, p.262 n.18), and MacDonald argues that 'the disaster in Sicily in 413, may have prompted

some craftsmen to abandon Athens, especially metics who had previously considered permanent residency' (p.166 - MacDonald quotes Hyp. 3(Athenogenes), 29 and 33, referring to the law forbidding metics to leave Athens in wartime and making them subject to arrest if they did so and later returned to Athens). This illustrates how adverse circumstances could lead some apparently settled metics to behave as Greeks outside the πόλις rather than as Whitehead's 'true "home-changers"'.

9. Cf. below, pp.162-164.

10. Cf. below, pp.288-325.

11. Any number of technical advances could be mentioned. Davies, pp.166-167 gives an overview of the fourth century as 'a spectacularly creative period in Greek culture' (p.166). One of very few texts which make explicit the recognition by a contemporary that innovation and advance in scientific and technical areas were fairly widespread is Theophrastus HP IX.16.8-9: having described how Thrasyas of Mantinea used to gather ingredients for drugs from a wide range of places, and how Thrasyas' pupil Alexias was as skilled as his master in drug-making and experienced in other aspects of medicine, Theophrastus says (§9): 'so these practices [sc. travel for scientific purposes] seem to be in evidence much more now than formerly.'

Cf. below, p.243 and n.55.

12. Cf. below, pp.257-260.

13. Cf. below, pp.249-250.

14. Cf. below, pp.165-166.

15. Cf. below, pp.144-145.

16. See MacMullen, p.vi.

17. MacMullen, p.ix.

18. Cf. below, pp.177-234 and pp.246-250. Cf. also MacMullen, pp.46-94 and pp.192-241.

19. See in particular MacMullen, p.216, where, commenting on the difficulties caused to Roman government by circumcellions, Bagaudae, Arabs and others, MacMullen says: 'by declaring them enemies or outlaws, the government put into formal words the simpler wish that they would all go away, behave themselves, or die. No chance of that. The need for legislation only acknowledged how vigorous they had become, and their vigor continued unabated, ultimately transforming the world from which the insiders - the acquiescent or directing members of the dominant civilization - tried to exclude them.'

20. MacMullen, p.242.

21. It would be unwise to underestimate the extent of the continuing association between aristocratic values and civic values: see e.g. W. Donlan The Aristocratic Ideal in Ancient Greece (Lawrence, 1980), pp.155-158.

22. A scholar with whom I discussed this suggested taking the existence of Greeks outside the cities as a datum and considering only the consequences of it. But to do so would be to confine the scope of this enquiry in an unnatural way. It might also give the impression that the reasons for the growth in numbers of Greeks outside the cities were more shadowy than in fact they are.

23. E. Barker 'Greek Political Thought and Theory' in CAH VI (Cambridge, 1927), pp.505-535 (hereinafter Barker), at p.509.

24. Barker, p.510.

25. Barker, p.509.

26. Barker, pp.512-513.

27. A. R. Burn The Warring States of Greece (London, 1968), p.112.

28. W. W. Tarn 'Greece: 335 to 321 B.C.' CAH VI (Cambridge, 1927), pp.438-460, at p.443.

29. Cf. below, pp.235-287.

30. Cf. below, p.260. It was becoming possible to be a courtier almost in the modern sense of the term; F. W. Walbank, commenting on how the early Hellenistic kings had to build up their own governing class, says (CAH VII² Part I (Cambridge, 1984), p.69) 'the Friends were almost invariably Greeks or Macedonians; ... Many, but not all, were exiles from their own cities ... Artists, writers, philosophers, doctors, scholars - all were possible recruits, but once they became the king's Friends they might be drafted to any task.'

31. See below, p.196: and Plutarch Praecepta gerendae rei publicae (= Mor. 798A - 825F), with the comments of de Ste. Croix, pp.310-313, shows how (at a later period) local politics retained its interest as an occupation for a citizen. Theophrastus Characters 23 ('Αλαζονεία) describes the imaginary Boastful Man who tells someone he happens to be walking down the street with (συνοδοῦπιρος) how he campaigned with Evander (the name Theophrastus uses is apparently chosen to stand instead of Alexander) - though in fact he has never been out of the country: and how he has received three letters from Antipater (this name not disguised) begging him to come to Macedonia. But the boasts about his cosmopolitan life as soldier and courtier are complemented by equally extravagant boasts about the good deeds he has done the city; and the reasons he gives for rejecting Antipater's requests are interesting: he has been offered the chance to export timber duty free but has refused in order not to be subjected to sycophancy (that is, so that no one in Athens will be able to make money out of him by starting a lawsuit against him), and he thinks the Macedonians ought to have more sense than to expect him to come to Macedonia (Περαιτέρω φιλοσοφεῖν προσῆκε Μακεδόσι). The joke is that he boasts so extravagantly about everything; but the assumption is that a man of the kind he pretends to be (wealthy, courageous, generous) will have the city as the beneficiary of his qualities. Even after Crannon and Amorgos,

Athenians limited their field of political interests to Athens. See also Hornblower, p.266.

32. There is no real reason to think there was such a decline. Cf. below, pp. 9-10 and Lintott, pp.252-262. Ruschenbusch, pp.60-61, gives a tabular presentation of ancient references to show the relative prevalence of στάσις in the fifth and fourth centuries: if increasing incidence of στάσις could be seen as an index of moral decline, Ruschenbusch's findings would not support a theory of moral decline in the fourth century.

33. Or 336 or 322.

34. T. T. B. Ryder Koine Eirene (Oxford, 1965), pp.99-100.

35. Davies, pp.228-253.

36. Davies, p.249. The qualification concerns the importance of legitimacy (p.250): 'In terms of power,' Davies says (p.249), 'the answer is probably yes.'

37. This is in effect the conclusion of Davies' chapter (cf. above, n.36), in which the question why Philip was the most successful is put at the beginning (Davies, p.228).

38. Which is in effect simply to acknowledge that conquering the Persian empire made a difference to the conquerors, as would be expected.

39. Cf. below, pp.207-212 and pp.29-34.

40. Cawkwell, p.19, says, 'Philip transformed the ancient world, confronting the city-states of Greece with the national state of Macedon ...' And at the end of the book (p.183) he speculates whether Philip, if he had lived, might not have consolidated gains round the Mediterranean instead of advancing to conquer the Persian empire ('if he had so preferred, Macedonia might have become the homeland of a mighty power'). This apparent suggestion that a distinctively Macedonian empire (rather than a number of Hellenistic kingdoms) could have come into being in the 330s and 320s is implausible in view of the fast pace of change in Macedonian society during Philip's reign.

41. de Ste. Croix, p.315.

42. This is intended, at least, as a fair interpretation of de Ste. Croix' point.

43. There are several parallel references in de Ste. Croix, for example at p.71 ('the anti-democratic instincts of the majority of scholars'), and cf. the comments on the Athenian policy of 'naval imperialism' at p.293.

It is not surprising that P. Green (rev. of de Ste. Croix, TLS 4167 (February 11 1983), pp.125-126 comments (p.125) on '... the risk of being relegated by de Ste. Croix to that stooge-chorus of bourgeois colleagues ...'

44. de Ste. Croix, p.315 notes as a result of the destruction of democracy the 'disappearance of the limited measure of political protection afforded to the lower classes against exploitation by the propertied.'

45. As de Ste. Croix, p.284, comments: 'the first and most characteristic feature of dēmokratia was rule by majority vote of all citizens.'

46. See Hornblower, p.155. Skilled workers who had come from well-off backgrounds and who had mobile practices of their various crafts lived without citizen rights; and so could clearly not be expected to take a Periclean attitude to democracy. On the lifestyle of philosophers, cf. below, pp246-250.

47. de Ste. Croix, p.289: 'And surely metics could not be exploited intensively: if they were, they would simply move elsewhere.' This is a naive expectation, in view of de Ste. Croix' theoretical framework: one would not usually expect a Marxist to put forward a proposition so closely analogous to 'surely employees cannot be exploited intensively: if they were, they would simply get new jobs.' The fact is more probably that some metics could improve their lot by moving, but others could not.

48. Hornblower, p.236, argues that because it embodies a representative principle 'Greek federalism was often more democratic than the often urban-dominated primary assemblies of the city-states.' But federalism

does not figure in the comments on democracy in de Ste. Croix. Athens in the fifth century, and Thebes in the fourth, ruled areas outside their own cities: but these empires had no say in the government of the cities which held them.

49. Lintott, p.252, and cf. above, n.32.

50. G. Theissen The First Followers of Jesus (London, 1978) discusses the role of 'wandering charismatics' in the earliest years of church history (see pp.8-16). The social situations described by Theissen are not closely analogous to those examined in this book, but insofar as wandering people were both a symptom and a catalyst of social change in both instances, there is a point of comparison.

Chapter 2 - Πλανώμενοι

1. Introductory

It is a commonplace of fourth - century rhetoric that people who travel, or who live away from home, are disreputable characters.

Philon, for example, who went to Oropus as a metic during the rule of the Thirty at Athens, is represented in Lysias as disloyal to his Athenian compatriots,¹ βουληθεὶς παρ' ἐκείνους μετουκεῖν μᾶλλον ἢ μεθ' ὑμῶν πολίτης εἶναι. Similarly, Aphobus' headlong getaway to Megara after his conviction in the matter of Demosthenes' estate is brought up against him by his former ward;² and Isaeus avers in his speech written for Hagnon and Hagnotheus, stay-at-home relatives of a mercenary (Nicostratus) who died at Ace,³ that his clients⁴ οὔτε ἀποδεδημήκασιν ουδαμοῦ πώποτε, ὅπου ἂν μὴ ὑμεῖς [sc. the Athenians] προστάξητε, οὔτ' ἐνθάδε μένοντες ἄχρηστοί εἰσι τῇ πόλει

Orators had to appeal to juries composed of Athenian citizens the majority of whom lived their whole lives in Athens and Attica or in Athenian military and naval service abroad. So the orators' testimony reflects the feeling of those with fixed homes that people who did not share in settled Greek life were reasonable objects of suspicion.

But (even given this unavoidable degree of bias in the sources, which is only partly compensated for by the few available strands of evidence for the feelings and ideologies of some of the Greeks who lived without city ties⁵), the sources for the history of Greece in the fourth century, and in particular the political works of Isocrates, offer a fair number of glimpses of the world outside the πόλις, and of a 'floating population' in Hellas.⁶ It is a diverse world, and there is a risk connected with an enquiry of the sort undertaken here that the constraints imposed by the nature of the primary sources may make it almost impossible for the

student to develop an accurate picture of what the people in the world outside the πόλις were like. Isocrates speaks of πλανώμενοι, whom he contrasts with πολιτευόμενοι (uses of πλανώμενος and cognates in other authors do not make this contrast explicit⁷).⁸ When he uses this word he may well not be including (in his own mind) the craftsmen and traders whose occupations (it will be argued in later chapters⁹) were using more manpower than in earlier periods and contributing to the non-πόλις society in Greece; he may have in mind only the destitute wanderers and may have regarded the others as a normal, and not an alarming, feature of contemporary life.

But even destitute wanderers encompassed a spectrum of different kinds of people. And πλάνη, a word which meant either simple travel, as in Herodotus,¹⁰ or error, as in the philosophers,¹¹ could be a temporary or a permanent life of moving from city to city. Certainly some πλανώμενοι would spend periods living in cities as metics, and a period of residence in a city might be followed by further travel.

It is clear that the people Isocrates wrote about and worried about were mainly mercenary soldiers, or exiles, or both. While modern authors have studied both mercenary service and exile,¹² less attention has been given to the wandering life adopted by some mercenaries and characteristic of exiles.¹³ Sections 1 and 2 of this chapter deal qualitatively with the life led by πλανώμενοι in the fourth century, while sections 3 - 5 deal with how the phenomenon of πλάνη and πλανώμενοι is related to general trends and particular events in the history of the period. That πλάνη was a social phenomenon of some significance is shown in Section 4, where the reasons for starting this study from about 400 are explained.¹⁴

But what living outside the πόλις involved is a point which will require careful examination. Already in the fourth century it was possible for Isocrates to complain that certain philosophers were taking altogether

too optimistic a view of the attractions of the wandering life. These philosophers, according to Isocrates,¹⁵ *τολμῶσι γράφειν ὡς ἔστιν ὁ τῶν πτωχευόντων καὶ φευγόντων βίος ζηλωτότερος ἢ τῶν ἄλλων ἀνθρώπων.*

The enquiry will begin from the particular, and move on in later chapters to examine the various distinct but interrelated areas of experience of Greeks who lived in different non-city-state contexts.¹⁶ The particular, for present purposes, is a story from a speech which is unique not only in that it is the only extant forensic speech of the Classical period prepared for delivery outside Athens, but also in the insight it offers into one family's history of separation from its home city.

2. Isocrates Aegineticus

Isocrates Aegineticus is an adventure story not without exotic features. A certain Thrasyllus inherited by will from Polemaenetus the *μάντις* his books of *μαντικὴ* and some property (Isocrates Aegineticus 5; in the rest of this sub-section, references to the Aegineticus will be by number only), and so began to practise sooth-saying, becoming a wanderer (*πλάνης*) and living (*δουαυτηθείς*) in many cities (6). He seems, like Chaucer's Pardoner, to have had 'a joly wenche in every toun',¹⁷ including the mother of the speaker's opponent (6). His *πλάνη* was profitable enough to enable him to return to Siphnos as the richest of the citizens, and to marry into the best family in the island (7).

After Thrasyllus' death the property passed to his sons Sopolis and Thrasylochus: they had a mother and sister living (9; 11). The property (*οὐσίαι*) must have consisted wholly or mainly of movables, since most of it was at some time left with the speaker's *ξένοισι* in Paros, and recovered by the speaker at the risk of his life when Pasinus (otherwise unknown) took Paros with the help of Siphnian exiles, who massacred six of the

speaker's male relatives (18-19). Later the speaker and Thrasylochus, with their respective mothers and sisters (Sopolis was already absent), were exiled from Siphnos (20; 22). The whole fortune inherited from Thrasyllus they managed to take (20), but the speaker's property, presumably not made up of movables, was lost (23). After the escape, they arrived first in Melos (21), where they had ξένου (22), but at Thrasylochus' suggestion they moved on to Troezen.

From Troezen or Melos - it is not made explicit from which, but almost certainly from the former, not least because it seems a much more likely source of ἐπίκουροι - the Siphnian exiles made an attempt to capture Siphnos (38). It failed (39). Sopolis went to Lycia, and died there (40), and at some time after his brother's death Thrasylochus, who together with the speaker had by then moved to Aegina, fell ill - fatally ill, as it proved (24; 11). His mother and sister stayed in Troezen (25), where the speaker's mother and sister had already died of disease (22). Thrasylochus before dying adopted the speaker in a will and gave him his sister and his οὐσία, and at the time of the lawsuit they are still living as metics in Aegina (12).

Now the narrative shows that the two families concerned were in some ways quite exceptional. They were not only oligarchs, but the leading oligarchic families of Siphnos (7; 36). Sopolis was chosen to lead the attempted revanche (38). Perhaps more exceptionally still, the οὐσία left to his children by Thrasyllus could be saved - not once but twice - and taken with the exiles as they travelled: the speaker's property, by contrast, was lost - as was the property of all land-owning exiles. The fact of having ready money probably helped gain Sopolis the command of the exiles. But in other respects the record of their πλάνη may be less untypical: of the six who left Siphnos, three died of diseases,¹⁸ and Sopolis, too, died, though the cause of his death is unspecified (failure

to recover from his wound?) (39-40). They left Melos to join a community of Siphnians in Troezen (31), so putting the wish to remain in the circle of the Siphnian oligarchs above the tie of ξενία and the reputed unhealthiness of Troezen (22). Seibert points out that Conon arrived in Melos in 393 and used it as a base, and states that while staying in Melos, the Siphnians believed themselves in danger of persecutions by the victorious democrats, connected presumably with the prospect of Conon's arrival (he cites the evidence about Conon to support this account of the Siphnians' fears).¹⁹ But there are difficulties with this view. Did anyone at Melos know that Conon was coming, until he arrived? Surely it would be unlikely. And Seibert's assumption that all the new exiles went to Melos together is not supported by the Aegineticus or any other ancient source.²⁰ Similarly, where Isocrates says that Thrasylochus and the speaker went to Aegina (24), Seibert says that 'many later continued their flight to Aegina'.²¹ On the contrary it seems almost certain that when Thrasylochus went to Troezen from Melos, he joined the other Siphnians, and when he went to Aegina from Troezen, he left them behind.

A few trends seem to emerge from the narrative of the Aegineticus. The exiles were able to travel - the ordinary Siphnians as well as the leading families, as is learnt from the fact that the Siphnians from Troezen attended the funeral in Aegina (31). Allied to the feasibility of travel is the fact that both Thrasylochus and Sopolis, and presumably some others, chose to settle elsewhere than with the community in Troezen: in the case at least of settlers with money, perhaps it is no surprise that they were welcomed as metics,²² but it is worth knowing that a community of exiles concentrated in one place would act as a sort of centre from which individuals would go and settle in small numbers as metics elsewhere; thus exile, πλάνη and temporary settlement were likely to be followed sooner or later by absorption into a new community as

metics.²³ Finally, and significantly, even formerly rich people were poor when they had lost their citizenship. As Seibert notes, poverty (caused by exile) led to loss of social position:²⁴ homeless oligarchs were mostly not, therefore, representative of the tradition of travel for pleasure recorded in Greek literature from Herodotus' time on.²⁵

As for Thrasyllus, his *πλάνη* was quite unlike the enforced wanderings of his son to Melos, to Troezen and then to Aegina. He was a *δημιουργός* with a mysterious and esoteric craft. From the Hippias Major of Plato the professional travels of sophists are known, and in that dialogue Socrates makes, on behalf of Gorgias of Leontini and Prodicus of Ceos, the claim that they each earned more money from *σοφία* than other *δημιουργοί* from their crafts.²⁶ It seems likely, though, from Thrasyllus' homecoming as the richest man in Siphnos (7), that a *μάντις* would be able to earn almost as much as a sophist. Travellers with less recondite crafts would command smaller fees. Thrasyllus chose to lead a wandering life; He went into it not only with the *τέχνη* and the books, but also with the money inherited from Polemaenetus (5). A chapter below on mobile skilled workers will discuss the life of people like him who lived and worked outside the cities.²⁷

3. Theorists' Viewpoints

An account like the Aegineticus is particularly valuable as a piece of material to consider in the context of Greek writers' reflections on the question of people without cities. Clearly the actors in the story experienced personal difficulties in adjusting to being outside the *πόλις*: in fact, Thrasylochus and the speaker of the Aegineticus found being in exile a thoroughly disagreeable experience. Every day in Aegina they spent *θρηνοῦτες ... καὶ τοὺς πόνους τοὺς ἀλλήλων καὶ τὴν φυγὴν καὶ τὴν ἐρημίαν τὴν ἡμετέραν αὐτῶν*: and no day was without tears,²⁸ or so says

their speech-writer. He says it also of the Plataeans in exile, for whom after their city's destruction he wrote:²⁹ πάντων τῶν ἀναγκαίων ὁμοίως ἐνδραεῖς ὄντες ἀλλήται καὶ πτωχοὶ κατέσταμεν. ἀλλήται is synonymous with ηλανώμενοι (the sentence structure here requires a noun): and the rhetorical exaggeration of how often the Siphnians and Plataeans wept over the loss of their place in Greek society (their being reduced from πολυτευόμενοι to πλανώμενοι) will not prevent the modern reader from realising what a serious view they had to take of their worsened circumstances. A Greek whose πόλις rejected him, or whose πόλις ceased to exist, thenceforth lacked the central one of the several terms in which he could define himself to the outside world. Aristotle in the ζῷον πολιτικόν passage from the beginning of the Politics reflects and expounds the view that a man without a πόλις was a man lacking an important part of his humanity:³⁰

... φανερόν ὅτι φύσει ἡ πόλις ἐστί, καὶ ὅτι ὁ ἄνθρωπος φύσει πολιτικὸν ζῷον, καὶ ὁ ἄπολις διὰ φύσιν καὶ οὐ διὰ τύχην ἤτοι φαῦλός ἐστιν, ἢ κρείττων ἢ ἄνθρωπος. ὥσπερ καὶ ὁ ὑφ' Ὀμήρου λολδορηθεὶς "ἀφρήτωρ ἀθέμιστος ἀνέστιλος." ἅμα γὰρ φύσει τοιοῦτος καὶ πολέμου ἐπιθυμητής, ἅτε περ ἄζυξ ὢν ὥσπερ ἐν πεττοῦς.

Now although Thrasyllus would probably not have been described by Aristotle as ἄπολις (since even when he chose to live as a traveller, he remained a πολίτης at Siphnos, where he later settled down again and brought up a family),³¹ and Thrasyllus' children were without a city by chance (διὰ τύχην), Aristotle's reservations only go to show the depth of his worry about anyone who really did choose to put himself outside the community. Such a choice would amount, in Aristotle's view, to a militant act of self-definition over against the normal (Hellenic) human pattern of life. Aristotle fears that such people will desire and encourage war. His quotation from Homer comes from a passage where Nestor is discouraging Diomedes from causing civil strife:³²

ἀφρήτωρ ἀθέστιλός ἀνέστιλός ἐστιν ἐκεῖνος
ὃς πολέμου ἔραται ἐπιδημίου ὀκρυόεντος

and the use of a passage reproaching the stirrer-up of civil strife (and having no obvious reference to being without a city) shows that in Aristotle's view the propensity to stir up strife is the chief characteristic of the ἄπολις, and not an occasional or accidental attribute. His theoretical justification follows: that the πόλις is prior to the individual, and that the individual, when isolated, is not self-sufficient; so that³³ ὁ ... μὴ δυνάμενος κοινωνεῖν ἢ μηδὲν δεόμενος δι' αὐτάρκειαν οὐθὲν μέρος πόλεως, ὥστε ἢ θηρίον ἢ θεός. Here Aristotle has repeated and strengthened the φαῦλος/κρείττων ἢ ἄνθρωπος alternative put forward in the earlier excerpt. It need hardly be pointed out that the second part is offered per impossibile: what Aristotle means is that all who choose to have no city are rogues.

Though a philosopher could express in such unequivocal terms as these his distrust of those who lived the life outside the πόλις, his eloquence fades by comparison with the pleas found in the ἐπίλογοι of some defence speeches on charges for which exile could be a penalty. Where the philosopher speaks for the settled, the 'political' population against the wanderers who trouble it, the λογογράφος puts words into the mouth of a citizen facing the prospect of becoming (though not, to use Aristotle's phrase, διὰ φύσιν) such a wanderer. Antiphon's imaginary defendant in Tetralogy I, for instance, describes his fate if convicted:³⁴ εἰάν δὲ νῦν καταλειφθεὶς ἀποθάνω, ἀνόσια ὀνειδέη τοῖς πασιὶν ὑπολείψω, ἢ φυγῶν γέρων καὶ ἄπολις ὦν ἐπὶ ξενίας πτωχεύσω. A number of other speakers make the same point.³⁵ Exile was of course the most complete form of separation from the πόλις, and exile by judicial decision (as opposed to exile of a party as a result of a coup d'état) left no prospect of fighting one's way back.³⁶ It also involved the confiscation of the condemned's property. πτωχεύσω was a fair prediction.

People who found that they could no longer live as part of a πόλις

community as citizens or metics with secure places in the city's life, faced the possibility of a beggarly, dangerous and humiliating life. Beggarly, if they had no income and no ξένου to go to; dangerous, from sickness or violence; humiliating because being stateless implied alienation (in the strict Latin-derived sense: becoming-foreign) from Greek people and from the typical Greek way of life. If, as Aristotle states, many such people were desirous of war, then it was by no means irrational that they should be so: to the political exiles, like the Siphnians in the Aegineticus, the overthrow of the home government would mean their κάθοδος; to others, war meant employment and hence a means of support.³⁷

4. Growth in Numbers of πλανώμενοι

There was a marked degree of growth in the number of men available for mercenary service between the end of the fifth century and the Peace of Philocrates.³⁸ Since the association between πλάνη³⁹ and mercenary service is so close in Isocrates, it will be useful in a brief space to try to get an overview of how the state of affairs alluded to by him and other writers⁴⁰ developed, and how it may have influenced their thinking. Now, it is perhaps in general not unfair to argue that the pattern of Greek history in the fourth century was set in the last decade of the fifth: and that two great events of those years can be identified as models for many later episodes. The first is the tyranny of the Thirty at Athens, and the second, the expedition of the Ten Thousand with Cyrus. Some aspects of that expedition have been examined above, but the point which here ought to be brought to the fore is, in Parke's words,⁴¹ that 'Cyrus, by raising the Ten Thousand, closed one period in the history of Greek mercenaries as he opened another.' His army became the first στρατόπεδον πλανώμενον, and its career marked the beginning of the period in which

mercenary soldiery was an important, instead of a peripheral, factor in Greek wars and Greek society.

The Peloponnesian war ended with the return of exiles to Athens.⁴² But the victory of the Spartans brought only a brief respite after the unprecedented spate of exilings which had happened throughout Hellas during the war.⁴³ Before long the Thirty decided to limit citizen rights at Athens to three thousand men,⁴⁴ and, as Lysias comments in his speech Against Eratosthenes, those who escaped death were in danger in many places, wandered to many cities and were banned from everywhere, went short of necessities, and left their children in foreign, some in hostile, lands - before they came to Peiraeus.⁴⁵ The pattern of mass exiling by a controlling faction followed by an attempted (in the Athenian case, successful) κἀθόδοος by the exiles is a completely typical feature of the fourth century in Greece till Alexander. This is not to say that the pattern was new at this time,⁴⁶ only that as mercenary soldiery and mercenary service were peripheral features of Greek life until Cyrus, and then became important, so until the Thirty Tyrants the practice of exiling political opponents wholesale (hundreds or thousands at a time) was pretty well exceptional, but after their example the instances of it multiplied.⁴⁷

If the troubles of Athens set a pattern for revolutionary politics in the post-war period, then they have also left behind a unique record of how the Athenian citizen community coped with the task of living together after its reunification: notwithstanding the amnesty, the recriminations concerning the rule of the Thirty continued at least throughout the 390s, as Lysias' speeches show. The reason must be that, amnesty or no amnesty, the upheavals of 404/3 were not easily forgotten by the Athenians. There is no other case where it is possible to see in any detail how life continued after the restoration of exiles to a city.⁴⁸

For the Athenian democrats, the φυγή - πλάνη - κάθοδος sequence was a fairly direct result of defeat in the Peloponnesian war. In contrast, the fact that Cyrus wished to raise an army, and had the money and good name needed to succeed in doing so, was not: but nevertheless, the continuation of the Cyreians' existence, as a στρατόπεδον πλανώμενον, can at least in part be explained by the observation that the Arcadian and Achaean hoplites who formed a majority of the army could have expected, had they gone home, to be required to serve the Spartans in an allied contingent, instead of serving paying customers. The Spartan campaigns in Asia arose out of the aftermath of the Peloponnesian war, and these campaigns made disbandment in effect an unattractive option for many of the Cyreians. The continued existence of Cyrus' army contributed to shaping the future of the mercenary armies of Greece.

And through the 390s there were more wars, of which the general effect was to hinder any attempt to return to the political and social pattern of the days before 431. The repeated tactical successes of Iphicrates' ξενικὸν ἐν Κορίνθῳ illustrate why it became preferable from an employer's point of view to be able to hire mercenaries who would not wish to go home in winter.⁴⁹ Through these years, and through the failure of the Peace of Antalcidas to stem the almost relentless tide of wars, Isocrates was in middle life, writing and teaching. In the Panegyricus, composed about 380, he already makes the plea for a panhellenic expedition against Persia which he continued to make, with differing degrees of shrillness, for more than forty years afterwards. He speaks against the wars of the Greeks:⁵⁰ οὐ τινες οὕτω περὶ μικρῶν κινδυνεύομεν, ἐξὸν ἀδεῶς πολλὰ κερτῆσθαι, καὶ τὴν ἡμετέραν αὐτῶν χώραν διαφθείρομεν, ἀμελήσαντες τὴν Ἄσίαν καρποῦσθαι, and later mentions how the wars and στάσεις cause homelessness and drive many men to serve as mercenaries:⁵¹

αὐτοὶ πλείω [sc. κακά] τῶν ἀναγκαίων προσεξευρήκαμεν, πολέμους καὶ στάσεις ἡμῶν αὐτοῖς ἐμπολήσαντες, ὥστε τοὺς μὲν ἐν ταῖς αὐτῶν

ἀνόμως ἀπόλλυσθαι, τοὺς δ' ἐπὶ ξένης μετὰ παίδων καὶ γυναικῶν
ἀλᾶσθαι, πολλοὺς δὲ δι' ἔνδειαν τῶν καθ' ἡμέραν ἐπικουρεῖν
ἀναγκαζομένους ... ἀποθνήσκειν.

Now, though N.H. Baynes, in his essay Isocrates,⁵² points out most convincingly that ἀσφάλεια - ability to enjoy property in security - is the cardinal aim of Isocrates' pronouncements both on domestic and on foreign policy,⁵³ he is hardly justified in his opinion that 'Isocrates remains a puzzle - just a bundle of contradictions':⁵⁴ on the contrary, Isocrates' claim to have spent his whole life warring on the barbarians (with words, of course, he means) carries a good deal of conviction.⁵⁵ He had in mind several possible champions of the Hellenic cause at different times: Athens, Dionysius I of Syracuse, Jason of Pherae, Philip;⁵⁶ and the detailed proposals he put forward were, as Baynes says, very inconsistent with each other;⁵⁷ but there is a single notion behind the whole thing - that of marching east to seize the Persians' wealth. This is the heart of Isocrates' message (an almost distressingly simple message), and the puzzles of the Nicocles and the Archidamus are unimportant by comparison. Isocrates saw a number of symptoms in the Greece of his day,⁵⁸ and attributed to them one cure.

The language of his speeches gives some clue as to how serious he thought the disease he hoped to see cured, was.⁵⁹ It is possible, however, to go a little way towards stating the size of the problem of πλανώμενοι in terms less subjective than those in which Isocrates dealt. At some time not far from 366, for example, Isocrates wrote in his Archidamus that there were more exiles (at the moment of writing) from one city, than there had been previously from the whole Peloponnese.⁶⁰ This is not informative about how many there were in absolute terms, but two important inferences can be drawn from it in relation to the number of exiles in Hellas in the mid-fourth century: first, that one event could change the general position a good deal (in this case, the mass exiling in

one city); and second, that impressions or comparative results are easier to come by than statistics or absolute figures. Seibert, in a very brief section titled Statistisches Zahlenmaterial, has collected the testimonies referring to numbers of exiles - and ten bodies of exiles from the period under consideration in this enquiry are numbered in the ancient sources.⁶¹ The largest attested single body of exiles in the period is of 3,000: the Messenians who in 401 joined the exiles from Cyrene and were killed wholesale in an attempted *κάθοδος* to that city;⁶² the smallest, from Mantinea in 385/4, is of 60.⁶³ They are scattered figures, and Seibert is right to avoid attempts at statistical inference from them. But however erratic the numbers of exiles were, and although the sources do not invite statistical treatment, there are some important events, which had happened many years before the decree was issued in 324 whereby exiles were restored,⁶⁴ which created exiles who were still homeless at the time of the decree. Their continued existence as exiles is an aspect of the continuity between the age of Isocrates and the time of the decree.

First, the problem of Arcadia, and particularly of Tegea, seems not to have been solved between 370 and 324. It would be more than plausible to guess that Tegea was the 'one city' Isocrates referred to in the Archidamus: 800 fled from it, and over 1400 from the whole of Arcadia, in the *στάσις* at the foundation of the *μία συντέλεια* of Arcadia,⁶⁵ and the inscription setting terms for the return of exiles to Tegea in accordance with the decree of Alexander can, in the absence of any evidence to suggest the contrary, be recognised as referring to these same exiles, or their children.⁶⁶

Second, as the same chapter of Diodorus in which the story of the decree is told shows, the Samians exiled by Timotheus in 365 were still in exile in 324.⁶⁷

Third, the years between 358 and 347 had seen the destruction of six cities in central and north Greece: the inhabitants of Potidaea and Sestos had been sold into slavery,⁶⁸ but the Methoneans and very possibly the Narycaeans and Zereians had simply been scattered.⁶⁹ The citizens of the largest of the six cities, Olynthus, were also sold as booty,⁷⁰ but in 316 Cassander gathered them up again and settled them in his new city, Cassandreia.⁷¹ Fourth, again in the same chapter of Diodorus as the decree, the Oeniadae had been expelled from their city by the Aetolians at some time before 324.⁷²

Xenophon records that the Tegean exiles were 800 in number.⁷³ He almost certainly means 800 men, since he records later on that 'the youngest of the Tegean exiles, about 400' were part of a Spartan garrison.⁷⁴ Counting women and children in proportion to adult men, they may have numbered about 2500 or 3000. The Samians will probably have been more than this,⁷⁵ the Methoneans, Narycaeans, Zereians and Oeniadae each fewer, yet certainly enough to number between them thousands rather than hundreds. There were more than 10,000 Olynthians in 347.⁷⁶ However, even though a brief glance at the middle years of the fourth century shows up a large and continuing problem of exile (Alexander could say truly to those exiles τοῦ μὲν φεύγειν ὑμᾶς οὐχ ἡμεῖς αὔτιλοι γεγόναμεν),⁷⁷ E. Badian's contention that mercenaries declared traitors to the League of Corinth during Alexander's campaign against Darius became exiles in great numbers,⁷⁸ and that mercenaries disbanded by the satraps in 324 ended up at Taenarum after being πλανώμενοι in Asia and living by foraging (προνομή),⁷⁹ is certainly right. So in spite of Alexander's attempt to settle mercenaries (his own) in new cities - which, as Parke notes,⁸⁰ 'reminds one of Isocrates' advice to Alexander's father that he should solve the problem of the Greek unemployed by conquering Asia Minor and settling colonies between Cilicia and Sinope' (Isocrates Philippus 120-122) - the result of the eastern conquests was

the exact opposite of what Isocrates had hoped. The problem which had persisted throughout the century, took a turn for the worse during the reign of Alexander the Great.

The connection between the exilings of the mid-century and the decree of 324 makes it necessary to undertake the study of exiles in these years with the decree in mind - as Seibert does.⁸¹ But Badian suggests that the decree was a response to 'an unprecedented and apparently insoluble social problem' created by Alexander himself.⁸² Arguing that only the exiles within easy reach of Olympia attended to hear the decree, he concludes that 'we shall not go far wrong, if we postulate a figure of the same order' (sc. as the 20,000 in D.S. 18.8.5) 'for those exiles who did not attend the Games'.⁸³ Regrettably, he glosses over Diodorus' explicit statement,⁸⁴ ἦσαν δ' οἱ φυγάδες ἀπηνηκότες ἅπαντες εἰς τὴν πανήγυριν, ὄντες πλείους τῶν δισμυρίων, which deserves at least the dignity of an open denial;⁸⁵ and it ought to be taken into account that there may perhaps have been 20,000 exiles altogether, of whom not all were at Olympia: in principle, Diodorus is as likely to have misinterpreted his source one way as the other. Badian goes on to say (same page): 'it is beyond belief that such numbers could be produced by the normal play of stasis in the cities.' Such numbers as Badian's conjectural 40,000, that is: but in view of the great mass of exiles 'left over' from the middle of the century who still needed settlement in 324, 20,000 is a perfectly credible number.

It is certain that the facts of πλάνη and exile affected the thought of Isocrates.⁸⁶ Another fourth-century theorist found it necessary to treat questions raised by this pervasive problem: Aeneas Tacticus, after outlining precautions to be taken by a city if there are exiles,⁸⁷ advises some very careful measures with regard to outsiders in the city: they are to have their arms confiscated; no one is to take them in without permission - not even innkeepers; they are to be locked into their inns at night; and

periodically the scruffy ones (ταλαπεῖροι) are to be expelled.⁸⁸ On the other hand, ἐπιδημοῦντες from nearby, with educational or other good reasons for their presence, ought merely to be registered.⁸⁹ The great mistrust expressed here, and attested in Polyaeus II.30.1, is of poor strangers with no reason for being in a particular city rather than the next: mistrust, in effect, of πλανώμενου.

Aeneas' treatise reflects the mundane concern for day-to-day security felt by the Greeks in their πόλεις. So his testimony is more to the point here than that of (on the one hand) Demosthenes, who, as noted below,⁹⁰ argued in the 350s that in spite of the ὑπάρχουσα πενία no Greek would serve the Great King against Greeks: here, ὑπάρχουσα πενία is treated as a small consideration beside any Greek's presumed pro-Hellenic feelings. More to the point too (in terms of its nearness to the world of events) than (on the other hand) the outstanding political texts of the fourth century, Plato's Republic and Laws and Aristotle's Politics. Though these books have as their theme, or part of their theme, the constitution of an ideal πόλις in the context of the Greek world, it was not the concern of their authors to comment on the existential details of city life, as Aeneas' theme required him to. Thus Plato, when, in the Republic, he comes to discuss how to maintain the number of households at 5,040, is obliged to provide that if a son is disowned by his father (and the process of ἀποκῆρυξις is made difficult) and not adopted into a household within ten years, he is to be sent to a colony. With the number of households strictly limited,⁹¹ ἀναγκάως ἔχει εἰς ἄλλην χώραν ἐξοικίσεσθαι τὸν ἀπάτορα. But the plan to have a colony to use as a sort of 'governor' to regulate the pressure of population is not very convincing: its theoretical merit, indeed, is that it avoids giving a place in Plato's theoretical apparatus to the possibility of life outside the πόλις. And Aristotle, though he derides Plato's plan to have 5,000 leisured citizens,⁹² affirms that there

is a best size for a city (beyond which it will not be manageable)⁹³ and outlines no practical non-violent way of keeping a city at that size. A case could be made for the conjecture that his and Plato's decisions to keep silent about the possibility of life outside the πόλις⁹⁴ were affected by a consciousness of the problem of πλανώμενοι: better perhaps, though, only to note how the political theorists accepted and reinforced the idea of the πόλις as the centre of life for Greeks. Greeks without πόλεις were at best marginal to their interests.

5. Points for Examination

This chapter has given an introduction to the nature of the social problem of πλανώμενοι and to some contemporary reactions to it. It is only a beginning. A whole range of questions is raised. It will be worth while at this stage to outline what the questions are, and to which of them answers can be attempted, and at what levels.

Some attempt can be made at answering the question from what cities, and at what times, the people had come who became wanderers. The section of the study dealing with foundations and destructions of πόλεις examines the fourth-century evidence for events of a traumatic kind which must have separated people from their homes, and the evidence for organization of people into groups of settlers for new foundations and refoundations. Here it is possible to form an impression of the shape of events and their likely social consequences, though it is not possible to adopt any really quantitative approach.

The chapters on mercenaries and on λησται show how the increases in availability of mercenary armies and incidence of piracy were related to the growth in the number of stateless people. What they cannot do is suggest what proportion of Greeks who had been forced to be outside the πόλις took to these occupations.

As implied above,⁹⁵ what anybody without a πόλις needed was an income; and (since few can have had enough movable wealth, or enough rich and kind ξένοι, to live on) most must have depended, short of beggary, on earning wages or fees for services. It has been pointed out many times how deeply untypical a life-style wage-earning was in ancient Greece;⁹⁶ and the fact that two chapters of this study (those on mercenaries and on skilled workers) concentrate on wage-earners outside the πόλις underlines one of the greatest differences between city life and non-city life. A separate chapter deals with traders, and considers the question what kind of relationship there was between the people who carried on long-distance trade and the communities which they served but in which, at least for the most part, they did not live permanently.

Notes

1. Lysias XXXI (Philon).9.
2. Demosthenes XXIX (Aphobus III).3.
3. Isaeus IV (Nicostratus).7.
4. Isaeus IV (Nicostratus).27.
5. Cf. below, pp.257-260 and 302-307.
6. Alexander Fuks' phrase (see Fuks, p. 26, and, for a list of key passages in Isocrates (many of which are referred to in this chapter), n.33.).
7. E.g. at D.S. XVIII.53.6: (Eumenes in 319) περὶ τὴν Καππαδοκίαν διέτριβεν ἀναλαμβάνων τοὺς προγεγονότας φίλους καὶ τοὺς κατὰ τὴν χώραν πλανωμένους τῶν συνεστρατευκότων αὐτῷ πρότερον. Here πλανώμενοι does not designate a distinct social grouping over against πολυτευόμενοι. The context does not make it possible that it should. Without the fairly few explicit Isocratean references, therefore, πλανώμενοι could not fairly be used as a category word.
8. Specially at Isocrates Ep.IX (Archidamus).9: μείζους καὶ κρείττους συντάξεις στρατοπέδων γιγνομένης ἐκ τῶν πλανωμένων ἢ τῶν πολυτευομένων. Cf. Philippus 96 and 120. 'πλανώμενοι', Fuks states (Fuks, p.27), 'is their usual designation in Isokrates', and though some of the passages he cites to support the statement are rather marginal to the issue, he is certainly right.
9. Cf. below, pp.257-260.
10. Herodotus I.30; II.103 and 116.
11. E.g. Plato Phaedo 81a6; Aristotle De Anima 402a21.
12. Notably Parke, Griffith and Seibert.
13. Cf. Isocrates Evagoras 28.
14. Below, pp.26-27.
15. Isocrates Helen 8.
16. This aspect of the enquiry moves in four directions, considering mercenaries, λησται, τεχνῖται and traders.

17. Geoffrey Chaucer Canterbury Tales VI (C). 453.
18. But note that Thrasylochus was consumptive (φθόη σχόμενον, 11) and already ill at the time of the revolution in Siphnos (ἀρρώστως διακείμενον, 20).
19. Seibert, p.105 and n.850. n.850 quotes Xenophon Hellenica IV.8.7.
20. Seibert, p.105: 'Im Gegenzug mussten die bisher regierenden Kreise, die Reichen und Besitzenden, den Insel verlassen. Sie fanden zunächst auf der Insel Melos Aufnahme.' Aegineticus 31 mentions Siphnians going from Troezen to Thrasylochus' funeral in Aegina, and 38 touches on their expedition, but elsewhere no Siphnians are mentioned except the two families concerned in the case. If the Siphnians had been travelling as a body from Melos to Troezen, surely it would seem odd for Thrasylochus to have to beg the speaker to come with him?

Throughout his brief treatment of this narrative Seibert is making a case for the conclusion that the exiled Siphnians acted all the time as a πόλις. On page 106 (cf. also p.373) he quotes from section 38 ἔδοξε τοῖς συμφυγάσιν, commenting: 'Die Form des Psephismas entspricht dem Formular eines Dekretes eines staatlichen Organs', but the construction δοκεῖ-plus-dative is very common and need not be from a decree. Reading the chapter, one finds that it is even in a subordinate clause (ἐδήλωσε δ' ἐν ἄλλοις τε πολλοῖς (sc. that he regarded me highly) καὶ ὅτ' ἔδοξε τοῖς συμφυγάσιν ἐπιχειρεῖν τῇ πόλει μετὰ τῶν ἐπικούρων). This scarcely seems like a portentous quotation from an official document. Further, Seibert says that Sopolis was chosen as στρατηγὸς αὐτοκράτωρ (same page; he quotes the Greek). Perhaps he was, but Isocrates does not say so. He says αἰρεθεῖς...ἄρχειν αὐτοκράτωρ (38): which sounds more like an informative description than an official rank-designation.

21. Seibert, p.105.
22. Xenophon Poroi 2.1-3.5, especially 2.7. Cf. Whitehead, p.7.

23. The Samians exiled from Samos by the Athenians in 365 seem, from the dossier of inscriptions thanking their benefactor, to have stayed in a wide range of communities: see below, p. 96 and nn. 56-58.
24. Seibert, p.377.
25. To Herodotus' own travels add Solon's πλάνη (Hdt. I.30.2; cf. above, n.10) and the casual comment at Hdt. III.139.1 on the many Greeks arriving in Egypt when Cambyses made his campaign against it: οὐ μὲν, ὡς οὐκός, κατ' ἐμπορίην, οὐ δὲ στρατευόμενοι, οὐ δὲ τινες αὐτῆς τῆς χώρας θεωταί· τῶν ἦν καὶ Συλοσῶν...
26. Plato Hippias Major 282b-e.
27. See below, pp.235-287.
28. Isocrates Aegineticus 27.
29. Isocrates Plataicus 46.
30. Aristotle Politics 1253a1-6.
31. Isocrates Aegineticus 7-9.
32. Homer Iliad IX.63.
33. Aristotle Politics 1253a28-29.
34. Antiphon II (Tetralogy I).2.9.
35. E.g. [Lysias] XX (for Polystratus).35; and especially (though not from a criminal case) Isocrates Plataicus 55: τὸ δὲ μηδεμίαν ἔχοντα καταφυγὴν ἀλλ' ἄπολυ γενόμενον καθ' ἐκάστην τὴν ἡμέραν κακοπαθεῖν καὶ τοὺς αὐτοῦ περιορᾶν μὴ δυνάμενον ἐπάρκειν, τί δεῦ λέγειν ὅσον τὰς ἄλλας συμφορὰς ὑπερβέβληκεν;
36. Timasion the Dardanian came fairly near being able to try this: Xenophon Anabasis VII.2.2 and V.6.23. His first attempt foundered by reason of lack of money for pay (Xenophon Anabasis v.6.36) and his second came at a time when the army was in any case dissolving (VII.2.3-6) and was kept together by offers of employment (VII.2.8-11).
37. Cf. below, pp.146-176.

38. This point is argued below, pp.157-159.
39. πλάνη used here to mean 'being - a - πλανώμενος'. But note that in fourth century Greek prose πλανᾶσθαι can still be used to mean simply travel: Isocrates himself apologises to the children of Jason of Pherae and declines their invitation to visit them, partly because of his inability to travel - τὸ μὴ δύνασθαι πλανᾶσθαι (Isoc. Ep.6 (Children of Jason).2.).
40. See below, pp.32-34.
41. Parke, p.23.
42. D.S. XIV.6.1-3; Xenophon Hellenica II.2.20.
43. See Seibert, pp.54-92.
44. Xenophon Hellenica II.3.18.
45. Lysias XII (Against Eratosthenes).97.
46. Leaving aside on this occasion the events of the Peloponnesian war, one need only turn to the Epidamnus affair for an example of a factional group looking for restoration (Thucydides I.26.3).
47. See Seibert, pp.92-147.
48. Though the story of Phlius, Xenophon Hellenica V.2.8-10 and V.3.10-12, is interesting.
49. The authoritative account of the ξενικὸν ἐν Κορίνθῳ is Pritchett, pp.117-125.
50. Isocrates Panegyricus 133.
51. Isocrates Panegyricus 167-168.
52. Baynes, pp.144-167.
53. Baynes, pp.153-160.
54. Baynes, p.160.
55. Isocrates Philippus 130.
56. Athens: Isocrates Panegyricus, passim; Dionysius I: Isocrates Ep. I (Dionysius), passim; Jason of Pherae: Isocrates Philippus 119-120; Philip: Isocrates Philippus, passim. Earlier Aristagoras had tried out a similar idea in two places: see Hdt. V 49.1-50.3 and 97.1-2.

Epistulae Socraticorum 28 (Orelli 30) (Speusippus to Philip), most readily accessible in L. Köhler 'Die Briefe des Sokrates und der Sokratiker' Philologus Suppl. 20 Heft 2 (1928), text at pp.44-50, translation into German at pp.85-89, commentary at pp.116-123, is a letter sent to Philip in the winter 343/2 after Isocrates Philippus. On its genuineness see E. Bickermann and J. Sykutris 'Speusipps Brief an König Philipp' Berichte über die Verhandlungen der Sächsischen Akademie der Wissenschaften zu Leipzig 80(1928, no.3), pp.1-86, at pp.29-33. It makes some shrewd points. At §16 the text runs: ἀπέσταλκε δέ σου [Ἰσοκράτης] τὸν λόγον, ὃν τὸ μὲν πρῶτον ἔγραψεν Ἀγησιλάῳ, μικρὰ <δέ> διασκευάσας ὕστερον ἐπόλει τῷ Σικελίας τυράννῳ Διονυσίῳ · τὸ δὲ τρίτον τὰ μὲν ἀφελὼν τὰ δὲ προσθεῖς ἐμνήστευσεν Ἀλεξάνδρῳ τῷ Θετταλῷ · τὸ δὲ τελευταῖον νῦν πρὸς σε γλίσχρως αὐτὸν ἀπηκόντισεν...

57. Baynes, pp.155-158.

58. Fuks' idea of the value of Isocrates' speeches as evidence ('Isocrates is first-rate evidence for the social-economic situation in Greece...'Fuks, p.17) is perhaps rather optimistic; but his method of presenting a sort of synopsis of salient passages from the political writings to build up a picture of 'the elements of the situation as perceived by Isocrates' (Fuks, p.19) illustrates how largely the matter of poverty and πλάνη figured in Isocrates' political perception.

59. Fuks, p.18: 'the signalling of the situation in Greece by Isocrates is terrifying' (examples are quoted), and p.30: 'the impression gained from Isocrates is that to him the dimensions of the floating population are very large indeed.'

In contrast Epistulae Socraticorum 28 (Orelli 30) (Speusippus to Philip). 5-7 (Cf. above, n.56) does not mention the problem of πλανώμενου when it puts forward elements of myth and early history relating to the Thracian Chalcidice with a view to supplying Philip with arguments suggesting that he might justifiably flatten every settlement in the place

if he wished. The question of where the inhabitants would go is not raised.

60. Isocrates Archidamus 68.

61. Seibert, pp.405-406. Ten not including (i) the Phliasian exiles of 380/79 (characterized as ὀλίγοι ἄνθρωποι by the other Phliasi-ans), who raised and trained a force of 1,000 from defectors from the city during the siege of Phlius (Xenophon Hellenica V.3.16-17), or (ii) the Syracusan exiles of 317/6.

62. D.S. XIV.34.3 and 5.

63. Xenophon Hellenica V.2.6.

64. D.S. XVIII.8.4-5.

65. 800 from Tegea: Xenophon Hellenica VI.5.10. 1,400 from all Arcadia: D.S. XV.59.2. Cf. W.E. Thompson 'Arcadian Factionalism in the 360's' Hist 32 (1983), pp.149-160.

66. Syll.³ 306 (new edition at A.J. Heisserer Alexander the Great and the Greeks (Norman, 1980), pp.206-208); cf. Seibert, pp.160-162.

67. D.S. XVIII.8.7; cf. Seibert, p.165.

68. Potidaea: D.S. XVI.8.5. Sestos: D.S. XVI.34.3.

69. Methone: city razed by Philip; inhabitants allowed to leave with one ἰμάτιον each, D.S. XVI.34.4-5, cf. XVI.31.1. Naryx: city taken and razed by Phayllus; fate of inhabitants not mentioned, D.S. XVI.38.5.

Zereia: φρούριον razed by Philip. Zereia was one of the Chalcidic πόλεις. Fate of inhabitants not mentioned, D.S. XVI.52.9.

70. D.S. XVI.53.3.

71. D.S. XIX.52.2.

72. D.S. XVIII.8.6; also Plutarch Alexander 49.5. This brief summary of the dimensions of the problem of exile is perhaps in danger of being too sketchy to be of much use by itself:

it should be supplemented by consideration of the chapter below on foundations and destructions of πόλεις (below, pp.

44-145.

73. Xenophon Hellenica VI.5.10; see also Seibert, p.405.

74. Xenophon Hellenica VI.5.24.

75. Cf. the decrees of the restored Samian State, below, p.124 n.58.

76. Demosthenes XIX (Embassy).226, cf. Beloch, p.205.

77. D.S. XVIII.8.4.

78. See Badian, p.29 and n.90 (cf. p.25 and n.57 quoting Arrian Anabasis I.16.6): 'any known cases of this crime' (sc. treason) 'must have been punished by the death penalty in absence (i.e. in practice exile).'

There seems to be a logical flaw here: (i) anyone under sentence of death was surely ἐναγής, and so not allowed to return home; and (ii) a city cannot restore someone whom it has never made an exile - and the decree does not require sentences of death to be quashed. So that the soldiers' being de facto exiles does not at all suggest that the decree was a response to the problem they caused. Parke, p.196 (not referred to by Badian) argues that the decree affected only the (few) mercenaries who had taken to soldiering because of banishment: which makes better sense.

79. D.S. XVII.111.1.

80. Parke, p.195.

81. Seibert, pp.158-162.

82. Badian, p.30.

83. Badian, p.28. G. Grote, on the other hand, speculates plausibly that the 20,000 'had mustered here from intimations that such a step was intended.'

(History of Greece XII, p.131); cf. also Timoleon's request for settlers.

Plutarch Timoleon 22.3-5 and D.S. XVI.82.5.

84. D.S. XVIII.8.5.

85. Seibert, p.158 also fails to mention this point.

86. Cf. above, pp.28-29.

87. Aeneas Tacticus 10.5-7.

88. Aeneas Tacticus 10.9-10.
89. Aeneas Tacticus 10.10: cf. below, pp.249-250.
90. Below, p.166 and n.21 .
91. Plato Laws 928e - 929d. The quotation from 928e.
92. Aristotle Politics 1265a17-18: δεῦ μὲν ὑποτίθεσθαι κατ' εὐχὴν, μηδὲν μὲντοι ἀδύνατον.
93. Aristotle Politics 1326a34-37.
94. Aristotle admits that there will be a great number of slaves, metics and foreigners in the πόλις (Politics 1326a18-20), and Plato devises terms for the residence of metics (Laws 850a-d) under which the metic must leave after twenty years - but where he is to go to, is not mentioned.
95. Cf. above, pp.25-26.
96. And de Ste. Croix, pp.179-204, gives a good survey. At p.182 he notes: 'The first appearance in antiquity of hired labour on a large scale was in the military field, in the shape of mercenary service.' It was precisely in Greece in the fourth century that mercenary service began to be available, and to be taken up, on a large scale (see below, especially at pp.157-159). So that it is clear that wage labour in ancient Greece had its first large development at the period when many people were being forced to live outside the cities (inside which it was normal for a free citizen not to gain his income in the form of wages).

Chapter 3 - Foundations and Destructions
of πόλεις in the Fourth Century B.C.

Introduction

This chapter, which is in two parts, gives a semi-narrative account of the events which caused city populations to join the wandering population of Greeks, and of the foundations and refoundations which brought people into new or re-established communities and so added to the numbers living the normal Greek life in stable settlements (cf. above p.4 and n.22).

Other chapters focus principally on people. Here a fairly broad city-by-city view of Greece as a whole is presented, with reference where appropriate to the sources for events in particular places. Choice of sources is eclectic; it would be nice to refer to accounts of archaeological digs throughout, but material from archaeological work for comparison with the literary texts is not available except in a few cases.

The reader should bear in mind that cities could be overthrown and re-established without news of the events appearing in the historical record. There were, as E. Ruschenbusch calculates, about 750 states in mainland and Aegean Greece, over half of them with fewer than 400 adult male citizens. (E. Ruschenbusch 'Zur Wirtschaft - und Sozialstruktur der Normalpolis' ASNP ser.III 13.1 (1983), pp.171-194, at p.171). Entella was overthrown and restored without a hint of it reaching the literary tradition (cf. below, pp.71-72) - and it was certainly a city which would, on Ruschenbusch's figures, be of above-average size. This is a caution. But some things are known, and there is something to gain from making the most of them. Part 1 of this chapter concerns Sicily and Italy, and Part 2 concerns Greece and Asia.

Part I: Sicily and Italy

For most of the fourth century the Greek cities of Sicily and Italy were politically and economically rather isolated from the rest of Hellas. It had problems of its own, and western affairs were remote from it. 'ulterior Graecia,' Livy comments referring to 348,¹ 'ea tempestate intestino fessa bello iam Macedonum opes horrebat.' Not that intestinum bellum was less of a problem to the western Greeks: and it affected the life of their cities. But the Siceliots and Italiots had also (what the people of ulterior Graecia had not) the difficulties which came from living near non-Greek peoples. After the victory of the Syracusans in the Attic war, there followed twenty years of strong pressure from non-Greeks, first on Sicily, then, in the first decade of the fourth century, on Italy. The enemies of the Siceliots were the Carthaginians, the enemies of the Italiots were the Lucanians.

1. Events in Sicily

This part of the chapter will turn first to the troubles of the Siceliots. Carthaginian invasions in 409/8 and 406/5 were the beginning of insecurity in eastern Sicily. It is clear that these invasions, and the Greeks' responses to them, drove away much of the population of the large Siceliot cities outside Syracuse.

The principal, almost the only, literary source for the invasions and their immediate after-effects is Diodorus Siculus (there are also four small notices in Xenophon Hellenica²). He relates how, in the first invasion, the Carthaginians overthrew Selinus and killed 16,000 inhabitants,³ then overthrew Himera, razed the city, killed the men, and kept prisoner the women and children.⁴ Encouraged by these successes, Diodorus says, they decided to try to dominate the whole island: they prepared large forces.⁵

The fall of Acragas to the invaders in the second invasion is presented in Diodorus' account as a very traumatic event for the Siceliot. Already in 409, 2,600 who escaped the fall of Selinus had gone to Acragas and been looked after by the Acragantines.⁶ And they were almost certainly not the only Greeks who had chosen Acragas as a place of safety: Diodorus' long digression on the prosperity and size of Acragas,⁷ deriving from Timaeus,⁸ says that there were 20,000 Acragantines and, counting the foreign settlers (σὺν δὲ τοῖς κατοικοῦσι ξένοις), no fewer than 200,000 inhabitants.⁹ It is not clear how many of these escaped before the fall of the city, though the suggestion at D.S. XIII.89.3 seems to be that most did, under the protection of the soldiers, so that the road to Gela and the parts of the χώρα of Acragas near Gela were full of refugee women and children. Most of those left in Acragas were killed when the Carthaginians entered the city.¹⁰

In the spring of 405, the Carthaginians demolished Acragas and turned to attack Gela.¹¹ But already over the winter the news of the fall of Acragas had had an effect on Sicily, as Diodorus notes:¹²

Τῆς...περὶ τὴν Ἀκράγαντα συμφορᾶς διαγγελθείσης, τοσοῦτος τὴν νῆσον κατέσχε φόβος ὥστε τῶν Συκελιωτῶν τοὺς μὲν εἰς Συρακούσας μεθίστασθαι, τοὺς δὲ εἰς τὴν Ἰταλίαν τέκνα καὶ γυναῖκας καὶ τὴν ἄλλην κτῆσιν ἀποσκευάζεσθαι.

It is clear that the Siceliot were much more seriously worried by the events at Acragas than they had been when Selinus and Himera fell. The reason for this can be inferred. The figures for the population of Acragas almost certainly reflect an abnormally high population at this time (indeed, the arrival of many κατοικοῦντες ξένοι may have been the reason for the taking of a census), of Greeks arriving to shelter behind the city walls. D.S. XIII.88.6 speaks of the food supply being depleted by 'so many myriads' being gathered in the city; this was the reason (the next section says) why Dexippus the Spartan advised evacuating Acragas and fighting the Carthaginians elsewhere. But the hope that the large cities of

Sicily would be held against the invaders was proved groundless: hence the fear, and the exodus to Syracuse and Italy. Discontent with the generals who evacuated Acragas contributed to Dionysius I's rise to power,¹³ but at Gela, to which the refugees from Acragas had fled, he used the same plan.¹⁴ Immediately afterwards he went to Camarina and moved its inhabitants from there to Syracuse.¹⁵

Dionysius continued his strategy of moving the Greeks of Sicily into Syracuse by speaking in the assembly, after he was elected general and before he became tyrant,¹⁶ in favour of the recall to Syracuse of the remnant of Hermocrates' followers. After Hermocrates' return to Sicily in 409 and his unsuccessful attempt to take Syracuse, this army had taken Selinus and re-walled some of it: it was a partial restoration of that city, involving some of the former inhabitants.¹⁷

Hermocrates was killed in the next year in another attack on Syracuse, and those of his supporters who did not die with him were condemned to exile by the Syracusans:¹⁸ but in the next year Dionysius persuaded the Syracusans to receive them back on the ground that they were implacable enemies of Carthage.¹⁹ He was hoping they would be on his side.²⁰ τοῦτο δ' ἔπραξεν ὁ Διονύσιος ἐλπίζων ἰδίους ἔξειν τοὺς φυγάδας, ἀνθρώπους μεταβολῆς ἐπιθυμοῦντας καὶ πρὸς τὴν ἐπίθεσιν τῆς τυραννίδος εὐθέτως διακειμένους. The next, and last, stage in Dionysius' rise to power was his seizure of the tyranny. He went to Leontini, a town then belonging to the Syracusans, which was full of exiles and foreigners - again with the idea of getting them on his side.²¹ J. Seibert, discussing the passage in which Diodorus describes these events, asks:²² 'wer waren die Phygades? Waren unter ihnen auch Phygades aus Syrakus, die sich noch nicht nach Syrakus zurückwagten?' He does not attempt an answer to these questions. But an easy explanation seems to be that the 'exiles and foreigners' were refugees from Acragas; Diodorus notes at XIII.89.4 (406) that: οὗτοι μὲν ἀσφαλῶς

διασωθέντες εἰς Γέλαν ὕστερον εἰς Λεοντίλους κατέκησαν, Συρακοσίων αὐτοῖς δόντων τὴν πόλιν οἰκητήριον. And since there is no reason to suppose that ὕστερον points to a time after the capture of Leontini by Dionysius in 403, it appears that this settlement happened almost at once.²³ Dionysius, once in Leontini, collected 'exiles and sacrilegious persons from everywhere';²⁴ their availability in large numbers, evidently, was due to the fear and unsettlement noted at D.S. XIII.91.1.²⁵

Returning from Leontini to Syracuse, Dionysius became the undisputable tyrant of Syracuse.²⁶ He had won the tyranny with the help of the homeless: he had made himself their leader, and gained the Syracusans' support for a campaign of revanche against the Carthaginians. But when his military operations to save Gela failed, he had turned to the former generals' strategy and evacuated Gela and Camarina.²⁷ This was certainly an unpopular decision: his reason for it was exactly the same as the generals' reason for abandoning Acragas - that the place was unfavourable for decisive action²⁸ - and its implications for the evacuated populations were, in the short term at least, no less severe. A.W. Lintott comments misleadingly 'it seems that the Geloans were in principle prepared to leave, when the Greek attack failed'²⁹ (he does not add that the Camarinaeans were certainly compelled³⁰), but Diodorus' account does not suggest that reference was made to the citizens' wishes, and it is in no way surprising that the inhabitants of a city under attack should have moved out without complaining (whatever their principles were) when their defenders chose to leave the place to the enemy. Later, indeed, Diodorus notes that the Geloans and Camarinaeans were at odds with Dionysius and went to Leontini:³¹ this discontent is best understood as a result of the evacuation of their cities.

This was how Dionysius came to be unpopular with a body of people similar to his former supporters. The course of events provides an example of the way in which Dionysius found himself at the mercy of circumstances,

and not free to shape Syracuse and Sicily according to his will. Military necessity drove him. And the withdrawal of Greeks before the invaders had begun before Dionysius had power to influence it: it was partly the cause, partly the worst symptom of a very serious hatred and fear of the Carthaginians among the Greeks to which several passages in Diodorus bear witness: D.S. XIII.91.1 speaks of a fear seizing the island (Sicily) and D.S. XIII.92.5 notes how Hermocrates' exiles had refused the Carthaginians' cash offer for military co-operation, even when refusal meant exile; and further on, D.S. XIII.111.4-6 describes what atrocities the Greeks expected the Carthaginians to commit in the captured cities, while D.S. XIV.46.2 notes that the Greek communities of Sicily did as Dionysius wished and expelled the Carthaginians living in them in 398, seizing their property, not because they liked Dionysius, but because they were glad to join in the war against the Carthaginians *διὰ τὴν ὀμότητα τῶν ἀνδρῶν*.³²

So Dionysius faced a double difficulty from the moment when first he seized power. First, that a good many Greeks were leaving their homes of their own accord, so that it was not likely that the cities evacuated before the Carthaginians would be able to be filled with Greeks again; and second, that the empty land in Greek Sicily would be a source of weakness to Syracuse: Carthage might people it with allies, or at least march across it unopposed in a future invasion. Dionysius' policies of expanding and strengthening Syracuse and of settling non-Greeks in formerly Greek areas of Sicily should be viewed, in general, as a reaction to this complex problem rather than as arbitrary acts.³³ Not that he encouraged the Greeks to moderate their fear of Carthage and set up strong cities: the continuance of the fear of Carthage which helped him gain the tyranny was much in his interest and he took vigorous action when he had reason to fear that it was becoming less acute;³⁴ and his deliberate transplantations

to Syracuse of Greek populations served to strengthen his position as ruler of the whole Greek part of the island.

It is worth considering these developments in the context of the earlier history of Greek Sicily. At the time when mainland Greece was defeating Xerxes' invasion, Gelon had come back from his victorious battle against the Carthaginians and carried out temple-building at Syracuse;³⁵ and his good work for the cities of Sicily is mentioned in a panegyric passage in Diodorus.³⁶ He brought the Camarinaeans, more than half the Geloans, and the rich people from Sicilian Megara and Sicilian Euboea, into Syracuse as citizens.³⁷ But his brother Hieron, who reigned as tyrant after him, moved the Naxians and Catanians out of their cities (to Leontini³⁸) and replaced them with settlers from Syracuse and the Peloponnese.³⁹ And at much the same time Theron, the tyrant of Acragas who controlled Himera, saw Himera in need of more inhabitants and enrolled many Dorians and others.⁴⁰ Movement from city to city was clearly in some degree typical of Siceliot life, whereas it was unusual in the older parts of Greece. Alcibiades comments to the Athenians at Th. VI.17.2: ὄχλους...εὐμμεΐκτους πολυανσοροῦσιν αἱ πόλεις καὶ ῥαδίως ἔχουσι τῶν πολιτῶν τὰς μεταβολὰς καὶ ἐπιδοχάς. Movement of this sort need not, however, have involved abandonment of land if, as Mr. D.M. Lewis suggests to me, the normal pattern in Sicily involved there being fewer Greek landowners working the land themselves than there were in other areas. Under Dionysius, though, there is evidence that abandonments of cities by their Greek populations were a cause of weakness to Greek Sicily.

2. Events in Italy

To turn now to the Greeks of Italy: the general problem of insecurity in the face of pressure from non-Greek neighbours was very similar to the difficulties experienced by the Siceliots in counteracting Carthaginian action. When the Roman historical tradition took up the question whether Alexander the Great could have conquered Italy and the Romans, the

warlikeness of the peoples of Italy was made much of:⁴¹ and in spite of the tendentious nature of some of the Latin accounts of the relations of the Greeks of Italy with their non-Greek neighbours,⁴² their evidence together with material from Greek sources, preserved mostly in Diodorus Siculus and Strabo, shows the severity of the threats the Italiots faced. When they were not fighting the barbarians, they had to resist the threat of domination by the Sicilian tyrants, as Strabo notes:⁴³

Τῶν Ἑλλήνων τὴν ἐκατέρωθεν παραλίαν μέχρι Πορθμοῦ κατεχόντων, πολὺν χρόνον ἐπολέμουν οἷ τε Ἕλληνας καὶ οἱ βάρβαροι πρὸς ἀλλήλους. οἱ δὲ τῆς Συκελίας τύραννοι... ἅπαντας τοὺς ταύτη κακῶς διέθηκαν, μάλιστα δὲ τοὺς Ἕλληνας.

So in 393 the Italiots formed an alliance for mutual defence, against Dionysius and the Lucanians.⁴⁴ There is no obvious reason not to think this alliance identical with the 'Italiot League' referred to by Polybius, who outlines how the Italiots followed an Achaean organizational model in forming their association some time after they had first accepted Achaean help towards bringing about a truce at the time at the burning-down of the Pythagorean συνέδρια.⁴⁵ J.A.O. Larsen dates the formation of the league as early as the last quarter of the fifth century, but he seems to allow too little time for the interval indicated by Polybius, and fails to mention D.S. XIV.91.1.⁴⁶ In 393 the danger from Dionysius was certainly apparent: he had just retreated (making a truce for one year) from his first attack on Rhegium.⁴⁷ The extent to which the Lucanians were a threat by that date, though, is less easy to determine. G. Pugliese Carratelli suggests that the panhellenic foundation of Thurii in the fifth century may show a realisation of the need for Hellenes to hang together against the barbarians; though (significantly) the paper in which this suggestion is made has a good deal to say about non-hostile relations between the Italiots and their non-Greek neighbours after 400.⁴⁸ But by 390 the Lucanians held the formerly Greek city of Laus and, possibly at the suggestion of their new ally Dionysius I,⁴⁹ were launching an attack

on the land of Thurii.⁵⁰ The battle that followed at Laus was won by the Lucanians, but the peace which was concluded afterwards with the help of Dionysius' brother and admiral Leptines, who lost his command because of it,⁵¹ seems to have lasted for a matter of decades.

An interesting piece of evidence shows that the pressure exerted by the Lucanians was cultural as well as military. A fragment from the work of Aristoxenus of Taras (whose floruit the Suda puts in the reign of Alexander⁵²), preserved at Athenaeus XIV.632a-b, describes the life of the Poseidoniates who had taken up barbarian language and customs, though they were originally Hellenes, and who remembered their former life at only one periodic Greek festival. These are not barbarized descendants of Greeks, but the Greeks themselves: they were Greeks in the beginning, notes Aristoxenus, and at the festival they remember their former names.⁵³ The point of the story is to compare to the Poseidoniates the 'old guard' who, in the days of a degenerate theatre, get together and remember what music used to be like (καθ' αὐτοὺς γινόμενου ὀλίγου ἀναμνησκόμεθα οἷα ἦν ἡ μουσική). So the Poseidoniates of the days of Alexander were looking as far back as any of them could remember - which is to say, to a time near the beginning of the fourth century⁵⁴ - and reminiscing about the days before the Lucanians came; but they had in that interval lost their Greek language and become culturally indistinct from the Lucanians.

Clearly the Siceliots who had fled the fall of Acragas had not found in Italy a country where the Greeks were strong enough to live without fear of non-Greek invasion. But it is not particularly likely that any large number of the refugees had gone as far as Laus or Poseidonia, in northern Lucania, to live. Probably they mostly stayed in Rhegium: certainly it was to that city that the enemies of Dionysius I had been going during the first decade of his rule in Sicily. Though Diodorus' narrative gives no ground for any inference as to whether their presence in Rhegium was a

cause or an effect of the Rhegines' strong enmity towards Dionysius, it should be noted that the two phenomena were closely related.⁵⁵

Dionysius spent the late 390s and early 380s campaigning in Italy, not stopping until Rhegium fell. The Lucanians and he had common interests: it is surprising that their alliance did not begin sooner and last longer, but it seems not to have been formed by the time of the formation of the Italiot league,⁵⁶ and not to have continued after Leptines had helped the Lucanians and Italiots to negotiate a peace in 390.⁵⁷ As it was, the Locrians were Dionysius' only allies in Italy. It will be useful to pause a moment and consider a brief outline of the wars in Italy in these years before examining their causes and implications.

Dionysius followed his first Italian campaign, which had provoked the formation of the Italiot League, with further campaigns in 390, 389, and 388-387. 390 ended with the Italiots' peace with the Lucanians,⁵⁸ 389 with a temporary settlement imposed on the Italiots by Dionysius after his victory at the Eleporus river: the cities were granted peace and allowed autonomy, and on Rhegium's surrender Dionysius took 300 talents, all the Rhegines' ships (70), and 100 hostages; the population of Caulonia was moved to Syracuse.⁵⁹ In 388 Dionysius took Hipponium, sending the inhabitants to Syracuse and giving the territory to the Locrians, and then indulged his feelings against Rhegium by beginning a new siege of it, which ended eleven months later.⁶⁰ After the surrender, 6,000 Rhegines were sent to Syracuse, and those who could not pay a mina as ransom were sold into slavery.⁶¹

Now, there is no prospect of unravelling what motives led Dionysius to fight these wars; and indeed it is of little importance to the subject of this inquiry how much Dionysius' personal hatred of the Rhegines influenced him,⁶² except insofar as that hatred is an alternative (rather than complementary) explanation to Justin's plausible comment⁶³ 'Dionysius...

grave otium regno suo periculosamque desidiam tanti exercitus ratus, copias in Italiam traiecit.' That Dionysius was not likely to be content to sit back with what he had, is an important point: and Greek Italy, even if all the Italiots had been merely indifferent to him, would have represented a desirable realm. But with the exception of Locri, Greek Italy was hostile to the tyrant Dionysius, so that the struggle in Italy ought to be looked on as part of his almost continual efforts at suppressing opposition to himself, and not only as an attempt at expanding his empire.

