Legislative and adjudicative ideals: the role of political morality in statutory interpretation

Thesis

In Law’s Empire, Ronald Dworkin articulates four ideals of political morality: integrity, justice, fairness, and procedural due process. Although he explicitly articulates integrity in both a legislative and adjudicative principle, the other ideals remain somewhat vaguely defined. However, Dworkin’s analysis of constructive interpretation gives rise to the view, often present but unstated in theories of statutory interpretation, that the ideals which guide legislation should also guide interpretation. If legal reasoning is a matter of interpreting in view of the object of interpretation’s purpose, in order to devise a theory of statutory interpretation, we must first look to the purposes and ideals of the object in question: legislation.

While I reject Dworkinian integrity as a viable ideal, the remaining three values offer important guidance. Fairness and due process both require strict textual fidelity, both from legislators in crafting laws and from judges in interpreting those laws. Justice requires that laws pursue legitimate purposes using legitimate means. Legislators must draft laws in this way and judges must interpret laws as though they have been drafted in this way. To draw out the complexities of this view, we can look to the classical legal concept of equity, particularly as expressed in the philosophy of Thomas Hobbes. Equity, for Hobbes, is a legal interpretive principle which demands that laws be interpreted in view of both the law’s immediate purpose, as well as the ultimate purpose of all laws – the reason that the government was instituted – which Hobbes argues is safety.

Finally, we can apply our insights regarding statutory interpretation to other spheres of legal interpretation. Adrian Vermeule’s common good constitutionalism provides a methodologically similar, explicitly Dworkinian example of a theory of constitutional interpretation, through which we can explore legal interpretation in general.

Authors: Greene, S

• DOI: 10.5287/ora-7qa5aaoey
• Type of award: BPhil
• Level of award: Bachelors
• Awarding institution: University of Oxford
• Language: English
• Keywords: statutory interpretation; philosophy; legal interpretation; legal philosophy; law; jurisprudence
• Subjects: Philosophy; Law