As early as 403 Dionysius had crushed Naxos, Catane and Leontini.⁶⁴ Leontini had become the focus for opposition in 405 when the evacuated Geloans and Camarinaeans had gone there.⁶⁵ The account of the surrender of Leontini in Diodorus ends with the statement that the Leontines migrated to Syracuse,⁶⁶ but it appears that there were some people exiled by the campaign of 403, whether from Leontini or not, who went in another direction. In 403 Archonides of Herbite, a city which had withstood Dionysius' attack on it earlier in the year,⁶⁷ led out a colony. It was formed of mercenaries, and 'a motley crowd which had streamed into the city because of the war with Dionysius', and poor Herbitaeans.⁶⁸ Refugees arriving at a city only recently at war with Dionysius, from cities only now being conquered by him, must be regarded as definite enemies of Dionysius. And the colony, Halaesa Archonidion, survived, probably with Carthaginian support.⁶⁹

In the same way in 394 the Rhegines tried to make a settlement of the 'left-over' Naxians and Catanians at Mylae.⁷⁰ These were presumably people who had escaped (by being ransomed or running away) from the slavery into which Dionysius had sold them in 403 when their cities fell.⁷¹ When the Messenians, Dionysius' allies, succeeded in seizing Mylae, the Naxians living there (narrating here, Diodorus mentions only Naxians. Presumably the Naxian element in Mylae was much the largest) dispersed and settled

among the Sicels and the Greek cities.⁷² The Rhegines had deliberately collected opponents of Dionysius by offering asylum to them,⁷³ clearly with the idea of building up a large number of stateless Greeks who would be available at the Rhegines' convenience for a venture on the lines of the foundation of Mylae. While the Herbitaeans' foundation of Halaesa Archonidion can be explained adequately as a reaction to the awkward position the arrival of hundreds of Dionysius' enemies put them in, the Rhegines precipitated an influx of the same sort, hoping to be able to use it against Dionysius. Probably the Rhegines' action encouraged Naxians and Catanians who had settled temporarily, to move again; at least, this seems a plausible inference from the apparent ease with which they dispersed to Sicel and Greek communities when the attempt to settle at Mylae failed - they may well have been returning to the places where they had been living before they went to Rhegium.

Both in the case of Halaesa and in the case of Mylae, opposition in Greek Sicily to Dionysius' rule there had been aided from outside, in the one case by the Carthaginians, in the other case by the Rhegines. Dionysius' attack on the Carthaginians in 396 was his response to Carthaginian encouragement of the Greek opposition to him (of which the Carthaginians' support of Halaesa was a particular, but small, case: in general they were encouraging the Greeks to return to the cities ceded by Dionysius in 405. Cf. above, n.34), and similarly his wars in Italy were his response to Rhegine action on behalf of his Siceliot enemies.

And it is worth drawing out this parallel. Halaesa and Mylae, the Carthaginians' and Rhegines' respective attempts at acting against Dionysius in his own domain, did not damage Dionysius much. But as Dionysius went to war with the Carthaginians because they were causing Greeks to leave his territory (cf. above, n.34), so it is worth considering the hypothesis that replacing his fugitive Greek population may have been one of his more

important aims in the wars in Italy. This would account for the removal in successive years of the Cauloniates and Hipponiates to Syracuse, and would permit a fully adequate explanation of Dionysius' persistent policy of attacking Rhegium: his reasons went beyond personal pique and beyond the need (in Dionysius' view⁷⁴) to keep Greek Sicily under his own control by keeping it at war, and encompassed the need to destroy the city which, like a magnet, was drawing his Greeks away from him.

Diodorus' History mentions virtually nothing of Dionysius' actions in Italy after 387. At XV.15.2 there is a passing comment about Dionysius' army going to Italy in 383 in the two-front war against the Italiot-Carthaginian alliance, but there is nothing else. This almost obscures the fact that, after the destruction of Rhegium, Dionysius turned his attention to Croton. But it is most interesting that Croton should have been the object of an attack by Dionysius, since the city is described by Diodorus as (in 389)⁷⁵ τῆς...πόλεως μάλιστα πολυοχλουμένης καὶ πλείστους ἐχούσης Συρακοσίου φυγάδας. It is not perfectly clear from the extant sources at what date the attack on Croton was made,⁷⁶ but it is clear that in the course of the fourth century Croton ceased to be the most populous city in Greek Italy, its mantle falling on Taras.⁷⁷ Since the moment of its conquest by Dionysius was the moment when it began to decline, it is possible that Dionysius may have taken at least a proportion of its population back to Sicily with him.⁷⁸

3. Effects

An examination of what happened in Sicily as the fourth century went on shows that Dionysius' persistent worry about Greeks leaving their homes, and about the country becoming barbarized, was justified. The city of Syracuse itself grew under Dionysius I,⁷⁹ suffering depopulation only during the interrupted reign of Dionysius II,⁸⁰ but the policy of keeping the rest of Sicily weak was certainly fully successful. The Platonic Letters allude to the fact repeatedly - and treat the ruin of the cities outside Syracuse

as symptomatic of the trouble brought by tyrannical government in general: Plato Ep. III.315c8-d7 notes that not a few people are saying that Plato had prevented Dionysius II from carrying out his proposal τὰς τε Ἑλληνίδας πόλεις ἐν Συκελίᾳ οἰκίξειν καὶ Συρακούσας ἐπικουφίσαι, τὴν ἀρχὴν ἀντὶ τυραννίδος εἰς βασιλείαν μεταστήσαντα... but was now encouraging Dion to do the same (and so subverting Dionysius). The author naturally denies the charge;⁸¹ but the interesting point is the way in which the refoundation of the Greek cities is presented as a key element in the turn away from tyranny.

There are other references in the Letters with the same general point - that the Greek cities of Sicily need to be refounded⁸² - but there are two of particular interest, which refer to a time earlier than the date of the Letters' composition.⁸³ The first, from Ep. VIII, is a retrospective explanation of Syracuse's coming under the rule of one family⁸⁴

ἦν ποτε κατέστησαν οἱ πατέρες ὑμῶν ἐς ἀπορίαν ἐλθόντες τὴν ἅπασαν, τόθ' ὅτε κίνδυνος ἐγένετο ἔσχατος Συκελίᾳ τῇ τῶν Ἑλλήνων ὑπὸ Καρχηδονίων ἀνάστατον ὅλην ἐκβαρβαρωθεῖσαν γενέσθαι.

This identifies 406/5 as the moment when Greek Sicily was in danger of becoming 'ruined, all barbarized by the Carthaginians' and notes (agreeing with D.S. XIII.91 - 96) that that very danger brought about Dionysius' tyranny. The origin of the present state of affairs (in the 350s) in the invasions of the decade before 400 is made quite explicit. The second reference is certainly of less importance, but yet is suggestive: the description in Ep. VII of Plato's first visit to Sicily includes the phrase 'Italiotic and Syracusan tables'⁸⁵ (the author is disputing the view that enormous banquets are a constituent of a happy life). The phrase is not proof that Greek Sicily apart from Syracuse could afford no banquets, or that Greek Italy was generally better off; but it does illustrate how in 387 Syracuse was not merely the most significant, but indeed the only significant, place in Greek Sicily. No others were worth mentioning.

There is some evidence to suggest how peoples of the Greek cities which had become ἀνάστατοι lived. The Carthaginians captured Messene in 396 and flattened it, so that no one would have known that anyone had used to lived there.⁸⁶ Some of the Messenians were killed in the fighting, others fled to the nearest cities, but most of the people (ὁ δὲ πολὺς ὄχλος) took to the mountains and were scattered to the φρούρια in the countryside.⁸⁷ Their period without a πόλις centre was short, since Dionysius refounded Messene in the same year,⁸⁸ but other cities remained unfounded much longer.

P. Orlandini's study of Gela between 405 and 282 notes that on the hilltop of Gela, explored and excavated in every part, no object datable between 405 and 383 has been found. There were three small finds of objects datable between 380 and 350.⁸⁹ But, as Orlandini notes, contingents of Geloans served in the siege of Motya (397)⁹⁰ and in the campaign after Dion landed (357).⁹¹ The explanation, cautiously adopted by Orlandini, is that the Geloans who served in these campaigns were living in the hinterland and that the city had not yet been refounded.⁹² The similarity of the cases of Camarina and Acragas to that of Gela suggests a parallel course of events in those cities.⁹³

Orlandini's findings have been challenged by G. Navarra, but his more recent article does not avoid or answer the criticisms put forward in reviews of his earlier book.⁹⁴ His central contention is that Orlandini's Gela is the Phintias founded in the third century when the first Gela was destroyed.⁹⁵ One of the weaknesses of his case is his overstatement when he says that⁹⁶ 'le fonti storiche...parlano di ripopolamento delle città rimaste semi deserte e non di fondazioni o ricostruzioni di città dopo la vittoria dei Greci al Crimiso.' SEG XII 379 and 380 (if Navarra would consider inscriptions 'fonti archeologiche' rather than 'fonti storiche', then the point is not affected) call the Coans 'co-founders' (συνουκισταί)

of Camarina and Gela respectively,⁹⁷ referring to the occasion when Gorgus and his followers set out from Cos (Plut. Timoleon 35.2 reads 'Ceos', but the emendation to 'Cos' is certain⁹⁸), to collect together the ἀρχαίου πολῖται and re-found the two cities. This shows that at least in retrospect, the Geloans and Camarinaeans thought of the years between the Carthaginian invasion and the arrival of Timoleon as years of disestablishment.⁹⁹

There were only isolated cases of attempts at establishing or re-establishing cities in the reigns of the Dionysii. Halaesa Archonidion and Mylae have been mentioned above.¹⁰⁰ The other example of a foundation carried out in opposition to Dionysius I is the example of Hipponium. The Carthaginians collected together all the exiles from Hipponium, a city in south Italy, taken by Dionysius in 388, whose population Dionysius had moved to Syracuse, and in 379 they settled them back in their own city.¹⁰¹ Their opposition to Dionysius, which had caused them to take an interest in Halaesa, must have been the Carthaginians' motive for taking care of the Hipponiates in this way; but a plague, Libyan and Sardinian rebellions, and disturbances in Carthage, were enough to distract the Carthaginians from whatever plan they had.¹⁰² It is worth noting that not all Hipponiates were living as citizens in Syracuse nine years after the destruction of Hipponium: the wording of Diodorus' narrative of the refoundation (Καρχηδόνηοι...πάντας τοὺς πεφευγότες συναγαγόντες: cf. above, n.101) shows that a good many - enough to refound the place - had gone into exile from Syracuse. The revealing thing is that all the (Hipponiate) exiles are mentioned: this cannot mean 'all the Hipponiates who had gone from Hipponium to Syracuse', first because, when they were living at Syracuse, the Hipponiates were not exiles but Syracusan citizens, and second because even if it were possible to regard the Hipponiates at Syracuse as exiles, it would have been impossible for the Carthaginians to recruit all of them

in Syracuse under Dionysius' nose. The phrase implies that a proportion, at least, of the Hipponiates were outside Syracuse in 379. All three cases, Halaesa, Mylae and Hipponium, show that the very depressed condition of the Greek cities of Sicily in Dionysius' reign ensured that colonising enterprises would be able to find willing participants. Nor was colonisation monopolized by Dionysius' enemies; Dionysius himself founded colonies: Messene, in Sicily, he peopled with Greeks from Italy; and 600 Messenians from the Peloponnese, settled by Dionysius at Tyndaris in 396, soon increased their numbers to over 5,000 by admitting new citizens.¹⁰³ But the recovery of the cities formerly surrendered to the Carthaginians, mentioned by Diodorus in the passage where he records these foundations, cannot have been more than partial; and the ruined condition of Greek Sicily was treated from a fairly early stage as a panhellenic problem. The references in the Platonic Letters to plans to colonise Sicily have been noted above;¹⁰⁴ but even as much as a generation earlier Lysias had alluded to the barbarization of Sicily in the Olympiacus:¹⁰⁵

ἀνδρὸς δὲ ἀγαθοῦ καὶ πολίτου πόλεως ἀξίου περὶ τῶν μεγίστων
 συμβουλεύειν, ὄρων οὕτως αἰσχροῦς διακειμένην τὴν Ἑλλάδα, καὶ πολλὰ
 μὲν αὐτῆς ὑπὸ τῷ βαρβάρῳ, πολλὰς δὲ πόλεις ὑπὸ τυράννων ἀναστάτους
 γεγεννημένας.

A solution to this problem was achieved by Timoleon's expedition. The sources dealing with Timoleon have a good deal to say about the state of Sicily at the time when he arrived, and it bears out and adds some colour to the impressions gained elsewhere.

The beginning of Plutarch Timoleon describes Syracuse itself as almost deserted because of the rapid exchange of tyrant for tyrant: this, as the reason given by Plutarch suggests, must have been a development which had come about since the times referred to in the Platonic Letters - in the ten years or so before the coming of Timoleon. And in the same passage the rest of Sicily is described as ἀνάστατος καὶ ἄπολις παντάπασιν ἤδη διὰ τοὺς πολέμους and it is noted that the cities had been settled by 'half-

breed barbarians and unemployed soldiers'.¹⁰⁶ Later, in the passage where he narrates how Timoleon sent to Corinth for settlers from Greece, Plutarch returns to the theme, mentioning grass growing in the ἀγορά of Syracuse, and deer and wild pigs living in the other cities: in this passage he describes the life of those who were living without a πόλις centre:¹⁰⁷

ὑπήκουε δ' οὐδεὶς τῶν ἐν τοῖς ἐρύμασι καὶ φρουρίοις κατοικοῦντων, οὐδὲ κατέβαινον εἰς τὴν πόλιν, ἀλλὰ φρίκη καὶ μῦσος εἶχε πάντας ἀγορᾶς καὶ πολυτείας καὶ βήματος.

This description is a very plausible addition to a picture of life in the (unwalled) city: the civic life before refoundation is envisaged as not entirely non-existent, but far too weak to be a focus for security and communal life. Towards the end of the Timoleon, Plutarch mentions Acragas and Gela, noting how they had been ruined by the Carthaginians after the Attic war (the Sicilian expedition) and saying that in each case an expedition composed of former citizens (one with Megellus and Pheristus from Elaia or Elea;¹⁰⁸ the other, mentioned above,¹⁰⁹ with Gorgus from Cos) came from Greece to refound the cities.¹¹⁰

Cornelius Nepos, too, makes some concise comments on the state in which Timoleon found Sicily and how he helped it:¹¹¹ '...totamque Siciliam, multos annos bello vexatam a barbarisque oppressam, suo adventu in pristinam restitueret.' A little later he speaks of 'bello vacuefactas possessiones' and 'urbium disiecta moenia':¹¹² the second of these phrases shows that the damage Timoleon is represented as repairing in this passage is the same which had gone unrepaired since the treaty between Dionysius and the Carthaginians in 405.¹¹³

In this way the sources for the later period confirm the impression that a movement of Greeks out of Sicily, due to fear of the Carthaginians and their plans of expansion, began before Dionysius I was tyrant, gained momentum as a result of his policies, and was not reversed (nor were its results repaired) in the generation in which Dionysius II held (and sometimes lost) power in Syracuse.

And Greek Italy was doing no better than Greek Sicily at this period. Dionysius II seems not to have had as much power in Italy as his father. In the earlier years of his reign he fought the Lucanians - Diodorus mentions the end of this war in 360 but not, unfortunately, its beginning.¹¹⁴ Ending it seems to have formed part of a policy of recognising that his father's efforts to control as much of Greek Italy as possible were not worth continuing: Dionysius II founded two cities in Apulia at this time, Diodorus says in the same passage, to secure safety against pirates in the Ionian Sea - an acknowledgment that he was not, in general, in control of the east coast of Apulia. He refounded Rhegium before 351, at which date Leptines and Callippus, the men in power in Syracuse during Dionysius' exile, captured it from his garrison; and these Syracusans 'restored autonomy to the Rhegines'.¹¹⁵ The exile of Dionysius II had begun in 356,¹¹⁶ and he had gone to Locri - his father's loyal ally and the birthplace of his mother - so it seems likely, since a strong Rhegium would strengthen south Italy and threaten Syracuse, that the refoundation of Rhegium occurred during this exile, rather than in the years when Dionysius had been tyrant in Syracuse.

And even the limited realm Dionysius held in Italy in the 350s slipped away from him in the 340s when he returned to Syracuse. The Locrians, having experienced his presence, overthrew his garrison after he left, and Dionysius could not recapture the city.¹¹⁷ When Timoleon expelled him from Sicily thereafter, he had to go to the Peloponnese as a private citizen.¹¹⁸

When there was no threat of domination from Syracuse, there was also no chance of help from that quarter against the Italic peoples. In the middle of the century the vulnerability of the Italic cities was made obvious. They were geographically widespread - most were near the coast, and most were towards the south-east (though Neapolis was as far north as

Campania) - and most of them had Italic neighbours. The larger cities are the only ones whose fortunes are even outlined in the extant historical record, but an odd comment of Strabo's illustrates the continual and wearing struggle smaller communities faced if they were to retain their Greekness. He notes that of the thirteen Greek cities of Iapygia all except Taras and Brundisium were (by this time) only *πολισμάτια*.¹¹⁹

Of the bigger towns, however, the Lucanians in the middle of the fourth century took Heraclea,¹²⁰ and the Bruttians Terina, Hipponium, Thurii and Sybaris.¹²¹ Sybaris, the city founded by exiles on the river Traeis before the original Sybaris was absorbed in the foundation of Thurii,¹²² was not refounded. According to Diodorus, its inhabitants were driven out by the Bruttians and killed (*ὕπὸ Βρυττίων ἐκβληθέντες ἀνηρέθησαν*).¹²³ But most of the other cities were retaken barely a generation later by Alexander of Epirus; in the case of Hipponium, since Livy does not mention it where he mentions the king's other successes,¹²⁴ the evidence of its restoration to Greek control is the coin-type, with a new, determinately non-Italic way of spelling the city's name, dated to the period of Alexander of Epirus:¹²⁵ this suggests a reassertion of their Greekness by the inhabitants.¹²⁶ Terina, also captured by the Bruttians c. 350, is described by Livy as a Bruttian city (in the same breath as Consentia, the Bruttian capital) in the passage where he mentions its capture by Alexander of Epirus,¹²⁷ and since in the same sentence the other Greek city Livy mentions, Heraclea, is described as a colony of the Tarentines, it may be right to infer from Livy's description of Terina that in the years since its capture it had begun to be dehellenized.

Thurii, on the other hand, minted coins throughout the fourth century without a break. B. V. Head notes 'a marked deterioration ... in the style and execution of the pieces' after c. 350, but he explains this as the result of material decline (connected with Bruttian control of

'inland sources of wealth').¹²⁸ The scattered indications suggest that the Thurians, whose city was near the frontier between Bruttium and Lucania, struggled vigorously for their autonomy: when Timoleon's reinforcements, sent from Corinth, were stuck at Thurii in the late 340s because of the Carthaginians' control of the sea, they guarded the city during the citizens' campaign against the Bruttians - the Bruttian occupation of Thurii had evidently lasted less than a decade. A little later, apparently, the Lucanians captured the city, but it was taken from them and came under Tarentine control.¹²⁹ Alexander of Epirus in his lifetime had wished to make Thurii the centre of the Italiot League instead of Heraclea, and so to slight the Tarentines:¹³⁰ so it is fair to conclude that Thurii had been a part of Alexander's own conquests, and was turned into a Tarentine possession after his death. In freeing themselves of the Tarentines, before the death of Alexander the Great, the Thurians became allies of the Romans.¹³¹

As for Heraclea, its reconquest from the Lucanians by Alexander of Epirus¹³² did not make it a secure possession of the Tarentines. At some point between the reconquest and the Hannibalic war, they fought the Messapians for possession of it. There seems to be no way to tell whether this war was in the fourth century or the third,¹³³ but in either case it illustrates how the Greeks, as one of the nations competing for land and resources in south Italy, were necessarily involved in perpetual struggle.

Alexander of Epirus' campaign extended into the north of Lucania, where he engaged the Samnites as he marched inland from Paestum, which, Livy's narrative implies, he had captured.¹³⁴ But there is no evidence of a Greek revival at Paestum of the sort Alexander's conquest inspired at Hipponium and Terina. Here, apparently, the expansion of Lucania at the expense of Greek Italy had been made permanent. This fact provides a suggestion as to how to interpret the effect on Italy of the Epirote's

brief campaign of conquest; it brought a restoration of overt Greekness to places recently enough conquered to have remembered their Hellenic identity, but it had far less cultural effect than Alexander the Great's ἀνάβασις (cf. n.133) into Asia.¹³⁵ The conquered Italic cities remained non-Greek. An amendment to Grote's characterization of the Italiot cities as 'a prize to be contended for between the Epirotic kings and the native Italian princes'¹³⁶ is required (though the comment conveys a sense of the cities' inability to find allies who would not overwhelm them, either militarily or culturally): the cities were in a position where either they would be part of the Italian dominion of some Greek or Greeks from outside Italy or they would be assimilated to the Italic cultures around them.

Alexander of Epirus was not the first general who had been asked to help the Italiots. In the middle 340s the Tarentines had asked their mother-city, Sparta, for help against the Lucanians, and had been sent an army under king Archidamus.¹³⁷ He died fighting on their side some years later, on the very day (Diodorus says) of another battle, that of Chaeronea.¹³⁸ But it may be doubted whether, if he had lived, he could have achieved in Italy what Timoleon achieved in Sicily. Two things, neither of which happened in Italy, brought about the revival of prosperity in Sicily: first, the decisive defeat of the one foreign enemy, and second, a great wave of immigrants from outside. Some, indeed, were from Italy: so that an examination of Timoleon's settlers in Sicily can contribute not only to an understanding of the Sicilian revival but also to a picture of what was happening to Greek Italy between the Lucanian/Bruttian conquests and the arrival of Alexander of Epirus.

Plutarch's account of Timoleon's settlers is the chief source. He notes that the Corinthians had learned that most of the exiles (πλείστους ... τῶν φυγάδων) were living in Asia and the islands, and so announced

the impending colonisation in those places: and that respondents to this announcement were too few, so that others from Corinth and the rest of Greece made their numbers up to 10,000.¹³⁹ Further colonists gathered up from Italy and Sicily made the total number of people newly settled in Italy by Timoleon up to 60,000.¹⁴⁰ Modern interpretations of these figures differ widely: J. Seibert's treatment of the migration from Italy as a Rückwanderung, a return of exiles to Sicily,¹⁴¹ ignores Plutarch's statement about most of the exiles living in Asia and the islands; D. Asheri is certainly right to note that exiles formed only a small part of the whole number of colonists,¹⁴² but unfortunately he suggests no alternative reason why so many Greeks in the West were ready to follow Timoleon. It seems fair to suggest that the Greeks from Sicily who joined the colonising enterprise were living beforehand either in the χώρα of a ruined Greek city or as resident aliens in a Sicel or Greek city:¹⁴³ that these were the people, or rather the descendants of the people, who had earlier lost their homes. Their return can be considered a Rückwanderung, since Timoleon brought them back into the normal πόλις life from outside it. But as for the Greeks from Italy settled by Timoleon, it is not possible to be certain whether they included some descendants of Siceliots who had fled at the end of the fifth or in the early fourth century: Plutarch's statement about Asia and the islands could only be reconciled with there being many such on the hypothesis that while those in Asia and the islands evidently kept their identity as Siceliots, those moving to Italy might have been likely to be more thoroughly absorbed.¹⁴⁴

Wherever the migrants from Italy had originated sixty or more years earlier, though, their movement to Sicily about 340 must have represented a noticeable reduction in the Greek population of Italy.¹⁴⁵ It was in spite of this decline that the military successes of Alexander of Epirus were achieved - and after his death there was no respite from war for the

Italiots. Indeed, this was the moment at which Rome began to be of importance in the affairs of Greek Italy: Alexander of Epirus had made a peace-treaty with the Romans (Livy makes a pompous comment about the likelihood that he would have broken it, given a chance),¹⁴⁶ but in 326 Neapolis fell to the Romans, after at least a year of war, without receiving hoped-for help from the Tarentines.¹⁴⁷ It seemed for a while that Roman and Lucanian/Apulian interests were about to become identical, as in 326 the Lucanians and Apulians were received in fidem populi Romani;¹⁴⁸ but the Tarentines managed to detach the Lucanians from the Roman alliance.¹⁴⁹

4. Agathocles

And in the 320s Agathocles began to make his mark.¹⁵⁰ Brought to Italy as a chiliarch in the Syracusan army fighting for Croton against the Bruttians, he stayed there after his attempt to discredit Heracleides and Sostratus, the rulers of Syracuse, had failed. He served as a mercenary at Taras until the Tarentines became suspicious of him.¹⁵¹ Then he gathered 'the exiles in Italy' and went to help the Rhegines against Heracleides and Sostratus.¹⁵² His activity as a ξεναγῶν in Italy was temporary, though: the δυναστεία in Syracuse fell, and he was able to return there.¹⁵³ When he became an exile again, Agathocles repeated in Sicily what he had done in Italy, and raised his own army in the inland parts.¹⁵⁴ But again this exile was short: he was soon back in Syracuse, elected general.¹⁵⁵ It is no great surprise, perhaps, that an army could easily be raised in Italy by an experienced officer; but it may seem odd that Agathocles had the same success in Sicily, in the years of grain exports and general material revival.¹⁵⁶ It is worth noting that Agathocles went inland to raise this army - whereas the great Siceliot cities revived by Timoleon were on or near the coast.

For the first dozen years of Agathocles' reign as tyrant of Syracuse, there was a body of Syracusan exiles ready to return if it ever had an opportunity. 6,000 had escaped to Acragas on the day of Agathocles' coup d'état in Syracuse,¹⁵⁷ and two years later at Messene some Syracusan exiles fought Agathocles until the Carthaginians successfully demanded peace for Messene from him.¹⁵⁸ Later Diodorus notes how all the exiles from Syracuse moved to Messene because all the other cities in Sicily had made peace with Agathocles,¹⁵⁹ and how when the Messenians, hoping for a peaceful settlement with the tyrant, sent them away,¹⁶⁰ they tried (unsuccessfully) to take Centoripa,¹⁶¹ and were then invited into Galeria.¹⁶² At the same time they asked the Carthaginians for help, though the Carthaginians' actions against Agathocles in response to the exiles' request seem to have been of no direct use to the exiles.¹⁶³ By 307 they were at Acragas: it was probably where they went after Agathocles' generals Pasiphilus and Demophilus defeated them in 312 and recaptured Galeria.¹⁶⁴

It is particularly interesting to note how Deinocrates, the leader of the exiles, was able to gain control of Acragantine policy at the moment of the defeat of Xenodocus, the Acragantine general, in 307.¹⁶⁵ He was able to recruit a very large army: 20,000 foot-soldiers and 1,500 cavalry, καὶ πάντων τούτων ἐν φυγαῖς καὶ μελέταις τοῦ πονεῖν συνεχῶς γεγονότων.¹⁶⁶ This illustrates what effect ten years of Agathocles' rule had had on Sicily: political conditions had caused a fair number of men to leave their homes for some period (it is not clear what Diodorus' phrase ἐν φυγαῖς...συνεχῶς γεγονότων would amount to in figures). But the general prosperity of the country continued to increase.¹⁶⁷ A century earlier the Siceliots had feared and run from the Carthaginians; now the Carthaginians' alliance was treated by the cities of Sicily as a possible alternative to alliance with and domination by the Syracusans. The reason for this may have been Agathocles' practice of taking exceptionally cruel revenge on

enemies;¹⁶⁸ or it may have been the Carthaginian policy of encouraging Greeks to live in Greek cities within their sphere of influence;¹⁶⁹ and the long years of ruin and exile under Syracusan domination may have been as easily remembered as the time when Timoleon presided over a more constructive Syracusan policy. In any case, it probably made little difference to the peoples of the half-dozen cities ceded by Agathocles in 307 and regained during the remainder of his reign whether they were under Punic or Greek rule.¹⁷⁰ And certainly Deinocrates, after Agathocles had defeated him in battle and treacherously killed his followers,¹⁷¹ served Agathocles, whom he had fought.¹⁷²

In the last years of the fourth century the Tarentines, at war with the Lucanians and Romans, asked the Spartans again for help and for Cleonymus, the king, as a general.¹⁷³ His career in Italy was not distinguished, but two points stand out: first, that he could enlist as many mercenaries in Taras as at Taenarum in Laconia (it is not stated whether they were all Greeks);¹⁷⁴ and second, that once the Lucanians (dismayed at the size of his army) had made peace, he attacked the people of Metapontum, a Greek city, and planned to invade Sicily.¹⁷⁵ Where Alexander of Epirus had striven to regain cities and territory and to extend the sphere of Greek control north-westwards into Italy, Cleonymus did not treat Greek Italy as an entity to be expanded at the expense of barbarians, but as a single unit in a projected personal kingdom. He had to defer his plan,¹⁷⁶ but his later raids on Italy, from Corcyra, were not connected with any gains retained from his earlier time in Italy.¹⁷⁷ Pyrrhus of Epirus, twenty years later, revived the plan of conquering Italy then Sicily:¹⁷⁸ two inferences are possible (and it seems likely that both would be justified): that the Hellenistic idea of kingship had eclipsed the idea of *τυραννίς* which the Dionysii and Alexander of Epirus had (and against which Timoleon reacted), and that the struggle for the survival of Greek Italy was no longer as difficult as it

had been between the 350s and the 330s. The days of quick expansion of the Lucanian and Bruttian areas were over, and the cities of Greek Italy (though now less populous than a century before) were for the most part, like the Greek cities of Sicily, inhabited by their peoples and living the normal life of Greek πόλεις. It was not to last. D.S. XXI.4 and 8 preserve some scattered facts about Agathocles' return to Italy in the 290s.

Appendix: Entella

The dossier of inscriptions dealing with the synoecism of Entella (ASNP Ser.III 12(3)(1982), pp.775-781 (texts numbered I-VIII); SEG XXX 1117-1123) has attracted comment from a range of scholars (ASNP Ser.III 12(3)(1982), pp.771-1103 - this collection referred to here as materiali e contributi). These scholars do not all agree on the questions of dating and circumstances.

S. Cataldi ('La boetheia dei geloi e degli herbitaioi ai Campani di Entella', materiali e contributi, pp.887-904) and G. Nenci ('Considerazioni sui decreti da Entella', materiali e contributi, pp.1069-1083) argue for a fourth-century dating of at least some of the texts. If this argument is accepted, then the Entelline community must be added to the list of communities of exiles living outside their cities in Sicily in the course of the fourth century.

But Minatus Corvius the Mamertine (SEG XXX.1121 lines 27-28) is as good as conclusive for a date after 289 (cf. D.S. XXI.18.2 and Polybius I.7.2, and M. Lejeune 'Noms grecs et noms indigènes dans l'épigraphie hellénistique d'Entella', materiali e contributi, pp.787-799). However, there are serious objections to the arguments for comparatively late dating (260s or 250s) favoured by some writers in materiali e contributi (e.g. M. Lombardo 'Il sinecismo di Entella' materiali e contributi pp.849-886, and M. Corsaro 'La presenza Romana a Entella: una nota su Tiberio Claudio di Anzio', materiali e contributi pp.993-1032): it is hardly conceivable that the Romans could go unmentioned, at any rate in the 250s.

In any case the Entellines were without a city for an unknown number of years. The Ennaeans received them while they were on their wanderings (ἐπεὶ ἐκ τῆς ἰδίας ἐξεπέτομεν καὶ ἐπλανώμεθα, SEG XXX.1123 lines 9-11) and when the city was refounded they received help from a number of quarters (SEG XXX.1117, 1118, 1120, 1121-and 1122). This in outline is the pattern

seen elsewhere: destruction, wanderings, later refoundation with outside help.

Notes

1. Livy VII.26.15.
2. Xen. Hell. I.1.37; I.5.21; II.2.24 and II.3.5. K.J. Beloch (Griechische Geschichte II.2 (Strassburg, 1916), pp.254-255) suggests that they are interpolated, and notes that the army strengths given 'sind die des Timaeos (Diod. XIII 54,5; 80,5)'. A broader case for interpolation in the Hellenica is made by D. Lotze ('Die chronologischen Interpolationen in Xenophons Hellenika' Philologus 106 (1962), pp.1-13, and 'War Xenophon selbst der Interpolator seiner Hellenika I-II?' Philologus 118 (1974), pp. 215-217) and by H. Baden (Untersuchungen zur Einheit der Hellenika Xenophons (Diss. Hamburg 1966)).
3. D.S. XIII.56.4 - 58.2; 16,000 killed: 57.6.
4. D.S. XIII.62.4.
5. D.S. XIII.80.1: the successes at the sieges of Selinus and Himera may have suggested to the Carthaginians that their siege techniques, not seen before in the Greek world (cf. Y. Garlan Recherches de Poliorcétique grecque (Bibliothèque des écoles françaises d'Athènes et de Rome, fasc. 123, 1974), pp.156-157), could make the conquest of Sicily a practical possibility (I owe this point to Mr. P.M. Tickler). C.R. Whittaker appears to misunderstand this passage when he comments that events before 406 showed 'nothing to justify Diodorus' words that Carthaginians were "eager to be overlords of the island"' (Whittaker, p.66) - Diodorus does not comment here on Carthaginian motives before 406, but says that 'about these times', after the more modest activity of previous years, they were 'eager to be overlords of the island'. The nuisance caused by Hermocrates may also have had something to do with the decision of 406 (cf. below, n.19): but the expedition was too large to be aimed merely at suppressing or punishing him.
6. D.S. XII.58.3-4.
7. D.S. XIII.81.4 - 84.7.

8. Explicit references to Timaeus: D.S. XIII.82.6 and 7. These chapters are part of Timaeus FGrHist 566 F 26a; and F 26c apud Aelian VH 12.29, has the same content as D.S. XIII.82.8. Cf. also Meister, pp.79-82.

9. D.S. XIII.84.5. Beloch, p.281 n.3, discusses this figure and concludes that unless it is worthless, it must be intended to take into account all inhabitants including slaves. He dismisses the figure 800,000 preserved at D.L. VIII.63 as a multiplication by 4 ('dem im Alterthum allgemein angenommenen Verhältniss der Waffenfähigen zur Gesamtbevölkerung') of Timaeus' figure.

J.A. de Waele 'La popolazione di Akragas antica', Φιλίας Χάρυν: Miscellanea de studi classici in onore di Eugenio Manni III (Rome, 1979), pp.747-760, uses an archaeological argument based on the aerial photography and excavation work of G. Schmiedt and P. Griffo, to suggest that 16-18,000 people could have lived in Acragas, so that while the figure of 20,000 is credible since people had come within the walls from the countryside during the siege, the figure of 200,000 is incredible. But de Waele's exegesis of σὺν δὲ τοῖς κατοικοῦσι ξένους (p.751) as referring to metics and slaves normally resident in Acragas is not satisfactory - not only because it would seem odd to call a slave a ξένος, but also in view of the position of Acragas as the first fortified city in the Carthaginians' westward path in 406/5. Non-Acragantines as well as country-dwelling Acragantines must have fled behind the walls of Acragas in that year.

10. D.S. XIII.90.1.

11. D.S. XIII.108.2.

12. D.S. XIII.91.1.

13. D.S. XIII.91.2.

14. D.S. XIII.111.1.

15. D.S. XIII.111.3.

16. D.S. XIII.92.1.

17. D.S. XIII.63.2-3.
18. D.S. XIII.75.8.
19. D.S. XIII.92.4-6. Indeed, it may be the case that the exiles' raids on Motye and Panormus (D.S. XIII.63.4) from 409 were a contributory and partial cause of the Carthaginian invasion of Sicily in 406/5.
20. D.S. XIII.92.7.
21. D.S. XIII.95.3.
22. Seibert, p.243.
23. The capture: D.S. XIV.15.4 (403). E.A. Freeman The History of Sicily from the Earliest Times III (Oxford, 1892), p.557, says 'just now we are told that Leontinoi was full of exiles and strangers; that is, it had been assigned as a place of shelter for the fugitives from Akragas. These men were likely to be favourable to Dionysios...'
24. D.S. XIII.92.6.
25. Cf. above, pp.45-46 and n.12. There is no apparent ground for the suggestion that 'die Phygades durften aus allen Teilen Siziliens und Unteritaliens gekommen sein' (Seibert, p.243): D.S. XIII.91.1 shows that the flow of exiles was to Italy, and that in the insecure circumstances affecting Sicily there was not likely to be movement in the other direction.
26. D.S. XIII.96.2-4.
27. Cf. above, p.47. D.S. XIII.109.1 - 111.3.
28. D.S. XIII.111.1; cf. D.S. XIII.88.7.
29. Lintott, p.197.
30. D.S. XIII.111.3: Δλονύσιος δὲ...ἠνάγκασε καὶ τοὺς ἐκεῖ [sc. at Camarina] ...εἰς Συρακούσας ἀπλέναι.
31. D.S. XIII.113.4.
32. I do not mean to suggest that the Siceliots were less cruel, when they had the chance: cf. D.S. XIV.51.4 and 53.2. Merely that their fear affected their actions.

33. In a thesis currently in progress P.M. Tickler argues (cf. D.S. XIV. 96.4) that Dionysius' settlement of mercenaries in Tauromenium in 392 completed a pattern of settlements planted to defend Syracuse: '...Tauromenium became the final link in a network of strongpoints with which he controlled the eastern sector of the island. On the coast Tyndaris, Messene and Tauromenium controlled the route taken by the Carthaginians in 396, while inland Aetna and Adranum protected the vital corn-producing areas of the Simieto valley and the plain of Leontini, with Leontini a valuable centre of strength near Syracuse. Small forts (XIV.58.1), either garrisoned or settled with mercenaries, will have provided supplementary protection.'

34. D.S. XIV.41.1-2. Mr. P.M. Tickler points out to me that εἰς τὴν ἐπικράτειαν τῶν Καρχηδονίων ἀποτρέχοντας τὰς τε πόλεις καὶ τὰς κτήσεις κομυζομένους in §1 should be rendered 'running away to the domain of the Carthaginians and receiving back their cities and possessions' (cf. D.S. XIV.78.4). Presumably the inhabitants of the Greek cities ceded to the Carthaginians in 405 are being referred to here (cf. D.S. XIII.114.1). D.S. XIV.75.3 explicitly notes that Dionysius made use of the Greeks' fear of the Carthaginians; presumably Timaeus is the source of this comment (Meister, p.94, uses it as evidence that the whole passage from 70.4 to 75.6 derives from Timaeus), which is well borne out by the narrative in general.

35. D.S. XI.21.1 - 22.6 and 26.7.

36. D.S. XI.38.1.

37. Hdt. VII.156.1-3. Cf. T.J. Dunbabin The Western Greeks (Oxford, 1948), pp.416-418.

38. D.S. XI.49.2.

39. D.S. XI.49.1.

40. D.S. XI.49.3.

41. Livy IX.19.4 lists the Italian peoples who would have been the Romans'

allies, and §§10-11 of the chapter assert that Alexander the Great would have had to admit (if he had come to Italy after conquering Asia) that he had formerly fought against women. Here and at Aulus Gellius NA XVII.21.33 the contrast between Romans (=men) and Asiastics (=women) is ascribed to Alexander of Epirus, whose assessment need not be treated as objective.

42. It is particularly noticeable how Livy's account of an attempt by the Tarentines to prevent a battle between the Romans and the Samnites in 320, just a few chapters before the beginning of the digression about Alexander the Great, prepares the reader to see the Greeks as crass and ineffectual: at IX.14.1 no reason is suggested why Tarentine ambassadors should have arrived, when the armies were preparing for battle, and asked both sides to refrain from fighting - adding that if either side refused, the Tarentines would fight for the other; sympathy is elicited for the view of the consul L. Papirius Cursor, who (Livy says in §5 of the chapter) went into battle 'vanissimam increpans gentem quae, suarum impotens rerum prae domesticis seditionibus discordiisque, aliis modum pacis ac belli facere aequum censeret.' The historian seems not to have told the whole truth, suppressing something necessary to an understanding of the incident in order to create an impression of Greek weakness. And cf. Livy VII.26.11 'res trahi segnitia Graecorum non committentium se in aciem videbantur', and Livy VIII.22.8 'Graeci...gente lingua magis strenua quam factis'.

43. Strabo VI.1.2 (=253).

44. D.S. XIV.91.1.

45. Polybius II.39.1-6.

46. J.A.O. Larsen Greek Federal States (Oxford, 1968), pp.95-97.

47. D.S. XIV.90.4-7.

48. G. Pugliese Carratelli 'Sanniti, Lucani, Brettii e italioti dal secolo IV a.C.' Convegno di Studi sulla Magna Grecia 11 (1971), pp.37-55. In general, Pugliese Carratelli comments on the degree of hellenization among

the Bruttians and Lucanians, noting for instance (p.48) their adoption of Greek civic forms. He explains (interestingly, in view of nn.41 and 42 above) how this hellenization later became part of anti-Roman sentiment.

J. de la Genière ('C'è un "modello" Amendolara?' ASNP ser. III 8.2 (1978), pp.335-354) makes the point that after a severe dislocation caused to existing populations by the foundation of Sybaris (pp.344-347) an economic pattern was established whereby the Italic inhabitants of Amendolara probably produced manufactured goods for the Sybarites (pp.348-351). So as early as the seventh century relations between Greeks and non-Greeks might be not merely of peace but even of economic interdependence.

49. D.S. XIV.100.5: §§1-5 of this chapter deal with Dionysius' second attack on Rhegium (390).

50. D.S. XIV.101.1.

51. D.S. XIV.102.3.

52. Suda s.v. Ἀριστόξευος.

53. A difficulty with the Aristoxenus fragment is its mention of the Poseidoniates as Τυρρηνοῦς ἢ Ῥωμαίους γεγονόσσι. U. von Wilamowitz deleted ἢ Ῥωμαίους. Paestum became a Roman colony in 123, but there is no question of its having been other than Lucanian in the fourth century after the end of Greek Poseidonia (cf. P-W, s.v. Poseidonia). Being an Italiot, Aristoxenus probably should have known this. The ascription of the fragment to him (rather than to some other Aristoxenus), is, however, certain, since two other fragments of Aristoxenus of Tarentum, dealing (as does this fragment) with musical topics, are quoted on the previous page of Athenaeus, at 631c and d. There seems to be no means of ascertaining whether the inexactitude was introduced by Athenaeus or the original author.

54. A.J. Evans ('The "Horsemen" of Tarentum' NC Ser. III Vol. 9 (1889), pp.1-228, p.40) is most likely right to think of it as having fallen to the Lucanians at much the same time as Laus. An isolated issue of Poseidoniates

staters, dated by C.M. Kraay 'perhaps after the middle of the [fourth] century' Kraay, p.198), bears the Italic name 'Dossenno'. This is particularly interesting because earlier Poseidoniates issues do not bear full personal names (ibid.). The name suggests well-established Italic domination, whether Dossenno was a magistrate or the die-engraver.

55. In 399 the Rhegines opposed Dionysius in the matter of the Naxians and Catanians, and harboured exiles from Syracuse (D.S. XIV.40.1-2). Five years later, again offering asylum to those exiled by Dionysius, they tried to settle the Naxians and Catanians at Mylae in Sicily (D.S. XIV.87.1-3).

56. At D.S. XIV.91.1 the mention of the Lucanians is quite casual (καὶ γὰρ οὗτοι τότε διεπολέμουν πρὸς αὐτούς) and does not in any way connect them with Dionysius.

57. Dionysius' favourable treatment of the Locrians (D.S. XIV.106.3 and 107.2) might have extended to the Lucanians if they had been his allies: at least there is no more mention of fighting between Lucanians and Italiots until the middle of the century.

58. D.S. XIV.100.1 - 102.3.

59. D.S. XIV.103.1 - 106.3. Cf. L. Moretti Olympionikai, i vincitori negli antichi agoni olimpici (Rome, 1957), no.379 (cf. nos. 388-389) on Dicon Son of Calli(m) brotus of Caulonia, who won the boys' stadium in 392 as a Cauloniate, and was called a Syracusan on the occasions of his two later victories (388 and 384), not corruptly as Paus. VI.3.11 alleges, but because the Cauloniates were moved to Syracuse in 389.

60. D.S. XIV.107.2 - 108.6 and 111.1-4.

61. D.S. XIV.111.4.

62. As J.B. Bury comments, with D.S. XIV.107.3 in mind, the Rhegines 'had turned Dionysius into a hangman at their own cost' (CAH VI (Cambridge, 1927), p.129).

63. Justin XX.1.1.

64. D.S. XIV.14.1 - 15.4.
65. Cf. above, p. 48.
66. D.S. XIV.15.4.
67. D.S. XIV.14.1.
68. D.S. XIV.16.1-2.
69. D.S. XIV.16.2. At 16.4 Diodorus notes that some say that Halaesa was founded by Himilco at the time of the treaty (sc. of 405). Meister, p.86, calls this an 'unhistorische Version', and as it stands it is certainly utterly implausible. But Diodorus may have been drawing on a source which recognised the Carthaginians as having been responsible, by their support of the Herbitaeans, for the success of the foundation of Halaesa. This is, after all, the sense in which the Carthaginians could 'found' a Greek city; and the foundation did take place only a couple of years after the treaty.

Archonides and his father the elder Archonides were friends of Athens, and so enemies of Syracuse (IG I³228, lines 6-25, cf. HCT ad. Thuc. VII.1.4), from the time of the Peloponnesian war. So it hardly seems surprising that his city, Herbite, should have been an enduring centre of anti-Syracusan activity.

70. D.S. XIV.87.1: ...τῶν Ναξίων καὶ Καταναίων τοὺς ὑπολειπομένους...
71. D.S. XIV.15.2-3.
72. D.S. XIV.87.3.
73. D.S. XIV.87.1.
74. Justin XX.1.1: cf. above, pp. 53-54.
75. D.S. XIV.103.4.
76. The three references are: Livy XXIV.3.8, Justin XX.5.1 and D.H. excerpta XX.7. From the third of these, E. Ciaceri dates the fall of Croton to 379 (Storia della Magna Grecia II (Milan, Rome and Naples, 1927), pp.432-433); but while this may be right, it should be noted that this passage reads

... καὶ κροτωνιᾶτας ἐξεῦλε καὶ Ῥηγίλους καὶ εἰετέλεσεν ἔτη δώδεκα τούτων τυραννῶν τῶν πόλεων: and since Rhegium, captured in 387, remained in Dionysius' control for the rest of his life, the fact of its being mentioned here should induce some caution about the 'twelve years' in the passage. Ciaceri (ibid.) also takes Justin as implying that the conquest of Croton was incomplete: but the fact that nothing more is said about Croton after 'Dionysius tyrannus ... Crotonienses adgreditur' is most likely only a symptom of Justin's erratic epitomizing: the passage in Livy says that the citadel of Croton was taken.

77. Beloch, pp.301-302.

78. The ἐξεῦλε in D.H. excerpta XX.7 (cf. above, n.76) shows that Dionysius took the Crotoniates out of the city: but there is no indication about what happened next.

79. In four stages, after the measures taken in 404 to consolidate the tyranny: (i) the absorption of the population of Leontini (403; there were at Leontini the survivors from Acragas, Gela and Camarina. These were now brought to Syracuse. D.S. XIV.15.4); (ii) the fortification of Epipolae (401); D.S. XIV.18.2-8); (iii) the great rearmament (399; D.S. XIV.41.3 - 43.4) and (iv) the absorption of the populations of Caulonia and Hipponium, followed by the building of dockyards, a new circuit wall, gymnasia, temples and other public buildings (the early 380s; D.S. XIV.106.3, XIV.107.2 and XV.13.5). So Dionysius planned and carried out development in three areas: population, military strength and building.

80. Plut. Timoleon 22.3 says of Timoleon: ... τὴν πόλιν ἐλὼν οὐκ εἶχε πολίτας, ἀλλὰ τῶν μὲν ἐν τοῖς πολέμοις καὶ ταῖς στάσεσι διαφθαρέντων, τῶν δὲ τὰς τυραννίδας φευγόντων ... Some had taken to exile in Dionysius I's reign (cf. D.S. XIV.40.2); but this comment can be taken to refer mainly to the years after 367.

81. Plato Ep. III 315b6-7. A further denial at Ep. III 319c7-d2.
82. Plato Ep. VII 332e3 - 333a2; Ep. VII 335e3 - 336a8; Ep. VIII 353e2-5 and Ep. VII 355c8-d7.
83. Real or dramatic date. It is not possible here to treat the questions of the Letters' composition and authorship, though it is worth noting that L. Edelstein (Plato's Seventh Letter (Leiden, 1966), p.32) argues against Plato's authorship of Ep. VII on the ground that no need for colonisation existed in the reign of Dionysius the younger or at the death of his father. His argument is invalid because of this mistaken premiss.
84. Plato Ep. VIII 353a4-8.
85. Plato Ep. VII 324a5-6.
86. D.S. XIV.57.3 and 58.3-4.
87. D.S. XIV.57.4.
88. D.S. XIV.78.4-5. §5 concentrates on Dionysius' settling new colonists in Messene; but the comment in §4 about survivors 'getting back their fatherlands' is without point unless it is recognised that Messenian survivors joined in the refoundation (a point not noted at Beloch, pp.288-289).
89. Orlandini, p.162.
90. D.S. XIV.47.6. Note that Dionysius received contingents from Camarina, Gela, Acragas, Himera and Selinus: the very cities overthrown between 409 and 405. The author of the account on which Diodorus' is based (Meister, p.89 and n.66, argues against the view that the source here is Ephorus, and suggests Timaeus) was making a point by bringing in these names during the advance on Motya. The fact that they are named does not, therefore, imply that they were able to send large contingents: it does symbolise the Siceliot revanche.
91. D.S. XVI.9.5 and Plut. Dion 26.1.
92. Orlandini, p.161: 'Geloi residenti nel retroterra e non gli abitanti di una polis ricostuita.' Orlandini (ibid.) notes D.S. XIV.68.2, where Theodorus of Syracuse, speaking in 396, refers to Gela and Camarina as

ἀοικητους.

93. Talbert, pp.149-150 and 155-159 review the archaeological evidence relating to Camarina and Acragas. The whole of chapter 8 (pp.146-160) is a useful survey contrasting conditions before and after Timoleon's expedition from Corinth.
94. The book: Città sicane, sicule e greche nella zona di Gela (Palermo, 1964); reviewed at JHS 87 (1967), pp.188-189 (A.G. Woodhead) and CR n.s.16 (1966), pp.213-215 (J. Boardman). The article: 'E Gela e Katagela' Röm. Mitt. 82 (1975), pp.21-82 (hereinafter Navarra).
95. Navarra, p.22.
96. Navarra, p.71.
97. SEG XII 379 line 9; SEG XII 380 line 7 (restored).
98. S.M. Sherwin-White comments (Sherwin-White, p.80) that 'the correctness of this minimal emendation need not be doubted', and goes on to note that there is no evidence of Coan participation in the original foundation of Camarina or of Gela. So the Coan involvement must have been at this moment.
99. Plut. Timoleon 23.2.
100. Above, p. 54.
101. Capture of Hipponium and removal to Syracuse: D.S. XIV.107.2; refoundation: D.S. XV.24.1.
102. D.S. XV.24.2-3.
103. D.S. XIV.78.4-6. The Italiots were from Locri (1,000) and its colony Medma (4,000) (§4).
104. Above, pp.56-57.
105. Lysias XXXIII (Olympiacus).3. It is scarcely necessary to argue that this generalization is intended to make the hearer or reader think of Sicily: note that Lysias, who refers to himself as a 'good man and a citizen worthy of his city', was a citizen not of Athens (where he lived), but of Syracuse (D.H. Lysias 1). Sicily must have been close to his heart.

Naturally the reference is also general (as appropriate to an Olympic speech) and encompasses the state of Asia Minor.

106. Plut. Timoleon 1.1-2.

107. Plut. Timoleon 22.3-4.

108. Plut. Timoleon 35.2. G. Manganaro was first to suggest following the manuscripts (all except one) which give the reading Ἐλαίας, and believing that the Epirote city Elaea was the source of these colonists (in the debate after P. Leveque's paper 'De Timoléon à Pyrrhos' Kokalos 14-15 (1968-1969), pp.135-151 (debate at pp.151-156), at pp.155-156). Talbert, pp.204-205, thinks it puzzling that Plutarch should not have clarified his meaning 'to prevent confusion with more famous cities of very similar name'; this is a fair point, but it ought to be noted that the names were not all that similar, except on paper - the name of Elea, the Lucanian city, began with a 'w'-sound which was not marked in the atticized spelling of the word. Its Roman name was Velia. Talbert (ibid.) is sceptical about D. Asheri's suggestion that the lack of any Ionian influence in fourth-century Acragas tends to make the Dorian city in Epirus seem a more likely source of settlers than the Ionian city in Lucania ('I coloni elei ad Agrigento' Kokalos 16 (1970), pp.78-88); Talbert may be right to say that it cannot be considered definitely proved, but it is only just to add that Manganaro's and Asheri's respective contributions are quite persuasive.

On the other hand no θεαροδόκoi from Elaea are recorded in IG IV² 95 among the contributors to the Epidaurian Asclepieum. This (Mr. D.M. Lewis suggests to me) does not inspire great confidence in Elaea (cf. N.G.L. Hammond Epirus (Oxford, 1967), pp.517-518). The conclusion is that there is no conclusion, as yet.

109. Above, p.59.

110. Plut. Timoleon 35.2.

111. Nepos Timoleon 1.1.

112. Nepos Timoleon 3.2.
113. Cf. D.S. XIII.114.1.
114. D.S. XVI.5.2.
115. D.S. XVI.45.9.
116. D.S. XVI.17.2.
117. Strabo VI.1.8 (=259-260).
118. D.S. XVI.70.1.
119. Strabo VI.3.5 (=281). οὕτως ἔκπεπόνηται, Strabo explains. P.A. Brunt in Italian Manpower 225 B.C. - A.D.14 (Oxford, 1971) does not discuss this passage, but it is apparent that he finds no reason to think of the Greeks as having formed a sizeable proportion of the population of Iapygia/ Apulia in 225 B.C.: he deduces a population of 284,000 (Italic) Apulians (p.54), but puts the population of Greeks in all Italy at only 210,000 (p.59). Therefore it seems best to put the gradual decline of the eleven cities of Apulia as far back as the fourth and earlier third centuries.
120. Livy VIII.24.4 is the account of its recapture from the Lucanians. There is no direct testimony to its capture by them.
121. D.S. XVI.15.2. Sybaris: D.S. XII.22.1.
122. D.S. XII.9.1 - 11.3; cf. Strabo VI.1.13 (=263) and D.S. XII.22.1.
123. D.S. XII.22.1.
124. Livy VIII.24.4.
125. B.V. Head Historia Numorum² (Oxford, 1911), pp.100-101: the series dated between 379 and 350 is marked [E] or [EIP] (the letter [being a digamma - cf. the city's Roman name, Vibo Valentia), but the later coins are marked EIIΩNIEΩN.
126. Here cf. Kraay, p.189, where it is noted that the dominant theme in fourth-century Italiot coinage is the theme of increasing pressure on Greek cities and of the Greeks' efforts to resist it.
127. Livy VIII.24.4.
128. B.V. Head Historia Numorum² (Oxford, 1911), pp.86-87.

129. The key passage is Strabo VI.1.13 (=263): θούριου δ' εὐτυχήσαντες πολὺν χρόνον ὑπὸ Λευκανῶν ἠνδραποδίσθησαν, Ταραντίνων δ' ἀφελομένων ἐκείνους ἐπὶ Ῥωμαίους κατέφυγον, οἱ δὲ πέμψαντες συνοίκους ὀλιγανδροῦσι μετωνόμασαν Κωπιᾶς τὴν πόλιν. The question is whether, when he mentions the Tarentines, Strabo is referring to the time of Alexander of Epirus or to the time of Pyrrhus. The Romans fought for the Thurians at the time of Pyrrhus, but not against the Tarentines: the enemies besieging Thurii then were Samnites, Lucanians and Bruttians (D.H. excerpta XIX.13); but after the death of Alexander of Epirus there was a Roman-Tarentine war (326: Livy VIII.27.1-11), and though Livy's explanation of its causes does not mention a request from Thurii (since Livy here aims to characterise the Tarentines as cupidos rerum novandarum), this war fits Strabo's comment much better than the other.

130. Strabo VI.3.4 (=280).

131. See above, n.129. Cf. also Livy IX.19.4, which lists the 'ora Graecorum inferi maris a Thuriis Neapolim et Cumas' among the 'strong allies or broken enemies of the Romans' at the time of Alexander the Great. The Thurians had apparently never been enemies of the Romans: so this is a reference to the alliance.

132. Livy VIII.24.4; cf. above, p.63 and n.120.

133. Strabo VI.3.4 (=281).

134. Livy VIII.17.9. Alexander, Livy notes in this passage, was making an escensio from Paestum. escensio is the Latin for ἀνάβασις ('march up country'): cf. Lewis & Short s.v. escendo, at §B.

135. Further north in Etruria, on the other hand, there was great Greek influence. Consider for instance the quantities of material listed in the catalogue of the Spina museum (N. Alfieri Museo archeologico nazionale di Ferrara, I (Bologna, 1979)): pp.1-124 listing Attic pottery, pp.125-129 other Greek wares, pp.130-149 Etruscan, Faliscan, a little Italiot.

This Greek influence was clearly coming from Attica rather than the South Italian cities.

136. D.S. XIX.3.3.

137. D.S. XVI.62.4 - 63.1. This is recorded under 346/5, but it is not made clear how long Archidamus' Cretan campaign took before the departure to Italy.

138. Greek historians were of course fond of this sort of thing, at least in cases of battles between Greeks and barbarians: cf. Hdt. IX.101.2 (Plataea and Mycale); D.S. XI.24.1 (Himera and Thermopylae) and, in contradiction, Hdt. VII.166 (Himera and Salimis).

139. Plut. Timoleon 23.3.

140. Plut. Timoleon 23.4, quoting Athanis. The figure in Diodorus which appears to correspond to this is 50,000 (D.S. XVI.82.5). 'Appears to', because Athanis' figure may perhaps include settlers who settled elsewhere than at Syracuse and nearby Agrigum.

141. Seibert, p.257.

142. D. Asheri Distribuzioni di terre nell'antica Grecia (Turin, 1966), p.29.

143. Carcinus, the father of Agathocles, does not quite conform to this pattern. He was an exile from Rhegium who settled at Therma in the Carthaginian ἐπικράτεια in Sicily (D.S. XIX.2.2). He later moved to Syracuse (2.7.) and became a citizen under Timoleon (2.8). He had migrated before Timoleon's appeals for settlers. But he was probably a man of importance: reduced circumstances may have turned him to being a potter (2.7), but while at Therma he was able to give commands to Carthaginian envoys (ἔδωκεν ἐντολὰς καρχηδονίους πρὸς θεωροῦς: 2.3) to question the Delphic oracle for him.

144. This may have been the case if Alcibiades' comments on Sicily (cf. above, p.50) could have been applied also to Italy.

145. Cf. above, n.119 for P.A. Brunt's estimate of the Greek population of Italy in 225 at 210,000. Even assuming that the population had declined over the previous century or so, the loss of colonists to Sicily soon after 340 must have had an impact unless Italiots formed only a small proportion of the 50,000.
146. Livy VIII.17.10.
147. Beginning of the war: Livy VIII.22.7-8. The Roman victory: Livy VIII. 25.5-13.
148. Livy VIII.25.3.
149. Livy VIII.27.6-11.
150. Goldsberry, p.44 (with references to secondary sources), ascribes his service in the Crotoniate-Bruttian war to this date.
151. D.S. XIX.3.3 -4.1.
152. D.S. XIX.4.2, which unfortunately gives no idea of the scale of this force.
153. D.S. XIX.4.3.
154. D.S. XIX.5.4. ἰδίαν δύναμιν ἐν τῇ μεσογείῳ συνεστήσατο.
155. D.S. XIX.5.5.
156. Goldsberry, p.10 deals with the evidence for grain exports from Sicily at this period; pp.9-14 are a review of evidence for the late fourth-century revival throughout Sicily. Cf. also above, n.93.
157. D.S. XIX.8.2.
158. D.S. XIX.65.4-5.
159. D.S. XIX.102.1.
160. D.S. XIX.102.4.
161. D.S. XIX.103.2-3.
162. D.S. XIX.104.1.
163. Request for help: D.S. XIX.103.1. The Carthaginians attacked Syracuse by sea (103.4-5) and took a hill called Ecnomus in Geloan territory (104.3-4).

After defending this in battle against Agathocles in the next year (311), they were able to gain the alliance of most of the Siceliot cities and confine Agathocles to Syracuse (110.1-4).

164. D.S. XIX.104.2.

165. D.S. XX.57.1.

166. D.S. XX.57.2.

167. Talbert, p.148 comments that '317, the year of Agathocles' seizure of power, only marked the end of Timoleon's political influence; the prosperity he set in motion continued to increase.'

168. D.S. XIX.1.8.

169. See above, nn.69 and 34.

170. Probably the formerly subject cities referred to at D.S. XX.79.5 are Camarina, Leontini, Catana, Tauromenium, Messene and Abacaenum - the cities which adhered to the Carthaginian cause in 311 (D.S. XIX.110.3-4) - and thus the treaty of 307 was not a renewal of the treaty of 405 (D.S. XIII.114.1).

171. D.S. XX.89.1-5.

172. D.S. XX.90.1-2.

173. D.S. XX.104.1.

174. D.S. XX.104.2.

175. D.S. XX.104.3-4.

176. D.S. XX.104.4.

177. D.S. XX.105.1-3 and Livy X.2.1-15.

178. Plut. Pyrrhus 14.4 and 22.1-3.

Part II: Greece and Asia

The difficulties faced by the west Greeks were not entirely special to their part of the world. There were similar events going on in Asia where Greek cities were near non-Greek communities, and many cities were destroyed in Greece too. Everywhere there were people losing their homes. This part of the chapter is chronologically divided into three sections.

1. The Spartan Domination and the Λευκτροῦ Καλοῦ 404 - 358

The end of the Peloponnesian war might almost have been the end of Athens. The Corinthians and Thebans had support for the suggestion, but Sparta willed otherwise.¹ But Lysander's restoration of local control in the Aegean states² had curtailed the area of Athenian settlement (all the time, he had been sending Athenians home to worsen the famine in Athens³), and so was effectively a partial destruction of Athens. The cleruchies, settlements housing Athenian citizens estimated by K.J. Beloch to number 10,000 in 431,⁴ were lost to Athens. C. Mossé, considering the problem of what the cleruchs did after the Spartan victory, suggests that 'it is... possible that the loss of certain cleruchies had entailed a decrease in the civic body: many cleruchs must have chosen to renounce their status as Athenians rather than the land which provided their living.'⁵ This, however, is an insecure conclusion: Lysander's aim was to send Athenians back home and hasten the process of starving Athens out; there is no suggestion (nor likelihood) that he gave cleruchs an opportunity in some way to 'renounce' their citizenship and stay where they were.⁶

In 400, having defeated Elis, the Spartans were able to expel the Messenians from Cephallenia and Naupactus.⁷ These Messenians left Greece and went some to Sicily and Italy, others to Cyrene, these to join the Euesperites who were inviting any Greek to join them.⁸ At Cephallenia and Naupactus the Spartans allowed the Cephallenians and the Ozolian Locrians

to return.⁹ This action on the Spartans' part is clearly similar to what they had done in the Aegean with the Athenian cleruchs: both actions indicate a conservative policy, of concentrating back in the hands of firm Spartan allies the gains made by Athens and her allies in the fifth century. This policy is evident also in Spartan action in Asia and the Aegean in the 390s - for instance when in 398 Dercylidas walled the Thracian Chersonese to protect the 'eleven or twelve' πόλεις which had been damaged by the Thracians.¹⁰

The Spartans displayed some consistency in following policies of this kind. Quelling a στάσις in Heradea Trachinia in 399, the Spartan Herippidas made war on the inhabitants of Oete and forced them to leave the land (ἐκλιπεῖν τὴν χώραν).¹¹ They fled - not only the men, but women and children too - into Thessaly. The Oetaeans seem not to have formed a state separate from that of the Heracleans: when the Boeotians seized Heraclea in 395 and killed the Spartan garrison,¹² they gave the city to the Trachinians who had been exiled by the Spartans, and whom Diodorus describes as the 'most ancient inhabitants of the land'.¹³ Here there was an ethnic division between friends and enemies of Sparta.

The Spartan aim in the ten years subsequent to Aegospotami was to keep Greece much as it was when the war was won; and the Spartan method involved using harmosts to control potentially dangerous cities.¹⁴ But the possibility of a permanent Spartan predominance in Greece faded away as Sparta was fought to a standstill in the Corinthian war,¹⁵ and the application of Sparta's methods was restricted to the Peloponnese. Mantinea was dioecised for a period by the Spartans: a change which involved the demolition of the πόλις centre and the removal of the citizens to villages which (as well as being easier for the pro-Spartan oligarchs to dominate¹⁶) were treated as separate communities by the Spartans for purposes of army recruitment.¹⁷ Yet the Mantineans were not made stateless

in a full and formal way, as the Thebans were by Alexander (for example), who gave their land to the neighbouring peoples.¹⁸ Dioecism of Mantinea was, to the Spartans, an alternative to putting a garrison in Mantinea (and the city would have needed unusually extensive repairs after the siege): there was no intention of putting the Mantineans outside the political structure of Greece, only of integrating them into the alliance controlled by Sparta.

The primacy of Sparta, already neutralised, was positively ended by the rise of Thebes.¹⁹ In 382/1, the Spartans had seized and garrisoned the Theban Cadmeia,²⁰ and the Thebans, after they had dislodged the Spartans from it,²¹ had to resist persistent pressure from them. In the course of doing so, they concentrated control of Boeotia in their own hands by destroying Plataea and Thespieae. There is a distinction evident between the circumstances of the two cases: the Plataeans, who had brought the anger of the Thebans upon themselves by sending for Athenian soldiers,²² were thrown out of Boeotia (those who were not captured by Theban cavalry);²³ but after the Thebans had demolished Plataea (κατασκάφαντες) they merely sacked Thespieae (ἐξεπόρθησαν),²⁴ and the Thespians at Xen. Hell. VI.3.1 may perhaps not have been living at Athens as the Plataeans were.²⁵ The evidence of Pausanias, writing about the battle of Leuctra,²⁶ shows that the Thespians stayed in the Thespian χώρα after the destruction of the πόλις. This accounts for the fact that the plight of the Plataeans made a greater impact, if impressions at this distance can be trusted, on Greece than that of the Thespians.²⁷

Given this difference between the destructions of Thespieae and Plataea, it is interesting to continue the comparison between the two cases. The Spartans just before Leuctra demanded of the Thebans that they should found (οὐκίξειν) Thespieae and Plataea, and restore the land (χώρα) to its former masters.²⁸ It is not out of the question that this could apply to

Thespieae as well as Plataeae, even if (as suggested here) the Thespian $\chi\acute{\omega}\rho\alpha$ was inhabited by Thespians at the time when the Spartans made the demand: the friends of Sparta (which had had an army at Thespieae in the 370s²⁹) and the owners of the land may have been dispossessed at the time of the Theban sack. The bracketing together of Thespieae and Plataeae in Isocrates' Archidamus is another allusion to Spartan awareness of the joint question of the two cities' destructions: here they are both described as $\acute{\alpha}\nu\acute{\alpha}\sigma\tau\alpha\tau\omicron\upsilon$.³⁰

It is interesting that being $\acute{\alpha}\pi\omicron\lambda\upsilon\varsigma$ at home and being cast out of one's homeland are thought and written of as the same thing. This suggests that the key element in the two different situations as they were perceived by the writers whose work forms the basis of the extant tradition, was the losing of the $\pi\acute{o}\lambda\iota\varsigma$. The $\pi\acute{o}\lambda\iota\varsigma$ - the city itself, much more than the $\chi\acute{\omega}\rho\alpha$ - was the citizen's $\pi\alpha\tau\rho\acute{\upsilon}\varsigma$.³¹ Destruction of it entailed, in the cases of Mantinea and Thespieae, the upsetting of the established national constitution (at Mantinea the oligarchs gained control with dioecism,³² at Thespieae the ownership of land was disrupted³³); so that although the citizens would probably in most cases still consider themselves as belonging to their cities,³⁴ their losing the $\pi\acute{o}\lambda\iota\varsigma$ (whether or not they continued to live on the land) would mean that they would feel they were living the life of people not fully integrated into Hellenic society.

Control of Boeotia was a perennial Theban aim. In 402 the Thebans moved Oropus seven stades inland, and later (unfortunately Diodorus does not specify when), they gave the Oropians Theban citizenship and 'made their land Boeotia.'³⁵ Leuctra was a decisive point. Before it, the Thebans had established control of Boeotia in spite of the Spartans' efforts to prevent them; after it, they were able to extend their power into the Peloponnese. Pausanias speaks of Epaminondas refounding Mantinea³⁶ (and his account makes it sound as if the Thebans marched on from Leuctra to Arcadia, pausing only to deal

with the Thespians in Ceressus: in fact the expedition was in the next year³⁷), but it is known from Xenophon that the Mantineans began their rebuilding immediately after the foundation of the Arcadian League, and before the Thebans came into Arcadia.³⁸ Perhaps Epaminondas and his army gave encouragement and help: certainly the other Arcadian cities did, and Elis.³⁹

But if the rebuilding of Mantinea received Theban aid, Thebes' more important initiative in Arcadia was the foundation of Megalopolis. Pausanias treats it in some detail, naming 41 πόλεις which the Arcadians resolved to abandon in order to people the new city.⁴⁰ He describes how the peoples of four cities resisted the decision and were compelled to move to Megalopolis,⁴¹ but a reference elsewhere to Aliphera, one of the cities he mentions here, shows that the abandonment was not permanent: it is described as a πόλισμα, not large, because many of its inhabitants were removed by the synoecism of Megalopolis.⁴² Probably Aliphera was small still in Pausanias' day (more than 500 years after the synoecism of Megalopolis), but since Pausanias' comments on the cults of Aliphera are explicitly noted as coming from local sources it is fair to think that his account of the reason for the smallness of Aliphera is based on a local tradition rather than merely on his own inference. So a certain amount of passive resistance to moving to Megalopolis can be inferred.

Nonetheless the comic line

μεγάλη ἔρημιά 'στειν ἢ Μεγάλη πόλις

must be treated as a joke.⁴³ K.J. Beloch, quoting it, notes that less than half the space enclosed by the wall-circuit was filled with houses,⁴⁴ which is the only thing the poet is likely to have been referring to: the word ἔρημιά most naturally connotes empty space (not necessarily implying lack of population). By 318, at any rate, there were in Megalopolis 15,000 men (citizens, foreigners and slaves) fit to give military service: it was a

substantially larger city than either Mantinea or Tegea.⁴⁵ And the failure of the siege by Polyperchon which had prompted the Megalopolitans to take the census, illustrates that as a city founded for military reasons, the Great city was a great success.⁴⁶ At the same period (in the 360s) Euaimon was absorbed into (Arcadian) Orchomenus: unfortunately the cippus (IG V (2). 343) recording the συφοικία does not mention whether military reasons led to the decision to merge the cities. The Euaimnians moved to Orchomenus.⁴⁷

The Thebans' other synoecism in the Peloponnese was that of Messene. Pausanias is particularly informative about this: relating how Epaminondas sent messengers to the scattered Messenians, in the areas where most had settled, and to those who had gone to other areas.⁴⁸

ἀγγέλους ἐς Ἰταλίαν τε καὶ Συκελίαν καὶ παρὰ τοὺς Εὐεσπερίτας ἀπέστελλον, ἔκ τε τῆς ἄλλης, εἴ ποῦ τις Μεσσηνίων εἴη, πανταχόθεν ἀνεκάλουν ἐς Πελοπόννησον.

Later Pausanias contrasts the return of the Messenians to the Peloponnese with the exile of the Plataeans, the Orchomenians and (later) the Thebans.⁴⁹ He closes the (rather well turned) rhetorical passage with the words:⁵⁰

'the Messenians wandered outside the Peloponnese about three hundred years, in which they do not appear to have lost any of the customs from home, nor did they unlearn the Doric dialect, but even to our day they, of the Peloponnesians, have guarded its purity most.' So here Epaminondas' foundation brought into the Peloponnese a number of people who had not lived there before. Messene was not a particularly large city, though,⁵¹ and it is best to think that most of the inhabitants of Messenia after Epaminondas' refoundation were those who had formerly lived there as Helots under the Spartan rule.

The Thebans continued their policy of close control of Boeotia in the years after Leuctra. After Orchomenian cavalry had agreed to help some Theban exiles in an attempt to change the Theban constitution to an aristocratic one, the Theban exiles betrayed the plot to the Boeotarchs, and the

Theban δῆμος decided to enslave the Orchomenians and demolish their city.⁵² They did so (killing the men); Diodorus speaks of traditional hatred between Thebes and Orchomenus.⁵³ Pausanias adds that Epaminondas disapproved of the atrocity, but was fighting in the ranks in Thessaly at the time.⁵⁴ It was a common fate of those whose cities were destroyed, to be sold into slavery; but here, as later at Olynthus and Thebes,⁵⁵ those who were sold could be gathered together later for the refoundation.

In 365 an Athenian cleruchy was installed at Samos, and the Samian state was destroyed - the Samians lost their πόλις and χώρα for 43 years, until Perdiccas restored them in 322.⁵⁶ S. Hornblower, in his account of the events at Samos, comments that⁵⁷ 'Samians who had been put on the streets of Greece by Athens were walking mementoes of the power of Fortune, τύχη, no less than of the πλεονεξία, the Greed, of the Athenians', and that 'prudence should have counselled Athens against taking a step which was likely to alienate even opinion sympathetic to herself.' True, and borne out by the archive of Samian inscriptions, from the period of the restored city, in which the benefactors of the Samians in their wanderings are thanked.⁵⁸ But many states in the fourth century demonstrated that public opinion was no terror to those contemplating destroying a Greek city.

While the Theban hegemony was causing foundations and destructions of πόλεις in the Peloponnese and central Greece, the Hecatomnid satraps in Caria were carrying out a programme of synoecisms and hellenization. This is fully investigated by S. Hornblower,⁵⁹ who gives considerable attention to the question of how much the eight communities drawn on for the synoecism of Halicarnassus continued to be inhabited.⁶⁰ His findings offer a little corroboration to the impression gained from the continued occupation of Aliphera that the inclusion of small communities in synoecised cities did not necessarily imply their abandonment.⁶¹ But the objectives Mausolus and the other Hecatomnid satraps had in mind did not require the peopling of

their cities with immigrant Greeks: the new citizens of Halicarnassus were Carians.⁶²

Both Epaminondas and Mausolus synoecised cities in order to dominate more effectively. The other recorded synoecism of the 360s, that of Cos, occurred in an island to some extent isolated from the politics of Greece and Asia. But it gained enough attention to be recorded in Diodorus, and the fact that 'a multitude of men was gathered to this [city]'⁶³ makes it proper to mention the synoecism in this account of foundations and destructions. S.M. Sherwin-White discusses the synoecism, and the *στάσεις* connected with it, at some length,⁶⁴ concluding that Cos before 366 was an island of more than one city. Showing that the synoecism was not done as part of a Theban plan, Sherwin-White notes that the Coans gave citizenship to Orchomenians after the destruction of Orchomenus by the Thebans in 364.⁶⁵ This shows that Diodorus' comment about a multitude of men being gathered refers to immigration from outside Cos into the new city, as well as to concentration of the island's existing population. And in Thessaly a new city, Metropolis, was founded in the 360s. Strabo gives a brief account of its foundation from three *πόλεις*, which is given a terminus ante quem by the Delphi inscription Syll.³ 239E.⁶⁶

So the main activity in the area of foundations and destructions of cities at this period was carried out by the Thebans. The homeless section of the Greek population was probably not in general reduced by Theban activity: the Plataeans and Orchomenians were expelled from their homes and the Thespians made *ἄπολις*, while a small city was founded in Messenia from returning refugees and a great city founded in Arcadia from 41 local communities. Mantinea was refounded, at any rate mostly by its own efforts, from dioecised inhabitants living in the *χώρα*. The general picture is of a static system of *πόλεις*, a world in which expansion of Greek settlement to cope with the problem caused by floating population had not yet begun. But the age of Philip and Alexander was to bring great changes.

2. The Age of Philip and Alexander 358 - 323

A. to the Death of Philip

Philip's reorganisation of the pattern of settlement in Macedonia is well enough attested to have provoked informed modern discussion,⁶⁷ and it is not the purpose of this discussion to deal with it except in outline, and insofar as Philip's activities affect the life of the πόλις of Greece. Philip civilised the Macedonians: that is, in a narrow sense.⁶⁸ He brought them from the mountains into the plains (Arrian says that Alexander told them⁶⁹), and made them inhabitants of cities (πόλεων...οικήτορας) instead of wanderers and destitutes (πλανήτας καὶ ἀπόρους). These last two words, appearing in Alexander's speech, point to the use by Arrian, in his composition of the speech, of the lifestyle of stateless Greeks as a model:⁷⁰ the Macedonians before Philip's reorganisation were (if Justin's account is rightly treated as convincing⁷¹) happy enough with their lives to dislike their king's interference, and would have been more likely to call themselves, for instance, ποιμένες καὶ πένητες, than πλάνητες καὶ ἄποροι. The phrase is contemptuous: the speaker refers to Philip's rural Macedonians as destitute, stateless persons.

Little information is available about what cities Philip founded in Macedonia and Thrace. What there is, is well summarized by G.L. Cawkwell.⁷² His foundations had strategic purposes: securing doubtful areas,⁷³ or, in the case of Philippi, ensuring safe access to supplies of gold from the mines.⁷⁴ But the Greeks who were not Macedonians had more occasion (at least until Chaeronea⁷⁵) to notice how Philip destroyed cities.

As early as 357 Philip attacked and captured Potidaea. Diodorus notes that he did this as part of an agreement giving him alliance with Olynthus, and that Athens was Philip's rival for this alliance.⁷⁶ Cawkwell makes it explicit that Athens was unlikely to hand Potidaea over to the Olynthians;⁷⁷ but Philip, who let the Athenian garrison (φρουρά is Diodorus' word, but

there were cleruchs there from Athens too⁷⁸) go, sold the citizens into slavery and gave the πόλις (evidently still standing) and the κατὰ τὴν χώραν κτήσεις to the Olynthians. Beloch estimates the citizen population of Potidaea at 2,000 - 3,000,⁷⁹ so that the availability of the city and its territory offered the Olynthians an ideal opportunity for quick expansion. This is the explanation of the apparently dissonant figures given by Demosthenes for the military strengths of Olynthus at different moments.⁸⁰ He contrasts the time (383⁸¹) when the Olynthians beat off a Spartan invasion in spite of having only 5,000 men (400 cavalry included), with the time when though they had 10,000 men (1,000 cavalry included) they could not resist Philip's attack (348⁸²). Beloch, unsure whether to find the figures credible, asks his readers at least to treat them as rounded-off;⁸³ but while it is perfectly right to realise that the original population cannot have doubled within a generation, it should be borne in mind that Potidaea will not have stood empty, nor its land gone unworked, in the ten years following Philip's cession of it to the Olynthians.⁸⁴ There is no evidence as to who the new settlers were, but new settlers there must have been in Olynthian Potidaea in the decade before Olynthus itself was swept away.

In 354 Philip captured and destroyed Methone, allowing the inhabitants to leave with one garment each.⁸⁵ Cawkwell stresses the strategic importance of the capture of Methone (and the place, whose site is unknown, can only have been small):⁸⁶ but the distribution of the land to Macedonians is an example of how Macedonian expansion in North Greece under Philip was tending to limit the area in which non-Macedonian Greeks could live. The parallel with the contemporary position in Italy and Sicily is clear.⁸⁷ An inscription from Potidaea, dealing with the period after the fall of Olynthus, attests a distribution of land comparable to that at Methone.⁸⁸

In the year in which Philip captured and destroyed Methone, Chares, the Athenians' general, captured Sestos (which Athens had earlier lost⁸⁹),

killed the adult males and enslaved the others.⁹⁰ At the same time the Athenians at Cersobleptes' invitation sent out cleruchs to the cities of the Thracian Chersonese (except Cardia).⁹¹ The inhabitants of these cities made room for the Athenian settlers, without compulsion if Dem. 8(Chersonese) hypothesis is to be believed.⁹²

Philip captured Olynthus, where the party favourable to Macedon (which had secured the gaining of Potidaea) had lost power,⁹³ in 348. In the year before, Philip had taken and razed Zereia in his campaign against the Chalcidic cities;⁹⁴ now he thoroughly carried out his Chalcidian policy. The inhabitants of Olynthus were enslaved.⁹⁵ 'The mass of the inhabitants', Cawkwell says, 'were carried off to slavery in Macedonia itself.'⁹⁶ There are three references in the Embassy speech to Olynthians as slaves in Macedonia (in two cases, they allude to Philip's being in control of them himself and setting them free or giving them away):⁹⁷ These references certainly indicate that Philip and his courtiers had taken a good many women and children away with them (and probably a large proportion of the men had been killed, though Diodorus' account does not say so explicitly⁹⁸), but it may not be possible to extend this automatically and conclude that most of the Olynthians had gone to serve Macedonian masters. Some Olynthians reached Athens and were granted ἰσοτέλεια (probably, or possibly citizenship), and probably others stayed to work as slaves on the land they had formerly owned - at any rate this would seem as sensible inference from the absence of any suggestion that Cassander had difficulty later when he was gathering up the Olynthians.⁹⁹

Here as at Methone, Philip gave land to Macedonians. Syll.³ 332,¹⁰⁰ a grant made by Cassander to Perdiccas son of Coenus, confirms Perdiccas' possession of lands granted by Philip in the area of Potidaea to Perdiccas' grandfather and father. Here again, Macedonians were taking the places formerly inhabited by Greeks from the world of the πόλις.¹⁰¹ And not only

from the Olynthians: besides Olynthus and Methone, Demosthenes mentions 'Apollonia and thirty-two cities in Thrace, all of which he has so savagely wiped out that it would not be easy for one to say whether they had ever been inhabited.'¹⁰² These can only have been small cities - what E. Ruschenbusch calls Normalpoleis¹⁰³ - but with several hundred occupants each,¹⁰⁴ the destruction of more than thirty of them to make room for Macedonian settlers implies that, say, ten to twenty thousand Greeks were either enslaved or thrown out of their homes, besides those who were enslaved from Olynthus. Cawkwell calls the destruction of these cities 'by no means necessary', but draws attention to how many of Alexander's cavalry came from Lower Macedonia:¹⁰⁵ expanding the area of Macedonian settlement helped Macedon dominate the Greek - and the Near Eastern - world.

In Southern Greece, Philip gained a reputation for piety by defeating the Phocians in the third Sacred war and destroying the cities of Phocis,¹⁰⁶ compelling the inhabitants to live in villages at least a stade apart, and not containing more than fifty houses.¹⁰⁷ At the same time he restored to his Theban allies the three Boeotian cities the Phocians had been holding: Coroneia, Corsiae and Orchomenus.¹⁰⁸ Evidently the Phocians had rebuilt Orchomenus, since the three cities are described by Diodorus as ὠχυρωμέναις,¹⁰⁹ but it was torn down again after the defeat of Phocis, at least to the extent of being unwalled.¹¹⁰

A few years earlier the Phocians had shown themselves capable of destroying other peoples' cities: in 352 Phaÿllus, attacking a Boeotian force which was retreating with booty from Phocis, succeeded in overrunning the Locrian city of Naryx which a Phocian force had been besieging. It was plundered and demolished.¹¹¹

Demosthenes, in the Embassy speech, gives a vivid picture of what life was like for the Phocians after the dioecism of their cities. Not surprisingly, it includes some hyperbolic statements, like 'no more terrible

or greater things have happened, men of Athens, than these, among the Greeks in our time';¹¹² but it includes some statements which can help the reader to understand what circumstances existed in dioecised cities - not only Phocis but also Thespieae and others. He speaks of demolished houses and buildings, and a lack of men of military age:¹¹³

ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἦν ὁρᾶν ἤμῃν πάντα τὰυτα, οἰκίας κατεσκαμμένας, τεῖχη περιηρημένα, χώραν ἔρημον τῶν ἐν ἡλικία, γυναῖκα δὲ καὶ παιδάρῃ ὀλίγα καὶ πρεσβύτας ἀνθρώπους οἰκτρούς· οὐδ' ἂν εἰς δύναϊτ' ἀφίκεσθαι τῷ λόγῳ τῶν ἐκεῖ κακῶν νῦν ὄντων.

Later he explains why no Phocian is appearing on his behalf:¹¹⁴

Φωκέων τῶν ἐκπεπωκότων οἱ μὲν, οὔμαι, βέλτιστοι καὶ μετριώτατοι φυγάδες ἡσυχίαν ἄγουσι, καὶ οὐδεὶς ἂν αὐτῶν ἐθελήσειεν ὑπὲρ τῶν κοινῶν συμφορῶν ἰδίαν ἔχθραν ἀνελέσθαι.

These exiles, some of them at least, had gone to Athens.¹¹⁵ Philip and the Amphictyons had succeeded in their aim of making Phocis defenceless.¹¹⁶

But further changes came about before and after the battle of Chaeronea. Before it, the Athenians and the Thebans brought the Phocians back to their cities.¹¹⁷ They began building at once, as Pausanias' passage on the double wall of dark, hard local stone built by the Thebans around the Phocian city of Ambrossus, shows.¹¹⁸ The restoration of Phocis seems to have lasted in spite of the defeat of the Greeks at Chaeronea:¹¹⁹ this perhaps because Philip was concerned to weaken Thebes, Phocis' ancient enemy.

His positive measures to weaken Thebes included the refoundation of Plataea and Orchomenus.¹²⁰ These cities continued, it appears, to have Macedonian patronage after the death of Philip: one of Alexander's gestures on becoming king of Asia, according to Plutarch, was that he sent a message to the Plataeans that their city should be rebuilt - because their ancestors had provided their land for the Greeks to fight for freedom in.¹²¹ The message need have no implication as to how much rebuilding needed to be done by then: Alexander sent it as a public statement about himself. But it is not difficult to believe that there was still work to

do in 336, after Thebes was destroyed - though the point of the passage in Arrian which says¹²² ἐπὶ τούτους Ὀρχόμενον τε καὶ Πλαταιὰς ἀναστῆσαί τε καὶ τευχίσαυ οἱ σύμμαχοι ἔγνωσαν... is perhaps almost entirely that Alexander's allies were endorsing development which was already in progress and which was consistent with their policy of destroying Thebes.

B. to the Death of Alexander

'Alexander', A.H.M. Jones remarks¹²³ (and it could not be put better) 'was a colonizer on a grand scale.' Even in his father's lifetime he founded a city and called it Alexandropolis:¹²⁴ though this should be seen as part of his father's policy of making settlements in Macedonia and Thrace.

It will not be possible here to do more than give an outline of Alexander's activities as a founder and patron of cities. He did in haste what the Seleucid kings spent centuries doing: he put large settlements of Greeks in the conquered Persian Empire. But before he began his career of conquest in Asia, he defeated the Theban rebellion and destroyed Thebes.¹²⁵ The decision was not, formally, his own,¹²⁶ but the allies' power derived from Alexander: he was responsible for the act. Diodorus records that 30,000 Thebans were sold as slaves:¹²⁷ here as elsewhere it seems best (bearing in mind later events¹²⁸) to think that more Thebans will have remained as slaves on the land of Thebes than will have been taken away. Even if Philip could have made a Theban revolt less likely by being kinder in 338 (as R.J. Lane Fox argues¹²⁹) the parallel with the destruction of Olynthus is clear: the existence of a dangerous city was intolerable to both Macedonian kings.

When Alexander crossed to Asia, he turned his attention, as he moved onward, to patronage of cities in Asia Minor. S. Hornblower points out (arguing that Alexander was probably 'the central and decisive figure in the rebirth of Priene'¹³⁰) that 'if Alexander wanted to found cities in

highly urbanised Asia Minor, such refoundations must, of virtual necessity, take the form of revivals - contrast central Asia.¹³¹ Besides Priene, Alexander may well have refounded Smyrna (an ancient city which had been disestablished through the earlier part of the century),¹³² It is not possible to date Alexander's activities in these places, and it is quite likely that he did not give much of his personal attention to each city. He had people who could manage that sort of thing. The pattern shown in the foundation of the eastern Alexandrias was probably applied: particularly since it can be seen being developed in the foundation of Alexandria by Egypt.

This foundation is well documented. Returning from Memphis in 331, Alexander (according to Arrian) came to Canopus, and sailed round lake Maria, disembarking on the site of Alexandria:¹³⁴

καὶ ἔδοξεν αὐτῷ ὁ χῶρος κάλλιστος κτίσαι ἐν αὐτῷ πόλιν καὶ γενέσθαι ἂν εὐδαίμονα τὴν πόλιν · πόθος οὖν λαμβάνει αὐτὸν τοῦ ἔργου, καὶ αὐτὸς τὰ σημεῖα τῆς πόλεως ἔθηκεν, ἵνα τε ἀγορὰ ἐν αὐτῇ δεύμασθαι ἔδει καὶ ἱερὰ ὅσα καὶ θεῶν ὠντινων, τῶν μὲν Ἑλληνικῶν, Ἴσιδος δὲ Αἴγυπτίας, καὶ τὸ τεῦχος ἧ περιβεβλήσθαι, καὶ ἐπὶ τούτοις ἐθύετο, καὶ τὰ ἱερὰ καλὰ ἐφαίνετο.

Verbal similarities to this account in passages in Arrian describing later foundations point to Alexander's consistent approach on separate occasions.¹³⁵ Consideration of the foundation narratives of Alexandria by Egypt in Diodorus and Curtius brings out some further points: Diodorus attributes to Alexander the arrangement of the angle of the streets (εὐστοχία... τῆς ῥυμοτομίας ποιήσας) whereby the Etesian winds cooled the city;¹³⁶ and Curtius makes quite specific what would have been inferred even if no source had said it: that Alexander left behind people to build the city ('...qui exaedificandae urbis praeessent relictis...').¹³⁷ And this first Alexandria, intended (as Alexandropolis and his father's foundations never had been) to be a great city, became the normative Hellenistic city: the pattern on which the others were modelled, in Alexander's reign and afterwards.

A pity, then, that more is not known about how the city was peopled.¹³⁸

There may have been some anxiety among Alexander's followers as to whether the city would attract population: at any rate the seers, when flocks of birds came and ate the barley Alexander had used to mark out the walls, predicted that a great crowd of newcomers would dwell in the city ('respondeisse vates magnam illam urbem advenarum frequentiam culturam').¹³⁹ P.M. Fraser comments that 'the dominating problem in the first period is that of the source of the original population of the city';¹⁴⁰ but in view of the lack of source material, it is unlikely ever to be possible to add much to Fraser's suggestions: Macedonians; people from the poorer regions of Greece (as later at Ptolemais:¹⁴¹ but Fraser cautions that Alexander would probably not encourage the settlement of only needy persons as citizens); people from Cyrene (Fraser refers to evidence showing that Cyrenian exiles found asylum in Egypt in Ptolemy I's time, and that Cyrenians were the largest group of Greek settlers in the Fayyum in the third century¹⁴²); argument from nomenclature (no great help, as only 300 names of Alexandrian demesmen are known from the 300 years of the Hellenistic period in Alexandria¹⁴³); and the linguistic approach (not favoured by Fraser: though he comments that if it pointed anywhere, it would point to Boeotia and Euboea¹⁴⁴). Fraser adds, referring to a passage in Theocritus XV which would point to Syracuse as a source of population,¹⁴⁵ that 'it would require no great exercise of imagination to suppose that there were Syracusans in Alexandria, and that Magna Graecia provided some of the original inhabitants of the city.'¹⁴⁶

Fraser's picture could perfectly well be consistent with settlement of stateless people (including stateless people from Alexander's mercenary forces) in Alexandria; though his warning that Alexander will not have been looking only for the poor as settlers is well offered. It should be added that here (as in later Alexandrias¹⁴⁷) local people - non-Greeks - were required for the foundation. Curtius says:¹⁴⁸ 'ex finitimis urbibus

commigrare Alexandream iussis novam urbem magna multitudine implevit.' Naturally the original full citizens will all have been Greeks: but a synoecism of previously existing communities was an element in the foundation of Alexandria (the pseudo-Callisthenes account of the establishment of the city names them¹⁴⁹), so it is necessary to recognise the importance of non-Greeks in the plan for the city.¹⁵⁰

The city was not completed in Alexander's lifetime. Tacitus notes that Ptolemy I was the first to wall it - evidently Alexander's marking-out of the walls, though effective as a statement of his intention to carry forward the foundation of Alexandria, did not at once lead to wall-building. This feature is paralleled in Arrian's account of the foundation, in 329, of Alexandria Eschate (an account which shows other similarities to his account of the Egyptian foundation):¹⁵¹

Αὐτὸς δὲ τὴν πόλιν, ἣν ἐπενόει, τειχίσας ἐν ἡμέραις εἴκοσι καὶ ξυνοικίσας ἐς αὐτὴν τῶν τε Ἑλλήνων μισθοφόρων καὶ ὅστις τῶν προσοικούντων βαρβάρων ἐθέλοντῆς μετέσχε τῆς ξυνοικήσεως καὶ τινας καὶ τῶν ἐκ τοῦ στρατοπέδου Μακεδόνων, ὅσοι ἀπόμαχοι ἤδη ἦσαν.

Even Alexander cannot have built city walls on a green-field site in twenty days: clearly here he was doing what he had done in Egypt. The talk of bringing in volunteers from among the neighbouring barbarians reinforces the point that Alexander was acting according to the same pattern; and this is corroborated by the earlier passage in which Alexander's reaction to the site of this city is recorded:¹⁵²

ὁ τε γὰρ χῶρος ἐπιτήδειος αὐτῷ ἐφαίνετο ἀξῆσαι ἐπὶ μέγα τὴν πόλιν καὶ ἐν καλῷ οἰκισθήσεσθαι.

here the similarity with the comment on the site of Alexandria shines through the change of vocabulary, which Arrian makes for literary reasons.¹⁵³ Comparable accounts showing points of similarity to the Egyptian account are the accounts concerning Alexandria on the Caucasus, Alexandria Iomousa, the Indian and Sogdian Alexandrias, and the Alexandria at Pollacopa.¹⁵⁴ Since some of these include settlement of mercenaries and Macedonians, and show

that it was part of Alexander's standard procedure, and since each account is brief and includes only a selection of possible elements, it is possible to say with near certainty that settlement of mercenaries and Macedonians was an element in the foundation of all Alexandrias, including the first.

G. T. Griffith computes how many mercenaries Alexander is known to have left behind him 'in garrisons or as settlers on the track of his advance to India':¹⁵⁵ and concludes that the number exceeded 36,100.¹⁵⁶ But most of the soldiers on Griffith's list were not in the Upper Satrapies: so he argues that the 26,000 Greeks from the Upper Satrapies who revolted after Alexander's death ought probably to be added to his other figure.¹⁵⁷ This is a more helpful datum, for the task of assessing what Alexander sought to achieve by way of foundations of Greek cities, than a list of names of cities (some disputed, some perhaps never finished).

His achievement was an abiding one at Alexandria in Egypt: and other Alexandrias survived the revolt of 323;¹⁵⁸ and the revolt of Greeks in the Upper Satrapies does not show that new cities were not needed - only that settling mercenaries (many without their families) in cities, outside the Greek world, which were not only unfinished when Alexander left them but indeed barely started, was not a technique leading to enough stability. He had shown the way for the settlement of Asia ('one of the most amazing works which the ancient world ever saw'¹⁵⁹), but, as W. W. Tarn comments,¹⁶⁰ 'the settlement of Asia as we know it was essentially Seleucid'. The next section examines events in the interval between Alexander's death and the establishment of Seleucus Nicator as king of almost all Alexander's Asia.

3. The Age of the Successors, 323 - 301

When Alexander the Great died, he left plans behind him.¹⁶¹ Put before a formal Macedonian assembly by Perdikkas, they were rejected as impracticable;¹⁶² but they merit consideration here not only as evidence of what

Alexander had hoped to do with the world he had turned upside down, but as a prologue to the account of the Successors' activities in that world.

Alexander had planned to continue doing what he had been doing since he acceded to the throne of Macedon. The plans divide into three parts: extension of conquest westwards; temple-building; synoecisms and resettlements.¹⁶³ Conquest was Alexander's speciality, and W.W. Tarn's argument purporting to show that he renounced it when he turned back from India is not convincing:¹⁶⁴ it is easy to believe that he intended to move west. Temples, too, were already an interest of Alexander's.¹⁶⁵ Similarly synoecisms and resettlements:¹⁶⁶ but as the other schemes were grander than Alexander's already completed achievements, so his plan for synoecisms and resettlements makes the great things he had done seem small. Diodorus explains the third part of the last plans in this way:¹⁶⁷

[κατασκευάσαι] πόλεων συνουκισμούς καὶ σωμάτων μεταγωγὰς ἐκ τῆς Ἀσίας εἰς τὴν Εὐρώπην, καὶ κατὰ τὸναντίον ἐκ τῆς Εὐρώπης εἰς τὴν Ἀσίαν, ὅπως τὰς μεγίστας ἠπειρούς ταῖς ἐπιγαμίαις καὶ ταῖς οὐκείωσιν εἰς κοινὴν ὁμόνοιαν καὶ συγγενικὴν φιλίαν καταστήσῃ.

Here synoecisms and μεταγωγὰί, features of Alexander's past activity,¹⁶⁸ are elaborated on through a plan to bring Asiatic people to Europe, as well as taking Europeans to Asia: the plan is based on what Alexander had done, and embroidered with what he would have liked to do.

The rejection of the plans was not reversed. E. Badian comments:¹⁶⁹ 'settlement of Asiatics in Europe is not attested, as carried out or (apart from this passage) even as intended. One can only say that, fully in line with Alexander's large-scale and perhaps megalomaniac ideas that are attested in the last year of his life, it might not seem utterly incredible as a further development.' So in considering the Hellenistic world between 323 and 301, though it would be of no use to look for fulfilment of Alexander's last and very ambitious plans, it will certainly be worth examining the continuity between the things Alexander did and the things the Successors did, with regard to synoecisms and μεταγωγὰί: and it will

become clear that the years after 323 were different from the years before Alexander's accession, and that the Successors' attitudes to foundations of Greek πόλεις had a good deal in common with Alexander's own.

Alexander had planned to move populations wholesale from place to place (a thing which had been done in Macedon in his father's time¹⁷⁰). Interesting, then, that the age of the Successors began with two such μεταγωγαί - one actually carried out, the other only contemplated. The first was imposed on Athens at the end of the Lamian war: Antipater ordered that citizen rights should be based on a census of wealth (ἀπὸ τμησέως εἶναι τὸ πολίτευμα).¹⁷¹ 2,000 drachmas was the qualifying level: about nine thousand qualified, over twelve thousand did not.¹⁷² Diodorus says that the twelve thousand were removed from the fatherland, but his account appears a little confused: in the previous sentence he has stated that Antipater gave land in Thrace for settlement τοῖς βουλομένοις - to those who wished. Plutarch's Phocion makes it clear that not all the disfranchised persons left the city.¹⁷³ No hint can be drawn from his account about whether staying in Athens or going to Thrace was more popular; Plutarch simply uses an antithesis to point out that the one course was as miserable as the other:

οἷ τε μένοντες ἐδόκουν σκέτλια καὶ ἄτιμα πάσχειν, οἷ τε διὰ τοῦτο τὴν πόλιν ἐκλιπόντες καὶ μεταστάντες εἰς Θράκην, Ἀντιπάτρου γῆν καὶ πόλιν αὐτοῖς παρασχόντος, ἐκπεπολιορημένους ἐψέκσαν.

This information that Antipater gave the disfranchised Athenians a city as well as land (γῆν καὶ πόλιν) is exclusive to the account in Plutarch. Diodorus mentions only χώραν...εἰς κατοίκησιν.¹⁷⁴ But Plutarch's account is the more lucid in the matter of what the twelve thousand disfranchised Athenians did. It is worth considering whether his testimony that Antipater gave the Athenians a πόλις is of any value. There were good reasons for him to do so: Alexander's leaving Greeks behind in the Upper Satrapies without firmly founded πόλεις had led to a dangerous revolt. Several

thousand Athenians deciding to try to force their way to Attica from Thrace could have caused damage. Antipater must have done, or intended to do, something for them - and Plutarch makes it explicit that he did.¹⁷⁵ This gives rise to the question whether there is any evidence which may suggest how Antipater provided for this need.

It is the kind of evidence which is often unavailable. But in this case a suggestion can be made. Cassander, Antipater's more famous son, had a less famous brother. His name was Alexarchus. Modern authors, when they have commented at all on him, have treated him with unwarranted disrespect. V. Tscherikower describes him as a crank (Sonderling);¹⁷⁶ and he bases his assessment on a passage of Athenaeus in which it is explained how various historical figures (including Alexarchus), played with words.¹⁷⁷ Some whimsical word-coinages are explained (eg. ὀρθροβόας (dawn-shouter) for ἀλεκτρούων) and Alexarchus' letter to the rulers of Cassandreia, a sort of tour de force built of words of this type, is quoted in full. The context suggests an intellectual joke shared between Alexarchus and the addressees rather than evidence of madness (another bit of sonorous and incomprehensible Greek is quoted.¹⁷⁸); modern misunderstanding illustrates the difficulty of recognising jokes in ancient texts (even Athenaeus). As Athenaeus says, Alexarchus founded Uranopolis. Lane Fox describes it as 'a drop-out community on Mount Athos', but quotes no evidence for this peculiar speculation.¹⁷⁹ There is none. It was a city which became well enough established to be mentioned in Strabo (who quotes Demetrius of Scepsis, first for his opinions about Xerxes' canal, near which the city stood, then as saying that Alexarchus laid the foundations of Uranopolis, which had a circuit of thirty stades¹⁸⁰) and in Pliny the Elder.¹⁸¹ The name is odd (as Tscherikower comments¹⁸²), but this is quite likely merely to be an indication of a relatively early date (at which Antipater would not have named a city after himself). Philip II's policy of founding cities

in Thrace had ceased by this date, its aim achieved: so if Antipater's son founded a city in Thrace, there was probably a definite reason for him to do so. It is not far-fetched to think that the reason may have been the need to provide a city for the thousands of Athenians moving to Thrace in 322. This hypothesis cannot be proved, but it has a good deal in its favour.

In 319 the disfranchised Athenians were able to return from Thrace. It is no argument against the connection of Uranopolis with their migration that it survived their return: volunteers from the floating population could have been found to live there, specially when three years' building work had already been done. Polyperchon, Antipater's designated successor,¹⁸³ issued an Exiles' Decree on the model of Alexander's.¹⁸⁴ The constitutions under Philip II and Alexander the Great were restored in the cities.¹⁸⁵ Alexander son of Polyperchon arrived in Attica with a force, and the exiles joined him in attacking, and were soon in the town, where they and the ἄτιμοι and (Plutarch says) ξένοι formed an assembly, deposed Phocion as general and chose others.¹⁸⁶ The exiles' sojourn in Thrace had proved temporary.

Antipater's scheme to move the Aetolians to the farthest desert of Asia did not receive even temporary fulfilment. He and Craterus made the plan in 322/1, when circumstances forced them to make a treaty with the Aetolians: and they wrote a decree (δόγμα) embodying it.¹⁸⁷ The revolt of the Greeks in the Upper Satrapies, and their leaving their settlements,¹⁸⁸ was presumably what led Antipater to refer to τὴν ἐρημίαν καὶ πορρωτάτω τῆς Ἀσίας κελευμένην: at this date Alexander's Empire was still a unit (though the Successors were at each other's throats), so Antipater perceived no need to make his plans parochial.

There were no other μεταγωγαί. But the age of the Successors was not many years old before attention was turned to making synoecisms. S.

Hornblower is right to stress that synoecism is strength;¹⁸⁹ and he adds that 'the maxim, synoikism is strength, will explain both the classical synoikisms (where political motives are usually uppermost) and the great hellenistic synoikisms, which are best interpreted as an accumulation of physical resources, in an attempt to remedy the chronic poverty of the states concerned.' This analysis is particularly useful in the case of the first Hellenistic years, the years before Ipsus, in which it is possible to trace continuity with the Classical age which ended with Alexander. But one very early, and most interesting, Hellenistic synoecism achieved its connection with the Classical age through the undoing of Alexander's work: the restoration of Thebes.

The Boeotians had supported the Macedonians at the time of the Lamian war, because they had received from Alexander the Thebans' χώρα (and were now gaining μεγάλας προσόδους from it), and they knew that if the Athenians were successful, they would give back πατρίς and χώρα to the Thebans.¹⁹⁰ But in 316 Cassander, marching south from Macedonia in order to throw Alexander son of Polyperchon out of the Peloponnese, forced a passage of Thermopylae, and then¹⁹¹

μεταπεμφάμενος...πανταχόθεν τοὺς διασωζομένους τῶν θηβαίων ἐνεχείρει κατοικίξειν τὰς θήβας, ὑπολαβὼν κάλλιστον ἔχειν καιρὸν πόλιν δωνομασμένην...ἀναστῆσαι καὶ διὰ τὴν εὐεργεσίαν ταύτην τυχεῖν ἀθανάτου δόξης.

His motive, and the occasion of the refoundation, attract attention. He wanted to outdo Polyperchon, and his son Alexander, who had brought back the exiles to Athens.¹⁹² He persuaded the Boeotians,¹⁹³ who, given the presence of a Macedonian army, may have felt that gracious and speedy consent was the wisest course to follow. There is no reason to think that their πρόσοδοι meant less to them than they had in 323. Probably most of the Theban survivors were living in the χώρα: Cassander had sent for them after passing Thermopylae,¹⁹⁴ rather than bringing them from Macedon, and the Athenians' presumed intention in 323 to give back πατρίς and χώρα to

the Thebans also suggests that the Thebans in question were living on the land, rather than that they were going to be brought out of Macedon.¹⁹⁵ Cassander had the help of 'many of the Greek cities' including Athens,¹⁹⁶ which was by 316 under the oligarchic constitution presided over by Cassander's man Demetrius of Phalerum, instead of the democratic constitution which had been restored by Polyperchon.¹⁹⁷

Cassander synoecised other cities. The importance of synoecisms in providing individual Successors with strong centres of support in particular areas is well illustrated by Cassander's activity in Acarnania in 314. He took a large army to Aetolia (the Aetolians, who supported Antigonus, were fighting a πόλεμον ὁμορον with the Acarnanians) and persuaded the Acarnanians at a κοινῆ ἐκκλησίᾳ to¹⁹⁸ ἔκ τῶν ἀνοχύρων καὶ μικρῶν χωρίων εἰς ὀλίγας πόλεις μετακῆσαι. Most of the Acarnanians, according to Diodorus, moved into Stratus; the Oeniadae into Sauria, and the Derieis into Agrinium.¹⁹⁹ Cassander left a force behind in Acarnania, but the Aetolians attacked: three thousand of them besieged Agrinium and forced the inhabitants to surrender.²⁰⁰ This shows that Agrinium was a small city, and though it had had Cassander's support it may not have been well walled yet. Nonetheless Cassander's men continued, despite this setback, to hold Acarnania.²⁰¹

Other synoecised cities bore the Successors' own, and their relatives', names. Here an odd (and isolated) text in Strabo has caused modern writers difficulty:²⁰²

ἔδοξε γὰρ εὐσεβῆς εἶναι τοὺς Ἀλέξανδρον διαδεξαμένους ἐκείνου πρότερον κτίζειν ἐπωνύμους πόλεις, εἴθ' ἑαυτῶν.

Strabo is commenting on Lysimachus' changing the name of Antigonía-in-the-Troad to Alexandria. This happened after Ipsus: the city may have existed for up to a decade, and Lysimacheia for almost as long.²⁰³ Strabo's remark does not deserve the respectful treatment accorded it by R.M. Errington, who puts forward the unconvincing suggestion that Antigonus had named Heraclea-by-Latmus Alexandria - so that Cassander's brother Pleistarchus

would have been attempting to bury the memorial of Antigonus' εὐσέβεια when he renamed the place Pleistarcheia.²⁰⁴ Strabo's evidence is much more likely based on ignorance than knowledge: Demetrius of Scepsis, Strabo's source, though he was a local man, wrote as late as the second century B.C.; it may perhaps have been Demetrius who first ascribed this sentiment to Lysimachus (since it could be posited that he may not have known that Lysimacheia was founded earlier);²⁰⁵ or, equally plausibly, Strabo may have thought the sentiment up himself (in which case it would have no value at all, except as evidence for Strabo's outlook). Certainly the only Alexandria other than Antigonias-in-the-Troad known to have been founded by a Successor is Alexandria κατ' Ἰσσοῦν: this city Tscherikower ascribes to Antigonus, or Seleucus I (and Jones refers to it as a foundation of Seleucus I).²⁰⁶ It is not at all likely to have been founded before the last decade of the fourth century,²⁰⁷ by which time the Successors had been naming cities after themselves for several years. The practice began with Cassandreia.

Cassandreia was synoecised in 316. Cassander settled in it the Olynthians who survived,²⁰⁸ and there were many of them: and since a large amount of good land had been marked off for the Cassandreians, and Cassander was keen on his city's expansion, Cassandreia became the strongest city in Macedonia.²⁰⁹ This was a centre of support, such as Cassander tried from 314 to create in Acarnania, but it was more than that: it was the first of the 'capital cities' founded by the Successors and named after themselves. Some of the Successors founded more than one city of this type, and they did not treat them as the administrative or diplomatic centres of their realms unless they happened to be in residence in them: their strength as centres of support is the feature which they chiefly have in common, and which (together with prestige) must have given the Successors most encouragement in founding them. Suddenly population - Greeks of any kind - was

needed. In a single year Cassander resettled the two largest outstanding groups of Greeks without πόλεις in mainland Greece.²¹⁰

No information is available about whether the other cities founded by the Successors had settlers who had been without πόλεις. An inscription relating to action by a king of Egypt to add ἔπουκτοι, further settlers, to Ptolemais, the Greek city founded by Ptolemy Soter in the Thebaid, records what were the provenances of the supplementary settlers (Argos and Thessaly are mentioned, together with other place-names now lost),²¹¹ but this third-century or later evidence, though it is an interesting indication of how their patrons sought out Greeks to people Hellenistic foundations, is only a vague indication of what fourth-century conditions may have been like. A text to contrast with this is D.S. XIX.85.4, where after the battle of Gaza Ptolemy sent those of Demetrius' troops whom he had captured to be divided ἐπὶ τὰς νομαρχίας in Egypt.²¹² This was a forcible settlement, and not into πόλεις (most of the Greeks of Egypt lived in villages: few πόλεις were ever founded): though Ptolemais was probably founded not much later than 312.²¹³

It was probably typical in the age of the Successors that newly synoecised cities had elements added to the populations of the communities used in the synoecisms. This was so at Cassandreia,²¹⁴ and Cassander would have transplanted some populations into Phthiotic Thebae in 302 if Demetrius had not prevented him.²¹⁵ It was probably so at Thessalonice and Lysimacheia: Thessalonice, the metropolis of the Macedonia of Strabo's time,²¹⁶ was synoecised by Cassander, who demolished twenty-six πολίσματα in Crousis and on the Thermaic Gulf in the process - Strabo names six of them,²¹⁷ but presumably the other twenty were very small communities indeed; Lysimacheia was founded with the destruction of Cardia.²¹⁸ In both cases, prestige depended on the new cities' being imposing, strong, and large: Cassander would not have wished to found a city which was not going to be the

metropolis of Macedonia; nor would Lysimacheia have been any good to Lysimachus if it had not been a better bulwark against the Thracians than Cardia could have been.²¹⁹ There is a strong case for the supposition that Successors must have been ready to recruit available Greeks, including those without πόλις, into their synoecised cities.²²⁰

The great expansion of Greek colonisation into Asia which was begun by Seleucus I mostly falls outside the scope of this study, since the great proportion of the colonisation attested by Appian occurred after the battle of Ipsus. But two great foundations in what was to be the Seleucid empire occurred in the period under consideration here, and are comparable, from the point of view of their intended function, with the other foundations of the last quarter of the fourth century. It was probably soon after 311 (after Cassandreia, before Lysimacheia) when Seleuceia on the Tigris was founded;²²¹ and though Tscherikower's argument that Seleuceia was 'das alte, von Seleukos neugegründete babylonische Opis' is sound and convincing,²²² it should not be allowed to obscure the newly-Greek city's rôle in the years before the foundation of the great Antioch of Syria as the capital of Seleucus' domains,²²³ designed to eclipse Babylon.²²⁴ Jos. AJ XVIII.372, telling the story of how Jews fled to Seleuceia in the late 30s A.D. to escape persecution by Babylonians, comments on how 'many of the Macedonians, very many Greeks, and no small number of Syrians' formed the civic body when Seleucus founded the city, and it may be noted that in Mesopotamia and Babylonia in 312 he was able to recruit Macedonians (who were settled already at a place called by Diodorus Carae)²²⁵ and soldiers (Greek mercenaries?),²²⁶ and suggested that Seleucus did what Xenophon had hoped to do, and ended his ἀνάβασις into Asia by making at least some of his army into a πόλις.²²⁷

Antigonus did the same sort of thing in 307, founding Antigonia on the river Orontes. Diodorus' statement that the city did not survive very

long, but was dismantled and moved to Seleuceia,²²⁸ is perhaps not misleading politically (Seleucus made sure that his own foundations were the only ones of importance), but is shown to be a little inaccurate by the evidence in Cassius Dio that the city still existed in 51 B.C.²²⁹ Its site was well chosen and it was expensively built, and evidently it was set up with the intention that it should serve as a centre of control: at least a local capital for Antigonus. Here again the settlers must have been drawn in the first place from Antigonus' army;²³⁰ but it is worth noting that in 302 Antigonus held games and a festival at Antigonía, and brought athletes and artists from everywhere (πάντοθεν):²³¹ a piece of deliberate publicization of the existence of Antigonía which would seem strange if the city were being built up only from Antigonus' supply of time-expired soldiers. The gesture stresses Antigonía's membership of the Hellenic world, rather than her identity as a Macedonian outpost. An action of this kind would be consistent with Antigonus' having brought Greeks into his new city, as he did into his other great foundation, the Antigonía in Bithynia which was later to be renamed Nicaea.²³²

A well-defined picture emerges. Jones questions whether most of the Successors had any very genuine enthusiasm for the political side of Greek culture:²³³ but there can be no doubt that they had all the enthusiasm of outsiders who hoped to find in the Greek πόλις a means of controlling their Greek and Asian dominions and a way of associating their own names with the cultural and military achievement which the foundation of a city represented. Cities outside formerly Greek areas required settlers from armies - these will have included Greek mercenaries as well as Macedonians, because the Successors' armies included Greek mercenaries as well as Macedonians;²³⁴ and the Successors' activities in cities established in Greek areas (Athens as well as the more complete refoundations) required from time to time large numbers of Greeks as settlers. As Tscherikower

says of the foundation of Lysimacheia and other contemporary foundations, they 'sind ... als ein Zeichen der neuen Epoche in der griechischen Geschichte zu betrachten.'²³⁵

Notes

1. Xen. Hell. II.2.19-20.
2. Xen. Hell. II.2.9.
3. Xen. Hell. II.2.2.
4. Beloch, pp.82-83. A.H.M. Jones Athenian Democracy (Oxford, 1957), pp.169-177, with a more detailed account of the evidence, would suggest a higher total: no estimate is offered for the total, though.
5. C. Mossé Athens in Decline, 404-86 B.C. (London and Boston, 1973), p.13.
6. The idea that citizenship may be renounced by the holder is in any case modern rather than ancient.
7. D.S. XIV.34.1-2.
8. D.S. XIV.34.3-6; Paus IV.26.2. Note also that Paus. IV.26.3-5 makes D.S. XIV.34.5 σχεδὸν ἅπαντες ἀνηρέθησαν look tendentious: evidently the community of Messenians in Cyrene lasted until the refoundation of Messene. Cf. Seibert, pp.102-103.
9. D.S. XIV.34.3.
10. Xen. Hell. III.2.10. U. Kahrstedt argues that Xenophon's use of the word χερροννησῦται at III.2.8 and VII.2.15 need not imply that the unitary state of the Athenian Tribute List days was still in existence after 405 (Kahrstedt, pp.24-25); but he does not explain the eleven or twelve πόλεις as each having the status of a Staat: only of a größere Siedelung. He suggests that there were six or seven states. If his conclusion is right, and the Chersonesites were organized neither in a single unit nor in autonomous units centred on each 'larger settlement', it is worth considering the possibility that their political structure was arranged by the Spartans with a view to protecting Spartan interests.
11. D.S. XIV.38.4-5.
12. D.S. XIV.82.6.

13. D.S. XIV.82.7; they had been exiled from their πατρίδων: on which cf. below, n.31.
14. D.S. XIV.10.1-2.
15. Xen. Hell. IV.2.1 - 4.1. At 4.1 Xenophon notes that the Athenians, Boeotians and Argives (after the defeats at Nemea and Coronea) continued operations from Corinth. The Corinthian war lasted eight years (D.S. XIV.86.6).
16. Xen. Hell. V.2.7.
17. D.S. XV.11.2: the move to villages and the destruction of the city (ἠναγκάσθησαν τὴν...ἰδίαν πατρίδα κατασχάπτειν); Xen. Hell. V.2.7 notes how the Spartans sent a ξεναγός to each village.
18. See below, p.103.
19. D.H. Ant. Rome. I.3.2 offers an over-schematic analysis; but it is interesting that Dionysius puts the end of Sparta's ἀρχή less than thirty years after 404: according to this passage they were stopped before Leuctra - in the middle 370s when the Thebans were consolidating control of Boeotia.
20. D.S. XV.20.1-2 and Xen. Hell. V.2.25-35 relate the seizure of the Cadmeia of Thebes. Both accounts say that Phoebidas was punished for it (mildly); only Diodorus' says that the Spartans had told their ἡγεμόνες to get control of Thebes if they could. Both agree that they kept control, and that was an act of policy.
21. Xen. Hell. V.4.1-2; D.S. XV.24.1 - 27.4.
22. D.S. XV.46.4.
23. D.S. XV.46.5.
24. D.S. XV.46.6.
25. Seibert, p.118 and n.939, takes it that they were living at Athens. This is possible, but not a necessary inference from what the text says:

οὐ δὲ Ἀθηναῖοι, ἐκπεπρωκότας μὲν ὀρῶντες ἐκ τῆς Βοιωτίας Πλαταιᾶς φίλους ὄντας, καὶ καταπεφευγότας πρὸς αὐτούς, ἱκετεύοντας δὲ Θεσπιᾶς μὴ σφᾶς περιιδεῖν ἀπόλυδας γενομένους, οὐκέτι ἐπήνουν τοὺς Θηβαίους...

The Athenians saw (a) the Plataeans thrown out of Boeotia and fled to them, and (b) the Thespians begging them not to overlook them (the Thespians) who had become stateless. It would be perfectly consistent with the force of the verb ἱκετεύω to think that the Thespians in question had come from somewhere else to Athens to do their supplicating.

26. Paus. IX.14.2, which is an awkward passage:

Θεσπιεῦσι δὲ...τὴν μὲν πόλιν ἔδοξεν ἐκλιπεῖν, ἀναφεύγειν δὲ εἰς Κερησσόν· ἔστι δὲ ἐχυρὸν χωρίον ὁ Κερησσὸς ἐν τῇ Θεσπιέων...

This was after the Thespian contingent had left Epaminondas' army before Leuctra. §4 notes that Epaminondas flushed out the Thespians from Ceressus after the battle and before he proceeded into Arcadia. Xen. Hell. VI.3.1 (cf. above, n.25) is positive that the Thespians were ἀπόλυδες, and Isocrates' comments in the Archidamus (cf. below, p.93 and n.30) supports the idea that the city was ruined. But it is possible to imagine partial reoccupation of the site of the city by 371 - and indeed the withdrawal to Ceressus bears witness to the unwallled state of the settlement on the site of Thespieae. The Thespians left Epaminondas' army with permission, but the victor of Leuctra would not let them occupy a strong-point.

Commenting on Xen. Hell. VI.3.1, C.J. Tuplin (Xenophon's Hellenica: Introductory Essay and Commentary on VI.3 - VI.5 (Diss. Oxford 1981, ms. D.Phil. c 4115), pp.99-114) presents an interpretation of events concerning Thespieae which is different from that suggested here. He gives a careful and useful analysis of the differing connotations of the word ἀπολυς (pp. 102-104), and notes (p.103) that VI.3.1 and VI.3.5 treat Plataea's and Thespieae's fates as parallel; so that it seems odd that he adds (p.104) that 'Xenophon means ἀπόλυδας to be construed "exiled" (in some sense): but he has not gone out of his way to make clear in what sense. Perhaps

he expected his readers to know what happened. What Xenophon has gone out of his way to do is to minimise the distinction which is evident from Diodorus (cf. above, nn.23 and 24). Later, Tuplin posits three Thespian revolts instead of one: (p.114) 'Shortly after the 375/4 peace (at the latest) Thebes forces Thespieae (and Tanagra) to join the Boeotian League. Later (with the excuse of imminent Athenian intervention) she destroys Plataea. Later still Thespieae revolts, but is crushed and dioecised, the population remaining in the League, perhaps as adjuncts of Thebes... At Leuctra they, in effect, rebel again, and are again crushed at Ceressus.' The first coercion Tuplin distinguishes from the main revolt by saying that Thebes' enforcement of συντέλεια on Thespieae and Tanagra was 'manifestly prior to Plataea's destruction' (pp.112-113): but Isoc. 14 (Plataicus).9 does not provide grounds for this assertion. The only event to which the coercion of Thespiæ and Tanagra is 'manifestly prior' is the composition of the Plataicus. As to the population of Thespieae remaining in the League: it remained Thespian (cf. below, n.34), and no source suggests that it became Theban. As to rebelling again at Leuctra, the question is what constitutes rebellion: it is hardly surprising that Epaminondas' Thespians should have been ἐθελοκακοῦντες (Polyaen. II.3.3), but the events amount to his flattening them, rather than their rising against him.

27. Isocrates wrote a Plataicus, not a Thespiacus; and there is an important point in it: Isocrates 14(Plataicus).9 argues (in the persona of the Plataeans) that when the Thebans could not get the Plataeans' consent, they should merely have compelled them to συντελεῖν εἰς τὰς θήβας, as they did the Thespians and Tanagraeans. It is obvious now, Isocrates continues, that that was not what they wanted to accomplish, but that they coveted our land. The implication is that the Thebans had got the Plataeans' land, but not the Thespians'.

28. D.S. XV.51.3.
29. Isocrates 14(Plataicus).13.
30. Isocrates 6(Archidamus).27.
31. At D.S. XV.11.2 the Mantineans are described as having been compelled to demolish τὴν...ἰδίαν πατρίδα. Similarly at D.S. XVIII.11.4 the distinction is made (in the Theban case) between πατρίς and χώρα (cf. XIX.54.3 and below, pp.112-3 ; cf. also Paus. VIII.27.3). This point would make an interesting addition to G.E.M. de Ste. Croix' comments on 'Polis and chōra' at de Ste. Croix, pp.9-19. LSJ, s.v. πατρίς, does not note this usage.
32. Cf. above, p.91 and n.16.
33. Cf. above, p. 92 and n.28.
34. An apposite example is the case of Thrasybulus the Thespian who contributed a drachma to the temple-building at Delphi in Spring 360 (Syll.³ 239 B (= Tod II 140) lines 79-80: and on the date, cf. J. Pouilloux 'ὁ ἐπικέφαλος ὀβολός' BCH 73(1949), pp.177-200, at pp.194-200.
35. D.S. XIV.17.3.
36. Paus. IX.4.4.
37. Xen. Hell. VI.5.19 and 22-32; cf. D.S. XV.62.3-5.
38. Xen. Hell. VI.5.3. Cf. Moggi, pp.251-256.
39. Xen. Hell. VI.5.5.
40. Paus. VIII.27.1-4. On Megalopolis, cf. Moggi, pp.293-325.
41. Paus. VIII.27.5.
42. Paus. VIII.26.5.
43. Strabo XVI.1.5 (=738).
44. Beloch, p.127. This appears to be an inference from Polybius IX.21.1-2, though Beloch does not quote it. W. Loring in E.A. Gardner, W. Loring, G.C. Richards and W.J. Woodhouse Excavations at Megalopolis 1890-1891 (London, Society for the Promotion of Hellenic Studies Supp. Paper no.1, 1892) at pp.12-16 and Plate 1 shows only a small area with finds, compared with the size of the area within the wall-circuit.

45. D.S. XVIII.70.1. Beloch, p.127, says 'die Vertreter der Stadt hatten 10 Sitze im arkadischen Bundesrath, soviel wie Mantinea und Tegea zusammen, was auf eine Bürgerzahl von 10,000 und darüber schliessen lässt.' In support, he quotes Syll.³ 183 (= Tod II 132), a proxeny decree of the Arcadians which contains a list of δαμλοργοί from the cities of Arcadia. There are fifty δαμλοργοί, five from each city except Megalopolis (10), Maenalus (3) and Leprea (2). This shows that representation on the body of δαμλοργοί was not closely proportional to population size: hence there is a danger in arguing that Megalopolis was as large as Mantinea and Tegea put together.
46. D.S. XVIII.70.1 - 72.1.
47. IG V (2) 343, lines 80-83. Cf. Moggi, pp.272-290.
48. Paus. IV.26.5.
49. Paus. IV.27.9-10.
50. Paus. IV.27.11.
51. See Beloch, pp.487 and 489, which offers a comparison of its built-up area with those of some other Greek cities. Messene covered 95 hectares, Halicarnassus 350 (pp.486 and 488), and Alexandria by Egypt 920 (pp.486 and 487).
52. D.S. XV.79.3-5.
53. D.S. XV.79.3.
54. Paus. IX.15.3.
55. See below, pp.112-115.
56. D.S. XVIII.18.9. S. Hornblower, p.199, doubts whether only the rich Samians were expelled.
57. S. Hornblower, p.199. The account runs from p.197 to p.200.
58. C. Habicht 'Samische Volksbeschlüssen der hellenistischen Zeit' Ath. Mitt. 72 (1957), pp.152-237 is a collection of decrees, of which the following honour persons who had helped the exiled Samians: nos. 2

(Naosinicus son of Philoxenus of Sestos), 3 (Nicomedes son of Aris [tander of Cos]), 4 (Dionysius/...ους, Macedonian, from Amphipolis), 13, 20 (Eurya[us]), 21 (Dracon son of Straton of Cos), 22 (Hipparchus son of Heniochus of Cyrene), 23 (Epinoidas son of Eudemus of Heraclea), 24, 25 (Agathocles), 26 (——s son of Melaenius [of Iasos?]), 27 (——s son of Dionysius of ——) and 28; id. 'Hellenistische Inschriften aus dem Heraion von Samos' Ath. Mitt. 87 (1972), pp.191-228, is a supplementary list: nos. 2 (Hermonax son of Phi [listus of Erythrae?]), 3 (Nicias son of Demetrius of Heraclea) and 4 (Sosistratus son of Phanodicus of Miletus) honour helpers of the exiled Samians. This indicates a very wide dispersion of Samian exiles, and confirms the presumption that there were a good many of them.

59. S. Hornblower, pp.78-105.

60. S. Hornblower, pp.88-99.

61. Though Hornblower does not mention the parallel.

62. S. Hornblower, pp.85-88.

63. D.S. XV.76.2. Strabo XIV.2.19 (=657) puts this in perspective by noting that the city is not large. Cf. G.E. Bean and J.M. Cook 'The Carian Coast III' BSA 52 (1957), pp.58-146, at pp.120-126.

64. Sherwin-White, pp.43-81.

65. Sherwin-White, pp.64-65, quoting Σ Theocritus VII.21a, which records a suggestion that the Simichidas in Theocritus' poem was descended from another (presumably well-known) Simichidas:

φασὶ δὲ τὸν τοιοῦτον ἀπὸ πατρῷου κληθῆναι, ἀπὸ Σιμιχίδου τοῦ
Περικλέους τῶν Ὀρχομενίων, οἵτινες πολυτείας παρὰ κώλους τετυχήκασιν.

Sherwin-White's n.185 on p.65 points to a possible Coan source for this scholium. In the same note A.S.F. Gow Theocritus II (Cambridge, 1950), p.128 n.3, which records possible emendations of the unsatisfactory text (but gives no opinion on them), is mentioned; Paton's αὐτὸν τοιοῦτως for τὸν τοιοῦτον is economical and helpful.

66. Strabo IX.5.17 (=437-438), and Syll.³ 239E, lines 32-33. See Moggi, pp.244-251.

67. Notably in Cawkwell and in Ellis.
68. See Cawkwell, p.40, and cf. A.H.M. Jones The Greek City from Alexander to Justinian (Oxford, 1940), pp.1-26.
69. Arr. Anab. VII.9.2.
70. It is particularly unclear (see P.A. Brunt in Arr. Anab. Loeb ed. vol. II pp.532-533) how Arrian used his sources in the Opis speech. It is on the assumption that Arrian used this model at least with a conscious view to it sounding right as part of the fourth century scene that this argument depends. This rather minimal assumption is not too difficult to accept.
71. Justin VIII.5.7 - 6.2. Ellis, p.13, says 'it may be conjectured that the vividness of the picture derives from an eyewitness account of some such transplant, though not necessarily of any by Philip'. It is certainly one of the better-written bits of Justin, and there is no reason to think that it comes from an unreliable source.
72. Cawkwell, pp.39-44.
73. Cf. Ellis, p.15.
74. D.S. XVI.8.6-7.
75. Cf. below, p.102.
76. D.S. XVI.8.3-4.
77. Cawkwell, p.84.
78. D.S. XVI.8.5: cf. Tod II.146.
79. Beloch, p.203.
80. Dem. 19(Embassy).263 and 266. Zahrnt, p.107, shows that Potidaea must have been given to Olynthus, rather than to the Chalcidian League as a whole (not followed by N.G.L. Hammond and G.T. Griffith (Hammond and Griffith, p.300)). Similarly Anthemus, which Zahrnt discusses on p.104 (cf. Dem. 6(Philippic II).20 and Dem. 1 (Olynthiac I). hypothesis).

81. Cf. Xen. Hell. V.2.24.

82. Cf. D.S. XVI.53.2-3.

83. Beloch, p.205. It is worth giving some thought to what was in Demosthenes' interest: he needed to refer to the great expansion the Olynthians had achieved with Philip's patronage, but he had to avoid saying why they had so many more men in 348 than in 383. Beloch is not wrong to note that the figures are rounded-off: but unless Demosthenes could count on his audience to realise that Olynthus was a larger city in 348 than in 383, he could expect only disbelief when he referred to two such different figures within a minute in his speech. But he could not have been more specific without in some measure flattering Philip.

M. Gude does not comment on the problem of these two figures. Gude, p.33, on the cession of Potidaea and Anthemus to Olynthus (cf. Dem. 6 (Philippic II).20), says 'in this way [Philip] directed the resentment of his enemies against those who benefitted by his depredations, and gained time to compass larger schemes by blinding his opponents to their one real need, - wholehearted cooperation against himself.' This is too elaborate an account of his purpose at this early date (Cawkwell, pp.122-123, is a better commentary on how Greek states were likely to react to generous acts carried out by Philip); the point was that as Olynthus was going to be his ally, it might as well become a larger and stronger ally.

An estimate of the number of houses in Olynthus at the moment of its destruction is possible, and may prove helpful in some degree: D.M. Robinson (Excavations at Olynthus XII (Baltimore, 1946) p.V.) refers to 'more than 100 houses excavated during the course of ... four campaigns', and maps (Pl.271) over 300 houses, with solid lines for ones excavated, broken lines for those only surveyed. Further, the map in Pl.271 outlines streets to the east of the East Spur Hill, where there would be room (to judge from the map) for about 200 houses on the usual pattern. Then the streets to

the south of the North Hill and the east of the South Hill have room for at least another 200. 750 houses in the πόλις would perhaps be a conservative estimate. This would suggest that even in 383 a majority of the adult male citizens lived outside the walls, and would tend to support the idea that to have had 10,000 men capable of military service, Olynthus must have had an accession of new territory.

84. Indeed, Dem. 2(Olynthiac II).21 refers to the Olynthians as τὴν ἀλλοτριάν καρπωσάμενοι.

85. D.S. XVI.34.4-5.

86. Cawkwell, p.37. Mr. D.M. Lewis points out that 'Methone is so near Pydna that absorption would be natural' (cf. Strabo VII Fragment 20 and Hammond and Griffith, pp.256-258).

87. Cf. above, pp.45-89.

88. Cf. below, p.100 and n.100.

89. Dem. 23(Aristocrates).158.

90. D.S. XVI.34.3.

91. D.S. XVI.34.4.

92. Cf. Kahrstedt, pp.32-34.

93. Cf. Gude, p.35.

94. D.S. XVI.52.9.

95. D.S. XVI.53.2.

96. Cawkwell, p.90.

97. Dem. 19(Embassy).193-195 and Aeschines 2(Embassy).156; Dem. 19 (Embassy).195-198 and 306.

98. D.S. XVI.53.3.

99. Athens: Harp. s.v. Ἴσοτελής (cf. Aeschin. 2(Embassy).154) and Suda s.v. Κάρανος. Cassander: cf. D.S. XIX.51.2.

100. Syll.³ 332 was found on the site of Cassandreia/Potidaea.

101. Cf. above, pp.98-99. Polyæn. IV.2.12, an odd little passage,

ought to be mentioned here. It relates how Philip moved the Sarnusians, the people of an Illyrian town (cf. Ellis, p.16), to Macedon. By gaining their permission to address their assembly, he obtained the chance to get his soldiers to tie the Sarnusians up and drive them away bound. They were Greek-speaking people (this is implied by the fact that Philip was going to speak to them), and it is a fair guess that the subject of Philip's speech would have been 'why the Sarnusians ought to move to Lower Macedonia', if he had not found a more direct way of causing them to comply with his wishes. On their reluctance, cf. above, p.⁹⁸ and n.71. Philip, it seems, was not primarily acting against Olynthus and the other cities on his borders in order to accommodate a burgeoning population, but was deliberately (and for strategical purposes) extending the area of Macedonian settlement to exclude the non-Macedonian Greeks.

102. Dem. 9(Philippic III).26.

103. Ruschenbusch, pp.3-9, presents evidence on the (large) number and (small) size of cities known to have existed. See also E. Ruschenbusch 'Zur Wirtschaft - und Sozialstruktur der Normalpolis' ASNP Ser III. Vol. 13.2 (1983), pp.171-194 at p.171.

104. Ruschenbusch, p.9, calculates that the Normalpolis had 450 - 1,250 citizens (225 - 625 men).

105. Cawkwell, p.37 and n.20 to p.38.

106. There were 22: Dem. 19(Embassy).141 adds τὸ Τιλφωσαῖον to the list, but in his version Orchomenus, Coroneia and Corsia do not have the definite article. This is because it was not a city. It was an old-established shrine incorporating a hilltop fortress: cf. D.S. XIX.53.7 and Strabo IX. 2.27 (=410) and 30 (=413), and P-W s.v. Tilphossion.

109. *ibid.*

110. D.S. XVI.60.1. Orchomenus was refounded by Philip after Chaeronea (see below, p.102), so presumably at this stage the Thebans returned it to a state of ruin (cf. above, p. 96 and nn.52-54).

111. D.S. XVI.38.3-5.
112. Dem. 19(Embassy).64.
113. Dem. 19(Embassy).65.
114. Dem. 19(Embassy).80.
115. Dem. 5(Peace).19, and here cf. Seibert, pp.138-140.
116. This is the point of the comment at Dem. 19(Embassy).141 that the Thebans have gained τῆς τῶν Φωκέων χώρας ὀπόσῃν βούλονται. Note also that payment of the fine to the Delphic Amphictyony commenced soon and continued for twenty-six instalments (Tod II 172): resistance to it was not made.
117. Paus. X.3.3. Seibert, pp.139-140, comments 'noch im Restitutionsdekret Alexanders waren sie als "Verflüchte" (enageis) ausgeschlossen' (but in fact they were at home already), and in n.1101 disparages the view that the Phocians could have come home in 338. This is surprising, since in n.1087 he cites 'Paus. X,3,1ff.' to support his account (p.138) of the dioecism of Phocis. Consideration of §3, which he does not cite, would perhaps have dispelled his doubt.
118. Paus. X.36.3-4. X.3.3 shows that similar activity went on throughout Phocis: τοῖς Φωκεῦσιν αἱ πόλεις ἀνψκίσθησαν ἐς τὰς πατρίδας κατήχθησαν ἐκ τῶν κωμῶν...
119. Paus. X.3.4 appears to be a summary account of the history of the Phocians after their return, extending into the third century. It is legitimate to think that the account would be different if the Phocians had been exiled again.
120. Paus. IV.27.10, IX.1.8 and 37.8. Philip also imposed a garrison in Thebes and took other steps which do not directly concern this enquiry: cf. Cawkwell, pp.167-168. Boeotia was represented in autumn 338 at the Delphic meeting of naopoioi by delegates from Tanagra and Thespieae, but not from Thebes: cf. Hammond and Griffith, p.611.

121. Plut. Alexander 34. The Eudemus of Plataea who contributed a thousand ζεύγη (yoke of oxen, not oxen and carts: see A.M. Woodward, rev. of Tod II, JHS 68 (1948), p.161) to Athenian building efforts in 329 (Tod II 198) was presumably active on a large scale in the refoundation of Plataea.
122. Arr. Anab. I.9.10. Cf. C. Roebuck 'The Settlements of Philip II in 338 B.C.' CPhil. 43 (1948) pp.73-92 at p.80 and n.46.
123. A.H.M. Jones The Greek City from Alexander to Justinian (Oxford, 1940), p.2.
124. Plut. Alexander 9.1.
125. Arr. Anab. I.7.7 - 9.10; D.S. XVII.8.2 - 14.4; Justin XI.3.7 - 4.8.
126. Arr. Anab. I.9.9. Cf. Justin XI.4.7 agri inter victores dividuntur: formally, the Thebans were defeated by an alliance.
127. D.S. XVII.14.1 and 4.
128. See below, pp.112-113.
129. Lane Fox, pp.86-89.
130. S. Hornblower, p.330.
131. S. Hornblower, p. 329.
132. S. Hornblower, p.321; cf. J.M. Cook 'Old Smyrna, 1948-1951' BSA 53 (1958), pp.1-34, at p.34. Cook is bold enough to state 'the inception of the new city may ... date to 334 B.C.'; a warning that fortifications and public buildings may not have been finished until the time of Lysimachus is added.
133. S. Hornblower, p.314.
134. Arr. Anab. III.1.5.
135. See below, p.106 with n.154.
136. D.S. XVII.52.2.
137. Q. Curtius Rufus IV.8.2.
138. P.A. Brunt in a note on Arr. Anab. III.1.5 in the Loeb edition notes that 'Strabo says that the settlers were natives, mercenaries and Greeks.'

There is a risk that this may be misleading. Strabo XVII.1.12 (=797) notes that Polybius comments on the three γένη living in the city (natives, mercenaries and Alexandrians (by origin Greek)). This comment on the second-century population does not necessarily imply anything about the fourth-century settlers.

139. Q. Curtius Rufus IV.8.6.

140. Fraser, p.62.

141. Fraser, p.63, and cf. p.62 on Ptolemais (with below, p.115 and n.213).

142. Fraser, p.63.

143. *ibid.*

144. Fraser, p.64.

145. Fraser, p.65; cf. Theocritus XV.87-93 (reprinted in Fraser's n.200).

Fraser describes this as 'the only direct literary evidence concerning the population of Alexandria' at this early period; but he points out that there is no knowing whether Theocritus means his readers to imagine the Syracusan ladies in the crowd at Alexandria as permanent residents or visitors in the city.

146. Fraser, p.65.

147. Cf. Arr. Anab. IV.4.1; IV.22.4, IV.24.7 and V.29.3. Cf. also below, n.154.

148. Q. Curtius Rufus IV.8.5.

149. Pseudo-Callisthenes I.31.2. Fraser, p.4, notes that 'there are considerable sections of [pseudo-Callisthenes] which are of Hellenistic origin', and argues that when dealing with the city of Alexandria, the author's account should be treated 'with care, even with respect.'

150. P. Briant in two papers ('Colonisation hellénistique et populations indigènes, La phase d'installation' Klio 60(1968), pp.57-92, and 'Colonisation hellénistique et populations indigènes II: Renfort grecs dans les cités hellénistiques d'Orient' Klio 64(1982), pp.83-98) argues that near-

eastern peoples were introduced into foundations of this sort in a dependent position in the χῶραι and suggests that the Greco-Macedonian class continued in a position of dominance. On this point Arrian's account, derived from Ptolemy, amounts to a kind of Authorised Version: this should be borne in mind.

151. Arr. Anab. IV.4.1.

152. Arr. Anab. IV.1.3.

153. The other passage is Arr. Anab. III.1.5 (cf. above, n.123): καὶ ἔδοξεν αὐτῷ ὁ χῶρος κάλλιστος κτίσαι ἐν αὐτῷ πόλιν καὶ γενέσθαι ἂν εὐδαίμονα τὴν πόλιν... Correspondences are almost exact: ἔδοξεν/ἐφαίνετο; γενέσθαι ἂν εὐδαίμονα τὴν πόλιν/αὐξῆσαι ἐπὶ μέγα τὴν πόλιν; χῶρος κάλλιστος/χῶρος ἐπιτήδειος.

154. (a) Arr. Anab. III.28.4; (b) V.29.3; (c) VI.15.2 and (d) 4; (e) VII.

21.7. (a) has Alexander sacrificing, as at the foundation of the Egyptian city; (b) has settlement of mercenaries and locals; (c) has a comment on hope for future prosperity; (d) has a comment on wall-building and (e) has comments on the good site and the settlement of mercenaries. These accounts and the accounts of the foundations of the Egyptian and Farthest Alexandrias share seven elements (the Egyptian has five, the Farthest six of them): site, sacrifices, walls; mercenaries, Macedonians, locals; future prosperity.

155. Griffith, p.21.

156. Griffith, pp.22-23.

157. Griffith, p.23. Griffith says 'no fewer than 26,000', but D.S. XVIII. 7.2 speaks of more than 20,000 infantry and 3,000 cavalry.

158. W.W. Tarn Alexander the Great II (Cambridge, 1948), pp.234-237, summarizes which Alexandrias are represented by modern towns, and which existed well down into Greek history.

159. Tarn, p.5.

160. Tarn, p.35.

161. D.S. XVIII.4.4. Tarn's elaborate rejection of D.S. XVIII.4.1-6 (Alexander the Great II (Cambridge, 1948), pp.378-398 and 427-429) is definitively refuted by E. Badian (Badian 2), adding to the earlier work of F. Schachermeyr ('Die letzten Pläne Alexanders des Grossen' JÖAI 41 (1954), pp.118-140. But cf. below, n.163.

162. D.S. XVIII.4.6.

163. D.S. XVIII.4.4. The central suggestion of Badian 2 is that Perdikkas read to the Macedonians a version of the plans which he had edited with a view to getting the plans rejected and to obviating the possibility that a document purporting to convey Alexander's last plans might later be produced by someone wanting to upset the settlement made after the King's death. (R.M. Errington, in 'From Babylon to Triparadeisos, 323 - 320 B.C.', JHS 90 (1970), pp.49-77, at p.59 with n.75 claims to follow Badian's general interpretation, but does not mention Badian's idea that Perdikkas edited the plans.) The edited version would be the one available to Diodorus' source (tentatively, Badian 2 favours Hieronymus of Cardia: p.199: 'our reliable author - let us without prejudice call him Hieronymus -'; but J. Hornblower (J. Hornblower, pp.89-97) argues against derivation of D.S. XVIII.4 from Hieronymus), so that Diodorus' version of the plans would bear no close relationship to what Alexander had had in mind. The conclusion is (Badian 2, p.201) that 'concentration on the analysis of the actual hypomnemata ... is merely a way of elaborately missing the point.'

This argument is over-refined. If Perdikkas had edited out items likely to attract the army's support, there was nothing to stop any of the Successors, who (on Badian's hypothesis) knew what was in the hypomnemata, from publicizing these items later in order to gain popularity. So there is no particular reason to think D.S. XVIII.4.4-5 misleading. It is a selection, certainly: but the scale of the projects mentioned in it can only suggest that the selection was made on the criterion set out at XVIII.4.4

(ἦν δὲ τῶν ὑπομνημάτων τὰ μέγιστα καὶ μνήμης ἄξια τάδε). More likely, surely, that this selection was made by a historian (Diodorus or his source) than by Perdikkas. It is certainly possible to treat the plans as a fair reflection of what Alexander had in mind.

164. W.W. Tarn Alexander the Great II (Cambridge, 1948), pp.394-397.

165. Strabo XIII.1.26 (=593); IPriene 156.

166. Cf. above, pp. 103-107.

167. D.S. XVIII.4.4.

168. Cf. for example Alexander's sending Miccalus of Clazomenae to Phoenice and Syria with 500 talents to collect seafaring people with a view to settling them on the Persian Gulf. Arr. Anab. VII.19.5-6.

169. Badian 2, p.195. S.M. Stern (Aristotle and the World-State (Oxford, 1968)) discusses a letter attributed to Aristotle and preserved in an Arabic source. It is clear that the Arabic is a translation of a Greek original (e.g. pp.21-22). Stern gives the Arabic on pp.8-10, and an English translation on pp.3-8. Stern argues (pp.28-32) that the text was composed at the time of Alexander, though not certainly by Aristotle. The first part of the text (pp.3-5) advises Alexander to remove the inhabitants of Persia from their places (p.4: 'If this cannot be done with all of them, do it at least with a great number, including the ruling class, and settle them in Greece and Europe. This will be acting justly towards them, since it just according to the law of Rhadamanthys to do to a man as he had done.'). Stern (pp.33-34) points out the difference between this and the plan in the hypomnemata: that this plan is punitive, and the other would have been intended as an integrative measure. It is interesting, then, that the two μεταγωγὰί discussed in this enquiry (below, pp.109-111) had a punitive purpose, at least in part.

170. Cf. above, pp.98-103.

171. D.S. XVIII.18.4.

172. D.S. XVIII.18.5.
173. Plut. Phocion 28.3.
174. D.S. XVIII.18.4.
175. Modern treatments display little interest in this point. Seibert, p.165 n.1296, comments that 'jeder, der es wünschte, sollte in Thrakien Land erhalten, d. h. es handelte sich nicht um eine systematische Zwangsumsiedlung': this is not a legitimate inference, since a highly organised migration might begin from an announcement inviting those who wished to participate (Seibert is right to note that Alexander had looked forward to transplants of this kind in the hypommemata (D.S. XVIII.4.4) - and it would be wrong to think that Alexander's μεταγωγάι had been going to be unsystematic). In the same note Seibert quotes W.S. Ferguson (Hellenistic Athens (London, 1911), p.26) as considering it probable that many people left Athens. Ferguson's opinion is the opposite of what Seibert takes it to be ('it is improbable that many of the disfranchised citizens left Athens'); his main argument is that the presence of the Attic outcasts in Athens five years later disproves the idea that Antipater actually deported them into Thrace. This is not a persuasive suggestion. See below, n.186.
176. Tscherikower, p.3.
177. Athenaeus III.98d-f.
178. Athenaeus III.98f-99b: pseudo-philosophy from a comedy.
179. Lane Fox, p.475.
180. Strabo VII Fragment 35.
181. Pliny NH IV.10.37.
182. Tscherikower, *ibid.*
183. D.S. XVIII.48.4.
184. D.S. XVIII.56.1-8.
185. D.S. XVIII.56.3.
186. Plut. Phocion 33.1. Seibert, p.168, draws the necessary inference

- that the exiles were in Alexander's following (Gefolge). The distinction between φυγάδες and ἄτιμοι here refers back to 28.3, where the distinction between those who stayed and those who left is first drawn. Alexander had brought the disfranchised Athenians back from Thrace. Ever since Polyperchon had passed his decree, they and the disfranchised democrats still at Athens had been his natural supporters (here cf. Nepos Phocion 3.1).
187. D.S. XVIII.25.3-5. The decree was presumably the source of Diodorus' source's information.
188. Q. Curtius Rufus IX.7.1-11; D.S. XVII.99.5-6; D.S. XVIII.4.8 and 7.1-9.
189. S. Hornblower, p.81 with n.22. Moggi is a collection of Synoecisms, a fair number of which do not concern this enquiry because of their character as unions at the political level only: e.g. the union of Corinth and Argos (Moggi, pp.242-251); the incorporation of Dium in the state of the Histiaeans (Moggi, pp.290-292); the political unification of Ceos (Moggi, pp.333-341) and the incorporation of Proconnesus in Cyzicus (Moggi, pp.341-344).
190. D.S. XVIII.11.3-4.
191. D.S. XIX.53.2.
192. Seibert, pp.169-170 mistakes Cassander's motives. He is right to note that 'die rivalisierende Politik der Diadochen mit dem Ziel, sich gegen die Mitkonkurrenten oder die Vorgänger abzugrenzen, bot weiterhin die Möglichkeit für Phygades, ihre Rückkehr zu erreichen.' He also says 'Kassander wollte sich gegen Philipp und Alexander abheben.' This statement appears to be based on Paus. IX.7.2, where the author gives it as his own opinion that Cassander founded Thebes chiefly out of hatred for Alexander (δοκεῖ δέ μοι τὰς Θήβας οἰκίσαι ὁ κάσσανδρος κατὰ ἔχθος Ἀλεξάνδρου μάλιστα). Pausanias supports this by mentioning Cassander's murders of Alexander's relatives (cf. Q. Curtius Rufus X.10.18-19). His

reasoning need not be respected merely because it is ancient; but it is developed further by R.M. Errington (at Errington, pp.151-152), who puts forward four items as pointing to an anti-Alexander policy: Cassander's marriage to Philip II's daughter Thessalonice, his restoration of Thebes, his murders of Alexander's relatives and his honourable burial of Philip Arrhidaeus, Eurydice and Cynnane. To answer them in order: Thessalonice was Alexander's half-sister as well as Philip's daughter, a point curiously ignored by Errington, but not omitted at D.S. XIX.52.1; refounding Thebes, Cassander, on campaign against Alexander son of Polyperchon, was directing propaganda against Mitkonkurrenten, not Vorgänger; the murders removed people who could claim more closeness to Alexander than Cassander himself could, and so strengthened his position as Alexander's successor; and burying Philip Arrhidaeus at Aegae καθάπερ ἔθος ἦν τοῖς βασιλεῦσι (D.S. XIX.52.5) was surely intended as a demonstration of Cassander's legitimacy as the holder of the power handed on by the kings.

There are two other anecdotes which have been taken to support the idea of Cassander's hatred of Alexander. Plut. Alexander 74.2-6 is the story of Cassander's arriving in Babylon and laughing to see everyone practising proskynesis to Alexander, Alexander's punishment of him, and Cassander's frightened reaction to a statue of Alexander at Delphi years later. J.R. Hamilton (Plutarch Alexander: a Commentary (Oxford, 1969), ad loc.) comments: 'it is difficult to believe that Cassander acted in this tactless manner... the story is suspect since both Polyperchon (Curt. VIII. 5.21ff.) and Leonnatus (Arr. Anab. IV.12.2) are said to have acted in a similar manner in Bactra. And Plut Mor. 180F20 is the story of Alexander's telling off Cassander for forcing another man's lover to kiss him (§19 also makes the point about Alexander's respect for others' rights in this area): Cassander is simply cast as the fool who provokes the wise apophthegm. These pieces of evidence do not give strong support to the idea that

Cassander had a towering furious hatred for his master, extending beyond the latter's death.

But clearly Cassander can not have wanted to reign in the shadow of his greater predecessor. Perhaps an analogy will suggest what Cassander's antipathy towards Alexander probably, amounted to: if Alexander were compared to Solomon, then Cassander ought to be compared to Rehoboam (who decided to dispense with his father's ideas and advisers: I Kings 12.1-19) rather than Jeroboam (who rebelled: I Kings 11.26-40 and 12.20-33). Errington is right when he says that 'his [Cassander's] policy ... was clearly directed towards destroying the possibility of exploiting Alexander's name, family or achievements in his own [s.c. Cassander's] sphere of power': right, that is, with the qualification that what Cassander wished was to prevent anyone except himself from exploiting that name, that family or those achievements. He is right also to assert, what Seibert denies, that Cassander relied very heavily on the reputation of Philip II.

193. D.S. XIX.54.1.

194. D.S. XIX.53.1-2.

195. Macedonia was the most likely destination of those who were carried off as slaves in 335 (cf. above, p.100). But the Athenians were resisting Antipater in Greece: they were not going to attack Macedon.

196. D.S. XIX.54.2-3. Chiefly Athens, according to Paus. IX.7.1. Syll.³ 337 is a Theban inscription recording the names of contributors. The most remarkable section of it is at lines 31-41, where three βασιλεῦς, among them Demetrius Poliorcetes (line 31), are recorded to have given money. This section (as Dittenberger notes) must have been added after the Successors took their royal titles - more than ten years after Cassander's first initiative. Though the propaganda value of his Theban activities was intended by Cassander to be immediate, Syll.³ 337 is a useful reminder that neither Thebes nor any other of the synoecisms of this period was built in a day.

197. D.S. XVIII.74.1-3.

198. D.S. XIX.67.3-4.

199. D.S. XIX.67.4. It is likely that this attempt by Cassander to concentrate the population of Acarnania in fewer centres had no permanent effect. A list of theorodokoi found in the Nemea excavations in 1978 gives the names of persons connected with the Nemean games in thirteen Acarnanian cities (ἐμ Παλαίρωι, ἐν Ανακτορίωι, ἐν Εχίνωι, ἐν Θυρρείωι, ἐν Εὐρίπωι, ἐν Λιμναῖι, ἐν Οἰνιάδασι, ἐν Στράτωι, ἐν Φηρίωι, ἐμ Μεδίωι, ἐν Φουτίαι, ἐγ Κορόνταισι, ἐν Ἀστάκωι; I owe this list to Mr. D.M. Lewis, since the inscription is published only as a photograph: S.G. Miller 'Excavations at Nemea, 1978' Hesp 48(1979), pp.73-103, at pp.78-80 and pl.22c); and since the list was revised in 311/10 (p.79), it is evident that the reorganization of 314 had made little impression. Mr. Lewis comments that 'the "Δερμειῶς" are presumably from Thyrraeion or Pherion'. The names Sauria and Agrinium are not in the list - presumably Cassander's men intended (and failed) to build these from scratch.

200. D.S. XIX.67.5 -68.1.

201. D.S. XIX.74.3-6 (313), and D.S. XIX.88.1 - 89.1 (312).

202. Strabo XIII.1.26 (=593).

203. Antigonia was founded after the exchange between Antigonus and Scep̄sis recorded in OGIS 5 and 6 (310), since Scep̄sis was one of the cities synoecised into Antigonia (Strabo XIII.1.33 (=597) and 1.47 (=604). Antigoneis may be a correct restoration at Syll.³ 337, line 16, recording contributors to the refounding of Thebes: in which case if Holleaux is right to date the first column of this text as early as 310, a very precise date indeed would be available for the synoecism of Antigonia. Here cf. J.M. Cook The Troad (Oxford, 1973), pp.148-204. Lysimacheia was founded in 309 (D.S. XX.29.1). C.B. Welles (Royal Correspondence in the Hellenistic Period (Newhaven, Conn., 1934), p.11) notes that 'the letter

is not a special communication to Scepsis... undoubtedly copies of it were sent out widely'; and, on the short interval between the letter and the new policy, comments (p.8) 'a more glaring case of inconsistency between promise and performance could not well be found.'

204. Errington, pp.162-168 (Pleistarcheia, pp.166-167).

205. Demetrius of Scepsis Strabo's source: cf. Strabo XIII.1.27 (=594).

His date, cf. P-W s.v. Demetrius 78 and W. Leaf 'Strabo and Demetrius of Skepsis' BSA 22 (1916-1918), pp.23-47, at p.23. Lysimacheia was overthrown perhaps c. 220 (cf. Tscherikower, p.2), so it is possible that Demetrius of Scepsis might have been almost unaware even that it had existed.

206. Tscherikower, pp.58-59; A.H.M. Hones The Greek City from Alexander to Justinian (Oxford, 1940), p.11.

207. Tscherikower, p.59, notes on Alexandria κατ' Ἴσσον: 'die Stadt ist wahrscheinlich von Antigonos oder Seleukos I. zugleich mit dem grossartigen Gründungen in Pierien und Kassiotis gegründet worden.' This is definitely plausible: and these foundations belong to the last decade of the century.

208. Cf. above, p.100.

209. D.S. XIX.53.2-3: the Olynthians were added to the people of Potidaea and of the 'cities of the Chersonese', who were gathered up into the one new city. Mr. D.M. Lewis comments: 'it would seem natural to suppose that this chersonese is simply Pallene.' Livy XXXI.45.14 (narrating events of 200) mentions Mendaeum as a maritimus vicus of Cassandreia: Mende and Scione seem to have been absorbed in the new city.

210. Cf. above, pp.112-114.

211. The text (P.M. Fraser 'Inscriptions from Ptolemaic Egypt' Berytus 13 (1960), pp.123-161, no.1, at pp.123-133; cf. SEG XX.665) is as follows
 Ἐδοξε τῆς βουλῆς καὶ τῶν δ[ήμων] (ὁ δεῦνα τοῦ δεῦνος εἶπεν?) ἐπειδὴ—ὁ
 θεὸς Σωτὴρ πόλιν Ἑλληνίδα ἐν[(τῆς) θηβαΐδι ἔκτισε — τὴν ἐπωνυ]-
 μίαν ποιησάμενος Πτολεμα[ΐδα ἀφ' ἑαυτοῦ - καὶ δοῦς αὐτῆς τὴν αὐτοῦ προσ]-
 τασίαν · εἰς ἣν ὁ βασιλεὺς ἀπ[έστειλεν ἐποίκους — ἐκ —]

5 καὶ ἐξ Ἄργους καὶ ἐκ[... ——— καὶ ἐκ ——— καὶ ἐκ Λακεδαίμο]-
 νος καὶ ἐκ Θετ[ταλίας καὶ ἐκ τῆς ——— (καὶ ἐκ τῆς ———?)].
 δεδόχθαι τ[ῆς βουλῆς καὶ τῶν δήμων· στεφανῶσαι (e.g.) τὸν βασιλέα Πτολεμαῖον(?)]
 κατὰ τὸν τ[ῆς πόλεως νόμον (?) —————]

Fraser argues (p.127) that the βασιλεύς is not the same person as the θεὸς Σωτήρ of line 2, 'since the same person would not be described in two different ways within two lines.' He adds (p.130): 'lines 4-6 contain an obvious reference to the introduction of fresh population to the city. The reference to the foundation by Soter, followed by the action of ὁ βασιλεύς, indicates that this event occurred after the original foundation and was not part of it.'

The stone appears (p.125) to be a copy, inscribed at a Hadrianic or later date.

212. The manuscripts of Diodorus give ναυαρχίας : νομαρχίας is Wesseling's emendation. E. Bevan (A History of Egypt under the Ptolemaic Dynasty (London, 1927), p.40 n.1) prefers ναυαρχίας on the lectio difficilior principle, but admits that it is a problem what ναυαρχίας could mean. He reports Mahaffy's view that it could mean 'naval defences', and Bouché-Leclercq's elaboration of this interpretation into its meaning 'the nomes of the delta'. This reading would make the unemended text mean almost what the emended text means; Bevan (ibid.) asks 'could the Greek word possibly bear such a meaning? I doubt it.' Much later (p.174 and n.4) Bevan makes his own view clear: assuming the correctness of ναυαρχίας, he comments: 'the chief Admiral bore the title of nauarchos, but the same title was probably also borne by the commander of divisions of the fleet.' The suggestion is that the 8,000 were put to the oars. The plausibility of this is markedly decreased by the fact that Ptolemy, in the same section of Diodorus, is said to have gone on (northwards) to besiege the cities of Phoenice

immediately after sending the 8,000 (southwards) to Egypt. He must have wanted his navy with him at Tyre and Sidon (D.S. XIX.86.1): there would be no point in sending 8,000 oarsmen away to Egypt. The word, whatever it is, must mean some kind of administrative divisions in the land of Egypt: so there is no sensible alternative to accepting Wesseling's emendation.

213. There is no direct evidence for the date of this foundation. It would seem likely to be after 312 because of the new attitude which according to Diodorus prevailed among the Successors after the treaty of 311 (D.S. XIX.105.1), whereby each began to treat his own territory ὡσανεὶ τινα βασιλείαν δορίκτητον (D.S. XIX.105.4). E. Plaumann (Ptolemais in Oberägypten (Leipzig, 1910)) makes no comment on the dating of the foundation.

In D.L. II.86 one Aethiops of Ptolemais is listed among the pupils of Aristippus of Cyrene. Aristippus, a mature money-earning philosopher as early as when Socrates was still alive (D.L. II.65) can hardly have survived much beyond 350; so any pupil of his must have been born by 375 or not long after. It would have to be presumed that Aethiops was a Cyrenian when Aristippus taught him, but it could then be suggested that he went to Ptolemais with the first settlers and became a citizen there in his 60s or 70s. This argument would make a foundation soon after 312 seem likely, and one after about 300 distinctly improbable, specially since, in order to become known to posterity as a Ptolemaite, Aethiops must almost certainly have spent several years philosophizing in Ptolemais before his death.

E. Turner in CAH VII² Part I (Cambridge, 1984) at p.127 puts the foundation of Ptolemais well before 297, but does not present arguments for this dating.

214. D.S. XIX.52.2. Cf. above, p.114 and n.209.

215. D.S. XX.110.3. The text gives Dium and Orchomenus as the places

whose populations would have been moved. Fischer in the apparatus criticus of the Teubner edition (Leipzig, 1906) shows the impossibility of the names, and suggests correcting the text from Strabo IX.5.15 (=436), which names Nelia, Pagasae and Ormenium as having been synoecised into Demetrias by Demetrius.

216. Strabo VII Fragment 21.

217. *ibid.* Apollonia, Chalastra, Garescus, Aenea and Cissus.

218. Paus. I.9.8.

219. Cf. App. Syriaca 1; but Appian is wrong to say that Lysimacheia was destroyed as soon as Lysimachus died: cf. Tscherikower, pp.1-2.

220. A case supported in general terms by Dio Chrysostom 39 (περὶ ὁμονοίας ἐν Νικαίᾳ πεπαυμένης τῆς στάσεως).1, where the orator speaks of Nicaea as ἡ...πόλις κατὰ τε ἰσχὺν καὶ μέγεθος οὐδεμιᾶς ἠττωμένη τῶν ὁποῖοτε ἐνδόξων γένους τε γενναιότητι καὶ πλήθους συνοικήσει, τῶν φανερωτάτων γενῶν οὐκ ἀλλαχόθεν ἄλλων συνελθόντων φαύλων καὶ ὀλίγων, ἀλλὰ Ἑλλήνων τε τῶν πρώτων καὶ Μακεδόνων. A.H.M. Jones The Greek City from Alexander to Justinian (Oxford, 1940), p.7, suggests that this may mean that drafts from cities under Antigonos' control were sent to Nicaea (Antigonia, until renamed by Lysimachus - cf. Tscherikower, pp.46-47). This is acceptable, though a little caution is induced by the fact that Dio Chrysostom's comments on Nicaea's past draw on a catholic mixture of history and myth; the section quoted here continues: τό τε μέγιστον ἥρωας τε καὶ θεοῦς οὐκιστὰς λαβοῦσα. Cf. also §8.

221. Strabo XVI.1.5 (=738). K.J. Beloch Griechische Geschichte² IV (1) (Berlin and Leipzig, 1925), p.136 n.2 argues as follows: 'der Name zeigt, dass Seleukeia ebenso zur Hauptstadt bestimmt war, wie Kassandreia, Lysimacheia, Antigoneia. Seit dem Siege über Antigonos aber ist Seleukos' Hauptstadt Antiocheia am Orontes, folglich muss Seleukeia vorher gegründet

sein, wahrscheinlich bald nach 311, ehe Seleukos nach Baktrien und Indien zog.'

222. Tscherikower, pp.90-91.

223. Cf. above, n.221.

224. Strabo XVI.1.5 (=738).

225. D.S. XIX.91.1. Presumably Carrhai.

226. D.S. XIX.91.5. στρατιῶται in the Hellenistic context are not inevitably mercenaries: cf. Griffith, pp.84-85, 126, 132-135. Nonetheless it is likely enough that there were mercenaries, especially since Seleucus bought up horses and distributed them to competent persons (in order to have a cavalry element).

227. The ἀνάβασις of Seleucus: referred to as such (in Nicanor's letter to Antigonos) at D.S. XIX.100.3.

228. D.S. XX.47.5-6.

229. D.C. XL.29.1. On Seleucus I's aims in founding cities cf. G.M. Cohen The Seleucid Colonies (Wiesbaden, Historia Einzelschrift 30, 1978), pp.11-12.

230. Cf. Griffith, pp.149-151, who justly compares Antigonos on the Orontes to Antigonos' military settlements.

231. D.S. XX.108.1. This extravaganza gained, through Hieronymus and Diodorus, its place in the historical tradition. Foundations of military colonies, even the foundation of Nicaea of Bithynia (cf. Tscherikower, pp. 46-47), did not, in spite of Diodorus' concentration on Antigonos and Demetrius (cf. J. Hornblower, p.36). It is fair to infer that Antigonos had higher ambitions for his capital city than for his lesser settlements.

232. Cf. above, n.220.

233. A.H.M. Jones The Greek City from Alexander to Justinian (Oxford, 1940), p.6.

234. Griffith, pp.317-318 gives a convenient summary.

235. Tscherikower, p.2.

Chapter 4 - Mercenary Soldiers and Life Outside the πόλις

That mercenary service grew after Cyrus' expedition to have a military and social importance in the Greek world which it had not previously had, is not a matter of controversy. Given that there were also more Greeks living outside the πόλις than before,¹ it would seem natural (even without the reinforcement given by Isocrates' opinionated comments²) to suppose that some of the homeless Greeks took to serving as mercenaries. And mercenaries were outside the πόλις community in a sense in which citizen soldiers, even when on campaign abroad, were not outside it. On the other hand, it might seem to make the category of πλανώμενοι trivial to lump all mercenaries into it for the duration of their service: other things being equal, mercenaries who began as citizens would return home and resume life in the πόλις. A. Fuks argues that 'people of long mercenary service would become technically, or in fact, ἀπόλλυδες'³ - and those who were ἀπόλλυδες would be likely to live as wanderers. But 'technically, or in fact' is a phrase which needs in some measure to be refined. An examination of some aspects of the soldiering life will show that the connection between the wandering life in general and the life of the mercenary was not unimportant; nor yet was it simple.

Four matters bearing on this connection will be discussed in this chapter. The question what sort of men could become mercenaries; the question what provision employers might make to enable poor men to serve; the question how mercenaries were recruited; and the question what a mercenary's conditions of service would be like.

1. Who Were the Mercenaries?

The expedition of Cyrus is an interesting point at which to start examining what sort of man became a mercenary, and what sort of men mercenaries became. H.W. Parke traces the history of the remnant of the

Cyreians from the time when they joined Thibron (399) as far as the battle of Coronea (394) and even beyond.⁴ Certainly seven years after the march with Cyrus these remaining soldiers were living a life outside their πόλις; in fact, once those who wished to, had sailed away or settled into the cities near Byzantium,⁵ it could fairly be said that those who stayed with the army had chosen the wandering life, and that the army itself had become (now by choice, though previously by chance), in Isocrates' phrase, α στρατόπεδον...πλανώμενον.⁶ What makes this particularly interesting is Xenophon's insistence that the soldiers were mostly not on the expedition because of σπάνις βίου, that on the contrary some had brought slaves (ἄνδρας ἄγοντες), others had spent money on coming, and that others still had left behind fathers and mothers or children, and were hoping to make money and go home.⁷ The details of this explanation are intended to assure the reader of the Anabasis of two points: the first and more obvious being that the soldiers were not the poorest of the poor; the second being that they were not rootless by reason of having no relatives living. Isocrates presents another picture of the Cyreians,⁸ but for the reasons given by Parke Xenophon's version, if rather exaggerated, is in general preferable:⁹ so that the uniquely well-documented case of the army of Cyrus gives an example of how a mercenary army which, when it was first recruited, was made up of city-dwelling and not unrespectable Greeks, came to choose to live by wandering - not needing anything from a city, because of self-sufficiency; desirers of war.¹⁰

This illustrates that it would be mistaken to assume that all mercenaries were destitute and unable to invest money in becoming professional soldiers; or that all who could spend money on starting up as mercenaries would resume life in the πόλις when the opportunity came. In this context the relevance of the cost of armour and weapons to the subject of mercenaries, and wandering mercenaries, is clear. It is discussed in the Appendix, to which reference will be made in several places in this chapter.

2. Ownership of Armour and Weapons

Modern writers who have dealt with Greek mercenaries have not explored the question who provided the armour which the soldiers wore.¹¹ But a moment's consideration reveals the importance of the question. If mercenaries usually provided their own armour, then πλανώμενοι who did not have capital assets to the value of at least 100dr. could only exceptionally turn to mercenary soldiering, at least in the hoplite rôle.¹² In this section the known instances of provision of armour and weapons to mercenary soldiers will be examined with a view to determining what expectations employers and mercenaries would have in this respect.

After Tissaphernes had murdered the Greek generals at the parley to which he invited them following the battle of Cunaxa, three former friends of Cyrus, Ariaeus, Artabazus and Mithradates, came to the Greek camp.¹³ Ariaeus' line, taken with a view to inducing the Greeks to give up their arms, was to tell them that they were the property of the king, having belonged to his slave Cyrus:¹⁴ ὑμᾶς δὲ βασιλεὺς τὰ ὄπλα ἀπαίτεῖ · αὐτοῦ γὰρ εἶναί φασιν, ἐπεὶ περὶ Κύρου ἦσαν τοῦ ἐκείνου δούλου. This small passage raises a number of difficulties. It must be examined carefully. If taken at face value and believed, it implies that Cyrus provided armour for all his Greek mercenaries.

No other statement in Xenophon Anabasis directly confirms this. The Greeks had armour which was to some extent standard: I.2.16 says that they all had helmet, shield and greaves as well as red tunics. The hoplites, that is, most of the Greeks, must have had thoraxes as well.¹⁵ Cyrus had a personal cavalry troop armed in the Hellenic manner, and one presumes that he had given them their arms, but one could not generalise from that (I.8.6-7). The King's and Tissaphernes' first embassy demanded (II.1.8) that the Hellenes give up their arms, but in the circumstances that is not at all surprising - it would have been a gesture of surrender,

rather than an acknowledgement of the King's title to them as de iure owner.

In the debates on whether to follow Cyrus and on the occasions when the pay goes up, the terms of the issue of armour are not mentioned. Certainly it is clear that the soldiers had joined Cyrus on some terms, whether set forth explicitly or understood (I.3.1); if the implication of II.5.38 is accepted then probably it can be taken that the position as regards armour was stated from the first. It may simply have seemed unnecessary to revise it. It may have been a gift from the first: Cyrus' expedition was for death or glory: whichever the outcome, the cost of 13,000 suits of armour was not going to be a matter of concern to him afterwards.

It may be worth using an analogy in suggesting why the matter of the armour was not raised in Cyrus' negotiations with his men en route: if an employee complains that his work is dangerous, he is more likely to be conciliated by an increase in pay than by being made a present of the protective clothing he already wears. 'Danger money' is surely the issue at I.4.12.

A particular difficulty is the fact that there is no obvious parallel for Ariaeus' statement at II.5.38 that the property of the King's slaves is the King's.¹⁶ On the other hand, while the word δοῦλος can be used by a Greek author of a person whom a modern reader might just call a subject,¹⁷ it must be regarded as most implausible that it could ever 'mean' subject in anything approaching a neutral sense.¹⁸ The Persians in Aeschylus were trying to 'throw the ζυγὸν...δοῦλον over Hellas' (Pers.50) - and that illustrates what the Greeks thought being subject to the King was: a yoke of slavery. It may be the case that Ariaeus was being particularly crafty and suggesting that because the Greek word describing any subject of the King was δοῦλος, the Greek practice with regard to property of δοῦλου was applicable to a Persian subject (as an ancient historian might

call a Helot a serf then misapply to him some characteristics of feudal serfs). In that case what he said would probably fool the Greeks on the point of Persian custom, but would not affect his statement about the armour having belonged to Cyrus.

At the same period in Sicily, where Dionysius I had made himself tyrant of Syracuse, complicated events were going on. The question of arms and mercenaries here is complicated by the tyrants' practice of confiscating the citizens' own arms.¹⁹ This meant that they had a stock-pile of arms²⁰ which could at least in theory be distributed to mercenaries: in D.S. XIV.10.4 Dionysius I hires a *πληθος* of mercenaries after seizing the citizens' arms. In view especially of his later activity in manufacturing armour, it would be perverse to think that on this occasion he did not give out his stock of arms to the mercenaries.

But earlier Sicilian history should be referred to here. Hermocrates' advice to the Syracusans at Th. VI.72.4 includes the suggestion that the Syracusans' recent defeat could have been avoided if (among other things) armour had been handed out to those who had none: the implication is that even under the democracy Syracuse could (given good management) issue arms to citizens to maximize hoplite strength in the field.²¹

Later Dionysius I instigated a programme of munitions manufacture.²² He intended to prepare an enormous quantity of arms, and missiles of all sorts, and the context makes it explicit that they were for the mercenaries whom he had gathered from many nations:²³ indeed he took steps to ensure that they all had the armour they were used to.²⁴ His barbarian mercenaries cannot necessarily be assumed to have joined him on what Greeks might have considered the usual terms, so the fact of his making armour for them may seem of little significance for present purposes; but the list of the arms made²⁵ not only shows the enormous scale of the programme, but also implies that the bulk of it was concerned with producing

Hellenic arms: there were 140,000 ἀσπίδες, and as many ἐγχειρίδια and περικεφαλαῖαι; then there were 14,000 θώρακες, for the cavalry, the infantry officers, and the mercenary bodyguards. The infantry officers were evidently to have a full Greek panoply, while their followers were to be light-armed. While the θώρακες were to be παντοῦτοι...ταῖς κατασκευαῖς, there is no statement that the other arms were not of a standard pattern. The inference that Dionysius preferred to keep his barbarian mercenaries as his own bodyguard is reasonable, and fits in with D.S. 14.8.4-6, where he hires Campanians when deserted by his other mercenaries.

In any case the largest single part of his army of 80,000²⁶ was certainly the citizen component,²⁷ and doubtless he meant to take their arms away again afterwards - though in the second campaign after the making of the armour a good many Siceliots deserted during the retreat, presumably taking the equipment with them. Evidently Dionysius had an adequate stock of armour in store for some time afterwards: when in 385 he made an alliance with Alcetas the Molossian, he sent him 500 Hellenic panoplies along with the 2,000 soldiers.²⁸ In conclusion: the making of 140,000 sets of arms was clearly intended as a once-only event (Dionysius was planning a big war²⁹ and the trouble taken in collecting skilled workers suggests that, as a very large quantity of equipment indeed must have been made, the figure 140,000 is very likely of the right order for the number made of each item of basic armour). This produced a reserve which was much larger than could be used in one campaign, so that it would seem sensible to conjecture that Dionysius envisaged giving some of it away (not to Syracusans). Such were probably the terms on which he hired men; and he, like Cyrus, was playing for high stakes (invasion of Libya was not unthinkable):³⁰ success against Carthage would make it unnecessary to worry about the cost of arms, failure would only increase the need for as many mercenaries as possible.

Later, in the 350s, Dion's decision to take arms to Syracuse³¹ was influenced by his knowledge that the Syracusans' arms had been confiscated. His 5,000 panoplies were not for mercenaries, but for the unarmed citizens who joined him at the borders of the Syracusan land.³² Plutarch has a different picture, but it makes less sense: he shows Dion leaving his spare armour behind on landing, then having 5,000 ill-armed men whose 'keenness filled up the deficiency of their equipment'.³³

Dionysius II and his men evidently had a centralised organisation of supplies: so the list of his resources at D.S. XVI.9.2 implies. Presumably all his army, citizen and mercenary, was supplied with arms and other χορηγία.

Instances of provision of arms to mercenaries in mainland Greece are less well attested. In 391 Evagoras of Cyprus sent envoys to Athens to ask the state for help and to recruit some mercenaries;³⁴ peltast equipment was provided for the (fairly few) men recruited.³⁵ As this expedition was on a small scale, it is probably not fair to assume that the provision of arms in connection with it is typical of what normally happened in mercenary recruitment.

There is, though, an interesting stratagem in Polyaeus in which Iphicrates deals with some units whose λοχαγοί have turned traitor.³⁶ The fact that Iphicrates seizes the men's armour before driving them out of the camp may (or, again, may not) suggest that the armour was not their own property. It would not be quite adequate to say that they were disarmed in order to prevent them turning traitors as their λοχαγοί had: to make them harmless to his army, Iphicrates need only have taken their offensive weapons, but in fact they left the camp γυμνοί. Parke³⁷ assumes that the armour was their own and that the point of the punishment was (a) to prevent desertion to the enemy, and (b) to prevent mercenaries from soldiering until they could buy new arms. This too is unsatisfactory:

they would have had to travel several hundred miles to find an enemy to desert to.³⁸ The least that can be said is that Iphicrates probably found the confiscated armour useful - the king could surely find some men to wear it - so that the main point of the punishment was that the men were dismissed from the army without the army losing any strength by it.

Another of Polyaeus' strategems says that Alexander gave some of his soldiers half-thoraxes instead of thoraxes.³⁹ This may (or may not) suggest that he had given them the thoraxes in the first place. στρατιῶται could be either Macedonians or mercenaries.

A piece of third century evidence adds a little more to the picture, and is not too far removed from the fourth-century context to be of interest. It points in the same direction as the story of Dion's landing in Sicily.⁴⁰ Archinus of Argos, put in charge of those carrying out a contract to make new armour at the public expense, took the old armour from the citizens ὡς ἀναθήσων τοῖς θεοῖς (in accordance with the people's decision).⁴¹ In sole control of everyone's old armour, he armed ξένους καὶ μετοίκους καὶ ἀτίμους καὶ πένητας, and so seized the tyranny over the Argives. ξένου is a standard word for 'mercenaries', and given the context it does not seem likely that it would here mean simply 'aliens' without the idea of their being professional soldiers. As for the other sorts of people armed by Archinus, they are the groups who would be likely to want to start a revolution; Aeneas Tacticus warns against allowing them to get hold of arms.⁴² The picture the stratagem offers is of Archinus being able to recruit mercenaries (and discontented people from Argos) once he had armour to supply them with.

Epigraphical evidence shows how stocks of matériel were kept at Athens. IG II² 1424a, a long inventory prepared by the treasurers of Athene and the other gods in 371/0, records the continued presence in store of 778 of the 1,000 shields which the banker Pasion gave to the city,⁴³

and mentions stockpiles of other kinds of weapons, mostly in the Chalcothece: 1,433 bronze helmets,⁴⁴ for instance, 626 greaves,⁴⁵ and 250 spear-butt spikes.⁴⁶ Less well-preserved texts from other dates show that the city checked stocks regularly.⁴⁷ But it is difficult to tell what might have been used and what was (for religious or practical reasons) not available.⁴⁸ The 300 panoplies placed in Attic temples by Demosthenes in 425 seem not to be thought of by Thucydides as available:⁴⁹ but the shields given by Lysias to the Athenian Demos in 403 were for immediate use,⁵⁰ and one of the decrees given at the end of the Lives of the Ten Orators, speaking of Lycurgus' achievements, mentions that⁵⁷

χειροτονηθεῖς...ἐπὶ τῆς τοῦ πολέμου παρασκευῆς ὄπλα μὲν πολλὰ καὶ βελῶν μυριάδας πέντε ἀνήνεγκεν εἰς τὴν ἀκρόπολιν, τετρακοσίους δὲ τριήρεις πλωτῆρας κατεσκεύασε...

so that it is clear that in some circumstances stockpiling ὄπλα on the Acropolis could form a normal part of war preparation. Clearly the purpose of collecting it was to hand it out, whether to citizens or to mercenaries.

The conclusion of this section is that there is enough evidence to suggest that persons and states who wanted to raise an army would often prepare to do so by collecting arms and armour, and that when they raised mercenaries they would often - perhaps even usually - provide them with armour. In the next section attention will turn to aspects of the fourth-century practice of mercenary recruitment.

3. Mercenary Leaders

Isocrates was disturbed by the existence of mercenaries:⁵²

τῶν Ἑλλήνων τοῖς τῆς μὲν φωνῆς τῆς ἡμετέρας κοινωνοῦσι, τῶν δὲ τρόπῳ τῶν βαρβάρων χρωμένοις· οὓς, εἰ νοῦν εὔχομεν, οὐκ ἂν περιεωρῶμεν ἀθροισζομένους οὐδ' ὑπὸ τῶν τυχόντων στρατηγουμένους, οὐδὲ μείζους καὶ κρείττους συντάξεις στρατοπέδων γυγνομένας ἐκ τῶν πλανωμένων ἢ τῶν πολιτευομένων.

The way in which these armies were recruited from the wandering people, the Greeks outside the πόλις, will be examined in this section. There are

unfortunately not very many relevant texts.⁵³ Parke quotes one of them at the head of his chapter Other Tyrants and Autocrats:⁵⁴ inappropriately, because the chapter is not at all concerned with the sort of mercenary army and mercenary commander the quotation refers to:⁵⁵

Ἵστε γὰρ δῆπου τοῦθ', ὅτι πάντες οἱ ξεναγοῦντες οὗτοι πόλεις καταλαμβάνοντες Ἑλληνίδας ἄρχειν ζητοῦσι, καὶ πάντων, ὅσοι περ νόμοις οἴκεῖν βούλονται τὴν αὐτῶν ὄντες ἐλεύθεροι, κοινοὶ περιέρχονται κατὰ πᾶσαν χώραν, εἰ δεῖ τάληθές ἐλπεῖν, ἐχθροί.

Demosthenes is characterising Charidemus (the whole speech is against an attempt to pass a decree in his favour) as a mercenary commander of the sort who travel around every land (περιέρχονται κατὰ πᾶσαν χώραν) looking for a city to seize. Parke in his chapter deals in detail with Clearchus of Heraclea and Jason of Pherae, and in a footnote names nine other autocrats, giving references.⁵⁶ Of the eleven, only Charidemus himself definitely answers Demosthenes' description;⁵⁷ the rest are mostly citizens who became tyrants of their own πόλεις, though some, for example Python the Clazomenian,⁵⁸ did so with the help of mercenaries. An exception is Hermias of Atarneus, slave, later partner, eventually heir of a banker who had attacked the places near Atarneus and Assus (ἐπιθεμένῳ τοῦς περὶ Ἀταρνέα καὶ Ἄσσον χωρίους)⁵⁹ and become tyrant. The beginning of this tyranny is hidden, though its end is known.⁶⁰

Nevertheless examples of others besides Charidemus who fitted Demosthenes' description can be found. One such is mentioned in chapter two above: the Pasius who took Paros.⁶¹ The exiles from Siphnos formed only part of his force (συγκατεληφότες δ' ἦσαν τινες τῶν ἡμετέρων φυγάδων τὴν πόλιν), and the speaker's comment that φόμεθα γὰρ μάλιστα ταύτην τὴν νῆσον ἀσφαλῶς ἔχειν makes it almost certain first, that Pasius was not a leader of Parian exiles - specially since presumably the worry that the Siphnian exiles might attack Siphnos was what induced its owners to deposit the money in Paros - and second, that the Parians were not expecting any attack. The brevity of the remarks in the Aegineticus is the only

difficulty which might make it prudent to hesitate before concluding that a mercenary commander could seize a Hellenic city more than forty years before the speech Against Aristocrates was written.⁶²

Some other wandering commanders of mercenaries (though these did not, as far as is known, manage ever to seize a Hellenic city) are attested as having formed part of an Athenian army: inveighing against the prodigality of Chares in the de falsa legatione, Aeschines accuses him of spending the Athenians' money not on the soldiers, but on the 'boastfulnesses of commanders' (ἡγεμόνων ἀλαζονείας).⁶³ The sum of money Aeschines alleges he spent on them is 1,500 talents. A brief description of the commanders in question, Deiares, Deipyros and Polyphontes, follows: δραπέτας ἀνθρώπους ἐκ τῆς Ἑλλάδος συνευλεγμένους. Now, Aeschines surely could not ask an audience to believe that the ἡγεμόνες had been given such an immense amount of money to keep for themselves alone; what he is saying, however, is that Chares had used the three as subcontractors, paying each for the wages of his own followers. This is what the Athenian audience would assume was behind the remark, though some of it would also respond to the implication that Deiares and the rest spent the money on conspicuous consumption and not all on soldiers for Athens. Aeschines goes on to complain about the ἡγεμόνες:

οὐ τοὺς μὲν ταλαιπώρους νησιώτας καθ' ἕκαστον ἐνιαυτὸν ἐξήκοντα τάλαντα εἰσέπραττον σύνταξιν, κατήγον δὲ τὰ πλοῦτα καὶ τοὺς Ἕλληνας ἐκ τῆς κοινῆς θαλάττης · ἀντὶ δὲ ἀξιώματος καὶ τῆς τῶν Ἑλλήνων ἡγεμονίας, ἡ πόλις ἡμῶν τῆς Μυοννήσου καὶ τῆς τῶν ληστῶν δόξης ἀνεπίμπλατο.

The association of these quasi-independent forces with pirates is hardly accidental.⁶⁴ W.K. Pritchett's case in defence of Chares' loyalty to Athens can be accepted readily enough;⁶⁵ but Aeschines' point is that the ἡγεμόνες (not Chares) were responsible for the poor peace terms:⁶⁶

τὴν εἰρήνην τοὺς τῶν ὀπλων ἡγεμόνας, ἀλλὰ μὴ τοὺς πρέσβεις, ἀπαυτεῖτε.

Which Demosthenes, whom Pritchett quotes,⁶⁷ confirms by saying that in his

trials at Athens Chares had been found to have had failures δὲ...τοὺς ἐπὶ χρήμασι λυμαυνομένους - and so (Pritchett rightly infers) had been acquitted. But by condensing Aeschines' description of these officers, quoted above, to 'vagabonds of Hellas' in his translated quotation,⁶⁸ Pritchett has made it seem imprecise, merely a gratuitous insult, and so let slip the point alluded to both by Aeschines and Demosthenes: that Chares had hired wandering commanders (with their followers) and so spent Athens' money on unpopular piratical activities.⁶⁹

Again, while Timotheus was besieging Samos in 365, many mercenaries arrived (and were using up the stores) until the general devised a stratagem to restrict the supply of food to his own soldiers.⁷⁰ Parke comments:⁷¹ 'these were apparently not mercenaries enlisted for his service, but adventurers arrived on speculation'. What seems to have happened is that the news that a military operation was going on attracted men to go and try to join up. This evidence tends to / ^{confirm} that from Aeschines and Isocrates' picture of armies 'coming into existence out of the πλανώμενοι' is an accurate one - even unbidden, the πλανώμενοι turned up for Timotheus' campaign.

So Demosthenes' sketch of the activities of the ξεναγοῦντες is an important part of the context in which Isocrates' remarks to Archidamus about larger armies coming into existence out of the πλανώμενοι than out of the πολυτευόμενοι ought to be interpreted. Pasius and Charidemus seized cities with their mercenary bands. Timotheus was almost overwhelmed with mercenary volunteers at an inconvenient time. Chares took on three wandering ξεναγοῦντες with their troops. The reason why the individual wandering commanders matter so much throughout the fourth century, from the Anabasis onward,⁷² is that groups of mercenaries were closely associated with their own leaders, who commanded more loyalty among them than could the general of the whole army. Parke comments on the incident of Iphicrates

and the two treacherous λοχαγοί at Ace:⁷³ 'it shows...how completely the λόχος was the unit of the mercenary army and how intimately the λοχιται were bound up with their λοχαγός.' Indeed it does. And the degree of loyalty must surely suggest that the smaller unit, with its own leader, had existed longer than the army.

And further light is shed on the expected relationship between mercenary employer and troops hired by a passage in Diodorus.⁷⁴ Sailing to West Greece with Phalaecus, his soldiers expected to see officers (ἡγεμόνες) from the prospective employers on board. As there were none, they became suspicious and joined together to force Phalaecus to take them back to the Peloponnese. The troops' own ἡγεμόνες took the lead in this action (συνίσταντο...μάλισθ' οἱ τὰς ἡγεμονίας ἔχοντες τῶν μισθοφόρων). Later, back in the Peloponnese, these ἡγεμόνες took part with Phalaecus in negotiation with the envoys from Cnossus who engaged the army for a campaign in Crete. It seems a fair conjecture that these ἡγεμόνες may not have been Phocians: after all, the Phocians surrendered to Philip after their mercenary army and Phalaecus had come to terms and withdrawn.⁷⁵ Such a sell-out is more likely to have been done without, than with, the knowledge of any Phocians who had been holding commands in the army. So it is thoroughly plausible to suppose that the ἡγεμόνες who expected to see their future employers' ἡγεμόνες on shipboard with them, were the men who were already the leaders of bodies of mercenaries when they were enrolled during the years when Phocis needed every soldier it could find.⁷⁶

The pattern of recruitment in the cases of Chares' operations, of Iphicrates' muster at Ace and of Phalaecus' Phocian army, then, is of an overall commander having employed already-existing units. Naturally ready-made units of mercenaries could come from inside the cities as well as from outside.⁷⁷ But Isocrates' assertion in the Philippus that it was easier to raise a larger and stronger army from the πλανώμενοι than from

the πολυτευόμενοι cannot be dismissed as mere exaggeration, as the point he goes on in the same section to make about the difference in conditions between 401 and 346 shows:⁷⁸

ἐν ἐκείνοις δὲ τοῖς χρόνοις οὐκ ἦν ξενικὸν οὐδέν, ὥστ' ἀναγκαζόμενοι
ξενολογεῖν ἐκ τῶν πόλεων πλεον ἀνήλισκον εἰς τὰς διδομένας τοῖς
συλλέγουσι δωρεὰς ἢ τὴν εἰς τοὺς στρατιώτας μισθοφορὰν.

Now however, Isocrates asserts, Philip can raise ἐξ ἐτοίμου as many soldiers as he wants. Clearly in fifty-five years there had been an enormous expansion in the number of πλανώμενοι available to take service: clearly it was also preferable to recruit without the overhead costs Cyrus incurred because of having to deal inside the cities. πλανώμενοι charged no commission. Isocrates' evaluation of the situation in 346 is all the more worth thinking about when it is taken into consideration that writing for Philip, he could scarcely include in his reckoning, as potential recruits to the Macedonian side, Phalaecus' 8,000 mercenaries in the Peloponnese.⁷⁹

4. Mercenary Service

What Parke called 'the general circumstance of mercenary service'⁸⁰ must be taken into account in this inquiry with reference to wandering mercenaries. The crucial question is what level of prosperity they could expect to achieve from their wages, and how regularly they could hope to be employed.⁸¹ While employed, ration-money would provide for food needs. Levels of pay have been discussed by Parke and also by Griffith,⁸² but there was certainly less of a depression of mercenary wages in the middle of the century than Parke supposed:⁸³ Demosthenes IV (Philippic I).20 is a text of small importance, as the plan it outlines was not carried out; but on the other hand the fact that the Phocians recruited men at a premium in 355/4, 354/3 and 353/2 (on the last of these occasions Phayllus doubled τοὺς εἰσθότας μισθοῦς, whatever they were) proves that even a fairly modest

recruiting requirement could force wages up considerably, at least for a while.⁸⁴ Assuming with Griffith that the middle of the fourth century was the time of the τετραβόλου βίος mentioned in New Comedy,⁸⁵ this would imply that the level of pay in one army at least was restored for a time to one drachma, and even eight obols, per day. It is certainly most improbable that the four-obol rate attested in Menander represented a rise in daily pay in terms of cash from some lower level.⁸⁶

Both Parke and Griffith take two obols per day as a sort of existence-minimum in the mid-fourth century.⁸⁷ Both state that a larger cash income would have been 'the smallest wage or salary on which a man could reasonably be expected to keep himself alive'⁸⁸ by the end of the century.⁸⁹ Menander Epitrepontes 136-141, however, suggests that two obols was still a possible minimum for subsistence even at the end of the century:

Σμικρίνης	πορνοβόσκῳ δώδεκα τῆς ἡμέρας δραχμᾶς δίδωσι.
Χαιρέστρατος	δέδεκα· πέπυσ]τ' ἀκριβῶς οὔτοσ' ἅ τ' ἀπράγματα.
Σμικρίνης	μηνὸς διατροφὴν ἀνδρὶ καὶ πρὸς ἡμέρων ἕξ.
Χαιρέστρατος	εἴ λελόγισται· δὴ ὀβόλους τῆς ἡμέρας, ἱκανό]ν τι τῷ πεινῶντι <πρὸς> πτισάνην ποτέ.

This is an interesting piece of dialogue, particularly because in addition to the remark 'a man could live 36 days on that' (twelve drachmas: two obols a day), there is the retort 'two obols a day! Enough if a chap only wants barley-gruel' - which gives an idea of purchasing power to add to the two-obol figure which Griffith takes as a base line.⁹⁰ At any rate if one is seeking a bare minimum cash income per person per day for survival in the fourth century there is no need to adjust upwards the figure of two obols.

This calculation indicates how little an employer need have paid by way of σιτηρέσιον. But it is another question what level of prosperity a mercenary's wages (when he received them) could secure. An interesting

but enigmatic piece of evidence bearing on this, comes from the early fourth century. Two brothers, in a speech claiming an inheritance, describe how they took to the soldiering life:⁹¹

Ἐκδόντες τοίνυν τὰς ἀδελφάς, ὧ ἄνδρες, καὶ ὄντες αὐτοὶ ἐν ἡλικίᾳ ἐπὶ τὸ στρατεύεσθαι ἐτραπόμεθα, καὶ ἀπεδημήσαμεν μετὰ Ἴφικράτους εἰς Θράκην· ἐκεῖ δὲ δόξαντές του εὔναι ἄξιου περιποιησάμενοί τι κατεπλεύσαμεν δεῦρο...

At first sight, this would seem to give some support to the expectations of Xenophon's comrades-in-arms that they would bring money home from Cyrus' campaign.⁹² But there are limitations on its usefulness. The brothers were not necessarily serving as common soldiers: contrary to Parke's assertion that 'they had never been well off',⁹³ they had been well off enough to marry their sister into a liturgy-paying family.⁹⁴ Each of the two sisters was given a dowry of 2,000 drachmas.⁹⁵ Thus the brothers may have been able, because of their thoroughly respectable background, to reach a higher-paid rank quickly: perhaps δόξαντές του εὔναι ἄξιου implies that they did. In which case the fact that they came home having made money may well not say anything about the general likelihood of being able to do so.

What seems likely is that one of the brothers subsequently settled at home in Athens, and the other continued in an occupation (probably soldiering) which kept him abroad regularly; but his travel was, in his own word, ἀποδημία: he was back in Athens from time to time.⁹⁶ So though there is extant this piece of fourth-century evidence about the travelling life from the mercenary's own mouth, its unique testimony has to be treated with some caution.

The career of these brothers, then, does not show for the 380s anything contrary to Parke's conclusion for the second half of the century that 'the general rate of pay...is too low to leave any room for doubt that the profession' (sc. the mercenary profession) 'was unremunerative, and had mostly been adopted for want of a better'.⁹⁷ And indeed the

evidence of the Panegyricus of Isocrates supports this extension: published about 380, it deplores the wars and στάσεις among the Greeks which forced many for lack of daily necessities to serve as mercenaries (ἐπικουρεῖν).⁹⁸ Later, in the Philippus, this idea is referred to again by Isocrates, this time in a context which shows still more explicitly that the soldiering life was taken up in default of a sufficient livelihood: 'we', the author argues (undertaking to speak for himself, Philip and the settled peoples of Greece), 'have an obligation to provide the πλανώμενοι with a βίον ἱκανόν, before they become a greater menace than the barbarians.'⁹⁹ This passage refers to πλανώμενοι banding together, as had Isocrates' letter to Archidamus about ten years earlier,¹⁰⁰ so that the definite assumption that the life of mercenaries was not a βίος ἱκανός cannot be thought of only as a response to awareness of the low level of wages, but ought also to be recognised as Isocrates' explanation of why πλανώμενοι tended to form themselves into mercenary (and brigand) units.

There must have been hopes of plunder entertained by some soldiers joining mercenary armies. On some occasions in the fourth century armies took very large quantities of plunder, of which some must have gone to soldiers.¹⁰¹ But, except to naive recruits, such hopes are not likely to have formed a large part of the motive for joining an army.

A very convenient overview of the use made of mercenaries by employers for most of the fourth century can be gained from a look at Parke's Table II.¹⁰² He comments: 'table II...shows that between 399 and 375 B.C. there were never less than 25,000 mercenaries in service, and later the average number must have remained about 50,000. Wherever hired fighters were needed, and however large the demand, they were always forthcoming. Their very abundance created new uses for them.'¹⁰³ This comment stresses a point which has been made here, that mercenaries were ready in organised units before a prospective paymaster came forward; but the steady high

numbers of mercenaries employed conceal the erratic nature of mercenary employment. The sources, as is natural, have much more to say about recruitments of mercenary forces than about their disbandments. Nevertheless the experience of Cyrus' men from Anaxibius' promise of pay to their incorporation in Thibron's army,¹⁰⁴ and the wait of about two years in the Peloponnese which Phalaecus and his men underwent before they were hired by the Cnossians,¹⁰⁵ both illustrate that soldiers could be a long time without an employer. The Cyreians, except on a few occasions when supplies were offered,¹⁰⁶ lived by plundering.¹⁰⁷ Phalaecus' men, Diodorus states, lived on the last of the treasure robbed from Delphi until it ran out, at which time Phalaecus made his plan to sail west:¹⁰⁸ now, Diodorus' source here is thoroughly hostile to the Phocians,¹⁰⁹ so that the possibility that the allegation that there was Delphian treasure available to them during their *πλῆν* is a lie, ought at least to be considered, but it is not prima facie implausible that Philip may have allowed Phalaecus under the *διαλύσεις*¹¹⁰ to leave with money. At any rate most unemployed mercenary units can have had no such resource. Plundering must have been the usual practice.

But Parke's table must be used with some care. The numerical inferences he draws from it are certainly well below the minimum figures for the numbers of mercenaries actually employed, because it is certain that the number of mercenaries kept by employers not on the table, including some small employers, was not negligible. Examples are: Iphicrates' Thracian employer (Seuthes or Cotys),¹¹¹ who may have employed as many as 8,000 soldiers with Iphicrates, if Polyaeus' information is correct;¹¹² Temenus the Rhodian, who nearly seized Teos;¹¹³ and Python the Clazomenian, who succeeded in seizing Clazomenae.¹¹⁴ More important perhaps than a few examples is the fact that Aeneas Tacticus devotes sections of his work to suggesting how city governments should deal with mercenaries not on campaign, but when employed as guards within the walls.¹¹⁵ The scale of

employment by individuals and groups requiring comparatively few soldiers each may well have been fairly large, though the scrappy evidence of the sources makes it impossible to reason to a conclusion about how much the lack of available employment could have affected the life of the wandering units of mercenaries in the years represented by the few relatively blank parts on Parke's table.

But although the number in absolute terms of soldiers employed cannot have dipped very low, room must be left in the picture of the soldiering life for the unemployed-and-wandering mercenary. It would be implausible to suggest that no forces except Xenophon's and Phalaecus' suffered periods without pay; in fact, confirmation of Isocrates' image of *πλανώμενου* 'causing trouble to everyone they may meet'¹¹⁶ can be found in the assumptions lying behind Polyaeus II.30.1: this stratagem describes a debate between Clearchus of Heraclea and the Heracleots, after mercenaries (who, secretly, were organised and paid by Clearchus) had started a nocturnal crime wave in the city (*λωποδυτεῖν, ἀρπάζειν, ὑβρίζειν, τυτρώσκειν*); the terms in which Clearchus presents his suggestion for solving the problem, acknowledge a consciousness that the community has to deal with a mercenary gang from outside - *οὐκ ἄλλως ἔφη δυνατόν εἶναι τὴν ἀπόνοιαν αὐτῶν* (sc. of the mercenaries) *κατασχεῖν, εἰ μή τις αὐτοὺς περιτευχίσειεν*. Not that there were no rascals in Heraclea for Clearchus to hire (surely there were), but hiring mercenaries created in the community a recognisable social problem (which those Heracleots with long memories will have remembered from the visit of the Ten Thousand to Heraclea).¹¹⁷ No suspicion fell on Clearchus as a result of the wave of violence in the night. Surely it is reasonable to infer that harassment of this sort was seen as needing no organiser: a city was all too likely to suffer the attentions of a group of desperate men from outside.

Griffith takes a rather optimistic view of life between periods of employment for a Hellenistic mercenary:¹¹⁸ 'suppose that the war ends after six months and that the recruit has not been killed - he will be discharged with perhaps 180 drachmae for pay, of which he will not have spent more than the half on food ... our imaginary mercenary can now afford to take his ease for six months, or to travel overseas in search of new employment ...' But his scheme depends on the assumptions that the soldier has no family to support,¹¹⁹ and that the soldier will have kept until discharge at least half his gross pay. Griffith uses this example to contend that the pay of mercenaries offered at least as high a standard of living as did the pay of some other wage labourers: his comparisons cannot be examined here, but his fundamental contention that¹²⁰ 'if he' (sc. the mercenary) 'is content to travel about enlisting for short periods as the opportunity appears, the odds are that he will be able to live either comfortably all the time or riotously in short bursts' is surely rather sanguine: in the Hellenistic Age, and a fortiori in the fourth century, a mercenary's wages, if spread out over periods of unemployment (with a carefulness which far from all soldiers would use), were worth so little (if any) more than the subsistence-minimum that nobody can have lived comfortably on them. Lived on barley-gruel, perhaps.

Examining the soldiering life with reference to *πλανώμενου*, then, leads to two main conclusions: first, that Isocrates was right in saying that the wanderers were banding together: and that units of wandering mercenaries, when recruited into large armies, had an important influence on the course of events in some cases; and second, that the rate of pay for mercenary soldiers was consistently low (though subject to less fluctuation than has sometimes been thought) and that prospects of employment were not always certain. Life without employment was (once any saved-up money was gone) a choice between beggary and banditry - or more likely a

mixture of the two, such as the Cyreians used. When a very significant part of the sum of Greek professional soldiers was homeless, it is not surprising that Demosthenes needed to use his persuasive powers in his first speech to the Athenian Assembly when he wished to assure his hearers that the King's wealth would not buy him Hellenes to campaign against Hellas;¹²¹ and when mercenary service, the way to break out of 'the existing poverty',¹²² was itself a very poor way of life, it is not surprising that Isocrates hoped for 'a man of high ambition and a philhellene' to release the ξενυτευόμενοι from 'the troubles which they have and provide to others'.¹²³

Notes

1. See above, pp. 18-43.
 2. See above, p. 28 and n.51.
 3. Fuks, p.29 n.46.
 4. Parke, pp.43-48.
 5. Xenophon Anabasis VII.2.3.
 6. Isocrates Antidosis 115: Τιμόθεος δ' οὔτε...οὔτ' ἐν τοῖς στρατοπέδοις τοῖς πλανωμένοις κατατετριμμένος...
 7. Xenophon Anabasis VI.4.8. Roy, p.245 and n.39, disputes whether ἄνδρας ἄγοντες can mean 'bringing slaves' (as Parke, p.29, renders it). Certainly ἀνήρ is an odd word to use of a slave; but, as Roy concedes, Xenophon is professedly speaking about the soldiers generally in this passage. It does not serve his rhetorical purpose to point out that some members of the army had recruited others. This could not strengthen his suggestion that the soldiers were mostly respectable Greeks. More the reverse. Parke is probably right, despite the difficulty.
 8. Isocrates Panegyricus 146.
 9. Parke, p.29. G.T. Griffith, too, accepts this picture (if cautiously): Griffith, p.3.
 10. Cf. above, p.24 and n.30.
 11. Griffith does not raise the question (the point at which he might have done so is probably the introduction, pp.1-7), and Parke seems to assume that mercenaries owned their equipment (see below, pp. 152-153 and n.37).
- Roy, p.310, discusses ownership of arms in Cyrus' army (without discussing Xen. Anab II.5.38 (cf. below, p.148 and n.14)) and concludes, on the ground of a general doubt whether Arcadia could supply 4,000 hoplite mercenaries and Achaea 2,000, that Cyrus had probably supplied equipment. He does not attempt to generalise to other mercenary forces.
12. See the Appendix below, especially pp. 337-338.

13. Xen. Anab. II.5.31-37.

14. Xen. Anab. II.5.38.

15. In the context of the uniformity of equipment in Cyrus' army it is worth adding that peltasts were probably not much different from γυμνήτες at the time of the Anabasis. It seems fair to think that I.8.4-5 would be best interpreted as picturing a combined light division: both Clearchus' peltasts (300 - I.2.3. and I.4.7) and Proxenus' (500 - I.2.3). If the γυμνήτες were with Proxenus' main body, they would have to be in the hoplite line. Surely it is easier to understand them being employed together with the thousand Paphlagonian cavalry. If so, then the whole light division is called the πελταστικόν. The objection that the separation of Proxenus from his light troops is not mentioned is worth little: neither is the separation of Clearchus from his light troops made explicit. And given the standard equipment in I.2.16, the difference between peltasts and γυμνήτες may only have consisted in what sorts of spears and swords they had.

Γυμνήτες, in spite of Hdt.IX.63, were not necessarily quite without armour (Xen. Cyrop. I.2.4). In later Greek authors the word was flexible enough to use of Roman light-armed troops (Plut. Titus Flamininus 4.4; Aemilius 16.5); πελταστικόν might perhaps seem more technical. The connection with slingers mentioned by Hesychius (s.v. γυμνήτες; cf. also D.S. V.17, Strabo III.5.1 (=254) and Arist Mir. 837a30) is certainly not applicable in the context of Xenophon Anabasis, where the γυμνήτες are definitely Greeks (I.2.3). Suda, s.v. Γυμνήτες is a confusing passage: τάξις πεζῶν is as expected and Xenophon's name is mentioned (as an author who uses the word), but later the sentence λέγεται καὶ γυμνής, γυμνήτος, ὀπίτου comes in. It is perhaps best ignored. Other references: Tyrtaeus 8.35 (11.35); Thucydides VII.37; Hell. Oxy.6.6; Eu. Phoenissae 147; Xen. Anab. IV.1.28. There is no suggestion of a definite technical

meaning for γυμνῆς which would distinguish it from πελταστής.

16. Mr. D.M. Lewis has stressed this difficulty in conversation and per epistulas. Cook, p.132, by contrast, says 'all men under the King's rule are his slaves, so he had power of life and death. All property was at his disposal'; but he offers no references to support the last proposition.

17. Cook, p.132 n.3. comments: 'the Greeks used the word "doulos" (slave) frequently in this context... Darius uses the word "bandaka" (bondsmen) of his generals and satraps. The treaty with Evagoras of Salamis about 380 B.C. turned on the question whether he was to be called the slave of Artaxerxes II or a King vis-a-vis his suzerain...'

18. Hence the distinction made between two meanings by J.E. Powell in A Lexicon to Herodotus (Oxford, 1938), s.v. δοῦλος, is misleading.

19. D.S. XIV.10.4; XVI.10.1.

20. D.S. XVI.9.2.

21. Consider also Dionysius' actions during his rise to power at D.S. XIII.96.1 (406).

22. D.S. XIV.41.3-4 and 42.2-3. cf. Agesilaus' armaments programme at Ephesus in 395 (Xen. Hell. III.4.17).

23. D.S. XIV.41.4.

24. D.S. XIV.41.5.

25. D.S. XIV.43.2.

26. D.S. XIV.47.7.

27. D.S. XIV.47.4.

28. D.S. XV.13.2.

29. D.S. XIV.41.2.

30. D.S. XX.3.3.

31. D.S. XVI.6.5-10; and Plut. Dion 25.1-27.3.

32. Plut. Dion 10.1 and 3.

33. Plut. Dion 26.2 and 27.3.
34. Lysias XIX (Aristophanes).21 and 43; add Xen. Hell. IV.8.24.
35. Lysias XIX (Aristophanes).43. Few enough to be transported in ten ships which they were (probably) not rowing. Perhaps 200 would be a sensible guess. The situation is not perfectly clear from the sources and it might be possible to think of the Athenians giving bare hulls to the envoys and leaving them to fill them. It is not possible to discuss the point closely here, but this alternative appears unlikely.
36. Polyaeus III.9.56. (374 B.C.).
37. Parke, pp.105-106.
38. D.S. XV.41.4.
39. Polyaeus IV.3.13.
40. See above, p. 152.
41. Polyaeus IV.8 (266-263 B.C.).
42. Aen. Tact. 30.1.
43. IG II² 1424a lines 128-129 and 139-140. Cf. APF p.435.
44. IG II² 1424a line 133.
45. IG II² 1424a line 134.
46. IG II² 1424a line 384.
47. For example IG II² 1455 (340s) and IG II² 1469B (320s).
48. Here cf. W.K. Pritchett The Greek State at War III (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1979), pp.240-295. The distinction was clear at the time - it was usual to take the handles off dedicated shields to make them useless:
Ar. Knights 846-859.
49. Thuc. III.114.1.
50. See APF p.589.
51. [Plut.] Mor. 852C (the whole decree, in response to the claim of Lycophron son of Lycurgus for σύτησις ἐν Πρωτανείῳ, runs from 851E to 852E). It is worth noting here that M.I. Finley (The Use and Abuse of History (London, 1975), pp.116-167 cf. n.10) argues (commenting that there is no

specific evidence on the point) that arms were probably given to Spartiates as a public provision: perioeci, he suggests, made the munitions - and he thinks it more likely that the state procured and distributed these than that the Spartiates obtained them individually for payment in kind.

52. Isocrates Ep. 9(Archidamus).8-9.

53. Xenophon Anabasis is of course a relevant text, but not typical of later practice. Cyrus began by instructing garrison-commanders in the cities he controlled to recruit as many Peloponnesians as possible for him (Xen. Anab. I.1.6) (Cf. Roy, pp.296-299). However, a feature which will be stressed below (pp.157-159) was present in Cyrus' army, that is, the importance of the separate contingents with their own commanders: on which see Roy, pp.287-296.

54. Parke, p.97.

55. Demosthenes 23(Aristocrates).139.

56. Clearchus, Parke, pp.97-100; Jason, pp.100-104. The other nine, p.100 n.1.

H. Berve Die Tyrannis bei den Griechen (Munich 1967), pp.373-379, makes reflective comments on the historical function of fourth-century tyranny, including one (pp.373-374) on how the tyrants, by fighting wars with their own mercenaries and promoting scientific and technical achievements increased the size of the area in which the government looked after the material prosperity of a state. He connects this extension of the responsibilities of government with a tendency for private concerns to matter more in Greek society in the fourth century than earlier, and for citizens to be disinclined to do military service.

57. Demosthenes 23(Aristocrates).154 shows Charidemus seizing Scepsis, Cebren and Ilium. Cf. Parke, pp.128-129.

58. Aeneas Tacticus 28.5 - his seizure of the gates, with ξένου hidden near the city. He also had confederates in the city.

59. Strabo XIII.1.57.
60. D.S. XVI.52 (cf. also Didymus cols. 4-6). Mentor, Artaxerxes' general, ousted Hermias from control of the many fortresses and cities (πολλῶν ὀχυρωμάτων καὶ πόλεων) he was by then controlling. W. Leaf in his presidential address On a Commercial History of Greece to the Hellenic Society (JHS 35 (1915), pp.161-172) took the phrase Ἑρμίας καὶ οἱ ἑταῖροι preserved in Tod II.165 to refer to Hermias' business partners ('Hermias and Company, Bankers and Despots' - p.169), though Tod ad loc. is more down-to-earth ('probably his chief officers'). A point worth noting is that Hermias had the resource an employer of mercenaries needed most: money.
61. See above, pp. 20-21.
62. Pasius took Paros before the speaker and the others went to Melos. They, in turn, had left Melos presumably before Conon arrived there. This makes 394 a likely year for Pasius' conquest.
63. Aeschines 2(Embassy).71-72.
64. Cf. below, pp.184-196.
65. Pritchett, pp.77-85.
66. Aeschines 2(Embassy).73.
67. Pritchett, p.82.
68. Pritchett, p.83. δραπέτας ἀνθρώπους ἐκ τῆς Ἑλλάδος συνευλεγμένους means 'wandering men collected together out of Greece'; 'vagabonds of Hellas', as a translation, represents a considerable sacrifice of accuracy for the sake of brevity.
69. J. Cargill The Second Athenian League (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1981) makes a series of brief comments on Chares (pp.2,181,185 and 194) in which the failure of the Athenians to win the Social War is blamed on him and his exceptionally bad generalship: but Chares' career is not regarded as an unique phenomenon (p.185).

70. Polyaeus III.10.10.

71. Parke, p.108.

72. The part of the army which followed Xenophon when the army split into three at Xenophon Anabasis VI.2.16 did so in spite of the τοῦ παντός ἀρχή of Cheirisophus. The solidarity between the Arcadians and Achaeans, by contrast, was ethnic: they chose new στρατηγοί.

73. Parke, p.106.

74. D.S. XVI.62.1-3.

75. D.S. XVI.59.3.

76. I.e. 355-352: D.S. XVI.24.2; 25.1; 28.1; 30.1; 32.4; 36.1.

77. Aeneas Tacticus 22.29 (a difficult passage) shows how a πρόξενος could be involved in dealings concerning a contract to guard city-walls. What seems to be envisaged is that guards would have been hired as a unit from a city, whose πρόξενος in the hiring city would take responsibility for them.

78. Isocrates Ep. 9(Archidamus).8-9. Cf. above, p.154 and n.52.

79. D.S. XVI.59.3. A few years later in Ep. II (Philip I).19, Isocrates recommends Philip not to hire τὰ τῶν ξενιτευομένων στρατόπεδα; (ξενιτευόμενοι is equivalent to 'wandering mercenaries': cf. Isocrates Philippus 122) but there he suggests that Philip might try to get an alliance with Athens instead (which would save him paying wages): not that he should hire mercenaries in the πόλεις.

80. Parke, ch. XXII; pp.227-238.

81. Wages in this section denote money given for pay as distinct from money given for buying supplies on campaign. W.K. Pritchett's work (The Greek State at War I (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1974) pp.3-52, esp. pp.40-41) has established that payment of rations in kind was exceptional from the time in the fifth century when μισθός was introduced (p.40) - though the cases he cites are nearly all of citizen armies, there is no reason to postulate a general difference of practice between citizen and mercenary

armies on this point - and he makes the point that a soldier had to receive his siteresion in order to live (p.41). This must be of general application.

82. Parke, pp.231-234; Griffith, pp.294-297.

83. Parke, p.232: 'Demosthenes believed he could actually find mercenaries to serve for 2 obols a day' (sc. in 350-349). Griffith, p.297: 'between 400 and 350 B.C. the rate has fallen, perhaps as much as from 8 to 4, and certainly as much as from 7 to 5 or 6 obols', is surely more likely to be right.

84. D.S. XVI.25.1 (355/4): τοὺς μισθοὺς καὶ ποιήσας ἡμιολίους; D.S. XVI.30.1 (354/3): ὑποστησαμένου δ' αὐτοῦ τοῖς ξένους μισθοὺς ἡμιολίους
D.S. XVI.36.1 (353/2): διπλασιάσας τοὺς εἰωθότας μισθοὺς. On the first of these occasions Philomelus gathered 'no less than five thousand soldiers' - including the Phocians themselves, though. This is not an enormous number, comparatively; though the size of the army had been increased by the time of the battle of the Crocus Field to 10,000 or more (cf. Parke, p.137).

85. Griffith, p.308.

86. Parke, p.233. Menander Perikeiromene 380 and Fragment 297 (Koerte).

87. Griffith, p.308; Parke, p.232.

88. Griffith, p.308.

89. Griffith, p.309: 'the man who could ... live on two obols a day in 340 B.C. would require more money in 300 B.C. to produce an equal standard of life'. Parke, p.233.

90. Griffith, pp.308-309.

91. Isaeus 2(Menecles).6.

92. Xenophon Anabasis VI.4.8.

93. Parke, p.232.

94. Isaeus 2(Menecles).42; and cf. APF, p.xxiii.

95. Isaeus 2(Menecles).3 and 5.

96. Some time after the brothers' return from their first period abroad, Menecles offered to adopt one of them. The speaker's brother answered (Isaeus 2(Menecles).12): "έμοι μὲν οὖν ... συμβαίνει ἀποδημία, ὡς σὺ οἶσθα · ὁ δ' ἀδελφὸς οὐτοσί ... τῶν τε σῶν ἐπιμελήσεται καὶ τῶν ἐμῶν, ἐὰν βούλη τοῦτον ποιήσασθαι."
97. Parke, p.233.
98. Isocrates Panegyricus 168.
99. Isocrates Philippus 121.
100. Cf. above, p.154.
101. W.K. Pritchett The Greek State at War I (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1974), pp.53-84 sums up available evidence on booty. The section on distribution of booty (pp.82-84) does not have much to say on the particular point of distribution of booty among mercenary armies.
102. Bound in at the end of the book.
103. Parke, p.227.
104. Xenophon Anabasis VI.1.16 - VII.8.24.
105. The two-year wait: H.D. Westlake 'Phalaecus and Timoleon', CQ 34 (1940), pp.44-46. Hired by the Cnossians: D.S. XVI.62.3. Westlake says (p.44): 'they can scarcely have been transported to Crete later than the autumn of 344.'
106. E.g. Xenophon Anabasis VI.2.3-4.
107. E.g. Xenophon Anabasis VI.5.7; 6.5; 6.38. Defending his collaboration with Seuthes, Xenophon argues that though deprived of pay, the soldiers have at least had a winter ἐν ἀφθόνοισι τοῖς ἐπιτηδείοις (VII.6.30-32). A third-century Samian inscription shows that some soldiers may have sought more respectable occupations while unemployed than plundering. It disqualifies slaves, soldiers, time-expired soldiers and temple suppliants from acting as traders (κάπηλοι) in the market at the temple of Hera (C. Habicht 'Hellenistische Inschriften aus dem Heraion von Samos' Ath. Mitt. 87 (1972), pp.191-228 no.9 at pp.210-212).

108. D.S. XVI.61.3-4 and cf. above, pp.
109. N.G.L. Hammond argues persuasively that this source is Demophilus' monograph on the Sacred war ('The Sources of Diodorous Siculus XVI: I: The Macedonian, Greek and Persian Narrative' CQ 31 (1937), pp.79-91, esp. pp.82-85). It is hard to understand his assertion that the tome of this monograph is 'a blend of piety and impartiality' (p.83). His own account of it shows its anti-Phocian character. As Parke wrote (Parke, p.136): 'bias' (sc. of the authors of the ancient narratives of the Sacred war) 'is intelligible; but it is strange to find its echo in a modern historian'.
110. D.S. XVI.59.2.
111. Parke, p.55 sums up the evidence on this point.
112. Polyaeus III.9.46. Parke, p.56 n.1 gives this reference and comments: 'certainly a high figure if correct'; but, as it is not included in Table II, presumably Parke's opinion is that it is probably not correct.
113. Aeneas Tacticus 18.13-19 is the only record of this incident.
114. Aeneas Tacticus 28.5 is the only record of this incident.
115. See Aeneas Tacticus 13; 22.26-29; 24.1-3.
116. Isocrates Philippus 120.
117. Xenophon Anabasis VI.2.4-8.
118. Griffith, pp.310-311.
119. Griffith, p.311: 'he may have to forgo the pleasures of a legal wife and legitimate children.' (this rather overlooks the fact that a concubine and illegitimate children would cost as much to support).
120. Ibid.
121. Demosthenes 14(Navy-Boards).31.
122. Ibid.
123. Isocrates Philippus 122.

Chapter 5 - Λησταιΐ

1. Introductory

It has been argued above that as the movement towards use of mercenary armies gained strength, there were unemployed and wandering mercenaries about in Greece.¹ In this chapter it will be suggested first, that ληστεΐα (which may as well be rendered as 'piracy' until the word's content is discussed) became more common, and so more of a social problem, in Greece in the fourth century, and second, that its growth was concomitant with the growth of mercenary service because the same sorts of people were engaged in both activities (respectively, or successively).

Establishing these suggestions will involve giving an overview of fourth-century ληστεΐα. To put this view in perspective, the chapter begins by focusing on three key aspects of fifth-century and earlier ληστεΐα - outlining the antecedents of later events - then turns to consideration of what meaning is conveyed by ληστής and cognates in literature dealing with the classical period.

2. Before the Fourth Century

These key aspects of earlier ληστεΐα represent areas for comparison with fourth-century events and trends. They are as follows: first, the importance of raids on land from the sea; second, instances of communities settling in places to raid them; and third, the nature of λησταιΐ as persons independent of control by a πόλις.

A. Raids on land from the sea

In Th. I.4-7 these are treated as the primary kind of ληστεΐα. Communities, under the leadership of 'not the least powerful men',² attacked unwallled cities, inhabited as villages, and made most of their living from it. This was what Minos put a stop to.³ It was also the reason for

founding cities inland:⁴ the coasts were liable to be attacked.

Hdt. II.152.4, dealing with the revolt of Psammetichus in Egypt in the seventh century, describes the arrival of the 'bronze men', the Ionian and Carian hoplites, who later fought for Psammetichus. They came from the sea into Egypt κατὰ ληΐην. This is an early example of mercenaries being demonstrably the same people as λησται.

Raids from the sea were an important feature of the Peloponnesian war, and were undertaken both by armies and by parties of exiles. At an early stage in the war, the Athenians fortified Atalante, a formerly empty island, as a προύριον against the λησται from Opus who were attacking Euboea.⁵ Conversely, the capture of Cythera by the Athenians was a serious blow to the Spartans, not only because the opportunity of attacking merchant shipping from Egypt and Libya, which the κυθηροδόλης and his hoplites had formerly enjoyed, was now denied, but also because the presence of Spartan forces on the island before the Athenians captured it had limited the extent to which Laconica could be attacked from the sea by λησται;⁶ it seems right to infer that the Spartans could expect others to follow the example given by Nicias and the Athenian navy.⁷ At III.85.2 the oligarchic Corcyreans set up on the mainland opposite Corcyra and ἐλήζοντο τοὺς ἐν τῇ νήσῳ καὶ πολλὰ ἔβλαπτον; soon, though, they were able to come back to the island (III.85.3).

B. Communities settling in places to raid them

Pylos, as well as Cythera, became a base for Athenian attacks on Spartan territory⁸ - which was what the Spartans had expected since the fall of Cythera, and had prepared for by sending squads of hoplites to guard the countryside.⁹ Later, too, the Athenians - specifically Demosthenes - took a 'sort of isthmus' (ἰσθμῶδες τε χωρίον) in Laconice to use as a base for raiding.¹⁰ Both sides in the war were able to encourage communities of exiles to settle and raid their mother cities: Athens supported the

Messenians and Helots at Pylos¹¹ (and the Megarians at Pegae served Athenian interests by invading Megara twice a year¹²); Sparta supported the Samians at Anaea.¹³ But there is evidence in Thucydides' narrative for some more independent settlements: Zancle in Sicily was first founded by λησται who arrived there¹⁴ - in the same way later Dionysius of Phocaea settled in Sicily, escaping after the Ionian revolt, and attacked Carthaginians and Tyrseni, but not Greeks;¹⁵ and the raiding by land and sea carried out (with barbarian help) by the Epidamnian oligarchs¹⁶ was certainly the same sort of harassment-by-exiles later encouraged by both sides in the Peloponnesian war. This activity was as common as it was because of the prevalence of στάσις, noted by Thucydides at III.82.

C. λησται as persons independent of control by a πόλις

Thucydides implies that it was not respectable in his day to be a ληστής.¹⁷ But sometimes λησται could expect the authorities in their πόλεις to allow them to carry on their activities: at Thucydides IV.67.3 the Megarians who were conspiring to betray the city to the Athenians are recorded to have got permission to move a boat in and out of the city ως λησται - on the ground that they were raiders. Similarly Nicias thought (though he was mistaken) that Gylippus had come west not to help Syracuse, but for ληστεία:¹⁸

ὁ δὲ Νικίας πυθόμενος αὐτὸν προσπλέοντα ὑπερεῖδε τὸ πλῆθος τῶν νεῶν, ὅπερ καὶ οἱ θούριοι ἔπαθον, καὶ ληστικώτερον ἔδοξε παρασκευασμένους πλεῖν, καὶ οὐδεμίαν φυλακὴν πω ἐποιεῖτο.

The fact that Nicias maintained no φυλακή indicates that he did not expect Gylippus to attack his forces. That neither the Megarians nor Gylippus were λησται does not affect the conclusion: the expectations of the observers are an adequate gauge of what was normal practice. The Megarians' activities must have been presumed to be against coastal areas: a boat small enough to be carried into the city would hardly be large enough or fast enough to attack a ship.

Nicias presumably expected Gylippus to carry on the raiding which the Spartans had made part of their strategy: the capture of Minoa, an island off Megara, relieved Athens of Peloponnesian raiding from it. He cannot have expected his forces to be the victims of this raiding, at least initially. Earlier the Athenians had taken measures to prevent τὸ ληστικὸν τῶν Πελοποννησίων from interrupting the transport of cargo ships to Athens.²⁰

Themistocles and Cimon had both acted against piracy,²¹ taking up the task begun by Minos²² and undertaken later by the Corinthians.²³ Most of the λησται active during the Peloponnesian war were exiles acting against their native lands, and the only independent λησται who seem not to have been exiles are those attested at Th. II.32. Most of these exiles were encouraged by one side or other in the war (in fact, F.M. Cornford seems right to say (Thucydides Mythistoricus (London, 1907), p.93) that the Messenians in the triacontar at Thucydides IV.9.1 were simply acting as allies of Athens), so that it must be inferred that the years when Athenian sea power was at its height were the years when the sea was kept clear of λησται other than exiles attacking their own lands (and Th. III.82 shows that there will have been fewer even of these before the war) and kept clear by Athens alone: the fact that the speaker of [Dem]. 7(Halonnesus) objects to the idea that anyone else need guard the seas (§14) adds weight to A.B. Bosworth's argument that Plut. Pericles 17 must be based on a fourth-century forgery (see below, n.198). This is the most striking difference between the λησται of the fifth century and those of the fourth: that in the fourth century there was a strong element outside the protection of any of the states. The most striking similarity, on the other hand, is the prevalence in both cases of raids on the land: not that it is possible to quantify, numerically at least, but because throughout Thucydides (and specially in I.4-7, dealing with

prehistory) ληστής is better rendered into English as 'raider' than as 'pirate'.

3. ληστής: Interpretation

'Raider' is indeed almost always a good translation of ληστής, in fourth century contexts as well as earlier contexts. It does not always have an outlaw connotation. It can be used of people sent out by armies to ravage the land. This is its almost exclusive meaning in Xenophon Hellenica: (a) at II.4.26, where λησταί are foragers organised by the Peiraeus party in 404/3; (b) at III.4.19, although the authors of two modern works on ancient piracy have taken the passage as referring to pirates: Agesilaus (in 395) was prepared to make a point by having barbarians sold naked, but it stretches credulity to suggest that he, a Spartan king, had turned trader and bought from pirates the barbarians his heralds were to sell: much more likely, surely, that the barbarians were taken by Lacedaemonian raiding-parties;²⁴ (c) at IV.8.35, where (in 389) ...Ἀναξίβουλος καὶ Ἴφικράτης ληστὰς διαπέμποντες ἐπολέμουν ἀλλήλους..; (d) at V.1.1, where Eteonicus in Aegina ἐφύησε λήξεσθαι τὸν βουλόμενον ἐκ τῆς Ἀττικῆς: this clearly refers principally to Aeginetans (under the protection of his army), but falls into the picture of pillage authorised by armies - it continued for two years until the peace of Antalcidas (V.1.29), and seems to have resumed after the battle of Alyzeia (VI.2.1, cf. V.4.61-66); (e) at V.4.42, where (in 378)ὁ Φουβύδας ἐκπέμπων μὲν ληστήρια ἔφερε καὶ ἤγε τοὺς θηβαίους....; and (f) at VI.4.35, where Alexander of Pherae is described as ...ἄδικος...ληστής καὶ κατὰ γῆν καὶ κατὰ θάλατταν, implying that as tagus of Thessaly he organised and led raids. Theopompus the Milesian ληστής, on the other hand, appears from II.1.30 to have been an independent operator, working for Lysander in a trusted capacity (taking the news of Aegospotami back to Sparta): unless, indeed, Xenophon

misunderstood something, and 'Theopompus the Milesian ληστής' is Theopompus the Melian admiral, whose statue later stood at Delphi.²⁵

Modern books on ancient piracy have used the differing emphases which the flexibility of the term ληστής allows. H.A. Ormerod makes the sea the centre of his enquiry, sub-titling his book An Essay in Mediterranean History, and arguing at the beginning of the first chapter that 'the earliest literature of Greece shows us the Homeric pirate pursuing a mode of life at sea almost identical with that of the Frankish corsairs':²⁶ he wishes to show that piracy had a continuous effect on Mediterranean life.²⁷ E. Ziebarth's purpose is to make deductions about trade from the evidence available about robbery at sea, so that he says 'wo aber für den Anfang die Geschichte des Handels fehlt, beweist der blühende Seeraub das Bestehen des Seeverkehrs und des Handels', and 'unsere Darstellung will vielmehr für die historisch greifbare Zeit den griechischen Seehandel in seinem Verhältnis zum Seeraub, d.h. in seiner Abhängigkeit vom Seeraub, schildern und gibt mit der Geschichte des Seeraubs zugleich ein Stück der griechischen Handelsgeschichte.'²⁸ He can therefore regard any activity which made the seas unsafe as legitimate material for his chapters on Seeraub, including the hijackings of cargoes by states which will be mentioned in the last section of this chapter,²⁹ but are related only indirectly to the activities of the λησταί mainly under discussion here.

There were pirates in the Aegean throughout the fourth century. In the Panegyricus, in a passage arguing that the ἀρχή of Athens was preferable to the state of Greece after the peace of Antalcidas, Isocrates asks³⁰

τίς γὰρ ἂν τοιαύτης καταστάσεως ἐπιθυμήσειεν, ἐν ἣ καταποντισταὶ μὲν τὴν θάλατταν κατέχουσι, πελτασταὶ δὲ τὰς πόλεις καταλαμβάνουσιν;

(and adds further comments on the contemporary state of Greece). Lack of

evidence to confirm this statement may make it possible to argue that it was an exaggeration in 380 (or thereabouts) when Isocrates wrote it; but things were moving in that direction, and the pirates were certainly very strong later in the century.³¹ For brigandage on land there is very little evidence. The outstanding instance is that of the Chian exiles at Atarneus in the early 390s. They were setting out from Atarneus and plundering Ionia. Dercylidas besieged them until they surrendered, then left Dracon of Pellene as ἐπιμελητής.³² At the other end of the fourth century Syll.³ 363, from Ephesus and dated about 297, shows the Ephesians helping with arms and money some Prienians who were living in a χάραξ - a fortified place - outside Priene after the battle of Ipsus. They offer in the decree (lines 9 and 15-16) to sell Ephesian citizenship to those of these Prienians who are free and born of free parents. It is easy to understand the whole decree as a move to bring the exiled Prienians under more direct Ephesian control.

Other evidence relates to soldiers: the crimes committed at Heraclea by the mercenaries hired secretly by Clearchus did not give rise to the suspicion that anyone was organising them, and so may suggest that mercenaries were likely sometimes to cause a problem of this sort when unemployed;³³ and when Antigonos I wintered in Cappadocia in 320/19, three thousand Macedonian hoplites deserted him, seized strong hills, and were plundering Lycaonia and Phrygia.³⁴ Polyaeus does not suggest that Antigonos minded their plundering the countryside: but he was worried that they might join the enemies. The brief narrative does not make it explicit why the soldiers turned to brigandage in this way: they were not led by a strong character (when Antigonos sent Leonidas to them they made him general) and there is no suggestion of a shortage of provisions or pay. That Antigonos allowed them to go to Macedonia, when he had cornered them and seized Holcias and two of the ringleaders of the ἀπόστασις, may perhaps suggest that their

main motive was to get away from further army service. In any case the incident is unique.

The explanation, which will be elaborated below,³⁵ of the prevalence of ληστεύα by sea and its absence on land, is (with all possible simplification) that pirates were mercenaries, and mercenaries pirates. As a reviewer of Ormerod's book wrote, 'from the fourth century they ' [sc. ancient governments] 'relied largely on mercenary soldiers, who between the land campaigns took to the water like a crocodile.'³⁶ Mercenary armies when without an employer lived by plundering.³⁷ So must the smaller mercenary units, from which some of the armies were formed, have done.³⁸

The conclusion of this section is that the ancient evidence will be best served by rendering ληστής as 'raider'. It should be borne in mind that does not by itself imply outlaw status (as the English 'pirate' does); and it is in general the case that most λησταί mentioned in the literary and epigraphic sources for the fourth century operated at sea. One text which is awkward to reconcile with this argument ought to be quoted here, though:³⁹

... καὶ ληστής ὁ μὲν ἐν ἠπείρῳ, πειρατής δὲ ὁ ἐν θαλάσῃ ...

This statement from the Suda, making a distinction between ληστής and πειρατής (a word which appeared in the fourth century), does not reflect the facts of word usage in the Classical period. Ormerod shows that ληστής continued, after the appearance of the word πειρατής, to be used in a sense translatable by the English 'pirate'.⁴⁰ It would not be wise to attach much importance to this part of the Suda definition.⁴¹

4. How λησταί lived

Modern authors have tended to assume that ancient pirates lived by raiding ships at sea. Ormerod's statements 'it goes without saying that the seamanship of pirates was of the highest order' and 'when inexperienced

landsmen took to piracy, their end was swift' are conditioned by this assumption.⁴² But the assumption is to a large extent misled and misleading. Partly, indeed, for the reason set out by Y. Garlan, who comments that 'isoler la piraterie (sur mer) du brigandage (sur terre), c'est ... rompre l'unité d'un seul et même phénomène historique';⁴³ but having gone so far, Garlan turns to another point. It is necessary to go further: pirates lived by raiding the land, more than by raiding ships at sea. This can be confirmed by looking in two directions: first, at the local effect of a well-documented infestation of pirates; and second, at what measures people in coastal areas took which can be treated as implying a need to protect themselves against attack from the sea.

The local argument concerns the north Aegean area. Between 346 and 338 Philip of Macedon and the Athenians were in conflict there: the 'peace' in the earlier part of the period was not very different from the war at the end of it,⁴⁴ so that similar conditions seem to have prevailed for the whole eight years. It was a period when λησται were very active. They attacked both Athenians and Macedonians; but Demosthenes argues, in the Embassy speech and again in the speech on the Crown, that Philip suffered from piratical attacks in these years much worse than did the Athenians. At the outset, he contends, Philip was⁴⁵

τῆς εἰρήνης ἐπιθυμῶν, διαφορουμένης αὐτοῦ τῆς χώρας ὑπὸ τῶν
ληστῶν καὶ κεκλειμένων τῶν ἐμπορίων

and much later, referring to the war of Chaeronea, Demosthenes comments on Philip that⁴⁶

καίπερ ἀθλίως καὶ κακῶς τῶν στρατηγῶν τῶν ὑμετέρων πολεμούντων
αὐτῷ, ὅμως ὑπ' αὐτοῦ τοῦ πολέμου καὶ τῶν ληστῶν μυρὶ ἔπασχεν κακά.

and in fact he claims it as an advantage of his (unsuccessful) policy that it resulted in peace in Attica throughout the war of Chaeronea, instead of the pirates ravaging from Euboea. Maintenance of power at sea kept Athens safe: loss of control of Euboea to Philip would have given Demosthenes' accusers the chance to complain that the sea was unsafe

because of the λησται based in Euboea.⁴⁷ The assumption behind these statements is that the pirates were a separate factor in the calculations of both sides, and not in an obvious sense part of the war. To be more explicit: what Philip suffered in the 340s was the effect of the normal activities of λησται: there was (contra Ormerod and Ziebarth) no 'privateer-war'.⁴⁸ The model implied by the use of the term 'privateer-war' will be examined below.⁴⁹

[Dem]. 7(Halonnesus).14-15 illustrates the community of interest between the antagonists in the matter of the λησται. Philip's suggestion that the Athenians should join him in guarding against those who commit crimes by sea (τοὺς ἐν τῇ θαλάττῃ κακουργοῦντας), the speaker says, is a request that they should set him up on the sea (εἰς τὴν θάλατταν κατασταθῆναι) and admit that they cannot maintain a φυλακή without him (§14). If a privateer-war were being carried on at this time, one would have to assume that both Philip's and the speaker's statements were the purest hypocrisy, and also that the Athenians were carrying on the privateering without the knowledge of their assembly. The fact is that both sides were genuinely anxious to avoid aiding the pirates in any direct or observable way,⁵⁰ even though they can hardly have been sorry to see the enemy suffer because of them.

The pirates, then, were treated by both governments as an element they wanted nothing to do with. It must be deduced that both states calculated that open dealings with the pirates would be likely to have a negative marginal utility: the possible military advantages would be outweighed by the certainty of attracting unpopularity in Greece in general - that is, among the cities. This calculation shows how pirates lived outside the πόλεις in the sense of being beyond the pale of political legitimacy. To harness their strength seemed (on this occasion at least) counter-productive.

Treating the pirates as an independent element, it is legitimate to ask how they profited from the tension between Athens and Macedon. Demosthenes' comments quoted above from the Embassy and the Crown⁵¹ imply that their activity was restricted to the northern Aegean, at least for the most part. Sostratus and his followers had taken Halonnesus, and Philip of Macedon took action against them,⁵² so it can be inferred that they had been taking action against Macedonian people and property. The Thasians received τῶν ληστῶν τοὺς βουλομένους in their harbour, and the fact that this is treated by Philip as a cause for complaint against Athens,⁵³ (although Athens' corn supply had to come through the northern Aegean) shows that Macedon and Macedonian interests suffered much worse from the pirates than did the Athenian trade. The Athenian supplies were carried in convoy under naval protection, but this measure was certainly taken for security against Philip, who in 340 seized 230 or 180 merchant ships while Chares was away at the muster of the King's generals.⁵⁴ Philip had a general strategy of cutting off Athens' supplies, which he furthered by his action against Byzantium and Perinthus.⁵⁵

Therefore the tendency of the evidence is to show that neighbours of the λησταί had more to lose than more distant states with a larger volume of trade through the area where the λησταί were.⁵⁶ What might be used as a counter-example, the case of Phrynon of Rhamnus, a case involving an attack on merchant shipping, very likely Athenian, is almost certainly not an instance of Athenians' suffering damage at the hands of λησταί who would as soon have attacked Macedonians:⁵⁷ it will be argued below that the λησταί who took Phrynon were Philip's own courtiers, and their retainers.⁵⁸

As for the measures taken by coastal peoples against pirate attacks, the simplest, naturally, was to beat off the attackers. IG XII (3) Supp. 1291, a Theran decree honouring a Ptolemaic navarch, describes how a raid

by λαίσταί was repelled. But it was as well to be prepared beforehand. περιπόλια against coastal attack in wartime are attested (for Sicily) in Thucydides, who says how the Athenians captured one from the Locrians in 426, how the Syracusans manned them in 415, and how Nicias in 413 argued that they were a drain on the financial resources of the Syracusans who were keeping them up:⁵⁹ similarly at the end of the third century, περιπόλια are mentioned in decrees from Halasarna and Carpathus honouring men who had contributed to defence in the Cretan war.⁶⁰ And Epichares of Rhamnus, στρατηγὸς ἐπὶ τὴν χώραν τὴν παραλίαν at Athens in the Chremonidean war, punished those who introduced pirates into the χώρα, as well as making vigorous use of defensive works and strengthening them: so the routine work of coastal defence included defence against pirates.⁶¹

But references to περιπόλια and other permanent buildings for coastal defence are uncommon: a fact which lent credence to J. H. Young's re-evaluation of the purpose of the existence of very many small towers in the Aegean islands and other coastal areas.⁶² There are hundreds of these towers, and Young's selective catalogue of those in the islands is useful, as is his discussion of the comparison between diameter and height.⁶³ Though noting how many authors have held that the towers served as refuges from pirates, and even conceding that 'the suggestion ... seems to fit very well the towers lining the coasts of the Cyclades, especially when we contemplate them on a map',⁶⁴ Young rejects completely the idea that the towers had any defensive purpose. He sees them as farm buildings, designed as they were because of the nature of the available materials: 'where we build in wood,' he writes, presumably with America in mind, 'the Greek built in stone, and if his building spread out very far, he would have trouble finding timbers long enough to roof it. The answer was obvious: to expand not out, but up.'⁶⁵

Young's general hypothesis - that the towers were used as farm

buildings - is amply established by finds of millstones and olive-presses,⁶⁶ and confirmed by the evidence of the Chersonesus (Crimea) towers illustrated and discussed by J. Peřirka,⁶⁷ and by the Egyptian material quoted by Young himself.⁶⁸ But his contention that their secureness against attack was an accidental attribute, and that their design was determined by a lack of roofing-timbers, appears a little far-fetched. It is barely necessary to refer to the finds at Olynthus to prove that large houses could be built and roofed;⁶⁹ and as for the usefulness of having a defensible place on a farm: Dem . 47(Evergus).56, in which $\theta\epsilon\rho\acute{\alpha}\pi\alpha\iota\nu\alpha\iota$ during an attack on an Attic farm locked the tower in which they were against the attackers, is one illustration of it (quoted by Young);⁷⁰ and P. Tebt. I.47, a petition to the comarch Menches in 113 (not quoted by Young), goes further towards suggesting why a tower was useful as part of a farm: Pyrrhichus, a cavalry-officer, and some followers, had attacked the petitioner's farm while the petitioner was in the fields, and⁷¹

... συντρίψαντας | τὴν παρόδιον θύραν | καὶ προσαγαγόντες τῷ | πύργῳ
 θύραν διέκοψαν | μέρος τι γεινόμενοι ἔνδον | τὰς λοιπὰς συντρίψαντες |
 ἀπηνέγκατο τὰ ὑπο|γεγραμμένα, κτλ.

here it is not only the fact that the attackers made for the tower first, after they had gained entry from the street, but also the fact that, while the other doors could be 'stove in' (συντρίβω), the door to the tower had to be 'cut through' (διακόπτω), which suggest that the πύργος was the farm's most important secure space.

The towers were built for protection, and in Greece many of them were built on or near the coast. A. W. Lawrence makes an analysis of how single towers were used:⁷² he lists more towers than Young, balancing his list of island towers⁷³ with a long list of towers on the mainland.⁷⁴ These towers, many of which form parts of larger defensive systems with walls and other features, were intended mainly for defence against attack over land by neighbouring states.⁷⁵ But Lawrence argues that the island towers

were built in a period of high pirate activity to defend against pirates.⁷⁶

Young, though, says that island towers were not for defence against pirates. He makes some serious points which Lawrence does not answer in detail. Young's comments on the distance of some from landing-places, their lack of view and other features which (he alleges) make them unsuitable as defences against pirates rest on the assumption that a place which could not be reached in an attack lasting at most a few hours, would be safe. The assumption is questionable on two grounds. First, because lands had to be protected against settlement by λησται as well as against raiding - as [Dem]. 7(Halonnesus).3 says,

ἄπαντες ... οἱ λησται τοὺς ἀλλοτρίους τόπους καταλαμβάνοντες καὶ τοὺτους ἐχυροὺς ποιοῦμενοι, ἐντεῦθεν τοὺς ἄλλους κακῶς ποιοῦσιν.

A. Bon, in a paper dealing with Thasos, where ruins of at least twenty towers survive, deduces (without quoting this text) where and how pirates were likely to live:⁷⁷ 'leur raid accompli, ils se réfugiaient sur leurs rochers, ou, s'ils étaient poursuivis, sur un point quelconque d'une côte déserte, où ils pussent se cacher; et de petites plages, comme celle de Hag. Ioannis à Thasos, isolées entre de caps rocheux, entourées de montagnes et de forêts, pouvaient offrir un asile sur à cet élément dangereux.'

Second, because λησται might stay in a place and raid it for some time before going away: Epichares punished τοῦ | [ς κ]αθηγουμένου εἰς τ[ὴν] χώραν τοῦς πευραταῖς,⁷⁸ which implies that the pirates had been harboured for a period of time, not merely that they had been shown the way to Attica; and in the first Philippic Demosthenes, proposing to send a force of 2,000 men to harry the Macedonians and noting that Athens cannot afford a force fit to meet Philip in battle, says (as an alternative to preparing for a battle) 'but we must act as λησται' (ἀλλὰ ληστεύειν ἀνάγκη)⁷⁹ - and by this he means that the force is to be based on Lemnos, Thasos, Sciathos and the neighbouring islands in the winter, and when the winds will permit,

is to lie off the Macedonian coast and the harbour entrances.⁸⁰ Both episodes point towards a technique of plundering the same land for as long as was feasible: between them, they illustrate why even farms well inland could not consider themselves safe from attack.

A further strong point indicating the connection of the towers with defence against pirates is the date of their construction. Most of those in Thasos, Bon notes, were built in the late fourth or early third centuries (he argues on the ground of the quality of the building work);⁸¹ and the six towers in Sunium which Young discusses are dated by him (on the evidence of potsherds found near the tower, and partly on the ground of the building work) between the late fifth and the third centuries.⁸² The fact that the building of towers was concentrated in the late Classical and early Hellenistic Ages suggests that in these times a necessity for defences was perceived by farmers living on or near the coasts of Greece.⁸³

Bon's and Demosthenes' comments on how pirates settled in other people's lands have been quoted above.⁸⁴ Further illustration of this point is available, and will afford the opportunity to draw a conclusion about what was implied by the techniques used by the λησται in settling and raiding. A brief passage in Dem. 23 (Aristocrates) deals with the Athenian expedition to the Thracian Chersonese in 359: the army went to Alopeconnesus, a promontory extending towards Imbros, and found it full of λησται and καταποντισται.⁸⁵ Here, in an area where the government was weak (at least until the army arrived), was an ideal place for a pirate camp or enclave. It may be that the pirates had an understanding with Charidemus - certainly he came to their assistance against the Athenians,⁸⁶ and Demosthenes hints at this complicity with them (as distinct from his opposition to Athens at that moment, which could account for his fighting for the pirates on the particular occasion) when he says of Charidemus⁸⁷

γράφας ... ὡς Ἀλεξάνδρου [sc. of Pherae] πρεσβευσαμένου πρὸς αὐτὸν οὐ προσεδέξατο, τοῖς ληστοῖς φαίνεται τοῖς παρ' ἐκείνων ταῦτά πράττων.

But whatever the position of Charidemus was, Alopeconnesus is clearly the sort of τόπος referred to by the speaker of [Dem]. 7. So, probably, was Myonnesus - but the single passing reference in Aeschines to 'the δόξα of Myonnesus and of the pirates' does not really allow much comment.⁸⁸

Occupying land they had seized, and operating independently as plunderers, the λησται, though often treated as beyond the pale, were sometimes able to negotiate with states on a basis (in a sense) of equality when they had something to offer; a likely example of this is the allegation made in [Dem]. 12(Letter of Philip).2 that Philip's herald Nicias had been kidnapped from Macedonian territory and kept prisoner by the Athenians for ten months. No other source mentions this incident. If the Athenians had done the kidnapping, in time (officially) of peace, it would of course have been natural to make that part of the accusation; but if it is assumed that λησται took the herald in a raid and (realising where he was of value) let the Athenians have him for a fee, then the terms of the charge made against the Athenians are well accounted for.

Being settled almost like πόλεις, and sometimes doing business with πόλεις almost as equals, the λησται (as was to be expected) made claims to be treated as legitimate states. Later literature provides the specific evidence for this. The first reference is Cic. de Rep. III.14.24 (Aug. Civ. Dei IV.4 echoes this passage, and makes still more explicit the point that a state without justice is no better than a pirates' enclave) - it is a little story about a pirate captured by Alexander the Great, who, cum quaereretur ex eo, quo scelere impulsus mare haberet infestum uno myoparone 'eodem' inquit 'quo tu orbem terrae'. Even without Augustine's clarification, this would amount to a claim by the pirate that both he himself and Alexander acted at sea by virtue of being rulers of sovereign states.⁸⁹ The second reference is Lucian Dial. Mort. 24.1, from a dialogue in which Sostratus the ληστής, presumably the one from Halonnesus, persuades Minos not to have him cast into Pyriphlegethon; and as well as

being described as ληστής and ἱερόσυλος,⁹⁰ he is called a τύραννος. This is surely good evidence that he made himself - or at least, styled himself - tyrant of Halonnesus. The fact that contemporary documents, [Dem]. 12(Letter of Philip) and [Dem]. 7(Halonnesus), do not refer to this claim does not show that it was not made: The Athenians recognised no ruler of Halonnesus but themselves; and Philip's justification for making his offer of Halonnesus as a gift rested on his having taken it from λησταί.⁹¹ Lucian may well have had access to sources not now extant.

These suggestions about claims to statehood arising out of the characteristic method of operation of Greek pirates in the fourth century give rise to further questions, concerning their relationship with the states (the πόλεις and later the Hellenistic kingdoms) and the states' attitudes to them. As a preliminary to dealing with these questions, the next Section will consider the λησταί themselves, and in particular their leaders.

5. λησταί and Their Leaders

This Section begins with Demetrius Poliorcetes. Not that he was a pirate chief: but because of Seleucus' propaganda directed towards Demetrius' troops in 286. Taking off his helmet, Seleucus shouted,⁹²

μέχρι ποῦ μαίνεσθε ληστάρῳ λιμώσσοντι παραμένοντες, δυνάμενοι
πλουτοῦντι βασιλεῦ μισθοφορεῖν καὶ βασιλείας μετέχειν οὐκ
ἐπιζομένης, ἀλλὰ παρούσης;

and the men deserted to his side. The particularly interesting point in this quotation is the implication that the political legitimacy of an employer of soldiers is a function of his ability to provide pay. Not that it should be stressed; Seleucus had to appeal with reference to circumstances. But it will be remembered that small mercenary units, with their own leaders, lived by plundering (that is, not on pay provided by their leaders) when they had no employer:⁹³ it is clear that at least a

close similarity is detectable between what a mercenary leader did and what a pirate chief did.⁹⁴

The last paragraph of G.T. Griffith's chapter on the provenance and recruiting of mercenaries in the Hellenistic Age mentions as a method of mercenary recruitment the practice of employing 'for one's own ends a section of the community of pirates that abounded in the Greek seas.'⁹⁵ Griffith ends the chapter with the comment that 'piracy and mercenary service were mutually sympathetic trades', but his analysis of the activities of Charidemus and other leaders through whose connivance (Griffith's word) pirates were used as mercenaries is brief and allows some measure of improvement.

The career of Charidemus, the outstanding example of the fourth-century pirate-and-mercenary commander, is well summarized by W.K. Pritchett, who gives dates for his occupations before the grant of Athenian citizenship to him.⁹⁶ Between 376 and 368 (in Demosthenes' words⁹⁷) ληστικὸν πλοῦτον ἔχων ἐλήξετο τοὺς ὑμετέρους [sc. the Athenians'] συμμάχους, that is, he was a pirate captain.⁹⁸ Later (Demosthenes adds in the same section) he became a ξεναγῶν, that is, the leader of a mercenary force; and he rose to a position of influence as a citizen and general at Athens, as Pritchett stresses.⁹⁹ But during his rise he took an opportunity to seize Scepsis, Cebren and Ilium, three towns in the Troad.¹⁰⁰ Before relating this, Demosthenes has declared that mercenary commanders go round looking for cities to seize:¹⁰¹ just as pirates took places - or, if as successful as Sostratus, whole islands - as the base for their operations. In fact, the feature of Charidemus' career which makes it untypical is his grant of citizenship from Athens: from being outside the πόλις (as there is no evidence that he ever returned to Oreos after his first service¹⁰²) he was admitted to the citizenship of the greatest of the πόλεις. This did not happen to any of the few other fourth-century

pirate chiefs whose names are now known.¹⁰³

Besides Charidemus, there are four, and two from the early years of the third century. Sostratus has been mentioned above,¹⁰⁴ but the feature of his notoriety not yet remarked on is how long it lasted. Lucian mentions him five hundred years after Philip took Halonnesus from him.¹⁰⁵ Lucian's readers were people with a literary education; but it is worth adding that Lucian notes (with amusement) that Epictetus' pupil Arrian descended to writing the Life of one Tillorobus, a bandit from Mysia and Mount Ida.¹⁰⁶ It may be that there was a persistent interest in biographies of bandits; certainly pirates were popular enough in fiction.¹⁰⁷

Glaucetes was another pirate who seems to have managed to make himself master of an island. Syll.³ 409, a decree honouring Phaedrus of Sphettus, notes as one of the achievements of the honorands's father that 'in the archonship of Praxibulus' (315/4), 'when Glaucetes had seized Cythnos and was bringing ships to land there, he took the city, and Glaucetes himself, and his ships (πλοῦα) with him, and provided safety for those sailing the sea.'¹⁰⁸

The end of Aristonicus, the piratical tyrant of Methymma, was brought about by deceit rather than courage. Expecting a friendly welcome from Pharnabazus at Chios, he was admitted to the harbour and then captured for Alexander.¹⁰⁹

Timocles, the ἀρχιπειρατής captured by the Rhodians during the siege of Rhodes by Demetrius in 305-304,¹¹⁰ can introduce the interesting subject of the relations of Demetrius with the pirates. Timocles and his followers had three ships, the account of his capture notes, and they seemed to be the strongest of those campaigning on the king's side (of those pirates, that is). So there were several units of pirates working for Demetrius. Not only because the siege of Rhodes involved operations by sea: on land in Thessaly in 302 Demetrius' army included, besides his Macedonians, and

his mercenaries, and his levies from Greek cities,¹¹¹

φυλικὰ...τάγματα καὶ πειρατῶν παντοδαπῶν τῶν συντρεχόντων ἐπὶ
τοὺς πολέμους καὶ τὰς ἀρπαγὰς οὐκ ἐλάττους τῶν ὀκτακισχιλίων...

Here the pirates are in the light-armed category. Similarly Charidemus was a σφενδονήτης and a φυλός after his years as a pirate captain.¹¹²

Evidence to support Griffith's assertion that 'the mercenary's was the steadier, the pirate's the riskier but more rapid way of making a fortune' is lacking,¹¹³ but it may well be right to think that the λησταί represented the bottom of the mercenary market, and so that Demetrius employed pirates simply in order to be able to get the largest possible number of recruits.¹¹⁴ Nonetheless, pirate chiefs could be in positions of trust: not only so as to be able to introduce enemy troops into a city, as at Ephesus in 287 Andron did, betraying Demetrius' general Aenetus,¹¹⁵ but even (under Antigonos) so as to end up called 'general', as Ameinias is in Plutarch Pyrrhus.¹¹⁶

The change since the 340s is striking. Philip abstained from friendship with pirates for the sake of his international credibility; but in the forty years between the 340s and Demetrius' Rhodian and Thessalian campaigns the pirates had been growing stronger (so that their claim to dealings on terms of mutual respect with states was likely to be heeded more often), and the successor-kingdoms had been set up, in which (as is argued above¹¹⁷) the governments often tended to like to draw the Greek manpower they needed from sources outside the πόλις.

6. Privateers?

Given the intimate connection between piracy and mercenary service, and the similarity of the pirate chiefs (insofar as anything is known about them) to the leaders of the στρατόπεδα πλανώμενα, it may seem strange to argue, as this section will, that there was no privateering in the fourth century. The case of Timocles shows that pirates were prepared

to serve in generals' maritime campaigns; and in this Timocles, at the end of the century, was probably doing no more than Theopompus the Milesian had done for Lysander.¹¹⁸ But 'privateering' is a word which has been applied by Ormerod to a model a good deal more complicated than that which can be derived from these two cases (Ziebarth appears to assume Ormerod's model,¹¹⁹ but categories make no great difference to his conclusions): and some considerable importance is attached to a distinction between it and piracy.¹²⁰

Ormerod's case is, briefly, that 'piracy and privateering were intimately connected, and the nomenclature in both cases almost identical', and that privateering can be distinguished mainly because 'closely allied to privateering is the system of reprisals and distraint as recognised in ancient international law.'¹²¹

The first example by which the 'system of reprisals and distraint' is illustrated is the episode, related in Demosthenes' speech against Timocrates, of the ship of Naucratis seized at sea by an Athenian naval vessel,¹²² the money in which had been kept by three ambassadors who were passengers in the trireme,¹²³ although it had been declared public property by the Assembly.¹²⁴ As this did not involve a private vessel, it is more than a little difficult to follow what Ormerod means it to indicate about privateering - he seems to show only that in 355 the Athenians were prepared to regard the King's enemies as their enemies.¹²⁵ Second, he instances depredations against Attica authorised by the Spartans (and adduces Hellenistic parallels).¹²⁶

This seems to be the nearest approach to privateering as Ormerod defines it: 'hostile action undertaken by privately owned vessels in wartime'.¹²⁷ But the third part of Ormerod's case for ancient privateering on the modern model is less easy to follow: it depends on a point of Attic law. If anyone were killed abroad,¹²⁸ his relatives might take up

to three hostages from those at whose house (παρ' οἷς) he died, with a view to their standing trial or the murderer's being given up.¹²⁹ Ormerod takes it that the ἀνδροληψία mentioned at [Dem]. 51(Trierarchic Crown).13 are family reprisals of this kind, and not merely unauthorised kidnappings done, with a view to exacting a ransom, by the unscrupulous trierarchs whom Demosthenes is describing in the passage. But surely there would be little if any profit for these trierarchs (contractors who have 'hired' a trierarchy from the liturgy-payer responsible for it¹³⁰) from helping relatives of murdered persons to seize hostages? And surely too few Athenians were murdered outside Athens for seizures of hostages for their murderers to make Athens unpopular?¹³¹ ἀνδροληψία here surely means (as can the synonym ἀνδρολήψιον¹³²) simply kidnapping. Ormerod's use of [Dem]. 51(Trierarchic Crown).13 is in any case thoroughly misleading, since (again) naval vessels, not privately owned ships, are involved.¹³³

Further on Ormerod writes: 'the official custodian of the seas' (sc. Athens) 'had issued general letters of marque during the Social war, with a view to destroying enemy commerce'.¹³⁴ This is based on Schol. in Dem.

21(Meidias).173 (=570.15):

ἐν τῷ συμμαχικῷ πολέμῳ ἐψηφίσαντο Ἀθηναῖοι λήζεσθαι τοὺς θάλατταν πλέοντας, κἂν ἔμποροι ᾖσι, τῶν πολεμίων...

The scholiast goes on to explain that it was on this pretext that Meidias had seized more than five talents from the Cyzicenes, who came to Athens and (without success) protested friendship towards the city. But this does not amount to an issue of 'letters of marque'. Meidias was a servant of the Athenian state - the ταμίης of the state trireme Paralus - when the alleged seizure was made.¹³⁵ There is no suggestion that the Athenians envisaged that their ψήφισμα was to be carried out other than by the navy.¹³⁶

The Spartan authorisations for raids on Attica are not by themselves sufficient to support Ormerod's idea of privateering on the modern model. It seems fairer to interpret them as a rather more obviously open

encouragement to piracy than the harbour facilities allowed to pirates from time to time at Thasos, Chios and Syracuse (for example).¹³⁷ States wishing to help the λησται and benefit from their activities had the option of giving passive support in this way, or hiring pirates as mercenaries. Once hired, they were not at liberty to plunder the enemy as they thought best themselves: they were part of an army.¹³⁸

The pirate chief was in a simpler position than either Griffith or Ormerod allowed. Making their followers mercenaries did not involve 'connivance':¹³⁹ it was part of their normal function as chiefs. If they were without an employer, they lived by raiding: some cities allowed them into the harbour, some did not, and others tried to suppress them. In the absence of the relationship expressed by letters of marque, the next Section will examine the dealings of λησται with Greek communities.

7. Trade and Piracy

As Ziebarth remarked, trade and piracy were closely connected. He writes, not perhaps without some obscurity, of seaborne trade '...in seinem Verhältniss mit Seeraub, d. h. in seiner Abhängigkeit vom Seeraub...'¹⁴⁰ This cannot refer only to the fact that evidence for piracy is indirect evidence for trading activity (a point he makes elsewhere¹⁴¹), nor yet can it be taken as a suggestion that the pirates were strong enough for transport by sea to depend on their goodwill (Ziebarth notes that trade grew in spite of piracy;¹⁴² not but what there were times, specially after the end of the fourth century, when the pirates were very strong indeed¹⁴³). It seems fair to suggest that part (at least) of what Ziebarth had in mind was the place pirates had in trade: trade involving the Greek πόλις.

Pirates were involved in the slave trade. Explicit statements of this are not common in the sources relating to the fourth century, but trade in slaves must have been a very easy and natural extension of the

normal piratical activity of seizing people and holding them to ransom: besides selling free people as slaves, pirates in any successful raid which took many captives must have had a good chance of taking some slaves along with the ransomable victims. The place attacked by pirates in a third-century attack on Thera was full of women, children and slaves.¹⁴⁴ And, to turn to fiction, in the prologue of Menander's Sicyonius a παιδίον and her οἰκέτης,¹⁴⁵ both captured by pirates, are bought in the slave market at Mylasa by 'a thoroughly decent and wealthy officer' - the Sicyonian in the title.¹⁴⁶ M.M. Austin comments on this passage: 'though fictitious, this prologue from Menander's most recently discovered play shows how completely piracy and the slave trade were taken for granted as a reality of everyday life in the later fourth and early third centuries.'¹⁴⁷

Menander's story in the Sicyonius has a heterosexual theme: but a fourth-century Cyrenean inscription (a difficult text) appears to record the damages recovered, by a Cyrenean embassy to several Peloponnesian (mostly Arcadian) cities, in consideration of (probably) moral offences committed against Cyrenean males on some one occasion by men from the cities mentioned.¹⁴⁸ If this interpretation of the text (P.M. Fraser's) is right, then it would seem likely that a group of Peloponnesians from different cities had carried out a homosexual kidnapping raid on Cyrenean territory. The cities seem to have been willing to help the Cyreneans recover damages,¹⁴⁹ so though the general circumstances of the events (which may have happened in the 360s¹⁵⁰) are highly obscure, it would seem that the perpetrators of the raid organized themselves privately (without city backing) to carry it out.

Granted, though, that some trade in slaves was carried on by some pirates, it is still a question how much of the slave trade was in the hands of λησται. W.W. Tarn was not in doubt here. 'The pirate,' he writes, 'had a most useful place in the economy of the old world; he was the general slave merchant.'¹⁵¹ Strabo, though (writing about a later era than that discussed by Tarn), uses a distinction between those who normally were

pirates (ληιζόμενοι) and those who traded in slaves (σωματεμποροῦντες): during the boom in slave trading after the destructions of Carthage and Corinth pirates found it easy to trade in slaves at Delos, and Strabo comments¹⁵²

ἄμα δὲ καὶ οἱ ληστοὶ προσποιούμενοι σωματεμπορεῖν, ἄλυτον τὴν κακουργίαν εἶχον...

Making the same point, M.I. Finley, in his paper 'The Black Sea and Danubian Regions and the Slave Trade in Antiquity,' argues that piracy '...was not the basic way in which slaves were procured (and especially not during the long periods when one major power or another succeeded in reducing such activity to very small proportions); second, that even when it was most active piracy could not have been a complete explanation.' He adds that pirates, when they did not exact a ransom for their captives, 'turned them over to professional traders.'¹⁵³

This illustrates an aspect of the Abhängigkeit of trade on piracy for which Ziebarth argued.¹⁵⁴ The pirates were a source of supply to the slave trade. Two (or perhaps three) Attic decrees may offer a little more information on the fourth century slave trade. They honour persons who had ransomed Athenians and sent them home, and are most easily understood if it is assumed that the benefactors had found the Athenians for sale in slave markets: Syll.³ 263, honouring Cleomis of Methymna (c. 336/5) says (lines 10-13):

...ἐπειδὴ κ|[αὶ το]ύς ἀλόντα[ς ὑπ]ὸ τῶν ληιστῶν ἐλ|[ύσατο] καὶ ποιεῖ [ὅτ]ι δύναται ἀγαθὸ|[ν τὸν δῆμ]ον τὸν 'Α[θ]ηναίων...

And although this is not explicit enough to show that the captives had been offered for sale in Methymna (though the word ἐλύσατο, 'ransomed', cannot on the contrary be taken to imply that the captives were not in a slave market: it is not conceivable that the Athenians would use a word meaning 'bought', ἠγόρασεν or similar, in the case of free citizens), it is on the whole unlikely that pirates would contact Cleomis and ask him

to ransom Athenians, or that Cleomis would hear at random that Athenians were being held to ransom by the pirates his régime (evidently) had not eradicated.

The second decree is IG II² 399 (320-19?), a non-στοιχηδόν inscription which reads (lines 17-19):

καὶ [αὔτιλος ἐ]γένετο τοῦ σωθῆναι ἐ[κ τῶν πολ|εμίω]ν εἰς τὴν
ἰδίαν...

L. Moretti's suggestion 'naturalmente sono possibili, in teoria, anche integrazioni come ἐ[κ τῶν πευ|ρατῶ]ν οὐνερο ἐ[κ τῶν ληυ|στῶ]ν' seems more than likely to be right.¹⁵⁵ Moretti prefers to think that the Athenians were captured in one or other of the naval battles of the Lamian war,¹⁵⁶ but since they are not described as στρατευόμενοι (which the Athenians saved by one --φάνης in the contemporary decree IG II² 398 (both were proposed by Demades) are called), it seems better to follow Moretti's alternative explanation, that they were seized by pirates and taken to Crete.¹⁵⁷ In which case the honorand in IG II² 399, Eurylochus of Cydonia, probably found the Athenians up for sale at Cydonia, paid for them, and sent them home.

IG II² 283 may be a third decree of this sort. It honours a man who ransomed Athenians from Sicily and sent them home. But caution is necessary for two reasons: first because λησταί are not mentioned in the decree, and then because of Sicily. The fourth-century lettering may perhaps disguise a (republished) text from after Athens' Sicilian expedition.¹⁵⁸ If the decree is from the fourth century, then capture by pirates would seem a plausible explanation of Athenians being ransomed from Sicily.

The explanation that the ransomers found the citizens on the market as slaves - a very plausible explanation at least of the situation outlined in the first two of these decrees - bears out the impression gained from the Sicyonius that it was far from unheard-of that free people

should be sold as slaves in Greek cities after being captured by λησται. That there was no generally applied sanction against selling free Greek people as slaves in Greek slave markets is illustrated by the story of Plato's treatment by the Spartan admiral Pollis, to whom Dionysius I had handed him over: when Pollis put Plato up for sale in Aegina the Aeginetans, far from rescuing him, almost decided to put him to death - and in the end sold him themselves (D.L. III.18-20). Though not captured by pirates, he was bought and freed by a well-wisher. The Strabo passage cited above suggests that in the case of people captured by pirates middle-men would usually be involved.¹⁵⁹ In the fourth century this fundamental commercial contact between the λησται outside the πόλις and the world of the city was probably, therefore, indirect most of the time.

8. Other Points of Contact between Piracy and the Cities

Trade (direct or indirect) in slaves was not the only form of contact or basis of relationship between the πόλις and the λησται. Things were more complicated than that. In a country where the sea was the chief means of communicating and trading, the thing which most affected the λησται in their relations with the πόλις was the extent to which either party had control of the sea. Though, as argued above, raids from the sea on coastal regions were the pirates' principal means of acquisition,¹⁶⁰ it would be perverse not to recognise that from the end of the Peloponnesian war seafarers had feared the pirates.¹⁶¹ Twenty or so years before the writing of the Panegyricus of Isocrates, the speaker against Diogeiton had said of his adversary:¹⁶²

οὐ γὰρ ἂν δύναίτο ἀποδεῦξαι οὔθ' ὑπὸ ληστῶν ἀπολελωκῶς οὔτε
ζημίαν εἰληφῶς οὔτε χρήστας ἀποδεδωκῶς...

putting loss to pirates at the head of a list of three ways of being parted from money. The fall of Athenian naval power must have made

worse the perennial risk of loss to pirates. Sparta, Ormerod points out,¹⁶³ had not Athens' reasons for wanting the sea clear (not that there were no pirates before 404: Theopompus the Milesian, for example, was already a ληστής when Lysander sent him to Sparta with the news of Aegospotami¹⁶⁴); and there were states which, it must be concluded, at least winked at the activities of λησταί who were closely connected with the city community: Lycon of Heraclea, leaving Athens by sea, was caught almost at once by pirates, shot down, and later died in Argos.¹⁶⁵ Though this happened some time before the death in 370 of the banker Pasion, it is likely that the Second Athenian Confederacy had been founded (the Argives were not in it) before the incident happened.¹⁶⁶

And concurrent with the growth in piratical activity which seems to have taken place in the course of the fourth century was a growth in piracy-by-states. Not the bringing of ships to land (τὸ κατάγειν) which was practised by states during famines (that is examined below¹⁶⁷); but the archaic practice as undertaken by Polycrates of Samos, who had got a hundred penteconters and a thousand bowmen and ἔφερε καὶ ἦγε πάντας διακρίνων οὐδένα (thinking he would get more thanks from a friend by giving back what he took than by not taking it in the first place).¹⁶⁸ The third-century blossoming of piracy was in some measure a renaissance of politics of this kind: the Aetolians and Cretans made terms with island cities promising not to rob them.¹⁶⁹ And fourth-century precedents for incorporation of ληστεία into the communal economy are not lacking, even when plundering in war is not included. Aristotle in the Politics mentions it quite casually as an εἶδος τροφῆς, in a section on χρηματιστική:¹⁷⁰ but more significantly, a few important persons (from non-πόλις parts of Hellas) are called λησταί, or emerge as λησταί, in the sources. They are not stateless persons (the main subject of this study), but their treatment in the sources makes clear their similarities to the pirate chiefs discussed above.¹⁷¹

Alexander of Pherae is the target of a vigorous piece of Xenophontic rhetoric:¹⁷²

χαλεπὸς μὲν θετταλοῖς ταγὸς ἐγένετο, χαλεπὸς δὲ θηβαίους καὶ Ἀθηναίους πολέμιος, ἄδικος δὲ ληστῆς καὶ κατὰ γῆν καὶ κατὰ θάλατταν.

Tagus, enemy, robber; his own people, other peoples, all peoples. Polemic of this quality would be wasted on anyone who was only a nuisance. But Alexander's piratical exploits were notorious. Not the least of them was his raid on the Peiraeus, when his men seized coin from the bankers' tables.¹⁷³ Where Jason had schemed to get the family money,¹⁷⁴ Alexander used more direct means: he illustrates the collapse of what Jason had built up before being assassinated - which is in general the purpose of this passage of the Hellenica.¹⁷⁵ ληστεία typifies Thessaly's retreat from good order, as it were.

And some courtiers of Philip II of Macedon were λησταί. Demosthenes says so in Olynthiac II:¹⁷⁶

λοιποὺς δὴ περὶ αὐτὸν εἶναι ληστὰς καὶ κόλακας καὶ τοιούτους ἀνθρώπους οἷους μεθυσθέντας ὀρχεῖσθαι τοιαῦθ' οἷ ἐγὼ νῦν ὀκνῶ πρὸς ὑμᾶς ὀνομάσαι.

(λοιποὺς is all the people at the court: anyone decent, Demosthenes has said, is driven away). This immoderate blast of rhetoric might be set aside, or put down only as evidence of drunken feasting in Pella, but for the passage in Aeschines' Embassy speech dealing with Phrynon of Rhamnus.¹⁷⁷

After Euboean ambassadors to Athens in 348 had told the Athenians that Philip wanted to come to terms with Athens,¹⁷⁸

φρύνων ὁ Ῥαμνούσιος ἐάλω ὑπὸ ληστῶν ἐν ταῖς σπονδαῖς ταῖς Ὀλυμπικαῖς, ὡς αὐτὸς ἠτιᾶτο· ἐπειδὴ δ' ἐπανηλθε δεῦρο λυτρωθεὶς, ἐδεῖτο ὑμῶν πρεσβευτὴν αὐτῷ πρὸς Φίλιππον ἐλέσθαι, ἵνα, εἴ πως δύναίτο, ἀπολάβοι τὰ λύτρα.

The Athenians chose Ctesiphon, who was kindly received (the next section says), but the part of his report back which Aeschines recalls concerns the peace and not the ransom. If Philip had exacted the ransom in the first place, he would hardly have relented and paid it back. But Philip

found piety in general the best policy:¹⁷⁹ which is presumably why the Athenians could have some hope that he would be persuaded to make himself responsible for reimbursing what a subject of his had taken. As for whether Phrynon's captor was a courtier of Philip,¹⁸⁰ no more can be said than that it is likely: to complain of a crime Philip could not be aware of would be no better than to complain of a crime Philip was known to have committed himself. This, in the context of the accusation in Demosthenes, leads to the explanation that Philip was to be persuaded to repay the money to Ctesiphon, and take an equivalent from the impious ληστής.

In the fourth century Alexander of Pherae and Philip's Macedonians, in the third century the Aetolians and the Cretans treated ληστεία as a form of χρημαίευστική. The divide was between south Greece, the Greece of the πόλεις, and the more backward areas. It was not a question so much of communities copying the pirates' way of life as of communities resuming a way of life which had been interrupted by the power of south Greece, and specially the power of Athens, in the fifth and earlier fourth centuries. The taboo against ληστεία was affirmed by Philip himself - if his dealings over Phrynon did not show this, his complaint against the Athenians for not taking action when the Thasians received τὰς Βυζαντίων τριήρεις καὶ τῶν ληστῶν τοὺς βουλομένους would leave no doubt.¹⁸¹ The Athenians did fine the Melians for receiving pirates - ten talents¹⁸² - and elsewhere took energetic measures against piracy, as the next Section will show; but the πόλεις and the rulers who espoused πόλις values had more than the superficial contacts of trade and harbouring to combat: they were against an older and less humane view of what statehood was. The Spartans had ὁμόνοια, conceded Isocrates on an occasion when he was disinclined to take their part, but no one would praise it any more than anyone would praise for it¹⁸³

τοὺς καταποντιστὰς καὶ ληστὰς καὶ τοὺς περὶ τὰς ἄλλας ἀδικίας ὄντας...

and this is a recognition that there were associations possessing some attributes of statehood (ὁμόνοια) but not others. This, with the story of Alexander and the pirate,¹⁸⁴ shows up the contact between community and piracy which still existed in the way of life of the outlying areas of Hellas in the fourth century and beyond.

9. Defence against the Raiders

If the growth of piracy in the later fourth century was aided by the weakness of the πόλις, it also contributed to that weakness. Before the Athenian navy was devastated at Amorgos in 322, piracy had grown into a very widespread phenomenon, able to survive Alexander's attempt to reduce it.¹⁸⁵ Which explains the urgency of the moral obligation assumed by leading maritime states, and referred to by states which were far from fulfilling it,¹⁸⁶ to act against the pirates.

Action against pirates was part of the φυλακή undertaken by Athens. Commenting on IG I² 18 line 4, D.M. Lewis notes on this word that 'its basic meaning is abstract, something like 'watch', 'defence', or frequently 'blockade'. ...this is the only meaning it has in inscriptions.'¹⁸⁷ The word is used in a naval context as early as Herodotus,¹⁸⁸ and at Thucydides VII.17.2-4 it is used in connection with a squadron of twenty ships put at Naupactus by the Athenians in 414/3 to prevent communications between the Peloponnese and Sicily: again as an abstract - the squadron is not called a φυλακή, but it is noted (§4) that it had to direct its φυλακή against the Corinthian ἀντίταξις of twenty ships.

In the fourth century at the time of the foundation of Adria by Athens, the founders made a detailed and positive statement of what they expected to achieve in relation to the piracy prevalent at the time:¹⁸⁹

ὅπως δ' ἂν ὑἱάρχῃ | τῶν δῆμων εἰς τὸν ἅπαντα | χρόνον ἐμπορία
οἰκεία καὶ | [σιτ]οπομπία καὶ ναυστάθμο | [οἰκ]είου κατασκευασθέν | [το]ς
ὑπάρχει φυλακή ἐπὶ | [Τυρ]ρηνοῦς, καὶ Μιλτιά | [δης] ὁ οἰκίστης καὶ

οἱ ἔποιοι | [κου ἔχ]ωσιν χρῆσθαι οἰκεί | [ωι ναυ]τικῶι, καὶ τῶν
 Ἑλ | [λήνων] καὶ βαρβάρων οἱ | [πλέοντες] τὴν θάλατταν | [ἀσφαλῶς
 εἰ]σπλέωσιν εἰ | [ς Ἀδρίαν, ὄρμον] τὸ Ἀθηναίων | [πλοῦσά τε
 ἔχον]τες καὶ τὰ ἄλλ | [λα ἐμ βεβαίωι, εἰδό]τες ὅτι | (lacuna)

The φυλακὴ ἐπὶ | [Τυρ]ρηνοῦς is naval defence: it needs a secure harbour to make it work (lines 220-221), and it is directed towards providing secure trade and corn-imports (lines 219-220) as well as safe use of Adria by Greek and foreign ships (lines 226-233). It is, indeed, almost incidental that the colonists are to be able to χρῆσθαι οἰκεί | [ωι ναυ]τικῶι (lines 225-226): from the point of view of the δῆμος who made the decree, they seem not to be the main intended beneficiaries. The colony was to maintain (in the mid-320s) the Athenian φυλακὴ against piracy and so secure safe shipping.

This φυλακὴ was also defence of the land of Attica: φυλακὴ τῆς χώρας. The same decree, after further provisions about the colony at Adria, adds (lines 270-271) ταῦτα δ' εἶναί ἅπαντα | εἰς φυλακὴν τῆς χώρας. The uses of the phrase φυλακὴ τῆς χώρας have been examined by P.J. Rhodes, who comments on how it and the phrase σωτηρία τῆς πόλεως figured in Athenian political deliberation and decisions.¹⁹⁰ Rhodes assumes no important distinction between φυλακὴ and φυλακὴ τῆς χώρας when he uses Dem. 18(Crown).248 to establish the connection between the two phrases in political usage: φυλακὴ appears without τῆς χώρας in this passage. The connection between φυλακὴ τῆς χώρας and the φυλακὴ against pirates being established in IG II² 1629, two other texts can be interpreted in this context. First, IG II² 1623 lines 276-282 (between 335/4 and 331/0), which speaks of two ships sent out εἰς φυλακὴν τῶν λειστῶν, confirming the evidence of IG II² 1629 to the effect that pirates were part of the threat against which φυλακὴ was maintained. Second, even more explicitly, [Dem]. 7(Halonnese).14, where the speaker tells the assembled Athenians that if Philip's cession of Halonnese as a gift is accepted, it will be an admission that

...ἄνευ Φιλίππου οὐδέ τῆν ἐν τῇ θαλάττῃ φυλακὴν δυνατοῦ ἔστε
φυλάττειν.

This was the φυλακὴ to which the trader honoured in IG II² 283, who ransomed Athenians from Sicily, contributed silver.¹⁹¹ And with good reason: with trading interests at both ends of the Mediterranean (he had sent the Athenians corn from Egypt as well as ransoming the citizens from Sicily)¹⁹² it was clearly in his interest to encourage anyone who was combatting the pirates. Rhodes records other instances of contributions to the φυλακὴ/φυλακὴ τῆς χώρας.¹⁹³

These phrases and ideas are not confined to Attic sources. The phrase φυλακὴ τῆς χώρας appears in a third-century decree from Teos (not available to Rhodes, since it was not published until 1976);¹⁹⁴ in an oath to be taken by the inhabitants of Cyrbissus there occurs the clause (lines 51-52):

καὶ ὃ τε ἂν ὁ φρούραρχος παραγ[γε]ύλην ποιήσω ὅσα εἰς φυλ[ακ]ή[ν]
[τοῦ χω]ρίου καὶ τῆς χώρας

Here the χωρίον is a fort: an earlier oath to be taken by citizens of Teos contains the clause (lines 12-14):

κατάρξω (= 'I will elect') φρούραρχον εἰς κυρβισσὸν ὅστις μο[υ]
[ἂν δόξη] ἄριστα καὶ δικαιοτάτα ἐπιμελέσει[σ]θαι τῆς φυλακῆς
τοῦ χωρί[ου] καὶ διαφυλάξειν τὸ χωρίον τῆς πόλει

so that a particular and general element can be identified in the inhabitants' oath - the general element concerning φυλακὴ τῆς χώρας. And in the first years of the third century the Delians borrowed 5,000 drachmas from Apollo εἰς φυλακὴν τῶν Τυρρηνῶν.¹⁹⁵ Since the battle of Amorgos there had been no Athenian fleet to keep seas safe: probably this was the Delian substitute for the systematic guard the Athenians had maintained.

But even before Amorgos others besides Athens took on themselves the responsibility of acting against the pirates. In the west, Dionysius I had initiated a movement to settle the Adriatic to make the Ἰόνιος πόντος, the route from south Italy to Greece, safe: though according to Diodorus, his object was to make the sea safe for his own raiding on

Epirus and (much worse) Delphi itself.¹⁹⁶ His son Dionysius II founded two cities in Apulia at the beginning of the 350s to make that same 'Ιόνιος κόπος safe from the barbarians living on the sea-coast, who were making the Adriatic impassable with their many pirate ships.¹⁹⁷

In the Aegean Philip II, though probably spurred on by the trouble λησται were causing Macedonia, made his policing the sea a propaganda point: this is the implication of the dispute 'over syllables', whether or not it is accepted that [Dem]. 12 (Letter of Philip). 12-15 represents Philip's own view of the matter:¹⁹⁸ Philip drew attention to himself as the liberator of an island from λησται. And his son Alexander made an effort to follow the same path of self-definition. The operations at sea he delegated to Amphoterus, with a grandiose commission 'above all, to rid the sea of piratic fleets'.¹⁹⁹ The style of Alexander's order is as important, for the purpose of understanding his stance on the λησται, as how effectively it was carried out. It amounts to a claim (and the incident with the pirate chief bears this out²⁰⁰) to a legal, quasi-constitutional guardianship of the sea: to an assertion that Macedon had taken over as well as the hegemony on land, the leading rôle of Athens at sea.

But his death and Athens' irreparable defeat at Amorgos left that rôle unfilled. The state which tried to fill the gap between 322 and 305 was Rhodes; with some success:²⁰¹

ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον...προεληλύθει δυνάμει ὥσθ' ὑπὲρ μὲν τῶν Ἑλλήνων ἰδίᾳ τὸν πρὸς τοὺς πειρατὰς πόλεμον ἐπαναιρεῖσθαι καὶ καθαρὰν παρέχεσθαι τῶν κακουργῶν τὴν θάλατταν.

the 'war against the pirates' is treated here as a continuous factor in the life of Greece - the Rhodians 'resumed' it (ἐπαναιρεῖσθαι); and the ἰδίᾳ suggests that the undertaking afforded the Rhodians some prestige.

In the context of this keenly felt moral obligation for leading states, or states which claimed to be leading states, to clear the sea of pirates, it is possible to understand the passage in Strabo which notes

how Alexander, and later Demetrius Poliorcetes, complained to the Romans about the piratical activities of the men of Antium.²⁰² Modern writers are divided as to whether to believe the story: Tarn doubts, on the ground that²⁰³ 'Rome in 290 could not be said στρατηγεῖν τῆς Ἰταλίας; and in 337 she had captured Antium, burnt its ships and forbidden its people the sea' (note, though, that the Greek phrase Tarn quotes is from Demetrius' polite message to Rome: there may be a case for treating it as flattery); but H. Berve is confident enough to use the story to confirm other alleged dealings between Alexander and Italy.²⁰⁴ Ormerod says that the story about Alexander 'may be apocryphal', but finds no reason to reject the corresponding story about Demetrius.²⁰⁵ A prima facie reason for scepticism about Strabo's account in his mention (as part of Demetrius' message) of the Romans' πρὸς τοὺς Ἕλληνας συγγένειαν - a commonplace of later literature, but surely unimagined in the early third century. But this seems more like a little elaboration than the point of the whole thing: exhortations from one leading state to another to take part in the 'war against the pirates', on the other hand, can easily be believed in, given that the Greeks expected a ἡγεμῶν to work for safe seas.

Discussing suppression of piracy, Tarn concludes that 'it was only small states like Rhodes, subsisting entirely on sea-borne corn, that felt any real interest in clearing the seas', and one of his main arguments towards this conclusion is that 'the governments could have put them down; but all the governments had their hands pretty full, and it suited them better to wink at the evil.'²⁰⁶ This Section has shown that the conclusion requires some amendment, at any rate for the fourth century (and Tarn is not on this occasion considering only the third): and it may be that the premiss too ought to be modified. All the fourth century, piracy grew; and all the fourth century, the states with the large navies fought against it. It must be inferred, then, that in general the measures taken against piracy were ineffective.

This is not to say that some times were not better than others. The Second Athenian Confederacy may well have made some difference. Referring to the capture and death of Lycon of Heraclea,²⁰⁷ Ormerod notes that²⁰⁸ 'this event took place soon after the year 378-377 B.C., when there are already signs of an improvement in the Aegean.' (no note) 'There is comparative silence as to the existence of piracy on a large scale during the early years of the second Athenian Confederacy.' This has to be qualified in a footnote remarking that Charidemus' early exploits were in these years,²⁰⁹ but the very fact that the allies worked together with Athens in guarding the seas should have made a difference.²¹⁰ The years from 338 to 322, by contrast, seem to have been difficult: the first of the Attic decrees honouring ransomers of captives taken by λησται come from that period,²¹¹ and the foundation of Adria against the Tyrrhenians dates from the mid-320s.²¹² It can be doubted whether Alexander's effort against the pirates was as successful as Ziebarth suggests;²¹³ his undoubtedly 'serious attemptto reduce piracy',²¹⁴ must have been much diminished in effectiveness by the scale of the phenomenon and the shortness of his reign.²¹⁵

The conclusion of this Section is that the reason for the ineffectiveness of action against piracy throughout the century was not any lack of eagerness to protect shipping, nor any lack of resources in absolute terms (since the navies of Athens, Alexander and Rhodes were, each in its time, the strongest the Greek world possessed in the fourth century), but simply that the pirates were too strong: or at least too pervasive. The states captured and punished many pirates, but others took their place. The fact that the ἐπακτροκέλητες were kept filled (though the explanation Aeschines supplies for it may be set aside)²¹⁶ was what defeated attempts to control the λησται outside the πόλεις.

10. Related Matters

This last Section deals with two matters related to Greek λησται: first, the Tyrrhenian λησται; and second, the bringing of ships to land by maritime πόλεως.

The Tyrrhenians, when they ventured into the eastern Mediterranean, had not the same local ties as the Greek λησται. Booty they seized went clear out of the Greek world. They could not, in general, be coped with by attacking their enclaves (like Halonnesus, Alopeconnesus, Cythnos), because these were in Italy (and were perhaps in many cases, as that of Antium, regular communities, using piracy as a form of production in the way which was not extinct in the backward parts of Greece²¹⁷). These considerations explain the foundation of Adria:²¹⁸ it was an adaptation of normal naval techniques for dealing with piracy, founded when they proved insufficient. The Tyrrhenians must have seized a large amount of booty over a fair length of time (years at least; not inconceivably decades) before the Athenians determined to found a colony against them in the West.

And yet the decree establishing it is the first fourth-century reference to Τυρρηνοί as pirates, except D.S. XVI.82.3, which refers only to Sicilian waters.²¹⁹ Doubtless, too, Ziebarth is right in noting that conditions in east Greece made contact with the Adriatic increasingly important for Athens at this period. As he and Ormerod say, Deinarchus' lost Tyrrhenicus and Hypereides' lost περὶ τῆς φυλακῆς τῶν Τυρρηνῶν must fit in here.²²⁰

Tyrrhenian pirates had been passing the straits of Messina as early as the beginning of the fifth century, until Anaxilaus, tyrant of Rhegium (494-476) equipped a harbour and denied them passage.²²¹ Dionysius I in the 380s had an Adriatic policy (which A.G. Woodhead argues amounted in practice to nothing more than occupying Lissus with a Syracusan naval squadron for a few years in the mid-380s²²²); the existence of pirates in

the Adriatic may have been the problem to which this was a response.²²³ There were also Greeks raiding Italy - at any rate when Camillus fought them off by denying them the chance of landing in the early 340s.²²⁴ After Dionysius, as D.S. XVI.82.3 shows, Postumius, who had twelve ληστρίδες, landed at Syracuse expecting to be treated as a friend. Timoleon, more or less fresh come from the victory at the river Crimissus, put him to death. IG XI (2) 148, from Delos, provides in the very first years of the third century for a φυλακή against the Τυρρηνοί; and there are a few scattered items associating the trumpet (σάλπιγξ) with raiders, and so with Etruscans, which go back to Menander.²²⁵ If these show anything, they show that ληστής was an idea which could readily be substituted for Τυρρηνός in the mind of Menander's audience (ληστοσάλπιγγες· οί Τυρρηνοί ἐπειδὴ πρῶτου σάλπιγγος εὐρεταὶ γεγονόασιν²²⁵): and this is confirmed by the Rhodian inscription Syll.³ 1225. Three sons of one Timacrates, all Rhodian officers, are commemorated. They were killed in separate engagements, two against λαυσταί, the other against Τυρρανοί.²²⁷ As the engagements happened at or about the same time,²²⁸ it seems clear that for the Rhodian navy the problems of raiders and Tyrrhenians were at least closely related.

Another phenomenon parallel to the activities of the Greek λησταί was the practice Greek πόλις had of hijacking each other's food. G.E.M. de Ste. Croix argues that 'any city which was itself suffering from a corn shortage had a tacitly recognised right to katagein ("bring to land") corn ships passing near by,' and that 'such an action would not necessarily be regarded as an act of war against the city to which the ships were sailing.'²²⁹ He has collected the testimonia relating to the practice.²³⁰ The case is perhaps overstated where 'right' is mentioned: at the foundation of the League of Corinth it was provided that all the parties to the peace should sail the sea, and that no one should prevent them or hijack

(κατάγειν) a ship of any of them; anyone acting contrary to this should be the enemy of all the parties to the peace.²³¹ If the right to sail the sea unmolested is guaranteed, then any 'right' of maritime cities to relieve their famine by forcing ships to land is implicitly denied. But certainly there is a de facto recognition in the sources that communities would (in conditions of necessity) rob persons trading with other communities with which they wished to remain at peace.

And to illustrate how close the parallel is between this and piracy, it is necessary only to consider two instances: in the late 360s, the Athenians took action to prevent the Byzantines, Chalcedonians and Cyzicenes from seizing cargoes of corn bound for Athens;²³² and in 315/4 they, under Thymochares of Sphettus, attacked Cythnos and took the city,²³³ because Glaucetes had established himself there and was bringing ships to land (...καταγαγόντι|ος έντεϋθεν τὰ πλοῦα...²³⁴). Ormerod speculates that he may have been acting in the interest of Antigonos I:²³⁵ be that as it may, Glaucetes was certainly (in Athenian eyes) a pirate rather than a garrison commander. Bringing ships to land (τὸ κατάγειν) was not a practice carried on exclusively by legitimate states.

But the fact that foreigners and Greek communities both from time to time acted like the Greek λησταί does not pose a serious problem of definition: the speaker of the Halonnesus speech pointed out the cardinal characteristic of the λησταί when he said²³⁶

ἅπαντες...οἱ λησταί τοὺς ἀλλοτρίους τόπους καταλαμβάνοντες καὶ τοῦτους ἐχυροὺς ποιοῦμενοι, έντεϋθεν τοὺς ἄλλους κακῶς ποιοῦσιν.

As homeless people, they made themselves a place in the Greek world, and provoked opposition, and fear,²³⁷ and perhaps some admiration (as Tarn says, 'probably "arch-pirate" was a very honourable appellation'²³⁸): that is, they were viewed in terms analogous to those in which the mercenaries, employed and unemployed, were viewed.²³⁹

Notes

1. Above, pp.162-166.
2. Th. I.5.1.
3. Th. I.4.
4. Th. I.7.
5. Th. II.32.
6. Th. IV.53.2-3.
7. Th. IV.54.4.
8. Th. V.14.3.
9. Th. IV.55.1.
10. Th. VII.26.2.
11. Th. VI.41.2; V.56.3.
12. Th. IV.66.1.
13. Th. IV.75.1. B.R. MacDonald ('ΛΗΙΣΤΕΙΑ and ΛΗΙΖΟΜΑΙ in Thucydides and in IG I³ 41, 67 and 75' AJP 105(1984), pp.77-84) surveys the use in the Peloponnesian war of the technique of establishing groups to carry out guerilla warfare against enemy communities (pp.77-79) and shows how the Athenians took precautions in some peace settlements to avoid their own interests being damaged by guerilla warfare of this sort (pp.80-82).
14. Th. VI.4.5.
15. Hdt. VI.17.
16. Th. I.24.5.
17. Th. I.5.2.
18. Th. VI.104.3.
19. Th. III.51.5.
20. Th. II.69.1.
21. Nepos Themistocles 2.3; Plut. Cimon 8.3.
22. Th. I.4.
23. Th. I.13.5.

24. Ormerod, p.114; Ziebarth, p.13: Ziebarth deduces that Agesilaus had good relations with the pirates ('Agesilaos lässt sie unter Heroldsruf verkaufen, muss also zu den Seeräubern gute Beziehungen gehabt haben').
25. Cf. ML 95 (e) and (f). D. Lotze (Lysander und der peloponnesische Krieg (Berlin, 1964; = Abhandlungen der sächsischen Akademie der Wissenschaften zu Leipzig, philologisch-historische Klasse, 57.1), p.37 n.6) refers to this suggestion of E. Cavaignac ('Les dekarchies de Lysandre' REH 90 (1924), pp.285-316, at p.293) and comments, 'aber die Namengleichheit kann natürlich auch Zufall sein'.
26. Ormerod, p.13.
27. Ormerod, p.14: 'if we remember that piracy was for centuries a normal feature of Mediterranean life, it will be realised how great has been the influence which it exercised on the ancient world.'
28. Ziebarth, p.1.
29. See below, pp.214-215.
30. Isoc. Panegyricus 115.
31. Cf. below, pp.207-212.
32. Xen. Hell.2.11. Cf. for the fifth century, the Samians who were at Anaea on the Asian coast south of Ephesus and opposite Samos. They opposed Athens (Th.III.19.2), negotiated with the Peloponnesians (Th. III.32.2) and caused trouble to the Samians at home (Th.IV.75.1).
33. Polyaen. II.30.1.
34. Polyaen. IV.6.6.
35. See below, pp.193-196.
36. Anon. review of Ormerod, JHS 45 (1925), p.149.
37. E.g. Xen. Anab. VI.1.16 - VII.8.24.
38. See for example Dem. 23(Aristocrates).139; Isoc. Philippus 120 and 122; Polyaen. II.30.1; D.S. XVII.111.1.
39. Suda, s.v. λησταί.

40. Ormerod, p.59 and n.2.
41. The anonymous judge of the 1982 Oxford Ancient History Prize competition suggests per epistulam that the definition is 'presumably based on common parlance at some date, e.g. the age of the fourth century orators, whose diction more than one lexicographer studied.' I am not able to accept this. I should make this counter-suggestion: the lexicographer decided to explain briefly in what respect ληστής and πειρατής are not synonyms; he knew that πειρατής always meant a sea-borne robber; so he wrote his definition without taking account of the uses of ληστής for a sea-borne robber in the old books he read.
42. Ormerod, pp.30-31; his single citation, Josephus Bell. Jud. III.9.2, is far from sufficient to establish the general point.
43. Y. Garlan 'Signification historique de la piraterie grecque' DHA 4(1978), pp.1-16: quoted from p.2.
44. [Dem]. 12(Letter of Philip).5.
45. Dem. 19(Embassy).315.
46. Dem. 18(Crown).145.
47. Dem. 18(Crown).230 and 241. Tod II 154, directing the Athenian βουλή to submit to the assembly a προβούλευμα to the effect that no Athenian nor anyother is to harm (ἀδικεῖν) any of the allies, ὀρμώμενος [τῆς Ἀττικῆς μηδὲ | τῶν π]όλεων τῶν σ[υ]μμαχίδων μηδ[αμόθεν (lines 4-5), and in particular providing for the punishment of τῶν ἐπισ|τρ[ατευσάντων ἐπὶ τ|ή]ν χώραν τῆν Ἐρετριέων (lines 6-7), seems to have the aim of suppressing ληστεία based in Attica and directed against Euboea. Assuming that Dittenberger was right to connect this text with Tod II 153 (see Tod II p.163), it dealt with 357/6.
48. Ziebarth, p.17 ('Kaperkrieg'); Ormerod, p.117 ('both sides resorted to energetic forms of privateering').
49. See below, pp.196-199.

50. See below, pp.207-212.

51. See above, p.185.

52. [Dem]. 12(Letter of Philip).13.

53. [Dem]. 12(Letter of Philip).2. It is necessary to say something about the value of the Letter of Philip as evidence. P. Wendland argues on the ground of Didymus In Dem. 11.7 that it, together with [Dem]. 11 (πρὸς τὴν ἐπιστολὴν τῆν φιλιππου), is excerpted from Anaximenes: and shows by referring to Dem.11.1, 17 and 20, sections which refer to the message from Philip (e.g. §17: [Philip] τολμῶν ἐπιστολὰς πέμπειν τοιαύτας οὔσας ἠκούσατε μικρῶ πρότερον), that the two pieces as they now stand in the Demosthenic corpus belong together (P. Wendland Anaximenes von Lampsakos (Berlin, 1905), p.13). It may nonetheless be right to suggest, with A.W. Pickard-Cambridge, that the Letter 'accurately represents Philip's view' when it deals with 'the acts of hostility which the Athenians had committed against him since 346' (A.W. Pickard-Cambridge Demosthenes and the Last Days of Greek Freedom (New York and London, 1914), p.356 n.6 and p.350); it is certainly plausibly phrased, in view of the public commitment made by Athens to suppress piracy (cf. below, pp. since it represents Philip as saying about Halonnesus (§13):

καίτοι τὴν νῆσον οὔτ' ἐκείνους [sc. the Peperethians] οὔθ' ὑμᾶς ἀφειλόμην, ἀλλὰ τὸν ληστήν Σώστρατον. εἰ μὲν οὖν αὐτοί φατε παραδοῦναι Σωστράτῳ, ληστὰς ὁμολογεῖτε καταπέμπειν· εἰ δ' ἀκόντων ὑμῶν ἐκεῖνος κατεκράτει, τί δεινὸν πεπόνθατε λαβόντος ἐμοῦ καὶ τὸν τόπον τοῦ πλέουσιν ἀσφαλῆ παρέχοντος;

This is exactly the sort of thing an aggrieved Philip would have said after Athens had administered the snub advised in [Dem]. 7(Halonnesus). It would be surprising if he had not communicated something on these lines to the Athenians. So, though the Letter almost certainly did not come as it stands from the pen of Philip II, it can be treated as evidence for events and Macedonian interpretations of events after 346.

54. Philochorus FGrHist 328 F 162 (=Didymus In Dem. 11.1 col. 10.45 - col. 11.5).

55. Didymus In Dem. 11.1 col.10.35-40.

56. The argument of this section should not be thought to imply that raiding shipping was unimportant to λησται: the point is to put it in perspective.

57. Aeschin. 2(Embassy).12-13.

58. Cf. below, pp 205-206.

59. 426: Th. III.99; 415: Th. VI.45; 413: Th. VII.48.5. For an example earlier in the fifth century, cf. ML 30 B, lines 11-23: in this part of a list of public imprecations from Teos, betrayal of the city and land of the Teians (12-14), or of the men (14-15), or of τὸ ἐν | Ἄρο[ι]ηι : περιπό[λι]ον (16-17) is mentioned, and being or receiving brigands (κλεῖαλλαι) or pirates (λησται) is the next item on the list of forbiddances. In the circumstances, it seems more natural to treat the περιπόλιον as a coastal guard-post than as a suburb (contrast ML, p.65); specially since it is mentioned separately from the city and land. W. Dittenberger argues for the derivation of περιπόλιον from περίπολος and not from περὶ + πόλις (whereas προαστεῖον is from πρὸ + ἄστυ) at Syll.³ 570 n.2.

60. Halasarna: Syll.³ 568 and 569; Carpathus: Syll.³ 570.

61. The inscription: B.Ch. Petrakos 'Νέαυ πηγαῖ περὶ τοῦ Χρεμωνιδεῖου πολέμου' Arch. Delt. 22(1967), pp.38-52; later in Heinen, pp.152-159.

English translation in Austin, pp.97-98 (=§50). See lines 5-23.

Routine preparations against pirates appear to be attested in SEG XXVI.1306, where detailed provisions are made for a permanent guard at Cyrbissus (near Teos) to be commanded by an elected magistrate (lines 8-11) who is to have at least twenty citizens as guards and three dogs (lines 18-20). Consciousness of danger that a commander might not hand over the χωρίον to his successor is attested by the penalties laid down at lines 21-27. Cf. below, p.209 and n.194.

62. In his work on South Attica (Young).

63. The catalogue: Young, pp.144-146; diameter and height: Young, p.135.
64. Young, pp.132-133.
65. Young, p.143.
66. Young, p.140.
67. J. Pečirka 'Homestead Farms in Classical and Hellenistic Hellas', in M.I. Finley (ed.) Problèmes de la terre en Grèce ancienne (Paris, 1973), pp.113-147, and in particular pp.123-129.
68. Young, p.133 n.22.
69. D.M. Robinson Excavations at Olynthus II (Baltimore, 1930), pp.35-98 and (especially) Fig.116, which gives the ground-plans of some large houses.
70. Young, pp.133-134. And a (non-Greek) farm with a πύργος occurs at Xen. Anab. VII.8.8-15.
71. Lines 13-20.
72. Lawrence, pp.187-197.
73. Lawrence, p.187 n.12.
74. Lawrence, p.187 n.11.
75. See for example W.J. Woodhouse Aetolia (London, 1897), pp.159-161, where three towers in the region of Stamma in south-west Aetolia (up the river Acheloos from Oiniadae) are identified as the 'towers...in the countryside' destroyed in Philip V's invasion of Lower Aetolia in 219 (Poly. IV.64.11).
76. Lawrence, pp.187-188.
77. Bon: quoted from p.186. pp.184-186 argue specifically and persuasively for the connection of the towers with the prevalence of piracy. For the bay of Hag. Ioannis, cf. p.162.
78. The Epichares inscription (cf. above, n.61), lines 21-22.
79. Dem. 4(Philippic I).23.
80. Dem. 4(Philippic I).32.
81. Bon, p.179.

82. 1. (Young, p.124): 5th. - 4th. century; 2. (p.126): 4th.; 3. (p.126): 4th. - 3rd.; 4. (p.128): 4th., not definitely stated; 5. (p.128): 3rd., perhaps; 6. (pp.130-131): 5th. - 4th., partly on the evidence of the masonry.

83. Lawrence, pp.187-188, argues that the main period of construction of island towers was the 2nd. - 1st. centuries B.C. in the period of Cretan and Cilician piracy. As for mainland towers, he considers that historical considerations make it unlikely (p.188) that many were built as late as the third century B.C. The writers of the published accounts of towers are often too shrewd to commit themselves to mentioning a date for the building of the structures, so that Lawrence's idea cannot be refuted by reference to them; but it is clear what has happened: the periods of construction have been fixed by Lawrence from outside considerations. 'The sea-borne danger...would have reached its maximum with the slave-raiding by Cretan and Cilician pirates,...from the middle of the second century well into the first.... That was surely the islanders' main period of construction.' (p.187). Observation is a better guide: the bulk of towers are of classical date (see above, nn.81 and 82). Lawrence was perhaps not aware of the evidence for great pirate activity in the fourth century. Not but what single towers were built at a wide variety of periods. L.E. Lord ('Watchtowers and Fortresses in Argolis' AJA 43(1939), pp.78-84) suggests a Mycenaean date for some in the Ligurio/Nemea areas.

84. Above, p.190.

85. Dem. 23(Aristocrates).166.

86. *ibid.*

87. Dem. 23(Aristocrates).162.

88. Aeschin. 2(Embassy).72; cf. Ormerod, p.116.

89. de Ste. Croix, p.477, notes that 'one is irresistibly reminded' of this incident by the conversation of Bulla Felix with the Praetorian

Prefect Papinianus (D.C. LXXVII.10.7). A statement in such terms is incapable of refutation; but the two conversations are very different: Bulla's 'why are you the prefect?' stresses that his position in the world is different from the prefect's (and implies that the prefect's question was a foolish one: as if, for example, he had asked a horse why it was a horse); but this pirate's claim is that his position is analogous to Alexander's.

90. On ἱεροσυλία by third-century pirates cf. Rostovtzeff, pp.201-202.

91. [Dem]. 7(Halonnesus).2.

92. Polyæn. IV.9.3. Cf. Plut. Demetrius 49.2. The anonymous judge of the Oxford Ancient History Prize competition draws my attention to Plut. Dem. 25.4 - the story of how Demetrius was pleased (c.303) when his courtiers at parties characterized the other new kings as if they were Demetrius' subordinates: Seleucus, the elephantarch. He suggests that this may have been Seleucus' rejoinder. G.T. Griffith notes (Griffith, p.60) that Demetrius' men had already had a great deal to endure in following Demetrius before they finally chose to desert: 'they had shown that mercenaries can be heroes, and had endured far more than any commander has a right to demand of his men for pay alone.'

93. Cf. above, p.184 and n.38.

94. It was of course a commonplace of invective to call one's enemy a pirate. Augustus at Res Gestae 25 says 'mare pacavi a praedonibus', meaning Sextus Pompeius. But Seleucus' comment, at least, was not wholly unfounded - cf. below, pp.195-196.

95. Griffith, pp.262-263 (the quotation from p.262).

96. Pritchett, p.85.

97. Dem. 23(Aristocrates).148.

98. Pritchett, p.85, calls Charidemus a 'naval privateer' in this period: but Demosthenes does not even suggest that he was working on behalf of a state, still less that he was part of a navy. And cf. below, pp.196-199.

99. Pritchett, pp.86-89.

100. Dem. 23(Aristocrates).154. The date was 360: cf. Pritchett, p.85 and J.M. Cook The Troad (Oxford, 1973), p.338.

101. Dem. 23 (Aristocrates).139.

102. Cf. Pritchett, p.85.

103. Callias the tyrant of Chalcis (on whom see Aeschin. 3(Ctesiphon).85-105) received Athenian citizenship (§85). This need only be mentioned because of [Dem]. 12(Letter of Philip).5, where the writer, referring to Callias' capture of the cities on the Pagasaeon Gulf, uses the phrase ληστὰς ἐξεπέμπετε. But this passage does not show that Callias was a ληστής from outside the πόλις: it is analogous to (e.g.) Xen. Hell. IV.8.35, on which cf. p. 181 above.

104. See above, p. 187.

105. But probably in one work only (Dial. Mort. 24). Ziebarth, p.17, treats the Sostratus in Lucian Alexander, or, The False Prophet 4 (the reference in Ziebarth to this passage is extravagantly wrong) as the same man; but there are alternatives (which do not present themselves in the Dialogue because Sostratus is called ὁ ληστής), for example the Syracusan Sostratus recorded at D.S. XIX.3.3 as having spent most of his life ἐν ἐπιβουλαῖς καὶ φόνοις καὶ μεγάλους ἀσεβήμασι.

106. Lucian Alexander, or, The False Prophet 2.

107. Cf. Ormerod, pp.260-270. R.A. MacKay 'Klephtika: the Tradition of the Tales of Banditry in Apuleius' G&R 2nd. Ser. 10 (1963), pp.147-152 suggests reasons. Cf. also F. Millar 'The World of the Golden Ass' JRS 71 (1981), pp.63-75, at pp.66-67 on Apul. Met. VII.6.

108. Syll.³ 409, lines 9-13.

109. C.R. IV.5.19 and Arr. Anab. III.2.7; cf. Ormerod, p.121.

110. D.S. XX.97.5.

111. D.S. XX.110.4.

112. Dem. 23(Aristocrates).149.
113. Griffith, p.262. Aeschin. 1(Timarchus).191 might be mentioned in support of Griffith, but the point of the passage is simply that ἀσελγεία (§190) gives rise to ruinous consequences. It does not say or imply that the pirate recruits are likely to make their fortunes.
114. But note Th. IV.9.1, where 40 Messenians out of the combined crews of a triaconter and a κέλης were hoplites. Hdt. VII.184.3 mentions 80 as the complement of a penteconter, but there is no evidence bearing specifically on how large a crew a triaconter or a κέλης would have had: so there is no telling what the proportions were.
115. Polyæn. V.19.
116. Plut. Pyrrhus 29; cf. Polyæn. IV.6.18.
117. Above, p. 6 and nn.30-31.
118. Xen. Hell. II.1.30. If Theopompus' ship was the quickest vehicle for the news to Sparta, it was probably a trireme. If a trireme, it was probably in the battle.
119. For instance, Ziebarth, p.15 speaks of Kaperkrieg (privateer-war) between Iphicrates and Anaxibius (Xen. Hell. IV.8.35, cf. above, p.1), and notes (p.17) how, between the Halonnesus affair and Chaeronea, 'beide Parteien, sowohl Philipp wie die Athener, im Kaperkrieg Erhebliches leisteten.'
120. Ormerod, p.60: 'throughout our discussion it will be necessary to make a careful distinction between piracy and such measures of war as would in modern times be classed as privateering.' The whole second chapter (pp.59-79) is directed towards establishing this distinction.
121. Ormerod, p.61.
122. Dem. 24(Timocrates).11-12. In §11 Archebius and Lysitheides are said by one Euctemon ἔχειν...τριηραρχήσαντας χρήματα Ναυκρατικὰ...('to have [as a result of] having been trierarchs some Naucratic money': cf.

the construction οἷδα ἀκούων), and in §12 a τριήρης conveys the three ambassadors. It would be perverse, in the circumstances, to think that it was not an Athenian naval trireme.

123. Dem. 24(Timocrates).13.

124. Dem. 24(Timocrates).12.

125. Ormerod, p.62.

126. Ormerod, p.63 with nn.1 and 2; to Xen. Hell. V.1.1 (cf. above, p. he adds Th. V.115.2. Th. III.51.1 could also be added.

127. Ormerod, p.61.

128. Abroad, not that Demosthenes makes this explicit (cf. below, n.129) but because the lexica say so: There are two notices on ἀνδροληψία, one in the Etymologicum Magnum and the Suda, the other in Harpocration (all of it) and Hesychius (part of it). Both notices stress that seizure outside Athens is in question. Pollux (VIII.41.50) says little.

129. Dem. 23(Aristocrates).83-85. The ...θήσω γὰρ οὕτω... in §85 shows that Demosthenes' instance of how the law works, deals with someone who has gone into exile after committing a homicide is given exempli gratia; so it must be assumed (contra P-W s.v. Androlepsie), or at least hoped, that the notices in the lexicographers (cf. above n.128) had some source other than just this passage.

130. [Dem]. 51(Trierarchic Crown).7.

131. Cf. [Dem]. 51(Trierarchic Crown).13-14.

132. E.g. at Appian BC IV.6.

133. B. Bravo 'Sulân. Représailles et justice privée contre des étrangers dans les cités grecques' ASNP Ser. III 10 (1980), pp.675-987, is a semantically based study of the practice of the remedy of self-help. Bravo includes a translation and elaborate exegesis of [Dem]. 51(Trierarchic Crown).13: διὰ τὰς ὑπὸ τούτων ἀνδροληψίας καὶ σύλας κατασκευασμένας he renders (p.739) as 'à cause de l'état de saisies portant sur les personnes

et sur les biens qui a été fabriqué par ces gens' and notes (p.740)
 'remarquons que le verbe κατασκευάζειν désigne souvent l'action d'établir, d'instaurer, de mettre sur pied, de construire, de fabriquer. C'est manifestement de cette manière qu'il est employé ici'. But it can be argued that κατασκευασμένος is better translated on the analogy of Dem. 27(Aphobus I).61 [πρόσοδον] οὐ μικρὰν κατεσκευάσαντο 'they made themselves a pretty good [income]' (and cf. LSJ s.v., esp. §§3 and 4), so that the translation should be 'because of the kidnappings and seizures carried out [sc. on their own behalf] by these men.' Bravo strains the evidence available from this passage when he infers (p.848) that 'à la piraterie non autorisée qu'exercent les triérarques athéniens, les cités lésées repondent en autorisant la piraterie contre Athènes.'

134. Ormerod, p.117.

135. Dem. 21(Meidias).173.

136. Nor was the navy expected to act in its own interest, despite the activities of a few unscrupulous trierarchs (cf. above n.130).

137. Thasos: [Dem]. 12(Letter of Philip).2. Chios: (Aristonicus) cf. above, p.195 and n.109. Syracuse: (Postumius) D.S. XVI.82.3.

138. See for example D.S. XX.83.3.

139. The word used at Griffith, p.262.

140. Ziebarth, p.1.

141. Ziebarth, p.5: 'Indirekt bieten die Nachrichten über Seeraub uns aber auch Zeugnisse für die Bedeutung des griechischen Seehandels der damaligen Zeit.' And cf. above, p.182.

142. Ziebarth, p.1: 'weiter aber will sie verfolgen, wie und in welcher Form sich der Seehandel trotz des Seeraubs weiter hat entwickeln können.'

143. Rostovtzeff, pp.198-199 shows how maritime πόλεις (specially islands) made treaties with the Aetolians and Cretans rather than be raided. p.202 says of piracy, 'the frequency of the Hellenistic inscriptions that refer

to it, though inscriptions of this period are comparatively rare, indicates that this ancient practice had now become very common and was carried on with cynical ruthlessness.'

144. IG XII (3) (Supp.) 1291, lines 11-13 (cf. above, pp.187-188).

145. Menander Sicyonius 5. A third captive, an old woman, the pirates in the story found it unprofitable to bring to market (lines 3-5).

146. Menander Sicyonius 9-10.

147. Austin, p.156 (=§86).

148. SEG XX, 716 (=SECir. no.103; Supplemento epigrafico cirenaico = Annuario della Scuola archeologica di Atene 39-40 (n.s. 23-24) 1961-62 (Rome, 1963), pp.219-375). The arguments leading to these conclusions are complex. I have had access to them from notes kindly made available to me by Dr. S. Hornblower and taken by him at classes given by Mr. P.M. Fraser on the 8th and 15th May 1979. The following points are crucial: that σῦλα λύω πρὸς + personal name in accusative + amount of money in accusative = settle for damages against [someone] in [a certain sum] (and so that λύω here does not mean pay); that ἀπολομένων (line 16) means corrupted; that φιλόπαυδας (line 25: which Fraser suggests amending to φιλόπαυδες) does, contra G. Pugliese Carratelli and D. Morelli at SECir. p.279, mean pederasts; and that the placing of the inscription in several important shrines, and particularly its going to the θεσμοθεταί in Athens, who dealt with moral offences, shows how highly the Cyreneans rated the importance of publicizing their success in getting compensation for what their community had suffered.

149. See in particular lines 15-20.

150. Dr. Hornblower's notes suggest that Fraser argues for a date c.365.

151. Tarn 2, p.88.

152. Strabo XIV.5.2 (668-669).

153. M.I. Finley 'The Black Sea and Danubian Regions and the Slave Trade in Antiquity' Klio 40 (1962), pp.51-60. Quotes from pp.57-58.

154. Cf. above, p.182
155. Moretti, p.2.
156. Moretti, p.3.
157. Moretti, p.3 quotes as a parallel the Athenians captured a century later by Bucris of Naupactus and taken to Crete (Syll.³ 535).
158. Mr. D.M. Lewis points out 'the similarity of situation to IG I³ 125' (there is not a close verbal similarity between the texts).
159. Strabo XIV.5.2 (668-669); cf. above, p.192.
160. See above, pp.179-184.
161. Cf. above, p.182 and n.30.
162. Lysias XXXII (Diogeiton).29.
163. Ormerod, pp.113-114; cf. Ziebarth, pp.12-13. Incidentally, Isoc. Trapeziticus 35-36, which Ormerod and Ziebarth both take as showing that the general risk of sea travel was greater because the Spartans controlled the sea, very likely means that Stratocles was afraid of being robbed by Spartans. The point of ἄλλως τε καὶ Λακεδαιμονίων ἀρχόντων κατ' ἐκεῖνον τὸν χρόνον τῆς θαλάσσης is diffuse otherwise: and the Spartans were interfering with traffic across the Aegean before the battle of Cnidus (Hell. Oxy. 7.1).
164. Xen. Hell. II.1.20; cf. above, pp.181-182.
165. Dem. 52(Callippus).5.
166. Cf. below, p212.
167. Cf. below, pp213-215.
168. Hdt. III.39.3-4.
169. Rostovtzeff, pp.198-199 (cf. above, n.143) gives an account of these events. Ziebarth, p.108 notes the formulaic similarity between the decrees, citing by way of example Syll.³ 554. J.K. Davies (CAH VII² Part I (Cambridge, 1984), pp.285-290), gives a general discussion of the place of piracy in third-century political developments.

170. Arist. Pol. 1256a 19-21 and 35.
171. See above, pp.193-196.
172. Xen. Hell. VI.4.35; cf. above, p.181.
173. His raid on the Peiraeus: Polyaeus. VI.2.2; in the Cyclades and Peperethus: D.S. XV.95.1; in Tenos: Dem. 50(Polycles).4.
174. Polyaeus. VI.1.2-7.
175. Xen. Hell. VI.4.33-37 gives a brief account of Thessaly from Jason's death until the time when that part of the Hellenica was finished (§37).
176. Dem. 2(Olynthiac II).19.
177. Cf. above, p.187.
178. Aeschin. 2(Embassy).12.
179. As his Amphictyonic dealings show: D.S. XVI.1.4.
180. Cawkwell, pp.38-39, shows how Philip made the Macedonian nobility his courtiers; but Mr. Cawkwell points out to me that not all Philip's courtiers were Macedonians: cf. Theopompus FGrHist 115 F 225a. F 225b amplifies this by noting that Philip's non-Macedonian courtiers ἀντὶ...τοῦ κοσμίως ζῆν ἀρπάζειν καὶ φονεύειν ἐξήτουν.
181. [Dem]. 12(Letter of Philip).2. On the Letter, see above, n.53.
182. [Dem]. 58(Theocrines).56.
183. Isoc. Panathenaicus 226.
184. Cf. above, p.192.
185. Discussed below, p.210.
186. Demetrius' kingdom for instance: cf. below, pp.210-211, and above, pp.195-196.
187. D.M. Lewis 'Notes on Attic Inscriptions' BSA 49 (1954), pp.17-50. Quoted from p.24.
188. Hdt. VII.203.1.
189. IG II² 1629 (= Tod II 200) lines 217-233 (with Dittenberger's restorations: Syll.³ 305 lines 52-68).

190. Rhodes, pp.231-235.
191. Cf. above, p.202.
192. Lines 8-10; 2-3.
193. Rhodes, p.233.
194. SEG XXVI.1306. The editio princeps, with detailed notes, is L. and J. Robert, 'Une inscription grecque de Téos en Ionie: L'union de Téos et Kyrbissos' JS (1976), pp.153-235.
195. IG XI (2) 148, line 73.
196. D.S. XV.13.1.
197. D.S. XVI.5.3.
198. Cf. above, n.53. A.B. Bosworth ('The Congress Decree: Another Hypothesis' Hist. 20 (1971), pp.600-616), arguing that the Congress Decree in Plut. Pericles 17 is a post-338 forgery, notes (p.607) that there is no earlier agreement comparable to the provision in the common peace at Corinth that all the parties to the peace should sail the seas without hindrance (Tod II 177 and [Dem]. 17(Treaty with Alexander).19) and that 'Philip was undoubtedly the first to present the freedom of the seas as a clause in a common peace agreement'. This, if correct, would illustrate further Philip's commitment to being seen to be against the ληστοί.

B.R. MacDonald ('The Authenticity of the Congress Decree', Hist. 31(1982), pp.120-123) suggests that the decree may be a genuine Periclean document (p.123); in doing so he argues that suppression of piracy was no part of its purpose and that the Persian threat was being presented by Pericles as the sole necessary and sufficient reason for the maintenance of the Athenian fleet. This is a difficult problem. I note only that given the very brief and general nature of the decree, the fact that pirates are not mentioned specifically is not a very strong point in MacDonald's favour.

199. C.R. IV.8.15. Read 'in bellum utroque rege converso' (edition of K. Müller (Munich, 1954), following some or all of the 12th to 15th century deteriores (see pp.734 and 739)). The state of chaos in Crete was evidently giving rise to opportunities for pirates; Amphoterus was to get control of the whole island from the Persians and Spartans and so enable himself to suppress the pirates. Here perhaps piracy was only an indirect result of Persian influence; but there was more direct support for piracy, too: see C.R. IV.5.18-19 and Arr. Anab. VI.1.2 and III.2.4 with A.B. Bosworth A Historical Commentary on Arrian's History of Alexander (Oxford, 1980) ad locc.
200. Cf. above, p.192.
201. D.S. XX.81.3.
202. Strabo V.3.5 (=232).
203. Tarn 2, p.48 and n.22 (quotation from n.22).
204. H. Berve Das Alexanderreich auf prosopographischer Grundlage I (Munich, 1926), p.326 n.3.
205. Ormerod, p.129. He argues against Tarn's view, p.129 n.4 and p.161.
206. Both quotations from Tarn 2, p.88.
207. See above, p. 204 and n.165.
208. Ormerod, p.114.
209. Cf. above, p. 194 and n.98.
210. See S. Accame La lega ateniese del sec. IV. A.C. (Rome, 1941), p.137; and cf. pp.124-125, which cites [Dem]. 58(Theocrines).53 but comments 'lo psefisma di Merocle' [from [Dem]. 58(Theocrines).53] 'non si sa con precisione a quando risalga, ma certo a prima dell' anno 342/1 in cui si può datare al più presto il discorso pseudodemostenico contro Teocrine.' So it is not known when this cooperation began. On Moerocles cf. below, p. 316 n.62.
211. Syll.³ 263 and IG II² 283; cf. above, pp. 201-202.

212. Cf. above, pp. 207-208.

213. Ziebarth, p.20: 'wenn wir vom Seeraub, so lange Alexander regierte, abgesehen von den angeführten Fällen nichts weiter hören, so wird das seinen Grund darin haben, dass der grosse König es verstanden hat, auch auf dem Meere Ordnung zu halten.'

214. Ormerod, pp.121-122.

215. Ormerod, p.122 suggests that 'we may suppose also that the famous rescript of 324 B.C. to the Greek cities, ordering the restoration of the exiles, was occasioned not least by the necessity of ridding the Greek world of the homeless outlaws who now formed a large element in the pirate bands.' Ziebarth follows him (p.20).

216. Aeschin. 1(Timarchus).191.

217. Cf. above, pp. 206-207.

218. Cf. above, pp. 207-208.

219. The fact that the site of Adria is unknown should induce some caution in the reader of Ziebarth, p.18: 'wir treffen damit zum ersten Male auf die tyrrhenischen Seeräuber im Westmeer Griechenlands.' Adria was certainly on the west coast of the Adriatic - that is, in Italy - but the attempts of G. Vallet ('Athènes et l'Adriatique' Mélanges de l'Ecole Française de Rome 62 (1950), pp.33-52) and A. Gitti ('La colonia ateniese in Adriatico del 325/4 a.c.' PP 9 (1954), pp.16-24) to be more precise are not conclusive. It does not seem quite right to include the Adriatic in the 'Westmeer Griechenlands' and exclude Sicilian waters.

220. Ziebarth, p.19, and Ormerod, pp.128-129.

221. Strabo VI.1.5 (257).

222. D.S. XV.13.1; Woodhead, at p.507.

223. Woodhead, p.508.

224. Livy VII.25.4 and 26.13-15.

225. Conveniently collected at Ziebarth, p.106, they are: Aristides XLIII p.540 K; Pollux IV.87 (=Men. Fr. 869 Koerte); Photius s.v.

ληστοσαλπυκτάς; Hesychius s.v. ληστοσάλπυγγες. The trumpet is associated with the Etruscans in Greek literature as early as Aeschylus Eumenides 567-568.

226. Hesychius s.v. ληστοσάλπυγγες.

227. Syll.³ 1225 lines 4-5, 8 and 10. Cf. M. Segre 'Due novi texti storici' Riv. Fil. 60 (1933), pp.446-461 at pp.451-461, where an honorific inscription shows that the sons of Timacrates were not 'semplici soldati di fanteria marina' (p.455). Cf. also C. Blinkenberg 'Triemiolia: étude sur un type de navire rhodien' Archaeologisk-Kunsthistoriske Meddelelser II, 3(1938), pp.1-59, at p.14.

228. The brothers were buried under the same mound (Syll.³ 1225 lines 1-2) as well as being mentioned in the same epitaph. And cf. Ziebarth, p.22.

229. de Ste. Croix 2, p.47.

230. de Ste. Croix 2, Appendix VIII.

231. [Dem]. 17(Treaty with Alexander).19.

232. [Dem]. 50(Polycles).6.

233. Cf. above, p.195 and n.108.

234. Syll.³ 409, lines 10-11.

235. Ormerod, p.124 n.3.

236. [Dem]. 7(Halonnesus).3; cf. above, p.190.

237. Opposition, see above, pp.207-212; fear, Theophr. Char. 25.1.

238. Tarn 2, p.88.

239. Compare Isoc. Peace 44 with Aeschin. 1(Timarchus).191 - differently worded but essentially similar accusations of greed.

Chapter 6 - Mobile Skilled Workers

1. Introductory

So far this study has concentrated on people who lost the settled places in Greek society which they would have been glad to keep. It has been suggested that the nature and growth of mercenary service and of ληστεία indicate that many stateless people turned to them.¹ But it would be incomplete and misleading not to mention the people whose occupations caused them (irrespective of political events) to move from city to city.

Some comments on the matter of definition are perhaps necessary. The subject-matter of this chapter is wide: but it does not extend to dealing with fully settled metics. There is a fine line here, though: many, indeed most, of the skilled workers under consideration here were people who could expect to stay in one city for several months, or even for years. Yet they would find it normal to move when the time came.² They were not the people whom Xenophon in the late 350s wanted to attract to Athens (to become long-term taxpayers).³ This subjective criterion, the criterion of what people in the occupations dealt with below would have found normal, is the criterion on which their definition as Greeks outside the πόλις will be based. It would be nice to be able to be more obviously rigorous - nice, for instance, if it were possible to make Isocrates' teacher Gorgias of Leontini, who did not establish a permanent home in any city and so avoided spending money on community interests or paying taxes,⁴ a paradigmatic case and compare with his way of life the pattern observed for other philosophers and similar people. But though a great quantity of evidence relevant to this inquiry is available (mostly in literary sources), it is not usually informative about the skilled workers' tax position or their juridical status in the communities they visited.

Any of the sorts of people covered in this inquiry could justify separate study. Most have already received such. So it is not the intention here to deal in any detail with the technical aspects of the callings under consideration, nor to compete against any of the specialized works referred to below: but it is very much the point of this chapter to provide a general picture of the rôle of travelling skilled workers in Greek society in the fourth century; and where possible to say in what respects things were changing, and how the changes were related to the other events concerning Greeks outside the πόλις. In view of the importance of seeing the picture whole, the final section of the chapter will make some general observations on the activities of skilled workers, who will be referred to as τεχνῖται (without prejudice to the claim the Dionysiac artists later had on the word), over the fourth century; before it, there will be sections on building, on medicine, and on education and entertainment (jointly).

It will be as well, at the beginning, to answer the possible objection that people whose occupation caused them (irrespective of political events) to move from city to city are unlikely to have been influenced, in their choice of occupation, by the state of the Greek world as a whole. Certainly many people followed their parents' occupations; but some had to find means of livelihood when the need arose: a story told to illustrate the unorthodox wit of Diogenes the Dog says that he praised a fat cithara player whom everyone else railed at, and explained (when they asked him why) that he praised him because he was a cithara-player, though a man of his size could be a ληστής.⁵ Clearly a cithara-player (and a bad one, at that) had a shorter and less highly technical training than a sculptor, or a doctor, or a philosopher - but there is an extent to which external circumstances counted, even in those cases. Greek philosophy would have developed differently (perhaps less richly) if circumstances had not driven Diogenes of Sinope (the Dog) and Zeno of

Citium to follow philosophical careers: Zeno, shipwrecked on a voyage to Athens, is recorded by Diogenes Laertius as commenting:⁶

εὖ γε ποιεῖ ἡ τύχη προσελεύουσα ἡμᾶς φιλοσοφία...

Diogenes the Dog made a sharper comment to someone who reproached his exile:⁷

ἀλλὰ τούτου γε ἔνεκεν, ὧ κακοδαίμον, ἐφιλοσόφησα.

And he is recorded as quoting (on another occasion) two iambic trimeters as applying to himself:⁸

ἄπολις, ἄουκος, πατρίδος ἐστερημένος
πτωχός, πλανήτης, βίον ἔχων τούφ' ἡμέραν.

2. Building and Related Skills

This section draws in many places on the work of A. Burford.⁹ Burford writes:¹⁰ 'craftsmen who worked in expensive materials and unusual techniques - not, of course, the shoemakers, blacksmiths, weavers, house builders, harness makers and so on - had to face the problem at one time or another of finding adequate employment for their special skills.' These specialist craftsmen moved to find work. Detailed evidence is made available in The Greek Temple-Builders at Epidaurus, where Burford analyses the levels at which craftsmen of different nationalities could work on the Epidaurian temple: Epidaurians on the foundations and invisible fittings, Corinthians and Argives on the main structure, Athenians and Parians on the pediment sculptures, the decorative stonework and the statue of the god.¹¹ For the chryselephantine statue itself the ivory-workers were from Corinth, Paros, Sicyon, Aegina and Ephesus; the painter was from Corinth; the stonemasons were from Corinth and Athens and the joiners were from Corinth.¹²

But the mobility in evidence at Epidaurus was not in general mobility over a very long distance. The craftsmen working there were mostly from Athens, Argos and Corinth¹³ - places not particularly distant (on the

scale of the size of the Greek world) from Epidaurus. This may in some measure have been due to the fact that Epidaurus happened to be near some of the largest cities in Greece, with the best resources,¹⁴ but it will be worth noting (for comparison with material below¹⁵) that the only workers at Epidaurus who had come a really long distance fell (like the Ephesian ivory-worker) into the top grade of skilled workers - pretty well the internationally reputed artist category.¹⁶ It may be possible to infer that in most circumstances an 'ordinary' skilled man might find it normal to maintain a workshop in one city and travel (for periods of months) to sites not too far away, expecting to go home again at the end of a run of work.¹⁷

This expectation will have ceased to apply when economic conditions became particularly strained for one reason or another. Burford explains the lack of activity in temple-building in mainland and island Greece between 400 and 375 as a consequence of the damage done by both sides to each other in the Peloponnesian War: Dionysius I made a great success of his building and armaments work in Sicily soon after the fall of Athens because he had so many workers, and many of those who went to Sicily must certainly have been from Athens; and Agesilaus made Ephesus a centre for manufacture of armaments from 396, and so must have attracted workers because of the relative economic weakness of Athens in the 390s;¹⁸ the damage done to Sparta's allies is less easily documented. G.T. Griffith argues from Corinthian hoplite numbers in 479 and 394 for a decline in manpower at Corinth and severe economic damage caused by the Archidamian and Deceleian wars,¹⁹ but J.B. Salmon argues that it is not legitimate to infer significant population decline from the hoplite figures and suggests that classical Corinth suffered no serious economic setback due to war until the Corinthian war in the 390s.²⁰

Until the workers returned from the periphery of the Greek world to its centre, Burford argues, the Epidaurians could not begin work on their temple.²¹ The tholos at Epidaurus, started later than the temple, took much longer to complete: Burford connects this with a new shortage of available labour.²² The case for Burford's suggestion that 'the presence in the community of skilled men, whether doctors, sculptors, engineers, or temple builders, was a matter for congratulation; if they were absent, they must be encouraged to come and reside in the city'²³ is well made out, and it is clear that there was usually a seller's market for highly skilled labour in the building trade, so that 'the city-governors could not compel constant loyalty from the craftsmen.'²⁴ But since in the fourth century there were more and more Greeks living outside the πόλις, it is necessary to ask why there is no obvious evidence to suggest that there was any great expansion in the numbers of people following the building trades.²⁵

Since building workers, once their skills were acquired, were indispensable to the patrons of great works,²⁶ the reason for the lack of expansion must be sought in the system under which skills were acquired. First, they were acquired in cities:²⁷ temple builders and sculptors are likely to have taken apprentices from their own cities, if they took any at all apart from sons and slaves. It is known that certain fourth-century sculptors were succeeded by their sons, as Praxiteles was by Cephisodotus, Lysippus by Laippus, Boedas and Euthykrates, and Timarchides by Polycles and Dionysius.²⁸ It seems likely that this pattern was general (the sons of Praxiteles and Lysippus had more reason than most artists for dwelling on their fathers' reputations, which may explain why the relationship came to be mentioned in Pliny's source), and that it applied also to the crafts which attracted less literary attention than the sculptor's. It is likely, then, that the highly specialized skills

connected with temple building and sculpture were guarded by their possessors in a way in which (it will be shown below) certain other skills were not.²⁹

After 375 a wide range of work was available to people with the skills needed in monumental projects. The Mausoleum at Halicarnassus, on the edge of the Greek world, was worked on by six³⁰ Greek sculptors, and it may be presumed that other skilled workers went from Greece to Halicarnassus.³¹ S. Hornblower dates the construction of the Mausoleum by considering what is known of the careers of the six sculptors, and arrives at 'a date in the 350s or thereabouts'.³² In treating the Mausoleum Hornblower makes the point very strongly that no craftsman could afford to work except when he was being paid,³³ and this was certainly in general the case, but it should be noted that exceptional artists may sometimes have made more money than they needed to live on: Lysippus, the most famous sculptor of the late fourth century (when there was more money in circulation than there had been before Alexander's conquests) is recorded as having saved up a gold piece from the price of each of his 1,500 works - the number seems too great but the principle that the very best artists could make savings is not implausible.³⁴

Work on the temples at Ephesus, Delphi and Tegea was done by sculptors,³⁵ and by others as well. Sculptors had commissions for work not connected with building, and so in some cases travelled where other skilled workers were not required: the sons of Praxiteles made an altar in Cos, for example, and both Bryaxis and Aristodemus made portrait statues of Seleucus Nicator;³⁶ but in other cases commissions recorded for sculptors imply the employment of others on the less spectacular work connected with the commissions: Cephisodotus made a statue of Zeus at Megalopolis,³⁷ but it is certain that many were employed on public buildings at Megalopolis throughout the 360s; and Leochares worked on statues of Philip II and his

family for the Philippeium at Olympia,³⁸ which others must have helped to build. In the later years of the century there must have been work available in the reconstruction of Priene,³⁹ and as for the period of the city-foundations of Alexander and the Successors, it is certain that work will have been available for skilled workers in many places. Indeed, shortage of them may have been a partial cause of some delays.⁴⁰ Proximity to the centre of the Greek world had continued to be a help to cities wanting to carry out building projects: when Thebes was re-established in 316 the Athenians built most of the wall and some of the other Greeks helped in the building work.⁴¹ Their resources enabled the work to be done quickly, as they had enabled work on the refortification of Phocian cities to be done quickly before Chaeronea.⁴²

The building-project begun at Delos in the last years of the fourth century continued well into the third century. M. Lacroix, noting that Delos produced little and supported few native people, finds nothing surprising in the fact that the inscriptions of the hieropoioi and the contemporary other inscriptions show that a high proportion of those involved in the work were not Delians.⁴³ As the third century progressed, Delians took on more of the contracts, but earlier 'pendant toute la fin du IV^e [siècle les métèques] semblent avoir nettement la prédominance.'⁴⁴ Some of the suppliers of materials seem to have lived in Delos, others not: but in general the suppliers of stones were, at least originally, from the areas from which they imported stone to Delos.⁴⁵ Lacroix attempts to gauge what rank the foreigners concerned with the temple occupied in the population of Delos: he finds that some large-scale entrepreneurs would also take small jobs, and that some served as choregi.⁴⁶ A few foreigners were in trades not necessarily connected with the temple (metal-workers, sculptors, traders),⁴⁷ but it is interesting that participation by non-Delians in the economic life of Delos declines sharply

after 250, except in the agricultural sector.⁴⁸ Though builders and similar craftsmen might stay put for some time, they eventually moved on.

3. Medicine

Whatever the difficulties involved in deciding the authorship of particular works in the corpus which bears his name, Hippocrates was certainly at the centre of an important change in the practice and transmission of the Greek medical craft. S.M. Sherwin-White, reviewing the development of the Coan school of medicine, mentions the key element:⁴⁹ 'Hippocrates' (c.460 - c.370⁵⁰) 'is the earliest Greek physician whose practice of teaching pupils for a fee is attested.' Previously the Asclepiads had reserved their knowledge for transmission to relatives; but by the beginning of the fourth century the effects of a widening of access to medical knowledge were beginning to be felt in Greece.

Not that doctors first began to travel as a result of the Hippocratic revolution. Democedes in the sixth century had made a large amount of money by being retained (at progressively larger fees) by the Aeginetans, the Athenians and Polycrates of Samos:⁵¹ and it seems that it was normal for a physician to travel at all periods, as far back as Homeric times.⁵² But a scientific interest in the possibilities afforded by travel accompanied the growth in size which will have occurred in the medical world once the principle of instruction for payment was established. Airs Waters Places is the outstanding early example of this: and H. Diller argues convincingly (against the theory that the ethnographic chapters 12 - 24 were written by someone other than the author of the more obviously medical chapters 1 - 11) that the content of the second part of the work forms the basis of the author's claim that climatic conditions affect people's constitutions, and so is integral to the whole.⁵³ Epidemics I.1-26, a study of conditions in Thasos, caters for readers with the same

scientific interest, and Medicus 14 notes that a military expedition is the only context in which a physician will learn the techniques concerned with extraction of missiles.⁵⁴

Another kind of scientific travel involved collecting ingredients for drugs. Theophrastus records how Thrasyas of Mantinea, who compounded a deadly drug of hemlock and other ingredients, gathered his hemlock 'not from just anywhere but from Susa (?) and any other place which was cold and shady'.⁵⁵

The possibilities offered by travel were not only scientific. The career of Ctesias of Cnidos illustrates this. He was Artaxerxes II's personal physician, and dressed his wound at the battle of Cunaxa: and afterwards he participated in the negotiations as a result of which Conon became the admiral of the Persian fleet.⁵⁶ He became a man of influence - though this may have imposed certain restrictions on him as well as offering enviable opportunities.⁵⁷ T.S. Brown suggests that his scientific interest in travel may have been connected with a wish to escape from restriction on medical innovation in the Cnidian school.⁵⁸ Perhaps this was so: but Ctesias also used his experience with the King in the composition of his Persica - not a work in the tradition of Airs Waters Places (still less of Epidemics I), but nonetheless a literary enterprise grown out of the opportunity afforded by mobility as a physician.⁵⁹

Few physicians' careers were as brilliant as Ctesias'.⁶⁰ But doctors, though their normal expectation was to travel, were in a very prestigious craft.⁶¹ There must have been some people who gave treatment to the sick without having been apprenticed to a skilled doctor, but two points should be given some weight before any strong distinction is made between 'mere leeches' and 'physicians':⁶² first that though it is often pointed out by modern writers that study and examination were not formal conditions of entry to the profession,⁶³ there is a stress in several treatises in

the Hippocratic corpus on the need to acquire the attributes which make the real physician a distinctive and recognisable character;⁶⁴ L. Edelstein in 'The Hippocratic Physician' discusses medical style:⁶⁵ but it ought to be stressed rather more than it is in Edelstein's paper that an authoritative demeanour and impressive bandaging come as the result of practice - the importance attached to them in Hippocratic writings indicates a progressive strengthening of the hold trained physicians had on medical practice, and not a potential weakening of it; second, that it is only in modern times that there has been a 'single, socially chartered therapeutic system with final authority':⁶⁶ in ancient Greece there was perhaps less to be gained from pretending to be a Hippocratic physician than from offering another style of healing.

The Hippocratic treatises have a good deal to say about the travelling way of life of the doctors.⁶⁷ The Law, apparently a kind of manifesto to new or prospective medical students, sets out the things which those heading for the medical craft are in need of in order to be thought physicians not in word only, but also in deed, when they go 'to the cities' (ἀνὰ τὰς πόλεις).⁶⁸ This treats training as a preparation for a mobile way of life - it would have been possible (if it had been the usual pattern) to say 'to a practice in some city' instead of ἀνὰ τὰς πόλεις. And one of the things which (the Law says) a student needs is 'to become a young pupil (παιδομαθής) in a place such as is suitable for learning.'⁶⁹ The implication is not that no one should think of becoming a physician unless a medical school is nearby, but that action may be required by the intending physician if he is to comply with this one of the author's six conditions for gaining understanding.⁷⁰ Travelling to study is envisaged, as a possibility at least.⁷¹ It would be odd if this were not so, as it would entail its being impossible (on the author's terms) for a travelling physician's son to acquire his father's craft. Decorum adds detail: the physician is to have a second παρέξοδος (set of equipment) for journeys

(ἀποδημίας) - it is to be a simpler one (ἡ λιτοτέρη) and portable (ἡ δὲ ἐν χερσίν).⁷² This description of the doctor's travelling kit introduces a short section on the doctor's preparation of himself⁷³ and of his medicines,⁷⁴ and it seems natural to apply the hints given on these subjects to the context of travel: he is to have information on drugs and diseases committed to memory, and he is to have a range of preparations available for instant use - 'gathered from the appropriate places' says the author, bringing out again the scientific value of travel to the doctor: it would give him chances to obtain a range of necessary things not all available in a single locality.⁷⁵

And a doctor coming to a town to settle for a while could (if he felt the need) use a Hippocratic treatise as a source of instruction in how to set up a surgery (ἰητρεῖον). The author of the de Medico advises on position, light, furniture and water supply before turning to the quality and suitability of medical supplies and instruments.⁷⁶ His treatise is too short to give any significant amount of technical information, and is perhaps best looked at as a kind of check-list for students at a fairly advanced stage:⁷⁷ those considering beginning to practise on their own account. Naturally they needed suggestions written down for reference when they arrived at a new place. In the Surgery, a treatise which gives more technical information than the de Medico, also provides a laconic list of requirements 'for operation in the surgery'.⁷⁸ These pieces of advice are an attestation in the medical literature of the style of life of doctors who settled for periods of years in a single place (possibly making tours from it: the λιτοτέρη παρέξοδος in the Decorum implies the existence of a more comprehensive set of equipment in some home base⁷⁹).

Some of these, so to speak, semi-settled doctors were Public Physicians, receiving payment of retainers from the states on which they lived. They almost certainly did not provide free health care (except

insofar as they obeyed the writers' exhortations to do so in special cases⁸⁰),⁸¹ but their presence in the communities they lived in was sometimes recognised by the passing of honorific decrees (in the fourth century, and more often as the Hellenistic Age progressed).⁸² It is reasonable to think that a state paying a retainer would expect its doctor to devote his full-time attention to treating patients in the city and not go on tours: the purpose of the retainer was probably not only to attract the doctor in the first place, but also to free patients of the anxiety described in [Hp.] Precepts 4, that the doctor who begins by talking about his fee may be about to leave his patient and go away with no bargain made.⁸³

4. Education and Entertainment

It may seem odd to couple education and entertainment. And capricious to deal in the same section with philosophers and their students, with hetaerae, and with actors (mentioning also orators, musicians and cooks). But when the hetaera Glycera said to the Megarian philosopher Stilpo⁸⁴

Τὴν αὐτήν...ἔχομεν αἰτίαν, ὡς Στίλπων. σέ τε γὰρ λέγουσιν
διαφθεῖρειν τοὺς ἐντυγχάνοντάς σου ἀνωφελεῖ καὶ ἐριστικὰ σοφίσματα
διδάσκοντα, ἐμέ τε ὡσαύτως ἐρωτικά,

the bite of the clever pun was added to by a resemblance between the lifestyles of philosophers and hetaerae (nor, in all likelihood, was she entirely unfair in her reporting of what 'they say': in some quarters philosophy attracted opposition⁸⁵). This account is intended to bring out the similarities, and in general to examine the place of mobility between cities in the cultural life of Greece.

Plato and Aristotle, the Academy and the Lyceum, represent the heart of Greek philosophy in the fourth century. Just because this is so, it is dangerous to concentrate on them in an examination of how philosophers

lived. But their great importance in this inquiry lies in the fact that their achievements ensured that nearly all the philosophers of the fourth century had to come to Athens to study before they could make a living as travelling philosophers. In this respect fourth-century Athenian philosophy represents a partial victory for Socrates' reaction against the methods of the sophists and in favour of education through *συνουσία*.⁸⁶ After 399 there was a sort of diaspora of Socrates' followers from Athens, connected with a withdrawal to the house of Euclides at Megara after the death of Socrates:⁸⁷ Phaedo went back to Elis;⁸⁸ Aeschines the Socratic went to the court of Dionysius I in Sicily,⁸⁹ introduced to the tyrant's patronage by Aristippus, who had entered the life of a travelling philosopher before the death of Socrates.⁹⁰ Aristippus' career shows traits which come out also in the careers of later alumni of the Athenian schools. He was a success, made money and sent it to Socrates (who refused a gift of twenty minas from him: but presumably accepted more modest offerings),⁹¹ and enjoyed a flamboyant level of consumption.⁹² Diogenes Laertius tells two stories about Aristippus on sea voyages,⁹³ which suggest the place of travel in the life of the philosopher; and he spent time in Athens with Socrates, in Sicily, in Corinth, in Asia and almost certainly a good deal of time in his native Cyrene.⁹⁴ Clearly he attained star status, and clearly it was important to do so: Diogenes of Sinope, on an occasion when no one would listen to his serious lecture, changed the style of the address.⁹⁵ Self-publicity was central to philosophical success. Not that Diogenes had the same attitude to earning and spending money as Aristippus:⁹⁶ but he travelled widely - at least to Megara, Myndus, Samothrace, Lacedaemon and Delphi besides Athens⁹⁷ - and, like Aristippus,⁹⁸ encountered pirates on a voyage.⁹⁹ A third self-publicist who attained star status in the philosophical business was Bion the Borysthenite.¹⁰⁰

The slave and protégé of a rhetor in Olbia from childhood to the age of about twenty, he sold up his master's books when he inherited them and went to Athens to learn philosophy.¹⁰¹ He, too, became a travelling philosopher (another who met up with pirates¹⁰²), and the story of his arrival in Rhodes indicates the kind of scene which might have been expected when a philosopher came to town (an extremely successful philosopher: the point of the story is that Bion was trying to create an exaggerated impression of his own status in the philosophical world): he persuaded the sailors, from the ship he arrived in, to wear academical dress (σχολαστικὰς ἐσθῆτας) and then made an entrance into the gymnasium with them in tow (σὺν οἷς εἰσβάλλων εἰς τὸ γυμνάσιον περίβλεπτος ἦν).¹⁰³ Diogenes Laertius gives the fact that Bion was πολυτελής as explanation of the fact that he moved from city to city:¹⁰⁴ probably fairly frequent moves helped maximise a philosopher's revenue from giving lectures.

Lectures were meat and drink. They represent an area where education and entertainment shaded into each other: Diogenes of Sinope's adaptation of his material in order to gain a bigger audience has already been noted,¹⁰⁵ and the writer of the Hippocratic Precepts makes disparaging reference to the wish to give an ἀκρόασις for the sake of attracting a crowd (he pleads with doctors at least not to quote poetry as evidence).¹⁰⁶ Aeschines the Socratic, returning to Athens from Sicily, found that the circles of Plato and Aristippus were well established so that he dared not σοφιστεῦεν (teach philosophy, the context implies, to private pupils), and he therefore gave ἐμμίσθους ἀκρόασις (lectures with an admission fee)¹⁰⁷ and composed law-court speeches.¹⁰⁸ The distinction between education and intellectual entertainment is rather a fine one, and it should be said that the criticism in Diogenes Laertius of Menedemus for not keeping order at his lectures ('it was not possible to see any order at his place, and the benches were not in a circle, but each would listen wherever he happened

to be walking about or sitting, and he himself followed the same pattern'¹⁰⁹) suggests that it was usual for a rather disciplined atmosphere to prevail at lectures.¹¹⁰ But the content of lectures had to appeal to paying customers: an audience came to hear Plato lecture on the Good - an understandably popular theme - and was not prepared for the mathematical content of the address;¹¹¹ by contrast Bion's Diatribes may well have contained a good deal of entertaining material.¹¹²

To make a success as a philosopher in Athens was the pinnacle of a philosophical career, at least for an ambitious practitioner of philosophy. Some, like Aristippus, were content to return to their original homes and become, as it were, the big fish in a small pond (though even Aristippus recognised the importance in his philosophical career of having left Libya for Greece).¹¹³ Alexinus, the pupil of Ebulides, went to Olympia in the hope of founding an Olympian αἴρεσις: this may have been an attempt to make a new philosophical centre (the grandeur of the name would suggest a rival to Athens), but it came to nothing - Alexinus' money ran out and he went away into inglorious retirement.¹¹⁴ But talented philosophers - for example Aristotle¹¹⁵ and Epicurus¹¹⁶ - became experienced and established practitioners by working outside Athens, then came to the big city. J.P. Lynch speaks of Athens attracting sophists who had 'given up their itinerant practice',¹¹⁷ and N.W. de Witt, commenting on Epicurus' career, says that 'from the very first it had possibly been his plan, after trying out his teaching in the provinces, as it were, to establish himself in Athens, where a new philosophy if bidding for general recognition, was bound to locate itself.'¹¹⁸

Pupils, as well as masters, would travel. This fact is perhaps reflected in the laconic entry in Photius s.v. φοιτητάς: μαθητάς παραγενομένους. It is certainly referred to by Aeneas Tacticus, when he advises his readers that a register should be kept of people from

neighbouring cities who are in a city 'for the sake of education (κατὰ παιδείου) or for any other purpose (χρεῖαν)'.¹¹⁹ And it is very amply illustrated by the wide range of ethnics in (for example) the list of Plato's disciples.¹²⁰ These were people who came to Athens either because they had heard of Plato or, as Bion did at the end of the century, because it was the only possible destination for a young man who wanted to be a philosopher.¹²¹ Disciples would, when necessary, follow their philosopher when he moved from one place to another - like the disciples who asked Alexinus why he had moved from Elis to Olympia,¹²² or the 'very many disciples' who followed Eudoxus of Cnidos from the court of Mausolus to Athens.¹²³ Considering the worry about security (attested in Aeneas) which could arise from the presence in a city of a man with a group of dedicated followers, it is perhaps surprising that there is not more evidence of philosophers' being banned from cities, as Epicurus was from Mytilene in 310.¹²⁴ Aristotle fled from Athens in 323, and had found it prudent to leave in 348,¹²⁵ and even on the later occasion his pupils seem not to have followed him, but this is accounted for by the established nature of the school in the Lyceum by 323. Philosophers were travelling persons, whether they were masters of their profession or students, but, particularly in the case of serious students of philosophy, the roads they travelled tended to lead to Athens.

Philosophy was usually regarded as unimpeachably respectable. Hetaerae, by contrast, are treated by the ancient authors as having existed as an element in a demi-monde. The writers, and their readers, knew what the facts were (and felt no strong disapproval of the society in which hetaerae had a not unimportant place), but it was possible for anyone with a claim to unworldliness to pretend ignorance of them: hence Socrates' 'feigned innocence' in Xenophon Memorabilia III.11, and its literary effectiveness.¹²⁶ The speech against Neaera, probably written by

Apollodorus, gives a unique view of the fourth-century demi-monde, and expresses a wide variety of moral views on the hetaerae, their occupation and their clients. There is an implicit distinction between merely consorting with hetaerae and living a dissolute life:¹²⁷ little or no blame seems to attach to a man for the former.¹²⁸ It was apparently regarded as normal that the demi-monde should exist, and moral debate tended to concern its proper Sitz im Leben, so that censorious comments in Greek literature about hetaerae and their lifestyle tend to come in the form of objections to lapses in the usually rigidly observed separation of the (so to speak) wifely mode of existence and the hetaera's mode of existence.¹²⁹ That is, it seemed reprehensible to marry a hetaera (and correspondingly some fun is made of hetaerae who marry);¹³⁰ but it seemed normal for a hetaera to be almost everything a wifely woman was not allowed to be:¹³¹ seen in public, present at dinners, property-owning,¹³² and mobile. Neaera lived in Corinth, and later in Megara, as well as in Athens, and travelled to the Peloponnese, Thessaly and Ionia in connection with her work.¹³³ Her moves seem to have been occasional, brought about by circumstances at particular moments; and this gives a definite point of comparison between her and the physicians and philosophers.¹³⁴ And others of the hetaerae found that fourth-century conditions made it desirable or necessary for them to adopt a mobile lifestyle.

Athenaeus book XIII provides a large fund of insights, mostly in the form of anecdotes, and quotations from comedy, into the Greek demi-monde. Many periods are represented, but there is a particularly impressive fund of stories dealing with the later part of the fourth century and the first century or so of the Hellenistic Age. It was perhaps a sort of golden age for the hetaerae - at least for the most successful of them; Alexander the Great and several of the Successors and Epigoni are named as lovers of hetaerae: Alexander of Thais (whom Ptolemy Soter

later married),¹³⁵ Antigonus of Demo,¹³⁶ Demetrius Poliorcetes of Lamia, Leaena and 'many others',¹³⁷ Ptolemy Philadelphus of a whole list of women.¹³⁸ It would be foolish to forget that colourful stories are easily attached to colourful characters, but the way in which hetaerae seem to have entered into the milieu of the mobile Macedonian courts is not only paralleled by the involvement of artists, physicians and philosophers in these circles,¹³⁹ but also comparable with the way in which slightly earlier dynasts on the fringes of the Greek world brought Greek girls into their courts: Many sources refer to Cyrus' two Greek concubines, one of whom (the more famous) was captured by the Persians at Cunaxa while the other escaped;¹⁴⁰ and Athenaeus quotes Theopompus on Strato, king of Sidon:¹⁴¹

ὁ δὲ Στράτων μετ' αὐλητρίδων καὶ φαλτριῶν καὶ κληροδοτριῶν
κατεσκευάζετο τὰς συνουσίας · καὶ μετεπέμπετο πολλὰς μὲν ἑταίρας
ἐκ Πελοποννήσου, πολλὰς δὲ μουσουργοὺς ἔξ Ἰωνίας, ἑτέρας δὲ
παιδίσκας ἐξ ἀπάσης τῆς Ἑλλάδος...

and goes on to note Strato's rivalry with the court of Nicocles the dynast of Cyprus.¹⁴² The princely practice of keeping hetaerae was copied by others, from Harpalus¹⁴³ downwards in the scale of wealth and influence through Demetrius of Phalerum to the philosophical and literary figures: Menander, Stilpo, Epicurus.¹⁴⁴

Of those hetaerae not travelling to the courts of kings and dynasts, probably many stayed in the same city for long periods.¹⁴⁵ Athens was as much a cultural centre for hetaerae as for philosophers (Aristophanes of Byzantium compiled from literary sources a list of 135 Attic hetaerae¹⁴⁶), and probably the personnel ensuring the Athenian cultural predominance in this area¹⁴⁷ were drawn largely from outside Athens,¹⁴⁸ just as the philosophers were. As early as the Periclean period 'crowds of beautiful women' had been imported to Athens by Aspasia (who was from Miletus),¹⁴⁹ and there are several examples afterwards of a style of (so to speak) 'apprenticeship' which involved a working hetaera buying girls as slaves

(hence from abroad) and bringing them up to the hetaeric way of life. Neaera, the speaker alleges, became a hetaera in this way;¹⁵⁰ Sinope, who moved her business from Aegina to Athens, was succeeded by Bacchis and Bacchis by Harpalus' mistress Pythionice;¹⁵¹ and Gnathaenium was the granddaughter (whether by blood or by convention¹⁵²) of Gnathaena.¹⁵³ The maintenance of these dynasties is likely to have required an inflow of young girls to Athens and to have caused a situation in which some hetaerae left Athens to seek work elsewhere (as philosophers left Athens and physicians left Cos): the passage which says that Aspasia imported women into Athens says also that Greece was filled with Aspasia's hetaerae.¹⁵⁴

The philosophic and hetaeric occupations were arguably paradigmatic callings in education and entertainment respectively. Something can be said about the other specialists in these areas, particularly about comic and tragic actors, though perhaps less than one would like. Orators may not have been very mobile:¹⁵⁵ only one speech in the extant corpora of fourth-century rhetoric was written for delivery in a law-court outside Athens (Isocrates Aegineticus¹⁵⁶), and it may well be the case that, though the Syracusan Lysias made a living and a name for himself as a metic in Athens, and the Corinthian Dinarchus became the top orator in Athens roughly from the death of Alexander to the restoration of democracy in 307,¹⁵⁷ the connection between political and forensic oratory was so close that usually only teachers, and not practitioners, of rhetoric could succeed in coming from outside and establishing themselves in business in a city.¹⁵⁸

It was always the business of actors to go on tours,¹⁵⁹ and by about 280 the guilds of Dionysiac artists were beginning to be formed:¹⁶⁰ an Amphictyonic decree of 278 granting extensive privileges 'to the $\tau\epsilon\chi\upsilon\tau\alpha\iota$ in Athens' shows something of their importance.¹⁶¹

A. Pickard-Cambridge argues that organization on these lines had been rendered almost inevitable by the growing importance of dramatic and musical performances in the fourth century.¹⁶²

P. Ghiron-Bistagne draws attention to the central importance of the fourth century in the development of the Greek theatrical tradition.¹⁶³ In this period some of the works of the great playwrights of the classical age gained through continued performance the canonical character which caused their survival into modern times and put them at the heart of the repertoire which the Dionysiac artists of later centuries drew on. It would be a mistake to underestimate the importance of the fourth-century antecedents of the Dionysiac artists.

Throughout the fourth century there were famous actors.¹⁶⁴ When Macedon came to prominence the court of Philip¹⁶⁵ and the court of Alexander could attract the top performers.¹⁶⁶ The anecdotal sources which tell stories of these actors do not in general have anything to say which is informative about their lifestyle, but the Samian decree honouring Polus the Aeginetan, passed in 306,¹⁶⁷ is an exceptionally interesting text relating to one of the most attractive of fourth-century actors, from the anecdotal sources' point of view.¹⁶⁸ The Samians, wanting to celebrate a festival to Antigonos and Demetrius on the news of Demetrius' naval victory at Cyprian Salamis, sent ambassadors to Polus to ask him to perform, and agree to a financial arrangement whereby he would receive less money for his performance than he would normally have expected.¹⁶⁹ The grant of citizenship and other privileges recognises his acceptance of this.

Naturally Polus' earning power at the height of his career had put him in a position where he could take note of the things which in the highest social circles were more important than money. But there is a third-century Euboean inscription which provides evidence on actors'

pay.¹⁷⁰ In this text a living-allowance (συντηρέσιον) of nine obols per day is laid down for actors during festivals; and performance fees are in hundreds of drachmas.¹⁷¹ These fees, as Ghiron-Bistagne notes, would be only to the protagonist, who would maintain his troupe out of them.¹⁷² The division is clear: the star performers would be able to become rich and famous, and need not spend on their assistants any more than necessary to assume themselves of capable support in their performances.¹⁷³ Organization among travelling actors should be envisaged on the lines of a star performer gathering a retinue of assistants and personal servants and maintaining them out of his earnings.

These star performers were welcomed in cities at festival-times. The popular appeal of their product is easily understood in the modern mind;¹⁷⁴ but it is as well to remember that in acting plays they carried out religious ceremonies which audiences and city governments regarded as having an importance beyond entertainment.¹⁷⁵ Hence the apparent unanimity between city governments (who paid) and the public (who made the star actors famous) in valuing actors highly.

But Ghiron-Bistagne makes the point that whereas people putting on festivals were carrying out a civic and religious duty, actors were paid workers.¹⁷⁶ They were people who had chosen a specialized career. Some achieved stardom and more did not: and this posed a certain ideological difficulty. Aristotle observes (in a section on complimentary and uncomplimentary words denoting identical referents) that some call actors δλονυσοκόλακες but that they call themselves τεχνῦται.¹⁷⁷ As time went on the literary tradition continued (at points where it was very representative of the aristocratic tradition in serious mood) to show hostility to actors; The Aristotelian Problems ask why Dionysiac artists are wicked,¹⁷⁸ and, in another place, why some people choose inferior occupations (θαυματοποιός, μῦθος, συρικτής) rather than more serious ones

(ἀστρονόμος, ῥήτωρ).¹⁷⁹ This second passage is interesting because it recognises that they develop a different value-scheme from that to which the reader is presumed to subscribe.¹⁸⁰

The Thrasyllus in Isocrates' Aegineticus had an occupation analogous to that of a doctor. He was a travelling fortune-teller, a μάντις, who, having inherited books from his ξένος Polemaenetus, became a πλάνης and made his own fortune before settling down into a highly respected retirement in his own city.¹⁸¹ The comments above on the style and manner of Hippocratic doctors¹⁸² probably apply, with due adjustment, to μάντις: Polemaenetus, who may not have been a travelling practitioner himself, probably taught Thrasyllus the value of appropriate dress and demeanour; and the books were the professional equipment¹⁸³ equivalent to the doctor's surgery and the philosopher's train of disciples, authenticating his status as well as having a part in the practice of his craft.

Another area which produced specialists was the area of cookery. If one can judge from the growth in the incidence of references to cooks in comedy, their profession came to be distinctive and of recognisable character (such as to be parodied and made a joke of) in the century after Aristophanes' career ended.¹⁸⁴ The evidence of comedy should be treated with great care, all the more so when access to it can be had only via Athenaeus, but it can establish some points. First, that it was usual for cooks to be free men and not slaves.¹⁸⁵ Second, that two masks were in use on the comic stage, one representing a native cook, the other a foreign cook.¹⁸⁶ Third, that specialist cooks were hired for particular occasions.¹⁸⁷ All these points favour the supposition that cooks were free to travel between cities when they thought business might be better elsewhere. And the flow of technical knowledge into Greece from outlying areas of the Hellenic world would suggest that cooks, like doctors, were prepared to travel partly in order to gain experience;¹⁸⁸

this is corroborated by evidence (again from Athenaeus) for the existence of technical treatises - ὀφαρτυτικὰ συγγράμματα.¹⁸⁹ There was money to be made from cooking - more, probably, after the beginning of the Hellenistic Age than before it (though the cook had become a stock character in the days of Middle Attic Comedy¹⁹⁰) - and the best-informed, most skilful and most plausible cooks were best placed to make it.

5. The General Picture

The list of travelling specialists could be extended almost indefinitely. Laches in Plato Laches 183A-B says how travelling ὀπλόμαχοι (professional drill-sergeants) seem to regard Sparta (the home of military training) as an ἄβατον ἱερόν and go anywhere else but there to practise. Tissaphernes employed a Greek military expert,¹⁹¹ and an Attic decree honours a Methonaeon who was a διδάσκαλος to Athenian ephebes.¹⁹²

It can be said with some confidence that in the fourth century B.C. more Greeks than ever before were receiving the technical training that would enable them to live from skills whose exercise normally involved enough travelling to make their practitioners effectively into persons who lived a life outside the πόλις. A piece of evidence for this statement, to add to the observations above on the flourishing state of particular specializations, is the 'protreptic' literature of the fourth century: the texts written to encourage young men to undertake training. [Hp.] The Art is a specially interesting example of the genre,¹⁹³ because in the introduction to its defence of medicine as a definable technique of demonstrable utility it shows an awareness of τέχνας (almost 'the professions') as a group of occupations of the same kind.¹⁹⁴ The author undertakes to oppose the detractors of ἱητρικὴ and leaves it to suitably qualified persons to give appropriate defences of other τέχνας.¹⁹⁵ Some other Hippocratic treatises appear to be directed at audiences

similar to the intended audience of The Art (though no other is so obviously cast as an apologia): Ancient Medicine aims to publicize and defend the author's scientific technique;¹⁹⁶ Law challenges the reader to undertake medical study;¹⁹⁷ and Decorum urges the young towards wisdom (σοφίη)...ές τέχνην πεπολημένη and away from wisdom ...μετ' αίσχροκερδείης καὶ ἀσχημοσύνης.¹⁹⁸ Philosophers, too, wrote works to attract young men to philosophy.¹⁹⁹ The clear example is Isocrates I (To Demonicus): most likely not written only to gain favour with the wealthy prospective pupil to whom the work is addressed, but also for public consumption: §3 almost invites any young man with intellectual interests to substitute his own name for Demonicus' and read Isocrates' pages of good advice as a sample of what philosophy has to offer.²⁰⁰ A protreptic element came into ὀφάρτυτικὰ συγγράμματα too, to judge from Athenaeus' report of the cookery-book authors' Heraclides' and Glaucus' the Locrian's opinions on who was a suitable entrant to the cooking profession.²⁰¹

There was counter-propaganda by the proponents of conventional styles of life: Plato in the Gorgias (463A-C) divides κολακεία into ὀφιοποιική, ῥητορική, κομμωτική and σοφιστική - and these, except perhaps κομμωτική (beautician work), were skills typically exercised by travelling Greeks. Passages in Plato seeking to limit the application of the term τέχνη (Gorgias 464B) or to incorporate features of the life of mobile skilled workers into regular city life (Rep. I 345E-347A) can be seen as responses to the ideological challenges to conservative thought implicit in the recruitment of young men with means to pay for training into skilled travelling occupations.

The Etymologicum Gudianum distinguishes between τεχνῦται and βάνουσοι.²⁰² This entry would seem likely to be derived from a source which came into existence in a period when there was debate about the prestige and position of 'professional' workers as compared with others and as compared with those

who did not need to work in order to live. Deprecation of banausic trades in fourth-century sources suggests that the growing element of educated and articulate persons in technical occupations will probably have been keen to dissociate themselves from the people whose work seemed menial to most writers. So the distinction in the Etymologicum Gudianum should probably be ascribed to this period. It, together with the outpouring of protreptic, is a pointer to an ideology; a minority ideology, indeed, but one not without importance. An ideology of people whose primary identification was with their job,²⁰³ and whose job would determine where they lived at a given time. People with means to afford training would be the most likely to take the path which would lead to itinerant practice in medicine or education (though there are examples of men from humble origins who took to philosophy²⁰⁴): hetaerae and cooks would not be recruited from the ranks of the well-to-do. But high income was available for some practitioners in all these occupations. The world outside the πόλις was not a world of uniform destitution.

G.E.M. de Ste. Croix' comments on the sorts of people discussed in this inquiry are limited in their usefulness by his classification of them under the miscellaneous category 'other independent producers'.²⁰⁵ He attempts (as observed above²⁰⁶) to treat the physician Democedes as an anomalous case: this treatment, given some plausibility by Democedes' exceptional success and his early date, is inadequate as an analysis of the position of skilled people who loosened, or entirely broke, their πόλις ties in the fourth century. By being outside the πόλις - on the move, periodically, from one city to another - they put themselves outside the established political order of Greece. By being identified primarily with their job, they put themselves outside the established social order: so that de Ste. Croix must fail to define their class position,²⁰⁷ and they must stand as an exception to M.I. Finley's generalizations on orders and status.²⁰⁸

They shook away the constraints of the usual kind of life in society. They lived an international life. Their existence and increasing numbers and importance were one of the factors which made the Greek world, as the fourth century progressed, an ideal world for Hellenistic kings to live in: the Macedonian courts fitted in to an already developing system which took people away from home to learn τέχνας and into a mobile mode of life to practise them. Athens, the centre of the international life, became the σκοπή τῆς οἰκουμένης so that Antigonus and Demetrius, even at the moment of hoping to conquer it,²⁰⁹ planned not to keep it for themselves after conquest - since it could flash their deeds to all men.²¹⁰ They were not intending to restrict their conquests by refraining from holding Athens - or at least, it is not necessary to ascribe to them a motive which would seem uncharacteristic - the point of the action was, as it were, to conquer the intellectual world. Kings needed support from philosophers and people of similar influence;²¹¹ though it might sometimes come unasked, it could not be gained by mere coercion.²¹² So their moves towards gaining the allegiance of the practitioners of τέχνας at the highest level (including the restrained behaviour of several of them, from Philip II onwards, towards Athens²¹³) were as much part of their drive to dominate the world of the Greek cities by control of the Greeks outside the cities as were their moves to recruit mercenaries, to drive the λησται off the seas, and to found cities to their own glory.

Notes

1. Cf. above, pp.146-234.
2. Whereas it was not usual to assume that a metic would leave a city one day: Plato Laws 850 A - D, which provides that metics are to stay only twenty years in the hypothetical city, is a proposal for an amendment to the standard (Athenian) practice - the amendment being intended to help regulate outside influences on the hypothetical community. The expectation that metics would be settled residents is brought out by D. Whitehead (Whitehead, pp.6-7), who insists that 'immigrant' is a better translation of μέτοικος than 'resident alien' (but cf. pp.18-19, where Whitehead notes the differentiated nature of the metic community at Athens). Cf. above, pp.1-2 and n.5.
3. Xen. Poroi 2.1-7; cf. Whitehead, pp.125-129. This is perhaps an appropriate place in which to add that this chapter will not be concerned with ἔμπορος (but cf. below, pp.288-325). Travel is not by itself the definitive element: the temporary or permanent relaxation of links of citizenship is more important.
4. Isoc. 4(Antidosis).155-156.
5. D.L. VI.47.
6. D.L. VII.2.
7. D.L. VI.49.
8. D.L. VI.38 (=Nauck TGF² Adesp.284).
9. In Burford (1), Burford (2), and Burford (3).
10. Burford (3), p.65.
11. Burford (2), pp.200-201.
12. Burford (2), p.201.
13. Burford (2), p.199.
14. Burford (2), p.200, outlines the resources available: 'the following assumptions may be made, that something more than a dozen stone-masons'

workshops existed in Athens and Corinth, and more than half-a-dozen in Argos; that there were several professional timber men in Corinth; (etc.)'.

(J.K. Davies Wealth and the Power of Wealth in Classical Athens (New York, 1981), pp.41-43, gives a list of known slave-worked industrial enterprises at Athens). On stonemasons' workshops at Athens Burford refers to R.S. Young 'An Industrial District of Ancient Athens' Hesp. 20 (1951), pp.135-288 with plates 55-85: pp.160-167 of this detailed study deal with the 'street of the marble workers'. See also Randall.

15. Below, §§3 and 4, pp.242-257.

16. Cf. below, pp.240-242.

17. Cf. above, n.14.

18. Burford (1), p.32; Burford (2), p.204; D.S. XIV.18.3 and 41.3;

Xen. Ages. 1. And two Athenian potters, sons of a very famous craftsman (IG II² 6320), were honoured by the Ephesians for settling and working in Ephesus at this period (H. Engelmann, D. Knibbe and R. Merkelbach Die Inschriften von Ephesos IV (Bonn, 1980) no.1420). This was part of a fairly general trend of emigration of potters from Athens to areas on the fringes of the Greek world from the late fifth century onwards: see B.R. MacDonald 'The Emigration of Potters from Athens in the Late Fifth Century B.C. and its Effect on the Attic Pottery Industry' AJA 85 (1981), pp.159-168. Among the destinations were Lucania and Apulia (p.159), Etruria (p.160), Sicily and Lipari (p.161), Olympia (p.101), Corinth (p.162), Smyrna (p.163) and Olynthus (p.163). Cf. above, pp.1-2 and n.5.

19. G.T. Griffith 'The Union of Corinth and Argos' Hist. 1 (1950), pp. 236-256, at p.240 (cf. n.1.). In Archaeological Reports 1978-79 at pp. 9-10 C. Williams' excavation of a building in the Corinthian forum, the 'Punic Amphora Building', is reported: this building, which began to be used partly in the fish trade in the second quarter of the fifth century and was later apparently used exclusively for this purpose, seems to have

been abandoned late in the third quarter of the fifth century. Williams suggests that events at the beginning of the Peloponnesian war may have put the fish-importer who used the building out of business. Cf. also D.M. Lewis Sparta and Persia (Leiden, 1977), p.88.

20. J.B. Salmon Wealthy Corinth (Oxford, 1984), pp.165-167 and 175-185. On the 'Punic Amphora Building' (cf. above, n.19) see p.128.

21. Burford (2), p.201: and cf. Burford (1), p.31 on how the Epidaurians recruited their temple builders. Burford (1), p.33 suggests that the revival of building activity in mainland Greece was connected with the revival of Athenian influence in the 370s.

22. Burford (2), p.203.

23. Burford (2), p.205. This comment could not be extended without reservation to all the people mentioned in §4 of this chapter (below, pp. 246-257).

24. Burford (2), p.205. Burford adds '...they followed the calling of their craft, and earned their living when and where they could.'

25. Cf. Burford (2), p.205: 'skilled labour was always scarce'.

26. Cf. Burford (1), p.34: 'the patrons of temple building supplied money and motive for the work. The craftsmen alone could ensure the achievement of the patrons' aims.'

27. Cf. above, n.14. Randall, p.204, notes from the Erechtheum accounts that slaves were owned only by carpenters, masons and the architect on this project (cf. table on p.202). On this reckoning prosperous trades might pass from master to slave, but trades less in demand would go only from father to son.

28. Praxiteles and Cephisodotus: Pliny NH XXXVI.4.24; Lysippus' sons: Pliny NH XXXIV.19.66 (Lysippus, on the other hand, started out as a coppersmith according to Duris of Samos (quoted at Pliny NH XXXIV.19.61 and seems not to have been anyone's pupil, his brother Lysistratus was a

sculptor too: Pliny NH XXXIV.19.51); Timarchides' sons: Pliny NH XXXVI.

4.35; Polycles floruit 01. 102 (372-369): Pliny NH XXXIV.19.51.

29. See below, pp. 242-246. Especially, there was no 'Hippocratic revolution' - contrast below, p. 242.

30. S. Hornblower, p.240: Scopas, Bryaxis, Timotheus, Leochares, Pytheus, Satyrus.

31. S. Hornblower, p.263 notes that 'local labour must have been available on a fairly humble level', and adds that the sculptors must have brought teams of co-workers from home. In n.321 he suggests Philistides of Athens as one such, and names a few other minor figures.

32. S. Hornblower, p.244.

33. S. Hornblower, pp.239-240. It would be possible to offer alternative exegeses of Pliny NH XXXIV.4.30 '...regina obiit. non tamen recesserent nisi absoluto, iam id gloriae ipsorum artisque monumentum iudicantes...' to Hornblower's 'Pliny says that after the death of Artemisia the four artists continued the work unpaid...' Pliny does not say 'unpaid'. He implies it, but he was working from a written source and probably understood no more about the likely terms of employment of sculptors by satraps than the modern student. The use of absolvo suggests that there was little left to do when Artemisia died (cf. OLD s.v. absolvo (7)). It is even possible that the sculptors and their assistants were receiving rations in kind as well as money payments, and that Artemisia's death may have affected only the money payments. What lies behind Pliny's comment is irrecoverably lost: but the general point that no one could work for no pay is certainly sound.

34. Pliny NH XXXIV.17.37. S. Hornblower, pp.239-240 and 263, shows that the conventional drachma-per-day wage was applicable to the most outstanding craftsmen, as well as the rest. At p.263 he speculates that the rate for work on the Mausoleum may have been a little above a drachma per

day, to take account of the fall in the value of money since the Erechtheum and Epidaurus. This is a sensible suggestion; but it might be worth adding that extra payments may have been made as lump sums, possibly on completion: the drachma-per-day rate became so thoroughly conventional in the Hellenistic period (by the first century A.D. a denarius per day was the direct successor: Matt. 20.1-13) that it appears in Tobit 5.14-15 - a reflection of the Hellenistic context in which the author or redactor lived. And in this passage the employer promises the employee a bonus on completion of the job. This may have been a fairly common condition of employment of temporary workers (it would explain Lysippus' savings): cf. (a) Antigonus' paying off his athletes and τεχνῶταυ (hurriedly) in 302 at D.S. XX.108.1., and (b) below, pp.254-255 and nn.170-171.

35. Richter, pp.199, 207 and 224.

36. Richter, pp.206, 217 and 224.

37. Richter, p.206.

38. Richter, p.220.

39. Pytheus worked on the temple of Athena Polias at Priene: cf. S. Hornblower, pp.323-330, which also puts the case for dating Priene late, rather than in the 350s.

40. Delays like the building of the walls of Alexandria-by-Egypt in the time of Ptolemy Soter: Tac. Hist. IV.83.1, cf. Fraser, p.12 and n.55.

41. D.S. XIX.54.2. Earlier the Athenians had received help in a building project (the stadium and the Panathenaic theatre) from Eudemus of Plataea (329: Tod II 198). IG II² 345 (332/1) honours a Plataean whose patronymic ends in]ήμου, and who may be a relative of this Eudemus.

42. Paus. X.36.3-4 and X.3.3. Cf. above, p. 102 and n.116.

43. Lacroix, pp.501-502.

44. Lacroix, p.506.

45. Lacroix, p.508.

46. Lacroix, pp.508-509. Mr. D.M. Lewis comments (per epistulam) 'the choregia seems to have institutionalized foreigners, four citizens and two metics (so described) for each tragedy and comedy...contrast the Athenian position; metic choregoi only at the Lenaia and perhaps not regularly.'
47. Lacroix, pp.511-516. Lacroix distinguishes people who passed from city to city from 'vrais métèques', but his distinction is different from that proposed at pp.235-236 above. He distinguishes those who came to make occasional transactions in high-value goods (pp.515-516) from the others ('vrais métèques'), but notes that even these were less in evidence after 250.
48. Lacroix, passim and especially pp.518-520.
49. Sherwin-White, p.261.
50. Cf. Sherwin-White, p.257.
51. Hdt. III.131.1-3. Cf. Cohn-Haft, p.10.
52. Cf. Cohn-Haft, p.21.
53. H. Diller Wanderarzt und Aitiologe (Leipzig, Philologus Suppbd.26, Heft 3, 1934), especially at pp.3-5 and 28. The other view is put by L. Edelstein, at Peri aerōn und die Sammlung der hippokratischen Schriften (Berlin, 1931), p.59.
54. Again the scientific motive for travel is to the fore. In this section the author of [Hp.] de Medico notes on the extraction of missiles that there is little call for it in practices in the city. But the suggestion is not that the doctor should not bother with things which may never happen: it is that anyone who is going to be a surgeon should go on expedition and follow mercenary forces (the date and context of de Medico will be dealt with below, n.67). On the scientific importance of travel, cf. Sherwin-White, p.264.
55. Theophrastus HP IX.16.8. Manuscripts have Σούσων; Λούσων the Scholiast conjectures (similarly at IX.15.8). A. Hort in the Loeb ed.

Vol II (1926), p.303, says: 'the mention of Mantinea makes it likely that a place in Arcadia is intended' (Λοῦσα, usually Λοῦσου, is a place in Arcadia). But Plin. NH XXV.9.154 has Susa.

On this passage cf. above, p. 2 and n.11.

56. Brown, pp.3-4.

57. Brown, p.12.

58. Brown, p.11. Citing his opinions on hellebore (Ctesias FGrHist 688 F68), Brown puts Ctesias 'in the same class as the better Hippocratic writers'.

59. And Brown, p.19, points out that Ctesias' experience as the Persian King's physician probably ensured him a busy practice on his return.

60. Though there were other court physicians: cf. Sherwin-White, pp. 279-280. The letter of Diocles to Antigonos Monophthalmus (W. Jaeger Diokles von Karystos (Berlin, 1938), pp.75-78) is not a request for a court appointment but does illustrate the use a physician could make of royalty: E.D. Phillips (Greek Medicine (London, 1973), p.135) notes that 'the letter is an advertisement for the activities of Diocles, and a request for royal support and approval in the age of Hellenistic kings.'

61. [Hp.] Law 1 'Ἰητρικὴ τέχνη μὲν πασέων ἐστὶν ἐκφανεστάτη. This is not an impartial source, but prestige depends on subjective judgments. de Ste. Croix, p.198 doubts the prestige of doctors ('mainly disqualified from the high degree of respect which nowadays is accorded to their profession'), though his mistaken plea (p.271) that Democedes (cf. above, n.51) was not giving a form of hired labour because he would collect fees from patients as well as payments from governments (which only shows that he was extravagantly well-paid for his medical services, which presumably Polycrates and the rest considered the best available) may perhaps suggest some degree of reservation. de Ste. Croix' comments on τέχνηται (he does not categorize mobile τέχνηται separately) will be considered below (p.

259).

D.M. Lewis ('Dedications of Phialai at Athens' Hesp. 37(1968), pp. 368-380) comments on a text which records a manumitted slave as being an ἰατροῦς (no.50 line 11) that this is 'a surprisingly complimentary designation for a slave. In the only medical manumission at Delphi the slave does not have this title' (p.372). Plato Laws IV 720A is pertinent here: εἰσί που τινες ἰατροί, φαμεν, καί τινες ὑπηρεταί τῶν ἰατρῶν, ἰατροῦς δὲ καλοῦμεν δὴ που καὶ τούτους. In B-E the Athenian stranger goes on and says (B) that these assistants may be free or slaves but that they get a different type of training from what a doctor gives to his own children. In C-E the point is made that slaves usually attend slaves. Clearly less prestige would attach to some individuals than to others.

62. Cohn-Haft, p.16. And [Hp.] Law 1 goes on (after its optimistic start: cf. above, n.6) to say that some practitioners bring the craft into disrepute.

63. Cohn-Haft, p.16; Edelstein, p.351; W.H.S. Jones in his Loeb edition of Hippocrates, vol. II (London and New York, 1923), pp.xxxvii-xl.

64. For instance [Hp.] Decorum 8; [Hp.] In the Surgery 2 and 4; [Hp.] de Medico 1 and 4; [Hp.] Precepts 10; and the medical-Ionic dialect made the physician sound distinctive.

65. Edelstein, pp.87-110. Craftsmanship, style of life and style of work are discussed at pp.87-90. A discussion of [Hp.] In the Surgery begins at p.91. At p.100 Edelstein stresses the need in daily activity for a physician to have oratorical skill.

66. The quotation is from V. Crapanzano The Hamadsha: A Study in Moroccan Ethnopsychiatry (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1973), p.133; cited at P. Brown The Cult of the Saints (London, 1981), p.114. Brown's discussion (at pp. 114-116), though it deals with another period of antiquity, makes a useful point about how therapeutic systems coexisted, and in certain places still coexist.

67. The argument of this chapter will proceed on the assumption that it is at least probable that [Hp.] Precepts, Decorum and de Medico are products of the same period, and that that period is the later part of the fourth century. J.F. Bensele ('Hippocratis qui fertur De Medico libellus ad codicum fidem recensitus' Philologus 78(1923), pp.88-130 comments on the three treatises (p.101) 'libros iisdem fere temporibus et viris, qui idem de medicorum officiis senserunt, ascribendos esse putem, ut eos altera saeculi quarti parte (350-300) ortos esse crediderim'. This suggestion that a broadly similar outlook indicates contemporaneity is reasonable, and is certainly not overturned by W.H.S. Jones' lists of odd words and expressions in his introductions to the Precepts and the Decorum (Loeb vol. I (London and New York, 1923), pp.308-309, and vol. II (London and New York, 1923), pp.269-270). Bensele, at p.101, takes Decorum 2 as a reference to the banishment of the philosophers from Athens by Sophocles' law in 306 (on which cf. below, n.122): there is no objection to acceptance of this as a possibility.

68. [Hp.] Law 4. On protreptic, see below, pp. 257-259.

A number of texts show how cities (at a slightly later date) would send in quite a formal way to get a doctor. See e.g. D.M. Pippidi Inscriptiile din Scythia minor grecești și latine I (Bucharest, 1983), no.26: no.27 shows the same sort of search for an architect.

69. [Hp.] Law 2. This word does not give any information about what exact age, below military age, the author envisaged as the right age to begin study. And it should not be forgotten that παιδομαθής is the logical antonym of όφλιμαθής, and that όφλιμαθία is treated by Theophrastus as the cast of mind which leads people to study things inappropriate to their age rather than as the intellectual result of receiving education late (Characters 27; and cf. [Hp.] Precepts 13): therefore παιδομαθής may have a connotation concerning the (proper) cast of mind for learning as

well as the (proper) age for learning. And cf. below, n.70.

70. *ibid.* A student is in need of φύσις · διδασκαλίας · τόπου εύφυέος παιδομαθίας · φιλοπονίας · χρόνου. φύσις, natural ability, is the only one treated as a pre-requisite: φύσις γὰρ ἀντιπρησσοῦσης κενεὰ πάντα.

The fact that παιδομαθία and χρόνος are required may bear out the suggestion (cf. above, n.69) that παιδομαθία connotes an intellectual quality and so may not necessarily in all cases imply that the παιδομαθής began his study at an exact and prescribed age.

71. Cf. below, pp. 249-250.

72. [Hp.] Decorum 8.

73. [Hp.] Decorum 9.

74. [Hp.] Decorum 10.

75. Cf. above p. 243 and n.55.

76. [Hp.] de Medico 2.

77. [Hp.] de Medico 14 (on which cf. above, n.54) suggests a way for a practising doctor to perfect his craft. §§1-13 give brief comments on a very wide range of topics and techniques.

78. [Hp.] In the Surgery 2.

79. Cf. comments above, p. 238 and n.17, on temple builders.

80. E.g. [Hp.] Precepts 6.

81. Cohn-Haft, pp.32-45, argues this point.

82. Cohn-Haft, pp.76-84, gives an index of epigraphical documents: nos. 2-6 are dated to the fourth century.

83. This passage requires careful examination: εἰ γὰρ ἄρξαιο περὶ μισθαρίων τῷ μὲν ἀλγέοντι τοιαύτην διανόησιν ἐμπουήσεις τὴν ὅτι ἀπολιπὼν αὐτὸν πορεύσει μὴ συνθέμενος, ἢ ὅτι ἀμελήσεις καὶ οὐχ ὑποθήσει τινα τῷ παρόντι. The patient may suspect one of two things: (a) that you the doctor will leave him and go away without making a bargain; or (b) that you will neglect him and not give him some immediate treatment. (a) involves the supposition that when the doctor has been gone, he will be beyond recall. (b)

involves the supposition that treatment may be delayed. Therefore it seems natural to think that the patient's first worry, (a), is that the doctor may be about to leave the district (and not just the patient's bedside: hence two different verbs of motion reinforcing each other: ...ἀπολιπὼν αὐτὸν πορεύσει...). Doctors who decided to move cannot always have been able to find a time to do so when no one was ill in the district they were leaving.

84. Athenaeus XIII.584A.

85. Cf. below, p.250.

86. On this cf. Lynch, p.42.

87. D.L. II.106 (with for instance D.L. II.62); and cf. Lynch, p.49.

88. D.L. II.105. It is not explicit that Phaedo went back to Elis immediately after the death of Socrates.

89. D.L. II.61-62.

90. D.L. II.65: σοφιστεῦσας.

91. *ibid.*

92. E.g. D.L. II.66 and 68-69.

93. D.L. II.71 and 77. Sea voyages form the background to several anecdotes in Diogenes Laertius. The differences between the stories show that they are not forms of the same account: and naturally the hazards of travel by sea provoked clever comments from philosophers particularly well.

94. D.L. II.65-66; 71; 79. Cf. also the list of his pupils: D.L. II.86.

95. D.L. VI.27.

96. D.L. II.66 and 68.

97. D.L. VI.41. 57 and 59-60.

98. Cf. above, n.93 and below, n.102.

99. D.L. VI.74.

100. D.L. IV.46-61.

101. D.L. IV.46-47. Here cf. D.L. II.81, where Aristippus receives money from Dionysius II, and Plato receives a book. Aristippus does not mind the implied slight to his intellectual prestige, saying ἐγὼ μὲν γὰρ... ἀργυρίων, Πλάτων δὲ βιβλίων ἐστὶν ἐνδεής. The implication of this comment is that Aristippus (a high-earning practitioner) regarded the possible benefits of reading as marginal to the philosopher's livelihood: his training came by personal contact with a teacher or teachers (Bion attended several schools: D.L. IV.52, and cf. Kindstrand, pp.10-11) and he subsequently earned money by talking, not by writing.

Aristippus' comment can also be read as a rejection of the evaluation of Dionysius' different gifts as implying that Plato was the weightier intellectual figure. Mr. D.M. Lewis quotes as a parallel exchange of pointed comments two anonymous epigrams on events in the English universities in 1715 (Jacobite riots in Oxford, the royal gift of Bishop Moore's library to Cambridge):

King George observing with judicious eyes
The state of his two universities
To Oxford sent a troop of horse: and why?
That learned body wanted loyalty.
To Cambridge books he sent, as well discerning
How much that loyal body wanted learning.

and: The King to Oxford sent a troop of horse
For Tories know no argument but force.
With equal skill to Cambridge books he sent,
For Whigs admit no force but argument.

102. D.L. IV.50, and cf. above, nn.93 and 98.

103. D.L. IV.53.

104. *ibid.*

105. See above, p.247 and n.95.

106. [Hp.] Precepts 12.

107. And cf. above, n.90.

108. D.L. II.62. It was probably usual for philosophers to turn to speechwriting (Isocrates' adoptive son Aphareus tried to pretend that

Isocrates had not done this, but could not convince Aristotle: DH

Isocrates 18, cf. K.J. Dover Lysias and the Corpus Lysiacum (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1968), p.25.): certainly it appeared unusual to someone that Aristippus should hire a rhetor. Aristippus, as usual, had a plausible reply: D.L. II.72.

109. D.L. II.130.

110. Cf. D.L. VII.22 (an incident at a lecture); cf. also Athenaeus II. 59D-F with Lynch, p.57.

111. Aristoxenus Principles of Harmony II.30-31. Aristoxenus quotes Aristotle, apparently as heard rather than as read (...'Αριστοτέλης ἀεὶ δὴλεγεῖτο...). The picture appears to be of a public lecture; the word ἀκρόασις is used, and when W.K.C. Guthrie (A History of Greek Philosophy IV (Cambridge, 1975), p.22) comments that 'one would not expect Plato to thrust some of his most difficult doctrine on a completely untrained audience' he appears in some measure to have lost sight of the fact that Aristotle (and Aristoxenus) used the story as a warning against Plato's mistake in producing obscure material on such an occasion (if mistake it was: Plato, the great master, could afford, like Immanuel Kant, not 'to give free rein to that loquacious shallowness, which assumes for itself the name of popularity' (I. Kant Critique of Pure Reason², tr. N. Kemp Smith (London, 1929), p.32) - being unintelligible only added to his mystique.).

112. A χρεῖα from the Diatribes is preserved at D.L. II.77. Cf. also Kindstrand, pp.21-39 (especially pp.29-30 on Bion's lively style) and pp. 97-99, where Kindstrand denies that the Diatribe was a novel form of literature but classes it as 'popular philosophical dialexis' (p.97).

113. D.L. II.103. Cf. Phaedo and Elis: D.L. II.105.

114. D.L. II.109.

115. D.L. V.9-10 gives a chronology of his career. D.L. V.2-3 is by

contrast a confused passage, putting Aristotle's sojourn with Hermias of Atarneus after Xenocrates' assumption of the headship of the Academy.

Lynch, pp.94-95, sets out the chronology of Aristotle's time in and outside Athens, making some suggestions.

116. D.L. X.15. Cf. de Witt, pp.36-37 (also pp.70-71). He taught at Mytilene and Lampsacus before coming to Athens.

117. Lynch, p.52. It is perhaps worth mentioning Timon of Phlius here, though his career fell mainly in the third century. Having started as a dancer, he studied with Stilpo in Megara and Pyrrho in Elis. Being unable to get an income in Elis, he went to the Hellespont and the Propontis. In Chalcedon he set up as a philosopher (σοφιστεῦων) and had a much better reception than before. Then (having made himself financially secure) he went to Athens and lectured for the rest of his life (D.L. IX.109-110).

118. de Witt, p.37.

119. Aen. Tact. 10.10.

120. D.L. III.46.

121. D.L. IV.47.

122. D.L. II.109. And cf. above, p. 248 and n.103.

123. D.L. VII.86-91 tells the story of Eudoxus, who went to Athens, Egypt, Cyzicus, the Propontis, the court of Mausolus and Athens again; cf. S. Hornblower, pp.115-116 and 337.

124. de Witt, pp.70-71: cf. the banishment of philosophers from Athens in 306: Athenaeus XIII.610B-D; D.L. V.38; Pollux IX.42 (cf. D.S. XX.45.2-5 and Plut Demetrius 9); Lynch, p.103.

125. Lynch, pp.94-95.

126. de Ste. Croix, pp.179-180.

127. Contrast [Dem]. 59(Neaera).122 and 33. Dover, p.14, notes the speaker's use of the sentiments in §122 as an important premiss in his law-court argument. Similarly in §33 he is trying to provoke outrage

at shocking behaviour. If he had expected his audience to be strongly of the opinion either that respectable men should never have anything to do with hetaerae or that no sexual activity with a hetaera ought ever to be thought to reflect badly on a man's moral character, it would not have been open to him to make both the suggestion in §122 and that in §33. Cf. also Dover, pp.205-207.

128. See for instance [Dem]. 59(Neaera).36. Dover, pp.178-179 calls this passage 'most unusual', but on the ground that it contains an implied compliment to extravagance (this is disputable: a reproach on niggardliness is not the same thing as a compliment to extravagance, nor is it unusual in Greek popular thought: see Theophrastus Characters 22 (ἀνελευθερία)).

129. Though there are some comments in Greek literature of this period against sex outside marriage (e.g. at Isoc. 3(Nicocles).40), and some attacks on hetaerae as such (e.g. in Anaxilas Neottis (Athenaeus XIII.558A = Kock II, p.270). Note that Neaera could charge more when she could claim to be a wife living with her husband ([Dem]. 59(Neaera).41): this because she had put herself in the more highly-regarded category of women (cf. below, n.131, and see IG II² 9057 with n.133 below). See for example Isaeus 3(Pyrrhus).17; [Dem]. 59(Neaera).113-114; D.L. IV.46; and Athenaeus XIII.577A μεταβάλλουσαι γὰρ αἱ τοιαῦται εἰς τὸ σῶφρον τῶν ἐπὶ τοῦτῳ σεμνυνομένων εἰσὶ βελτίους. Pomeroy, p.92, observes that there is evidence for hetaerae attempting to live as respectable wives, but not for the opposite state of affairs.

131. The word wifely is used here to refer to the respectable citizen women of good family who derived status and commanded respect as members of households (cf. Dover, pp.95-98) and whose activities were so closely restricted to home life that it had become usual at Athens, in court, not to refer to women by name unless they were disreputable, or connected with one's opponent, or deceased (see D. Schaps 'The Woman Least Mentioned:

Etiquette and Women's Names' CQ n.s. 27(1977), pp.323-330). The word respectable could possibly be used (and without implying anything defamatory of the citizen women who were not in a social position in which a fully secluded life could be maintained: cf. Dover, p.98), but it is less than ideal, for two reasons: first, that the hetaerae and their demi-monde had a definite and (usually) recognised role and were not social outcasts except in an ambiguous way; and second, that the feeling that there were two kinds of women (suitable wives for well-to-do men and others) was very deep and lasting in antiquity, and was not directly analogous to a modern distinction between respectability and its opposite: Augustine of Hippo in the 380s A.D. encountered no moral censure for sending his concubine back to Africa from Milan when he was considering marriage - he was as yet still a Manichee, but as P. Brown comments (Augustine of Hippo (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1967), pp.88-89): 'in Milan ... well-to-do people gave little thought to such things. To abandon one's concubine, in order to take a wife in legitimate matrimony, was "not bigamy, but a sign of moral improvement"' (Brown quotes Pope Leo).

132. de Ste. Croix, p.101 notes that a hetaera's economic position 'might be virtually identical with that of a male prostitute or any other non-citizen provider of services in the city.' de Ste. Croix mentions hetaerae before doctors and after traders in a survey on p.271, but his comment 'talented hetairai (courtesans) and other providers of essential services sometimes did very well for themselves' appears to be intended as a joke.

133. [Dem]. 59(Neaera).26, 35 and 108. The evidence of gravestones about mobility of Corinthian women to Athens is quite striking. Mr. D.M. Lewis observes from a survey of fourth-century gravestones from Athens that the only foreigners for whom women outnumber men are Corinthians (IG II² 9056, 9061, 9069, 9080 and 9081). J.B. Salmon (Wealthy Corinth (Oxford,

1984), pp.398-400) deals with cult prostitution in the temple of Aphrodite and comments on the higher classes of prostitute also afforded by Corinth.

134. Cf. above, pp.242-250.

135. Athenaeus XIII.576E.

136. Athenaeus XIII.578A.

137. Athenaeus XIII.577C-D; cf. VI.253B, where it is noted that the Thebans founded a temple of Aphrodite Lamia, as a piece of flattery to Demetrius. This was not altogether a new idea: Harpalus had founded a temple of Aphrodite Pythionice (Theopompus FGrHist 115F253).

138. Athenaeus XIII.576E-F.

139. Involvement of this sort goes back to Archelaus; in the period more immediately preceding the Hellenistic courts, Philip II had a doctor (Critobulus: Pliny NH VII.37.124, cf. Sherwin-White, p.279) as well as a philosopher (Aristotle: D.L. V.4).

140. Xen. Anab. I.10.2-3. Cf. also Plut. Per. 24.12 and Artax. 26-29, Justin X.2.1-7, Aelian VH 12.1 (a worked-up account) and Athen. XIII.576d (where it is discussed whether Aspasia/Milto was a hetaera or a concubine).

141. Athenaeus XII.531B (= Theopompus FGrHist 115F114).

142. It is worth noticing that Strato imported musicians as well as hetaerae. There appears not to have been a strong practical distinction between the lifestyles of women musicians and of hetaerae: e.g. Athenaeus XIII.576F - 577D.

143. D.S. XVII.108.4-6; cf. Athenaeus XIII.584D - 595E.

144. Demetrius of Phalerum: Athenaeus XIII.593E-F; Menander: Athenaeus XIII.585C and 593D; Stilpo: Athenaeus XIII.596E; Epicurus: Athenaeus XIII.588B. In earlier days, Plato and Aristotle too: Athenaeus XIII.589C-D.

145. At Plautus Asinaria 230 Cleaereta asks Argyrippus 20 minas for her services for a year (and claims that there may be other bidders: 1.231).

It was perhaps usual to hire hetaerae for a matter of months or years - this seems to be the situation envisaged at Theophrastus Characters 17 (μεμφλιμορῶα).3. There was probably sometimes reason to move on the expiry of the period: cf. [Dem]. 59(Neaera).32.

146. Athenaeus XIII.583D.

147. The distinction between hetaerae and common prostitutes was not perhaps a strong one, but it was there: cf. Athenaeus XIII.569A-D, quoting Xenarchus Pentathlum (=Kock II, p.468). Pomeroy, p.89, makes the distinction.

148. Cf. above, n.133.

149. Athenaeus XIII.569F.

150. [Dem]. 59(Neaera).18-19.

151. Athenaeus XIII.595A.

152. Nicarete, Neaera's mistress, called six girls daughters, though she had bought them as slaves ([Dem]. 59(Neaera).18-19). On the other hand, in the absence of effective contraception, hetaerae must have had daughters.

153. Athenaeus XIII.581A.

154. Athenaeus XIII.569F καὶ ἐπλήθυνεν ἀπὸ τῶν ταύτης ἑταιρῶν ἡ Ἑλλάς.

155. The matter of epideictic oratory presents a slightly special case here. A historian or a tragedian, as well as professional speakers, might seize the chance of going and speaking a panegyric at Olympia (Theopompus FGrHist 115T6).

156. Isoc. 19(Aegineticus) was written in the late 390s. It is perhaps significant that in the last section (§51) Isocrates mentions the exceptional degree of unanimity in the diverse legal systems of Greek states about the point of law at issue in the case.

157. It is not clear whether Isaeus was a metic. F. Wehrli Die Schule des Aristoteles IV: Demetrios von Phaleron F 206 (from Photius s.v.

Ἴσαϊος) comments on Isaeus: Ἀθηναῖος τὸ γένος, Δημήτριος δὲ Χαλκιδεὺς φησὶν αὐτὸν εἶναι. Wehrli (p.89) comments on the relatively high probability that the Demetrius in question may not be Demetrius of Phaler but no conclusion is possible. The first known Athenian Isaeus, leaving aside the orator, is the archon of 284/3.

158. One Alcimus, whom Stilpo is represented as having trapped into philosophy, is described by Diogenes Laertius as ἀπάντων πρωτεύοντα τῶν ἐν Ἑλλάδι ῥητόρων (D.L. II.114). The ἐν Ἑλλάδι suggests that he was a professional, and that the comparison is with professionals. G.B. Kerferd points out (The Sophistic Movement (Cambridge, 1981), pp.15-17 that the fifth-century sophists supplied a social need by teaching young men in Athens (and similar cities) to speak in public. The social need was for young men from well-to-do backgrounds to be able to become effective politicians by being able to persuade citizens to follow their advice. With this purpose in mind, they will have found a rhetorical education a better investment than a few prepared speeches, since the ability to prepare speeches for others would give them a valuable asset from the patronage point of view.

159. See also Tod II 140 lines 67-69 for Theodorus, an Athenian actor, who in 363 was in Delphi (quite possibly on tour) to give 70 drachmas (100 Attic drachmas) to the temple restoration.

160. Syll.³ 460 (cf. Pickard-Cambridge, p.282).

161. IG II² lines 1-39, FD III (2) 68, lines 61-94. Cf. Pickard-Cambridge, p.308.

162. Cf. Pickard-Cambridge, p.279.

163. Ghiron-Bistagne, p.206.

164. Ghiron-Bistagne, pp.154-171, discusses the most famous and gives references to the (usually anecdotal) sources dealing with them.

165. After the fall of Olynthus in 348 Philip held an Olympian festival

and called the ΤΕΧΝΙΤΑΙ to it ([Dem]. 19(Embassy).192-193): this, as Pickard-Cambridge notes, implies that there was a large number of such professionals available (Pickard-Cambridge, pp.279-280). And Neoptolemus the tragedian was at Philip's banquet shortly before the assassination, and gave an appropriate performance (of unintentional ominousness):

D.S. XVI.92.3.

166. At the beginning of his reign, after the capture of Thebes, Alexander held a nine-day festival in Macedonia (D.S. XVII.16.3-4 and Arr. Anab. I.11.1) - the parallel with Philip's celebration of the fall of Olynthus is clear. Thenceforth, as Pickard-Cambridge shows, Alexander showed an even greater passion for musicians and actors than his father (Pickard-Cambridge, p.280).

167. SEG I.362.

168. Mentioned by Plutarch, Lucian, Stobaeus and Aulus Gellius (see Ghiron-Bistagne, pp.167-168).

169. M. Schede 'Aus dem Heraion von Samos' Ath.Mitt. 44(1919), pp.1-46, at pp.18-19, explains the financial arrangement and establishes the date of the inscription.

170. IG XII (9) 207 (cf. Pickard-Cambridge, pp.306-308 and Ghiron-Bistagne, pp.181-185), esp. lines 21-25.

171. Lines 21-22: for a piper, 600 drachmas; for a tragic actor, 100 drachmas; for a comic actor, 400 drachmas; for a costumier, 300 drachmas.

172. Ghiron-Bistagne, p.185.

173. Ghiron-Bistagne, p.185, suggests that deuteragonists would be better off than tritagonists. Doubtless it was the next step up, but the idea that the deuteragonist became an associé rather than a simple assistant, if it is intended to imply that deuteragonists could expect some fair-sized share of the profits, does not seem satisfactory in view of the degree of concentration on individuals in the sources. After all, Polus

(see above, p.254 and nn.167-169) presumably took his colleagues to Samos.

174. Cf. Pickard-Cambridge, p.305 (on the imperial age) where a parallel with film stars is caustically drawn.

175. This was the motive for the making of the Amphictyonic decree referred to above (p.253 and n.161).

176. Ghiron-Bistagne, p.174.

177. Arist. Rh. III.2 1405a 23-25; at lines 25-28 he notes that ληστοὶ call themselves ποροῖστοι.

178. [Arist.] Problems XXX.10 956b 11-15.

179. [Arist.] Problems XVIII.6 917a 6-16. In connection with these occupations characterized by Aristotle as inferior, this is an appropriate place to mention the work of H. Blümner ('Fahrendes Volk im Alterthum' SBA 1918 Abh.6 pp.1-53), who attempts a diachronic overview of what circus-type arts were practised in antiquity (for example sword-dancing, pp.10-11; tightrope-walking, pp.13-16 and fire-eating, pp.19-20). Some useful points are made, for example on the life of rhapsodes in Xenophon's time (p.4), but the study does not consistently encompass close examination of the question whether the people referred to were actually travelling folk: it appears to claim its title more from Blümner's interest in locating classical antecedents of the skills of medieval and modern travelling entertainers.

180. This recognition, not surprisingly, is hostilely expressed:

διέφθαρται γὰρ ἡ δεινότης διὰ φαύλας προαυρέσεις. However, cf. below, pp.257-259.

181.. Isoc. 19(Aegineticus).5-9. Thrasyllus married only after his retirement (§§7-9); he was by then the richest man in Siphnos: cf. above, p.249 and n.113. He had been involved with several women during his career (§6: cf. above, n.131).

182. Cf. above, pp.243-4 and nn.64 and 65.

183. Others consulted books, but use of them was not indispensable (cf. above, n.101) for most τεχνῦται. It was for Thrasyllus. For another μάγειρος see SEG XXVIII 1245 lines 18-19.

184. Rankin, pp.4-5, summarizes the few references in Aristophanes.

185. See e.g. Athenaeus XIV.661D-E (incorporating Alexis Λεβήτιον Kock II, p.343, and an anonymous comic fragment Kock II, p.442). Cf. Rankin, pp.17-23.

186. Rankin, pp.12-17, cf. Pickard-Cambridge, pp.178 n.6. Pollux classifies each of these types (Maeson, Tettix) as θεράποντες (not free).

187. A good example of this is Athenaeus VII.291F - 292D (= Diphilus Ζωγράφος Kock II, p.553), where a cook outlines what sorts of party he is prepared to work on, and what sorts he prefers to avoid (those where the host is likely to be parsimonious).

188. Cf. Rankin, p.4. Rankin stresses the importance of 'foreign' cooks coming into Greece: meaning by foreign Greek-speaking cooks from remote regions whose appearance on the comic stage would have a suitable effect.

189. See e.g. Athenaeus XIV.661E (before 300: cf. Rankin, pp.23-25); Athenaeus VII.282A; Athenaeus I.5B on Artemidorus the Pseudaristophanean (pretended pupil of Aristophanes of Byzantium) who collected ὀφάρτυτικὰς λέξεις. Even on the comic stage, cooks were not always merely boastful: one, a schoolmasterish character (διδασκαλὸς τις) says ἀλλ' ἔστι τις φρόνησις ἐν τῷ πράγματι (Athenaeus VII.291D-F = Philemon the younger Kock II, p.540). And in a fragment of Straton Phoenicides (D.L. Page Greek Literary Papyri I (Loeb ed.) pp.260-269) an old man complains at length about a cook who affects a haughty Homeric vocabulary - a symbol of intellectual prowess which he will not relinquish merely to please an employer (lines 32-33). A technical, even a philosophical, business.

190. Athenaeus VII.293A quotes Sotades 'the poet ... of the Middle

Comedy'. Rankin, pp.12-17, argues for the cook as a standard character in Old Comedy; but there is certainly a great development between the little material in Aristophanes (cf. above, n.18₁) and the kind of comic monologue Sotades wrote (293A-E, =Sotades 'Εγκλειόμενα Kock II, p.447).

191. Xen. Anab. II.1.7 (cf. D.M. Lewis Sparta and Persia (Leiden, 1977), p.14 and n.69)

192. B.D. Meritt 'Greek Inscriptions' Hesp. 9(1940), pp.53-96, no.8

Col. I lines 33-36. Cf. Arist. Ath.Pol. 42.3 and P.J. Rhodes A Commentary on the Aristotelian Athenaiion Politeia (Oxford, 1981), ad loc. On the possible implications of being a Methonaeon at Athens in the 330s consider above, p.99 and Harp. s.v. 'ισοτελής. Another travelling trainer, this one not military but a chorus-trainer, is attested in a choregic dedication: SEG XXVII.19 line 5. A third-century Thespian text honours an Athenian who was serving training boys in military skills (P. Roesch 'Une Loi fédérale Béotienne sur la préparation militaire' Acta of the Fifth International Congress of Greek and Latin Epigraphy Cambridge 1967 (Oxford, 1971), pp.81-88; cf. below, p.331 and n.18.)

193. A genre which had become possible in the medical area as a result of the end of the Asclepiad monopoly in Coan medicine, and of the 'Hippocratic revolution' in general: cf. above, p.242 and nn.49 and 50. The sophistic movement 'opened up' philosophy in a similar way.

194. [Hp.] The Art, like most Hippocratic treatises, contains no definite dating points. T. Gomperz argues that the author was Protagoras of Abdera (Gomperz, pp.466-469): the argument rests on Plato Sophist 232D5-E1, where the Eleatic Stranger alludes to some texts which are circulating περὶ πασῶν τε καὶ κατὰ μίαν ἐκάστην τέχνην: Theaetetus says (D9-E1) τὰ Πρωταγόρου μοι φαίνη περὶ τε πάλης καὶ τῶν ἄλλων τέχνων εἰρηκέναι. Gomperz, p.468, takes The Art 9 as meaning that the author of The Art promises to write other treatises. In fact he merely hopes and presumes that such treatises

will be written (and cf. below, n.195). A difficulty with Gomperz' view is that the Hippocratic treatise is called περὶ τέχνης and not περὶ ἰητρικῆς: the writer of a series of treatises on τέχναι would probably avoid the (medical) usage 'τέχνη = the medical craft'. The argument from likelihood in §7 is perhaps suggestive of the last quarter of the fifth century, since argument from likelihood is a favourite line in Antiphon: see for instance 2(Tetralogy I).1-11 and 5(Herodes).37.

195. [Hp.] The Art 1. Nothing said by the author of The Art implies that he is not a physician. §14, in particular, does not (contra Gomperz, p.423) say that the author is not one of 'those who know the τέχνη'. In §1 he makes a straightforward claim to be regarded as competent to speak about ἰητρικῆ, but not about the other arts. The inference that he was a doctor seems easy to draw. Particularly in view of the usefulness to doctors in everyday life of rhetorical skill (cf. above, n.65: this shows that Gomperz, p.423, draws a faulty conclusion when he says '[The Art is] a treatise designed for oral delivery, carefully constructed for that purpose, and polished with consummate mastery. These facts alone would go far to exclude the theory of its composition by a physician') and in view of the fact that some Greek philosophers were also doctors, e.g. Eudoxus of Cnidos (D.L. VII.89) and later Timon of Phlius (D.L. IX.109).

196. This is the purpose of Hp. Ancient Medicine throughout, and most obviously so at §§1-5, 13, 15-16 and 20.

197. [Hp.] Law 2-5. This text puts a very high value on disciplined study: an attitude suitable for a piece of publicity material. §5 is an enticing offer of initiation into the mysteries (ἄρτυα) of knowledge.

198. [Hp.] Decorum 1-2.

199. Authors known to have written protreptics include: Aristippus (D.L. II.85); Aristotle (D.L. V.22); Theophrastus (D.L. V.50) and Demetrius of Phalerum (D.L. V.81).

200. And Isoc. 1(To Demonicus).51-52 graciously adds that Demonicus might also read the other sophists - εἴ τι χρήσιμον εὐρήκασιν. It is not suggested that he go to anyone's lectures except Isocrates'.
201. Athenaeus XIV.661E. Cf. Rankin, pp.23-25, and above, n.189.
202. Etymologicum Gudianum s.v. τεχνύτης. de Ste. Croix, pp.182-185, following a selection of texts from Aristotle, makes βάνυστος and τεχνύτης virtual synonyms. That this is a fair exegesis of Aristotle is not in dispute.
203. The phrase is from J.K. Galbraith The Affluent Society² (Harmondsworth, 1970), p.276. It is used here to suggest a parallel between the τεχνύται and what Galbraith calls the 'New Class'. The ancient and modern contexts are not very similar except in that in both cases observation shows how an increasing number of people were taking up a new sort of labour ('the identity of all classes of labour is one thing on which capitalist and communist doctrine wholly agree ... in fact the differences in what labour means to different people could not be greater.' p.273) for which they were qualified by education (p.275).
204. For instance the Cleanthes who supported himself as a gardener while learning philosophy (D.L. VII.168). Menedemus of Eretria, whose father Cleisthenes was 'a nobleman, but a building-foreman and poor' (ἄνδρὸς εὐγενοῦς μὲν, ἀρχιτέκτονος δὲ καὶ πένητος D.L. II.125), took to philosophy as a result of meeting Plato during a visit to Athens while he was serving as a guard at Megara (he was probably of ephebic age, as Epicurus was when he had his first encounter with Athenian philosophy (see de Witt, pp.36-37): a man of twenty, or a little less, was probably regarded as being at the right sort of age to start serious philosophical study). He abandoned his military service and studied in Megara and Elis (D.L. II.125-126). He would otherwise have followed his father's craft: his becoming a professional philosopher illustrates the possibility of choice in some cases.

205. de Ste. Croix, pp.269-275.
206. Above, n.61.
207. de Ste. Croix, pp.269-271 treats the question with some diffuseness. His 'other independent producers', he says, 'of course must not be treated as belonging to a single class' (p.269); but (p.271) they are 'all, by definition, not members of the "propertied class"'. He promises (p.269) to 'indicate broadly' how he thinks their class position should be determined, but in the following pages can only suggest that stopping working for one's living was the criterion for membership of the propertied class and that acquiring slaves was the usual way of becoming able to fulfil that criterion (pp.270-271). These comments have almost no application to the people under discussion here. A famous sculptor or doctor would not hand over his practice to a slave. Still less would a philosopher.
208. At M.I. Finley The Ancient Economy (London, 1973), pp.35-61. See especially p.45: 'for the plousioi of antiquity - and they alone are at present under consideration - categories of social division other than occupation have priority in any analysis.' But in these cases occupation is crucial.
209. 307: cf. D.S. XX.45.1 - 46.1.
210. Plut. Demetrius 8.2.
211. Earlier Mausolus' funeral had been graced by the presence of what S. Hornblower calls 'an impressive (and expensive) shipload of Greek intellectuals' (S. Hornblower, p.334; see pp.333-339 for the general picture of patronage of Greek intellectuals by the Hecatomnids) brought in by Artemisia. Smaller Asiatic courts also employed Greeks: Arbinas of Xanthus had a παυδοτρόβας and a μάντις (SEG XXVIII.1245 lines 7-8 and 18-19). The μάντις was from Pallene, and the παυδοτρόβας was surely a travelling worker too.

What the Hellenistic Kings had to gain from employing travelling

Greek intellectuals was substantially similar to what the Hecatomnids had hoped for. Their stability depended in part on people's being convinced that their rule was legitimate. Here cf. above, p.⁶ and n.31. Since the days of Plato's support of Dionysius II and Isocrates' support of Evagoras, philosophers had been able, and, in certain circumstances, willing to speak (and there were those who found them convincing) in favour of monarchy. And Plato at Rep. VIII 568A-D comments on how the tragic poets give support to tyranny and democracy (this point being intended to support his suggestion that the two are closely related, cf. 564A). Suda s.v. βασιλεία (2), defining what gives monarchies to men, uses the Successors to exemplify the assertion that personal ability, especially in the military sphere, is the decisive thing. This would seem to derive from the work of some theoretical writer sympathetic towards early Hellenistic kingship.

212. It came unasked to Philip II from Isocrates (cf. Isoc. 5(Philippus)); but Ptolemy Soter failed to draw Stilpo into his court circle (D.L II.115).

213. D.S. XVI.87.1-3 (Philip); D.S. XVII.15.1-5 (Alexander); D.S. XVIII. 74.2 - 75.2 (Cassander: 75.1-2 outlines the propaganda value of Cassander's installation of Demetrius of Phalerum to rule Athens).

Chapter 7 - Traders

The large volume of modern writing on Greek trade in the fourth century is based on a relatively small corpus of ancient evidence. Much less has been written about traders, though it is a sign of the importance of traders for the study of trade that J. Hasebroek makes them the subject of the first chapter of his book Trade and Politics in Ancient Greece.¹ C.M. Reed takes Hasebroek's system further,² focusing on traders and producing a catalogue of 71 traders as an exhaustive prosopography of known ἔμποροι and ναύκληροι of the Archaic and Classical ages.³ The small number of names known is a severe limitation, in that it prevents the accumulation of a 'basis of factual knowledge' similar to that available about, for instance, the Athenian liturgical class;⁴ therefore the study of traders is best approached through evaluation of the usefulness and implications of each of the miscellaneous items of evidence available.

In concentrating on the extent to which traders were outside the cities, and the ways in which the world of the traders interacted and had connections with the world of the cities, this inquiry will have an aim different from that of Reed's study. Reed, at book length, adds detail to Hasebroek's disproof of the theory that a commercial aristocracy arose in the Archaic age and displaced and overthrew the landed gentry:⁵ it is a proof of Reed's sensitivity to the nature of the evidence that he places his treatment of the Archaic period after his chapters building up the fourth-century picture.⁶ But a shorter treatment of traders, in the context of the world of Greeks without cities, can be expected to contribute both to an understanding of the people who undertook the buying, selling and transport which comprised Greek long-distance trade in the fourth century and to the wider picture of the Greeks who lived by moving about between and outside the cities.

Traders, who formed at best a transient element in city populations, stood low in the scale of respectability and integration in the community. It is easy enough to ascertain that the world of traders ('le monde de l'emporion';⁷ 'the "world of the emporium"',⁸) had close connections, and connections which were recognised as close by contemporaries, with what has been described elsewhere in this study as the 'demi-monde'.⁹ J. Vélissaropoulos stresses that ἐμπόρια were parts of towns, and quotes Pollux' comment that καπηλεῖα and πορνεῖα are parts of an ἐμπόριον.¹⁰ Traders were men and travelled without their wives. Other sources connect seafarers with the 'demi-monde': Timarchus, Aeschines alleges, had settled as an adolescent in the surgery of Euthydicus the physician in the Peiraeus and, while pretending to be a student of medicine, was practising homosexual prostitution with some of '...the traders, or other foreigners, or our citizens' as clients;¹¹ and Lucian in one of his Dialogi Meretricii illustrates how a naval oarsman would be unable to compete with a successful ἔμπορος for the attention of a hetaera.¹² As short-term visitors to the cities, the traders came into contact typically, and perhaps chiefly, with elements in the cities which were themselves not fixed, and not, or not fully, part of the cities.¹³ This is a preliminary indication that the trader, even if he would spend the winters at home as a full citizen of his own πόλις, went out in summer and lived in the world outside the city-states for the time being.

G.E.M. de Ste. Croix mentions the possibility that members of 'what we might almost call an "international merchant class"' may often have had to spend the winter wherever they happened to be when the sailing season ended.¹⁴ This is a sound point, and is supported by evidence for groups of people from non-Athenian Greek cities having existed in the Peiraeus: there were Citians, who asked the Athenians if they might buy land to build a sanctuary,¹⁵ and to judge from the 277 gravestones of

Heracleots at Athens in IG II², there must have been a Heracleot presence sustained over a number of centuries.¹⁶ This too suggests that the connexions of traders with their home cities could become distant.

The tendency of this inquiry will be to confirm this impression. A text which might be regarded as offering a counter-example is Plautus Mercator:¹⁷ Charinus, having arrived in Rhodes and sold his cargo at a big profit,¹⁸ meets a family friend (hospes) at whose house he then has an evening meal and stays overnight.¹⁹ While it is not possible to infer from a Roman comedy things about the civil status of the hospes in Rhodes which probably were not explicit even in the lost Greek source,²⁰ it is clear that the hospes is meant to be understood as having a settled household:²¹ if it were the case that traders could usually have expected hospitality from ξένοι in ports of call, then they could be treated as having had a positive connection with the πόλις life of the cities they visited. But it would be unfair to regard Plautus Mercator as implying this: Charinus meets the hospes by accident (while he is walking around the city enjoying the feeling of having money to spend);²² and there is no suggestion anywhere that traders fitted into a network of friends' houses in every port.

This by way of introduction. The points raised here will be considered further below: §1 will deal with background and the position early in the fourth century; §2 will consider the contribution of the philosophical and theoretical writers; §3 will deal with rhetorical evidence; §4 will comment on Athens and other locations as centres of the trading world; §5 will consider tourism and aristocratic traders; and §6 will give attention to the issues raised by the portrayal of traders in New Comedy and Roman Comedy.

1. The Fifth and Early Fourth Centuries

The institution of maritime loans, Reed suggests, originated between 475 and 450.²³ But much less is known about traders in the fifth century than in the fourth, and what little is known has in the past caused almost as much confusion as enlightenment to interpreters of the evidence.²⁴ But there is a sprinkling of sources dealing with the first decades of the fourth century. Aristophanes groups ἔμποροι with followers of other modest pursuits,²⁵ showing that their occupation did not give them high status in the eyes of Athenian citizens. But it was possible to suggest to an Athenian jury (with what effect is not known) that the ἔμποροι were important to the city - that it would be worth the Athenians' while to ingratiate them by putting to death the corn-dealers, who had illegally bought up large quantities of corn and so kept low the prices the traders received.²⁶ As Reed shows, this implies that most of the ἔμποροι were not covered by the law which obliged Athenian citizens and metics to carry grain to no port other than Athens.²⁷ This is an important point, and it indicates that throughout the fourth century the ἔμποροι who came into Athens (and so probably into any other port) would expect to leave again within a short period (D. Whitehead suggests that foreigners in Athens became liable to pay the metic-tax after a month²⁸).

A text which may have a bearing on the predominance of ξένου in the shifting communities of ἔμποροι around the Greek world is P. Oxy. 2538,²⁹ a fragment of an unidentified Attic orator, probably of the period of Lysias.³⁰ The speaker relates how his father, who was a merchant and made his living from the sea, came to Selymbria and made friends with one Antiphanes, whose daughter in due course he married; the speaker, the surviving one of the three sons of the marriage, produces witnesses to show that his father introduced him to the members of his phratry in Athens and that after his mother's death he was sent to the same school

as some others (perhaps children of a later or earlier marriage).³¹ J.R. Rea shows that the text is part of a speech either defending a charge of *ξενία* or claiming a share in an inheritance;³² perhaps the latter seems the more likely, in view of the speaker's emphasis on what happened to him as a child, and in particular (since it survives) in view of his account of how he was treated in his schooldays:³³ Rea argues that a defence of his citizenship would have required a plea that he was born in legitimate matrimony and was exercising citizen rights before 403/2 and that therefore his treatment in his schooling as a member of his family would not have any legal bearing on the question whether he was a citizen.³⁴ After the reenactment of Pericles' citizenship law in 403/2 an Athenian working as a trader would not have been able to offer a Selymbrian (or other non-Athenian) friend the prospect of citizen status at Athens for children of a daughter the trader might marry: this, while strengthening Athenian traders' connections to their own city by requiring them, if they cared about their children's status, to marry Athenian women, will have reduced the potential for firm personal connections between citizens of different cities who met as a result of one of them being a trader.

Therefore Athenian traders were obliged to act as temporary and alien visitors while abroad, and to come home in order to act as respectable Greek people:³⁵ while they were on their summer tours (probably in their youth³⁶) they had to have little to do with the cities they visited - to remain physically almost outside them, and ideologically entirely so.

If in these early years of the fourth century the trader's status and respectability abroad were compromised first by his position as an alien and second by the strength of his own city's claims on him, he might still be regarded with some suspicion in his home city, if the example of Andocides can be treated as indicative: he complains that his law-court opponents accuse him *περὶ τῶν ναυκληριῶν καὶ περὶ τῆς ἐμπορίας*.³⁷

The trader was insecure at home as well as abroad. His ties with the community - his own, let alone the communities he visited - were weakened. The next section will deal with the articulation and implications of these facts, and in particular with their relationship to what Greek writers had to say about trade and traders in the abstract.

2. The Philosophical and Theoretical Writers

The embarrassing position Andocides' ναυκληρία and ἐμπορία put him in when he had to appear in court is all the easier to understand if consideration is given to a passage near the beginning of Plato Laws. Plato defines what he means to treat as παιδεία (τὴν...πρὸς ἀρετὴν ἐκ παίδων παιδείαν, ποιοῦσαν ἐπιθυμητὴν τε καὶ ἐραστὴν τοῦ πολίτην γενέσθαι τέλεον) and specifically excludes as ἀπαίδευτοι men educated εἰς τε καπηλείας καὶ ναυκληρίας καὶ ἄλλων τοιούτων σοφίαν.³⁸ Expertise in trade is treated as antithetical to the education needed for good citizenship. The point is not much developed in the treatise, but it is returned to in an obiter dictum in book IV, at the beginning of the discussion of laws for a new Cretan city, where an inland site is preferred and the sea characterized as a 'salty and bitter neighbour' because of the damage caused to a city's moral character by contacts made through trade.³⁹ A practical formula for avoiding the influence of traders while not isolating the city from the benefits of trade⁴⁰ is given in book XI: traders are to be received in markets, harbours and a public building outside the city.⁴¹

Similarly Aristotle in the Politics accepts the necessity of import, of the things a city cannot supply itself with, and of export of surpluses;⁴² but he postulates that a city should be ἐμπορικὴ for those two purposes only, observing that those who make themselves a market-place for all and sundry do so for the sake of revenue: he adds that this is πλεονεξία and ought to be avoided.⁴³ The assumption is the same as Plato's, that

traders will be an element which will be liable to disturb the equilibrium of a city society; as A.E. Samuel comments: 'all [Aristotle's] reasoning is based on the fundamental assumption that stability in a society is a good, is achievable, and is the basic aim of all political and economic arrangements. Thus the designation of self-sufficiency as the chief good. It is so because self-sufficiency is the circumstance which will most certainly produce stability. So too, the attacks on certain kinds of exchange or commerce are based on the premise that they are undesirable insofar as they tend towards or promote instability.'⁴⁴

But whereas Plato theorizes about the possibility of trade being respectable, or even praiseworthy, as a way of life (and sets out why the possibility is not likely ever to become actuality),⁴⁵ Aristotle, asking the question whether the εὐδαιμονία of the state is the same as that of the individual,⁴⁶ and noting that the answer depends on which life it is better to choose, ὁ δὲ διὰ τοῦ συμπολιτεύεσθαι καὶ κοινωνεῖν πόλεως ἢ ὁ ξενικὸς καὶ τῆς πολιτικῆς κοινωνίας ἀπολελυμένος, elects not to express a preference between city and non-city life.⁴⁷ Having raised the question, it seems rather lame to avoid answering it on the ground that it is outside the scope of the political treatise.⁴⁸

It is surprising to what extent the formula in Laws XI seems to reflect what was already being done in practice. It has been mentioned above that ἔμποροι typically occupied the same quarter of a city as hetaerae;⁴⁹ and as Vélissaropoulos comments: 'c'est toujours le souci d'empêcher que les contacts s'étendent au-delà des échanges matériels qui donne à l'emporion sa raison d'être.'⁵⁰ Aeneas Tacticus prescribes rules for the treatment of ξένοι in a city under siege (it is envisaged that the ξένοι will be in the city for trade⁵¹), restricting the places where they may go in the city;⁵² later he describes how a city was captured as a result of weapons' being brought in through the city gates ἐν κιβωτοῖς

ὡς φορταγωγοῖς: ἐλλυμενισταί inspected the boxes when they were brought through the gate (but did not find the weapons), and Aeneas recommends inspection of incoming ships by λιμενοφύλακες and ἀποστολεῖς.⁵³ The picture here is of wares being carried into the city from a separate place used for unloading the ships. The fact that separation of this kind was usual explains Theopompus' tone in his comment on the people of Byzantium spending their time in the ἀγορά and the city's being a πόλις ἐπ' ἐμπορίου κεκλήνη.⁵⁴

3. Rhetorical Evidence

In the case of Byzantium, though, it was only the closeness of the city's identification with its emporium which drew (hostile) comment. Political writers could accept the necessity for trade (and even look on its practice as a potentially noble calling⁵⁵), but chose to prescribe protection of the city-state by endorsing in their treatises 'the marginality' as Mossé has it 'of the world of commerce'.⁵⁶ The orators, on the other hand, had less opportunity to concentrate in their writing on aspects of city life chosen by themselves, since they might be called on to write speeches about whatever dispute had arisen. Demosthenes in some places seems to explain affairs at the emporium to the jurors as if they were likely to be innocent of any familiarity with the kind of things that went on there: he says in the Zenothemis speech 'there is a gang of disreputable men that has gathered in the Peiraeus...',⁵⁷ so giving his story the quality of a shocking revelation about an unfamiliar aspect of life; similarly, in the Lacritus speech he begins by characterizing the Phaselites as 'the cleverest at borrowing money in the emporium',⁵⁸ insinuating into the hearer's mind an image of the emporium as full of tricky foreigners and the home of arcane techniques for doing business (and on both counts unfamiliar and threatening);⁵⁹ and, on a more apologetic tack, the defendant in the Apaturius case says: 'I have stopped sailing,

but I have a moderate amount of money and I try to put it to work on maritime loans. Because I have been to the emporium often and spent time there, I know most of those who sail the sea...',⁶⁰ so attempting to excuse himself for a much greater involvement in affairs in the emporium than it would be usual for a respectable Athenian to have.⁶¹ But it would perhaps not be legitimate to generalize from these instances to the conclusion that the rhetorical treatment given by Demosthenes to the world of the emporium always relies on the assumption that jurors would have little knowledge about the place or the people who frequented it.

Mossé develops the argument about the marginality of the world of commerce⁶² by suggesting that maritime loans at Athens in the fourth century were financed by two distinguishable groups of citizen lenders: 'the first group, composed of men of wealth, only concerned themselves indirectly with maritime loans and these loans represented no more than a fractional part of their total fortune ... the second group ... was composed of men of modest origins much more deeply involved in maritime commerce and it had far fewer connections with the life of the city.'⁶³ But the case for the existence of the first group referred to is compromised by the fact that Nausimachus and Xenopithes, identified by Mossé as having made a maritime loan, are mentioned in the passage referred to by Mossé⁶⁴ only as having had money owing to them in Bosphorus. It is far from necessary to suppose that it was owed in the form of a maritime loan: in fact, in view of the stress laid by the defendant on the fact that Demaretus, his guardian, had never been to Bosphorus and so could not have collected the money on behalf of the defendant (whose father had been Nausimachus' and Xenopithes' guardian),⁶⁵ it seems much more likely that it was not, since the debtor, in the case of a maritime loan, would normally have returned to the port in which the loan was made (which in this hypothetical case would presumably have been Athens) to pay.⁶⁶

Mossé's first group is left with only two members, of whom Stephanus is treated by Mossé only as 'probably' coming into the category.⁶⁷

Examining the members of the second group of Athenian citizens, Mossé finds that they were closely involved with, and people very similar to, the metics and foreigners engaging in maritime business in the Athenian emporium.⁶⁸ This conclusion is supported by consideration of J.K. Davies' list of the nineteen men known certainly to have been involved in financing sea voyages:⁶⁹ though Attic oratory is the source for every entry in the list (all but two come from Demosthenes⁷⁰), 12 or 13 of the nineteen people were not Athenians; and the fact that of the seven loans of 3,000 dr. or more mentioned in the list three were subscribed to jointly by more than one lender suggests that quite often lenders would not have enough cash available to finance a large venture alone. A financier of this kind found it difficult 'to secure large enough profit margins, or to operate on a large enough scale, to give him major financial status';⁷¹ and if he was an Athenian, he 'in no sense belonged to the circles of leadership in the city.'⁷²

The world of commerce, therefore, came to the attention of the city authorities most sharply when the Athenians began to be deprived of the benefits of trade during the Social War. Isocrates in the mid-350s expressed the hope that making peace would double the city's revenues,⁷³ and would cause the city to be full again of 'merchants and foreigners and metics of whom the city is now empty';⁷⁴ but the burden of Xenophon's Poroi is to show that positive measures will be needed to restore the city to prosperity.⁷⁵ His comments on ways to encourage metics are not of primary relevance to the matter of traders, as his own strong change of subject at the beginning of chapter 3 shows,⁷⁶ and the proposals he makes, in §§1-5 and 12-14 of chapter 3, all gain their point from the assumption that the intended beneficiaries will be in Athens for a very short time:

being able to take good quality silver away instead of a return cargo would increase for the trader the ease and speed of completing a visit,⁷⁷ the proposal for speedy settlement of legal disputes bears some similarity to what Athens in the end did for visiting traders,⁷⁸ the proposal to invite importers of outstanding goods to front seats in the theatre and civic meals is made with a view to securing more visits (rather than to inducing the traders so honoured to settle in Athens),⁷⁹ and the suggestions about providing lodging-house accommodation and merchant ships for charter, to the trading community, show how Xenophon thought there was money to be made from offering facilities for hire to Athens' temporary residents.⁸⁰ Action at Athens followed the literary encouragements given by Isocrates and Xenophon,⁸¹ and ἐμπορικαὶ δίκαι were available to settle traders' disputes for the second half of the fourth century and indeed beyond. There is no question but that once the need to take measures to encourage merchants had become a point for discussion in Athens the Athenians gave the world of commerce the facilities it needed if it was to find Athens an attractive location.⁸²

4. Athens and Other Locations

Even before the institution of ἐμπορικαὶ δίκαι, and all the more afterwards, Athens was an uniquely well-frequented port. Athens had been committed to reliance on corn imports on a large scale since the fifth century,⁸³ and though the dangers to Athens' supply⁸⁴ were ipso facto dangers to Athens' suppliers also, Reed is certainly right to say that there was guaranteed work for the large number of men regularly engaged on the Athenian corn trade.⁸⁵ This suggests that Athens was a centre of the world outside the πόλις for traders in the same way as for certain other travelling workers.⁸⁶ But it was not the only such centre. Lycurgus makes much of the likely effect of Leocrates' spreading his comments on

Athens to the ἔμποροι at Rhodes and says that these ἔμποροι sail all round the oecumene and proclaim about the city what they have heard from Leocrates.⁸⁷ He goes on to say, in particular, that Leocrates caused some ἔμποροι and ναύκληροι not to come to Athens: and at a very awkward moment, after Chaeronea.⁸⁸ Unless Lycurgus is guilty of a very considerable exaggeration, Rhodes by this time was already becoming a very important port of call: its importance grew as the Greek world entered the Hellenistic age, though the early medieval compilation which is extant under the name of the Rhodian Sea Law echoes the importance of Rhodes as a centre of the commercial world of Greece more in its title than in its contents.⁸⁹

Probably there was no other place which attracted as much traffic as Athens or Rhodes. If Isocrates' hope of doubling Athenian trade-related revenue was at all realistic, in a year when it can be presumed that Athens received her full normal quantity of imported corn,⁹⁰ then it is fair to infer that half or more of the imports arriving in Athens in a normal year were non-grain items which were carried by merchants to destinations which would be chosen on the basis (presumably) of a calculation of what port would be both easily reached and likely to offer a market in which the wares would fetch a good price. In normal circumstances Athens must very often have come into the mind of a merchant making such a calculation. Similarly Rhodes, which was better placed, geographically, to be reached from places in the East opened up by Alexander. Aristotle, describing subdivisions of maritime occupations which a δῆμος might have, says that the εἶδος...ἐμπορικόν is prevalent at Aegina and Chios,⁹¹ but it is more plausible to suggest as Reed does that these locations may have been the homes of many people who became merchants, rather than places which were filled with merchants in summer.⁹²

There is a fragmentary passage of Hyperides which gives an illustration of the difference between ports which expected an influx of summer

visitors and cities which expected not to have much contact with traders who moved from place to place. It shows how a city only a short distance from an international centre could be thoroughly remote from the network of emporia visited by travellers along trade routes in summer. It is the story from the Deliacus of two Aeolians who came to Delos on a sight-seeing tour of Greece.⁹³ They were not, apparently, carrying on a trading enterprise, as some travellers did to finance their voyages: they had a large quantity of gold with them.⁹⁴ They were found dead on Rheneia.⁹⁵ The Delians made an accusation of sacrilege against the Rheneians when they heard about the murders. The Rheneians were annoyed at this and made a counter-accusation. At the arbitration,⁹⁶ they asked the Delians why they thought the two Aeolians would have come to Rheneia: there were no harbours, no emporium nor any other attraction; they said that everybody went to Delos,⁹⁷ and that they themselves spent a good deal of time in Delos. The Delians replied that the two Aeolians had gone to Rheneia to buy sacrificial victims;⁹⁸ and the Rheneians asked why, in that case, they had left their attendants in Delos instead of bringing them over to drive the victims back, and why, when they had walked around in the temple of Delos with shoes on, they had crossed to Rheneia without their shoes when it was thirty stades along a rough road from the crossing point to the city of the Rheneians, where they would have had to go to make their purchase. The fragment ends at this point: but it is clear from the tone of it that the reader is intended to understand that the Rheneians' cross-examination of the Delians made the point that it was overwhelmingly likely that the Aeolians were murdered in Delos and their bodies cast out on Rheneia: and the central element of the argument presented by the Rheneians is that however many people go in and out of the harbours and emporium of Delos, none (or hardly any) of them ever visits Rheneia.

The fact that it cannot have been possible for Rheneia, any more

Traders, who formed at best a transient element in city populations, stood low in the scale of respectability and integration in the community. It is easy enough to ascertain that the world of traders ('le monde de l'emporion';⁷ 'the "world of the emporium"',⁸) had close connections, and connections which were recognised as close by contemporaries, with what has been described elsewhere in this study as the 'demi-monde'.⁹ J. Vélissaropoulos stresses that ἐμπόρια were parts of towns, and quotes Pollux' comment that καπηλεῖα and πορνεῖα are parts of an ἐμπόριον.¹⁰ Traders were men and travelled without their wives. Other sources connect seafarers with the 'demi-monde': Timarchus, Aeschines alleges, had settled as an adolescent in the surgery of Euthydicus the physician in the Peiraeus and, while pretending to be a student of medicine, was practising homosexual prostitution with some of '...the traders, or other foreigners, or our citizens' as clients;¹¹ and Lucian in one of his Dialogi Meretricii illustrates how a naval oarsman would be unable to compete with a successful ἔμπορος for the attention of a hetaera.¹² As short-term visitors to the cities, the traders came into contact typically, and perhaps chiefly, with elements in the cities which were themselves not fixed, and not, or not fully, part of the cities.¹³ This is a preliminary indication that the trader, even if he would spend the winters at home as a full citizen of his own πόλις, went out in summer and lived in the world outside the city-states for the time being.

G.E.M. de Ste. Croix mentions the possibility that members of 'what we might almost call an "international merchant class"' may often have had to spend the winter wherever they happened to be when the sailing season ended.¹⁴ This is a sound point, and is supported by evidence for groups of people from non-Athenian Greek cities having existed in the Peiraeus: there were Citians, who asked the Athenians if they might buy land to build a sanctuary,¹⁵ and to judge from the 277 gravestones of

than it was possible for any Greek city,⁹⁹ to be self-sufficient in all kinds of articles of consumption, might seem to constitute a difficulty here. But the difficulty is not serious. First, a small or backward city is likely to have needed a less wide range of imports than a larger city: military and naval supplies, for instance, cannot have been proportionally as much in demand by cities not large enough to have a foreign policy as by the larger cities;¹⁰⁰ so that Isocrates' mention of the absence of harbour and emporium at Salamis in the days before Evagoras is a key element in the contrast drawn between the city's former backwardness¹⁰¹ and its present status as an impressively built and militarily powerful city.¹⁰² Second, self-sufficiency in food was the norm in Greece, and large-scale importing was confined to a very few exceptional cities.¹⁰³ Third, there was little to attract a trader to a small city like Rheneia when there was virtually no commodity that would not be easier to sell in a much larger place like Delos. There is a likelihood that wares were moved by small craft from Delos by the Rheneians when they needed something from abroad.

It is worth noticing how in Scylax' *Περίπλους τῆς θαλάσσης τῆς οἰκουμένης Εὐρώπης καὶ Ἀσίας καὶ Λιβύης*¹⁰⁴ there are some sections where the phrase *πόλις καὶ λιμὴν* is used of particular places.¹⁰⁵ In other sections the phrase does not occur, but this is because of the non-uniform nature of the work's composition. Where it comes in, it is a cue to mariners that a city has harbour facilities, while places where it is not possible to put in are mentioned probably to aid navigation and recognition of localities. The implication is that for the users of the book the range of coastal cities at which it is possible to call constitutes only a fraction of the whole number of cities on the coast.¹⁰⁶

The inference is that the large slave-crewed cargo ships of the Aegean in the fourth century B.C. will have tended to travel between a fairly

large but limited number of destinations. These destinations, cities with emporia which were in most cases districts separate, or at least distinct, from the rest of the built-up area¹⁰⁷ (often outside the walls¹⁰⁸), were filled in summer with men who had at least temporarily gone to live outside the πόλις. Athens was the doyenne of these maritime cities, which formed between them a complex of locations whose connections with each other, through acquaintance between traders, was stronger than each one's connection with the self-sufficient community life of the city to which it was juxtaposed.¹⁰⁹

5. Tourism and Aristocratic Traders

Hasebroek says of Solon:¹¹⁰ 'his travels were inspired purely by the desire for knowledge, and he carried goods with him for sale abroad simply because at a time when any money that existed was current only within a narrowly restricted area and trade between one district and another had to be carried out on a barter basis, that was the only way in which he could support himself during his absence from home.' If Solon traded only to pay his expenses, then it would be fair to expect to observe a decline in aristocratic trading as the money economy became established: and this expectation would be strengthened by consideration of the mysterious case of the Aeolians at Delos, who were paying in gold.¹¹¹ But in the fourth century there were still Greeks from rich backgrounds who took cargoes of goods with them when they went abroad.

There was the plaintiff who commissioned Isocrates Trapeziticus. He was the son of one Sopaeus, who held a position of trust and authority under Satyrus, king of Bosphorus.¹¹² But when he (in the speech he commissioned) comments that οἱ πλείοντες εἰς τὸν Πόντον all know his father's position, it may perhaps show that his father had some official or business connections with the traders on their visits to Bosphorus.¹¹³ If that were

the case, perhaps it could be expected that his father, who may have been used to loading ships with grain as part of his work in Satyrus' service, would load two ships with grain for his son and give him money and so send him to Greece.¹¹⁴

But it is perhaps less obviously likely that Plato would have spent any part of his life selling olive oil in Egypt.¹¹⁵ He was a man of good family who was interesting himself in gaining knowledge, though: and even where a money economy operated it could easily be worth while to take goods to sell on a trip abroad - professional traders expected to make good profits, so clearly it was intelligent for a well-off traveller, instead of taking money with him, to spend it at home on a cargo and space in a ship, and sell it at the destination for more than he paid.¹¹⁶ Comments in the dialogues should not be taken as indicative of Plato's own behaviour (where the views expressed are Plato's own, they represent his reflective outlook at the moment of writing). And there is a parallel for the combination of trade and study, besides Solon: the young man from Pontus who came to Athens to sell salt fish and learn philosophy.¹¹⁷

The chance survival of a proverbial phrase from the fourth century casts another small light on the relationship between philosophizing and being a trader.¹¹⁸ The phrase is tantalizingly referred to by Cicero, who writes to Atticus¹¹⁹ 'dic mihi, placetne tibi primum edere iniussu meo? hoc ne Hermodorus quidem faciebat, is qui Platonis libros solitus est divulgare, ex quo λόγουσιν 'Ερμόδωρος.' It is explained in the Suda:¹²⁰ ὁ 'Ερμόδωρος, ἀκροάτης γενόμενος Πλάτωνι, τοὺς ὑπ' αὐτοῦ συντεθειμένους λόγους κομίζων εἰς Συκελίαν ἐπώλει. Note the use of the imperfect ἐπώλει: he used (regularly) to take loads of Platonic dialogues to Sicily and sell them.¹²¹ Most likely it was an act of discipleship to become a long-range book exporter for Plato: but Hermodorus would hardly have done it unless it was possible to make money from it.¹²² But as has been argued elsewhere

in this study, philosophy, though it attracted students mostly from well-off backgrounds, was not in any exclusive sense an aristocratic pursuit in the fourth century.¹²³ This is where aristocratic, 'amateur' trade shades into ordinary trade, and it becomes more clear than ever that being a trader was more comparable with following another mobile τέχνη than with other styles of Greek living.¹²⁴

6. Traders in New Comedy and Roman Comedy

There are many references to traders in comedy. More in Latin than in Greek, because more Roman comedy is extant than Greek New Comedy. Discussion of the pertinence of comic material to consideration of what sort of people traders were is begun in a rudimentary way by Knorringa,¹²⁵ who surveys a list of references in Greek only. He says: 'we cannot find an opinion on ἔμποροι in these authors',¹²⁶ and most of his short chapter is devoted to a list of objects of trade derived from his collection of references.¹²⁷ He gives no consideration to Latin sources.

Hasebroek says nothing of comedy. Reed, though he presents a useful collection of references including many to Latin authors, deals with the subject of traders in comedy very briefly;¹²⁸ he argues that the authors' liking for making their characters merchants is a dramatic device for getting entrances and exits, and adds that there is no comment on the respectability of, or the necessity for, traders:¹²⁹ indeed, he says that there is no correspondence between traders in comedy and the figures in philosophy or oratory. Accordingly, he treats comic characters who are traders as 'amateur' traders.¹³⁰ 'Once they appear,' he sums up, 'we quickly forget their trading and concentrate on other features - usually on their family rôles as father, son, uncle, family friend, etc.'¹³¹

The last point is an interesting one. The action of a comic play takes place in what is introduced to the audience as a city (at least in

most cases). The 'return motif',¹³² involves exploration of the difficulties and comic situations to which transfer from 'outside' to 'inside' gives rise in the case of characters who are returning from abroad to their home context. Certainly in most cases the returning characters' family rôles will be uppermost in the mind of the audience or reader through most of the play: the question is usually how the returning character is going to fit in again to his temporarily-relinquished background.¹³³ It would be naive to suppose, because the playwrights' theme is family life,¹³⁴ that no serious treatment (in the measure in which New Comedy is a genre at least partly serious) is given to the issues raised by the ambiguous position of the returner-from-abroad;¹³⁵ in fact, the incidence of the 'return motif' in comic plays can be recognised as a symptom of awareness that relatives' absences from home as traders and soldiers, and, indeed, on State business, created tensions and awkward situations in a world where it was expected that people would normally live their whole lives within the social context of their own city.¹³⁶

The statement that there is no correspondence between comic characters who are traders and the figures in philosophy and oratory may perhaps suggest that Reed has read Plato and Demosthenes with an insufficiently sceptical eye.¹³⁷ It is not surprising that Plato says that traders are rascals but that comic writers do not;¹³⁸ Plato, writing at as high a level of theoretical abstraction as any writer ever had, needs to distinguish, at that theoretical level, between the attainments of men educated as he himself was (for good citizenship) and men who had reached a high level of technical training in the complex business of being ἔμπορος and ναύκληρος.¹³⁹ He has no room to make a polite concession to the personal qualities of his counterparts in a different ideological tradition.¹⁴⁰ Writing in a period in which the city-state tradition seemed to be losing the military imperative for its unchanged existence,¹⁴¹ and was losing its able young

men to τέχνας,¹⁴² and was dependent on traders for the cities' survival,¹⁴³ he was in a position where he had to use to the full his readers' predisposition in favour of the aristocratic/political style of education and life.¹⁴⁴ As for the characters in Demosthenes: they are the parties in lawsuits, and it is not surprising that they come out looking bad. G.M. Calhoun makes a good point, which should not be neglected:¹⁴⁵ 'the trade could not, and would not, have been maintained on the basis of this type of contract' [the maritime loan] 'had not the majority of adventurers been honest and upright men.'

And comedy has a number of pictures of traders and the trading life to present besides that of the reintegration of the returning trader into his family. An amusing fantasy appears in the mouth of the slave fisherman Gripus in Plautus Rudens,¹⁴⁶ when he has caught a heavy chest which he imagines contains gold:¹⁴⁷ the first purchases after his freedom, he says, will be land, a house and slaves; then he will carry out trade in great ships; and he will become the very rival of the successor kings.¹⁴⁸ It sums up the romance of trade, in the late fourth century, in six lines.¹⁴⁹ But there are more passages where trade is presented as dangerous to person and property: Pataecus in Menander Perikeiromene describes how 'the wild sea of Aegean salt covered ... the ship';¹⁵⁰ but Davus in Terence Andria considers improbable the story he has been told of an Athenian's being shipwrecked on Andros.¹⁵¹ What consideration of these and other pictures of the trader's life in comedy¹⁵² yields is the information that being a trader was a way of acquiring and losing wealth with surprising speed and ease: and here, though the writers were naturally attracted to the extreme cases, comedy certainly was imitating life.¹⁵³

So the idea that there is no correspondence between reality and the world of the trader of Greek and Roman comedy ought not to be entertained. Recognition of the plausibility of the comic character as trader is not

damaging to the general Hasebroekian thesis that traders were persons of small account in society: it is not, after all, characteristic of Greek and Roman comedy to deal with characters whom Plato or Xenophon would have recognised as highly respectable - the abundance of meretrices and rascally slaves is an element in the temporary release from respectability which audiences welcomed. But the amount of information which comedy has to offer about typical trading activities is slight. Trade in slaves appears in a number of places, but it is often connected with the personal histories of characters in the plays, and so cannot indicate the relative importance of slaves as an item of trade. Comedy's contribution to knowledge of what traders were like comes in the form of its attestation of the at times uneasy relationship between individuals' lives inside the $\pi\acute{o}\lambda\iota\varsigma$ (with their family) and outside it (doing business).

Notes

1. Hasebroek, pp.1-43. The book is a translation of Staat und Handel im alten Griechenland (Tübingen, 1928).
2. Reed, especially pp.xxiv-xxv. de Ste. Croix, p.271 n.6 says that Reed is going to produce a book on Greek maritime traders. It will presumably be substantially similar to the Oxford thesis referred to in this chapter.
3. Reed, pp.135-219.
4. Cf. J.K. Davies Wealth and the Power of Wealth in Classical Athens (New York, 1981), p.2.
5. Reed, passim and especially pp.xxiv-xxv; Hasebroek, pp.44-96 (at pp. 44-45 there is a statement of the theory to which Hasebroek applies his critique). J. Vélissaropoulos (Les naoclères grecs (Geneva and Paris, 1980), p.6) argues for a theory exactly opposed to the theory of the rise of a commercial aristocracy, suggesting that the stability in the function and social rôle of the ναύκληρος was such that the passing of a political régime (meaning changes such as that from classical politics to Hellenistic monarchy, or from Hellenistic monarchy to Roman rule) brought no important change.
6. Reed, pp.1-99, deals with the people and conditions in fourth-century trade.
7. J. Vélissaropoulos 'Le monde de l'emporion' DHA 3 (1977), pp.61-85 (hereinafter Vélissaropoulos).
8. C. Mossé 'The "World of the Emporium" in the private speeches of Demosthenes' in P. Garnsey, K. Hopkins and C.R. Whittaker (eds) Trade in the Ancient Economy (London, 1983), at pp.53-63 (hereinafter Mossé).
9. Cf. above, pp.250-253.
10. Vélissaropoulos, p.61 and n.10; Pollux IX.34. Cf. Hasebroek, p.160, who cites Strabo XVII.1.9 (=794) on Alexandria and Dicaearchus on Chalcis;

the περὶ τῶν ἐν Ἑλλάδι πόλεων ascribed to Dicaearchus was shown by F. Pfister to belong to Heraclides ('Die Reisebilder des Herakleides' Sb.Ak. Wien 227.2 (1951)), a third-century author (pp.44-45). §29 is the pertinent one (pp.84-87).

11. Aeschines I (Timarchus).40. This is exactly the kind of accusation which may be a lie. There is no knowing. But (as modern writers who use Attic orators as sources often, and rightly, say) lies have to sound plausible to the jury. Aeschines' story must have fitted in with the kind of things Athenian citizens thought went on down near the docks.

12. Lucian Dialogi Meretricii 14.1-4. L. Casson (Travel in the Ancient World (London, 1974), p.92) refers to this dialogue as 'an amusing skit in which a sailor from the Athenian navy storms at a courtesan because she threw him over for a toothless, balding fifty-year-old merchant'. This reveals a degree of misunderstanding: the sailor is not specified as being in Athenian service - Lucian probably did not intend to make his context exact, but it is apparently Hellenistic (the sailor has been (§§2-3) to Sicyon, Syria, Samos, Cyprus, Caria, Patara, Gythium and, since the σαπέροδης (cf. LSJ s.v.) was a fish associated with the Nile, to Egypt: this humorous list seems to envisage routine peacetime naval activity in places which were under Persian control until the time of Alexander) so that it would make more sense to think of a Hellenistic king's navy. Nor does the sailor storm at the girl: he shows that he has given her all the presents he can afford, and she says (with a trace of sarcasm) that what he can afford will not persuade her to give up her (rich and generous) Bithynian merchant. Though Lucian is a late source this is an interesting dialogue, communicating a feel for the shifting population of seafarers who came in and out of a port (the list of destinations might perhaps suggest Rhodes as the scene of the action, but probably Lucian did not mean to be specific here either); but it must be said that none of the other

Dialogi Meretricii refers to merchants in any way - 'merchant-and-hetaera' is only one of a very wide variety of available τόποι in this area. On the other hand, the foreigners who did not come to Neaera in Megara ([Dem] 59(Neaera)).36) were quite likely merchants for the most part.

13. This point is amplified below, at pp.294-296.

14. de Ste. Croix 2, p.266.

15. See below, n.104.

16. IG II² 8548-8825. 24 of these texts (29 persons named) are identified in the corpus as belonging to the fourth century B.C. One deceased person is identified as a steersman (8755), while another text commemorates a father, son and daughter who perished in the waves of the Aegean (8708). Most texts simply name the deceased, but many are located in the Peiraeus. The Heracliot community was certainly a community of traders.

17. Reed, p.98 and n.175, treats Charinus as an 'amateur' merchant. This depends on a misunderstanding of the text: Charinus' father Demipho, who had made his pile by selling up his farm and turning to maritime trade (Plautus Mercator 73-79), is shown as sending his son to Rhodes to trade (11) in order to get him started on the serious business of following in his father's footsteps as a mercator. On Reed's opinions on traders in comedy cf. below, pp.304-307.

18. Plautus Mercator 87-97.

19. Plautus Mercator 97-105.

20. Which was Philemon's Ἐμπορος (Plautus Mercator 9).

21. He has a house to which to invite Charinus, and a slave girl to send to him at bedtime (Plautus Mercator 97-105).

22. Plautus Mercator 97-98.

23. Reed, p.56; G.E.M. de Ste. Croix ('Ancient Greek and Roman Maritime Loans' in H. Edey and B.S. Yamey (eds.) Debits, Credits, Finance and Profits (London, 1974), pp.41-59, at p.44) guesses that maritime loans began at this

period: he mentions that the volume of the corn trade to Athens must have grown during the fifth century to become by the middle of the century 'the most important single item of Greek trade'.

F.D. Harvey argues ('The Maritime Loan in Eupolis' "Marikas" (P. Oxy. 2741)' ZPE 23(1976), pp.231-233) that the fragment P. Oxy. 2741 fr. 1B col.ii lines 16-18 (=C. Austin Comicorum Graecorum Fragmenta in papyris reperta (Berlin and New York, 1973) no.95 lines 96-98) refers to maritime loans at 20%. Since Eupolis Marikas was produced in 421 (p.233) this is the earliest reference to such a loan, and it seems that the maritime loan was already a familiar institution in 421.

24. This comment refers most sharply to treatment of Thucydides III.72-74. Knorringa, p.59, for example, says 'the ἔμποροι who formed the aristocratic element in Corcyra, a town preeminently fitted for trade by its situation, live near the market and in the neighbourhood of the harbour.' A.W. Gomme in HCT ad III.72.3 says, of 'those of the Corcyreans who were in charge of affairs' (III.72.2), 'doubtless absentee landlords of wide agricultural domains, most of them; some of them merchants.' This is a more cautious comment, but neither Gomme nor Knorringa faces up to what III.74.2 (the place where merchants are mentioned) says: 'the few ... set on fire the houses round about the agora and the tenements, so that there would be no avenue of approach, and they spared neither their own property nor that of others, so that many wares belonging to merchants were burnt up ...' This does not state or imply that any of 'the few' were merchants. M.I. Finkelstein, by contrast, makes sensible use of III.74.2 (ἔμπορος, ναύκληρος and κάπηλος: a Prolegomena to the Study of Athenian Trade' CPhil 30 (1935), pp.320-336, at pp.335-336 with n.66) by pointing out that it shows how wares were stored near the agora. ἔμπορος and ναύκληρος are grouped together in an Attic inscription (later than 434/3): IG I³ 133, e.g. at line 3.

25. Aristophanes Plutus 904; cf. Reed, p.50.
26. Lysias 22(Corn-dealers).21 (on which cf. R. Seager 'Lysias against the Corndealers' Hist. 15(1966), pp.172-184).
27. Reed, p.42.
28. Whitehead, pp.9-11.
29. The Oxyrhynchus Papyri XXXI (London, 1966), pp.38-45 (hereinafter Rea).
30. Rea, pp.39-40.
31. P. Oxy. 2538 col.ii.9-28, col.iii.1-8 and 14-20, col.iv.1-28.
32. Rea, pp.38-39.
33. P. Oxy. 2538 col.iv.1-28.
34. Rea, p.39. But the point is in a high degree unclear. Birth before 403/2 is presented as a defence at Dem. 57(Eubulides).30: but S.C. Humphreys ('The Nothoi of Kynosarges' JHS 94(1974), pp.88-95 at pp.92-93) suggests that Pericles' law of 451/0 disfranchised all sons of non-Athenian mothers not registered at the time of the law's passage, and C. Patterson (Pericles' Citizenship Law of 451-50 B.C. (New York, 1981), p.145) argues that the reenactment in 403/2 and non-examination of those coming of age before 403/2 (Schol. in Aeschin. 1(Timarchus).39) were part of the general provisions for amnesty reflecting the turmoil of the preceding decade.
35. In Lysias 32 (Diogeiton).4, for instance, it is related how Diodotus, who had made a lot of money κατ' ἐμπορίαν, was persuaded by Diogeiton to marry his (Diogeiton's) daughter. This all happened in Athens, after Diodotus had made his money. By contrast P. Eleph.1 (311/10) is a marriage-contract between one Heraclides of Temnos and one Demetria of Cos - and as the editor comments (O. Rubensohn Elephantine Papyri (Berlin, 1907), p.19), 'wir befinden uns hier offenbar im Kreis der Söldner der Garnison von Elephantine.' But mercenary officers (one dowry is 1,000 dr. line 4) in this context would be planning for a career and settlement in Ptolemy I's Egypt.

36. It is only an impression that ἔμποροι tended to start in young adulthood and retire (if their circumstances permitted) to less risky pursuits later. Some texts support it: Dem. 33(Apaturius).4 is the account given by a former trader, now a maritime money-lender, of his career; Plautus Mercator (on which cf. above, n.17) gives the same sort of picture, the father having retired after making a fortune and deciding to send his son out trading; and Diodotus (cf. above, n.35) married after retiring with a fortune. Probably this course was open only to a small proportion of ἔμποροι, the rest never growing rich enough.

37. Andocides 1(Mysteries).137. For substantiation of this, see Lys. 6(Andocides)30 and 48-49.

38. Plato Laws I.643D-E. Cf. Rep.II.371A and Politicus 289D: ἔμποροι characterized as δολάκονοι, menials; it is Rep.II.271D which defines as ἔμποροι tradespeople who wander from city to city (τοὺς...πλάνητας ἐπὶ τὰς πόλεις) cf. also Knorringa, p.112.

39. Plato Laws IV.705A: ἐμπορίας γὰρ καὶ χρηματισμοῦ διὰ καπηλείας ἐμπυμπλάσσα αὐτήν, ἦθη παλίμβολα καὶ ἄπιστα ταῦς ψυχαῖς ἐντίκτουσα, αὐτήν τε πρὸς αὐτήν τὴν πόλιν ἄπιστον καὶ ἄφιλον ποιεῖ καὶ πρὸς τοὺς ἄλλους ἀνθρώπους ὡσαύτως.

40. Plato Laws XI.918B-C is an unexpectedly frank and pleasant expression of the need for traders. Knorringa, p.69, is mistaken to say that Plato thinks trade has to be reduced to the smallest possible proportions: it comes nearer the mark to say, as at Knorringa, p.110-111, that Plato may have asked himself 'in what way can I see to trade, which cannot be entirely abolished, exercising a minimum of demoralising influence on the citizens?' Hasebroek, pp.175-182, also seems to allow insufficient weight to this passage in the Laws.

Arist. Pol. I.1257a17-19 comes to the opposite conclusion to that of Plato Laws XI.918B-C, and says that καπηλική is not by nature a part of

χρηματιστική. This would point in the direction of a rejection of Plato's idea that people who are in trade are in a necessary and potentially noble occupation whose followers are corrupted by the exceptional degree of temptation to greed for gain to which they are subject.

41. Plato Laws XI.952D-953A. Traders are mentioned as the first of four kinds of unavoidable foreign visitor: usually coming in summer (952D); χρηματισμοῦ χάριν ἐμπορευόμενοι ἔτους ὥραν πέτονται πρὸς τὰς ἄλλας πόλεις (952E).

42. Arist. Pol. VII.1327a25-27.

43. Arist. Pol. VII.1327a27-31.

44. A.E. Samuel From Athens to Alexandria: Hellenism and Social Goals in Ptolemaic Egypt (Studia Hellenistica 26, Louvain, 1983), pp.26-27.

Samuel's book is as much concerned with reflective comment on Greek social thought in general as with Ptolemaic Egypt.

45. Cf. above, n.40 and below, n.55.

46. The phrase used by Aristotle at Pol.1324a6, which is rendered here as 'the individual', is εἷς ἕκαστος τῶν ἀνθρώπων. This clear and elegant usage disproves G.E.M. de Ste. Croix' contention (de Ste. Croix, p.439) that 'this ... notion can hardly be expressed in Greek'. But the value of correcting a small point in such a highly tendentious passage is perhaps open to question.

47. Arist. Pol. VII.1324a13-17.

48. Arist. Pol. VII.1324a18-23: ending with ἐκεῖνο μὲν πάρεργον ἂν εἴη, τοῦτο δὲ ἔργον τῆς μεθόδου ταύτης (lines 22-23). But it should be added that by 1334a15-16 he is saying that the τέλος of men is the same καὶ κοινῇ καὶ ἰδίᾳ, and τὸν ὄρον ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι τῷ τε ἀρίστῳ ἀνδρὶ καὶ τῇ ἀρίστῃ πολιτείᾳ. This, considered in connection with the substance of n.46 above, may suggest that the question Aristotle avoids is whether being a good man is a better thing to choose than a life outside the sphere in

which virtue may be exercised and recognised.

49. Cf. above, p.289.

50. Vélissaropoulos, p.61.

51. Aeneas Tacticus 10.11 and 13.

52. Aeneas Tacticus 10.11-13.

53. Aeneas Tacticus 29.1-12. Hdt. VII.137.2 mentions a successful stratagem of the kind a measure of this sort was intended to prevent.

54. Theopompus FGrHist 115F62; cf. Vélissaropoulos, p.62 with n.18, and p.70, where it is pointed out that Theopompus' comments on the Byzantines are intended to account for their allegedly debauched character.

55. Plato Laws XI.918B-C: Plato says that anyone who evens out the uneven and unbalanced distribution of goods of any kind must be a benefactor (εὐεργέτης), and adds that this is what coinage and traders are for. He goes on to look elsewhere for the reasons for the calling's disreputableness (918E-919C) ending with the observation that the problem with trade is the struggle against poverty and riches, whose moral dangers he sets forth (919B-C). At 919D-920C he provides that no citizen is to engage in καπηλεία or crafts, and that aliens who do so are to be under supervision. This is in contrast with the provision at Rep. II.371A, where the ἔμποροι are envisaged as a necessary element in the city population.

56. Mossé, p.53.

57. Dem. 32(Zenothemis).10.

58. Dem. 35(Lacritus).1.

59. Further on, Demosthenes develops the theme of arcane techniques, disclosing in Dem. 35(Lacritus).15 that Lacritus is Isocrates' pupil; and in §§39-42, explaining Lacritus' alleged dishonesty as a result of his sophistic education, he warns that Lacritus is gathering paying pupils and has passed on to others (his brothers first) the evil and unjust παιδεία, namely the art of borrowing money as maritime loans in the emporium and not paying it back.

60. Dem. 33(Apaturius).4-5.

61. This apologetic tone is perhaps the factor which has given rise to the impression that the defendant in this case was an Athenian (cf. Mossé, p.54 (following L. Gernet) and Davies, pp.61-62): a metic might have felt able to describe his means of livelihood with less explanatory comment.

62. But note should be taken of the influence of ἔμποροι and ναύκληροι on getting decrees passed at Athens - see for instance IG II² 343, line 416, and the whole career of Moerocles (C. Ampolo 'Tra finanza e politica: carriera e affari del signore Moirokles' Riv.Fil. 109(1981), pp.187-204)). The marginality of the world of commerce from the point of view of public policy ought not to be over-stressed.

63. Mossé, pp.54-58: quotation from p.56.

64. Dem. 38(Nausimachus).11; cf. Mossé, p.54.

65. Dem. 38(Nausimachus).11 and 14.

66. Cf. Knorringa, pp.93-94. Naturally the question arises what sort of loan was outstanding to Nausimachus and Xenopithes in Bosphorus. The speech does not supply an answer. It seems odd that a rich Athenian (Nausimachus' and Xenopithes' father) should become so far separated from his money; but this should not be taken as showing that the money was lent to finance the voyage that took it away from its owner.

67. Mossé, p.54. Mossé does not mention the son of the strategos engaged in maritime loans attested at Dem. 34(Against Phormio).50. But this is hardly enough to save Mossé's model.

68. Mossé, pp.56-58.

69. Davies, p.68.

70. The others come from Lysias (no.1: Diodotus) and from Hyperides plus Plutarch (no.4: Demosthenes, the orator, himself).

71. Davies, p.68.

72. Mossé, p.58: which is in line with Davies' finding that it was not

likely that anyone would be able to enter the liturgical class by financing maritime loans (Davies, p.68). But a counter-example against this generalization is now available: the Megaclides and Thrasyllus of Eleusis who are attested as borrowing forty minas at [Dem.] 52(Callippus).20 (370s) arrived in the liturgic class some twenty or so years later (SEG XXVII.19, which combines J. Kirchner Prosopographia Attica (Berlin, 1901 and 1903), nos. 9685 and 9686). Davies' arguments, though, are not such as to be overthrown by one counter-example.

73. Isocrates 8(Peace).20-21.

74. Isocrates 8(Peace).21.

75. Xenophon Poroi, passim.

76. Xenophon Poroi 3.1: "Ὡς γε μὴν καὶ ἐμπορεύεσθαι ἡδύστη τε καὶ κερδαλεωτάτη ἡ πόλις, νῦν ταῦτα λέξω.

77. Xenophon Poroi 3.2.

78. Xenophon Poroi 3,3 suggests prizes for the ἀρχή of the emporium on just and quick settlement of disputes. ἐμπορικὰ δίκαια (on which cf. below, n.82), which were the solution actually adopted, constituted perhaps a more radical answer; the implication of Xenophon's suggestion is that in the first half of the fourth century, and earlier, the ἀρχή of the emporium had had at least an informal part in the settlement of disputes (noted at Hasebroek, pp.171-172).

79. Xenophon Poroi 3.4. Hasebroek, p.26, misses out in his summary of Xenophon's suggestions the important point that only οὐκ ἂν δόκωσιν ἀξιολόγους καὶ πλοῖους καὶ ἐμπορεύμασιν ὠφελεῖν τὴν πόλιν are to get the prestigious invitations.

80. Xenophon Poroi 3.12-14.

81. Which is not to say that legislation was influenced by the pamphlets: more likely the pamphlets reflected a widespread consciousness that something ought to be done.

82. Reed, pp.60-67, details what special measures were taken to attract ἔμποροι; and at p.67 Reed says 'Athens obviously did act on behalf of maritime traders, due simply to the huge overlap of their interests with those of the Athenian citizen body.' At p.91 Reed dates the introduction of ἐμπορικὰ δίκαια between the composition of Xenophon Poroi (355) and that of [Dem.] 7(Halonnesus).12 (342), here following L. Gernet 'Sur les actions commerciales en droit Athénien' REG 51(1938) pp.1-44 at pp.1-2.

83. Cf. above, n.23.

84. See for example de Ste. Croix 2, pp.46-47, and Reed, p.18, referring to 'those willing to make the long and dangerous voyages to the distant points, particularly Pontos, from which Athens secured her grain.'

85. Reed, ibid.

86. Cf. above, pp.249 and 252. On the central importance of the Peiraeus in the Greek international world, cf. E.E. Cohen Ancient Athenian Maritime Courts (Princeton, 1973), pp.6-8.

87. Lycurgus In Leocratem 14-15.

88. Lycurgus In Leocratem 18; cf. Hasebroek, p.144.

89. Cf. W. Ashburner The Rhodian Sea Law (Oxford, 1909), e.g. at p.lxvii: 'Part III, in the form in which we possess it, has nothing to do with the Rhodians' (Part III is the heart, and by far the largest part, of the extant text).

90. Cf. above, p.297 and n.73. In the year in the mid-350s referred to at Dem. 20(Leptines).31-32 the Athenians imported 800,000 medimni (this, as the only available figure for the annual Athenian corn import, has attracted comment in a number of places: de Ste. Croix 2, pp.46-47, gives a brief explanation of it); the merchants whose ships brought this corn must have spent the usual amount of time in Athens implied by a delivery there. Therefore the emporium of Athens must have seemed markedly emptier than usual, at any rate considering the whole summer period, when only the corn-merchants were there.

91. Arist. Pol. IV.1291b17-24.
92. Reed, p.46, suggests Chios, Aegina and Massalia as likely provenances of traders; Massalia because nos. 19 and 20 in his catalogue (see above, n.3) come from there, Chios and Aegina on the strength of the Aristotle passage (cf. above, n.91). It should be added that Rhodes was also a provenance of traders: Polyaeus IV.6.16 says how in 305 Antigonos allowed safety to Rhodian ἔμποροι (and θαλασσοϋργοί) provided that they did not sail to Rhodes.
93. Hyp. F.70, from Hyp. 13(Deliacus).
94. Hyp. F.70.1.
95. ibid. οὗτοι ἐφάνησαν ἐν Ῥηναίᾳ ἐκβεβλημένοι τετελευτηκότες.
96. Hyp. F.70.2: οὕσης δὲ τῆς διαδικασίας ...
97. ibid. πάντας δὲ ἀνθρώπους ἀφικνεῖσθαι πρὸς τὴν Δῆλον ἔλεγον. That is an interesting testimony to the impression created in a small neighbouring city by the busy influx of traders and travellers to a larger neighbour. It does represent a certain rhetorical overstatement.
98. ibid. The Delian position has by now begun to look shaky: it cannot have been usual for visitors who wanted to make sacrifices to have to go far from a large temple to buy them.
99. Cf. above, pp.293-295 for the theorists' acceptance of the necessity for all cities to participate in trade.
100. Ruschenbusch, p.68, points out that a majority of Greek states were too small to have an independent foreign policy (=policy of war or peace: cf. p.67). Since all cities maintained a hoplite force, all would require imports of metal, or of manufactured armaments; but as the large cities were centres of employment of mercenaries and of technical innovation, they must certainly have imported more matériel per citizen than the 'Normalpoleis' (cf. Ruschenbusch, p.9).
101. Isocrates 9(Evagoras).47; Isocrates points up the city's backwardness

by observing that it was ἐκβαρβαρωμένη, that it did not welcome Greeks or know τέχνας, that it did not use an emporium and that it did not have a harbour.

102. ibid.

103. See de Ste. Croix 2, p.46

104. Text in A. Peretti Il Periplo di Scilace (Pisa, 1979), at pp.505-538. Peretti, noting the enormous amount of geographical material in the treatise, comments (p.485) that it cannot all have been collected by a mid-fourth century writer; and argues (p.486) that the work, being independent of the famous literary works of the fifth century (Hecataeus, Herodotus), is representative of a tradition of knowhow: 'È il filone di un sapere empirico, fornito dalla secolare esperienza marinara dei Greci, rimasto nell'ombra come strumento della navigazione...' (and cf. pp.435-438, arguing that the extant text is the product of a redaction made in the Philippic age and including some earlier work). It is not contentious to speculate that this tradition of knowhow was probably built up in the context of communities of professional seafarers and traders, just as the physicians built up their own traditions, the philosophers theirs and the cooks theirs (cf. above, pp. 242-257): this is another aspect of the traders' existence as a body of men with a cohesion between themselves, habitually living outside the city-state system.

Reed, pp.93-97, argues that there was no cohesion among traders, except that there were religious ties, some of which were national in character (at pp.94-95 Reed discusses Tod II 189, the Athenians' response to a request from the Citians to be allowed to buy a plot of land and build a sanctuary to Aphrodite on it). The fact that he fails to find cohesion shows that his definition of cohesion has been inadequate as a tool for analysing the available evidence: traders knew each other personally (cf. above, p.296 and n.60) and their community had enough

internal continuity over a long period for it to be possible for Scylax Περύπλους to come into existence.

105. See for instance Scylax Περύπλους 67, and some of the sections in the 80s.

106. It is typical of this text to refer to which cities are Greek cities when dealing with non-Greek areas. E.g. Scylax Περύπλους 86 Χουράδες πόλις Ἑλληνίς - among the Mossynoeci.

107. Cf. above, p.289 and n.10.

108. Cf. above, pp.294-5 and nn.51-53: Aeneas Tacticus assumes that wares brought ashore will subsequently need to be brought through a city gate into the city.

109. Cf. above, n.104. It need scarcely be added that revenue from harbours was important to governments, regardless of the self-sufficiency of community life in cities. See [Arist.] Oeconomica 1350a16 on how Callistratus in Macedonia doubled the yield of the ἐλλυμένιον.

110. Hasebroek, p.13. Cf. Reed, p.16.

111. Hyp. F.70.1; cf. above, p.300 and n.94.

112. Isocrates 17(Trapeziticus).4.

113. ibid. Hasebroek, p.13, is perhaps likely to be right in calling Sopaeus a 'rich landlord of Bosphorus', but it should be noticed that the text gives no explicit support to the idea and that Sopaeus may have been a courtier rather than an indigenous nobleman. He was in charge (ibid.) of Satyrus' forces (probably mercenary forces, as Hasebroek, ibid., says), and so had possibly started his career as a travelling mercenary leader.

114. Isocrates 17(Trapeziticus).4.

115. Plut. Solon 2.4. Other sources (the earliest of which are Cic. Rep. I.10.16 and Fin. V.29.87) stress only that he went to Egypt for study.

116. Commodities also probably had less attraction than precious metals for thieves; the Aeolians at Delos (cf. above, p.300 and n.94) after all,

were probably murdered for their money.

117. D.L. VI.9.

118. On which cf. also above, n.52.

119. Cic. ad Att. XIII.21a.

120. Suda, s.v. Λόγοισιν Ἑρμόδωρος ἐμπορεύεται. Note also that the phrase is an iambic trimeter and so a comic fragment (Kock III p.456, Adesp.269). The context cannot be guessed: Cicero clearly quotes it as a proverbial phrase.

121. A. Böckh (Die Staatshaushaltung der Athener³ I, ed. M. Fränkel (Berlin, 1886), p.62) suggests that trade in books over long distances was so unusual that Hermodorus became proverbial. This is not fully satisfactory in view of the facts (a) that the line began its career as part of a comic play; and (b) that at Xen. Anab. VII.5.14 books appear as part of a mixed cargo: Böckh thinks them likely to have been unwritten books (p.61), but he is corrected by his editor Fränkel (II, p.14, n.89). Fränkel's explanation is that Hermodorus was 'nach den Worten Ciceros ... nicht dadurch sprichwörtlich, dass er Buchhandel in die Ferne betrieb, sondern durch die Art, wie er ihn betrieb' (II, p.14, n.89); this is right as far as it goes, but it should be made explicit that Cicero is referring to Hermodorus as an exceptionally devoted publicist of Plato's work: his message to Atticus could be paraphrased as "you can be as devoted and effective a literary publicist as the greatest of them all, viz. Hermodorus, without publishing things without my permission."

122. Cf. above, n.121.

123. Cf. above, p.259 and n.204.

124. On 'amateur' traders, cf. below, pp. 304-307.

125. Knorringa, pp.74-76.

126. Knorringa, p.74.

127. Knorringa, pp.74-76.

128. Reed, pp.98-99.

129. It is perhaps not entirely surprising that there is not: but simply portraying traders (as Charinus in Plautus Mercator, on whom see above, n.17) as normal people, while it does not imply a value-judgement on their occupation, disposes the audience or the reader to view traders as a part of Greek society which can be treated as familiar enough to be laughed at. Their existence is therefore affirmed as part of a generally genial status quo, rather than being (as for example in Plato) analysed as one of the less attractive implications of the need for distribution and exchange.

130. Reed, p.98 and n.175. Here cf. above, n.17; but Demeas and Niceratus in Menander Samia certainly seem, from their discussion at lines 96-111, to be amateur travellers (cf. 416-417).

131. Reed, p.98.

132. On which cf. S.M. Goldberg The Making of Menander's Comedy (London, 1980) (hereinafter Goldberg), pp.109-110, where attention is drawn to this motif in the context of 'the situations the tradition provides and the relationships they represent' (p.109).

133. As for instance in the case of Clinia's return from military service in Asia with 'the king' in Terence Heautontimoroumenos (see lines 110-117 for a military counterpart to Demipho's exhortation to his son to go trading in Plautus Mercator (cf. above, n.14)). Menander Aspis trades on the contrast between the consequences of Cleostratus' return as corpse and as living man.

134. Cf. for instance Goldberg, pp.109-121, on 'Menander and Life'.

135. For example the position of Theopropides in Plautus Mostellaria, who expects to return to his position as head of his family, and to his property. But his son Philolaches has spent all the family fortune in his father's absence. Among the laughs there are moments of genuine poignancy: e.g. at lines 431-445 and 1153-1165.

136. If people left their own city's territory it would most commonly be as part of a city military expedition. Plautus Truculentus makes sophisticated contrasts between Diniarchus, the townsman who has been abroad on State business (355-356), Strabax, the countryman come to town with a windfall of money in his pocket (647-655), and Stratophanes, the Babylonian soldier returning from campaigning (81-87). The differences, in success with the meretrix Phronesium, between the stay-at-home Strabax and Diniarchus and Stratophanes, make for many of the comic situations.

137. n.129 above suggests a main reason for this apparent lack of correspondence.

138. Even in his most moderate moment (cf. above, n.40) he speaks of riches destroying the souls of traders with luxury (τρουφή) and poverty turning them to shamelessness (Plato Laws XI.919B-C).

139. As at Plato Laws II.643D-E.

140. Not that he is consistently rude about all who do not conform to his gentlemanly ideal: cf. how he makes the contrast between doctors and doctors' assistants a type of the relationship between free people and slaves: Plato Laws IV.720B-E. But he does not regard them as the equals of himself or people like himself, however necessary they are to his Utopian plans (as in the case of the foreign schoolmasters required at Plato Laws VII.804C-D).

141. The success of the Phocians, temporary as it was, showed what a tiny state could do with a large mercenary army.

142. Cf. above, pp.257-260.

143. Cf. above, n.40.

144. Certainly Plato was an enemy of democracy (de Ste. Croix, pp.70-71); but he was as militantly in favour of being-a-good-πολίτης (cf. Plato Laws I.643D-E). Aristocratic/political is a term intended to sum up this state of mind.

145. G.M. Calhoun The Business Life of Ancient Athens (Chicago, 1926), p.54. And Reed, pp.9-12, stresses the time necessary to build up a good reputation as a trader.
146. Plautus Rudens 930-935.
147. Plautus Rudens 925-926.
148. Plautus Rudens 931: 'apud reges rex perhibebor': and note what Gripus means to do (934-935): 'oppidum magnum communibo, ei ego urbi Gripo indam nomen,/ monimentum meae famae et factis, ibi qui regnum magnum instituam.' M.N. Tod ('Epigraphical Notes on Freedmen's Professions' Epigraphica 12(1950), pp.3-26, at p.6) notes six references to freedmen ἔμποροι from the catalogi paterarum argentearum: IG II² 1157.59, 1558.91, 1559.39, 1566.2 and 1577.3(?). Cf. above, p.114.
149. On the romance of being a trader cf. Kock III p.443, Adesp.181, which occurs in Aelian Ep. 18 (from Demylus to Blepsias on the neighbour Laches who has taken to sailing and wishes he had not).
150. Menander Perikeiromene 808-809.
151. Terence Andria 223-224.
152. Cf. the lists of references in Reed, pp.98-99 nn.173-181.
153. Cf. Aristophanes of Byzantium Test.32 K-T.

Conclusion

In this thesis, then, chapters 1 - 3 represent bones and chapters 4 - 7 flesh. The correspondence between people leaving or losing their cities and people taking up travelling occupations is not (this has been stressed throughout) in all cases a direct one. There were alternatives: living on the kindness of ξένου (when available), or settling permanently as metics (when possible). But consideration of the whole Greek social picture in the fourth century must yield the conclusion that the political and social process of destructions and foundations of cities aided and sped the growth of a non-πόλις society.

The geographically and socially differentiated category of people who travelled as a normal part of their livelihood is a measure of the increasingly sophisticated nature of Greek society in this period. Its function as the source of infrastructure for Hellenistic royal governments has been mentioned;¹ and it should be added that the growth in mercenary service, in medicine, in other skilled service capacities, and in trade, allowed settled populations access to services (whether privately distributed, as educational and related services, or publicly used, as mercenary armies for the securing of public policy aims) which represented an infrastructure for the development of Greek life. Important aspects of Greek culture reached places and people who would have remained culturally less sophisticated in earlier periods.

This suggests, superficially at least, that the social developments discussed in this study give evidence of a lively and confident society. Certainly it will not allow characterization of the fourth century as a period of decline. More and more people, and people at a wide range of social levels from the raider to the philosopher, were living by occupations removed from simple primary production. But some of these

occupations - soldiering, raiding - must have been thoroughly miserable.²

This study explores an aspect of fourth-century Greek society which is clearly of some importance to the whole. It is worth considering at this stage what questions are raised by the perception it offers and the observations which led to it. Three areas for consideration come to mind.

First, questions about skilled occupations. Ancient historians take too little notice of the lives of philosophers, physicians and similar specialists. The interests of the people who do study such characters are not primarily historical, for the most part. Systematic work in this area could be expected to lead to the acquisition of very valuable information on how developments happened in society, specially in the Hellenistic period.³

Second, questions about mobility of people between cities and areas of the Greek world, particularly in the early Hellenistic period. A grave-inscription study might perhaps yield interesting information on people with non-local ethnics marked on stones. If a suitable sample were used, there might be opportunities to draw conclusions about how Greeks migrated from place to place.⁴

Third, general questions about πόλις society and its place in Greek social history. E. Ruschenbusch has done an important service in defining and quantifying something typical to set over against the equation of 'Athenian' and 'Greek' which the nature of the literary sources tempts all students of ancient Greece to make;⁵ and it may deepen understanding of Greek history to be conscious, further, that the distinctiveness and disparateness which Greek cities preserved through the Classical period and into the Hellenistic period was maintained in the face of alternatives, and modified by social change.

Notes

1. Cf. above, pp. 6-8.
2. This is an important point to make and an easy one to overlook. The frontispiece of de Ste. Croix is an attempt at making it memorably, whatever the complexity of the author's motives for choosing it (cf. G.E.M. de Ste. Croix 'A worm's-eye view of the Greeks and Romans and how they spoke: martyr-acts, tables, parables and other texts' Latin Teaching 37.4 (1984), pp.16-30, at pp.25-26).
3. Detailed new work on the language, composition and dating of the Hippocratic corpus would be of particular value.
4. There would be difficulties in designing and carrying out a suitable study. Mr. D.M. Lewis pointed out to me its potential value.
5. See Ruschenbusch, passim.

Appendix: The Cost of Armour and Weapons

The evidence relating to the cost of armour and weapons in the fourth century is sparse and of mixed value. The only prices mentioned in a literary source are in a scene towards the end of Aristophanes' Peace, where several characters in succession lament how the cessation of war has damaged their interests. A breastplate-merchant asks what he will do with an outstanding ten-mina breastplate;¹ a trumpeter says he bought his trumpet for sixty drachmas;² and a helmet-merchant claims he bought his helmets for a mina each.³ Trygaeus jokes about the alternative uses he can find for the items:⁴ the expensive equipment will serve purposes comic, or menial, or both. As the jokes rely on this contrast, the inference is that the prices mentioned are either very high indeed or (more likely) purely joke prices.⁵

The other pieces of evidence are all epigraphical.⁶ The least useful for the present purpose is the copy set up at Athens of a law of the Delphic Amphictyony from 380/79, giving the prices in Aeginetan staters⁷ of two items of armour: 'for the shield, 200 Aeginetan staters ... for the crest, 15 Aeginetan staters ...'⁸ The inscription does not by itself provide an explanation of these very high prices, but editors since Boeckh have argued that the text relates to money to be spent on adorning a statue.⁹ The cost of these pieces of armour, like the costs quoted by Aristophanes' characters, is surely completely unrelated to the cost of armour for ordinary use.

But there are three inscriptions which offer more useful data. One is part of the 'Attic Stelai' collection edited and commented on by W.K. Pritchett:¹⁰ when the Hermocopidae were sold up, a spear without a butt-spike (δόρυ ἄνευ στύρακος) went for 1 dr. 4 ob., plus 1 ob. sales tax;¹¹ and a short spear for throwing (δοράτιον) for 2 dr. 5 ob., plus

1 ob. sales tax.¹² The context makes it certain that these were ordinary items, sold at normal secondhand prices. In his discussion¹³ Pritchett refers to the most comprehensive extant list of Greek weapon-prices, which is contained in an inscription, probably of the third century, from Ceos.¹⁴

This inscription is a lex sacra regulating (among other things) a contest (ἀγών) which the πρόβουλοι of the Coressians are to hold in connection with a religious festival. The relevant portion of text (lines 20 - 31) reads: 'And the councillors shall institute a contest in connection with the festival, at a cost of 65 dr., and a gymnasiarch shall be chosen at the same time as the other offices are filled, who shall be not less than thirty years old. This magistrate shall organise a torch race for the young men at the festival, and shall be responsible for the other matters relating to gymnastic training, and shall lead the young men out three times per month for practice in javelin-throwing, archery, and catapult-shooting. Any of the young men who does not attend, while able to do so, shall be liable to be fined up to a drachma. The councillors shall give prizes to the winners as follows:

to the winning archer: a bow and a quiver of arrows (15 dr.)
second prize: a bow (7 dr.)

to the winning javelin-thrower: three spearheads and a helmet (8 dr.)
second prize: three spearheads (1 dr. 4 ob.)

to the winning catapultist: a helmet and a pole (8 dr.)
second prize: a pole (2 dr.)

to the winner of the torch race: a shield (20 dr.) ...'

Presenting this information in tabular form,¹⁵ Pritchett seems to take the phrase φαρέτραν τοξευμάτων to mean a 'quiver (for putting arrows in)'; but it is better taken as 'a quiver full of arrows'. This is a more natural rendering of the Greek,¹⁶ and it avoids the difficulty of having to think that a quiver by itself could cost 8 dr. He also gives

the cost of a spearhead ('or, possibly, spear')¹⁷ as 3 1/3 ob. without pointing to the difficulty that the winning catapultist's helmet seems to cost 6 dr. (by subtracting the value of the second prize from the value of the composite first prize), whereas the javelin-thrower's helmet by the same calculation seems to cost 6 dr. 2 ob. One of the three items (helmet, pole, set of spearheads) must vary in price, unless the text contains a mistake: but there is no certain way of determining which. Pritchett leaves the helmet price out of his table altogether, not mentioning it at all in his treatment; which may perhaps be taken as indicating that he assumed that it was the variable item: yet the text of the inscription gives no ground for doing so.

Clearly the Coressians were concerned to have their young men systematically trained in military exercises.¹⁸ The budget for prizes is 61 dr. 4 ob. out of a total of 65 dr. budgeted to cover the cost of the contest. Since neither of these figures is a round number in the way that 50 dr. (Ϟ) or 100 dr. (H) would be, it seems fair to deduce that the budget for the whole event was based on an estimate of the likely cost of suitable prizes (rather than the nature or quality of prizes being fitted into an arbitrarily fixed budget): so the prices quoted are probably perfectly realistic for weapons of serviceable quality.

Pritchett treats these prices as high. He writes, 'the weapons mentioned were given as prizes of victory, so were presumably of good quality',¹⁹ and on the same page comments, 'our evidence is scattered, but we can safely conclude that weapons were not cheap.'²⁰ This judgement might well have been reinforced had he been aware of the Thasian inscription published in 1954 (the year after the publication of Pritchett's Attic Stelai article) by J. Pouilloux²¹ in which the value of the panoplies which are to be given by the city to the orphans of the ἀγαθῶν ἀνδρῶν²² is to be three minas. Indeed in his study on dedications

of armour Pritchett comments on this text that 'in terms of actual earning power, the sum of three hundred drachmai was a large one'.²³ This is certainly true. And it must be made explicit that if the Ceos prices are high, then the Thasos price is higher still, by some way.

As a preliminary to considering the reasons for this discrepancy, it will be helpful to clarify what sorts of weapon are in question here. The Thasian text specifies greaves, corslet, short sword, helmet, shield, spear²⁴ (the basic hoplite panoply): the combined value of which is not to be less than 3 minas. Notice that this is a round figure, and a minimum value - in contrast to the Cean text, where the cost of each item is stipulated exactly. Pritchett's argument that the Cean weapons were of good quality applies a fortiori to the Thasian weapons: they were not at Thasos prizes of victory, but they were a means of improving morale among men worried about being killed in battle;²⁵ and indeed the very fact of being hoplite armour sets it apart from some of the Cean prizes: the bows, arrows, the poles have no place in conventional hoplite fighting,²⁶ and as the spearheads were given to the javelin-throwers, they were probably suitable for use on throwing-spears rather than anything else.

It is likely, however, that the shield was of hoplite type, and possible that the helmets were also. ἄσπις is to some extent a general word for 'shield',²⁷ but if one item of equipment more than any other defined the hoplite, it was the ἄσπις.²⁸ So one is entitled to assume that an ἄσπις, defined no further except by price, would be of the standard hoplite pattern.²⁹ As for the helmet, the standard words for the hoplite helmet are κράνος and κυνῆ, but this does not exclude the possibility of using the word περικεφαλαία to denote a helmet of this type. The word is used by Aeneas Tacticus in a passage dealing with how Charidemus supplied his friends inside a besieged city with some

mercenaries in heavy armour (note the use of the word ὄπλα for 'shields'):³⁰ so it has a respectable fourth century pedigree in this sense. But there is a case against understanding περικεφαλαῖα here as a bronze helmet. The bronze helmet used by Greek hoplites required a fair amount of skilled labour in manufacture: A.M. Snodgrass describes hoplite armour as 'a panoply which (particularly in the case of the Corinthian helmet) required exceptional skill in the bronze-smith and a considerable amount of his time'.³¹ Now, if Snodgrass is right to imply that a helmet would need more labour in the making than, say, a shield, and given that it might well need almost as much bronze (because the shield was made mainly of wood, with a bronze rim, and was not necessarily bronze-faced: see for example Cartledge's note on the ἄσπις, cited in n.28), it would seem likely that it would cost as much or more. But the Cean helmets cost 6 dr. 2 ob. or 6 dr., and the Cean shield 20 dr. Perhaps it is more likely that these helmets were not, or not all, of bronze.³²

Of the Cean prizes, therefore, probably only the shield (the star prize, given to the winner of the main event) was of the hoplite type. Even so its price puts it in a quite different category as regards quality from the 300 dr. Thasian suit of armour: one can only conjecture, but perhaps it will seem reasonable to suggest for purposes of comparison that a whole panoply of uniform quality to a 20 dr. shield would cost 100 dr. or thereabouts (the helmet and the cuirass both costing more than the shield, greaves costing less, spear and sword being comparatively small items).

Of the two Athenian spears, the δοράτιον (3 dr., including tax) did not form part of a hoplite panoply. The δόρυ ἄνευ στύρακος, on the other hand, may well have done. The fact of its being sold on its own (not with the rest of a panoply) is accounted for by the fact that it had no butt-spike, and so was in need of repair. This seems a more

satisfactory interpretation of ἄνευ στύρακος than to assume that this negative description could denote a sort of spear which would in any case not have a butt-spike. Needing repair accounts also for its low price (1 dr. 5 ob. including tax) as compared to the δοράτιον. The στύραξ it needed may well have been similar in price to the Cean λόγχαυ, three of which cost 1 dr. 4 ob. So it is probably reasonable to think of a spear for use in the hoplite phalanx costing between 2 dr. and 3 dr. Independently from the Cean shield, this points to the conclusion that the 300 dr. the Thasians undertook to spend on war orphans' arms was very far from being the minimum possible price for a hoplite panoply.

Not that it is likely to have been anything like a maximum. Towards the beginning of his study of 'Dedications of Armor' W.K. Pritchett notes that:³³ 'it is important to bear in mind that the Greek warrior went into battle with the most expensive arms he could afford'; this he supports mostly with quotations from and about Xenophon.³⁴ Fair enough: though Xenophon was both a rich man and a soldier by inclination. Pritchett rather fails to prove the point he seems to be trying to make: namely that all Greeks used the most expensive weapons they could afford (indeed the fact that a man like Xenophon bought the best he could proves little even about what rich men in general would do). But what is clear from the Memorabilia passage, as indeed from the existence later in the fourth century of Alexander's 'Silver Shields',³⁵ is that some soldiers had, and used, very expensive armour.

Hoplite armour, then, covered a very wide price range.³⁶ The items other than the shield on the Cean inscription were suitable for use by light-armed troops (which does not imply that those who received the prizes would necessarily be required to serve as such: cf. n.18; nor would the winner of the ἄσπυς necessarily be able to serve as a hoplite.). By the time this inscription was set up, in the third century, the great days

of the Iphicratean peltast were past: and peltasts of this type account for most of the mercenary troops employed in the middle of the fourth century.³⁷ The Cean περικεφαλαία may have been of a type which the fourth-century peltast would have used,³⁸ and it seems unlikely that the cost of spearheads can have changed much; but the other items mentioned in the list are only marginally relevant to the cost of kitting oneself out as a soldier in the fourth century.

Some general conclusions about the cost of arming oneself are beginning to suggest themselves; but another aspect remains to be considered, which may help to shed some light on the question in general, as well as being important in its own right. The cost of horses is a matter on which much more information is available than on the cost of arms and armour. Even before some spectacular and relatively recent discoveries, a fair amount of testimony was available from the literary tradition. There are four references to horses costing 12 minas or thereabouts,³⁹ all of which clearly are about very good horses, one reference to the fact that a man (who is seeking to prove that he is not extravagant) has never paid more than 3 minas for a horse,⁴⁰ and, in an inscription of the second century from Thebes, a reference to a hipparch selling two horses for 85 and 86 bronze drachmas respectively.⁴¹ All of which is both interesting and helpful.

The chief sources of information on the price, or rather on the value, of horses, however, are the 681 lead tablets discovered in Athens in two finds: one of 570 tablets, in the Ceramicus,⁴² and one of 111 tablets, in the Agora.⁴³ These contain names and tribes of owners, colour and value of horses. The values in the third century part of the smaller find mostly fall between 300 and 700 dr. (52 of the 72 values given fall in this range), with a very few below 300 dr. (1 at 250 dr., 2 at 200 dr., 1 at 100 dr.) and smaller clusters at 1000 dr.

and 1200 dr.,⁴⁴ which was apparently the maximum figure for this purpose.⁴⁵ Only 20 fourth-century values are preserved in this archive: though a less reliable sample because they are fewer, they seem to suggest a lower price in the fourth century: there are five valuations lower than 300 dr. (1 at 250 dr., 1 at 200 dr., 1 at 100 dr.) and none over 700 dr.; the largest cluster is at 500 dr. (6).⁴⁶

It will be clear at once that the wide price-range applying to horses is similar to the variation in price which the scanty evidence for the cost of armour seems to suggest. It is also not irrelevant that it was possible in the fourth century to buy a perfectly serviceable cavalry horse for 3 minas - the cost of the armour the Thasians promised to the sons of the ἀγαθοὶ ἄνδρες. On the Solonian census Aristotle comments that⁴⁷ 'those who made 300 μέτρα, wet and dry, were to be of cavalry census, or, as some say, those able to keep a horse'; he adds that it is more reasonable to think that the qualification was in terms of μέτρα, analogous to the qualification for the πεντακοσιομέδων census, but it is clear that the census qualification was at some time seen as the level necessary to make it possible to keep a cavalry horse. The qualification is 50% higher than the qualification for the zeugite census.⁴⁸ So if A.H.M. Jones' argument that many hoplites were quite poor men⁴⁹ is accepted, and his inference that the zeugite property-qualification in the fourth century was 2000 dr.⁵⁰ is extended to infer a ἰππεὺς qualification of 3000 dr., then it would seem that men who were not at all rich could be in the cavalry. But one must proceed with caution here. Keeping a horse was expensive: and the cavalry were drawn from the rich people in the cities - Xenophon is quite explicit about this:⁵¹ 'I do not think I need write about how to break a colt. For in the cities those are drawn up to be cavalrymen who both are best off for money and have no small share in the city ... Anyone who shares my opinion about colt-breaking

will obviously send the colt out.'

Nevertheless it is inescapable that some of the cavalry only just managed to qualify: not only from the fact that there are only a few horses at the bottom end of the cost scale (these could conceivably belong to rich men who chose not to replace them until the last possible moment), but also from the fact that the Athenian state had a scheme for helping with the purchase of horses⁵² and from Xenophon's statement that it is likely to be possible to persuade phylarchs to spend the tribe's money on arming its cavalry contingent 'if they are persuaded that it is much more prestigious from the city's point of view for the cavalry to be decked out with the splendour of the tribe rather than with their own equipment' - a public provision is necessary for the troop to look smart.⁵³ And if these 'marginal knights' had a horse worth less than 300 dr., they would not in general be likely to have a panoply worth more than their horse. And as a majority of hoplites would be much poorer than the poorest cavalryman,⁵⁴ it would seem difficult to suppose that many of them would be able to afford a 3-mina panoply. What the Thasians offered their fallen heroes' sons was therefore perhaps not an extravagant suit of armour, but certainly a more than adequate one.⁵⁵

It is time to consider what conclusions can be drawn. What the evidence seems to permit is the following: that for hoplite armour, the price of a panoply could be very high indeed at the top end, and 300 dr. would buy a very decent panoply, but it would probably be possible to equip oneself for as little as 100 dr.; that for peltast armour, prices could have been very noticeably lower even than that; and that the poorest imaginable cavalryman would take into battle mobile capital to the value of at least 200 dr., some of which, at least if he were an Athenian, might be bought with state help. The peltasts at the bottom of this

scale could be genuinely poor men, but the cost of a hoplite's armour bears witness to a certain degree of present or past prosperity, unless it was given by someone wanting an instant army.⁵⁶ It is above all necessary to remember that the suit of armour was the only really indispensable piece of equipment for a mercenary (except a few water-bottles and such-like),⁵⁷ and that some owned almost literally nothing else; Polyænus has a telling stratagem:⁵⁸ Iphicrates, seeing in some storms and frost a chance for an attack, wanted to lead his soldiers forward. Because of their nakedness and the cold they were not keen, so he put on poor clothes, worse than the others', and went round the tents encouraging each one to attack the enemy. They followed him gladly, seeing the general humbly dressed and without shoes in his eagerness for their common safety.

Notes

1. Aristoph. Peace 1224-5.
 2. Aristoph. Peace 1241.
 3. Aristoph. Peace 1251.
 4. Aristoph. Peace 1228, 1242-9, 1253-4.
 5. Cf. A. Boeckh Die Staatshaushaltung der Athener³ (Berlin, 1886) p.138: 'Aristophanes ... wahrscheinlich die hoechsten, wo nicht gar erdichtete Preise setzt ...'; similarly W.K. Pritchett, 'The Attic Stelai II', Hesp. 25 (1956), p.307: 'these are regarded as high, if not fictitious, prices'.
 6. IG I³ 1 (=ML 14) gives 30 dr. as the cost of hoplite armour in a late sixth-century context; it will be as well to keep in mind in reading this discussion that there is no cost-of-living adjustment which can be used to make this figure useful in considering the fourth century.
 7. 1 Aeginetan stater = 3 Attic drachmas.
 8. IG II² 1126 (= Syll.³ 145) lines 29-30.
 9. A. Boeckh Corpus Inscriptionum Graecarum I (Berlin, 1828), no.1688. Comment at p.810: Boeckh thinks in terms of a colossal statue.
 10. W.K. Pritchett, 'The Attic Stelai I', Hesp. 22 (1953), pp.225-299 (texts), and 'The Attic Stelai II', Hesp. 25 (1956), pp.178-317 (comment) (hereinafter Pritchett 2).
- The relevant text is Stele II, Column III, lines 225-6 (=IG I³ 422 lines 266-267).
11. Pritchett 2, p.308, has a note establishing what sort of weapon this is.
 12. Pritchett 2, p.308, has a note establishing what sort of weapon this is; on the previous page he notes: 'Stele II contains the price of the short hurling spear ... as 2 drachmas ...' This should read '... 2 drachmas, 5 obols ...'.

13. Pritchett 2 pp.306-8.
 14. Sokolowski, no. 98 (= IG XII (5) 647).
 15. Pritchett 2 p.307. The table is as follows:

Value of Weapons in IG XII (5) 647

Weapon	Price	Line No.
Bow (<u>toxon</u>)	7dr	28
Bow and quiver (<u>pharetra</u>)	15dr	28
Spearhead (<u>lonche</u>)	3 1/3ob	30
Staff pole (<u>Kontos</u>)	2dr	31
Shield (aspis)	20dr	31

16. Cf. LSJ s.v. φαρέτρα. IG II² 1424a 344-345 ἡμισωράκιον τοξευμάτων σαπρῶν ἀχρήστων ('half a basket of rotten useless arrows') is an analogous usage.

17. Pritchett 2, p.307 n.5.

18. τοξικὴ, ἀκοντισμὸς and καταπελταφειλία, besides hoplite-fighting, were elements in the training of Athenian ephebes at the time when Aristotle's 'Αθηναίων Πολιτεία was written (42.3). Evidently at Athens, as well as at Coressia, it was felt that persons of hoplite means, as well as others, should learn these non-hoplite techniques. J. Rhodes A Commentary on the Aristotelian Athenaiion Politeia (Oxford, 1981) ad loc. refers to later inscriptions attesting the employment of separate instructors called ὀπλομάχης, τοξότης, ἀκοντιστῆς and [καταπαλι]αφειτῆς.

P. Roesch 'Une Loi fédérale Béotienne sur la préparation militaire' Acta of the Fifth International Congress of Greek and Latin Epigraphy Cambridge 1967 (Oxford, 1971), pp.81-88 publishes a third-century text attesting a Beotian federal law to the effect that παῖδες and νιανίσκου (line 13) are to be provided with instructors who shall teach them 'to shoot arrows and to throw javelins and to be drawn up in ranks as in war' (lines 14-16). He argues (pp.84-86) that these παῖδες and νιανίσκου are

boys below ephebic age and (pp.86-87) that this training requirement was introduced as part of the Boeotian League's change from hoplite fighting to the Macedonian phalanx.

19. And indeed the law itself says they are not to be sold and must be inspected by the generals at the ἐξοπλασία (Sokolowski no.98 lines 38-39).

20. Pritchett 2, p.307.

21. Pouilloux, p.371 (no.141) and plate 39 no.6. Pouilloux dates this text to the end of the second half of the fourth century (p.372).

22. Pouilloux p.372 explains that the ἀγαθοὶ ἄνδρες, with whom the inscription as a whole is concerned, are 'soldats morts pour la patrie'. This seems to be right, though as Pouilloux admits, there is no earlier parallel for the usage. The exact meaning which the Thasian text gives to the expression ἀγαθοὶ ἄνδρες, according to Pouilloux, '...se retrouve davantage dans Démosthène Pour la couronne §208: καὶ πολλοὺς ἐτέρους τοὺς ἐν τοῖς δημοσίοις μνήμασι κειμένους ἀγαθοὺς ἄνδρας οὓς ἅπαντας ὁμοίως ἢ πόλις ἔθαψεν But the quotation as he gives it is seriously misleading. Demosthenes has already referred explicitly to the dead of Marathon, Plataea, Salamis and Artemisium: there is no question of ἀγαθοὶ ἄνδρες without further qualification referring unambiguously, as in the Thasian text, to those killed in war. R.S. Stroud ('Greek inscriptions, Theozotides and the Athenian Orphans', Hesp. 40 (1971), pp.280-301) publishes and discusses an inscription, from 403, in which reference is made (lines 8-9), to the ἀνδραγαθία of the late fathers of orphans for whom provision is being made. At pp.288-289 and nn.19-20 the Athenian practice in this connection is outlined: there, too, orphans were presented with a suit of armour on coming of age (see Aeschines 3 (Ctesiphon). 154).

23. W.K. Pritchett The Greek State at War, III (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1979) p.259 n.9.

24. Pouilloux no.141 lines 18-19.
25. This is the reason Diodorus gives (20.84.3-4) for the passing of a very similar decree in Rhodes in 305.
26. Ephebic training is another matter. Cf. above, n.18.
27. Cf. D.S.14.41.5 and 43.2, where ἀσπίδων μὲν τεσσαρεσκαίδεκα μυριάδες will include all designs.
28. Cartledge, at p.12, calls it 'the cardinal item of hoplite equipment'.
29. On which see Cartledge (ibid.).
30. Aen.Tact.24.6.
31. A.M. Snodgrass 'The Hoplite Reform and History', JHS 85 (1965) pp. 110-122, at p.114.
32. Th.IV.34 refers to the Spartans at Pylos wearing πῦλου: and R. Warner's translation 'felt helmets' (in the Penguin translation, Harmondsworth, 1954) makes better sense here than LSJ's 'felt cuirass, jerkin' - suggested for this passage only, without parallel. Evidently felt helmets were used; though the point of Thucydides' comment is that they did not keep out the arrows. An inscription of the treasurers of Demeter and Kore at Eleusis from 329/8 records paying 4 dr. 5¼ ob. for 17 πῦλου for slaves (IG II² 1672 lines 70-71), that is 1¼ ob. each: but a cap of that sort was clearly not in any way intended to serve as protective headgear.
33. W.K. Pritchett The Greek State at War, III (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1979), p.242.
34. Xen. Mem.3.10.14; Aelian VH.3.24; Xen. Anab.3.2.7, where Xenophon describes himself as ἐσταλμένος ἐπὶ πόλεμον ὡς ἐδύνατο κάλλιστα. Pritchett also quotes Alcaeus Fr.224 Lobel-Page.
35. Curt.VIII.5.4 puts the introduction of the silver shields in 327; D.S. XVII.57.2 mentions them at Arbela (331).
36. Mr. D.M. Lewis comments (per epistulam)...'there is a very general

problem which starts right from the beginning of the hoplite revolution. What kind of corselet is normal or necessary? It seems clear to me that this is the item where there could be the biggest variation.'

37. Parke, Table II, illustrates this conveniently.

38. The Ἀρκαδικὸς πῦλος mentioned in Polyæn.4.14 (Polysperchon) is of interest here, specially in view of Arcadia's importance as a source of mercenaries (e.g. Xen. Anab.VI.2.10).

39. Aristoph. Clouds 21-23; 1224-5; Lysias 8.10; Xen. Anab.7.8.6: the price here is 50 darics; cf. Xen. Anab.1.7.18 for the value of darics, 1:20 dr.

40. Isaeus 5(Dicaeogenes).43.

41. IG VII 2426 lines 3-5.

42. Braun: The relevant part of this is section II 'Die Inschriften auf Metall', p.197ff.

43. Kroll.

44. Kroll, nos.27-111. The distribution (ignoring some uncertainties) is as follows: 100 dr.-1; 200 dr.-2; 250 dr.-1; 300 dr.-12; 400 dr.-8
500 dr.-12; 600 dr.-11; 650 dr.-1; 700 dr.-8; 800 dr.-2; 900 dr.-1; 1,000 dr.-6; 1,200 dr.-7.

45. There is one tablet in Braun's collection which gives 1,300 dr. Braun's comment (Braun, p.267) is 'Auf 176 als einzigen Streifen ist die Lesung der Zahl "1300" nicht ganz unmöglich, aber da 1,300 dann nur hier vorkommen würde, bilden 1,200 Drachmen bei der Wertfestsetzung offenbar die oberste Grenze.'

46. Kroll, nos.1-26. The distribution (again ignoring some uncertainties) is as follows: 100 dr.-1; 150 dr.-2; 200 dr.-1; 250 dr.-1; 300 dr.-3;
400 dr.-2; 500 dr.-6; 600 dr.-3; 700 dr.-1.

47. Arist. Ath.Pol.7.4.

48. *ibid*.

49. A.H.M. Jones Athenian Democracy (Oxford, 1957), p.31.
50. A.H.M. Jones Athenian Democracy (Oxford, 1957), p.142 n.50.
51. Xen. περὶ ἵππων.2.1-2. J.K. Anderson Ancient Greek Horsemanship (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1961) comments in some detail on the economics of horse-keeping (pp.128-139). His estimates of the gross income of holders of estates producing 300 medimni are of interest (p.135), though his final figures for the minimum cost of a horse to a poor cavalryman (pp.136-137: 450 dr.in 390, at least 900 dr. by 300) prove in view of the discovery of the lead tablets to be too high.
52. Harpocraton, s.v. κατόστασις; Lysias 16(Mantitheus).6-7.
53. Xen. Hipparch.1.22-23.
54. Note two things: first, that one had to feed one's horse (except on campaign, when the state provided σῦτος: cf. for example IG I² 304) and a cheap horse eats as much as an expensive one; second, that one had to replace it when it became unfit for service (but n.b. n.41). Also cf. Arist. 'Αθηναίων Πολιτεία 49.1.
55. The question of whether armour was commonly passed on has some relevance to this study. A.M. Snodgrass writes (Arms and Armour of the Greeks (London, 1967) p.59): 'Whether armour was often passed on from father to son or brother to brother is doubtful; this could have been regarded as an attempted evasion of the property-qualification and further, the need for an exact fit, especially with the Corinthian helmet but also with the corslet and even the shield, must have made it impossible in many cases.' His first point is very dubious: a city in time of war would surely not turn away a man with a suit of armour who was prepared to serve. His second point is more serious; W.K. Pritchett has collected evidence relating to dedications of ὄπλα οἷς αὐτὸς ἔχρεῖτο (The Greek State at War, III (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1979) cf.7); but if armour fits badly, surely one can sell it and buy some which fits

better? There seems to be no substantial objection to the proposition that if a family could not afford new armour, its members would use the old as long as possible. The armour of the Thasian ἀγαθὸν ἄνδρες, if not taken by the enemy, would presumably have been damaged in battle. The provision of new armour by the state ensured that boys left without armour would not therefore drop out of the hoplite category.

56. The armour made the army, as e.g. in Polyæn.3.8 (Archinus), where the armour Archinus pretended he was going to dedicate to the gods he gave instead to mercenaries and so seized the tyranny. The secret of Dion's taking Sicily with two φορητοὶ was that they were filled with panoplies (D.S.XVI.9.2 and 5) - five thousand panoplies were as good, under the circumstances, as five thousand hoplites (D.S.XVI.10.3).

57. For water-bottles, see Polyæn.3.9.47. Parke p.235 and n.3 notes that in new comedy a soldier's possessions typically amount to 'his armour, a wallet, a blanket, and a wine-cup.'

58. Polyæn.3.9.34.

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